

A REVENUE MANUAL

OF THE

BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA

Being an Abstract of the evidence received by the
E. I. F. Committee on the various items of
British Indian Revenue, supplemented
by the information contained in the
latest Administration Reports.

BY

M. G. RANADE, ESQ., M. A.

PRINTED AT THE "DNYAN PRAKASH" PRESS

Benares

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PREFACE.



MORE than three-fourths of the matter contained in this Manual appeared in the columns of the *Indu Prakash* Newspaper while the East India Finance Committee was still actively engaged in its investigation. The articles were very favourably received at the time by the Indian public, and secured a flattering notice in the columns of the *London Saturday Review* in one of its articles on the Native Press. Now that the East India Finance Committee has been extinguished before its labours had borne any fruit, a desire has been anxiously expressed on all sides that there should be some accurate and exhaustive resumé of the important mass of evidence relating to India which was elicited from the official and non-official witnesses examined by the Committee. Mr. Eastwick, Chairman of the East India Association, and a Member of the East India Finance Committee, in the address he recently delivered in Bombay, expressed a regret that an effort made by him in the direction of publishing an abstract of the evidence had to be abandoned for want of support. The Compiler of this Manual does not hope to succeed when his betters have failed, but, in the absence of a standard authoritative epitome of the evidence recorded in the voluminous blue-books, the Compiler has been encouraged by the good opinion of his friends to re-publish the articles, and

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he trusts that, supplemented as the abstract of the evidence has been by trustworthy information collected from the latest Administration Reports of the different provinces of India, the Manual will be found a convenient book of reference by all official and non-official persons, whose business or tastes incline them to study the present condition and the future prospects of the Finances of the Indian Empire. The Compiler claims no other merit for himself than that of being accurate and painstaking in his analysis of the evidence. The proof-sheets were submitted to the inspection of Mr. Pedder C. S., while he was Acting Secretary of the Bombay Government. He was pleased to return the proofs with the following reply:—

“ I have read with much interest your analysis of the evidence before the House of Commons Finance Committee, and consider it well done and very valuable. * * * From what I recollect of the latter, I think the analysis is very accurate.”

If the readers of this Manual and those who have occasion to consult its pages confirm the truth of the flattering testimony given by Mr. Pedder, the Compiler will feel himself rewarded for all his troubles and the expense involved in this publication.

Poona, *1st March 1877.*

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INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

Among the advantages which India enjoyed under the old East India Company's rule, by far the most enduring was the attitude which the English Parliament and the English public generally felt themselves constrained to adopt in relation to the affairs of India. The intervention of the Company as the constitutional executive sovereign of India relegated to the great English nation the responsibility of a disinterested protector, and naturally inspired a feeling of jealous distrust and hostile criticism of the Company's rule both in and out of Parliament. This spirit showed itself in most healthful activity at each renewal of the Company's charter, when the independent scrutiny of Select Committees of both houses of Parliament was brought to bear upon every department of the administration with the happiest results. Every great administration needs this thorough cleansing at moderate intervals to keep up its energies, and secure its chances of further development. The abolition of the Company's rule, and the direct assumption of the executive power and responsibility by the British Parliament, have deprived this country of a most useful constitutional guarantee. The acts of the Secretary of State reflect for better or for worse the policy of the English ministry which may be in power, and, except on rare occasions, Parliament can never be persuaded to take up independent action for itself. There is no inducement left why the members of Parliament, even when they belong to the party out of office, should find fault with their friends in office.

in which they need the aid of the Government. There is a feeling of fellowship which is unfavourable to the growth of any organized independent action. It was therefore no slight concession to the liberal spirit of the times when Mr. Gladstone's ministry consented to appoint the East India Finance Committee to inquire into the financial administration of India. The Committee, during its first two years of existence, favoured by the protection of the Liberal ministry, worked energetically and thoroughly, disturbing and frightening the entire herd of officialdom both in India and in England. At one time, the English government presented the rare sight of a conquering race inviting its subjects to criticize its doings with the utmost freedom, and even consenting to pay the expense of transporting native witnesses to England. These fair promises of an early summer were too good to endure long, and in a short time they were blighted by the frown of cold officialism. Unfortunately Mr. Gladstone went out of office, and, with the accession of the Conservative ministry to power, this official feeling of horror and jealousy mustered sufficient courage to extinguish the Committee itself before its work was well-nigh half finished. The scope of the Committee's investigation was so narrowed by the Marquis of

y that the proceedings of the Committee have ceased to possess any interest for the people of this country. There are evident signs in the last report of the Committee that the spirit of fellow-feeling has prevailed over every other consideration, and it may be safely asserted that the only objects of usefulness have

ceased. Like Samson shorn of his hairs, the Committee may drudge for a session or two at the official mill, but the promise of a regular onset on the ranks of the Phillistines in office is now extinguished for a decade or two at least. It is not even likely that the Committee, as now constituted, will put together the results of its three year's investigation in a permanent form.

Under these circumstances, I think it will be of some service if these results are put together in a permanently available form, and in a way fit for easy reference. The Committee in its first year's inquiry confined itself to the investigation of the different heads of the revenues of British India. In its second and third year's work, it continued the inquiry as regards the items of expenditure in India and England. I propose in this first part to summarize the results of the first year's inquiry regarding the methods of collection and the existing condition and prospects of development of the different items of our revenue. No student of Indian history can aspire to understand the events that are occurring before us, or to feel interest in the progress of the great administrative machinery which has been set up in this country, without a thorough acquaintance with the various systems of levying the land tax, and the excise, opium, salt, and customs revenues, which obtain in different parts of India. The information on these points, being taken direct from the mouths of the great Indian administrators, representing all the varieties of official opinion, and under the fear of sharp cross-examination, has all the guarantees of truth and freshness of interest which are so seldom found in purely official summaries.

The official who is acquainted with his own Presidency only, and with the system which obtains in it, will find it a most improving study to make himself acquainted with the methods of action which slow and painful experience has proved to be safe and economical in other parts of this great country. The bulky volumes which contain the detailed questions and answers of the witnesses who were examined can never be attractive reading, and, without a proper guide, can never be safe reading. The present summary of their evidence faithfully reproduces all that is of permanent value in it, and it is hoped that it may prove equally useful to the official and the non-official reader.

The Committee examined in all thirty-four witnesses in 1871, the first year of their sitting. They found it necessary to proceed with the inquiry in the order of the various items on the receipt side of the revenues of this country, as shown in the accounts of the Government of India, before entering into the consideration of the more general questions affecting the finances of the empire. They were not able to conclude the investigation into the income side of the account in 1871, though they proceeded with the inquiry in the most methodical manner. The 1st item on the receipt side in the General Budget is the Land Revenue. Seven witnesses were examined on this head, Sir Bartle Frere for Bombay, Mr. Mangles for Bengal, Mr. Dalryell for Madras, Sir Robert Meade for the N. W. Provinces and the Punjab, Mr. G. A. Smith for the Central Provinces, Sir Richard Phayre for Burmah,

The 3rd item on the receipt side is the Forest Revenue, with regard to which Mr. Philimore and Dr. Cleghorn were examined by the Committee. The 4th item relates to Excise on Spirits and Drugs, with regard to which Sir Cecil Beadon was examined for Bengal, Sir T. Pycroft was examined for Madras, Mr. Bell for Bombay, and Sir D. H. MacLeod for the Punjab. Mr. Seccombe was examined with regard to the 5th item of Assessed Taxes. Upon the 6th item of Customs, Mr. Bullen was examined on the Bengal side, and Mr. Casseles was examined as the representative of Bombay. With regard to the 7th item of Salt, Sir C. Beadon was examined for Bengal, Sir T. Pycroft for Madras, Mr. Pedder for Bombay, Sir D. H. MacLeod for the Punjab, and Sir W. Money for the North-Western Provinces. With regard to the 8th item of opium, Sir C. Beadon and Sir F. Halliday were examined for Bengal, Mr. Bell and Sir Bartle Frere were examined for Bombay, and Sir D. H. MacLeod for the Punjab. Sir R. Hamilton was examined on the subject of the growth of opium in Malwa, while the evidence of Mr. Cooper, Sir K. Alcock, and Mr. Winchester, was taken upon the prospects of the continuance of the demand for our opium in China. Dr. Smith of Serampoor and Dr. Wilson of Bombay were examined partly upon the subject of the growth of opium in Bengal and in Malwa, but chiefly upon the moral tendencies of the present system of the opium and liquor laws as encouraging the progress of vice among the people of this country. Upon the 9th item of Stamps, as well as on the 11th of the Post Office, and the 13th of Law and Justice, and

~~the 12th of Police, Sir H. Anderson was examined at~~

In a portion of the Southern Konkan, the Khote or farming system prevails to a great extent, and the Government deals with the Khote farmers as middlemen, settling with them for an entire village or villages, and there is no official recognition of the actual cultivators under them for the purposes of collection and assessment.

In the Island of Salsette and Bombay, the English and Portuguese tenures of fee simple obtain to some extent.

In Guzerath, portions of the country are settled on the Deccan plan of dealing direct with each individual cultivator for his own plot of land, while in the Bhagdaree and Naravadaree villages, the village community is dealt with in a lump way, and no Government interference is allowed in the division of individual fields. In other parts of the province, the settlement is made with the Talukdars, or great landlords, who are for the most part descendants of ancient nobles and sovereign families.

In Kattiawar, the government assessment used to be collected, under the Peishwa and the Gaikwar, on the Moolukgiree plan, that is by military demonstration of force, the levy being larger or smaller according to the strength or weakness of the parties, except so far as custom and precedence sanctioned the levy. The British Government has succeeded to these rights, and the lump assessment is now collected without any actual demonstration of force.

In Sind, Mahomedan tyranny has succeeded in destroying all traces of the old Hindu system. The practice under the Ameers was to attach the whole

crops, and the cultivator had to be satisfied with what the Government gave up for his subsistence. This was coupled with a system of compulsory labour on the canals. Since the conquest, the Deccan system has been introduced, but as there were no traces of village communities, the country has been divided into fiscal charges, and the assessment is fixed with reference to former demands, while an extra water cess is levied upon the land in substitution of the old system of forced labour, out of the proceeds of which cess, labourers employed in the works undertaken by the State are paid.

Such, in brief, is the account which Sir Bartle Frere gave of the characteristic varieties of the different systems of revenue assessment which prevail in the four great divisions of this Presidency. The principal feature of the Bombay system of revenue settlement, and one in which, in Sir B. Frere's opinion, consists its peculiar success, is the principle of making the settlement with the man who by the common consent of his neighbours is the owner of the holding. In the Deccan, previous to the conquest, under the rule of the latter Peishwas, the good settlements of former times were superseded, and a system of rack-renting, and as a consequence annual remissions, had obtained to a frightful extent. The British Government succeeded to this inheritance. At first it was sought to assess the revenue by arriving at a precise idea of the gross produce, and then after deducting the expenses, a certain proportion of the net profits was fixed upon as Government revenue. This system of assessment broke down in practice, and about the year 1834 Government reverted to the old

fixed rule, as in the N. W. Provinces, to determine the proportion of assessment to the gross produce, or to the net rental of the land.

Sir Bartle Frere went on to state that, in common with his great predecessor Mr. Elphinstone, he was an admirer of the village system as it obtained in this Presidency, but not as it is found to exist in other parts of India, saddled with the load of a joint liability of the entire village community to the Government. The Deccan system deals directly with the cultivator. Though some under-tenures exist, the system is simplicity itself by the side of the multiplied involution of rights and liabilities entailed by the N. W. Provinces' settlement. The Government guarantees the component elements of the village system with its direct sanction, and pays, by way of percentage on the revenue, the income of such of the village officers as perform duties to the State, while those, whose importance is only confined to the village limits, are left to be provided for by the ordinary prudential considerations of claims for service done, backed by the protection of the Civil courts.

The thirty years' settlement gives a claim to the lessee for renewal at the end of that period at the increased rates, and while it binds Government for 30 years, and under certain conditions permanently, it has no binding obligation on the Ryot beyond one year. It is a sort of hereditary right on payment of the necessary tax to Government. In fact, it is regarded as a perpetual tenure subject to periodical re-assessments. The right of mortgage and of sale is possessed and freely

nation, there was a sharp passage-at-arms between Mr. Fawcett and Sir Bartle Frere relating to the difficulty entailed on the Government of India by reason of a considerable portion of its land revenue being permanently settled. Mr. Fawcett tried to put it in the shape of a dilemma. The charges of civilized Government in this country must, he said, increase with its growing exigencies, while on the other hand, the tendency of all recent years has been steadily towards a depreciation of the value of money, and, under these circumstances, the problem of Indian Finance is, how to provide for these great wants with 1/5th of its revenue permanently settled in Bengal and the North-West. Such revenue of permanently settled districts represents year by year a smaller purchasing power. Sir B. Frere's reply was that, firstly, it was not by any means necessary that the total charges of Government should increase, they might be reasonably expected to decrease, or at least that the increase in particular departments might be fairly met by greater reductions in others; secondly, that the other sources of revenue would yield more abundantly with the rise in prices, and cover a portion of the increased expenditure. Sir B. Frere admitted that, to a certain extent, our land revenue was inelastic even on this side of India, because the leases only gradually expired during a cycle of 30 years. Sir Bartle Frere moreover said that he saw nothing in the terms of the permanent settlement guarantee which precluded Government from levying special cesses for local roads or schools, or even a railway cess, if the lands were benefited by the railway. Sir Bartle Frere

further on gave it as his opinion that the increase in the wages of labour during the last few years was greater than the increase in the prices of the commodities which the labourer consumed, and that the latter lived better and clothed himself better of late than he ever did before. He also stated it as his belief that there were no grounds for the complaint that the rise of our export trade, by the opening of the European market, had caused much suffering to the people in consequence of the diversion of many lands, which before produced food for the people, to the growth of the staples of foreign commerce.

Upon the point, whether and how far the pressure of assessment pressed hard upon the Ryots, Sir Bartle Frere said that the power of attachment of the crops or of personal duress, to which the law allowed recourse for realizing the State demand, was rarely exercised now in settled districts, and that there was seldom any large unrecovered balance of revenue. During exceptional years of bad harvests, a considerable discretion is left to the Collector to allow remissions. For the most part, the cultivators tide over their difficulty without having recourse to the Government. The absence of the processes of duress and the absence of large balances of land revenue indicate a comparatively comfortable state of things on the part of the Ryot community.

Sir Bartle Frere unconsciously indulged in a hard hit against our arithmetical economists when he deliberately stated, that, in his opinion, the statistical elements were entirely wanting for forming an accurate judgement as to the proportion between the gross returns, and the revenue which was payable to Government. The Pre-

sidency, and that he had found such approximate comparisons open to grave errors, and oftentimes misleading. The religious books of the Hindus prescribed a certain percentage, but the native princes took as much as they could levy, and the British Government has adopted for its model what the natives regarded as the best administrations, and has taken care not to exceed their demands by giving benefit of all doubt to the cultivator.

In answer to a question from Mr. Eastwick, Sir Bartle Frere said that he saw no great chance of reducing the expenses of collecting the land revenue. No economy would result by reason of the settlement of the revenue or from increased communications; there might be a saving as the new settlements progressed, but not to any great extent. Sir B. Frere admitted that the charges of collecting the revenue, including the salaries of the survey and settlement officers and the allowances to district and village officers, were 23 per cent., but he said that the large percentage was only so in appearance, as it included many items which in the accounts of other provinces were not shown at all.

As to the effects of the rise in the export trade in cotton and other staples, Sir Bartle Frere said that the large sums received by the Ryots during those years enabled them to pay off largely their debts, to buy land and agricultural stock and metal utensils, and to hoard money under ground, or in the shape of ornaments upon the persons of their wives and children. He stated, moreover, that notwithstanding the comparative extinction of the system of making advances at exorbitant interest,

Shroffs or the banking class were as thriving as before. Sir Bartle Frere in the course of his second day's examination admitted that the instalments of Government revenue were only nominally arranged with reference to the facility of getting the produce to market, but the arrangement was imperfect, and was generally rather hardly calculated, so as to catch the cultivator without leaving him much chance of making away with his crops.

As one effect of the settlement, Sir B. Frere observed, that while rent-paying land fetched little or no value about 35 years ago, it had now acquired a marketable value, and had grown to be worth many years' purchase, and the Ryots seldom threw up their land for inability to pay the revenue. Sir B. Frere was understood to state that this sensible change for the better in the condition of the agricultural classes since 1840 was not directly connected with the setting in of the flow of the tide of silver into this country in consequence of a favourable balance of trade, for this flow of silver only set in so late as 1856. In this matter, Sir B. Frere contradicted directly the correctness of Mr. Knight's favourite opinion, for Mr Knight does not allow that even the old rates, which obtained before the first settlements, and which required large remissions every year, were in any way oppressively heavy, although they were felt to be so because of the commutation into money of the old payments in kind, and the great dearth of silver in this country.

Upon the question of the relative advantages of a permanent over a periodical settlement, Sir Bartle Frere gave

his opinion with characteristic caution. He said that though, in his view, periodical settlements were, on the whole, those which best conserved the rights of the State with regard to its income, yet, as a matter of practice, as the State landlord was entitled only to the rents as his income, it may be for his interest to dispose of a considerable portion of that land to people who would make the best of it as absolute proprietors, and as such entitled to the whole of its future increase. Strange heresy in the mouth of an Indian Statesman of the new school, but nothing very heretical in one who was trained up under the great pioneers of the Bombay Survey! For Captain Wingate and his associates always regarded a permanent settlement as the consummation of their land policy, to which the periodical settlements were only intended to serve as a preparation and midway introduction. We are quite sure Mr. Knight will never more see any thing to admire in such a heretic Governor. Upon the much disputed question of the rise of prices, Sir Bartle Frere furnished the Committee with the conclusions of the Price Commission appointed in Bombay in 1863, and stated that the increase in prices differed very much in different districts, and its pressure was unequally felt by different classes, but that it was very considerable over the whole of Western India.

At the conclusion of his evidence, Sir Bartle Frere observed that the maximum revenue levied from land under the most favourable circumstances was ten Rs. an acre. It was very much higher in Native States, but in Native States they made a deduction which descended to 4/6 or 5/6 an acre if inferior crops were

grown ; for they look to the crops, while our assessment is made with reference chiefly to the quality of the land itself.

Before finishing this summary of Sir B. Frere's evidence, we think it necessary to protest against the spirit which dictated several of the questions put to him. We are disposed to regard it as a very unfortunate circumstance, that the Parliamentary Committee of inquiry, or at least some of its more prominent members, seem to have entered upon their task with their minds fully made up upon a point which, in one sense, is the very issue on which they have to pronounce judgment as the result of their investigation. Throughout the inquiry, it is assumed as a postulate, that the expenses of Government are increasing, and must increase, every year in a greater ratio than the normal increase in revenue from the progress of the country, and that the only problem the Committee have to investigate is to determine or devise the ways and means by which this increasing expenditure may be conveniently provided for. So far is this assumption from being a self-evident truth, that many witnesses, very favourably disposed to justify the Government in its recent policy of oppressive taxation, put in their demurrer to it, and not only declined to believe that there was any logical necessity for a continued increase in expenditure, but roundly asserted that, with better communications and the firm establishment of the British power in India, the present scale of expenditure ought to be materially diminished in several large departments. The stand-point from which the Committee, in starting upon their investigation, took in one connected view the whole question of Indian

Finance, is one which has a tendency to obscure and narrow their vision and prejudice their judgment, for it is simply begging the whole question at issue to start with such an assumption as the back-ground of their views on this subject.

CHAPTER III.

THE LAND REVENUE (MADRAS)

In our last chapter, we finished our precis of Sir Bartle Frere's evidence, the only official witness who was examined in connection with the Bombay system of land revenue. We shall pursue our course of inquiry, not in the order in which the witnesses were examined before the Committee, but in the order in which the different systems of land revenue more or less resemble our own. In connection with this subject, it may be of use to present in one view a short abstract of the various systems of land revenue which obtain throughout British India.

The Bombay Presidency, the East and West Berars, and the Madras Presidency, form a group by themselves. For the most part, the settlement is Ryotwar, *i. e.*, directly with individual Ryots, and it is founded upon a survey and settlement, and is guaranteed to last for a period of generally thirty years. The N. W. Provinces, the Punjab, and, to some extent, the Central Provinces, form together a group by themselves. The settlement, it is true, is made as in the first group after a survey and for a period of 30 years, but it is made, for the most part, not with the individual Ryot for his field or fields, but with the village or a community of villages for a lump sum, on the principle of joint responsibility, the shares being arranged by the members of the community among themselves. In Oudh and in the Bengal Presidency, excepting Orissa, (in which the settlement is for thirty years), the *Zemindar* settlement obtains, *i. e.* the settlement is made, not with the cultivator direct for

each plot of land cultivated by him, nor with the village community collectively, but with middlemen called *Zemindars* or *Talookdars*. The settlement is permanent in Bengal, Behar, and in the Benares districts of the N. W. Provinces, and it is liable to revision after 30 years in Oude. We have thus three groups of Provinces, but it is not to be understood that one uniform system obtains throughout the whole of each province. We have already described the varieties of system which obtain in the Bombay Presidency,—the *Khote* or farming system of southern Konkan, the perpetual leases of Canara, the *Narvadari* and *Bhagdari* tenures of Guzerath, which are of the nature of joint village responsibility for the lump assessment, the *Talookdari* settlement of Broach and Ahmedabad, and the settlement in fee simple of Salsette and Bombay.

In the order of resemblance, the Madras Presidency ranks first, and in this chapter we shall give a summary of the evidence of Mr. Dalrymple with regard to its land revenue system. In the Madras Presidency, also, there is a mixture of systems. The northern districts are settled permanently on the Bengal plan with *Zemindars*, and there are some large *Zemindary* estates in the south also, making up in all one-fourth of the Presidency, and paying about 50 *lacks* of Rupees as Government revenue. Then there are in this Presidency Inam lands which pay about 25 *lacks* of quit-rent revenue. These alienations are numerous,—in all some five *lacks* of small estates,—which the Inam Commission has settled by raising the quit-rent upon them from ten to twenty *lacks*. The per-

permanently settled districts and the alienations cover about one-third of the Presidency, and no increase can be expected to accrue to the State from this extent of territory, which may be supposed to be permanently settled at the sum of 75 *lacks* of Government revenue. From the other two-thirds of the Presidency, the Government share of land revenue realized amounts to a total of about three and a half *crores*. The whole of this portion of the country was settled annually so late as 1860, when the regular survey and settlement operations commenced. The settlement is made direct with each cultivating tenant on the Bombay principle, with this characteristic difference that, after deducting the cost of cultivation and cost of carrying to market and other expenses, one-half the net produce, commuted into money, is levied as the land revenue, which represents the fair share of Government. The net produce of the surplus is the amount for which the field could be let or farmed, exclusive of all expenses of the cultivator included.

The Government, at the time of introducing the survey settlement, surveyed and assessed both cultivated and uncultivated land and reserved to itself the right to enclose any cultivable land that might be taken up in the progress of years. The old rates under the annual settlements were so heavy that much good land was allowed to go out of cultivation, and the Government found it necessary to lower the rates. Since the new system was introduced, the revenue, which was 3½ million pounds sterling in 1855, became 4 millions in 1860, 4½ millions in 1865, and 5½ millions in 1869-70, and would be a source of revenue that can be confidently looked

for the new settlements. The general effect of the introduction of the survey rates, which have in no case been higher than the old annual rates, is, that there is at first a small reduction in the realizations, but this deficiency is more than made up in the course of a few years from extended cultivation and a more equitable adjustment of the rates. The new settlements are made direct with the Ryots reputed to be in possession, who are, however, not always the cultivating occupants themselves. There are about $2\frac{1}{2}$ million Ryots, and a million more who are their tenants. In the earlier settlements under the new survey, the commutation price of the Government half of the net produce was calculated upon an average of 60 or 70 years, but of late the Government have directed that only the last twenty years should be taken into account in fixing the average. The rise in prices first commenced about 1850-51. Between 1840 and 1850, the average price of rice, second sort, which is the staple food of the country, was 155 *Pice* or *Garce*, or 175 *Rs.* for a British quarter. The average price from 1855 to 1865 was more than double, *i. e.* 321 *Rs.* per *Garce*, and the present price *i. e.* in 1871 is 383 *Rupees*. The rates under the old annual settlements were felt to be much oppressive, and there were loud complaints between 1840 and 1850, but the subsequent rise in prices served to alleviate the pressure, and remedied the old order of things. Previous to the new settlements, the Government share was estimated to be one-third of the gross produce. Under the new settlement, it is estimated to be 50 per cent of the net assets. As to the prospec

increase of revenue in the future, Mr. Dwyer said there appeared to be but little chance that any considerable increase would accrue by enhancing the rates. The chief increase would come from extended cultivation. In 1855, there were 10 millions of acres under cultivation. In 1860-61, the area under cultivation was 14 millions, and for the latest year (1870) the area was 17 millions. About twenty-five per cent. of the area of cultivable land represents the margin of available waste to which cultivation may still extend. Besides, all land now reserved for natural pasture belongs to Government. The landholders have, beyond a common right of pasturage, only a qualified right to cultivate. If the villagers do not take it up for pasture purposes or for cultivation at the rates which a stranger tenders for the land, the Government have the right to let it to the stranger at these rates. The increase in wages, which for the most part are paid in kind, has not been at all proportionate to the increase in prices. The money wages have doubled, and, on the whole, there has been an increase of 50 per cent. in the wages. The rise in prices has resulted chiefly from the Australian gold discoveries and the consequent depreciation of metals; to some extent also, the rise is due to the development of the export trade, the extension of railways and other roads, and the general progress of the country. It would not be politic to raise the money rates much beyond what they are now. The Government has reserved to itself the right to levy special rates in excess of the fixed land revenue. A cess on roads is levied, and a new law has been passed for levying a cess for local purposes generally. As regards the cost of collection, it is estimated that the

expenses would decrease in the course of years, as the revenue increases. It was 9 per cent. on the collections in 18

in the eastern districts, where the Mahomedan law had made much permanent impression, the constitution of the village communities has remained perfect. In the western parts of the Presidency, the people live as separate proprietors of detached farms, and not gathered in village communities. In Malabar, which closely corresponds to our own Canara and the northern Konkan in its climatic and economical aspects, there is an upper class of recognized land-owners, and a class of work-people and cultivators under them. The people live in detached homesteads like the *fermes* of proprietors in France. Sir Thomas Munro, who surveyed these districts, which were partly ceded and partly conquered from Tipoo, did not deny the Ryot's private property in land, he simply held that, under the Mahomedan dominion, this private property had been seriously impaired. Any right of private property was simply incompatible with the rapacious demands of the rulers of Mysore. The relations between the *Zemindars* of the permanently settled districts and the cultivating tenants under them have been determined by law, which has effected a compromise between the conflicting claims of the two classes. Throughout the Presidency, the Ryots, as a class, are small farmers. Of Ryots who paid more than 1000 Rs. as Government assessment, there were only 420 in 1861-62, which number was reduced to 384 in 1866-67. Of Ryots paying from Rs., 500 to 1000, there were 1627 in 1861-62, which number was reduced to 1500 in 1866-67. The number of Ryots holding

leases under 50 *Rs.* was 17,47,398, in 1860, and in 1867 they were 17,85,005. Ryots holding single leases and paying from 50 to 250 *Rs.*, numbered 1,08,939 in 1860, and 1,12,075 in 1866-67. Ryots holding single leases and paying over 250 *Rs.* numbered 7,688 in 1861, and 7,611 in 1866-67. Ryots holding joint leases of various amounts were 2,62,009 in 1860-61, and 3,60,784 in 1866-67. In all, there were 21,26,035 holders in 1861-62, and in 1866-67 the number had increased to 22,65,485.

CHAPTER IV.

LAND REVENUE.

(N. W. PROVINCES.)

In the preceding chapters, I furnished a brief outline of the systems of land revenue which obtain in the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras. I shall now proceed to the next group of provinces in which, while the settlements are made as with us after a survey and for a period of thirty years, the village community is dealt with as a whole for the Jamma of the whole village, and the settlement is not made with each individual cultivator for his separate holding. This is the prevailing system in the N. W. Provinces, the land *par excellence* of periodical settlements, and it was thence introduced into the Punjab and the Central Provinces by the officials of the N. W. Provinces, as being the best adapted to the habits and conditions of society as it was found organized there, when those provinces became British territory.

The N. W. Provinces were first formed into a separate division about the beginning of this century, soon after the great Maratha war. They were acquired partly by conquest and partly by cession from Oudh, from the great Maratha chiefs, from Nepaul, and from Bundelkhand. Subsequently, four districts of the permanently settled provinces of the Bengal Presidency, Benares, Jaunpore, Mirzapore, and Gazipore, were transferred to this division for administrative convenience. At the time when portions of these territories came into British possession by cession and by conquest, the native governments were understood to take 85 per

ent. of the net assets, and only 15 per cent. of the supposed rent that the cultivator would pay to the landlord was left to the Ryot community. The revenue was for the most part farmed. The farms were sometimes co-extensive with large districts, and were never for less than an entire village. During the early years of the British administration, the Bengal officers ignored altogether the existence of the proprietary village communities. The pro-Bengal tendencies were at first so strong that it was actually under contemplation to settle permanently the revenue with the persons in whose names the estates were entered. This was prevented by the peremptory interference of the President of the Board of Control in 1817. Though a repetition of the Cornwallis blunder was thus timely prevented, the complete ignoring of the rights of village communities produced much mischief. The person in whose name the estate was entered in the Government lists was regarded as its sole proprietor, and when the revenue was not paid in punctually by a certain date, the estates were put up to sale, and they were

The village communities had never heard of estates being put up to sale for arrears of revenue, and as many estates changed hands, and the village communities gave way to auction purchasers, the desperation of the people was great, and agrarian crimes of murder and arson were of frequent

cure. 21, a Commission was appointed under the guidance of Mr. Holt Mackenzie, and as the result of the inquiries instituted by this Commission, half the estates were restored to the old proprietary communities. These inquiries extended

over a great time, and the work progressed so very slowly, that, in 1833, a law was passed by which the old ambitious scheme of determining the rights of all proprietors and of all classes of cultivators under them was given up, and it was ordered that, for the purposes of settlement, possession alone was to be looked into, leaving all, who had any other claims of old standing, to establish them in the Civil Courts. All disputes between the members of the proprietary body about their respective shares were to be likewise settled in the Civil Courts. The work with these limitations was entrusted to Mr. Bird, who completed the settlement of the whole province before he left India in 1842. The settlement was made for a period of 20 years; the villages were all mapped out; the proprietor's rights, as also any special rights which the cultivators had, were recorded; and all statistical details were fully entered in the registers. The revenue of the N. W. Provinces, which was $2\frac{3}{4}$ crores in 1811-12, reached three crores in 1816, and $3\frac{1}{2}$ crores in 1826, and when Mr. Bird completed his settlement, it mounted up to $3\frac{1}{2}$ crores. The gradual increase was due partly to territorial additions by cession or conquest, and partly to a more equable distribution of the old rates of assessment on the different estates. During the thirty years of British rule, an immense quantity of waste land was brought under cultivation, and the resumptions of rent-free tenures also tended to swell the total. The rate of assessment was not lowered, but the power to pay it was increased owing to the extension of cultivat

Mr. Bird's settlement was made on the principle that the State was entitled to $\frac{2}{3}$ ds of the net assets, leaving 33 per cent. to the occupant or owner. The nabob's villages in the N. W. Provinces are held by proprietary communities who cultivate a certain portion of the land, and let out the rest to others who cultivate without claiming any right of property, in other words, are tenants from year to year of the proprietary community. When the settlement was made the cultivable land was left to the proprietary body to break up during the period of the settlement. They were allowed to take the whole profit to themselves and the Government contented themselves with the prospect of being able to buy up the lands at the time of the renewal of the settlement. The uncultivable land also remained in the hands of cultivators as common pasture, and the Government derived, and even now derives, a revenue from these barren grass plots.

By the settlement of 1846, it was determined that the cultivable land in the N. W. Provinces is about 51 per cent., 15 per cent. is cultivable, 9 per cent. is rent-free, and 23 per cent. is barren.

The settlement of 1846-47 was concluded in 1846-47, and the term of the settlement was to expire in 1862. At the expiration of the term of the settlement of the N. W. Provinces, the Government was going a revision of settlement, and was accepting the permanently settled districts of Benares and the neighbourhood. It was at the time of the settlement of 1846-47 that the Government

was going a revision of settlement, and was accepting the permanently settled districts of Benares and the neighbourhood. It was at the time of the settlement of 1846-47 that the Government

great consideration, it was decided that Government should limit its demands to half the net assets, plus a certain percentage for expenses. The general result of the new settlements has been a great increase in revenue.

There are now no lands in the North West Provinces of any value which are not included in the estates to which the settlement extends, except Government Forests and the Terai, which belong to a different department altogether. In the case of these latter, the Government proprietary rights have in some instances been sold, including the claim to Government revenue. There have been no sales worth mentioning in these Provinces in pursuance of the rules relating to the sale of waste lands. The rise in the value of assessment is partly due to the increased money value of produce, and partly to the increase of cultivation. Between the two agencies, the increase may be divided half and half. The actual increase in the value of assessment has been in amount about 70 *lacks*, but when it is borne in mind that the Government share is now $\frac{1}{2}$ instead of $\frac{2}{3}$ rds, the proportional increase in the value of the assessment is a million and a half.

About the time that the revised settlements were first commenced in the N.W. Provinces, Her Majesty's Government sent a Despatch in 1862 directing that all villages, where the area of the estates under cultivation amounted to 80 per cent. of the whole cultivable area, should be settled with in perpetuity, provided it was not likely that the villages would be benefited during the next 20 years by any works of canal irrigation, so as to have their assets increased by twenty per cent.

A great many districts in the North West fulfill both these conditions, i. e., cultivation has reached in them its extreme point, and there is no likelihood of any projected irrigation works extending to them during the next twenty years. Lord Lawrence was himself in favour of the plan of extending a permanent settlement to districts which fulfilled both these extreme conditions.

In the opinion of Sir Robert Montgomery, it is not desirable, looking to the rapid increase in the assessment, to fix the Government share of the net profits in perpetuity. In the next 20 years, the 15 per cent. margin of waste land which is still available for cultivation will be all taken up, and there will be, as one effect of a perpetual settlement, the needless sacrifice of a million and a half of prospective revenue. A lease of 30 years is quite sufficient to encourage cultivation. Mr. Bird's settlement effected a great indirect revolution in the N.W. Provinces. It has already been stated before, that, during the first quarter of the century, the rights of the village communities had been wholly ignored, and estates had been sold for arrears of revenue, and bought in by auction purchasers. By way of recoil from this Bengal extreme, Mr. Bird and Mr. Thomason went in all for the village proprietary bodies, and made a regular onset on the numerous *Talookdars* who owned extensive estates, many of whom were, moreover, representatives of ancient families, and chiefs of large and powerful clans. The settlement officers entertained a strong feeling of political jealousy towards large and powerful landholders, and (though Sir R. Montgomery tried hard to

hide this ugly fact), had come to regard as an article of their creed that a *Talookdar* was a robber and an usurper. The large *Talookdars* were accordingly all turned out of their estates, and forced to become pensioners, receiving 18 *annas* out of every 33 *Rupees* set aside by the Government as representing the share of the rental which was allowed to the village proprietary bodies, and this percentage allowance was to be reduced at the time of the next revision. The disruption of old associations and the general levelling of rights was so violently and arbitrarily carried out, that the population itself, in whose ostensible interest this crusade was undertaken, felt the injury and the insult as keenly as the *Talookdars* themselves, and when the mutiny broke out, they joined the *Talookdars*, and swore allegiance to them. The fugitive British officers had to seek protection in these terrible times with the natural leaders of the people, whom the Government had so grievously injured.

In regard to the large class of cultivators who hold from year to year under the village proprietary bodies, a distinction has of late been recognized by which all who could establish a 12 years' title by occupancy were guaranteed occupancy rights, and were separated from others who were simply tenants-at-will. The old distinction between residents of the village and foreigners was wholly ignored in this arrangement.

As to the *Ryots* on such of the estates as are still held by *Talookdars*, there are two classes. One class belongs to the old proprietary body, has occupancy rights, and hold at certain rates. More cannot be said of them at this period of the year.

tlement. The other class of tenants from year to year has no such protection. The thirty years' term gives satisfaction to the people. A shorter term would be a bar to improvements, which are generally encouraged by the thirty year's period. About four acres is the limit of the small tenancies in the N. W. Provinces.

In the N. W. Provinces, 50 per cent. of the net assets is taken by Government directly as land revenue. This does not, however, represent the whole of the demand. A cess of one-half per cent. is levied for the school fund, another half per cent. for the road fund, one-eighth per cent. for the postal department, and $3\frac{7}{8}$ for municipal purposes, town improvements, and police expenses. Altogether the cesses absorb five per cent. The road and education cesses are levied from rent-free lands, and no objection is made, or at least has been allowed, to their levy in the North West Provinces, Punjab, and Oudh. In Sir Robert Montgomery's opinion, the permanent settlement is a blunder, because it entails a needless loss of revenue as prices rise, and drives Government to impose obnoxious taxes on the people. The fact is, that the permanent settlement is recommended more for political than for economic reasons; but the political benefits to the proprietors, who are a small body only, are greatly outweighed by the ill effects upon the large mass of the people who will have to be taxed to make up the deficiency. It has also not been established by actual experience, that the permanent settlement ensures a stronger interest in the stability of the British Government. There is not much truth in the alle-

gation that limited settlements induce the *Ryots* to neglect their lands as the end of the term approaches. Thirty years' leases afford sufficient encouragement for agricultural improvements. Sir Robert Montgomery condemned also the policy of selling land free from all claim for revenue. The redemption money of land so sold is spent as it comes, it is not charged to the capital or debt account, and this forestalling of Government rights is likely to lead to great embarrassment in future. In fact, the sale of estates free from all liability for land revenue is not now allowed, and land is sold only for houses, gardens, and tea plantations.

The thirty year's settlement has improved the condition of the people sensibly, their houses are better, they are better clothed, their food is more abundant, and in every way they are more comfortable. Out of 30 millions of the population, fully 18 millions are agriculturists. The state of agriculture is somewhat improved, people are more alive to the use of manure, and more attention is paid to the choice of better seeds. The non-agricultural classes are about 12 millions. The cloth-manufacturing trade, however for which the N. W. Provinces were much noted, has been almost ruined by English competition of cheap but less durable cotton goods. Sugar, grain, and cotton are still exported in large quantities into the other provinces down the Ganges and Jamna.

In Sir Robert Montgomery's opinion, if an honest effort were made to consult the wishes of the people on all important matters, and the measures of Government were taken in communica-

tion and in concert with them, they might suggest very acceptable modes of additional taxation, and they would also readily consent to the levy of special cesses for undertakings of immediate and local advantage, such as tramways or short railways. In India, however, the witness went on to say, the Government sets aside the people altogether. It devises measures, and decides upon what it thinks is a good thing to be done, and then it is carried out with a high hand, without caring to ask the people much about it.

The increase in land revenue in any future settlements will be due more to the extension of cultivation than to an enhanced yield of the soil; but as prices rise, Government will, no doubt, share in the advantage of increased value. With respect to land improvements generally, the English methods of farming fail, because the expenditure required does not pay. The native farmer with his simple instruments makes ground pay where certainly an English farmer would fail. The Indian cultivators are admirably skilled agriculturists. They are fully alive to the advantage of a rotation of crops and letting the land lie fallow. With respect to the choice of better seeds, it has been found out that foreign seeds do not thrive. It is more profitable to make choice of the best indigenous seeds, for it is found that this careful selection of seeds improves the produce very much. The proprietors of villages are not by any means a stagnant and unimproving race, doing nothing for the better improvement of the land. They are an eminently improving class of people, and ready to profit by any method which is shown to improve

the land. They are mostly poor in the command of capital, and if they could get that, they would use better manure, and sink wells for irrigation. All improvements that actually take place are effected by the proprietors, and not by the cultivating tenants who occupy under them.

With respect to the Despatch of 1862 regarding the extension of the permanent settlement, Sir Robert Montgomery stated that there was a great difference of opinion at the time, but the majority were in favour of the orders that were issued. This determination was not arrived at by the Home Government till after all adverse opinions in England and India had been heard and deliberately considered. The order is still obligatory upon the Indian Government, and it has never been called in question, nor is there any idea of reversing it. The order is not quite a dead letter in the N. W. Provinces. In the other Provinces, as in the Punjab, it certainly is a dead letter, and in newly acquired territories also, such as the Central Provinces, where its extension would be certainly most disastrous. Even in the N. W. Provinces, no districts have been yet permanently settled in pursuance of the Despatch. The order directing the sale of waste lands originated in the intention of redeeming the national debt of India with the proceeds of these sales. The redemption of the land tax would involve Government in serious embarrassments in the future, and would be fraught with great political danger, as the land tax is the only tax the people are used to pay, and pay as a matter of course, all other

taxes being novel and distasteful to them. Moreover, as the national debt of India is held for the most part by Europeans, if the debt were to any considerable degree redeemed, the burden of the capital of the debt would be transferred from Europeans to the people of India, leaving India to the chance and the mercies of future governments. The redemption of the land tax is thus not recommended by either political or economical reasons, and, as a matter of fact, it has not been carried out in any part of the N. W. Provinces, though the settlement officers have now finished their investigation in the case of some districts, and have made their final reports. No new orders in furtherance of the Despatch have been issued by the Secretary of State. The permanent settlement Despatch was an error, though well meant, and it should not be carried out except in those districts where the promise has been given.

In the opinion of the witness, the land revenue system of the N. W. Provinces is fair to the possessors of land, and fair also to the large non-agricultural population which does not possess land.

In regard to the recommendation of the witness, that the people should be more frequently consulted in matters of local taxation, he was asked whether it would be advisable to have a representative assembly. Sir Robert Montgomery replied that each local governor should have a consultative council of native gentlemen, without any power to legislate, and the members of this council should be selected by him from time to time. He should submit for their opinion new projects of law or taxation, and in arriv-

ing at his own decision, he should consult the opinion of this consultative council as well as the opinions of the officers of Government. The consultative body should be nominated solely by the Executive Government, as the people of India were not yet ripe for the election of representatives. The local Government would select the best men for their council. Sir Robert Montgomery stated in conclusion that the levy of the Income tax is not regarded by the landholders as a breach of faith with them.

CHAPTER V.

LAND REVENUE.

(PUNJAB.)

Sir Robert Montgomery, a summary of whose evidence regarding the revenue settlement of the N. W. Provinces was presented at some length in the last chapter, was also examined as an official witness with regard to the Punjab settlement, with which province he was more intimately associated, first as Judicial Commissioner in 1852, and subsequently as Lieutenant Governor. Upon the first conquest of the Punjab, the British Government contented itself with the cession of Jallundar Doab, and governed the country in the name of the minor son of Maharaja Ranjitsig through a Council of Regency, of which Sir Henry Lawrence was appointed the President. This method of Government continued for two years (1846-48), when the second Seik war broke out, and on its successful termination, the Punjab was annexed, and a Board of Administration, consisting of the Lawrence brothers and Sir Robert Montgomery, was appointed in place of the old Council of Regency. This Board was broken up in 1852, and Sir John Lawrence was appointed sole Lieutenant-Governor, with Sir Robert Montgomery as Judicial Commissioner.

The Council of Regency did not content themselves with simply carrying out the old revenue system of produce assessments. The produce payments were turned into money payments, leading to a considerable decrease of revenue, but saving a world of trouble and inconvenience to the officials and the

der the old system to go all over the country every year to inspect the crops. The Seik Government were supposed to take one-third of the produce, and this estimate of one-third share of the produce was fixed with due consideration of the assessments of former

After the conquest in 1849 and the subsequent annexation, it was found that the conversion into money rate of the one-third scale of produce payments made the assessment very excessive in its measure upon the cultivators; moreover, as a great extent of land was broken up for cultivation by the disbanded Seik soldiery who settled in their villages, and the seasons between 1848-50 proved very propitious, prices fell, and it was found impossible to collect the money assessments, and as a consequence annual reductions became necessary.

The Government accordingly commenced the work of regular settlement in 1850, and this work was finished for the whole of the six districts in eight or nine years. The settlement was partly statistical, partly fiscal, and partly judicial in its character. First of all, a tract of country comprising about 300 villages was prepared for the settlement officer, who had to visit every village, and make himself acquainted by actual observation with the agricultural condition of the villages, study the past assessments, ascertain the condition and character of the cultivators, the facility of irrigation, the quantity of waste land, the vicinity to markets, and the comparative value of the lands. He formed upon these data his estimate, which should be a fair assessment of the actual value of the land, and was confirmed by the Government. The first object of the settlement should have been to

sent a fixed proportion of the probable net profits of cultivation. The Government took two-thirds of the estimated net profits after deducting all expenses, *i. e.* two-thirds of the money rent for which the field assessed could be let to a person occupying it as a tenant. Along with this work of settlement, or rather preliminary to it, the boundaries of the villages were defined, the area of each village was surveyed, the lands were classified, and a map of the village was prepared by a sort of scientific survey. To supplement this work, the fields within the area were measured, the name of the owner, the quality of the soil, the nature of the crops and the cost of their cultivation, the number of the holdings, the number of the ploughs and cattle and wells &c., all these points were ascertained in great detail. Besides this fiscal and statistical work, the settlement officer had judicial functions in adjusting all disputes about shares in coparcenery villages, and in determining questions of title. Upon the conclusion of this inquiry, every shareholder was furnished with a paper stating the amount of his share, and the proportionate Government revenue he had to pay.

At the time of this first settlement, no assessment whatever was placed upon unoccupied or untilled land. It was directed that the assessment should be levied at the next revision if in the mean while the land was brought under cultivation. Even when, though capable of cultivation, the lands of the village were not from accidental circumstances in actual cultivation, no assessment was put upon

to the village to be broken up during the term free from assessment, the settlement officer, at his discretion, put a higher rate upon the tilled land, and if the untilled land were subsequently brought under cultivation, the profits went entirely to the proprietors for the 12 years of the settlement. The persons with whom the settlements were made were for the most part coparcenary communities in numbers ranging between 50 and 500. About $\frac{3}{4}$ ths of the villages in Punjab are held under this tenure, and it is only in one-fourth of the province that the village lands are held by single proprietors. In these coparcenary villages, each share-holder cultivates a certain portion himself, and the lands cultivated by tenants are thrown into the common stock. In some cases, it is true, the proprietary body itself cultivates the whole land, and there are no tenants; in others, the cultivators belong to each share-holder separately; but, for the most part, the cultivators are the tenants of the whole coparcenary, and the money goes to the common fund. If the rent received by the proprietary body from the lands cultivated by their tenants suffices to pay the revenue, it goes to the Government; if there is a deficiency, the community make it up by distributing the burden between the share-holders. The settlement officers in respect of these villages recognize only the coparceners. The rights of the tenants under them are settled between themselves, the settlement officer simply confines himself to the work of ascertaining and recording these rights in the register. If there be a default made by a share-holder, the Government has the

power of selling his share; but this power of sale is never resorted to, as the other share-holders pay the amount, and the share of the defaulter is made over into their possession for a certain time, till they are repaid. A shareholder can also sell or mortgage his share, but the other shareholders have a right of pre-emption, and no outsider is allowed to come in. There are altogether 3,78,997 registered hereditary tenant cultivators, whose rent cannot be changed during the period of the settlement, and about 12,32,469, *i. e.*, a million and a quarter, tenants-at-will.

The province of Punjab is divided into three great natural divisions. The portion at the base of the hills, and the part of the country along the banks of the five rivers between 5 and 50 miles on either side, are exceedingly fertile, and produce two crops. The Doabs between the rivers, except where the water of the inundation reaches, are arid and barren, covered with grass and shrubs, and tenanted by wild tribes. The sub-soil in these Doabs is not made of rocky strata, it is good soil, but the distance of water precludes cultivation. The Doab between the Indus and the Jelum is valuable for its great salt range of hills. From the wild tribes of these Doab highlands, a grazing tax is the only revenue received by Government.

The whole area of the Punjab is about 200,000 square miles, of which one-half belongs to the British Government, and the other half to the dependent chiefs. About a third of the British Punjab, *i. e.*, about 35,000 square miles, is cultivated, and there is 100,000 square miles, which is not

tivable. The rest is barren and uncultivable, unless great irrigation works can be constructed so as to bring water near to the arid soil. Excluding the Doab plains, there is still a wide margin for extended cultivation.

The first settlement was for 12 years, and the leases under this first settlement fell in about 1864. Between 1864 and 1870, the country has been re-surveyed, and the work has been nearly completed by this time (1871). The present settlement has been made for 30 years, and instead of taking two-thirds of the assumed net profits, the Government now takes one-half of the net profits, after making allowance for village expenses and the dues of village officers and servants. The rent of the lands held by these latter class of persons is deducted from the payments due to them, and of the balance, half is taken. The net assessable value of a village is estimated at half the rent, which, if the village were let to an annual occupant, such a lessee would pay to the village shareholders. The remaining half of the net return represents the proprietary interest of the sharers in the village. In addition to the half share of the net assets, the proprietors have been called upon to pay one per cent. for education and one per cent for roads. These cesses are, by the present arrangement, as much a fixed part of the settlement as the regular land revenue, and cannot be changed. There is one joint engagement for both the land revenue and the cesses, *i. e.* for the gross amount of both, and the details are stated below. If special assessments were imposed in addition to the present

cesses, the *Ryots* would consider it a grievance, although there is no guarantee given against enhancement during the term.

With regard to the two per cent. cess for education and roads, the proprietors have a right to require that the money shall be locally spent. No proclamation has been issued generally reserving the right of Government to impose additional revenue to meet any emergency of the State. The Government is bound in good faith not to increase the assessment during thirty years. The untilled land belonging to a village is left to the body of proprietors to do exactly what they like with it. They are permitted to break it up for cultivation and enjoy the profits for the thirty years' term, even though Government may have incurred great expenditure in railways or canals, which have directly and immediately benefited the land, and encouraged the extended cultivation. With respect to the Doab grass lands, the Government have taken the precaution of reserving large areas as Government property, after setting apart a considerable portion of the pasture land for the use of the nomad tribes who inhabit these grass-plains. This liberal policy in dealing with the waste lands of the village has been followed in the North West Province, and, under its influence, cultivation has spread very rapidly. In rare cases, where the untilled cultivable area was enormous in proportion to the cultivated land, the Government have fenced round a large portion of it to be disposed of by separate auction, after leaving a sufficient margin of the waste area for the use of the village.

proprietors by way of encouraging them to sink wells, and where waste land was taken up by private persons who undertook to sink wells and bring it under cultivation, a guarantee was given that no revenue would be demanded for twenty years from the land so cultivated. The right of sinking a well is one of the tests of proprietorship; no mere cultivator is allowed to do it in the case of village lands, and the Government will not go into a proprietor's estate and tell the cultivator to sink a well in what is the proprietor's property. In the case of waste lands, no such distinction is made, and whoever applies for these waste lands, and proposes to sink wells, gets them under the guarantee of 21 years. As a rule, in a large village, the inhabitants take up at first the very best land, and land most advantageously circumstanced for cultivation, and it is seldom that land once cultivated falls out of cultivation. The land described as untilled though cultivable, is generally of inferior quality, remotely situated from inhabited villages, and, for the most part, very sparsely peopled.

The Punjab settlement was made upon the model of the one which obtained in the North West Provinces, and circulars embodying the spirit of their regulations were framed for the guidance of the settlement officers. During the interval of ten years between the two Punjab settlements, there was an increase of ten lacks of revenue, notwithstanding the fact that the Government share was reduced to 50 per cent. of the net profits. At the time of the resettlement, it was found out in the Punjab as in the N.W. Provinces, that the Government

this reduction. The present settlement having been made for 30 years, and untilled land being left for the most part unassessed to the village proprietors, there is little likelihood of an increase in revenue for the period of the settlement from the settled estates, except by the sale of the waste uplands, or by the resumption of *Jahgirs* or rent-free tenures. With regard to these latter, the work of resumption has been nearly completed; the service grants have all been done away with, life allowances being settled upon the grantees which cease as they die out. The assignments and allowances under treaties and engagements amount in all to ten *lacks*, and will all eventually fall in as the assignees gradually die out. At the same time, there is no likelihood of any large reductions in the cost of collection, which is at present 10 per cent. The revenue is paid in with the greatest facility; there is hardly an instance of distress; no sales ever take place for arrears of revenue; and the instalments are always paid punctually to the day. These are all indications of an easy assessment. When there is a general drought, although Government is under no obligation to allow remissions, the ruin is so complete that remissions have to be allowed on a considerable scale; and when the country is swept by famine, large advances for the purchase of the cattle and seeds have to be made which are returned in seven or eight years. With the exception of these famine years, it is not usual to grant annual remissions. The proprietors in Punjab are generally more free from debt than in other :

for advances for seed, the individual proprietors are as a class not wealthy, they are generally shareholders owning perhaps from five to fifty acres, and they suffer in common with their tenant cultivators during years of famine. Remissions are written off once for all, and are not allowed to clog the ryot's prospects in good years. The advances made by the Government are returned within six or seven years, and no charge is made for interest.

The revenues of the Punjab proper, the territory of the Seiks, is about 92 *lacks*, rather small in proportion to the extent of territory. The total land revenue of the territory under the control of the Lieutenant Governor of Punjab in 1869-70 was nearly two *crores*, the total receipts from all sources were 3 *crores* and 80 *lacks*. There are no great proprietors of land in the Punjab. The great *Jahgir-dars* are not proprietors, they were under the Seik rulers simply collectors and assignees of Government revenue. The Punjab, like the N. W. Provinces, is thus for the most part a country of peasant proprietors, or rather proprietary village communities, holding sometimes from five to ten villages in joint property. The cultivating tenants have, in some favourable instances, one or two per cent. of the whole body, attained the status of proprietors in fact, though not in name, for the amount they pay to the proprietors does not exceed more than the Government revenue. The system of granting leases for years, with a graduated progressive increase from year to year

rience that it afforded no inducement to the cultivators to bring it under tillage. The land revenue, on the whole, does not increase at such a rapid rate as the excise on spirits, which has increased much more considerably, and the stamps, which have increased enormously. The assessed taxes, and customs, and salt, have also increased in a great measure. All these sources of revenue will yield more and more every year, while the land revenue must, for the most part, remain fixed during the thirty years' term. The slight increase of 10 per cent. during the last ten years will not be kept up during the next ten years, except so far as rent-free *Jahgir* tenures lapse to the State, and are settled with the village proprietors, or new irrigation works are extended to the Doab highlands. The increase in general prices has been about 30 per cent. during the last ten years. Flour was sold in 1850 at 25 or 24 *Sheers* for a Rupee, the price at present (1870) is not more than 16 or 17 *Sheers* for a Rupee. In respect of some articles, prices have more than doubled. There has been a corresponding increase in wages. The wages of the agricultural labourer have nearly doubled. The expenses of Government have increased with the increase in prices, and much in the same proportion. The land revenue differs from other taxes, inasmuch as it is the only tax which is not taken from the pockets of the people. The uncultivated land is very rapidly being broken up for cultivation. On the whole, all that has been done has been highly beneficial to the prosperity of the country. The quantity of agricultural produce grown

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the population, and grain, wool, hides, horns, cotton, and sugar are largely exported. The cotton is for the most part inferior, and is used by the population themselves, or sent to the trans-Indus countries. The Punjab is an extremely thriving district, and the people extremely prosperous; and a good deal of this state of things is due to the land settlement which has been judiciously liberal. The limitation of thirty years is a most judicious one, and it would be a mistake to introduce a permanent settlement, for the value of money will fall in the course of years, and with it the expenses of Government must increase, and the Government can solely look to the land alone to reimburse themselves for their increased expenditure. The people are quite satisfied with a thirty year's lease, for they never had more than one year's term under the old Government.

The Government are constructing a great canal in the Baree Doab, which will go past Amritsar and Lahore, and be continued to Multan, thus irrigating an enormous breadth of the country. It has taken a long time to construct this canal, because the Government could not afford to give the money except in dribbles. The work would have been finished long ago if the Government had borrowed the money on loan, or if a private company had undertaken it. The cost of this and other irrigation works is paid for by a special water rate which is levied from those *Ryots* who choose to make use of the water, which for the most part they are very anxious to obtain. The net returns of the Baree Doab canal are not as yet sufficient to pay the interest

when the work is completed, the canal will pay, though barely pay. In countries watered by irrigation canals, there is at times great distress, but no danger of a famine as in other parts of the country.

In the trans-Indus countries, the assessment, which was at first fixed for 12 years, and is now being re-settled for 30 years, is very much lightened in consideration of the people and their habits; assessment is in some cases almost a pepper-corn or nominal payment. It is not likely that in future years there will be any excess of produce so as to glut the market as in 1849-50, for our increased communications will come to the relief by enabling the people to export the grain. The tea estates in the Kangra hills of the Jallandar district are assessed exactly as other land, according as they are irrigated or not, and solely with reference to the quality of the soil. The kind of crops grown in no way determines the assessment. It is expected that, before the end of the century, the whole of the cultivable land, measuring nearly one-fourth of the entire area, will be taken up as the population increases. The assessment per English acre upon cultivated land is *Rs.* 1-1-3 per acre, upon the total of cultivated and cultivable lands, about 10 *Annas* and 2 *Pies* per acre, and upon the whole area, 5 *Annas* and 4 *Pies* per acre. The proprietors charge their tenants about double the revenue rates.

CHAPTER VI.

LAND REVENUE.

(CENTRAL PROVINCES.)

I propose in this chapter to give an abstract of evidence of Mr. Morris with regard to the system of land revenue which obtains in the Central Provinces. The Central Provinces system forms the connecting link between the proprietary communities of the North West Provinces and the landholder settlement of Bengal. The settlement in the provinces is not made with each individual cultivator as in Bombay and Madras, nor with entire village communities as in the North-West and the Punjab; it is made with landlords, called malguzars, who are recognized as proprietors, and who do not occupy the position of mere holders of government land. The State has parted with its sovereign proprietary rights over the soil, and recognizes private property in land. The settlement is in spirit *Zemindari* as in Bengal and Oudh, only the estates are not large, and the settlement is subject to periodical revisions, and is not permanent. The Central Provinces consist of two integral portions, one of the Sagar and Narbada territories, which were first acquired from the Maráthas in 1818, and formed part of the N. W. Provinces till 1861, and the other the Nagpore Provinces, the territory of the Bhoslas, which were annexed in 1854, and continued to be administered under a separate Commissioner till 1861, when both the Sagar and Narbada territories and

the Nagpore Provinces were formed together under the Chief Commissionership, with all the attributes of a Divisional Government. Subsequently, Sumbalpoore, which belonged to Bengal, and the Nimar territory, were attached to the same Government.

In the Sagar and Narbada territories, after the conquest in 1818, short term farming leases extending from three to five years were continued as under the Marathas, and ultimately a permanent settlement for 20 years was introduced on the model of the North-West Provinces. The farming leases were given to the farmers of the old Maratha Government, some of whom were proprietors, others had bought and settled the villages, while a large number received the farm because they were best able to pay the revenue. These farmers were recognized by the British Government as the lessees of the land.

When such a settlement was made, the actual cultivators were not to be the tenants of the farm, but the farmer had to be the tenant of the village, and settled the land, and had farmed the village for a long time, that the cultivator was regarded as his tenants, and the Government did not directly interfere in any way between the two classes.

The twenty years' settlement had been introduced in the Provinces

Provinces

and 1850, and when in 1850 these two

was commenced, the Government for the first time introduced an almost radical change in the system. Rules were laid down defining the principles on which the new settlement was to be made, and the first rule declared that the Government no longer regarded itself as the proprietor of land, it resigned its proprietary right in favour of those who could prove the next best title to it. If the lessee could show that his ancestors had founded or reclaimed the village, and held it hereditarily, and had spent large sums in its improvement, and exercised power over the cultivators, he was regarded as the proprietor of the village, and the revenue was settled with him. Where he could not show any other indications of proprietary power and enjoyment except that he had spent great sums in its improvement, and it was proved that there were cultivators who held the village from before or along with him, and had not been much interfered with by him, and held their position against him, these latter were declared to be proprietors of their old holdings, and the rest of the village held by tenants-at-will, and the uncultivated portion, were made over to the lessee as his absolute property. When, however, he could not show either an old hereditary title, or that he had in any way improved the village, and it appeared that there were a number of cultivators who had held their own from before him and independently of him, or that the lessee had given up the village from incapacity to pay the arrears of revenue, the lessee was not regarded to have any claim, and the old cultivators were declared to be proprietors of their several holdings, and the rest of the

land held by tenants-at-will, and the cultivated land, were made over to the whole body of the old cultivators, who were thus formed into a village community. The settlement of the Sagar and Narbada territories has been completed on these principles since 1861, and there are now few estates in these provinces in which the proprietary right is held to vest in Government. The principle followed in the Central Provinces in fixing the assessment is that the Government claim extends to half the net profits. The Government share of the rent of land will increase according to the increased productiveness of the land, for the net profits will increase in a greater proportion. When a revision of the settlement takes place in these Provinces, no allowance is made as in the Bombay Presidency for improvements made by the cultivator. The assessment is based on the actual productiveness of the land at the time when the assessment is resettled.

With respect to uncultivated or waste lands belonging to the villages, each village is allowed a margin of waste which is generally within the maximum limit of 200 per cent. of the cultivated land, and all waste lands in excess of this margin are regarded as the property of Government, and are disposed of under the waste lands rules. There are about 15,000 square miles of Government waste lands in the Central Provinces, and taking the whole of these Provinces, one-sixth of their entire area is Government waste; the other five-sixths are either cultivated land, or waste land belonging to the pro-

ment of the Sagar and Narbada territories has made for a period of 30 years, and there is no possibility of increase of revenue from these settled lands, which form about five-sixths of these districts, during the currency of the leases, except the lapses of rent-free land. These latter rent-free grants are either temple or religious endowments, in which case they are for the most part settled with in perpetuity, or they are of the nature of service grants which are exempted for one or more lives only. Both these kinds of grants, being in all about one-twelfth of the revenue, were examined and inquired into by the settlement officers, and it is expected that all the limited grants will fall in during the next thirty years. Besides the lapsed grants, increased revenue may be derived in future from the Government waste lands. Portions of these lands are reserved as Government forests, and realize about 30,000£. a year, and the rest are let out for grazing purposes, and for collecting miscellaneous forest produce. The rates of the old twenty year's settlement in the Sagar and Dumoh districts were so oppressively heavy, that the whole settlement broke down entirely, and the people resigned their lands in numbers. The rates had accordingly to be lowered at the time of the new assessment. Notwithstanding this reduction, the general result of the new settlement has been an increase of twelve per cent. The territory of Nimar has been surveyed and will be settled on much the same terms as the Sagar and Narbada territories, as soon as the old settlement of twenty years has run out its term in that district.

To come now to the Nagpore districts proper.

and 1861 the old Maratha system of short leases was continued. A separate engagement was made with the farmer for each village, though the same man often farmed many such villages. After 1861, the principles on which the Sagar and Narbada territories had been settled were applied to the Nagpore districts. The Government gave up its

claim, and its proprietary right was vested in those who could prove the best title to it. This settlement was made on the principle of confining the Government demand to one-half of the profits, and has been only recently completed. With

the Government being generally about 200 per cent. of the cultivated land, have been left free of tax to the villages, and the rest, about one-sixth of the entire area of waste lands, has been reserved as Government waste. Out of these

Government reserve waste lands, about one-seventh of large forests, from which an annual revenue of 8,000 £. is realized, and from the other waste lands, Government realizes about 31,500 £. a year. No very large increase of revenue can be looked for in the next few years, which will take place six

years. The settlement of one-fourth of the Nagpore districts was made for the term of twenty years only. It was thought, that, as the Province was in a transition state, and the effects of the Railways could not be at first properly estimated, a thirty year's lease would be too long a period for the interests of Government. The revenue will be reassessed in about 1880, and of the districts about fifteen years hence.

About one-twelfth of the entire revenue-paying land is alienated, out of which all the more limited or ser-
 grants will lapse in one or two generations. In-
 creased revenue can, for the present, only come from
 the lapse of these rent-free lands, or from the extended
 cultivation of waste lands. There is not much disposition
 now to buy up these Government waste lands. When
 the rules for the sale of waste lands were
 promulgated, there was a considerable demand for
 them, and Government sold its right to the reve-
 nue as well as its proprietary right for $2\frac{1}{2}$ Rupees per acre
 in some districts, and for $1\frac{1}{2}$ Rupees per acre in other
 districts. The minimum rates. The purchasers
 bought was. These rates at the auction sale
 held by Government, bought the land as a positive free
 hold, free for ever from all liability for payment of any
 land tax. Of course they are in no way exempted from
 any other tax. The rules for the sale of waste lands,
 as well as the rules providing for the perpetual redemption
 of the land tax, were promulgated by Sir Charles
 Wood; they are however, at present in abeyance in the
 Central Provinces. A considerable portion of the land
 which was sold under these rules, some land
 large lumps, has come back again into the hands of
 Government.

The average rate of land tax in these provinces ranges from 12 Annas to one Ru-
 pee per acre. The land tax in the most pro-
 ducing districts falls

... five or six-fold of the seed. Waste lands sold under the rules promulgated by the Government of India realized good prices in the Railway districts of Doshiabad and Narsingpore. In these districts, the prices realized ranged from 8 to 15 year's purchase on the Government revenue. In the hilly districts, where such land was taken up for pasturage, the sales realized about a *Rupee* and a half to two *Rupees* and a half per acre. These latter varieties of lands were of a sort which would not under ordinary circumstances have been brought under cultivation for a long number of years. The country is so sparsely populated that people have more land than they can well cultivate. The Government realizations of forest revenue are not more than 2*d.* or 3*d.* per acre.

The Government has reserved to itself all the mineral wealth under the soil. There is an express stipulation in these waste lands rules that the proprietary right to the land does not confer a right to the minerals. Considerable coal fields have been lately discovered in the Chanda and Vardha districts, from which, however, at present little or no revenue is realized. In the Narbada valley, the Narbada Coal and Iron Company have the right of working the coal and iron mines, and have been working in that district for some years. The future of the country with reference to its mineral wealth is very promising indeed.

From the town populations, the Government realize no revenue by way of ground rent. But there is a local tax, called *Pāndhari*, which is not a land tax.

ally looked upon as a kind of non-agricultural house-tax.

In Mr. Morris's opinion, the assessment in the Central Provinces is by no means light. Bearing in mind the fact that the soil is very poor and not richly cultivated, the enhancement in some cases has been something enormous. On some estates the revenue has been doubled or trebled. The whole of the enhancement however is about twelve per cent. on the old revenue. This low average is due to the fact before noticed that the Sagar and Dumoh districts had been oppressively overassessed at the first settlement, and the rates had accordingly to be reduced in these districts. The other districts were also highly assessed, and the assessment could not be increased to any considerable extent in them. It is not reasonable to double or treble or quadruple a man's taxation all at once, because when a man has been accustomed to live in a certain style of comfort for a certain number of years, his expenses cannot be halved all at once. At least two-thirds of the land in the Central Provinces is very poor indeed, and there is only a nominal cultivation, and even from the better lands, chiefly in consequence of repeated cropping, the yield is only five or six-fold of the seed. The best land in the Central Provinces is poorly cultivated as compared with good land in other parts of India. It is not possible to impose any but a light assessment on a province so circumstanced with respect to the quality of its land. Neither the land nor

the cultivators can compare with the land or the peasantry of the North-West Provinces or of Oudh. Moreover, the population is very sparse in these Provinces as compared with the North-West Provinces, which contain at least four times as many people to the square mile as the best district in Nagpore. It is not quite correct to say that, under the Maratha rule, the cultivating classes had no proprietary rights in the soil. The right did exist. It was in theory true to say that the proprietary right vested in the Government except in name, though in matter of fact, under the Maratha rule, the rights of the landholders were represented and controlled by the State.

It would not be a breach of faith or a misunderstanding between the Government and the cultivating classes, if a local tax were imposed for a local railway which directly benefited the district through which it passed. Of course, the Government must be the judge of what will directly benefit the *Ryots*, whose representations, if thoughtless, should be overruled. There may be objections to such a course, but Mr. Morris thinks that at times the policy of overriding the representations of the people is justified and that the people can be persuaded to believe in an increase in taxation.

During the term of the settlement was confined to the land revenue only, it does not exempt the cultivators from any tax which cannot be considered as land revenue, and the people cannot justly complain of such a levy. Even now, a road cess of two per cent

from rent-paying as well as rent-free and feudatory lands, and from lands the land revenue of which has been permanently redeemed, and there would be no injustice in imposing for a railway cess or an irrigation cess to provide for the interest of the loan contracted for such works of local utility. The people are not sufficiently intelligent to contract any binding agreement with Government, and undertake to find the means for the money by any private arrangement. This is the chief reason which justifies occasional pressure. The land revenue is fixed at half the net profits calculated upon the actual produce of the land, or what the land is deemed to be capable of producing at the time when the settlement is made. The increase of produce arising from better cultivation would not represent in the Central Provinces more than the fair return to the capital necessary to produce that better cultivation, for the soil is very poor both in its intrinsic quality and for want of water, and the population is scanty, and the progress of improvement takes a long time to realize more than the bare profits. It is but proper therefore that the benefit of any improvement effected by the *Ryot* should not be encroached upon by the Government during the currency of the lease, unless Government can provide extended irrigation works, for none but large works will prove of any use in this country, or even pay their expenses. Any prospective increase of revenue at the time of the re-settlement will have to be looked for more from the rise in prices and extended cultivation, than from any great increase in the produce of land. At the re-settlement it will be, in Mr. Moore's

nion, perfectly fair to raise the assessment with reference to the then produce arising from good cultivation and the outlay of capital, quite independently of any consideration as to whether Government in any way contributed to make the improvement, because the cultivator will have got a fair return for his outlay during the long term of the lease, quite enough to re-pay the value of his labour and of his capital.

It is of great importance to have for every large district in India a Government model farm, not so much for the cultivation of exotic products, but for the improved cultivation of indigenous ones. Model farms are, however, very expensive luxuries, and can yield no ostensible return for the outlay for many years.

Since 1861-62, when the communications were first opened up with the Bombay Presidency, prices have risen a great deal. The expenses of Government at the same time have increased considerably, but not in proportion to the rise in prices. The expenses of Government have only increased about 30 per cent., and this increase is due not so much to any increase of salaries, but to the introduction of general improvements.

The Central Provinces export wheat, rice, cotton, and millet in considerable quantities as their surplus agricultural produce, and receive in exchange piece goods, hardware, salt and sugar, and the balance is paid in silver. The southern portions of the Central Provinces are great cotton-exporting countries. The Central Provinces settlement is a

landlord or village settlement, as contra-distinguished from the occupier's or field settlement of Bombay and Madras. The landlords pay the revenue into the State Treasury. They collect the rents from the cultivators, and pay it in a lump sum. Where village communities are recognized as proprietors, the settlement is made with them, and not with the occupying cultivators as in Bombay. In the villages so settled, they have a representative head of the community who holds the position hereditarily, or is elected by the community. He pays the revenue into the Government Treasury, and gets a fee of five per cent. on the Government revenue, and pays all the village expenses out of his percentage. The gross receipts of land revenue for the Central Provinces are about sixty *lacks* of Rupees, the charges of collection amount to seven *lacks*, and the revenue survey charges are put down at $2\frac{3}{4}$ *lacks*, making a total of about ten *lacks*. The arrears of revenue are recovered after service of process by distraint of personal property. If this latter be not found sufficient to cover the default, which is however seldom the case, personal imprisonment and sale of the estate are next resorted to. The arrears are very trifling, only about one-third per cent. in these provinces,—a fact which unmistakeably indicates that the assessment is moderate. There have been of late two or three very serious famines in these Provinces, when the poorer *Ryots* were compelled to sell their proprietary rights in large numbers.

