

C O N T E N T S.

1. The Disorders Inquiry Committee,  
1920. Vol. 4 - Evidence - Lahore  
& Kasur.

2. do. Vol. 5 - Evidence - Gujaran-  
wala, Gujrat, Lyallpur & Punjab.

THE DISORDERS INQUIRY COMMITTEE

---

# EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE


Disorders Inquiry Committee

---

VOLUME

IV

LAHORE AND KASUR



CALCUTTA  
SUPERINTENDENT GOVERNMENT PRINTING, INDIA  
1920

**VOLUME IV.**

**LAHORE AND KASUR.**

	<b>Pages.</b>
<b>Part I.—Oral evidence :—</b>	
<b>Lahore</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Kasur</b>	<b>159</b>
<b>Part II.—Written Statements of witnesses subsequently examined orally :—</b>	
<b>Lahore</b> . . . . .	<b>279</b>
<b>Kasur</b> . . . . .	<b>361</b>
<b>Part III.—Martial Law notices and instructions, Lahore and Kasur . . . . .</b>	<b>393</b>

## WITNESSES.

LAHORE.

Serial No.	Name.	Oral evidence.	Written statement.
		PAGE.	PAGE.
1	ABDUL AZIZ, Khan Sahib, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Political Branch, C.I.D., Punjab . . . . .	101	348
2	AGNIHOTRI, Pandit K. N., Proprietor, "The Capital Sports Works," Lahore . . . . .	154	359
3	AMAR NATH, Rai Bahadur, M.B.E., Joint Registrar, Lahore . . . . .	127	353
4	AYA SINGH, SARDAR, Head Booking Clerk, Golden Mosque Booking Office, Lahore . . . . .	148	358
5	BADHAWA MAL, Rai Sahib, Head Accountant, Moghalpura Workshops, North Western Railway, Lahore . . . . .	130	354
6	BEYNON, Major General Sir G. L. W., K.C.I.E., C.B., D.S.O., Commanding 16th (Indian) Division, Lahore . . . . .	57	320
7	BOWRING, Mr. I. W., Superintendent of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab . . . . .	98	348
8	BROADWAY, Mr. E. P., Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore . . . . .	31	314
9	CLARKE, Mr. W. G., Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lahore . . . . .	76	343
10	COCKS, Mr. G. A., Deputy Inspector General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab . . . . .	97	347
11	DALE-GREEN, Mr. A., District Traffic Superintendent, North Western Railway, Lahore . . . . .	113	349
12	DWARAKANATH, Rai Sahib SETH, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lahore . . . . .	95	347
13	FATEH ALI KHAN, Nawab, Qazilbash, C.I.E., Lahore . . . . .	132	354
14	FERGUSON, Mr. J. A., Registrar, High Court, Lahore . . . . .	148	359
15	* FYSON, Mr. H., I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Lahore . . . . .	..	338
16	GULSHAN RAI, Mr., Vice-Principal, Sanatan Dharam College, Lahore . . . . .	149	359
17	HARDING, Mr. C. B., Deputy-Superintendent, Railway Telegraphs, Lahore . . . . .	120	351
18	HEMRY, Mr. A. S., Principal, Government College, Lahore . . . . .	124	353
19	HUNTER, Major J. C., R.E. (Temp.) Carriage and Wagon Superintendent, North Western Railway, Lahore . . . . .	114	350
20	JIWAN LAL, LALA, Inspector, Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab . . . . .	141	357
21	JOHNSON, Lieutenant-Colonel FRANK, D.S.O., Royal Sussex Regiment, Commanding, Lahore . . . . .	1	279
22	KEOUGH, Mr. J. E., Extra Assistant Commissioner, Lahore . . . . .	80	345
23	LUCAS, Rev. E. D., Principal, Forman Christian College, Lahore . . . . .	120	352
24	MITCHELL, Mr. ALAN, I.C.S., Additional Deputy Commissioner, Lahore . . . . .	74	338
25	MUHAMMAD SHAH, Sayad, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Lahore . . . . .	86	346
26	NORTH, Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon'ble W. F., Officer Commanding, Fort Lahore . . . . .	83	345
27	RAHIM BAKHSH, SHEIKH, Senior Sub-Judge, Lahore . . . . .	92	346
28	RAHMAT ILAHI, Mr., B.A., LL.B., Pleader, Lahore . . . . .	157	360
29	RAM SARAN DAS, LALA, the Hon'ble Rai Bahadur, C.I.E., Lahore . . . . .	139	356

\* Mr. Alan Mitchell, I.C.S., appeared on his behalf.

Serial No.	Name.	Oral evidence.	Written statement
		Page.	Page.
30	RYAN, Mr. C. C., Station and Assistant Traffic Superintendent, North Western Railway, Lahore . . . . .	118	331
31	SOHAN LAL, the Hon'ble BAKSHI, Vakil, High Court, Lahore . . . . .	136	336
32	WATKINS, Mr. O. W., Works Manager, Loco., North Western Railway, Lahore Junction . . . . .	117	350

## KASUR

1	AHMAD KHAN, Khan Sahib, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lahore . . . . .	184	366
2	AMAR SINGH, SAEDAR, B.A., LL.B., Pleader, Kasur . . . . .	268	300
3	ANANT RAM, LALA, Municipal Commissioner, Kasur . . . . .	259	348
4	DOVETON, Captain A. C., 1-30th Punjabis . . . . .	207	370
5	KEHAR SINGH, BHAI, Assistant Station Master, Kasur . . . . .	257	388
6	KHAIR-UD-DIN, M., Travelling Inspector of Accounts, North Western Railway . . . . .	249	386
7	KHAN CHAND, LALA, Tahsildar, Kasur . . . . .	200	366
8	KHARAK SINGH, BAWA, Sub-Inspector of Police, Kasur . . . . .	263	389
9	MARSDEN, Mr. P., I.C.S., Sub-Divisional Officer, Kasur . . . . .	159	361
10	MCRAE, Lieutenant-Colonel H. St. G. M., D.S.O., Commanding Kasur Area. . . . .	225	371
11	MITTER, Mr. R. F., Extra Assistant Commissioner, Kasur . . . . .	196	368
12	MOHAN LAL SETH, LALA, Vakil, High Court, Punjab, and Municipal Commissioner, Kasur . . . . .	235	384
13	MUNRO, Lieutenant H., 2-17th Infantry . . . . .	244	385
14	RAYNOR, Mr. V. O., District Traffic Superintendent, North Western Railway . . . . .	254	387
15	SHERBOURN, Mr. A. J., Signal and Interlocking Inspector, North Western Railway . . . . .	246	386
16	SHUJA BEG, MIRZA, Honorary Magistrate, Patti . . . . .	264	390
17	TARA SINGH NARULA, Mr., Bar.-at-Law, Kasur . . . . .	181	365

# Volume IV

## PART I

### Minutes of Evidence, Lahore

At Lahore, Monday, the 24th November 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B.,  
K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Rai Bahadur G. K. ROY, Superintendent (*Acting for Secretary*).

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON, D.S.O., Royal Sussex Regiment, late Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

*By the President—*

Q. You commanded for a time the Lahore Area?

A. Yes.

Q. It was from the 15th April to the 29th of May that you held the command?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What was the area under your control?

A. It was called the Lahore Civil Area. It consisted of country between the Ravi river and the Bari Doab Canal and was within a radius of three miles from the Central Telegraph Office. Subsequently it included the Moghalpura Works.

Q. Roughly speaking it consisted of about a million population?

A. About 240,000.

Q. What was the date of the outrage in Lahore?

A. Thursday, the 10th of April.

Q. What sort of forces were available on that day to maintain law and order?

A. Before the Martial Law?

Q. At the outbreak of the outrage, i.e., at the time when the command was handed over to you?

A. I had only 580 men available including the police. After Martial Law was proclaimed roughly speaking I had 1,500 rifles besides the police.

Q. You prepared a statement\* which you communicated to the Adjutant-General in India during the occurrences narrating the steps you had taken to deal with the situation?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On certain points arising out of that statement I want information. In the first place in Appendix I† to that report you have given a chronological summary of the signs of unrest, acts of violence and outrages here?

A. Yes, Sir, Appendix I.

Q. Was that compiled from information which was before you at the time?

A. I took a good deal of time in collecting information.

Q. Are there any corrections to be made in it?

A. In this report.

Q. In that Appendix?

A. I know of none.

Q. In Appendix II,\* I think you have supplied a graphic diagram showing the rise of criminal acts under four heads?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. According to that diagram the four coincide to some extent with the declaration of Martial Law or a little before the declaration?

A. I think the outbreak begins after the shooting at Amritsar.

Q. As regards Lahore itself was the only bloodshed that occurred before Martial Law was proclaimed?

A. Yes; not a shot was fired nor any violence used after that.

Q. I think so far as the Lahore Area was concerned conditions had been more or less normal until the 6th of April?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On that day there was a *hartal* in connection with the agitation against the Rowlett Acts?

A. That is so, Sir.

Q. Had additional troops been drafted into the Fort on that occasion?

A. On the evening of the 6th.

Q. I think some cavalry were also sent from Cantonments to assist the police?

A. That is so, yes.

Q. But no actual collisions occurred with the police?

A. None, Sir.

Q. You referred to what had occurred here and in Amritsar; I need not trouble you with the incidents there. When did the information reach Lahore as to what had occurred in Amritsar?

A. It reached me at 12 minutes past 5.

24 November 1919.]

LT.-COL. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

Q. At that time did you get any instructions as to what you were to do with the troops?

A. At 5.12 the Staff Captain gave me the information and orders.

Q. What did you do with the troops then?

A. The first 200 men I collected with Lewis guns and mules and put into a special train which was waiting and sent them as fast as possible to Amritsar, and as men began to come in I sent them off in parties to various vital points in Lahore by Air Force lorries.

Q. What were the vital points in your opinion that required protection?

A. The Telegraph Office, the Gymkhana Club, where there were a large number of European ladies, thirdly and practically simultaneously Government House, and subsequent to that the European hotels.

Q. I do not know whether you have the information—if you have not it does not much matter. What size was the force which you assigned to each of these points?

A. One officer and 40 men to the Telegraph Office. First of all one officer and 20 men; but he no sooner reached there than he sent an urgent telephone message that he could not hold the place with the number. I then telephoned him and sent on the detachment with us at the Punjab Club to reinforce him. So they had 40 men at the Telegraph Office. They had another 45 men at the Gymkhana Club, about 50 men at Government House and about 25 men at the Punjab Club and subsequently 25 or 30 at Faletti's Hotel. This of course did not all take place at once and it took about an hour and a half to get the men together. It was a Thursday and a Military holiday and the men were absent at sports.

Q. At what time did the unrest show itself in the city?

A. I was not there, but I am told it showed itself at about 6 o'clock. They came out of the city at about 10 minutes to 7; at any rate, they appeared at the Telegraph Office at that time.

Q. How did they come out of the Lohari Gate?

A. The Lohari Gate and down the Anarkali Bazar.

Q. Was it a large crowd?

A. I did not see it but my officer at the Telegraph Office reported that he thought it was about 6,000.

Q. What effect had the sight of British soldiers that were at the Telegraph Office upon the mob that came out?

A. The report of the officer in charge of the detachment there was that they turned half left, as it were, going up the Mall to the Telegraph Office and he got his bayonets fixed and came to the high port and advanced, whereupon they halted, and there was hesitation for a minute and then they went off down the Mall. They turned to their right rear and went down the Mall.

Q. Was there any force of military and police to bar their passage down the Mall?

A. There was a very small force a little lower down by the Cathedral, a force of police.

Q. Was that police force effective in barring the way of the crowd?

A. They did after they fired.

Q. I think they were under the control of the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Fyson?

A. Yes; and Mr. Cocks.

Q. How far was the place at which the firing took place from the Gymkhana Club?

A. I should not think it is more than a dozen yards.

Q. At the Gymkhana Club, as you have indicated, were there a large number of ladies and children collected?

A. They are always there, every evening.

Q. Do you know what casualties were inflicted on the mob by the firing that took place on that occasion?

A. I do not know, of my own knowledge.

Q. Later on that night, at about 10 o'clock, there was firing by the police in the Anarkali Bazar?

A. Yes, Sir; near the Lohari Gate.

Q. Did any military fire on that occasion?

A. No, Sir; I may say that no shot was fired by a soldier in Lahore at all.

Q. At any time?

A. No, Sir.

Q. During the night was the city in a state of great excitement?

A. I take it, Sir, no white man could go into the city; the police had evacuated the city that night and it was given over to the mob until two days later.

Q. So far as you could judge, was the action in evacuating the city by the police a right and prudent action to take?

A. Absolutely.

Q. I think, meantime, certain detachments of Indian troops had been posted at certain places?

A. Yes.

Q. At what places were they?

A. I am speaking from memory. They were the Railway Station, the water works, the electric light works, and the Ravi Bridge.

Q. Were the headquarters of the 43rd Brigade moved into Lahore?

A. They came in on Thursday night the 10th and stayed there until 6 a.m. on the 15th.

Q. Did you think that appearance of military force had any effect in maintaining order?

A. I think it had every effect.

Q. And in fact, there was no outbreak in Lahore on the 11th?

A. There was nothing on the 11th; they were shut up in the city.

Q. Were meetings being held in the city on that day?

A. I am told so, Sir; of course I was not there.

Q. And you heard in particular about a large meeting at the Badshahi Mosque?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 12th April, was any resolution come to as to the necessity of obtaining control of the city again?

A. Yes, Sir. It was decided to do that at all costs.

Q. And what means were resorted to in order to do it?

A. I was given a column of about 800 mixed troops and police and told to go into the city and re-establish police and military control there.

Q. I think you took the road up the Delhi Gate into the Delhi Gate and came out at the Bhati Gate? On that occasion was there any firing?

A. Yes, Sir. At the Hira Mundi, we fired a few shots to extricate the rear-guard.

Q. Was that firing done by the military or the police?

A. No, Sir; it was done by the police supported by British troops.

Q. I think in entering the city in that way you were supported by certain aeroplanes?

A. Yes, Sir; by four aeroplanes co-operating.

Q. What was the intention with reference to these aeroplanes?

A. I made arrangements with the Officer Commanding the four aeroplanes, Col. Minchin, at midnight, before we went in, that two of them should fly as low as they possibly could and watch for a signal which I would give by firing a "Very" pistol. If two shots were fired he was to drop bombs 200 yards ahead of the troops; because I did not want my troops cut about by bombs or rifles from the roofs of houses.

Q. Did you indicate to the mob or the leaders of the mob what course you were going to pursue in the event of an attempt being made by bombs or gun-fire upon your troops?

A. Yes, Sir. On arrival at the Delhi Gate, I got Mr. Fyson, the Deputy Commissioner, who accompanied the column to call for the leaders and explain to them that that was my intention and they would have 15 minutes or 10 minutes in which to make that known to the people in the city so as to play the game with them.

Q. As a matter of fact, you never had occasion to make use of the aeroplanes?

A. No, Sir.

Q. In what condition was the crowd through which you passed?

24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

A. Very sullen, very bad-tempered, not to say savage in places.

Q. Were any attacks made on any part of your force?

A. It would be wrong to say an attack until the incident you referred to on the rear guard at Hira Maudi, that was a distinct attack.

Q. You gave the order, I think, to the police to fire?

A. As a matter of fact, I did not. I thought we had cleared up the trouble in the vicinity of Hira Maudi, as we had been halted there for three quarters of an hour clearing that large open space on to which the crowd came from the Badshahi mosque, and I rejoined the head column which was in the street facing the Bhati Gate. I had only just given the order to advance, and that order did not reach one of the rear units round the corner, and they stood fast. It was only subsequently that I heard shots being fired. I left the head of the column and found the police had given orders to fire and I confirmed the order and carried on for a minute or two.

Q. What casualties were there?

A. One killed; there may have been five wounded.

Q. And in consequence of the firing did the crowd fall back?

A. Yes, Sir. And the moment I saw that they commenced to fall back I ceased firing and ordered some British troops to advance with the bayonet, and that was sufficient.

Q. How long were you in the city on that occasion on the 12th?

A. I entered at 9.30 and left at 1.30.

Q. And by the time you left, had the city quietened down?

A. The parts that I went through had, and where I had posted strong detachments of Indian troops and police.

Q. Was that action taken with a view to the maintenance of order?

A. Yes. Patrols were sent out. I considered the state of the city such that I left orders that no troops were to move in parties of less than 200.

Q. Did you consider a smaller number would be insufficient?

A. Yes, insufficient.

Q. I think all these troops were armed with rifles?

A. All of them.

Q. On the 13th and 14th, did any further actual disturbance take place in your area?

A. No.

Q. But I think the *hartal* continued?

A. The *hartal* continued and got even more strict and better organized.

Q. What effect had this *hartal* on the life of the city?

A. It paralysed it, Sir.

Q. The city was in that position, I think, when the Government of India authorised the introduction of Martial Law?

A. Yes, Sir. It was then very complete.

Q. Martial Law was in fact declared on the morning of the 15th?

A. Yes, Sir. I think the information was received here at 4 A.M. from Simla and it was actually proclaimed to the people at 11 o'clock.

Q. The Ordinance is dated the 14th, but the proclamation did not take place till the 15th?

A. Yes; morning of the 15th.

Q. What was your opinion then, and what is your opinion now, as to the necessity for Martial Law being declared at the time it was declared?

A. My opinion then, Sir, was, as it is now, that no act done by the Government of India was ever of greater value to India. It undoubtedly saved Lahore from much worse trouble than they had at Amritsar. Its effect was instantaneous.

Q. Coming to the period of Martial Law, I think the headquarters of 49th Brigade and Cavalry were withdrawn to Lahore Cantonment?

A. Yes; at 6 A.M. on the 15th.

Q. Then a separate military area was created and placed under your command?

A. That is so.

Q. That separate military area is what you refer to as Lahore Civil Area?

A. Yes; within 3 miles of the Telegraph Office.

Q. And you indicated that in addition to the troops under your disposal you had a number of police?

A. About 800.

Q. Altogether, you had a force of about 2,000.

A. Yes, Sir; about 2,300.

Q. You have in an Appendix† to your report indicated the bi-monthly strength of the garrison of the area?

A. Yes; it varied a little from time to time.

Q. Those are the actual figures?

A. Yes.

Q. On the declaration of Martial Law, did you receive offers of assistance from a number of officers who were on leave?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. At 11 o'clock on the 15th, did you issue your first notice to the public announcing, *inter alia*, the introduction of martial law?

A. That is so, Sir.

Q. And that, I think, is printed as an appendix to this report?

A. Yes, Sir; Appendix IV.\*

Q. How was that notice proclaimed?

A. It was printed at the Government Printing Office in Vernacular and English and distributed throughout the city.

Q. Was that distributed by hand?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was it posted in any parts of the city?

A. Oh yes; in dozens and dozens of places.

Q. I see that in that notice you indicate in a general and brief way what is the effect of Martial Law?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. It gives the military commander a full discretion in dealing with the situation, independent of the existing civil institutions?

A. That is so, Sir.

Q. Looking at the orders that you issued on that occasion, they are briefly these, I think. You prohibited all persons other than Europeans or persons in possession of a permit from being in the street between 10 at night and 5 in the morning?

A. Eight at night; it was 20 hours.

Q. And prohibiting gatherings of more than 10 people and warning them that drastic reprisals would be taken in the event of a bomb being thrown or shot fired at either troops or police; prohibiting the interference with any persons desirous of opening their shops, requisitioning of tongas, tumtums, motor vehicles?

A. Yes, Sir. That is all I did that morning.

Q. In an Appendix,† you have further indicated all the different Martial Law orders and notices issued by you during the period of your authority?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. That Appendix contains an accurate statement of all of them? Reading it through, I doubt if it is quite correct. In No. 12, I think, there must be a misprint. Order No. 12, last paragraph, 2nd line. After the word "persons" should be inserted "other than Europeans."

A. That was my intention at any rate.

Q. Now in connection with certain of these orders, I would just like to ask you a question or two. Generally speaking I may take it that in this report you set forth accurately the reasons you had for promulgating these different orders?

A. Yes, Sir. In some detail I put it there.

Q. Take first what is known as the Curfew order; you indicate briefly the objects of pronouncing that Curfew order?

A. May I quote from this?

Q. You can quote from that or give it in your own language.

A. My first object was to save the strain on the troops and police under my command. If people were wandering about all night, it would have meant a tremendous lot of extra patrolling. If you keep people in their houses you keep them out of mis-



chief and save one's police and troops from doing a lot patrolling.

Q. I think such an order as that is an order very usually passed when Martial Law comes into operation?

A. I think always where there is a dense population. I have administered Martial Law under other conditions where one has not issued that order.

Q. So far as the effect of it was concerned, it had a good effect?

A. Excellent; with a population of a quarter of a million of people in the city, I think I am right in saying there were something under 20 people who were convicted for breaking it.

Q. Do you know whether there were any serious complaints made by citizens as to their suffering hardship from the operation of that order?

A. The only complaint that I heard, the only real complaint, was the alleged difficulty of women in child-birth being attended by doctors or nurses.

Q. And in consequence of that you relaxed the order?

A. Yes, Sir. I may say that from the very start, from the first day I realised that I had to give exceptions to that; and on the morning of the 15th, I had passes printed to give to people who had any reasonable excuses whatever to be allowed out.

Q. This order was altered, I think, as regards the time during which it was to operate very shortly after the 15th April?

A. I think the first alteration was 4 or 5 days afterwards, when I altered it to 9 o'clock; and subsequently, as the behaviour of the people warranted it and the situation came under control I further relaxed it till ultimately the streets were only close for 2 hours in the night.

Q. When was that?

A. Some date in May.

Q. It was before you ceased to command?

A. Yes.

Q. In connection with the order about gatherings, on the face of it, that seems rather a severe order, as it prohibits all processions or gatherings of more than 10 persons. Did you in connection with that make specific concessions?

A. Oh yes; whenever it was really necessary, such as in the case of funerals, and even for weddings.

Q. These relaxations that you made were they done by a written permit or a verbal permit?

A. They were always written. They always got permission from the staff officer.

Q. Did you attach considerable importance to the warnings which you gave in your notices in the event of bombs being thrown?

A. Yes, very great importance.

Q. In that connection did you take steps to explain the position to the leaders?

A. Yes, Sir. I had up a hundred of the leading men on the 1st day of Martial Law and explained to them what was going to happen.

Q. What action did you indicate to them would be taken in the event of a bomb being thrown?

A. Well, if I might say so, the only two courses that were open to me were to take hostages from every street threatened, shoot them or flog them if anything happened in that street, but knowing that was useless because it was only an empty threat I was looking for some other course. I therefore told them that if any bomb fell or that if any British soldier or anybody was wounded or injured as a result of that bomb that spot would be deemed the centre of a circle having a diameter of a 100 yards and that I would give them one hour in which to remove everything living from that circle and that at the end of that time the demolition of every building, other than mosques and temples, would take place inside that circle. And they understood it.

Q. Fortunately you did not have occasion to put that into force?

A. No, Sir. As a result of this order I received an enormous number of anonymous letters giving the names of *badmashes* concealed in various people's houses. They were very excellent detectives in the whole city after this.

Q. Did any good effect result from the prohibition you issued against interference with people desiring to open their shops?

A. No Sir, because I could not enforce it as they had private picquets inside and outside and there is no doubt that tremendous moral persuasion was brought to bear upon people not to work.

Q. And the effect of that picqueting considerably counteracted the effect of your order?

A. Yes Sir, undoubtedly.

Q. About the other orders that you issued as regards the commandeering of tongas and tum-tums, I see you have stated the object for which this was done and I do not suppose you desire to add anything more?

A. No, Sir, I hope I have stated it very clearly.

Q. I see in your report that you say "the order to report was obeyed with alacrity, over 800 tongas and tum-tums being registered, 800 subsequently reduced to 200 tongas were retained for military service." That refers to the 800, was this 800 retained?

A. They were reduced to 200 and this took place within a few days and all these were retained all the time that I was in command in Lahore. They were kept merely for the purpose of moving women and children in time of danger.

Q. With reference to this order you gave exemptions?

A. Yes Sir, on condition that they *bona fide* plied for hire and dropped their *hartal*. They had to report to the police twice daily.

Q. In fact did they do so?

A. Yes, there was not a single case of a *tum-tum-wala* being convicted.

Q. Then there was a similar order as regards motor-cars?

A. Yes, they were purely for military purposes.

Q. Then you had an order as regards railway tickets purchased; that is a matter on which you might give us something more?

A. My main object in preventing the people of Lahore, which I looked upon as the capital of the Punjab, and the centre of the trouble, was to limit their activities and to prevent gentlemen going into other districts and causing trouble there. And another reason was the railway people were unable to cope with the traffic.

Q. Were the duties of the management considerably eased in consequence of this order?

A. Undoubtedly.

Q. Was that order obeyed?

A. On the first day they did but they then got to stations just outside my area where there was no order against them taking tickets. The General Officer Commanding Lahore Area then decided this was not good enough, a similar order was issued, and that stopped it.

Q. You issued an order dealing with these *langars*?

A. Yes, Sir. These were places where food was provided free—alleged charitable institutions.

Q. Why did you consider it necessary to close these *langars*?

A. There were two reasons. They became very convenient centres at which sedition could be preached, where one could not get, and as long as there were people of this class who could keep out of work and get their food without working naturally they considered it a good state of things to support a *hartal* and from that class who went to get free food the extremist picquets were supplied.

Q. I see in the Appendix\* a statement of the punishments that were inflicted upon students?

A. By the Principal with my concurrence.

Q. Were any complaints made about the orders issued as regards the students?

A. I really do not remember. They did not like it.

Q. Did you yourself under Martial Law deal with any students who were offenders or did you leave that entirely to the Principal?

A. I think there were two who absconded—that is, who failed to carry out the Martial Law order in reporting themselves and I made the Principal of each college responsible for advising me of an absentes. Two

24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

were reported only out of five thousand and one I succeeded in arresting at Lyallpur and he was brought before me, but as he produced proof that his mother was dying or was very ill, I promptly let him off.

Q. In connection with the *hartal* you had orders to break up the *hartal*?

A. I issued orders bearing on the military situation.

Q. You have already stated that the *hartal* was paralyzed?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In your opinion did you expect the restoration of order as long as the general strike lasted?

A. As long as the general *hartal* continued one could not expect restoration of order. It was an essential precedent to the restoration of order.

Q. Did you in that connection as regards the breaking up of the *hartal* intimate to the people the procedure you intended to follow?

A. I caused it to be intimated to the shop-keepers in the Anarkali Bazar. I took that bazar first instead of the whole area under my command. I deemed it wise never to issue an order I could not carry out and I could not enforce the breaking of the *hartal*, so I took a small portion of it and told them frankly what would happen if they did not obey.

Q. What did you tell them?

A. If by a certain hour they did not open their shops, I would picquet the streets with a strong body of troops and police and proceed to burst open each shop. I would then place two soldiers in each shop to protect the owners and their goods and I should then expect business to be carried on as usual, and that if they were not there to sell goods or to receive money for them the British soldiers would supply *bona fide* customers with such goods, but that they would not be authorised to make book entries for them or to receive money.

Q. What effect did that have upon the situation?

A. All the shops were opened hours before the time specified.

Q. Following upon that result did you extend your order as regards the opening of shops to the whole city?

A. To the rest of the area—that was from the 17th.

Q. And the effect of this order was illustrated at the Moghulpura Railway Works?

A. Yes, Sir. The number of workers rose from something under four thousand on the 16th to a figure approximating ten and a half thousand upon the 19th.

Q. You had an order prohibiting the circulation of false reports?

A. They were getting very thick.

Q. What sort of reports were these?

A. The most ludicrous ones one could think of. The king was dead, the Afghans were at Peshawar. Anything was good enough for the people.

Q. I think you only prosecuted one person for a breach of this order? And he was the man who wrote an account in a vernacular paper of the presence of a large Turkish force with the Afghans at Landi Kotal?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. As regards the possession of guns and arms by the population what steps did you take?

A. If I had had my own way I would have taken every rifle and arm away at once not because I distrusted the loyalty of the particular people—the license holders—but in order to prevent them from being stolen, keeping them in safe custody from people who might use them unlawfully, but as the Lieutenant-Governor thought it would hurt the feelings of a number of these men of undoubted loyalty, I restricted it in fact to those people whom one had reason to think might not be able to look after their arms. There were about 400 of them.

Q. You issued certain orders as regards the regulation of prices on commodities?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Are these orders issued under Martial Law?

A. I have never seen it before. But I had to consider the military situation. If people are hungry and have not sufficient money to buy the necessaries of life they take action which they would never dream of doing if their stomachs were full.

Q. Did you find that prices were high?

A. There is no question of it. It was profiteering of a flagrant type.

Q. I suppose orders of that sort regulating the prices dissatisfied some and satisfied others?

A. It dissatisfied those engaged in selling them but the consumer was undoubtedly satisfied. There was a complete change in the atmosphere of the city at once.

Q. Did you find these orders regulating prices had an effect on withdrawing supplies?

A. No, Sir, I took care never to apply that to any article or store I could not control. For instance, pressure was brought to bear to control the price of *ghi*, but as *ghi* is not in this area at all or under any area under Martial Law it was impossible for me to control it and the result of attempting to lower the price of *ghi* would have meant a shortage in the city.

Q. In administering a regulation like that in Great Britain there would be great difficulty in maintaining the supply?

A. One has got to remember that there is one law above Martial Law and that is the law of supply and demand.

Q. Were you controlling the whole supply?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think you found that there was a certain amount of adulteration particularly with regard to milk and you took steps in connection with that?

A. Yes, Sir. It was apparently the custom here to adulterate the milk and consumers rather liked a certain amount of water, but it did not occur to them to adulterate it themselves.

Q. In your report you dealt with a certain amount of blackmail that was prevalent among certain people?

A. Yes, it undoubtedly did exist. Perhaps I should have used the prefix "sub" before the word "conscious" in sub-paragraph 53.

Q. What difference does that make?

A. If I am conscious of a thing I take it that I have some definite proof but I had an uncomfortable feeling that all was not quite well.

Q. Where you found that bribery existed did you punish the person taking bribes?

A. Appendix V\* will show that heavy punishments were meted out under Martial Law.

Q. May I take it that everything was done to discourage and not to encourage such practice?

A. My great object was to try and keep it down.

Q. As regards your other orders dealing with the opening of the Badshahi Mosque did you close it for some time?

A. As a matter of fact it was closed by order of the Deputy Commissioner before Martial Law came into force. I agreed in the continuance of that order after I took over control and I thought it under the circumstances extremely necessary to continue it until I got guarantees from the religious communities concerned that it would not occur again.

Q. It was closed in consequence of a joint seditious meeting of Hindus and Muhammadans?

A. That was it, Sir.

Q. You did not make arrangements for the re-opening?

A. When I got the guarantees that I asked for.

Q. During the time of the closure of the mosque were you approached by a number of people to get the regulation modified?

A. Yes, I was submitted to great pressure. Ultimately they agreed with my conditions.

Q. What were those conditions?

A. I do not think I have got them but briefly they were these†—that there should be 15 leading Muhammadans in this city, not in the whole area, who should make themselves personally responsible that such a thing should never occur again—that no seditious or even political views should be preached from the pulpits there—that it should be kept purely for religious purposes and that no Hindu should ever again be permitted to enter that mosque. These I think were the leading points.

Q. In Appendices\* V, VI and VII you set forth details of convictions and punishments that took place

\* Pages 307 et seq.  
† Vide Annexure A—page 30.

24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

in the summary courts. Can you under Martial Law orders constitute these summary courts?

A. The officers were appointed by me in this particular case. I was their Senior Officer. The Lieutenant-Governor appointed a certain number of Civil Magistrates who acted.

Q. Either an officer or a Civil Magistrate dealt with these offences in a summary manner?

A. I took most of the cases myself—about more than half—Major Barnes and Major Hunter also assisted.

Q. All the offences were brought under the Martial Law orders that were issued?

A. We did not deal with any offences against the existing law.

Q. During this time were the ordinary law courts doing their judicial work?

A. I think so. I do not know what their functions would be but naturally they would be suspended under the operation of Martial Law. Most of the serious offences committed under that Martial Law were tried by the special commissions. They dealt with crimes that were committed before the introduction of Martial Law dating back some three days before.

Q. In connection with these lists I see that altogether they were 277 persons of whom 69 were acquitted and 208 convicted?

A. That is so, Sir.

Q. Of these 140 were dealt with by Major Barnes and yourself and 187 by Civil Magistrates specially appointed for the purpose?

A. To begin with most of them were dealt with by Civil Magistrates but in order to get a uniformity of sentences—I found it better to deal with them myself.

Q. What was the maximum sentence that was pronounced in the court?

A. Two years' hard labour, 80 lashes and a fine of Rs. 1,000.

Q. Could you give them the lot?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In point of fact the total number of punishment inflicted amounted to 74 months' imprisonment, 832 stripes and Rs. 6,818 of fine?

A. That is so, Sir.

Q. That is the total punishments inflicted by Major Barnes and by the Civil Magistrates?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think 20 persons received 74 months' imprisonment or an average of 8·7 months?

A. That is so, Sir.

Q. And stripes were distributed among 66 persons on an average of 12½ each?

A. That is so, Sir.

Q. The sentences that you actually pronounced varied from 6 months to one?

A. Yes, Sir. The greater sentences were of six months for blackmail, and I think there was nothing under a month. It was not worth putting any one in for under a month.

Q. And the corporal punishment was from 20 to 50?

A. Yes, Sir. I never went to the full number.

Q. As regards corporal punishment on whom was this inflicted?

A. Upon able-bodied men only. I issued an instruction to all serving under me in the very early days of Martial Law. I think it is here, it is Appendix IX.\* I was rather after that people might lose their heads a little by the administration of Martial Law and sentences under it, and so I sent that round first of all as a private memorandum to the officers concerned. I was asked afterwards to publish it.

Q. I take it that that order which you refer to is a general instruction as to the conduct that should be observed in the administration of Martial Law?

A. That is it, Sir.

Q. In addition to dealing with the matter of punishments by whipping, it also gives advice as to the observance of such conduct as to prevent anything like harsh treatment or abuse of Martial Law?

A. Quite so. I was so anxious to prevent or stop an abuse of Martial Law.

Q. As regards the whipping sentences, were these pronounced by the Civil Magistrates and the specially constituted courts?

A. I am not suggesting that it was wrong. As a matter of fact, most of the whipping was done by them.

Q. Where did the floggings take place?

A. More or less in the vicinity of the courts where the sentences were passed, i.e., the Reservoir Chowka, in the immediate vicinity of the courts, and some were sent down to the old Kotwali. The Civil Magistrate was sitting in the Telegraph Office, they were flogged in the compound there. There were 11 cases altogether of that kind. Then there came an expression of wish,—that was practically an order—from the Commander-in-Chief, that flogging should not take place even in semi-public. After that the other 55 were flogged in the Central Jail, Lahore.

Q. Do I understand that except in those 11 cases where flogging was inflicted quasi-public, all the other floggings were inflicted entirely in private?

A. Yes, in private, inside the Jail.

Q. The suggestion has been made that flogging in certain cases may have had serious effects on the health of the persons subjected to it?

A. I have not heard of any serious effect upon persons. No case was reported to me, Sir.

Q. Can you imagine the punishment having a serious effect?

A. I cannot imagine that type of punishment as administered has a very serious effect.

Q. Do you consider in administering law under Martial Law conditions that the right to inflict punishment by flogging is a valuable right for an officer to possess?

A. I think it is absolutely essential. I think it is the kindest method of punishment because it is the greatest deterrent that you can possibly get; for mere imprisonment and mere fines do not act, they do not deter the people.

Q. Can you explain to me the procedure that was adopted in the Summary Courts?

A. I had a printed notice. It is Martial Law No. 5. Unfortunately I have not got with me a copy of it. It is a long sheet based on the form used in the Civil Magistrates' Courts containing the date of his arrest, his name, the name of his father, the district from which he came, a note of the offence under which he was charged, a short statement of the case for the prosecution, a short statement of the defence, a little column showing whether convicted or dismissed and in the case of conviction the sentence that was applied.

(Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate, produced a form which was identified by witness.)

Q. Do you hear evidence for the prosecution in these courts?

A. Not necessarily.

Q. Were the accused represented in these courts?

A. The accused were representing themselves.

Q. There was the right of representation?

A. Oh, yes! And the fact, if I may say so, that some 25 persons escaped conviction rather shows that their cases must have been heard.

Q. There are many cases of people being arrested and not brought up for any charge for substantial period of time?

A. I never heard of it. There was a little confusion perhaps for 24 hours. I saw the trouble that was likely to arise and that people might get lost in the courts of Martial Law. (Here the witness went up to the President and produced Martial Law Forms Nos. 4 and 5.) I never heard of a case of a man having been lost and not brought up.

Q. There are a number of people arrested and afterwards released without any charge preferred against them?

A. They were released within 24 hours. Every man was dealt with within 24 hours. I cannot remember the exact number of cases.

Q. During the 24 hours what provision was made for them?

A. They were detained like an ordinary prisoner and fed.

24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

Q. What was the practice as regards handcuffing them with other persons?

A. I don't know but I take it for granted that they were handcuffed till they were put inside the lock-up.

Q. Were they merely handcuffed, were they not taken to the lock-up and detained and hand-cuffed in the lock-up?

A. I do not know. The police can answer that. I never heard of it.

Q. Still less you have heard that they were detained in custody handcuffed, one person being handcuffed with another?

A. This is the first time I have heard it suggested.

Q. I think it has come to your notice before you sent this report to the Adjutant-General that there was a rumour about certain people having been shot at night?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What is the foundation for that?

A. It is merely somebody's imagination. There was no foundation at all.

Q. Had one or two shots been fired during the night on one occasion?

A. Yes, Sir. That was not in my Brigade. It was in the Lahore Brigade on the Ferozepore Road about 5 miles off when some missionaries had gone out to rescue some ladies who they thought ought to be brought in safety and a Native Infantry patrol there fired on the motor car. Those were the only shots fired.

Q. There were no casualties?

A. Only they hit one tyre.

Q. During the period of your administration of Martial Law did you carry out some defensive works in connection with the vital services at Lahore.

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. They were as regards light, power, water and telegraph?

A. That is so.

Q. And you give full details with your reasons for undertaking them in your report?

A. Yes, Sir. In Appendix VIII,\* Sir.

Q. Under arrangements made before the introduction of Martial Law by the Divisional Commander, were a number of women and children evacuated to Hill Stations during April and May?

A. Yes, Sir. Some 600.

Q. Did that leave a considerable number in the city?

A. Not in the city, but in the Civil Lines there were left about 1,800.

Q. Was it practically impossible to evacuate them?

A. It was very difficult. First of all, there was no room in the hill stations for them. Secondly, very few of them had the necessary finances to get there.

Q. I see in your report you suggest that the matter of having provision beforehand for dealing with such a situation is worthy of consideration?

A. Yes, Sir, because I have been in rebellions before where the presence of women and children very seriously cramped the military, if I may say so.

Q. Do you think that something might be done to ensure that more rapid and greater evacuation of all women and children might take place in the case of a rebellion?

A. I think so, Sir.

Q. As regards the general question, in your opinion, what was the effect of Martial Law on the situation?

A. I think that it was a great factor for maintaining peace and preventing bloodshed in Lahore, Sir.

Q. Was it necessary to continue it for the length of time for which it was continued?

A. I think so, Sir. On account of the trouble on the frontier it was necessary to continue to have Martial Law on the Railways because the Railways were very vital points of communication with the frontier, and the Railways came through Lahore.

Q. You have already explained that gradually the intensity of the regulations under Martial Law was relaxed?

A. Yes, Sir. They were practically non-existent except for two hours at night, the people were required, unless for special reasons for being on the

streets, to keep in their houses and as long as they obeyed for those two hours they carried on without any hindrance.

Q. I take it that in the latter period of the administration of Martial Law there were very few cases that had to be dealt with by the Summary Courts?

A. I have not got the dates here, but I feel I am right in saying that about 75 per cent. occurred in the first fortnight, and roughly there had been 5 per cent. of these in the last month.

Q. After you left on the 29th of May until the 6th of June Martial Law continued?

A. It continued I heard.

Q. Who administered it?

A. Colonel Brackenbury of the 42nd Division.

Q. In your second last Appendix\* you published a notice signed by Danda Akhbar?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Where was this found?

A. That was obtained by the police at Lahore.

Q. It was not published in Lahore?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. It was circulated by hand?

A. I don't know. I got it through the Police.

Q. I see in that notice statements to this effect that "The Danda Fauj of Amritsar bravely killed a number of European monkeys and their Sikh regiments have revolted and deserted." There is also a passage to this effect "Oh, Hindu, Muhammadan and Sikh Brethren, raise the cry of Allah-u-Akbar and kill the Kafirs. Get ready soon for the war and God will grant victory to India very soon."

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Do you consider that the publication of such notices was a very serious matter?

A. I do, Sir. It showed me that there was not a mere political agitation, but we were face to face with the elements of an organised rising.

Q. Do you know whether the origin of that publication was ever discovered?

A. I was not aware of that. The C. I. D. can tell you, Sir.

(Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate:—This particular passage has been brought out in the Main Lahore Conspiracy Case, Sir.)

Q. So far as the people of Lahore were concerned did they seem to acquiesce in the administration of Martial Law?

A. I think I am not exaggerating, Sir, when I say that they all liked it, i.e., the masses of the people. I had almost daily representations coming to me from the different people in Lahore and all of them thanked me for the preservation of peace and nearly all of them, curiously enough, were making the remark that after all this was a state of affairs to which for some thousands of years their forefathers had been used, to be governed by hukm so to speak.

Q. During the period of Martial Law what have you to say as to the conduct of the military and the police?

A. I should say it could not possibly have been better. I have not a single regrettable instance reported to me or a complaint made to me about the conduct of the police or of British soldiers or of an Indian soldier.

Q. Did you have any cases of insubordination or breach of discipline?

A. None whatever. The discipline was perfect, under rather trying circumstances, at times.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. If I follow you, your view is that apart altogether from Martial Law being necessary to stop the spread of infection to outlying districts, it was necessary to prevent bloodshed and murders in Lahore?

A. Exactly, Sir.

Q. I want to come to the three occasions on which, if I have got the story correctly, there was actual firing in Lahore?

A. Only on three occasions.

Q. The first was on the 10th, when this mob of seven or eight thousand people were coming down the Mall?

24 November 1919.]

IA.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

A. That is so, Sir.

Q. Have you any idea how many police fired on that occasion, how many rifles fired?

A. I was not there myself. I believe there were only 20 police.

Q. I see the casualties were said to be one killed and five wounded?

A. Yes, I was told so.

Q. It hardly looks that there had been a great deal of firing?

A. If I may say so a great deal of the musketry of the police was not good. I saw it myself on one occasion and it was less than third class.

Q. Anyhow with the result that one was killed and five wounded it appears to be the case that that mob of 7 or 8 thousand was checked and afterwards pressed back?

A. That is so.

Q. You did not see the mob yourself?

A. I did not see it. I was at the headquarters.

Q. On the second occasion on which there was firing I think later on that night in the Anarkali Bazar I take it that you did not see it?

A. I did not see it.

Q. Apparently there was a report about the casualties there and they amounted to 2?

A. That is what came through the Intelligence. The report was circulated the next morning.

Q. On that night, as I understand, all the police and outposts in the city were withdrawn?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that done in consequence of the incident at night?

A. It was done in consequence of the general position in Amritsar and Lahore and information was coming in every minute of fresh troubles.

Q. But apart from that instance of being heavily stoned were there any instances in the bazar on the night of the 10th, of friction between the mob and the police?

A. I should say none. One must have heard of it if there had been any.

Q. The police having been taken away there were left small bodies unprotected?

A. There was nobody to fire inside the city.

Q. As regards the actual condition of the city when the police picquet were withdrawn during that night, had you any other sources of information?

A. No, none.

Q. Apart from the fact that one of the police picquets did get into collision with the mob that part of the story is left to inferences?

A. Exactly, there was nobody to give definite information.

Q. Anyhow on the 11th you thought it necessary to post strong picquets at important points?

A. I received on the night of the 11th an order to proceed the next morning and take certain troops allotted to me and take up a position in the city.

Q. The first thing you did was to establish the control of the city?

A. By marching through and dropping about 200 men at each point.

Q. You said that before you commenced the operations you called for the leaders and you told them what you were going to do if there was any rifle firing from houses or bombs dropped on your troops from houses?

A. I caused them to be told; I do not speak their language unfortunately, and so I got the Deputy Commissioner to tell them.

Q. Do you remember or did you know at the time who were the individual persons who were treated as the leaders of the crowd for this purpose?

A. I do not know their names. They hold very prominent positions.

Q. You picked them up from what they were doing at the time?

A. One assumed from the part they were playing in the proceedings. The Deputy Commissioner was representing the Civil authorities and he told them.

Q. Who would see that these people were the right leaders?

A. I think the Deputy Commissioner did. I was only there then with the aid of the Civil power. There was no Martial Law.

Q. Then from what date do you consider that you established control of the city in any practicable sense?

A. I do not consider that one had got what you call full control of the city excepting in a very military sense on the 12th, i.e., I thought it necessary to give an order that no troops should move unless in parties of 20. I was very glad that I had over 800 with me when I went.

Q. But when did you consider that the control of the city was restored for practical purposes?

A. That is to say, that the Europeans could march in safety. Do you mean to say that, Sir? I should say at the end of the first week it was reduced to 50, three or four days afterwards it was again reduced and finally it was reduced to 10. At that time I think that probably individual Europeans could go about in safety.

Q. As regards the orders that you issued—I do not want to ask you any questions, but there is one thing that I want to ask you on that Martial Law Instruction No. 2, the one you refer to in Appendix IX, paragraph 8. About the punishment of whipping you say "the punishment of whipping in particular, whilst probably the most efficacious and convenient method of summarily dealing with most minor breaches of Martial Law Regulations, requires tact and commonsense in its infliction. Under no circumstances should old and feeble men be flogged, and the social status of the offender also needs consideration." Now looking at the list of offences for which this punishment was inflicted, we see a large number of offences included in it, but there are a great many minor offences, breaches of Martial Law Regulations, for which whipping was not in fact administered at all?

A. Right, Sir.

Q. I only want to suggest, is it not a little strong to suggest that whipping should be regarded as the most efficacious and convenient method of summarily dealing with most of the minor breaches of Martial Law Regulations. Is it not ordinarily treated even under Martial Law as an exceptional punishment?

A. I can hardly agree with you, Sir. You have got this issue before you. You have a great population and only a limited jail accommodation. You are creating now offences in large numbers by the issue of these orders. If jail is the only punishment that you are going to inflict, it would not affect the population here at all because, viewed generally, I do not think the ordinary householder in the city very materially decreased his amenities of life by living on jail food. In fact I did not realize that the population was going to accept Martial Law Regulations as well as they did, and when I foresaw that the jails would be full with hundreds of cases, I considered it necessary to resort to the punishment of whipping. There is also another point, Sir. One sentence of whipping deters other people far more than dozens and dozens of sentences of imprisonment.

Q. I quite follow what you say about having the power to inflict sentences of whipping being a valuable asset and doing what a thousand rifles cannot do, but in point of fact, as things have turned out, it does not seem to be true, that whipping was the usual punishment for officers under the circumstances against Martial Law?

A. No, I think all officers who administered this form of punishment looked upon it as an unusual form of punishment to be resorted to, and they did it rather charily, and I think they carried it out very well considering the fact that only 66 men were whipped in the whole population of Lahore.

Q. You say that under no circumstances should old and feeble men be flogged. That goes without saying, but I gather from what you say in your Report, as a matter of fact, able-bodied men were flogged, and those, I understand, were people who had not much social status?

A. Exactly.

24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

Q. There again, does not that rather show if one had to do all this over again that whipping ought not to be regarded as a normal punishment for breaches of minor offences?

A. I do not think so. I think if I had to do it over again I would stick to it.

Q. I understand there were Martial Law proclamations almost every day, and persons might commit breaches of those regulations without being guilty of any great offence?

A. Quite, that is where tact and commonsense come in.

Q. If you mix these proclamations with tact, it becomes entirely a right?

A. I have always hoped that there would be a substantial amount of tact in dealing with such persons, and I think there was.

Q. Can you tell me as the ordinary punishment to be resorted to, in the absence of reasons to the contrary, is whipping a most convenient method?

A. Yes, in the two instances I have known, whipping is always a most convenient method.

Q. Most convenient to the person who inflicts it?

A. Or causes it to be inflicted.

Q. It is a punishment that used to be employed in the British Army and has gone out long ago, and I understand it has nearly gone out practically in the Army in India, and is it not rather in the nature of a survival when it is regarded as an ordinary punishment in cases of Martial Law Administration on civil population?

A. Well, I still think that the value of it is so great that when the civil population runs amok, if I may say so, as in this case, it is the only method by which you can deal with it, unless you have got vast numbers of troops.

Q. I understand you to say that in the case of Lahore these sentences of whipping were being administered as much by the civil magistrates acting as Martial Law officers as they were by the military officers?

A. As a matter of fact, it was more—a coincidence.

Q. And in the Lahore area under you, you thought it necessary to keep that work largely in your own personal hands with the assistance of Major Barnes?

A. I did; but then Major Barnes was sitting with me in the office all day long. He knew my views as to uniformity of punishment. Civil Magistrates were dotted all over the place who were acting for themselves in fact, and I saw great disparity in some of the sentences.

Q. I understand while the maximum number of lashes was restricted to 30, in your area 20 was the maximum number?

A. That was the greatest number, the average being 12.6.

Q. With regard to the orders about tongas, carriages, was there a good deal of enquiry as to whether a particular person owned a carriage or did not own a carriage or a tonga?

A. Yes. Having said that everybody who had or owned a tonga, should give it up, one naturally sent for information from the Corporation and Police and ascertained whether anybody had failed to comply with that order.

Q. What was the practice pursued in the case of persons who the Police thought owned a carriage and did not give it up?

A. They went and saw whether he had or had not.

Q. Was the man himself summoned to start with or did the Police investigate?

A. I presume the Police investigated on the spot.

Q. So far as you are aware, the men had not been summoned to attend office, but the question was gone into by the Police and investigated and they made their own enquiry?

A. Yes, I take it so. I know nothing to the contrary. I have never heard it suggested that men were summoned or arrested without facts, having been determined beforehand, but I know in the case of motor cars which I regarded as more serious, there was prolonged enquiry before the owners were brought up.

Q. What was the earliest date on which you can safely say that the chances of renewed outbreak in Lahore itself had practically gone?

A. It is a matter of opinion of course. I should say any time after the 15th of May after the Afghan trouble had broken out without again affecting Lahore. I do not think it was before that date.

Q. In your view up to somewhere about the middle of May, there was always the possibility of renewed disturbances in Lahore itself unless the situation had been grappled with firmly?

A. Undoubtedly. I do not think Lahore would have risen itself, left to itself. But as a result of risings elsewhere in India, they may have reacted on Lahore. Lahore was in a mood.

Q. We know that the commencement of the trouble in Lahore was apparently in consequence of the trouble in Amritsar?

A. Undoubtedly it reacted here at once.

Q. Until about the middle of May, did you keep up arrangements for example with the object that women and children should be got into a central spot if necessary?

A. I got them up to the last day I left.

Q. At the commencement of Martial Law, can you tell me whether a great many arrests were made straightaway in Lahore in connection with the disturbances of the 10th?

A. I supplied escorts and troops.

Q. When you came on the 12th, was there a certain collection of arrested persons who had not yet been dealt with, in the lock-ups?

A. I do not think they were in the lock-ups, i.e., Police thanas. A large number of persons were in the Lahore Central Jail.

Q. With regard to that I take it that investigations would be pursued before they could be sent up for trial?

A. They were not coming to me for trial. All those people were arrested for offences against the ordinary law, not against Martial Law regulations. Their cases were obviously being prepared by the Police and C. I. D., to bring them before the bigger tribunal.

Q. All that really you had to do with the collection of people would be to assist the Police and give them escorts to enable arrests to be made?

A. That is all.

Q. From information or otherwise can you give me the date on which the bulk of these arrests were made?

A. No; I could not. I think it can be got from the war diary, but it is all in 4 or 5 days.

Q. It was no part of your object in going into the city on the 12th to make arrests?

A. No; my orders were to establish control in the city.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Colonel Johnson, You told us that on the 10th there were two occasions on which firing took place?

A. Yes.

Q. Then there was firing on the 12th, I understand?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that at the Badshahi Mosque?

A. It was about three hundred yards on this side of the Badshahi Mosque, a place known as Hira Mandi.

Q. Was that in connection with a meeting that was being held at the Badshahi Mosque?

A. No; it was an attack on my vanguard.

Q. Were you present at that fire?

A. I was present; I got a brick myself.

Q. How did you happen to go there? What did you hear? What information did you get on which you went?

A. I was carrying out my orders to march through the city and to establish Military posts at various places. In pursuance of those orders after I passed the water works, I got to that open space beside the Badshahi Mosque and I had the people addressed by the civil authority who tried to get the crowd dispersed.

24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

Q. When you went there, were there crowds in the street?

A. Not in the street but in the big open stretch between Hira Mandi and the Badshahi Mosque, and as they refused to disperse when ordered by the civil authority, I sent a squadron of cavalry to facilitate the dispersing.

Q. What were the casualties on that occasion?

A. One killed and 4 or 5 wounded with buckshot.

Q. Then there was fire again I see on the 13th?

A. I do not think so.

Q. On the 13th when a large meeting was held?

A. I think that was in Amritsar.

Q. There was no fire in Lahore on the 13th?

A. There were only two occasions, one on the 10th and one on the 12th.

Q. Colonel Johnson, were you in touch with what was happening in Lahore before the 10th?

A. From the 10th. From the 5th, I knew what was happening and I had to send a portion of my own battalion as a military preparation.

Q. You knew what was going on about the end of March about the Rowlatt Act and passive resistance?

A. I read in the papers.

Q. You had not personally anything to do with those things?

A. Nothing whatever.

Q. There was *hartal* on the 30th March?

A. As a matter of fact I do not know, but if you say so, I have no doubt it is true.

Q. The authorities tried to prevent the *hartal*?

A. The authorities were trying.

Q. On the 30th of March?

A. I really do not know.

Q. Have you any knowledge about what happened between the Deputy Commissioner and certain prominent men in Lahore with regard to the *hartal* and these events before the 10th?

A. None whatever.

Q. Who will be able to speak about that? The Deputy Commissioner?

A. I should think obviously he is the man.

Q. Mr. Fyson?

A. Yes.

Q. Is he in Lahore?

A. Not to my knowledge. I have not seen him here.

Q. Then who would be able to speak of those events?

A. I cannot very well suggest. I cannot help you. I would, if I could.

Q. Are you aware that after the fire on the 10th and also after the fire on the 12th, people were asking for the dead and the wounded and the authorities were making difficulties about giving them?

A. I am not aware of it on the 10th. On the 12th they took their dead; one man had duly buried them.

Q. And the killed on the 10th?

A. I do not know about the 10th. I was not present. On the 12th the dead were taken and buried and I did not interfere with them.

Q. That was on 12th?

A. Yes.

Q. You are not aware of the various meetings that took place between certain prominent men and the Deputy Commissioner and negotiations about getting the killed and the wounded?

A. No; as a matter of fact I heard that such meetings were held, but it was not a matter for us. I was not in Lahore at the time. I could not tell you what happened.

Q. You have told us now that the last firing was on 12th?

A. That is so.

Q. After that there was no occasion to resort to firing?

A. None whatever.

Q. And practically before the 15th the Civil Authority with the aid of the Military had recovered control of the city and the civil station?

A. Up to a point they had; as I said it was dangerous for a European to walk through the city on the 15th.

Q. Up to a point they had recovered control?

A. Up to the point that armed troops had to march through the city.

Q. That is with the aid of the Military?

A. That is exactly so.

Q. On the 14th, civil authorities had arrested certain prominent men in Lahore?

A. I believe they had. I do not know anything and I cannot say.

Q. Then when Martial Law was declared on the 15th, what I want to understand is what exactly was the effect on the civil administration?

A. The effect of it was the civil administration as such ceased to exist, with one exception that court martials which form ordinary part of Martial Law, were not to be held, but serious offences which were under the power of first class Magistrates were transferred to special tribunals. That would be the effect of it.

Q. That would be the effect. What I want to understand is what in fact was the effect in Lahore?

A. The effect in Lahore, taking the Police for example, the Inspector-General of Police asked me and I said "carry on." He continued to carry on, although nominally I was in charge.

Q. So the Police carried on?

A. Yes, their functions in the proper manner.

Q. Though nominally you were in charge?

A. Yes.

Q. So also the civil authorities carried on, though nominally under your control?

A. That is so.

Q. And the High Court and the Subordinate Courts carried on their work in the ordinary way?

A. I do not know if they did; I rather fancy they all stopped, but you may be right.

Q. They may have stopped in this sense that litigants did not come or people would not go to the courts but so far as the exercise of jurisdiction was concerned, they did not stop in fact?

A. No; I do not know it; in fact, they did not stop. But I do not think any cases were heard.

Q. That may be owing to this reason, *vis.*, about new cases coming up.

A. It was stopped as regards new cases arising after the proclamation of Martial Law. Any man arrested for some offence after 6 o'clock in the morning of the 15th of April, in case of serious offence would be put up by me for the special tribunal or be dealt with by me. He would not be dealt with by the civil power as such.

Q. You have told us already that Police continued their work though nominally under you, and so they obeyed the civil authorities?

A. Yes.

Q. And in fact, the real control, the real work of the administration still remained with the Local Government and the civil officers though nominally under your control?

A. Not only nominally, actually I was responsible for anything that was done; I knew what was being done.

Q. The Local Government and their officers still carried on their administration?

A. They were not supplanted by Military authorities.

Q. Did the Police go on performing their duties in the ordinary way as before and arrest people?

A. Yes.

Q. And the Deputy Commissioner also carried on his duties as before?

A. Yes; I looked upon him as my chief civil representative.

Q. He also ordered arrests on his own initiative? Did he?

A. Not that I am aware of.

Q. Then after the 15th, I understood you to say that the Police carried on their work as before and made arrests?

A. They carried on their work. I did not interfere with the method of the Police distribution, whether they sent patrols, whether they had pickets or whether certain number of policemen went out together. I left these as purely a police question.

24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

Q. Take the question of arresting people. With regard to that what I understood the position to be was that the Military took no initiative about that; the Police carried on their work and the Military supplied the escort?

A. That is as regards crimes or accusations before the introduction of Martial Law. There were offences. Men were arrested for offences in connection with the Lahore Mall case. The Police knew who the offenders were, and they made those arrests and they applied to me for warrants.

Q. Who issued the warrants?

A. I issued practically every warrant.

Q. And you sent the escort for them?

A. In some cases, i.e., in the case of big men, British escort was sent.

Q. When you were asked to issue warrants, did the civil authorities give you the reasons for the arrests?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it true that blank warrants were issued or were given in possession of the Police?

A. Not to my knowledge. None of the warrants issued by me were blank warrants, I never signed a warrant that was not filled in.

Q. You never signed a blank warrant?

A. No. There was the case of one man; it was not known where he was; he fled to Madras or somewhere. I am not sure that it was not left blank.

Q. After you assumed control, you issued various orders that you have appended to your statement?

A. That is so, Sir.

Q. In No. 1 of those orders, paragraph 5 you say "I forbid any person to offer violence or cause obstruction to any person desirous of opening his shop or conducting his business or proceeding to his work or business. Any person contravening this order will be arrested, tried by a Summary Court and be liable to be shot"?

A. Yes.

Q. You thought such a drastic order was necessary?

A. I think the business of this city depended on breaking the *hartals* and letting people follow their proper business. If you keep people from earning money and they cannot buy bread you will agree that an atmosphere would be created which is dangerous, and I proposed to stop it.

Q. Your view was that the great thing to be done was breaking up the *hartal*?

A. That is one of the great things.

Q. And that no measure was too severe for effecting that object?

A. None.

Q. Then in Order No. 5 you say "Whereas, from information received by me, it would appear that shops, generally known as *Langars*, for the sale of cooked food, are used for the purpose of illegal meetings and for the dissemination of seditious propaganda, and whereas I notice that all other shops have been closed as part of an organized demonstration..... I order that all such *Langars* or shops for the sale of cooked food in the Lahore Civil area, except such as may be granted an exemption in writing by me, shall close....." There you say that the *Langars* were used for the purpose of illegal meetings and for seditious propaganda. What evidence had you to come to that conclusion?

A. I had sufficient evidence to satisfy me that it was true, and I had to draw up the order.

Q. I would like to know what evidence you had?

A. Evidence was laid before me by the Police.

Q. What you had was a Police report?

A. It was Police evidence.

Q. What sort of evidence was it?

A. Statements of facts were laid down.

Q. Have you got those reports?

A. No. I have not. They made verbal reports to me.

Q. No written reports?

A. I have no written reports.

Q. There were verbal reports stating that illegal meetings were held in the *Langar-khanas* and seditious propaganda was disseminated?

A. That is so.

Q. It was reported to you. Who did that? What persons did that?

A. No, I do not know. If I had that information I would give it. Obviously I do not know; otherwise they would have been arrested at once.

Q. You were merely told that *Langar-khanas* were used for this purpose?

A. Yes.

Q. On that you proceeded?

A. Yes. On that I proceeded.

Q. Then in Order No. 6 you say "Whereas, I have reason to believe that certain munshis, agents, dealers, and chaprasis employed by legal practitioners in Lahore are engaged in disseminating seditious propaganda," and therefore you prohibited them from leaving Lahore Civil Command without permission? And you ordered every legal practitioner to submit through the Deputy Commissioner a complete list of every munshi, agent or chaprasi directly or indirectly employed by him?

A. That was so.

Q. What evidence had you before you to come to that conclusion that the munshis, agents and even chaprasis of legal practitioners were disseminating seditious propaganda?

A. I had sufficient evidence to enable me to come to that conclusion.

Q. Was that again verbal or in writing?

A. Verbal. When you are administering Martial Law, you cannot stop to have all things in writing.

Q. Why were these munshis, agents and chaprasis of legal practitioners engaged in disseminating seditious propaganda?

A. I cannot tell you why. My information was that they were.

Q. What sort of information did you get? Were the police making verbal reports to that effect?

A. I do not think there was police only in this case.

Q. Who else made the report?

A. I cannot tell you. I had ample information to go on. I do not remember it. If I did, I would tell you like a shot.

Q. Then by your Order No. 8, this is what you promulgated:—

"Whereas some evilly disposed persons have torn down or defaced Notices and Orders which I have caused to be exhibited for the information and good government of the people in the Lahore (Civil Command), I issue this warning: In future all orders that I have to issue under Martial Law will be handed to such owners of property as I may select, and it will be the duty of such owners of property to exhibit and keep exhibited and undamaged in the position on their property selected by me all such Orders. The duty of protecting such Orders will therefore devolve on the owners of property, and failure to ensure the proper protection and continued exhibition of my Orders will result in severe punishment."

By that order you selected certain properties on which your orders were to be exhibited and you cast the duty on the owners of these properties to see that the notices were kept exhibited undamaged in the position in which they were put. On what principle did you select those particular houses on which these notices were so stuck?

A. There was one principle probably on which I did not select them, and that was notorious loyalty. I did not select them on account of their notorious loyalty. We left it at that.

Q. I want to know the principle on which you selected those particular houses exactly?

A. There were two principles involved. One was the geographical situation of the house, so that in every ward in the city the inhabitants thereof might have ample opportunity of always being certain of finding the notice which I found necessary to publish for their guidance there and it naturally entailed a certain amount of work on the owner in question; and so I selected those whom I thought might just as well be doing a little work.



24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

Q. Those you suspected to be evilly disposed people? Was that your idea?

A. If you like to put it that way, I shall not dispute it.

Q. What was in your mind in doing that?

A. I thought that people who were not known for their loyalty, whom I did not come across in rendering us help, should be employed on that work.

Q. People who were not notoriously loyal, i.e., who were not proclaiming their loyalty openly?

A. Yes; those who did not come and tender their assistance. A number of people did like that in Lahore.

Q. Those who had not tendered any assistance?

A. Yes.

Q. Or those whom you suspected to be not very loyal?

A. Exactly. I tell you frankly that is the reason.

Q. On what information did you come to the conclusion that these particular persons were not loyal?

A. You know that as well as I do. The C. I. D. and the Police information.

Q. You left the selection of these houses to the C. I. D.?

A. They submitted a list. I requested them to send a list of people who were not notoriously loyal. I selected the houses from the geographical position from the map.

Q. Didn't you think that it was rather putting a heavy burden on the residents of those particular houses to see at all times that any particular placard or notice stuck up on the outer walls of the house was preserved?

A. I agree with you that the burden was there.

Q. Hundreds and thousands of people passing in the streets may take it down and the owner of the house will still be liable to a heavy punishment under your notification?

A. It could be seen by a chowkidar that the poster or notice was not tampered with if he wanted to escape arrest and punishment.

Q. All those house-owners or residents had to be chowkidars all the 24 hours of the day to save punishment?

A. He can always be hired. Money will do most things even in Lahore.

Q. Do you think that this was really justifiable to put such a heavy burden on the residents of houses?

A. Undoubtedly. Let me explain my reason. It was absolutely necessary; even you, Sir, will admit, that a quarter million of people inside that city should know what these orders were so that they should not run the risk of disobeying them unintentionally and get into trouble.

Q. I do not object for a minute to your promulgating these orders and taking steps to put the notices in prominent places in the city. That is quite all right. But when you go further and cast a burden on the residents of the particular houses on the outer walls of which the notices are stuck to see at all time of the 24 hours of the day that nobody touches them and over whom they have no control, is not that putting a really unjustifiable burden?

A. It puts a burden, but not unjustifiable. I had got to see that the people of Lahore should know what these orders were. As fast as I caused the notices to be put up, the people of Lahore allowed them to be torn down. That was my trouble. I was willing to take suggestions of any other method of doing that without the aid of the force of Police and troops I had at my disposal. But that was the only method. Could you suggest another?

Q. That is not my job, Colonel.

A. That is the only method I could think of.

Q. I put it to you again that to make the owner of the property liable to severe punishment if any poster put up by you on the outer wall of his house was removed or interfered with or even damaged to any extent by any outsider was rather severe, you don't think so?

A. I do think the burden is there; I admit it, but I don't think it could be very serious because there was not a single case in all these houses of an owner getting

into trouble for inability to retain undamaged these notices that were put up. They all managed to keep it easily.

Q. What else could they do, they would have had to go to jail otherwise, they had to devise some means?

A. I had to devise some means of getting my orders obeyed.

Q. Do you think that was a reasonable order to make?

A. Quite. I would do it again; it was I think one of the few brain waves I had.

Q. You will be able to tell me whether the Ranatan Dharam College was one of the buildings which was selected for putting up this notice on?

A. I believe it was. I do not think it is in the list.

Q. It was not in the list, I understand, but it was subsequently added to it?

A. Yes. It held a very prominent place on the road.

Q. It was not in the original list, this building prominent though it was, but it was added to it several days afterwards?

A. Quite. The list was recast several days afterwards.

Q. Then the notice was stuck on the outer wall or the compound wall, whatever it may have been, of this College and was torn by somebody?

A. That was the information laid before me.

Q. That was the information laid before you?

A. Yes, not by the Police.

Q. And on that is it true that all the students in the hostel of this College were arrested?

A. That is so.

Q. How many of them?

A. I really cannot remember, but I gave orders that every male person found in the precincts of that college should be arrested while I decided what to do with them.

Q. I should like to know how many students were so arrested?

A. May I just ask the officer who received them for internment?

(After referring to Col. North, the witness replied "about 500.")

Q. 500 students were arrested for this notice being torn?

A. Yes, and all the Professors too.

Q. All were so arrested and marched to the Fort, which is three miles away from the College?

A. Quite so.

Q. And during this march they were ordered to carry with them their bedding on their shoulders or their heads, whatever it may be?

A. It was not a heavy load; it was hot weather.

Q. Heavy or light they had to carry their bedding with them, these 500 students and their Professors, that is true?

A. If they wanted to take their bedding with them, obviously they carried it; there was no compulsion of course.

Q. Were they not made to carry it?

A. I gave no orders to make them carry it. If they wanted it they had to take it with them.

Q. It was a hot summer day?

A. It was a May day.

Q. It is very hot in Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. And these 500 students and their Professors were marched a distance of 3 miles that day?

A. Quite.

Q. And they were kept under arrest in the Fort?

A. That is to say they had a corner given them in the Fort.

Q. How long?

A. I think one day, oh, two days.

Q. And they were then released after two days, after taking from the Principal certain undertakings as to their seeing that the notices were preserved?

A. That is so. I got the necessary guarantees that I wanted that it would not happen again.

Q. Do you think that the measure which you took with regard to this College, arresting the 500 students

24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

*Continued.*

and their Professors like this was a reasonable action to take?

A. Yes, I was looking for it. I looked for just such an opportunity.

Q. Your view then was, and your view still is, that it was a reasonable order to make?

A. I had got to stop notices being torn down and I wanted to make an example of somebody who had torn them down.

Q. You considered it then, and you still consider it, to be a reasonable order?

A. Undoubtedly.

Q. And your frame of mind then was, as you indicate in your report in paragraph 43, that you were waiting for an opportunity to bring home to all concerned the power of Martial Law?

A. That was so, Sir.

Q. You were longing for an opportunity?

A. Only in the interests of the people themselves.

Q. I did not suggest it was in any other interest; it may or may not have been, but you were longing for an opportunity to show them the power of Martial Law?

A. Quite.

Q. And you got this opportunity?

A. And I took it.

Q. And you marched these 500 students and their Professors in the sun 3 miles?

A. That is so.

Q. And you still maintain that was a proper exercise of your authority as Martial Law administrator?

A. Absolutely. I would do it again to-morrow in similar circumstances.

Q. Did it ever occur to you and does it occur to you even now, that to have treated 500 students and their Professors like this would create and must have created in the minds of these young men great bitterness and hatred towards the British Government for the rest of their lives?

A. No; it does not any more than when a boy at school is punished it necessarily creates hatred to his master.

Q. Now that I have dealt with these 500 students I may as well take here the action taken generally with regard to the students. The action that you took with regard to the students generally was, as you say in your report, designed to keep students out of mischief and not as a punishment?

A. That is so.

Q. Now what you ordered for that purpose, to keep the students out of mischief was this; you first issued an order with regard to the three colleges, if I understand aright, the D.-A.-V. College, Dyal Singh College, and the Medical College, that there was to be a roll-call of all the students four times a day, and the hours mentioned are 7 o'clock in the morning, 11 o'clock in the morning, 3 in the after-noon and 7-30 in the evening?

A. That is so, Sir.

Q. And the Medical College students, in order to attend this roll-call four times a day, had to walk in all about 17 miles a day?

A. I thought it was only 16, according to my measurements of the map. I measured it.

Q. And they had to walk like this 16 miles a day in the hot May sun of Lahore for 3 weeks?

A. That is so, unless with the exception of a medical certificate if anybody was not fit to walk he did not walk.

Q. You thought then and you still maintain that view, that this was a reasonable order to make in order to keep students out of mischief?

A. That was my opinion then. It kept them from the adjacent villages where they were before I issued that order.

Q. And still is your opinion?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Did it ever occur to you, and does it occur to you now, that it was inflicting upon these students immense hardships to make them walk 16 miles a day in Lahore like that for 3 weeks?

A. No hardship at all for able-bodied young men. It is only ordinary physical training of a mild form.

Q. You thought you were doing them a kindness?

A. Yes; in keeping them out of mischief and physically fit.

Q. I put it to you, as I did with regard to the other suggestion, did it ever occur to you that by treating, I do not know how many hundreds, possibly thousands of students in the manner you did for about 3 weeks with regard to the roll call, you were making these young men very bitter with hatred towards the British Government for the rest of their lives?

A. Yes; it did; but you cannot do what is already done, and I came to the conclusion that there was so much disloyalty in these colleges that nothing I could do would make it worse.

Q. Did it occur to you that it might have this result?

A. In the general appreciation of the situation, yes; that is one of the things that did occur to me.

Q. Did it occur to you?

A. I considered it.

Q. Your view was that all the students were such confirmed seditious, that it did not matter whether you made them any more bitter?

A. If you will look at the last clause of paragraph 39 you will see my view.

Q. I got from what you said just now that there was so much sedition that it could not be made worse. May I take this to be your view that although it did occur to you that this treatment of yours in this matter might result in turning them bitter against the British Government, your view was that they were all of them such confirmed seditious that you could not make them more bitter than they were?

A. I will not accept your description as confirmed seditious, but the seditious atmosphere of these particular colleges was such that you could not hurt them.

Q. And do you think that by the measures you took you were helping in the least to remove that seditious atmosphere?

A. I was certainly not making it worse.

Q. Were you improving it in any manner?

A. I was not out to teach them loyalty. I was out to keep them from mischief and from spreading disloyalty in the district.

Q. And do you think you succeeded?

A. I know I did; because I had no further cases of students being found in the outlying villages.

Q. You think this is the best way to keep students right?

A. The best way I could think of; there were two other ways; one was closing the colleges and sending them home to be dealt with and the other was prosecuting the individual students. I adopted the third way and I would do it again under similar circumstances.

Q. Do I take it to be your view that the best way of making young people in this country loyal and well disposed to Government is to adopt the measures you did to achieve that result?

A. I would put it the other way; that by teaching them there is a penalty for even suspected seditious you are stopping it; that is my view.

Q. Did it occur to you that among those thousands of students there must have been a large number of perfectly innocent ones?

A. Oh yes, and I have dealt with that in the Martial Law form which I handed to the President. Anyone whom I thought loyal was exempted.

Q. Was any exemption, as a matter of fact, made with regard to these four colleges that I have named?

A. To individual students in them? Yes.

Q. How many were so exempted?

A. Unless I get the counterfoil of the book I cannot tell you.

Q. I should like to know how many students were so marched for four days for roll call and how many were exempted from that order?

A. It is there. I found so many of them that I gave up writing the notices and had them printed.

24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

Q. They were exempted on grounds of ill-health?

A. I do not remember any on grounds of ill-health; but their loyalty was demonstrated by their fathers or some one who came and said they were loyal, and there were so many that I had to print notices.

Q. If somebody came and interceded on behalf of any student and said he was loyal you exempted him?

A. If I thought the intercession was worthy of belief.

Q. There are a large number of students of these colleges from the mufussal with possibly no relatives in Lahore city at all?

A. They had got their Principals who acted for their parents, I take it.

Q. Now with regard to the students of all colleges in Lahore you wanted certain punishments to be inflicted on them?

A. I deemed it desirable that they should remember what had happened.

Q. That they should remember what had happened?

A. As far as they had been concerned.

Q. What had they done?

A. I had plenty of information given to me as to the conduct of these students, quite apart from some of them being caught at villages outside. They had been going outside to the villages stirring up sedition there. I had information given to me, dozens of times even as to their insulting white ladies, the cultured classes of these colleges; I had I suppose not less than 20 letters every day addressed to me personally by the students or declared students (of course they were not signed) with even pictorial representations of what they would like to do to me, in such obscene and indecent language that one had to destroy them. There were also in one of the college libraries British illustrated papers in which British officers and British women had disgusting and obscene remarks written against them. This was done by the cultured young men of these colleges. These are some of the things I had to go on.

Q. What was reported to you? In regard to how many individual cases was it reported?

A. I can't tell you, but ample for me to write paragraph 38, ample to justify that.

Q. Nobody denies that there may have been individual students who behaved very badly but from that it is a big jump to come to the conclusion that thousands of students in Lahore had all behaved so badly that they deserved this punishment.

A. Let me put this to you, admitting I thought that only half were tainted with sedition and half were not.

Q. We are not now dealing with sedition, we are dealing with specific suggestions you have made, that some of them went to villages to stir up sedition; some insulted ladies. Those cases could only be few, leaving aside the general seditious tendencies for the moment. Specific allegations could only be with regard to a few?

A. That was quite enough for me.

Q. Because you got reports of the character you mentioned with regard to 20 or 30 or 50 you thought that was enough to justify you in making orders of this character affecting thousands?

A. I thought I was justified in making the orders at the time. I still think so and I shall always think so.

Q. Now with regard to awarding punishments to these students, had you meetings with the Principals of the colleges?

A. One meeting.

Q. And what did you tell them in that meeting: that they were to punish students?

A. I just had a frank talk with them on the whole position of their colleges.

Q. What did you instruct them to do?

A. To submit to me their proposals for adequate punishment.

Q. Adequate punishment?

A. Of the ringleaders.

Q. Did you tell them what percentage of students were to be punished?

A. No: not at that meeting.

Q. Then you fixed a particular day by which the punishments, which they fixed upon, should be submitted to you for approval?

A. That is so.

Q. And they sent up lists to you of the punishments they suggested?

A. They did.

Q. And when you got these lists it was your view that these punishments were insufficient?

A. Some of them were. Some of them were adequate.

Q. And on that did you inform the Principals that unless the punishments were raised the colleges would be closed and the students would be stopped from attending University examinations?

A. That is so.

Q. Have you got that correspondence between yourself and the Principals on the subject?

A. No, I have not.

Q. What happened to it?

A. It was filed in the offices of the Martial Law Administrator. It was taken over with the rest of the office by the officer who succeeded him in command of Lahore.

Q. It must be available somewhere in the official records?

A. I take it it is.

(Note.—Complete file of correspondence as left by Martial Law Administrator was subsequently shown to the Committee.)

Q. Now in that correspondence did you suggest to the principals that a certain percentage of students should be punished?

A. I am not sure; possibly I did.

Q. Because you suggested just now that you did so at some stage.

A. I think I did so, in this correspondence.

Q. You fixed the percentage of each college which should be punished?

A. I took the same percentage as the other colleges whose punishments I thought were adequate.

Q. Because some colleges had suggested punishments for, say 40 per cent. of the students you took that percentage; you took the highest percentage?

A. I do not know; it may have been the mean.

Q. How did you fix the percentage, by some rough method I suppose? You came to the conclusion that 50 per cent. of the students should be punished?

A. Obviously not 50 per cent. because only a fifth of the students were punished. If I came to the conclusion that 50 per cent. of the students were to be punished it would have been a different return.

Q. I gave 50 per cent. only as an illustration.

A. It is a wrong illustration; the figures are there.

Q. And your orders to the principals were to the effect that they must give similar punishments?

A. They need not have done so; their colleges could have been closed.

Q. There was no alternative to that?

A. Except that one alternative of closing their colleges.

Q. And you gave them also a short time to send in their suggestions?

A. Yes; but they already had a week or ten days; when I told them to try again I naturally did shorten the period.

Q. You wanted them to try again and raise the punishments?

A. They were so ludicrously inadequate in my opinion.

Q. That depends on what view you take and what evidence you had of the offences of those students?

A. Quite.

Q. Now about a thousand and odd students were punished in this time?

A. I think 1,011 to be correct.

Q. The students were subjected to Police and Criminal Investigation Department espionage?

A. Not that I know of; only those who disappeared, then one put the Police on to them.

24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

Q. To your knowledge, were individual students of these colleges punished because their relations or their fathers had been arrested in Lahore?

A. Not that I know of. This is the first I have heard of it; one does not as a rule visit the sins of their fathers upon the children so directly as that.

Q. You know the Dayal Singh College?

A. Oh yes.

Q. You know the Principal of the college?

A. I am afraid I have not the privilege of remembering his name, but I do know him.

Q. Was it reported to you that certain objectionable posters had been found up on the outer wall of his college premises?

A. It was so.

Q. And that the same had been removed by the police?

A. No; that was not reported to me.

Q. Did you serve the principal with an order in this matter?

A. I told him to hand over to me the name of the young men of the college who had written it.

Q. The order said that if the college authorities did not find out the writer and report to you by 12 noon of the same day drastic measures would be taken against all concerned with the college?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you got on record a copy of this order?

A. You are quoting from it there.

Q. Will you kindly produce that?

A. Those are my very words; you have got them there.

Q. I would still like the original order produced.

A. The original order is with the college authorities.

Q. Cannot you produce a copy of it?

A. Yes; you can get the original from the college authorities.\*

Q. This is the correct interpretation of the order that unless he found the writer before 12 noon some drastic measures would be taken?

A. Yes.

Q. On this order being made, is it true that the trustees of this college came and waited upon you?

A. I believe they did; I am speaking from memory. Somebody came, they may have been the trustees or the principal.

Q. One of them was Raja Narendra Nath who was once a Commissioner of Lahore?

A. Yes. I do not know he was Commissioner of Lahore, but I will take your word for it.

Q. And they represented to you that they had made careful enquiries and that none of the students in the college were responsible for the poster?

A. They gave me the name of the student who wrote it.

Q. A student of their own college?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you produce that?

A. A man named Aziz. I remember his name. It took me a fortnight to catch him.

Q. I want to get at the real facts.

A. These are the real facts; they gave me the name; they complied with the order.

Q. Can you produce that?

A. When those people came they produced the name of the man who had done it. It was produced to me an hour before I suggested. I could not tell you who produced it.

Q. Is it not a fact that what was represented was that in fact no such poster has been affixed to the college Board outside and you yourself, Colonel, went to the spot to make inquiries?

A. I made inquiries myself to begin with.

Q. Was not the position this, that the college authorities came and represented to you that the informa-

tion that you had that that poster was affixed on the College Board was not correct.

A. I think you are right. The trustee of the people came and told me that there was no such thing as a notice put up. I put this person into the motor car, took a Staff Officer and drove down to the college, and asked him "where is it now, come and show me the place where this poster was put." I should think it was about 9th or 10th, subsequently the college authorities discovered the name of the student who had written it.

Q. Is it true that you fined the Principal Rs. 250?

A. I did.

Q. Or in addition three months' imprisonment?

A. I have forgotten about this.

Q. So he was taken to the College in charge of two soldiers and was only released on payment of the fine of Rs. 250.

A. I think two soldiers would have certainly gone with him to collect the fine.

Q. What you did was you summoned the Principal and you did not release him and sent him in the custody of two soldiers till he paid Rs. 250?

A. That is the normal procedure.

Q. Is it not also true that about a week or 10 days after that, the people convinced you that the college authorities were not responsible for this poster and that you remitted the fine?

A. The last part of your premise is correct. This particular man who had given me information as to the poster having been found and sworn to by him was convicted of perjury at a place called Kasur. That caused a doubt on the evidence that he gave and I remitted that fine.

Q. Then you came to the conclusion that the evidence may not be reliable and you remitted the fine?

A. Yes.

Q. With regard to flogging in the public street?

A. I have already given my information that flogging was carried out in various quasi-public places.

Q. How was the flogging done? Were the people tied to a framework and then lashed?

A. I take it that is the normal procedure again.

Q. Were they stripped?

A. I do not know, I was not there.

Q. Was there any flogging done at the Central jail?

A. Most of the cases were done in the Central jail.

Q. And was that done in the sight of the undertrial political prisoners?

A. None that I know of.

Q. Flogging was also resorted to with regard to people tampering with notices that you had issued or any instances of that character?

A. I know of one case only, where a person got five stripes which was ludicrous. So I at once took away the powers from the Magistrate as he was so lenient.

Q. Was notice No. 12, dated 16th April 1919, "From and after the promulgation of this order it shall be unlawful for more than two persons who walk abreast, etc.,....." What was the object of issuing this order preventing any two persons walking abreast?

A. I think the preamble sets forth the object, if I may refer to it; to stop violence and intimidation.

Q. How could violence and intimidation be practised by two people?

A. More than two people walking abreast. Supposing there were three or four natives coming down the pavement; if they did not give way to an European there was likely to be a breach of the peace.

Q. Kindly use the expression "Indian" as the word "native" gives offence to people. You know that the Government of India have issued orders about this?

A. I did not know, but I shall be careful in future.

Q. Who would commit the breach of peace if they did not give way?

A. Undoubtedly there would be a breach of peace.

Q. You think that you were justified in doing that?

A. That pavement was meant to walk on and if three or four persons walked abreast and took up the whole pavement a European coming from the opposite side

\* All correspondence between Lt.-Colonel Frank Johnson, Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area and college authorities was subsequently shown to the members of the committee.

24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

would naturally resent it, and there would be a breach of peace.

Q. Now with regard to the order about commandeering motor cars. You commandeered all motor cars owned by Indians?

A. I think that is so.

Q. With regard to motors belonging to Europeans that were commandeered what was done to those?

A. Some of them got a certificate of exemption and others were used for military purposes.

Q. Is it true that motor cars commandeered from Indians were given for use to private Europeans? Were the motor cars taken by the military for military purposes?

A. It may have been so in one or two cases. Carriages were taken from Indians and given to European gentlemen whose motor cars had been taken away for military purposes.

Q. Did you consider that a necessary step to take?

A. I think it was a very fair step to take.

Q. The motor cars and carriages of the Indians were taken away from them and not used for Government or military purposes but given for use to European gentlemen?