In Mr. Morris's opinion, the native popula-

them bring their land into proper cultivation ; otherwise they are apt to content themselves with bare scratching it if they can just manage to live on such conditions.

In the North West Provinces, the people have come to regard the extra-road and education cesses to be as fixed and immutable as the land revenue, but in the Central Provinces, the cesses which are taken from the proprietors of the soil are regarded to be in the nature of temporary additions to the land revenue, and not as a fixed tax final for all purposes. The Government have the option of levying other taxes if they think fit, provided a direct and immediate benefit can be shown to result in return. The *Ryots* might object, but the objection would not be valid, and ought to be overruled. In the case of a canal, Mr. Morris does not think that the compulsory levy of an additional cess, irrespectively of the consideration whether the proprietors benefited by the water or refused to take it, would be justifiable. In the case of a road, every one would have the benefit, whether he wished it or no, and the compulsion would be justifiable. In the case of a canal, nobody would get any benefit from the water unless he took it, and it would be pushing matters to an extreme to insist upon charging water rent to proprietors who refused to take the water. There is no reason to apprehend political danger from such compulsory levies, as the people of the country are a more simple and a quieter race than those of the North West Provinces and the Punjab. The hostile temper of the people in other parts of India has been

perhaps induced by the Government not having sufficiently asserted its rights at first, and having assumed that the people had certain rights and privileges which, in reality, they had not, and which, moreover, they ought not to possess.

The great want of the Central Provinces is not the absence of land, but of cultivators to cultivate the land. The North-West Provinces have an area of 83,000 square miles, but they have a population of *crores*, and a land revenue of four *crores*. The Central Provinces, with an area of 1,14,000 square miles, have a population of only 90 *lacks*, and a land revenue which is barely 60 *lacks*. The sparseness of the population, the immense extent of waste or *jungle* lands, the inferior quality of the cultivable land, and the careless cultivation, all together account for this extraordinary depression of the Central Provinces, as compared with the North-West Provinces. About ten per cent. of the land is held by feudatories who pay tribute, which is generally a moderate quit-rent, and its amount is liable to be increased when Government deem proper to revise it. The aboriginal Gond population comes close upon twenty *lacks*, who cultivate with the axe instead of the plough. They cut down the *jungle*, set fire to it, and in the ashes sow the seeds, and reap what they can. Even of the Hindoo cultivators, many are of inferior castes, and have intermarried with the aborigines, and form a mongrel race, who exhaust the soil by repeated cropping, and do nothing to improve it.

As the Central Provinces settlement is a land-

under three classes :—(1) Ryots who have occupancy rights, whose rent is fixed for the term of the settlement, and who are not liable to be ousted; (2) next come those whose rent may be increased under certain conditions, which have to be proved in the civil courts which regulate the enhancement; (3) lastly rank the mere tenants-at-will and tenants from year to year, who are subject to ouster and enhancement on receiving proper notice. There are about 1,58,075 tenants of the 1st class with fixed rates; 1,40,000 of the 2nd class with occupancy rights and variable rates, and about 4,74,656 tenants-at-will, in all making about $7\frac{3}{4}$ lacks of cultivating tenants. None but those who were proved to have been introduced by the landlords after the village was settled, and to have held from year to year, and to have exercised no rights and privileges, have been placed in the third class. As a matter of fact, the tenants-at-will do not pay higher rates than the cultivators with occupancy rights paying at fixed rates. The average rate is between thirteen and fourteen *Annas* per acre for both classes. There is such a want of tenants, and there is such superabundance of lands, that the tenants can command almost any price they ask.

CHAPTER VII.

LAND REVENUE.

(BENGAL.)

I proceed next to furnish a summary of the evidence regarding the system of revenue settlement which obtains in the third group of Provinces. The prevailing feature of the settlement in this third group of provinces is, that the State has professedly parted with its proprietary rights to the soil, and has settled for the revenue of large estates, oftentimes including many villages, with private persons who are recognized as proprietors of the land, and with whom alone the settlement is made, either permanently as in Bengal and Behar, or for a period of thirty years as in Orissa and Oudh. With regard to the permanently settled districts of Bengal and Behar, Mr. Mangles was examined as a witness before the Committee. Mr. Mangles was qualified to speak as an authority on the subject, having held successively the offices of Secretary to the Board of Revenue, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, and Secretary to the Supreme Government in the Revenue Department. He was also a member of the Board of Revenue, and after his retirement from India, he served as a member of the Court of Directors and of the Council of India. The permanent settlement of Bengal and Behar was made first in 1789 by Lord Cornwallis, and the Court of Directors confirmed it in 1793. The permanent settlement, according to Mr. Mangles, was made without necessary deliberation,

and without obtaining sufficient information as to the state of the people and the relations of the several classes who claimed to have interest in the land. In consequence of this haste, sufficient provision was not made for the protection of the *Ryots* and the under-tenants generally from the power of the person with whom the settlement was made. Many of those who were found in the actual charge of the revenue management of the districts had been only collectors and farmers of the land-tax, who undertook for a percentage commission the work of paying in gross the revenue of a whole village, or many villages included in the estate, into the Treasury. These farmers and collectors of the land-tax were in many cases recognized as proprietors of the soil, and the settlement was made with them. Mr. Mangles at the same time admitted that this description was not correct with regard to the whole class of the Zemindars with whom Lord Cornwallis's settlement was made. There were of course many *Zemindars*, proper, who were landed proprietors and holders of ancient tenures, or representatives of the old native dynasties once ruling over the land, who still owned very large tracts of the country. The settlement of the estates was made in gross for large areas, including cultivated and uncultivated land, (in some cases these areas were co-extensive with whole districts), in a most reckless way, without any careful specification of the land or villages included. In extreme cases, it was discovered that parts of the estates settled with in this hap-hazard way were not all included in the same district. The unit of the village was not defined, no separate revenue was fixed for each

village, and the settlement was made in gross for the entire number of villages, however large the tenure might be. The regulation which legalized the settlement reserved expressly a right to the Government to interfere for the protection of the under-tenants, of whom there were and are many varieties, but this reservation proved in-effective. As a consequence of the settlement, the whole benefit resulting from extended cultivation within the area of the settled district accrued to the *Zemindars*, and the Government took no further account of what was done within the settled area, and no further assessment could under any circumstances be made. In the laws of 1793, the Government in exhaustive language declared that the settlement was made in perpetuity, and that no addition whatsoever would be made to it on any pretence. There was no reservation made in favour of even the right of the Legislature to impose a new tax generally for any purpose upon land, and although many people have since endeavoured to discover by implication such a reservation, they have signally failed in their attempts to undo the binding character of the settlement.

Mr. Mangles indeed admitted that, at the time when the settlement was made, the whole country had been reduced to a very low state from the effects of a terrible famine which desolated the Lower Provinces in 1770, and which destroyed about ten millions of people. It is estimated that about one-third of the population in Bengal perished at the time, and as a consequence, large tracts of land went out of

and the revenue could only be collected upon the small area of land actually under cultivation. The country had not only been desolated by famine, but it had also been rack-rented by a succession of short leases till the people were very much impoverished. At the time when the settlement was fixed, the calculation of the assessment was made to rest upon the principle that the Government was entitled to ten-elevenths of the assumed rental of the entire estate settled with, taking the average for the ten years preceeding the settlement. If the Government had therefore got at the correct rental, the assessment would have been ruinously severe. The fact was that the rental was not correctly ascertained. The haste with which the settlement was made led to this result, that the assessment, fixed on the principle of taking ten-elevenths of the rental of land, was felt to be ridiculously light in those estates where there was much waste land, and where the land was pretty fully cultivated, the assessment was felt to be very heavy. Upon the whole, the assessment was practically very light. Between 1793 and 1815, one-half of the landed property of Bengal was sold for arrears of revenue. There were several reasons to account for this extensive transmutation of estates. The persons who were first settled with were bad men of business, they did not understand their own affairs, and did not pay their revenue punctually on the day fixed. Another reason was, that the *Zemindars* possessed at first no powers to compel their cultivators to pay rent promptly. This defect in the

prevent the change of one-half of the entire landed property in Bengal. Most of the principal landowners in Bengal now are the descendants of the men who have bought the estates at these auction-sales. Although many of the old gentry of the country, and the representatives of ancient families, were sold out, yet even now a considerable number of the old landed proprietors still exist in Bengal, and more especially in Behar. When the estates are sold by auction in Bengal for arrears of revenue, the Government does not become the owner of the estate; it only pays itself the revenue out of the price, and hands over the balance to the proprietor. The estate is resettled with under the terms of the permanent settlement, and the purchaser buys the estate subject to the liability for the assessment fixed at the term of the first settlement. Of late the revenue has been punctually paid, and the prices which estates fetch at auction sales have been very good, so much so, that the proprietors, who want to dispose of their estates on the best terms possible, purposely fall in arrears. A public sale by auction for arrears of revenue obliterates all leases granted by the *Zemindars*, and the estate reverts back to its position under the original settlement, *i.e.* the purchaser comes in with the same rights as the man who was settled with by Lord Cornwallis. From the sweeping effects of this incident of the Bengal tenure, the legislature has protected certain classes of tenants called *Patneedars*, whose tenancies hold good notwithstanding the sale by the Government. Latterly, under a more general law, every tenant who has held under the same terms for twelve years has

with an occupancy right. So that, at present, the customary holding of the *Ryot* is of the nature of a fixed occupancy subject to the superior holder's rights. There have been during the last sixty years diverse and often in-consistent alterations in the state of the law with regard to the relative rights of landlords and tenants between themselves, at one time weakening the *Zemindars* to a degree by refusing them any assistance in levying their dues from their tenants, at another time clothing them with powers which enabled them to oppress the *Ryots* grievously; as the final result of this alternating legislation, the *Ryot* in Bengal, is, at present, in the condition of a fair tenant in England, and the *Zemindars* as a body do not oppress or rack-rent their *Ryots*.

It is not possible to give any fixed estimate of the proportion between the present rental of the *Zemindar* and the sum which he pays to the State. In the case of the minor's estates, it has been found that the revenue of the *Zemindar* is exactly double the revenue of the State. This divergence is, however, constantly increasing. As a matter of fact, there has been an enormous increase of the area of the cultivation in the land permanently settled, and with it of land revenue, the latter chiefly due to the resumption of rent-free estates. The expenses of collecting the revenue are comparatively very small in Bengal. The stringent laws regulating the time and mode of payment, and the penalty of sale attending all delay, make it the interest of the *Zemindars* to pay up the revenue promptly.

In the case of a drought or famine, which is very rare in these provinces as the country is well watered

and moist, there is no organized system of compelling the *Zemindars* to assist their tenants. A great many *Zemindars* are very bountiful on such occasions. The whole work of relief is, however, a matter of persuasion, and when the Government finds it necessary to make large payments for the support of the famine-oppressed districts, it has no claim to recoup itself. The *Zemindars* had at first police duties to perform, but they have been since exempted from their performance, and now, besides providing for village constables, they are not in any way responsible for the peace of the village. The *Zemindars* can divide their holdings, and the Collector apportions the entire burden upon the several parts of the estate so divided, and each fractional owner then becomes responsible to the State for his portion.

When the permanent settlement was made, it was distinctly provided that the settlement was made to the entire exclusion of rent-free holdings, with regard to which the Government claimed the absolute right of inquiring into their title, and assessing them at their proper value. A distinction was made between royal grants and grants by private individuals, and all rent-free lands, the holders of which could not show a title by long prescription as fixed by law, were subjected to a strict inquiry with a view of settling with them as revenue-paying land. The revision commenced in earnest in 1819, and the inquiry proceeded vigorously down to 1828. These rent-free lands are much more numerous in Behar than in Bengal. In the Behar Province alone, as the result of these resumption inquiries, the

year. The field of inquiry having been exhausted, the inquiry has ceased long since. The revenue of Bengal and Behar in 1799 was two *crores* and sixty-five *lacks* of *Rupees*. It was $3\frac{1}{2}$ *crores* in 1853 partly in consequence of the accession of new territories, and in 1869-70, it reached four *crores*. The loss of revenue entailed upon Government by the permanent settlement may be put down at a sum equal to the present revenue, which fairly represents the margin of surplus profits to the *Zemindar*. In Mr. Mangle's opinion, all the advantages in regard to security of tenure and confidence in Government, ascribed to Lord Cornwallis's grant, would have been as well secured under a thirty year's settlement, and every acre of land brought under cultivation under the permanent settlement would have been equally reclaimed under the protection of a thirty years' lease. The permanent settlement was unfair to the Government and unfair to the people at large; for, the land revenue in India is a sort of common stock, and the Government share of the rental no more belongs to the agricultural class, whether *Zemindar* or *Ryot*, than it belongs to the merchant or artizan; it is a common stock for the common benefit, and the Government has no right to give away this property which belongs to the whole community to any particular class among them. By so doing, it has robbed all the rest of the community, for this settlement has made it necessary to impose additional taxation upon property and articles of necessary consumption, which would not have been necessary if the Government had not parted with this

over unfair to the other Provinces, as they have been generally over-assessed in comparison with Bengal. The North-West Provinces for instance, were greatly over-assessed at the time of the first settlement. Formerly, the men who made the highest assessments were thought to be the best officers. At present, the Government has grown wiser, and there is a general tendency towards moderate assessments. Mr. Mangles said that his experience and study of the Bengal settlement made him decidedly adverse to the plan of repeating the experiment in any other part of India. Lord Lawrence was in favour of a permanent settlement, and Mr. Mangles got very little support from his colleagues in Council. Since that time there has been a great change in the official opinion on the subject, and the members of the Council have very generally come round to the opinion that to extend the permanent settlement to the other Provinces of British India would be a great mistake.

The *Zemindars*, as a class, do little to stimulate cultivation ; cultivation has increased under the self-acting pressure of increased population. The light taxation has not in any way caused improvement in cultivation. The ground is as carelessly tilled as before ; as cultivation increases and more *Ryots* come in, the *Zemindars*, whether Native or European, get better rents, and feel in consequence no inducement to improve their estates.

The object of Lord Cornwallis in introducing the permanent settlement has been attained to a certain extent ; the *Zemindars* have attained rank as opulent

landed-proprietors. A few among them have laid themselves out handsomely to found schools and improve the condition of their tenantry. No *Zemindar*, however, has made a road in his estate, and only one or two have done anything in the way of irrigation. For the most part, they have been content to receive their rent and fatten upon it, and render no service in return. Lord Lawrence's strongest argument in favour of extending the permanent settlement was that it would conciliate the people, and give them an interest in the support of the British Government which had granted them this great privilege. Mr. Mangles allowed the force of this argument as the only argument of weight, and gave his testimony in support of the position that during the mutiny, as a general rule, the behaviour of the people towards the Government corresponded with the length of the time that they had been under British rule. In other respects, the settlement has been productive of no good results. The land revenue of the province of Bengal bears a much smaller proportion to the general revenue than in other provinces. There was one popular argument used in favour of extending the settlement, namely, that if you gave the people a fixed rent for their right, and only a certain revenue were demanded from their land, it would be easy to find other modes of taxation. Mr. Mangles stated that there was a fallacy in this, and that it has been falsified by the results of the revenue administration of Bengal. For you can get no more additional revenue from Bengal than in the

and are not so well-off as the *Ryots* of the North West Provinces. The race itself is weak and depressed, lacking both energy and courage as compared with the natives of the other parts of India. The condition of the people has not been bettered by reason of their being under the protection of the *Zemindars*, who, it was expected, would have a direct interest in their welfare, but who, as a fact, have done nothing to improve their condition. Though the value of the *Zemindars* has been greatly enhanced by the *Canals*, *Roads* and the *Railways*, constructed at great expense by Government, the *Zemindars* have contributed nothing thereto, and the Government has so unconditionally bound itself, by the stringent conditions of the settlement and consequent obligations and promises, not to levy any annual contribution, that it cannot impose any such levy without laying itself justly and with considerable plausibility open to the charge of a serious breach of faith. The annual deficit in the Indian revenues is in one sense a voluntary one, and is wholly owing to the large sums expended on great public works, which were not contemplated at the time the settlement was made, and yet Government cannot abstain from making improvements, because it would simply punish itself if it sat idle. The principal source of revenue derived from land is of all forms of property the one which is most fairly and equitably liable to be assessed for the purposes of taxation. Independently of the salaries of Government officers and the interest paid to fundholders, the principal source of revenue is the land and income tax upon the floating capital of the country.

Bengal. The only remedy resorted to upon default in the payment of the assessment is a sale by auction of the estate. The seizure of crops is not resorted to as in the North West Provinces. Even sales by auction are of late seldom resorted to. Government cannot undertake to settle the estates which have to be sold upon any other but the *Zemindaree* tenure; it would have to pay so much in the way of compensation that it would not be a good bargain. The law by which twelve year's tenure upon fixed terms confers a permanent right of occupancy has improved the condition of the Bengal *Ryot*. The *Ryots* made a good fight against the Indigo-planters in the assertion of their rights; and they are altogether much stronger now than they were before in their confidence in Government. The reports of the missionaries relating to the impoverished condition of the peasantry are much exaggerated. There is poverty no doubt, but their condition has much improved of late. The *Zemindars* have grown immensely wealthy; they employ their savings in trade at Calcutta, and most of the native merchants in Calcutta are also large landholders. They are a very saving people. It may be a benefit to the country to have a number of rich people of the upper classes with the ability of assisting the masses, and although they do little assistance now in this respect it may be hoped that they will be gradually brought to render this help as they become more enlightened by education. The benefit to be realized in that way will however never be commensurate with the sacrifice made by Govern-

might have carried out extensive improvements, and dispensed moreover with bad taxes altogether. The Bengalees, though more acute in intellect than any native race in India, have not the public spirit of the people of Bombay. Even in the Lower Provinces, the people of Behar are a much manlier people than those of Bengal, but not so acute and intelligent. They have more back-bone and greater firmness of character. One fertile source of the impoverished condition of the cultivators is to be traced to the excessive sub-infeudation of tenure in the Province, which has been thus turned into another Ireland. A very large number of the permanent proprietors have permanently alienated their own rights, and have sub-let to tenants and annuitants of various orders for a fixed quit rent. To sum up briefly Mr. Mangles's great complaint against the land-settlement of Bengal is, that it was fixed in a way far too unfavourable to the Government, that it was so settled permanently, and that the claims of the *Peasants* were overlooked and neglected.

The Permanent Settlement Despatch of Sir Charles Wood was dated 9th July 1862. Mr. Mangles dissented from its principles, and Lord Lawrence advocated them. Mr. Mangles stated that he also dissented partially from the view which found favour with the Secretary of State in Council in relation to the bearing of the permanent settlement upon the question of the Education and Road cess. In his opinion the settlement did effectually bar the imposition of such cesses in the way in which it was proposed to impose them upon the Bengal Zemindars.

CHAPTER VIII.

LAND REVENUE.

(OUDH.)

Sir Charles Wingfield, who served as Chief Commissioner of Oudh from 1859 down to 1866, was examined before the Committee on the subject of its system of land revenue. The system that prevailed there before the ill-fated annexation in 1857 was much of a sort which obtains under all weak native rulers. Tracts of country were leased out to farmers and contractors. There were, besides, collectors of revenue in charge of districts, who either sublet to, or collected directly from, *Talookdars* and village communities. There were also assignments of districts made for the support of the armies to whom arrears of pay were due. As a general feature, there was an intermediate authority recognized between the Government and those who actually paid the revenue, who was responsible for the collection and punctual payment of it into the Treasury. When the province was annexed, the native functionaries were displaced to make room for English officials, and as the annexation was made in the middle of the year while the winter crop was being cut, arrangements were made for the payment of the first year's revenue by the parties in possession. In the next year a settlement for three years was ordered to be made, and the country was handed over to the rule of the North-West officials, who proceeded to carry out their favourite revolutionary settlement, by which the superior proprietors were peremptorily set aside, and the settlement was made

mainly with the village community. The result of this settlement was that the Oudh *Talookdars* lost half their estates. A large majority of these *Talookdars* were of the Hindu race, and the chiefs of these families were the ruling class in the Province when the Mahomedans conquered Delhi, and had ever since exercised plenary jurisdiction over their own tribes and estates, never owning the control of the collection of the native government, but always paying tribute directly into the treasury. There were also a few Mahomedan *Talookdars*, descendants of the ancient Mahomedan conquerors of Oudh, and there were a few only who were in their origin contractors and speculators, and officials that had managed by the judicious use of their talents to acquire the possession of land. There was no class in Oudh who ever claimed any distinct proprietary rights under the *Talookdars*; much less could there be a class hostile to them. Traces of old village communities were still there, but they could not be distinctly recognised, for, under the old governments, small proprietors and proprietary bodies found it most to their advantage to place themselves under the protection of one or other of the *Talookdars* to have an ally against the oppression of the revenue collectors. They were ousted in numbers by the settlement officers from their estates in favour of parties who did not want the boon, and who in fact were the real cause of the settlement.

For the details of the settlement see the annexed table of the revenue of

the mutiny broke out, and the Province of Oudh was not conquered till late in that year. Before the rebellion was thoroughly quelled, Lord Canning issued his famous Proclamation by which the entire proprietary rights of the people of Oudh were confiscated for their general participation in the insurrection, but at the same time a promise was held out that those who made their submission would have their lands restored to them. When the *Talookdars* laid down their arms and claimed the advantage of the Proclamation, the revolutionary settlement which had worked all this mischief was wholly ignored and set aside, and each *Talookdar* who submitted received back the estates he had in his possession when the country was first annexed. The *Talookdars* were considered, however, to have re-entered into possession by the free gift of Government, and not by virtue of any previous rights. With the exception of a few *Talookdars* who were not included in the amnesty, and whose estates were accordingly confiscated, the whole of Oudh was thus settled with the ancient proprietors of land, *i. e.* with the *Talookdars* or with the village communities as the case might be. One-third of the whole territory was settled with the village communities, and the rest was all *Talookdaree*. This settlement was made for three years till a revised regular settlement could be introduced on the basis of the payments which had been made to the native governments. In compliance with the representation which Sir Charles Wingfield made on the subject, Lord Canning confirmed this settlement in perpetuity, and ~~was the~~ *Talookdars* title-deeds which declared that

their estates were settled on them in perpetuity, subject only to periodical revision of the assessment; the title-deeds also declared that all the subordinate rights that might on inquiry be found to exist would be maintained. Both the cardinal errors of the Bengal settlement, the confusion of the permanence of tenure with a fixed revenue, and the disregard of subordinate rights, were thus avoided in this Oudh settlement. For the first three years, no increase of revenue followed, because the British officials took amounts that had formerly been paid to the native governments.

In the meanwhile, however, the work of the survey and settlement of the land commenced. The work of settlement has gone on during the last ten years, and has not yet been finished. Out of 12 districts, the settlement operations were completed in seven districts before 1869, and the result was that the revenue had risen from one *crore* and four *lacks* to one *crore* and 30 *lacks*, and Sir C. Wingfield estimates that when the whole work will be over, the revenue of Oudh will not fall short of one and a half *crore* of *Rupees* yearly. In assessing a *Talooka*, cultivated, fallow, and uncultivated lands are all taken into account; the fallow land is classed with the cultivated, and if the uncultivated but cultivable land occupies a considerable portion of the whole area settled with, either a small rate per acre is put upon that land in consideration of its cultivable na-

ture, or the settlement officer, in fixing the assessment of the village, adds so much more to the assessment according to his estimate of the capability of the population to bring this land into cultivation. So far as the settlement operations have extended, it has been ascertained that as much as nine-tenths of the area is under cultivation. Oudh is in fact the richest and most densely peopled part of India ; under native rulers it was considered as the garden of India. Its population was in 1869 estimated to be $11\frac{1}{4}$ millions or 466 per square mile. There is but little waste land in Oudh except the tracts at the foot of the hills, which are called Terai. They are generally of the primeval forest sort, very rank and unhealthy. Oudh is abundantly supplied with large natural tanks and reservoirs, and besides, it is well watered by rivers. There never has been a famine known in Oudh during the last 100 years, and there is no record of any famine having occurred before. Under the rules for the sale of waste lands, lands were granted rent-free for the first 12 years, and if one-quarter of the area taken up was brought within six years under cultivation, half the fixed assessment was charged for the next 12 years. If, at the end of that term, the whole of the land so granted was not brought under cultivation, the grantee got only as much waste land as was equal in area to what he had brought under cultivation. The grantees of the waste lands were allowed to commute for the land tax at the rate fixed by Lord Canning, namely five shillings an acre, and land valued at some nine *lacks* was sold under these Lord Canning's rules, half of which

amount will have to be written away as irrecoverable, and the land represented by that amount will revert into the hands of Government. The right to levy revenue is all as the proprietary right to the land, in the case of a simple owner, and was sold, freed from all and every liability to Government. This did not exempt the land from the police and road cesses. Lord Clive's rules for the sale of waste lands were modified by Sir Charles Wood, who ordered that the lands should be sold by auction, and not at a fixed price of 5s. per acre. At some of the auction sales held under these modified rules, land fetched as much as 20 shillings per acre, and even more. There are in all about 20,000 villages in Oudh, and the average rate of assessment per cultivated acre is 4s. 2d. in the settled villages. In the Punjab, the average is only 2 shillings per acre. In the N. W. Provinces, it is higher, but still less than in Oudh, and yet the people do not complain that the assessment is heavy, so wonderful is the fertility and richness of the country. So well watered is this country in some parts, that the irrigated area, irrigated both from wells and reservoirs, is in Roy Bareilly three times as much as the unirrigated land. The wells are easily sunk in one or half a day with one man's labour at a cost of 2 shillings. The tank reservoirs are the property of the villages among themselves; one tank irrigates often as many as a dozen villages. And the tanks have always a plentiful supply of water in all seasons, though they are generally nothing more than natural depressions in the soil in which rain water collects.

At the time of the settlement, the same rate of

assessment was fixed for all villages, whether the revenue was paid directly or through the *Talookdars*. The inhabitants of the villages settled with under the *Talookdaree* system are in as good a condition as the villagers holding directly under Government, and there is no perceptible difference between the general appearance of the *Talookdar* and Government villages. Under the native governments, the *Talookdars* always stood in need of the assistance of their tenants to fight, and unless the demands of the Government pressed heavy on their resources, they did not oppress their tenantry. Under the British Government, the subordinate rights of the cultivators, whatever might be their nature, have been carefully ascertained, fixed, and recorded. If it was found that they were really proprietors of the village lands, and that they had retained the management in their own hands, they were allowed to manage their village, and pay only a head rent to the *Talookdar* as they did before. If their rights had not been preserved in entirety, they were protected in what little vestiges there remained of their proprietary title.

For the next thirty years, while the settlement lasts, it is not possible to have any increase of land revenue. When the time for resettlement arrives, there will be a considerable increase, mostly from the rise in prices, and little or none from the reclamation of waste lands. The settlement is fixed on the principle of taking 50 per cent. of the net rental. Except the estates which were given rent-free as rewards during the mutiny, there are no estates holding under the

fixed or rent-free tenures. The territory of Oudh was at one time very prosperous, but during the reign of the last sovereign, the machinery of government was much relaxed, and it got into a disordered state. It has, however, under the British rule recovered all its old prosperity; more land is cultivated now, and it is cultivated better than it ever had been before under the best native rulers.

Under the *Sanad* grant, the *Talookdar* has the fullest power of alienation by gift or devise. In the case of intestate succession, the law of primogeniture, or rather the undivided succession of a single person, applies. But for the thoroughness of the previous confiscation, it would not have been possible to set aside the settlements made in 1857 to the great prejudice of the proprietary rights of the *Talookdars*. The status of the mere cultivators of the soil was under consideration under the administration of Lord Lawrence, who was himself strongly inclined to the plan of conferring occupancy rights on all cultivators who cultivated land on the same terms for a period of 12 years or more. The *Talookdars* were strongly opposed to this arrangement, and Sir Charles Wingfield was himself of the same view, as he was convinced that the distinction between cultivators with and without occupancy rights was a purely artificial one, and was utterly unknown to native custom. After a long discussion, a compromise was arrived at, which is said to have been favourably received by the *Talookdars*.

Sir Charles Wingfield admitted ...

of the value of silver during the last twenty years. As a consequence of this fall, the land revenue does not possess the same value now as it did before, and this is in his opinion, one of the strongest objections against permanent settlement; for, in territories permanently resettled, this depression will be made up at the time of the resettlement. While the land revenue is being thus depreciated, the expenditure of Government under all heads, *i. e.* in paying wages, in purchasing stores, and buying food and clothing for the army, must increase. The only exception to the rule is represented by the Government outlay for interest on the national debt which does not increase with the rise in prices. The salaries of Government servants also have not been increased on account of the high prices except in Bombay. Most of the Provinces of India do not admit of being resettled on any large scale during the remaining quarter of this century, and it is to this fact that we owe chiefly the serious financial difficulty which presents itself so embarrassingly before Indian statesmen, namely, that the only source of revenue, which does not represent onerous taxation on the people, is being constantly and increasingly depreciated while the outlay of Government is as constantly increasing.

By way of compensation for this disadvantage, Sir Charles Wingfield of course admitted that the settlements are not synchronous, they are generally so dated that the work of the revision of settlements will be always going on in one or other part of India; he urged, besides that, the disturb-

ing cause of the rise in prices, while it injuriously affected the land revenue, has increased the yield of the other resources of Government, namely the salt duty and the customs. There is, however, a fundamental distinction between land revenue and other taxes, the one represents the inherent right of the Government to a portion of the produce of the soil, the other items of revenue are taxes upon the labour or capital of the country. The land revenue, if not paid to Government, will have anyhow to be paid to the landlord class, and the burden on the cultivators will not be a whit less if the Government were ever to give up its right. In so far as the land tax does not exceed the rent proper, it is a natural increment which is the private property of no particular class in the community. It is a public fund which is best turned to account by being used up for public services. If the land tax were abolished, this fund so devoted to public purposes would not go to enrich the cultivators or farmers, who would have to pay some substitute for it to the Government. This unearned natural rent would be appropriated by the idle land-lord class. Besides, the proprietors and cultivators would grow careless and indifferent but for this stimulant of a land tax. Moreover, it is not true as a fact that the condition is better, or the condition of the country is more prosperous, in rent-free villages than in Government villages. The revenue derived from land represents no loss to the community, whereas the revenue raised from the customs or

from salt, or from stamps, represents a real burden on the people.

Sir Charles Wingfield however maintained that while he fully admitted the force of the objection based on the ever-increasing inadequacy of a temporarily or permanently settled revenue to meet the increasing outlay necessitated by high prices, yet they were not sufficient to out-weigh the other considerations which made it absolutely necessary for the prosperity of the country to protect and encourage the cultivating classes by long terms of fixed assessment. At this stage of his examination, Sir Charles Wingfield was asked whether he did not think that all the disadvantages might be avoided, and all the advantages of both the permanent and periodical systems of settlement be secured in a settlement in which the land revenue was fixed for ever not in the shape of its money value, but in the shape of a fixed quantity of the staple produce of the country assessed according to the natural advantages of the soil and of its situation as regards markets &c, and it was further arranged that the actual sum to be paid to the state should be fixed for a term of years, and made to vary according to the greater or less money value of this fixed quantity of produce, taking the average of five or ten or more years. By this arrangement the advantages of a permanence of tenure and fixity of revenue would be secured in the interest of the agricultural classes. The Government will not suffer by reason of a rise in prices, nor will the *Ryots* be distressed when a fall takes place. The weight and

interests of both the Government and the *Ryots* will thus mutually adjust themselves, and produce harmony and content unknown under the present arrangements. Sir Charles Wingfield answered that this plan had been suggested by some people, but he never approved of the suggestion, chiefly because people would not understand it, as it is opposed to their feelings and ideas, and they would not feel the security and the encouragement they find under the present settlements. So that, in his opinion, there is no way of getting over this perpetual source of embarrassment and loss to Government caused by the depreciation of silver except by additional taxation, from which the only moral to be drawn is that the greatest possible economy in the administration of the finances of India is the sole resource left to the Government.

Sir Charles Wingfield agreed with Mr. Fawcett who examined him upon this point, that the proceeds of the sale of waste lands, and to some extent of the sale of the *Khasmehals* also, ought not to have been spent as revenue, but that they should have been credited to the capital or debt account of the State. The *Khasmehals* were, however, mostly of the nature of windfalls, and not a regular source of revenue, and they were too insignificant in value to make it a matter of much consequence how they were spent. Sir Charles Wingfield said he was opposed to the Permanent Settlement Despatch of Sir Charles Wood, which was intended for, but has not been acted upon in, the North West Provinces. It was applicable only to the Bengal Presidency,

and no other province in India fulfilled the two essential conditions of the Despatch. Sir D. Macleod of the Punjab, and Sir L. Edmondstone of the N. W. Provinces, were also equally opposed to the policy of extending the Permanent Settlement to the Provinces under their charge, and Sir Charles Wingfield went so far as to urge upon the Committee that not a day should be lost in rescinding the Despatch. Lord Lawrence and Sir W. Muir lent the support of their great authority to the measure, and advocated the policy of a Permanent Settlement for the whole of India. The great apostle, however, of this revival of Lord Cornwallis's policy was Colonel Baird Smith, the Famine Commissioner, who reported upon the condition of the N. W. Provinces after the famine of 1860-61. Colonel Baird Smith thought that if the Government demand were once fixed, the people would be so enriched that a thousand new sources of indirect taxation would be opened. This hope, however, has not been justified by the results of past experience. The permanently settled Province of Bengal has of all Provinces in India shown most opposition to direct taxation, and of all classes of people in Bengal, the *Zemindar* class is the strongest in its objections to direct taxes.

The depreciation in the value of silver began long before the years of cotton famine. It began at the time when the first railways were commenced. The cotton famine only increased the tendency towards high prices, especially on the west coast of India. Oude was not much affected by it, for

been found necessary to raise the salaries of Government servants notwithstanding the rise in prices in any part of India excepting the Bombay Presidency. The higher salaries of European officers are generally liberal, and leave a good margin to live on and save out of, and there is no just ground for complaint. The salaries of the native subordinates have had to be raised, not on account of the rise in prices, but because they were so very inadequate before.

The description of misgovernment in Oudh given by Colonel Sleeman was much overdrawn; it was partial and incorrect in that it was too gloomy, and Colonel Sleeman relied too much upon the information he obtained from his native assistants. Oudh has enormously improved under British rule by the security that has been given to peaceful industry during the last fifteen years, and now it would be strictly true to say that it is one of the most peaceful, contented, and prosperous districts in India.

CHAPTER IX.

LAND REVENUE.

(BRITISH BURMAH.)

British Burmah, comprising the Provinces of Araccan and Tenasserim acquired in 1826, and the Province of Pegu conquered in 1852, was raised only lately into a Chief Commissioner-ship under Sir Arthur Phayre. This Province hardly comes within the limits of India Proper, and its economical and agricultural polity marks it out as a province beyond the border, with a barely developed civilization. It has no system of land settlement; the settlements are made from year to year; it is with difficulty that in some cases a ten years' settlement was made, as the people are decidedly averse to long settlements. Before British rule commenced, the revenue, estimated at 1/10th of the gross produce, was paid in kind. The grain tribute had to be conveyed to the Government granaries at the cost of the tax-payer. Soon after the conquest, an arrangement was made by which the proportion taken by the Government was doubled. Twenty per cent. of the gross produce commuted into its money value was taken as the revenue due to Government on cultivated land. The arrangement was made with the actual cultivators, as there are no intermediate agents or village-holders in Burmah. In some years, more than 20 per cent. of the produce has been taken by the Government.

The whole area of British Burmah is 94,000 square miles, of which only 3,000 miles are under cultivation. About 30,000 or 40,000 square miles admit of being brought under cultivation as the population increases. A large population is the great desideratum of British Burmah. The rest of the land is overgrown with *jungle*, or is mountain land covered with teak forests. Immigrants from Burmese and Siamese territory are pouring in in numbers, and they are rapidly bringing the waste land into cultivation; very few people come from India except at the ports, where, however, they do not settle; they only live sufficiently long to save a certain sum, and then return back to India. The Chinese have settled in numbers, but they work as artizans or merchants, and have no liking for agriculture. The holdings are generally very small, seldom exceeding 10 acres. There are no alienations of revenue in British Burmah, no chiefs or holders of ancient tenures, and hardly any man who holds more than 40 acres. The occupants are considered owners of the land, and can sell or deal with the land as they please. The land revenue at present is about 47 *lacks*, and it is increasing every year, as more land is brought under cultivation, and it is likely to be doubled in forty years. The forests, especially the teak forests on the hills, yield a revenue of four or five *lacks*, exclusive of the expenses incurred by the state. Besides, much timber is floated down the rivers from independent Burmah, and pays an excise duty estimated to bring a *lack* of *Rupees* every year. The general

and undecided. Sir A. Phayre said he was satisfied on one point, namely, that the people were not over-assessed. The people accept the assessment cheerfully, at least he had heard no complaints from them. The revenue is paid promptly, and the coercive powers of selling the land for default in payment of revenue are seldom exercised. The approximate number of persons paying land revenue direct to Government is about $3\frac{1}{2}$ lacks, and the average rate is about 13 or 14 Rs. per head.

SECTION

FOREST REVENUE

Having in the previous chapters examined the summary of the whole of the evidence received by the Committee on the subject.

I now proceed to furnish an abstract of the evidence relating to the Forest Revenue, with regard to which, Mr. Phillimore, an Assistant in the Revenue Department of the India Office, and Dr. Cleghorn, late Conservator of Forests in Madras, were examined before the Committee. Mr. Phillimore made but a very sorry appearance before the Committee. The confession was most reluctantly wrung out of his mouth that the superintendence professed to be exercised by the Secretary of State over the action of the Government of India in the matter of the Forest Revenue was only a farce. He could not give any idea as to what the estimated out-turn of Government forests would be in the future, nor whether the present proportion of 80 per cent. out-lay upon the realizations was likely to be diminished in the course of succeeding years. He could not even furnish Mr. Fawcett with a table showing the principal items which went to swell the total of 57 lacks of *Rupees* of the forest revenue. The Secretary of State is ostensibly supposed to review the budgets that come from India, and most marvellously is this review accomplished by the officials of the India Office without forming any estimate as to the yield of the several sources of the revenue, and

to year of the items composing the gross receipts. The check and control turns out thus to be only a costly joke. The budgets from the various administrations are indeed sent up regularly to the Secretary of State, but there is no functionary in the India Office whose business it is to club the results of the various reports together, and present them to his chief for his information. Mr. Phillimore spurned to enter into particulars, and stated that he thought he would only be examined on the *principles*, and not on the small details of the forest revenue by the Committee. The Committee found it necessary at last to give up Mr. Phillimore's examination, and content themselves with directing him to prepare a digest of the various administration reports, which accordingly appears in the Blue-book as Appendix No. 5. I have turned this digest to some account in the remarks which follow. Dr. Cleghorn stood his ground better before the Committee, but his information was chiefly of the nature of a professional expert's testimony. It had no economical value, and threw but little light upon the financial bearings of the subject.

The forest revenue was in times past included under the Sayer revenue, and forests themselves were included under waste lands. In 1800, the Court of Directors wrote to the Government of India that it should assert the Royal rights claimed by the native princes over the Malabar forests, which had been long neglected by the British Govern-

bay Presidency down to the year 1846, when Dr. Gibson was appointed Conservator for Bombay, and worked with great success for many years. In Burmah, the forest revenue has always been an important item, and in 1855 Mr. Brandis, a German, was appointed Conservator for the Burmese Provinces. In Madras, Lord Harris, about the year 1856, appointed Dr. Cleghorn to organize the Forest Department of that Presidency. Ultimately in 1863, a separate conservancy department and a local administrative charge were sanctioned for each Presidency, and from that year the forest revenue began to figure as a distinct item in the budgets. At present, the Inspector General of Forests advises the Government of India with regard to, and superintends, the forests in Burmah, Central India, and Oudh. The Presidency Governments of Madras, Bombay, and Bengal, look to their own conservancy. These departments have only recently been subjected to proper organization, and, it was not till 1869 that a separate forest service was formed, and young men were selected in England by competition, and trained for their special work by two years' stay in the great forest schools of Germany and France. There are about 88 of these forest officers at present in state employ, of whom only one is a native of India, who qualified himself in England for this service. There is some idea of opening a school in India as soon as specimen forests are formed, and a goodly supply of skilled teachers can be secured to train native gentlemen to fill the higher posts of this service, for

which at present, it is assumed, the natives are not qualified. The forest tracts have not yet been demarkated in the bigger Presidencies, the N. W. Provinces, Madras, Bombay, or the Punjab; in the smaller administrative charges, this work has been accomplished, and it is estimated that there are 21,000 square miles of forest land in the Central Provinces, about 2,400 miles in British Burmah, and 4,000 square miles in Assam. In the Punjab, and at the foot of the Himalayas, the forests are of *Deodar* and pine wood; in Oudh and in Bengal, the forests are of *Sal* chiefly. In Assam there are some forests which are much valued for silk-worms. In British Burmah teak forests are most abundant. In Madras, especially on the Malabar coast, forests of teak, ebony, and sandalwood abound. In the Bombay Presidency, we have, more especially in North Canara, magnificent teak forests. The Sind forests furnish a good supply of fuel for railways.

Such is a general outline of the distribution of forests. The forest revenue includes three great heads, the proceeds of the sale of timber, of fuel wood, and the produce of the minor forests, which differs for each Province. In Sind, pasturage or grazing fees are included under forest revenue. Before the department

was formed the system most in vogue was what is called the license or contract system. All forests without exception were dealt with in this manner. This entailed great waste; the contractors and licensees recklessly cut down the forests of valuable timber, and did

not plant seedlings. There was back-
wardness in the number and age of the
trees which were permitted to be cut, and the
Railway and the Public Works Departments found
a great difficulty in securing a proper supply of
timber. The forest organization improved and
reserves were formed. The expenditure incurred under
the license system was stopped, and the Government
began to cut down timber on its own account for
the purpose of selling it. There has been under
this management a great diminution of waste ;
the trees are cut at the lowest possible point, and fires
are scarce. The railway and other public depart-
ments receive their supply on half-yearly instalments,
and there is a greater stock of timber at the
depots now than in any previous period. The
system of departmental management, which
plants, and cuts, and sells at its own depots, tim-
ber and firewood to the Government Depart-
ments or the Railway Companies or private
contractors, is gradually displacing the old contract
system in all parts of India, and much benefit is
anticipated in future from this direct management.

Forests are divided into two classes reserved
and unreserved forests. From the reserved, all
private persons are excluded, while in the unreserved
forests, cuttings are allowed with the permission of the
department on payment of a tax levied upon timber
brought out of the forest. There is a third class of
what are called the village forests, which generally be-
long to private persons, and are managed under the

control of the forest department. The reserved forests are preserved in order to allow timber to grow to a proper size, and the trees that are fit for cutting are alone cut, according to a system of regular rotation and management.

The departmental officers have to perform various duties : the first and foremost of which relates to the demarkation of the forests, a work which is only slowly progressing throughout the Provinces. Arrangements have to be made for excluding cattle, and preventing fires which caused great mischief in times past. Then they have to classify the forests into reserved and unreserved forests. The larger forests lie generally in out-of-the-way districts, and the officers are therefore also charged with the work of opening up communications between them. The expenditure on forest-roads is charged against forest revenue. Then their next duty is to provide for the economical management or conservancy proper of the forests in their keeping, to bring more and better seasoned timber into the market, and to have a fresh supply of growing timber always ready in the forests to take the place of that which may be cut. This supply is ensured either by the process of natural reproduction or by planting ; the first is more economical, but is not suited in all cases. Natural reproduction is most important, but it is necessary that planting should go along with it in convenient spots. on the banks of rivers, or by the sides of railways, where you cannot expect growth by the natural process.

wood in Mysore, Mahogany in Bengal, plantations in the valleys of the Himalayas, Cinchona plantations on the Neilgiri hills. Every year there is a liberal allowance made for replanting, and the formation of fuel plantations for the purposes of the railways has become an important duty of the forest officers, causing great present outlay. It is the policy of the department to have always a certain number of growing trees per acre in the reserved forests. The best example of successful plantation is seen on the Malabar Coast in what is called the Conolly teak plantation, which was commenced in 1844, and has during the last ten years more than repaid its expenses out of the proceeds of the sale of the loppings. A teak plantation lasts 60 years.

The total of the forest revenue for the last year (1870) was 57 lacks of *Rupees* against an expenditure of 45 lacks, which left a margin of 12 lacks of *Rupees* as net profit to the Government. Not only is this 80 per cent. of outlay astounding in itself, but what is worse, this outlay has been increasing out of all proportion to the increased receipts. The net receipts have actually diminished during the last 6 or 7 years. The net receipts were 18 lacks of *Rupees* in 1864-65. The gross receipts were 36½ lacks, and the expenditure was only 18½ lacks in that year. In the year 1869-70, the expenditure was more than twice as much. The increased yield of this year moreover contains a fictitious item of a considerable store of Government timber.

to the other Government departments and the railway. All sorts of excuses were put forth by Mr. Phillimore, or rather they were put into his mouth by Mr. Grant Duff, to explain these anomalies, but as they were flimsy, they did not stand the test of the minute scrutiny of the committee. The fact is obvious that the increased expenditure is chiefly owing to the employment of European fore-

It is held out that, when in course of time natives come to be employed more numerous in this service, its working charges will be reduced. No school of instruction for native students is however to be established till we have specimen forests in perfect developement in India, and a large *posse* of qualified and skilled instructors is secured to teach forest science to the natives. Mr. Phillimore found himself in a fix when he was asked what was the nature of the signal improvement in the forest administration which was represented by the greatly increased outlay. He could only say that uniformity of management had been secured, admittedly a rather poor return for an additional expenditure of 25 *lacks* of *Rupees* every year.

In respect of forest revenue, the Bombay Presidency yields the largest return, 0½ *lacks* of *Rupees*, of which about 4 *lacks* represent the costs of collection. Including Sind, the yield for the Presidency is 12½ *lacks*. Burmah stands next, the yield being nearly 10 *lacks*; the charges are much

Provinces, the Punjab, the Provinces, Bengal, Coorg, and Oudh come next der mentioned.

In Bombay Presidency exclusive of Sind, it appears from the Administration Report for 1870-71 that the small province of North Canara yields the largest forest revenue, nearly 4 lack

Ratnagiri parts of the district are many of them private preserves reared up under the protection of Mr. Dunlop's Proclamation issued in 1824. The total yield of the Konkan districts of Tarna, Colaba, and Ratnagiri was Poona yielded $\frac{3}{4}$ ths lack, chiefly its Mawal Talooka. Surat, Khandeish, Dharwar, and Belgaum yielded about half a lack each. Satara, Ahmednuggar, and Nasik yielded a quarter of a lack each. Ahmadabad, Sholapoor and Kaladgi yield nothing revenue.

question of the village cultivation concerned one of the topics on which Dr. Horn was examined. He replied that as these village forests covered only small areas, and were for the part private properties, they did not fall under the supervision of the department. The government authorities of Madras, the N. W. Provinces, the Punjab, have held villages not topes and groves lands ars, and making advances for wells, but owing to the expense of labour for timber and fuel the villagers are

and show no care to provide for the wants of the next generation. It is, however, eminently desirable in the interests of the country to encourage the growth of these small village forests. The climate would be improved, there would be more moisture in the air from the presence of the trees, and less suffering from hot winds, and less desiccation of the ground. The Province of Oudh is very favourably circumstanced in this respect, and its people are in advance of all others in their systematic village cultivation of wood. The ill effects of the denudation of forests, caused by the old reckless management under the license system were soon observed in the diminished rainfall and arid climate. Dr. Cleghorn said that care was being now taken to preserve a sufficiently large extent of land under timber for climatic purposes ; at least we are in a better condition now than we were ten years ago. The crests of the *Ghauts* and the fringes of the water-courses are now systematically preserved.

Independently of the revenue it yields, the Forest Department is a necessity for the important service it does to preserve the humidity of the climate, and the material assistance it renders to other departments. The Government administration of forests is not solely directed with the view of producing revenue, but it also seeks to ensure the indirect benefits which large areas of ground covered by forests confer upon the country, in tempering its climate and enabling its soil to retain moisture. The maintenance of forests has a great influence on the regularity of water-springs, for, when the upper parts of the slopes and

crests of mountains are laid bare, the rainfall becomes less each year, the supply of water is reduced, or rather there is nothing to check the rush of water down the slopes and crests. It no longer soaks into the ground, but washes off the dirt and gravel, and silts the beds of rivers. These latter are swollen with floods during the rains, but they soon run out; the smaller streams dry out sooner, and in hot weather water becomes scarce.

The existence of large forests, in another respect, of great economical advantage to the country. In some of the drier districts of India the supply of fuel is scanty, and people burn valuable manure, thereby robbing the land of what ought to have gone to fructify it. A more plentiful supply of fire-wood for fuel would increase the productiveness of the land, as it would get the advantage of the manure at present burned, and the dry leaves of trees. In Spain, owing to reckless cutting, the ground has been baked and dried up, and on the continent, in France and Germany especially, this connection of the fertility of the soil with the existence of large forests has been acknowledged by their Governments, and great care is bestowed upon keeping up reserves of large forests.

Dr. Cleghorn expressed himself satisfied that the seemingly unthrifty condition of the Forest department, shown by the fact that the expenses of its management are steadily gaining upon the gross revenue, is likely to be improved in future, and that the recent increase of expenditure was due solely to the necessity of opening up roads, blasting rocks, and purchasing elephants.

fairly assumed that we have now reached the turning point, as nearly every province is under some sort of organized supervision, and clearances except by government officers are now discountenanced, unless where it is intended to bring the land under permanent cultivation.

Besides the climatic and economic benefits, the demands of the various railways of seasoned timber for their sleepers, and of fire-wood as a substitute for coal, render the existence of such an organized department absolutely indispensable. In the North West Provinces and the Punjab, *Deodar* is used for sleepers, for which purpose it is too valuable and expensive. In the south of India teak-wood is supplied for sleepers. The *Deodar* sleeper stands wear for 12 years. Sal-wood and teak can bear the strain for a longer

With regard to fuel, it has been found that imported coal is three times as dear as native fire-wood, and the result is that wood is almost exclusively used on the Madras railways. In that Presidency, by way of a permanent prospective source of fuel, plantations of fuel-trees on railway lands have been made during the last four years. Altogether without the help of the Forest Department, railways could not have been constructed nor worked except at much greater expense than has been incurred at present.

The minor forest-produce includes gums, dyes, oils, resins, gallnuts. These were not valued at all. A charge for

These products is put in small areas to prevent monopoly, and it is likely that there will be in the course of years a larger yield from these sources. And it may be safely assumed generally, that the receipts of forest revenue will be this year, as the preliminary and final account has been already made, and will not recur again, while increased economy in the management and saving of materials, and increased demand for the produce, will diminish the expenditure, and bring in more net profits.

Dr. Claphorn said he believed that for the higher offices in the forest service a scientific botanist was much more needed than an ordinary forest keeper; the resources of the country are so varied, and so many of the products are so little known, that the more knowledge of botany the forest officer has, the better it fits him for his post. Mr. Grant Duff, with his usual habit of interference, put leading questions and almost forced the answers from the witness to the effect, that with a view to develop the resources of India, the Government both in India and England were extremely anxious to have a class of scientific and skilled officers in this service, and also to open the service to qualified natives. Anxious as Government is to admit natives, it is not possible at present to admit them to high posts with any advantage to the state. Till there was a real forest-school for India, and a set of good traditions of management, to attempt to do anything in that direction would be premature at present, except in the lower posts which the natives now occupy. This hypocrisy is particularly

habitual with Mr. Grant Duff, that none of the other members of the Committee troubled themselves to interrupt him except with a quiet and indirect irony. It may be safely asserted that this pretended anxiety to employ natives has not the smallest foundation in fact. It is at least clear that the hastily presumed absence of necessary qualifications has nothing to do with the exclusion of natives from this service, for a small percentage only of the 88 gentlemen in the forest service, all engaged since 1863, possess any of the scientific or professional qualifications, considered to be so indispensable and unavoidable, and the absence of which is in the case of the natives held to be a bar to their admission into the higher ranks of this service.

SECTION III.

EXCISE REVENUE.

In the order of the Budget Statement, I shall now proceed to furnish an abstract of the evidence relating to the Excise Revenue. Being for the most part a tax on vice and intemperance, excise duties are the most unobjectionable of imposts, and one only regrets that the principle which is supposed to guide the action of Government in levying these duties,—namely, that of levying the largest amount of duty upon the smallest consumption of these noxious luxuries of the poor,—is not practically and systematically carried out. The total revenue of the empire under this head is about $2\frac{1}{4}$ crores of Rupees. Of this sum, Bengal contributes 69 lacks, Madras contributes 57 lacks, and Bombay contributes 44 lacks, making together $1\frac{3}{4}$ crores of revenue for the three older Presidencies. The returns for the other Presidencies were not furnished to the Committee. There are four or five different systems according to which excise duties are levied in the four great provinces about which the witnesses spoke, and some of these different systems are found more or less concurrent in one and the same Presidency. There is first the farming system; there is next the Sadar distillery system; thirdly, there is the system of taxing individual trees; fourthly, there is the system of cultivating the plant, and selling it wholesale from Government warehouses; and there is, lastly, the licensing system. The excise revenue is derived from distilled spirits and arrack distilled from rice and sugar or

rent other substances, and from fermented liquors, which are generally obtained from the palm and date varieties, and from the manufacture and sale of opium, and *Bhang*, and *Ganja* preparations. In the Madras Presidency, no revenue is derived from opium and *Bhang* and *Ganja*. There is no restriction upon the sale of these substances, and the reason of this exception is not given. The farming system obtains throughout the whole of the Madras Presidency, excepting the town and suburbs of Madras, as also in the Deccan districts of the Bombay Presidency. The Sadar distillery system may be said to be now almost universal in Bengal and the Punjab, and it obtains in three places in this Presidency. Taxing the *toddy*-producing trees is peculiar to the Konkan districts of this Presidency. The general consensus of testimony points to the superiority of the Sadar distillery system over all the others in effectively securing the two main objects of all excise regulations. It brings the largest revenue, prevents illicit traffic and waste, and checks drunkenness as far as check is possible. There can be no doubt that if people *will* drink or drug themselves into beasts, and the State cannot prevent them from so doing, the next best thing the State can do is to tax the vice heavily, so as to make it pay the increased expenditure which beastly indulgence in vice makes necessary for the protection of society. With these general remarks, I shall now proceed with a summary of the evidence relating to the particular systems of Excise Regulations which obtain in the different provinces of India.

CHAPTER I.

THE REVENUE

BENGAL.

The excise on spirits and fermented liquors, and opium, and *Ganja* hemp, realized for the Presidency of Bengal 69 *lacs* 10 *annas* 10 *pie*. Separate licenses are granted for each description.

Drinks or drugs, and if sometimes one license covers all, the different items are specified in it. Voted to the excise on country spirits, which in Bengal are distilled from rice and sugar.

See, there have been great

management of this branch of revenue from time to

Previous to 1840, there was a double system at work, the system of farming prevailed in the country districts, and the system of Sadar distilleries obtained stations. A Sadar distillery consisted in those days of a large enclosed area in which all persons who desired to make spirits after the country process were obliged to distil their liquor. They set up their own stills at

the ground occupied. The duty of one *Ann*

was taken when the spirits were removed from the distilleries, and the spirits so removed after paying duty were supplied to the retail shop-keepers who had to take out a license for the sale of such spirits. These licenses were issued by the Coll.

subscribed or endorsed over by the M. The license was a fixed charge at so much a day for each shop with conditions annexed providing

when the shops should be shut. All the retail dealers within a certain area were bound to obtain their liquor at the Sadar distillery. This system of Sadar distilleries was confined to the Sadar station of each district, the principal station where population was dense, and the European officers resided. The rest of the district was farmed out either as one whole district, or in conveniently small divisions. The farms were put up every year to public auction, and the farmer manufactured his own spirit, or got it elsewhere. He purchased at the auction the exclusive monopoly of the manufacture and sale, together with the liberty of distilling, and selling wholesale or retailing *arak* to the shops within his district. In fact, the whole country was given over to him to be supplied with drugs and spirits as he pleased. It sometimes happened, when the *Abkari* fell into the hands of a large capitalist, that nobody was found to bid against the farmer, and the Government was entirely at his mercy when the time for re-letting came.

This double system obtained till 1840, when gradually the farming system was discontinued, and the Government put itself into the position of the farmer, and collected the revenue by its own establishments. Licenses were issued for the sale of liquor at so much a day for each shop which supplied a certain district, and the licensee distilled his own liquor, or purchased it elsewhere. He had to pay no duty for the privilege of distilling; the revenue was wholly derived from the licenses, therein constituting the chief difference between the system of Sadar distilleries, and that which obtained in the rural districts. Of course the

daily tax varied greatly according to the c
 was understood that the licensee had a l
 within a certain area. The revenue increased
 derably under this system as compared with
 farming system. The Sadar distilleries were conti-
 nued as before for the Sadar stations.

Since 1860, there has been an extension of the Sadar distillery system beyond the limits of the Sadar stations, as it was found that the out-still system for the rural districts led to a great extension of drunkenness. It was the interest of the excise officer to open as many shops as he could, and show a good return; thus every village came to have its shop, and there was a great increase of the habit of drinking among the agricultural population. Under the Sadar distillery system, the duty is taken not by petty excise officers, but by an officer of high standing, and it does not become the interest of the Abkari officer to show increased revenue by opening additional shops. By the extension of the Sadar distillery system, the number of retail shops became less, and as better surveillance was exercised, a greater duty was levied upon the distilled spirits than was realized under the indirect daily licenses. The rate of duty on distilled spirits was raised with the Customs duty on imported spirits to 3 Rs. per gallon about 20 years ago. At present, the Sadar distillery system may be said to be almost universal throughout whole of the Presidency, except in a few remote districts where the out-still system is retained, as the country distilled liquor is so very weak, that it will not bear carriage in small quantities to those remote places.

of this extension of the Sadar distillation system has been a gradual improvement in the revenue, as is shown by the fact that, while the duty remained the same, the revenue has been increasing every year. In Sir C. Beadon's opinion, among the higher classes in Bengal there has been an increase of intemperance: As to the lower classes, there were loud complaints to that effect from the missioneries while the out-still system obtained, but no complaints have been heard since the extension of the Sadar distillery system. Sir C. Beadon stated that, although without doubt the consumption of intoxicating liquors had increased of late, there was no more perceptible drunkenness now than was observed before, except among a few of the higher classes, (and of these among the Hindus more than among the Mahomedans), who drink English liquors. The petty system of licensing did increase drinking among the people. The present system however is based on the principle of extracting the highest possible amount of duty from every gallon of spirits that is drunk, the object being to get the largest revenue from the smallest amount of drink, and the effect of the system is rather to check than to encourage drinking. The increased consumption is due more to the prosperous condition of the people who have so much more money to spend on the luxury of drink than they could spare before. There is no foundation for the reproach cast at the British Government that British rule has encouraged habits of drunkenness among the people. Drinking cannot be said to have been introduced by the English. Several of the Mahomedan emperors were noted as drunk-

ards, as also Jaswantrao Holkar and Ranjitsing. The followers of the Tantras drink spirits, and the aboriginal tribes like the Sonthals are greatly given to drinking.

The changes of the system before described relate chiefly to distilled liquors ; fermented liquors, such as *Toddy* and others, also come under the head of the Abkari revenue. The spirits sold to the army pay no duty, they are provided by the Commissariat, and the soldiers can buy them at their canteens, or may go into the Bazars, and buy on their own account. There is not much adulteration of spirits in Bengal ; simple dilution with water is often practised. The granting or withholding of the license to open a shop does not in any way depend upon the wishes of the population of the locality concerned, who are not consulted upon the point ; the executive officer determines that himself, and there is no approach to the system of permissive Bills. English example has had an injurious effect upon the higher classes of natives. It is true English gentlemen as such do not drink to excess, it is only the lower classes of Europeans among whom drunkenness prevails. The higher classes of natives, in following the example of the English, have carried the practice too far, and often drink to excess. They first commenced with wine, and have now taken to spirits.

As regards fermented liquors, there are two sorts, one called *Toddy* from the palmyra trees, and the other which is made from rice, and drunk in great quantities by the Sonthals. Annual licenses are issued for the sale of

amount of the license for each shop within certain fixed territorial limits, mostly corresponding to a village and its area, is settled by competition. The license is taken out for each shop, and the contractor cannot multiply the shops without permission. If a village is large, two or more shops may be set up ; so also in towns, where separate localities are marked out for each shop. The total revenue derived from the sale of these licenses in 1868-69 was 6,65,000 *Rupees*, of which 5,37,000 *Rs.* were from *Toddy* licenses.

Besides distilled spirits and fermented liquors, the Abkari revenue includes *Bhang* or *Ganja*, which grows only in two districts. The cultivation is under the supervision of an excise officer who compels the cultivators to collect the hemp plant after it is cut, and store it up in certain places. No one is allowed to purchase this *Ganja* except licensed wholesale dealers,—who take out passes for the quantity they wish to buy, and with the pass in their hand they go to the warehouse, and take out as much *Ganja* as is covered by the pass, after paying a fixed duty per *Seer* on the quantity bought. The duty per *Seer* is 10 times the cost of the production. The wholesale dealers then sell the *Ganja* to retail dealers, who have to take out a license for the privilege of selling the *Ganja* and its various preparations. The principal duty is paid by the wholesale buyer. The income from this source was in all 9,79,000 *Rs.*, of which 9,68,000 were obtained from the price paid by the wholesale purchasers. The revenue from this source is increasing every year, and the duty itself, which was two *Rupees* a *Seer*,

These three items constitute the whole of the Abkari revenue of the Bengal Presidency. In 1852 the total revenue was 28 *lacks* ; in 1862 it doubled itself, and stood at 56 *lacks* ; in 1868-69 it touched 71 *lacks*. The increase has been partly due to increase of duty, and partly to increase of consumption. In the matter of these drugs, increase of revenue is the chief consideration, and if the revenue be not injuriously affected, it is desirable rather than otherwise to check the consumption of these noxious drugs.

There have been complaints on the part of the magistracy that the liquor shops had been unduly multiplied for revenue purposes. The law however has empowered the magistrates to veto the establishment of any shop within any fixed limits where he thinks it encourages crime. Under the new system, licenses are given by the Collector, subject to the approval of the magistrate. When the people are well-to-do and easy, the Abkari revenue has a tendency to increase. Sir C. Beadon said he thought that there was no moral evil connected with the system for which the Government were responsible. The tendency of Government interference is to check drunkenness, and its regulations are devised with a view to make the sale of spirits as difficult as possible, and to get as high a price as possible for revenue purposes.

CHAPTER II.

EXCISE REVENUE.

(BOMBAY.)

The total amount of revenue derived from the duties on spirits manufactured and retailed, and also on the retail sale of opium, and on the manufacture and retail sale of drugs such as *Bhang* and *Ganja*, which constitute the various sources of Abkari revenue, was about 44½ *lacks* of *Rupees* for the Presidency of Bombay. There are three systems which obtain in this Presidency, of levying the duty on spirits. There is first the *Sadar* distillery system which obtains only in three towns in the Presidency. Secondly, in places where *Toddy* producing trees grow, there is a system of taxing each individual tree. Thirdly, there is the farming or monopoly system which is the prevailing system in this Presidency. The *Sadar* distillery system in Bombay is very much the same as that which obtains in Bengal. In this Presidency every body is not at liberty to distil in the *Sadar* distillery; only a few people have acquired a sort of proprietary right to manufacture spirits in the distilleries, and they are also permitted to export and supply them to others. These persons get a permit to remove the spirit to certain places, chiefly to Bombay. They are generally wholesale manufacturers, but they also supply the licensed retail sellers. They themselves have no right to retail in any particular place. The next system is more complicated, and varies in the several divisions of the Presidency. The *Toddy* producing trees grow along

the coast in a belt extending from one to five miles from the sea into the interior. In some places the *Toddy* drawing class is permitted to pay a certain fee to tap a certain number of trees. The minimum number of trees that may be tapped is also sometimes fixed. After drawing the juice, the *Toddy* drawers can either sell the *Toddy*, or erect a still where they please, and sell the spirits themselves by retail. The third system is simply the farming or monopoly system. The right of manufacturing and selling liquor is put up to auction and knocked down to the highest bidder. The farmer has his places appointed for him, and the number of shops which he can set up is also limited. Generally there is a fair competition for these farms, but sometimes there is a combination, in which case the Government refuses to issue any licenses at all for the sale of liquor, or puts an upset price below which it will not let the contract, which threat has always sufficed to break the force of all adverse combinations. There have been a few changes in the areas subject to the different systems. Under the Sadar distillery system, the revenue realized was 86,000 *Rs.* in 1857-58, and in ten years it increased to 2 *lacks*. Under the individual-tax system, the tax on the cocoanut, palmyra and date trees was 85,000 *Rs.* in 1857 ; it was 2½ *lacks* in 1867. Under the farming system the revenue was 7½ *lacks* in 1857, and in 1867 it increased to 18½ *lacks*. The rate of duty under the Sadar distillery system was increased from 9 *annas* to one *Rupee* per gallon, and since 1867 there has been a further increase, and the rate is 11 *Rupees* per gallon.

As regards the tax on trees, there has been a regular increase all round, and a great deal of increased revenue is due to a more extensive cultivation and numbering of the trees than before. The increase of revenue under the franchise system has been obtained chiefly by the extension of the franchise. In the opinion of Mr. Bell, the monopoly system stimulates the people to drink intoxicating liquors much more than the sale of spirits by the authorities. When numbers of persons are engaged in the revenue of the region, they are not so much inclined to take license. The liquor itself is sufficient attraction to the people, and music and gambling are not much resorted to as helps to secure the revenue.

Mr. Bell said that under British rule drunkenness has not increased, and, indeed, the habit of drinking liquor has not been at all out of proportion to the improvement in the condition of the people, and that it is not necessary to stop it. The only persons who drink most have been the people who were formerly drunkards, they are the sailors of the coast, fishermen and the natives of the interior who have been always habitually addicted to intemperance. The rest of the population are far from being intemperate. The intemperance is a very ordinary matter of course. The increase in revenue has been 100 per cent, about 50 per cent increase being due to increase of duty. The price of liquor has risen, and the increase in revenue has not been due to any increase in any way.

Under the present system the revenue was not

so regular an item of State receipts. Afterwards

Under the later Peishwas, it was regularly entered in the accounts as an item of non-Imperial revenue, and a source of profit to the minor chiefs. Under the Peishwas, drunkenness was punishable with flogging, the administration of which punishment, moreover, was not by any means uncommon. There is no regular excise establishment in the Bombay Presidency. Except in the island of Salsette, where a new system was introduced in 1864-65, and in the three Sadar distilleries, there is no expenditure incurred by the State for any special establishment. If the Sadar distillery system were more largely introduced to the displacement of the system of taxing individual trees, the profits of *Toddy* drawers would be much less than now, for now they have a monopoly, and distil and retail the juice, both sweet and fermented. The incidence of duty varies from 3d per gallon of proof spirits to 2 Rs. per gallon. If a regular excise establishment were created, and the Sadar distillery system substituted in place of the two others, complete control would be possible over the entire manufacture, and the Government could raise the tax when it was low, and thus check the consumption and increase the revenue, and control the number of shops in a district, which its officers cannot now do. The sole object of the Government is no doubt to get a good revenue, but it is also its object to prevent as much as possible an unnecessary consumption of liquor and the increase of drunkenness. At least this profession is freely made in the Government records. As a matter of fact, Government has succeeded in con-

spread of drunkenness. The drunkenness which exists does not lead to so much crime in India as in England. The thief by profession drinks, but drink does not make a thief of him in India as it does in England.

In those Districts where the system of taxing individual trees obtains, the cocoanut, palmyra, and date trees pay two rates:—a small rate on the trunk which is carried to the land revenue, and another on the tree which goes by the name of a tax on the *Toddy* drawer's knife, which is credited to the Abkari. Tapping the cocoanut tree interferes with the capacity of the tree to produce fruits. The date trees in India produce no eatable fruit, and the nut of the palmyra tree is not used for food. The palmyra tree yields juice from its 20th to its 70th year, the date tree from its fifth to its fifteenth year. The cocoanut tree has the same longevity as the palmyra tree. The cocoanut tree is not much tapped except in certain localities. The palmyra tree is tapped two months in every year; a good palmyra tree gives 5 *Seers* of juice, or 300 *Seers* during the tapping season, which is sold for 7 *Rs.*, and pays a tax of 2 *Rupees*. The revenue derived from the palmyra tree varies from 6 *Annas* to 2½ *Rupees* per tree. About 60 palmyra trees grow on an acre of ground. There has been no improvement in the modes of distilling liquors. The sole apparatus consists of a rude earthen or metal retort. There is a distillery at Bhandoop where *Arak* is distilled for the use of the troops, and the process of distilling is of a higher order. The juice is not distilled at Bhandoop from the *Toddy* trees, but from date trees. As long as the farms are given from year to year, there is no

inducement to the farmer to effect any permanent improvements. If the manufacture of *Toddy* or *Arak* were more centralized, Government would be able to place an officer in each distillery, thereby increasing the quantity and refining the quality of the spirits, and also adding to the revenue considerably. An attempt to extract coarse sugar or jaggery from these trees was made many years ago, but it was not successful as the trees do not possess enough of saccharine matter. In the south of India, the production of jaggery has led to the creation of important refining establishments which work very profitably.

Mr. Bell was understood to approve of the establishment of larger and central distilleries, which would be more amenable to the control of Government, and he also recommended the imposition of a uniform duty per gallon upon proof spirits. The drinking of the native spirits has no deleterious effect upon the constitution of the men of the coast districts, who are exposed to a very heavy rainfall and its concomitant fever. The native spirits are to a great extent a necessary of life in the coast districts. There are two seasons when the trees are tapped, November and May. One man can tap 20 palmyra trees in the season, which yield about 200 maunds of juice. According to the quality of the soil where the trees grow, these 200 maunds of juice yield from 33 maunds to 66 maunds of spirits, which are retailed at 3 *Rupees* per maund. The Government tax varies from 4 *Annas* to 2 *Rupees* on each tree, and there thus remains from 100 to 166 *Rupees* to represent the expenses, includ-

ing the charge for profits and the payment of labour.

The revenue derived from the licenses for the retailing of opium in this Presidency amounted to one *lack* and a quarter in 1867. The license is put up to auction, and the highest bidder buys his opium from the Government stores, where it is supplied to him at a price which includes the duty. The licenses for *Ganja* and *Bhang* and other preparations, which yield about half a *lack* for the Presidency, are similarly granted to retail dealers. The manufacture, as well as the retail vending, of *Bhang* and *Ganja* belongs to the Abkari Department. The cultivation of the poppy was suppressed so late as 1838, and it had a great effect in checking the retail sale. Instead of 381 maunds which were given out to the retail sellers in Ahmedabad for the three years 1834-37, only 121 maunds were given out in the succeeding three years. In 1867-68 the amount was only 5 maunds, which shows that there is much illicit consumption in the Guzerath districts. The amount of opium illicitly retailed cannot be less than what, if the duty were fully realized upon it, would bring in 3 *lacks* of *Rupees*, that is to say, double the present revenue. The items of *Bhang* and *Ganja* admit of considerable increase if measures were taken to regulate the growth of hemp and the sale in bulk of these articles on the Bengal model.