A. Ample compensation was paid—compensation for damage done. Take the case of Nedou's Hotel who kept a motor car which was probably earning Rs. 50 a day.

Q. When you took the cars and carriages from the Indians not for the purpose of using them for Government purposes but to give them for use to European gentlemen, was that not objected to?

A. Well, I supposed they would object.

Q. Do you think it is a right thing?

A. Yes. I wanted to bring home to them that they could not have risings in the city of Lahore.

Q. You wanted to teach a lesson?

A. It was a part of general lesson.

Q. You commandeered electric lights and fans from people?

A. Yes.

Q. These were taken from various colleges and from various temples?

A. None that I know of. I certainly never signed the order to take electric lights from temples.

Q. Were they taken from colleges?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they taken from the Arya Samaj Institution or Brahma Samaj Institution?

A. I don't know. Personally I did not select any particular house. I made it clear that they were not to take a fan from a room where a woman was.

Q. You are aware that various people were arrested after the 15th when Martial Law came into operation for offences committed under the Penal Code?

A. I believe that is so.

Q. Do you know that among them was one Manohar Lal, Bar.-at-Law, at Lahore?

A. I do not remember his name.

Q. Is it true that this gentleman Manohar Lal was arrested and was kept in jail for a very long time?

A. I have not the slightest idea whether your statement of fact is correct or not.

Q. He was arrested on the 18th April and kept in jail for a month?

A. That may or may not be so.

Q. Will you kindly have inquiries made and let us know?

A. I am afraid I have no powers now. I have no doubt that the representatives of the Government would do this.

Q. Is it also true that during this period from 18th April to 18th May he was kept for a week or 10 days in solitary confinement?

A. I have not the slightest idea.

Q. And ultimately this gentleman was released when he was brought to trial?

A. He was not released by my order.

Q. Are you aware that similarly various other people in Lahore were arrested and kept in prison?

A. I have seen it stated in the press.

Q. Is that true?

A. I do not know. I only commanded Lahore from a certain day. What was done about the prisoners arrested before that date was no business of mine.

Q. After the 15th you were administrator in Lahore? Surely your administration ought to know of this fact that a large number of people were arrested during that period and kept in jail when any charges were made against them?

A. I know there were some 2,000 people and their cases were all being prepared for the higher tribunals.

Q. You never cared to inquire?

A. No.

Q. Has it come to your knowledge that a marriage party in a certain part of Lahore were arrested because they were moving about as a marriage party usually does in that manner, and that people were flogged?

A. It is quite true. It is the one instance that I know of under Martial Law that is to be regretted. The moment I heard of it I had the Magistrate removed and his powers taken away.

Q. Does not that show how dangerous it is to resort to flogging?

A. I am afraid you can't generalize from this particular case.

Q. Is it also true that five persons were arrested and imprisoned because they were driving in a landau?

A. I have never heard of that.

Q. During the Martial Law Administration there was censorship established?

A. Yes, certainly. I took measures to hold up mails at intervals.

Q. And newspapers were not to publish what was happening?

A. I do not think there is any order issued by me to that effect.

Q. You are aware of the trials that took place under the Martial Law Commission?

A. I know they were sitting and trying people. Various people were tried.

Q. Are you aware that on the 14th May General Officers Commanding, Lahore and Rawalpindi, issued a proclamation that no lawyers ordinarily doing their business outside this place should be allowed to come into this area without the permission of the Martial Law administrators?

A. Yes; I heard of that.

Q. And the Martial Law administrator mentioned there, was yourself?

A. Yes, as regards Lahore.

Q. Are you aware that various lawyers applied to you as Martial Law administrator to be allowed to enter the Lahore area for the purpose of defending accused people?

A. As a matter of fact I think one did. They had to pass through other areas under Martial Law.

Q. You are aware of the fact that all the persons were refused permission?

A. I gathered there was a total prohibition.

Q. The notification stated that nobody was to enter the area without the special permission from the Martial Law administrator but in fact permission was always refused?

A. As a matter of fact I dare say it was. But I cannot remember any special application being given to me because they had to go through Amritsar before they got to me.

Q. "That this refusal was dictated by the desire to prevent disturbance . . ." Under that notification a discretion was invested in you so far as Lahore is concerned?

A. I did not issue that notification.

Q. You fixed the price of various commodities—did you think that was strictly within your purview?

A. Absolutely, as long as the people were contented there was not the least likelihood of having trouble. If a poor man had not been allowed to work through the *hartal*, or if he has not got much money through inability to work and he has to pay

24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

double and treble for necessaries of life and has his wife and children hungry he naturally gets desperate.

Q. And you may carry that much too far?

A. It is again a question of commonsense and tact.

Q. Did you think that you were right in issuing orders about the adulteration of milk?

A. I thought so.

Q. Adulteration of milk had gone on for many years?

A. Yes, they reverted to it the very day I left.

Q. You undertook this, as you say in your report, for improving the low standard of business morality. Do you think that step was within your purview?

A. I think you can raise the standard of business morality. I am afraid I was taking rather an unnecessary burden upon my shoulders, rather a hopeless one.

Q. You refer to the Badshahi mosque. I want to understand what the facts are about it. Was it ordered to be kept shut?

A. Yes.

Q. Who made that order?

A. The order was originally made by the Deputy Commissioner, I think, on the 11th or 12th. When I came here I confirmed the order and saw it carried out.

Q. May I have the terms of that order?

A. The Deputy Commissioner may have it. I have not got it. The fact was that it was closed. The order was clearly understood.

Q. Then you confirmed an order without seeing it?

A. I knew the effect of the order. Negotiations were going on for nearly six weeks until they agreed to the terms I suggested.

Q. The fact was that it remained shut for nearly six weeks. Don't you think that action must have wounded the religious feelings of certain people?

A. I don't think so when they allowed Hindus into the same mosque.

Q. You said that after some time Martial Law or rather Martial Law in its intensive form was really non-existent?

A. Yes, the effects of it were lightened.

Q. From what date were they very much lightened?

A. It took place gradually. There was no one specific date. You see the dates are given here. They were altered on five different occasions, it was a gradual development.

Q. By the end of April Martial Law in its intensive form practically ceased?

A. Oh, I do not think at the end of April. The only relaxations were the travelling of public on railways and the curfew, and larger processions were allowed in case of weddings and funerals.

Q. What else was done under Martial Law after the end of April?

A. You will find the orders issued after the 8th of April. I will give them to you if you like. We start with No. 33 on the 2nd May, and from 33 onwards up to the end, all were done during May.

Q. We see from 33 you go only up to 36? Only 3 orders?

A. I beg your pardon, we go up to 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and so on. I think they go on up to 50.

Q. The principal thing after the end of April that was done under Martial Law was to carry on the trial of those persons who had been arrested by special tribunals in a summary manner?

A. I would not say that as the principal thing at all. There was the control of prices, that was another thing that was carried on. In fact none of these orders were cancelled at all during May excepting the alteration in the hours of the curfew. Otherwise the existence of Martial Law remained the same.

Q. I understood you to say that the continuance of Martial Law was not in fact so much necessary for Lahore itself as because of the risings in other places?

A. That was after the 10th May. I think I suggested in my report that after the 10th May that condition would arise.

Q. After the 10th May for Lahore itself it was not necessary?

A. Only as a preventive measure. If there had been a rising somewhere else it might have re-acted at once on Lahore.

Q. In fact there was no rising anywhere else after the 15th April?

A. I think that is right.

Q. In fact from the 15th April till the end of April and the beginning of May there was no rising anywhere at all?

A. That is an historical fact.

Q. So by the time you come to the 10th or 15th May, as you put it, one full month had elapsed with no disturbances, I think, in any other part of the country at all?

A. I think you are eliminating the frontier, but I don't think you can bar the frontier. There is also the trouble between the Afghans and India proper.

Q. True, you had the frontier troubles, we know that.

A. I do not think you can divorce the two things.

Q. But for the moment I am asking you to confine your attention to the country itself; and in the country itself up to the 15th April there was no disturbance and no rising anywhere?

A. You bar all frontier territory this side of the Durand line, do you call it 'in the country itself'?

Q. In that sense of the frontier there is always some trouble or another with the tribes. That is pretty continuous, that is more or less a normal issue, there was nothing new then?

A. I should rather differ from you, if I may with respect.

Q. I admit there was trouble with Afghanistan.

A. Which again re-acted on the frontier and which came south.

Q. You say that Martial Law was liked by the people?

A. So I gathered from the very kindly treatment that people of all kinds gave me.

Q. You think what you call Government by *hukm* is the best suited for them, that is your view?

A. I think they were very pleased. They certainly liked it very much, they told me so.

Q. You think in this country any other rule is a mistake, and Government by *hukm* is the right thing to adopt?

A. I have not said so. I only mentioned it as a matter of fact.

Q. You have had experience, I understand, in Africa?

A. I was there for 20 odd years.

Q. Had you occasion there to administer Martial Law?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Now you grant that the conditions in Africa are quite different from the conditions in this country and that the people there, compared to the people in this country, have altogether a different degree of civilization?

A. They are different. They were much easier to handle.

Q. Different conditions in this sense, there you had to deal with a more barbarous population?

A. I should not call them barbarous, not the particular brand I was dealing with.

Q. I do not know what class of population you were dealing with.

A. I was dealing with people in Bechuanaland.

Q. Is it not a fact that the civilization there among the masses is quite different from what you find in this country?

A. Yes, if it is not abusing the word "civilization," I should say it is very different.

Q. I mean you would not follow in India the same system of administration which you followed in Africa?

A. I did not adopt one single order that we used in Bechuanaland.

24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. There is only one question that I want to ask you, Colonel Johnson. You say in your Report first regarding Amritsar, "A small party of Indian troops broke up this meeting by fire, inflicting severe casualties among the crowd. It is only fair to record my opinion that this incident had a far-reaching effect on the seditionists and agitators in Lahore and was probably no small factor in enabling me, as subsequently shown, to re-establish and maintain order in the area under my command without further bloodshed." Is that just an expression of your opinion, or is that based on any specific facts?

A. It was my considered opinion on account of the tremendous change of atmosphere that took place here after the 14th compared with what took place on the 12th and on account of the information which reached me through secret service of what was going on in the city. I think I put it very mildly. If I had to amend that report at all, I should say that our action on the 13th in Amritsar was a great factor for the maintenance of peace in Lahore.

Q. That action that happened in Amritsar?

A. Exactly, it is my considered opinion.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. How many miles is Gujranwala from Lahore?

A. I really do not know. If you consult a map you can know it. I have not got a map here. I do not know whether it is 38 or 41 or more.

Q. Approximately what is the distance?

A. I should say it is about 40 miles.

Q. Now if you will kindly look at your Appendix I,\* you will see that nothing was done at Gujranwala up to the 14th, and the first time anything happened at Gujranwala was on the 14th?

A. It does not seem to be down there. It is No. 27.

Q. May I know how it is that the effect of what happened at Amritsar on the 15th was very salutary so far as Lahore was concerned but had a very contrary effect upon Gujranwala which is only 40 miles from Lahore?

A. I cannot tell you. I was not there.

Q. Is it not a fact according to your Appendix I that more than 60 per cent. of the offences or crimes that were committed or the disturbances that took place, all took place after the 13th? The total number given by you is 64, and Gujranwala has 27. Therefore about 60 per cent. of the disturbances took place in the province after what had happened at Amritsar?

A. Before the 14th and 15th before news had time to circulate in all districts. I suggest to you that is the answer.

Q. There are many shops in Lahore where arms are sold?

A. I know of one.

Q. And from your statement I find that there are a large number of persons who are license holders?

A. 1,700, I think.

Q. It is a fact that throughout these disturbances there is not a single instance where any fire-arm was used by any of the rioters?

A. As far as I know that is so.

Q. Not only they were not used in Lahore, but throughout the province?

A. I have not heard of their being used. I think there was an instance of a train being fired on, if I am right, I think it was circulated in the military intelligence.

Q. Now from the 30th March up to the time that the Martial Law rule was in force, there are no facts brought to your notice where it is alleged that any person anywhere tried to steal arms or to get possession of arms from any of the license holders?

A. No, I don't remember any such case.

Q. And am I right in supposing that if the people of these provinces had been bent on rebellion, that would have been the first thing they would have done?

A. I say that is my opinion. I think you are right.

Q. You are aware that even in the ordinary dacoities that are committed, fire-arms, off and on, are used by the dacoits and they are in possession of arms?

A. I have read about it in papers.

Q. Even you must have seen in papers that these revolutionary anarchists from time to time have been able to secure large quantities of arms from the Native States?

A. I have not heard that.

Q. Therefore in your opinion they were going to turn out the British Government without the use of any arms?

A. I cannot see how the conspiracy would have developed.

Q. So far as you are concerned, you took charge of everything on the 15th?

A. At 6 A.M. on the 15th.

Q. Therefore I take it that from the 10th up to the 15th no reports of the C. I. D. or the regular police were sent to you or were you consulted?

A. You will be inaccurate in taking that.

Q. You were consulted by the C. I. D.?

A. My headquarters were the Brigade headquarters, and there, I think, I had access to every paper that had come through.

Q. Do I understand that the C. I. D. reports and the police reports were before you before the 15th?

A. Of course they were not read out to me. My battalion headquarters were all in one room, and all information was circulated for military information.

Q. During the time that you were in command, I think for a greater part of the time the Lieutenant-Governor was here in Lahore?

A. As far as I know, he was here the whole time up to about the last week.

Q. And also all the high officials of the Government, Secretaries and all those people?

A. I don't know whether all of them were here. A number of them were here.

Q. Were you in daily communication with those officers during those days?

A. After I commanded I was in daily communication, not with all the officers, but with a certain number of them.

Q. At least they were aware of every order that was issued under Martial Law?

A. Yes, most of them, but not before they saw them in the press like you did.

Q. None of them advised you about the issuing of these orders?

A. There was only one advice given at all . . . . .

Q. Was any advice given to you by any of these officers?

A. I think I have got your case. I want to make quite clear, to save other questions, that every order that you have got here was written by me on my own initiative, and the only one which ever emanated elsewhere related to arms. But every word of these orders was written by me personally.

Q. My point is, after you issued those orders was any advice given to you that they were too severe, they should be modified or anything of that sort? None of these officers ever expressed to you their view or their opinion that some of the orders were harsh and should not be issued?

A. The only instance that I can remember is this. My attention was drawn to various religious festivals taking place and there were suggestions that I should so modify the orders so to suit the religious festivals.

Q. That was the only dissent ever expressed by the officials?

A. I should personally have taken possession of all arms and looked after them myself.

Q. Now nothing happened in Lahore on the 13th, 14th and 15th, so far as you know?

A. No outward sign of rebellion.

Q. Any tangible thing or anything of the kind took place on the 13th?

A. What do you mean by anything? All sorts of things happened.

Q. Any gathering fired on, any person assaulted or anything of that sort?

24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

A. Firing only took place between the 10th and the 12th, so obviously nothing took place on the 13th.

Q. I want to know if anything definite took place on the 13th, 14th and 15th which could be called a sign of rebellion?

A. No.

Q. On the 11th, 12th, 13th and 14th, were not the civil courts and High Court open and were not cases decided by the High Court and civil courts and were they not doing their regular daily work?

A. I do not know. I cannot tell you.

Q. You do not know whether they were closed?

A. I should say they were closed, but I do not know.

Q. You said that you were present where all these things were discussed. Are you not aware that on every one of these dates some of the leaders used to be sent for from the High Court so they must have been going to the High Court? That must have come to your knowledge?

A. I do not remember it.

Q. Are you aware of any summonses issued by the civil courts not being served during those days from the 10th to the 14th?

A. I am not aware.

Q. Are you aware that any person who had to serve a writ or summons on any person inside the city from the 10th to the 14th was prevented by the crowd?

A. I have not heard of it.

Q. Are you aware of any witnesses who were required by the court during these days being unable to receive the summonses?

A. I think I have already said that the courts were closed. I am not aware of that.

Q. So far as the arrangements of the police on the night of the 10th were concerned, were you consulted about it?

A. No, I was not in command.

Q. Were any offences committed between the 10th and the 15th in the night time, offences not connected with these disturbances, because you have stated before that from the introduction of Martial Law there was a great security. I want to know whether you know whether any offences were committed by the crowd or by the outside public or by the regular *badmashes* during the nights between the 10th and the 15th?

A. I have not the slightest idea, but you can get that from the police; they have got a record.

Q. What was the total number of soldiers, British and Indian, required for the purpose of maintaining control of the city on the 11th and 12th and also for the picketting that was required?

A. I think I mentioned the number here. It was about 800.

Q. I want to know the total number?

A. I went in with a column of 800 strong, but I was very thankful it was not weaker.

Q. How many did you leave inside the city?

A. Five hundred.

Q. These soldiers were at your disposal on the night of the 10th?

A. They were at the disposal of the Officer Commanding, Lahore, not at mine.

Q. If he wanted to procure them for the help of the civil authority?

A. Certainly: they were his troops.

Q. However, at a distance of 4 miles from Lahore, in the cantonment, there is a very large number of British soldiers stationed?

A. I should not call it large.

Q. At least there was one division?

A. Nothing like it, Sir.

Q. How many were there?

A. I have not got the information.

Q. Roughly what do you think?

A. There might be 1,000 rifles; that is an outside figure. There is never a division in Lahore.

Q. How many police posts are there inside the city?

A. I cannot tell you really; I have not got the map now.

Q. Were any police posts assaulted from the 30th March up to 10th April inside the city?

A. I am not aware of it.

Q. Except one C. I. D. man was any policeman assaulted by the crowd from the 30th up to the 10th April?

A. Certainly several persons were badly injured.

Q. At the time when stones were thrown?

A. That is on the 10th.

Q. I am not talking of it. Apart from these men, military or police, who were inside the city trying to prevent crowd from throwing stones, I want to know whether between the 30th March and the 10th April, there were any individual assaults on the police by the crowd?

A. You will get the answer to this from the police; I cannot tell you.

Q. Therefore you are not in a position to say that the remaining of the police inside the city was dangerous?

A. Yes; I am, because I saw the temper of the city on the 12th.

Q. The whole of your statement is based upon what you saw of the temper of the crowd and is not based on anything done by them?

A. On the acts of the mob on the 10th and the temper that I saw on the 12th.

Q. Now, so far as the 10th is concerned, is it not a fact that a handful of these police officers and men were able to check the crowd and were able to drive them for two furlongs?

A. Yes; by fire. One was rather trying to avoid bloodshed at this time, Sir.

Q. If my memory is right, they fired only once and they had no occasion to fire afterwards when the crowd were pushed for two furlongs?

A. Your memory is probably right, but I was not there myself.

Q. So far as the 12th is concerned, you were present at that time?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. May I read out to you a report? I would like to know whether it is correct. It runs thus:—

"Up to this time (1 p.m.) everything was quiet, but when the crowd was coming out of the mosque in order to proceed to the city, their passage was barred by cavalry who had ranged themselves before the gate. They began to shout cries of *La ilaha illallah* and wanted to go towards the city. After some minutes shouting, they were allowed to proceed but when they came near Hira Mandi, shouting cries of *La ilaha illallah* some people amongst the crowds threw stones upon the police and cavalry, whereupon order for fire was given and the crowd was fired on. It is said 2 were killed and 8 or 9 wounded, of which 4 were seriously wounded." Is that a true account?

A. It is inaccurate, Sir.

Q. In what respect?

A. Certainly in many respects—about the crowd coming out of the mosque finding their way blocked by cavalry. When the crowd came out from the mosque, they were ordered to go and they would not go, and I brought the cavalry and pushed the crowd back into the city. The difficulty was to get them into the city. The cavalry did not prevent them from going into the city. It facilitated their progress to the city.

Q. The mob was prevented rightly or wrongly from proceeding further, on this occasion?

A. They were not prevented from going into the city. The crowd was about 7,000 people. I wanted to get them into the city to their proper homes. They refused to go. They had to be pushed by cavalry.

Q. On all the three occasions when there was occasion to fire, the situation was that there was a large



24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

crowd and they were prevented from going in a certain direction?

A. You are totally wrong, as regards the case that you are referring to, it is a travesty of what took place.

Q. On the occasion of the first firing on the 10th?

A. I was not there at the first firing. Would you mind leaving it?

Q. You have given evidence about the 10th. When I am asking you about those things, you cannot answer me.

A. I gave it to you from the official reports which are at my disposal.

Q. It is clear from your statement which has been placed before us that, as a matter of fact, this crowd was coming from the Badshahi Mosque after the meeting was dispersed?

A. The meeting was not dispersed in the Badshahi Mosque. They came out of the mosque voluntarily, either because the service was over or . . . . .

Q. May I understand from you that they deliberately came for the purpose of assaulting?

A. I do not know the purpose for which they came; that was the effect of their coming.

Q. Is there any record available to us from which we could find whether during the period from the 30th March to 15th April anybody received any wounds from a *lathi* inflicted by any member of the crowd?

A. I have somewhere definitely stated that the crowd used *lathis*.

Q. I want to know whether there is any record available to us from which we could find as to whether any member of the police force or any soldier was wounded by a *lathi* by any member of the crowd?

A. I cannot give you any record, but the crowd did certainly strike. There is a difference between striking and wounding. I was struck by a brickbat from a four-storied house.

Q. I am asking you about *lathis*.

A. They were hit by *lathis*; I saw that myself.

Q. Is there any record of that? In Delhi as soon as the soldiers went back after they were hit they made reports and there was a record. Is there any record here in existence from which we could find as to how many soldiers were as a matter of fact struck by *lathis* or were hit by stones?

A. I cannot tell you how many were hit. In this case, i.e., the Hira Mandi case on the 12th, the attack on the rear guard which was made by *lathis* brought about the subsequent events. How many were struck by stones and how many by *lathis*, I really do not know.

Q. They did not make any report about that?

A. I saw it with my own eyes.

Q. Is there no recorded report?

A. No; you do not report or record anything but serious injuries.

Q. Was anyone treated in hospital for any wounds caused by the crowd?

A. Not that I know of. Some police officers were treated in the hospital I think. I saw them.

Q. Did not the news of the arrest of Mr. Gandhi reach Lahore about 4 P.M. on the 10th?

A. I am not aware of that.

Q. Is it not a fact that even the Military authorities were not aware that any Europeans were killed at Amritsar till after 5-30 P.M.

A. I do not know, Sir.

Q. Even the Military authorities did not receive any news that Europeans were killed at Amritsar till about 6 P.M.?

A. I cannot tell you. I am not the Military authority who was commanding the battalion on the 10th.

Q. Therefore may I take it that when you make this statement before this committee that on the evening of that day you were aware of what happened at Amritsar it was only based on hearsay knowledge?

A. Exactly; we all knew by the evening; but you are tying me down to 5 o'clock just now.

Q. Are you aware that no private telegrams were allowed to be despatched from Amritsar to any other place from the evening of the 10th?

A. I was not aware of that; but they were not stopping telegrams coming to Military authorities.

Q. My question was with reference to private telegrams.

A. I am not aware of it at all.

Q. Are you aware at what time the train leaves in the evening for Amritsar?

A. No; unfortunately I have not got the time table.

Q. I believe you are not also aware that on the 10th, nobody was allowed to alight at Amritsar Station or to leave Amritsar Station for any other place?

A. No; I was not there. I was otherwise employed on the 10th.

Q. A crowd of about 6,000 persons which was stopped by a few Police Officers or which was prevented from doing damage to the telegraph office by only 40 soldiers, would you call it a dangerous or rebellious crowd?

A. Certainly I should. There was certainly the potential danger.

Q. In order to reach the telegraph office this crowd will have to pass the Alliance Bank and the Bengal Bank and the Post office?

A. That is so. It depends upon which way they come.

Q. If they came from Anarkali?

A. It depends upon the end of Anarkali which they take.

Q. It is said that they came from that end?

A. Yes.

Q. No attempt was made either to damage the Post Office or to loot the Bengal Bank?

A. I have not heard; as a matter of fact, I do not think there was any.

Q. And on their way from Anarkali to the Telegraph Office, they must have passed a number of European gentlemen and ladies?

A. I do not think that follows, Sir. Very few European ladies and gentlemen live in that part of Anarkali bazaar.

Q. You do not think it is reasonable to suppose that they must have passed some Europeans?

A. I do not think it follows.

Q. Probably they did?

A. Probably they did not I should say. No Europeans live in that part of the city.

Q. Still up to that time there was no news received by you that any one was either molested or assaulted or in any way interfered with?

A. No.

Q. According to you the ostensible object of the crowd was to go and see the Lieutenant-Governor? When they were checked and prevented from coming out, they wanted to go to Government House?

A. I believe they said so when they found that they could not go to the Telegraph Office.

Q. Was not their object to get the orders against Mahatma Gandhi repealed?

A. I cannot tell what the object of the crowd was.

Q. Was that the object given out by them? It may be wrong?

A. I do not think it was true. When you go and call on the Lieutenant-Governor, you take visiting cards, you do not take brickbats. That is why I do not think they were going to call on the Lieutenant-Governor.

Q. Here again your hearsay knowledge comes in?

A. They were throwing bricks.

Q. You have not seen them carrying bricks?

A. But I have evidence that they were making use of them.

Q. When the crowd according to you was in such a mood and when it was beyond control, you did not consider it to be the duty of Government to protect the city and to protect the loyal and law-abiding citizens of the city instead of withdrawing all the Police Force?

A. It is not for me to criticise the action of the superior officers.

24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

Q. Still you are praising them, and I think I have a right to ask you this?

A. I have already said and I stand by it that the withdrawal of the police was absolutely necessary to prevent bloodshed.

Q. What are your reasons?

A. Because if you have a few isolated men with arms in their possession and they face the mob and talk to them, you are trailing your coat.

Q. That is your inference; it is not based upon facts?

A. It is based upon the attitude of the mob.

Q. By looking at their faces?

A. That is my appreciation of the situation.

Q. In paragraph 21 you say that the notice issued on the 18th April was under the Defence of India Regulation?

A. I presume it was, because Martial Law as far as I know was not proclaimed till the 14th.

Q. Did you not visit the city, i.e., the inside of the city, from the 13th to the 14th?

A. No; I went on the 15th.

Q. You had not been there on the 13th and 14th?

A. Not on the 13th and 14th.

Q. Were you present at the negotiations between the different persons who were coming to the Deputy Commissioner about the opening of the *hartal*?

A. No. Some came to me about it; I was not present at the Deputy Commissioner's.

Q. Therefore you have no personal knowledge as to what these people were doing inside the city on the 13th and 14th?

A. No; I have no personal knowledge.

Q. And therefore when you say that on the 13th and 14th these leaders were perfecting their arrangements for *hartal*, that is knowledge based on certain hearsay or inference?

A. It is based on the broad fact that the *hartal* was tightened up and further strengthened during those times. It was a fact.

Q. I want to know how you came to the conclusion that they were perfecting the arrangements?

A. Because we had information from the city; there were meetings being held in private houses and so on.

Q. Your information was that on the 13th and 14th at the meetings that were being held inside the city, efforts were not made for opening the shops, but arrangements were made for making the *hartal* more perfect?

A. That is my information; the result rather supported it.

Q. That information you received on the 15th?

A. I heard of that. It would not come to me direct; it would come to the Officer Commanding, Lahore, for the time being, General Clarke.

Q. Going through all your orders would it be right to infer that your object in issuing these various orders was to strike terror and kill the political life of the province?

A. I never thought about political life. My business was to keep peace and prevent bloodshed.

Q. Would it be right to infer from the various orders that have been passed by you that one of your main objects was to strike terror and to kill the political life of the province?

A. You would be entirely wrong if you infer anything else other than the one fact that my object was to keep peace and prevent bloodshed. Anything else is wrong inference.

Q. With regard to the posting of notices, one of the main reasons that has been given by you was that when these orders were promulgated, people might not come and say they were not aware of it. Therefore you wanted to put them at important places at different centres, so that they may not be able to come forward and make that excuse that they were not aware of the promulgation of these orders. That is one of the reasons given by you to Sir C. Setalvad.

A. The chief reason was the notices were torn down and therefore people could not see them.

Q. Because they were torn down? Will you kindly refer to order No. 9. Although these places were select-

ed for the purpose of informing the citizens, only 20 places were selected inside the city and 37 places outside the city?

A. Quite so, because the population is more concentrated in the city than it is outside.

Q. Or because the majority of the educated classes and the majority of the politically minded class were living outside the city?

A. I believe that is so.

Q. And therefore the majority of the inhabitants of the city during those days would not come outside the city and go to the Civil Lines for the purpose of getting themselves informed what the orders issued were?

A. That is entirely a wrong inference.

Q. They would come?

A. I do not think they would take the trouble to go to the Civil Lines if they can find that in the city itself. I would not like to cause any inconvenience to them by asking them to go to Civil Lines for this purpose.

Q. Notwithstanding the fact that more men were inside the city, notwithstanding the fact that more than two persons were not allowed to walk abreast, still you think that for the purpose of getting information as to what were the notices issued, they would come to the Civil Lines and get themselves informed?

A. The question is rather a lengthy one, and I did not catch the drift of it.

Q. One of the main reasons given by you was that these places were selected in order that those who committed breach of your orders may not be able to come forward before you and say that they were not informed?

A. Exactly.

Q. If that was your object, I want to know why only 20 places were selected inside the city and 37 places outside the city during those days, having regard to other orders passed by you which made it difficult for them to come out of the city and make themselves acquainted with your orders?

A. If you work it out in square yards or square metres, it is the same inside and outside. The population is very much concentrated at one place and a fraction living outside the city. If you take 100 square yards or half a square mile, I think you will find the notices evenly distributed.

Q. You have given us a definition of Martial Law somewhere. I want to know whether the will of the Military commander is in any way limited or restricted under the law?

A. Yes; it is restricted under the law to all acts done in good faith.

Q. And to all acts done for the purpose of only maintaining peace and order and nothing else. Am I right?

A. Yes, certainly.

Q. And therefore if he does anything which is not for the purpose of maintaining law or order then he exceeds his authority?

A. I agree with you. I know what is coming, Sir.

Q. A large number of persons had been convicted for breach of your Order No. 1, clause 4. So far as this clause is concerned, you have not prescribed any penalty. You have not informed the people that if they commit a breach of this rule, they will be flogged or sentenced to jail or punished in any way. The only thing you say is that if more than 10 persons assemble at once place, the meeting will be dispersed by force?

A. Quite so.

Q. Therefore so far as this Order No. 1, clause 4, is concerned, you did not attach any penalty. You did not inform them that if 10 persons assembled, they would be fired on or sent to jail.

A. They were sent to jail or punished instead otherwise of being shot.

Q. Kindly look at page 60, 6 persons were flogged for breach of this rule?

A. Personally I only find 4, but I daresay your eyes are better.

Q. For taking part in processions or gatherings?

A. I am sorry; you are quite right.

Q. So there were 6 persons who were flogged under Order I. clause 4?

A. Yes.

24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

(Continued.)

Q. How were they flogged?

A. In the usual manner, I suppose.

Q. My contention is that you have prescribed penalties for different clauses. So far as clause 4 is concerned, your order was that such meetings will be dispersed.

A. Perhaps you do not understand the administration of Martial Law. It is not essential to be a lawyer or anything like that. You carry it out on broad lines. Because a penalty is not prescribed, it does not surely excuse or exclude from trial a person who commits a breach of the order.

Q. Have you any recollection about these six men, as to whether there was any deliberate breach of this order by these men?

A. I have already told you in my previous evidence to another member of the committee, that the case of 5 of these persons forms one regrettable incident in the administration of Martial Law in Lahore.

Q. What is the reason for flogging?

A. As I told you that leaves only one out of the six. I will look up and see what his case was. As regards the 5, it was a regrettable incident.

Q. Take the case of your Curfew Order. You will find that in Appendix IV. I think there will be some record of these things somewhere?

A. There is a record of every case.

Q. May I know whether you think that those who have been flogged deliberately committed a breach of your order, or whether it was a breach of the order which was excusable because they had no watches or because they were obliged to do so? Was it a deliberate breach of your order? Was it done deliberately?

A. No person would have been convicted unless he committed a deliberate breach of the order. Numbers of people were excused, I think. You will find it mentioned in the report.

Q. May I know whether those persons who were sentenced to flogging were out of their houses for mischief?

A. They were out of their houses against my orders.

Q. That is the whole thing? Had they not been out, they would not have been punished?

A. Exactly.

Q. They were out of their houses for doing some mischief, which you wanted to prevent or practically they were out of their houses because they had no watches?

A. It is a matter of complete indifference to me why they come out of their houses. My main reason for insisting on the Curfew Order was to save troops and police from being constantly on patrol and to get streets cleared at night. Why people went out into the street, had nothing to do with me.

Q. Therefore it was a matter of indifference to you why they were out of their houses. So long as they were out of their houses they were flogged?

A. They all were not flogged, that does not follow.

Q. Those mentioned in column 3?\*

A. Yes, well it was not a matter of indifference.

Q. There were 32?

A. I daresay.

Q. Are you aware that the punishment of flogging is much resented by the Indian public?

A. I think it is resented by everybody besides Indians.

Q. It appears according to you that the stigma of being sent to jail is much more serious than being flogged?

A. No, I do not think so; they do not mind being sent to jail a bit, but I think they do dislike being flogged. I think that is common to everybody, it is not confined to India.

Q. Such being the case, do you not agree with me that if in these 32 cases it was only a mistake on their part to be out of their houses

A. Then they were not flogged.

Q. If they were not out of their houses for mischief?

A. No men were flogged if they were outside of their houses by mistake. There were some cases of people who had just come in from outside Lahore and did not know of the order. They were not convicted. All the cases tried by me and all cases tried by Magistrates showed this, the latter probably better than I did.

Q. I believe that your orders accomplished a great deal?

A. It is not for me to say.

Q. I think that they could not prevent people falling ill?

A. I had no power to keep them in good health, except by a little physical exercise.

Q. Therefore you thought it was no hardship that between 8 and 10 everybody in the city was deprived of all sorts of medical help?

A. But they were not, Sir. If you will be good enough to look at that Martial Law Form that I think His Lordship the President has, you will see that from the very first day Martial Law was introduced I recognised the necessity of giving passes to people who had some reason for being in the street, and they were issued in their tens of thousands literally.

Q. Supposing all of a sudden at 8:30 a brother or a relation or somebody fell ill and medical aid was required, I do not know that these forms would help him in any way and he would not be able to come to you, and even if he could come to you he would have to spend three or four hours doing so?

A. I will quite agree with you, but I only add that you cannot wage war and not have some inconvenience following it.

Q. Therefore you thought, as a matter of fact, that you were occupying an enemy country and therefore you were introducing all these things, and that this precaution was absolutely necessary?

A. It was a precaution necessary to protect the lives of the people of the city, to keep them off the streets at night.

Q. After that, except on three occasions of rioting, no attempt was made to endanger the life of any British soldier?

A. I do not think I gave them a chance.

Q. Even Indian High Court Judges were not allowed to go out of their houses?

A. If they had applied for a pass they would have been.

Q. Still under the rules they were not?

A. That is so.

Q. You have not heard that during these disturbances any bombs were ever thrown by anybody anywhere?

A. No, Sir, I warned them about that the first day.

Q. And no bombs were discovered in possession of any of the villagers anywhere in the various large number of searches that were made?

A. You mean subsequent to this day? There were none. I had two men badly wounded by bombs here before.

Q. If my memory serves me right, excepting the outrage on the Viceroy on the 12th December at Delhi, there has been no bomb outrage in the whole of your Province since that day?

A. Oh, Sir, you are quite wrong. I had two of my men wounded by a bomb in Anarkali Bazaar about 6 months before this disturbance.

Q. How was that?

A. A bomb was thrown at two of my soldiers of the Royal Sussex Regiment in Anarkali Bazaar 6 months before. That is what made me so careful about bombs.

Q. What sort of bombs do you mean, firework bombs?

A. I mean a bomb that killed two Indians and wounded 6 more and injured two of my men; I do not know if you would call that a firework bomb.

Q. Was that man ever arrested and tried?

A. I don't think they ever caught him.

Q. Was it ascertained that he was a man belonging to your Province or district?

A. We did not get him but the outrage took place in this city within 200 yards of where we are sitting.

Q. Excepting that outrage, I do not think there were any other outrages in the Province?

A. That is one that came to my knowledge which I did not forget.

Q. No other outrage?

A. No, that was quite enough for me to remember the probability of bombs here.

Q. What difference did you make, when you passed that order that within a radius of 100 feet every house and every property would be raised to the ground.....

\* Of appendix VI, page 308.

24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

A. Not every house; I said no mosques or temples.

Q. Leaving aside mosques and temples. A mosque or temple is not a house.

A. I beg your pardon.

Q. What difference was there between British methods and Nawabi methods?

A. I did not catch the last word.

Q. The methods of the old, old Nawab rulers?

A. I never heard the name before, but it seems to me to be an excellent one if that was the rule in force.

Q. I asked you what is the difference?

A. There is no difference.

Q. What were the reasons for your commandeering tongas and other vehicles which were plying for hire? Was it not that they also took part in the *hartal*?

A. That was the main reason, they were taking part in the *hartal* and no one could move in Lahore if they wanted to. They refused to carry you.

Q. I will read out one passage from paragraph 34. "I refrained from granting exemptions in the case of Indians resident in Lahore as I thought it desirable to bring home to them all, loyal and disloyal alike, some of the inconveniences of Martial Law in the hope and belief that in the future the weight of their influence would be given whole-heartedly?"

A. That was my pious hope.

Q. If it was decided by the so-called conspirators or agitators to have communication with some other conspirators in other places I do not understand why your order about 3rd and intermediate class passengers could have prevented them from going to Lahore?

A. Oh don't you? Because it gave the railway police only the first and second class of passengers to deal with instead of the vast mass of third class and intermediate traffic.

Q. Am I to understand that if there was a 2nd class passenger he would not have been given a ticket unless C. I. D. man was there?

A. No doubt the C. I. D. were watching who were the people purchasing 2nd class tickets.

Q. Do I understand the C. I. D. were empowered to dog that man's footsteps and go after him to find out where he was going?

A. I do not think they would go after him; if they viewed him with suspicion, they would take him there and then.

Q. Supposing 20 2nd class passengers went to the Railway Station to purchase tickets to go to Bombay, would they be given tickets?

A. Certainly.

Q. And would 20 C. I. D. men have to follow them to find out what they were doing?

A. I think the C. I. D. are much too efficient to require 20 men to look after 20 2nd class passengers.

Q. It is your opinion that they are very efficient?

A. For that; they are efficient enough to look after 20 2nd class passengers without having 20 of them to do it.

Q. You have stated with reference to the orders that you passed about the fixing of prices that with an empty stomach a poor man is apt to be up to mischief?

A. Yes, broadly speaking.

Q. And that you wished to prevent him from doing that mischief and in that indirect way you have connected it with your authority and passed that order about *langars* in order to maintain peace and order?

A. All part of the general idea, Sir.

Q. Were not *langars* meant for poor people?

A. They may have been, but they were meant for other purposes too.

Q. Were not the poor people allowed to have their food there?

A. Or any one else.

Q. Therefore, as a matter of fact, in one way they were helping you, they were keeping the empty beggars from doing any mischief in the city?

A. That is hardly the case, because the food supplied at those *langars* was keeping the people from their legitimate work and preventing them from earning money with which to buy food.

Q. I think you were prepared to please the masses by making concessions and therefore in the end they came

and informed you that they were quite happy with Martial Law and came and cried out "Martial Law *ki jai*"?

A. Yes, they did.

Q. Therefore where was the harm of these *langars*, one way was quite as good as another?

A. May I put it to you that this was a time of *hartal*, these people instead of getting about their lawful vocations and earning their money and buying food, were delighted with a state of affairs which produced their daily *chapati* without doing any work for it. It was a bad condition of things.

Q. And therefore you wanted them to earn their living instead of getting their food at *langars*?

A. I think so, it was a case of idle hands and mischief.

Q. And are you aware that a large number of respectable citizens of Lahore who had subscribed towards these *langars*, believing them to be charitable institutions, were arrested and kept in jail for some time?

A. No I am not. I had not the slightest idea of a single gentleman who contributed to the funds.

Q. It appears to me that according to you *hartal* is a great crime?

A. I regard *hartals* as an organised demonstration against the Government, and you may call that a crime or not.

Q. What difference do you make between a strike against the Government and a *hartal*?

A. None.

Q. Supposing a miners' strike in England, was that against the Government or not?

A. No that was a different thing; that was a strike for the improvement of economic and social conditions.

Q. The police strike, was it against the Government or against somebody else?

A. In England, it was for improved economic and social conditions, Sir.

Q. I am not asking about causes, was it against the Government?

A. Not a bit, it was against the public to improve their economic condition; it was totally different from the strike here which was not to improve economic conditions.

Q. How do you mean against the public?

A. Naturally any strike which hurts the public is against the public.

Q. And this strike was not hurting the public?

A. It did both.

Q. Therefore anybody who says "I will not do my work now because I am dissatisfied with a certain Act," becomes, I take it, a seditionist according to you?

A. Certainly not; it is only when the strike is organised. Take your individual case; if you decide to throw up your hand and do no legal work it will hurt nobody.

Q. In order that a strike should have some effect and attain its object it must be organised?

A. Not a general organisation like this, which was meant to paralyse the whole community; it was not one trade, one calling, which was organised.

Q. Supposing there was this strike and it was organised for the purpose of drawing the attention of the authorities to the fact that the masses of the people were against a certain act of the authorities, where does the question of sedition come in?

A. I say that anything organised to break a Government is an act of sedition; it is against constituted authority.

Q. That is your own definition?

A. That is my definition; it may be entirely wrong, I am not a lawyer.

Q. When you have used the word sedition and seditionist in the whole of your statement you are relying on that definition of yours?

A. When I use the word seditionists, I use it in the sense of a man up against constituted authority as constituted to-day.

Q. And you have not come upon any instance where constitutional authority is opposed by constitutional means?

A. I do not call these constitutional means.

24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

Q. You have said in your statement that it was organised and pre-arranged conspiracy, may I know what you mean by organised and pre-arranged? It may mean one thing, that here were six or seven persons who thought the *hartal* should be introduced in the city of Lahore, and they held a meeting and passed a resolution and they tried to persuade people and succeeded in persuading them to close their shops. Is that the only meaning which you attach to pre-arranged and organised?

A. I should say that is organised and in this instance pre-arranged too.

Q. Do you say that what happened on the evening of the 10th was pre-arranged?

A. I say the whole rising in India and throughout the Punjab was pre-arranged.

Q. Now you are giving a different meaning to your "pre-arranged?"

A. I am only trying to help you.

Q. Therefore I must ask you what you mean by pre-arranged throughout India?

A. I will tell you. There was some power behind it all which organised this rising or *hartal* as you call it.

Q. Then was that power inside the Punjab or outside the Punjab?

A. I cannot tell you where it was; its effect was felt in the Punjab.

Q. Judging from the facts, have you any tangible evidence that there was some other power behind it?

A. Yes, I think I can appeal to your common-sense in the matter and can give you a clear case. With the one exception I think of Amritsar and possibly Ahmedabad, every act of violence and outrage which accompanied these disturbances or risings was directed against one thing, communications, either railways or telegraphs. You know perfectly well, I am sure, that no military organisation, however large or small, can remain in existence for long without lines of communication of some sort. Cut the lines of communication of any military force and you will kill it. You must see that it is an insult to my common sense, and I am sure it would have been to yours, to suggest that all these people from one end of the Punjab to the other when they rose all had the same brain wave, and all went and cut telegraph wires and railway lines.

Q. Therefore, according to you there was some brain or some controlling mind behind this and what happened at Ahmedabad at Bombay, at Calcutta and at Lahore was controlled by one organisation?

A. That is my firm, considered opinion.

Q. And that is based on the fact that in a stated time, that is during three or four days, so many wires were cut and so many railway communications destroyed?

A. That is one of them.

Q. Anything else?

A. Yes, I will give you another; there are plenty of pointers. It is a coincidence which again strains one's common-sense to believe that in these riots every attack on property was limited to property owned by Europeans and not by Indians. You come to Gujranwala, what do you find? You find the Church, the Railway Station, every building owned by Europeans burned, but you find the bungalows owned by citizens in the Gujranwala City all left intact. You come to Amritsar, and I think I am right in saying that in the attacks on the banks there—one bank certainly was not burned because there happened to be a guard there in time and another bank which was not burnt but looted was an Indian-owned bank. It is rather straining one's common-sense to believe that all these things were mere coincidence, and there was no power behind the throng.

Q. Therefore your second point was that the Europeans were attacked everywhere and not Indians, and that the property of Europeans was damaged and not that of Indians?

A. Yes, that is a fact.

Q. That is point No. 2, anything else?

A. I don't suppose the Amir of Afghanistan learnt from his daily paper in Kabul of unrest in India when he issued that proclamation and declared war against the British Empire. He must have got that from somewhere. There must have been somebody in India who

communicated the news of the disturbances in India and the alleged disaffection of the people; he did not pick that up in the newspapers, somebody must have conveyed that to him. Then the last point in Appendix X,<sup>2</sup> where I have ventured to give the Danda Fauj proclamation, that all points to organisation.

Q. That Danda Fauj proclamation, that is your third point?

A. I put that fourth.

Q. You appeal to my common-sense; I must say I am not convinced. My common-sense says that these are the effusions of some mad brains, and should the mere fact that some madcap writes with his hand a certain notice and posts it on the clock tower or somewhere else and makes certain allegations, be taken into consideration by the highest military power at this time to base on it an argument that the whole community was seditious, or at least a large part of it, and there was an organisation behind it?

A. I make you a present of the madman and stand on the other three points.

Q. Is there any country which is free from such madcaps?

A. I cannot say, I think there are. I have not been in all countries so I cannot possibly answer the question.

Q. The countries in which you have been and about which you have read is there any country free of such madcaps?

A. There are maniacs everywhere I know.

Q. Is it not a fact that a large number of persons from the surrounding villages of Lahore had come back from the war previous to what had happened?

A. I think that is an undoubted fact.

Q. Has it come to your knowledge that in at least one or two cases the persons arrested were pensioners and soldiers returned from the war?

A. I suppose they did some crime then.

Q. In connection with these disturbances?

A. Service in the army does not make one immune from arrest.

Q. I will put my point before you, have you heard or not?

A. No, I have not heard of it.

Q. Have you not heard what happened at Tarn Taran? Who were the gang suppressed at Tarn Taran?

A. No, I never even heard of that.

Q. Don't you think that those people who have gone outside India and have gained some experience if they become rioters they would know much better how the wires should be cut and trains derailed, and goods trains looted than those villages who have never left India?

A. They made a very good try at it, if they had never done it before. They were very effective.

Q. Take your schedule of offences, Appendix No. 1, have you seen the file of these cases, or have you only been supplied with facts and put them down?

A. Every night at 6 o'clock there was sent to me a record of every case tried in my area. There I have seen every one.

Q. You have gone through the files of these cases?

A. Every case tried in the Lahore Area has been seen by me.

Q. It is very strange that you have not seen the Tarn Taran case?

A. They were not tried in Lahore.

Q. Except the cases tried in Lahore you have not seen the files of other cases?

A. Of course not.

Q. You do not know the facts of those cases?

A. Of course not.

Q. Take the very first item in your Appendix I— "80th March, Delhi Riot. Mob attacked Railway Station; beat the staff and Police. Mob was fired on." You also include that as proving the conspiracy. That is your information, "beat the staff and Police and the mob was fired on?"

A. Yes, I think that was the popular account of what took place as published in the papers.

24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

Q. You have put down the Tarn Taran affair?

A. Yes, I believe it is here.

Q. Suppose it were admitted in the Tarn Taran case that as a matter of fact they had nothing to do with any rioting whatsoever, that they were not in any way connected with any Amritsar people, but that hearing the National Bank had been looted and that there was a chance of looting, they cut the wires. The wires, however, were cut simply for the purpose of looting and by people who had nothing to do with any organisation, because they themselves cut them and admitted what had been done. If that be the fact would you connect that Tarn Taran affair with any organisation around?

A. I do not see why you should not; it is a very bad thing to do to cut the wires.

Q. As a matter of fact your opinion is based upon the large number of cases? You have not read the file of these cases?

A. I got those from the papers—all those outside Lahore.

Q. Your opinion is that your administration was always merciful?

A. Yes.

Q. You do not put it down to the forbearance of the crowd; you do not put it down to the fact that the crowd were not a rebellious crowd, you say that it was the effect of Martial Law?

A. Yes, and I stand by it.

Q. With regard to students—in reply to Sir C. Setalvad you have stated about these mistaken facts—when was that information given to you? When did you see these mistakes?

A. I should think it was in the first week or ten days.

Q. I take it that you issued a large number of your orders of the 15th and 16th?

A. A certain number.

Q. This order about students was issued by you on the 16th of April?

A. Yes, on the 16th.

Q. May I take it that at the time that this order was issued by you—all these facts that had been mentioned by you in cross-examination were not known to you and were not before you?

A. You are quite wrong that all these facts were not known.

Q. At that time was there any evidence before you that any of these students had insulted any ladies?

A. Yes. I got one particular case, and the lady would not allow me to take action amongst that college. It was on the 16th when it was brought home to me.

Q. Excepting that one case what was the number of such cases?

A. One.

Q. Can you give me any information as to what was the percentage of students that were arrested throughout these disturbances?

A. I could not possibly tell you. One or two were shot in the riots.

Q. Apart from that, how many were arrested in connection with these disturbances?

A. I could not tell you.

Q. Will you accept it from me that there were hardly any convicted so far as these trials were concerned?

A. They were busy all day answering roll-calls.

Q. If it be a fact that hardly any—perhaps four or five—had been convicted for what happened between the 30th March and the 15th April, are you still prepared to maintain that there was evidence in your possession showing that they were seditionists?

A. Absolutely. One would not have taken action if one had no evidence.

Q. You took charge on the 15th. Therefore I think you had many important matters to deal with, and I suppose that practically no diary nor reports were put before you against the students? Were any diaries or papers placed before you when you passed that order?

A. No written reports were made. They were only verbal.

Q. I do not understand why you say that Martial Law was necessary. Supposing you began by hanging people for paltry thefts or for minor crimes—will not crimes be

stopped at once? It would have been more effective than your Martial Law?

A. If you take me into the realms of supposition I would rather keep out of it.

Q. I repeat my question—supposing that instead of lashing you had passed an order that any person who has been guilty of minor offences will be hanged, would that be more effective than.....?

A. I should be found guilty of lacking in common-sense and be removed from my job. It would be a ludicrous thing to do to hang a man for thieving handkerchief.

Q. It depend upon common-sense?

A. That is the whole essence of Martial Law. If I thought you should be put out of the way and that it would help to maintain peace I should not hesitate to do it.

Q. In your Martial Order No. 7 you say that students were engaged in seditious propaganda—may I understand that you only refer to it being "expedient" and nothing else—that was one of the reasons that led you to promulgate this order. May I take it that they were present at the Ram-Naumi fair, and that they did not attend their schools on the *hartal* day?

A. I do not know about their attending. I will give you one instance. Students were sent up from villages on the 13th and 14th as they were found spreading seditious propaganda. They were brought up and convicted, but I quashed their sentences at once because it was done before the issue of Martial Law.

Q. They were preaching *hartal*?

A. Well that is organised.

Q. When you say seditious propaganda do you mean a *hartal*? They were persuading people to hold meetings?

A. Exactly.

Q. Was that information in your possession that they were asking people to take up arms?

A. They were not there for nothing.

Q. So far as your Order No. 9 is concerned is it not a coincidence that there is in it a very large number of pleaders and barristers?

A. I do not think it a coincidence. The selected people were not notorious for their loyalty.

Q. To you the majority were seditious?

A. There were a certain number of them whose views were not in accordance with mine.

Q. Or were they a class of persons who were holding meetings in this province against certain action of the Government or taking interest in public affairs?

A. They were not sufficient to form a meeting of themselves. They took a very prominent part.

Q. Supposing you had deported all these pleaders and barristers all would be calm and quiet? These pleaders were the cause of all the trouble—if you at once did away with them there would be nobody to oppose you?

A. Frankly I think they are cause of a great deal of trouble. They are looked up to by the masses. They are like sheep following.

Q. That is your experience, that the uneducated masses in these provinces look upon the educated classes as sheep and follow them?

A. No, they look upon them as leaders, the other people are the sheep.

Q. According to you they lead the masses?

A. I think they have great influence with the masses.

Q. More than any other people?

A. Oh yes, I think so, they are their own *jat* and people.

Q. Your No. 12 was issued on the 16th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. About it you say something of students and turbulent persons walking abreast and monopolising the entire pavement. They were not in the habit of monopolising the whole side-walk?

A. Complaints were made to me and it was up to me to stop it.

Q. Now with regard to your No. 24 you say "Now therefore of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I authorise any officer appointed by me for that purpose to enter any college, public buildings, hostel, hotel, private or other residence or building and remove such

24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

number of electric lights and fans required for the purpose aforesaid." This was for the purpose of greater comfort for the British troops. Were Europeans also deprived of these fans?

A. I cannot tell you. I should not think they were. Obviously I would not take them from Europeans.

Q. Why, were they not required for the troops in the month of May to make them more comfortable?

A. Some had got conveniences in the shape of electric fans and I proposed to take them from those people. I wanted the cap to fit where I thought it would fit best.

Q. Now we will turn to your No. 84 about the supply of wheat. I find that your order about this clearly showed that your information was wrong?

A. Yes, it was not as much as I thought it was.

Q. It was nothing?

A. I quite agree.

Q. Therefore I want to know why you included all the Indian gentry in this order? Why did you go out of your way to ask every native householder to furnish this list?

A. Not natives, Indians, Sir.

Q. I do not think this refers to Indians?

A. Every trader and every banker. A banker means a banker in grain. It means what I say, every trader.

Q. There are European firms who might have held wheat?

A. They would have dropped in for it if they did not send in returns.

Q. You will find that subsequently, when you asked for the list, you asked every Indian gentleman to furnish you with a list, but every Indian gentleman does not keep a stock of wheat; the order was for a person having more than five maunds?

A. No, of course I did not.

Q. This list which forms part of your statement clearly shows that about 70 per cent. of them have nothing to do with grain—where orders had been directed to the people not notorious for their loyalty. Except say, 70 per cent. of Indian gentlemen and are not dealers in grain why were they not exempted?

A. Indian gentlemen or British gentlemen, nobody was exempted from it. I wanted to know for economic reasons what wheat supply there was.

Q. Were any notices ever posted on the house of any European? On their houses were there not some nice places where the notices could be displayed conspicuously? Why is it that when you selected your sites you did not select the house of a single European for the purpose of posting these notices?

A. Because I saw no reason for taking this action. Some were exhibited by Europeans. They came and asked for copies of notices and put them up themselves voluntarily.

Q. May I know, excepting passing these Martial Law orders and trying cases summarily for breach of these Martial Law orders, what did the military authorities do? Supposing no Martial Law had been proclaimed and your assistance had been required by the civil authorities, where would have been the difference?

A. The civil authorities have not the power which Martial Law gives to the military authorities.

Q. May I take it that you think that without these orders which you issued it would have been impossible for you to maintain peace and order?

A. No doubt about it, the people would have got into trouble.

Q. What is the difference between military aid and Martial Law? Except that from the 15th April to the 10th of June certain cases were decided by the military authorities and the military authorities issued certain Martial Law orders there seems to be no difference.

A. If the military would have been asked to help the civil authorities I agree with you absolutely.

Q. What is the difference in these orders?

A. These orders are the whole case. They were issued for the purpose of preventing any further outbreak.

Q. Therefore I think your opinion is that these were the very things which practically maintained peace and order—these Martial Law orders?

A. I put four things forward as reasons why peace was maintained and bloodshed avoided. First of all about 60 per cent. I put to General Dyer's action at Amritsar; the next thing I put to the institution of Martial Law, the third thing, I had a sufficient number of troops placed at my disposal here, and the fourth—and a very minor consideration—was the use one made of that power and those troops—

15 per cent. for the number of troops,

20 per cent. for Martial Law,

60 per cent. for General Dyer,

5 per cent. for the use made of powers and men.

Now General Dyer had proclaimed his own Martial Law which he was prepared to do. Whether Martial Law was proclaimed or not is a common factor.

Q. You mean then that when the news of what had happened on the 13th at Amritsar arrived at Lahore the situation was eased and things were looking better?

A. Yes, there was a change in the atmosphere.

Q. Therefore that was due to the action of General Dyer? May I know whether there was any opportunity for such communication between Amritsar and Lahore?

A. I should think every means of communication barring the telegraph, motor-bicycles, etc., I cannot imagine there would have been difficulty in the way of communication.

Q. If you accept this proposition that what happened on the 13th would not reach Lahore—under the circumstances that were prevailing on the 14th—will you be prepared to modify your statement?

A. It did reach Lahore on the 13th. It was common property late that night.

Q. Now with regard to persons who were flogged. In Appendix V\* you give a general abstract of the whole thing. It appears that being in prohibited areas some people were flogged and for being in streets during prohibited hours. We have dealt with taking part in processions.

A. Quite so.

Q. Besides the mosque incident which you mentioned there were five persons flogged for taking part in processions?

A. Quite so.

Q. Then there were 4 persons who were fined for failing to deliver up their motor cars?

A. That is right, Sir. They were all Europeans.

Q. And 4 persons were flogged for tearing down Martial Law orders?

A. That is all, Sir.

Q. There were two persons who were flogged for refusing to carry on their business?

A. That is right, Sir.

Q. And there were three persons who were flogged for adulterating milk?

A. Yes, there ought to have been a good many more. They were rather old.

Q. These people who were adulterating milk were fined to the extent of Rs. 2,682?

A. That is right, Sir.

Q. One person was flogged for raising dissatisfaction amongst His Majesty's subjects.

A. That is right, Sir. That was under the Divisional Commander's proclamation.

Q. One person was flogged for obstructing an officer on duty?

A. That is all, only one.

Q. One person was flogged for acts to the prejudice of good order. May I know what that means?

A. If I can look up case No. 156 I can tell you. I do not remember it. It is all in the file, it is case No. 156.

Q. And your opinion is, however far-reaching the reforms may be, they will not, as a matter of fact, in any way ease the situation and Indians will remain disloyal?

A. I think you will always have agitation as education goes on.

Q. I am not asking you any question about agitation. Your opinion is that there is no remedy so far as India is concerned, and any political reforms, no matter how far-reaching they may be, are useless?

24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

A. That is my opinion. It is true, Sir. You will always have agitators, Sir.

Q. Now do you know the names of the leaders of educated India?

A. No, I gather that one is Mr. Gandhi. I see his name in papers.

Q. Have you wasted your time in reading the speeches of those leaders?

A. Oh, I read that paper, the *Independent*; I think it is of Allahabad.

Q. Do you know anybody else? Do you know Mr. Srinivasa Sastri?

A. I have not had the pleasure of knowing him.

Q. The name of any other leader in your opinion?

A. I rather gather that you are a leader of India. I rather gather that you come under the category of leaders of Indian opinion.

Q. Do you know my name?

A. Yes, I know your name, I cannot pronounce it quickly, but I can spell it.

Q. You had not known my name before I was appointed on this committee or you considered me as one of the smaller fry. I would like to know the names that were known to you before these disorders took place.

A. I really cannot give their names.

Q. According to you, the majority of the educated classes are the leaders of Indian opinion?

A. That is my opinion, most distinctly.

Q. I want to know on what it is based.

A. That has been so since I have been in India, four years.

Q. Can you tell me the name of any leader who has ever spread false rumours about the Rowlatt Act?

A. If I may say so, it is my opinion and I still stick to it. How I got that opinion does not affect the case.

Q. I want to know on what your opinion is based?

A. My opinion is based on what I believe is one's commonsense.

Q. That is your commonsense?

A. I may be mistaken, I am afraid, but that is my opinion.

Q. Beyond commonsense you cannot give me any tangible names?

A. There are so many names but they are unpronounceable to me.

Q. And you say "the colossal ignorance of the uneducated classes who are but the tools of the educated classes who are the more dangerous weapons behind these risings?"

A. That is so, Sir.

Q. That is your opinion?

A. It may be very nasty to read, but it is my opinion. I am perfectly frank about it. I have stated the case of Wagah.

Q. Your opinion is, no matter what reforms are given to India, there are going to be other outbreaks very soon in the future and they will be at shorter intervals and they will be better organised, and therefore the Government should be prepared for this eventuality? The other outbreaks are bound to take place and are certain to be better organised and they are going to be a more serious thing?

A. That is my frank opinion. That is my appreciation of the situation, Sir.

Q. And therefore the duty of the Government is to make in every principal city a fortress or a fort?

A. I do not say that at all. There is a vast difference between protection and building a fort or a fortress. Any elementary text-book on Engineering will show you that.

Q. You think in future the bulwark of the British Empire in India will not be the Indian public, but your brick and mortar walls?

A. Eventually you will be wrong in your supposition, Sir, when education has completed its task, but so long as you have got 95 per cent. of totally uneducated people being led by the nose by 5 per cent., the educated classes, you have got that danger.

Q. Who is responsible for it?

A. The Indian himself is responsible.

Q. Do you mean the uneducated?

A. You are getting very busy with their education. Are you not? I am all for it.

Q. Don't you think it is the duty of the Government to educate the Indian?

A. They are doing it.

Q. Who is responsible for only the 5 per cent. of the educated classes?

A. Very largely the Indian himself.

Q. That is, this poor man who cannot live from hand to mouth?

A. I do not think they are so very poor. I do not think they live from hand to mouth.

Q. Why did you prohibit entry into the Badshahi Mosque, and stipulate that no Hindu should be allowed to enter the Badshahi Mosque?

A. Because surely it is contrary to the good order and government of a mosque. I should think so. I am not an expert on the Muhammadan religion and law.

Q. Are you also versed in Muhammadan Law?

A. No, but I am credibly informed that Hindus do not usually go to Muhammadan mosques.

Q. Have you ever been to a mosque on a festive occasion?

A. No.

Q. Are you aware of the fact that there are mosques in other places where Hindus are allowed to go and everybody is allowed to go?

A. I am not aware of that, but they are not allowed for services at any rate.

Q. Are you aware that to every mosque on every Id day, the greatest festival of the Muhammadans, every Hindu and Muhammadan has free access?

A. No, I frankly confess I was not aware of that. Nor did I know they had free access to the pulpit as they had in these cases.

Q. Even supposing what you considered was true, would it not be your duty to bring about a reconciliation rather than to accentuate the differences even if the Hindus and Muhammadans were not prepared to do that?

A. I am all for it as long as its object is a right one. When its object is the overthrow of the British *raj*, I am against it.

Q. So far as this unity is concerned, you are not for it, you are only afraid of it?

A. I am not afraid of it. I think essentially there is no single nation in India at all.

Q. You agree with me that for the prosperity and progress of India it is absolutely necessary?

A. You can never be fit for self-government until you have become a nation.

Q. Any attempt that is made in that direction is a laudable one?

A. If it is done for obviously lawful purposes.

Q. It will be the only opportunity on those occasions when as a matter of fact both Hindus and Muhammadans are standing on a common platform.....?

A. You have got all about a common platform in the Badshahi Mosque. In this connection I should like to say that in 1856 the British Government had the right to close the Badshahi Mosque whenever it wanted and I was acting on that ground.

Q. Why do you confine your remarks to the Badshahi Mosque? You can take it from me that every mosque after 1857 which was confiscated was the property of Government. If you are going to base any arguments on that ground, then they would of course apply to the whole country. Government or rather the King-Emperor being the landlord, every inch of land that is held by anybody is either granted to him or the King-Emperor or he holds it from him. Therefore that argument does not appeal to me very much.

A. With a special condition in it, that the Government had the right to close that mosque whenever it liked: or rather "prohibit access to it" is the wording of the order.

Q. Don't you think that it was a convenient place for holding meetings?



24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

A. Specially fine, but the open space outside is much nicer.

Q. Do you think that any mob would select that place just beneath the walls of the Fort and go there and preach rebellion?

A. You cannot hear from the Fort what is said in the mosque.

Q. A body of soldiers may come out at any time. Do you think that it would be a very safe place?

A. It would be ludicrous to think that a body of soldiers would march from the Fort into the mosque unless they had some good reasons for so doing. I gathered from the C. I. D. that they were trying to know what was happening there.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith—*

Q. Do you say that, judging from your experience of what might have happened you consider the whole question of Martial Law in India calls for reconsideration? What exactly are we to understand?

A. I rather mean the relations between the civil power and the military. In India you have got three kinds of Martial Law. You have got what is known as Martial Law in all other countries, which is not a law at all and which means the will of the individual commander. Then you have got the Statutory Martial Law (a) and Statutory Martial Law (b). Statutory Martial Law (a), I gather, is rather an advance upon the ordinary business of giving troops temporarily to the assistance of the civil power. It is rather safer to get the best of both things, to get all the power without the civil Government handing over control, but it is a little involved, and I think I am right in saying that India is the only country where you have got these three different kinds of Martial Law. Martial Law (b) is applied specially to forts and fortresses. Statutory Martial Law (a) can be introduced wherever the Government wishes to have it, and ordinary Martial Law is introduced where the civil Government ceases to exist; this is of course common to all countries. You have therefore got three kinds here, and it makes the relations between the civil and the military liable to strain.

*By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—*

Q. You said that you believed there was a widespread conspiracy with the object of waging war against the King and for purpose of rebellion. May I take it that on such an important and serious question you will not form your opinion hastily?

A. No, Sir, I should not dream of it.

Q. And you will form your opinion after a great deal of consideration and after getting reliable evidence?

A. Quite so.

Q. Also you have told us that the C. I. D. is very efficient?

A. I think they are.

Q. And the Government have at their disposal an agency to inform them of what is going on in the country. Do you agree with that?

A. Yes.

Q. And they would place before you all materials to form your opinion? Now, may I know what is the evidence upon which you came to the conclusion that there was a widespread conspiracy in India to wage war against the King?

A. I gave four points just now. I made a present of one to the Pandit and stood on the three. One was the universal attack on communications. That must have been organized. It could not have been the inspiration of the moment to every villager in the Punjab and other places in India to suddenly strike at communications. I think you cannot get away from the facts. That showed the organization for the paralyzing of communications.

Q. My questions did not relate to these things, but apart from these occurrences, I want to know whether you had positive evidence as to the existence of any conspiracy?

A. My opinion is entirely based upon this, and nothing beyond that.

Q. And the Government also did not tell you anything about it?

A. No, Sir.

Q. If they had anything in their possession, probably they would have told you?

A. I cannot answer that. I should think they would.

Q. In special circumstances they would surely have told you. So may I take it that the inference is correct that neither the Punjab Government nor Government of India nor you had any positive evidence apart from these occurrences that there was a widespread conspiracy to wage war against the Government?

A. Of course I cannot answer for the Punjab Government or for the Government of India. I can only speak for myself. There is no good asking me whether they would or would not tell me.

Q. They did not tell you?

A. It is my own opinion, it has nothing to do with the Government of India or the Government of the Punjab. It is purely a personal opinion.

Q. I see here that you have taken a survey of the whole Indian situation?

A. That is what we call an appreciation of the situation.

Q. In order to appreciate the situation in Lahore you have taken a survey of the whole Indian situation, and from that you have drawn the inference that because certain occurrences took place in various parts of India, therefore in Lahore also there was a deep-seated conspiracy going on which require stamping out by very strong measures?

A. "Preventing the taking place" is perhaps a better wording to apply to Lahore.

Q. I am talking about conspiracy, may I take it that your idea was to prevent a conspiracy taking place?

A. To prevent the results of that conspiracy. I cannot stop a conspiracy. Two people can meet in some dark corner somewhere and hatch a conspiracy, but you can stop the results of it.

Q. And from the results can you not trace the conspiracy?

A. If you are lucky you may be able to trace it, but you may not be. For instance, the C. I. D. with all their efficiency had not known on the 10th April, they had no knowledge whatever of the outbreak like that which happened in Amritsar and they did not hear of it until a few hours after it happened.

Q. From these occurrences that took place, did you make an attempt to find out whether there was any conspiracy in Lahore?

A. No, the C. I. D. were doing their work.

Q. Did you attempt to find out from the C. I. D. the whereabouts of this conspiracy?

A. Of course, I did. Naturally I tried to find out.

Q. What was the result of that?

A. I could not find out what was at the back of it.

Q. You have said in answer to a question, Lahore being the capital of the Punjab, therefore it was also the headquarters, at any rate, if not of the Indian conspiracy at least of the conspiracy in the Punjab?

A. I should think so very naturally, because you have more lawyers here, you have got more of the usual agitating classes here.

Q. Because you have got more lawyers here and the usual agitating classes here?

A. Yes, that is it.

Q. Who are the usual agitating classes, may I know, besides the lawyers?

A. I cannot say which particular class, but you know perfectly well what are called the extremists in India, they are the educated classes and very highly educated people.

Q. Then every person who is highly educated in India is naturally an extremist?

A. Not naturally at all. But that is the class from which they come, I venture to say that is an historical fact. I don't say they all are.

Q. Those that are extremists are all highly educated, but are all extremists highly educated?

A. As far as I know they are very prominent.

24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

Q. So the class of people who are agitators are all extremists or seditious as you call them?

A. I prefer that word in plainer English.

Q. Are they lawyers practically or a great majority of them or some highly educated people who are called extremists?

A. I do not say lawyers particularly, I say the highly educated people.

Q. What I understood you to say was the lawyers and the usual agitating class, then I asked you who were the extremists?

A. They came from that class.

Q. So the lawyers and some of the highly educated people were called extremists. Then did you trace this conspiracy in Lahore to these people?

A. Unfortunately from the very fact that they were not arrested it is clear that I did not trace them.

Q. What made you think that the lawyers and some of the highly educated classes are seditious?

A. That is my own view.

Q. Certainly you must have based it upon facts?

A. I can form my opinion how I like.

Q. You must give me the grounds upon which you based that opinion?

A. I have got my own opinions. I tell you every normal thinking man has his opinions, and that is the opinion I come to.

Q. It is a very serious charge against an important class of people, and I am sure you will not make that charge lightly without some very strong grounds, and if I ask you to tell me the grounds, I think it is only right that you should tell me.

A. No, I have given you my opinion.

Q. You would rather not give me the grounds?

A. I give you the grounds. You have only to read the papers. Look at the meetings that are held all over India. They are all run by the educated classes, and very often by lawyers. I read my papers and I form my opinions from them.

Q. Are all those meetings necessarily seditious meetings? Because lawyers organize those meetings, that is why they are seditious?

A. When the meetings have a seditious object, undoubtedly; if the lawyers have organized them.

Q. But not all meetings are like that, are they?

A. I suppose they are not.

Q. The very fact of lawyers organizing meetings does not show that the meetings are seditious?

A. It depends on the object for which the meeting is held.

Q. The object you know from the speeches?

A. Yes, and the results.

Q. What do you mean by the results?

A. The results of the meeting. You organize a meeting and bricks and stones are freely used . . . . .

Q. A meeting may have been held to pacify a crowd and people started throwing stones?

A. That may have been the result. There may be extreme cases.

Q. So a mere knowledge of the speeches will not tell us who are seditious and who are not seditious?

A. Not necessarily, that is the trouble.

Q. In this survey of Indian situation you say that all over it was the property of Europeans that was burnt or destroyed?

A. Yes, Sir. I only said in the Punjab. I was speaking of places that I know, Gujranwala and Amritsar.

Q. I thought in this you had not restricted yourself to the survey of the situation in the Punjab alone but that you had taken the whole of India, because you have mentioned places like Calcutta, Ahmedabad and Bombay.

A. Did I say there that the property of Europeans only was destroyed?

Q. In your survey of the situation you have confined yourself not to the Punjab alone,—I am stating the fact—but you have taken the whole of India. Therefore I took it that when you said that these disturbances were directed against Europeans, that naturally must relate to the whole of India where all these

disturbances took place. That is why I put you that question.

A. I specifically said Gujranwala and Amritsar in answer to the Pandit. I particularly pointed out the non-destruction of *sahib-log*-occupied, but Indian-owned houses, those are the two special cases that I gave.

Q. Very well. You believe that the disturbances in the Punjab and also the disturbances in the Bombay Presidency and Ahmedabad and Calcutta were connected disturbances?

A. I do so, Sir.

Q. Then are you aware that in Ahmedabad there was some property destroyed which was not the property of Europeans?

A. I am not aware of that.

Q. Also that an Indian gentleman was killed in Ahmedabad?

A. I am not even aware of that. I would have told you that if I knew it.

Q. Do you know that in the whole of the United Provinces, practically at all places *hartal* was held and there were no disorders?

A. I am not aware of the fact.

Q. May I take it that the places at which disturbances took place have been put down in that list of yours?

A. All those that I found out. I do not say that this is a perfect or complete list.

Q. If there were disturbance anywhere, you are sure to find that here?

A. I hope so; I do not guarantee that that is a complete list at all. I only put it forward for what it is worth. I should think it is the best list.

Q. Who gave you that information?

A. I got practically every newspaper in India and I put a staff of clerks to read through them and to report the places at which disturbances took place. There might have been others.

Q. It is not likely that any place would have been left out?

A. I quite agree, it is probably very nearly accurate. I should think so.

Q. None of those places belong to the United Provinces?

A. I am not very good at the Geography of India. I cannot tell to which provinces these places belong.

Q. You may have also learned from papers that there was a *hartal* in the United Provinces?

A. I do not know it as a matter of fact.

Q. You also thought that the disturbances in Delhi were also due to the same one common conspiracy that was going right through India?

A. That was my view.

Q. Will you be surprised to hear that when the authorities made investigation, they found that there was no conspiracy as regards the Delhi disturbances?

A. I saw that in the evidence that took place before your commission.

Q. Do you still hold that opinion?

A. That is my opinion; unless you can explain to me the cutting off of communications, I must stick to my opinion.

Q. Your opinion is based upon the extraordinary coincidence that everyone of these attacks was directed, with the exception of Amritsar and another place, at communications. You based your opinion on the one isolated fact that communications were disturbed, railways were destroyed, and concluded that there was sufficient truth in the allegation that this were done to wage war against the King?

A. I have already stated in my evidence, if you had followed me, that there were three other factors.

Q. I referred to it simply because you just referred to it. There was some talk about the connection between the Lahore disturbances and the frontier disturbances. How do you connect the two?

A. Because we have it as a fact that emissaries from India went across the border of India and were in Afghanistan. That is the connection. Proclamations came down from Afghanistan into India.

24 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Concluded.]

Q. Because the Amir of Afghanistan chose to make a proclamation, that is the reason why you came to that conclusion?

A. If you have the view that the Amir invented it, I leave it to you. He said that his proclamation was based upon information which reached him from India and a lot of representations made from India; so he took action against the British Empire. If you think he invented that reason, I must leave it to you.

Q. Representations came to him from India?

A. He said so in his proclamation that came.

Q. Government were not aware who were the people who gave him information?

A. I do not know about Government. I am not here to answer for Government. I am here to answer for myself. So I cannot answer.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. It has been suggested that you acted very improperly in making over cars and carriages of Indian gentlemen to Europeans. Were the cars that were made over used by Europeans to perform official duties or for joy rides?

A. It was purely for official work.

By the President—

Q. Do you mean that there were cars used by Europeans other than officials?

A. I do not think any private Europeans here had cars. I think there were cars of officials in Government employ. I cannot think of a single car owned by other Europeans.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Have you any reason to believe that your administration of Martial Law in Lahore was appreciated by the Indian community?

A. I am proud to say it was. I am able to give reasons. It is rather personal and I hardly like to mention it. Before I left Lahore, the Muhammadan community presided over by Mahomed Shafi, Member of the Indian Government, was kind enough to entertain me at a dinner in appreciation of my Martial Law administration.

Q. The Hindus also joined?

A. There were Hindus also, the Afghans also and the British public also. In fact I left Lahore with a feeling that I had been all things to all men.

### ANNEXURE A.

#### *Agreement by the Members of the Committee of Supervision of the Badshahi Mosque, Lahore.*

To

The OFFICER COMMANDING,  
Lahore (Civil) Area.

SIR,

We, the undersigned members of the Committee of Supervision of the Badshahi Mosque, make the following statement and give the undertaking set forth below:—

- (1) The said mosque was to our sorrow desecrated on the 11th and 12th April last by its misuse for seditious meetings, at which Hindus spoke from a portable wooden pulpit and during one of which an officer of the Government was brutally assaulted.
- (2) We acknowledge that such a deplorable misuse of the mosque is intolerable and that so far as lies in our power steps must be taken by us to prevent its repetition.
- (3) We will take all necessary steps that the mosque is in the future used only for purposes allowed by the laws of Islam.

We have the honour to be

SIR,

Your most obedient servants,

- |   |                       |
|---|-----------------------|
| 1. Nawab Fatch Ali Khan Qazilbash, C.I.E., President, Anjuman-i-Islamia . . . . .                   | (Sd.) FATEH ALI KHAN. |
| 2. Hon. Nawab Zulfiqar Ali Khan, C.S.I., Member Executive Committee . . . . .                       | „ ZULFIQAR ALI KHAN.  |
| 3. Hon. K. B. Mian Mohd. Shafi, C.I.E., Bar.-at-Law, Member Executive Committee, Anjuman-i-Islamia. | „ MD. SHAFI.          |
| 4. K. B. Nawab Mohammad Ali Khan Qazilbash, Vice-President of the Anjuman . . . . .                 | „ MOHAMMAD ALI KHAN.  |
| 5. Khan Mohd. Bashir Ali Khan, General Secretary of the Anjuman . . . . .                           | „ M. BASHIR ALI KHAN. |
| 6. Khan Bahadur Shaikh Nasiruddin, Member, Executive Committee, Anjuman-i-Islamia.                  | „ M. NASIRUDDIN KHAN. |
| 7. Khan Bahadur Dr. S. Amir Shah, Member, Executive Committee . . . . .                             | „ AMIR SHAH, K.B.     |
| 8. Khan Sahib Faqir Zafrud Din, Member, General Committee of the Anjuman . . . . .                  | „ F. ZAFFARUDDIN K.S. |
| 9. Khan Bahadur Shaikh Inam Ali, B.A., Member, General Committee of the Anjuman.                    | „ INAM ALI.           |
| 10. Maulvi Fazlud Din, Vakil High Court, Member Executive Committee of the Anjuman.                 | „ M. FAZLUD DIN.      |
| 11. Haji Shams-ud-Din, Member, Executive Committee of the Anjuman . . . . .                         | „ SHAMS-UD-DIN.       |
| 12. Shamsul Atibba Khan Sahib Dr. Ghulam, Jilani Member, Executive Committee of the Anjuman.        | „ GHULAM JILANI.      |
| 13. Maulvi Ahmad Ali, Imam, Badshahi Mosque, Lahore . . . . .                                       | „ AHMAD ALI.          |
| 14. Maulvi Mahbub Alam, Member, Executive Committee of the Anjuman . . . . .                        | „ MAHBUB ALAM.        |
| 15. M. Abdulla Khan, Financial Secretary of the Anjuman . . . . .                                   | „ ABDULLA KHAN.       |
| 16. Mian Nizam ud-Din, Hony. Magistrate, Member, Executive Committee, Anjuman-i-Islamia.            | „ NIZAMUDDIN.         |

Dated, Lahore, the 16th May, 1919.

25 November 1919.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

## At Lahore, Tuesday, the 25th November 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.  
 The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.  
 Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B.,  
 K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.  
 The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.  
 Sir C. H. SETALVAD, KT.  
 Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., *Secretary*.

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY, Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore.

*By the President—*

Q. Are you the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think, as we know a general *hartal* had been arranged for Sunday, the 30th of March?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Which was afterwards postponed to the 6th of April?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was there a meeting at the Bradlaugh Hall to protest against the Rowlatt Act on Sunday, the 30th March?

A. That was the one which was put off for the 6th.

Q. And in consequence of the trouble that had arisen in Delhi you had to make special arrangements to prevent similar trouble in Lahore?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you on the 3rd of April issue notices under section 80 of the Police Act indicating that no meetings or processions should be held in the public streets without a proper license?

A. Yes, Sir, after consulting the Deputy Commissioner.

Q. Did you require intending promoters of any such meeting or procession to apply to you for licenses not later than 10 A.M. on the day previous to that for which the license was required?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Each of these notices were prepared and issued after consultation with the Deputy Inspector-General and Deputy Commissioner.

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were they sent to all the newspapers?

A. They were published as widely as possible and sent to all the newspapers, English and Vernacular, to the organisers of the meeting and their known sympathisers by name, posted at the City Gates, in fact made as widely known as possible.

Q. Was there any application for a license made?

A. No application was received.

Q. On the morning of the 4th April did the Deputy Commissioner hold a meeting of all the Municipal Commissioners of Lahore in his office?

A. Yes, Sir, at 11.30.

Q. Were you present then?

A. No, that was about 10 o'clock.

Q. Were you at that meeting?

Q. On that occasion did the Deputy Commissioner remind the Municipal Commissioners of their responsibilities and duties?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you asked them to look after their wards?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In particular did you say anything as to the attitude they should adopt with reference to any attempts being made to compel people to suspend business and close shops?

A. They were asked to see that no coercion was used to compel people to suspend business or to close their shops.

Q. Were any efforts made by the Municipal Commissioners to carry out these instructions?

A. As far as their reports went they had done so.

Q. Were they successful?

A. No.

Q. Was there a general *hartal* throughout the city and Anarkali?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On Friday previously, i.e., Friday, the 4th April, did you accompany the Deputy Commissioner to the cantonments?

A. The D. I. G. of the C. I. D. and the Deputy Commissioner went with me to the cantonments.

Q. Was a route march of troops through Lahore arranged for Saturday morning?

A. Yes, Sir, by the British Infantry.

Q. What was the display of force that was arranged for them on Saturday, the 5th?

A. A route march of troops through Lahore was arranged by the General for Saturday morning. It was further arranged that a hundred British Infantry should march through Lahore *via* Gol Bagh to the Fort on Saturday evening, and should remain in the Fort till Monday morning. They were provided with lorries to go out, if necessary, quickly, but the force in the Fort was not used at any time.

Q. I think eventually the arrangements actually ordered by the General were that a squadron of 114 Lancers were to be at the Gol Bagh at 6.30 A.M. on Sunday ready to assist if required with two armoured cars to be at the High Court and two at the Deputy Commissioner's Kutchery?

A. Yes, Sir, they were to remain all day there.

Q. So far as you know were they the only armed military forces?

A. Yes, they were, with the exception of signal and medical units. They were non-combatant units.

Q. As regards the Punjab Light Horse, what about them?

A. They kept about 20 troops on duty to look after their headquarters and the Punjab Rifles arranged for 50 men to look after their armoury at their headquarters, and the North-Western Railway Volunteer Force arranged to look after their own armoury at the Railway Station with a similar force of 50 men.

Q. How much of the Indian Defence Force?

A. These are the Indian Defence Force.

Q. But they were not moved, I think, from their posts throughout the day?

A. They did not move all the day.

Q. About 4 P.M. did the Deputy Commissioner hold a meeting at which some of the leaders of the people were summoned?

25 November 1919.

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

A. Yes, Sir, the leaders and the organisers of the *hartal*, as far as we knew them from the list of signatories to the notices, were summoned.

Q. Was that on Saturday?

A. That was on the same day, Friday, 4 P.M. Not Saturday, Sir.

Q. At that meeting did you point out to the gentlemen present the danger of exciting people?

A. Yes, Sir, we pointed out to the people the particular danger at that particular time. There was always danger in these *hartals*, and at that time with the economic distress we considered the danger particularly bad, and that was all pointed out, and we indicated to them that they could not be free of responsibility. Under these conditions if they stirred up forces they would not be able to control them.

Q. Did you say anything as to their refraining from bringing compulsion to bear upon them to get the *hartal* made general?

A. We asked that they should, if possible, abandon the *hartal* altogether as being dangerous. But if they could not or would not abandon it at least they would see that the closing of shops and suspension of business was voluntary, that no coercion would be used to make people, who were willing to open shops or to carry on work or business, shut up shops and close business.

Q. Did you make arrangements as to being kept in touch with the people?

A. Yes Sir. That was all based on some articles in the *Tribune*. I saw these, and one of the points made in the *Tribune* was that we should keep in touch with the leaders. I particularly pointed out that it caused incitement, but it was reversing the order of things. The leaders might be scattered all over the town. I particularly wished that we should keep in touch with the leaders, and that we should be found in the Deputy Commissioner's office at the Telegraph Office. It was impossible for us to find them, but we hoped that they would keep in touch with us.

Q. I see that you prepared a statement showing the order and dispositions in detail?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Is that the one which is found as Annexure C\* to this statement of yours?