One of the 44 *lokhs* of *Punjab* which represent the total of Abkari revenue in the Province of *Punjab*, the details for the several districts are furnished by the Administration Report. The Surat and Tanna

butes $3\frac{1}{2}$ *lacks*, and Tanna 5 *lacks* of revenue. The Sind districts yield a revenue of 4 *lacks*. The Guzerath districts proper,—for some portions of the Surat district retain all the characteristics of the Konkan belt,—are the least productive of the Presidency under this head. The three districts of Ahmedabad, Kaira, and Broach with difficulty contribute between them as much as $1\frac{1}{2}$ *lacks* as Abkari revenue. The Konkan districts are the great sinners in this respect. Surat, Tanna, Ratnagiri, and Canara contribute *lacks* by way of Abkari revenue. Next to the Konkan districts, the Southern Maratha country, Poona, Dharwar and Kalladgi yield the largest income, *lacks* for the three districts. The Maratha district proper, Satara, Ahmednuggar Solapoor Nasick, yield only 2 *lacks*, while Poona and Khandeish yield each two *lacks* as Abkari revenue.

CHAPTER III.

EXCISE REVENUE.

MADRAS.

(SIR T. PYEROFT).

The excise revenue is derived in the Madras Presidency from the sale of the exclusive privilege of selling and manufacturing spirituous and fermented liquors, and amounted to 57 *lacks* of *Rupees* 1869-70. The Abkari revenue does not include *Ganja*, *Bhang* and other drugs, which pay no excise duty, and are not interfered with at all by the State. The excise duty of 57 *lacks* is realized by selling the farm of each district to the highest bidder at auction sales. The farmers arrange with their sub-contractors to establish shops for the sale of spirituous liquors. The country *Arak* or distilled spirit is made from rice, flavoured with spices and the bark of some trees. The fermented liquors or *Toddy* is drawn from the cocoanut and palmyra trees on the western coast, and from the date trees on the eastern coast. The cocoanut, palmyra, and date trees are taxed singly or in groves, but the proceeds of this tax form part of the land revenue. The Government has no distilleries of its own for the manufacture of spirits except in the city of Madras itself. In the districts the farmers distil in their own distilleries. There is no obligation on the farmer to manufacture his own spirit. He might import it from a distance, if he only takes care that it was not sold in transit to the detriment of other farmers. The farmer gets a lease in which the villages and shops may

he opened are defined, and one of the conditions that he shall not charge less than a certain rate. The condition is imposed with the object of preventing people from getting the liquor cheap. Exclusive of Madras town, the Presidency districts, containing a population of nearly 26 millions, pay an excise duty of 44 lacks, or 3 *Annas* per head of the population. The town of Madras with its suburbs and the district around contains $12\frac{3}{4}$ lacks of population, and pays $12\frac{1}{2}$ lacks of *Rupees* as excise duty, which gives a proportion of nearly a *Rupee* per head. These totals do not include the supply of spirits to the army which is a separate concern, and is managed by the Commissariat, who supply liquor for canteens and other places from the head quarters at Madras.

In the town of Madras, the shops are rented separately; the Government have their own distillery and all the native spirit is supplied from it. The *Columbo* and *Ceylon Arak* sold in the shops is also imported by the Government, and supplied to the retail dealers. The revenue is chiefly derived from the sale of the *Arak*. There is a regulation which prohibits Government from making a profit of more than $3\frac{1}{2}$ *Rs.* per gallon, which, being added to the cost of manufacturing country liquor, determines the sale price. The maximum charge is $3\frac{1}{2}$ *Rs.* per gallon. The Government does not sell the liquor at an upset price but it sells the shops for which the proper prices are fixed by the Police and Magisterial authorities who of course grant the licenses to those who bid highest at the auction sales of the shops. The particular

here the shop is situated

Government; the farmer finds his own shop in the locality; it is only the privilege of selling liquor in the particular localities or streets which is sold by auction. For the whole of the Madras town and suburbs with a population of $12\frac{3}{4}$ lacks, the excise revenue yields $12\frac{1}{2}$ lacks, including the profits of the distilleries, and the proceeds of the sale of the shop licenses.

During the last four years, this branch of revenue has steadily increased. In 1865-66 it was $41\frac{1}{2}$ lacks, in 1866-67, it was $42\frac{3}{4}$ lacks, in 1867-68, it rose to $50\frac{1}{2}$ lacks, in 1868-69 it was 49 lacks, and in 1869 70 it reached the large total 57 lacks. This increased revenue is due solely to increased consumption as the duty has not been increased. It is the lower classes of menials and labourers and men employed on public works who drink most, and this consumption is likely to increase with the improvement in the condition of the people and the rise in wages. The towns consume more liquor than the country. The higher castes do not drink. The shop licenses do not include European drinks; in the shops only country liquors are sold, and they are allowed to sell only small quantities, a bottle of brandy or so, of the European drinks. The English drinks are sold in English shops, and licenses are taken out for the sale of these liquors, which bring, however, but a small sum by way of revenue. None but licensed shop-keepers can sell these European drinks. The English shops cannot sell less than a certain quantity, half a dozen of bottles or so, at a time. There is very little demand for

some country spirits and Columbo Arak to which they been accustomed all along.

As for the consumption of the army in the canteens, the soldiers are allowed a fixed quantity of Arak, and of late years, in lieu of Arak, beer per head. The duty on intoxicating spirits is 3 Rs. per gallon, and the duty is increased as the strength exceeds London proof. As a general proposition, the farmer of the district retails spirits of his own manufacture; he has no manufacture of liquors to sell to retailers, or to the customers of those shops for which he does not hold a license. In Sir T. Pycroft's opinion, intoxication has not much increased in the Madras Presidency. Though increased revenue indicates that there is some increase in drunkenness, the average per head shows that there cannot be much drunkenness prevailing to any large extent. The system of farming out whole districts is found much more convenient than giving licenses to the sellers direct, as the district farmer is generally a man of capital, and is more easily dealt with. The Abkari revenue in Madras does not include either opium or tobacco. No licenses are needed for the sale of opium, or for opium smoking, and no revenue is derived from these sources.

Sir T. Pycroft expressed himself perfectly satisfied with the present system as it obtains in the Madras Presidency. It is not liable to any objections which are not incidental to all systems of taxing liquors. If drunkenness has increased as compared with native rule, it is because people get better wages, and spend more money in one of the few luxuries in

which they indulge. There is a strong feeling in some quarters against the unlimited sale of intoxicating liquors and against the consequent spread of drunkenness among the natives, but it does not go to the extent of any allegation that the actual physical condition of the people has in any way deteriorated by reason of the increasing consumption. There is no more foundation also for the allegation that their comfort and life and the comforts of their families are much deteriorated in consequence. The competition at the sale of licenses or farms by auction is supposed to create an inducement on the part of the liquor sellers to stimulate consumption, but even if there were no competition, it would be the interest of the liquor sellers to sell all they could. The liquor sellers are forbidden by their licenses from harbouring bad characters, or allowing disorderly practices such as gambling and others on their premises. It is part of the agreement that they shall not allow drunkenness in their premises. The present system of licenses and farms has obtained in the Presidency ever since 1812. Sir T. Pycroft admitted that probably a Hindu or Mahomedan Government would have been more strict with its subjects for indulging in intoxicating drinks than the British Government. Women in Southern India drink to some extent, but they use fermented liquors more than spirits. Opium is not produced in the Presidency, and there is a heavy pass-duty on its export, which pass is never granted, and this prevents the cultivation of opium to any extent

CHAPTER IV.

[EXCISE REVENUE.

(PUNJAB.)

In the earlier period succeeding the conquest, the monopoly or farming system obtained in the province of Punjab on the model of the system which prevails in Bombay. The monopoly of sale was let out by auction to those who made the highest bid for it. Within the last five or six years, the Sadar distillery system has almost wholly superseded the farming system. A still-head duty of 8 Rs. a gallon is levied upon all spirits of medium strength. The rate varies according to the varying strength of the spirits. Besides the still-head duty, a large portion of the revenue is derived from licensing shops for the sale of liquors. Annual licenses are given to the highest bidders at the auction sales. The collectors of revenue fix the locality, and the limits and the licenses of shops are under the control of the magistrates. In the Punjab, the Mahomedans form the majority of the population, and they are not as a rule given to drink. The Seiks do drink to a considerable extent, but they are a small minority of the people. The working people of the lower classes and castes, the menial servants, horse-keepers &c, these are the largest consumers. Sir D. F. Macleod said his early years of service were spent in the Narbada territories inhabited by the Gonds, who were excessively given to drink, and the result was that whole *Parganas* were depopulated in consequence of the operations of the spirit contractors. These sent their agents to seduce the simple people,

and demoralized them utterly till many were at last sold out of house and home and absconded in thousands. This was the effect of the large farming system, though such a result was certainly not intended by the Government. The Government at last displaced the old system by establishing Sadar distilleries in these Narbada districts. The Sadar distillery system has worked well in the Punjab.

The Punjab Government derives a small revenue from the monopoly of the sale of the different preparations of the hemp, *Bhang*, *Ganja*, &c., revenue. The proceeds of these articles were at first reckoned as part of the *Abkari* revenue, but are now kept separate in the accounts. The sale of opium is also farmed out in the same way. The revenue obtained from the licences for the sale of opium is shown differently in the accounts, though opium itself is included among the narcotic and revenue-paying drugs. These branches of revenue are still let out for whole districts as before. There is a small area of ground in the hill parts of the Punjab where opium is grown of a superior quality, and a duty is levied upon it when it is exported to other parts of the country. The *Seiks* smoke opium largely, and it is not known to produce any ill effect upon them, except that when deprived of it, inveterate smokers become helpless. Much greater injury is done by the consumption of the drug itself. Unless when taken in very large quantities, opium does not shorten life. There is no tax levied on tobacco, though the recommendation to tax it has been made. Mr. Strachey wrote

an elaborate paper condemning the ... and the ...
posal was dropped.



ASSESSSED TAXES.

The fifth item of Revenue in our annual budget is made up of assessed taxes on income and trade profits. This resource of revenue was at first devised as a short and swift remedy to make both ends meet, and to restore the balance which had been disturbed by the permanent increase in expenditure caused by the Mutiny. After undergoing many alterations, the extraordinary levy has now obtained a permanent place in the revenue system of the empire, and in the hands of our Financial Secretary has been the magic wand to restore the equilibrium of our ways and means, and patch up artificial deficiencies. Mr. Secombe of the India Office was examined before the Committee on this subject. His evidence is singularly imperfect in all those respects in which a person in the position of Financial Secretary to the autocrat Minister for India may be expected above all others to be fully and accurately informed. Beyond giving a bare out-line without the details of facts and figures of the several taxation-acts which have been passed during the last 12 years, Mr. Secombe was not able to throw any light upon the larger questions involved, which have been so hotly debated in Council and in the Press, the actual incidence of the taxes, their adaptability to the existing economic state of native society, and the extent to which direct taxes of this kind are made instruments of oppression in their systematic levy. In giving an outline of his evidence, I will supplement it in places with information from the Adminis-

tration Reports and Mr. Geddes's Logic of Indian Deficits.

Mr. Wilson was the Finance Minister who first introduced the Income Tax in India. There were, it is true trade and excise taxes levied in the different provinces before this time. The *Moturfa* tax was in fact a favourite levy in all native States, though the general tendency of the British Government down to the time of Mr. Wilson was to abolish all direct taxes on trade and professions. The *Moturfa* was expressly abolished throughout most of the Indian provinces except Madras, where it was levied down to the times of Mr. Wilson when it gave way to the Income Tax. In Madras and Oude direct taxes on trade and professions were levied since 1860, but they are not included in the general Indian Income Tax of 1860. The tax was fixed at first for five years certain. A person whose income was Rs. were subjected to the tax. Persons between 200 and 500 Rs. were subjected to a charge of only two per cent. On incomes above 500 Rs., the tax was 4 per cent., of which 3 per cent. were levied for the general purposes of the Government and 1 per cent. was levied for the benefit of the Government. The incidence of the tax was not uniform. The *Talukdars* of Oude, nor the *Zemindars* of permanent settlements in Bengal. Mr. Wilson had at first intended to levy a tax on articles of personal consumption, but this was abandoned. However, an attempt was again made to levy a license tax on a mo-

ter the bill was passed, the tax was kept in abeyance from political considerations.

In 1862, however, the minimum of income liable to taxation was raised from 200 to 500 *Rs.*, as the levy of two per cent. duty on the smaller incomes was found to cost 30 per cent. of the receipts in the mere collections. In 1863, the tax was reduced from 4 to 3 per cent. on all incomes. In the first year when the tax was fully levied according to its original conception, the yield was two *crores* and 5 *lacks* of *Rupees*. The three per cent. Income-tax of 1864-65 produced $1\frac{1}{2}$ *crores* of *Rupees*.

The original five years' term of the tax expired in 1865, which was a year of apparent surplus, and Sir C. Trevelyan kept the solemn pledge given by the Government of India when the tax was first levied, and no assessed taxes were levied in 1866. In 1867, the deficit reappeared, and Mr. Massey imposed the first License Tax on professions and trades, the minimum license being 4 *Rupees* upon traders whose profits were between 200 and 500 *Rs.* a year, and the license rate ascended gradually, till it reached the maximum of 500 *Rupees* upon all trade profits above 25,000 *Rs.* a year. Though this was called a license tax, Government servants with salaries above 1,000 *Rs.* a year were not exempted from its operation; the only exempted classes were land-owners and cultivators of land who kept no shop, and members of the military service not in civil employ, in whose favour the minimum of exempted incomes was fixed at 6,000 *Rs.* instead of 1,000 *Rs.* as in the case of all other servants.

In 1868 this License Tax was extended to all other

called a Certificate Tax was imposed in its place. The minimum assessable income was fixed at 500 *Rs.*, upon which income a certificate tax of 8 *Rupees* a year was levied, and the scale of the tax gradually ascended to the maximum rate of 6,400 *Rs.* upon incomes of 4 *lacks* a year. The exempted classes were pretty much the same as in the case of the License Tax of 1867. Persons who derived incomes from land and Indian securities were exempted from assessment. In 1869, the Income Tax was again imposed at one per cent. upon all incomes arising from offices, property, professions, and trades. All incomes below 500 *Rs.* were exempted from this tax. Land-holders and cultivators were not exempted from the operation of this tax. The exemption of the military officers not in civil employ, with incomes of less than 6,000 *Rupees*, was continued, and all property dedicated to religious and charitable purposes was exempted. In fact, this kind of property had been exempted from assessment under all the previous Acts. In the middle of the year 1869, a large deficit was apprehended by Lord Mayo and his Council, and the tax was raised by half a per cent. In the year 1870, the Income Tax was again imposed, this time at the rate of 6 *Pies* in the *Rupee*, or $3\frac{1}{8}$ per cent. In the previous Income Tax Acts, the persons liable to be taxed had to fill in the returns. This was dispensed with in 1870 with regard to the lower incomes; under the new Act, the Collector assessed the amount, and, unless the party so assessed appealed against the Collector's estimate, he had to

pay the assessment. In 1871, the tax was again reduced, the minimum limit was raised from 500 to 750 Rs., and the tax was lowered from $3\frac{1}{8}$ to a fraction above one per cent. Mr. Secombe admitted that he was unable to furnish the committee with the precise results as regards the yield of each tax, because no such accounts had been furnished to the India Office in England. Speaking approximately, the estimated outturn of an Income tax at one per cent., comprising all incomes below 500 Rs., is about 70 lacks. The India Office has no authentic statements as to the precise amount that would be obtained by a one per cent. levy; nor is there any statement showing the classified collection of the tax, the difference between the assessed amount, and the number of taxable persons in the different classes. Mr. Secombe stated that the Government of India had very accurate and voluminous statistics on these heads, but this detailed information was not sent to England.

Mr. Secombe was asked whether the India Office had received any representations to the effect that popular feeling in India was strongly against the Income Tax. He could not say that there had been any such feeling when the tax was first imposed, although there was a very bitter altercation between the Government of Madras and the Supreme Government, yet there was on the whole little exhibition of feeling on the part of the people. There was only one instance in which the officers employed in the revenue districts were considered to have exhibited themselves, and opposed the tax. There is no doubt there has been much exhibition of feeling, several

have been received, and many

the Department of Revenue

upon the strength of these representations, inquired of the Government in India whether the complaints of oppression were well founded. In their reply, the Government of India admitted that there had been some instances of oppression, but none of a serious character. The feeling of discontent is to a great extent shared by all the communities, and it is not confined to any one class. The Government has never resorted to the expedient of imposing a special tax as an extraordinary revenue on the occasion of a great war or a similar national calamity. It reaches those classes of men who are engaged in trade and commerce, and who would be otherwise inadequately taxed at all, at least in proportion to the income of the rest of the population in India. When the first Income tax was imposed, the question whether the imposition of the tax was not a breach of faith with the proprietors of land with whom a permanent or periodical settlement had been made was debated, and Mr. Wilson decided that there was no breach of faith involved in the levy, and the action of Mr. Wilson and his successors has been all through approved by the Secretary of State in Council. The License Tax was given up because it was found that it was only an imperfect Income Tax; and the Income tax was again given up because it was the fairest mode of levying assessed taxes. There are three modes of levying assessed taxes, namely, by calling for

returns of income, and assessing them accordingly after inquiring into each individual income ; secondly, by making a lump assessment for towns or districts, and leaving the distribution thereof to the collective body of the inhabitants so taxed, a plan which was much resorted to in the Punjab and Oudh ; thirdly, there is the system of fixing grades and classes, and confining the inquiry into individual incomes to the extent of fixing their grade only.

The revenue derived from assessed taxes in 1869-1870 for the several provinces of India, when the tax was only one and a half per cent, and all incomes below 500 *Rs.* were exempted, was as follows :—Bengal yielded $37\frac{1}{2}$ *lacks*, Bombay yielded $24\frac{1}{2}$ *lacks*, the N. W. Provinces yielded 15 *lacks*, Madras yielded $13\frac{1}{2}$ *lacks*, the Punjab yielded $6\frac{1}{2}$ *lacks*, Central Provinces $5\frac{1}{2}$ *lacks*, Oudh $2\frac{3}{4}$ *lacks*, British Burmah $1\frac{1}{2}$ *lacks*, making up a total of one *crore* and 11 *lacks*.

SECTION VI.

SALT REVENUE.

(BENGAL.)

I shall now proceed to furnish a summary of the evidence regarding the Salt Revenue estimated at six crores of *Rs.* in the Budget. It is by far the most important of our indirect taxes; it is moreover a tax on one of the necessaries of life, and as such it forms a part of every body's bill of fare, and none however poor are exempted from paying it. Sir C. Beadon and Sir E. Halliday, both of them in their time Governor of Bengal, were examined by a committee with regard to the salt revenue of Bengal proper. In 1856 Lord Dalhousie ordered an inquiry into the manufacture and sale of salt and the methods of levying salt Revenue which obtained throughout India. At that time, the salt revenue was collected under three different systems in Bengal,—(1) under a system of Government manufacture and sale as regards salt produced in Bengal, (2) by the levy of duty on imported foreign salt, and (3) by issuing licenses on payment of duty to manufacture salt.

With regard to the salt produced in Bengal, Sir C. Beadon stated that the sea-board districts were divided into a certain number of agencies, and an agent was appointed for each district agency. Agreements were made to the agents of the districts who entered into agreements to manufacture and sell to the Government a certain quantity of salt at a certain rate. The salt was then taken up in Government carts till it was sold.

The sales were effected by the Board of Revenue in Calcutta, to whom merchants applied for the quantity they required, and paid the duty plus the price or cost of manufacture, and the Board thereupon furnished them with an order upon the district agencies for the supply of the salt to the merchants. There was no competition at these sales, the price was fixed by the Government, and every body was free to buy at that rate. Besides these wholesale clearances from the Presidency ware-houses, local stores were opened in the salt-producing districts whenever it was found difficult to realize the Calcutta scale of duty, and the merchants bought the salt from these local depots at prices fixed by the Board with reference to the particular circumstances of each district. In 1856, the salt duty was 3 *Rs.* 4 *Annas* per maund, or 72d. on 80 lbs. The general cost of manufacturing salt varied from 80 to 110 *Rs.* for 100 maunds. The duty was thus nearly three times the cost of manufacture. Though the import duty on foreign salt was fixed at the same rate as that on manufactured salt, it was found that imported salt could be sold much cheaper than manufactured salt. In the few cases where licenses for private manufacture were given, the license duty was equal to the duty on manufactured salt. These excise licenses were chiefly given to a few Europeans who desired to manufacture salt on more scientific principles. Sir Cecil Beadon furnished some figures representing the cost of manufactured salt on a large scale from the return for 1857-58. The cost price of $27\frac{1}{2}$ lacks of maunds of salt was about 15 lacks of *Rupees*, or about 8 *Annas* a maund. The duty upon these $27\frac{1}{2}$ lacks of maunds

was $68\frac{1}{2}$ lacks of Rupees or about $2\frac{1}{2}$ Rupees per maund, and the total price was about 3 Rs. a maund. The aggregate quantity of salt cleared and sold in 1857-58 was about 71 lacks of maunds, of which about $36\frac{1}{2}$ lacks were manufactured salt, $34\frac{1}{2}$ lacks were imported salt, and about 18,000 maunds paid license duty. The total proceeds were one crore and $83\frac{1}{2}$ lacks, of which one crore and three lacks of Rupees were yielded by the sale of manufactured salt, 80 lacks were the proceeds of the import duty, and half a lack was obtained from the excise licenses. The charges of the department for advances, cost of agencies, and all general expenditure, were 39 lacks, thus leaving a net revenue of one crore and 44 lacks for the whole of Bengal for 1857-58.

Such was the state of things about the time that Lord Dalhousie ordered a general inquiry into the manufacture, sale, and taxation of salt throughout India. No action was taken by the Government in consequence of that inquiry till 1863, when it was resolved to abandon altogether the system of Government manufacture, and its place was to be supplied by the extension of the third system, the levy of an excise duty on salt manufactured in the country. The result of this change was quite unexpected. Partly because no body had sufficient capital to manufacture salt under the excise system, but chiefly because imported salt was cheaper than salt produced in the province, salt ceased altogether to be manufactured in Bengal, and no excise duty, or but an insignificant amount only, was derived from licenses. The main supply of salt in
 now from abroad. The effect upon the

price of salt of this change of system was that it fell 50 per cent. Salt is now imported into Bengal chiefly from England. There is also a considerable importation from Madras and Bombay, including Sind. The fact is that there are some serious natural difficulties in the way of a cheap manufacture of salt in Bengal. The brine at the head of the Bay of Bengal is greatly diluted with the fresh water of the Ganges, and requires a more expensive process of evaporation than salt produced in Madras or Bombay, where the brine is pure sea-water, and is easily evaporated by the solar rays, or than rock salt dug out of the earth. By reason of the diminution in price, the consumption of salt increased in ten years from 70 *lacks* of maunds in 1857 to 80 *lacks* in 1867, of which last amount nearly 63 *lacks* were imported from abroad, about 16½ *lacks* were sold by Government from their old stores, and about half a *lack* were manufactured by private persons. The sale price is composed of two elements,—of these from 80 to 110 *Rs.* per 100 maunds represented the cost price in 1857, and the duty of 3¼ *Rs.* per maund was added to it, while in 1867 it was 50 *Rs.* per 100 maunds plus the duty. When the Government manufacture of salt ceased, great distress prevailed among the men who had been previously engaged in the manufacture. Having no agricultural resource, and being trained to no other work, they became perfectly helpless, and before long were swept off the face of the earth, being the first victims of the Orissa famine.

Such were the important consequences of this change of system. The duty on Bengal salt had been

3 Rs. 4 Annas a maund in 1843, from which point it was reduced by successive stages to 2 Rs. 4 Annas in 1856. After the mutiny it was again enhanced to 3 Rs. and 4 annas, at which figure it stood till 1869. The gross yield of the salt duty in 1869 was 2 crores and 58 lacs, and allowing for the charges of collection, (1,20,000 Rupees) and repayments, the net yield was 2 crores and 53½ lacs. The salt duty of 3 Rs and 4 Annas levied in Bengal is higher than what is levied in other parts of India, but it is in the opinion of Sir C. Beadon not too high, and does not diminish consumption. The cost price of salt is as high as 8 Annas a maund in Bengal, so that the duty of 3 Rs. 4 Annas is only 700 per cent. upon the cost price. Sir C. Beadon indeed admitted that private individuals might in favour of the Government, collect the salt at 2 Annas a maund. The Government might, however, if the private collector were at the rate of 2,800 per cent. upon the cost of manufacture. The levy of a duty of 2,800 per cent. upon a prime article of life did not appear to Sir C. Beadon as an extraordinary one, and he said he was of opinion that it is quite possible to have a larger revenue if the duty were enhanced. As to the question whether it was expedient so to raise the duty, Sir C. Beadon said it was difficult to give an answer, as it must depend upon the circumstances under which revenue is required by the Government. There was some salt duty levied under the native rulers, but it was inconsiderable. Sir C. Beadon, so far as the Government is concerned, the people are not at all affected by the salt duty, and the Government can easily

of it as being oppressively heavy. The consumption of salt has regularly increased in spite of the increased duty, and has not been greatly stimulated by any reduction of duty. If it were absolutely necessary to obtain an increased salt revenue, the object would be secured easily by an equalization of the duty all over India, in other words, by raising the rates of Madras and Bombay to the Bengal standard. Speaking abstractedly, as the present duty is only a penny per pound, Sir C. Beadon suggested that if it were absolutely necessary, some addition might be made to the tax without causing any severe burden to fall on even the poorest class of the population. The tax might be increased from $1\frac{1}{2}$ *Anna* to 2 *Annas* safely. The agricultural population of Bengal was in the opinion of Sir C. Beadon much better off than that of the N. W. Provinces, and quite as well off as that of Bombay. The price of salt which has paid duty is not much enhanced by the cost of carriage in Bengal. The price in the remotest district varies from 4 *Rs.* 2 *Annas* to 4 *Rs.* 8 *Annas* per maund. If by making a Railway in a certain district, the price of salt is sensibly lowered by the diminished cost of carriage, it is perfectly fair on the part of Government to enhance the duty to that extent to repay the charges of construction, and the people will not be the worse off for the increase of duty, if it only absorbs the saving caused in diminished cost of carriage.

As stated before, no salt is now manufactured in Bengal. Salt is imported there from England, and from the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay, and from Sind, where salt is cheaply produced. The North

West Provinces are supplied with salt from the Sambhoor lake, the Punjab territories are supplied from the salt Range Hills in that Province, while the Central Provinces are supplied with salt from Bombay. The estimated salt revenue for 1870-71 was more than six crores of Rupees. Of this sum, Madras yielded one crore and 16½ lacks, Bombay yielded 60 lacks, and the revenue from Bengal was two and a half crores.

Some years ago, the Government of India instituted minute inquiries as to the actual consumption of Salt by people of all grades and classes. Sir C. Beadon said that he was quite satisfied from the result of these inquiries that the tax upon salt did not press severely upon any class of the population, and that the outcry against it was to a great extent very unreasonable. The varying scale of the consumption of salt in a well-to-do native family, in a middle class native family, and a family of a man of the lowest classes, was compared, and the result was that, with variations of a trifling sort, the consumption of each family was found to be six *Shers*, or 12 lbs. a year, for each member of the family, both children and adults. There was no material difference between the average consumption of the poor man's family and the consumption in the family of the richest man. Taking the population of India at 4 crores, and the amount of salt consumed to be 280 lacks of maunds, this gives an average of 7 *Shers* per head, which result remarkably confirms the more particular estimate arrived at before. The price of salt has not increased with the general rise in prices during the last few years. There is a sort of a natural and

fixed limit to the consumption of salt. Moreover, while other things consumed by the people are dearer at the Presidency towns and cheaper in the mofussil, salt alone follows a different law. It is cheapest at the centre, and gets dearer as we go into the country. In the mofussil districts, all agricultural products sell at a price in inverse proportion to the facilities of communication with the Presidency Town. Salt on the other hand is cheap in direct proportion to the facilities. The average consumption per head being 14 lbs. or 7 *Shers*, the salt duty operates as a poll tax of 14d., or nearly 10 *Annas* on every man, woman, and child indiscriminately. Though it is really a poll tax it is collected with the greatest possible ease and without the least oppression.

Salt duty is the only tax on necessaries which the masses of the population pay, unless of course we include the excise on spirits and drugs, which are not necessities of life. The Customs duty on clothing does not fall upon the lower classes because they chiefly use country cloth. One consequence of the unequal duties levied in different parts of India is the encouragement held out to extensive smuggling on the confines of the Presidencies, which necessitates a great charge in the maintenance of the service. Some 10,000 men are employed along the line of the Customs frontier between the Presidency and the North-West. The duty on salt has another advantage over the other taxes. By reason of the British Government having the entire command of the coast of India, the Native States have to pay for the salt consumed in their territories just as

Sir F. Halliday was also examined before the Committee with regard to the salt revenue. In reply to the question whether the tax was a judicious one, he stated that it might be theoretically objectionable, though as a matter of fact the native population did not complain of it. In the circumstances of a country like India, it had many recommendations which he enumerated at length. (1) The tax exists, and has existed for a long while. The natives have got to understand it to believe in it, to expect it, and they accordingly never complain of it. (2) It is the only tax which falls upon the people at large, and its place cannot be well supplied by any substitute of a poll tax so easy of levy, and so productive. (3) Owing to the rise in wages, and the increase of facilities, its actual pressure is much lowered than before. (4) Owing to the great simplicity of the wants of the people, and their generally uniform habits as regards the consumption of salt, it shews no great tendency to rise or fall with a lower or higher scale of duty. Sir F. Halliday stated that he had himself reduced the salt duty from 3 *Rs.* and 4 *Annas* to 2 *Rs.* and 8 *Annas*, but he found that the diminished duty did not increase consumption. (5) The tax thus acts very much like a poll tax, and that is one reason why the duty should be equalised over India in justice to the people of Bengal, by which means the extensive temptation to smuggling which an unequal duty holds out would be done away with, and as a consequence, we might be able to dispense with an extensive preventive service. Sir F. Halliday concluded his reply upon the consideration that the burden of the salt tax has been of late years very much di-

rise in wages, secondly, by the diminution in the cost of conveyance, and thirdly, by the importation of cheaper salt. The popular outcry against the injustice or oppression of the salt duty is not in any way a legitimate expression of the feeling of the native population who pay the tax, for they make no complaint. Moreover, if the exigencies of the State required it, Sir F. Halliday admitted that the tax might be increased moderately, i. e. to two *Annas* a maund, or 25 per cent. over its present amount, without any approach to oppression, or without seriously diminishing consumption. The charge of one penny per pound of salt gives about 8 *Annas* a year per head. The earnings of a Bengalee labourer with wife and three children will be about 8 *Annas* a day, out of which they would have to pay about three *Annas* a month for the consumption of salt. Labourers' wages in the Bengal districts, are seldom lower than 4 *Annas* a day. They are much higher in the towns and in the vicinity of railways. Besides tobacco, there is no other article like salt of general consumption, on which an indirect tax could be imposed so as to fall upon the majority of the population. The outcry against the oppressive nature of the salt duty was chiefly a reflection of opinion from England, where the objections were raised in the interests of the Cheshire Salt manufacturers.

The tendency of the recent action of Government to reduce the expenses of the Customs frontier line, chiefly out of deference to the sentiment of the English public, has resulted in an attempt to equalize the duty by lowering it in those districts where it was highest. Sir F.

Halliday said he was of opinion that the equalization should be brought about by raising the duty all round to the Bengal and North-West Provinces scale. No precise limit can be fixed, except after actual trial, beyond which the duty may not be raised. If, as the result of any definite increase of duty, diminished consumption followed, that would be the extreme limit beyond which taxation should not go.

Besides its consumption for domestic purposes salt in Bengal is not at all used in agriculture. It is used slightly for cattle and for curing fish in Bombay. Nobody in India salts his meat as the climate does not admit of it.

SALT REVENUE.

MADRAS.

(SIR T. PYEROFT.)

In the Madras Presidency, ever since 1805, the salt revenue has been collected under the monopoly system. Both the manufacture and sale of salt are exclusively in Government hands. In the beginning of the season, the Government contracts with the manufacturers at the different salt works for the quantity of salt required, which is accordingly brought into store by the manufacturers. It is stored on the Government platforms, and sold in due course to dealers at the monopoly rates. The rate at present is 2 *Rs.* per maund. It was 1 *Rupree* 11 *Annas* before. There are express regulations in regard to the salt monopoly, and none but those who hold the Government license are permitted to manufacture salt. The manufacturer owns the salt pans or beds, and he produces in these beds as much salt as may be required. The Government determines for each salt work how much salt is required to be produced in it, and when that quantity is ascertained, it arranges for the supply with the salt manufacturers, giving to each a fair proportion to manufacture, and the manufacturer accordingly stores the quantity required from him on the Government platforms. The Government takes it to Government magazines, and it is sold by measure again by Government to wholesale merchants, except for purposes of export, when sold by weight. When salt is exported, the Government puts it on board the shipping vessel and charges, and does not receive any price for it. The monopoly is

As between the Government and the manufacturer the rates are fixed by custom, and continue from year to year without change, though they vary from place to place. The price in the northern division is lower than that which obtains in the south. These rates are not regulated by competition. They vary from 5 *Rs.* to 12 or 14 *Rupees* by the *Garce*, which is equivalent to about $4\frac{1}{2}$ tons. The Government sells salt both wholesale and in retail to the dealers who come to the store-houses to buy salt there. In some parts of the country where the land is low, the swamps are occasionally inundated by high tides, and the water is then prevented from returning, and is allowed to evaporate. The salt so produced is also brought to the Government stores, and sold in the same way as all other salt.

From 1850 to 1859, the salt duty was one *Rupee* per Indian maund, and the quantity sold was 49 *lacks* of maunds. In 1856 a Commission was appointed by the Government of India, and it made its report on the Madras salt monopoly. Mr. Plowden, one of the Commissioners, recommended that an excise duty should be substituted for the monopoly system, but nothing was done at the time to carry out this suggestion. In 1860 the duty was raised to one *Rupee* and two *Annas*, and the quantity sold in that year was 58 *lacks* of maunds. In 1861, the duty was again raised from 1 *Rupee* 2 *Annas* to 1 *Rupee* 6 *Annas*, and the quantity sold was $60\frac{3}{4}$ *lacks* of maunds. The increased duty was partly compensated by the diminished cost of conveyance, for in that year about 200 miles of the railway were first opened for traffic. This cir-

...stance might partly account for the increased consumption notwithstanding the increase of duty. The duty was subsequently raised to 1 *Rupee* and 11 *Annas*. In the year 1868-69, the quantity sold had increased to 67 *lacks*. In the next year it fell off, because the duty was suddenly raised in October 1869 to 2 *Rupees* per maund. This sudden enhancement was made at a time when the Government of India apprehended a great financial crisis, it was made in the middle of the year, and for a time it checked the sale. The railway carried about 17½ *lacks* of maunds of salt into the interior districts in 1870 at one-fourth the cost of bullock conveyance. In the year 1870, a final effort was made to adopt the suggestion of Mr. Plowden's Commission, and an act was passed assimilating the system of levying the salt duty in Madras with that of Bombay. The advantages of levying the duty on the sale instead of on the production under the monopoly system are considerable, though the cost of collection is much the same under either system. The supply is more nearly adjusted to the demand when there is free trade, and people are allowed to manufacture salt than there is than is the case under the monopoly system. Moreover, salt will be produced, and therefore sold, at a lower price under the influence of free competition than it is now demanded by the Government licensees now demand by reason of their monopoly of production. The excise will however be introduced gradually in the Presidency, and is to be tried in one district at a time, and slowly extended till it prevails throughout the Presidency.

Sir T. Pycroft stated that he did not recollect having heard any complaints as to the onerous character of this duty from the native inhabitants of any part of the Madras Presidency. Salt is not used to any great extent in curing fish in Madras ; people dry the fish in the sun without salt. Salt is occasionally given to cattle, but it is chiefly used for domestic purposes. In the Madras Presidency, wages are mostly paid in grain, and that quantity has not increased with the rise in prices, though the rise of prices has indirectly benefited the labourers. The wages of unskilled labour on the Public Works and the Railway are about 4 *Annas* a day, and the charge for the salt tax does not fall heavy on a labourer's family. About 15 lbs. of salt per head of the population, taking young and old together, is a fair estimate of the consumption of salt throughout the Presidency.

The salt which pays duty at Madras supplies the native States of Mysore and Hydrabad with the quantity they consume, and no drawback is allowed on the salt exported to these native territories. The maritime State of Travancore manufactures its own salt, and also imports salt from Bombay. It provides itself with salt enough for its own consumption, and does not export. The prices are much the same there as in Madras, and there is no inducement to export it. There is an arrangement with the State of Cochin by which that State is made to charge the Madras price for the salt produced within its limits, and therefore there is not much salt that comes in thence. In the French territory, salt was manufactured many years ago, but on consideration of receiving 4 *lacks* of *Sicca*

Rupees, the French Government has given up its right to the manufacture, and now its supply of salt comes from Madras, and the French have bound themselves not to sell salt below the Madras rates. Madras salt also finds its way to Bengal on the confines of the two Provinces near the Chillka lake. With the view of equalizing the duty in the two Presidencies of Bengal and Madras, the Government of India made several proposals to increase the duty in Madras, but these proposals have always met with opposition from the Government of Madras. The people of Madras are less able to bear a heavy salt tax than those of Bengal, because the country of Bengal is better favoured by nature than Madras, the soil is more fertile in Bengal, and its large rivers afford all the advantages of cheap and natural irrigation. In Madras, all crops which require much water depend upon artificial irrigation from tanks and channels and not from nature. The land rent in Bengal is much lower than that of Madras, and food grain is much cheaper in Bengal than in southern India. The salt duty in Bengal is accordingly of no great enhancement in Madras.

If, however, the consumption be not materially diminished by the increase of the tax, the salt duty may be safely enhanced. If this duty were wholly removed, the natural price of salt would be about two *Annas* a maund. The duty therefore of two *Rupees* a maund is about 1,600 per cent. on the value of the article, or, in other words, the price of salt is now about sixteen fold on account of the duty. The total value of the duty for 1868, when the duty was 1 *Rupee* 11 *Annas* a maund, were one crore and 10½ lacks of *Rupees*. In 1869,

the duty was increased 20 per cent. in the middle of the year, and the realizations were one crore and 16½ lacks of *P* or about 5½ per cent. only more than the amount realized in 1868. The proportionately diminished yield indicates a diminished consumption, or rather indicates that the consumption had reached its normal limits. The charges for collection are about 2¼ per cent. of the gross receipts net of cost of manufacture, which will be *nil* when the excise system has been generally adopted. Including the cost of manufacture, the proportion of charges to the gross receipts was 12 per cent. On the Coromandel Coast, owing to the character of the surf, salt cannot be imported except at a loss. Imported salt cannot compete in those parts with salt manufactured on the coast. Madras is thus differently circumstanced from Bengal in this respect, for Bengal finds it cheaper to import salt than to manufacture it. When the excise system is fully adopted, the import duty would be fixed at the same rate as the excise duty, *i. e.*, 1 *Rupee 13 Anna* per maund. There is little possibility of foreign competition in the Madras Presidency, unless the imported salt can be manufactured at a cheaper rate than 2 or 3 *Annas* a maund.

SALT REVENUE

BOMBAY.

(MR. PEDDER.)

Mr. Pedder was appointed in 1869 by the Government of India on special duty to prosecute inquiries into the salt department of the Bombay Presidency, and it was chiefly at his suggestion that the salt revenue department, which was superintended by the Customs Commissioner till 1870, was made over to the charge of a special Collector. Mr. Pedder was examined by the Committee, and stated that the system of collecting the salt revenue in Bombay, unlike the system of Government manufacture and sale which obtained in Bengal and Madras till very recent times, has always, at least ever since 1837, been one of an excise duty supplemented in places by the levy of an import duty. An uniform excise system was first regularly introduced in 1837. Before that year, the duty was partly levied in the form of a transit duty on salt which passed from the salt districts, partly in the shape of an excise duty, and partly by charging a monopoly price at the various salt works which belonged to the Government. The transit duties were abolished in 1837, and in their place a duty of 8 *Annas* per maund of 82 lbs. was imposed in that year. When town duties and taxes on professions were abolished in 1844, the salt duty was raised to 12 *Annas*. In 1859, the duty was further raised to one *Rupee* per maund, it was again enhanced to one *Rupee* and a quarter in 1861, one *Rupee* and a half in 1865, and one *Rupee* and thirteen *Annas* in 1869. The Bom-

bay Government gave their consent to this final increase with great reluctance. They represented to the Government of India that the people of this Presidency had been subjected to much taxation which the people of Bengal had escaped, and that the consumption of salt had diminished with the increase of duty since 1843, which showed that a contraband trade in the article existed to a large extent.

In the northern part of the Bombay Presidency, the salt works are the property of Government, and Government pays a fixed price of one *Anna* and a quarter per maund for manufactured salt to those who contract to manufacture it in these Government salt pans. The people who manufacture salt are cultivators of land as well as those who live by salt making. In the rest of the Presidency, the prevailing system is that of a free excise on manufacture, and the manufacturers take out licenses to open works on their own lands. Any one that possesses land suitable for the evaporation of salt may apply for a license, which he obtains as a matter of course, if he can show that there is likely to be a considerable demand for his salt. The present law empowers the Commissioner of Customs to suppress any work that does not produce 5,000 maunds per annum. This limit is fixed for the purpose of protecting the revenue. Since the constitution of a separate salt department in 1870, the Government of Bombay has adopted many similar measures of precaution with the intention of preventing smuggling. In the salt works in the Northern division have been closed, and a great central saltwork was opened at *Bombay*, and a light branch railway

ted connecting this work with the B. B. C. I. Railway, also which has now been opened for the sale of salt in the interior. These reforms, and the close superintendence exercised in the preventive service, have resulted in a considerable increase in the revenue of nearly ten *lacks* in three years. The revenue was $63\frac{1}{2}$ *lacks* in 1871, and had risen to 72 *lacks* in 1873-74. This revenue was chiefly obtained from the excise duty which yielded 68 *lacks*, while land and sea import duty brought in $3\frac{1}{4}$ *lacks* in 1873.

The approximate quantity of salt delivered from the salt districts for consumption into the interior was 30 *lacks* of maunds in 1843-44, and, if Canara be excluded from the account, this amount has not much changed in the course of the last 30 years. Besides the districts of the Presidency proper, Bombay supplies salt to the North Western Provinces included in the Presidency, and to the States of the Deccan, for the Peishwa's Government reserved to itself the exclusive right of levying salt duty throughout its possessions, to which right the British Government has not interfered. The Berars, the Central Provinces, and the Nizam's Dominions, and Mysore, also receive their supplies from Bombay. The consumption of the Bombay Presidency is about 22 *lacks* of maunds; $4\frac{3}{4}$ *lacks* are supplied to the Berars and the States of the Deccan, a *lack* and three quarters to the States of the North Western Provinces, and about 1 *lack* goes to Hyderabad. Large quantities are exported to Madras and Calcutta by the sea.

The quantity of salt consumed by the population upon the coast of the Presidency is about 100 *lacks* of maunds.

to be the normal amount required by the habits of the people. This low average shows that there is much salt consumed which pays no duty. Mr. Pedder estimates that this illicit consumption, if properly checked, would bring in 14 *lacks of Rupees* as additional revenue.

Besides the salt manufactured by the process of evaporation on the sea coast, a large quantity of the best salt is produced from the saline deposit on the Runn of Cutch, some of which is naturally produced without manual labour, and the rest is manufactured by solar evaporation. Besides this Runn salt, much free salt is manufactured at Cambay, and in the Portuguese dominions of Goa and Daman. It is true there is a frontier duty levied on this salt when it enters British territories, but much salt escapes through the cordon without paying duty. The salt works, moreover, are distributed all along the coast, and in places very difficult to guard, in consequence of which much smuggling goes on unchecked. In Mr. Pedder's opinion, a system of free excise permits smuggling more than the system of monopoly such as that which obtained in Madras. Even when the salt works belong to Government, the manufacturer in this Presidency does not store the salt manufactured in Government warehouses as in Madras. He sells directly to the merchants, and the salt does not come into the possession of Government. The duty is paid not by the manufacturer but by the merchant, who purchases it from the maker, and pays the permit duty when he removes the salt according to the weight removed. The

salt is delivered to him by weight under the inspection of a Government officer according to the quantity specified in the permit order.

In the northern division of the Bombay Presidency, the salt belongs to Government, and the Government sells it to the merchants at a permanently fixed price, two *Annas* a maund. In the southern division, the salt belongs to private persons, and its price is fixed by an arrangement between buyers and sellers. The price varies from an *Anna* and a quarter to 3 *Annas*, according to the quality of the salt. In Mr. Pedder's opinion, the Madras monopoly system would be the most economical one, but it cannot now be introduced in Bombay as it would interfere with vested interests. The system which obtains in the northern portion of the Presidency admits of closer inspection than that which obtains in the southern division. As the salt works belong to the Government, salt can be stored, and the works inspected, and illicit smuggling prevented, more effectually in the northern than in the southern division where the works are scattered all over the coast. Mr. Pedder proposed as a remedy that the smaller works should be suppressed, either so as to concentrate the manufacture as much as possible, and allow watchful supervision. As described before, the Government of Bombay has given effect to some of these proposals.

The salt revenue was 24 *lacks* of *Rupees* in the first five years commencing with 1844, when the duty was 12 *Annas* per maund. It rose to 45½ *lacks* in the years 1865-69 when the duty was 1 *Rupee* 8 *Annas* per maund. In the year 1869, the quantity of salt re-

removed was 33 *lacks* of maunds, and the duty realized was 59 *lacks* of *Rupees*. In 1870, when the duty was 1 *Rupee* 13 *Annas* per maund, the quantity of salt removed had risen to 37 *lacks* of maunds, and the duty realized was 63 *lacks* of *Rupees*. In 1873-74 the duty realized was nearly 72 *lacks* of *Rupees* of which sum, nearly 67½ *lacks* were realized by way of excise duty on salt removed from pans, about 2¾ *lacks* were excise duty on salt exported by land, ½ *lack* was realized from the salt removed by sea, about ¾ *lack* represented the annual value of the proprietary right of Government in the salt pans, and a quarter *lack* was received as the ground rent from salt pans.

In Mr. Pedder's opinion, the people hardly feel the weight of the tax, as the incidence of the duty is only 3 *Annas* 8 *pies* per head per annum, and there is no popular complaint against it. The average rate of wages of unskilled labour is 3 *Annas* per day. A good deal of salt is given to cattle, and much is used in curing fish. Salted fish is carried very largely into the interior. Little or no salt is used for agricultural purposes in this Presidency. If there were not such extensive smuggling, those who use salt to cure fish would be placed at some disadvantage in competition with the fishermen of Kattiawar and other foreign territories who have to pay no duty, but the illicit removal partly remedies this state of things. The salt duty might in Mr. Pedder's opinion be raised to two *Rupees* per maund in this Presidency. If it were raised above that limit, it would check consumption. The revenue might however be considerably increased by a strict system : : : : : could put a

stop to all illicit consumption. If the duty were increased considerably, it would only encourage the importation of salt from across the frontiers of Rajpootana, the Portuguese dominions, and Kattiawar. The Rajpootana salt is manufactured in the same way as that of the Runn of Cutch. Smuggling is carried to the greatest extent on the Rajpootana frontier. In regard to the other Native States and the Portuguese possessions, a convention or treaty might be easily entered into with them analogous in some degree to the Zolleverin, by which smuggling might be greatly diminished. The Rajpootana States however would be very difficult to deal with. The increased duty seriously affects the interests of the fishermen in British territory, whose industry is thereby exposed to unfair competition. The only way to remedy this evil is to tax foreign fish as it was taxed before, when the temptation to smuggle would cease, or at least would not be so strongly operative as at present. Any reduction of duty, unless it was a descent to the old rates of 8 or 12 *Annas*, would not prevent smuggling. The excessive amount of smuggling which at present obtains is due not so much to the rate of the duty being oppressively heavy, as to the laxness of the system, and the little supervision exercised on the numerous salt works, as also to the circumstance that our districts run into native territories, and that free ports exist in the neighbouring Portuguese territories of Daman. A lower rate of duty would simply yield a less revenue without any compensatory advantage accruing therefrom to the tax-paying consumers of salt. The consumption has remained nearly stationary for the last 25 years, while the revenue has been rapidly declining.

ing the illicit consumption which causes a loss of 25 per cent. Unless the tax is very heavy, the consumption of salt is much the same every year, and is not much affected by the price. The natural cost of the production of salt varies from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 *Annas* a maund; —the present duty in this Presidency is therefore 1600 per cent. upon the natural price. This heavy duty puts it out of the power of fishermen living within the limits of the British territories to pursue an important branch of industry without having recourse to dishonest smuggling. It is true, foreign salted fish might be made to pay a heavy customs duty, and such a duty was levied in times past, but owing to the numerous creeks on the coast, it would be very difficult, if not impracticable, to levy this customs duty upon foreign salted fish without incurring an inadequate expenditure in the shape of a large establishment.

While admitting that the existing duty increases the temptation to smuggle illicit salt, and injuriously affects the honest fisherman's industry, Mr. Pedder still maintained it to be his view that it would be better to increase the salt duty in Bombay and Madras to the level of the present duty in Bengal, rather than impose new taxes which can only fall upon a small minority of the population. The salt tax is the only real tax on necessities that the people of India pay. And as to the alleged demoralizing effects of the tax in the encouragement it holds out to smuggling and dishonesty, Mr. Pedder urged that the Income Tax produced equal mischief. In fact, any other tax which might be suggested would be equally, if not more, objectionable than the existing salt duty. Increased taxation in

India means one of two alternatives, increased salt duty, or the imposition of a tax still more objectionable. No tax can be suggested less objectionable than an enhancement in the salt duty, if more money is wanted by the Government of India.

In the territory of Sind, salt is naturally produced everywhere, and the duty is consequently small, from 6 to 8 *Annas* a maund. In Rajpootana, the duty is levied by a system of transit duties, and if the salt travels over a great distance, the amount of transit duties comes to something considerable. A duty equal to the price is levied by the State where the salt is produced, and then it pays a transit duty on its way out to all the Native States through whose territories it passes. An uniform salt duty might with convenience and benefit to the Native States concerned be levied throughout India, and the native rulers would be but too glad to fall in with proposals by which their revenue would be so materially benefited. The Rajpootana and Malwa salt exported to foreign parts is for the most part produced from certain salt lakes, and has to be manufactured into a state fit for consumption. Natural salt is also produced there at little or no cost, but it will not bear long travelling.

SALT REVENUE.

N. W. PROVINCES.

(MR. MONEY.)

The most productive salt sources in these Provinces are to be found in foreign territories, in the Rajpootana States of Jeypoor and Bharatpoor, and for many years past the duty has been levied by forming a frontier land customs line of 1,800 miles, intercepting the salt while on its way from the Rajpootana territories to the N. W. Provinces, as also the sugar which passes from the British territories into Rajpootana. The establishment on this line consisted in 1866-67 of 11,000 men, and the annual cost was $11\frac{1}{2}$ lacks of *Rupees*, and the revenue realized was one *crore* and forty lacks. In 1866, it was 1,43,00,009 *Rupees*. The salt chiefly comes from the Sambhoor lake, and has on its way to pay a duty of two *Annas* a maund at Jeypoor, 5 *Annas* and 4 *Pies* a maund at Bharatpoor, two and a half *Annas* at Tonk, 4 *Annas* and 4 *Pies* at Boondee, and so on through the other States before it reaches British territory. Besides the Sambhoor lake supply, salt is found in the Bharatpoor territory, and in the British territory thirty miles from Delhi, at a place called Sultanpoor. Lahore salt comes from the Punjab, and Bengal salt comes up to Allahabad. The Sambhoor lake salt is preferred by the natives above all other varieties. No arrangement has been entered into with the native States by which the frontier line might be given up, and no arrangement is possible till the railway is open to Sambhoor lake. As a result of this new

policy, the management of this lake supply under a lease from the Native State of Jeypoor has already been taken over by the British Government into its own hands.

The salt duty is three *Rupees* per maund, and Mr. [] stated that the tax was not felt to be oppressive, [] never heard a single complaint against it, and further that the duty on salt might be safely increased to 3 *Rupees* and 4 *Annas*. Though the Sultanpoor salt works near Delhi belong to the Government, the tax is collected as in the case of Rajpootana salt by the levy of a transit duty on salt crossing the line, which is between the salt works and British territory. A man consumes 8 lbs. or 4 *Seers* of salt a year, and as taxed salt is sold at Allahabad at 8 *seers* for a *Rupee*, this calculation would give 8 *Annas* as the charge which a single individual has to pay for his consumption all the year round. The general rate of wages is from 4 to 5 *Rupee* a month in the N. W. Provinces. The jail allowance to prisoners is 7 lbs. of salt throughout the year.

Independently of the Sambhoor lake, Bharatpoor, and Sultanpoor salt, there are besides in the N. W. Provinces and Oudh many saliferous districts, where people get salt for their domestic use by merely scratching the ground, and pouring water over it, which, when evaporated, leaves edible salt behind. Strict regulations have been enforced to put a stop to the domestic manufacture of salt so spontaneously produced without cost, because it interferes with the revenue. The prime cost of Sambhoor lake salt is 9 *Annas* per maund at the lake, of the Bharatpoor salt from 6 to 8 *Annas* a maund, and that of the Sultanpoor

works varies from 3 to 4 *Annas*. The price of taxed salt of course increases with the distance from the frontier. At Allahabad it is five *Rupees* a maund, but if there had been no salt duty, the natural price of salt near Allahabad would have been only 4 or 5 *Annas* a maund. The duty is therefore a tax of 2,000 per cent. upon the natural price. There are no treaty arrangements with Native States analogous to a Zolleverin, and the question of transit duties is left entirely to the regulation of the individual Native States. The Native States, besides the transit duty they levy on salt passing through their territorial limits, do not impose any duty upon the salt consumed by their subjects. The consumption of salt is not much affected by dear or cheap prices. The people consume the same quantity in good or bad years, and the amount of duty makes no difference as regards the quantity consumed. Salt is not wanted in the N. W. Provinces except for purposes of food, and taking more salt than usual would be distasteful. The salt duty might in Mr. Money's opinion be safely increased in the N. W. Provinces to 3 *Rupees* 4 *Annas* a maund to make it equal to the Bengal scale of duty. There is no other tax which can be made equally to reach all classes like the salt duty. As soon as the railway line to Sambhoor is completed, the cost of carriage will be diminished to a quarter of what it is at present, namely, a *Rupee* per maund from Sambhoor to Agra, a distance of 180 miles.

Since the opening of the Nagpoor Railway, Bombay salt has displaced the Sambhoor lake salt which used to be consumed in the Central Provinces before.

Of late in certain places, notably Jawnpoor and others within the Customs line, people have been allowed to manufacture salt on payment of a duty of 3 *Rupees* per maund, but the experiment has proved a failure. The excise system is not practicable in these provinces, because the salt supply in the shape of the saliferous deposits is scattered over thousands of square miles in small quantities, and it would be impossible to guard the manufacture, and ensure the payment of the duty. The levy of a transit duty on the frontier Customs line is the only safe method of obtaining a revenue from salt in these provinces. The merchants who want to import salt go to Agra or Delhi, and obtain passes by payment of duty, and with these passes in their possession, they are allowed to bring any quantity of salt which may be covered by the pass. There is not much smuggling along the line. The illicit trade within the Customs line has been entirely stopped. Illicit manufacture for private consumption goes on as before, though it is very jealously watched by a special establishment. The incidence per head of the salt duty is so small that it is a matter of no great consequence whether the duty is a thousand per cent. on the produce price, or two thousand per cent., for the poorest person does not feel the difference.

SALT REVENUE.

PANJAB.

(SIR D. F. MCLEOD).

The gross salt revenue realized in 1869-70 for the whole of the Punjab Provinces reached a total of **92 lacks of Rupees**, of which sum about **42 lacks** represented the yield of a land customs duty levied on the frontier line extending from Sutledge in the north to the confines of the N. W. Provinces, and about **38 lacks** were realized from the salt mines north of the Sutledge. Besides these two sources of supply, there are also the Kohat mines across the Indus which produce an inferior salt called black salt, from which realizations were about **80,000 Rs.** The Government is the sole owner of all the salt mines in the Punjab, and employs its own men to excavate salt. The cost of this operation is but slight, about **2s. 2d.** per ton, and the Government charges a duty of **3 Rs.** a maund on the salt excavated to the merchants who come to the mines to purchase the salt. The salt so excavated is exceedingly pure, and requires no preparation. The supply of the mines is practically unlimited, and will last for generations. Salt from the mines is conveyed on the back of camels to Amritsar, a distance of **150 miles**, from which city it is distributed all over the country. It is also carried by rail to Delhi, and further on to Oudh. The rivers of the Punjab are very impracticable for navigation, and cannot compete with railways. From the mines situated on the Jhelum river, some salt is floated down that river to Multan. The trans-Indus salt is as pure as the Punjab salt,

though it is of a greyish colour. A duty varying from 6d. to 1s. per maund is levied on this trans-Indus salt from the Kohat mines. The duty has not been raised from political considerations, and a considerable quantity of the salt goes to the Chiefs in whose territories the mines are situated. This salt is moreover not allowed to come over to the Punjab side of the Indus, where it is treated as a contraband article, and is at once confiscated, and the person on whom it is found is punished. The territories to the north of the Sutledge are supplied entirely from the mines. South of the Sutledge, the Rajpootana salt, coming chiefly from the Sambhor lake, is the chief source of supply to the great districts of cis-Sutledge, Hissar and Delhi, and it is this salt which pays the land customs duty of three *Rupees* per maund.

The duty was increased in 1870 to 3 *Rs.* 1 *Anna* both on the rock salt of the mines, as well as on the salt which comes from Rajpootana. The price of the Rajapootana salt is 1d. per pound near the frontier, and increases to 3d. as it travels further, till it meets at the Sutledge the rock salt of the mines, where the prices of both kinds of salt are equal. As the facilities of conveyance are increasing, there is a decided tendency at present to send the rock salt, which is much more pure than the Rajpootana salt, more and more to the south to the displacement of Rajpootana salt. Cashmere and some of the foreign territories receive their supply of salt from the Punjab mines. The annual yield of the mines is estimated to be 120 millions of pounds, which gives to a population of 13½ millions an average of 9 lbs. per head. Mr.

Hume, the Commissioner of land Customs in the Punjab Provinces, estimates $8\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. as the average consumption of salt per each adult head of the population in the Punjab, the N. W. Provinces, the Central Provinces, and Oudh, and half that for each child, which would give from 6 to 7 lbs. as the average per head, exclusive of cattle. At the same time it is calculated that each working man requires about 12 lbs. of salt per annum for his consumption to ensure proper health and comfort, which quantity is thus nearly double of what he actually consumes at present. Sir D. F. McLeod stated however that 7 lbs. per head sufficed for the people of the Punjab as they ate little of the more stimulating stimulants. The wages of unskilled labour are about 3d. a day, and the labourer has thus to pay on an average $6\frac{1}{2}$ d. by way of salt-tax per annum.

The Rajpootana salt on its way to the Punjab pays transit duties to the many Chiefs through whose territories it passes. These duties however are not heavy, for if these chiefs were to levy a heavy duty, the Punjab customs line would have no existence. Arrangements have been recently made by Lord Mayo to take the management of the Sambhoor lake into the hands of the British Government, and it is proposed to build a railway to the lake.

As regards the rock salt of the mines, there is no smuggling. The tax does not press heavily upon the population. The duty does not act as a deterrent to those who purchase it for consumption. In 1849-50, the first year after the conquest when the duty was 2 Rs. per maund, the salt mines yielded 3,40,000 maunds, on which a duty of 8 lacs

Rupees were realized. Next year the yield was $7\frac{3}{4}$ lacks of maunds, and the revenue derived under our more systematic management rose from 8 lacks, at which figure it stood in 1849, to $15\frac{1}{2}$ lacks of *Rupees* in the second year 1850. In 1857-58, the Sutledge frontier land customs duty was first imposed. In 1860, when the duty was further raised to 2 *Rs.* 2 *Annas*, the yield of the mines was 13 lacks of maunds, and the revenue realized was $27\frac{1}{2}$ lacks against $21\frac{1}{2}$ lacks of *Rupees*, which was the revenue for 1859-60. In 1862, when the tax was further raised to 3 *Rs.* there was an apparent falling off in the revenue, the yield was only 10 lacks of maunds, and the revenue realizations did not exceed 28 lacks of *Rupees*. Since then the deficiency has been made up, the yield was 15 lacks of maunds, and the revenue 42 lacks of *Rupees* in the year 1869-70. It must be stated here that the population of the Punjab, which was $14\frac{3}{4}$ millions in 1856, rose to $17\frac{1}{2}$ millions in 1868, when the second census was taken, the increase being 30 lacks in 12 years. These figures show that the duty does not act as a deterrent to the free growth of consumption, and the same inference is borne out by the fact that there is so little smuggling. The increase of consumption has been 100 per cent., though the population has only increased 20 per cent. The cost of salt is so very small that there is no appreciable effect produced upon the quantity consumed by any increase of duty. The average measure per head is at present $6\frac{1}{2}$ d. per annum, and an increase of 3d. more would make no difference. Sir D. F. McLeod stated however his belief that in levying a duty of 3 *Rs.* 1 *Anna* per maund we have reached the just limit, and it would not be advisable to go beyond unless un-

der great financial pressure, when however, in justice to Punjab, the duty should be raised all over India.

In Oudh, a very large quantity of earth salt is produced. Salt is also similarly made in the Bharat-poor and Gwalior territories. The cost of collecting the salt revenue in the Punjab is considerable, and amounts to 7 *lacks*. This expenditure is chiefly incurred on account of the establishments guarding the preventive line to the north of the Sutledge, which prevents the rock salt from going eastwards, and also the land customs line on the right bank of the Sutledge which admits the Rajpootana salt. The salt tax is not at all oppressive, and if the exigencies of the state required it, the duty might in Sir D. F. McLeod's opinion be increased to 4 *Rupees* a maund without creating any discontent or destroying the confidence of the people. Sir D. F. McLeod stated that he knew of no tax which was less likely to create a sensation among the people than the salt tax, though he would himself as a matter of policy consult the native populations first before enhancing the duty.

SECTION VI.

CUSTOMS REVENUE.

The revenue derived from sea Customs duties on imports and exports exceeds two and a half crores of *Rupies*. The history of the legislation on this subject was given in considerable detail by Sir H. B. Fraser. Down to the year 1846 there was no general Customs Act, and there was a considerable variation in the practice of the different Presidencies. About that time, owing to the pressure which was brought to bear upon the Court of Directors by Manchester men, several reforms were promised in the Customs arrangements, and within about 2 years from that time, the coasting duties upon articles carried from port to port, and the double duties levied upon foreign bottoms, were abolished. In February 1857, Lord Canning, immediately before the Mutinies, requested the sanction of the Court of Directors to the enactment of a general Customs law, with a view to compensate the State for loss incurred by the abandonment of the Mothurfa tax in the Madras Presidency (which had not been relinquished there when it was abolished throughout the other Provinces about the year 1844-48,) and also with a view to reduce the salt tax in Bengal. It was also proposed to equalize the duties on British and foreign goods, as well as upon manufactured and unmanufactured goods, to exempt a great number of small articles which produced little or no revenue, to abolish the export duties, and at the same time augment the import duties. The Mutiny intervened, and the proposals of Lord Canning were not attended to till the year 1859, when the Office till April 1859

pressure of the annual deficits caused by the Mutinies, Lord Stanley sent out a Despatch relating to the Customs revenue. The Indian Government was directed by this Despatch not to give up any existing source, however small, of Customs revenue. The export duties were not to be abandoned, on the contrary they were ordered to be increased in the case of indigo, salt-petre, opium, and other articles of which it was supposed India had a practical monopoly in the world's market. The proposal for the equalization of foreign and British duties was sanctioned, but it was to be carried out by raising the duties on British goods to the foreign rates. The distinction between the duties on manufactured and unmanufactured goods was to be maintained. The long list of duty-paying articles which yielded little revenue was to be retained as before, and as regards the increase of import duties, the Despatch directed that the duties should be raised to $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. all round on raw and half-manufactured produce, to 10 per cent. on manufactured goods, and 20 per cent. on luxuries, and it was also suggested that instead of levying the duties *ad volorem*, the rates should be fixed on weights and measures of the commodities taxed. Lord Stanley calculated that by the adoption of these changes, the Government of India would obtain an increase of 75 lacks of Rupees of annual revenue.

While this Despatch was on its way to India, the Government here had already passed their first general Customs Act of 1859, in which the duties were by anticipation raised to the pitch directed in the

Despatch from the Secretary of State ; and the act contained also retrospective clauses which made the new rates applicable to contracts made under the old law, and charged the burden of the duties on the buyer. This act provoked some opposition from the European mercantile community, especially in Bombay. When the Despatch from the Secretary of State reached Lord Carnarvon's hands, he could write in reply that the orders received had in effect already been carried out in most respects, except that the duty on cotton yarn was not raised beyond 5 per cent, while a 10 per cent. duty was levied on unwrought metals, and 20 per cent. was levied on beer, tobacco, and spices. The duties on exports had not been increased except on grain, and reduced duties were for special reasons levied on raw silk and tobacco. Subsequent to this date, Mr. Wilson was sent out as Financial adviser to the Government of India, and he was told to pay his particular attention to the subject of the Customs duties which had been much complained of by the mercantile communities as bearing heavy on the trade. In 1860, the Government of India introduced a general 10 per cent. duty on cotton yarn, piece goods, and articles of millinery and hosiery, instead of the varying rates which obtained under the Act of 1859. The direction to levy duties on the quantities instead of on the values of goods was not carried out except in the case of spirits and liquors.

Mr. Wilson found on enquiry that there were great discrepancies in the practice of the three Presidencies as to the mode of valuations on which the duties were levied. A Commission was appointed to inquire into

ed in 1860, which met at Calcutta to consider the possibility of having an uniform Tariff for all India. Mr. Spooner, the Chief Commissioner of Bombay, Mr. Bullen, a member of the Council of India, and Mr. Ashley Eden, Secretary to the Bengal Board of Revenue, were placed on this Tariff Committee. This Committee made its report in October 1860, and suggested a scheme of one uniform Tariff for all India, and several other Customs reforms. In 1867, another Tariff Committee was appointed, consisting of Mr. Bellasis of Bombay, Mr. Blair, as representative of the Madras Government, Mr. Crawford and Mr. Schiller, as representatives of the mercantile community of Calcutta; and this second Tariff Committee submitted their report in the same year re-commending a revised Tariff of valuations calculated to meet the changes in prices which had occurred since the date of the last Tariff Committee's report.

The result of the labours of these Tariff Committees was seen in a new classification of articles by which 97 imports and 9 exports were alone retained on the list of dutiable merchandise, all others being not enumerated, and hence free from duty. The small loss caused by the abandonment of the duties levied on these petty articles under the old system was made up by a new charge on the export and import of grain. In 1869 there was another Tariff of valuations. In 1870, a general Customs Act was passed, the principal features of which were that a 7½ per cent. import duty was levied on manufactured goods and raw materials, 3 per cent. on twist, 5 per cent. on fine yarn, 10 per cent. on iron, and 10 per cent. on :

Frere expressed his opinion, and both Mr. Bullen and Mr. Cassels agreed with him on this point, that it was extremely desirable to abolish the duties on exports altogether, whenever the financial state of the country might admit of this reduction. This reform might in their opinion be carried out with very little loss of revenue. There are doctrinaires and publicists in India who advocate the general abolition of all Customs duties, and Mr. Cassels, as the representative of this school, was examined at great length by the Committee. Sir Bartle Frere however laughed down their suggestions, and described this proposal to be a millennial sort of reform, the practical consideration of which was precluded as long as the Indian Government was not in a position to abandon nearly two *crores* of its present certain income. Sir B. Frere at the same time hinted that the Government of India were fully alive to the necessity of exempting the numerous duty-paying articles which yielded but little revenue, but they could do nothing in the matter as their hands were at present tied by their financial difficulties.

With regard to the question whether the Customs revenue might not safely be increased to the maximum amount which was realized in 1859-60, Sir Bartle Frere went to the root of the matter, and pointed out that the increase might easily be made by increasing the import duties on piece goods and yarns. But here the interests of India and of England were in conflict. The Manchester men will not bear the idea of increasing these import duties, the effect of which would be to diminish the consumption of their goods, and stimulate production on the spot.

This is the real difficulty. The Government of India will not risk the disturbance of the cotton interest. Of course a philanthropic mission may also be assigned for keeping the duties low on piece goods and yarns in the interests of the poor classes of Indian consumers, who have every right to be allowed the choice of the best quality of fabric suited to their clothing supply. But the commodities in question are in this view certainly not the sort of commodities which should be selected for taxation, if it can be possibly avoided.

There is however no such plausible excuse for the imposition of export duties which bring little revenue, and which are a discouragement on our foreign commerce. By the general abolition of all export duties, the foreign trade of the country would receive a great stimulus. Moreover it should not be forgotten that India has not such a monopoly of any one of its exports as to enable it to retain its hold on foreign countries in spite of the duty. The heavy duties on saltpetre have strangled that trade, and the existing duties on indigo threaten to produce the same effects. As regards the history of our saltpetre trade, down to 1860 it was supposed that India had a natural monopoly of saltpetre. It is a natural product of the soil in many parts of Northern India, being found wherever there is animal matter mixed up with the ordinary soil of the country, notably in places of old ruins and former habitations. Mr. Wilson, from a false notion that India was the only country whence the supply of saltpetre or its commercial equivalents could be obtained, imposed a heavy duty on the export of this article, which was strongly protested against.

at the time both in India and in England. One of the Government of India's interference in this matter (in the shape of levying a heavy duty on the article in 1859) was that before long the manufacturers of Belgium discovered a cheap process of making saltpetre artificially. This artificial substitute is a combination of muriate of potash and nitrate of soda, and is produced at almost as low a price as the natural saltpetre of India, even when freed from duty. The demand for Indian saltpetre in the European markets has declined in consequence, and India has never regained its lost ground, although the duty has been removed long ago. The duties on indigo have similarly encouraged production in Java, Central America, Jamaica, and the West Indies, which send indigo free of duty. Between artificial dyes and improved indigo coming from these competing countries, the Indian indigo, though of a finer quality, will have a hard race to run. The Madras indigo, which is of an inferior quality, has already suffered most by this levy.

The export duties on Burmah rice place British Burmah at a considerable disadvantage in competition with its neighbours of Siam and other rice-producing countries. Since the increase of duty from two to three *Annas* a maund, which represents a charge of nine or ten per cent. on the value, the Burmah rice trade has fallen off considerably. The Indian duty-paying rice comes in competition in foreign markets with free rice produced elsewhere, and the duty falls on the grower in addition to the land tax. Mr. Crawford, one of the members of the Tariff Committee of 1867, was

strongly opposed to the export duty on rice, generally on the ground that all export duties were indefensible except under the pressure of a great State necessity, and specially for the reason that the new duty on grain was a great wrong, and was a violation of all the recognized principles of political economy which should govern the conduct of the State in such matters. Sir Bartle Frere expressed his entire concurrence with these views, though they were opposed to the views of the other members of the Tariff Committee.

At present export duties are levied on cotton goods, grain of all sorts, hides and skins, indigo, lac, oil seeds, and spices. The injurious operation of these duties in regard to salt-petre, indigo, and grain has already been specified. The three per cent. duty on linseed is a heavy charge, especially as India has a formidable competitor in Russia in the European markets. These duties have produced the same injurious effect on the trade in hides and skins, in which India has formidable competitors in the American South Atlantic States and Australia. In the case of borax, India has competitors in Italy, Chili, and China. Every kind of Indian timber is run after in the race of cheapness more or less closely by timber imports from other countries. Belgian salt-petre, indigo from the West Indies and Gautemala, rice from Siam and Cochin China, hides and skins from South America, borax from Italy and Chili, linseed from Russia, these articles of export pay no duty in their own respective countries. In fact, no other country in the civilized world ever taxes its own exports in the way the Bri-

tish Government taxes them in India. One result of the Indian trade being thus weighted is, that it places India at a relative disadvantage in its trade with other countries, and prevents its export trade from expanding freely.

As regards the present import duties in general, they are, in the opinion of Sir B. Frere, almost as low as they could well be consistently with the intention of getting any revenue at all from Customs. Every-body in India, poor and rich, pays the import duty on clothing. None is so poor as not to be able to purchase the articles of foreign-made cloth which Manchester sends out in yearly increasing quantities. There are yet a few inland districts where most of the cotton cloth is of native manufacture, but generally the English imports are driving out the native manufactures throughout the country. The English trade gives cheap clothing to the natives, but the cloth is not so substantial as the native cloth. The native manufactured cloth is made of heavier yarns, while the weight of Manchester goods is made up artificially by a good deal of filling or size, more than what is necessary to enable the yarns to be woven, which system of filling leads to the rotting and mildew so much complained of in the trade. Moreover, this foreign supply diminishes a certain amount of native industry; the process of competition therefore cuts both ways, and is not wholly the people of India.

The fact seems to be, though Sir B. Frere did not say so in his own words, that if Indian interests were well considered, it was most desirable to

get rid of all export duties on Manchester goods. The loss caused by their abolition might be easily made up by enhanced duties on the imports of piece goods. The Indian Government, although fully alive to the wisdom of this general policy, will not risk the displeasure of Manchester men by sanctioning an increase in the import duties, and cannot therefore give up the 50 *lacks* of revenue derived from the exports. A tax on the imports of Manchester piece goods is financially recommended by every consideration. Piece goods constitute the bulk of our taxable imports, and a tax on clothing would reach large numbers of people, and would therefore be extremely productive, while its actual incidence per head would be so trifling that it would not be felt sensibly by any one.

On this point the mercantile witnesses, Mr. Bullen and Mr. Cassels, differed from one another in their opinions as to the pressure of the present duties on the imports of piece goods and yarns. Mr. Bullen said that the five per cent. duty on piece goods was unobjectionable. Lord Canning had levied once a ten per cent. duty, the effect of which was that in the Bombay Presidency a very large amount of capital was forth-with invested in spinning and weaving mills. In Bengal, although the industry was not developed yet the natural inclination of the trade was checked for some time. There are only one or two spinning and weaving mills in Bengal, out of which only one pays a dividend of 10 per cent. Mr. Bullen however thought that the $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. import duty on metals was very high. This duty does not act

as a protective duty in the interests of the manufacturers of India, for as yet there has been no importation of copper articles into Bengal, the native manufacture being both cheaper and more adapted to the native wants than anything that England can send out there. There is a variety of iron stone ground in India from which a superior description of iron is smelted. Iron ore however does not abound in India, at least not near places where fuel is available. The one per cent. duty on iron ore, pig iron as well as iron bars and sheet iron, falls upon the consumer. There is a $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. duty on ironmongery, including cutlery and agricultural instruments which are imported in considerable quantities. The armours and military weapons of India were once considerably celebrated all over the world, but this manufacture is gradually dying out, although even at this date superior articles of cutlery are made in many parts of India.

Mr. W. Cassels, lately a merchant of Bombay, was examined as the representative of the party which advocates the entire abolition of all Customs duties. These duties, he said, were opposed to all the received principles of taxation, and were besides very inefficient, as they hindered trade considerably without bringing in a large revenue to Government. As the Government was however not prepared to abandon the whole of its customs revenue, Mr. Cassels suggested that, among the export duties, the duty on the opium exported from Burmah, which amounted to 14 per cent. on the price, was open to the strongest ob-

The duty on opium was also very objectionable as it checked the development of the export trade of

India in that article. The excess of production over consumption was the key to and the measure of the prosperity of India. Export duties which checked production were therefore a great public evil. As regards import duties, Mr. Cassels objected to the five per cent. duty on piece goods and $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on yarns, as they acted like protective duties, and enabled the Indian manufacturer to compete with Manchester on favourable terms. Mr. Cassels suggested an enhancement of the land revenue, which is not a tax at all, but is of the nature of rent, as the ready resource out of which the loss caused by the abandonment of our Customs revenue might be made up. If the land tax cannot in any district be enhanced by reason of its being permanently settled, the settlement must be done away with, and where there exists no such bar, the assessments should be raised as the resettlements take place. Mr. Cassels said that if the import duties on piece goods must in the present condition of the finances be retained in the interests of public revenue, he would advocate a tax on Indian manufactures, which might be made equal to the pressure of the import duties on the English trade, so that the protection they now afford to native manufactures would cease. Mr. Cassels illustrated the protective character of the present duties by pointing out the fact that there are at present (1870) in the Bombay Presidency 12 mills, which employ 3,19,314 spindles, 4,199 looms, and 8,170 hands, and consume about 60,000 bales of cotton of 400 lbs. each annually, and return from $5\frac{1}{2}$ to $9\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. profits, and produce very good cloth and good yarns, although of the low

19 mills in working order in the Bombay Presidency in 1873-74, and they employed 13323 hands, 52230 spindles, and 6103 looms, and consumed about 1,13,302 bales of cotton of 400 lbs each.

The entire system of protective duties was, in Mr. Cassel's opinion, bad in principle, for that which cannot protect itself does not deserve protection. Most of the Mofussil mills are found in the three chief cities of Guzerath, the one at Broach was established in 1854, and the Ahmedabad mill was established in 1867. The cloth produced in all these Bombay mills is quite equal in certain respects to the cloth imported from England, and is sometimes really preferred by the natives, because the turn-out of these mills consists of really very pure made goods, while the English goods are generally starched and contain much filling. Of late however, the evil example of English adulteration has re-acted on the Indian mills, and already complaints have been rife that the old honesty of native manufacturers has not been able to resist the temptation of artificially increasing the weight of their cloth. Even if the Manchester goods were admitted free of duty, Mr. Cassels said he was of opinion that these Bombay mills would still continue to be profitable to the proprietors. They enjoy the great advantages of having cotton that has been saved a double journey, and a market at their doors; these advantages more than outweigh the superiority which the English mills possess in the fact that the cost of labour and of machinery, and of the fuel consumed, is comparatively higher in India than in England. Mr. Cassels had no doubt on the point

that, taking all things into consideration, the Indian mills could compete with Manchester without the artificial help of the import duties. The English and native goods of the same quality and weight fetch, generally speaking, equal prices; in some instances, however, a higher price is paid for the native than for the equivalent English weight of cloth. The English imported piece goods are, some kinds of them at least, very largely used by the great mass of the people in India because of their cheapness. In case the Customs duties were abandoned, Mr. Cassels suggested that, besides an increase in the land revenue, a moderate income-tax might be had to a moderate income-tax which did not reach too low, for such a tax, notwithstanding all the outcry against it, was quite unobjectionable in principle. He would not hear of any addition to the salt tax because it was a tax on the poor, and the poor in India are very heavily taxed already, not absolutely, for they are very well off, and can bear additional taxation, but relatively to the richer classes, who are wholly free. During the years of the cotton famine, the extra price paid by Great Britain to India has been estimated to exceed one hundred millions sterling. The high prices which Indian cotton then obtained in the English market has led to some improvement in the cultivation and in the quality of the cotton grown, but the increased facilities of sending the cotton afforded by the railways, and the care taken in the cleaning and packing of it, have chiefly enabled the *Ryots* to send it in a much better condition than before, when cotton was stored in the open air, and lay exposed to the damp for days and months.

together, and became discoloured, and suffered much injury also in the long journies on the backs of bullocks.

Notwithstanding the high duties levied on Indian trade, the Custom House affords a very insufficient accommodation to the trade of the port. No ship can come along-side the wharf; all goods have to be landed in *Bandar* boats, thus causing serious loss and expense. The private companies who own the *Bandar* shore have become a source of great inconvenience to the public. Mr. Cassels finally admitted that his objection to all Customs duties was a general objection on principle to the policy of deriving any revenue from the Customs dues, and applied to all countries. His specific objection to the Customs duties in India was that they hampered trade with very little advantage to the State.

The foreign trade of India at the present day may be taken in round numbers to be about 100 millions sterling, and the coasting trade to be about 25 millions sterling. The value of the foreign trade of British India stood at 7 *crores* in 1813, 14 *crores* in 1834, 125 *crores* in 1865-66—the largest total ever reached; it declined in 1867 to 95½ *crores*, in 1868 it stood at 101 *crores*, in 1869 it rose to 105 *crores*, and it fell again to 100 *crores* in 1870. Of these 100 *crores*, taking the average of the four years (1867-70), about one-third or 33 *crores* is the value of imports, about one-half or 52 *crores* is the value of the exports, about 14 *crores* is the value of the treasure imported, while treasure exported represents a *crore*. During the last four years

(1870-1874) the grand totals of imports and exports both under the head of merchandize and treasure show a still further decline, as will be seen from the following statement ;—

Years.	IMPORTS.		EXPORTS.	
	Merchandize.	Treasure.	Merchandize.	Treasure.
1870-71	85,87,288	5,44,48,231	53,85,16,812	2,21,07,946
1871-72	95,608	11,57,38,129	61,69,62,252	1,47,60,925
1872-73	35,81,81,404	4,55,65,850	53,44,04,838	1,28,80,750
1873-74	38,38,61,424	5,79,25,386	53,11,44,194	1,91,40,711

SECTION VIII.

OPIUM REVENUE.

(BENGAL.)

On the subject of the revenue derived from the opium trade with China, which next to our land revenue forms the main stay of British Indian Finance, the Committee examined a considerable number of witnesses, who were qualified to speak on the subject by reason of their long connection with India in the various capacities of administrators, political residents, missionaries, news-paper editors, travellers, and merchants both of India and China. I propose in this place to sum up the evidence received by the Committee regarding the opium revenue of Bengal, or rather of the Behar and Benares divisions of Gangetic India, which provinces contribute by far the largest income under this head. Sir Cecil Beadon, late Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, was the first witness examined. He stated that the system which at present obtains in Bengal, or rather in the Gangetic Provinces generally, has been in existence ever since the commencement of British rule in that part of India, and under its influence the production of opium and the revenue derived by Government therefrom have both been gradually increasing for a long series of years. The system may be briefly described in these terms. The Government has established two great agencies, one called the Behar, and the other the Benares, agency, with headquarters at Patna and Gazipore respective-

ly, and minor agencies in other places to which native establishments are attached, and all over the country, and often interminous with the limits of the revenue and administrative sub-divisions. The Province of Behar, a portion of Chota Nagpore, the Benares division of the North West Provinces, part of the Allahabad division, and Oudh,—these make up the whole of what may be called the opium region in the Gangetic Provinces of British India.

The extent of land under opium cultivation in this fertile country was 5 *lacks* of acres in 1869-70, which would give work to 250,000 cultivators and their families. Throughout this opium region, no *Ryot* can grow opium except under a license from the Government opium agents. If a man wishes to grow the opium crop, he goes to one of these agents, gets his name registered, and his land measured; upon complying with these conditions, he obtains a license, and a small cash advance is made by the opium agent upon the personal security of the *Ryot* and his fellow-villagers. The advance is made before the sowing season, because the *Ryot* has then to expend money in preparing the land, in irrigating it, and purchasing the seeds. The *Ryot* in due time sows the seed, and when the crop is above ground, the land is again measured to see if the *Ryot* has sown the land according to his license, and a second advance of cash is then made to him. The season in which opium is produced coincides with the Spring months of March, April, and May. The *Ryot* gathers the crop which consists of the juice of the poppy pods in vessels, and takes these to the

sels to the factory, where their contents are exposed for a considerable time in masonry tanks, till they are reduced to a proper consistency. After the monsoon rains are over in October, these contents are packed in chests, and these chests are for the most part exported to Calcutta for the periodical auction sales which take place there. The *Ryot* who grows opium is often the owner of the land in which he sows it, or he may hold it as a tenant of some superior land-lord. There is no interference on the part of Government in respect of the cultivation of opium, except so far that by law the opium crop is exempt from the ordinary law of distress. The crop is in a sense mortgaged to Government in the first instance for the advances it has made to the growers, and Government has a right to be first paid out of the crop.

The area of land under the opium crop is regulated by the financial needs of the Imperial Government. It decides how much opium should be brought to market each year, and the opium agents accordingly extend or restrict their advances to a large number of applicants. The soils on which the best opium are not found in large blocks together, and as a consequence the cultivation is scattered all over the district. The lands, easily flooded and manured, are liable to inundations, and preferred for the opium crop. The opium crop takes a long time to mature, and moreover is a crop which can possibly be cultivated from the numerous surplus lands in the districts. The districts mentioned measure

tion there is none ; there can be no doubt, however, that the men engaged in the production partly smuggle it for their own consumption, or for sale, but the amount in either case is very insignificant. Opium is a thing of such great value and small bulk that the heavy duty on it necessarily tempts men to smuggle it in small quantities. The Government officers however discourage smuggling by selling opium in the districts where it grows at prime cost. The *Ryots* are thus induced not to abstract opium for their private consumption, and are encouraged to send it all to the Government factories. The cultivation of opium is very popular with the agricultural classes, and the *Ryots* punctually discharge their obligations. The sum advanced to the *Ryots* exceeds 2 millions sterling a year, and out of this advance the paltry sum of 200 or 300 *Rupees* represents the amount which has to be remitted as unrecovered debt.

The gradual growth of the opium revenue in successive years has been most remarkable. In 1829-30, 7,565 chests represented the total yield of the provinces, while the cost price was 1650 *Rupees* per chest, and the Government realized a gross revenue of $1\frac{1}{4}$ crores of *Rupees*. In 1853-54 the number of chests had increased to 53,321, the cost price per chest was 281 *Rupees*, and the gross revenue was nearly 4 crores of *Rupees*. With increased production, the sale price of a chest fell one half, from 1650 *Rupees* in 1829 to 730 *Rupees* in 1853. In 1853 and the following years, the quantity of opium grown was gradually reduced, till in 1858-59, only 21,357 chests were produced.

of this short supply, the price per chest rose at once to 1630 *Rupees*, and the gross revenue realized was $4\frac{1}{2}$ *crores* of *Rupees*, and the net revenue was $3\frac{1}{2}$ *crores* of *Rupees*. The decrease in quantity between 1853 and 1858 was obtained partly by giving up some of the agencies, and partly by offering a smaller price per *Sher* of opium to the cultivator, which limited the number of applicants for advances. The experience of opium sales from 1829 to 1858 shows that the revenue derived from opium will not indefinitely increase with the growth of opium, but that there is a limit which can not be exceeded without affecting the price in China in a manner seriously to diminish our net revenue therefrom.

The cost of producing opium is for the most part an invariable quantity, and the variations in revenue are caused solely by the fluctuations of demand at the auction sales, which demand is necessarily influenced by the state of the China market. Up to the year 1865, it was the practice to bring to Calcutta all the opium produced during the year. It was almost impossible under this system to know before-hand what this quantity of the annual produce might be, and the result too often was that there was a great danger of the market being either over or under-stocked. The collapse of 1853, as described before, was caused by a too rapid increase in the quantity produced, and this mistake was again repeated in 1865. It has been already stated that the crop of the year 1858 was the smallest in quantity since 1853. One consequence of the crop being so small was that, although the sale price of a chest was raised to

2,000 *Rupees*, Government found that the larger amount of profit got on the smaller number of chests did not compensate them for the moderate profit which they had made in previous years upon the larger number of chests. It was therefore resolved to increase the quantity, and the cash advance made to the *Ryot*, which was $3\frac{1}{2}$ *Rupees* per *Sher* in 1858, was raised to 4 *Rs.* in 1860, and 5 *Rupees* in 1861. Under this stimulus, the number of chests increased from 21,000 to 40,000, 49,000 and 64,000 in the next three years. This enormous increase in quantity caused the price to fall in 1865, and a considerable loss of revenue was the consequence.

To prevent these alternate collapses, it was proposed by Sir Cecil Beadon, who was then Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, that instead of depending upon the varying quantity of the year's actual crop, an absolutely fixed quantity should be brought to the Calcutta market, quite independently of the greater or smaller yield of the seasons, and a reserve should be kept from the crop of good seasons to cover the deficiencies of the bad seasons. About 48,000 chests, at 1,200 *Rupees* a chest, was fixed as the invariable quantity, upon a calculation that that quantity found a normal demand in the China market without causing any undue fall in prices, or encouraging home production in China. These proposals of Sir C. Beadon were acted upon to some extent between 1865-68, and they were sanctioned by the Secretary of State in 1869. In the year 1871, however, the Government of India departed from this rule, and ordered 52,000 chests to be sold. The price

paid to the cultivator was reduced in 1866 from 5 to $4\frac{1}{2}$ Rs. per *Sher*. In 1868-69, the total opium receipts were $6\frac{2}{3}$ crores of *Rupees*, the charges were $1\frac{2}{3}$ crores, and the net revenue was nearly 5 crores, the sale price of a chest being 1370 *Rupees*. In 1869-70, the gross receipts were $5\frac{1}{2}$ crores, and the net receipts $3\frac{1}{2}$ crores. This reduction in the opium revenue was caused by a fall of prices in the China market, and this fall was wrongly supposed at the time to have been caused by the extended cultivation of the crop in China.

The opium revenue is at best an unsteady revenue, as it depends, (1) upon the seasons in Bengal and in Malwa; (2) upon the prices in China, a circumstance over which the British Government has no control; and 3rdly, upon foreign competition. Of these three influences, one element of uncertainty which re-acts upon the Chinese market would, in Sir Cecil Beadon's opinion, be removed by always taking care to bring a fixed quantity at the auction sales, and this he said, it is in our power to do, especially as it would greatly increase the stability of our financial calculations. At the same time, Sir C. Beadon allowed that as nearly half the opium comes from Malwa and the Native States in Central India, over whose cultivation we have no control, the restriction of Bengal opium does not wholly remove all the elements of uncertainty so far as India itself is concerned. At the auction sales, the Government officials offer the opium at a fixed price, say 1000 *Rupees* per chest, and the highest bidder pays the price. The Government then takes the opium to market. For the agency

ed, the first bid is always double the upset price, and the sales take place at such higher prices as people found to bid for. The Government does not buy back any quantity for the sake of a higher or more revenue. The stock it keeps in hand is chiefly to equalize the exports of different years. Persian opium competes to a certain extent with the Indian drug in the Chinese market, and there is an increasing home production in China itself. The Imperial edicts, it is true, prohibit the production of opium in China, but these edicts are not much regarded.

Besides the fact that 48,000 chests at 1200 *Rs.* would meet a normal demand in China, Sir C. Becher has another reason for fixing the price of a chest at 1,200 *Rupees*. The Government levies an excise duty of 600 *Rs.* per chest upon Malwa opium, and it is estimated that it costs 600 *Rupees* more to bring this opium from Central India to the port of Bombay. By fixing the price at 1,200 *Rupees*, the duty on Bengal and Malwa opium is as nearly as possible equalized. The quantity to be sold at the Calcutta biddings is announced some months before the sales actually commence. The opium produced in the spring season of one year is not sold till the following year. The quantity to be sold is divided into 12 portions, and there is a sale of one of these 12 parts every month, and the first sale takes place in January. The re-sales in China take place within a month after the Calcutta sales. The auction prices in Calcutta are to a great extent governed by the prices which, in anticipation of the sales, are expected to obtain in

China. They are also to some extent affected by the state of exchange, as Anglo-Indian merchants who import tea and silk from China settle their Chinese account by exporting Indian opium. Often-times opium is thus used as a means of remittance, and it is found more profitable to remit money due this way than by taking bills. The prices at the Calcutta sales depend also to some extent upon the Bombay holders who keep up the prices of their own stocks in Bombay by bidding high at Calcutta. The quantity sold at a single sale is not sufficiently large to preclude speculative biddings, and it is not the interest of Government to prevent these biddings, for the bidders never bid below the value.

A part of the entire opium produced is sold for home consumption in India, and forms an important item of *Abkari* revenue. It is sold at little more than the cost price in the districts where it is produced, but the price charged increases with the length of distance that it travels from these opium districts. The Government has every right to levy such a revenue by the sale of opium, and to levy it by selling it at the maximum rates. The maximum limit of the sale price of opium sold for consumption in Bengal is fixed on principle at the highest rates which people can pay without smuggling.

The gross proceeds from the sale of *Abkari* opium in Bengal, including Behar and Orissa, were 31½ lacks of Rupees, and, as the cost of production was 10½ lacks, there was a net profit of 21 lacks. The opium consumed in Bengal is valued at 10½ lacks of Rupees is the quantity consumed by the people of Bengal, and all the rest is exported to China. The present system of production

cannot therefore be charged with unduly stimulating the use of the drug among the people of India. If free cultivation were permitted, it would be impossible to prevent private sales, and the use or abuse of the drug would be greatly encouraged. The large advance made by Government to the *Ryots* who grow opium puts in circulation a considerable sum of money, amounting to nearly two *crores* of *Rupees* without charge for interest, among the people of these opium-districts, and this circulation stimulates and indirectly contributes to keep up the prosperity of these districts. The advances in the Behar division for instance are considerably in excess of the land revenue of that division, and the settlement officers always take the fact of these advances into account when they fix the assessment in these districts. In some districts, the instalments of land revenue are as a matter of fact not collected till the opium advances are made. In the year 1858, the opium advances were stopped for one season in the Gorackpore district; the effect of this stoppage was that the *Ryots* in a body went to the Collector's office, and said they could not pay their land revenue; so absolutely dependent in these districts have the *Ryots* become upon the opium advances for the punctual discharge of their liabilities to Government.

Sir Cecil Beadon was also examined upon the merits of the proposal to substitute the Bombay system of levying a transit or excise duty upon opium in place of the present system of Government production and auction sales. He stated first that if the duty upon Bengal opium was reduced to the level of the duty of

600 Rs. per chest levied in the Bombay Presidency upon Malwa opium, and if the duty was as easily collected in Bengal as in Bombay, the financial effect of the change would be the relinquishment of the entire margin of profit, about 200 or 250 Rs. per chest, now realized by the sale of opium under the Bengal system. It is likely also that the cultivation will fall off, as it must take a long time for private merchants to step in the place of Government, and make the necessary advances to the *Rajahs*. The Indian opium is consumed by the wealthy classes in China. It is said to be 50 per cent. of the quality than the opium produced in China, of which latter there is every year a larger and larger quantity grown, for the prohibition against it has lost all practical efficacy. The extension of cultivation in China however is not as yet of a sort to affect calculations in India. In 1870-71, it was apprehended at first that by reason of the growing competition of China opium, only 970 Rs. would be realized as the maximum price per chest, but as a matter of fact it was found that 1,120 Rs. per chest were realized at the sales.

In reply to Mr. Fawcett's question, Sir *James* confessed that the Government only regarded opium as a means of revenue, and did not allow any other considerations to influence its conduct to any extent. At the same time he stated that the Government would not go the length of doubling the revenue, if doubled it could be, by increasing the quantity without limit. The opium duty at present is an average of 180 per cent. duty of 180 per cent. The Emperor of China were to rescind his prohib-

edict, opium would not be so extensively cultivated in China, and it would be impossible to levy more than 10 per cent. duty, which would make the difference in quality between the two drugs one-third of the amount. In China, Persia has received

last year, and it is estimated that it will be yearly extended in that Province. Persia and China in the field, it is quite possible that more than nine crores

and it is a very precarious one, although Sir C. Beadon urged at the same time that it would be long before it was seriously affected. Having got out this admission from

Mr. Fawcett forced the witness to admit that the financial condition of British India was very unsatisfactory, for, notwithstanding the assistance of such a precarious source of revenue to the

the normal vice of our annual deficits, if the total expenditure including the charge for extraordi-

Sir C. Beadon was further obliged to admit that he had never seen any plan which had taken this large scale and had never had a practical shape before his mind as yet.

Of course, the Government of Bengal, India, and

ed solely by a heavy license fee on the sale of opium. The consumption of opium is not great among the people of Behar and Bengal, or in the opium districts generally, as far at least as the sale of Government opium can be regarded as the measure of consumption. This is however not a correct test, for there can be no doubt that in these districts a large quantity of opium is surreptitiously obtained for home consumption. The object of Government has throughout been simply a fiscal one, to get as much revenue out of the drug from consumers in India or in China as it can, though as a matter of fact it must be admitted that the profits on the exportation to China are much larger than any obtained from the opium sold in India. The consideration of not encouraging the consumption of opium among their Indian subjects has not directly influenced the action of Government, though the levy of a heavy duty for fiscal reasons may have had an incidental effect in checking consumption.

The cultivation of opium on a large scale has in no way affected for the worse the character or health of the population of the districts where it is produced. The people in Behar are as fine and healthy a population as any in India. The Rajpoots and Seiks, both opium-eaters, are the finest races in India. Sir C. Beadon said he never saw any people suffering in their health or appearance from the use or abuse of opium. The population directly and indirectly concerned in the opium cultivation is estimated to be about $7\frac{1}{2}$ lacks ; they are in better circumstances than the rest of the cultivators, as they receive annual advances, and obtain remissions in bad years.

Sir Willam Muir, in his Minute dated 22nd February 1868, advocated the giving up of the entire system of Government monopoly of the production and sale of opium, and proposed that the Government should in lieu thereof depend for its revenue exclusively upon the resource of a heavy export and import duty. In Sir W. Muir's opinion, the action of Government will by this change of policy have the appearance of a legitimate check upon vice, and will no longer be obnoxious to the odium of affording a stimulus to its consumption. With regard to this proposal, Sir Cecil Beadon remarked that if the system were changed so radically as it is proposed to do, it would lead to a certain loss of revenue, though not necessarily to a diminished consumption either in India or China. The monopoly system is maintained because it is found to be a fiscal agent of great power, as it enables Government to extract the largest possible revenue for the smallest outlay. The present system is certainly the best that can be devised in the interests of revenue. The Government can in no way be charged with encouraging the consumption of opium, at least not in any more rational sense than the manufacturers of all stimulants throughout the world. The indulgence in the use of opium is not in any way more injurious to public health as the use of alcoholic stimulants, which every state in the world raises a very large revenue. The charges proper for the collection of opium duty are only 17 per cent. in Bengal. The two millions which stand for the cost of collection in the accounts include the advances

In Bombay, no such expense is needed, and the charges average only 30,000 Rs. for a revenue of some 2½ crores of Rupees. The Bombay opium is produced in the Central India States and in Rajpootana by private individuals, who pack the opium in chests, and these chests are weighed at certain fixed places by the officers of Government. The opium so weighed is allowed to pass the frontiers, and pays a sort of transit duty of 600 Rs. per chest. Malwa opium fetches a higher price in China than even Bengal opium, because the former variety is prepared so as to have a much higher consistency than can be secured for Bengal opium. This latter has 70 parts of opium mixed with 30 parts of water, while Malwa opium has 90 parts of opium proper with ten parts of water. The Chinese opium is a very coarse kind. The Turkey or Persian opium is esteemed to be of superior quality to that of Bengal. The opium crop is, as observed before, a most precarious crop, a night's rain out of season will suffice to destroy the chests. On the whole, Sir C. Beadon stated it to be his fixed opinion that, although there might be moral objections to the monopoly system, yet, at the same time, the profits derived from it were so great that the Government would not be justified in abandoning it, unless they clearly saw their way to supplement the revenue to an equal amount by some other means. Sir Cecil Beadon urged further that it should be our policy to try and keep down the competition of China and Persia by maintaining the area of cultivation. Not that there is any

from the open competition, for the price of opium during the last few years has been much more affected by the quantity of Indian opium brought to market in Calcutta, than by any thing that goes on the way of home production in China. The increased cultivation in China, if increase there is, has had as yet no sensible effect on prices. Although the danger is thus only a very remote contingency, the interests at stake are so great that India should sometimes take steps to disarm it by increasing its stock of supply.

Sir Cecil Beadon observed in conclusion that if the system of levying an export duty were adopted in the place of direct Government production in Bengal, it would be found difficult and very expensive to prevent smuggling. It would be found also necessary to retain at least in part some system of growing and manufacturing opium under license and supervision for home consumption. Over and above all these inconveniences, the change would involve, as stated before, a certain loss of 200 Rs. per chest of extra profits now made. The opium plant is moreover, not like alcoholic spirits, useless for any other purposes save those of vicious indulgence. It is useful in many other ways besides its use as a drug. The stubble serves as fodder for cattle. The seeds are used to make oil in which there is a large trade. The petals are also sold on a large scale for their medical virtues. Every part of the plant has its value in the market, and the *Ryots* get it all, as the Government only take the opium from him at a fixed price. Opium is also used large-

ly as a medical drug. The cultivation of opium therefore is in every way very profitable to the cultivator, and it cannot be wholly stopped without manifest injustice and inconvenience to various trades and industries.

Sir C. Beadon referred to the history of Assam to illustrate the mischief that is likely to result from the giving up of the Government monopoly of opium. In Assam down to 1860, the cultivation of opium was free, and as one effect of it, the entire population was demoralized to an extent that Government found it necessary absolutely to prohibit the production of opium. There is every likelihood of the recurrence of this danger if cultivation were made free in Behar and Bengal, and the danger would be equally great though an export duty were levied, unless indeed a very strict supervision could be exercised over the growth of opium. Scattered as this production is over extensive tracts of country, such a close supervision will be found to be practically impossible. The present restrictions on production tend largely to diminish consumption in Bengal. With a change of system, there would be the risk of losing a large revenue, and the further risk of the demoralization of the people. The cultivation, as it now stands, is entirely voluntary, without pressure or compulsion on the part of the State, and the *Ryots* take the advantages because they find that the cultivation of opium is more profitable to them than that of sugar or tobacco.

As regards Persian opium, Sir C. Beadon observed that there is no direct trade between Persia and China. The Persian Gulf trade is in the hands

of English merchants, and it is their anxious desire to get the Government to allow them to ship the opium on board the steamers that touch at Bombay, and to re-ship their cargo there into other steamers going from Bombay to China. It is highly inconvenient to these merchants that they cannot effect this transshipment under the present law. With a view to meet their wishes, there is at present a proposition before Government to impose a sort of transport duty from 50 to 100 *Rs.* per chest, and allow this transshipment of Persian opium at Bombay.

Sir C. Beadon at the conclusion of his examination stated that all the great Bengal authorities were opposed to the third alternative proposal of levying an acreage tax on opium growing land, because such a tax would cause loss of revenue, make inquisitorial supervision necessary, and subject the cultivators to great uncertainties from the fluctuations of the tax.

Sir F. Halliday, another retired Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, was also examined upon the subject of the opium revenue, and he confirmed generally, with some important differences, the views expressed by Sir C. Beadon on this subject. Sir F. Halliday stated that the Government of India were fully aware of the uncertain nature of this revenue, and most anxiously watched its fluctuations. There are, he observed, among the higher officials of Government two schools of financiers, one who think that the opium revenue will be subject to violent fluctuations in the future as it has been in the past, but that it will never really fail us; another school there is who think that the recent fall of prices in 1869 was a

warning of a serious financial danger to come. Sir F. Halliday, greatly disconcerted Mr. Grant Duff's prepossessions when he confessed that he belonged to the alarmist school, *i.e.*, he sided with those who were anxious for our opium revenue, which was rendered doubly precarious by the combined action of increasing foreign competition and domestic growth in China. Sir R. Alcock was referred to as an authority in support of the view that cultivation was increasing every year in China. The rise in the price of opium in the last year 1870 could not be accepted as a safe index that this danger was averted, for this rise was caused by short crops in the previous years. Mr. Laing and Mr. Massey both belonged to the sanguine or hopeful school, while Sir Richard Temple holds the opposite or alarmist view.

The competition of Persian opium and the extension of cultivation in China are both events of a recent date, for they were not in any way of sufficient importance to cause anxiety ten years ago. Sir F. Halliday however suggested that both these elements of disturbance might be indirectly controlled by the British Government in India. It might for instance encourage the Persian Government to levy a heavy export duty on Persian opium. As regards the Chinese opium, if the drug produced in China is inferior in quality, no serious danger need be apprehended. It is said however that of late, the Chinese officials have been deliberately and wilfully and of set purpose encouraging the cultivation in China to revenge themselves upon us, and avowedly to stamp out our opium revenue. If they ever succeed in improving

the drug, they may unduly

As regards Sir C. Beadon's proposal to bring to market every year a fixed quantity of opium, Sir F. Halliday stated that the plan broke down the first year that it was seriously tried. The opium crop is a very precarious crop, and drought, rain, hail-storm, wind, any the slightest thing, damages it entirely. It alters the consistency that the opium agents cannot tell till the end of the season what the outturn will be. In 1861 the Government had fixed the quantity of opium to be sold at 48,000 chests, but the actual quantity of opium produced was only 38,000 chests. In consequence of the failure of Sir C. Beadon's system, the Government notified that they wanted 48,000 chests for the year's supply, and at the eleventh hour their opium agents stated their inability to bring more than 38,000 chests to the market, and the Government had to be made up somehow to calm the popular uproar. As regards the suggestion to substitute an excise or export duty for the present monopoly of production, Sir F. Halliday summarized the objections to all such proposals in the words used by Sir John Peter Grant in his Minute of 1862:—(1) that under an excise system, it would be found impossible to prevent a very large amount of smuggling, which would be very extensive and hence the Government would be obliged to give up the monopoly of production, which would retard private growth, and thus induce an increased consumption among our own people in India; (3) that the Government would be obliged to restrict the opium supply to the quantity which could be produced in India, and thus induce an increased consumption among our own people in India. The margin of pro-

fits at present earned, nearly 200 Rs. per chest, was considerable, and if the export duty system were adopted in Bengal, it would be necessary to impose an additional taxation of two millions on the people to make up the deficiency. Sir F. Halliday stated that he saw nothing formidable in the first two objections, but the third consideration was a serious one, and till some-body pointed out an effective substitute, it would be rash on the part of Government to fling away such a resource. If foreign competition and domestic growth threaten to be serious dangers in the future, it will be our policy to retain our command of the Chinese market by making as much opium as India can grow, and sending it as cheap as we can to China. By keeping up the price artificially high, we may kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. It is certainly better to save the half than lose the whole. If our monopoly of the China market were really in danger, it would be advisable to remove the bar on private production and manufacture. By this means, production will be easily doubled or trebled, and we may be enabled to recoup our loss, whole or in part. At present, however, in the absence of reliable information as regards the state of production in China, Sir F. Halliday said that it would be most rash indeed to make any alteration. Opium has in fact become a great necessary of life in China. If we do not give opium to the Chinese, somebody else will give it, and they will have it anyhow. Our finances will thus suffer seriously without the Chinese being any the better for our loss.

OPPIUM REVENUE.

MALWA

Mr. Hamilton, late Governor General's Agent in Central India, was examined on the subject of Malwa and Bombay opium. He stated that Malwa opium came from the territories of the Holkar at Indore. The Government did not do anything to do with the cultivation of opium in Malwa and Central India. The opium intended for exportation was reared by private growers and merchants in chests weighing 100 lbs. each; these chests were brought to the scales at Indore, and paid duty there. This duty was 500 *Rs.* per chest, but was subsequently at the witness's suggestion raised to 500 *Rs.* per chest, and recently Lord Dalhousie raised it to 600 *Rs.* per chest. An effort was made in 1862 to raise it to 700 *Rs.* per chest, but the plan was given up. Malwa opium is chiefly grown in parts of the Scindia's and Holkar's dominions and in Ratlam territory, and in small quantities in all the Central India States. The opium is brought by the private growers and merchants to the Indore Residency, where it is weighed at the scales, and the duty of 600 *Rs.* per chest is levied there. As soon as the chests are sealed, and a pass is given to cover its transit to Bombay. A Government Agent accompanies the opium on its way from Indore to Bombay, and it is not stopped anywhere on its way. At Bombay it is sold to the Government, who is

a Government... it is to hand over the opium to the... agents for future disposal.

The Native States through whose territories opium passes in its way from Malwa to Bombay used formerly to levy a transit duty, but Sir Robert Hamilton made an arrangement with them by which... to... according to the mileage. The prime cost of a chest of Malwa opium is Rs.300 per chest. The Ryots who grow opium receive advances from the agents of Bombay... and some... are also largely... the production. Besides the British duty... Rs. per chest, some of the Native States levy a small duty. His Highness... being the chief of them, levys a duty... to 10 Rs. per chest. There is not much smuggling of Malwa opium. Opium from Rajpootana however is... in considerable quantities from the Portuguese port of Daman.

Sir R. Hamilton stated that he was... of the export duty system, and he had proposed... ago that Government should gradually introduce this system in Bengal, and reduce the amount of their... to the Ryots, and... manufactures and sale, which... and morally... The opium... of Central India and Malwa is so extensive that even if the Government were to abandon all its Bengal... will supply the... agent

This responsibility it cannot undertake at present because of the artificial monopoly which the Government system of production and manufacture secures for Bengal opium. At the same time Sir R. Hamilton suggested that Government need not at first restrict itself for its annual supply of opium to Malwa alone. Malwa opium does not require any general financial support, and private cultivation in Bengal or in the other provinces of India should not be stopped, if profitable. Malwa opium is esteemed to be superior in quality to all other opium, and the system under which the duty is collected is cheap beyond all comparison. The cost of collecting the opium duty of 600 *Rs.* per chest is only one and a half *Anna* per cent. Malwa opium in its present state is too strong to be used, and has to be adulterated with oil and catechu before it can be sold in the market. In China, the sellers mix Bengal and Malwa opium together to make their saleable opium. The cost of producing a chest of 112 lbs. of Malwa opium is estimated to range between 250 and 300 *Rs.* Sir R. Hamilton admitted further that the substitution of Malwa for Bengal opium cannot be arranged all at once, for Malwa cannot produce 45,000 chests to order in one year, but there can be no doubt that, by spreading the work over a few years, and by gradually reducing the quantity of opium grown in Bengal, the deficiency can be easily made up in a few years. When the change of system is fully carried out, the sum of 2 millions now advanced annually in Bengal to the opium-growing *Ryots* will be saved, and Malwa opium would, if it were left alone, pay a heavier duty, i. e. 700 or 800 *Rupees*

per chest. The Government will thus for a comparatively insignificant outlay receive in full their present revenue. The opium crop is a very uncertain crop in Malwa as elsewhere, and one hailstorm will spoil a year's harvest. There will always be therefore some risk, but the risk under the new arrangement will be much reduced, and Government will be freed from the odium of being the monopolist of the producers and manufacturers and sellers of this narcotic poison.

There is one other advantage which Malwa possesses over Bengal, in that the opium grown in it cannot be smuggled out of India so easily as Bengal opium. The whole of the Malwa opium is produced in the territories of Native States, and is made to pay pass duty at Indore. It cannot get to any sea-port without going through British territory, as the sea-board is all English, and it cannot therefore, unless smuggled, pass without paying duty. The Native States in Central India do not superintend the cultivation, or keep a register of the cultivators, or measure the land under poppy. Malwa opium in its journey to the coast has to travel through narrow passes where it can be easily watched if necessary. In the case of Bengal, if the Government give up its monopoly, and allow the cultivation to be free, it will be found that the entire sea-coast will be divided into different points. This will necessitate a more extensive system of inspection, and in the end the present staff of inspectors, if freed from one duty, will be required for the new inspecting work. On the other

hand, the services of most of these officials can be dispensed with, if the Government give up its monopoly, and restrict the cultivation to Central India.

The lowest figure for the pass duty on Malwa opium was 125 *Rs.* thirty years back. Opium then found its way through the desert to Karachee. This trade was stopped when the duty was raised. The highest duty was 700 *Rs.* per chest in 1862-63, which had to be reduced as the trade could not bear it with advantage to the revenue. The Native Princes are not likely to discourage opium cultivation because they derive profit from it, though not to the extent they would have derived if the British duty was not so high as 600 *Rs.* The Native States, Holkar being the chief of them, get 10 per cent. of the profits, *i.e.* eight *Rupees* per chest upon all opium chests that come to the Indore scales. Though there is no treaty on the subject, Sir R. Hamilton stated that His Highness the Maharajah Holkar would not be permitted to raise his duty so as to affect the interests of our Exchequer. The cultivation of opium can be extended indefinitely in Malwa, but the extension cannot be done at once to order, as it takes three years to prepare the land to receive the seed, and the opium crop requires at the same time rich manuring and deep cultivation.

While Malwa has thus considerable advantages over Bengal, Sir Robert Hamilton admitted that there is much to be said on the other side of the question. Malwa is mostly native territory, over the cultivation in which the British Government has no control, at least not so effective as it exercises in Bengal, which is British territory. Besides, the table land of Central

India is more subject to droughts than Bengal, which circumstance necessarily affects the crops in Malwa, and makes them very precarious. It would thus be very risky to have to depend on Malwa alone in a matter upon which the financial prosperity of India may be said to depend, and which, next to the land revenue, is our most productive resource. It is safe therefore to have two sources to depend upon, and to supplement each other's defects.

The cultivation of opium is generally garden cultivation, in small patches immediately round the villages, where it can be easily supervised and collected. A large quantity of opium is produced from a very small quantity of land. The producers of Malwa opium consume very little of it. Sir R. Hamilton gave it as his opinion that the habitual consumption of opium, whether it is eaten or smoked, injuriously affects the health, it debilitates the constitution, and permanently unfits the man who indulges in the vice for active pursuits, and in the end shortens his life. The cultivation of opium is however very profitable to the *Ryot*, because it is the only crop for which he gets large advances of cash, by which he is enabled to pay the revenue without feeling the strain of a heavy land-tax. Opium has become a necessary of life in China to the same extent that alcoholic spirits are in Europe. If the cultivation of opium be thrown open to all private producers like that of any other crop, the Government will not run the risk of having any one source of supply to depend upon. This risk should never be incurred, because Government cannot dispense with the opium revenue under any circumstan-

ces. Though on the face of it, the Bengal system shows a profit of 200 Rs. per chest more than Malwa opium, this is not a correct view of the facts, because the Malwa duty of 600Rs. represents the net profit without any expense, while in Bengal Government has to advance annually 2 millions sterling. In taking 400 Rs. per chest as the cost price of Bengal opium at the time when it comes to the Calcutta market, the interest charge of these 2 millions is not calculated. If this charge were included, the difference between the net profits of a Bengal and Malwa chest of opium would be reduced to a considerable extent.

OPPIUM REVENUE

Having summed up the official evidence
subject of Bengal and Madras. I propose
this place to present a summary of the

of the only non-official who
any independent light upon this much discussed
George Smith, Editor of the *Friend of*

examined by the Finance Com-

chiefly upon the subject of the
the Government necessity of pro- legal, and
the moral aspects of this connection. He expressed
his entire dissent the official views legal
civilians, and advocated a mixed system of
tax upon opium producing lands, (which is a system
in Punjab), joined with a heavy license duty upon
the manufacturer. He recommended further that
manufacture should be restricted to certain places
and districts, very upon the model of the sys-
s, and maintained that the
of system as proposed by
great morally, economically, and finan-
ally. the first place to remove the odium

d manu this poison.
precarious character

foresee and arrange for all the ordinary fluctuations of the seasons, and of the demand in China, far better than the officials now employed, and the revenue would be thus as certain as our Customs revenue. If this change were once fairly introduced, the Malwa system of levying a pass duty can safely be adopted in Bengal, by which means the present facilities of smuggling, which obtain to a great extent in Bengal, would entirely cease. The interest of private persons would, under a system of licensed manufacture and sale, incite them to keep a more strict watch than the most vigilant set of officials can exercise, and thus diminish the chances of successful smuggling. The self-interest of the licensed trader, acting upon the self-interest of the producer, would secure the same absence of fraud in the manufacture and sale of opium that is met with in other industries of the same kind.

As regards the excise duty on liquors generally, as also the duty levied on the sale of opium for home consumption in Bengal, Dr. Smith observed that the present excise system is unpopular with the natives because it affords great facilities to vice by bringing the poison within tempting neighbourhood, and suggested that the evil of drunkenness would be best checked by increasing the duty upon all indigenious and some imported liquors and drugs, and by vesting the municipal bodies or the respectable residents of the place, along with the Collector of Revenue, with the power of granting or withholding licenses upon the principle of the permissive legislation in England. The Sadar distillery system can work well if only a heavy duty is imposed upon the license to manufacture. Under the

it is the interest of the excise collector to multiply the shops because they bring in more revenue, and these officials act as though they had no concern for the people and need show no consideration for the wishes of the people in whose midst the shops are established, or of the encouragement thereby given. The number and location of the retail shops should be regulated by the wishes of the people, whose leaders must be associated with the collector and his officials in fixing sites for the shops. In the Indo-Chinese districts of British Burmah, the action of the excise department in promoting the sale of opium has become a public scandal, and the people of Burmah have been greatly demoralized thereby.

The question of converting the monopoly system of Government production into an excise system has been under the consideration of Government ever since 1825. Before that time, Government had their opium agents in Rajpootana and Malwa, and the monopoly system prevailed both in Malwa and in Bengal. In 1826, an agreement was made with Holkar and other Chiefs, by which an exclusive right of purchasing opium grown in Malwa was conferred to our Government. The Political Agent attached to the Central India and Rajapootana states, Colonel Sutherland, Sir C. Metcalfe, Sir David Ochterlony, were opposed to the monopoly system of production, and as it was a source of revenue and employment to the people, it was not to be taken away. The duty of the Government was continued for a long time, and Sir [Name] to the excise [Name]

1863, when he was Finance Minister. Lord Lawrence's government had almost made up its mind on the point. Lord Lawrence himself was strongly in favour of the policy of giving up the monopoly system, but the discussion has somehow dropped since he retired from India, and the official supporters of the monopoly system seem to have regained their lost ground.

In the opinion of Dr. Smith, the Government monopoly leads necessarily to considerable abuse and oppression. The cultivation is protected by a severe contract law, and by the right of distraint of property, which is denied to all other produce. Official pressure is avowedly used to extend cultivation. The extension of cultivation in the North-West Provinces and in Oudh by the bait of advances has called forth the protest of all the high officials of those parts. When the price paid to the cultivator was 3 *Rs.* 4 *Annas* a *Beegha*, the opium crop was not at all remunerative to him. The price was accordingly raised subsequently to four and five *Rupees* per *Beegha*, which has stimulated the production by the hope of securing the large advances which prove of such help to the *Ryots*. In Assam, the cultivation of opium was formerly free, and Government soon found that it was impossible to raise any opium revenue from the province. The consumption of the drug, moreover, became in a few years so universal that the people were utterly demoralized. The Government accordingly interfered chiefly for financial reasons, and stopped the free cultivation entirely, since which time the consumption of

the demand has sensibly diminished, and a considerable amount of opium accrues to the state from the opium that is consumed, and the land revenue has also been greatly benefited. It takes three years to prepare the ground for poppy cultivation. When the ground is once prepared, the cultivator is committed to a long course of poppy growth, and becomes unwilling to retire from the cultivation, as the ground is in his estimation too good for the ordinary grains. Besides, the opium officials take care that the strength of the highly cultivated soil is not diminished by other exhausting crops in the same year. The native officials practically dictate to the *Ryot* what crops he shall put in the ground when the opium crop has been removed. As one effect of a change of system in the direction suggested by Dr. Smith, he observed that at first it was likely there might be an undue extension of cultivation, but the evil would right itself after a time. The Government might find it necessary for some time by way of precaution to restrict opium cultivation within certain areas.

In the Punjab, an acreage tax ranging from 3 to 4 *Rs.* per acre in excess of the ordinary assessments is imposed upon all opium-producing land. The cultivation, though free, has not demoralized the population of that province. The probabilities are strongly in favour of the view that the opium revenue in the next decade will diminish considerably. Dr. Smith stated in the concluding portion of his evidence that in 1862-63, charges were brought in the public newspapers of oppression and corruption and carelessness against the opium establishments.

and he accordingly investigated the matter on the spot both at Patna and Indore, and came to the conclusion, that, though there was much exaggeration, there was a sufficient basis of truth to lead the Government to consider whether the new system would not be preferable on all grounds to the monopoly system. It was at this time that Sir Charles Trevelyan became a convert to the new faith, and Lord Lawrence's Government also gave in its adhesion to the change, but the subject has somehow since then dropped entirely out of discussion.

SECTION

No.

Sir H. L. ... of the Judicial Department under the Secretary of State for India, was examined upon the subject of the Stamps ... 1869-70 ... fully two ... were derived from the sale of ... paper, including the Judicial or Court-fee ... and the stamps required under the General Stamp Act. About 6½ lacks were obtained from the sale of adhesive stamps. Another ... were obtained from the duty on impressed documents used in commerce, for instance, Hoondees and cheques prepared by banks or firms, on which the stamp is afterwards impressed ; fines and penalties made up about 40,000 Rs., the item of stamp duty recovered from successful suitors *in formá pauperis* produced about 54,000 Rs., and about 37,000 Rs. were derived from miscellaneous savings. Impressed paper stamps are either general i. e. documentary stamps, or judicial. The judicial stamps produced about 1½ crores of Rupees out of the total stamps revenue. Under Lord Lawrence's Government, the scale of judicial fees on the institution of civil plaints was increased in 1867 by about 50 per cent. on the ground of an increase in the number of suits of the judicial establishment. The result of the increase was that although the number of suits instituted fell 10 per cent., the revenue derived from the increase of the scale of Rs. ... number of suits ... the ... figures of 1867

The Act of 1867 fixed a uniform ten per cent duty upon the value of the property or interest in all classes of suits

fixed by the Court-fee Act of 1867 which is at a rate of $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

and in suits which are valued at less than Rs. 100, the duty is fixed at 5 per cent.

The duty has a natural tendency to increase by about 6 per cent. every year.

It is estimated that the duty on probate has increased to 2 per cent.

is the classes of suits which are calculated, that, out of an aggregate of 7,00,000 suits in India, about 10 per cent are for sums exceeding 1,000 Rs.

while fully one-sixth are for sums less than 10 Rs.

The uniform per cent. scale of duty fixed by Act 26 of 1867 was found to be unduly repressive.

It was therefore reduced by the Court-fee Act of 1884.

As regards general or documentary stamps, there are of two kinds, there is an *ad-valorem* class, and a fixed class.

It is estimated that one quarter of the general stamp revenue is derived from stamps not exceeding 500 Rs.

In other words, the smaller transactions bring in the most revenue. The revenue derived from general stamps has been increasing steadily.

It will increase with the prosperity of the country.

The revenue of the stamp duty is estimated to be Rs. 10,00,000.

The revenue of the stamp duty is estimated to be Rs. 10,00,000.

establishment of superintendents and their subordinates and by licensed vendors, and the cost of collection under both these heads comes to about 10 lacks of *Rupees* all over India. The stamps law exercises a very beneficial effect in tending to repress false and fruitless litigation. It furnishes also to some extent preconstituted evidence of place, time, and identity of person as regards the execution of bonds &c, which proves a great check upon the unscrupulous fabrication of evidence and the forging of documents. The $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. scale of Court-fees or judicial stamps is not heavy, because people in India are very fond of litigation, as is shown by the large number of suits below ten *Rupees* in value. The stamp duty tends to check a great deal of the abuse of litigation. In the case of appeals, the rate of duty is the same as in original suits.

As the administration of justice by native judges in the primary courts, checked and corrected by European judges of the superior Courts, has to be carried on through a triple system of Original, Appeal, and Special Appeal inquiries, the machinery of these Courts is necessarily a very costly thing in India, and the Government seek by means of the stamp duty to recoup themselves as much as possible for this heavy expenditure, and make justice pay for itself. The Government does not seek to get any surplus revenue by means of this duty. At present the Government is not recouped for its expenditure on the civil and criminal Courts from the proceeds of the stamps duty. While in England the administration of justice, like the expenditure on the army and the navy, is paid for by

general taxation, in India, the general revenue does not provide it with justice, for which a payment in addition to general taxation is levied in the shape of a charge upon the litigant classes. The only law-charges taxed in England are what a man has to pay to his solicitors. These are very heavy in England. They are not so heavy in India except in the Presidency towns, where the fees of solicitors and barristers are much higher than those paid in England, and the suitors have besides to pay a heavy stamp duty. Taking both parties together, a suit which passes through the three Original, Appeal, and Special Appeal Courts pays in stamp duty about 25 per cent. of the value of the subject matter. But with this expenditure, final justice is not obtained. The last appeal in all heavy cases lies in England to the Privy Council, where the delays in obtaining justice are most grievous, and amount almost to a scandal at present (1870-71). Out of 700 appeals to the Privy Council, filed since the amalgamation of the old Supreme and Sadar Courts, nearly 650 appeals were from Calcutta alone, for the Bengali suitors are both rich and litigious, and regard appeals as a luxury. The delay is partly accounted for by the great time required for translations in heavy cases, and many of these appeals are certainly made because much pride and feeling enter into them, but there can be no question that by far the largest number of these appeals are made simply because it takes so long a time before the Privy Council can dispose of them, and parties take advantage of this block of business to put off the time for the execution of the decrees passed against them.

Besides the $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. duty paid to the Government, the ordinary suitor in an Indian Court has to pay the expenses of his witnesses, and also the fees of his professional advisers, which last payment is for the most part settled by private contract.

SECTION X.

MINT REVENUE.

Having thus discussed the larger and more general items of Imperial revenue derived from land, forests, excise duties, assessed taxes, salt, opium, and stamps, I shall next proceed to summarize the evidence received by the Committee upon the minor items of Indian revenue, and, which, by way of distinction, may well be called the heads of special funds, which represent payments for special services done by the State of a sort which are not always found associated with sovereign functions. The revenue derived from the Mint certificates, from the Post Office, from the Telegraph, to a certain extent, even the revenue derived from Irrigation Works all have this distinctive character, viz. that the payment is made for an obvious service rendered. Mr. Harrison, who holds the office of Comptroller-General to the Government of India, was examined regarding the nature of the receipts from the Government mints.

There were till lately three mints in operation in British India at the three Presidency towns, but one of these, the Madras Mint, has been recently closed. The revenue derived from the Government mints consists chiefly of the seignorage duty of 2 per cent. on all silver brought to the mint to be coined, and a further charge of 1/10th per cent. for the preliminary melting. The silver is always melted when tendered at the mint for acceptance, because it has to be reduced to a homogeneous shape,

and as the gold is coined at the Mint, and the silver is coined at the Mint, and the charge for the gold is 25 per 10,000. In the coining of copper, a considerable profit is obtained in the share of the difference between the cost of manufacture and the nominal value of coined copper pieces. The gold pieces coined are equivalents of 5 *Rupees*, 10 *Rupees*, and 15 *Rupees*, all authorized by an Act of Parliament.

The gold pieces were coined in the Mints of Calcutta and Bombay. The gold pieces of 15 *Rupees* were coined in the Mint of Calcutta, and the gold pieces of 10 *Rupees* and 5 *Rupees* were coined in the Mint of Bombay.

The receipts of the Calcutta Mint for the year 1869-70 from gold coinage were 15½ lacks of *Rupees*, while from the Bombay Mint, these latter were 7½ lacks of *Rupees*, and there were no receipts from gold coinage. The total receipts of the two Mints were 15½ lacks of *Rupees*, and the charges of collection amounted to 7½ lacks of *Rupees*, half the income, viz. 8½ lacks of *Rupees*. In 1870, the receipts of the Calcutta Mint were 68,000£, and expenses were 18,000£, which were only 50,000£. The Government anticipates that, under present conditions, gold may be imported and coined to a considerable extent as a way of substitution for the silver coinage, in addition to it. The proportion of gold to silver in the gold bears to silver is 15 to 1 in the Calcutta mints, though in France it is 15½ to 1, the equivalent rate at which the English sovereign

is worth the face value of the silver coinage, and it to be a sufficient inducement,

sovereign was brought at that rate to the Treasury. It is quite optional for any one to receive English sovereigns in payment from the Treasury, though the Government will take these sovereigns at the prescribed rate in payment of its dues. Even with this inducement of a higher value, only a small number, or in fact no sovereigns, have been brought to the Treasury, showing plainly that its equivalent value exceeds the sanctioned rate of $10\frac{1}{4}$ Rupees. Gold bullion is also received by the Currency Department at the same rate as sovereigns, subject to a mintage charge for conversion. No sovereigns are received for recoinage, only gold bullion is received for that purpose. No distinction is made between the Australian and English sovereigns, though the Australian is understood to contain a certain amount of silver, and sells in the Bazaar for one *Anna* less than the English sovereign. The mint officers do not pay in cash for the gold or silver bullion presented there to be coined. They give gold or silver mint certificates; on presenting these at the Government Treasuries, gold and silver coins are paid to the certificate-holder according to the specification in the certificate. These certificates were formerly made payable 20 days after date, but since 1861, they are all made payable at sight, and are issued as soon as the assay is completed.

The Madras Mint was stopped because of late the importations of gold and silver have been so small that the retention of the three mints was found to involve needless waste. If the quantity of coinage does not increase, this economy may well be carried further, as

only one working mint would have sufficed for the quantity of gold and silver bullion brought to be coined during the last two years, and the Calcutta mint was actually worked at a dead loss, as the work done in it was not sufficient to pay the cost of the establishment. At the same time it must be admitted that great inconvenience would result from having only one mint. The mercantile transactions of Bombay are large enough to entitle it to a separate mint of its own, and to be independent of Calcutta, the imperial importance of which latter place demands a mint for itself.

The import of silver in India first began to be of considerable amount in 1854, when our export trade received a great stimulus with the breaking out of the Russian war, and the commencement of the great Railway works. In 1860, and for eight or nine years after, the imports of silver were very large. In 1854, the great railway works commenced, and it was owing to that fact that the imports of silver increased. Since 1860, the cotton famine in Lancashire added force to this growth of the silver imports. In 1849, when the extreme point of depression has been reached, the exchange was at the very low rate of 1s. 9½d. or 9¾d. per *Rupee*. During the years of the cotton famine, the rate was as high as 2s. 1d. It has fallen since to 1s. 10½d. At the present rate of exchange, it is not possible to maintain the circulation of gold sovereigns. When the rate was high and exceeded 2s., sovereigns were paid at the value of 10 *Rs.* each into the Treasury, but these have found their way out since the rates have fallen. The sovereign being now worth one shilling more, it is not likely that Government can issue and

maintain a gold circulation in India at $10\frac{1}{2}$ Rs. The few English sovereigns paid into the Treasury are reissued at the rate at which they were received, with $\frac{1}{12}$ th alloy of copper, the same as the English standard. A uniform currency for India and England is a possibility, but as it would involve a change in the standard of value from silver to gold, the plan of assimilation can hardly be carried out without great trouble and inconvenience.

There are reasons for believing that the importations of silver will not be so large in the future as they have been in the past. In the place of the old remittances of large amounts of English capital to India for investment in railway enterprise and other undertakings, we have now to remit large sums of money from India to England, which represent the growing profits of these railways. There has been moreover a great fall-off in the value of our export trade. The value of our export trade in cotton alone amounted to 30 millions some years ago. In 1869-70, this value did not amount to half that sum. Under these combined influences, it is expected that the rate of exchange will be permanently lowered as between England and India.

The natives of India do not buy English standard gold pieces for their ornaments. They require a finer and purer standard such as the old gold *Mohors*, the Venetian sequins, or China gold pieces. The English standard sovereign cannot be made acceptable to the natives of India, and if its standard were raised, it would not exchange in England. This is a serious difficulty in the way of an uniform gold currency for India and England. If it is desired to cir-

culate gold freely in India, the only plan that will succeed is to raise the rate at which gold is taken at the mint. As regards the question of introducing a double standard in India, Mr. Harrison suggested that if gold were somewhat under-rated, no practical inconvenience would arise from the introduction of a double legal standard. It has however been proved by the experience of France that, in accordance with the variations in the values of gold and silver, practically only one standard prevails at a time in all countries where the double standard system obtains; and it would not therefore be possible to maintain permanently the double standard in India, however nicely the relative proportions of the weight and purity of gold and silver might be adjusted.

Sir William Mansfield advocated the introduction of a gold coinage, but Mr. Harrison stated that he did not agree with Sir William Mansfield's views on this point. Sir William Mansfield seemed to hold that the main purpose of a currency is only to serve as a medium of domestic exchange, and a means of transacting business, and as a nation advanced in wealth, it was advisable that a change should be made in the currency medium from copper to silver, and when there was a still further advance in wealth, from silver to gold. In Mr. Harrison's view, the most important function of a currency is that it is the standard or measure of all money values, and this function has been entirely passed over by Sir William Mansfield. As this is however the most important function of a currency, a material basis is necessary for the maintenance of a standard of value. In advocating a change of stan-

dard, the effect of it upon existing contracts must be kept in view, especially as the State is a creditor with its revenue fixed to the extent of many *crores* of *Rupees* from the permanently settled districts of Bengal, Madras, and the N. W. Provinces. Besides, even independently of the consideration of the influence of a change of standard on existing contracts, Mr. Harrison maintained that in the present backward condition of India, silver as a standard of value was better suited to the circumstances of the people than gold, for gold pieces of the smallest dimensions would be quite beyond their reach, and would not be wanted by them in their domestic and mercantile transactions, which are conveniently discharged by the silver coins. Even if the silver *Rupees* were retained in imitation of the English system as subsidiary to gold as a legal tender up to a certain amount, this could only be done by making the silver token of less intrinsic worth than its nominal value as a submultiple of the gold coin, a step which would be thoroughly unpopular, as the people hug the idea of intrinsic value in coins. The inconveniences described in Sir William Mansfield's Minute, as resulting from the retention of silver as the standard, owed their force to the exceptional nature of the years of the cotton famine, when the importations of silver suddenly increased to an enormous extent; they do not in any way affect the normal state of things which has returned since the close of the years of cotton famine.

The greater part of gold bullion that remains in India passes into private hoards, and disappears. There is no gold in circulation. The quantity of sil-

ver in circulation has not been even approximately estimated, but it must be enormous. If a double standard were adopted, it would be a difficult thing for gold to displace this enormous quantity of silver, and as the transactions in India are on a very small scale, gold would be practically useless for making payments among the lower orders. Silver coin in large quantities would thus be always required for the most numerous concerns of the most numerous class of people. India is supplied with silver from Europe and China, and with gold from Australia and China. Neither gold nor silver are exported from India to China. The value of Indian opium is always largely in excess of Chinese imports to India. Although there are no exports of specie from India to China, there is always a large balance due to China from England which has to be paid in money ; and this balance is paid through India to China, and represents a portion of the specie apparently exported from England to India. The depreciation in the value of silver measured by the price of the staple grain of Bengal has been 50 per cent. during the last 25 years. Mr. Harrison stated that he did not anticipate any further decline in the value of silver.

SECTION XI.

POST OFFICE REVENUE.

Sir H. L. Anderson was examined upon the subject of the postal revenues. The post office revenues, amounting to 71 *lacks* and more in 1869-70, are, like the Mint receipts, a payment for a special service done by the agency of Government. These 71 *lacks* were made up of the following items: (1) the sale of postage stamps realized about 29 *lacks*; (2) service stamps, that is, postage on Government letters of the various departments, represented 27 *lacks* more; (3) cash sale of service labels brought in about a *lack*; (4) the postage on letters and newspapers yielded 9 *lacks*; (5) bangy parcel-post yielded $2\frac{1}{2}$ *lacks*; (6) mail cart and parcel-vans service brought in 72,000 *Rupees*; and there was, lastly, (7) a miscellaneous item of 80,000 *Rupees*, including contributions from Native States. The gross charges in India on account of the Postal department amounted to 65 *lacks* in 1869-70, and in England about 4 *lacks* were required for the Inland post service. The cost of the sea service is not included in this sum. In the year 1854, the one *Anna* postal system was first organized. In that year there were sent by post 28 million covers in all. This number rose to $84\frac{1}{2}$ millions in 1868-69, that is, it was nearly tripled in 14 years. The gross receipts were 45 *lacks* in 1853-54, and they rose to 74 *lacks* in 1869-70. The $84\frac{1}{2}$ millions of covers sent by post in 1869-70 were made up of 77 millions of letters, 6 millions of newspapers, 76,500 parcels, and 73,500 books and patterns. The rates of postage are the

same for all *Annas*. This is the present *postal* system. In 1868 the rates were $\frac{1}{2}$ *Anna* for a quarter *Tola*, one *Anna* for half *Tola*, and two *Annas* for a whole *Tola*. In 1868 the rates were lowered, and are now half of what they were before.

As regards the *communications* of the *English* and the *Indian* and *English* Governments agree to pay to the *Peninsular and Oriental Company* an annual subsidy of 40 *lacks of Rupees*, and it was further agreed that if the three *communications* should be carried at a dividend of the *Peninsular and Oriental Company* short of 6 per cent., both the *Government*s should increase the subsidy so as to make good the difference. These conditions were altered in 1870, when a new agreement was entered into with the *Company* for 10 years, by which the subsidy was raised to 45 *lacks*, and the clause about making good a six per cent. dividend, which was found by experience to impose a charge of 10 *lacks* annually, was done away with. The *Company* performs the sea service only, and conveys *mail* once a week from *Bombay* to *England*, and from *England* to *Bombay*. The postage rate was at first fixed at 13d, of which 7d. went for the sea postage, 4d. were paid to the *Company*, and the rest were shared between the *Indian* and *English* Governments. Since the breaking out of the *French* war of 1870, the mails have been carried by the *Brindisi* road, and the charge has been reduced by one penny. Out of the subsidy of 40 *lacks*, which was paid to the *P. and O. Company* down to 1870, about 11 *lacks* and 70,000 *Rupees* are paid by the *Indian Government*, which re-

ed in return a revenue of about 6 *lacks* and 20,000 *Rupees*, and the difference of about 5½ *lacks* represented the dead loss incurred for the mail service by India. When the subsidy was raised to 45 *lacks*, the contribution from India was raised to 13¼ *lacks*, and the total loss which India has thus to bear on account of this service comes at present to about 7 *lacks*. The change in the terms of the contract was made, and the proportion of the contribution which England and India should pay was settled, by the English Government without considering the wishes or views of the India Office. The postal revenue is not sufficient to pay the charges incurred by Government on account of this department. Excluding the Government service letters, there is a deficit of nearly 16 *lacks* a year on the Inland post service.

The Inland post is carried over 4,433 miles by the railways, 5,333 miles by the mail cart, horse, and camel dak, 5,613 miles by the sea, and over 35,495 miles by runners, and boats on rivers such as the Indus, &c. The railways are bound to carry the post free except in the case of frontier sorting, for which the railways provide carriages, and charge a haulage fee of about 2 *Annas* a mile. India does not in any way suffer by her mail service being connected with the mail service of China and Australia, for the Imperial Government pays whatever China cannot pay. Besides, the Peninsular and Oriental Company refuse to take the Indian contract alone, unless a certain sum is paid for the line from Ceylon to Calcutta, over which line the Company sends its steamers for the passenger traffic, but which line the Government say they

do not want. India has thus to pay on this account about $1\frac{1}{4}$ lacks of *Rupees* more every year than what are strictly required for Indian exigencies. The overland postage was increased from 9d. to 13d. in 1867, when the contract was first entered into. It was subsequently reduced when the Brindisi route was adopted, and is now one shilling. As regards postal communications with places situated within the limits of Native States, an understanding has been arrived at by which the Indian Government pays all the expenses, and receives all the postage, and the deficiency, if any, is made up by the Native States. The soldier's and sepoy's letters go free in India, but not officers' letters. The sepoy's letter is stamped by the commanding officer, and at the end of the month he recovers the stamps, so that in the end, the sepoy's letters go substantially free.

SECTION XII.

LAW AND JUSTICE.

Sir H. L. Anderson was also examined upon the subject of the sources of revenue included under the head "Law and Justice," which represented a total of 80 *lacks* in 1869-70. The first item of about $1\frac{1}{2}$ *lacks* consists of the sale proceeds of unclaimed property. Such property is not sold for the benefit of Government till after a year or more lapses from the date that it comes into the hands of Government, and due steps are taken to advertize the death of the intestate owner all over the country. The next item of revenue under this head consists of the proceeds of Jail manufactures and convict labour, which amounted to 13 *lacks* in 1869-70. This figure represents the net yield after deducting the expenditure, including the cost of the raw material manufactured, and the prison expenses, and maintenance charges of the convicts. The net revenue of 13 *lacks* however includes the value of convict labour when it is employed in other Government departments such as the Public Works. In the Bengal Jails, which are the best managed Jails in this respect, the number of prisoners sentenced in 1869-70 was 71,751, and the daily average strength of the Jails was about 20,000. Out of this daily average, 17,387 were sentenced to labour, and out of these again, nearly one half, or 8,252 prisoners, were employed in manufactures. The outturn of the Bengal Jails was valued at 4,55,457 *Rupees*, out of which the net yield of the Bengal Jails was

are employed in the Government Press at that place. The hire of convicts let out to other departments resulted in a debit against the Public Works department of $2\frac{1}{2}$ *lacks*, showing a net result of nearly 7 *lacks* as the value of the labour of eight thousand and a quarter of prisoners. The gross cost of the Jails in Bengal is 53 *Rupees* per head per annum, and the net cost is 36 *Rupees*, after deducting the 7 *lacks* which represent the return of labour, or the sale price of goods manufactured. In Bombay the total number of prisoners was about 22,912 in 1869-70, the daily average was about 5,948 prisoners, and the gross cost of maintenance was 102 *Rs.*, while the net cost was 59 *Rupees*, per head per annum. The death rate in Bombay was 3 per cent., in Bengal it was 5 per cent. Out of the 102 *Rs.* of gross charges per head in the Bombay Jails, about 23 *Rs.* represented the cost of the guards, which expenditure was not charged in the Bengal accounts. The real cost of maintenance in the Bombay Jails is thus reduced to 80 *Rs.* per head against the 56 *Rupees* per head of Bengal. The daily average of prisoners in the Madras Jails was 9,933, and the death rate was nearly 4 per cent. The gross charge for maintenance was 70 *Rs.* per head in that Presidency.

As regards convict labour generally, it is to be remarked that the convicts are mostly men of the criminal tribes who are not brought up to know any trade. They are therefore made to work as labourers in various manufactures, chiefly the manufacture of coarse cloth, towels, carpets &c. In Bengal they are employed on the Jute mills, and make

gunny bags ; some of them perform menial services in Jails, which effects some saving in expenses. In some Jails they are also employed as warders. They are not employed on works which require skilled labour, as the convicts chiefly come from those classes of people who know no trade, and in fact have most often to be taught the first rudiments of manual work while in Jail. There are no special trade instructors, but there are skilled foremen, conversant with particular trades. By good conduct at the short drill and other unremunerative kinds of work, a convict gets the opportunity of being employed in other kinds of labour which are less irksome than mere manual labour. In some Jails they have got a good conduct mark-system. In Punjab they allow good conduct marks to go towards a remission of sentence, and in Bengal there is a scheme of what is called intermediate imprisonment. In the Alipoor Jail, the convicts are employed upon jute mills and oil pressing machines. There are tread-mills in Calcutta and Bombay, but not in the Mofussil Jails. The treadmill punishment can be made productive by turning it to account for the purpose of grinding corn. The general fault of the Indian Jail discipline is that the object of enforcing really hard labour is a little sacrificed to the consideration of profitable outturn. In some of the best Jails, they have not made the punishment sufficiently deterrent because the authorities look to make it productive. In the Alipoor Jail, where the convicts work on the Government printing press establishment, the Jail authorities charge excessive prices for the work done there, much more than what would be demanded by private printers, and this excess

of charge is made in order to show a large apparent profit to the great prejudice of private industry. The commission of the Superintendent of this Jail was formerly made to depend upon the profit of the Jail, and the great temptation to exaggerate the profits of the Jail, the principles upon which the profits of Jail labour are ascertained may be briefly summed up in these words; first in the case of manufactured goods, the purchase price of the goods is deducted from the sale price of the goods, and the balance is the profit. Secondly in the case of convict labour, the market wages of the labour are taken to represent the cost of it. No payment however is actually made by the Public Works department when it employs convict labour; the market value of the labour is only credited as a nominal receipt to the Jail account. Of course convict labour is very inferior, and at one time the Public Works department would rather have nothing of it at all. The convicts do not come out of the Jails with better principles or better habits of industry. The Jails are in all cases enabled to undersell the free trades. But very often there is no competition at all, as they are enabled to undersell the free trades, and are not in competition with them. On the other hand, any persons whose duty it is to employ convict labour as hard or simple labour.