A. Yes, Sir, that is my order.

Q. You see it is signed by Mr. Clarke?

A. He was my Deputy Superintendent for the time.

Q. What was your idea in making the dispositions?

A. Roughly to protect the civil Station from any ebullition of mobs from the city into the Civil Station.

Q. Were the armed picquets and reserves commanded by the carefully selected officers?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you explain their duties to them?

A. I think I had them called up before me and I carefully explained to each man and impressed upon them the importance of self-control and a careful study of the rules as regards dealing with the mob.

Q. Did you with your remaining officers take up your headquarters with the Deputy Commissioner at his office?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was that the nearest point to Bradlaugh Hall?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were all detachments, Police and Military, in their places by 6-30 A.M.

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You remained in the closest touch with the Deputy Commissioner throughout the day?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you also make visits to the picquets and reserves?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And up to about 11 everything was reported quiet?

A. Yes.

Q. At that time had you heard of any gathering?

A. There had been a large gathering of students and people at the Kavi and we heard of this gathering breaking up and parties dispersing, going off towards the city.

Q. You refer to what route they had taken?

A. They entered the city by various routes and various gates, and apparently they collected into mobs again inside the city and these eventually came on to the circular road which passes along by the Mochi, Shahalmi, Lohari Gates, etc., and formed into one big mob.

Q. Did the City Inspector enter the city?

A. The City Inspector came patrolling round the circular road. He went into the Mochi Gate which was an important gate, and was immediately confronted by a huge mob. He was practically swallowed up in that mob.

Q. Then what happened to that mob?

A. That mob came out of the Mochi Gate and on to the circular road. The people were pouring in from all sides to join this mob all the time. The Inspector informed me that they turned up to the Railway Station direction; but he pointed out to them that it was not the direction of the Bradlaugh Hall and induced them to turn to the west again. They then turned to the west and came along the circular road being momentarily increased and down into the Anarkali Bazar just opposite the Lahori Gate. In the meantime the City Inspector extricated himself from the mob and came down to the side street to report to me at the Kutchery. Mr. Fyson, the Deputy Commissioner, and myself were there when he arrived. He told us about this.

Q. What report did he give you as to the attitude of the crowd so far?

A. He said that they were very excited, but that they were peaceful inasmuch as they had done no damage or assaulted anybody. They were not doing damage or anybody or to any property, but they were very excited. In fact they begged us not to go out to them.

Q. What did you do then?

A. I sent him back immediately to take up his original position in the mob and try to restrain them. At the same time I sent Mr. Clarke, Deputy Superintendent, on horseback to Nila Gumbaz to try and hold them there, and in support of them I sent two Inspectors and 50 men to follow up to Nila Gumbaz to help him.

Q. What did you yourself do?

A. Mr. Fyson and I then came out, and after we had been consulting together we ordered two armed motor cars to proceed to the Telegraph Office and we rode to the Gol Bagh where the Cavalry were stationed. We galloped on to the Mall at the Market Chowk where the Anarkali Bazar really debouches. We saw that the crowd had not come down a bit. They turned to Chowk Nila Gumbaz towards the King Edward Square. We went through the Gate in front of the mob until we came to Y. M. C. A. Chowk where we saw a crowd, a huge crowd coming down.

Q. In what direction were they coming?

A. Towards the Mall. We immediately went up to the head of the mob with a few mounted men I had, and came up with them to Mul Chand's shop.

Q. Where were Mr. Clarke and the Inspector?

A. They had been driven along by the mob. They were there at the time with the mob; we found them there.

Q. Were they endeavouring to get the mob go back?

A. They were there all the time; but the mob would not listen.

Q. Were you yourself parleying with the mob asking them to go back?

A. Yes; Mr. Fyson and myself parleyed with the mob.

Q. What did they say in reply to your request?

25 November 1919.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

A. They said they would not go back; they asked all sorts of conditions. They asked me to jump off the horse; our horses were impatient; some of the young fellows came in front and said: "if you send back the police, we will go back;" I said "Alright; I have no objection to send the police back;" and I ordered the police to go back; and when they went back, instead of going back, the mob became more excited, shouted and yelled, as if they had secured a victory and pushed forward a few paces; and that was the kind of parleying that one had for some time. They asked again that we should go back. I said, "No, we cannot go back." One sowar was left with me. I sent my orderly there. He went back to the end of the street. I said: "I cannot go back." I turned back myself. I turned my horse, and there was another shouting and yelling. Mr. Clarke, my Deputy Superintendent said. "That was what they had been doing with me all the way." This parleying went on for some time, and then Mr. Gokal Chand Naurang came up. He was one of the leaders, one of the signatories to the notice. He was one of the local leaders; he came up and tried to induce the mob to go back. He was on foot and only a few people could see him, and his efforts were of no avail, and he appealed to me to give him a horse so that the people could see him. I gave him a police sowar's horse, and meantime I may mention that the opening of the street into the Mall had been lined by cavalry and armoured motor cars with machine guns, so that the situation was practically that the mob could not move really. They were about 200 yards behind us. The cavalry were blocking the street. My sowars had come back, and behind the cavalry were two armoured motor cars which could be seen for a very long way. Then Dr. Gokal Chand Naurang came. I put him on to a horse and they saw him and raised shouts, and he urged them to go back, and by that time I think they were rather glad of some excuse to go back. They saw they could not come forward, and they turned back.

Q. Where did they go?

A. They went back the same way they had come past the Nila Gumbaz to Kutchery road, and on to Bradlaugh Hall.

Q. Was the street then clear?

A. At that part of the street the trouble was all over.

Q. And did the Deputy Commissioner and you return to the Hall?

A. We came back the same way and got to the Market Chowk and the mob had extended as far as we could see. The mob was filling the whole of the Anarkali Bazar, and when it was halted by us at Mool Chand's shop apparently the pressure from behind drove part of the mob that had not gone on into the bit of bazar between Nila Gumbaz and the Market Chowk. There they were met by other officers and some cavalry, and when Mr. Fyson and I came back there they were driving them back, and trying to get them to disperse. After a time we pushed them back there and then Dr. Gokal Chand Naurang again came back on the same horse and eventually succeeded in leading them away down Kutchery Road to the Gol Bagh and to the Bradlaugh Hall.

Q. How long had all this lasted?

A. About 2½ hours, perhaps a little more.

Q. Was there any further trouble that day?

A. There was no further trouble that day, Sir. From 2 o'clock they organised the meeting for Bradlaugh Hall, which, as far as I remember, was fixed for 5 p.m., but in view of the crowd and the excitement and the crowd having got into the Bradlaugh Hall and filled up the place, they had meetings there at about 2 o'clock, I believe or half-past 2. They put up people to speak to keep the crowd occupied.

Q. And meantime had you any meeting with the leaders of the people?

A. Two of them came to see me, Dr. Gokal Chand Naurang and Mr. Duni Chand. They are the only two I saw that day: they came to see me at the Kutchery.

Q. And what arrangement did you make with them?

A. We pointed out what serious results there might have been, what a dangerous situation had been created, and pointed out that we could not have any more processions down the Mall again, and they asked that in case impromptu processions were made they should be allowed down the Mall. We said we could not allow that, and eventually they undertook to try and prevent this. They were chiefly students. Apparently they were afraid of forming processions, and we also asked them to have their meeting over as quickly as possible before sunset, as it would be more dangerous if large crowds dispersed after dark, and eventually Dr. Gokal Chand Naurang undertook that the meeting would be over by 6 o'clock, and that the students would not process down the Mall.

Q. Did you make a fresh disposition of forces to deal with the situation, if necessary?

A. Yes, Sir, I had to make fresh dispositions in consultation with the Deputy Commissioner, both of police and of military in order to enforce our orders as to processions coming down the Mall.

Q. I understand there was no further clashing with the police that day?

A. No further; there was lots of excitement at the Hall, and speeches and so forth, but there was no trouble after that.

Q. Did you get any report as to the conduct of the crowd during that night in the city?

A. Yes, there were reports that the crowds of students and others paraded the streets shouting out their various cries of *jai*, and abusing Municipal Commissioners and others who had been endeavouring to prevent the *hartal* and assist local officers.

Q. And business was resumed on the 7th?

A. Yes.

A. And business was continued for the next two days?

A. Yes, for the 3 days, 7th, 8th and 9th. There was no particular excitement.

Q. We know that the *Ram Naumi* celebration was held on the 9th?

A. Yes, Sir, at night.

Q. Were you present there?

A. I was not, Sir, no British Officer was present there, it is always managed by the City Inspector.

Q. On the evening of the 10th of April did you hear about the trouble that had taken place at Amritsar?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When was this?

A. I cannot remember the time. I was out in the morning. We had been hearing news that a *hartal* similar to that on Saturday, the 6th, would be held on the following Sunday. Therefore I went out to see the General on the morning of the 10th and arranged with him that certain military measures should be taken from Saturday evening. When I returned to my office I was telephoned to, I think, by the Personal Assistant to the Inspector-General to come down at once and take the Inspector-General out to the cantonments. I think it must have been about half-past two, or possibly later.

Q. You refer to Saturday, the 10th was not a Saturday?

A. No, Sir, I was telling you that I went out on the morning of the 10th to arrange for troops for the following Saturday evening because we expected a *hartal* on the following Sunday similar to the previous Sunday's *hartal*. I took the Inspector-General out to cantonments, and when I got to the Central Police Office I enquired what the sudden call meant and what was the matter. I was told there had been serious trouble in Amritsar and people had been murdered there.

Q. We have had the details of what occurred?

A. I then took the Inspector-General out to the cantonments, and we arranged for troops to come out at 6-30 that day instead of the following Saturday.

Q. Did you go to Government House and see the Lieutenant-Governor?

25 November 1919.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

A. When I came back I made police arrangements in case of trouble, and while I was making these arrangements at about 5-30, perhaps I heard that the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest had come in and possibly of the Amritsar trouble, and that the shops were shutting again. I then wrote supplementary orders and telephoned these to my police stations and lines. Having done so I motored back to my bungalow. There I met the Deputy Commissioner who was waiting for me and informed him that His Honour wished to see me.

Q. I think you proceeded then to Government House?

A. I then drove Mr. Fyson, Deputy Commissioner, to Government House.

Q. Did you receive news as to a crowd collecting on the Mall?

A. While we were at Government House a message came through by telephone that crowds were collecting. I did not take the message. The impression conveyed was that the mob had formed and was moving towards Civil Lines.

Q. Then I think you proceeded down Montgomery Road to the Mall?

A. His Honour then dismissed us, and I went off to my police lines in the first instance to turn out my reserves, while Mr. Fyson and Mr. Cocks drove straight down the Mall.

Q. Then after you had turned out your reserves you proceeded to the Mall yourself?

A. Yes, Sir. I sent one party down McLeod Road and one party down Montgomery Road, armed parties under officers to a rendezvous at the Telegraph Office.

Q. How many men had you with you?

A. Actually 13 mounted men.

Q. As you were proceeding to the Mall did you hear firing?

A. I am not very clear about it. Just as we were leaving the Police Lines I think we heard shots.

Q. And at about Charing Cross you met the cavalry?

A. Yes, as we came on to the Mall at Charing Cross we met the cavalry coming out; they were late.

Q. Did you then proceed further?

A. We proceeded rapidly down. I asked the Officer Commanding to draw in his defence party and to let me and my men get in front of the cavalry because in all these matters the police, I told him, should take action first. He agreed to this and he put back his men and he was alongside of me, and followed by the police, 12 or 13 sowars, and the cavalry we proceeded rapidly to the Telegraph Office.

Q. At the Telegraph Office did you find Mr. Cocks?

A. I found Mr. Cocks at the Telegraph Office and asked what had happened. He informed me that a big mob had come down the Mall, that he had very few men and tried to disperse the mob and eventually had to fire to do so. I then asked where my men were and where my officers were. He told me that Mr. Clarke, my Deputy Superintendent, was at the time pushing the mob back towards Anarkali.

Q. Did you find what force Mr. Clarke had at his disposal?

A. I understand he had about a dozen men. I therefore thought it necessary to proceed to his assistance immediately.

Q. You joined him?

A. Yes, Sir. I asked the Officer Commanding the cavalry to give me some troopers. I picked up a picket of foot police of 25 muskets at the Telegraph Office and we proceeded along the Mall up through King Edward Square, past Mul Chand's into Nila Gumbaz. Before we got half way I thought it necessary to push on. I left my foot police and with the mounted men we galloped on. Just inside Nila Gumbaz, a few yards inside Anarkali Bazar, I found Mr. Clarke with only five or six men trying to drive a very large mob back up the bazar towards the city.

Q. Then you took action?

A. I joined him, Sir, with the mounted men and we pushed the crowd up Anarkali almost to the end of the bazar, to within 200 yards of the end of the bazar.

Q. Was the crowd getting smaller or larger?

A. The crowd was growing and packing closer and we pushed them back every moment until they got to within 200 yards of the Circular Road and they became very dense. I was mounted and it was getting dark, and one could only see a sea of heads closely packed from where we were, as far as the Lahori Gate, something like 15,000 or 20,000 people.

Q. What was the attitude of the crowd towards you?

A. Very excited and very angry.

Q. Did they throw anything at you?

A. Yes, Sir, when we stopped they began throwing bricks and mud. As soon as we were stopped I sent back one of my mounted men with a written note to the Deputy Commissioner at the Telegraph Office to come up with reinforcements at once. We were stoned there with bricks and mud for about three quarters of an hour.

Q. Were you yourself hit?

A. I was hit five or six times, only three times at all badly.

Q. On any occasion did you receive a severe blow?

A. Yes, I got half a brick, I think it must have been, from the top of one of the houses. They were stoning us from the tops of the houses and from the front as well. And this hit me on the point of my shoulder blade and raised a big bruise there. I could not lie on my back for three or four days but apart from that it was not serious.

Q. Did you receive any other wounds?

A. My hand was cut open and my thigh was cut open. It was not serious, only drew a little blood, and the others were lumps of mud. One lump of mud bigger than a cricket ball hit me just inside my lap but did not hurt me.

Q. Were any officers or men near you struck?

A. Yes, Sir, Lieutenant Wilson, the officer with me, was hit, I understand, on the shoulder with a brick and my Deputy Superintendent, Mr. Clarke, was hit on the hand. He had almost the same thing as I had. He got it on the back of his hand, but in his case it was rather worse than mine and it festered and he was a week or two with his hand in a sling. I also saw many of my men hit in various places, but nobody was seriously injured.

Q. Were some crackers thrown by the crowd?

A. Yes, Sir, at one time when it was getting very dark some crackers were thrown and Mr. Clarke remarked near me that they had got pistols or firearms. However they proved to be only crackers.

Q. Were the crowd fired on on that occasion?

A. Before Mr. Fyson came. To our left front were some low shops and also a shrine or grave. Just by that there was a building being put up or repaired, a chemist's shop. That is where most of the bricks and rubbish were obtained from as far as I could gather and some of the wilder and more excited people got on to the roof of these low sheds and they were very persistent and they were damaging us worse than any others, and eventually we fired three shots of buckshot up on to those roofs to clear them.

Q. Who gave the instructions to fire?

A. I did.

Q. That was after Mr. Fyson came?

A. Before Mr. Fyson came?

Q. At the time you gave the instructions to fire was it possible to get the mob to disperse without firing?

A. Absolutely impossible, Sir. We had been trying to get them to disperse. I had been warning them that I would have to fire and we could not move them. We were being swayed backwards and forwards. As they became a little more violent we fell back. After I had fired I think Mr. Ram Bhaj Dutt came up to me and said "that is a good thing you have done, firing in the air, now they will disperse." I told him "I am not firing in the air. I have no authority to fire in the air. Our rules do not allow it; I fired at those low houses, and if we have to fire we shall fire at the crowds and not over their heads."

Q. Did Ram Bhaj Dutt try to get the crowd back?

A. Yes, Sir, he waved his hands and tried to get them to listen to him and he asked eventually for a horse. I put him on a horse, but the crowd was very

25 November 1919.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

excited and making such a noise the horse would not face it. He was put on to a sowar's horse which would not go near the crowd and began backing and plunging and he got off. He could not manage it. He then, I think, got on to an electric standard close by.

Q. With a view to addressing the crowd?

A. He did try to address the crowd, and waved a cloth and tried to get them to go back, but the crowd were not listening to anybody.

Q. Had the first shots you fired made any casualties among the crowd?

A. I cannot say, there may have been casualties, but we did not hear of any.

Q. Before Mr. Fyson came on the scene?

A. Before Mr. Fyson arrived on the scene, and I told him we had been stoned for three quarters of an hour and that I had been warning them and could not get them to disperse. I was getting nervous at this time. I had been hung up there and had no knowledge of what was going on. I was responsible for the whole of the police arrangements throughout Lahore and did not know what was going on elsewhere and I told him and he said he would try and disperse the mob. He rode forward to disperse them and talked to them, but was met with stones and bricks, and he called out that he had been hit, and I said "you had better come back." He gesticulated and tried to get them to hear. As soon as anybody tried to speak to the crowd they became wilder than ever; they shouted and jumped and clapped their hands. And eventually he fell back and said "You will have to fire." Mr. Ram Bhaj Dutt came up to me and asked for time. Mr. Fyson gave them a few minutes, I do not remember how many minutes; I remember his taking out his watch. He was on a horse in front of me, and after a time he instructed me to fire. I asked him to fall back behind my firing party and then I opened fire.

Q. Had Mr. Dutt attempted to get the crowd to go back?

A. He had Sir, he tried to speak to them on the ground, he tried to get on a horse and confront them, and as I heard he got on to a standard to try to get them to listen, but nobody would listen at the time.

Q. After that Mr. Fyson gave you instructions to fire and you in turn I suppose ordered your men to fire?

A. He gave me instructions to fire and I ordered the men to fire with buckshot.

Q. And were five or six shots fired?

A. Five or six buckshots were fired.

Q. What effect did that have on the crowd?

A. The crowd began to break and I shouted out "cease fire."

Q. Did the crowd then disperse?

A. As soon as the crowd began to break we moved forward. Mr. Fyson had brought up cavalry as well.

Q. Did you yourself move on to the Circular Road?

A. We moved on to Circular Road where I established a picquet of my own police to stop the Circular Road westward and to stop the mouth of the Anarkali Bazar. A few troopers of the 17th Lancers were left with them in support. The Deputy Commissioner and I moved on and my Deputy Superintendent Mr. Clarke who was on foot all this time. We moved round Circular Road—the main body throwing out men into the gardens. We cleared the street and the garden right up to the Akbari Gate.

Q. Where is the Akbari Gate?

A. A good way on to the east and a little to the north.

Q. Does Circular Road go round Lahore?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think you sent Mr. Clarke with mounted police?

A. Yes, Sir. I told Mr. Clarke to take one of the sowar's horses and to take the remaining mounted constables up towards the Kotwali. I asked him to go through Landa Bazar and McLeod Road and to join me at the Telegraph Office and report affairs to me there.

Q. You went back with Mr. Fyson to the Telegraph Office?

A. Yes, Sir, the same way as we had come.

Q. When Mr. Clarke arrived I think he reported to you as having dispersed a mob in Landa Bazar?

A. Yes, Sir, it appears that Mr. de Gale who was at the lines at the time had received information that a big mob was in the Landa Bazar. He proceeded with some men to Landa Bazar but he outrode the men on foot and was attacked. He was attacked, I think, with sticks or stones. Anyhow his pony fell. He recovered himself and was joined by the men. When Mr. Clarke came to the Kotwali he heard this uproar going on and he immediately took 20 armed foot police from the Kotwali and proceeded down Landa Bazar. This was the report that I received afterwards.

When he came down Landa Bazar he found the mob armed with sticks and he dispersed the crowd and joined up with Mr. de Gale.

Q. I think you and the Deputy Commissioner took up your quarters at the Telegraph Office and remained there for some weeks?

A. We remained there for three weeks.

Q. On the 11th of April were you receiving the reports from your officers and others?

A. On the 11th of April we received very unsatisfactory reports on the state of affairs in the city. The city was in fact actually out of hand. We were hearing reports that a committee had been formed to control the affairs of the city, that they were going to maintain the *hartal* and that they were to stop Government servants from coming out. We heard of a *Danda Fauj* in the evening.

Q. What is that *Danda Fauj*?

A. "*Danda Fauj*" means a club army—an army armed with clubs. We heard reports of a *Danda Fauj* being formed that afternoon. I cannot be certain whether that afternoon or the next morning, but the reports were all to the effect that we were not controlling the city. And my ordinary body of our police posts outside the city were still being occupied, but all the internal police arrangements had been wiped out. They all had to be withdrawn.

Q. Did the police enter the city on the 11th?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Why was that?

A. There were many reasons. One was that the city was in a very disturbed state. It was virtually in rebellion. Any small party going into the city would undoubtedly have met with opposition. It would involve more loss of life and more firing. On the 11th there was parleying going on with the leaders. The Deputy Commissioner saw the leaders who were endeavouring to make terms and who were proposing to try and get the *hartal* stopped and to restore normal conditions. Anything short of a very big force that would really impress the city moving in the city would have been at that time fatal.

Q. Did you hear anything as to rumours circulating in the city with reference to the troops rising against the Government?

A. Yes, there were all sorts of rumours being reported by my men and by Indian gentlemen who came to see us. All day long they were reporting that there was a great show of unity going on and that they were expecting the troops and police to turn. At one of our gates a man was arrested for endeavouring to tamper with the police calling to them to join their brethren and there was an incident where a man,—Balwant Singh—who came into the mosque and declared that he was coming from cantonments where the troops had risen and a large number had been killed; he himself had killed six soldiers. This sort of thing was going on. The Muhafizadans and Hindus were meeting in the Badshahi mosque where they were being harangued by their leaders.

Q. That morning you decided to march a column of troops through the city the next morning?

A. Yes, Sir, it was decided to resume control of the city as quickly as possible.

Q. And arrangements were made between you and the military as to the places where picquets were to be left?

A. Yes, Sir, it was arranged that we must go into the city with a big force sufficient to prevent trouble and to picquet certain points with police and military.



25 November 1919.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

A. We went with such a force.

Q. And Colonel Johnson was at the head of it?

A. Colonel Johnson commanded it. He told us where he put his picquets and reserve.

Q. What was the attitude of the city?

A. They were very sullen and very hostile.

Q. Did you hear any remarks made by the crowd as you passed through?

A. Remarks were reported to me. I did not hear any particulars that I can recollect except where an old man said "You must let go Mr. Gandhi. We will not open until you let go Mr. Gandhi." The others reported remarks that they would not open their shops until the Rowlatt Act was repealed. And there was a man at the Waterworks coming apparently from Badshahi mosque direction in an excited condition. There was a British officer walking through the streets and the man tried to move him away from the place where he had halted. He raised his arm at this officer in a threatening manner.

Q. Did he raise his arm as though he was going to strike him?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What happened to the man?

A. He was arrested. I arrested him. I caught hold of him at the time but he broke away and rushed down the line but some of my men arrested him. He was afterwards convicted.

Q. What was he convicted of?

A. I think he got two months.

Q. Did you hear of an attack on the C. I. D. Inspector?

A. On our march through the city, just as we got near the waterworks we heard that a C. I. D. Inspector had been severely assaulted.

Q. At Hira Mandi was there a large crowd?

A. Yes, there was at Hira Mandi.

Q. Were these people attempting to come into the mosque?

A. They were moving to and from the mosque.

Q. Were they armed with anything?

A. They were the most threatening crowd that we had seen at the disturbances. They were armed with lathis and we understood that this was the *Danda Fauj*.

Q. Did you make any attempts to disperse the crowd?

A. Several.

Q. And did you give them warning?

A. Over and over again.

Q. What attention did they pay to the warning?

A. None at all. Eventually it was decided that the mosque should be cleared and a Muhammadan Magistrate was sent down to clear the mosque. Crowds came out of the mosque. Crowds filled the places between the mosque and Hira Mandi. The cavalry tried to disperse them but they would not disperse. They would go from one place to another. Eventually they collected in a mass. They tried to stampede the cavalry by waving and shouting at them and eventually they massed in large numbers actually in Hira Mandi.

Q. Was that a crowd that you could have allowed to remain between your force and the picquets that had been established at the mosque?

A. We could not have allowed such a crowd to remain. Personally I had no great anxiety about the military picquets, they could look after themselves all right but the situation was that we had established these five picquets on the way to Hira Mandi and we had already established police picquets of 25 men with muskets which had been located at the Kotwali, Bazaz Hatta and what is known as the Haveli Nawab Sahib. These picquets were everywhere in the air except at the Haveli Nawab Sahib where they were in an enclosure. They were absolutely in the open street. If a mob like that had been left behind us and the column had turned its back on it there would have been serious trouble at all the picquets. If these pickets had been attacked they would have been in a very bad position and they would have to fire and there would have been probably considerable loss of life.

Q. Had you at this time armed police with you?

A. Yes, Sir. I had 100 armed police with me—with the military column.

Q. Did you receive any instructions from Mr. Fyson as to how you would disperse the crowd?

A. Yes, Sir. When we formed up the military faced round and the stoning began. I sent for the police as a part of my force was behind and when the military turned round to disperse the crowd I asked the officer commanding to let my men get in front in order to avoid as long as possible any collision between the military and the crowd. To fire into the crowd with rifles would have been very much more serious than firing by my men with luckshot. My men were brought up by Mr. Clarke from the front of the column and they lined up in front of the cavalry. Mr. Fyson took a few troops and pushed forward into the crowd in order to disperse them and to give them warning that they would be fired upon. The only result was a great uproar and the people on the left tried to push in between and Mr. Fyson seemed to be in danger of being cut off and I shouted out to him to come back. He fell back and he told me that we shall have to fire. Eventually he gave me orders to fire and I gave orders to four files to load and fire.

Q. How many men in all fired?

A. Four or five. There were eight rounds fired at the time.

Q. Did you give any orders as to whether the men should fire high or low?

A. I gave the men orders to fire low. We always give orders to fire low at the feet of the crowd.

Q. What was the effect of the firing?

A. The crowd began to break. One man turned round and waved his stick and some of the crowd turned immediately with him and as the crowd broke we pushed forward.

Q. During the course of your march did the Deputy Commissioner make any announcement as to whether meetings or processions would be allowed in the city?

A. At every point—probably at about a dozen places—wherever there was a crossing or a *chowk* or any crowd at all. He announced that there should be no processions of any kind, etc., and that they should open their shops and resume business.

Q. After you went back yourself to the Telegraph Office did you make arrangements as to patrols of 40 or 50 armed men moving in and about the city day and night?

A. Yes, Sir. I do not mean by that that we had patrols continually moving. I had a flying picquet at Lohari Gate which was 50 strong and this patrol accompanied a gazetted officer through the city to visit the picquets that we had established.

Q. I think you know that on this day, the 12th, there was serious trouble at Kasur. Then on the 13th of April did the *hartal* continue?

A. On the 13th the *hartal* continued.

Q. Was Wagah station sacked and burnt?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Where is Wagah Station?

A. Down the line about two stations down the road to Amritsar.

Q. How far from here?

A. About 12 or 14 miles.

Q. On the 14th the *hartal* still continued?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On that day were certain of the leaders deported?

A. Yes, Sir, Messrs. Ram Bhaj Datt, Harkishen Lal and Duni Chand.

Q. Were you acting in connection with the arrangements about the deportation?

A. I had to make police arrangements to get them off quietly.

Q. Were you getting reports as to the destruction of railway and telegraph plant about this time?

A. On the 14th and 15th there was this going on. There were disturbances in the Moghulpura workshops. A train was stoned at Kot Radha Kishen and wires were cut at Wagah, Jallo and Attari.

Q. On the 15th Martial Law was declared. What way was it proclaimed in Lahore?

25 November 1919.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

A. I was told that the Officer Commanding the Civil Area had proclaimed it in notices.

Q. When Martial Law was proclaimed were the police or the civil authorities able to deal with the situation?

A. No, Sir, we were played out by that time. The strain was almost unbearable. My men had been on duty night and day. We had no reserves for this sort of thing. The police were barely sufficient for peace work.

Q. What was the effect of the mob on the declaration of Martial Law?

A. It was very effective. Things began to come down at once.

Q. I think on the 16th there were cases of violence reported by the mob?

A. That was out of the district. This was all in my district.

Q. I think it was on the 16th that an order was issued as to the ending of the *hartal*?

A. Yes, Sir. Martial Law notice No. 10 was issued ending the *hartal* in Anarkali. As soon as this notice got known the *hartal* ceased long before the time fixed in the notice. General notices for the city were issued on the 17th ending the *hartal* in the city and that took effect immediately; before the time laid down the shops were opened.

Q. On the 17th the *hartal* was practically ended?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you see anything of seditious posters that were put up?

A. Many seditious posters were found and brought to me and these were passed on by me to various officers, the Deputy Commissioner and to the C. I. D.

Q. Have you got any of these posters?

A. I have none, Sir, they were all forwarded.\*

Q. Whereabouts were these seditious posters being posted?

A. In various parts of the city. They were torn down and brought to me by my men.

Q. Were there many of them?

A. A good many.

Q. And from different parts of the city?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. As regards the casualties I see you have given a list of casualties for the three occasions when shooting took place?

A. As far as I know that is a correct and complete list.

Q. And there were altogether 45 wounded?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were any attempts made to get the members of the Police force to rise against the Government?

A. I mentioned just now the one definite case at Lahori Gate where a man was arrested for trying to seduce the Police, and there was an European Inspector in charge of that picket. He had the man immediately arrested, who was subsequently convicted and sentenced to two years or so. That was the one definite case. There were no other cases, but we were receiving vague reports both verbally and by telephone at that time; there was no office going really at the time.

Q. During the continuance of Martial Law, were the Police pickets gradually modified or abolished as things settled down?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When was Martial Law removed?

A. I think it was on the 12th June.

Q. Was Martial Law removed in Lahore at a later date than it was removed in some of the other districts?

A. I do not know when it was removed elsewhere but here I think it was on the 12th June.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. After Martial Law was proclaimed, did you, as Senior Superintendent of Police, have anything to do with the arresting of persons and sending them up for trial after investigation?

A. Yes, Sir. I have got reports about certain persons who had been prominent in the mobs. For instance,

I ordered the arrest of the *Danda Fauj* man, in fact I ordered the arrest of all men who were reported to me. The Inspector came up and mentioned to me the names of men who were supposed to have been leading the mobs and so forth, and I arrested all such men. I went into the matter roughly—I had a great deal to do at that time—and I asked what the evidence was. Where I thought that the evidence was satisfactory, that is to say, independent, in addition to any police reports, then I ordered the man's arrest. Altogether 25 or 30 men were arrested under my orders.

Q. And within what time after the proclamation of Martial Law?

A. I think the arrests were made from about the 16th. I don't remember the date exactly.

Q. Then you said that you ordered the arrest of the *Danda Fauj* man, which man is that, Chaman Din?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. As regards the people who had been deported, you had nothing to do with that except their actual deportation?

A. I had to assist in the carrying out of their deportation.

Q. As regards the people whom you ordered to be arrested did you say there were 20 people?

A. I do not remember. I must have ordered the arrests of 25 or 30 men during those days as the reports came to me. There may be a few more or a few less. I don't remember.

Q. They were arrested, and did you have anything to do with the examination of their cases before they were sent up for trial?

A. I deputed my Assistant Superintendent, Mr. deGale. I also saw the special officer Mr. Tomkins. I met him and went through with him such cases of persons who had been arrested at the city Kotwali, and Mr. deGale and another C. I. D. officer dealt with the rest of the cases. I deputed Mr. deGale to take up these cases. They made out a sort of memorandum showing the evidence on which the men had been arrested and they considered whether the man might or might not be sent up for trial.

Q. Of those 25 or 30 accused, do you know if any were never sent up for trial at all, although they were all sent up for trial?

A. A good many of the people whom I arrested were not sent up for trial.

Q. How long were they kept under arrest before being released? Was it the case of a day or two or a week or two before they were released?

A. More than a day or two.

Q. What was the practice followed in Lahore? There were no intermediate remands before Magistrates, but cases only went before Magistrates after investigation was completed, was that the system?

A. I think that is correct.

Q. And the idea was especially where the evidence was insufficient to make sure that there was a case which could be substantiated before sending it up before a Magistrate?

A. Yes.

Q. Well now, have you got a list showing the exact cases, the number of people who were arrested and the dates when they were released? Have you any papers?

A. I have none.

Q. At any rate, it will be quite easy to obtain those particulars. I take it there is a memorandum of the arrest of such persons?

A. There were lists handed in, and those were each taken up by the Assistant Superintendent of Police, and one of my officers and by a C. I. D. officer, and they made out separate memos. in each case. There were people against whom they were not satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to send up, and such persons were released.

Q. A record would be made in the office both of the date on which their arrest was ordered and of the date on which their release was ordered?

A. Yes, there should be.

Q. Those particulars must be available?

A. Yes, I think so, they were there at the time.

\* A number were produced later: see pages 106 to 112.

25 November 1919.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

Q. Now those persons whose arrests you ordered yourself did any of them figure afterwards in what I think is called the Main Conspiracy Case?

A. I cannot remember that. The men whom I ordered to be arrested were mainly mob leaders and those who were reported to be such.

Q. You told us about Dr. Gokal Chand helping you or trying to help you in connection with the incident of the 6th, and also of Lala Duni Chand. Was either of these people prosecuted afterwards?

A. They were both sent up for trial.

Q. What happened to them, do you remember?

A. Dr. Gokal Chand was acquitted, I think, and Lala Duni Chand was convicted.

Q. What was Dr. Gokal Chand charged with?

A. I have not got that case, I forget the charges against him. It was not one of the cases I had taken up.

Q. Was it before a tribunal?

A. Yes.

Q. Was one of the persons acquitted in what you call the Main Conspiracy Case?

A. Dr. Gokal Chand Naurang was acquitted.

Q. Lala Duni Chand was convicted?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember what his sentence was from the tribunal?

A. I think Lala Duni Chand got a heavy sentence. (Mr. Abdul Kadir.—He got transportation for life.)

Q. Another name was mentioned, Ram Bhuj Dutt Chaudhri, he was deported on the 14th?

A. He was deported on the 14th.

Q. Was he prosecuted afterwards?

A. He was prosecuted in the Main Conspiracy Case.

Q. What happened to him?

A. He was also convicted.

Q. On the 6th, I see at any rate that Dr. Gokal Chand seemed to be helping you to deal with that particular mob and was doing all he could?

A. Yes.

Q. And later on when the crowd surrounded the Bradlaugh Hall he and other people came and you fixed up arrangements with them to minimise the chances of a trouble?

A. He and Lala Duni Chand came.

Q. So that at that time you treated them as persons whom you thought were honestly endeavouring to help you, is that so?

A. I think Mr. Gokal Chand was doing his best. I do not think Lala Duni Chand was particularly helpful at the time because he was not prepared to agree to stopping the Bradlaugh Hall meeting at 6. He said that he did not think that they could stop the meeting at 6 and so on, while Dr. Gokal Chand said eventually that he would.

Q. But apart from the fact that Dr. Gokal Chand was more amenable to reason, I take it you would not have had any dealings at all with Mr. Duni Chand if at that time you thought he was not honest in his intentions in trying to keep down trouble?

A. I could not refuse to have dealings with him in any case. I did not know whether he was honest or dishonest. I did not know he was not out to be particularly helpful to us, but he raised a lot of objections. He said, "Oh, at 6 o'clock there will be a lot of people, there will be a lot of speeches to make, the chairman will have to say a good deal, and so on." Then Dr. Gokal Chand turned round and said "I will see we do stop." Mr. Duni Chand protested with him and he said "All right, Duni Chand, you leave it to me."

Q. The result is then that although he was one of the persons whom you had selected to make arrangements, you do not give him very much credit?

A. I do not give him much credit. I saw him only on that day as far as I remember.

Q. But apart from the fact that he was not as good from your point of view as Dr. Gokal Chand, you cannot say that at that time when you were trying to make arrangements with him you saw anything against him?

A. No, there was nothing particularly against him. He was not out to be helpful as the other man. I had seen the other man two or three times that day.

Q. What I want to ask you is, he and Dr. Gokal Chand came to see you at the Kutchery?

A. Yes, they came to see me at about 2.

Q. If they wanted to be irreconcilable, there was nothing to oblige them to come to you at all, and the fact that you much preferred the one to the other still leaves the fact that Duni Chand was at any rate according to his lights trying to see if he could help?

A. Oh, Yes, I think so. He and Dr. Gokal Chand were the only two people who came to us.

Q. The other gentleman, Ram Bhaj Dutt Choudhri, as I understand, he did his best to help you to manage that other mob on the 10th?

A. He tried to induce them to disperse.

Q. I mean he tried to get on a horse, I mean all that as far as you told us at the time, he was doing to help you?

A. Yes.

Q. I mean there was no question of any dishonest intention, he was honestly doing it?

A. I think he was very anxious. He saw that the position then was very serious and that the mob would have to be fired on if they did not disperse, and he remarked to me "now fire in the air, then the mob will disperse." He was distinctly anxious to get the mob dispersed.

Q. I see when you come a little later on, on the 11th, that is the day after Ram Bhaj Dutt helped you, it is among the reports that came to you on the next day that Ram Bhaj Datt and others addressed the crowd and advised them to stand firm. This was the mass meeting?

A. That was the meeting.

Q. Have you a C. I. D. report of what was said on that occasion? Or a verbal report?

A. There was practically no report that I can remember on the 11th that reached me, but there were masses of reports that I received that day verbally.

Q. But from that moment I want to know if you have seen since or at any time a written C. I. D. report of the meeting?

A. I saw that two or three days later.

Q. Perhaps we will have a look at it?

(Mr. Herbert, the Government Advocate.—The reports are here, Sir.)

Q. There is just one thing I should like to ask you about firing low, is that laid down by the Police Regulations?

A. Yes.

Q. Do these Regulations apply to the Punjab only?

A. I think it is in our Police Rules.

Q. When you say "our Police Rules," do you mean the Punjab Police Rules?

A. Yes.

Q. And therefore it may or may not be in Delhi or any other Province?

A. I can't say. (After a pause), I think it would be in Delhi too. They are working under the same rules.

Q. It was said that the rule did not obtain in Delhi, I wanted to make sure.

A. There may be a difference now, I don't know.

Q. Have you got there a copy, may I just know the terms of that rule about firing low?

A. I have not got a copy here.

Q. Do they give you discretion to fire according to the size of the mob and the urgency of the occasion, or do they lay down that when firing the police must always fire at the feet of the mob?

A. I think, as far as I remember, the wording runs more or less in this way, that they shall refrain from firing over the heads of the mob, they should fire low and at the most threatening parts of the mob.

Q. That is quite a different thing to fire at the feet of the mob, that means low, so that no shots may go away unintentionally and hit others who may be looking from a window at some distance?

A. Also the object is to make the wounds, if such wounds are inflicted, on the lower part of the body.

Q. Is it any part of the object of that rule to direct you to fire at the feet of the crowd or is it simply to

25 November 1919.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

tell you that the crowds should be hit and not anywhere else. That is the point?

A. Very likely. Also the object is, I think I have always understood it, if you fire at the feet of the crowd rather than at the body, you will inflict less serious injuries.

Q. Perhaps, I will go into that when I get the rules. As far as you are concerned, you are responsible, as the police executive officer, for the police of Lahore before Martial Law and you were working during the Martial Law. So far as the actual chances on, let us say the 14th April were concerned, do you consider that Martial Law was necessary to avoid a rebellion or to prevent that possibility in Lahore itself?

A. I think so, I think it was undoubtedly necessary. We could not hold on any longer on our own.

Q. And you think that matters would have gone from bad to worse as regards the city here if you had not Martial Law?

A. It looked like that to us. The reports that were coming in from outside showed that the position was getting from bad to worse.

Q. I rather want you to put out of sight the reports that came from outside. I want the benefit of your experience as to what had happened and what was happening in the city of Lahore alone. So far as the whole problem is concerned as regards the city itself, do you think that the introduction of Martial Law was necessary to enable the authorities here to keep peace?

A. I think it certainly was.

Q. Now apart from any question of the Afghan trouble, how long before the 12th June when Martial Law came to an end—How long do you think you could have done without Martial Law prior to the 12th June?

A. It is rather difficult to tell. It is a matter of opinion whether it could have been stopped 10 days or a fortnight before.

Q. I want your opinion whether it is a question of 10 days or whether you think, so far as Lahore is concerned, if you had it for a fortnight you could have dispensed with it thereafter?

A. I don't say a fortnight of Martial Law. It might have been stopped a fortnight possibly before. That would be only a matter of opinion. Cases would have been taken up and there would have been excitement.

Q. I want you just to consider with me for a minute. Of course there is always a debateable margin in matters of that sort as to how early you took off Martial Law. But looking only to the necessities of Lahore itself, what do you think is the shortest time after the 15th April that Martial Law could have been dispensed with?

A. It is a very difficult question to answer. I do not know that I am prepared to answer that.

Q. Some of us have got to try and answer that.

A. I am trying my best to answer it correctly, but I have never thought of it as to how long before Martial Law could have been dispensed with. I said it is all a question of opinion, it might have been taken off two or three weeks before, but I never thought of the matter really.

Q. Would you be prepared at any rate to say this, that it could not have been taken off more than a month before?

A. Yes that I am prepared to say.

Q. Do you think that it would have been necessary to keep it after the middle of May merely on account of the position in Lahore itself?

A. I think so. I can certainly say so.

Q. Then do you think, apart from any question of the Punjab position or the Afghanistan war position, that after the middle of May, so far as Lahore is concerned, it is doubtful whether Martial Law was really necessary?

A. Possibly I might be able to say as much as that. I never considered it. It was not a question I had to deal with in any way. I do not think it might be possible to have taken it away earlier than it was taken off.

Q. Now did you require the assistance of the Military after the middle of May?

A. I do not know what was going on exactly at certain times, but it is quite possible that if I had been asked to carry on say 10 or 15 days before the date on which Martial Law was removed, I might have said yes.

Q. Do you agree with the existence of the liability of Martial Law penalties in Lahore, you were able to administer the city with much less difficulty than in ordinary times?

A. It made things easier, certainly. I think so.

Q. I think we were told yesterday that the mere existence of Martial Law was as good as a thousand rifles, do you mean that after Martial Law was declared that people were much more amenable to orders?

A. Undoubtedly, the strain was very much relieved all round.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Mr. Broadway, there was firing on the 10th on two occasions?

A. Yes, there was.

Q. And once on the 12th?

A. Yes.

Q. There was no occasion after the 12th for any firing in Lahore at all?

A. No.

Q. And nothing unusual happened after that date?

A. No, in Lahore itself nothing unusual happened.

Q. I am dealing with Lahore itself for the moment. After the 12th nothing unusual happened in Lahore?

A. No, I don't think there was anything.

Q. And before the 15th, really the Civil authorities were in control of the city, no doubt with the aid of the Military?

A. Not ordinary control. As I said in my previous examination, pickets were established and to keep in touch with those pickets flying patrol, armed patrol, had to be kept.

Q. That is why I said with the aid of the Military?

A. I mean the ordinary conditions were not existing, the ordinary conditions where the constables could go out on beats and so on, those had not been restored.

Q. But before the 15th had not the Civil authorities with the aid of the Military regained control of the city?

A. You cannot say that they had absolutely regained control of the city. There was *hartal* still on, *langars* were still open.

Q. The *hartal* may have been there. There was *hartal* in other parts of the country where the Civil administration had been going on without any disturbance at all. The mere existence of *hartal* does not show that the control of the city was not regained. You had not been able to put an end to the *hartal*, that I quite admit.

A. But then the *hartal* by this time had developed into, whatever it may have been in other places, a distinctly *anti-Government* movement. On the 6th it was not looked upon as an *anti-Government* movement. So no objection was raised to the procession on the 10th when the *hartal* started on the news having reached of Mr. Gandhi's arrest and trouble at Amritsar. Later on when it was maintained after the firing on the 10th and the 12th, and after the troops had passed through, it was maintained, as I understand, as a direct *anti-Government* movement. Therefore it was against law and order. Therefore you cannot say that law and order was established.

Q. How do you say that the *hartal* after the 12th was an *anti-Government* movement?

A. It had become so, because it was obvious to everybody by this time that a continuation of the *hartal* was undesirable.

Q. After the 12th, there was no violence in the city at all?

A. None at all, because pickets had been posted.

Q. There was no coercion, was there, after the 12th, for continuing the *hartal*?

A. I am not prepared to say that. Reports were coming in all the time, whether they were correct or not I can't say but reports were coming in that people were going about and insisting or trying to make people hold firm.

Q. What I want to know is, what distinguished the *hartal* after the 12th from the previous *hartal*, which made you consider it *anti-Government*?

25 November 1919.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

A. All that had gone before.

Q. You made a distinction that the *hartal* before the 12th was not anti-Government?

A. I did not say before the 12th. I am giving you my opinion for what it may be worth. My opinion is that simply I distinguished between the *hartal* that continued after the troubles on the 10th and the 12th from the *hartal*, pure and simple *hartal*, of the 6th.

Q. I want to know what the distinguishing feature is between the *hartal* after the 10th and the *hartal* prior to that. You seem to distinguish between the nature of the *hartal* after the 10th and the *hartal* before that?

A. Yes; in my mind there is a distinction. After the 10th, 11th and 12th, after what had occurred, after the shooting and after the Military and Police picketed the city, the *hartal* was continued in defiance of all measures taken to restore normal conditions.

Q. Don't you see, Mr. Broadway, that there may be complete law and order and still people may for certain reasons want to have a *hartal*? Why does the existence of the *hartal* itself connote any anti-Government movement?

A. I am only giving you the impression, the view that I held at the time. I may be right or wrong. That is the way it impressed me. The movement, after all that took place, in continuing the *hartal* impressed me as being distinctly anti-Government in that it was defying everything that was being done to restore normal conditions.

Q. You see after the happenings of the 10th and 12th, other events happened; for instance on the 14th, Government arrested and deported certain people in Lahore.

A. Quite so.

Q. May not the continuance of the *hartal* be a sort of protest against or a sort of manifestation of the disapproval of the people of that act? May it not be that?

A. I have only given you what I thought of it, my own personal opinion for what it is worth.

Q. If it was merely a manifestation of the disapproval of the action of Government in arresting and deporting certain people, will not the people be justified in doing that?

A. I do not think they were justified, because they should have seen what the consequences of the *hartal* had already been. No good was coming of it.

Q. Was there any reason to say, barring this *hartal* itself, that the civil authorities with the continued aid of the Military had not regained control of the city after the 13th or 14th?

A. The excitement still continued. We had not come back to normal conditions. I thought it was still dangerous.

Q. You see, Mr. Broadway, there might be excitement, there might be danger. But I am putting it to you that before the 15th, for all practical purposes the civil authorities had regained control?

A. I suppose they had regained control. I would not consider that we regained actual control, until you revert to something like normal conditions.

Q. You agree that with the aid of the Military they had for all practical purposes regained control?

A. We had begun to regain control anyhow. And after the declaration of the Martial Law on the 15th, the civil authorities virtually carried on the administration as before.

Q. The civil authorities virtually carried on the administration as before?

A. Yes, after Martial Law was introduced. We were told to carry on.

Q. You carried on as before?

A. Yes, practically as before.

Q. The Police for instance did their ordinary duties, arrested people, made investigations and all that?

A. Yes, to a certain extent they did not; they had to go with large parties.

Q. Except that the Military supplied the escort for that purpose?

A. Yes.

Q. The ordinary courts were going on as they were? The High Court and the Subordinate Courts were going on and doing their business?

A. I cannot say. I cannot remember if they were going on. My impression is they were not. At any rate for the first few days they were not carrying on.

Q. When did they begin their ordinary work again?

A. I cannot tell you.

Q. They did not work for a few days?

A. I said for the first few days. I was constantly seeing Honorary Magistrates and Stipendiary Magistrates also. They were coming in and seeing the Deputy Commissioner many times.

Q. After those few days, they did begin again? Didn't they?

A. I cannot say; in fact, I do not know that they were carrying on. After a certain number of days, they did begin to carry on. I do not know when they did start their ordinary work. We were at the Telegraph Office for two or three weeks, which is away from the Courts. So I do not know what was going on.

Q. What I want to know, Mr. Broadway is, what you consider to be the causes of this outbreak in Lahore?

A. I can offer my opinion. I would say that the causes were these. The war and the unsettling and worrying effects of the war. This was at the top of the causes. There was the stress of the economic condition on the people. People were very hard up indeed. I was always hearing of the difficulties of the poor, about cloth, etc. There was undoubted economic distress. There was also some objection by people to certain taxes.

Q. Objection to taxes?

A. There was increase in taxes. That was what one heard at the time—the revised income-tax. By talks with officers and Indians this is the impression I received as to the unsettling effect. There was some objection taken perhaps to grain being taken away. There was suspicion. There were all these conditions for which the people of India invariably hold the Government responsible. Government is supposed to be able to remove all troubles, and to reduce prices. These caused signs of discontent.

Q. Were these the unsettling causes that created the unrest? Was there anything connected with the Rowlatt Bills?

A. On the top of these, came this political agitation.

Q. Occasioned by the Rowlatt Act?

A. Well, the Rowlatt Act was the cause of it, at any rate, it was the excuse for it.

Q. Why do you say it was the excuse for it? Was it not the cause of the agitation that followed?

A. My own idea has been that the Rowlatt Act was the excuse for the trouble, rather than the actual cause. It appeared to me to be likely not to weary the people very much.

Q. You consider no objection should have been raised to that legislation?

A. I did not say that. It was not an Act that appeared to me to give the people much trouble or to interest the people very greatly.

Q. You know that the passage of the Rowlatt Act in the Legislative Council was very strenuously resisted almost unanimously?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you suggest that they merely used the Rowlatt Act as an excuse for that purpose, or caught hold of that occasion to go against Government?

A. I am not prepared to say that.

Q. They started opposition because they honestly believed that the legislation was bad?

A. Quite possible they believe it to be so.

Q. I want to understand what you mean when you say that the Rowlatt Act was an excuse for the agitation. Do you mean to suggest that those who opposed the Rowlatt Act really were not honest or genuine in their opposition and took hold of the opportunity for going against Government?

A. The Members of Council quite possibly opposed it honestly. They probably did. But I doubt very much whether everybody who took up the Rowlatt Act agitation understood it. It appeared to me that they opposed it because the Council Members opposed it. They did not try to satisfy themselves or to worry about it very much; many of them, I do not say all.

25 November 1919.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

Q. It happens almost everywhere that if the leaders of the public oppose a measure, the ordinary people are content to follow them and take the same view as their leaders. Is there anything extraordinary in that?

A. Possibly not.

Q. Then on the top of all this came the arrest of Mr. Gandhi on the 9th?

A. I think probably it was; but it hardly got to that, because on the top was the Rowlatt agitation, and there was a great deal of misrepresentation.

Q. You mean misrepresentation with regard to the Rowlatt Act itself?

A. Yes. There was a great deal of misrepresentation. I think people were induced to oppose the Act not so much because the leaders opposed it in Council but because it was represented to them that it would very closely touch their private life.

Q. Now who do you think was responsible for these misrepresentations?

A. I wish I knew. There are all grades of leaders in every movement, just as there are senior men and junior men, leaders going right down to N. C. O's. in a regiment or force. In every movement of this kind, I take it there must be all grades of leaders and all shades of opinion, views, ideas and intentions. It seems to me that the views of those at the top may differ very widely from the opinions and views of those who are down below, and when you come to the lower leaders, what we might call, subalterns, captains and N. C. O's., they are generally the people who are most in touch with the masses.

Q. You do not suggest, Mr. Broadway, that the top leaders in Lahore (I am merely using your expression) were responsible for the misrepresentations?

A. I do not suggest that. I have no reason to believe that they misrepresented matters, but I never saw that they did very much or anything to refute these things and to really explain matters.

Q. When did these misrepresentations first start in Lahore?

A. I have no idea. It has been going on for some time, but possibly since January at any rate. I was away in Ambala till December 23rd. I returned from Ambala on 23rd. It was virtually Christmas week. I took over charge here again on the 23rd December. My cognizance of affairs in the district recommenced about the beginning of January.

Q. Was it soon after that that these misrepresentations came to your knowledge?

A. I do not think it was so early. My impression is that I became aware some weeks later.

Q. Somewhere in February?

A. Probably; I cannot say the date. It was somewhere about the middle of February.

Q. Did the Punjab Government take any steps to disabuse the public of these misrepresentations?

A. I presume they were aware of these misrepresentations.

Q. You told us that there was to be a meeting on the 8th March?

A. Yes.

Q. And that you called some of the leaders on the 29th? Did you?

A. I do not think I called any of the leaders on that occasion. I do not remember that. The Deputy Commissioner may have done so.

Q. The Deputy Commissioner did?

A. Yes; on the 29th March. I have no authority to call the leaders. I never called any leaders at any time. I had been to the Deputy Commissioner on the 4th of April. I am not aware of the meeting on the 29th. I cannot remember; and I do not think I was at any meeting on the 29th.

Q. Were you present at the informal meeting on the 4th April with the Deputy Commissioner?

A. I was at two meetings on that day.

Q. And what happened really on that day?

A. At which meeting? There were two meetings.

Q. The first meeting.

A. About 10 o'clock on the 4th, the Deputy Commissioner had only called up certain people,

Q. Were Duni Chand and Ram Bhaj Datt at the meeting?

A. I cannot remember who was present. I have an impression that Duni Chand was present. He was present at the meeting at 4 o'clock and I think he was present at the meeting at 10 o'clock.

Q. He was certainly present at the later meeting; in all probability he was also present at the first?

A. I think so, because he was a Municipal Commissioner.

Q. Was Ram Bhaj Datt there?

A. I did not know him at the time. So I do not know.

Q. Was Gokal Chand present?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. At the first meeting on the 4th?

A. I have no idea whether he was present. I remember Mr. Duni Chand's presence simply by an incident on the afternoon of the 4th. I do not know any of these gentlemen by sight.

Q. What did you do at this first meeting?

A. At the first meeting the Deputy Commissioner and I did our best to make the Municipal Commissioners, Honorary Magistrates and others who were present appreciate their responsibility and to try and prevent any coercion in the matter of *hartal* and to use their influence as far as they could to prevent it.

Q. Did those people who were present at the meeting appear to be willing to follow your suggestion?

A. I think so.

Q. At all the consultations and meetings that you had with these leading people, were they always ready and willing to help matters in such manner as they could? Was their attitude one of help?

A. There was not much discussion. The Municipal Commissioners and others who came there seemed to be willing to assist, but the opposition was at the evening meeting. They were organisers of the Bradlaugh Hall meeting and the *hartal*.

Q. At the evening meeting you had the organisers of the meeting at Bradlaugh Hall for the 6th?

A. Yes; we summoned them. I do not know how many were present. I cannot tell you. I did not summon them. The Deputy Commissioner called them up. I have got a list of the names here. The names of the signatories of the Urdu notice.

Q. Is the list referred to in your statement?

A. No, it is not.

Q. Kindly look at the list and see if Duni Chand and Ram Bhaj Datt are there.

A. Yes.

Q. Who else? Gokal Chand?

A. I will read you the names. It is only a translation of the Urdu notice.—Harkishan Lal, Ram Bhaj Datt, Duni Chand.

Q. Very few persons came to that meeting. Is the list one of all those who came?

A. No; I have no recollection. I was not responsible for the meeting. I was only there to assist. I turned up there at the last moment. The Deputy Commissioner summoned me.

Q. I think this list contains the names of persons who were present?

A. I have got the list of persons who were summoned.

Q. You remember having seen Duni Chand, Ram Bhaj Datt Chaudhri?

A. I cannot remember; I think they were there.

Q. Dr. Gokal Chand?

A. I do not remember he was there. I do not remember anybody except Duni Chand, because Duni Chand, I remember, asked me a question.

Q. I think the list you have is a list of persons who were invited to attend?

A. That is so.

Q. Let us have a copy of it.

A. These are the signatories to the Urdu notice of the Bradlaugh Hall meeting and we simply asked them to come.

Q. Did those people who were present at that meeting appear to you to be reasonably ready to assist?

A. They were not ready to assist. We pointed out to them that *hartal* was always a dangerous business. We

25 November 1919.]

Mr. R. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

wanted them particularly to realise the dangers and the possible trouble of *hartal* by people being out in the streets creating excitement and there was also the chance of riot and trouble in the atmosphere which was surcharged with electricity as it then was. We said that it was particularly dangerous and asked them not to have *hartal* or encourage *hartal*. They were not prepared to assist us in that way.

Q. What did they say? Did they say that they would have the *hartal*?

A. I do not know the exact words.

Q. Did they agree to do anything at that meeting?

A. We asked them to try and induce people not to hold *hartal*. That was hopeless. Then we said 'if you mean holding the *hartal*, you at least arrange that there is no coercion, that parties should not go about inducing people to close down who did not really wish to close down.'

Q. Did they agree to do that?

A. In a measure they did. They were inclined to bargain with us. I remember it now; I have not thought of it since. Somebody said if we say that we agree not to send pickets, they would agree not to send parties out to induce people to shut down, we must not send parties to open them. I said that the Deputy Commissioner and I never sent any parties out to induce people to open. They said Honorary Magistrates and some Extra Assistant Commissioners were going about trying to induce people not to hold *hartal*. I said that I did not know that it was particularly objectionable, and added "if Extra Assistant Commissioners go about inducing people not to hold *hartal*, they are only doing the correct thing. They are only asking people to continue to do their normal business to avoid trouble. You are inducing them to do something abnormal which is likely to create trouble. That is hardly a bargain for us."

Q. From what you say I gather their attitude was that people should be left entirely to themselves whether to continue the *hartal* or to open the shops. Their attitude was that neither side should coerce or compel people to do one thing or the other?

A. They did not say anything about coercion. The thing that we feared was, which I believe actually did happen, that parties of excited youngsters would go down coercing people to shut down. The Extra Assistant Commissioners were using their influence and I was told up to the last moment that they were going to open the shops. Those present at the meeting were not inclined to agree to any terms involving the stopping of going round in parties to get shops closed. Eventually that was the ultimatum, so to speak, to us 'Will you do that? You need not send pickets.'

Q. So no agreement was arrived at on that point?

A. No agreement was arrived at. But I remember in the *Tribune* it was published that there was an agreement. I pointed it out to the Deputy Commissioner. He said no agreement was arrived at. I was also under the impression that no agreement was arrived at.

Q. The *hartal* continued on the 6th?

A. It was complete on the 6th.

Q. From the 7th to 10th, business was resumed?

A. Yes.

Q. Then during that period there was the *Ram Naumi* festival on the 9th?

A. Yes, and the procession.

Q. During these days, from the 7th to 10th, when business was resumed, there were no disturbances or any untoward incidents at all?

A. Up to the time of procession there was no trouble at all.

Q. On the 10th also when the firing took place, shops had opened?

A. Yes.

Q. When did the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest arrive in Lahore?

A. I do not know when the official information came.

Q. When did it become known to the public? It must be on the 10th?

A. I think somewhere between 4 and 5.

Q. Somewhere between 4 and 5 on the 10th?

A. Yes, in the afternoon. That is my impression. I do not remember, but I base it on the fact that I was

told news had come and that the *hartal* was beginning about that time.

Q. On receipt of the news of the arrest of Mr. Gandhi, the *hartal* started again and the mob began to collect?

A. That is so.

Q. Now Mr. Broadway after the firing on the 10th was there any discussion about the wounded on that occasion?

A. Yes, there was, I believe with the Deputy Commissioner.

Q. Discussion between whom?

A. Some of the leaders came to see the Deputy Commissioner, I think.

Q. Who were they? Can you name them?

A. I cannot. I think Mr. Duni Chand was one of them.

Q. They came to see the Deputy Commissioner?

A. They came to the Deputy Commissioner.

Q. What was their suggestion about the wounded? What did they want the Deputy Commissioner to do in connection with that?

A. I do not remember the details of the proposal. I was not concerned with them. I was working in the same room and I gathered that they wished that the bodies should be given back to them.

Q. The wounded or the killed?

A. No, the killed. The wounded we had not got.

Q. On the 10th how many were killed?

A. There were three who were killed or had died of wounds.

Q. And those dead bodies were in the possession of the police?

A. They were in the hospital. I think they had been conveyed to the hospital.

Q. And the wounded were also in the hospital?

A. There must have been those that we had. There were only about 2.

Q. And they wanted the dead bodies to be handed over to them?

A. That is what I understood.

Q. Was that allowed or not allowed?

A. No, it was not allowed.

Q. And was it ever allowed afterwards or not allowed at all?

A. It was never allowed. The dead bodies were not allowed to be handed back in that way. I understood the Deputy Commissioner's contention was that it would only create a big crowd and procession and great excitement. But as far as I remember he proposed, and I believe the proposal was eventually agreed to and carried out that the relations and friends of the deceased should go and take over the dead bodies and arrange for the funerals.

Q. On what date was it decided upon?

A. I suppose it was on the 11th, but I do not remember the date at all.

Q. There was a meeting on the 11th at the Telegraph Office?

A. There was a meeting on the 11th.

Q. Of whom? Was the meeting between the Deputy Commissioner and these people?

A. Yes. As far as I remember there were two or three. No large number of gentlemen came.

Q. It may not have been a large meeting. How many came?

A. Two or three; might be four or five. I think they came more than once.

Q. And on those occasions there were conversations about the wounded and the killed?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the Deputy Commissioner say that he must consult the Lieutenant-Governor before he could do anything?

A. I do not know. I was in the same room but I did not take part in the discussions at all. I was busy with my own arrangements. He may have consulted the Lieutenant-Governor.

Q. Was this on that day or the next day?

A. On that day. I believe so.

Q. Was a meeting held at the Government House?

A. I think I was there at the Government House on the evening of the 11th. I am not sure of the date.

25 November 1919.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

A. Yes.

Q. And that they followed it rightly or wrongly?

A. Yes.

Q. As it appears to me that the matter is 6 months' old and you are not quite clear about the different meetings that were held I think I must trouble you and refresh your memory, and I will quote to you from the statements of Ram Bhaj Dutt, Harkishen Lal and Duni Chand and I will ask you whether that portion of the statement is right or wrong.

A. Yes.

Q. I am reading from the statement of Pandit Ram Bhaj Dutt.

A. I know the gentleman now, I did not know him then.

Q. Before reading it, are you aware that when it was first intended to hold a *hartal* on the 30th March the conveners of the meeting were called by the Deputy Commissioner and that they put the question point blank to the Deputy Commissioner, "If you pass an order that the meeting should not be held we will not hold the meeting, but that unless and until you pass the order we will hold the meeting." And the Deputy Commissioner said "I am not going to pass an order; if you hold a peaceable meeting I will not prevent it." Are you aware of that?

A. No, I do not think I was at that meeting.

Q. Here according to Ram Bhaj Dutt you were present, because he says "Mr. Broadway, the Superintendent of Police, was also present." He says: "On the evening of the 4th of April, I along with the other signatories of the notice were sent for by the Deputy Commissioner, and when I reached there the following persons were present:—

Messrs. S. S. Bhatia, Jai Gopal Sethi, Marghub Ahmad, Dina Nath, Said Hasan, Gokal Chand, Duni Chand and others.

Mr. Broadway, the Superintendent of Police, also was with the Deputy Commissioner. And when we assembled there he read out an article from the *Tribune* of the previous day and remarked that it was written in a very good spirit and there ought to be co-operation between the people and the Government as advocated therein. Then a discussion followed and the Deputy Commissioner said that he would deal severely with any person found causing compulsion for bringing about a *hartal*. When it was pointed out to him that a good deal of compulsion was being used the other way to prevent the *hartal* by some of the Municipal Commissioners and others, the Deputy Commissioner at the last proposed as follows:—

'That no compulsion was to be ever used but persuasion to keep the shops either closed or open could be used up to the night of the 5th April. But on the 6th no kind of persuasion or compulsion was at all to be resorted to and anyone found doing so would be severely dealt with.'

This accused suggested that he with others be made Special Constables under the Police Act and made responsible for the peace of the several parts of the town. But this suggestion was not entertained and had therefore to be dropped.

Some one among those present asked the Deputy Commissioner if the Police notice prevented the holding of the meeting at the Bradlaugh Hall, but was told that it applied only to processions and meetings on public roads."

That is, you and the Deputy Commissioner were present and they were told it applied only to processions and meetings on public roads and not to any meeting in the Bradlaugh Hall. And subsequently he says to give effect to this promise a notice was issued, Exhibit D 2 (1), which runs thus

A. May I answer that now before I forget the details? It is in part correct. One place where Mr. Ram Bhaj Dutt has gone astray is that we made a mutual agreement that no pressure should be applied after the night of Saturday. They asked that there should be a mutual agreement. We did not acquiesce in that arrangement. We distinctly pointed out that any efforts made to get shops to keep open were in the direction of law and order. We were not prepared to make a

compromise. I have seen that notice before and have noted that particular thing in my mind. The point we made was that parties would go round practically insisting on shops being closed. We know in any movement there are more lukewarm people than people who are keen on it. When one man shuts his shop there is pressure put on nine others to shut their shops, and we were afraid this would go on. They said the Municipal Commissioners were putting pressure the other way and the point we made was that the Municipal Commissioners were not asking for anything improper or abnormal whereas they were, and we distinctly did not bind ourselves to tell the Municipal Commissioners anything of the kind. But I may mention that they did agree that there would be no picketing or parties going round, that persuasion should stop on the next night, the night before the occurrence. When they had gone I discussed the matter with the Deputy Commissioner and I said, "I think we had better issue these orders, though we have distinctly said we would not make any terms of this kind with them."

Q. And that order was in the following words: "All Municipal Commissioners will please note that on Sunday, April 6th, they should be present in their wards in order to assist in keeping peace. There must be no interference with any shop-keepers who wish to close or open their shops, and any person seen to be endeavouring to do so must be reported at once to the nearest chowki or thana and influence should be used so as to prevent any such interference. Shops that are open already should remain open and those which are closed are to remain closed." You think that is probably correct?

A. I think so, those are about the terms the Deputy Commissioner and I agreed upon. But I wish particularly to say we made no terms with the leaders when then they came on those grounds, but I suggested to the Deputy Commissioner that we should issue some such order.

Q. The rest of what I read out to you was correct? As to special constables?

A. No; no question of special constables was raised at that meeting.

Q. So practically it is false, this statement?

A. I have no recollection of it.

Q. Do you take any objection to any other portion of that statement?

A. No, I do not think so.

Q. You said there the order did not apply to the Bradlaugh Hall meeting?

A. Those were the words that it applied only to processions and meetings on public roads and not to meetings in the Bradlaugh Hall. Mr. Duni Chand raised this question and I said it did not apply to the Bradlaugh Hall. I had no power to issue such a notice in regard to meetings in a public hall.

Q. And do you remember that this arrangement of the 6th April was praised by the local press, both the *Civil and Military Gazette* and the *Tribune*, and that the authorities and the people were praised for the amicable arrangement made and for the happy ending it had.

A. Yes, I remember that.

Q. And I believe that you as the head of the police did not receive any complaint that anybody was forced to close his shop on the 6th?

A. I have a recollection of reports that parties did go through at night on the 6th urging the *hartal* till quite a late hour.

Q. That is a different matter, a party might have gone round. I want to know whether there was any actual complaint from any person who went to the police and said he was ready to open his shop and had to close it?

A. No, there was only one complaint that came to me and Mr. Fyson in the *Kutcheri* in regard to being turned out of a tum-tum.

Q. Only one?

A. That is all I remember.



25 November 1919.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

A. Then he must have been arrested by the order of Officer Commanding the Civil Area.

Q. And I am told that he was arrested by the police?

A. All arrests were made by the police at the request of the Officer Commanding the Civil Area or the C. I. D.

Q. You are not in a position to give information about the facts of his particular case?

A. I do not know the man nor can I give information as to his case personally in any way.

Q. Then was the arrest of a marriage party at Rajgarh made? Was that done by the police?

A. By the police on the Mozang side.

Q. The marriage party consisted of ten people?

A. All were arrested, I think by the police.

Q. Were the arrests made under your orders?

A. I don't think any orders were given for the arrest; they were arrested by the police for breach of Martial Law orders as far as I recollect.

Q. Because they were more than a particular number?

A. As far as I remember, it was late at night and there was a large concourse of people assembled against Martial Law orders. They were I think warned in the first place by the Sub-Inspector who came across this meeting. These details were reported to me afterwards.

Q. Did the Sub-Inspector realise that they were going to perform a marriage?

A. I expect he did.

Q. Still he thought it was the right thing to do to arrest those people?

A. It was his duty to arrest them if they were assembled for any purpose as long as they were contravening the order. Licenses were applied for and issued by the Officer Commanding the Civil Area wherever anybody desired to collect people for a marriage.

Q. You do not think any exercise of discretion or common sense was necessary in dealing with cases of this character?

A. How far are you going to give discretion to an officer? At this time the Officer Commanding, Civil Area, was my superior and the superior of all the police under me. He had issued certain orders under Martial Law. It was not, I think, the duty of the Sub-Inspector to exercise his discretion. As a matter of fact he does seem to have used his discretion in the first instance because as I remember the facts he found this marriage meeting going on and he told them it was contrary to orders, and if they had not permission to hold it they must go and get it first. And I think he was told that somebody had gone to get permission.

Q. I want to be clear about the facts. When the police officer came on the spot what was actually happening, marriage ceremonies were being performed?

A. There was a concourse of people collected, what the exact stage of the proceedings was I cannot say. The information I got afterwards was that he had found this concourse of people which was contravening a Martial Law order, that he had told them that they could not collect together like that without permission and they must disperse. I think he was then told that somebody had gone to get permission and he replied that they must disperse till they had got the permission. He then went on his rounds and when he was coming back he found this crowd again and they still had not permission.

Q. When he came next what was going on, the marriage was being performed?

A. I cannot tell you what stage they were at the first time or the second time. At that second visit they were still contravening orders and he thereupon arrested them.

Q. All these people were flogged, were they?

A. I believe one or two of them were flogged. They were taken before the Officer Commanding the Civil Area.

*The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin.*—Was it not before the Civil Magistrate?

*Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate.*—Yes, before the Civil Magistrate.

*Witness.*—I do not remember, I think he was taken first to the Officer Commanding, Civil Area, and then to the Magistrate, or he may have been taken direct to the Magistrate.

Q. Then about the Badshahi Mosque; that was ordered to be kept shut for several weeks?

A. I believe so, but I do not know for how long; I thought it was several days only. My recollection is based on the fact that it was closed on the 12th of April when we had to clear the mosque and the gates were guarded on the occasion of troops passing through when the trouble occurred at Hira Mandi, and on the 18th, that is only 6 days afterwards, it was again closed, that is to say again guarded. A special arrangement had to be made on the 18th because it was a Friday and it was feared that mobs might collect there again and there might be trouble.

Q. But after the 18th?

A. It was closed I think on the evening of the 18th and the 19th was a Friday and it was closed on the 19th. I do not know if it was kept closed after that.

Q. We were told that the mosque was not allowed to be opened till the Trustee or whoever it may be had sent a document agreeing to certain conditions?

A. They may have sent a document in that time, or possibly the mosque may have remained unoccupied though no guard was posted.

Q. Were you the officer concerned who negotiated the matter with the Trustees about this document?

A. No.

Q. That was entirely the military?

A. I suppose the Officer Commanding, I do not know.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—*

Q. I believe you are aware that these *hartals* on the 30th of March and 6th April were due to a suggestion made by Mahatma Gandhi that that day should be observed as a universal day of mourning?

A. Yes.

Q. And it was because of such an order passed by Mahatma Gandhi that it was observed at several places as a day of mourning?

A. Yes, it was on account of Mr. Gandhi's passive resistance movement.

Q. I think you will agree with me that the observance of a *hartal* on the 6th of April was not due to a certain conspiracy between the inhabitants of Lahore; it was rather in the due observance of the orders of Mahatma Gandhi and it was universal?

A. It had to be organised and worked up.

Q. I mean the idea, the suggestion was Mahatma Gandhi's suggestion?

A. Yes it was Gandhi's suggestion.

Q. It was not the suggestion of any person living in Lahore?

A. I believe not.

Q. Up to the 10th April had the Lahore Police Department any information or any evidence that Ram Bhaj Dutt, Duni Chand, Harkishan Lal and Naurang and two or three others were members of a conspiracy and that in furtherance of the object of that conspiracy this *hartal* was being organised? As the head of the Police Department at Lahore, were you in possession of any information or any evidence to that effect?

A. No, I had no evidence. All I knew at the time of their connection with the whole movement was that they were the organisers of the *hartal* and the signatories of the notices calling the Bradlaugh Hall meeting.

Q. That is not my point.

A. No other conspiracy.

Q. You say you had no idea up to that time and no information that there was a conspiracy in existence at Lahore and that these persons were members of that conspiracy and that its object was to subvert British rule? You were not in possession of any such information up to the 10th of April?

A. No, certainly not of any conspiracy. I take it you mean conspiracy in the bad sense, that is a conspiring together to do an improper thing. It was improper in my opinion to organise a *hartal* and create a disturbance, but beyond that I had no evidence that there was a conspiracy.

Q. And that this *hartal* was a limb of that conspiracy, you were not aware of that?

A. No.

Q. And even if they organised the whole thing and were the conveners of the meeting, you will agree with me that the idea originated with Mahatma Gandhi?

25 November 1919.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

A. Yes.

Q. And that they followed it rightly or wrongly?

A. Yes.

Q. As it appears to me that the matter is 6 months' old and you are not quite clear about the different meetings that were held I think I must trouble you and refresh your memory, and I will quote to you from the statements of Ram Bhaj Dutt, Harkishen Lal and Duni Chand and I will ask you whether that portion of the statement is right or wrong.

A. Yes.

Q. I am reading from the statement of Pandit Ram Bhaj Dutt.

A. I know the gentleman now, I did not know him then.

Q. Before reading it, are you aware that when it was first intended to hold a *hartal* on the 30th March the conveners of the meeting were called by the Deputy Commissioner and that they put the question point blank to the Deputy Commissioner, "If you pass an order that the meeting should not be held we will not hold the meeting, but that unless and until you pass the order we will hold the meeting." And the Deputy Commissioner said "I am not going to pass an order; if you hold a peaceable meeting I will not prevent it." Are you aware of that?

A. No, I do not think I was at that meeting.

Q. Here according to Ram Bhaj Dutt you were present, because he says "Mr. Broadway, the Superintendent of Police, was also present." He says: "On the evening of the 4th of April, I along with the other signatories of the notice were sent for by the Deputy Commissioner, and when I reached there the following persons were present:—

Messrs. S. S. Bhatia, Jai Gopal Sethi, Marghub Ahmad, Dina Nath, Said Hasan, Gokal Chand, Duni Chand and others.

Mr. Broadway, the Superintendent of Police, also was with the Deputy Commissioner. And when we assembled there he read out an article from the *Tribune* of the previous day and remarked that it was written in a very good spirit and there ought to be co-operation between the people and the Government as advocated therein. Then a discussion followed and the Deputy Commissioner said that he would deal severely with any person found using compulsion for bringing about a *hartal*. When it was pointed out to him that a good deal of compulsion was being used the other way to prevent the *hartal* by some of the Municipal Commissioners and others, the Deputy Commissioner at the last proposed as follows:—

'That no compulsion was to be ever used but persuasion to keep the shops either closed or open could be used up to the night of the 5th April. But on the 6th no kind of persuasion or compulsion was at all to be resorted to and anyone found doing so would be severely dealt with.'

This accused suggested that he with others be made Special Constables under the Police Act and made responsible for the peace of the several parts of the town. But this suggestion was not entertained and had therefore to be dropped.

Some one among those present asked the Deputy Commissioner if the Police notice prevented the holding of the meeting at the Bradlaugh Hall, but was told that it applied only to processions and meetings on public roads."

That is, you and the Deputy Commissioner were present and they were told it applied only to processions and meetings on public roads and not to any meeting in the Bradlaugh Hall. And subsequently he says to give effect to this promise a notice was issued, Exhibit D 2 (1), which runs thus

A. May I answer that now before I forget the details? It is in part correct. One place where Mr. Ram Bhaj Dutt has gone astray is that we made a mutual agreement that no pressure should be applied after the night of Saturday. They asked that there should be a mutual agreement. We did not acquiesce in that arrangement. We distinctly pointed out that any efforts made to get shops to keep open were in the direction of law and order. We were not prepared to make a

compromise. I have seen that notice before and have noted that particular thing in my mind. The point we made was that parties would go round practically insisting on shops being closed. We know in any movement there are more lukewarm people than people who are keen on it. When one man shuts his shop there is pressure put on nine others to shut their shops, and we were afraid this would go on. They said the Municipal Commissioners were putting pressure the other way and the point we made was that the Municipal Commissioners were not asking for anything improper or abnormal whereas they were, and we distinctly did not bind ourselves to tell the Municipal Commissioners anything of the kind. But I may mention that they did agree that there would be no picketing or parties going round, that persuasion should stop on the next night, the night before the occurrence. When they had gone I discussed the matter with the Deputy Commissioner and I said, "I think we had better issue these orders, though we have distinctly said we would not make any terms of this kind with them."

Q. And that order was in the following words: "All Municipal Commissioners will please note that on Sunday, April 6th, they should be present in their wards in order to assist in keeping peace. There must be no interference with any shop-keepers who wish to close or open their shops, and any person seen to be endeavouring to do so must be reported at once to the nearest *chowki* or *thana* and influence should be used so as to prevent any such interference. Shops that are open already should remain open and those which are closed are to remain closed." You think that is probably correct?

A. I think so, those are about the terms the Deputy Commissioner and I agreed upon. But I wish particularly to say we made no terms with the leaders when they came on those grounds, but I suggested to the Deputy Commissioner that we should issue some such order.

Q. The rest of what I read out to you was correct? As to special constables?

A. No; no question of special constables was raised at that meeting.

Q. So practically it is false, this statement?

A. I have no recollection of it.

Q. Do you take any objection to any other portion of that statement?

A. No, I do not think so.

Q. You said there the order did not apply to the Bradlaugh Hall meeting?

A. Those were the words that it applied only to processions and meetings on public roads and not to meetings in the Bradlaugh Hall. Mr. Duni Chand raised this question and I said it did not apply to the Bradlaugh Hall. I had no power to issue such a notice in regard to meetings in a public hall.

Q. And do you remember that this arrangement of the 6th April was praised by the local press, both the *Civil and Military Gazette* and the *Tribune*, and that the authorities and the people were praised for the amicable arrangement made and for the happy ending it had.

A. Yes, I remember that.

Q. And I believe that you as the head of the police did not receive any complaint that anybody was forced to close his shop on the 6th?

A. I have a recollection of reports that parties did go through at night on the 6th urging the *hartal* till quite a late-hour.

Q. That is a different matter, a party might have gone round. I want to know whether there was any actual complaint from any person who went to the police and said he was ready to open his shop and had to close it?

A. No, there was only one complaint that came to me and Mr. Fyson in the *Kutcheri* in regard to being turned out of a *tum-tum*.

Q. Only one?

A. That is all I remember.

25 November 1919.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

A. Then he must have been arrested by the order of Officer Commanding the Civil Area.

Q. And I am told that he was arrested by the police?

A. All arrests were made by the police at the request of the Officer Commanding the Civil Area or the C. I. D.

Q. You are not in a position to give information about the facts of his particular case?

A. I do not know the man nor can I give information as to his case personally in any way.

Q. Then was the arrest of a marriage party at Rajgarh made? Was that done by the police?

A. By the police on the Mozang side.

Q. The marriage party consisted of ten people?

A. All were arrested, I think by the police.

Q. Were the arrests made under your orders?

A. I don't think any orders were given for the arrest; they were arrested by the police for breach of Martial Law orders as far as I recollect.

Q. Because they were more than a particular number?

A. As far as I remember, it was late at night and there was a large concourse of people assembled against Martial Law orders. They were I think warned in the first place by the Sub-Inspector who came across this meeting. These details were reported to me afterwards.

Q. Did the Sub-Inspector realise that they were going to perform a marriage?

A. I expect he did.

Q. Still he thought it was the right thing to do to arrest those people?

A. It was his duty to arrest them if they were assembled for any purpose as long as they were contravening the order. Licenses were applied for and issued by the Officer Commanding the Civil Area wherever anybody desired to collect people for a marriage.

Q. You do not think any exercise of discretion or common sense was necessary in dealing with cases of this character?

A. How far are you going to give discretion to an officer? At this time the Officer Commanding, Civil Area, was my superior and the superior of all the police under me. He had issued certain orders under Martial Law. It was not, I think, the duty of the Sub-Inspector to exercise his discretion. As a matter of fact he does seem to have used his discretion in the first instance because as I remember the facts he found this marriage meeting going on and he told them it was contrary to orders, and if they had not permission to hold it they must go and get it first. And I think he was told that somebody had gone to get permission.

Q. I want to be clear about the facts. When the police officer came on the spot what was actually happening, marriage ceremonies were being performed?

A. There was a concourse of people collected, what the exact stage of the proceedings was I cannot say. The information I got afterwards was that he had found this concourse of people which was contravening a Martial Law order, that he had told them that they could not collect together like that without permission and they must disperse. I think he was then told that somebody had gone to get permission and he replied that they must disperse till they had got the permission. He then went on his rounds and when he was coming back he found this crowd again and they still had not permission.

Q. When he came next what was going on, the marriage was being performed?

A. I cannot tell you what stage they were at the first time or the second time. At that second visit they were still contravening orders and he thereupon arrested them.

Q. All these people were flogged, were they?

A. I believe one or two of them were flogged. They were taken before the Officer Commanding the Civil Area.

*The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin.*—Was it not before the Civil Magistrate?

*Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate.*—Yes, before the Civil Magistrate.

*Witness.*—I do not remember, I think he was taken first to the Officer Commanding, Civil Area, and then to the Magistrate, or he may have been taken direct to the Magistrate.

Q. Then about the Badshahi Mosque; that was ordered to be kept shut for several weeks?

A. I believe so, but I do not know for how long; I thought it was several days only. My recollection is based on the fact that it was closed on the 12th of April when we had to clear the mosque and the gates were guarded on the occasion of troops passing through when the trouble occurred at Hira Mandi, and on the 18th, that is only 6 days afterwards, it was again closed, that is to say again guarded. A special arrangement had to be made on the 18th because it was a Friday and it was feared that mobs might collect there again and there might be trouble.

Q. But after the 18th?

A. It was closed I think on the evening of the 18th and the 19th was a Friday and it was closed on the 19th. I do not know if it was kept closed after that.

Q. We were told that the mosque was not allowed to be opened till the Trustee or whoever it may be had sent a document agreeing to certain conditions?

A. They may have sent a document in that time, or possibly the mosque may have remained unoccupied though no guard was posted.

Q. Were you the officer concerned who negotiated the matter with the Trustees about this document?

A. No.

Q. That was entirely the military?

A. I suppose the Officer Commanding, I do not know.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan*—

Q. I believe you are aware that these *hartals* on the 30th of March and 6th April were due to a suggestion made by Mahatma Gandhi that that day should be observed as a universal day of mourning?

A. Yes.

Q. And it was because of such an order passed by Mahatma Gandhi that it was observed at several places as a day of mourning?

A. Yes, it was on account of Mr. Gandhi's passive resistance movement.

Q. I think you will agree with me that the observance of a *hartal* on the 6th of April was not due to a certain conspiracy between the inhabitants of Lahore; it was rather in the due observance of the orders of Mahatma Gandhi and it was universal?

A. It had to be organised and worked up.

Q. I mean the idea, the suggestion was Mahatma Gandhi's suggestion?

A. Yes it was Gandhi's suggestion.

Q. It was not the suggestion of any person living in Lahore?

A. I believe not.

Q. Up to the 10th April had the Lahore Police Department any information or any evidence that Ram Bhaj Dutt, Duni Chand, Harkishan Lal and Naurang and two or three others were members of a conspiracy and that in furtherance of the object of that conspiracy this *hartal* was being organised? As the head of the Police Department at Lahore, were you in possession of any information or any evidence to that effect?

A. No, I had no evidence. All I knew at the time of their connection with the whole movement was that they were the organisers of the *hartal* and the signatories of the notices calling the Bradlaugh Hall meeting.

Q. That is not my point.

A. No other conspiracy.

Q. You say you had no idea up to that time and no information that there was a conspiracy in existence at Lahore and that these persons were members of that conspiracy and that its object was to subvert British rule? You were not in possession of any such information up to the 10th of April?

A. No, certainly not of any conspiracy. I take it you mean conspiracy in the bad sense, that is a conspiring together to do an improper thing. It was improper in my opinion to organise a *hartal* and create a disturbance, but beyond that I had no evidence that there was a conspiracy.

Q. And that this *hartal* was a limb of that conspiracy, you were not aware of that?

A. No.

Q. And even if they organised the whole thing and were the conveners of the meeting, you will agree with me that the idea originated with Mahatma Gandhi?

25 November 1919.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

Continued.