The next item of receipts under the head of Land and Justice is the sum of £100,000 for the purchase of process which is made by the Public Works department. These are paid by the Public Works department, and their

of imperial law. The saving process in former times did not go to the Government Treasury. They were called Amin fund in Bombay, and Talabana in Bengal, and were kept with the Judges of the courts who employed the men to serve the processes. Though these processes are now credited as a receipt in the Government Treasury, the same only comes in to be paid out again to the process serving establishments. So far as it goes, it represents an addition to the stamp duty charge upon suitors in India.

The next item consists of fines and forfeitures which yielded about 31½ lacks of Rupees in 1869-70. This sum represents the gross receipts, for there is no estimate of what India paid out and the amount levied in, the amount of the fines levied, like the Magistrates' Clerks in England. The next head consists of the fees for the Registration of documents which yielded a revenue of 16 lacks in 1869-70. The old Act 16 of 1864

Government obtained a net income of 2½ lacks after payment of charges and they had accumulated 13½ lacks in this way in saving in half a dozen years. The Government in 1864 their last Registrar declared

was to make revenue, and they stated that they would be levying such charges would recoup them and leave a margin of 5 per cent for the permanent provisions to the establishment. Besides these permanent

minor importance included under the head of Law and Justice, which are in the nature of casual accessions, such as the convict receipts for Port Blair, which are more than covered by the general charges of that convict settlement; all these items together made up the total of 80 *lacks*. The total expenditure on Law and Justice was 2 *crores* and 98 *lacks* in 1869-70. It will be seen therefore that it is not covered by the $1\frac{1}{2}$ *crores* of the receipts from judicial stamps, and the 80 *lacks* obtained under the head of Law and Justice. There is a deficit of nearly 60 *lacks*.

SECTION XIII.
MISCELLANEOUS RECEIPTS.

CIVIL DEPARTMENT.

The item of miscellaneous receipts is composed of amounts which do not fall under any of the principal heads of revenue, and are not themselves of sufficient importance to be separately noticed, or are casual and extraordinary receipts, the inclusion of which in the principal heads of revenue with which they are connected would be inconvenient, as tending to vitiate and comparison of results for different years. Some of the items under this head are recurrent, and others are casual. There are three heads of miscellaneous receipts belonging respectively to the civil, military, and Public Works department. Of the civil miscellaneous receipts which occur every year, the first item is a sum of $4\frac{1}{4}$ lacs which represents the gain on transactions with London. Every year large amounts are advanced in England for the payment of annuities to retired members of the civil service, and to annuitants upon certain provident funds connected with the civil services. The Trustees of these funds repay the annuities at the rate of 1000 *Sicca Rupees* for an annuity of 100 £. These *Sicca Rupees* represent $10666\frac{2}{3}$ Government *Rupees*, being six per cent. more than the amount paid in England as compared with the official rate of exchange. This results in a gain in account of six per cent. on the amount of the annuities disbursed in England. The premium on money orders which the Government grant from one treasury to another, representing an annual yield of $1\frac{1}{2}$ lacs, is the second item under this head of civil miscellaneous receipts. The

next item consists of unclaimed deposits and Bills which, if unclaimed within three years, are carried to revenue, and, if they are paid thereafter, appear as refunds. For the most part there is no real gain in these transactions. Under this head also are entered the subscriptions to the military funds. As regards the military funds, previous to 1866 a separate account was kept of these funds, but in that year Government assumed the management of these funds, and took over the capital of the funds with all its obligations, and the interest of the officers in these funds was formally guaranteed to them. The subscriptions are at present carried to the revenue, the pensions paid are taken as charges against revenue, and the difference by which the annual charge exceeds the annual receipts is shown as a charge to the capital account of the funds. These funds were formed at first by voluntary associations of the officers, and the East India Company assisted these funds by simply allowing a higher rate of interest upon the deposits. When these funds were taken over, instead of showing the entire capital of the funds transferred as revenue of that year, it was arranged that only the excess of pensions paid over subscriptions received in each year should be taken from the capital, and the balance of the capital account appears in the statements of account as deposit not bearing interest. The amount of these funds at the close of the year 1869-70 was about 3 millions. This capital will be gradually exhausted by the annual charges in respect of excess of payments over subscriptions received. Interest was allowed before the Government assumed

management of the funds ; since then interest is not allowed. When the capital will be exhausted, Government will have to provide for the charges out of ordinary revenue. The funds are applicable to the support of the widows and orphans of officers who entered the army before 1859, and are closed against new admissions, and they would come to a natural end with the lives of the widows and orphans of officers who entered service before 1859. Of late by an act of Parliament it has been made an incident of the military service that Government should pay the annuities. At present, all the civil service Annuity and Provident funds carry interest, and the receipts of annual subscriptions are credited under this miscellaneous head. The sale of old stores and Darbar presents, fees and fines and forfeitures including marriage fees, burial fees, emigration fees, and fees for stamping weights, proceeds of the sale of Government books, recoveries on account of law charges in pauper suits, proceeds of experimental cotton farms and factories, all these appear under the head of miscellaneous civil receipts.

MISCELLANEOUS ARMY RECEIPTS.

These receipts were estimated in 1869-70 to be about 75 *lacks*. of *Rupees*, and include, like the civil receipts, both casual and recurrent items. Of the latter, the purchase money paid for discharges, and the unclaimed balances of deserters, formed the principal heads under the grant of regimental pay. On the Commissariat grant, the receipts were chiefly derived from the sale of malt liquor bought in England, and of spirits, rum, and Arrack

bought in India by Government, and resold to the troops in regimental canteens. A considerable sum was derived from the sale of old stores and provisions, and of Commissariat cattle. The stud establishments also brought in a considerable sum from the sale of regimental cart horses, and amounts received from officers for chargers supplied. The army clothing establishments supplied clothing to the Police and other departments, and the payments made on account of these supplies were brought to account under this head. The same observation applies to the stores supplied by the Army medical establishments to the civil dispensaries. These latter items are more matters of account than real revenue. The proceeds of the sale of ordnance stores and camp equipage also appear under this head. Mr. Harrison admitted that there are no regular stated accounts or annual balance sheets concerning these transactions, showing at a glance whether they make a profit or loss on the whole business. All the items of military receipts mentioned before are of an ordinary and recurring character, though varying in amount from year to year.

MISCELLANEOUS PUBLIC WORKS RECEIPTS.

Upon this third head of miscellaneous Public Works receipts, Lieutenant Colonel G. Chesney was examined before the Committee. He stated that it consisted chiefly of three items, water rent from irrigation works, the yield of which was about 53 *lacks* in 1869-70, miscellaneous receipts, and State Railway receipts, making in all about 95 *lacks* of revenue. The gross receipts of water rents from irrig

tion works are gradually expanding. The total amount of 53 *lacks* is made up of 32 *lacks* derived from the North West Provinces, and 20 *lacks* from Punjab. Bengal yielded 54,000 *Rs.* and Bombay about 25,000 *Rupees.* At first Government derived no direct revenue from irrigation works. The previous native Governments levied no special water rates; they maintained the irrigation works at their own cost, and recouped themselves from the enhanced assessment on land. This was the plan adopted in Southern India, where there are extensive irrigation works constructed by the old native rulers, and even under British rule this policy has been continued. When new canals were however constructed in the North West Provinces, it was found that the assessments had been fixed there for long periods, and could not be enhanced without a breach of faith; a direct irrigation rate was therefore levied for the first time in these Provinces, and the system has been extended thence to Punjab, Bengal, and Bombay. In Bengal the revenue from irrigation rates is derived chiefly from the Orissa works. In the N. W. Provinces, the revenue is derived from the Ganges and Jumna canal works; two thirds of it comes from the Ganges canal, and one third from the Jumna canal. The irrigation cess is entirely voluntary, and the rates vary according to the nature of the crops from 2½s. to 10s. On the Ganges canal, the supply of water is not equal to the steadily rising demand of the cultivators, and the other canals in the North West and Punjab are also in full working order. The Ganges canal did not for some years pay its working expenses. It now pays 7½ per cent. on the capital, after deducting all expenses for

maintenance and capital charges. The Government does not include the accumulation of interest during the years when the canal did not pay its expenses. The two Janna canals are on the same principle paying about 17 or 18 per cent. on the capital sum spent in their construction. These canals paid for their interest cost from the first construction, and in their case there is no accumulation of interest to make up. They were constructed in two or three years, and have been in working order for the last 40 years nearly. The Orissa canal has 10 years to complete; the Government bought the canal from a private company who had constructed it partially before. The Orissa canal has just commenced to yield some revenue by means of water rates. The Orissa works are not quite in the nature of canals, they are more in the nature of a net work of navigable canals connected with irrigation works.

Besides the water rates levied from the great canal works, considerable revenue is derived from navigation tolls, which, along with fines and refunds, form contributions to the general income of the Public Works Department. The yield of navigation is however inconsiderable, and as for refunds it is a matter of account only, being a credit on account of the local fund for maintenance by the Government of India on the canal and other works. The rents of lands and buildings, including Military quarters occupied by officers and civilians, and Government quarters rented, and Government land, are also included in the revenue of the Department of Public Works.

head of Public Works Miscellaneous receipts consists of the gain in exchange on the Railway transactions, and the gross traffic receipts of the State Railways in Bengal and the Central Provinces. The gain in exchange represents the difference between the rate at which the Government receive the traffic receipts from the Companies in India, and pay them to the share-holders in England. They receive them at the rate of 1s. 10d. a *Rupee* from the Companies, and credit the Secretary of State at the rate of two shillings for a *Rupee*. There is thus a gain of 2d in the *Rupee* to the Government of India. As the rate of exchange has not been for some years so low as 1s. 10d., this difference represents an actual gain, and not a mere adjustment of accounts. In effect 22 pence are given by the Secretary of State in England to the Railway Companies for every *Rupee* of traffic receipts received from them in India. As a set off against this, when the Railway capital was first transferred to India for the construction of the great lines, for every 22 pence paid by the Companies in England, they obtained a credit of one *Rupee* in India.

The Ganges canal cost two *crores* of *Rupees*. There is a huge dam built at the spot where the river issues from the mountains; the Ganges canal commences at that place, and joins the river again at Cawnpore. The whole of the Ganges water at the place where the dam is built is diverted into the canal, and the canal is kept navigable at all times. The channel is not sufficiently large to give off all the water for which there is a demand, *i. e.*, the quantity of water that

would be sold if it were available. The level of the canal is ordinarily below the level of the land, but the canal runs with great velocity, about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles an hour, and has a fall of about 65 inches in the mile, while the country has a considerably greater fall, so that at the end of every third or fourth mile the water comes up to the surface of the country, and is then taken by a branch channel for irrigation, while the main stream goes over a weir to a lower level. The irrigation is carried on by means of small subsidiary channels taken off at intervals from the main canal; these latter are again diverted into smaller channels which open out into the fields by means of small gates. The irrigation extends to about five or six miles on the banks of each channel. The whole of the Doab for about 70 or 80 miles in width is watered by the canal, and the length of the canal is about 900 miles up to Cawnpoor. The Ganges Canal was first opened for navigation in 1855, and for irrigation in 1858, but it brought in no sensible revenue till 1861, fifteen years after its commencement in 1845, or rather in 1848. Looking simply to the water rents, the canal cannot be considered to be remunerative, if the loss of interest for the many years it did not pay anything be taken into account. But if the saving of the land revenue in bad years which it has effected be taken into account, it has been undoubtedly highly remunerative. In respect of this latter consideration, the Madras works, although they bring it no direct revenue, are the most remunerative. They may be said to have banished famine from the irrigated districts. Since the Ganges canal was opened, there

have been two years of great draught which would have resulted in a famine but for the canal. Both in the Madras Presidency and in the North West Provinces, the land revenue has been enormously increased by reason of these canals.

The gross profits from the single State Railway open in 1869-70 were 80,000 *Rs.* on a capital expenditure of 40 *lacks*. The working expenses of this Railway are not covered by the gross receipts, so that in effect the Government has paid 40 *lacks* to purchase a Railway on which the actual loss is 50,000 *Rs.* a year. Colonel Chesney stated that about three State Railways are expected to pay more than 5 per cent. interest on their capital. There is a railway running along the side of the Ganges canal. Though the canal was originally built both for irrigation and navigation purposes, it has been found by the experience of the last few years that the navigation is very inconsiderable, and the large expenditure incurred in making the locks returns no interest in the shape of navigation tolls. On the Jamna canal and the Punjab canal system, the navigation is also very trifling. On the Rajmahandry canal, there has been a considerable increase of traffic. The Ganges canal yielded by way of navigation tolls 35,000 *Rupees* in 1869, out of which 12,000 *Rupees* represented the cost of the boat establishment. If the cost of constructing the locks be added to the cost of the establishment, it will be found that the canal is worked at a dead loss.

SECTION XIV.

MINOR SOURCES OF REVENUE.

(POLICE.)

The revenue derived under this head showed a total of $28\frac{3}{4}$ *lacks of Rupees* in 1869-70 ; this sum was made up chiefly of municipal contributions which brought in 21 *lacks* ; the contribution paid by the Railway Companies for the Police employed on the stations amounted to about $3\frac{1}{2}$ *lacks* ; about 35000 *Rs.* were received on account of the chowkey-dari police employed by private persons ; about $1\frac{1}{4}$ *lacks of Rupees* were obtained from fees, fines, and forfeitures ; and there was a miscellaneous receipt of $1\frac{1}{2}$ *lacks* from various sources, such as cattle pounding fees, and departmental savings &c. When Lord Mayo effected reductions in 1871, the Police expenses were at a single stroke reduced by nearly 10 *lacks*, out of which sum six *lacks* were allotted to Bengal, and 4 *lacks* to Madras. This large saving was effected by reducing the number of officers, chiefly Assistant Superintendents. Similar reductions were not made in the Bombay Presidency. Bombay had till then enjoyed another advantage over the other parts of India. The Bombay Municipalities did not contribute sufficiently to the expenses of their Police, and the Government of India called the attention of the local Government to this difference. The country districts in Bombay moreover still retain their village police shetsandies, who cost nothing as they receive no pay from the state. The Government of India accordingly confined their attention chiefly to the Municipalities. In Bengal

the number of regular Police comes up to 31,700 men, and the strength of the village Police is 18,610. In the Bombay Presidency, including Scind and the Island of Bombay, the regular police force consists of 20,525 men; of these 15,770 men belong to the mofussil, 3500 to Scind, and 1350 to the Island of Bombay. The number of Police in the Madras Presidency comes to about 23,433 men. The cost of the Police, taking the whole of India, is nearly $2\frac{1}{2}$ crores of *Rupees*. Out of this sum the cost for Bombay was about 35 *lacks*, and for Madras 36 *lacks Rupees*.

Every man of the Police force is taught a certain amount of drill, but not a complete drill; some of the corps, such as the Bheel corps in Khandesh, are even taught Military drill.

MINOR SOURCES OF REVENUE.

(MARINE.)

The receipts under the item of marine Revenue amounted in all to 33 *lacks* in 1869-70. The most important of these receipts consists of the pilotage dues for the Hoogly, which amounted to about 7 *lacks*; about 60 per cent. of this income is paid to the pilots employed in the service, and the rest of the money goes as profits to Government which maintains the four pilot brigs and the fixed establishment. Government also maintains the lights at the mouth of the river Hoogly. A sum of $7\frac{1}{2}$ *lacks* in Calcutta, and of three *lacks* in Bombay, is received by Government for dockyard services and supplies. There are other miscellaneous items, large in the aggregate, but each separately not worth a separate notice. The normal receipts under this head come to about 20 *lacks* of *Rupees*; the item of $12\frac{1}{2}$

lacks, received in the shape of the proceeds of Government vessels sold, is not a regular item of receipts under this head. The Budget estimate for 1871-72 under the head of marine was nearly 24 *lacks*, and the whole of this revenue is derived from special services rendered by Government to private ship-ping. The seven *lacks* received on account of the Hoogly pilotage fees are properly not taxation; they are a reasonable return for the money disbursed by Government in maintaining the pilots, the pilot ships, and the lights. It is a payment for service rendered, and is not revenue in the sense of taxation. The receipts are more than balanced by the corresponding disbursements, as the expenses of maintaining the channel lights and buoys, and of surveying and dredging the river, and keeping open the channels, are not covered by the pilotage receipts. The same observation holds true about the dockyard receipts. They bear no proportion to the sums spent by Government in building the dockyards. In the case of the Hoogly river, the Government maintains the brigs, but the pilots are not in its service. They formed a close service once, but now any person on passing an examination receives a certificate to act as pilot, and use the Government brigs. The pilotage fee is demanded for the use of the vessel, and is independent of the charge for the pilot's service. The fees are collected by a Government officer, and the rates of pilotage are fixed by Government. In the accounts of the Government of India there is no separate heading in the nature of a capital dead stock account showing the ships, docks, buildings, stores &c., which are the property of Government. When ships and stores and

buildings, whether built or purchased from the annual revenue or from money obtained by loans, are sold off, the proceeds appear as a regular receipt on the income side of the accounts of the year in which the sale takes place, just as the price paid for them or the cost of building them appeared as an item in the expenditure side of the accounts of the year in which they were purchased or built.

MINOR SOURCES OF REVENUE.

(EDUCATIONAL)

The total receipts under this head were about $7\frac{1}{2}$ *lacks* in 1869-70, and were made up partly by fees, donations, and contributions, which brought in $4\frac{1}{4}$ *lacks*, and partly by the sale of books which brought in $2\frac{1}{2}$ *lacks* of *Rupees* of gross receipts. The entrance fees of the Calcutta University yielded 40,000 *Rupees*. Of course the $7\frac{1}{2}$ *lacks* mentioned before do not include the proceeds of the local funds contribution. The total sum spent on education in India from all sources in 1869-70 was $1\frac{1}{2}$ *crores* of *Rupees*, of which about 62 *lacks* represented the proportion of the imperial expenditure, and 39 *lacks* were contributed by the local cess for education. The total imperial grant in 1867 for science, art, and education was 87 *lacks*. The local funds system has at present been developed all over India, and the education grant from the Imperial treasury is supplemented by a nearly equal payment out of these funds, which sum does not find its way in the Financial accounts. In the North West Provinces, the Government formerly used to divide the local expenditure on education into two parts, one of which was

paid directly out of imperial funds, and the other was paid from local cesses. Of late the Government levies an additional five per cent. on the land revenue, and pays thereout for roads, education, and other expenditure. In Bengal there are no local cesses, although there are large contributions paid by the Municipalities, not for local, but for municipal purposes. In Bombay, one *Anna* in the *Rupee* of the land Revenue is levied, and this sum is divided into three parts, two portions are devoted to roads and repairs, and one part is allotted to education. In the Panjab and Madras territories, an additional two per cent. is levied upon the land assessment. The people of Bengal, in so far as the education expenditure is concerned, pay very considerably larger fees than the other Presidencies, and thus compensate to some extent for the want of local cesses. The Government besides contributes grants-in-aid to a considerable extent; the general principle of these grants-in-aid, so far as Bengal is concerned, is that Government pays a sum which never exceeds what the locality itself may have contributed towards building its own school, or maintaining it. In Bombay the payment of the grants in aid is now regulated by results; the teacher gets paid according to the number of scholars taught by him who pass fixed standards of examination. The Imperial expenditure in Bengal on education is 18 *lacks*, and 13 *lacks* are contributed by private sources. In Bombay, the Local contributions and cesses exceed considerably the Imperial contribution. The bulk of the expenditure is spent on higher education, and not upon primary schools. Besides the Government schools proper, there are some private schools which

are aided by Government, and others which are simply under Government inspection, and receive no aid from Government.

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SECTION XV.

INTEREST.

The receipts under this head for 1869-70 were $33\frac{1}{2}$ *lacks*, the most important item being the interest on the Government securities held as part of the reserve against the circulation of the Government Paper Currency. The amount of this interest was $16\frac{1}{2}$ *lacks* in 1869-70, and represented a capital of $3\frac{1}{4}$ *crores* of *Rupees* worth of Government securities, which have been purchased in the open market, and the stock receipt of which is held in the name of two Commissioners appointed under the Currency Act as trustees of the reserve held in securities. The maximum limit of the reserve fund as fixed by law which may be invested in securities is six *crores*, though at present only $3\frac{1}{4}$ *crores* are so invested. The stock receipt in the name of the Trustees represents in fact the notes themselves, and is held in the custody of the Mint-master at Calcutta. The notes themselves have been given up and cancelled. The stock receipt would entitle the Trustees of the reserve fund to receive the notes from the officer of Government on request. These $16\frac{1}{2}$ *lacks* of *Rupees* represent the profit obtained by Government which issues the Paper Currency, and the expenses of that department must be set against these $16\frac{1}{2}$ *lacks*. The next item under this head of interest receipts consists of dividends received on the shares held by Government in the Banks of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay. These receipts amounted to two *lacks* in 1869-70. The third item under this head consists of the interest on loans advanced to Municipalities. The receipts under

this head amounted to about 7½ *lacks* in 1869-70. The Calcutta Municipality pays 1,82,620 *Rupees* as interest upon a loan of 52 *lacks* borrowed by it from the Government for the completion of the water supply of Calcutta. Bombay pays a sum of nearly 6 *lacks* under this same head. While the Government seldom gets a loan for itself at less than 5 or 4½ per cent., it advances loans to these Municipalities at 4 per cent, making a present of one per cent. interest to them out of the general revenues.

The other receipts under this head are of a miscellaneous kind, including among others the interest received on arrears of revenue in the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay.

As regards the item of the dividends received by Government on account of its share in the Banks of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, Mr Harrison stated that the Government have invested 2½ *lacks* in the Bank of Bengal, and 6,18,750 *Rupees* in the Bank of Madras; it had invested 12 *lacks* in the old Bank of Bombay which have been all lost, and it has since then invested in the new Bank of Bombay 1,60,000 *Rs.* In all 40 *lacks* of *Rupees* represent the share of Government in these Banks, and the sum of two *lacks* received as interest on this investment represents a considerable profit, seeing that 12 *lacks* out of the capital fund have been lost altogether. In fact, the Bengal Bank has paid a dividend of 10 per cent. on the shares held by Government during the last 20 years, and the return of the Bank of Madras has also been higher than 5 per cent.

As a question of principle, Mr. Harrison conceded that the Government ought not to invest money in such speculative concerns. But, practically speaking, this investment has been of great benefit as well to the Government as to the Banks so subsidized. The Bank of Bengal has existed ever since 1809, and the Madras Bank is also an old institution, and both are well managed and sound concerns. The Bank of Bombay has been the only exception to the general rule. The Government derive considerable advantages from their connection with the Presidency Banks. They serve as Treasuries where Government keep their cash, and make their disbursements ; both those purposes formerly required the services of a separate establishment. For this service the Bank of Bengal receives the trifling payment of 43,000 *Rs.* a year, and the Government, besides the advantage described before, are able to exercise a considerable amount of control over its management. In return for these services, the banks get the advantage of holding large Government balances in their hands free of interest. The Government has held shares in these Presidency Banks ever since their institution, while the services rendered by the Banks as Government Treasuries are only of a recent date. The shares are not held as a part of the bargain by which the Banks are remunerated for the services they render. When the Presidency Banks were first started, it was thought that strong local Banks could not be constituted without Government support, and it was with this view that the Government subscribed for a few shares in each bank. And the necessity for such support

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milar manner, Government took over the Calcutta and South Eastern Railway at a loss. The Orissa Irrigation Works were also bought up from the private Company which first undertook to construct them for a very large sum, for which there is no prospect of any immediate return. Besides the Municipalities of Calcutta and Bombay, a loan of $6\frac{1}{2}$ lacks has been sanctioned for Karachi, a loan of nearly 13 lacks has also been sanctioned for the water supply of Madras, and a loan of 2 lacks for the completion of a canal round Madras. In the case of some of these loans to the municipalities, provision has been made for the gradual formation of a sinking fund in addition to the 4 per cent. interest paid to Government, by which the capital amount due will be paid off in the course of a fixed period of years.

SECTION XVI.

ELECTRIC TELEGRAPH REVENUE.

Major B. Champion, Director in Chief of the Government portion of the Indo-European Telegraph, was examined upon the subject of the revenue derived by Government from the earnings of the Government portion of the Indo-European Telegraph line. The lines under Major Champion's charge leave Karachi, and through the Persian Gulf extend to the mouth of the Euphrates and Tigris. One branch of the line touches the Persian coast at Bushire, and runs up to Teheran. This line is fed from Europe by the Indo-European Company's special line *via* Prussia and Russia, which joins it at Teheran. Another fork of the line is fed by the European system *via* Constantinople to Bagdad. This latter is supported by the Turkish Government. The bulk of the traffic passes *via* Russia. The purely Indian lines are entirely separate from these Indo-European lines, and Major Champion has no control over them. The receipts in 1868-69 from the Electric Telegraph Department in India were 20½ *lacks* of Rupees and in England 44,110£, or in all about 25 *lacks*. Of this sum the Indo-European lines yielded 44,110£ in England, and about 7½ *lacks* in India, during the year 1869-70 the rest, about 13 *lacks*, was the income of the purely Indian lines. For the first four or five years, the income of the Government portion of the Indo-European line ranged up to 10 *lacks*. The rate for telegraphic message was then 5£, 1s. This rate was reduced to 2£ 17s. in January 1869, which led to the

reduced income of that year. Out of the whole Indo-European line, the Government portion is nearly one-half. The Government charge for their portion of the line was before 22 10s., but it was subsequently reduced to 1£ 8s. The opening of the Persian line has however again affected the income of the old Indo-European line for the worse. Its income in 1870-71 was 2£ 17s. By reason of the opening of this line, the Indo-European Company found itself unable to work at the lower rates, and the rates for the Indo-European line have been therefore again raised from 2£ 17s. to 4 & 10s. The share of Government in the line is increased by the proportion of 1£ 8s. to 2£ 17s. The Government present rate for a thorough message of 100 miles is 10s. A small portion of the Persian line from Teheran to Bushire yields an income of about 30,000 Rs., and the Government pay a certain sum to the Persian Government for the use of the line.

There are now two good lines to India, the Indo-European and the Suez lines. The messages sent by the Indo-European line in the year (1865-66) of the opening of the Indo-European line numbered 28,000; they increased to 46,000 in 1869-70. Since the opening of the Suez Canal, they have fallen to 11,000. Mr. Champion said he expected to receive 100,000 Rs. on the Government portion of the Indo-European line. The sum of 100,000 Rs. is the Government portion of the

about 100,000 Rs. recovered from the Turkish and

twelve *lacks* includes the expenses of superintendence in laying down the line. The working expenses in the year 1869-70 were more than 8 *lacks*. They were, taking England and India together, about 8 *lacks* a year between 1865 and 1868, and the average earnings were about 9½ *lacks* for the same period. The expenses have been since reduced to 6½ *lacks*, and may be still further reduced to six *lacks*. Since the opening of the Suez Canal, the income has decreased notwithstanding the enhanced rates, and though it is rising again, it is not expected to be more than 7 *lacks*. Under all circumstances, the receipts will never more than repay the working expenses; the rates cannot be put so high as to pay any really good dividend on the sum invested, for the expenses of keeping up a costly double line from end to end are very great. The Marine Cable in the Persian Gulf was laid down in 1864, and it is as good now, and tests as well, as when it was first laid. It has had to be repaired in places, but the time when a general replacement will become necessary cannot be at present ascertained. The general opinion is that a cable should last from 30 to 50 years. The working of the Persian line entails on the Government a dead loss of 2300*£s.* a year. The original arrangement with Persia was that the Persian Government were to pay for the wire material, and supply the poles and the labour, while the English Government were to grant the officers and men to work and superintend the line, and the whole of the receipts up to 12,000*£* were to be paid to Persia. The receipts have never yet reached 12,000*£.*, and the line is worked at a loss of 23,00*£* a year.

This old arrangement was altered when the Persian or Siemen's line was laid. The present arrangement provides that the British Government should pay a lump sum of 4,800£ a year to the Persian Government, no matter what the receipts are, and halve the remainder with Siemen's Company. Since this arrangement was entered into, the line has been paying some revenue. At present the rates of the British Indian Submarine and the Indo-European or Siemen's lines are 4£ 10s., while the Turkish rates are 2£. 17s. The messages by the line passing through Asia Minor and Constantinople, take 36 hours, while the messages by the other line require about 3 hours less. From the time that the rates of the Indo-European line were raised, the messages have diminished in number, but not nearly so much as to affect the increase of rates. When the Indian Navy was abolished, the Indian Government pays about 7 lacks of Rupees a year to the Government for the maintenance of the Persian Gun. In 1870-71 the line under Major Champion's Directorship cost 56,250£, and the working charges 53,000£. As there is a double line all the time there is no chance of its being blocked. The arrangement described before in August last, and the fresh arrangement entered into, the Indo-European Company will have to take up that line, and work it at a loss.

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line between Bagdad and Bassarah was not thought to be safe owing to the roving character of the Bedowin Arab tribes through whose territories it passed, and an alternative line was laid from Bagdad up to Teheran, which again joins the main line at Bushire. The Arab tribes have not except once for three months interrupted traffic on the line passing through their country. This Persian line is not much used for traffic purposes, but it gives access to the Persian country to a number of English officers which is itself a great political advantage. The Persian Gulf system of Telegraph though it does not financially pay, cannot be abandoned with advantage, especially as it is now made to yield a sufficient income to pay its working expenses. The Red Sea line was opened in March 1870, since which time it became necessary to raise the rates, because although the lines were doubled, the old traffic did not double, and was not sufficient to feed two lines when it barely fed one line before. England has not paid as yet, and Major Champion thinks she ought not to pay, any portion of the one *crore* of *Rupees* and more that India was made to spend in constructing the Government portion of the Telegraph. England however paid half the expenses of a line which was attempted to be laid during the mutiny years in the Red Sea, which attempt failed miserably. The charge for a thorough message now is 4 £ and 10s. from England to Calcutta; of this sum 9s. 6d. are paid for the Telegraph in India, and 1£. 8s. for the Government portion of the Indo-European Telegraph; about 10s. go to Persia for the transit from Teheran to Bushire; and 1£. 2s. 5d. go to the Company for the distance between

London and Teheran., out of which payment the Government has to pay royalties to Persia and Russia.

The line is now to do without a telegraph to India doubly secured against all chances of interruption. The Persian Gulf has now two cable lines for communication, and one land line for the whole distance. The Government has also got a local telegraph system which they have learned to use for their purposes.

Mr. Thornton, who is in charge of the Public Works Department of the India Office, was also examined upon the subject of the Indian, European and Indian systems of Telegraphic communication. He said he had recommended once the giving up of the Persian Gulf line, but that he had changed his mind since, as the line has sufficient traffic to pay its expenses, and it would not be possible for any private company to work it with profit. It could not moreover be abandoned without a dead loss of all the materials and stores employed, and without sacrificing the many political relations which its communication brings with it. He said that a charge of 6d. is made by the Government for the forwarding of any message received from Bombay to any other part of India, the same whether the message is sent by cable or by land. This charge was 7s. when the message was sent by cable, and 9s. 6d. when the message was sent by land. If the message is delivered, the British Government has to pay the cost of the telegraph company used to receive the message. The British Government has to pay for themselves. In

the first Red Sea Telegraph, the Government lost nearly one *crore of Rupees*, because the company which undertook to lay down the wire did not conduct its operations with economy. It was a guaranteed undertaking, and Mr. Thornton stated it to be his opinion that the guarantee system destroys all security for economy and efficiency. In the same way the three lines of the Persian Gulf system, namely the cable from Bassarah to Karachi, the Bassarah Teheran and Bushire line, and the Mekran land line, were not needed, and involved a needless waste of money. The Indo-European Telegraph is chiefly for the benefit of Englishmen, and the messages mostly pass between Englishmen in India and Englishmen in England. As the Telegraph has proved financially a failure, it is but fair that a portion of the loss ought to have been borne by England. Speaking from experience, Mr. Thornton stated that there is not the smallest chance of any fair treatment of the interests of India in all cases where English interests are in opposition.

About the Indian system of Telegraph, Mr. Thornton went on to state that there are about 14,000 miles of Telegraph open in India; the total cost of their construction was 1 *crore and 80 lacks of Rupees* exclusive of arrears of interest. The total charge for 1868-69 was about 20 *lacks*, including all charges except the interest on capital, and the total revenue was about 12 *lacks*, leaving a net excess charge of 8 *lacks*. The revenue was 13 *lacks* in 1869-70. The receipts have increased regularly every year since 1850, chiefly because the mileage has also increased. The fact is that the local

rates are too low, and the Government of India is seriously thinking of raising them.



English Men of Letters

EDITED BY JOHN MORLEY

H U M E



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BY
PROFESSOR HUXLEY

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PART I.

HUME'S LIFE.

CHAPTER I.

EARLY LIFE : LITERARY AND POLITICAL WRITINGS.

DAVID HUME was born in Edinburgh on the 26th of April (O.S.), 1711. His parents were then residing in the parish of the Tron church, apparently on a visit to the Scottish capital, as the small estate which his father Joseph Hume, or Home, inherited, lay in Berwickshire, on the banks of the Whitadder or Whitewater, a few miles from the border, and within sight of English ground. The paternal mansion was little more than a very modest farmhouse,¹ and the property derived its name

¹ A picture of the house, taken from Drummond's *History of Noble British Families*, is to be seen in Chambers's *Book of Days* (April 26th); and if, as Drummond says, "It is a favourable specimen of the best Scotch lairds' houses," all that can be said is that the worst Scotch lairds must have been poorly lodged indeed.

of Ninewells from a considerable spring, which breaks out on the slope in front of the house, and falls into the Whitadder.

Both mother and father came of good Scottish families—the paternal line running back to Lord Home of Douglas, who went over to France with the Douglas during the French wars of Henry V. and VI. and was killed at the battle of Verneuil. Joseph Hume died when David was an infant, leaving himself and two elder children, a brother and a sister, to the care of their mother, who is described by David Hume in *My Own Life* as “a woman of singular merit, who though young and handsome devoted herself entirely to the rearing and education of her children.” Mr. Burton says: “Her portrait, which I have seen, represents a thin but pleasing countenance, expressive of great intellectual acuteness;” and as Hume told Dr. Black that she had “precisely the same constitution with himself” and died of the disorder which proved fatal to him, it is probable that the qualities inherited from his mother had much to do with the future philosopher’s eminence. It is curious, however, that her estimate of her son in her only recorded, and perhaps slightly apocryphal utterance, is of a somewhat unexpected character. “Our Davie’s a fine good-natured crater, but uncommon wake minded.” The first part of the judgment was indeed verified by “Davie’s” whole life; but one might seek in vain for signs of what is commonly understood as “weakness of mind” in a man who not only showed himself to be an intellectual athlete, but who had an eminent share of practical wisdom and tenacity of purpose. One would like to know, however, when it was that Mrs. Hume committed

herself to this not too flattering judgment of her younger son. For as Hume reached the mature age of four and thirty, before he obtained any employment of sufficient importance to convert the meagre pittance of a middling laird's younger brother into a decent maintenance, it is not improbable that a shrewd Scots wife may have thought his devotion to philosophy and poverty to be due to mere infirmity of purpose. But she lived till 1749, long enough to see more than the dawn of her son's literary fame and official importance, and probably changed her mind about "Davie's" force of character.

David Hume appears to have owed little to schools or universities. There is some evidence that he entered the Greek class in the University of Edinburgh in 1723—when he was a boy of twelve years of age—but it is not known how long his studies were continued, and he did not graduate. In 1727, at any rate, he was living at Ninewells, and already possessed by that love of learning and thirst for literary fame, which, as *My Own Life* tells us, was the ruling passion of his life and the chief source of his enjoyments. A letter of this date, addressed to his friend Michael Ramsay, is certainly a most singular production for a boy of sixteen. After sundry quotations from Virgil the letter proceeds:—

"The perfectly wise man that outbraves fortune, is much greater than the husbandman who slips by her; and, indeed, this pastoral and saturnian happiness I have in a great measure come at just now. I live like a king, pretty much by myself, neither full of action nor perturbation—*molles somnos*. This state, however, I can foresee is not to be relied on. My peace of mind is not sufficiently confirmed

by philosophy to withstand the blows of fortune. This greatness and elevation of soul is to be found only in study and contemplation. This alone can teach us to look down on human accidents. You must allow [me] to talk thus like a philosopher: 'tis a subject I think much on, and could talk all day long of."

If David talked in this strain to his mother her tongue probably gave utterance to "Bless the bairn!" and, in her private soul, the epithet "wake-minded" may then have recorded itself. But, though few lonely, thoughtful, studious boys of sixteen give vent to their thoughts in such stately periods, it is probable that the brooding over an ideal is commoner at this age, than fathers and mothers, busy with the cares of practical life, are apt to imagine.

About a year later, Hume's family tried to launch him into the profession of the law; but, as he tells us, "while they fancied I was poring upon Voet and Vinnius, Cicero and Virgil were the authors which I was secretly devouring," and the attempt seems to have come to an abrupt termination. Nevertheless, as a very competent authority¹ wisely remarks:—

"There appear to have been in Hume all the elements of which a good lawyer is made: clearness of judgment, power of rapidly acquiring knowledge, untiring industry, and dialectic skill: and if his mind had not been preoccupied, he might have fallen into the gulf in which many of the world's greatest geniuses lie buried—professional eminence; and might have left behind him a reputation limited to the traditional

¹ Mr. John Hill Burton, in his valuable *Life of Hume*, on which, I need hardly say, I have drawn freely for the materials of the present biographical sketch.

recollections of the Parliament house, or associated with important decisions. He was through life an able, clear-headed man of business, and I have seen several legal documents, written in his own hand and evidently drawn by himself. They stand the test of general professional observation; and their writer, by preparing documents of facts of such a character on his own responsibility, showed that he had considerable confidence in his ability to adhere to the forms adequate for the occasion. He talked of it as 'an ancient prejudice industriously propagated by the dunces in all countries, that a *man of genius is unfit for business*,' and he showed, in his general conduct through life, that he did not choose to come voluntarily under this proscription."

Six years longer Hume remained at Ninewells before he made another attempt to embark in a practical career—this time commerce—and with a like result. For a few months' trial proved that kind of life, also, to be hopelessly against the grain.

It was while in London, on his way to Bristol, where he proposed to commence his mercantile life, that Hume addressed to some eminent London physician (probably, as Mr. Burton suggests, Dr. George Cheyne) a remarkable letter. Whether it was ever sent seems doubtful; but it shows that philosophers as well as poets have their Werterian crises, and it presents an interesting parallel to John Stuart Mill's record of the corresponding period of his youth. The letter is too long to be given in full, but a few quotations may suffice to indicate its importance to those who desire to comprehend the man.

"You must know then that from my earliest infancy I found always a strong inclination to books and letters. As our college education in Scotland, extending little further

than the languages, ends commonly when we are about fourteen or fifteen years of age, I was after that left to my own choice in my reading, and found it incline me almost equally to books of reasoning and philosophy, and to poetry and the polite authors. Every one who is acquainted either with the philosophers or critics, knows that there is nothing yet established in either of these two sciences, and that they contain little more than endless disputes, even in the most fundamental articles. Upon examination of these, I found a certain boldness of temper growing on me, which was not inclined to submit to any authority in these subjects, but led me to seek out some new medium, by which truth might be established. After much study and reflection on this, at last, when I was about eighteen years of age, there seemed to be opened up to me a new scene of thought, which transported me beyond measure, and made me, with an ardour natural to young men, throw up every other pleasure or business to apply entirely to it. The law, which was the business I designed to follow, appeared nauseous to me, and I could think of no other way of pushing my fortune in the world, but that of a scholar and philosopher. I was infinitely happy in this course of life for some months; till at last, about the beginning of September, 1729, all my ardour seemed in a moment to be extinguished, and I could no longer raise my mind to that pitch, which formerly gave me such excessive pleasure."

This "decline of soul" Hume attributes, in part, to his being smitten with the beautiful representation of virtue in the works of Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch, and being thereby led to discipline his temper and his will along with his reason and understanding.

"I was continually fortifying myself with reflections against death, and poverty, and shame, and pain, and all the other calamities of life."

And he adds very characteristically :—

"These no doubt are exceeding useful when joined with an active life, because the occasion being presented along with the reflection, works it into the soul, and makes it take a deep impression: but, in solitude, they serve to little other purpose than to waste the spirits, the force of the mind meeting no resistance, but wasting itself in the air, like our arm when it misses its aim."

Along with all this mental perturbation, symptoms of scurvy, a disease now almost unknown among landmen, but which, in the days of winter salt meat, before root crops flourished in the Lothians, greatly plagued our forefathers, made their appearance. And, indeed, it may be suspected that physical conditions were, at first, at the bottom of the whole business; for, in 1731, a ravenous appetite set in and, in six weeks from being tall, lean, and raw-boned, Hume says he became sturdy and robust, with a ruddy complexion and a cheerful countenance—eating, sleeping, and feeling well, except that the capacity for intense mental application seemed to be gone. He, therefore, determined to seek out a more active life; and, though he could not and would not "quit his pretensions to learning, but with his last breath," he resolved "to lay them aside for some time, in order the more effectually to resume them."

The careers open to a poor Scottish gentleman in those days were very few; and, as Hume's option lay between a travelling tutorship and a stool in a merchant's office, he chose the latter.

"And having got recommendation to a considerable trader in Bristol, I am just now hastening thither, with a resolution to forget myself, and everything that is past, to engage myself, as far as is possible, in that course of life, and to toss,

about the world from one pole to the other, till I leave this distemper behind me." ¹

But it was all of no use—Nature would have her way—and in the middle of 1736, David Hume, aged twenty-three, without a profession or any assured means of earning a guinea; and having doubtless, by his apparent vacillation, but real tenacity of purpose, once more earned the title of "wake-minded" at home; betook himself to a foreign country.

"I went over to France, with a view of prosecuting my studies in a country retreat: and there I laid that plan of life which I have steadily and successfully pursued. I resolved to make a very rigid frugality supply my deficiency of fortune, to maintain unimpaired my independency, and to regard every object as contemptible except the improvement of my talents in literature." ²

Hume passed through Paris on his way to Rheims, where he resided for some time; though the greater part of his three years' stay was spent at La Flèche, in frequent intercourse with the Jesuits of the famous college in which Descartes was educated. Here he composed his first work, the *Treatise of Human Nature*; though it would appear from the following passage in the letter to Cheyne, that he had been accumulating materials to that end for some years before he left Scotland.

¹ One cannot but be reminded of young Descartes' renunciation of study for soldiering.

² *My Own Life*.

"I found that the moral philosophy transmitted to us by antiquity laboured under the same inconvenience that has been found in their natural philosophy, of being entirely hypothetical, and depending more upon invention than experience: every one consulted his fancy in erecting schemes of virtue and happiness, without regarding human nature, upon which every moral conclusion must depend."

This is the key note of the *Treatise*; of which Hume himself says apologetically, in one of his letters, that it was planned before he was twenty-one and composed before he had reached the age of twenty-five.¹

Under these circumstances, it is probably the most remarkable philosophical work, both intrinsically and in its effects upon the course of thought, that has ever been written. Berkeley, indeed, published the *Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision*, the *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, and the *Three Dialogues*, between the ages of twenty-four and twenty-eight; and thus comes very near to Hume, both in precocity and in influence; but his investigations are more limited in their scope than those of his Scottish contemporary.

The first and second volumes of the *Treatise*, containing Book I., "Of the Understanding," and Book II., "Of the Passions," were published in January, 1739. The

¹ Letter to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, 1751. "So vast an undertaking, planned before I was one-and-twenty, and composed before twenty-five, must necessarily be very defective. I have repented my haste a hundred and a hundred times."

publisher gave fifty pounds for the copyright; which is probably more than an unknown writer of twenty-seven years of age would get for a similar work, at the present time. But, in other respects, its success fell far short of Hume's expectations. In a letter dated the 1st of June, 1739, he writes,—

“I am not much in the humour of such compositions at present, having received news from London of the success of my *Philosophy*, which is but indifferent, if I may judge by the sale of the book, and if I may believe my bookseller.”

This, however, indicates a very different reception from that which Hume, looking through the inverted telescope of old age, ascribes to the *Treatise in My Own Life*.

“Never literary attempt was more unfortunate than my *Treatise of Human Nature*. It fell *deadborn from the press* without reaching such a distinction as even to excite a murmur among the zealots.”

As a matter of fact, it was fully, and, on the whole, respectfully and appreciatively, reviewed in the *History of the Works of the Learned* for November, 1739.¹ Whoever the reviewer may have been, he was a man of discernment, for he says that the work bears “incontestable marks of a great capacity, of a soaring genius, but young, and not yet thoroughly practised;” and he adds, that we shall probably have reason to consider “this, compared with the later productions, in the same light as we view the juvenile works of a

¹ Burton, *Life*, vol. i. p. 109.

Milton, or the first manner of a Raphael or other celebrated painter." In a letter to Hutcheson, Hume merely speaks of this article as "somewhat abusive;" so that his vanity, being young and callow, seems to have been correspondingly wide-mouthed and hard to satiate.

It must be confessed that, on this occasion, less than on that of his other publications, Hume exhibits no small share of the craving after mere notoriety and vulgar success, as distinct from the pardonable, if not honourable, ambition for solid and enduring fame, which would have harmonised better with his philosophy. Indeed, it appears to be by no means improbable that this peculiarity of Hume's moral constitution was the cause of his gradually forsaking philosophical studies, after the publication of the third part (*On Morals*) of the *Treatise*, in 1740, and turning to those political and historical topics which were likely to yield, and did in fact yield, a much better return of that sort of success which his soul loved. The *Philosophical Essays Concerning the Human Understanding*, which afterwards became the *Inquiry*, is not much more than an abridgment and recast, for popular use, of parts of the *Treatise*, with the addition of the essays on Miracles and on Necessity. In style, it exhibits a great improvement on the *Treatise*; but the substance, if not deteriorated, is certainly not improved. Hume does not really bring his mature powers to bear upon his early speculations, in the later work. The crude fruits have not been ripened, but they have been ruthlessly pruned away, along with the branches which bore them. The result is a pretty shrub enough; but not the tree of knowledge, with its roots firmly fixed in fact, its branches perennially budding forth into new

truths, which Hume might have reared. Perhaps, after all, worthy Mrs. Hume was, in the highest sense, right. Davie was "wake minded," not to see that the world of philosophy was his to overrun and subdue, if he would but persevere in the work he had begun. But no—he must needs turn aside for "success": and verily he had his reward; but not the crown he might have won.

In 1740, Hume seems to have made an acquaintance which rapidly ripened into a life-long friendship. Adam Smith was, at that time, a boy student of seventeen at the University of Glasgow; and Hume sends a copy of the *Treatise* to "Mr. Smith," apparently on the recommendation of the well-known Hutcheson, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the university. It is a remarkable evidence of Adam Smith's early intellectual development, that a youth of his age should be thought worthy of such a present.

In 1741 Hume published anonymously, at Edinburgh, the first volume of *Essays Moral and Political*, which was followed in 1742 by the second volume.

These pieces are written in an admirable style and, though arranged without apparent method, a system of political philosophy may be gathered from their contents. Thus the third essay, *That Politics may be reduced to a Science*, defends that thesis, and dwells on the importance of forms of government.

"So great is the force of laws and of particular forms of government, and so little dependence have they on the humours and tempers of men, that consequences almost as general and certain may sometimes be deduced from them as any which the mathematical sciences afford us."
—(III. 15.) (See p. 45.)

Hume proceeds to exemplify the evils which inevitably flow from universal suffrage, from aristocratic privilege, and from elective monarchy, by historical examples, and concludes:—

“That an hereditary prince, a nobility without vassals, and a people voting by their representatives, form the best monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.”—(III. 18.)

If we reflect that the following passage of the same essay was written nearly a century and a half ago, it would seem that whatever other changes may have taken place, political warfare remains *in statu quo*:—

“Those who either attack or defend a minister in such a government as ours, where the utmost liberty is allowed, always carry matters to an extreme, and exaggerate his merit or demerit with regard to the public. His enemies are sure to charge him with the greatest enormities, both in domestic and foreign management; and there is no meanness or crime, of which, in their judgment, he is not capable. Unnecessary wars, scandalous treaties, profusion of public treasure, oppressive taxes, every kind of maladministration is ascribed to him. To aggravate the charge, his pernicious conduct, it is said, will extend its baneful influence even to posterity, by undermining the best constitution in the world, and disordering that wise system of laws, institutions, and customs, by which our ancestors, during so many centuries, have been so happily governed. He is not only a wicked minister in himself, but has removed every security provided against wicked ministers for the future.

“On the other hand, the partisans of the minister make his panegyric rise as high as the accusation against him, and celebrate his wise, steady, and moderate conduct in every part of his administration. The honour and interest of the nation

supported abroad, public credit maintained at home, persecution restrained, faction subdued: the merit of all these blessings is ascribed solely to the minister. At the same time, he crowns all his other merits by a religious care of the best government in the world, which he has preserved in all its parts, and has transmitted entire, to be the happiness and security of the latest posterity."—(III. 26.)

Hume sagely remarks that the panegyric and the accusation cannot both be true; and, that what truth there may be in either, rather tends to show that our much-vaunted constitution does not fulfil its chief object, which is to provide a remedy against maladministration. And if it does not—

"we are rather beholden to any minister who undermines it and affords us the opportunity of erecting a better in its place."—III. 28.

The fifth Essay discusses the *Origin of Government*:—

"Man, born in a family, is compelled to maintain society from necessity, from natural inclination, and from habit. The same creature, in his farther progress, is engaged to establish political society, in order to administer justice, without which there can be no peace among them, nor safety, nor mutual intercourse. We are therefore to look upon all the vast apparatus of our government, as having ultimately no other object or purpose but the distribution of justice, or, in other words, the support of the twelve judges. Kings and parliaments, fleets and armies, officers of the court and revenue, ambassadors, ministers and privy councillors, are all subordinate in the end to this part of administration. Even the clergy, as their duty leads them to inculcate morality, may justly be thought, so far as regards this world, to have no other useful object of their institution."—(III. 37.)

The police theory of government has never been stated

more tersely, and, if there were only one state in the world; and if we could be certain by intuition, or by the aid of revelation, that it is wrong for society, as a corporate body, to do anything for the improvement of its members and, thereby, indirectly support the twelve judges, no objection could be raised to it.

Unfortunately the existence of rival or inimical nations furnishes "kings and parliaments, fleets and armies," with a good deal of occupation beyond the support of the twelve judges; and, though the proposition that the State has no business to meddle with anything but the administration of justice, seems sometimes to be regarded as an axiom, it can hardly be said to be intuitively certain, inasmuch as a great many people absolutely repudiate it; while, as yet, the attempt to give it the authority of a revelation has not been made.

As Hume says with profound truth in the fourth essay, *On the First Principles of Government* :—

"As force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is, therefore, on opinion only that government is founded: and this maxim extends to the most despotic and the most arbitrary governments, as well as to the most free and the most moderate."—(III. 31.)

But if the whole fabric of social organisation rests on opinion, it may surely be fairly argued that, in the interests of self-preservation, if for no better reason, society has a right to see that the means of forming just opinions are placed within the reach of every one of its members; and, therefore, that due provision for

education, at any rate, is a right and, indeed, a duty, of the state.

The three opinions upon which all government, or the authority of the few over the many, is founded, says Hume, are public interest, right to power, and right to property. No government can permanently exist, unless the majority of the citizens, who are the ultimate depositary of Force, are convinced that it serves the general interest, that it has lawful authority, and that it respects individual rights :—

“A government may endure for several ages, though the balance of power and the balance of property do not coincide But where the original constitution allows any share of power, though small, to an order of men who possess a large share of property, it is easy for them gradually to stretch their authority, and bring the balance of power to coincide with that of property. This has been the case with the House of Commons in England.”—(III. 34.)

Hume then points out that, in his time, the authority of the Commons was by no means equivalent to the property and power it represented, and proceeds :—

“Were the members obliged to receive instructions from their constituents, like the Dutch deputies, this would entirely alter the case ; and if such immense power and riches as those of all the Commons of Great Britain, were brought into the scale, it is not easy to conceive that the crown could either influence that multitude of people, or withstand that balance of property. It is true, the crown has great influence over the collective body in the elections of members ; but were this influence, which at present is only exerted once in seven years, to be employed in bringing over the people to every vote, it would soon be wasted, and no skill, popularity, or revenue could support it. I must, therefore, be of opinion that an alteration in this particular would introduce a total alteration in our

government, would soon reduce it to a pure republic; and, perhaps, to a republic of no inconvenient form."—(III. 35)

Viewed by the light of subsequent events, this is surely a very remarkable example of political sagacity. The members of the House of Commons are not yet delegates; but, with the widening of the suffrage and the rapidly increasing tendency to drill and organise the electorate, and to exact definite pledges from candidates, they are rapidly becoming, if not delegates, at least attorneys for committees of electors. The same causes are constantly tending to exclude men, who combine a keen sense of self-respect with large intellectual capacity, from a position in which the one is as constantly offended, as the other is neutralised. Notwithstanding the attempt of George the Third to resuscitate the royal authority, Hume's foresight has been so completely justified that no one now dreams of the crown exerting the slightest influence upon elections.

In the seventh essay, Hume raises a very interesting discussion as to the probable ultimate result of the forces which were at work in the British Constitution in the first part of the eighteenth century:—

"There has been a sudden and sensible change in the opinions of men, within these last fifty years, by the progress of liberty. The people in this island have discovered a less reverence to names and authority; the clergy have much lost their credit; their pretensions and doctrines have been much ridiculed; and even religion can scarcely support itself in the world. The mere name of *king* commands little respect; and to talk of a king as God's viceregent on earth, or to give him any of those magnificent titles which formerly dazzled mankind, would but excite laughter in every one."—(III. 54.)

In fact, at the present day, the danger to monarchy in Britain would appear to lie, not in increasing love for equality, for which, except as regards the law, Englishmen have never cared, but rather entertain an aversion; nor in any abstract democratic theories, upon which the mass of Englishmen pour the contempt with which they view theories in general; but in the constantly increasing tendency of monarchy to become slightly absurd, from the ever-widening discrepancy between modern political ideas and the theory of kingship. As Hume observes, even in his time, people had left off making believe that a king was a different species of man from other men; and, since his day, more and more such make-believes have become impossible; until the maintenance of kingship in coming generations seems likely to depend, entirely, upon whether it is the general opinion, that a hereditary president of our virtual republic will serve the general interest better than an elective one or not. The tendency of public feeling in this direction is patent, but it does not follow that a republic is to be the final stage of our government. In fact, Hume thinks not:—

“It is well known, that every government must come to a period, and that death is unavoidable to the political, as well as to the animal body. But, as one kind of death may be preferable to another, it may be inquired, whether it be more desirable for the British constitution to terminate in a popular government, or in an absolute monarchy? Here, I would frankly declare, that though liberty be preferable to slavery, in almost every case; yet I should rather wish to see an absolute monarch than a republic in this island. For let us consider what kind of republic we have reason to expect. The question is not concerning any fine imaginary republic of which a man forms a plan in his closet. There is no doubt

but a popular government may be imagined more perfect than an absolute monarchy, or even than our present constitution. But what reason have we to expect that any such government will ever be established in Great Britain, upon the dissolution of our monarchy? If any single person acquire power enough to take our constitution to pieces, and put it up anew, he is really an absolute monarch; and we have already had an instance of this kind, sufficient to convince us, that such a person will never resign his power, or establish any free government. Matters, therefore, must be trusted to their natural progress and operation; and the House of Commons, according to its present constitution, must be the only legislature in such a popular government. The inconveniences attending such a situation of affairs present themselves by thousands. If the House of Commons, in such a case, ever dissolve itself, which is not to be expected, we may look for a civil war every election. If it continue itself, we shall suffer all the tyranny of a faction subdivided into new factions. And, as such a violent government cannot long subsist, we shall at last, after many convulsions and civil wars, find repose in absolute monarchy, which it would have been happier for us to have established peaceably from the beginning. Absolute monarchy, therefore, is the easiest death, the true *Euthanasia* of the British constitution.

“Thus if we have more reason to be jealous of monarchy, because the danger is more imminent from that quarter; we have also reason to be more jealous of popular government, because that danger is more terrible. This may teach us a lesson of moderation in all our political controversies.”—(III. 55.)

One may admire the sagacity of these speculations, and the force and clearness with which they are expressed, without altogether agreeing with them. That an analogy between the social and bodily organism exists, and is, in many respects, clear and full of instructive suggestion, is undeniable. Yet a state answers, not to an individual, but to a generic type; and there is

no reason, in the nature of things, why any generic type should die out. The type of the pearly *Nautilus*, highly organised as it is, has persisted with but little change from the Silurian epoch till now; and, so long as terrestrial conditions remain approximately similar to what they are at present, there is no more reason why it should cease to exist in the next, than in the past, hundred million years or so. The true ground for doubting the possibility of the establishment of absolute monarchy in Britain is, that opinion seems to have passed through, and left far behind, the stage at which such a change would be possible; and the true reason for doubting the permanency of a republic, if it is ever established, lies in the fact, that a republic requires for its maintenance a far higher standard of morality and of intelligence in the members of the state than any other form of government. Samuel gave the Israelites a king because they were not righteous enough to do without one, with a pretty plain warning of what they were to expect from the gift. And, up to this time, the progress of such republics as have been established in the world has not been such, as to lead to any confident expectation that their foundation is laid on a sufficiently secure subsoil of public spirit, morality, and intelligence. On the contrary, they exhibit examples of personal corruption and of political profligacy as fine as any hotbed of despotism has ever produced; while they fail in the primary duty of the administration of justice, as none but an effete despotism has ever failed.

Hume has been accused of departing, in his old age, from the liberal principles of his youth; and, no doubt, he was careful, in the later editions of the *Essays*, to expunge everything that savoured of democratic tendencies. But

the passage just quoted shows that this was no recantation, but simply a confirmation, by his experience of one of the most debased periods of English history, of those evil tendencies attendant on popular government, of which, from the first, he was fully aware.

In the ninth essay, *On the Parties of Great Britain*, there occurs a passage which, while it affords evidence of the marvellous change which has taken place in the social condition of Scotland since 1741, contains an assertion respecting the state of the Jacobite party at that time, which at first seems surprising:—

“As violent things have not commonly so long a duration as moderate, we actually find that the Jacobite party is almost entirely vanished from among us, and that the distinction of *Court* and *Country*, which is but creeping in at London, is the only one that is ever mentioned in this kingdom. Beside the violence and openness of the Jacobite party, another reason has perhaps contributed to produce so sudden and so visible an alteration in this part of Britain. There are only two ranks of men among us; gentlemen who have some fortune and education, and the meanest slavish poor; without any considerable number of that middling rank of men, which abound more in England, both in cities and in the country, than in any other part of the world. The slavish poor are incapable of any principles; gentlemen may be converted to true principles, by time and experience. The middling rank of men have curiosity and knowledge enough to form principles, but not enough to form true ones, or correct any prejudices that they may have imbibed. And it is among the middling rank of people that Tory principles do at present prevail most in England.”—(III. 80, *note*.)

Considering that the Jacobite rebellion of 1745 broke out only four years after this essay was published, the assertion that the Jacobite party had “almost entirely

vanished in 1741" sounds strange enough: and the passage which contains it is omitted in the third edition of the *Essays*, published in 1748. Nevertheless, Hume was probably right, as the outbreak of '45 was little better than a Highland raid, and the Pretender obtained no important following in the Lowlands.

No less curious, in comparison with what would be said nowadays, is Hume's remark in the *Essay on the Rise of the Arts and Sciences* that—

"The English are become sensible of the scandalous licentiousness of their stage from the example of the French decency and morals."—(III. 135.)

And it is perhaps as surprising to be told, by a man of Hume's literary power, that the first polite prose in the English language was written by Swift. Locke and Temple (with whom Sprat is astoundingly conjoined) "knew too little of the rules of art to be esteemed elegant writers," and the prose of Bacon, Harrington, and Milton is "altogether stiff and pedantic." Hobbes, who whether he should be called a "polite" writer or not, is a master of vigorous English; Clarendon, Addison, and Steele (the last two, surely, were "polite" writers in all conscience) are not mentioned.

On the subject of *National Character*, about which more nonsense, and often very mischievous nonsense, has been and is talked than upon any other topic, Hume's observations are full of sense and shrewdness. He distinguishes between the *moral* and the *physical* causes of national character, enumerating under the former—

"The nature of the government, the revolutions of public affairs, the plenty or penury in which people live, the

situation of the nation with regard to its neighbours, and such like circumstances."—(III. 225.)

and under the latter :—

"Those qualities of the air and climate, which are supposed to work insensibly on the temper, by altering the tone and habit of the body, and giving a particular complexion, which, though reflexion and reason may sometimes overcome it, will yet prevail among the generality of mankind, and have an influence on their manners."—(III. 225.)

While admitting and exemplifying the great influence of moral causes, Hume remarks—

"As to physical causes, I am inclined to doubt altogether of their operation in this particular; nor do I think that men owe anything of their temper or genius to the air, food, or climate."—(III. 227.)

Hume certainly would not have accepted the "rice theory" in explanation of the social state of the Hindoos; and, it may be safely assumed, that he would not have had recourse to the circumambience of the "melancholy main" to account for the troublous history of Ireland. He supports his views by a variety of strong arguments, among which, at the present conjuncture, it is worth noting that the following occurs—

"Where any accident, as a difference in language or religion, keeps two nations, inhabiting the same country, from mixing with one another, they will preserve during several centuries a distinct and even opposite set of manners. The integrity, gravity, and bravery of the Turks, form an exact contrast to the deceit, levity, and cowardice of the modern Greeks."—(III. 233.)

The question of the influence of race, which plays so

great a part in modern political speculations, was hardly broached in Hume's time, but he had an inkling of its importance :—

“ I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the Whites. There scarcely ever was a civilised nation of that complexion, nor even any individual, eminent either in action or speculation. . . . Such a uniform and constant difference [between the negroes and the whites] could not happen in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction between these breeds of men. . . . In Jamaica, indeed, they talk of one Negro as a man of parts and learning ; but it is likely he is admired for slender accomplishments, like a parrot who speaks a few words plainly.”—(III. 236.)

The *Essays* met with the success they deserved. Hume wrote to Henry Home in June, 1742 :—

“ The *Essays* are all sold in London, as I am informed by two letters from English gentlemen of my acquaintance. There is a demand for them ; and, as one of them tells me, Innys, the great bookseller in Paul's Churchyard, wonders there is not a new edition, for he cannot find copies for his customers. I am also told that Dr. Butler has everywhere recommended them ; so that I hope that they will have some success.”

Hume had sent Butler a copy of the *Treatise* and had called upon him, in London, but he was out of town ; and being shortly afterwards made Bishop of Bristol, Hume seems to have thought that further advances on his part might not be well received.

Greatly comforted by this measure of success, Hume remained at Ninewells, rubbing up his Greek, until 1745 ; when, at the mature age of thirty-four, he made his entry into practical life, by becoming bear-leader to

the Marquis of Annandale, a young nobleman of feeble body and feebler mind. As might have been predicted, this venture was not more fortunate than his previous ones; and, after a year's endurance, diversified latterly with pecuniary squabbles, in which Hume's tenacity about a somewhat small claim is remarkable, the engagement came to an end.

CHAPTER II.

LATER YEARS: THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND.

IN 1744, Hume's friends had endeavoured to procure his nomination to the Chair of "Ethics and pneumatic philosophy"¹ in the University of Edinburgh. About this matter he writes to his friend William Mure:—

"The accusation of heresy, deism, scepticism, atheism, &c., &c., &c. was started against me; but never took, being bore down by the contrary authority of all the good company in town."

If the "good company in town" bore down the first three of these charges, it is to be hoped, for the sake of their veracity, that they knew their candidate chiefly as the very good company that he always was; and had paid as little attention, as good company usually does, to so solid a work as the *Treatise*. Hume expresses a naive surprise, not unmixed with indignation, that Hutcheson and Leechman, both clergymen and sincere,

¹ "Pneumatic philosophy" must not be confounded with the theory of elastic fluids; though, as Scottish chairs have, before now, combined natural with civil history, the mistake would be pardonable.

though liberal, professors of orthodoxy, should have expressed doubts as to his fitness for becoming a professedly presbyterian teacher of presbyterian youth. The town council, however, would not have him, and filled up the place with a safe nobody.

In May, 1746, a new prospect opened. General St. Clair was appointed to the command of an expedition to Canada, and he invited Hume, at a week's notice, to be his secretary; to which office that of judge advocate was afterwards added.

Hume writes to a friend: "The office is very genteel, 10s. a day, perquisites, and no expenses;" and, to another, he speculates on the chance of procuring a company in an American regiment. "But this I build not on, nor indeed am I very fond of it," he adds; and this was fortunate, for the expedition, after dawdling away the summer in port, was suddenly diverted to an attack on L'Orient, where it achieved a huge failure and returned ignominiously to England.

A letter to Henry Home, written when this unlucky expedition was recalled, shows that Hume had already seriously turned his attention to history. Referring to an invitation to go over to Flanders with the General, he says:

"Had I any fortune which would give me a prospect of leisure and opportunity to prosecute my *historical projects*, nothing could be more useful to me, and I should pick up more literary knowledge in one campaign by being in the General's family, and being introduced frequently to the Duke's, than most officers could do after many years' service. But to what can all this serve? I am a philosopher, and so I suppose must continue."

But this vaticination was shortly to prove erroneous.

Hume seems to have made a very favourable impression on General St. Clair, as he did upon every one with whom he came into personal contact; for, being charged with a mission to the court of Turin, in 1748, the General insisted upon the appointment of Hume as his secretary. He further made him one of his aides-de-camp; so that the philosopher was obliged to encase his more than portly, and by no means elegant, figure in a military uniform. Lord Charlemont, who met him at Turin, says he was "disguised in scarlet," and that he wore his uniform "like a grocer of the train-bands." Hume, always ready for a joke at his own expense, tells of the considerate kindness with which, at a reception at Vienna, the Empress-dowager released him and his friends from the necessity of walking backwards. "We esteemed ourselves very much obliged to her for this attention, especially my companions, who were desperately afraid of my falling on them and crushing them."

Notwithstanding the many attractions of this appointment, Hume writes that he leaves home "with infinite regret, where I had treasured up stores of study and plans of thinking for many years;" and his only consolation is that the opportunity of becoming conversant with state affairs may be profitable:—

"I shall have an opportunity of seeing courts and camps: and if I can afterward be so happy as to attain leisure and other opportunities, this knowledge may even turn to account to me as a man of letters, which I confess has always been the sole object of my ambition. I have long had an intention, in my riper years, of composing some history; and I question not but some greater experience in the operations of the field and the intrigues of the cabinet will be requisite, in order to enable me to speak with judgment on these subjects."

Hume returned to London in 1749, and, during his stay there, his mother died, to his heartfelt sorrow. A curious story in connection with this event is told by Dr. Carlyle, who knew Hume well, and whose authority is perfectly trustworthy.

“Mr. Boyle hearing of it, soon after went to his apartment, for they lodged in the same house, where he found him in the deepest affliction and in a flood of tears. After the usual topics and condolences Mr. Boyle said to him, ‘My friend, you owe this uncommon grief to having thrown off the principles of religion: for if you had not, you would have been consoled with the firm belief that the good lady, who was not only the best of mothers, but the most pious of Christians, was completely happy in the realms of the just. To which David replied, ‘Though I throw out my speculations to entertain the learned and metaphysical world, yet in other things I do not think so differently from the rest of the world as you imagine.’”

If Hume had told this story to Dr. Carlyle, the latter would have said so; it must therefore have come from Mr. Boyle; and one would like to have the opportunity of cross-examining that gentleman as to Hume's exact words and their context, before implicitly accepting his version of the conversation. Mr. Boyle's experience of mankind must have been small, if he had not seen the firmest of believers overwhelmed with grief by a like loss, and as completely inconsolable. Hume may have thrown off Mr. Boyle's “principles of religion,” but he was none the less a very honest man, perfectly open and candid, and the last person to use ambiguous phraseology, among his friends; unless, indeed, he saw no other way of putting a stop to the intrusion of unmannerly twaddle amongst the bitter-sweet

memories stirred in his affectionate nature by so heavy a blow.

The *Philosophical Essays or Inquiry* was published in 1748, while Hume was away with General St. Clair, and, on his return to England, he had the mortification to find it overlooked in the hubbub caused by Middleton's *Free Inquiry*, and its bold handling of the topic of the *Essay on Miracles*, by which Hume doubtless expected the public to be startled.

Between 1749 and 1751, Hume resided at Ninewells, with his brother and sister, and busied himself with the composition of his most finished, if not his most important works, the *Dialogues on Natural Religion*, the *Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, and the *Political Discourses*.

The *Dialogues on Natural Religion* were touched and re-touched, at intervals, for a quarter of a century, and were not published till after Hume's death: but the *Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* appeared in 1751, and the *Political Discourses* in 1752. Full reference will be made to the two former in the exposition of Hume's philosophical views. The last has been well said to be the "cradle of political economy: and much as that science has been investigated and expounded in later times, these earliest, shortest, and simplest developments of its principles are still read with delight even by those who are masters of all the literature of this great subject."¹

The *Wealth of Nations*, the masterpiece of Hume's close friend, Adam Smith, it must be remembered, did not appear before 1776, so that, in political economy,

¹ Burton's *Life of David Hume*, i. p. 354.

no less than in philosophy, Hume was an original, a daring, and a fertile innovator.

The *Political Essays* had a great and rapid success; translated into French in 1753, and again in 1754, they conferred a European reputation upon their author; and, what was more to the purpose, influenced the later French school of economists of the eighteenth century.

By this time, Hume had not only attained a high reputation in the world of letters, but he considered himself a man of independent fortune. His frugal habits had enabled him to accumulate £1,000, and he tells Michael Ramsay in 1751:—

“While interest remains as at present, I have £50 a year, a hundred pounds worth of books, great store of linens and fine clothes, and near £100 in my pocket; along with order, frugality, a strong spirit of independency, good health, a contented humour, and an unabated love of study. In these circumstances I must esteem myself one of the happy and fortunate; and so far from being willing to draw my ticket over again in the lottery of life, there are very few prizes with which I would make an exchange. After some deliberation, I am resolved to settle in Edinburgh, and hope I shall be able with these revenues to say with Horace:—

‘Est bona librorum et provisæ frugis in annum
Copia.’”

It would be difficult to find a better example of the honourable independence and cheerful self-reliance which should distinguish a man of letters, and which characterised Hume throughout his career. By honourable effort, the boy's noble ideal of life, became the man's reality; and, at forty, Hume had the happiness of finding that he had not wasted his youth in the pursuit of illusions, but that “the solid certainty of

waking bliss" lay before him in the free play of his powers in their appropriate sphere.