Q. Just as they do in *Muharram*?

A. Those who were beating their breasts said *hai, hai*; and those who were saying *jai, jai* were flinging their hands high. (The witness here made signs with his hands and showed the movements of the hands of the crowd when crying out *hai hai* and *jai jai*.)

Q. Therefore a portion of the crowd who were beating their breasts were saying *hai hai*?

A. Yes.

Q. You have expressed that in your opinion Martial Law was necessary?

A. Yes, I think it was necessary.

Q. I would just ask you a few questions to know the grounds upon which you base that opinion. Now practically no fire-arms were used during the whole of these disturbances at Lahore by the mob?

A. No.

Q. No person has been convicted up to this time of looting any shop or any goods in Lahore between the 10th and 15th?

A. No, I don't remember any case.

Q. No person has been convicted of assaulting any of the citizens of Lahore leaving aside those three occasions?

A. I think that is correct.

Q. That is, leaving aside the Lohari Gate and Hira Mandi firing and the firing at the Mall, there was no assault by this crowd?

A. No, I believe not.

Q. Then on the 10th when you threatened them with firing and when that order was not obeyed, you actually fired, and the people were aware of this fact, on the 12th also they were aware of this fact that on the 10th when you threatened to fire you actually did fire and that it was not an empty threat?

A. But they were very excited. I do not think they were going to take any risks.

Q. You have no information, and there is no complaint that any individual police officer or any officer of Government was assaulted during these days by the mobs?

A. No, not in Lahore itself, but in Moghalpura, which is a part of Lahore, I heard of some.

Q. It is four miles away, and you know nothing about Moghalpura?

A. I was not there. I was getting information from all my *ilagas*. I heard that there had been stone-throwing.

Q. Therefore the only information that you had was that at Moghalpura there had been stone-throwing?

A. Yes.

Q. And may I take it that, putting at the lowest computation, the whole mob was about 40 to 50 thousand in Lohari Gate? What will be the number of those who were rebels as you have typically described them?

A. I cannot tell you.

Q. Some rough idea?

A. I cannot even form a rough idea. The only mob that I saw up in Lohari Gate was about 15 to 20 thousand. But the whole city seemed to be disaffected.

Q. Because otherwise how will you say that the situation was hopeless? I mean the population of Lahore city is 2 lakhs and 30 thousand, and if I suggest that one thousand were disaffected, you cannot say that you lost the civil control, because the rest of the citizens who are law-abiding will be prepared to obey your orders, and therefore you cannot say that you lost civil control. Therefore what I want to know is when you say practically it was impossible to maintain order in the whole of Lahore, what do you mean? Out of a total population of 2 lakhs and 50 thousand, how many were rebels?

A. I cannot tell you, I never made any computation.

Q. Neither can you give me any rough idea?

A. I never formed any idea.

Q. You know there are a very large number of license-holders in Lahore?

A. Oh, yes, arms license-holders.

Q. As a Superintendent of Police, I think you know that it is very easy for these dacoits and anarchists to obtain illicit arms from Native States and other ad-

joining provinces, and that arms had been used in the majority of these dacoities and anarchical crimes?

A. I don't know that it is easy, but certainly arms have been used from time to time.

Q. Then at least you will admit that the High Court was not closed? Do you say that in the month of April the High Court of these provinces was closed and it was not deciding cases?

A. Do I say so? To tell you the truth, I do not know. I think it was open.

Q. The courts of the Munsifs and Subordinate Judges and the District Judge, were they closed or open?

A. I cannot tell you. I do not know.

Q. Supposing they were open and they were doing their regular work, then the mere fact that because some of your Honorary Magistrates and Stipendiary Magistrates did not do their regular work, will you be prepared to say that the ordinary civil work of this province was not going on during the 1st week of April?

A. Certainly not, not normally. I don't know how many courts were sitting. My impression at the time was there was nothing doing at the time.

Q. Were these courts attended by pleaders, cases argued and witnesses examined?

A. I don't know. I have told you that I don't know that. The Deputy Commissioner and I were at the Telegraph Office.

Q. At least you know this that, according to you, within 24 hours when you lost control of the Lahore city you were holding a farewell dinner in honour of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor on the 11th April?

A. I think it was on the 10th. But this was all organized before.

Q. But on the 11th April dinner was not given to His Honour?

A. May be, I do not remember the date at all. I was not there.

Q. Therefore having regard to these facts, why do you say that the city was in rebellion and beyond your control?

A. That was my opinion at the time. That was the impression I had of the situation from all the reports I was receiving that it was out of my control.

Q. How many *thanas* are there in the Lahore City?

A. One *thana* in the Lahore City.

Q. How many *chowkies*?

A. I can't tell you exactly. They are not inside. There are practically none inside, they are all outside.

Q. I don't know what the practice here is, but practically for every two or three *mohallas* there is always a police *chowki*?

A. There are no police *chowkies* inside the city.

Q. None?

A. None inside the city, except one, that is, at Tibighat which is practically outside the city, that is, the old tahsil on the road near Taksali Gate. All the others are outside the city.

Q. Are they within municipal limits or not?

A. They are all within municipal limits. We are now in municipal limits, but we are not in the city.

(Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate. —What used to be the four walls of the city.)

Q. You have got the city, you have got Anarkali, you never lost control over Anarkali. In my province for a city like Lahore there will be more than 3 dozen of these *chowkies* because for every ward there are about 6 or 7 *chowkies*, I do not know the practice here.

A. We have not got a very large number. I can tell you the exact number if you wish.

Q. So far as these police *chowkies* are concerned, the whole town is distributed amongst these police *chowkies*, that is, the different *chowkies* have to keep watch and ward in different portions of the city?

A. The men from those *chowkies* keep watch and ward in different places, but they are not in the city. You will take the Kotwali, it is outside Delhi Gate, it is about 200 yards outside.

Q. There are at least a dozen *chowkies* in Lahore?

A. All outside the city.

25 November 1919.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

A. Quite impossible.

Q. You said that five pickets were established at different places, and now you stated before this committee that the sole object, the sole necessity, of your firing on the crowd that assembled at Hira Mandi was that there was a danger of that crowd being in between your body of soldiers and the pickets that were established by you?

A. I did not say that was the sole object. That was one. The point was, we had a huge mob at Hira Mandi, a dangerous mob with *lathis*. This mob had assembled contrary to everything that had been said by the Officer Commanding all the way along. This dangerous mob would not disperse. The troops were in this position, that they must either leave that mob there in its position and in that condition and march away. This mob might follow us and there might be trouble or it might turn on the pickets.

Q. May I put that question again? First of all, are there or are there not any number of by-lanes and by-streets between the pickets that you had established that night?

A. There are.

Q. Then may I take it that you had passed no orders and you had made no arrangements for preventing people from coming from these by-lanes on to the main road. You had passed no such orders that no person from the by-lanes should enter the main road?

A. I do not catch your meaning. No orders were issued, and no arrangements could be made to stop people from coming from those by-lanes.

Q. One picket is here, another picket is here, the third picket is here, and there are any number of by-lanes?

A. They were not in that position. The pickets were posted at the old Kotwali and at Bazaz Hatta, down at what is known as Nawab Haveli and at Lohari Mandi, and the 5th picket was posted after this as we went there at what is known, I think, as Lakar Mandi. They were in a circle as it were.

Q. My point is, having regard to the geographical position of these pickets, it was impossible for you to prevent people from assembling at different points between these pickets?

A. Yes, it was impossible. We did not have any body else except pickets. We could not keep parties away from forming mobs. But the whole object of these pickets was by the moral effect to restore order and to prevent such assemblies, if possible.

Q. And no orders were passed that these pickets should prevent people from using the lanes or coming on to the main road?

A. No.

Q. Therefore I cannot understand the one important reason that has been suggested to us that the firing was necessary because the pickets were going to be cut off from the body of men that you had deputed?

A. The pickets were not going to be cut off in that sense. It is one of the reasons as I have said. It may be very difficult for you or even for anybody at such a distance of time sitting quietly to consider the matter now when all the trouble is over, to know what the situation was at the time. What appeared to us at that time is very different. You cannot possibly realize our situation at that time. Well the point was that we had taken control of the city. One of the objects of taking control of the city was to be able to prevent by moral effect, if possible, if not by any other force that might be necessary, the formation of dangerous mobs and processions. Having done this, we came through to Hira Mandi. There was a large mob there, a very hostile mob. At every place I may say there were crowds. They were told to get away, and in most places they got away in small crowds. Here they absolutely would not move at all, they would not disperse. They were far more dangerous than at other places. They were not armed. It was represented as the *Danda Fauj*. Large numbers of people were armed with *lathis*. This was the situation that had to be dealt with. It appeared to the Deputy Commissioner, and I agreed with him, that these big mobs should be

told to disperse. They were told to disperse. Far from dispersing they grew in numbers. The whole of that place was massed with people, and the Deputy Commissioner attempted, as I said to-day in my statement, with a few squares to disperse the crowd eventually and failed. Stone-throwing began and then he gave me instructions to fire. One of the necessities for firing, as I mentioned to-day, in my mind was that an unruly mob had been left behind. We could not leave a mob behind under those circumstances. They were all together. Once they dispersed it is a different matter. If they were going down to any of those pickets, there would have been a tremendous loss of life.

Q. You had no intention of remaining there for ever?

A. We had not.

Q. You only intended to pass through the street and come back. What did it matter as to whether the crowd was there just after you established the pickets or the crowd collected after two hours. There is a body of men. As you proceed you go on leaving certain pickets. You find between a certain picket that was left by you and the main body, there was a large crowd. You had no mind to stop there for the whole time. Therefore what did it matter unless and until you found that that large crowd was going to assault you or your picket, what did it matter to you as to whether that picket was cut off from the main body when there was a large crowd in between the picket and the main body?

A. That I have only mentioned incidentally as one of the things that made it impossible to leave the crowd at all. But the main point remains, the assembly was illegal. It was told to disperse by the Deputy Commissioner over and over again. It collected in larger numbers. He endeavoured to disperse it. That is one of the things. I think you are misunderstanding me saying that because of those pickets there, the necessity arose for firing. But the actual situation at the time was this. This was an illegal assembly which had been ordered to disperse by the Deputy Commissioner and which refused to disperse and commenced stoning.

Q. Before it began to throw stones, how do you call it an illegal assembly? I can understand that when they were asked to disperse they did not do so, and instead of dispersing they threw stones. It may become an illegal assembly, but why was it an illegal assembly before it threw stones?

A. Because all the way along the Deputy Commissioner had been announcing that assemblies and processions would not be allowed. This large assembly had formed, it was with sticks and it was ordered to disperse. When it did not obey the order of the Deputy Commissioner to disperse, it became an illegal assembly.

Q. Is it not a fact that at least 50 per cent. of those people were those people who were turned out from the Badshahi Mosque by the cavalry that was sent to you?

A. I do not know what percentage.

Q. Certainly when they were asked to clear out of the mosque they would go somewhere?

A. Yes, but there are lots of places to go to, but they assembled there and stayed there. It did not all happen in two or three minutes. There is any amount of space there, streets and Galis through which the people could disperse if they wished, but they had no intention of dispersing.

Q. I think you have stated previously that this crowd that was facing you at Hira Mandi, and which was subsequently fired upon, a large number of them were with open breasts and beating their breasts crying out *hai, hai*?

A. I cannot say whether they were with open breasts, but certainly they were crying out *hai, hai* and *jai, jai*.

Q. And with their open breasts?

A. I do not remember seeing them with open breasts. I did not notice that in particular.

Q. Just as they do in *Muharram*?

A. Those who were beating their breasts said *hai*.

25 November 1919.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

Q. Just as they do in *Muharram*?

A. Those who were beating their breasts said *hai, hai*; and those who were saying *jai, jai* were flinging their hands high. (The witness here made signs with his hands and showed the movements of the hands of the crowd when crying out *hai hai* and *jai jai*.)

Q. Therefore a portion of the crowd who were beating their breasts were saying *hai hai*?

A. Yes.

Q. You have expressed that in your opinion Martial Law was necessary?

A. Yes, I think it was necessary.

Q. I would just ask you a few questions to know the grounds upon which you base that opinion. Now practically no fire-arms were used during the whole of these disturbances at Lahore by the mob?

A. No.

Q. No person has been convicted up to this time of looting any shop or any goods in Lahore between the 10th and 15th?

A. No, I don't remember any case.

Q. No person has been convicted of assaulting any of the citizens of Lahore leaving aside those three occasions?

A. I think that is correct.

Q. That is, leaving aside the Lohari Gate and High Mandi firing and the firing at the Mall, there was no assault by this crowd?

A. No, I believe not.

Q. Then on the 10th when you threatened them with firing and when that order was not obeyed, you actually fired, and the people were aware of this fact, on the 12th also they were aware of this fact that on the 10th when you threatened to fire you actually did fire and that it was not an empty threat?

A. But they were very excited. I do not think they were going to take any risks.

Q. You have no information, and there is no complaint that any individual police officer or any officer of Government was assaulted during these days by the mobs?

A. No, not in Lahore itself, but in Moghalpura, which is a part of Lahore, I heard of some.

Q. It is four miles away, and you know nothing about Moghalpura?

A. I was not there. I was getting information from all my *ilaqas*. I heard that there had been stone-throwing.

Q. Therefore the only information that you had was that at Moghalpura there had been stone-throwing?

A. Yes.

Q. And may I take it that, putting at the lowest computation, the whole mob was about 40 to 50 thousand in Lohari Gate? What will be the number of those who were rebels as you have typically described them?

A. I cannot tell you.

Q. Some rough idea?

A. I cannot even form a rough idea. The only mob that I saw up in Lohari Gate was about 15 to 20 thousand. But the whole city seemed to be disaffected.

Q. Because otherwise how will you say that the situation was hopeless? I mean the population of Lahore city is 2 lakhs and 30 thousand, and if I suggest that one thousand were disaffected, you cannot say that you lost the civil control, because the rest of the citizens who are law-abiding will be prepared to obey your orders, and therefore you cannot say that you lost civil control. Therefore what I want to know is when you say practically it was impossible to maintain order in the whole of Lahore, what do you mean? Out of a total population of 2 lakhs and 50 thousand, how many were rebels?

A. I cannot tell you, I never made any computation.

Q. Neither can you give me any rough idea?

A. I never formed any idea.

Q. You know there are a very large number of license-holders in Lahore?

A. Oh, yes, arms license-holders.

Q. As a Superintendent of Police, I think you know that it is very easy for these dacoits and anarchists to obtain illicit arms from Native States and other ad-

joining provinces, and that arms had been used in the majority of these dacoities and anarchical crimes?

A. I don't know that it is easy, but certainly arms have been used from time to time.

Q. Then at least you will admit that the High Court was not closed? Do you say that in the month of April the High Court of these provinces was closed and it was not deciding cases?

A. Do I say so? To tell you the truth, I do not know. I think it was open.

Q. The courts of the Munsifs and Subordinate Judges and the District Judge, were they closed or open?

A. I cannot tell you. I do not know.

Q. Supposing they were open and they were doing their regular work, then the mere fact that because some of your Honorary Magistrates and Stipendiary Magistrates did not do their regular work, will you be prepared to say that the ordinary civil work of this province was not going on during the 1st week of April?

A. Certainly not, not normally. I don't know how many courts were sitting. My impression at the time was there was nothing doing at the time.

Q. Were these courts attended by pleaders, cases argued and witnesses examined?

A. I don't know. I have told you that I don't know that. The Deputy Commissioner and I were at the Telegraph Office.

Q. At least you know this that, according to you, within 24 hours when you lost control of the Lahore city you were holding a farewell dinner in honour of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor on the 11th April?

A. I think it was on the 10th. But this was all organized before.

Q. But on the 11th April dinner was not given to His Honour?

A. May be, I do not remember the date at all. I was not there.

Q. Therefore having regard to these facts, why do you say that the city was in rebellion and beyond your control?

A. That was my opinion at the time. That was the impression I had of the situation from all the reports I was receiving that it was out of my control.

Q. How many *thanas* are there in the Lahore City?

A. One *thana* in the Lahore City.

Q. How many *chowkies*?

A. I can't tell you exactly. They are not inside. There are practically none inside, they are all outside.

Q. I don't know what the practice here is, but practically for every two or three *mohallas* there is always a police *chowki*?

A. There are no police *chowkies* inside the city.

Q. None?

A. None inside the city, except one, that is, at Tibighat which is practically outside the city, that is, the old *tahsil* on the road near Taksali Gate. All the others are outside the city.

Q. Are they within municipal limits or not?

A. They are all within municipal limits. We are now in municipal limits, but we are not in the city.

(Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate. —What used to be the four walls of the city.)

Q. You have got the city, you have got Anarkali, you never lost control over Anarkali. In my province for a city like Lahore there will be more than 3 dozen of these *chowkies* because for every ward there are about 6 or 7 *chowkies*, I do not know the practice here.

A. We have not got a very large number. I can tell you the exact number if you wish.

Q. So far as these police *chowkies* are concerned, the whole town is distributed amongst these police *chowkies*, that is, the different *chowkies* have to keep watch and ward in different portions of the city?

A. The men from those *chowkies* keep watch and ward in different places, but they are not in the city. You will take the *Kotwali*, it is outside Delhi Gate, it is about 200 yards outside.

Q. There are at least a dozen *chowkies* in Lahore?

A. All outside the city.

25 November 1919.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

A. Quite impossible.

Q. You said that five pickets were established at different places, and now you stated before this committee that the sole object, the sole necessity, of your firing on the crowd that assembled at Hira Mandi was that there was a danger of that crowd being in between your body of soldiers and the pickets that were established by you?

A. I did not say that was the sole object. That was one. The point was, we had a huge mob at Hira Mandi, a dangerous mob, with *lathis*. This mob had assembled contrary to everything that had been said by the Officer Commanding all the way along. This dangerous mob would not disperse. The troops were in this position, that they must either leave that mob there in its position and in that condition and march away. This mob might follow us and there might be trouble or it might turn on the pickets.

Q. May I put that question again? First of all, are there or are there not any number of by-lanes and by-roads between the pickets that you had established that night?

A. There are.

Q. Then may I take it that you had passed no orders and you had made no arrangements for preventing people from coming from these by-lanes on to the main road. You had passed no such orders that no person from the by-lanes should enter the main road?

A. I do not catch your meaning. No orders were issued, and no arrangements could be made to stop people from coming from those by-lanes.

Q. One picket is here, another picket is here, the third picket is here, and there are any number of by-lanes?

A. They were not in that position. The pickets were posted at the old Kotwali and at Bazaz Hatta, down at what is known as Nawab Haveli and at Lohari Mandi, and the 5th picket was posted after this as we went there at what is known, I think, as Lakar Mandi. They were in a circle as it were.

Q. My point is, having regard to the geographical position of these pickets, it was impossible for you to prevent people from assembling at different points between these pickets?

A. Yes, it was impossible. We did not have anybody else except pickets. We could not keep parties away from forming mobs. But the whole object of these pickets was by the moral effect to restore order and to prevent such assemblies, if possible.

Q. And no orders were passed that these pickets should prevent people from using the lanes or coming on to the main road?

A. No.

Q. Therefore I cannot understand the one important reason that has been suggested to us that the firing was necessary because the pickets were going to be cut off from the body of men that you had deputed?

A. The pickets were not going to be cut off in that sense. It is one of the reasons as I have said. It may be very difficult for you or even for anybody at such a distance of time sitting quietly to consider the matter now when all the trouble is over, to know what the situation was at the time. What appeared to us at that time is very different. You cannot possibly realize our situation at that time. Well the point was that we had taken control of the city. One of the objects of taking control of the city was to be able to prevent by moral effect, if possible, if not by any other force that might be necessary, the formation of dangerous mobs and processions. Having done this, we came through to Hira Mandi. There was a large mob there, a very hostile mob. At every place I may say there were crowds. They were told to get away, and in most places they got away in small crowds. Here they absolutely would not move at all, they would not disperse. They were far more dangerous than at other places. They were not armed, it was represented as the *Danda Fauj*. Large numbers of people were armed with *lathis*. This was the situation that had to be dealt with. It appeared to the Deputy Commissioner, and I agreed with him, that these big mobs should be

told to disperse. They were told to disperse. Far from dispersing they grew in numbers. The whole of that place was massed with people, and the Deputy Commissioner attempted, as I said to-day in my statement, with a few sowars to disperse the crowd eventually and failed. Stone-throwing began and then he gave me instructions to fire. One of the necessities for firing, as I mentioned to-day, in my mind was that an unruly mob had been left behind. We could not leave a mob behind under those circumstances. They were all together. Once they dispersed it is a different matter. If they were going down to any of these pickets, there would have been a tremendous loss of life.

Q. You had no intention of remaining there for ever?

A. We had not.

Q. You only intended to pass through the street and come back. What did it matter as to whether the crowd was there just after you established the pickets or the crowd collected after two hours. There is a body of men. As you proceed you go on leaving certain pickets. You find between a certain picket that was left by you and the main body, there was a large crowd. You had no mind to stop there for the whole time. Therefore what did it matter unless and until you found that that large crowd was going to assault you or your pickets, what did it matter to you as to whether that picket was cut off from the main body when there was a large crowd in between the picket and the main body?

A. That I have only mentioned incidentally as one of the things that made it impossible to leave the crowd at all. But the main point remains, the assembly was illegal. It was told to disperse by the Deputy Commissioner over and over again. It collected in larger numbers. He endeavoured to disperse it. That is one of the things. I think you are misunderstanding me saying that because of those pickets there, the necessity arose for firing. But the actual situation at the time was this. This was an illegal assembly which had been ordered to disperse by the Deputy Commissioner and which refused to disperse and commenced stoning.

Q. Before it began to throw stones, how do you call it an illegal assembly? I can understand that when they were asked to disperse they did not do so, and instead of dispersing they threw stones. It may become an illegal assembly, but why was it an illegal assembly before it threw stones?

A. Because all the way along the Deputy Commissioner had been announcing that assemblies and processions would not be allowed. This large assembly had formed, it was with sticks and it was ordered to disperse. When it did not obey the order of the Deputy Commissioner to disperse, it became an illegal assembly.

Q. Is it not a fact that at least 50 per cent. of these people were those people who were turned out from the Badshahi Mosque by the cavalry that was sent to you?

A. I do not know what percentage.

Q. Certainly when they were asked to clear out of the mosque they would go somewhere?

A. Yes, but there are lots of places to go to, but they assembled there and stayed there. It did not all happen in two or three minutes. There is any amount of space there, streets and Galis through which the people could disperse if they wished, but they had no intention of dispersing.

Q. I think you have stated previously that this crowd that was facing you at Hira Mandi, and which was subsequently fired upon, a large number of them were with open breasts and beating their breasts crying out *hai, hai*?

A. I cannot say whether they were with open breasts, but certainly they were crying out *hai, hai* and *jai, jai*.

Q. And with their open breasts?

A. I do not remember seeing them with open breasts. I did not notice that in particular.

Q. Just as they do in *Muharram*?

A. Those who were beating their breasts said *hai*.

25 November 1919.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

Q. That is a different matter. I want to put it on another footing. There is no doubt on account of the firing, rightly or wrongly, there was resentment. People were saying that their fellow-citizens had been killed and so on. There was that feeling and resentment?

A. There must have been of course.

Q. And all this happened because they were not going to open their shops. That was the consequence of their persistence in their maintaining *hartal*?

A. Firing?

Q. After that crowd did not disperse, and you had to fire. Practically that was the natural consequence of the *hartal* movement. All that happened was the natural consequence of the *hartal* movement?

A. Yes, I suppose so.

Q. According to you, you foresaw it and wanted to prevent it?

A. There is always the danger of riots and trouble.

Q. There was that resentment in the minds of the people. Do you mean to say that these orders that were passed or promulgated by the Martial Law authorities would help in bringing about a normal state of affairs or increase the resentment of the people?

A. I think they may increase the resentment of the people; they would certainly restore a normal state of affairs. People may not like them. When you are subjected to control, you do not like it.

Q. Was the continuance of Martial Law necessary? May I understand that when these orders were passed they were necessary, and that they were very important factors in bringing Lahore city to its normal condition?

A. That is a question for the Military and would be as the military position suggested to the Military officers. They were passing these orders. I did not make out these orders. It is not for me to justify or defend their action.

Q. You have expressed the opinion that the continuance of Martial Law was necessary?

A. I consider that the continuance of Martial Law was necessary. It was the best and quickest way of restoring and maintaining law and order.

Q. Therefore I want to know as to whether the Martial Law orders that were passed by the Military authorities in your opinion were necessary? I do not mean this order or that notice in particular. I mean the general administration?

A. You mean the general control. People immediately understood that such things should not go on. Things immediately began to improve. As soon as the control came in, we were able to continue.

Q. Everybody would agree with you that if in ordinary times a summary procedure is adopted and this complicated machinery of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Indian Evidence Act is removed, certainly there will be better control of Police. There will be no crime. You can put it down. Is that your opinion?

A. You can take it at that. I did not mean that; I would not suggest that. Abnormal conditions require abnormal measures. Conditions were distinctly abnormal and Martial Law was an abnormal measure, but it was a necessity.

Q. In your opinion if a summary procedure is adopted in normal conditions doing away with all these complicated procedure of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Indian Evidence Act, will not that give you better control of the *badmashas*?

A. It probably would give me better control. It is neither desirable nor necessary in normal times.

Q. The only thing which I could gather from your answer is that you thought that there were so many persons arrested and there was a chance of a speedy trial under Martial Law?

A. I did not say that. The quick disposal of the whole thing and the restoration and the continued maintenance of order in my opinion required it; and it was a quick way of dealing with all these cases.

Q. There was no disorder after the 14th?

A. There was no disorder after the 12th, actual disorder.

Q. There was no disorder after the 15th, 16th and 17th, throughout the province?

A. I do not know.

Q. Yes; a list has been given to us. Practically there was no disorder throughout the province after the 17th. I will take from the 18th. There was no disorder after the 18th?

A. Quite likely. I do not remember the date. But I have given it in my statement so far as my district was concerned.

Q. Supposing there was no disorder throughout the province after the 18th, what are your grounds for saying that it was necessary that Martial Law should have been maintained?

A. Disorders might have been made. Therefore, in the same way as you are supposing, there was every possibility of an outbreak of disorder. You have got to restore normal conditions. There were no actual disturbances and things of that kind going on at the time.

Q. Is there any guarantee that after the restoration of normal conditions, there can be no disorder?

A. There is far greater guarantee than there was at that time.

Q. In order to avoid that possibility, I think you will be in favour of Martial Law. There is always the possibility of there being disorder?

A. No; abnormal conditions require special measures and they were taken. You will admit that the conditions were very abnormal. But I did not say that because there is the possibility of disorder, you could maintain better order under Martial Law; therefore in ordinary times Martial Law should be continued, I never said that.

Q. That is what I do not understand and I am troubling you and wasting the time of the Committee and your time. I do not understand what were the abnormal conditions after the 14th. You have admitted that *hartal* came into existence because Mr. Gandhi wanted a universal day of *hartal*. After that Mahatma Gandhi was arrested on the 10th. On account of his arrest there was that riot on the 10th. There was another *hartal*. Then after that the *hartal* continued up to the 15th. It ceased on the 16th?

A. I think it ceased on the 17th or 18th.

Q. Therefore there is no doubt you will not call it abnormal, if you realise in a city that different people had been shot, rightly or wrongly, and that the leaders of that city had been deported, that the crowd will be sulky; they will not be very happy and jubilant, praising everybody that all this was very good. But I do not see what were the abnormal conditions after the 17th. I do not see anything abnormal in the state of Lahore that according to you would have justified the prolongation of Martial Law.

A. Further resentment, you say, was created in the minds of the people.

Q. I am coming to resentment.

A. There must be resentment.

Q. Therefore don't you think you should conciliate them?

A. We might have an outbreak again at any time.

Q. The best way of putting down resentment is by conciliation and not by the promulgation of Martial Law orders that were promulgated and adding to the resentment?

A. Quite possible. It was not because they were putting down resentment. You ask what was the necessity for imposing and continuing Martial Law because things had settled down. You point to the resentment of the people at various acts that had taken place. I say the conditions were abnormal and there had been a great upheaval, and it was necessary to crush this very resentment and prevent any ebullitions of that resentment coming into violence. That was why the continuance of Martial Law was necessary.

Q. So long as there is resentment, there is a chance of those people doing something wrong. Isn't that so?

A. There is always the danger of those people doing some thing. The fresher the resentment, the nearer the danger.



25 November 1919.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

Q. I quite agree with you. Therefore which would have been the better thing, to allow that resentment by efflux of time to subside in 2 weeks or 3 weeks or to add to the resentment by passing these Martial Law orders which I have referred to and to add fire to that resentment and to make it smoulder for a long time?

A. I am quite sure so far as I am concerned and so far as every other officer is concerned, we tried to put down resentment in any way we could, but there was nothing to assure us that, by removing Martial Law or by doing away with Martial Law or any of the measures that were taken to protect and to restore and maintain order, we could succeed by withdrawing Martial Law and stopping all precautions.

Q. I leave that point. About this *Danda Fauj*. Was it not a show? They had small sticks and they were presenting them and making fun of the whole thing. There was nothing serious?

A. It was certainly not reported or represented to me as such.

Q. Was it reported as a serious thing? What was the *Danda Fauj* reported to be doing? May I take it that they marched through the city, as sometimes happens on the occasion of festivals. The man in front had a toy gun, and they were presenting sticks. If he asked them kneel, they would kneel. They would stand up and proceed further, and so on. Did they do anything else? Have I described this *Danda Fauj* correctly?

A. They were certainly supposed to be doing these things. Do you wish me to understand that you are suggesting that this *Danda Fauj* was merely a *tamasha*?

Q. I do not say it was a *tamasha*. I am prepared to say that it was a very mischievous thing. But as has appeared in the statement of witnesses it was not more than this idea. He had a toy gun and in front of a street he called out "come along." A number of boys went behind him. When he said 'fire,' all of them had the sticks in a particular way. Then when he said 'shoulder arms,' they did that.

A. It was not an amusement.

Q. Anything else which this *Danda Fauj* did?

A. We had persons going about the streets making more or less a *tamasha*. The idea was that this was a party to organise regular men.

Q. This was for organising a regular army?

A. Mob, not regular army.

Q. Then the head of this *Danda Fauj* was prosecuted and convicted?

A. Yes.

Q. This is the only thing which has been alleged against him, viz., what he was doing on the 12th. Whatever may be his intention, we will not quarrel about it. Is it not true that in the case against him, only these things had been alleged against him?

A. The formation and management of the *Danda Fauj* is what he was run in for.

Q. Is it not a fact that a number of people who had subscribed to these *langar khanas* were arrested?

A. Not that I am aware of. I did consider the question of dealing with persons who would be opening *langar khanas*.

Q. I do not want that. I want to know whether any persons who had subscribed to the *langar khanas* were arrested or not by the Police?

A. They may have been, but certainly not because they had subscribed to the *langar khanas*. Amongst persons who were arrested, there may have been persons who had subscribed to the *langar khanas*. They were not arrested because they had subscribed to the *langar khanas*.

Q. They were arrested because you thought that if these *langar khanas* were not suppressed, the *hartal* may continue?

A. You are quite mistaken. I considered whether the organisers of *langar khanas* and their subscribers were or were not to be dealt with. There were two sides to the question. Both sides were represented to me. One was that these people who were organising *langar khanas* were encouraging the holding and continuing the *hartal*. That was at the time when we considered it as anti-Government movement. The

other was that these people may have those ideas. At the same time there were other reasons that could be urged for these *langar khanas*, which would be beneficial; they might be considered to be as a protection from riot and looting, because if the people were not able to get food somewhere and became hungry, they might loot. I considered both these possibilities and I decided absolutely to take no action, and I gave no orders to arrest any man for that purpose. Somebody connected with *langar khanas* might have been arrested on some other charge. No man I am aware of was arrested because he was opening or connected with or subscribed to *langar khanas*.

Q. One Karam Das was arrested?

A. I believe he was not arrested by my order.

Q. And you know that he was in the first place acquitted or discharged?

A. I do not know. He was not arrested by my order. He was not arrested even in Lahore.

Q. Even after the Martial Law had ceased to exist, is it not a fact that he was under custody for more than a week without any charge?

A. I have no idea how long he was in custody. I do not know anything about him, when he was released or dealt with.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. How long have you been in the Police, Mr. Broadway?

A. Over 26 years.

Q. In the Punjab Police I suppose?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you been in various districts of the Punjab from time to time?

A. Yes.

Q. I take it that you are pretty well acquainted with the conditions, political or otherwise, of the Punjab?

A. I may say that I am; yes, but only superficially. I do not go very deeply into the matter, but only as far as it affects crime and so on.

Q. The means which the Government have at their disposal of knowing about the conditions in the country are the Police. Is it not?

A. The Police and the C. I. D., and the Deputy Commissioner.

Q. The C. I. D. belong to the Police?

A. It is a separate branch.

Q. If there was any widespread political movement of the nature of subverting Government, it would come to your notice?

A. Yes; the local part of it would. I should know of the local movement more than of the general. I should not have any general idea of the movement. I would know something of what was going on locally.

Q. How long have you been in Lahore?

A. As Superintendent of Police, Lahore, I have been since May last year; 4 months of that I was away. I think I took over charge in May last year, as Superintendent of Police.

Q. Were you in Lahore before?

A. I have been actually in Lahore since 1915. I was on the Railway for 18 months.

Q. May I take it that you know the conditions in Lahore, at any rate, either from your own knowledge or from the records which you may have had confidentially in your office?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there any conspiracies in Lahore? Was there any conspiracy in Lahore with the object of subverting Government in Lahore? Any conspiracy for rebellion?

A. I should certainly say that there was no conspiracy to create rebellion in Lahore. I am not aware of any conspiracy to create rebellion. But there was this movement, you may call it conspiracy or not, to create agitation, widespread agitation, to paralyse Government and also to force their hands.

Q. Which movement?

A. Passive resistance, opposition to the Rowlatt Act.

Q. Did it not emanate from Mr. Gandhi at Bombay?

A. Yes, on account of the Rowlatt Act.

25 November 1919.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

Q. It was quite open, it was published?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you call it conspiracy?

A. Not in that sense. It is a very difficult thing to explain it. The object of Mr. Gandhi may not be the object of the lower leaders. They may be conspiring.

Q. You are referring only to this movement. Anything else? I particularly asked whether there was any conspiracy in Lahore and you said 'no.'

A. I know of no conspiracy to rebel against Government at all.

Q. Except this passive resistance movement?

A. Except the general agitation against the Rowlatt Act.

Q. That was started by Mr. Gandhi?

A. The passive resistance movement was. I do not think the agitation against the Rowlatt Act was started by Mr. Gandhi.

Q. What form did that agitation take against the Rowlatt Act?

A. It took the form of passive resistance, *hartals* and so on.

Q. That was started by Mr. Gandhi?

A. Yes.

Q. Then there was nothing beyond this. It was all?

A. I do not think there was anything beyond it in Mr. Gandhi's mind.

Q. I am not talking about Mr. Gandhi's mind. I am asking so far as your information about Lahore goes, whether there was anything going on except to organise this movement of passive resistance?

A. I have no information about it. Do you mean to say there was any organisation to create a rebellion or anything of that sort?

Q. There was nothing beyond this?

A. I do not know of any.

Q. The form it was taking was *hartal* and holding of meetings?

A. That is the form it took. The holding of *hartal* and meetings to force the Government's hands.

Q. Whatever may be the object, there were only these things?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know who were the leaders of this movement in Lahore?

A. Yes, I can tell you the signatories of the movement. I have got here an old note of mine. I do not know when I made it out. It is called a committee working to give effect to Mr. Gandhi's instructions for Sunday, 6th April 1919.

Q. And the Committee was composed of whom?

A. There are 7 or 8 names. I really forget how I got it. I will read it out.

Dr. Gokal Chand.  
Mehta Babadur Chand.  
Mr. Duni Chand.  
Maulvi Fazul Din.  
Malik Barkat Ali.  
Chaudhri Ram Bhaj Datt.  
Dharam Das Suri.  
Sardar Habibulla Khan, Barrister.

Q. This was a local committee to organise the *hartal* and, I understand, to give effect to Mr. Gandhi's movement of having *hartal* all over India?

A. Yes, they were organised; and then there were others; it included the signatories of the notice about the Bradlaugh Hall meeting and *hartal*.

Q. And that was broadly advertised and not made in secret?

A. It was printed.

Q. There was no secret about it?

A. No.

Q. I understand that the *hartal* on the 6th of April, which was the day appointed for it, passed off perfectly quietly at Lahore and nothing happened? The only thing which happened as regards the passive resistance movement was the *hartal* and that went off all right?

A. Yes. I heard that another one was to be held the following Sunday.

Q. What was the reason for it?

A. I do not know the reason. That was the rumour heard here. That was stated. No notice was issued. It was put for the reason that I have already stated in my statement here. I went out on the morning of the 10th and arranged for Military arrangements, similar to those that we had before, on the following Saturday night.

Q. Is it not likely that if it had been contemplated, as was held on the 6th, there would have been some organisation to advertise it asking people to close shops?

A. Yes.

Q. Because there is nothing secret about it, they did not want the *hartal*?

A. There was nothing widespread that there was to be another *hartal*. It was stated that there would be a *hartal*. I cannot see how it was. The impression was so strong that arrangements were made to meet it.

Q. Did you enquire from any of these gentlemen whether they wanted to hold the *hartal*?

A. No, I did not.

Q. You have told us that this *hartal* was an anti-Government movement. What do you mean by its being anti-Government movement?

A. *Hartal* has always been looked upon by Policemen as a dangerous movement. In this case it became anti-Government, because it was organized to resist a Government measure.

Q. Would you also call a public meeting for the purpose of protesting against any legislation which people did not like as an anti-Government movement?

A. No, it depends on the meeting. A very big *hartal* on this wholesale scale where all sorts of people are brought in constitutes a danger to my mind and makes it undesirable in that sense. If you have a meeting which is properly controlled and where the views put forward are temperate, moderate, it need not necessarily be objectionable.

Q. I suppose you take objection to anything which might result in danger. I am just looking at the question how you call it anti-Government. It may be a dangerous movement because it is done on a wide scale. It may not be anti-Government at all?

A. *Hartal* is very often an anti-Government movement, because it is in opposition to Government measures.

Q. It was a protest against Government measures. Was it not? How could it be against Government?

A. It was to force the Government's hands, presumably to reconsider the Act which they objected to.

Q. That was protest. Was it not?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it anything else? Similarly a meeting could be a protest meeting. You will not call it an anti-Government meeting, though it may be dangerous?

A. I should of course say it is anti-Government. In the one case, I take it that the *hartal* is objectionable and the other need not be.

Q. Similarly any expression of opinion against Government measures by anybody would be anti-Government according to you?

A. Anti-Government, but not objectionable. We are all entitled to our opinions.

Q. It would be anti-Government according to you?

A. Must be anti-Government if it is against Government measures. That is how it appears to me.

Q. Disapproval of Government measures is anti-Government?

A. It may be anti-Government or it may not be.

Q. It is not anything very objectionable?

A. I had not put it as in a very objectionable sense; that is, seditious or rebellious, causing or intended to cause sedition or rebellion.

Q. I simply want to understand it.

A. It is against Government.

Q. These two things are very different, Mr. Broadway; to do anything against Government, and to disapprove of Government measures; these are two very different things. If there is any protest against a measure would you call it anti-Government?

25 November 1919.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

A. I would call the Bradlaugh Hall meeting anti-Government because it was encouraging the *hartal* and all that sort of things.

Q. I am just enquiring about its meaning. Is *hartal* anti-Government?

A. I do not know about the Bradlaugh Hall meeting; all *hartals* need not be anti-Government; that is my impression; but this was anti-Government because it excited the people against Government.

Q. I do not understand what you mean by it. If anything was done in disapproval of Government measures that is anti-Government? Were you of the opinion?

A. It is anti-Government, not in an objectionable sense.

Q. When did this Afghan trouble begin?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. In April or May?

A. Somewhere in May; I cannot remember.

Q. This question I am asking because it has been said that the continuance of Martial Law was necessary on account of the Afghan trouble. Otherwise it would be irrelevant.

A. I take it that it had something to do with the bearing on the military situation.

Q. In your own opinion the foreign trouble has nothing to do with the present situation?

A. I say it had a bearing on the situation.

Q. What bearing had it?

A. We had trouble at home; we had trouble abroad. When you have trouble here, trouble breaks out on the frontiers. It cannot be considered otherwise than having a bearing on the situation here.

Q. If the situation here had been restored to practically normal conditions and if there was no fear of anything happening why should Martial Law be continued?

A. It is no doubt true; but I am not competent to answer that question; in a general way, I think it is necessary.

Q. You cannot answer that question?

A. I am not competent to. It is a question of policy. To me it appears necessary.

Q. Martial Law was only established in a few districts in the Central Punjab, in Lahore, Amritsar?

A. I knew it was established in Lahore, Amritsar, and in Gujranwala.

Q. Was there *hartal* in other districts of the Punjab besides these districts?

A. I do not know.

Q. You have no information?

A. There was *hartal* in other districts; I cannot remember; there was *hartal* in Delhi.

Q. Delhi is not in the Punjab?

A. There was *hartal* in other places; I do not know.

Q. Outside this area, was Martial Law established in Rawalpindi or other places? You do not know?

A. I do not know.

Q. You are aware that as soon as the Afghan trouble arose, people in the Punjab held meetings in which they expressed their sentiments of loyalty to the Government and they desired to aid Government in every way they could? Is it not so?

A. I know of no particular meeting; I think I saw it in the papers.

Q. Was any meeting also held in Lahore?

A. I do not remember; probably so; I cannot remember.

Q. If I understand you rightly; in your reply to a question of mine, you said that Martial Law or the continuance of Martial Law was necessary in order to prevent *hartal* taking place; that was the sole object of Martial Law?

A. I did not suggest that it was the sole object. The object of Martial Law was to restore and maintain law and order; and order was disturbed, because people were continuing the *hartal*; continued *hartal*, I think, had developed abnormal conditions.

Q. Was there anything else beyond the *hartal* which did disturb the order?

A. The general situation, as occasioned by the *hartal*, required a firm control. People were all upset; there had been all this trouble; there had been

resentment all round against Government and against officials.

Q. Why?

A. Because there had been all this trouble.

Q. On account of firing?

A. On account of firing.

Q. The firing caused the necessity for Martial Law?

A. Trouble arose, and firing naturally was a source of pressure put upon the people. The resentment that had caused all this trouble was not allayed naturally by the firing. The firing was a necessary measure.