In 1751, Hume removed to Edinburgh and took up his abode on a flat in one of those prodigious houses in the Lawnmarket, which still excite the admiration of tourists; afterwards moving to a house in the Canon-gate. His sister joined him, adding £30 a year to the common stock; and, in one of his charmingly playful letters to Dr. Clephane, he thus describes his establishment, in 1753.

"I shall exult and triumph to you a little that I have now at last—being turned of forty, to my own honour, to that of learning, and to that of the present age—arrived at the dignity of being a householder.

"About seven months ago, I got a house of my own, and completed a regular family, consisting of a head, viz., myself, and two inferior members, a maid and a cat. My sister has since joined me, and keeps me company. With frugality, I can reach, I find, cleanliness, warmth, light, plenty, and contentment. What would you have more? Independence? I have it in a supreme degree. Honour? That is not altogether wanting. Grace? That will come in time. A wife? That is none of the indispensable requisites of life. Books? That is one of them; and I have more than I can use. In short, I cannot find any pleasure of consequence which I am not possessed of in a greater or less degree: and, without any great effort of philosophy, I may be easy and satisfied.

"As there is no happiness without occupation, I have begun a work which will occupy me several years, and which yields me much satisfaction. 'Tis a History of Britain from the Union of the Crowns to the present time. I have already finished the reign of King James. My friends flatter me (by this I mean that they don't flatter me) that I have succeeded."

In 1752, the Faculty of Advocates elected Hume their

librarian, an office which, though it yielded little emolument—the salary was only forty pounds a year—was valuable as it placed the resources of a large library at his disposal. The proposal to give Hume even this paltry place caused a great outcry, on the old score of infidelity. But as Hume writes, in a jubilant letter to Clephane (February 4, 1752):—

“I carried the election by a considerable majority. . . . What is more extraordinary, the cry of religion could not hinder the ladies from being violently my partisans, and I owe my success in a great measure to their solicitations. One has broke off all commerce with her lover because he voted against me! And Mr. Lockhart, in a speech to the Faculty, said there was no walking the streets, nor even enjoying one's own fireside, on account of their importunate zeal. The town says that even his bed was not safe for him, though his wife was cousin-german to my antagonist.

“'Twas vulgarly given out that the contest was between Deists and Christians, and when the news of my success came to the playhouse, the whisper rose that the Christians were defeated. Are you not surprised that we could keep our popularity, notwithstanding this imputation, which my friends could not deny to be well founded?”

It would seem that the “good company” was less enterprising in its asseverations in this canvass than in the last.

The first volume of the *History of Great Britain, containing the reign of James I. and Charles I.*, was published in 1754. At first, the sale was large, especially in Edinburgh, and if notoriety *per se* was Hume's object, he attained it. But he liked applause as well as fame and, to his bitter disappointment, he says:—

"I was assailed by one cry of reproach, disapprobation, and even detestation: English, Scotch, and Irish, Whig and Tory, Churchman and Sectary, Freethinker and Religionist, Patriot and Courtier, united in their rage against the man who had presumed to shed a generous tear for the fate of Charles I. and the Earl of Strafford; and after the first ebullitions of their fury were over, what was still more mortifying, the book seemed to fall into oblivion. Mr. Millar told me that in a twelve-month he sold only forty-five copies of it. I scarcely, indeed, heard of one man in the three kingdoms, considerable for rank or letters, that could endure the book. I must only except the primate of England, Dr. Herring, and the primate of Ireland, Dr. Stone, which seem two odd exceptions. These dignified prelates separately sent me messages not to be discouraged."

It certainly is odd to think of David Hume being comforted in his affliction by the independent and spontaneous sympathy of a pair of archbishops. But the instincts of the dignified prelates guided them rightly; for, as the great painter of English history in Whig pigments has been careful to point out,¹ Hume's historical picture, though a great work, drawn by a master hand, has all the lights Tory, and all the shades Whig.

Hume's ecclesiastical enemies seem to have thought that their opportunity had now arrived; and an attempt was made to get the General Assembly of 1756 to appoint a committee to inquire into his writings. But, after a keen debate, the proposal was rejected by fifty votes to seventeen. Hume does not appear to have troubled himself about the matter, and does not even think it worth mention in *My Own Life*.

¹ Lord Macaulay, Article on History, *Edinburgh Review*, vol. lxvii.

In 1756 he tells Clephane that he is worth £1,600 sterling, and consequently master of an income which is sufficient to support a man of his frugal habits. In the same year he published the second volume of the *History*, which met with a much better reception than the first; and, in 1757, one of his most remarkable works, the *Natural History of Religion*, appeared. In the same year, he resigned his office of librarian to the Faculty of Advocates, and he probably proceeded to London, probably to superintend the printing of the additional volume of the *History*.

"I shall certainly be in London next summer; and probably I shall be able to spend some of my life: at least, if I can settle myself in a quiet manner, I shall be glad to have an eye to you. A room in a sober discreet family, who would not be averse to admit a sober, discreet, virtuous, regular, quiet, goodnatured man of a bad character—such a room, I say, would suit me extremely."¹

The promised visit took place in the latter part of the year 1758, and he remained in the metropolis for the greater part of 1759. The two volumes of the *History* published in that year, and which were published in Edinburgh in 1757, were well received, and, according to his own account, they raised almost as great a clamour as the first volume.

Busily occupied with the completion of his historical labours, Hume remained in Edinburgh until 1763; when, at the request of Lord Hertford, who was going as ambassador to France, he was appointed to the embassy; with the promise of the secretaryship, and, in the mean-

¹ Letter to Clephane, 3rd September, 1757.

while, performing the duties of that office. At first, Hume declined the offer; but, as it was particularly honourable to so well abused a man, on account of Lord Hertford's high reputation for virtue and piety,¹ and no less advantageous by reason of the increase of fortune which it secured to him, he eventually accepted it.

In France, Hume's reputation stood far higher than in Britain; several of his works had been translated; he had exchanged letters with Montesquieu and with Helvetius; Rousseau had appealed to him; and the charming Madame de Boufflers had drawn him into a correspondence, marked by almost passionate enthusiasm on her part, and as fair an imitation of enthusiasm as Hume was capable of, on his. In the extraordinary mixture of learning, wit, humanity, frivolity, and profligacy which then characterised the highest French society, a new sensation was worth anything, and it mattered little whether the cause thereof was a philosopher or a poodle; so Hume had a great success in the Parisian world. Great nobles fêted him, and great ladies were not content unless the "gros David" was to be seen at their receptions, and in their boxes at the theatre. "At the opera his broad unmeaning face was usually to be seen *entre deux jolis minois*," says Lord Charlemont.²

¹ "You must know that Lord Hertford has so high a character for piety, that his taking me by the hand is a kind of regeneration to me, and all past offences are now wiped off. But all these views are trifling to one of my age and temper."—*Hume to Edmonstone*, 9th January, 1764. Lord Hertford had procured him a pension of £200 a year for life from the King, and the secretaryship was worth £1000 a year.

² Madame d'Epinay gives a ludicrous account of Hume's performance when pressed into a *tableau*, as a Sultan between two

Hume's cool head was by no means turned; but he took the goods the gods provided with much satisfaction; and everywhere won golden opinions by his unaffected good sense and thorough kindness of heart.

Over all this part of Hume's career, as over the surprising episode of the quarrel with Rousseau, if that can be called quarrel which was lunatic malignity on Rousseau's side and thorough generosity and patience on Hume's, I may pass lightly. The story is admirably told by Mr. Burton, to whose volumes I refer the reader. Nor need I dwell upon Hume's short tenure of office in London, as Under-Secretary of State, between 1767 and 1769. Success and wealth are rarely interesting, and Hume's case is no exception to the rule.

According to his own description the cares of official life were not overwhelming.

"My way of life here is very uniform and by no means disagreeable. I have all the forenoon in the Secretary's house, from ten till three, when there arrive from time to time messengers that bring me all the secrets of the kingdom, and, indeed, of Europe, Asia, Africa, and America. I am seldom hurried; but have leisure at intervals to take up a book, or write a private letter, or converse with a friend that may call for me; and from dinner to bed-time is all my own. If you add to this that the person with whom I have the chief, if not only, transactions, is the most reasonable,

slaves, personated for the occasion by two of the prettiest women in Paris:—

"Il les regarde attentivement, il se frappe le ventre et les genoux à plusieurs reprises et ne trouve jamais autre chose à leur dire que *Eh bien! mes demoiselles.—Eh bien! vous voilà donc. . . Eh bien! vous voilà . . . vous voilà ici!* Cette phrase dura un quart d'heure sans qu'il pût en sortir. Une d'elles se leva d'impatience: Ah, dit-elle, je m'en étois bien doutée, cet homme n'est bon qu'à manger du veau!"—Burton's *Life of Hume*, vol. ii. p. 224.

equal-tempered, and gentleman-like man imaginable, and Lady Aylesbury the same, you will certainly think I have no reason to complain; and I am far from complaining. I only shall not regret when my duty is over; because to me the situation can lead to nothing, at least in all probability; and reading, and sauntering, and lounging, and dozing, which I call thinking, is my supreme happiness—I mean my full contentment."

Hume's duty was soon over, and he returned to Edinburgh in 1769, "very opulent" in the possession of £1,000 a year, and determined to take what remained to him of life pleasantly and easily. In October, 1769, he writes to Elliot:—

"I have been settled here two months, and am here body and soul, without casting the least thought of regret to London, or even to Paris. . . . I live still, and must for a twelvemonth, in my old house in James's Court, which is very cheerful and even elegant, but too small to display my great talent for cookery, the science to which I intend to addict the remaining years of my life. I have just now lying on the table before me a receipt for making *soupe à la reine*, copied with my own hand; for beef and cabbage (a charming dish) and old mutton and old claret nobody excels me. I make also sheep's-head broth in a manner that Mr. Keith speaks of for eight days after; and the Duc de Nivernois would bind himself apprentice to my lass to learn it. I have already sent a challenge to David Moncreiff: you will see that in a twelvemonth he will take to the writing of history, the field I have deserted; for as to the giving of dinners, he can now have no further pretensions. I should have made a very bad use of my abode in Paris if I could not get the better of a mere provincial like him. All my friends encourage me in this ambition; as thinking it will redound very much to my honour."

In 1770, Hume built himself a house in the new town

of Edinburgh, which was then springing up. It was the first house in the street, and a frolicsome young lady chalked upon the wall "St. David's Street." Hume's servant complained to her master, who replied, "Never mind, lassie, many a better man has been made a saint of before," and the street retains its title to this day.

In the following six years, the house in St. David's Street was the centre of the accomplished and refined society which then distinguished Edinburgh. Adam Smith, Blair, and Ferguson were within easy reach; and what remains of Hume's correspondence with Sir Gilbert Elliot, Colonel Edmonstone, and Mrs. Cockburn gives pleasant glimpses of his social surroundings, and enables us to understand his contentment with his absence from the more perturbed, if more brilliant, worlds of Paris and London.

Towards London, Londoners, and indeed Englishmen in general, Hume entertained a dislike, mingled with contempt, which was as nearly rancorous as any emotion of his could be. During his residence in Paris, in 1764 and 1765, he writes to Blair:—

"The taste for literature is neither decayed nor depraved here, as with the barbarians who inhabit the banks of the Thames."

And he speaks of the "general regard paid to genius and learning" in France as one of the points in which it most differs from England. Ten years later, he cannot even thank Gibbon for his History without the left-handed compliment, that he should never have expected such an excellent work from the pen of an Englishman. Early in 1765, Hume writes to Millar:—

“The rage and prejudice of parties frighten me, and above all, this rage against the Scots, which is so dishonourable, and indeed so infamous, to the English nation. We hear that it increases every day without the least appearance of provocation on our part. It has frequently made me resolve never in my life to set foot on English ground. I dread, if I should undertake a more modern history, the impertinence and ill-manners to which it would expose me; and I was willing to know from you whether former prejudices had so far subsided as to ensure me of a good reception.”

His fears were kindly appeased by Millar's assurance that the English were not prejudiced against the Scot in general, but against the particular Scot, Lord Bute, who was supposed to be the guide, philosopher, and friend, of both the King and his mother.

To care nothing about literature, to dislike Scotchmen, and to be insensible to the merits of David Hume, was a combination of iniquities on the part of the English nation, which would have been amply sufficient to ruffle the temper of the philosophic historian, who, without being foolishly vain, had certainly no need of what has been said to be the one form of prayer in which his countrymen, torn as they are by theological differences, agree; “Lord! gie us a gude conceit o' oursels.” But when, to all this, these same Southrons added a passionate admiration for Lord Chatham, who was in Hume's eyes a charlatan; and filled up the cup of their abominations by cheering for “Wilkes and Liberty,” Hume's wrath knew no bounds, and, between 1768 and 1770, he pours a perfect Jeremiad into the bosom of his friend Sir Gilbert Elliot.

“Oh! how I long to see America and the East Indies revolted, totally and finally—the revenue reduced to half—

public credit fully discredited by bankruptcy—the third of London in ruins, and the rascally mob subdued! I think I am not too old to despair of being witness to all these blessings.

“I am delighted to see the daily and hourly progress of madness and folly and wickedness in England. The consummation of these qualities are the true ingredients for making a fine narrative in history, especially if followed by some signal and ruinous convulsion—as I hope will soon be the case with that pernicious people!”

Even from the secure haven of James's Court, the maledictions continue to pour forth:—

“Nothing but a rebellion and bloodshed will open the eyes of that deluded people; though were they alone concerned, I think it is no matter what becomes of them. . . . Our government has become a chimera, and is too perfect, in point of liberty, for so rude a beast as an Englishman; who is a man, a bad animal too, corrupted by above a century of licentiousness. The misfortune is that this liberty can scarcely be retrenched without danger of being entirely lost; at least the fatal effects of licentiousness must first be made palpable by some extreme mischief resulting from it. I may wish that the catastrophe should rather fall on our posterity, but it hastens on with such large strides as to leave little room for hope.

“I am running over again the last edition of my History, in order to correct it still further. I either soften or expunge many villainous seditious Whig strokes which had crept into it. I wish that my indignation at the present madness, encouraged by lies, calumnies, imposture, and every infamous act usual among popular leaders, may not throw me into the opposite extreme.”

A wise wish, indeed. Posterity respectfully concurs therein; and subjects Hume's estimate of England and

things English to such modifications as it would probably have undergone had the wish been fulfilled.

In 1775, Hume's health began to fail; and, in the spring of the following year, his disorder, which appears to have been hæmorrhage of the bowels, attained such a height that he knew it must be fatal. So he made his will, and wrote *My Own Life*, the conclusion of which is one of the most cheerful, simple, and dignified leave-takings of life and all its concerns, extant.

"I now reckon upon a speedy dissolution. I have suffered very little pain from my disorder; and what is more strange, have, notwithstanding the great decline of my person, never suffered a moment's abatement of spirits; insomuch that were I to name the period of my life which I should most choose to pass over again, I might be tempted to point to this later period. I possess the same ardour as ever in study and the same gaiety in company; I consider, besides, that a man of sixty-five, by dying, cuts off only a few years of infirmities; and though I see many symptoms of my literary reputation's breaking out at last with additional lustre, I know that I could have but few years to enjoy it. It is difficult to be more detached from life than I am at present.

"To conclude historically with my own character, I am, or rather was (for that is the style I must now use in speaking of myself, which emboldens me the more to speak my sentiments); I was, I say, a man of mild dispositions, of command of temper, of an open, social, and cheerful humour, capable of attachment, but little susceptible of enmity, and of moderation in all my passions. Even my love of fame, my ruling passion, never soured my temper, notwithstanding my frequent disappointments. My company was not unacceptable to the young and careless, as well as to the studious and literary; and as I took a particular pleasure in the company of modest women, I had no reason to be displeas-

with the reception I met with from them. In a word, though most men any wise eminent, have found reason to complain of calumny, I never was touched or even attacked by her baleful tooth; and though I wantonly exposed myself to the rage of both civil and religious factions, they seemed to be disarmed in my behalf of their wonted fury. My friends never had occasion to vindicate any one circumstance of my character and conduct; not but that the zealots, we may well suppose, would have been glad to invent and propagate any story to my disadvantage, but they could never find any which they thought would wear the face of probability. I cannot say there is no vanity in making this funeral oration of myself, but I hope it is not a misplaced one; and this is a matter of fact which is easily cleared and ascertained."

Hume died in Edinburgh on the 25th of August, 1776, and, a few days later, his body, attended by a great concourse of people, who seem to have anticipated for it the fate appropriate to the remains of wizards and necromancers, was deposited in a spot selected by himself, in an old burial-ground on the eastern slope of the Calton Hill.

From the summit of this hill, there is a prospect unequalled by any to be seen from the midst of a great city. Westward lies the Forth, and beyond it, dimly blue, the faraway Highland hills; eastward, rise the bold contours of Arthur's Seat and the rugged crags of the Castle rock, with the grey Old Town of Edinburgh; while, far below, from a maze of crowded thoroughfares, the hoarse murmur of the toil of a polity of energetic men is borne upon the ear. At times, a man may be as solitary here as in a veritable wilderness; and may meditate undisturbedly upon the epitome of nature and of man—the kingdoms of this world—spread out before him.

Surely, there is a fitness in the choice of this last resting-place by the philosopher and historian, who saw so clearly that these two kingdoms form but one realm, governed by uniform laws and alike based on impenetrable darkness and eternal silence: and faithful to the last to that profound veracity which was the secret of his philosophic greatness, he ordered that the simple Roman tomb which marks his grave should bear no inscription but

DAVID HUME

BORN 1711.

DIED 1776.

Leaving it to posterity to add the rest.

It was by the desire and at the suggestion of my friend, the Editor of this Series, that I undertook to attempt to help posterity in the difficult business of knowing what to add to Hume's epitaph; and I might, with justice, throw upon him the responsibility of my apparent presumption in occupying a place among the men of letters, who are engaged with him, in their proper function of writing about English Men of Letters.

That to which succeeding generations have made, are making, and will make, continual additions, however, is Hume's fame as a philosopher; and, though I know that my plea will add to my offence in some quarters, I must plead, in extenuation of my audacity, that philosophy lies in the province of science, and not in that of letters.

In dealing with Hume's Life, I have endeavoured, as far as possible, to make him speak for himself. If the extracts from his letters and essays which I have given

do not sufficiently show what manner of man he was, I am sure that nothing I could say would make the case plainer. In the exposition of Hume's philosophy which follows, I have pursued the same plan, and I have applied myself to the task of selecting and arranging in systematic order, the passages which appeared to me to contain the clearest statements of Hume's opinions.

I should have been glad to be able to confine myself to this duty, and to limit my own comments to so much as was absolutely necessary to connect my excerpts. Here and there, however, it must be confessed that more is seen of my thread than of Hume's beads. My excuse must be an ineradicable tendency to try to make things clear; while, I may further hope, that there is nothing in what I may have said, which is inconsistent with the logical development of Hume's principles.

My authority for the facts of Hume's life is the admirable biography, published in 1846, by Mr. John Hill Burton. The edition of Hume's works from which all citations are made is that published by Black and Tait in Edinburgh, in 1826. In this edition, the *Essays* are reprinted from the edition of 1777, corrected by the author for the press a short time before his death. It is well printed in four handy volumes; and as my copy has long been in my possession, and bears marks of much reading, it would have been troublesome for me to refer to any other. But, for the convenience of those who possess some other edition, the following table of the contents of the edition of 1826, with the paging of the four volumes, is given:—

VOLUME I.

TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE.

Book I. *Of the Understanding*, p. 5 to the end, p. 347.

VOLUME II.

TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE.

Book II. *Of the Passions*, p. 3—p. 215.

Book III. *Of Morals*, p. 219—p. 415.

DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION, p. 419—p. 548.

APPENDIX TO THE TREATISE, p. 551—p. 560.

VOLUME III.

ESSAYS, MORAL AND POLITICAL, p. 3—p. 282.

POLITICAL DISCOURSES, p. 285—p. 579.

VOLUME IV.

AN INQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, p. 3—
p. 233.

AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS, p. 237—
p. 431.

THE NATURAL HISTORY OF RELIGION, p. 435—p. 513.

ADDITIONAL ESSAYS, p. 517—p. 577.

As the volume and the page of the volume are given in my references, it will be easy, by the help of this table, to learn where to look for any passage cited, in differently arranged editions.

PART II.

HUME'S PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER I.

THE OBJECT AND SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY.

KANT has said that the business of philosophy is to answer three questions: What can I know? What ought I to do? and For what may I hope? But it is pretty plain that these three resolve themselves, in the long run, into the first. For rational expectation and moral action are alike based upon beliefs; and a belief is void of justification, unless its subject-matter lies within the boundaries of possible knowledge, and unless its evidence satisfies the conditions which experience imposes as the guarantee of credibility.

Fundamentally, then, philosophy is the answer to the question, What can I know? and it is by applying itself to this problem, that philosophy is properly distinguished as a special department of scientific research. What is commonly called science, whether mathematical, physical, or biological, consists of the answers which mankind

have been able to give to the inquiry, What do I know? They furnish us with the results of the mental operations which constitute thinking; while philosophy, in the stricter sense of the term, inquires into the foundation of the first principles which these operations assume or imply.

But though, by reason of the special purpose of philosophy, its distinctness from other branches of scientific investigation may be properly vindicated, it is easy to see that, from the nature of its subject-matter, it is intimately and, indeed, inseparably connected with one branch of science. For it is obviously impossible to answer the question, What can we know? unless, in the first place, there is a clear understanding as to what is meant by knowledge; and, having settled this point, the next step is to inquire how we come by that which we allow to be knowledge; for, upon the reply, turns the answer to the further question, whether, from the nature of the case, there are limits to the knowable or not. While, finally, inasmuch as What can I know? not only refers to knowledge of the past or of the present, but to the confident expectation which we call knowledge of the future; it is necessary to ask, further, what justification can be alleged for trusting to the guidance of our expectations in practical conduct.

It surely needs no argumentation to show, that the first problem cannot be approached without the examination of the contents of the mind; and the determination of how much of these contents may be called knowledge. Nor can the second problem be dealt with in any other fashion; for it is only by the observation of the growth of knowledge that we can rationally hope to discover how knowledge grows. But the solution of the

third problem simply involves the discussion of the data obtained by the investigation of the foregoing two.

Thus, in order to answer three out of the four subordinate questions into which *What can I know?* breaks up, we must have recourse to that investigation of mental phenomena, the results of which are embodied in the science of psychology.

Psychology is a part of the science of life or biology, which differs from the other branches of that science, merely in so far as it deals with the psychical, instead of the physical, phenomena of life.

As there is an anatomy of the body, so there is an anatomy of the mind; the psychologist dissects mental phenomena into elementary states of consciousness, as the anatomist resolves limbs into tissues, and tissues into cells. The one traces the development of complex organs from simple rudiments; the other follows the building up of complex conceptions out of simpler constituents of thought. As the physiologist inquires into the way in which the so-called "functions" of the body are performed, so the psychologist studies the so-called "faculties" of the mind. Even a cursory attention to the ways and works of the lower animals suggests a comparative anatomy and physiology of the mind; and the doctrine of evolution presses for application as much in the one field as in the other.

But there is more than a parallel, there is a close and intimate connexion between psychology and physiology. No one doubts that, at any rate, some mental states are dependent for their existence on the performance of the functions of particular bodily organs. There is no seeing without eyes, and no hearing without ears. If the origin of the contents of the mind is truly a philosophical

1.] THE OBJECT AND SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY

problem, then the philosopher who attempts to deal with that problem, without acquainting himself with the physiology of sensation, has no more intelligent conception of his business than the physiologist, who thinks he can discuss locomotion, without an acquaintance with the principles of mechanics ; or respiration, without some tincture of chemistry.

On whatever ground we term physiology, science, psychology is entitled to the same appellation ; and the method of investigation which elucidates the true relations of the one set of phenomena will discover those of the other. Hence, as philosophy is, in great measure, the exponent of the logical consequences of certain data established in psychology ; and as psychology itself differs from physiology only in the nature of its subject-matter, and not in its method of investigation, it would seem to be an obvious conclusion, that philosophers are likely to be successful in their inquiries, in proportion as they are familiar with the application of scientific method to less abstruse subjects ; just as it seems to require no elaborate demonstration, that an astronomer, who wishes to comprehend the solar system, would do well to acquire a preliminary acquaintance with the elements of physics. And it is accordant with this presumption, that the men who have made the most important positive additions to philosophy, such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Kant, not to mention more recent examples, have been deeply imbued with the spirit of physical science ; and, in some cases, such as those of Descartes and Kant, have been largely acquainted with its details. On the other hand, the founder of Positivism no less admirably illustrates the connexion of scientific incapacity with philosophical incompetence. In truth,

the laboratory is the fore-court of the temple of philosophy; and whoso has not offered sacrifices and undergone purification there, has little chance of admission into the sanctuary.

Obvious as these considerations may appear to be, it would be wrong to ignore the fact that their force is by no means universally admitted. On the contrary, the necessity for a proper psychological and physiological training to the student of philosophy is denied, on the one hand, by the "pure metaphysicians," who attempt to base the theory of knowing upon supposed necessary and universal truths, and assert that scientific observation is impossible unless such truths are already known or implied: which, to those who are not "pure metaphysicians," seems very much as if one should say that the fall of a stone cannot be observed, unless the law of gravitation is already in the mind of the observer.

On the other hand, the Positivists, so far as they accept the teachings of their master, roundly assert, at any rate in words, that observation of the mind is a thing inherently impossible in itself, and that psychology is a chimera—a phantasm generated by the fermentation of the dregs of theology. Nevertheless, if M. Comte had been asked what he meant by "physiologie cérébrale," except that which other people call "psychology;" and how he knew anything about the functions of the brain, except by that very "observation intérieure," which he declares to be an absurdity—it seems probable that he would have found it hard to escape the admission, that, in vilipending psychology, he had been propounding solemn nonsense.

It is assuredly one of Hume's greatest merits that he clearly recognised the fact that philosophy is based upon

psychology; and that the inquiry into the contents and the operations of the mind must be conducted upon the same principles as a physical investigation, if what he calls the "moral philosopher" would attain results of as firm and definite a character as those which reward the "natural philosopher."¹ The title of his first work, a "*Treatise of Human Nature, being an Attempt to introduce the Experimental method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects,*" sufficiently indicates the point of view from which Hume regarded philosophical problems; and he tells us in the preface, that his object has been to promote the construction of a "science of man."

"'Tis evident that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature; and that, however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they will return by some passage or another. Even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Astronomy, are in some measure dependent on the human mind, inasmuch as they lie under the cognizance of men, and are regulated by their powers and qualities. 'Tis impossible to tell what changes and improvements we might make in these sciences were we thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding, and could explain the nature of the ideas we employ and of the operations we perform in our reasonings. . . . To me it seems evident that the essence of mind being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the observation

¹ In a letter to Hutcheson (September 17th, 1739) Hume remarks:—"There are two parts of philosophy, the natural and as well as the body. One is the study of the mind or the soul, and the other is the study of the body and principles of nature; and the former is the study of the moral sciences;" and he speaks of the "new mode of looking at the moral sentiments" as a "new point of view."

of those particular effects which result from its different circumstances and situations. And though we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes, 'tis still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical. . . .

“But if this impossibility of explaining ultimate principles should be esteemed a defect in the science of man, I will venture to affirm, that it is a defect common to it with all the sciences, and all the arts, in which we can employ ourselves, whether they be such as are cultivated in the schools of the philosophers, or practised in the shops of the meanest artisans. None of them can go beyond experience, or establish any principles which are not founded on that authority. Moral philosophy has, indeed, this peculiar disadvantage, which is not found in natural, that in collecting its experiments, it cannot make them purposely, with premeditation, and after such a manner as to satisfy itself concerning every particular difficulty which may arise. When I am at a loss to know the effects of one body upon another in any situation, I need only put them in that situation, and observe what results from it. But should I endeavour to clear up in the same manner any¹ doubt in moral philosophy, by placing myself in the same case with that which I consider, 'tis evident this reflection and premeditation would so disturb the operation of my natural principles, as must render it impossible to form any just conclusion from the phenomenon. We must, therefore, glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures. Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may

¹ The manner in which Hume constantly refers to the results of the observation of the contents and the processes of his own mind clearly shows that he has here inadvertently overstated the case.

hope to establish on them a science which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility, to any other of human comprehension."—(I. pp. 7—11.)

All science starts with hypotheses—in other words, with assumptions that are unproved, while they may be, and often are, erroneous; but which are better than nothing to the seeker after order in the maze of phenomena. And the historical progress of every science depends on the criticism of hypotheses—on the gradual stripping off, that is, of their untrue or superfluous parts—until there remains only that exact verbal expression of as much as we know of the fact, and no more, which constitutes a perfect scientific theory.

Philosophy has followed the same course as other branches of scientific investigation. The memorable service rendered to the cause of sound thinking by Descartes consisted in this: that he laid the foundation of modern philosophical criticism by his inquiry into the nature of certainty. It is a clear result of the investigation started by Descartes, that there is one thing of which no doubt can be entertained, for he who should pretend to doubt it would thereby prove its existence; and that is the momentary consciousness we call a present thought or feeling; that is safe, even if all other kinds of certainty are merely more or less probable inferences. Berkeley and Locke, each in his way, applied philosophical criticism in other directions; but they always, at any rate professedly, followed the Cartesian maxim of admitting no propositions to be true but such as are clear, distinct, and evident, even while their arguments stripped off many a layer of hypothetical assumption which their great predecessor had left untouched.

No one has more clearly stated the aims of the critical philosopher than Locke, in a passage of the famous *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, which, perhaps, I ought to assume to be well known to all English readers, but which so probably is unknown to this full-crammed and much-examined generation that I venture to cite it :

“ If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding I can discover the powers thereof, how far they reach, to what things they are in any degree proportionate, and where they fail us, I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension : to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether ; and to sit down in quiet ignorance of those things which, upon examination, are proved to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We should not then, perhaps, be so forward, out of an affectation of universal knowledge, to raise questions and perplex ourselves and others with disputes about things to which our understandings are not suited, and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear and distinct perception, or whereof (as it has, perhaps, too often happened) we have not any notion at all Men may find matter sufficient to busy their heads and employ their hands with variety, delight, and satisfaction, if they will not boldly quarrel with their own constitution and throw away the blessings their hands are filled with because they are not big enough to grasp everything. We shall not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us : for of that they are very capable : and it will be an unpardonable, as well as a childish peevishness, if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was given us, because there are some things that are set out of the reach of it. It will be no excuse to an idle and untoward servant who would not attend to his business by candlelight, to plead that he had not broad sunshine. The candle that is set up in us shines bright

enough for all our purposes Our business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct."¹

Hume develops the same fundamental conception in a somewhat different way, and with a more definite indication of the practical benefits which may be expected from a critical philosophy. The first and second parts of the twelfth section of the *Inquiry* are devoted to a condemnation of excessive scepticism, or Pyrrhonism, with which Hume couples a caricature of the Cartesian doubt; but, in the third part, a certain "mitigated scepticism" is recommended and adopted, under the title of "academical philosophy." After pointing out that a knowledge of the infirmity of the human understanding, even in its most perfect state, and when most accurate and cautious in its deductions, is the best check upon the tendency to dogmatism, Hume continues:—

"Another species of *mitigated* scepticism, which may be of advantage to mankind, and which may be the natural result of the PYRRHONIAN doubts and scruples, is the limitation of our inquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding. The *imagination* of man is naturally sublime, delighted with whatever is remote and extraordinary, and running, without control, into the most distant parts of space and time in order to avoid the objects which custom has rendered too familiar to it. A correct *judgment* observes a contrary method, and, avoiding all distant and high inquiries, confines itself to common life, and to such subjects as fall under daily practice and experience; leaving the more sublime topics to the embellishment of poets and orators, or to the arts of priests and politicians. To bring us to so salutary a determination, nothing can be more

¹ Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Book I. chap. i. §§ 4, 5, 6.

serviceable than to be once thoroughly convinced of the force of the PYRRHONIAN doubt, and of the impossibility that anything but the strong power of natural instinct could free us from it. Those who have a propensity to philosophy will still continue their researches; because they reflect, that, besides the immediate pleasure attending such an occupation, philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life, methodised and corrected. But they will never be tempted to go beyond common life, so long as they consider the imperfection of those faculties which they employ, their narrow reach, and their inaccurate operations. While we cannot give a satisfactory reason why we believe, after a thousand experiments, that a stone will fall or fire burn; can we ever satisfy ourselves concerning any determination which we may form with regard to the origin of worlds and the situation of nature from and to eternity?" (IV. pp. 189—90.)

But further, it is the business of criticism not only to keep watch over the vagaries of philosophy, but to do the duty of police in the whole world of thought. Wherever it espies sophistry or superstition they are to be bidden to stand; nay, they are to be followed to their very dens and there apprehended and exterminated, as Othello smothered Desdemona, "else she'll betray more men."

Hume warms into eloquence as he sets forth the labours meet for the strength and the courage of the Hercules of "mitigated scepticism."

"Here, indeed, lies the justest and most plausible objection against a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not properly a science, but arise either from the fruitless efforts of human vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the understanding, or from the craft of popular superstitions, which, being unable to defend themselves on fair ground, raise these entangling brambles to cover and

protect their weakness. Chased from the open country, these robbers fly into the forest, and lie in wait to break in upon every unguarded avenue of the mind and overwhelm it with religious fears and prejudices. The stoutest antagonist, if he remits his watch a moment, is oppressed; and many, through cowardice and folly, open the gates to the enemies, and willingly receive them with reverence and submission as their legal sovereigns.

“But is this a sufficient reason why philosophers should desist from such researches and leave superstition still in possession of her retreat? Is it not proper to draw an opposite conclusion, and perceive the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret recesses of the enemy? The only method of freeing learning at once from these abstruse questions, is to inquire seriously into the nature of human understanding, and show, from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects. We must submit to this fatigue, in order to live at ease ever after; and must cultivate true metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy the false and adulterated.” (IV. pp. 10, 11.)

Near a century and a half has elapsed since these brave words were shaped by David Hume's pen; and the business of carrying the war into the enemy's camp has gone on but slowly. Like other campaigns, it long languished for want of a good base of operations. But since physical science, in the course of the last fifty years, has brought to the front an inexhaustible supply of heavy artillery of a new pattern, warranted to drive solid bolts of fact through the thickest skulls, things are looking better; though hardly more than the first faint flutterings of the dawn of the happy day, when superstition and false metaphysics shall be no more and reasonable folks may “live at ease,” are as yet discernible by the *enfants perdus* of the outposts.

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If, in thus conceiving the object and the limitations of philosophy, Hume shows himself the spiritual child and continuator of the work of Locke, he appears no less plainly as the parent of Kant and as the protagonist of that more modern way of thinking, which has been called "agnosticism," from its profession of an incapacity to discover the indispensable conditions of either positive or negative knowledge, in many propositions, respecting which, not only the vulgar, but philosophers of the more sanguine sort, revel in the luxury of unqualified assurance.

The aim of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* is essentially the same as that of the *Treatise of Human Nature*, by which indeed Kant was led to develop that "critical philosophy" with which his name and fame are indissolubly bound up: and, if the details of Kant's criticism differ from those of Hume, they coincide with them in their main result, which is the limitation of all knowledge of reality to the world of phenomena revealed to us by experience.

The philosopher of Königsberg epitomises the philosopher of Ninewells when he thus sums up the uses of philosophy:—

"The greatest and perhaps the sole use of all philosophy of pure reason is, after all, merely negative, since it serves, not as an organon for the enlargement [of knowledge], but as a discipline for its delimitation; and instead of discovering truth, has only the modest merit of preventing error."¹

¹ *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Ed. Hartenstein, p. 256.

CHAPTER II.

THE CONTENTS OF THE MIND.

IN the language of common life, the "mind" is spoken of as an entity, independent of the body, though resident in and closely connected with it, and endowed with numerous "faculties," such as sensibility, understanding, memory, volition, which stand in the same relation to the mind as the organs do to the body, and perform the functions of feeling, reasoning, remembering, and willing. Of these functions, some, such as sensation, are supposed to be merely passive—that is, they are called into existence by impressions, made upon the sensitive faculty by a material world of real objects, of which our sensations are supposed to give us pictures; others, such as the memory and the reasoning faculty, are considered to be partly passive and partly active; while volition is held to be potentially, if not always actually, a spontaneous activity.

The popular classification and terminology of the phenomena of consciousness, however, are by no means the first crude conceptions suggested by common sense, but rather a legacy, and, in many respects, a sufficiently *damnosa hæreditas*, of ancient philosophy, more or less

leavened by theology; which has incorporated itself with the common thought of later times, as the vices of the aristocracy of one age become those of the mob in the next. Very little attention to what passes in the mind is sufficient to show, that these conceptions involve assumptions of an extremely hypothetical character. And the first business of the student of psychology is to get rid of such prepossessions; to form conceptions of mental phenomena as they are given us by observation, without any hypothetical admixture, or with only so much as is definitely recognised and held subject to confirmation or otherwise; to classify these phenomena according to their clearly recognisable characters; and to adopt a nomenclature which suggests nothing beyond the results of observation. Thus chastened, observation of the mind makes us acquainted with nothing but certain events, facts, or phenomena (whichever name be preferred) which pass over the inward field of view in rapid and, as it may appear on careless inspection, in disorderly succession, like the shifting patterns of a kaleidoscope. To all these mental phenomena, or states of our consciousness,¹ Descartes gave the name of "thoughts,"² while Locke

¹ "Consciousnesses" would be a better name, but it is awkward. I have elsewhere proposed *psychoses* as a substantive name for mental phenomena.

² As this has been denied, it may be as well to give Descartes's words: "Par le mot de penser, j'entends tout ce que se fait dans nous de telle sorte que nous l'apercevons immédiatement par nous-mêmes: c'est pourquoi non-seulement entendre, vouloir, imaginer, mais aussi sentir, c'est le même chose ici que penser."—*Principes de Philosophie*. Ed. Cousin. 57.

"Toutes les propriétés que nous trouvons en la chose qui pense ne sont que des façons différentes de penser."—*Ibid.* 96.

and Berkeley termed them "ideas." Hume, regarding this as an improper use of the word "idea," for which he proposes another employment, gives the general name of "perceptions" to all states of consciousness. Thus, whatever other signification we may see reason to attach to the word "mind," it is certain that it is a name which is employed to denote a series of perceptions; just as the word "tune," whatever else it may mean, denotes, in the first place, a succession of musical notes. Hume, indeed, goes further than others when he says that—

"What we call a mind is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity."—(I. p. 268.)

With this "nothing but," however, he obviously falls into the primal and perennial error of philosophical speculators—dogmatising from negative arguments. He may be right or wrong; but the most he, or anybody else, can prove in favour of his conclusion is, that we know nothing more of the mind than that it is a series of perceptions. Whether there is something in the mind that lies beyond the reach of observation; or whether perceptions themselves are the products of something which can be observed and which is not mind; are questions which can in nowise be settled by direct observation. Elsewhere, the objectionable hypothetical element of the definition of mind is less prominent:—

"The true idea of the human mind is to consider it as a system of different perceptions, or different existences, which

are linked together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence and modify each other. . . . In this respect I cannot compare the soul more properly to anything than a republic or commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to other persons who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts."—(I. p. 331).

But, leaving the question of the proper definition of mind open for the present, it is further a matter of direct observation, that, when we take a general survey of all our perceptions or states of consciousness, they naturally fall into sundry groups or classes. Of these classes, two are distinguished by Hume as of primary importance. All "perceptions," he says, are either "*Impressions*" or "*Ideas*."

Under "impressions" he includes "all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, see, feel, love, or will;" in other words, "all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul" (I. p. 15).

"Ideas," on the other hand, are the faint images of impressions in thinking and reasoning, or of antecedent ideas.

Both impressions and ideas may be either *simple*, when they are incapable of further analysis, or *complex*, when they may be resolved into simpler constituents. All simple ideas are exact copies of impressions; but, in complex ideas, the arrangement of simple constituents may be different from that of the impressions of which those simple ideas are copies.

Thus the colours red and blue and the odour of a rose, are simple impressions; while the ideas of blue, of red,

and of rose-odour are simple copies of these impressions. But a red rose gives us a complex impression, capable of resolution into the simple impressions of red colour, rose-scent, and numerous others; and we may have a complex idea, which is an accurate, though faint, copy of this complex impression. Once in possession of the ideas of a red rose and of the colour blue, we may, in imagination, substitute blue for red; and thus obtain a complex idea of a blue rose, which is not an actual copy of any complex impression, though all its elements are such copies.

Hume has been criticised for making the distinction of impressions and ideas to depend upon their relative strength or vivacity. Yet it would be hard to point out any other character by which the things signified can be distinguished. Any one who has paid attention to the curious subject of what are called "subjective sensations" will be familiar with examples of the extreme difficulty which sometimes attends the discrimination of ideas of sensation from impressions of sensation, when the ideas are very vivid, or the impressions are faint. Who has not "fancied" he heard a noise; or has not explained inattention to a real sound by saying, "I thought it was nothing but my fancy"? Even healthy persons are much more liable to both visual and auditory spectra—that is, ideas of vision and sound so vivid that they are taken for new impressions—than is commonly supposed; and, in some diseased states, ideas of sensible objects may assume all the vividness of reality.

If ideas are nothing but copies of impressions, arranged, either in the same order as that of the impressions from which they are derived, or in a different order, it follows that the ultimate analysis of the contents of

the mind turns upon that of the impressions. According to Hume, these are of two kinds : either they are impressions of sensation, or they are impressions of reflection. The former are those afforded by the five senses, together with pleasure and pain. The latter are the passions or the emotions (which Hume employs as equivalent terms). Thus the elementary states of consciousness, the raw materials of knowledge, so to speak, are either sensations or emotions ; and whatever we discover in the mind, beyond these elementary states of consciousness, results from the combinations and the metamorphoses which they undergo.

It is not a little strange that a thinker of Hume's capacity should have been satisfied with the results of a psychological analysis which regards some obvious compounds as elements, while it omits altogether a most important class of elementary states.

With respect to the former point, Spinoza's masterly examination of the Passions in the third part of the *Ethics* should have been known to Hume.¹ But, if he had been acquainted with that wonderful piece of psychological anatomy, he would have learned that the emotions and passions are all complex states, arising from the close association of ideas of pleasure or pain with other ideas ; and, indeed, without going to Spinoza, his own acute discussion of the passions leads to the same result,² and is wholly inconsistent with his classi-

¹ On the whole, it is pleasant to find satisfactory evidence that Hume knew nothing of the works of Spinoza ; for the invariably abusive manner in which he refers to that type of the philosophic hero is only to be excused, if it is to be excused, by sheer ignorance of his life and work.

² For example, in discussing pride and humility, Hume says :—

fication of those mental states among the primary un-compounded materials of consciousness.

If Hume's "impressions of reflection" are excluded from among the primary elements of consciousness, nothing is left but the impressions afforded by the five senses, with pleasure and pain. Putting aside the muscular sense, which had not come into view in Hume's time, the questions arise whether these are all the simple undecomposable materials of thought? or whether others exist of which Hume take no cognizance.

Kant answered the latter question in the affirmative, in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, and thereby made one of the greatest advances ever effected in philosophy; though it must be confessed that the German philosopher's exposition of his views is so perplexed in style, so burdened with the weight of a cumbrous and uncouth scholasticism, that it is easy to confound the unessential parts of his system with those which are of profound importance. His baggage train is bigger than his army, and the student who attacks him is too often led to suspect he has won a position when he has only captured a mob of useless camp-followers.

In his *Principles of Psychology*, Mr. Herbert Spencer appears to me to have brought out the essential truth

"According as our idea of ourselves is more or less advantageous, we feel either of these opposite affections, and are elated by pride or dejected with humility . . . when self enters not into the consideration there is no room either for pride or humility." That is, pride is pleasure, and humility is pain, associated with certain conceptions of one's self; or, as Spinoza puts it:—"Superbia est de se præ amore sui plus justo sentire" ("amor" being "lætitia concomitante idea causæ externæ"); and "Humilitas est tristitia orta ex eo quod homo suam impotentiam sive imbecillitatem contemplatur."

which underlies Kant's doctrine in a far clearer manner than any one else; but, for the purpose of the present summary view of Hume's philosophy, it must suffice if I state the matter in my own way, giving the broad outlines, without entering into the details of a large and difficult discussion.

When a red light flashes across the field of vision, there arises in the mind an "impression of sensation" —which we call red. It appears to me that this sensation, red, is a something which may exist altogether independently of any other impression, or idea, as an individual existence. It is perfectly conceivable that a sentient being should have no sense but vision, and that he should have spent his existence in absolute darkness, with the exception of one solitary flash of red light. That momentary illumination would suffice to give him the impression under consideration; and the whole content of his consciousness might be that impression; and, if he were endowed with memory, its idea.

Such being the state of affairs, suppose a second flash of red light to follow the first. If there were no memory of the latter, the state of the mind on the second occasion would simply be a repetition of that which occurred before. There would be merely another impression.

But suppose memory to exist, and that an idea of the first impression is generated; then, if the supposed sentient being were like ourselves, there might arise in his mind two altogether new impressions. The one is the feeling of the *succession* of the two impressions, the other is the feeling of their *similarity*.

Yet a third case is conceivable. Suppose two flashes

of red light to occur together, then a third feeling might arise which is neither succession nor similarity, but that which we call *co-existence*.

These feelings, or their contraries, are the foundation of everything that we call a relation. They are no more capable of being described than sensations are; and, as it appears to me, they are as little susceptible of analysis into simpler elements. Like simple tastes and smells, or feelings of pleasure and pain, they are ultimate irresolvable facts of conscious experience; and, if we follow the principle of Hume's nomenclature, they must be called *impressions of relation*. But it must be remembered, that they differ from the other impressions, in requiring the pre-existence of at least two of the latter. Though devoid of the slightest resemblance to the other impressions, they are, in a manner, generated by them. In fact, we may regard them as a kind of impressions of impressions; or as the sensations of an inner sense, which takes cognizance of the materials furnished to it by the outer senses.

Hume failed as completely as his predecessors had done to recognise the elementary character of impressions of relation; and, when he discusses relations, he falls into a chaos of confusion and self-contradiction.

In the *Treatise*, for example, (Book I., § iv.) resemblance, contiguity in time and space, and cause and effect, are said to be the "uniting principles among ideas," "the bond of union" or "associating quality by which one idea naturally introduces another." Hume affirms that—

"These qualities produce an association among ideas, and upon the appearance of one idea naturally introduce another." They are "the principles of union or cohesion among our

simple ideas, and, in the imagination, supply the place of that inseparable connection by which they are united in our memory. Here is a kind of *attraction*, which, in the mental world, will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to show itself in as many and as various forms. Its effects are everywhere conspicuous; but, as to its causes they are mostly unknown, and must be resolved into *original* qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to explain."—(I. p. 29.)

And at the end of this section Hume goes on to say—

"Amongst the effects of this union or association of ideas, there are none more remarkable than those complex ideas which are the common subjects of our thought and reasoning, and generally arise from some principle of union among our simple ideas. These complex ideas may be resolved into *relations, modes, and substances.*"—(*Ibid.*)

In the next section, which is devoted to *Relations*, they are spoken of as qualities "by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination," or "which make objects admit of comparison," and seven kinds of relation are enumerated, namely, *resemblance, identity, space and time, quantity or number, degrees of quality, contrariety, and cause and effect.*

To the reader of Hume, whose conceptions are usually so clear, definite, and consistent, it is as unsatisfactory as it is surprising to meet with so much questionable and obscure phraseology in a small space. One and the same thing, for example, resemblance, is first called a "quality of an idea," and secondly a "complex idea." Surely it cannot be both. Ideas which have the qualities of "resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect," are said to "attract one another" (save the mark!), and so become

associated; though, in a subsequent part of the *Treatise*, Hume's great effort is to prove that the relation of cause and effect is a particular case of the process of association; that is to say, is a result of the process of which it is supposed to be the cause. Moreover, since, as Hume is never weary of reminding his readers, there is nothing in ideas save copies of impressions, the qualities of resemblance, contiguity, and so on, in the idea, must have existed in the impression of which that idea is a copy; and therefore they must be either sensations or emotions—from both of which classes they are excluded.

In fact, in one place, Hume himself has an insight into the real nature of relations. Speaking of equality, in the sense of a relation of quantity, he says—

“Since equality is a relation, it is not, strictly speaking, a property in the figures themselves, but arises merely from the comparison which the mind makes between them.”—(I. p. 70.)

That is to say, when two impressions of equal figures are present, there arises in the mind a *tertium quid*, which is the perception of equality. On his own principles, Hume should therefore have placed this “perception” among the ideas of reflection. However, as we have seen, he expressly excludes everything but the emotions and the passions from this group.

It is necessary therefore to amend Hume's primary “geography of the mind” by the excision of one territory and the addition of another; and the elementary states of consciousness will stand thus:—

A. IMPRESSIONS.

A. Sensations of

a. Smell.

b. Taste.

- c.* Hearing.
- d.* Sight.
- e.* Touch.
- f.* Resistance (the muscular sense).
- B. Pleasure and Pain.
- c. Relations.
 - a.* Co-existence.
 - b.* Succession.
 - c.* Similarity and dissimilarity.

B. IDEAS.

Copies, or reproductions in memory, of the foregoing.

And now the question arises, whether any, and if so what, portion of these contents of the mind are to be termed "knowledge."

According to Locke, "Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas;" and Hume, though he does not say so in so many words, tacitly accepts the definition. It follows, that neither simple sensation, nor simple emotion, constitutes knowledge; but that, when impressions of relation are added to these impressions, or their ideas, knowledge arises; and that all knowledge is the knowledge of likenesses and unlikenesses, co-existences and successions.

It really matters very little in what sense terms are used, so long as the same meaning is always rigidly attached to them; and, therefore, it is hardly worth while to quarrel with this generally accepted, though very arbitrary, limitation of the signification of "knowledge." But, on the face of the matter, it is not obvious why the impression we call a relation should have a better claim to the title of knowledge, than that which we call a sensation or an emotion; and the restriction has this

unfortunate result, that it excludes all the most intense states of consciousness from any claim to the title of "knowledge."

For example, on this view, pain, so violent and absorbing as to exclude all other forms of consciousness, is not knowledge; but becomes a part of knowledge the moment we think of it in relation to another pain, or to some other mental phenomenon. Surely this is somewhat inconvenient, for there is only a verbal difference between having a sensation and knowing one has it: they are simply two phrases for the same mental state.

But the "pure metaphysicians" make great capital out of the ambiguity. For, starting with the assumption that all knowledge is the perception of relations, and finding themselves, like mere common-sense folks, very much disposed to call sensation knowledge, they at once gratify that disposition and save their consistency, by declaring that even the simplest act of sensation contains two terms and a relation—the sensitive subject, the sensigenous object, and that masterful entity, the Ego. From which great triad, as from a gnostic Trinity, emanates an endless procession of other logical shadows and all the *Fata Morgana* of philosophical dreamland.

CHAPTER III.

THE ORIGIN OF THE IMPRESSIONS.

ADMITTING that the sensations, the feelings of pleasure and pain, and those of relation, are the primary irresolvable states of consciousness, two further lines of investigation present themselves. The one leads us to seek the origin of these "impressions;" the other, to inquire into the nature of the steps by which they become metamorphosed into those compound states of consciousness, which so largely enter into our ordinary trains of thought.

With respect to the origin of impressions of sensation, Hume is not quite consistent with himself. In one place (I. p. 117) he says, that it is impossible to decide "whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produced by the creative power of the mind, or are derived from the Author of our being," thereby implying that realism and idealism are equally probable hypotheses. But, in fact, after the demonstration by Descartes, that the immediate antecedents of sensations are changes in the nervous system, with which our feelings have no sort of resemblance, the hypothesis that sensations "arise immediately from the object" was out of court;

and that Hume fully admitted the Cartesian doctrine is apparent when he says (L. p. 272) :—

“All our perceptions are dependent on our organs and the disposition of our nerves and animal spirits.”

And again, though in relation to another question, he observes :—

“There are three different kinds of impressions conveyed by the senses. The first are those of the figure, bulk, motion, and solidity of bodies. The second those of colours, tastes, smells, sounds, heat, and cold. The third are the pains and pleasures that arise from the application of objects to our bodies, as by the cutting of our flesh with steel, and such like. Both philosophers and the vulgar suppose the first of these to have a distinct continued existence. The vulgar only regard the second as on the same footing. Both philosophers and the vulgar again esteem the third to be merely perceptions, and consequently interrupted and dependent beings.

“Now 'tis evident that, whatever may be our philosophical opinion, colour, sounds, heat, and cold, as far as appears to the senses, exist after the same manner with motion and solidity; and that the difference we make between them, in this respect, arises not from the mere perception. So strong is the prejudice for the distinct continued existence of the former qualities, that when the contrary opinion is advanced by modern philosophers, people imagine they can almost refute it from their reason and experience, and that their very senses contradict this philosophy. 'Tis also evident that colours, sounds, &c., are originally on the same footing with the pain that arises from steel, and pleasure that proceeds from a fire; and that the difference betwixt them is founded neither on perception nor reason, but on the imagination. For as they are confessed to be, both of them, nothing but perceptions arising from the particular configurations and motions of the parts of body, wherein possibly can their difference consist? Upon the whole, then, we may conclude that, as far as

the senses are judges, all perceptions are the same in the manner of their existence."—(I. p. 250, 251.)

The last words of this passage are as much Berkeley's as Hume's. But, instead of following Berkeley in his deductions from the position thus laid down, Hume, as the preceding citation shows, fully adopted the conclusion to which all that we know of psychological physiology tends, that the origin of the elements of consciousness, no less than that of all its other states, is to be sought in bodily changes, the seat of which can only be placed in the brain. And, as Locke had already done with less effect, he states and refutes the arguments commonly brought against the possibility of a causal connexion between the modes of motion of the cerebral substance and states of consciousness, with great clearness :—

“From these hypotheses concerning the *substance* and *local conjunction* of our perceptions we may pass to another, which is more intelligible than the former, and more important than the latter, viz. concerning the *cause* of our perceptions. Matter and motion, 'tis commonly said in the schools, however varied, are still matter and motion, and produce only a difference in the position and situation of objects. Divide a body as often as you please, 'tis still body. Place it in any figure, nothing ever results but figure, or the relation of parts. Move it in any manner, you still find motion or a change of relation. 'Tis absurd to imagine that motion in a circle, for instance, should be nothing but merely motion in a circle; while motion in another direction, as in an ellipse, should also be a passion or moral reflection; that the shocking of two globular particles should become a sensation of pain, and that the meeting of the triangular ones should afford a pleasure. Now as these different shocks and variations and mixtures are the only changes of which matter is

susceptible, and as these never afford us any idea of thought or perception, 'tis concluded to be impossible, that thought can ever be caused by matter.

“ Few have been able to withstand the seeming evidence of this argument; and yet nothing in the world is more easy than to refute it. We need only reflect upon what has been proved at large, that we are never sensible of any connexion between causes and effects, and that 'tis only by our experience of their constant conjunction we can arrive at any knowledge of this relation. Now, as all objects which are not contrary are susceptible of a constant conjunction, and as no real objects are contrary, I have inferred from these principles (Part III. § 15) that, to consider the matter *a priori*, anything may produce anything, and that we shall never discover a reason why any object may or may not be the cause of any other, however great, or however little, the resemblance may be betwixt them. This evidently destroys the precedent reasoning, concerning the cause of thought or perception. For though there appear no manner of connection betwixt motion and thought, the case is the same with all other causes and effects. Place one body of a pound weight on one end of a lever, and another body of the same weight on the other end; you will never find in these bodies any principle of motion dependent on their distance from the centre, more than of thought and perception. If you pretend, therefore, to prove, *a priori*, that such a position of bodies can never cause thought, because, turn it which way you will, it is nothing but a position of bodies: you must, by the same course of reasoning, conclude that it can never produce motion, since there is no more apparent connection in the one than in the other. But, as this latter conclusion is contrary to evident experience, and as 'tis possible we may have a like experience in the operations of the mind, and may perceive a constant conjunction of thought and motion, you reason too hastily when, from the mere consideration of the ideas, you conclude that 'tis impossible motion can ever produce thought, or a different position of parts give rise to a different passion or reflection. Nay, 'tis not only possible we may have such

an experience, but 'tis certain we have it; since every one may perceive that the different dispositions of his body change his thoughts and sentiments. And should it be said that this depends on the union of soul and body, I would answer, that we must separate the question concerning the substance of the mind from that concerning the cause of its thought; and that, confining ourselves to the latter question, we find, by the comparing their ideas, that thought and motion are different from each other and by experience, that they are constantly united; which, being all the circumstances that enter into the idea of cause and effect, when applied to the operations of matter, we may certainly conclude that motion may be, and actually is, the cause of thought and perception."—(I. pp. 314—316.)

The upshot of all this is, that the "collection of perceptions," which constitutes the mind, is really a system of effects, the causes of which are to be sought in antecedent changes of the matter of the brain, just as the "collection of motions," which we call flying, is a system of effects, the causes of which are to be sought in the modes of motion of the matter of the muscles of the wings.

Hume, however, treats of this important topic only incidentally. He seems to have had very little acquaintance even with such physiology as was current in his time. At least, the only passage of his works, bearing on this subject, with which I am acquainted, contains nothing but a very odd version of the physiological views of Descartes:—

"When I received the relations of *resemblance*, *contiguity*, and *causation*, as principles of union among ideas, without examining into their causes, 'twas more in prosecution of my first maxim, that we must in the end rest contented with experience, than for want of something specious and plausible which I might have displayed on that subject. 'Twould

have been easy to have made an imaginary dissection of the brain, and have shown why, upon our conception of any idea, the animal spirits run into all the contiguous traces and rouse up the other ideas that are related to it. But though I have neglected any advantage which I might have drawn from this topic in explaining the relations of ideas, I am afraid I must here have recourse to it, in order to account for the mistakes that arise from these relations. I shall therefore observe, that as the mind is endowed with the power of exciting any idea it pleases; whenever it despatches the spirits into that region of the brain in which the idea is placed; these spirits always excite the idea, when they run precisely into the proper traces and rummage that cell which belongs to the idea. But as their motion is seldom direct, and naturally turns a little to the one side or to the other; for this reason the animal spirits, falling into the contiguous traces, present other related ideas in lieu of that which the mind desired at first to survey. This change we are not always sensible of; but continuing still the same train of thought, make use of the related idea which is presented to us and employ it in our reasonings, as if it were the same with what we demanded. This is the cause of many mistakes and sophisms in philosophy; as will naturally be imagined, and as it would be easy to show, if there was occasion."—(I. p. 88.)

Perhaps it is as well for Hume's fame that the occasion for further physiological speculations of this sort did not arise. But, while admitting the crudity of his notions and the strangeness of the language in which they are couched, it must in justice be remembered, that what are now known as the elements of the physiology of the nervous system were hardly dreamed of in the first half of the eighteenth century; and, as a further set off to Hume's credit, it must be noted that he grasped the fundamental truth, that the key to the comprehension of mental operations lies in the study of the molecular changes of the nervous apparatus by which they are originated.

Surely no one who is cognisant of the facts of the case, nowadays, doubts that the roots of psychology lie in the physiology of the nervous system. What we call the operations of the mind are functions of the brain, and the materials of consciousness are products of cerebral activity. Cabanis may have made use of crude and misleading phraseology when he said that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile; but the conception which that much-abused phrase embodies is, nevertheless, far more consistent with fact than the popular notion that the mind is a metaphysical entity seated in the head, but as independent of the brain as a telegraph operator is of his instrument.

It is hardly necessary to point out that the doctrine just laid down is what is commonly called materialism. In fact, I am not sure that the adjective "crass," which appears to have a special charm for rhetorical sciolists, would not be applied to it. But it is, nevertheless, true that the doctrine contains nothing inconsistent with the purest idealism. For, as Hume remarks (as indeed Descartes had observed long before):—

"'Tis not our body we perceive when we regard our limbs and members, but certain impressions which enter by the senses; so that the ascribing a real and corporeal existence to these impressions, or to their objects, is an act of the mind as difficult to explain as that [the external existence of objects] which we examine at present."—(I. p. 249.)

Therefore, if we analyse the proposition that all mental phenomena are the effects or products of material phenomena, all that it means amounts to this; that whenever those states of consciousness which we call sensation, or emotion, or thought, come into existence,

complete investigation will show good reason for the belief that they are preceded by those other phenomena of consciousness to which we give the names of matter and motion. All material changes appear, in the long run, to be modes of motion; but our knowledge of motion is nothing but that of a change in the place and order of our sensations; just as our knowledge of matter is restricted to those feelings of which we assume it to be the cause.

It has already been pointed out, that Hume must have admitted, and in fact does admit, the possibility that the mind is a Leibnitzian monad, or a Fichtean world-generating Ego, the universe of things being merely the picture produced by the evolution of the phenomena of consciousness. For any demonstration that can be given to the contrary effect, the "collection of perceptions" which makes up our consciousness may be an orderly phantasmagoria generated by the Ego, unfolding its successive scenes on the background of the abyss of nothingness; as a firework, which is but cunningly arranged combustibles, grows from a spark into a coruscation, and from a coruscation into figures, and words, and cascades of devouring fire, and then vanishes into the darkness of the night.

On the other hand, it must no less readily be allowed that, for anything that can be proved to the contrary, there may be a real something which is the cause of all our impressions; that sensations, though not likenesses, are symbols of that something; and that the part of that something, which we call the nervous system, is an apparatus for supplying us with a sort of algebra of fact, based on those symbols. A brain may be the machinery by which the material universe

becomes conscious of itself. But it is important to notice that, even if this conception of the universe and of the relation of consciousness to its other components should be true, we should, nevertheless, be still bound by the limits of thought, still unable to refute the arguments of pure idealism. The more completely the materialistic position is admitted, the easier is it to show that the idealistic position is unassailable, if the idealist confines himself within the limits of positive knowledge.

Hume deals with the questions whether all our ideas are derived from experience, or whether, on the contrary, more or fewer of them are innate, which so much exercised the mind of Locke, after a somewhat summary fashion, in a note to the second section of the *Inquiry* :—

“It is probable that no more was meant by those who denied innate ideas, than that all ideas were copies of our impressions ; though it must be confessed that the terms which they employed were not chosen with such caution, nor so exactly defined, as to prevent all mistakes about their doctrine. For what is meant by *innate*? If innate be equivalent to natural, then all the perceptions and ideas of the mind must be allowed to be innate or natural, in whatever sense we take the latter word, whether in opposition to what is uncommon, artificial, or miraculous. If by innate be meant contemporary with our birth, the dispute seems to be frivolous ; nor is it worth while to inquire at what time thinking begins, whether before, at, or after our birth. Again, the word *idea* seems to be commonly taken in a very loose sense by Locke and others, as standing for any of our perceptions, our sensations and passions, as well as thoughts. Now in this sense I should desire to know what can be meant by asserting that self-love, or resentment of injuries, or the passion between the sexes is not innate ?

“But admitting these terms, *impressions* and *ideas*, in the

sense above explained, and understanding by *innate* what is original or copied from no precedent perception, then we may assert that all our impressions are innate, and our ideas not innate."

It would seem that Hume did not think it worth while to acquire a comprehension of the real points at issue in the controversy which he thus carelessly dismisses.

Yet Descartes has defined what he means by innate ideas with so much precision, that misconception ought to have been impossible. He says that, when he speaks of an idea being "innate," he means that it exists potentially in the mind, before it is actually called into existence by whatever is its appropriate exciting cause.

"I have never either thought or said," he writes, "that the mind has any need of innate ideas [*idées naturelles*] which are anything distinct from its faculty of thinking. But it is true that observing that there are certain thoughts which arise neither from external objects nor from the determination of my will, but only from my faculty of thinking; in order to mark the difference between the ideas or the notions which are the forms of these thoughts, and to distinguish them from the others, which may be called extraneous or voluntary, I have called them innate. But I have used this term in the same sense as when we say that generosity is innate in certain families; or that certain maladies, such as gout or gravel, are innate in others; not that children born in these families are troubled with such diseases in their mother's womb; but because they are born with the disposition or the faculty of contracting them."¹

¹ Remarques de René Descartes sur un certain placard imprimé aux Pays Bas vers la fin de l'année, 1647.—Descartes, *Œuvres*. Ed. Cousin, x. p. 71.

His troublesome disciple, Regius, having asserted that all our ideas come from observation or tradition, Descartes remarks :—

“So thoroughly erroneous is this assertion, that whoever has a proper comprehension of the action of our senses, and understands precisely the nature of that which is transmitted by them to our thinking faculty, will rather affirm that no ideas of things, such as are formed in thought, are brought to us by the senses, so that there is nothing in our ideas which is other than innate in the mind (*naturel à l'esprit*), or in the faculty of thinking, if only certain circumstances are excepted, which belong only to experience. For example, it is experience alone which causes us to judge that such and such ideas, now present in our minds, are related to certain things which are external to us ; not in truth, that they have been sent into our mind by these things, such as they are, by the organs of the senses ; but because these organs have transmitted something which has occasioned the mind, in virtue of its innate power, to form them at this time rather than at another. . . .

“Nothing passes from external objects to the soul except certain motions of matter (*mouvements corporels*), but neither these motions, nor the figures which they produce, are conceived by us as they exist in the sensory organs, as I have fully explained in my “*Dioptrics*”; whence it follows that even the ideas of motion and of figures are innate (*naturellement en nous*). And, *à fortiori*, the ideas of pain, of colours, of sounds, and of all similar things must be innate, in order that the mind may represent them to itself, on the occasion of certain motions of matter with which they have no resemblance.”

Whoever denies what is, in fact, an inconceivable proposition, that sensations pass, as such, from the external world into the mind, must admit the conclusion here laid down by Descartes, that, strictly speaking, sensations,

and *à fortiori*, all the other contents of the mind, are innate. Or, to state the matter in accordance with the views previously expounded, that they are products of the inherent properties of the thinking organ, in which they lie potentially, before they are called into existence by their appropriate causes.

But if all the contents of the mind are innate, what is meant by experience?

It is the conversion, by unknown causes, of these innate potentialities into actual existences. The organ of thought, prior to experience, may be compared to an untouched piano, in which it may be properly said that music is innate, inasmuch as its mechanism contains, potentially, so many octaves of musical notes. The unknown cause of sensation which Descartes calls the "*je ne sais quoi dans les objets*" or "*choses telles qu'elles sont*," and Kant the "*Noumenon*" or "*Ding an sich*," is represented by the musician; who, by touching the keys, converts the potentiality of the mechanism into actual sounds. A note so produced is the equivalent of a single experience.

All the melodies and harmonies that proceed from the piano depend upon the action of the musician upon the keys. There is no internal mechanism which, when certain keys are struck, gives rise to an accompaniment of which the musician is only indirectly the cause. According to Descartes, however—and this is what is generally fixed upon as the essence of his doctrine of innate ideas—the mind possesses such an internal mechanism, by which certain classes of thoughts are generated, on the occasion of certain experiences. Such thoughts are innate, just as sensations are innate; they are not copies of sensations, any more than sensations

are copies of motions; they are invariably generated in the mind, when certain experiences arise in it, just as sensations are invariably generated when certain bodily motions take place; they are universal, inasmuch as they arise under the same conditions in all men; they are necessary, because their genesis under these conditions is invariable. These innate thoughts are what Descartes terms "vérités" or truths: that is beliefs—and his notions respecting them are plainly set forth in a passage of the *Principes*.

"Thus far I have discussed that which we know as things: it remains that I should speak of that which we know as truths. For example, when we think that it is impossible to make anything out of nothing, we do not imagine that this proposition is a thing which exists, or a property of something, but we take it for a certain eternal truth, which has its seat in the mind (*pensée*), and is called a common notion or an axiom. Similarly, when we affirm that it is impossible that one and the same thing should exist and not exist at the same time; that that which has been created should not have been created; that he who thinks must exist while he thinks; and a number of other like propositions; these are only truths, and not things which exist outside our thoughts. And there is such a number of these that it would be wearisome to enumerate them: nor is it necessary to do so, because we cannot fail to know them when the occasion of thinking about them presents itself, and we are not blinded by any prejudices."

It would appear that Locke was not more familiar with Descartes' writings than Hume seems to have been; for, viewed in relation to the passages just cited, the arguments adduced in his famous polemic against innate ideas are totally irrelevant.

It has been shown that Hume practically, if not in

so many words, admits the justice of Descartes' assertion that, strictly speaking, sensations are innate; that is to say, that they are the product of the reaction of the organ of the mind on the stimulus of an "unknown cause," which is Descartes' "je ne sais quoi." Therefore, the difference between Descartes' opinion and that of Hume resolves itself into this: Given sensation-experiences, can all the contents of consciousness be derived from the collocation and metamorphosis of these experiences? Or, are new elements of consciousness, products of an innate potentiality distinct from sensibility, added to these? Hume affirms the former position, Descartes the latter. If the analysis of the phenomena of consciousness given in the preceding pages is correct, Hume is in error; while the father of modern philosophy had a truer insight, though he overstated the case. For want of sufficiently searching psychological investigations, Descartes was led to suppose that innumerable ideas, the evolution of which in the course of experience can be demonstrated, were direct or innate products of the thinking faculty.

As has been already pointed out, it is the great merit of Kant that he started afresh on the track indicated by Descartes, and steadily upheld the doctrine of the existence of elements of consciousness, which are neither sense-experiences nor any modifications of them. We may demur to the expression that space and time are forms of sensory intuition; but it imperfectly represents the great fact that co-existence and succession are mental phenomena not given in the mere sense experience.¹

¹ "Wir können uns keinen Gegenstand denken, ohne durch Kategorien; wir können keinen gedachten Gegenstand erkennen, ohne durch Anschauungen, die jenen Begriffen entsprechen. Nun sind alle

unsere Anschauungen sinnlich, und diese Erkenntniss, so fern der Gegenstand derselben gegeben ist, ist empirisch. Empirische Erkenntniss aber ist Erfahrung. Folglich ist uns keine Erkenntniss *a priori* möglich, als lediglich von Gegenständen möglicher Erfahrung."

"Aber diese Erkenntniss, die bloss auf Gegenstände der Erfahrung eingeschränkt ist, ist darum nicht alle von der Erfahrung entlehnt, sondern was sowohl die reinen Anschauungen, als die reinen Verstandesbegriffe betrifft, so sind sie Elemente der Erkenntniss die in uns *a priori* angetroffen werden."—*Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Elementarlehre*, p. 135.

Without a glossary explanatory of Kant's terminology, this passage would be hardly intelligible in a translation; but it may be paraphrased thus: All knowledge is founded upon experiences of sensation, but it is not all derived from those experiences; inasmuch as the impressions of relation ("reine Anschauungen"; "reine Verstandesbegriffe") have a potential or *a priori* existence in us, and by their addition to sense-experiences, constitute knowledge.

CHAPTER IV.

THE CLASSIFICATION AND THE NOMENCLATURE OF MENTAL OPERATIONS.

IF, as has been set forth in the preceding chapter, all mental states are effects of physical causes, it follows that what are called mental faculties and operations are, properly speaking, cerebral functions, allotted to definite, though not yet precisely assignable, parts of the brain.

These functions appear to be reducible to three groups, namely : Sensation, Correlation, and Ideation.

The organs of the functions of sensation and correlation are those portions of the cerebral substance, the molecular changes of which give rise to impressions of sensation and impressions of relation.

The changes in the nervous matter which bring about the effects which we call its functions, follow upon some kind of stimulus, and rapidly reaching their maximum, as rapidly die away. The effect of the irritation of a nerve-fibre on the cerebral substance with which it is connected may be compared to the pulling of a long bell-wire. The impulse takes a little time to reach the bell; the bell rings and then becomes quiescent, until

another pull is given. So, in the brain, every sensation is the ring of a cerebral particle, the effect of a momentary impulse sent along a nerve-fibre.

If there were a complete likeness between the two terms of this very rough and ready comparison, it is obvious that there could be no such thing as memory. A bell records no audible sign of having been rung five minutes ago, and the activity of a sensigenous cerebral particle might similarly leave no trace. Under these circumstances, again, it would seem that the only impressions of relation which could arise would be those of co-existence and of similarity. For succession implies memory of an antecedent state.¹

But the special peculiarity of the cerebral apparatus is, that any given function which has once been performed is very easily set a-going again, by causes more or less different from those to which it owed its origin. Of the mechanism of this generation of images of impressions or ideas (in Hume's sense), which may be termed *Ideation*, we know nothing at present, though the fact and its results are familiar enough.

During our waking, and many of our sleeping, hours, in fact, the function of ideation is in continual, if not continuous, activity. Trains of thought, as we call them, succeed one another without intermission, even when the starting of new trains by fresh sense-impressions is as far as possible prevented. The rapidity and the intensity of this ideational process are obviously dependent upon physiological conditions. The widest

¹ It is not worth while, for the present purpose, to consider whether, as all nervous action occupies a sensible time, the duration of one impression might not overlap that of the impression which follows it, in the case supposed.

differences in these respects are constitutional in men of different temperaments; and are observable in oneself, under varying conditions of hunger and repletion, fatigue and freshness, calmness and emotional excitement. The influence of diet on dreams; of stimulants upon the fulness and the velocity of the stream of thought; the delirious phantasms generated by disease, by hashish, or by alcohol; will occur to every one as examples of the marvellous sensitiveness of the apparatus of ideation to purely physical influences.

The succession of mental states in ideation is not fortuitous, but follows the law of association, which may be stated thus: that every idea tends to be followed by some other idea which is associated with the first, or its impression, by a relation of succession, of contiguity, or of likeness.

Thus the idea of the word horse just now presented itself to my mind, and was followed in quick succession by the ideas of four legs, hoofs, teeth, rider, saddle, racing, cheating; all of which ideas are connected in my experience with the impression, or the idea, of a horse and with one another, by the relations of contiguity and succession. No great attention to what passes in the mind is needful to prove that our trains of thought are neither to be arrested, nor even permanently controlled, by our desires or emotions. Nevertheless they are largely influenced by them. In the presence of a strong desire, or emotion, the stream of thought no longer flows on in a straight course, but seems, as it were, to eddy round the idea of that which is the object of the emotion. Every one who has "eaten his bread in sorrow" knows how strangely the current of ideas whirls about the conception of the object of regret or

remorse as a centre ; every now and then, indeed, breaking away into the new tracks suggested by passing associations, but still returning to the central thought. Few can have been so happy as to have escaped the social bore, whose pet notion is certain to crop up whatever topic is started ; while the fixed idea of the monomaniac is but the extreme form of the same phenomenon.

And as, on the one hand, it is so hard to drive away the thought we would fain be rid of ; so, upon the other, the pleasant imaginations which we would so gladly retain are, sooner or later, jostled away by the crowd of claimants for birth into the world of consciousness ; which hover as a sort of psychical possibilities, or inverse ghosts, the bodily presentments of spiritual phenomena to be, in the limbo of the brain. In that form of desire which is called "attention," the train of thought, held fast, for a time, in the desired direction, seems ever striving to get on to another line—and the junctions and sidings are so multitudinous !

The constituents of trains of ideas may be grouped in various ways.

Hume says :—

"We find, by experience, that when any impression has been present in the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea, and this it may do in two different ways : either when, on its new appearance, it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, and is somewhat intermediate between an impression and an idea ; or when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The faculty by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner, is called the *memory*, and the other the *imagination*."—(I. pp. 23, 24.)

And he considers that the only difference between ideas of imagination and those of memory, except the

superior vivacity of the latter, lies in the fact that those of memory preserve the original order of the impressions from which they are derived, while the imagination "is free to transpose and change its ideas."

The latter statement of the difference between memory and imagination is less open to cavil than the former, though by no means unassailable.

The special characteristic of a memory surely is not its vividness; but that it is a complex idea, in which the idea of that which is remembered is related by co-existence with other ideas, and by antecedence with present impressions.

If I say I remember A. B., the chance acquaintance of ten years ago, it is not because my idea of A. B. is very vivid—on the contrary, it is extremely faint—but because that idea is associated with ideas of impressions co-existent with those which I call A. B.; and that all these are at the end of the long series of ideas, which represent that much past time. In truth I have a much more vivid idea of Mr. Pickwick, or of Colonel Newcome, than I have of A. B.; but, associated with the ideas of these persons, I have no idea of their having ever been derived from the world of impressions; and so they are relegated to the world of imagination. On the other hand, the characteristic of an imagination may properly be said to lie not in its intensity, but in the fact that, as Hume puts it, "the arrangement," or the relations, of the ideas are different from those in which the impressions, whence these ideas are derived, occurred; or in other words, that the thing imagined has not happened. In popular usage, however, imagination is frequently employed for simple memory—"In imagination I was back in the old times."

It is a curious omission on Hume's part that, while thus dwelling on two classes of ideas, *Memories* and *Imaginations*, he has not, at the same time, taken notice of a third group, of no small importance, which are as different from imaginations as memories are; though, like the latter, they are often confounded with pure imaginations in general speech. These are the ideas of expectation, or as they may be called for the sake of brevity, *Expectations*; which differ from simple imaginations in being associated with the idea of the existence of corresponding impressions, in the future, just as memories contain the idea of the existence of the corresponding impressions in the past.

The ideas belonging to two of the three groups enumerated: namely, memories and expectations, present some features, of particular interest. And first, with respect to memories.

In Hume's words, all simple ideas are copies of simple impressions. The idea of a single sensation is a faint, but accurate, image of that sensation; the idea of a relation is a reproduction of the feeling of co-existence, of succession, or of similarity. But, when complex impressions or complex ideas are reproduced as memories, it is probable that the copies never give all the details of the originals with perfect accuracy, and it is certain that they rarely do so. No one possesses a memory so good, that if he has only once observed a natural object, a second inspection does not show him something that he has forgotten. Almost all, if not all, our memories are therefore sketches, rather than portraits, of the originals—the salient features are obvious, while the subordinate characters are obscure or unrepresented.

Now, when several complex impressions which are

more or less different from one another—let us say that out of ten impressions in each, six are the same in all, and four are different from all the rest—are successively presented to the mind, it is easy to see what must be the nature of the result. The repetition of the six similar impressions will strengthen the six corresponding elements of the complex idea, which will therefore acquire greater vividness; while the four differing impressions of each will not only acquire no greater strength than they had at first, but, in accordance with the law of association, they will all tend to appear at once, and will thus neutralise one another.

This mental operation may be rendered comprehensible by considering what takes place in the formation of compound photographs—when the images of the faces of six sitters, for example, are each received on the same photographic plate, for a sixth of the time requisite to take one portrait. The final result is that all those points in which the six faces agree are brought out strongly, while all those in which they differ are left vague; and thus what may be termed a *generic* portrait of the six, in contradistinction to a *specific* portrait of any one, is produced.

Thus our ideas of single complex impressions are incomplete in one way, and those of numerous, more or less similar, complex impressions are incomplete in another way; that is to say, they are *generic*, not *specific*. And hence it follows, that our ideas of the impressions in question are not, in the strict sense of the word, copies of those impressions; while, at the same time, they may exist in the mind independently of language.

The generic ideas which are formed from several similar, but not identical, complex experiences are what

are commonly called *abstract* or *general* ideas; and Berkeley endeavoured to prove that all general ideas are nothing but particular ideas annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall, upon occasion, other individuals which are similar to them. Hume says that he regards this as "one of the greatest and the most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters," and endeavours to confirm it in such a manner that it shall be "put beyond all doubt and controversy."

I may venture to express a doubt whether he has succeeded in his object; but the subject is an abstruse one; and I must content myself with the remark, that though Berkeley's view appears to be largely applicable to such general ideas as are formed after language has been acquired, and to all the more abstract sort of conceptions, yet that general ideas of sensible objects may nevertheless be produced in the way indicated, and may exist independently of language. In dreams, one sees houses, trees and other objects, which are perfectly recognisable as such, but which remind one of the actual objects as seen "out of the corner of the eye," or of the pictures thrown by a badly-focussed magic lantern. A man addresses us who is like a figure seen by twilight; or we travel through countries where every feature of the scenery is vague; the outlines of the hills are ill-marked, and the rivers have no defined banks. They are, in short, generic ideas of many past impressions of men, hills, and rivers. An anatomist who occupies himself intently with the examination of several specimens of some new kind of animal, in course of time acquires so vivid a conception of its form and structure, that the

idea may take visible shape and become a sort of waking dream. But the figure which thus presents itself is generic, not specific. It is no copy of any one specimen, but, more or less, a mean of the series; and there seems no reason to doubt that the minds of children before they learn to speak, and of deaf mutes, are peopled with similarly generated generic ideas of sensible objects.

It has been seen that a memory is a complex idea made up of at least two constituents. In the first place there is the idea of an object; and secondly, there is the idea of the relation of antecedence between that object and some present objects.

To say that one has a recollection of a given event and to express the belief that it happened, are two ways of giving an account of one and the same mental fact. But the former mode of stating the fact of memory is preferable, at present, because it certainly does not presuppose the existence of language in the mind of the rememberer; while it may be said that the latter does. It is perfectly possible to have the idea of an event A, and of the events B, C, D, which came between it and the present state E, as mere mental pictures. It is hardly to be doubted that children have very distinct memories long before they can speak; and we believe that such is the case because they act upon their memories. But, if they act upon their memories, they to all intents and purposes believe their memories. In other words, though, being devoid of language, the child cannot frame a proposition expressive of belief; cannot say "sugar-plum was sweet;" yet the psychical operation of which that

proposition is merely the verbal expression, is perfectly effected. The experience of the co-existence of sweetness with sugar has produced a state of mind which bears the same relation to a verbal proposition, as the natural disposition to produce a given idea, assumed to exist by Descartes as an "innate idea" would bear to that idea put into words.

The fact that the beliefs of memory precede the use of language, and therefore are originally purely instinctive, and independent of any rational justification, should have been of great importance to Hume, from its bearing upon his theory of causation; and it is curious that he has not adverted to it, but always takes the trustworthiness of memories for granted. It may be worth while briefly to make good the omission.

That I was in pain, yesterday, is as certain to me as any matter of fact can be; by no effort of the imagination is it possible for me really to entertain the contrary belief. At the same time, I am bound to admit, that the whole foundation for my belief is the fact, that the idea of pain is indissolubly associated in my mind with the idea of that much past time. Any one who will be at the trouble may provide himself with hundreds of examples to the same effect.

This and similar observations are important under another aspect. They prove that the idea of even a single strong impression may be so powerfully associated with that of a certain time, as to originate a belief of which the contrary is inconceivable, and which may therefore be properly said to be necessary. A single weak, or moderately strong, impression may not be represented by any memory. But this defect of weak experiences may be compensated by their repeti-

tion ; and what Hume means by " custom " or " habit " is simply the repetition of experiences.

" Wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding, we always say that this propensity is the effect of *Custom*. By employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity. We only point out a principle of human nature which is universally acknowledged, and which is well known by its effects."—(IV. p. 52.)

It has been shown that an expectation is a complex idea which, like a memory, is made up of two constituents. The one is the idea of an object, the other is the idea of a relation of sequence between that object and some present object ; and the reasoning which applied to memories applies to expectations. To have an expectation¹ of a given event, and to believe that it will happen, are only two modes of stating the same fact. Again, just in the same way as we call a memory, put into words, a belief, so we give the same name to an expectation in like clothing. And the fact already cited, that a child before it can speak acts upon its memories, is good evidence that it forms expectations. The infant who knows the meaning neither of " sugar-plum " nor of " sweet," nevertheless is in full possession of that complex idea, which, when he has learned to employ language, will take the form of the verbal proposition, " A sugar-plum will be sweet."

¹ We give no name to faint memories ; but expectations of like character play so large a part in human affairs, that they, together with the associated emotions of pleasure and pain, are distinguished as " hopes " or " fears."

Thus, beliefs of expectation, or at any rate their potentialities, are, as much as those of memory, antecedent to speech, and are as incapable of justification by any logical process. In fact, expectations are but memories inverted. The association which is the foundation of expectation must exist as a memory before it can play its part. As Hume says,—

“. . . it is certain we here advance a very intelligible proposition at least, if not a true one, when we assert that after the constant conjunction of two objects, heat and flame, for instance, weight and solidity, we are determined by custom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other. This hypothesis seems even the only one which explains the difficulty why we draw from a thousand instances, an inference which we are not able to draw from one instance, that is in no respect different from them.” . . .

“Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past.” . . .

“All belief of matter-of-fact or real existence is derived merely from some object present to the memory or senses, and a customary conjunction between that and some other object; or in other words, having found, in many instances, that any two kinds of objects, flame and heat, snow and cold, have always been conjoined together, if flame or snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind is carried by custom to expect heat or cold, and to *believe* that such a quality does exist and will discover itself upon a nearer approach. This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits, or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent.”—(IV. pp. 52—56.)

The only comment that appears needful here is, that Hume has attached somewhat too exclusive a weight to that repetition of experiences to which alone the term "custom" can be properly applied. The proverb says that "a burnt child dreads the fire"; and any one who will make the experiment will find, that one burning is quite sufficient to establish an indissoluble belief that contact with fire and pain go together.

As a sort of inverted memory, expectation follows the same laws; hence, while a belief of expectation is, in most cases, as Hume truly says, established by custom, or the repetition of weak impressions, it may quite well be based upon a single strong experience. In the absence of language, a specific memory cannot be strengthened by repetition. It is obvious that that which has happened cannot happen again, with the same collateral associations of co-existence and succession. But, memories of the co-existence and succession of impressions are capable of being indefinitely strengthened by the recurrence of similar impressions, in the same order, even though the collateral associations are totally different; in fact, the ideas of these impressions become generic.

If I recollect that a piece of ice was cold yesterday, nothing can strengthen the recollection of that particular fact; on the contrary, it may grow weaker, in the absence of any record of it. But if I touch ice to-day and again find it cold, the association is repeated, and the memory of it becomes stronger. And, by this very simple process of repetition of experience, it has become utterly impossible for us to think of having handled ice without thinking of its coldness. But, that which is, under the one aspect, the strengthening of a memory, is,

under the other, the intensification of an expectation. Not only can we not think of having touched ice, without feeling cold, but we cannot think of touching ice, in the future, without expecting to feel cold. An expectation so strong that it cannot be changed, or abolished, may thus be generated out of repeated experiences. And it is important to note that such expectations may be formed quite unconsciously. In my dressing-room, a certain can is usually kept full of water, and I am in the habit of lifting it to pour out water for washing. Sometimes the servant has forgotten to fill it, and then I find that, when I take hold of the handle, the can goes up with a jerk. Long association has, in fact, led me to expect the can to have a considerable weight; and, quite unawares, my muscular effort is adjusted to the expectation.

The process of strengthening generic memories of succession, and, at the same time, intensifying expectations of succession, is what is commonly called *verification*. The impression B has frequently been observed to follow the impression A. The association thus produced is represented as the memory, $A \rightarrow B$. When the impression A appears again, the idea of B follows, associated with that of the immediate appearance of the impression B. If the impression B does appear, the expectation is said to be verified; while the memory $A \rightarrow B$ is strengthened, and gives rise in turn to a stronger expectation. And repeated verification may render that expectation so strong that its non-verification is inconceivable.

CHAPTER V.

THE MENTAL PHENOMENA OF ANIMALS.

IN the course of the preceding chapters, attention has been more than once called to the fact, that the elements of consciousness and the operations of the mental faculties, under discussion, exist independently of and antecedent to, the existence of language.

If any weight is to be attached to arguments from analogy, there is overwhelming evidence in favour of the belief that children, before they can speak, and deaf mutes, possess the feelings to which those who have acquired the faculty of speech apply the name of sensations; that they have the feelings of relation; that trains of ideas pass through their minds; that generic ideas are formed from specific ones; and, that among these, ideas of memory and expectation occupy a most important place, inasmuch as, in their quality of potential beliefs, they furnish the grounds of action. This conclusion, in truth, is one of those which, though they cannot be demonstrated, are never doubted; and, since it is highly probable and cannot be disproved, we are quite safe in accepting it, as, at any rate, a good working hypothesis.

But, if we accept it, we must extend it to a much

wider assemblage of living beings. Whatever cogency is attached to the arguments in favour of the occurrence of all the fundamental phenomena of mind in young children and deaf mutes, an equal force must be allowed to appertain to those which may be adduced to prove that the higher animals have minds. We must admit that Hume does not express himself too strongly when he says—

“no truth appears to me more evident, than that the beasts are endowed with thought and reason as well as men. The arguments are in this case so obvious, that they never escape the most stupid and ignorant.”—(I. p. 232.)

In fact, this is one of the few cases in which the conviction which forces itself upon the stupid and the ignorant, is fortified by the reasonings of the intelligent, and has its foundation deepened by every increase of knowledge. It is not merely that the observation of the actions of animals almost irresistibly suggests the attribution to them of mental states, such as those which accompany corresponding actions in men. The minute comparison which has been instituted by anatomists and physiologists between the organs which we know to constitute the apparatus of thought in man, and the corresponding organs in brutes, has demonstrated the existence of the closest similarity between the two, not only in structure, as far as the microscope will carry us, but in function, as far as functions are determinable by experiment. There is no question in the mind of any one acquainted with the facts that, so far as observation and experiment can take us, the structure and the functions of the nervous system are fundamentally the same in an ape, or in a dog, and in a man. And the sug-

gestion that we must stop at the exact point at which direct proof fails us; and refuse to believe that the similarity which extends so far stretches yet further, is no better than a quibble. Robinson Crusoe did not feel bound to conclude, from the single human footprint which he saw in the sand, that the maker of the impression had only one leg.

Structure for structure, down to the minutest microscopical details, the eye, the ear, the olfactory organs, the nerves, the spinal cord, the brain of an ape, or of a dog, correspond with the same organs in the human subject. Cut a nerve, and the evidence of paralysis, or of insensibility, is the same in the two cases; apply pressure to the brain, or administer a narcotic, and the signs of intelligence disappear in the one as in the other. Whatever reason we have for believing that the changes which take place in the normal cerebral substance of man give rise to states of consciousness, the same reason exists for the belief that the modes of motion of the cerebral substance of an ape, or of a dog, produce like effects.

A dog acts as if he had all the different kinds of impressions of sensation of which each of us is cognisant. Moreover, he governs his movements exactly as if he had the feelings of distance, form, succession, likeness, and unlikeness, with which we are familiar, or as if the impressions of relation were generated in his mind as they are in our own. Sleeping dogs frequently appear to dream. If they do, it must be admitted that ideation goes on in them while they are asleep; and, in that case, there is no reason to doubt that they are conscious of trains of ideas in their waking state. Further, that dogs, if they possess ideas at all, have

memories and expectations, and those potential beliefs of which these states are the foundation, can hardly be doubted by any one who is conversant with their ways. Finally, there would appear to be no valid argument against the supposition that dogs form generic ideas of sensible objects. One of the most curious peculiarities of the dog mind is its inherent snobbishness, shown by the regard paid to external respectability. The dog who barks furiously at a beggar will let a well-dressed man pass him without opposition. Has he not then a "generic idea" of rags and dirt associated with the idea of aversion, and that of sleek broadcloth associated with the idea of liking?

In short, it seems hard to assign any good reason for denying to the higher animals any mental state, or process, in which the employment of the vocal or visual symbols of which language is composed is not involved; and comparative psychology confirms the position in relation to the rest of the animal world assigned to man by comparative anatomy. As comparative anatomy is easily able to show that, physically, man is but the last term of a long series of forms, which lead, by slow gradations, from the highest mammal to the almost formless speck of living protoplasm, which lies on the shadowy boundary between animal and vegetable life; so, comparative psychology, though but a young science, and far short of her elder sister's growth, points to the same conclusion.

In the absence of a distinct nervous system, we have no right to look for its product, consciousness; and, even in those forms of animal life in which the nervous apparatus has reached no higher degree of development, than that exhibited by the system of the spinal cord

and the foundation of the brain in ourselves, the argument from analogy leaves the assumption of the existence of any form of consciousness unsupported. With the super-addition of a nervous apparatus corresponding with the cerebrum in ourselves, it is allowable to suppose the appearance of the simplest states of consciousness, or the sensations; and it is conceivable that these may at first exist, without any power of reproducing them, as memories; and, consequently, without ideation. Still higher, an apparatus of correlation may be superadded, until, as all these organs become more developed, the condition of the highest speechless animals is attained.

It is a remarkable example of Hume's sagacity that he perceived the importance of a branch of science which, even now, can hardly be said to exist; and that, in a remarkable passage, he sketches in bold outlines the chief features of comparative psychology.

“. . . any theory, by which we explain the operations of the understanding, or the origin and connexion of the passions in man, will acquire additional authority if we find that the same theory is requisite to explain the same phenomena in all other animals. We shall make trial of this with regard to the hypothesis by which we have, in the foregoing discourse, endeavoured to account for all experimental reasonings; and it is hoped that this new point of view will serve to confirm all our former observations.

“*First*, it seems evident that animals, as well as men, learn many things from experience, and infer that the same events will always follow from the same causes. By this principle they become acquainted with the more obvious properties of external objects, and gradually, from their birth, treasure up a knowledge of the nature of fire, water, earth, stones, heights, depths, &c., and of the effects which result from their

operation. The ignorance and inexperience here plainly distinguishable from the cunning and sagacity of the old, who have learned, by long observation, to avoid what hurt them, and pursue what gave ease or pleasure. A young hare that has been accustomed to the field, becomes acquainted with the proper height which he can leap, and will never attempt to leap higher. An old greyhound will trust himself to the chase so as to meet the hare in her doubles; nor are the sagacity which he forms on this occasion founded on anything but his observation and experience.

“This is still more evident from the effects of discipline and education on animals, who, by the proper application of rewards and punishments, may be taught any kind of action, and to depart from their natural instincts.”

Is it not experience which renders a dog sensible of pain when you strike him, or lift up the stick to beat him? Is it not even experience which makes him answer to his name, and infer from such an arbitrary sound that it means him rather than any of his fellows, and intend to strike him?

It is true that the inference is not founded on some fact which the creature expects from the present object, the sound of the name, which it has always found in its observation to be attended with the same effect.

But it is not less true that this inference of the creature can be founded on any other fact which concludes the same effect.

For if there be any other fact which always be regularly attended with the same effect, it is surely lie too abstruse

to be guided
by any other

the generality of mankind in their ordinary actions and conclusions; neither are philosophers themselves, who, in all the active parts of life, are in the main the same as the vulgar, and are governed by the same maxims. Nature must have provided some other principle, of more ready and more general use and application; nor can an operation of such immense consequence in life as that of inferring effects from causes, be trusted to the uncertain process of reasoning and argumentation. Were this doubtful with regard to men, it seems to admit of no question with regard to the brute creation; and the conclusion being once firmly established in the one, we have a strong presumption, from all the rules of analogy, that it ought to be universally admitted, without any exception or reserve. It is custom alone which engages animals, from every object that strikes their senses, to infer its usual attendant, and carries their imagination from the appearance of the one to conceive the other, in that particular manner which we denominate *belief*. No other explication can be given of this operation in all the higher as well as lower classes of sensitive beings which fall under our notice and observation." —(IV. pp. 122—4.)

It will be observed that Hume appears to contrast the "inference of the animal" with the "process of argument or reasoning in man." But it would be a complete misapprehension of his intention, if we were to suppose, that he thereby means to imply that there is any real difference between the two processes. The "inference of the animal" is a potential belief of expectation; the process of argument, or reasoning, in man is based upon potential beliefs of expectation, which are formed in the man exactly in the same way as in the animal. But, in men endowed with speech, the mental state which constitutes the potential belief is represented by a verbal proposition, and thus becomes what all the world recognises as a belief. The fallacy

which Hume combats is, that the proposition, or verbal representative of a belief, has come to be regarded as a reality, instead of as the mere symbol which it really is; and that reasoning, or logic, which deals with nothing but propositions, is supposed to be necessary in order to validate the natural fact symbolised by those propositions. It is a fallacy similar to that of supposing that money is the foundation of wealth, whereas it is only the wholly unessential symbol of property.

In the passage which immediately follows that just quoted, Hume makes admissions which might be turned to serious account against some of his own doctrines.

“But though animals learn many parts of their knowledge from observation, there are also many parts of it which they derive from the original hand of Nature, which much exceed the share of capacity they possess on ordinary occasions, and in which they improve, little or nothing, by the longest practice and experience. These we denominate *INSTINCTS*, and are so apt to admire as something very extraordinary and inexplicable by all the disquisitions of human understanding. But our wonder will perhaps cease or diminish when we consider that the experimental reasoning itself, which we possess in common with beasts, and on which the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species of instinct or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to ourselves, and in its chief operations is not directed by any such relations or comparison of ideas as are the proper objects of our intellectual faculties.

“Though the instinct be different, yet still it is an instinct which teaches a man to avoid the fire, as much as that which teaches a bird, with such exactness, the art of incubation and the whole economy and order of its nursery.”—(IV. pp. 125, 126.)

The parallel here drawn between the “avoidance of a fire” by a man and the incubatory instinct of a bird

is inexact. The man avoids fire when he has had experience of the pain produced by burning; but the bird incubates the first time it lays eggs, and therefore before it has had any experience of incubation. For the comparison to be admissible, it would be necessary that a man should avoid fire the first time he saw it, which is notoriously not the case.

The term "instinct" is very vague and ill-defined. It is commonly employed to denote any action, or even feeling, which is not dictated by conscious reasoning, whether it is, or is not, the result of previous experience. It is "instinct" which leads a chicken just hatched to pick up a grain of corn; parental love is said to be "instinctive"; the drowning man who catches at a straw does it "instinctively"; and the hand that accidentally touches something hot is drawn back by "instinct." Thus "instinct" is made to cover everything from a simple reflex movement, in which the organ of consciousness need not be at all implicated, up to a complex combination of acts directed towards a definite end and accompanied by intense consciousness.

But this loose employment of the term "instinct" really accords with the nature of the thing; for it is wholly impossible to draw any line of demarcation between reflex actions and instincts. If a frog, on the flank of which a little drop of acid has been placed, rubs it off with the foot of the same side; and, if that foot be held, performs the same operation, at the cost of much effort, with the other foot, it certainly displays a curious instinct. But it is no less true that the whole operation is a reflex operation of the spinal cord, which can be performed quite as well when the brain is destroyed; and between which and simple reflex actions

there is a complete series of gradations. In like manner, when an infant takes the breast, it is impossible to say whether the action should be rather termed instinctive or reflex.

What are usually called the instincts of animals are, however, acts of such a nature that, if they were performed by men, they would involve the generation of a series of ideas and of inferences from them; and it is a curious, and apparently an insoluble, problem whether they are, or are not, accompanied by cerebral changes of the same nature as those which give rise to ideas and inferences in ourselves. When a chicken picks up a grain, for example, are there, firstly, certain sensations, accompanied by the feeling of relation between the grain and its own body; secondly, a desire of the grain; thirdly, a volition to seize it? Or, are only the sensational terms of the series actually represented in consciousness?

The latter seems the more probable opinion, though it must be admitted that the other alternative is possible. But, in this case, the series of mental states which occurs is such as would be represented in language by a series of propositions, and would afford proof positive of the existence of innate ideas, in the Cartesian sense. Indeed, a metaphysical fowl, brooding over the mental operations of his fully-fledged consciousness, might appeal to the fact as proof that, in the very first action of his life, he assumed the existence of the Ego and the non-Ego, and of a relation between the two.

In all seriousness, if the existence of instincts be granted, the possibility of the existence of innate ideas, in the most extended sense ever imagined by Descartes, must also be admitted. In fact, Descartes, as we have

seen, illustrates what he means by an innate idea, by the analogy of hereditary diseases or hereditary mental peculiarities, such as generosity. On the other hand, hereditary mental tendencies may justly be termed instincts; and still more appropriately might those special proclivities, which constitute what we call genius, come into the same category.

The child who is impelled to draw as soon as it can hold a pencil; the Mozart who breaks out into music as early; the boy Bidder who worked out the most complicated sums without learning arithmetic; the boy Pascal who evolved Euclid out of his own consciousness: all these may be said to have been impelled by instinct, as much as are the beaver and the bee. And the man of genius, is distinct in kind from the man of cleverness, by reason of the working within him of strong innate tendencies—which cultivation may improve, but which it can no more create, than horticulture can make thistles bear figs. The analogy between a musical instrument and the mind holds good here also. Art and industry may get much music, of a sort, out of a penny whistle; but, when all is done, it has no chance against an organ. The innate musical potentialities of the two are infinitely different.

CHAPTER VI.

LANGUAGE—PROPOSITIONS CONCERNING NECESSARY TRUTHS.

THOUGH we may accept Hume's conclusion that speechless animals think, believe, and reason; yet, it must be borne in mind, that there is an important difference between the signification of the terms when applied to them and when applied to those animals which possess language. The thoughts of the former are trains of mere feelings; those of the latter are, in addition, trains of the ideas of the signs which represent feelings, and which are called "words."

A word, in fact, is a spoken or written sign, the idea of which is, by repetition, so closely associated with the idea of the simple or complex feeling which it represents, that the association becomes indissoluble. No Englishman, for example, can think of the word "dog" without immediately having the idea of the group of impressions to which that name is given; and conversely, the group of impressions immediately calls up the idea of the word "dog."

The association of words with impressions and ideas is the process of naming; and language approaches perfection, in proportion as the shades of difference between various ideas and impressions are represented by differences in their names.

The names of simple impressions and ideas, or of

groups of co-existent or successive complex impressions and ideas, considered *per se*, are substantives; as redness, dog, silver, mouth; while the names of impressions or ideas considered as parts or attributes of a complex whole, are adjectives. Thus redness, considered as part of the complex idea of a rose, becomes the adjective red; flesh-eater, as part of the idea of a dog, is represented by carnivorous; whiteness, as part of the idea of silver, is white; and so on.

The linguistic machinery for the expression of belief is called *predication*; and, as all beliefs express ideas of relation, we may say that the sign of predication is the verbal symbol of a feeling of relation. The words which serve to indicate predication are verbs. If I say "silver" and then "white," I merely utter two names; but if I interpose between them the verb "is," I express a belief in the co-existence of the feeling of whiteness with the other feelings which constitute the totality of the complex idea of silver; in other words, I predicate "whiteness" of silver.

In such a case as this, the verb expresses predication and nothing else, and is called a copula. But, in the great majority of verbs, the word is the sign of a complex idea, and the predication is expressed only by its form. Thus in "silver shines," the verb "to shine" is the sign for the feeling of brightness, and the mark of predication lies in the form "shine-s."

Another result is brought about by the forms of verbs. By slight modifications they are made to indicate that a belief, or predication, is a memory, or is an expectation. Thus "silver *shone*" expresses a memory; "silver *will shine*" an expectation.

The form of words which expresses a predication is

a proposition. Hence, every predication is the verbal equivalent of a belief; and, as every belief is either an immediate consciousness, a memory, or an expectation, and as every expectation is traceable to a memory, it follows that, in the long run, all propositions express either immediate states of consciousness, or memories. The proposition which predicates A of X must mean either, that the fact is testified by my present consciousness, as when I say that two colours, visible at this moment, resemble one another; or that A is indissolubly associated with X in memory; or that A is indissolubly associated with X in expectation. But it has already been shown that expectation is only an expression of memory.

Hume does not discuss the nature of language, but so much of what remains to be said, concerning his philosophical tenets, turns upon the value and the origin of verbal propositions, that this summary sketch of the relations of language to the thinking process will probably not be deemed superfluous.

So large an extent of the field of thought is traversed by Hume, in his discussion of the verbal propositions in which mankind enshrine their beliefs, that it would be impossible to follow him throughout all the windings of his long journey, within the limits of this essay. I purpose, therefore, to limit myself to those propositions which concern—1. Necessary Truths; 2. The order of Nature; 3. The Soul; 4. Theism; 5. The Passions and Volition; 6. The Principle of Morals.

Hume's views respecting necessary truths, and more particularly concerning causation, have, more than any other part of his teaching, contributed to give him a prominent place in the history of philosophy.

“All the objects of human reason and inquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, *relations of ideas* and *matters of fact*. Of the first kind are the sciences of geometry, algebra, and arithmetic, and, in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. *That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the square of the two sides*, is a proposition which expresses a relation between these two figures. *That three times five is equal to the half of thirty*, expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought without dependence on whatever is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or a triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence.

“Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner, nor is an evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible, because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. *That the sun will not rise to-morrow*, is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, *that it will rise*. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind.”—(IV. pp. 32, 33.)

The distinction here drawn between the truths of geometry and other kinds of truth is far less sharply indicated in the *Treatise*, but as Hume expressly disowns any opinions on these matters but such as are expressed in the *Inquiry*, we may confine ourselves to the latter; and it is needful to look narrowly into the propositions here laid down, as much stress has been laid upon Hume's admission that the truths of mathematics are intuitively and demonstratively certain; in

other words, that they are necessary and, in that respect, differ from all other kinds of belief.

What is meant by the assertion that "propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe" ?

Suppose that there were no such things as impressions of sight and touch anywhere in the universe, what idea could we have even of a straight line, much less of a triangle and of the relations between its sides? The fundamental proposition of all Hume's philosophy is that ideas are copied from impressions; and, therefore, if there were no impressions of straight lines and triangles there could be no ideas of straight lines and triangles. But what we mean by the universe is the sum of our actual and possible impressions.

So, again, whether our conception of number is derived from relations of impressions in space or in time, the impressions must exist in nature, that is, in experience, before their relations can be perceived. Form and number are mere names for certain relations between matters of fact; unless a man had seen or felt the difference between a straight line and a crooked one, straight and crooked would have no more meaning to him, than red and blue to the blind.

The axiom, that things which are equal to the same are equal to one another, is only a particular case of the predication of similarity; if there were no impressions, it is obvious that there could be no predicates. But what is an existence in the universe but an impression?

If what are called necessary truths are rigidly analysed, they will be found to be of two kinds. Either they depend on the convention which underlies the

possibility of intelligible speech, that terms shall always have the same meaning; or they are propositions the negation of which implies the dissolution of some association in memory or expectation, which is in fact indissoluble; or the denial of some fact of immediate consciousness.

The "necessary truth" $A = A$ means that the perception which is called A shall always be called A . The "necessary truth" that "two straight lines cannot inclose a space," means that we have no memory, and can form no expectation of their so doing. The denial of the "necessary truth" that the thought now in my mind exists, involves the denial of consciousness.

To the assertion that the evidence of matter of fact, is not so strong as that of relations of ideas, it may be justly replied, that a great number of matters of fact are nothing but relations of ideas. If I say that red is unlike blue, I make an assertion concerning a relation of ideas; but it is also matter of fact, and the contrary proposition is inconceivable. If I remember¹ something that happened five minutes ago, that is matter of fact; and, at the same time, it expresses a relation between the event remembered and the present time. It is wholly inconceivable to me that the event did not happen, so that my assurance respecting it is as strong as that which I have respecting any other necessary truth. In fact, the man is either very wise or very virtuous, or very lucky, perhaps all three, who has gone through life without accumulating a store of such necessary beliefs which he would give a good deal to be able to disbelieve.

¹ Hume, however, expressly includes the "records of our memory" among his matters of fact.—(IV. p. 33.)

It would be beside the mark to discuss the matter further on the present occasion. It is sufficient to point out that, whatever may be the differences, between mathematical and other truths, they do not justify Hume's statement. And it is, at any rate, impossible to prove, that the cogency of mathematical first principles is due to anything more than these circumstances; that the experiences with which they are concerned are among the first which arise in the mind; that they are so incessantly repeated as to justify us, according to the ordinary laws of ideation, in expecting that the associations which they form will be of extreme tenacity; while the fact, that the expectations based upon them are always verified, finishes the process of welding them together.

Thus, if the axioms of mathematics are innate, nature would seem to have taken unnecessary trouble; since the ordinary process of association appears to be amply sufficient to confer upon them all the universality and necessity which they actually possess.

Whatever needless admissions Hume may have made respecting other necessary truths he is quite clear about the axiom of causation, "That whatever event has a beginning must have a cause;" whether and in what sense it is a necessary truth; and, that question being decided, whence it is derived.

With respect to the first question, Hume denies that it is a necessary truth, in the sense that we are unable to conceive the contrary. The evidence by which he supports this conclusion in the *Inquiry*, however, is not strictly relevant to the issue.

"No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the cause which produced it, or the effects

which will arise from it ; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact."—(IV. p. 35.)

Abundant illustrations are given of this assertion, which indeed cannot be seriously doubted ; but it does not follow that, because we are totally unable to say what cause preceded, or what effect will succeed, any event, we do not necessarily suppose that the event had a cause and will be succeeded by an effect. The scientific investigator who notes a new phenomenon may be utterly ignorant of its cause, but he will, without hesitation, seek for that cause. If you ask him why he does so, he will probably say that it must have had a cause ; and thereby imply that his belief in causation is a necessary belief.

In the *Treatise* Hume indeed takes the bull by the horns :

" . . . as all distinct ideas are separable from each other, and as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, 'twill be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or productive principle."—(I. p. 111.)

If Hume had been content to state what he believed to be matter of fact, and had abstained from giving superfluous reasons for that which is susceptible of being proved or disproved only by personal experience, his position would have been stronger. For it seems clear that, on the ground of observation, he is quite right. Any man who lets his fancy run riot in a waking dream, may experience the existence at one moment, and the non-existence at the next, of phenomena which suggest no connexion of cause and effect. Not only so, but it is notorious that, to the unthinking mass of man-

kind, nine-tenths of the facts of life do not suggest the relation of cause and effect; and they practically deny the existence of any such relation by attributing them to chance. Few gamblers but would stare if they were told that the falling of a die on a particular face is as much the effect of a definite cause as the fact of its falling; it is a proverb that "the wind bloweth where it listeth;" and even thoughtful men usually receive with surprise the suggestion, that the form of the crest of every wave that breaks, wind-driven, on the sea-shore, and the direction of every particle of foam that flies before the gale, are the exact effects of definite causes; and, as such, must be capable of being determined, deductively, from the laws of motion and the properties of air and water. So again, there are large numbers of highly intelligent persons who rather pride themselves on their fixed belief that our volitions have no cause; or that the will causes itself, which is either the same thing, or a contradiction in terms.

Hume's argument in support of what appears to be a true proposition, however, is of the circular sort, for the major premiss, that all distinct ideas are separable in thought, assumes the question at issue.

But the question whether the idea of causation is necessary, or not, is really of very little importance. For, to say that an idea is necessary is simply to affirm that we cannot conceive the contrary; and the fact that we cannot conceive the contrary of any belief may be a presumption, but is certainly no proof, of its truth.

In the well-known experiment of touching a single round object, such as a marble, with crossed fingers, it is utterly impossible to conceive that we have not two round objects under them; and, though light is un-

doubtedly a mere sensation arising in the brain, it is utterly impossible to conceive that it is not outside the retina. In the same way, he who touches anything with a rod, not only is irresistibly led to believe that the sensation of contact is at the end of the rod, but is utterly incapable of conceiving that this sensation is really in his head. Yet that which is inconceivable is manifestly true in all these cases. The beliefs and the unbeliefs are alike necessary, and alike erroneous.

It is commonly urged that the axiom of causation cannot be derived from experience, because experience only proves that many things have causes, whereas the axiom declares that all things have causes. The syllogism, "many things which come into existence have causes, A has come into existence: therefore A had a cause," is obviously fallacious, if A is not previously shown to be one of the "many things." And this objection is perfectly sound so far as it goes. The axiom of causation cannot possibly be deduced from any general proposition which simply embodies experience. But it does not follow that the belief, or expectation, expressed by the axiom, is not a product of experience, generated antecedently to, and altogether independently of, the logically unjustifiable language in which we express it.

In fact, the axiom of causation resembles all other beliefs of expectation in being the verbal symbol of a purely automatic act of the mind, which is altogether extra-logical, and would be illogical, if it were not constantly verified by experience. Experience, as we have seen, stores up memories; memories generate expectations or beliefs—why they do so may be explained hereafter by proper investigation of cerebral physiology. But, to seek for the reason of the facts in the verbal

symbols by which they are expressed, and to be astonished that it is not to be found there, is surely singular; and what Hume did was to turn attention from the verbal proposition to the psychical fact of which it is the symbol.

“When any natural object or event is presented, it is impossible for us, by any sagacity or penetration, to discover, or even conjecture, without experience, what event will result from it, or to carry our foresight beyond that object, which is immediately present to the memory and senses. Even after one instance or experiment, where we have observed a particular event to follow upon another, we are not entitled to form a general rule, or foretell what will happen in like cases; it being justly esteemed an unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole course of nature from one single experiment, however accurate or certain. But when one particular species of events has always, in all instances, been conjoined with another, we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other, and of employing that reasoning which can alone assure us of any matter of fact or existence. We then call the one object *Cause*, the other *Effect*. We suppose that there is some connexion between them: some power in the one, by which it infallibly produces the other, and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity. . . . But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist. . . . The first time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse, as by the shock of two billiard balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was *connected*, but only that it was *conjoined*, with the other. After he has observed several instances of this nature, he then pronounces them to be *connected*. What alteration has happened to give rise to this new idea of *connexion*? Nothing but that he now

feels these events to be *connected* in his imagination, and can readily foresee the existence of the one from the appearance of the other. When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another we mean only that they have acquired a connexion in our thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other's existence; a conclusion which is somewhat extraordinary, but which seems founded on sufficient evidence."—(IV. pp. 87—89.)

In the fifteenth section of the third part of the *Treatise*, under the head of the *Rules by which to Judge of Causes and Effects*, Hume gives a sketch of the method of allocating effects to their causes, upon which, so far as I am aware, no improvement was made down to the time of the publication of Mill's *Logic*. Of Mill's four methods, that of *agreement* is indicated in the following passage :—

"... where several different objects produce the same effect, it must be by means of some quality which we discover to be common amongst them. For as like effects imply like causes, we must always ascribe the causation to the circumstance wherein we discover the resemblance."—(I. p. 229.)

Next, the foundation of the *method of difference* is stated :—

"The difference in the the effects of two resembling objects must proceed from that particular in which they differ. For, as like causes always produce like effects, when in any instance we find our expectation to be disappointed, we must conclude that this irregularity proceeds from some difference in the causes."—(I. p. 230.)

In the succeeding paragraph the *method of concomitant variations* is foreshadowed.

"When any object increases or diminishes with the increase or diminution of the cause, 'tis to be regarded as a compounded effect, derived from the union of the several different effects which arise from the several different parts of the cause. The absence or presence of one part of the cause is here supposed to be always attended with the absence or presence of a proportionable part of the effect. This constant conjunction sufficiently proves that the one part is the cause of the other. We must, however, beware not to draw such a conclusion from a few experiments."—(I. p. 230.)

Lastly, the following rule, though awkwardly stated, contains a suggestion of the *method of residues* :—

" . . . an object which exists for any time in its full perfection without any effect, is not the sole cause of that effect, but requires to be assisted by some other principle, which may forward its influence and operation. For as like effects necessarily follow from like causes, and in a contiguous time and place, their separation for a moment shows that these causes are not complete ones."—(I. p. 230.)

In addition to the bare notion of necessary connexion between the cause and its effect, we undoubtedly find in our minds the idea of something resident in the cause which, as we say, produces the effect, and we call this something Force, Power, or Energy. Hume explains Force and Power as the results of the association with inanimate causes of the feelings of endeavour or resistance which we experience, when our bodies give rise to, or resist, motion.

If I throw a ball, I have a sense of effort which ends when the ball leaves my hand ; and, if I catch a ball, I have a sense of resistance which comes to an end with the quiescence of the ball. In the former case, there is a strong suggestion of something having gone from

myself into the ball; in the latter, of something having been received from the ball. Let any one hold a piece of iron near a strong magnet, and the feeling that the magnet endeavours to pull the iron one way in the same manner as he endeavours to pull it in the opposite direction, is very strong.

As Hume says:—

“No animal can put external bodies in motion without the sentiment of a *nisus*, or endeavour; and every animal has a sentiment or feeling from the stroke or blow of an external object that is in motion. These sensations, which are merely animal, and from which we can, *a priori*, draw no inference, we are apt to transfer to inanimate objects, and to suppose that they have some such feelings whenever they transfer or receive motion.”—(IV. p. 91, *note*.)

It is obviously, however, an absurdity not less gross than that of supposing the sensation of warmth to exist in a fire, to imagine that the subjective sensation of effort or resistance in ourselves can be present in external objects, when they stand in the relation of causes to other objects.

To the argument, that we have a right to suppose the relation of cause and effect to contain something more than invariable succession, because, when we ourselves act as causes, or in volition, we are conscious of exerting power; Hume replies, that we know nothing of the feeling we call power except as effort or resistance; and that we have not the slightest means of knowing whether it has anything to do with the production of bodily motion or mental changes. And he points out, as Descartes and Spinoza had done before him, that when voluntary motion takes place, that which we will

is not the immediate consequence of the act of volition, but something which is separated from it by a long chain of causes and effects. If the will is the cause of the movement of a limb, it can be so only in the sense that the guard who gives the order to go on, is the cause of the transport of a train from one station to another.

“We learn from anatomy, that the immediate object of power in voluntary motion is not the member itself which is moved, but certain muscles and nerves and animal spirits, and perhaps something still more minute and unknown, through which the motion is successively propagated, ere it reach the member itself, whose motion is the immediate object of volition. Can there be a more certain proof that the power by which the whole operation is performed, so far from being directly and fully known by an inward sentiment or consciousness, is to the last degree mysterious and unintelligible? Here the mind wills a certain event: Immediately another event, unknown to ourselves, and totally different from the one intended, is produced: This event produces another equally unknown: Till at last, through a long succession, the desired event is produced.”—(IV. p. 78.)

A still stronger argument against ascribing an objective existence to force or power, on the strength of our supposed direct intuition of power in voluntary acts, may be urged from the unquestionable fact, that we do not know, and cannot know, that volition does cause corporeal motion; while there is a great deal to be said in favour of the view that it is no cause, but merely a concomitant of that motion. But the nature of volition will be more fitly considered hereafter.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ORDER OF NATURE : MIRACLES.

If our beliefs of expectation are based on our beliefs of memory, and anticipation is only inverted recollection, it necessarily follows that every belief of expectation implies the belief that the future will have a certain resemblance to the past. From the first hour of experience, onwards, this belief is constantly being verified, until old age is inclined to suspect that experience has nothing new to offer. And when the experience of generation after generation is recorded, and a single book tells us more than Methuselah could have learned, had he spent every waking hour of his thousand years in learning; when apparent disorders are found to be only the recurrent pulses of a slow working order, and the wonder of a year becomes the commonplace of a century; when repeated and minute examination never reveals a break in the chain of causes and effects; and the whole edifice of practical life is built upon our faith in its continuity; the belief that that chain has never been broken and will never be broken, becomes one of the strongest and most justifiable of human convictions. And it must be admitted to be a reasonable request, if we ask those who would have us put faith in the actual occurrence of

interruptions of that order, to produce evidence in favour of their view, not only equal, but superior, in weight to that which leads us to adopt ours.

This is the essential argument of Hume's famous disquisition upon miracles; and it may safely be declared to be irrefragable. But it must be admitted that Hume has surrounded the kernel of his essay with a shell of very doubtful value.

The first step in this, as in all other discussions, is to come to a clear understanding as to the meaning of the terms employed. Argumentation whether miracles are possible, and, if possible, credible, is mere beating the air until the arguers have agreed what they mean by the word "miracles."

Hume, with less than his usual perspicuity, but in accordance with a common practice of believers in the miraculous, defines a miracle as a "violation of the laws of nature," or as "a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent."

There must, he says,—

"be an uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as an uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed or the miracle rendered credible but by an opposite proof which is superior."—(IV. p. 134.)

Every one of these dicta appears to be open to serious objection.

The word "miracle"—*miraculum*,—in its primitive and legitimate sense, simply means something wonderful.

Cicero applies it as readily to the fancies of philosophers, "*Portenta et miracula philosophorum somniantium,*" as we do to the prodigies of priests. And the source of the wonder which a miracle excites is the belief, on the part of those who witness it, that it transcends or contradicts ordinary experience.

The definition of a miracle as a "violation of the laws of nature" is, in reality, an employment of language which, on the face of the matter, cannot be justified. For "nature" means neither more nor less than that which is; the sum of phenomena presented to our experience; the totality of events past, present, and to come. Every event must be taken to be a part of nature, until proof to the contrary is supplied. And such proof is, from the nature of the case, impossible.

Hume asks:—

"Why is it more than probable that all men must die: that lead cannot of itself remain suspended in the air: that fire consumes wood and is extinguished by water; unless it be that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of those laws, or in other words, a miracle, to prevent them?"—(IV. p. 133.)

But the reply is obvious; not one of these events is "more than probable"; though the probability may reach such a very high degree that, in ordinary language, we are justified in saying that the opposite events are impossible. Calling our often verified experience a "law of nature" adds nothing to its value, nor in the slightest degree increases any probability that it will be verified again, which may arise out of the fact of its frequent verification.

If a piece of lead were to remain suspended of itself, in

the air, the occurrence would be a "miracle," in the sense of a wonderful event, indeed ; but no one trained in the methods of science would imagine that any law of nature was really violated thereby. He would simply set to work to investigate the conditions under which so highly unexpected an occurrence took place, and thereby enlarge his experience and modify his hitherto unduly narrow conception of the laws of nature.

The alternative definition, that a miracle is "a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent," (IV. p. 134, *note*) is still less defensible. For a vast number of miracles have professedly been worked, neither by the Deity, nor by any invisible agent ; but by Beelzebub and his compeers, or by very visible men.

Moreover, not to repeat what has been said respecting the absurdity of supposing that something which occurs is a transgression of laws, our only knowledge of which is derived from the observation of that which occurs : upon what sort of evidence can we be justified in concluding that a given event is the effect of a particular volition of the Deity, or of the interposition of some invisible (that is unperceivable) agent ? It may be so, but how is the assertion, that it is so, to be tested ? If it be said that the event exceeds the power of natural causes, what can justify such a saying ? The day-fly has better grounds for calling a thunderstorm supernatural, than has man, with his experience of an infinitesimal fraction of duration, to say that the most astonishing event that can be imagined is beyond the scope of natural causes.

"Whatever is intelligible and can be distinctly conceived,

implies no contradiction, and can never be proved false by any demonstration, argument, or abstract reasoning *a priori*." —(IV. p. 44.)

So wrote Hume, with perfect justice, in his *Sceptical Doubts*. But a miracle, in the sense of a sudden and complete change in the customary order of nature, is intelligible, can be distinctly conceived, implies no contradiction; and, therefore, according to Hume's own showing, cannot be proved false by any demonstrative argument.

Nevertheless, in diametrical contradiction to his own principles, Hume says elsewhere:—

"It is a miracle that a dead man should come to life: because that has never been observed in any age or country." —(IV. p. 134.)

That is to say, there is an uniform experience against such an event, and therefore, if it occurs, it is a violation of the laws of nature. Or, to put the argument in its naked absurdity, that which never has happened never can happen, without a violation of the laws of nature. In truth, if a dead man did come to life, the fact would be evidence, not that any law of nature had been violated, but that those laws, even when they express the results of a very long and uniform experience, are necessarily based on incomplete knowledge, and are to be held only as grounds of more or less justifiable expectation.

To sum up, the definition of a miracle as a suspension or a contravention of the order of Nature is self-contradictory, because all we know of the order of nature is derived from our observation of the course of events of

which the so-called miracle is a part. On the other hand, no event is too extraordinary to be possible; and, therefore, if by the term miracles we mean only "extremely wonderful events," there can be no just ground for denying the possibility of their occurrence.

But when we turn from the question of the possibility of miracles, however they may be defined, in the abstract, to that respecting the grounds upon which we are justified in believing any particular miracle, Hume's arguments have a very different value, for they resolve themselves into a simple statement of the dictates of common sense—which may be expressed in this canon: the more a statement of fact conflicts with previous experience, the more complete must be the evidence which is to justify us in believing it. It is upon this principle that every one carries on the business of common life. If a man tells me he saw a piebald horse in Piccadilly, I believe him without hesitation. The thing itself is likely enough, and there is no imaginable motive for his deceiving me. But if the same person tells me he observed a zebra there, I might hesitate a little about accepting his testimony, unless I were well satisfied, not only as to his previous acquaintance with zebras, but as to his powers and opportunities of observation in the present case. If, however, my informant assured me that he beheld a centaur trotting down that famous thoroughfare, I should emphatically decline to credit his statement; and this even if he were the most saintly of men and ready to suffer martyrdom in support of his belief. In such a case, I could, of course, entertain no doubt of the good faith of the witness; it would be only his competency, which unfortunately has very little

to do with good faith or intensity of conviction, which I should presume to call in question.

Indeed, I hardly know what testimony would satisfy me of the existence of a live centaur. To put an extreme case, suppose the late Johannes Müller, of Berlin, the greatest anatomist and physiologist among my contemporaries, had barely affirmed he had seen a live centaur, I should certainly have been staggered by the weight of an assertion coming from such an authority. But I could have got no further than a suspension of judgment. For, on the whole, it would have been more probable that even he had fallen into some error of interpretation of the facts which came under his observation, than that such an animal as a centaur really existed. And nothing short of a careful monograph, by a highly competent investigator, accompanied by figures and measurements of all the most important parts of a centaur, put forth under circumstances which could leave no doubt that falsification or misinterpretation would meet with immediate exposure, could possibly enable a man of science to feel that he acted conscientiously, in expressing his belief in the existence of a centaur on the evidence of testimony.

This hesitation about admitting the existence of such an animal as a centaur, be it observed, does not deserve reproach, as scepticism, but moderate praise, as mere scientific good faith. It need not imply, and it does not, so far as I am concerned, any *a priori* hypothesis that a centaur is an impossible animal; or, that his existence, if he did exist, would violate the laws of nature. Indubitably, the organisation of a centaur presents a variety of practical difficulties to an anatomist and physiologist; and a good many of those generalisations

of our present experience, which we are pleased to call laws of nature, would be upset by the appearance of such an animal, so that we should have to frame new laws to cover our extended experience. Every wise man will admit that the possibilities of nature are infinite, and include centaurs; but he will not the less feel it his duty to hold fast, for the present, by the dictum of Lucretius, "Nam certe ex vivo Centauri non fit imago," and to cast the entire burthen of proof, that centaurs exist, on the shoulders of those who ask him to believe the statement.

Judged by the canons either of common sense, or of science, which are indeed one and the same, all "miracles" are centaurs, or they would not be miracles; and men of sense and science will deal with them on the same principles. No one who wishes to keep well within the limits of that which he has a right to assert will affirm that it is impossible that the sun and moon should ever have been made to appear to stand still in the valley of Ajalon; or that the walls of a city should have fallen down at a trumpet blast; or that water was turned into wine; because such events are contrary to uniform experience and violate laws of nature. For aught he can prove to the contrary, such events may appear in the order of nature to-morrow. But common sense and common honesty alike oblige him to demand from those who would have him believe in the actual occurrence of such events, evidence of a cogency proportionate to their departure from probability; evidence at least as strong as that, which the man who says he has seen a centaur is bound to produce, unless he is content to be thought either more than credulous or less than honest.

But are there any miracles on record, the evidence for which fulfils the plain and simple requirements alike of elementary logic and of elementary morality?

Hume answers this question without the smallest hesitation, and with all the authority of a historical specialist:—

“There is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned goodness, education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves; of such undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to deceive others; of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great deal to lose in case of their being detected in any falsehood; and at the same time attesting facts, performed in such a public manner, and in so celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection unavoidable: All which circumstances are requisite to give us a full assurance of the testimony of men.”—(IV. p. 135.)

These are grave assertions, but they are least likely to be challenged by those who have made it their business to weigh evidence and to give their decision under a due sense of the moral responsibility which they incur in so doing.

It is probable that few persons who proclaim their belief in miracles have considered what would be necessary to justify that belief in the case of a professed modern miracle-worker. Suppose, for example, it is affirmed that A.B. died and that C.D. brought him to life again. Let it be granted that A.B. and C.D. are persons of unimpeachable honour and veracity; that C.D. is the next heir to A.B.'s estate, and therefore had a strong motive for not bringing him to life again; and

that all A.B.'s relations, respectable persons who bore him a strong affection, or had otherwise an interest in his being alive, declared that they saw him die. Furthermore, let A.B. be seen after his recovery by all his friends and neighbours, and let his and their depositions, that he is now alive, be taken down before a magistrate of known integrity and acuteness : would all this constitute even presumptive evidence that C.D. had worked a miracle? Unquestionably not. For the most important link in the whole chain of evidence is wanting, and that is the proof that A.B. was really dead. The evidence of ordinary observers on such a point as this is absolutely worthless. And, even medical evidence, unless the physician is a person of unusual knowledge and skill, may have little more value. Unless careful thermometric observation proves that the temperature has sunk below a certain point; unless the cadaveric stiffening of the muscles has become well established; all the ordinary signs of death may be fallacious, and the intervention of C.D. may have had no more to do with A.B.'s restoration to life than any other fortuitously coincident event.

It may be said that such a coincidence would be more wonderful than the miracle itself. Nevertheless history acquaints us with coincidences as marvellous.

On the 19th of February, 1842, Sir Robert Sale held Jellalabad with a small English force and, daily expecting attack from an overwhelming force of Afghans, had spent three months in incessantly labouring to improve the fortifications of the town. Akbar Khan had approached within a few miles, and an onslaught of his army was supposed to be imminent. That morning an earthquake—

“nearly destroyed the town, threw down the greater part of the parapets, the central gate with the adjoining bastions, and a part of the new bastion which flanked it. Three other bastions were also nearly destroyed, whilst several large breaches were made in the curtains, and the Peshawur side, eighty feet long, was quite practicable, the ditch being filled, and the descent easy. Thus in one moment the labours of three months were in a great measure destroyed.”¹

If Akbar Khan had happened to give orders for an assault in the early morning of the 19th of February, what good follower of the Prophet could have doubted that Allah had lent his aid? As it chanced, however, Mahometan faith in the miraculous took another turn; for the energetic defenders of the post had repaired the damage by the end of the month; and the enemy, finding no signs of the earthquake when they invested the place, ascribed the supposed immunity of Jellalabad to English witchcraft.

But the conditions of belief do not vary with time or place; and, if it is undeniable that evidence of so complete and weighty a character is needed, at the present time, for the establishment of the occurrence of such a wonder as that supposed, it has always been needful. Those who study the extant records of miracles with due attention will judge for themselves how far it has ever been supplied.

¹ Report of Captain Broadfoot, garrison engineer, quoted in Kaye's *Afghanistan*.

CHAPTER VIII.

THEISM; EVOLUTION OF THEOLOGY.

HUME seems to have had but two hearty dislikes: the one to the English nation, and the other to all the professors of dogmatic theology. The one aversion he vented only privately to his friends; but, if he is ever bitter in his public utterances, it is against priests¹ in general and theological enthusiasts and fanatics in particular; if he ever seems insincere, it is when he wishes to insult theologians by a parade of sarcastic respect. One need go no further than the peroration of the *Essay on Miracles* for a characteristic illustration.

"I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here delivered, as I think it may serve to confound those dangerous friends and disguised enemies to the *Christian religion* who have undertaken to defend it by the principles

¹ In a note to the *Essay on Superstition and Enthusiasm*, Hume is careful to define what he means by this term. "By priests I understand only the pretenders to power and dominion, and to a superior sanctity of character, distinct from virtue and good morals. These are very different from *clergymen*, who are set apart to the care of sacred matters, and the conducting our public devotions with greater decency and order. There is no rank of men more to be respected than the latter."—(III. p. 83.)

of human reason. Our most holy religion is founded on *Faith*, not on reason, and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is by no means fitted to endure. . . . the Christian religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved by *Faith* to assent to it, is conscious of a continual miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience."—(IV. pp. 153, 154.)

It is obvious that, here and elsewhere, Hume, adopting a popular confusion of ideas, uses religion as the equivalent of dogmatic theology; and, therefore, he says, with perfect justice, that "religion is nothing but a species of philosophy" (iv. p. 171). Here no doubt lies the root of his antagonism. The quarrels of theologians and philosophers have not been about religion, but about philosophy; and philosophers not unfrequently seem to entertain the same feeling towards theologians that sportsmen cherish towards poachers. "There cannot be two passions more nearly resembling each other than hunting and philosophy," says Hume. And philosophic hunters are given to think, that, while they pursue truth for its own sake, out of pure love for the chase (perhaps mingled with a little human weakness to be thought good shots), and by open and legitimate methods; their theological competitors too often care merely to supply the market of establishments; and disdain neither the aid of the snares of superstition, nor the cover of the darkness of ignorance.

Unless some foundation was given for this impression by the theological writers whose works had fallen in Hume's way, it is difficult to account for the depth of

feeling which so good natured a man manifests on the subject.

Thus he writes in the *Natural History of Religion*, with quite unusual acerbity :—

“The chief objection to it [the ancient heathen mythology] with regard to this planet is, that it is not ascertained by any just reason or authority. The ancient tradition insisted on by heathen priests and theologers is but a weak foundation : and transmitted also such a number of contradictory reports, supported all of them by equal authority, that it became absolutely impossible to fix a preference among them. A few volumes, therefore, must contain all the polemical writings of pagan priests : And their whole theology must consist more of traditional stories and superstitious practices than of philosophical argument and controversy.

“But where theism forms the fundamental principle of any popular religion, that tenet is so conformable to sound reason, that philosophy is apt to incorporate itself with such a system of theology. And if the other dogmas of that system be contained in a sacred book, such as the Alcoran, or be determined by any visible authority, like that of the Roman pontiff, speculative reasoners naturally carry on their assent, and embrace a theory, which has been instilled into them by their earliest education, and which also possesses some degree of consistence and uniformity. But as these appearances are sure, all of them, to prove deceitful, philosophy will very soon find herself very unequally yoked with her new associate ; and instead of regulating each principle, as they advance together, she is at every turn perverted to serve the purposes of superstition. For besides the unavoidable incoherences, which must be reconciled and adjusted, one may safely affirm, that all popular theology, especially the scholastic, has a kind of appetite for absurdity and contradiction. If that theology went not beyond reason and common sense, her doctrines would appear too easy and familiar. Amazement must of necessity be raised : Mystery affected : Darkness and obscurity sought after : And a foundation of merit afforded to the

devout votaries, who desire an opportunity of subduing their rebellious reason by the belief of the most unintelligible sophisms.

“Ecclesiastical history sufficiently confirms these reflections. When a controversy is started, some people always pretend with certainty to foretell the issue. Whichever opinion, say they, is most contrary to plain reason is sure to prevail; even when the general interest of the system requires not that decision. Though the reproach of heresy may, for some time, be bandied about among the disputants, it always rests at last on the side of reason. Any one, it is pretended, that has but learning enough of this kind to know the definition of *Arian*, *Pelagian*, *Erastian*, *Socinian*, *Sabellian*, *Eutychian*, *Nestorian*, *Monothelite*, &c., not to mention *Protestant*, whose fate is yet uncertain, will be convinced of the truth of this observation. It is thus a system becomes absurd in the end, merely from its being reasonable and philosophical in the beginning.

“To oppose the torrent of scholastic religion by such feeble maxims as these, that *it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be*, that *the whole is greater than a part*, that *two and three make five*, is pretending to stop the ocean with a bulrush. Will you set up profane reason against sacred mystery? No punishment is great enough for your impiety. And the same fires which were kindled for heretics will serve also for the destruction of philosophers.”—(IV. pp. 481—3.)

Holding these opinions respecting the recognised systems of theology and their professors, Hume, nevertheless, seems to have had a theology of his own; that is to say, he seems to have thought (though, as will appear, it is needful for an expositor of his opinions to speak very guardedly on this point) that the problem of theism is susceptible of scientific treatment, with something more than a negative result. His opinions are to be gathered from the eleventh section of the *Inquiry* (1748); from the *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*, which were written at least as early as 1751, though not

published till after his death; and from the *Natural History of Religion*, published in 1757.

In the first two pieces, the reader is left to judge for himself which interlocutor in the dialogue represents the thoughts of the author; but, for the views put forward in the last, Hume accepts the responsibility. Unfortunately, this essay deals almost wholly with the historical development of theological ideas; and, on the question of the philosophical foundation of theology, does little more than express the writer's contentment with the argument from design.

"The whole frame of nature bespeaks an Intelligent Author; and no rational inquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion.—(IV. p. 435.)

"Were men led into the apprehension of invisible, intelligent power, by a contemplation of the works of nature, they could never possibly entertain any conception but of one single being, who bestowed existence and order on this vast machine, and adjusted all its parts according to one regular plan or connected system. For though, to persons of a certain turn of mind, it may not appear altogether absurd, that several independent beings, endowed with superior wisdom, might conspire in the contrivance and execution of one regular plan, yet is this a merely arbitrary supposition, which, even if allowed possible, must be confessed neither to be supported by probability nor necessity. All things in the universe are evidently of a piece. Everything is adjusted to everything. One design prevails throughout the whole. And this uniformity leads the mind to acknowledge one author; because the conception of different authors, without any distinction of attributes or operations, serves only to give perplexity to the imagination, without bestowing any satisfaction on the understanding."—(IV. p. 442.)

Thus Hume appears to have sincerely accepted the

two fundamental conclusions of the argument from design; firstly, that a Deity exists; and, secondly, that He possesses attributes more or less allied to those of human intelligence. But, at this embryonic stage of theology, Hume's progress is arrested; and, after a survey of the development of dogma, his "general corollary" is, that—

"The whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, uncertainty, suspense of judgment, appear the only result of our most accurate scrutiny concerning this subject. But such is the frailty of human reason, and such the irresistible contagion of opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could scarcely be upheld; did we not enlarge our view, and opposing one species of superstition to another, set them quarrelling; while we ourselves, during their fury and contention, happily make our escape into the calm, though obscure, regions of philosophy."—(IV. p. 513.)

Thus it may be fairly presumed that Hume expresses his own sentiments in the words of the speech with which Philo concludes the *Dialogues*.

"If the whole of natural theology, as some people seem to maintain, resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined proposition, *That the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence*: If this proposition be not capable of extension, variation, or more particular explication: If it affords no inference that affects human life or can be the source of any action or forbearance: And if the analogy, imperfect as it is, can be carried no further than to the human intelligence, and cannot be transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other qualities of the mind; if this really be the case, what can the most inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more than give a plain, philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as it occurs, and believe

that the arguments on which it is established exceed the objections which lie against it? Some astonishment indeed will naturally arise from the greatness of the object; some melancholy from its obscurity; some contempt of human reason, that it can give no solution more satisfactory with regard to so extraordinary and magnificent a question. But believe me, Cleanthes, the most natural sentiment which a well-disposed mind will feel on this occasion, is a longing desire and expectation that Heaven would be pleased to dissipate, at least alleviate, this profound ignorance, by affording some more particular revelation to mankind, and making discoveries of the nature, attributes, and operations of the Divine object of our faith." ¹—(II. pp. 547—8.)

Such being the sum total of Hume's conclusions, it cannot be said that his theological burden is a heavy one. But, if we turn from the *Natural History of Religion*, to the *Treatise*, the *Inquiry*, and the *Dialogues*, the story of what happened to the ass laden with salt, who took to the water, irresistibly suggests itself. Hume's theism, such as it is, dissolves away in the dialectic river, until nothing is left but the verbal sack in which it was contained.

Of the two theistic propositions to which Hume is committed, the first is the affirmation of the existence of a God, supported by the argument from the nature of

¹ It is needless to quote the rest of the passage, though I cannot refrain from observing that the recommendation which it contains, that a "man of letters" should become a philosophical sceptic as "the first and most essential step towards being a sound believing Christian," though adopted and largely acted upon by many a champion of orthodoxy in these days, is questionable in taste, if it be meant as a jest, and more than questionable in morality, if it is to be taken in earnest. To pretend that you believe any doctrine for no better reason than that you doubt everything else, would be dishonest, if it were not preposterous.

causation. In the *Dialogues*, Philo, while pushing scepticism to its utmost limit, is nevertheless made to say that—

“ . . . where reasonable men treat these subjects, the question can never be concerning the *Being*, but only the *Nature*, of the Deity. The former truth, as you will observe, is unquestionable and self-evident. Nothing exists without a cause, and the original cause of this universe (whatever it be) we call God, and piously ascribe to him every species of perfection.”
—(II. p. 439.)

The expositor of Hume, who wishes to do his work thoroughly, as far as it goes, cannot but fall into perplexity¹ when he contrasts this language with that of

¹ A perplexity which is increased rather than diminished by some passages in a letter to Gilbert Elliot of Minto (March 10, 1751). Hume says, “ You would perceive by the sample I have given you that I make Cleanthes the hero of the dialogue ; whatever you can think of, to strengthen that side of the argument, will be most acceptable to me. Any propensity you imagine I have to the other side crept in upon me against my will ; and 'tis not long ago that I burned an old manuscript book, wrote before I was twenty, which contained, page after page, the gradual progress of my thoughts on this head. It began with an anxious scent after arguments to confirm the common opinion ; doubts stole in, dissipated, returned ; were again dissipated, returned again ; and it was a perpetual struggle of a restless imagination against inclination—perhaps against reason. . . . I could wish Cleanthes' argument could be so analysed as to be rendered quite formal and regular. The propensity of the mind towards it—unless that propensity were as strong and universal as that to believe in our senses and experience—will still, I am afraid, be esteemed a suspicious foundation. 'Tis here I wish for your assistance. We must endeavour to prove that this propensity is somewhat different from our inclination to find our own figures in the clouds, our faces in the moon, our passions and sentiments even in inanimate matter. Such an inclination may and ought to be controlled, and can never be a legitimate ground of assent.” (Burton, *Life*, I. pp. 331—3.) The picture of Hume here

the sections of the third part of the *Treatise*, entitled, *Why a Cause is Always Necessary, and Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion*.

It is there shown, at large, that "every demonstration which has been produced for the necessity of a cause is fallacious and sophistical" (I. p. 111); it is affirmed, that "there is no absolute nor metaphysical necessity that every beginning of existence should be attended with such an object" [as a cause] (I. p. 227); and it is roundly asserted, that it is "easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or productive principle" (I. p. 111). So far from the axiom, that whatever begins to exist must have a cause of existence, being "self-evident," as Philo calls it, Hume spends the greatest care in showing that it is nothing but the product of custom, or experience.

And the doubt thus forced upon one, whether Philo ought to be taken as even, so far, Hume's mouth-piece, is increased when we reflect that we are dealing with an acute reasoner; and that there is no difficulty in drawing the deduction from Hume's own definition of a cause, that the very phrase, a "first cause," involves a contradiction in terms. He lays down that,—

"'Tis an established axiom both in natural and moral philosophy, that an object, which exists for any time in its full perfection without producing another, is not its sole cause; but is assisted by some other principle which pushes it from its state of inactivity, and makes it exert that energy, of which it was secretly possessed."—(I. p. 106.)

drawn unconsciously by his own hand, is unlike enough to the popular conception of him as a careless sceptic loving doubt for doubt's sake.

Now the "first cause" is assumed to have existed from all eternity, up to the moment at which the universe came into existence. Hence it cannot be the sole cause of the universe; in fact, it was no cause at all until it was "assisted by some other principle"; consequently the so-called "first cause," so far as it produces the universe, is in reality an effect of that other principle. Moreover, though, in the person of Philo, Hume assumes the axiom "that whatever begins to exist must have a cause," which he denies in the *Treatise*, he must have seen, for a child may see, that the assumption is of no real service.

Suppose Y to be the imagined first cause and Z to be its effect. Let the letters of the alphabet, *a, b, c, d, e, f, g*, in their order, represent successive moments of time, and let *g* represent the particular moment at which the effect Z makes its appearance. It follows that the cause Y could not have existed "in its full perfection" during the time *a—e*, for if it had, then the effect Z would have come into existence during that time, which, by the hypothesis, it did not do. The cause Y, therefore, must have come into existence at *f*, and if "everything that comes into existence has a cause," Y must have had a cause X operating at *e*; X, a cause W operating at *d*; and, so on, *ad infinitum*.¹

If the only demonstrative argument for the existence of a Deity, which Hume advances, thus, literally, "goes

¹ Kant employs substantially the same argument:—"Würde das höchste Wesen in dieser Kette der Bedingungen stehen, so würde es selbst ein Glied der Reihe derselben sein, und eben so wie die niederen Glieder, denen es vorgesetzt ist, noch fernere Untersuchungen wegen seines noch höheren Grundes erfahren."—*Kritik*. Ed. Hartenstein, p. 422.

to water" in the solvent of his philosophy, the reasoning from the evidence of design does not fare much better. If Hume really knew of any valid reply to Philo's arguments in the following passages of the *Dialogues*, he has dealt unfairly by the reader in concealing it:—

"But because I know you are not much swayed by names and authorities, I shall endeavour to show you, a little more distinctly, the inconveniences of that Anthropomorphism, which you have embraced; and shall prove, that there is no ground to suppose a plan of the world to be formed in the Divine mind, consisting of distinct ideas, differently arranged, in the same manner as an architect forms in his head the plan of a house which he intends to execute.

"It is not easy, I own, to see what is gained by this supposition, whether we judge the matter by *Reason* or by *Experience*. We are still obliged to mount higher, in order to find the cause of this cause, which you had assigned as satisfactory and conclusive.

"If *Reason* (I mean abstract reason, derived from inquiries *a priori*) be not alike mute with regard to all questions concerning cause and effect, this sentence at least it will venture to pronounce: That a mental world, or universe of ideas, requires a cause as much as does a material world, or universe of objects; and, if similar in its arrangement, must require a similar cause. For what is there in this subject, which should occasion a different conclusion or inference? In an abstract view, they are entirely alike; and no difficulty attends the one supposition, which is not common to both of them.

"Again, when we will needs force *Experience* to pronounce some sentence, even on those subjects which lie beyond her sphere, neither can she perceive any material difference in this particular, between these two kinds of worlds; but finds them to be governed by similar principles, and to depend upon an equal variety of causes, in their operations. We have specimens in miniature of both of them. Our own mind resembles the one; a vegetable or animal body the

other. Let experience, therefore, judge from these samples. Nothing seems more delicate, with regard to its causes, than thought: and as these causes never operate in two persons after the same manner, so we never find two persons who think exactly alike. Nor indeed does the same person think exactly alike at any two different periods of time. A difference of age, of the disposition of his body, of weather, of food, of company, of books, of passions; any of these particulars, or others more minute, are sufficient to alter the curious machinery of thought, and communicate to it very different movements and operations. As far as we can judge, vegetables and animal bodies are not more delicate in their motions, nor depend upon a greater variety or more curious adjustment of springs and principles.

“How, therefore, shall we satisfy ourselves concerning the cause of that Being whom you suppose the Author of Nature, or, according to your system of anthropomorphism, the ideal world in which you trace the material? Have we not the same reason to trace the ideal world into another ideal world, or new intelligent principle? But if we stop and go no farther; why go so far? Why not stop at the material world? How can we satisfy ourselves without going on *in infinitum*? And after all, what satisfaction is there in that infinite progression? Let us remember the story of the Indian philosopher and his elephant. It was never more applicable than to the present subject. If the material world rests upon a similar ideal world, this ideal world must rest upon some other; and so on without end. It were better, therefore, never to look beyond the present material world. By supposing it to contain the principle of its order within itself, we really assert it to be God; and the sooner we arrive at that Divine Being, so much the better. When you go one step beyond the mundane system you only excite an inquisitive humour, which it is impossible ever to satisfy.

“To say, that the different ideas which compose the reason of the Supreme Being, fall into order of themselves and by their own natures, is really to talk without any precise meaning. If it has a meaning, I would fain know why it is not

as good sense to say, that the parts of the material world fall into order of themselves, and by their own nature. Can the one opinion be intelligible while the other is not so?" —(II. pp. 461—4.)

Cleanthes, in replying to Philo's discourse, says that it is very easy to answer his arguments; but, as not unfrequently happens with controversialists, he mistakes a reply for an answer, when he declares that —

"The order and arrangement of nature, the curious adjustment of final causes, the plain use and intention of every part and organ; all these bespeak in the clearest language one intelligent cause or author. The heavens and the earth join in the same testimony. The whole chorus of nature raises one hymn to the praises of its Creator." —(II. p. 465.)

Though the rhetoric of Cleanthes may be admired, its irrelevancy to the point at issue must be admitted. Wandering still further into the region of declamation, he works himself into a passion:

"You alone, or almost alone, disturb this general harmony. You start abstruse doubts, cavils, and objections: You ask me what is the cause of this cause? I know not: I care not: that concerns not me. I have found a Deity; and here I stop my inquiry. Let those go further who are wiser or more enterprising." —(II. p. 466.)

In other words, O Cleanthes, reasoning having taken you as far as you want to go, you decline to advance any further; even though you fully admit that the very same reasoning forbids you to stop where you are pleased to cry halt! But this is simply forcing your reason to abdicate in favour of your caprice. It is impossible to imagine that Hume, of all men in the world, could have rested satisfied with such an act of high-treason against

the sovereignty of philosophy. We may rather conclude that the last word of the discussion, which he gives to Philo, is also his own.

"If I am still to remain in utter ignorance of causes, and can absolutely give an explication of nothing, I shall never esteem it any advantage to shove off for a moment a difficulty, which, you acknowledge, must immediately, in its full force, recur upon me. Naturalists¹ indeed very justly explain particular effects by more general causes, though these general causes should remain in the end totally inexplicable; but they never surely thought it satisfactory to explain a particular effect by a particular cause, which was no more to be accounted for than the effect itself. An ideal system, arranged of itself, without a precedent design, is not a whit more explicable than a material one, which attains its order in a like manner; nor is there any more difficulty in the latter supposition than in the former."— (II. p. 466.)

It is obvious that, if Hume had been pushed, he must have admitted that his opinion concerning the existence of a God, and of a certain remote resemblance of his intellectual nature to that of man, was an hypothesis which might possess more or less probability, but was incapable on his own principles of any approach to demonstration. And to all attempts to make any practical use of his theism; or to prove the existence of the attributes of infinite wisdom, benevolence, justice, and the like, which are usually ascribed to the Deity, by reason, he opposes a searching critical negation.²

The object of the speech of the imaginary Epicurean in the eleventh section of the *Inquiry*, entitled *Of a*

¹ *I. e.* Natural philosophers.

² Hume's letter to Mure of Caldwell, containing a criticism of Leechman's sermon (Burton, I. p. 163), bears strongly on this point.

Whence, do you think, can such philosophers derive their idea of the gods? From their own conceit and imagination surely. For if they derive it from the present phenomena, it would never point to anything further, out must be exactly adjusted to them. That the divinity may *possibly* be endowed with attributes which we have never seen exerted; may be governed by principles of action which we cannot discover to be satisfied; all this will freely be allowed. But still this is mere *possibility* and hypothesis. We never can have reason to *infer* any attributes or any principles of action in him, but so far as we know them to have been exerted and satisfied.

"Are there any marks of a distributive justice in the world? If you answer in the affirmative, I conclude that, since justice here exerts itself, it is satisfied. If you reply in the negative, I conclude that you have then no reason to ascribe justice, in our sense of it, to the gods. If you hold a medium between affirmation and negation, by saying that the justice of the gods at present exerts itself in part, but not in its full extent, I answer that you have no reason to give it any particular extent, but only so far as you see it, at present, exert itself."
(IV. pp. 164—6.)

Thus, the Freethinkers said, the attributes of the Deity being what they are, the scheme of orthodoxy is inconsistent with them; whereupon Butler gave the crushing reply: Agreeing with you as to the attributes of the Deity, nature, by its existence, proves that the things to which you object are quite consistent with them. To whom enters Hume's Epicurean with the remark: Then, as nature is our only measure of the attributes of the Deity in their practical manifestation, what warranty is there for supposing that such measure is anywhere transcended? That the "other side" of nature, if there be one, is governed on different principles from this side?

Truly on this topic silence is golden; while speech

reaches not even the dignity of sounding brass or tinkling cymbal, and is but the weary clatter of an endless logomachy. One can but suspect that Hume also had reached this conviction ; and that his shadowy and inconsistent theism was the expression of his desire to rest in a state of mind, which distinctly excluded negation, while it included as little as possible of affirmation, respecting a problem which he felt to be hopelessly insoluble.

But, whatever might be the views of the philosopher as to the arguments for theism, the historian could have no doubt respecting its many-shaped existence, and the great part which it has played in the world. Here, then, was a body of natural facts to be investigated scientifically, and the result of Hume's inquiries is embodied in the remarkable essay on the *Natural History of Religions*. Hume anticipated the results of modern investigation in declaring fetishism and polytheism to be the form in which savage and ignorant men naturally clothe their ideas of the unknown influences which govern their destiny ; and they are polytheists rather than monotheists because, -

... the first ideas of religion arose, not from a contemplation of the works of nature, but from a concern with regard to the events of life, and from the incessant hopes and fears which actuate the human mind. . . . in order to carry men's attention beyond the present course of things, or lead them into any inference concerning invisible intelligent power, they must be actuated by some passion which prompts their thought and reflection, some motive which urges their first inquiry. But what passion shall we have recourse to, for explaining an effect of such mighty consequence? Not speculative curiosity merely, or the pure love of truth. That motive is too refined for

such gross apprehensions, and would lead men into inquiries concerning the frame of nature, a subject too large and comprehensive for their narrow capacities. No passions, therefore, can be supposed to work on such barbarians, but the ordinary affections of human life; the anxious concern for happiness, the dread of future misery, the terror of death, the thirst of revenge, the appetite for food and other necessaries. Agitated by hopes and fears of this nature, especially the latter, men scrutinize, with a trembling curiosity, the course of future causes, and examine the various and contrary events of human life. And in this disordered scene, with eyes still more disordered and astonished, they see the first obscure traces of divinity."—(IV. pp. 443, 4.)

The shape assumed by these first traces of divinity is that of the shadows of men's own minds, projected out of themselves by their imaginations:—

"There is an universal tendency among mankind to conceive all beings like themselves, and to transfer to every object those qualities with which they are familiarly acquainted, and of which they are intimately conscious. . . . The *unknown causes* which continually employ their thought, appearing always in the same aspect, are all apprehended to be of the same kind or species. Nor is it long before we ascribe to them thought, and reason, and passion, and sometimes even the limbs and figures of men, in order to bring them nearer to a resemblance with ourselves."—(IV. pp. 446—7.)

Hume asks whether polytheism really deserves the name of theism.

"Our ancestors in Europe, before the revival of letters, believed as we do at present, that there was one supreme God, the author of nature, whose power, though in itself uncontrollable, was yet often exerted by the interposition of his angels and subordinate ministers, who executed his sacred purposes. But they also believed, that all nature was full of other invisible powers: fairies, goblins, elves, sprites;

beings stronger and mightier than men, but much inferior to the celestial natures who surround the throne of God. Now, suppose that any one, in these ages, had denied the existence of God and of his angels, would not his impiety justly have deserved the appellation of atheism, even though he had still allowed, by some odd capricious reasoning, that the popular stories of elves and fairies were just and well grounded? The difference, on the one hand, between such a person and a genuine theist, is infinitely greater than that, on the other, between him and one that absolutely excludes all invisible intelligent power. And it is a fallacy, merely from the casual resemblance of names, without any conformity of meaning, to rank such opposite opinions under the same denomination.

“To any one who considers justly of the matter, it will appear that the gods of the polytheists are no better than the elves and fairies of our ancestors, and merit as little as any pious worship and veneration. These pretended religionists are really a kind of superstitious atheists, and acknowledge no being that corresponds to our idea of a Deity. No first principle of mind or thought; no supreme government and administration; no divine contrivance or intention in the fabric of the world.”—(IV. pp. 450—51.)

The doctrine that you may call an atheist anybody whose ideas about the Deity do not correspond with your own, is so largely acted upon by persons who are certainly not of Hume's way of thinking and, probably, so far from having read him, would shudder to open any book bearing his name, except the *History of England*, that it is surprising to trace the theory of their practice to such a source.

But on thinking the matter over, this theory seems so consonant with reason, that one feels ashamed of having suspected many excellent persons of being moved by mere malice and viciousness of temper to call other folks atheists, when, after all, they have been

obeying a purely intellectual sense of fitness. As Hume says, truly enough, it is a mere fallacy, because two people use the same names for things, the ideas of which are mutually exclusive, to rank such opposite opinions under the same denomination. If the Jew says, that the Deity is absolute unity, and that it is sheer blasphemy to say that He ever became incarnate in the person of a man; and, if the Trinitarian says, that the Deity is numerically three as well as numerically one, and that it is sheer blasphemy to say that He did not so become incarnate, it is obvious enough that each must be logically held to deny the existence of the other's Deity. Therefore; that each has a scientific right to call the other an atheist; and that, if he refrains, it is only on the ground of decency and good manners, which should restrain an honourable man from employing even scientifically justifiable language, if custom has given it an abusive connotation. While one must agree with Hume, then, it is, nevertheless, to be wished that he had not set the bad example of calling polytheists "superstitious atheists." It probably did not occur to him that, by a parity of reasoning, the Unitarians might justify the application of the same language to the Ultramontanes, and *vice versa*. But, to return from a digression which may not be wholly unprofitable, Hume proceeds to show in what manner polytheism incorporated physical and moral allegories, and naturally accepted hero-worship; and he sums up his views of the first stages of the evolution of theology as follows:—

"These then are the general principles of polytheism, founded in human nature, and little or nothing dependent on caprice or accident. As the *causes* which bestow happiness or misery, are in general very little known and very uncertain,

our anxious concern endeavours to attain a determinate idea of them: and finds no better expedient than to represent them as intelligent, voluntary agents, like ourselves, only somewhat superior in power and wisdom. The limited influence of these agents, and their proximity to human weakness, introduce the various distribution and division of their authority, and thereby give rise to allegory. The same principles naturally deify mortals, superior in power, courage, or understanding, and produce hero-worship; together with fabulous history and mythological tradition, in all its wild and unaccountable forms. And as an invisible spiritual intelligence is an object too refined for vulgar apprehension, men naturally affix it to some sensible representation; such as either the more conspicuous parts of nature, or the statues, images, and pictures, which a more refined age forms of its divinities." —(IV. p. 461.)

How did the further stage of theology, monotheism, arise out of polytheism? Hume replies, certainly not by reasonings from first causes or any sort of fine-drawn logic:—

"Even at this day, and in Europe, ask any of the vulgar why he believes in an Omnipotent Creator of the world, he will never mention the beauty of final causes, of which he is wholly ignorant: He will not hold out his hand and bid you contemplate the suppleness and variety of joints in his fingers, their bending all one way, the counterpoise which they receive from the thumb, the softness and fleshy parts of the inside of the hand, with all the other circumstances which render that member fit for the use to which it was destined. To these he has been long accustomed; and he beholds them with listlessness and unconcern. He will tell you of the sudden and unexpected death of such-a-one; the fall and bruise of such another; the excessive drought of this season; the cold and rains of another. These he ascribes to the immediate operation of Providence: And such events as, with good reasoners, are the chief difficulties in admitting a Supreme Intelligence, are with him the sole arguments for it. . . .

“We may conclude therefore, upon the whole, that since the vulgar, in nations which have embraced the doctrine of theism, still build it upon irrational and superstitious grounds, they are never led into that opinion by any process of argument, but by a certain train of thinking, more suitable to their genius and capacity.

“It may readily happen, in an idolatrous nation, that though men admit the existence of several limited deities, yet there is some one God, whom, in a particular manner, they make the object of their worship and adoration. They may either suppose, that, in the distribution of power and territory among the Gods, their nation was subjected to the jurisdiction of that particular deity; or, reducing heavenly objects to the model of things below, they may represent one god as the prince or supreme magistrate of the rest, who, though of the same nature, rules them with an authority like that which an earthly sovereign exerts over his subjects and vassals. Whether this god, therefore, be considered as their peculiar patron, or as the general sovereign of heaven, his votaries will endeavour, by every art, to insinuate themselves into his favour; and supposing him to be pleased, like themselves, with praise and flattery, there is no eulogy or exaggeration which will be spared in their addresses to him. In proportion as men's fears or distresses become more urgent, they still invent new strains of adulation; and even he who outdoes his predecessor in swelling the titles of his divinity, is sure to be outdone by his successor in newer and more pompous epithets of praise. Thus they proceed, till at last they arrive at infinity itself, beyond which there is no further progress; And it is well if, in striving to get further, and to represent a magnificent simplicity, they run not into inexplicable mystery, and destroy the intelligent nature of their deity, on which alone any rational worship or adoration can be founded. While they confine themselves to the notion of a perfect being, the Creator of the world, they coincide, by chance, with the principles of reason and true philosophy; though they are guided to that notion, not by reason, of which they are in a great measure incapable, but by the

adulation and fears of the most vulgar superstition." (IV. pp. 463-6.)

"Nay, if we should suppose, what never happens, that a popular religion were found, in which it was expressly declared, that nothing but morality could gain the divine favour; if an order of priests were instituted to inculcate this opinion, in daily sermons, and with all the arts of persuasion; yet so inveterate are the people's prejudices, that, for want of some other superstition, they would make the very attendance on these sermons the essentials of religion, rather than place them in virtue and good morals. The sublime prologue of Zaleucus' laws inspired not the Locrians, so far as we can learn, with any sounder notions of the measures of acceptance with the deity, than were familiar to the other Greeks."—(IV. p. 505.)

It has been remarked that Hume's writings are singularly devoid of local colour; of allusions to the scenes with which he was familiar, and to the people from whom he sprang. Yet, surely, the Lowlands of Scotland were more in his thoughts than the Zephyrean promontory, and the hard visage of John Knox peered from behind the mask of Zaleucus, when this passage left his pen. Nay, might not an acute German critic discern therein a reminiscence of that eminently Scottish institution, a "Holy Fair"? where as Hume's young contemporary sings:—

“ ° ° ° opens out his cauld barangues
 On practice and on morals;
 An' aff the godly pour in thrangs
 To gie the jars and barrels
 A lift that day.

“ What signifies his barren shine
 Of moral powers and reason?

His English style and gesture fine
Are a' clean out of season.
Like Socrates or Antonine,
Or some auld pagan heathen,
The moral man he does define,
But ne'er a word o' faith in
That's right that day."¹

¹ Burns published the *Holy Fair* only ten years after Hume's death.

CHAPTER IX.

THE SOUL: THE DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY.

DESCARTES taught that an absolute difference of kind separates matter, as that which possesses extension, from spirit, as that which thinks. They not only have no character in common, but it is inconceivable that they should have any. On the assumption, that the attributes of the two were wholly different, it appeared to be a necessary consequence that the hypothetical causes of these attributes—their respective substances—must be totally different. Notably, in the matter of divisibility, since that which has no extension cannot be divisible, it seemed that the *chose pensante*, the soul, must be an indivisible entity.

Later philosophers, accepting this notion of the soul, were naturally much perplexed to understand how, if matter and spirit had nothing in common, they could act and react on one another. All the changes of matter being modes of motion, the difficulty of understanding how a moving extended material body was to affect a thinking thing which had no dimension, was as great as that involved in solving the problem of how to hit a nominative case with a stick. Hence, the successors of Descartes either found themselves obliged, with the

Occasionalists, to call in the aid of the Deity, who was supposed to be a sort of go-between betwixt matter and spirit; or they had recourse, with Leibnitz, to the doctrine of pre-established harmony, which denied any influence of the body on the soul, or *vice versâ*, and compared matter and spirit to two clocks so accurately regulated to keep time with one another, that the one struck when ever the other pointed to the hour; or, with Berkeley, they abolished the "substance" of matter altogether, as a superfluity, though they failed to see that the same arguments equally justified the abolition of soul as another superfluity, and the reduction of the universe to a series of events or phenomena; or, finally, with Spinoza, to whom Berkeley makes a perilously close approach, they asserted the existence of only one substance, with two chief attributes, the one, thought, and the other, extension.

There remained only one possible position, which, had it been taken up earlier, might have saved an immensity of trouble; and that was to affirm that we do not, and cannot, know anything about the "substance" either of the thinking thing, or of the extended thing. And Hume's sound common sense led him to defend this thesis, which Locke had already foreshadowed, with respect to the question of the substance of the soul. Hume enunciates two opinions. The first is that the question itself is unintelligible, and therefore cannot receive any answer; the second is that the popular doctrine respecting the immateriality, simplicity, and indivisibility of a thinking substance is a "true atheism, and will serve to justify all those sentiments for which Spinoza is so universally infamous."

In support of the first opinion, Hume points out that

it is impossible to attach any definite meaning to the word "substance" when employed for the hypothetical substratum of soul and matter. For if we define substance as that which may exist by itself, the definition does not distinguish the soul from perceptions. It is perfectly easy to conceive that states of consciousness are self-subsistent. And, if the substance of the soul is defined as that in which perceptions inhere, what is meant by the inherence? Is such inherence conceivable? If conceivable, what evidence is there of it? And what is the use of a substratum to things which, for anything we know to the contrary, are capable of existing by themselves?

Moreover, it may be added, supposing the soul has a substance, how do we know that it is different from the substance, which, on like grounds, must be supposed to underlie the qualities of matter?

Again, if it be said that our personal identity requires the assumption of a substance which remains the same while the accidents of perception shift and change, the question arises what is meant by personal identity?

"For my part," says Hume, "when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of *myself*, and may be truly said not to exist. And were all my perceptions removed by death, and I could neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate, after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is further requisite to make me a perfect nonentity. If any one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has

a different notion of *himself*, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may perhaps perceive something simple and continued which he calls *himself*, though I am certain there is no such principle in me.

“But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed one another with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. . . . The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance, pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no *simplicity* in it at one time, nor *identity* in different, whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place where these scenes are represented, or of the materials of which it is composed.

“What then gives so great a propension to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possessed of an invariable and uninterrupted existence through the whole course of our lives? In order to answer this question, we must distinguish between personal identity as it regards our thought and imagination, and as it regards our passions, or the concern we take in ourselves. The first is our present subject; and to explain it perfectly we must take the matter pretty deep, and account for that identity which we attribute to plants and animals; there being a great analogy betwixt it and the identity of a self or person.”—(I. pp. 321, 322.)

Perfect identity is exhibited by an object which remains unchanged throughout a certain time; perfect diversity is seen in two or more objects which are separated by intervals of space and periods of time.

But, in both these cases, there is no sharp line of demarcation between identity and diversity, and it is impossible to say when an object ceases to be one and becomes two.

When a sea-anemone multiplies by division, there is a time during which it is said to be one animal partially divided; but, after a while, it becomes two animals adherent together, and the limit between these conditions is purely arbitrary. So in mineralogy, a crystal of a definite chemical composition may have its substance replaced, particle by particle, by another chemical compound. When does it lose its primitive identity and become a new thing?

Again, a plant or an animal, in the course of its existence, from the condition of an egg or seed to the end of life, remains the same neither in form, nor in structure, nor in the matter of which it is composed: every attribute it possesses is constantly changing, and yet we say that it is always one and the same individual. And if, in this case, we attribute identity without supposing an indivisible immaterial something to underlie and condition that identity, why should we need the supposition in the case of that succession of changeful phenomena we call the mind?

In fact, we ascribe identity to an individual plant or animal, simply because there has been no moment of time at which we could observe any division of it into parts separated by time or space. Every experience we have of it is as one thing and not as two; and we sum up our experiences in the ascription of identity, although we know quite well that, strictly speaking, it has not been the same for any two moments.

So with the mind. Our perceptions flow in even

succession ; the impressions of the present moment are inextricably mixed up with the memories of yesterday and the expectations of to-morrow, and all are connected by the links of cause and effect.

“ . . . as the same individual republic may not only change its members, but also its laws and constitutions ; in like manner the same person may vary his character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity. Whatever changes he endures, his several parts are still connected by the relation of causation. And in this view our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination, by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures.

“ As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions, tis to be considered, upon that account chiefly, as the source of personal identity. Had we no memory we never should have any notion of causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects which constitute our self or person. But having once acquired this notion of causation from the memory, we can extend the same chain of causes, and consequently the identity of our persons, beyond our memory, and can comprehend times, and circumstances, and actions, which we have entirely forgot, but suppose in general to have existed. For how few of our past actions are there of which we have any memory ? Who can tell me, for instance, what were his thoughts and actions on the first of January, 1715, the eleventh of March, 1719, and the third of August, 1733 ? Or will he affirm, because he has entirely forgot the incidents of those days, that the present self is not the same person with the self of that time, and by that means overturn all the most established notions of personal identity ? In this view, therefore, memory does not so much *produce* as *discover* personal identity, by showing us the relation of cause and effect among our different perceptions. 'Twill be incumbent on those who affirm that memory produces entirely our personal identity,

to give a reason why we can thus extend our identity beyond our memory.

“The whole of this doctrine leads us to a conclusion which is of great importance in the present affair, viz. that all the nice and subtle questions concerning personal identity can never possibly be decided, and are to be regarded rather as grammatical than as philosophical difficulties. Identity depends on the relations of ideas, and these relations produce identity by means of that easy transition they occasion. But as the relations, and the easiness of the transition may diminish by insensible degrees, we have no just standard by which we can decide any dispute concerning the time when they acquire or lose a title to the name of identity. All the disputes concerning the identity of connected objects are merely verbal, except so far as the relation of parts gives rise to some fiction or imaginary principle of union, as we have already observed.

“What I have said concerning the first origin and uncertainty of our notion of identity, as applied to the human mind may be extended, with little or no variation, to that of *simplicity*. An object, whose different co-existent parts are bound together by a close relation, operates upon the imagination after much the same manner as one perfectly simple and undivisible, and requires not a much greater stretch of thought in order to its conception. From this similarity of operation we attribute a simplicity to it, and feign a principle of union as the support of this simplicity, and the centre of all the different parts and qualities of the object.”—(I. pp. 331—3.)

The final result of Hume's reasoning comes to this : As we use the name of body for the sum of the phenomena which make up our corporeal existence, so we employ the name of soul for the sum of the phenomena which constitute our mental existence ; and we have no more reason, in the latter case, than in the former, to suppose that there is anything beyond the phenomena which answers to the name. In the case of the soul, as in that

of the body, the idea of substance is a mere fiction of the imagination. This conclusion is nothing but a rigorous application of Berkeley's reasoning concerning matter to mind, and it is fully adopted by Kant.¹

Having arrived at the conclusion that the conception of a soul, as a substantive thing, is a mere figment of the imagination; and that, whether it exists or not, we can by no possibility know anything about it, the inquiry as to the durability of the soul may seem superfluous.

Nevertheless, there is still a sense in which, even under these conditions, such an inquiry is justifiable. Leaving aside the problem of the substance of the soul, and taking the word "soul" simply as a name for the series of mental phenomena which make up an individual mind; it remains open to us to ask, whether that series commenced with, or before, the series of phenomena which constitute the corresponding individual body; and whether it terminates with the end of the corporeal series, or goes on after the existence of the body has ended. And, in both cases, there arises the further question, whether the excess of duration of the mental series over that of the body, is finite or infinite.

Hume has discussed some of these questions in the remarkable essay *On the Immortality of the Soul*, which was not published till after his death, and which seems long to have remained but little known. Nevertheless, indeed, possibly, for that reason, its influence has been

¹ "Our internal intuition shows no permanent existence, for the Ego is only the consciousness of my thinking." "There is no means whatever by which we can learn anything respecting the constitution of the soul, so far as regards the possibility of its separate existence."—*Kritik von den Paralogismen der reinen Vernunft*.

manifested in unexpected quarters, and its main arguments have been adduced by archiepiscopal and episcopal authority in evidence of the value of revelation. Dr. Whately,¹ sometime Archbishop of Dublin, paraphrases Hume, though he forgets to cite him; and Bishop Courtenay's elaborate work,² dedicated to the Archbishop, is a development of that prelate's version of Hume's essay.

This little paper occupies only some ten pages, but it is not wonderful that it attracted an acute logician like Whately, for it is a model of clear and vigorous statement. The argument hardly admits of condensation, so that I must let Hume speak for himself:—

“By the mere light of reason it seems difficult to prove the immortality of the soul: the arguments for it are commonly derived either from metaphysical topics, or moral, or physical. But in reality it is the gospel, and the gospel alone, that has brought *life and immortality* to light.”³

“1. Metaphysical topics suppose that the soul is immaterial, and that 'tis impossible for thought to belong to a material

¹ *Essays on Some of the Peculiarities of the Christian Religion*, (Essay I. Revelation of a Future State), by Richard Whately, D.D., Archbishop of Dublin. Fifth Edition, revised, 1846.

² *The Future States: their Evidences and Nature; considered on Principles Physical, Moral, and Scriptural, with the Design of showing the Value of the Gospel Revelation* by the Right Rev. Reginald Courtenay, D.D., Lord Bishop of Kingston (Jamaica), 1857.

³ “Now that ‘Jesus Christ brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel,’ and that in the most literal sense, which implies that the revelation of the doctrine is *peculiar* to His Gospel, seems to be at least the most obvious meaning of the Scriptures of the New Testament.”—Whately, *l.c.* p. 27.

substance.¹ But just metaphysics teach us that the notion of substance is wholly confused and imperfect; and that we have no other idea of any substance, than as an aggregate of particular qualities inhering in an unknown something. Matter, therefore, and spirit, are at bottom equally unknown, and we cannot determine what qualities inhere in the one or in the other.² They likewise teach us, that nothing can be decided *a priori* concerning any cause or effect; and that experience, being the only source of our judgments of this nature, we cannot know from any other principle, whether matter, by its structure or arrangement, may not be the cause of thought. Abstract reasonings cannot decide any question of fact or existence. But admitting a spiritual substance to be dispersed throughout the universe, like the ethereal fire of the Stoics, and to be the only inherent subject of thought, we have reason to conclude from *analogy*, that nature uses it after the manner she does the other substance, *matter*. She employs it as a kind of paste or clay; modifies it into a variety of forms or existences; dissolves after a time each modification, and from its substance erects a new form. As the same material substance may successively compose the bodies of all animals, the same spiritual substance may compose their minds: Their consciousness, or that system of thought which they formed during life, may be continually dissolved by death, and nothing interests them in the new modification. The most positive assertors of the mortality of the soul never denied the immortality of its substance; and that an immaterial

¹ Compare, *Of the Immateriality of the Soul*, Section V. of Part IV., Book I., of the *Treatise*, in which Hume concludes (I. p. 319) that, whether it be material or immaterial, "in both cases the metaphysical arguments for the immortality of the soul are equally inconclusive; and in both cases the moral arguments and those derived from the analogy of nature are equally strong and convincing."

² "The question again respecting the materiality of the soul is one which I am at a loss to understand clearly, till it shall have been clearly determined *what matter is*. We know nothing of it, any more than of mind, except its attributes."—Whately, *l.c.* p. 66.

substance, as well as a material, may lose its memory or consciousness, appears in part from experience, if the soul be immaterial. Reasoning from the common course of nature, and without supposing any new interposition of the Supreme Cause, which ought always to be excluded from philosophy, *what is incorruptible must also be ingenerable.* The soul, therefore, if immortal, existed before our birth, and if the former existence noways concerned us, neither will the latter. Animals undoubtedly feel, think, love, hate, will, and even reason, though in a more imperfect manner than men: Are their souls also immaterial and immortal?"¹

Hume next proceeds to consider the moral arguments, and chiefly

"... those derived from the justice of God, which is supposed to be further interested in the future punishment of the vicious and reward of the virtuous."

But if by the justice of God we mean the same attribute which we call justice in ourselves, then why should either reward or punishment be extended beyond this life?² Our sole means of knowing anything is the

¹ "None of those who contend for the natural immortality of the soul . . . have been able to extricate themselves from one difficulty, viz. that all their arguments apply, with exactly the same force, to prove an immortality, not only of *brutes*, but even of *plants*; though in such a conclusion as this they are never willing to acquiesce."—Whately, *l.c.* p. 67.

² "Nor are we therefore authorised to infer *à priori*, independent of Revelation, a future state of retribution, from the irregularities prevailing in the present life, since that future state does not account fully for these irregularities. It may explain, indeed, how present evil may be conducive to future good, but not why the good could not be attained without the evil; it may reconcile with our notions of the divine justice the present prosperity of the wicked, but it does not account for the existence of the wicked."—Whately, *l.c.* pp. 69, 70.

reasoning faculty which God has given us; and that reasoning faculty not only denies us any conception of a future state, but fails to furnish a single valid argument in favour of the belief that the mind will endure after the dissolution of the body.

“ . . . If any purpose of nature be clear, we may affirm that the whole scope and intention of man's creation, so far as we can judge by natural reason, is limited to the present life.”

To the argument that the powers of man are so much greater than the needs of this life require, that they suggest a future scene in which they can be employed, Hume replies :—

“ If the reason of man gives him great superiority above other animals, his necessities are proportionably multiplied upon him; his whole time, his whole capacity, activity, courage, and passion, find sufficient employment in feencing against the miseries of his present condition; and frequently, nay, almost always, are too slender for the business assigned them. A pair of shoes, perhaps, was never yet wrought to the highest degree of perfection that commodity is capable of attaining; yet it is necessary, at least very useful, that there should be some politicians and moralists, even some geometers, poets and philosophers, among mankind. The powers of men are no more superior to their wants, considered merely in this life, than those of foxes and hares are, compared to *their* wants and to their period of existence. The inference from parity of reason is therefore obvious.”

In short, Hume argues that, if the faculties with which we are endowed are unable to discover a future state, and if the most attentive consideration of their nature serves to show that they are adapted to this life and nothing more, it is surely inconsistent with any

conception of justice that we should be dealt with, as if we had all along had a clear knowledge of the fact thus carefully concealed from us. What should we think of the justice of a father, who gave his son every reason to suppose that a trivial fault would only be visited by a box on the ear; and then, years afterwards, put him on the rack for a week for the same fault?

Again, the suggestion arises, if God is the cause of all things, he is responsible for evil as well as for good; and it appears utterly irreconcilable with our notions of justice that he should punish another for that which he has, in fact, done himself. Moreover, just punishment bears a proportion to the offence, while suffering which is infinite is *ipso facto* disproportionate to any finite deed.

“Why then eternal punishment for the temporary offences of so frail a creature as man? Can any one approve of Alexander’s rage, who intended to exterminate a whole nation because they had seized his favourite horse Bucephalus?”

“Heaven and hell suppose two distinct species of men, the good and the bad; but the greatest part of mankind float betwixt vice and virtue. Were one to go round the world with the intention of giving a good supper to the righteous and a sound drubbing to the wicked, he would frequently be embarrassed in his choice, and would find the merits and demerits of most men and women scarcely amount to the value of either.”¹

¹ “So reason also shows, that for man to expect to earn for himself by the practice of virtue, and claim, as his just right, an immortality of exalted happiness, is a most extravagant and groundless pretension.”—Whately, *l.c.* p. 101. On the other hand, however, the Archbishop sees no unreasonableness in a man’s earning for himself an immortality of intense unhappiness by the practice of vice. So that life is, naturally, a venture in which you may lose all, but

One can but admire the broad humanity and the insight into the springs of action manifest in this passage. *Comprendre est à moitié pardonner.* The more one knows of the real conditions which determine men's acts the less one finds either to praise or blame. For kindly David Hume, "the damnation of one man is an infinitely greater evil in the universe than the subversion of a thousand million of kingdoms." And he would have felt with his countryman Burns, that even "auld Nickie Ben" should "hae a chance."

As against those who reason for the necessity of a future state, in order that the justice of the Deity may be satisfied, Hume's argumentation appears unanswerable. For if the justice of God resembles what we mean by justice, the bestowal of infinite happiness for finite well-doing and infinite misery for finite ill-doing, it is in no sense just. And, if the justice of God does not resemble what we mean by justice, it is an abuse of language to employ the name of justice for the attribute described by it. But, as against those who choose to argue that there is nothing in what is known to us of the attributes of the Deity inconsistent with a future state of rewards and punishments, Hume's pleadings have no force. Bishop Butler's argument that, inasmuch as the visitation of our acts by rewards and punishments takes place in this life, rewards and punishments must be consistent with the attributes of the Deity, and therefore may go on as long as the mind endures, is unanswerable. Whatever exists is, by the hypothesis, existent by the will of God; and, therefore, the pains and pleasures which can earn nothing. It may be thought somewhat hard upon mankind if they are pushed into a speculation of this sort, willy-nilly.

exist now may go on existing for all eternity, either increasing, diminishing, or being endlessly varied in their intensity, as they are now.

It is remarkable that Hume does not refer to the sentimental arguments for the immortality of the soul which are so much in vogue at the present day; and which are based upon our desire for a longer conscious existence than that which nature appears to have allotted to us. Perhaps he did not think them worth notice. For indeed it is not a little strange, that our strong desire that a certain occurrence should happen should be put forward as evidence that it will happen. If my intense desire to see the friend, from whom I have parted, does not bring him from the other side of the world, or take me thither; if the mother's agonised prayer that her child should live has not prevented him from dying; experience certainly affords no presumption that the strong desire to be alive after death, which we call the aspiration after immortality, is any more likely to be gratified. As Hume truly says, "All doctrines are to be suspected which are favoured by our passions;" and the doctrine, that we are immortal because we should extremely like to be so, contains the quintessence of suspiciousness.

In respect of the existence and attributes of the soul, as of those of the Deity, then, logic is powerless and reason silent. At the most we can get no further than the conclusion of Kant:—

"After we have satisfied ourselves of the vanity of all the ambitious attempts of reason to fly beyond the bounds of experience, enough remains of practical value to content us. It is true that no one may boast that he *knows* that God and a future life exist; for, if he possesses such know-

ledge, he is just the man for whom I have long been seeking. All knowledge (touching an object of mere reason) can be communicated, and therefore I might hope to see my own knowledge increased to this prodigious extent, by his instruction. No; our conviction in these matters is not *logical*, but *moral* certainty; and, inasmuch as it rests upon subjective grounds, (of moral disposition) I must not even say: *it is* morally certain that there is a God, and so on; but, *I am* morally certain, and so on. That is to say: the belief in a God and in another world is so interwoven with my moral nature, that the former can no more vanish, than the latter can ever be torn from me.

“The only point to be remarked here is that this act of faith of the intellect (*Vernunftglaube*) assumes the existence of moral dispositions. If we leave them aside, and suppose a mind quite indifferent to moral laws, the inquiry started by reason becomes merely a subject for speculation; and [the conclusion attained] may then indeed be supported by strong arguments from analogy, but not by such as are competent to overcome persistent scepticism.

“There is no one, however, who can fail to be interested in these questions. For, although he may be excluded from moral influences by the want of a good disposition, yet, even in this case, enough remains to lead him to fear a divine existence and a future state. To this end, no more is necessary than that he can at least have no certainty that there is no such being, and no future life; for, to make this conclusion demonstratively certain, he must be able to prove the impossibility of both; and this assuredly no rational man can undertake to do. This negative belief, indeed, cannot produce either morality or good dispositions, but can operate in an analogous fashion, by powerfully repressing the outbreak of evil tendencies.

“But it will be said, is this all that Pure Reason can do when it gazes out beyond the bounds of experience? Nothing more than two articles of faith? Common sense could achieve as much without calling the philosophers to its counsels!

“ I will not here speak of the service which philosophy has rendered to human reason by the laborious efforts of its criticism, granting that the outcome proves to be merely negative : about that matter something is to be said in the following section. But do you then ask, that the knowledge which interests all men shall transcend the common understanding and be discovered for you only by philosophers? The very thing which you make a reproach, is the best confirmation of the justice of the previous conclusions, since it shows that which could not, at first, have been anticipated ; namely, that in those matters which concern all men alike, nature is not guilty of distributing her gifts with partiality ; and that the highest philosophy, in dealing with the most important concerns of humanity, is able to take us no further than the guidance which she affords to the commonest understanding.”¹

In short, nothing can be proved or disproved, respecting either the distinct existence, the substance, or the durability of the soul. So far, Kant is at one with Hume. But Kant adds, as you cannot disprove the immortality of the soul, and as the belief therein is very useful for moral purposes, you may assume it. To which, had Hume lived half a century later, he would probably have replied, that, if morality has no better foundation than an assumption, it is not likely to bear much strain ; and, if it has a better foundation, the assumption rather weakens than strengthens it.

As has been already said, Hume is not content with denying that we know anything about the existence or the nature of the soul ; but he carries the war into the enemy's camp, and accuses those who affirm the immateriality, simplicity, and indivisibility of the thinking substance, of atheism and Spinozism, which are assumed to be convertible terms.

¹ *Kritik der reinen Vernunft.* Ed. Hartenstein, p. 547.

The method of attack is ingenious. One appears to acquaint us with two different systems of beings, and both Spinoza and orthodox philosophers agree that the necessary substratum of each of these is a substance, in which the phenomena adhere, or of which they are attributes or modes.

"I observe first the universe of objects or of body; the sun, moon, and stars; the earth, seas, plants, animals, men, ships, houses, and other productions either of art or of nature. Here Spinoza appears and tells me that these are only modifications and that the substance in which they inhere is simple, un compounded, and indivisible. After this I consider the other system of beings, viz. the universe of thought, or my impressions and ideas. Then I observe another sun, moon, and stars; an earth and seas, covered and inhabited by plants and animals, towns, houses, mountains, rivers; and, in short, everything I can discover or conceive in the first system. Upon my inquiring concerning these, theologians present themselves and tell me that these also are modifications and modifications of one simple, un compounded, and indivisible substance. Immediately upon which I am deafened with the noise of a hundred voices, that treat the first hypothesis with detestation and scorn, and the second with applause and veneration. I turn my attention to these hypotheses to see what may be the reason of so great a partiality; and find that they have the same defect, being unintelligible, and that, as far as we can see, they are so much alike, that it is impossible to discover any absurdity in one, which is not common to both of them."—(I. p. 309.)

For the manner in which Hume makes his case good, I must refer to the original. Plain people may rest satisfied that both hypotheses are unintelligible, without arguing any further. The premises are so obscure, of which convey no meaning, while the conclusions carry no conviction.

CHAPTER X.

VOLITION : LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

IN the opening paragraphs of the third part of the second book of the *Treatise*, Hume gives a description of the will.

“Of all the immediate effects of pain and pleasure there is none more remarkable than the *will*; and though, properly speaking, it be not comprehended among the passions, yet as the full understanding of its nature and properties is necessary to the explanation of them, we shall here make it the subject of our inquiry. I desire it may be observed, that, by the *will*, I mean nothing but *the internal impression we feel, and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind*. This impression, like the preceding ones of pride and humility, love and hatred, 'tis impossible to define, and needless to describe any further.”—(II. p. 150.)

This description of volition may be criticised on various grounds. More especially does it seem defective in restricting the term “will” to that feeling which arises when we act, or appear to act, as causes: for one may will to strike, without striking; or to think of something which we have forgotten.

Every volition is a complex idea composed of two elements: the one is the idea of an action; the other is

a desire for the occurrence of that action. If I will to strike, I have an idea of a certain movement, and a desire that that movement should take place; if I will to think of any subject, or, in other words, to attend to that subject, I have an idea of the subject and a strong desire that it should remain present to my consciousness. And so far as I can discover, this combination of an idea of an object with an emotion, is everything that can be directly observed in an act of volition. So that Hume's definition may be amended thus: Volition is the impression which arises when the idea of a bodily or mental action is accompanied by the desire that the action should be accomplished. It differs from other desires simply in the fact, that we regard ourselves as possible causes of the action desired.

Two questions arise, in connexion with the observation of the phenomenon of volition, as they arise out of the contemplation of all other natural phenomena. Firstly, has it a cause; and, if so, what is its cause? Secondly, is it followed by any effect, and if so, what effect does it produce?

Hume points out, that the nature of the phenomena we consider can have nothing to do with the origin of the conception that they are connected by the relation of cause and effect. For that relation is nothing but an order of succession, which, so far as our experience goes, is invariable; and it is obvious that the nature of phenomena has nothing to do with their order. Whatever it is that leads us to seek for a cause for every event, in the case of the phenomena of the external world, compels us, with equal cogency, to seek it in that of the mind.

The only meaning of the law of causation, in the physical world, is, that it generalises universal experience

of the order of that world ; and, if experience shows a similar order to obtain among states of consciousness, the law of causation will properly express that order.

That such an order exists, however, is acknowledged by every sane man :

“Our idea, therefore, of necessity and causation, arises entirely from the uniformity observable in the operations of nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other. These two circumstances form the whole of that necessity which we ascribe to matter. Beyond the constant *conjunction* of similar objects and the consequent *inference* from one to the other, we have no notion of any necessity of connexion.

“If it appear, therefore, what all mankind have ever allowed, without any doubt or hesitation, that these two circumstances take place in the voluntary actions of men, and in the operations of mind, it must follow that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of necessity, and that they have hitherto disputed merely from not understanding each other.”
—(IV. p. 97.)

But is this constant conjunction observable in human actions ? A student of history could give but one answer to this question :

“Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit : these passions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed through society, have been, from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprises which have ever been observed among mankind. Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans ? Study well the temper and actions of the French and English. You cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former *most* of the observations which you have made with regard to the latter. Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history

informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials from which we may form our observations, and become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behaviour. These records of wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions are so many collections of experiments, by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the principles of his science, in the same manner as the physician or natural philosopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, and other external objects, by the experiments which he forms concerning them. Nor are the earth, air, water, and other elements examined by Aristotle and Hippocrates more like to those which at present lie under our observation, than the men described by Polybius and Tacitus are to those who now govern the world."—(IV. pp. 97-8.)

Hume proceeds to point out that the value set upon experience in the conduct of affairs, whether of business or of politics, involves the acknowledgment that we base our expectation of what men will do, upon our observation of what they have done; and, that we are as firmly convinced of the fixed order of thoughts as we are of that of things. And, if it be urged that human actions not unfrequently appear unaccountable and capricious, his reply is prompt:—

"I grant it possible to find some actions which seem to have no regular connexion with any known motives, and are exceptions to all the measures of conduct which have ever been established for the government of men. But if one could willingly know what judgment should be formed of such irregular and extraordinary actions, we may consider the sentiments commonly entertained with regard to those irregular events which appear in the course of nature, and

the operations of external objects. All causes are not conjoined to their usual effects with like uniformity. An artificer, who handles only dead matter, may be disappointed in his aim, as well as the politician who directs the conduct of sensible and intelligent agents.

"The vulgar, who take things according to their first appearance, attribute the uncertainty of events to such an uncertainty in the causes as make the latter often fail of their usual influence, though they meet with no impediment to their operation. But philosophers, observing that, almost in every part of nature, there is contained a vast variety of springs and principles, which are hid, by reason of their minuteness or remoteness, find that it is at least possible the contrariety of events may not proceed from any contingency in the cause, but from the secret operation of contrary causes. This possibility is converted into certainty by further observation, when they remark that, upon an exact scrutiny, a contrariety of effects always betrays a contrariety of causes, and proceeds from their mutual opposition. A peasant can give no better reason for the stopping of any clock or watch, than to say that it does not commonly go right. But an artist easily perceives that the same force in the spring or pendulum has always the same influence on the wheels; but fails of its usual effect, perhaps by reason of a grain of dust, which puts a stop to the whole movement. From the observation of several parallel instances, philosophers form a maxim, that the connexion between all causes and effects is equally necessary, and that its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret opposition of contrary causes."—(IV. pp. 101-2.)

So with regard to human actions :—

"The internal principles and motives may operate in a uniform manner, notwithstanding these seeming irregularities; in the same manner as the winds, rains, clouds, and other variations of the weather are supposed to be governed by steady principles; though not easily discoverable by human sagacity and inquiry."—(IV. p. 103.)

Meteorology, as a science, was not in existence in Hume's time, or he would have left out the "supposed to be." In practice, again, what difference does any one make between natural and moral evidence?

"A prisoner who has neither money nor interest, discovers the impossibility of his escape, as well when he considers the obstinacy of the gaoler, as the walls and bars with which he is surrounded; and, in all attempts for his freedom, chooses rather to work upon the stone and iron of the one, than upon the inflexible nature of the other. The same prisoner, when conducted to the scaffold, foresees his death as certainly from the constancy and fidelity of his guards, as from the operation of the axe or wheel. His mind runs along a certain train of ideas: The refusal of the soldiers to consent to his escape; the action of the executioner; the separation of the head and body; bleeding, convulsive motions, and death. Here is a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions; but the mind feels no difference between them, in passing from one link to another, nor is less certain of the future event, than if it were connected with the objects presented to the memory or senses, by a train of causes cemented together by what we are pleased to call a *physical* necessity. The same experienced union has the same effect on the mind, whether the united objects be motives, volition, and actions; or figure and motion. We may change the names of things, but their nature and their operation on the understanding never change."—(IV. pp. 105-6.)

But, if the necessary connexion of our acts with our ideas has always been acknowledged in practice, why the proclivity of mankind to deny it words?

"If we examine the operations of body, and the production of effects from their causes, we shall find that all our faculties can never carry us further in our knowledge of this relation, than barely to observe, that particular objects are *constantly*

conjoined together, and that the mind is carried, by a *customary transition*, from the appearance of the one to the belief of the other. But though this conclusion concerning human ignorance be the result of the strictest scrutiny of this subject, men still entertain a strong propensity to believe, that they penetrate further into the province of nature, and perceive something like a necessary connexion between cause and effect. When, again, they turn their reflections towards the operations of their own minds, and *feel* no such connexion between the motive and the action; they are thence apt to suppose, that there is a difference between the effects which result from material force, and those which arise from thought and intelligence. But, being once convinced, that we know nothing of causation of any kind, than merely the *constant conjunction* of objects, and the consequent *inference* of the mind from one to another, and finding that these two circumstances are universally allowed to have place in voluntary actions; we may be more easily led to own the same necessity common to all causes."—(IV. pp. 107, 8.)

The last asylum of the hard-pressed advocate of the doctrine of uncaused volition is usually, that, argue as you like, he has a profound and ineradicable consciousness of what he calls the freedom of his will. But Hume follows him even here, though only in a note, as if he thought the extinction of so transparent a sophism hardly worthy of the dignity of his text.

"The prevalence of the doctrine of liberty may be accounted for from another cause, viz. a false sensation, or seeming experience, which we have, or may have, of liberty or indifference in many of our actions. The necessity of any action, whether of matter or of mind, is not, properly speaking, a quality in the agent, but in any thinking or intelligent being who may consider the action; and it consists chiefly in the determination of his thoughts to infer the existence of that action from some preceding objects; as liberty, when

opposed to necessity, is nothing but the want of that determination, and a certain looseness or indifference which we feel, in passing or not passing, from the idea of any one of these actions to the idea of any succeeding one. Now we may observe that though, in *reflecting* on human actions, we seldom feel such looseness, yet we feel it when we reflect on the dispositions of the agent; yet it frisks about in the mind, even in *performing* the actions themselves, when we are not engaged in something like it: And as all resembling objects are taken for each other, this has been employed as demonstrative and even intuitive proof of human liberty. We feel that our actions are subject to our will on the one hand, and that we do not feel, that the will itself is subject to any other power. If by a denial of it we are provoked to think of any other power, it comes easily every way, and produces an image of it (as it is called in the schools), even on that side on which it did not settle. This image or faint notion, we persuade ourselves, could at that time have been completed into the thing itself; because, should that be denied, we find upon a second trial that at present it can. We consider not that the fantastical desire of liberty is here the motive of our actions." —(IV. p. 175.)

Moreover, the moment the attempt is made to give a definite meaning to the words, the supposed opposition between free will and necessity turns out to be a mere verbal dispute.

"For what is meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary actions? We cannot surely mean, that actions have so little connection with motive, inclinations, and circumstances, that they do not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the other, and that there is a perfect indifference by which we can conclude the one from the other. For these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact. Liberty, therefore, can only mean a *power of acting or not acting*, according to the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at

rest, we may ; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here then is no subject of dispute."—(IV. p. 111.)

Half the controversies about the freedom of the will would have had no existence, if this pithy paragraph had been well pondered by those who oppose the doctrine of necessity. For they rest upon the absurd presumption that the proposition, "I can do as I like," is contradictory to the doctrine of necessity. The answer is ; nobody doubts that, at any rate within certain limits, you can do as you like. But what determines your likings and dislikings ? Did you make your own constitution ? Is it your contrivance that one thing is pleasant and another is painful ? And even if it were, why did you prefer to make it after the one fashion rather than the other ? The passionate assertion of the consciousness of their freedom, which is the favourite refuge of the opponents of the doctrine of necessity, is mere futility, for nobody denies it. What they really have to do, if they would upset the necessarian argument, is to prove that they are free to associate any emotion whatever with any idea whatever ; to like pain as much as pleasure ; vice as much as virtue ; in short, to prove, that, whatever may be the fixity of order of the universe of things, that of thought is given over to chance.

In the second part of this remarkable essay, Hume considers the real, or supposed, immoral consequences of the doctrine of necessity, premising the weighty observation that

"When any opinion leads to absurdity, it is certainly false ; but it is not certain that an opinion is false because it is of dangerous consequence."—(IV. p. 112.)

And, therefore, that the attempt to refute an opinion by a picture of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality, is as absurd as it is ineffectual.

It is said, in consequence, that the law destroys responsibility; that, as it is commonly put, we have no right to praise or blame actions that cannot be helped. Hume's reply amounts to this, that the very idea of responsibility implies the belief in the necessary connection of actions with certain states of the mind. A man is held responsible only for those acts which are preceded by a certain intention; and, as we cannot see, or hear, or feel, an intention, we can only reason from the consequence on the principle that like effects have like causes.

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as that of "wicked." If A does something which puts B in a violent passion, it is quite possible to admit that B's passion is the necessary consequence of A's act, and yet to believe that B's fury is morally wrong, or that he ought to control it. In fact, a calm bystander would reason with both on the assumption of moral necessity. He would say to A, "You were wrong in doing a thing which you knew (that is, of the necessity of which you were convinced) would irritate B." And he would say to B, "You are wrong to give way to passion, for you know its evil effects"—that is the necessary connection between yielding to passion and evil.

So far, therefore, from necessity destroying moral responsibility, it is the foundation of all praise and blame; and moral admiration reaches its climax in the ascription of necessary goodness to the Deity.

To the statement of another consequence of the necessarian doctrine, that, if there be a God, he must be the cause of all evil as well as of all good, Hume gives no real reply—probably because none is possible. But then, if this conclusion is distinctly and unquestionably deducible from the doctrine of necessity, it is no less unquestionably a direct consequence of every known form of monotheism. If God is the cause of all things, he must be the cause of evil among the rest; if he is omniscient, he must have the fore-knowledge of evil; if he is almighty, he must possess the power of preventing, or of extinguishing evil. And to say that an all-knowing and all-powerful being is not responsible for what happens, because he only permits it, is, under its intellectual aspect, a piece of childish sophistry; while, as to the moral look of it, one has only to ask any decently honourable man, whether, under like cir-

circumstances, he would try to get rid of his responsibility by such a plea.

Hume's *Inquiry* appeared in 1748. He does not refer to Anthony Collins' essay on Liberty, published thirty-three years before, in which the same question is treated to the same effect, with singular force and lucidity. It may be said, perhaps, that it is not wonderful that the two freethinkers should follow the same line of reasoning; but no such plea will account for the fact that in 1754, the famous Calvinistic divine, Jonathan Edwards, President of the College of New Jersey, produced, in the form of a sermon, a powerful and able demonstration of the Calvinistic doctrine, which has never been equalled in power, and certainly has never been refuted.

In the ninth section of the fourth part of Edwards' *Inquiry*, he has to deal with the Arminian objection to the Calvinistic doctrine that "it makes God the author of sin"; and it is curious to watch the struggle between the theological controversialist, striving to ward off the admission which he knows will be employed to damage his side, and the acute logician, conscious that, in some shape or other, the admission must be made. Beginning with the assumption that the Arminian doctrine involves consequences as bad as the Calvinistic view, he proceeds to object to the term "author of sin," though he ends by admitting that, in a certain sense, it is applicable; he proves from Scripture, that God is the disposer and orderer of sin; and then, by an elaborate false analogy with the darkness resulting from the absence of the sun, endeavours to suggest that he is only the author of it in a negative sense; and finally he takes refuge in the conclusion that, though

God is the orderer and disposer of those deeds which, considered in relation to their agents, are morally evil, yet, inasmuch as His purpose has all along been infinitely good, they are not evil relatively to Him.

And this, of course, may be perfectly true; but if true, it is inconsistent with the attribute of Omnipotence. It is conceivable that there should be no evil in the world; that which is conceivable is certainly possible; if it were possible for evil to be non-existent, the maker of the world, who, though foreknowing the existence of evil in that world, did not prevent it, either did not really desire it should not exist, or could not prevent its existence. It might be well for those who inveigh against the logical consequences of necessarianism to bethink them of the logical consequences of theism; which are not only the same, when the attribute of Omniscience is ascribed to the Deity, but which bring out, from the existence of moral evil, a hopeless conflict between the attributes of Infinite Benevolence and Infinite Power, which, with no less assurance, are affirmed to appertain to the Divine Being.

Kant's mode of dealing with the doctrine of necessity is very singular. That the phenomena of the mind follow fixed relations of cause and effect is, to him, as unquestionable as it is to Hume. But then there is the *Ding an sich*, the *Noumenon*, or Kantian equivalent for the substance of the soul. This, being out of the phenomenal world, is subject to none of the laws of phenomena, and is consequently as absolutely free, and as completely powerless, as a mathematical point, *in vacuo*, would be. Hence volition is uncaused, so far as it belongs to the noumenon; but, necessary, so far as it takes effect in the phenomenal world.

Since Kant is never weary of telling us that we know nothing whatever, and can know nothing, about the noumenon, except as the hypothetical subject of any number of negative predicates; the information that it is free, in the sense of being out of reach of the law of causation, is about as valuable as the assertion that it is neither grey, nor blue, nor square. For practical purposes, it must be admitted that the inward possession of such a noumenal libertine does not amount to much for people whose actual existence is made up of nothing but definitely regulated phenomena. When the good and evil angels fought for the dead body of Moses, its presence must have been of about the same value to either of the contending parties, as that of Kant's noumenon, in the battle of impulses which rages in the breast of man. Metaphysicians, as a rule, are sadly deficient in the sense of humour; or they would surely abstain from advancing propositions which, when stripped of the verbiage in which they are disguised, appear to the profane eye to be bare shams, naked but not ashamed.

CHAPTER XI.

THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS.

In his autobiography, Hume writes:—

“In the same year [1752] was published at London my *Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*; which in my own opinion (who ought not to judge on that subject) is of all my writings, historical, philosophical, and literary, incomparably the best. It came unnoticed and unobserved into the world.’

It may commonly be noticed that the relative value which an author ascribes to his own works rarely agrees with the estimate formed of them by his readers; who criticise the products, without either the power or the wish to take into account the pains which they may have cost the producer. Moreover, the clear and discernible common sense of the *Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* may have tasted flat after the highly-seasoned *Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding*. Whether the public like to be deceived, or not, may be open to question; but it is beyond a doubt that they love to be shocked in a pleasant and mannerly way. Now Hume’s speculations on moral questions are not so remote from those of respectable professors, like Hutcheson, or saintly prelates, such as Butler, as to present any striking

novelty. And they support the cause of righteousness in a cool, reasonable, indeed slightly patronising fashion, eminently in harmony with the mind of the eighteenth century; which admired virtue very much, if she would only avoid the rigour which the age called fanaticism, and the fervour which it called enthusiasm.

Having applied the ordinary methods of scientific inquiry to the intellectual phenomena of the mind, it was natural that Hume should extend the same mode of investigation to its moral phenomena; and, in the true spirit of a natural philosopher, he commences by selecting a group of those states of consciousness with which every one's personal experience must have made him familiar: in the expectation that the discovery of the sources of moral approbation and disapprobation, in this comparatively easy case, may furnish the means of detecting them where they are more recondite.

“We shall analyse that complication of mental qualities which form what, in common life, we call PERSONAL MERIT: We shall consider every attribute of the mind, which renders a man an object either of esteem and affection, or of hatred and contempt; every habit or sentiment or faculty, which if ascribed to any person, implies either praise or blame, and may enter into any panegyric or satire of his character and manners. The quick sensibility which, on this head, is so universal among mankind, gives a philosopher sufficient assurance that he can never be considerably mistaken in framing the catalogue, or incurs any danger of misplacing the objects of his contemplation: He needs only enter into his own breast for a moment, and consider whether he should or should not desire to have this or that quality assigned to him, and whether such or such an imputation would proceed from a friend or an enemy. The very nature of language guides us almost infallibly in forming a judgment of this nature; and as every tongue possesses one set of words which are taken in a

good sense, and another in the opposite, the least acquaintance with the idiom suffices, without any reasoning, to direct us in collecting and arranging the estimable or blamable qualities of men. The only object of reasoning is to discover the circumstances on both sides, which are common to these qualities; to observe that particular in which the estimable qualities agree on the one hand, and the blamable on the other, and thence to reach the foundation of ethics, and find their universal principles, from which all censure or approbation is ultimately derived. As this is a question of fact, not of abstract science, we can only expect success by following the experimental method, and deducing general maxims from a comparison of particular instances. The other scientific method, where a general abstract principle is first established, and is afterwards branched out into a variety of inferences and conclusions, may be more perfect in itself, but suits less the imperfection of human nature, and is a common source of illusion and mistake, in this as well as in other subjects. Men are now cured of their passion for hypotheses and systems in natural philosophy, and will hearken to no arguments but those which are derived from experience. It is full time they should attempt a like reformation in all moral disquisitions; and reject every system of ethics, however subtle or ingenious, which is not founded on fact and observation."—(IV. pp. 242—4.)

No qualities give a man a greater claim to personal merit than benevolence and justice; but if we inquire why benevolence deserves so much praise, the answer will certainly contain a large reference to the utility of that virtue to society; and as for justice, the very existence of the virtue implies that of society; public utility is its sole origin; and the measure of its usefulness is also the standard of its merit. If every man possessed everything he wanted, and no one had the power to interfere with such possession; or if no man desired that which could damage his fellow-man, justice

would have no part to play in the universe. But as Hume observes:—

“In the present disposition of the human heart, it would perhaps be difficult to find complete instances of such enlarged affections; but still we may observe that the case of families approaches towards it; and the stronger the mutual benevolence is among the individuals, the nearer it approaches, till all distinction of property be in a great measure lost and confounded among them. Between married persons, the cement of friendship is by the laws supposed so strong, as to abolish all division of possessions, and has often, in reality, the force assigned to it.¹ And it is observable that, during the ardour of new enthusiasms, when every principle is inflamed into extravagance, the community of goods has frequently been attempted; and nothing but experience of its inconveniences, from the returning or disguised selfishness of men, could make the imprudent fanatics adopt anew the ideas of justice and separate property. So true is it that this virtue derives its existence entirely from its necessary use to the intercourse and social state of mankind.”—(IV. p. 256.)

“Were the human species so framed by nature as that each individual possessed within himself every faculty requisite both for his own preservation and for the propagation of his kind: Were all society and intercourse cut off between man and man by the primary intention of the Supreme Creator: It seems evident that so solitary a being would be as much incapable of justice as of social discourse and conversation. Where mutual regard and forbearance serve to no manner of purpose, they would never direct the conduct of any reasonable man. The headlong course of the passions would be checked by no reflection on future consequences. And as each

¹ Family affection in the eighteenth century may have been stronger than in the nineteenth; but Hume's bachelor inexperience can surely alone explain his strange account of the suppositions of the marriage law of that day, and their effects. The law certainly abolished all division of possessions, but it did so by making the husband sole proprietor.

man is here supposed to love himself alone, and to depend only

“But suppose the relation of the sexes to be established in nature, a family is formed; and particular rules being found out for the conduct of the sexes, these are im-

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further. But again, suppose that several distinct societies maintain a kind of intercourse for mutual convenience and advantage, the boundaries of justice still grow larger, in pro-

portion as we become acquainted with the extensive utility of that virtue.”—(IV. pp. 262—4.)

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portion as we become acquainted with the extensive utility of that virtue.”—(IV. pp. 262—4.)

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portion as we become acquainted with the extensive utility of that virtue.”—(IV. pp. 262—4.)

that virtue.”—(IV. pp. 262—4.)

The moral obligation of justice and the rights of property are by no means diminished by this exposure of the purely utilitarian basis on which they rest:—

“For what satisfaction can be desired or conceived for any duty, but that human satisfaction which

the more inviolable the regard is which is paid

dilemma seems obvious: As just

promote public utility, and to support

sentiment of justice is either derived from our reflecting on

that tendency, or, like hunger, thirst, and other appetites, re-

sentment, love of life, attachment to offspring, and other

The moral approbation, therefore, with which we regard acts of justice or benevolence rests upon their utility to society, because the perception of that utility or, in other words, of the pleasure which they give to other men, arouses a feeling of sympathetic pleasure in ourselves. The feeling of obligation to be just, or of the duty of justice, arises out of that association of moral approbation or disapprobation with one's own actions, which is what we call conscience. To fail in justice, or in benevolence, is to be displeased with oneself. But happiness is impossible without inward self-approval; and, hence, every man who has any regard to his own happiness and welfare, will find his best reward in the practice of every moral duty. On this topic Hume expends much eloquence.

“But what philosophical truths can be more advantageous to society than these here delivered, which represent virtue in all her genuine and most engaging charms, and make us approach her with ease, familiarity, and affection? The dismal dress falls off, with which many divines and some philosophers have covered her; and nothing appears but gentleness, humanity, beneficence, affability; nay, even at proper intervals, play, frolic, and gaiety. She talks not of useless austerities and rigours, suffering and self-denial. She declares that her sole purpose is to make her votaries, and all mankind, during every period of their existence, if possible, cheerful and happy; nor does she ever willingly part with any pleasure but in hopes of ample compensation in some other period of their lives. The sole trouble which she demands is that of just calculation, and a steady preference of the greater happiness. And if any austere pretenders approach her, enemies to joy and pleasure, she either rejects them as hypocrites and deceivers, or if she admit them in her train, they are ranked, however, among the least favoured of her votaries.

“And, indeed, to drop all figurative expression, what hopes can we ever have of engaging mankind to a practice which we confess full of austerity and rigour? Or what theory of morals can ever serve any useful purpose, unless it can show, by a particular detail, that all the duties which it recommends are also the true interest of each individual? The peculiar advantage of the foregoing system seem to be, that it furnishes proper mediums for that purpose.”—(IV. p. 360.)

In this pæan to virtue, there is more of the dance measure than will sound appropriate in the ears of most of the pilgrims who toil painfully, not without many a stumble and many a bruise, along the rough and steep roads which lead to the higher life.

Virtue is undoubtedly beneficent; but the man is to be envied to whom her ways seem in anywise playful. And, though she may not talk much about suffering and self-denial, her silence on that topic may be accounted for on the principle *ça va sans dire*. The calculation of the greatest happiness is not performed quite so easily as a rule of three sum; while, in the hour of temptation, the question will crop up, whether, as something has to be sacrificed, a bird in the hand is not worth two in the bush; whether it may not be as well to give up the problematical greater happiness in the future, for a certain great happiness in the present, and

“Buy the merry madness of one hour
With the long irksomeness of following time.”¹

If mankind cannot be engaged in practices “full of austerity and rigour,” by the love of righteousness and the fear of evil, without seeking for other compensation than that which flows from the gratification of such love and the consciousness of escape from debasement, they

¹ Ben Jonson's *Cynthia's Revels*, act i.

are in a bad case. For they will assuredly find that virtue presents no very close likeness to the sportive leader of the joyous hours in Hume's rosy picture; but that she is an awful Goddess, whose ministers are the Furies and whose highest reward is peace.

It is not improbable that Hume would have qualified all this as enthusiasm or fanaticism, or both; but he virtually admits it:—

“Now, as virtue is an end, and is desirable on its own account, without fee or reward, merely for the immediate satisfaction which it conveys, it is requisite that there should be some internal sentiment which it touches; some internal taste or feeling, or whatever you please to call it, which distinguishes moral good and evil, and which embraces the one and the other.

“Thus the distinct boundaries and offices of *reason* and *taste* are easily ascertained. The former conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood: The latter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. The one discovers objects as they really stand in nature, without addition or diminution: The other has a productive faculty, and gilding and staining all natural objects with the colours borrowed from internal sentiment, raises in a manner a new creation. Reason being cool and disengaged, is no motive to action, and directs only the impulse received from appetite or inclination, by showing us the means of attaining happiness or avoiding misery. Taste, as it gives pleasure or pain, and accordingly creates happiness or misery, becomes a motive to action, and is the first spring or impulse to desire and volition. From circumstances and relations known or supposed, the former leads us to the discovery of the concealed and unknown. After all circumstances and relations are laid before us, the latter makes us feel from the whole a new sentiment of blame or approbation. The standard of the one, being founded on the nature of things, is external and inflexible, even by the will of the Supreme Being: The standard of

the other, arising from the internal frame and constitution of animals, is ultimately derived from the Supreme Will, which bestowed on each being its peculiar nature, and arranged the several classes and orders of existence."—(IV. pp. 376--7.)

Hume has not discussed the theological theory of the obligations of morality, but it is obviously in accordance with his view of the nature of those obligations. Under its theological aspect, morality is obedience to the will of God; and the ground for such obedience is two-fold; either we ought to obey God because He will punish us if we disobey Him, which is an argument based on the utility of obedience; or our obedience ought to flow from our love towards God, which is an argument based on pure feeling and for which no reason can be given. For, if any man should say that he takes no pleasure in the contemplation of the ideal of perfect holiness, or, in other words, that he does not love God, the attempt to argue him into acquiring that pleasure would be as hopeless as the endeavour to persuade Peter Bell of the "witchery of the soft blue sky."

In whichever way we look at the matter, morality is based on feeling, not on reason; though reason alone is competent to trace out the effects of our actions and thereby dictate conduct. Justice is founded on the love of one's neighbour; and goodness is a kind of beauty. The moral law, like the laws of physical nature, rests in the long run upon instinctive intuitions, and is neither more nor less "innate" and "necessary" than they are. Some people cannot by any means be got to understand the first book of Euclid; but the truths of mathematics are no less necessary and

binding on the great mass of mankind. Some there are who cannot feel the difference between the *Sonata Appassionata* and *Cherry Pipe*; or between a grave-stone gutter's cherub and the Apollo Belvidere; but the canons of art are none the less acknowledged. While some there may be, who, devoid of sympathy are incapable of a sense of duty; but neither does their existence affect the foundations of morality. Such pathological deviations from true manhood are merely the halt, the lame, and the blind of the world of consciousness; and the anatomist of the mind leaves them aside, as the anatomist of the body would ignore abnormal specimens.

And as there are Pascals and Mozarts, Newtons and Raffaelles, in whom the innate faculty for science or art seems to need but a touch to spring into full vigour, and through whom the human race obtains new possibilities of knowledge and new conceptions of beauty; so there have been men of moral genius, to whom we owe ideals of duty and visions of moral perfection; which ordinary mankind could never have attained; though, happily for them, they can feel the beauty of a vision, which lay beyond the reach of their dull imaginations, and count life well spent in shaping some faint image of it in the actual world.

THE END.