Q. I agree. Was not this massing of crowds due directly to the arrest of Kitchlew and Satyapal at Amritsar?

A. I believe it was the ostensible reason. It was said at the time that it was Mr. Gandhi who had been arrested; as soon as the news came, they were starting a *hartal*.

Q. Did not you think your information quite reasonable?

A. Of course reasonable in the sense that the cause is not necessarily a true cause. Possibly there were other causes than his arrest. I am not clear as to when the information came in. As to the trouble in Amritsar, I think, that had also a great deal to do with it. I think the news came about the same time of the arrest of Gandhi and trouble in Amritsar.

Q. And the trouble in Amritsar was due to the arrest of these people, Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal? Nothing had happened before their arrest?

A. I do not know what was the situation in Amritsar; I cannot speak for it.

Q. You have told various causes which had created a sort of unrest among the people, economic distress, objection to certain taxes, war weariness, high prices and so on and so on. Was it not necessary under those circumstances to deal with some patience and forbearance?

A. Undoubtedly; but I think all patience and forbearance was shown, very great patience and forbearance was shown.

Q. Do you think it was proper under those conditions to arrest these people?

A. Arrest whom?

Q. Gandhi, Satyapal and Kitchlew?

A. You ask me to give an opinion on the action of the Government of India. I am not in a position to do that.

Q. Referring to this meeting in the Badshahi Mosque, you said that the crowd were advised to stand firm. What do you mean by 'standing firm'?

A. I do not know; that was what I was told.

Q. These were the very words that came to you direct?

A. I did not understand anything more, anything less.

Q. That must have been in either Punjabi or Urdu. What was said in this meeting?

A. I never got any report of these meetings; but that was the general impression conveyed to me.

Q. What do you mean by 'stand firm'?

A. "To stand firm" I took at the time to mean, they were to remain firm, to keep on the *hartal* and to stand out against Government, against any proposal until they got what they asked. There were certain proposals at the time; between the people and the Deputy Commissioner; I did not know then.

Q. To keep on the *hartal* and stand out against Government until they got their conditions accepted and so forth?

A. Yes.

Q. I just want to know the meaning of "stand out"?

A. Keeping on the *hartal*.

Q. That was the only way to stand out, by keeping the *hartal*?

A. That is practically what it amounts to.

Q. They were simply told to stand out?

A. To stick to the condition of things that was then going on; the maintenance of *hartal*; that is all. I cannot recollect anything else.

Q. And beyond this you did not hear there were any seditious speeches or any seditious propaganda in the meeting?

25 November 1919.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

A. Yes; I heard about this man Balwant Singh coming to the mosque. I think I said that. He gave out there that the Indian troops had mutinied in Cantonments, that so many British people had been killed and other things. He was given a great reception and carried round. Apparently this is one of the reasons that I formed my opinion on; because he was received by a certain number of people apparently with warmth and they apparently approved of his action.

Q. That was all; you heard nothing more about this meeting?

A. No; not about this particular meeting. I do not think I heard anything more. But I heard all this talking about Balwant Singh; and of course I heard the report of the C. I. D. Inspector.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. What would you say to the suggestion that the crowd which tried to come down the Circular Road was peaceful?

A. I shall certainly not admit it. I was not there. I did not see that mob; but I think I saw what was happening off the other end of the Anarkali Bazar. From what I heard it was not a peaceful demonstration. There were several thousand men.

Q. I think you said that from the 12th April, after the crowd had been dispersed, Gazetted Officers visited the police pickets by night and day.

A. Each was followed by armed escort and a police constable.

Q. That condition of affairs lasted until the 15th when Martial Law was declared?

A. Certainly.

Q. Then at the time when Martial Law was declared would you say that the situation was such that the civil authorities who were using the aid of the military had failed to regain possession of the city and restore law and order?

A. *Hartal* continued; normal conditions were not restored.

Q. You won't call the city as subject to law and order when the Police Officer has to take the aid of the military?

A. Certainly not.

Q. That failure to restore law and order with the aid of the military was in spite of the fact that the police had been working at great pressure?

A. Yes.

Q. These considerations led to the introduction of Martial Law?

A. Absolutely.

By Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate—

Q. Talking of this particular person, Mr. Balwant Singh, are you aware that this man was given a reception at the Badshahi Mosque, that he proclaimed to the people that the Indian troops had mutinied in the Lahore Cantonments and were on their way to the mosque, and he was taken on people's shoulders?

A. I was informed so.

Q. Was this man Balwant Singh eventually traced and brought to trial?

A. He was convicted.

Q. Did you get any report that any of the leaders, so-called leaders, of the Passive Resistance movement or agitation against the Rowlatt Act took steps (some of them were certainly among those who attended the Badshahi Mosque on the 11th) either to protest against this action of Balwant Singh, or disabuse the public mind of the feelings that he tried to create?

A. I have not heard anything of the kind.

Q. Coming to the *Danda Fauj* question, you were just now told that this might have been a sort of frivolous display by some youngsters and nothing serious; here I may tell you an additional fact: I took it from the judgment of the *Danda Fauj* case: it is stated there that this man Chanan Din, the leader of that *Danda Fauj*, went through the city at the head of his gang, made inflammatory speeches proclaiming that he and his bands were rebels and were looking not to His Majesty the King, but to Germany, Turkey and Kabul, as their suzerain, etc.

(To the Committee.—Here is that judgment of the Tribunal in the *Danda Fauj* case. Some facts about this *Danda Fauj* presumably taken by the Hon'ble Members of the Committee from the same record were given to the witness, but this part of the record was not put to the witness.)

Q. What would you say as to the seriousness of this *Danda Fauj* affair? Do you regard it as very serious if such speeches are made by the gang?

A. I never meant it anything but serious. It was a serious thing. I suppose I heard most of it, more or less at the time. That all left an impression on my mind.

Q. Now coming to these two processions of mobs, i.e., one on the 6th April and the other on the 10th April, I just want to put to you one or two things about the 6th April. It was suggested to you this afternoon that it was part of the programme for the day that people should first go to the river and bathe. This was part of their programme. I know that some students who had gone to the river might have had a bath; that is a different matter. I want to ask you if you ever heard it suggested before that bathing that day was part of the programme of the Passive Resistance?

A. I do not remember; I was told that they were going there; I do not know that it was ever said as part of the programme.

Q. Then the mob you say was met by the police near the turn towards the Upper Mall, near the Mochi Gate; that was noon time; that was long after the time when any people who went to the river simply for the purpose of bathing might have returned from the river side; that was long after that?

A. It must be a considerable time after.

Q. And this end of the Anarkali leading on to the Upper Mall was not a place where they would go in the ordinary pursuit of their business or when going towards their homes.

A. Certainly not. They were trying to come down the Mall to the Civil Lines; they had no business at all there.

Q. Well, that is what I wanted specifically to put to you. On the 6th, they had not even that ostensible reason which had been urged on the 10th; that on the 10th they were going as a deputation to wait on His Honour. On the 6th no such reason was given. They had no such ostensible object for going to the Civil Lines?

A. I do not recollect. I have heard nothing about it.

Q. Of course you have told us about the 10th in reply to one of the questions of the Hon'ble Members you heard that there was an ostensible object.

A. Yes. I heard that it was their ostensible object to go to His Honour as a deputation.

Q. From the crowd did you think that it was the case?

A. I have no knowledge of it. I have never heard it said to me. I did not meet the crowd nor hear what was said by it there.

Q. Are you aware that after this meeting of the 6th, there were again processions in the streets? Was that reported to you, loud processions in the streets which came after the Bradlaugh Hall meeting?

A. In the city; I was told that parties of small processions went through the city making noise and shouting cries and abusing the Municipal Commissioners and the people who had been assisting the authorities during the time, and I believe that some copies of the Act had been distributed and that these had been burnt in the city.

Q. Was there, in your opinion, from what you know of the city as the Senior Superintendent of Police, any connection between the *hartal* and the conveners of these meetings which persisted in the *hartal*?

A. Every connection.

Mr. Abdul Kadir.—I am just drawing Your Lordship's attention to one document. Mr. Justice Rankin wanted to know whether there was a report of the meeting of the Badshahi Mosque. If you like,

25 November 1919.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

Sir, it may be put in.\* He (witness) was asked whether he had come across this report. Later on, if necessary, we would produce it.

*Q. Addressing the witness.*—There was a C. I. D. report which you saw subsequently, about the meeting of the Badshahi Mosque?

*A.* Yes, I saw the report a day or two after.

*Mr. Abdul Kadir.*—Then there is just one document which can be put either by this witness because it passed through him and also by another witness.

*President.*—What is that document?

*Mr. Abdul Kadir.*—A letter purporting to be written by Swami Shraddhanand to Duni Chand showing that there was some outside influence going on so far as this passive resistance movement was concerned and that we have it on record in the Lahore main case. It was sent on to the Superintendent of Police and the Superintendent of Police sent it on to the Deputy Superintendent of Police who was conducting the investigation in these particular cases.

*President.*—That letter exists as signed by Swami Shraddhanand to another gentleman?

*Mr. Abdul Kadir.*—Yes.

*By Sir C. H. Setalvad to witness:—*

*Q.* You said, Mr. Broadway, that at the Badshahi Mosque when this man Balwant Singh came and stated what he did about the troops, the leaders did not express their disapproval?

*A.* I was asked whether the leaders or anybody expressed disapproval, and I said I heard of no such expression of disapproval at the Mosque.

*Q.* Are you aware that so far as Harkishan Lall, Duni Chand, Ram Bhaj Datt and others are concerned, they were not present at the meeting at the time this man Balwant Singh came and made this declaration, are you aware of this fact?

*A.* I do not know.

*Q.* Are you aware that they did make that assertion that they were not present at that time?

*A.* I am not aware of it.

*Q.* And that it has never been established that that assertion was incorrect?

*A.* I did not hear anything of their being present or not present.

\* It is printed on page 146.

26 November 1919.]

Major-General Sir W. BEYNON.

**At Lahore, Wednesday, the 26th November 1919.**

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.  
The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.  
Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B.,  
K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.  
Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., *Secretary.*

Major-General Sir W. BEYNON, K.C.I.E., C.B., D.S.O., Commanding 16th (Indian) Division.

*By the President—*

Q. Were you in command of the 16th (Indian) Division during the period of the riots and also during the period of Martial Law?

A. I was.

Q. Did your jurisdiction extend over the whole area affected?

A. The 16th Division extends practically through the Lahore, Amritsar, Ferozepore, Multan areas, not up to Gujranwala and Sialkot. Jullundur is also in my division.

Q. With the exception then of these places you have mentioned, your jurisdiction extended over the whole affected area?

A. Yes.

Q. And I think upon the 5th of September you sent a detailed report\* to the Adjutant-General in India, Simla, dealing with the occurrences as you viewed them, and in appendices also forwarding certain reports that had been made to you?

A. I did.

Q. I don't propose to take you over the whole of your report, but there are one or two little points of the narrative which perhaps you might give us information about. You heard I think on the 30th March about what had occurred at Delhi?

A. Yes.

Q. Then had you and your staff interviews with the Local Government about the beginning of April?

A. Yes, we were always in touch with the civil authorities.

Q. You were informed that the occasion of the riot was a *hartal* at Delhi on the 30th of March and you knew that there was to be a *hartal* in Lahore on the 6th of April?

A. That is so.

Q. Were arrangements made by the Local Government with you as to the disposition of troops in Lahore so as to prevent anything like what had occurred in Delhi on the 30th of March?

A. That is so.

Q. And I think you instructed General Dyer who was commanding the Jullundur Brigade to take special precautions against incidents especially at Amritsar?

A. I did.

Q. We know what precautions he took on that date. As regards the 6th April, I think it passed off without disturbance although there was a complete *hartal* in the city?

A. It passed off without disturbance in Lahore because we were ready.

Q. You had, we had it from Mr. Broadway, to disperse processions by means of police and cavalry?

A. Yes, it was not exactly dispersing, they were prevented from proceeding further towards the civil station and gradually driven back, and afterwards they held a meeting at a place called the Bradlaugh Hall.

Q. But in fact there was no firing on that day?

A. No firing on that day.

Q. On the 10th of April you gave certain instructions to General Dyer as regards sending troops to Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. I think you were present and heard what General Dyer said?

A. I was.

Q. What he said was in accordance with the instructions you had given him?

A. It was.

Q. I think you heard about the occurrences in Amritsar on the 10th of April?

A. At half past three I was informed.

Q. Did the Inspector-General of Police of the Punjab, Mr. Stewart, inform you as to what had occurred in Amritsar and that he anticipated trouble might occur in Lahore in the evening?

A. Yes.

Q. After you had seen the Inspector-General of Police did you issue verbal orders to Brigadier-General Clarke to despatch troops to Lahore?

A. I did.

Q. I think most of these troops were attending the sports of the 43rd Brigade in the cantonments?

A. They were mostly belonging to the 43rd Brigade.

Q. Although that caused a little delay in collecting them and getting them ready, you were able to send a detachment at about half past six?

A. We got the first detachment of the Sussex into the Telegraph Office at about 6-30 I believe, and the others followed as quickly as we could get them ready.

Q. As we know that detachment of troops at the Telegraph Office was able to turn back the crowd?

A. So it was reported to me.

Q. And did the main body of your troops arrive in Lahore at about 7 o'clock?

A. Yes.

Q. And they were instrumental in preventing the mob getting into the civil station?

A. Hardly that, the cavalry practically supported the police. I do not think, as far as my memory serves me, that the infantry were much used.

Q. You know that certain firing had taken place; that firing, so we have been told, was entirely by the police and not by the military?

A. Entirely.

Q. Had you given orders to the General Officers Commanding at Ferozepore and Jullundur as regards their taking certain precautions?

A. Yes.

Q. What were your instructions to these officers?

A. My instructions were that such important places as Telegraph Offices, Railway Stations, and points where damage could easily be done which would affect our communications, were to be particularly guarded.

26 November 1919.]

Major-General Sir W. BRYDON.

[Continued.]

Q. I think you learnt that the station at Chheharta near Amritsar was attacked among other points?

A. Yes, all these reports came in.

Q. In addition to the reports of the actual occurrences at Amritsar about which I will not trouble you?

A. Reports came in from time to time. We had our Intelligence Officers always collecting the reports.

Q. On the 11th reinforcements were sent to Amritsar from Jullundur and you were able to send two aeroplanes to Amritsar as well?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there a strong or a weak force of British troops in Lahore at the time on about the 11th?

A. I may call it a weak force, Sir.

Q. Were you afraid of trouble at Moghulpura?

A. Yes, that was one of the points where we had expected trouble.

Q. Where is Moghulpura?

A. It is really the Railway Workshops to the north of the railway line, lying roughly between Lahore junction station and Lahore Cantonment East. It is the other side of the canal.

Q. A very large number of men are employed there?

A. A very great number.

Q. Did you take any means to strengthen the military forces in Lahore in consequence?

A. Naturally, Sir.

Q. What were they?

A. We withdrew troops that had gone up to Dalhousie. We made certain dispositions of the troops between Ferozepore and Jullundur which enabled me to draw back troops from Amritsar into Lahore.

Q. Then I think you know that there was a display of military force in Lahore city upon the 11th of April?

A. On the 12th, the column marched through on the 12th.

Q. On the 11th I think the police did not enter the city of Lahore at all?

A. I believe not.

Q. On the 12th did you hear of occurrences at Kasur?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Had you an interview with the Lieutenant-Governor?

A. No, Sir, I informed him over the telephone.

Q. On hearing what had occurred at Kasur did you despatch an armoured train from Lahore?

A. We did.

Q. I think the armoured train you ordered arrived at Kasur late at night?

A. Yes, arrived late at night, left here at 1 o'clock.

Q. Did you learn by aeroplane that things had quietened down at Kasur?

A. I have that in my report.

Q. Did you receive any request from the Lieutenant-Governor as regards holding additional British troops in readiness?

A. Yes, I considered the matter and I did not think it was necessary at the time.

Q. Had you a difficulty about sending a large number of troops into Lahore?

A. You see it was the hot weather and the accommodation there is very limited and one does not want to put unnecessary hardships on British troops in the hot weather, therefore I did not want to have more troops than I could comfortably accommodate.

Q. I think you did make a request to the Northern Command?

A. I asked them for a couple of companies.

Q. In readiness?

A. In readiness, and these were sent afterwards.

Q. On the evening of the 12th were you present at a conference at Government House where the question of the security of the railways was discussed?

A. Yes.

Q. I need hardly ask you from a military point of view as well as from the point of view of maintaining peace and order in large commercial towns, whether it is essential that the railway communications should be preserved intact?

A. It is absolutely essential.

Q. Did you make arrangements at that conference for the protection of important stations and bridges?

A. Yes, we have a scheme already cut and dried, but it was not able to be entirely carried out owing to certain unforeseen events and we made arrangements to rectify the points that were not quite correct.

Q. That cut and dried scheme you refer to involves the police supplying guards for certain points?

A. It does.

Q. And on this occasion were the police not in a position to supply those guards?

A. No.

Q. And I think you made an arrangement under which the military and the police were jointly responsible?

A. Yes, we took over the stations, bridges or other points which they could not furnish guards for.

Q. I think you did not furnish guards in the Multan District?

A. No, not at that time.

Q. And two other districts?

A. There was no trouble at Pathankot and the Kasur-Amritsar line.

Q. At those places in the Multan District and on the Pathankot-Kasur-Amritsar Junction line where no guards were furnished did any outbreaks take place during the time there were no guards?

A. I think I am right in saying no; this was early in the proceedings.

Q. I think on the 13th of April all telephonic communication with Amritsar was stopped. Was that in consequence of the destruction of wires?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you receive reports as regards the destruction of certain stations on the Kasur-Patti line?

A. Yes.

Q. To what effect were those reports?

A. I cannot remember exactly how they came in, but they would be to the effect, probably through the railway, that these stations had been burned, destroyed, or looted as the case might be.

Q. In consequence of that destruction of plant did you ask for five sets of wireless to be sent to you?

A. I did.

Q. Did you get them?

A. They were sent down. We asked the Northern Command; I cannot say exactly where they were all collected from.

Q. Then did you give certain instructions as to the recalling of British Infantry and Royal Artillery from Dalhousie and Pathankot?

A. Yes.

Q. Where did you send them?

A. Back to their winter stations, mostly Lahore. Of course details might have come from other stations.

Q. Was there a shortage of transport for the conveyance of these troops?

A. Very much so.

Q. How did you meet that difficulty?

A. Well we asked for motor lorries from the Northern Command.

Q. Were these motor lorries also necessary to move the troops rapidly to any point that might be threatened?

A. That was the idea.

Q. And did you organize mobile columns?

A. Yes, we have them, of course, always organized.

Q. Did you make use of them in connection with these disturbances?

A. Yes.

Q. What was your object in using mobile columns?

A. At ordinary times there is not much movement of troops about the district and the people do not altogether understand our strength and it is sometimes useful to make an exhibition that we are able and intend to keep the law; and it is also useful to counteract the lies spread by people who wish Government ill.

Q. You also had an armoured motor battery. Was that sent by Ferozepore?

A. We have them detailed at certain stations and move them when necessary.

Q. Did you give orders to the Air Force?

A. No, they are not under me. I tell them what I want and they help.

26 November 1919.]

Major-General Sir W. BRYNON.

[Continued.]

Q. Who gives the orders to the Air Force?  
 A. The Officer Commanding. I tell him that I want a certain action carried out and he then carries it out as he thinks best.

Q. Did you know that orders were given to the Air Force to fire upon any gangs that might be seen damaging the railway?  
 A. That was so.

Q. I suppose you did not give orders to the force but you approved of them?  
 A. In time of war the Air Force is attached to a command whatever it is and on those occasions my orders practically are orders. If I tell the Air Force Commander that I want a certain action taken—for instance give him general directions—these are considered as orders and carried out as such. He gives the detailed orders. For instance I say that I want certain information about certain points at a certain place. I leave it to the Air Commander whether he sends one, two or three aeroplanes to do the job or whether he gets it by some other method.

Q. So far as firing on gangs engaged in damaging railways was concerned, you approved of the course entirely?  
 A. Entirely; my orders were to keep the railway intact.

Q. Did you receive information as to attempt being made to induce a strike at the Moghulpura Workshops?  
 A. We heard reports of it.

Q. I think you issued instructions for military guards to travel on trains between Lahore, Amritsar and Ferozepore?  
 A. That is so.

Q. I see your first appendix\* contains a memorandum. Who prepared that memorandum?  
 A. This is the report of the 43rd Infantry Brigade—that is General Clarke. It was prepared by his staff from the papers at their disposal.

Q. On the night of the 13th of April was Wagah station destroyed? And the next morning you got news of the destruction of Gujranwala. Did these occurrences necessitate your dispersing your forces?  
 A. Yes.

Q. And I think you kept small guards at the stations in the disturbed areas?  
 A. That was so.

Q. Then the local Government meantime asked the local authorities to arrange for the protection of the railways in their districts?  
 A. Yes.

Q. Was that attended to?  
 A. That was very effective, I believe.

Q. Did that relieve you of a considerable amount of responsibility?  
 A. Yes, it relieved me not of responsibility but of dispersing the troops to protect the line.

Q. There were definite arrangements as to villages finding five men per mile for the protection of railways?  
 A. That was done through the local Government.

Q. After these precautions had been taken, what was the result so far as the destruction of railway plant was concerned?  
 A. It practically stopped it.

Q. And measures in connection with them seem to have been complete about the 18th of April?  
 A. I should say about that date.

Q. As regards the moveable columns that you sent out, they operated some distance from the railways?  
 A. Yes.

Q. What were the duties imposed upon the moveable columns?  
 A. I can tell you roughly the duties they had. To show the districts through which they passed that there were troops ready and available, to find out if there was unrest in the district and, as I have said, to correct rumours and general seditious movements.

Q. Had they instructions as regards explaining the real nature of the Rowlatt legislation?  
 A. Yes.

Q. Who was it that explained the Rowlatt legislation?  
 A. I cannot tell you exactly the name of the officer. There was a Civil officer attached to each column. He would be able to explain. In one case we had two very efficient Indians with the column who held regular Durbars.

Q. I suppose your particular object was to uproot from the minds of people ideas with reference to the stoppage of marriage and certain other things as being effected by that legislation?  
 A. These were part of the rumours that we counter-acted.

Q. On hearing of the trouble at Gujranwala was an armoured train immediately sent from Lahore?  
 A. That is so.

Q. And later in the day an aeroplane was also sent?  
 A. Yes.

Q. Who was it that suggested sending an aeroplane?  
 A. It came from the Civil authorities.

Q. I think the commander of the aeroplane had instructions to disperse any gatherings engaged in the work of destruction?  
 A. Yes.

Q. I think in fact the machine sent out bombed and machine-gunned crowds?  
 A. That is a report—Appendix VI.

Q. Was that report sent to you?  
 A. As soon as the plane comes back they send out their reports to the Commanding Officer.

Q. As regards the actual movement of the aeroplanes you know nothing about that?  
 A. No, the technical details would be taken up by the Air Force.

Q. Looking at this matter from a military point of view had you sufficient soldiers to send to Gujranwala to deal with the situation without an aeroplane?  
 A. No; we could not spare them.

Q. I think at this time a separate command was established in the Lahore Civil Area under Colonel Johnson?  
 A. That is so.

Q. There were certain very important points in Lahore that required protection?  
 A. The Electric Power House, the pump house, etc.

Q. Up to the time when Colonel Johnson received command Brigadier-General Clarke had acted?  
 A. That is so.

Q. On the 15th of April did you receive news as to the communication of Bahawalnagar?  
 A. That came through.

Q. Did the communication cause unrest in your mind as to the fate of Europeans who were stationed there?  
 A. We knew there were Europeans there and we did not know what had happened to them. We were very anxious about all outlying Europeans at that time.

Q. Was the threat of a railway strike also a very disturbing element in the situation?  
 A. It was. It would have paralysed us.

Q. In consequence of what you heard did you give instructions to General Southey to send troops from Ferozepore?  
 A. I think a detachment under Captain Maud went to Bahawalnagar.

Q. And the disturbance was quickly dealt with?  
 A. It was efficiently dealt with.

Q. And certain trains that had been held up were sent to their destination?  
 A. Yes.

Q. After arranging for the security of that place and Europeans did the military party return to Ferozepore?  
 A. They did.

Q. With certain prisoners and Europeans and children?  
 A. That is so.

Q. On the 15th I think Brigadier-General Cartwright was put in command of armoured trains?  
 A. That is a matter of administration to facilitate the working of the armoured trains.

Q. Did the situation call for the use of a number of trains?  
 A. Very much so.

Q. I think very many armoured trains are somewhat unwieldy?

\* This and the following references to appendices relate to the appendices printed on pages 325—338.



26 November 1919.]

Major-General Sir W. BRYNOR.

[Continued.]

A. They were not intended for the actual situation. They were intended for larger operations.

Q. How did you get other trains?

A. We made up small trains which contained machine guns and a breakdown gang and an escort. They were not armoured plated.

Q. Appendix VIII gives a brief *résumé* of the operations of armoured trains from the 30th March to the 4th May 1919?

A. That would be of the reports that would be furnished from time to time.

Q. On the 18th I think you re-organized your system of armoured trains?

A. That is so.

Q. And you had six light trains instead of one or two heavy trains. Where were these six armoured trains stationed?

A. As far as I remember they were kept in Lahore. With steam up ready to go out in any direction.

Q. In paragraph 49, you say, as regards these trains, they were stationed at Ludhiana, Bhatinda, Multan, Lyallpur and Lahore, each with a definite area of operations, and one in reserve at Lahore.

A. Those details would be entirely arranged by General Cartwright. He had the working of the trains, and he of course naturally placed them where he liked.

Q. In your Appendix IX you give a report from Captain Flowerdew as to certain operations undertaken by him. What was the nature of these operations?

A. He was sent out by the Civil authorities. We can move troops quickly with an armoured train.

Q. I think you refer to the work done?

A. The work done was excellent.

Q. I notice in your report here you refer to Sergeant Davis. He was under Captain Flowerdew?

A. I think he was, Sir. To tell you the truth I do not quite know how he arrived. Possibly he came down with a hockey team in Rawalpindi and was mobilised, and his services made use of.

Q. I want to ask you about these armed men whom Sergeant Davis met. You say in your report "Sergeant Davis, while following up a party which had separated from the one Captain Flowerdew and his men were chasing, came up with armed party some of which were mounted. Two were armed with rifles and two with guns. Sergeant Davis single-handed, shot three of these men, but their servants got away with their arms." I want to ask you about these armed men. This is the first instance in the course of the enquiry where we have had a reference to armed men. Can you tell us anything more?

A. I am afraid I cannot. These reports were all that I had.

Q. When did you consider that active opposition in the Lahore District had been got under?

A. That would be about the 16th, I should think.

Q. You refer in your report to punitive columns being sent in different directions. What are punitive columns as contrasted with mobile columns?

A. It is practically the same thing. We might use the word "mobile" there instead of "punitive."

Q. There is no special significance attached to the word "punitive"?

A. Well, not in this case. Punitive columns in a sense go out to punish, but that was not the idea here. They were all small columns sent on to villages which had been concerned in breaking up the railway and burning Government grass stacks and things like that.

Q. The action of these columns is more particularly dealt with in your Appendices XI, XII, XIII and XVII?

A. Those are the actual diaries of the column commander.

Q. What opinion did you form as to whether these columns did or did not do useful work?

A. I think they did very useful work.

Q. I think you have already explained that you had the assistance of certain Indian officers?

A. Yes.

Q. When the reports of these columns were made to you did you form any opinion as to whether the rural population had been in sympathy with the outrages that had taken place?

A. From the reports of the officers I came to the conclusion that the villagers were not concerned in the outrages that had taken place beyond perhaps the individual burning of stations in the vicinity of their villages.

Q. From these reports did it appear that the damage, if not entirely, to a very large extent, had been done by local *badmashes*?

A. From the general reports received it appeared that the local inhabitants were led by people from elsewhere who incited them and led them to commit outrages.

Q. We know that Martial Law was proclaimed in Lahore on the 16th of April. Looking at the situation as you found it then what was your opinion as to whether, without proclaiming Martial Law, the military could not render efficient assistance to the Civil authorities in the way of restoring law and order?

A. I think Martial Law was absolutely necessary.

Q. Would the work of the military in assisting the Civil authorities have been impeded if Martial Law had not been established?

A. It would have been considerably impeded. In fact on several occasions it might have stopped.

Q. On the declaration of Martial Law I think you asked for and obtained the services of Colonel Money as Administrator of Martial Law. In what area did he administer Martial Law?

A. The whole of the 16th area over which Martial Law was proclaimed.

Q. I think Colonel Johnson administered Martial Law?

A. Colonel Johnson made a mistake. He was Officer Commanding the Civil Area. When Martial Law is proclaimed the officer proclaiming Martial Law appoints administrators of Martial Law who carry out his orders, draw up the rules, collate information as regards punishments, sentence and generally anything which has to do with Martial Law. Colonel Johnson is the Officer Commanding Civil Area, just as General Clarke was the Officer Commanding, 43rd Brigade Area. General Dyer was Commanding Jullundur and Amritsar.

Q. Was Colonel Money the Supreme Military Authority for the whole division where Martial Law was proclaimed?

A. Yes.

Q. In addition to his other duties did Colonel Money act as Liaison Officer between yourself and the Punjab Government?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you find that assistance useful?

A. Yes, it is very useful. I am a busy man.

Q. In consequence of certain statements of Colonel Johnson I must ask you as regards the orders that were issued in Colonel Johnson's areas. Were these orders drafted by him and then approved by Colonel Money or was it Colonel Money who drafted them?

A. My orders on Martial Law are published for the whole area, then the officers in command of those areas issue any necessary subsidiary orders. They need not necessarily come up to me. If Colonel Money considered that an order was not quite correct or did not meet the case he would bring the case up to me. He would not issue orders himself. I should then take action to countermand the order of my subordinate or to confirm it.

Q. In connection with the orders that were put in operation in Lahore with reference to the students of colleges who were responsible for these orders?

A. Colonel Johnson. Of course I am responsible for everything that goes on in the whole area.

Q. Had those orders been sent to you for approval before?

A. No.

Q. Then Colonel Johnson had the right in his own area to issue such orders without the consultation of anyone in a higher position?

A. As long as they were consistent with Martial Law orders published by me.

Q. With reference to your Martial Law published in Appendix XIV?

A. There is a Proclamation signed by me at the end.

Q. In connection with that Proclamation on what date did it issue?

28 November 1919.]

Major-General Sir W. BEYNON.

[Continued.]

A. It was published on the 19th of April.

Q. There you say that Martial Law has been declared subject to the maintenance of ordinary courts for ordinary offences. Were the ordinary courts sitting at this time? Were they dealing with ordinary offences that were committed in the area where Martial Law was in operation?

A. I should say so. The Deputy Commissioner would probably be holding his courts. I cannot actually speak with my own knowledge.

Q. As a matter of fact, is it not the case that at all events when Martial Law was proclaimed or when Martial Law in fact did exist, the Civil Courts were entirely closed.

(Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate.—We are going to produce evidence that the courts were not acting.

Witness.—I am afraid I am not very strong in law. This is all drawn up by gentlemen with large legal knowledge. I put my name to it.)

Q. I don't think any one is entitled to criticise legal inaccuracies. I take it therefore that in consequence of these qualifications the Martial Law that you actually proclaimed was a qualified form of Martial Law?

A. Very much qualified.

Q. I suppose it was entirely Government action that set up these special tribunals under the Bengal State Offences Act, 1804?

A. Yes, of course, if it had been Martial Law pure and simple, they would not have existed.

Q. Martial Law is the negation of all law, superseding all Civil Law by the will of the Military Commander?

A. In this case of course there were certain restrictions.

Q. During the administration of Martial Law you had nothing to do with the sending up of cases before these special tribunals?

A. Certain cases were tried by the special courts, but the more serious ones were sent up to the tribunals.

Q. The practical effect was that, so far as Martial Law administration under you was concerned, that was done, I understand, by special courts, and these special courts consisted of officers or Civil Magistrates who dealt with what we describe as minor offences such as breach of Martial Law regulations, and so on, whereas more serious cases were dealt with by these special tribunals?

A. That is so.

Q. I do not know if I have carefully gone over all these regulations of yours. Are these regulations what I may describe as general regulations relating to Martial Law or they have any special bearing on the situation in the Punjab?

A. I think you must say that they were general. We took them as a matter of fact from a small book we have to guide us on these occasions.

Q. After you had given these instructions to Colonel Money, he dealt with the particulars and he in turn delegated certain particulars to Colonel Johnson?

A. I think you are fairly correct, except that I delegated them. I am responsible.

Q. I quite appreciate that. Now it was within your knowledge, I suppose, that from time to time during the maintenance of Martial Law the restrictions upon civil liberty were gradually relaxed?

A. That was so.

Q. That I suppose was done with your approval?

A. Yes, in point of fact it was done after consideration by several Civil and Military authorities.

Q. Have you anything to say as regards the necessity for Martial Law having been continued for the length of time it was continued?

A. I had a good deal to say at the time. In fact I was in opposition to Sir Michael O'Dwyer when he wished to relax it. I considered it was not quite the time.

Q. Speaking generally, what were your grounds for taking that view?

A. The unrest on the railway, the unrest in the North-West Frontier and the military necessities that resulted from those circumstances. From a civil point of view it may be quite enough here, but from the military point of view the main principles, ideas and plans of service

will be affected. These things would not affect the civil, but they affect me.

Q. Perhaps you will give us your views as to the practical limitation that ought to be imposed by the Military Commander upon his exercise of absolute power entrusted to him on those movements?

A. I do not think I can put it better than Colonel Johnson put it, tact and common sense.

Q. Would you agree with me in this, that as regards the measures taken under Martial Law, any measures that are likely to leave a bad feeling behind them are to be regretted. I suppose I must put it this way. You must administer Martial Law in such a way that it is not going to continue indefinitely?

A. That was a point which civil officers said to me once, they said 'we have got to live with these people afterwards.' But I am concerned with the military aspect, and I quite agree that one does not want to leave a bitter feeling behind. One wants the people to help you in keeping law and order.

Q. May I put it this way? That the military in putting into force orders under Martial Law may perhaps unintentionally have omitted to appreciate the effects that certain regulations may leave behind after Martial Law came to an end?

A. They may have. One would not naturally and willingly.

Q. Not willingly?

A. Oh, no.

Q. I suppose from the military point of view you want to deal with the situation as you find it and as rapidly as possible, to get definite results, but in such action, is there any liability or tendency to forget or to fail to appreciate fully the consequences with reference to the future of particular measures that may be taken?

A. You may fail to appreciate, we are all fallible, but one would naturally try not to. One would naturally consider from every point of view, and the whole idea of military law is the preservation of law and order, and as you say, not to acerbate the feelings of the people.

Q. But of course in a situation like the present, the subjects of the King are Indians and British both, and there are loyal Indians and loyal British. Is it not, as far as possible, advisable that the regulations should not be such as might indicate special treatment of one subject as against another?

A. It might be necessary. You will have to consider all points of view.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. When you say that the military force at your command was very weak, what was the number that you had?

A. I know it, but I don't think it is necessary to give you the exact numbers. If Lord Hunter desires the numbers I can give them to him.

(The President to the witness.—The only point about that is this. If you think that there are any military reasons against it, then I should not ask you to give the figures in public, but you might give a statement to the Pandit for his information.

The witness then showed the figures asked for.)

Q. Coming to paragraph 8.\* I want to put only one question. On the 10th April it was Captain Massey who requested you from Amritsar to send an aeroplane there?

A. Yes.

Q. He requested you on the 10th April to send an aeroplane to Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. And in consequence of that request, you sent it on the 11th, paragraph 20?

A. Yes.

Q. Then I would ask you to refer to paragraph 37. You say that "I received information . . ." You mean the information which you received about Moghulpura was from some C. I. D. men?

A. That would be so.

Q. And you say that only one picket was seen on the morning of the 14th April and the crowds were dealt

\* This and the following references to paragraphs relate to the report on pages 320—325.

26 November 1919.]

Major-General Sir W. BRYNOR.

[Continued.]

with so summarily by a detachment of the 17th Cavalry that there has been no trouble in Moghulpura. I want to know what is meant by "they were dealt with so summarily?"

A. I am not quite certain as to exact details. I believe they ran after them, and the picket ran as far as they could. I am not quite certain whether anybody was crooked. I should have to look that matter up.

Q. I would refer you to clause 8 of paragraph 89. So far as the report came to you, it was that on the 13th as soon as General Dyer reached that place he ordered the opening of fire immediately and dispersed the crowd? That was the report sent to you?

A. Yes.

Q. I mean to say there was no report to you that there was any attempt on the part of the crowd to face General Dyer or to do something?

A. No.

Q. No opposition?

A. You have got his report. That is what he says.

Q. I would just refer you to clause 5. There seemed to be some dispute about the telegram that was sent, and it was suggested that perhaps that telegram was not an authorised telegram, and you say that the Lieutenant-Governor agreed with General Dyer—that is with reference to the firing that took place at the Jallianwala Bagh on the 13th?

A. I can tell you exactly about that. I am responsible for that telegram. That was my telegram. I sent it.

Q. This approval of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor is with reference to what happened on the 13th at Jallianwala Bagh?

A. That is so. But I sent the telegram and I approved, after having considered General Dyer's reports. I informed Sir Michael O'Dwyer that I considered General Dyer had acted correctly and that I intended to send a telegram saying so. His Honour said that he agreed to it, and that I might add his approval to my telegram.

Q. Paragraph 49. I refer to the last portion. You say "the object of the leaders was undoubtedly to damage Government property and murder Europeans, but the mob wanted their *quid pro quo* in the shape of loot. Their easiest way to get this was to smash up a small wayside station and hold up a train going through and loot it." That is what you said. Now you say that the object of the leaders was to murder Europeans?

A. That is undoubtedly so.

Q. Is that based only on the fact that Europeans were murdered in Amritsar, or have you drawn an inference or had you some information?

A. What about Kasur?

Q. You have based your information on what happened at Kasur and Amritsar?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You had no other information that the leaders had incited the mob to murder Europeans?

A. I can only judge by acts.

Q. This opinion was based upon the reports that you received from Kasur and Amritsar. Beyond that you had no other information?

A. We had information of the danger of outlying Europeans. We brought them in. Their lives were not safe.

Q. That would be again on the reports that were received by you?

A. Naturally.

Q. And which find a place in Nos. 10, 11, 13 and 14 of the Diaries, all the information that was received by you?

A. Yes.

Q. The diaries were at your command. All the reports were received during that period?

A. I got reports from all sorts of sources. My duties are to get intelligence in all sorts of ways, and from those reports my action was taken and my opinion was formed.

Q. Then will you kindly give the names of those leaders whom you suspected or about whom you had knowledge that they incited the mob to murder Europeans?

A. I regret I cannot.

Q. The names of the leaders in Kasur, you cannot?

A. No.

Q. The names of the leaders in Lahore, you cannot?

A. No. I don't think I know them, if I had known I would have checked them.

Q. Was that information given to you by some person or is it written information that the leaders at Kasur, Amritsar and Lahore were inciting people to murder?

A. Would you just repeat that again?

Q. The other information, apart from the reports upon which you based this opinion, that the leaders were inciting the people to murder Europeans, is that only a verbal report made to you or was it a written report?

A. You want me to give away my means of information. I decline to do it. As a military man I have all sorts of information, and I cannot tell you how I get my information.

*The Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan.*—Let the President decide.

*The President.*—It is a general question, General. As a general question is there any objection to your indicating the sources of your information?

A. I think so. You see we have secret information from various sources. I would not mind telling you. We have various means, our Intelligence Bureau gives us information. We get the C. I. D. reports, military intelligence, our spies and our reports from railways, our reports from Military Commanders are tabulated.

*The President.*—I quite understand that from a military point of view in connection with military operations, but as regards this particular point which has been asked you, is there any objection to indicate generally the sources from which in fact you get information and upon which you formed your conclusions?

*The witness.*—You want me to give exact names. Well, I cannot do that.

Q. I think probably the Pandit wants a general answer.

A. I have nothing to conceal, but of course from a military point of view if you want me to give names, I would not do it.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan.*—

Q. My question was as to whether that information was verbal or written information?

A. Both.

Q. And in that written information the names of the leaders are given who incited the mob to murder?

A. Not necessarily, not always. If the names were given to me I should have been able to deal with them.

Q. Therefore may I take it that in the information in your possession, no names were given?

A. You will be correct.

Q. I would be correct in taking that no names were given?

A. You will be correct.

Q. I would like to know the names of the leaders that were given?

A. I am afraid I do not remember at the present moment. I should have to look up my diaries.

*The Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan.*—I would request the President to have them.

*The President to witness.*—Probably you will communicate with the Pandit.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan.*—

Q. However, you are not prepared to give the details of this secret information in public?

A. Will you tell me exactly what information you want?

Q. I wanted to know the basis upon which you came to the conclusion that the leaders were inciting the public to murder Europeans and so on. No doubt, murders had been committed, and if you had drawn your inference from these murders that the leaders were implicated in it, I would have had no quarrel with you, because it is only a matter of inference. But if you go beyond that and say that the leaders were inciting the people to murder Europeans, I want to know if that opinion is based upon any definite information that any of the leaders at Lahore, Amritsar

26 November 1919.]

Major-General Sir W. BEYNON.

[Continued.]

or Kasur ever instigated any person to murder Europeans?

A. No, I can say that my opinion was formed on the general facts of murders having been committed.

Q. Therefore I take it that no names of leaders at Lahore, Amritsar or Kasur find a place in any written information that has been supplied to you?

A. I think not, but I cannot remember all these reports.

Q. So far as you can remember now?

The President to Pandit Jagat Narayan.—As I understand, the word "leaders" there does not necessarily mean political leaders, but he means men who were actually at the head of the mob.

The President to the witness.—In using the word "leader" am I right in supposing that you are referring to the leaders of the mob and not to any political leaders?

Witness.—Oh, no, I know nothing about politics.

The Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan.—I was driving at that. As a matter of fact, from the way in which the sentence is worded, it was open to that construction.

Witness.—I am not concerned with politics at all.

Q. That is by leaders you mean those persons who were leading the mob on those dates?

A. Certainly.

Q. Paragraph 45. In answer to the question that was put to you by the President, you said that it was at the request of the Lieutenant-Governor that an aeroplane was sent to Gujranwala?

A. Yes.

Q. These are the words in your report: "At the request of the Lieutenant-Governor an aeroplane was sent out with verbal orders to disperse any gathering engaged in the work of destruction." That is, only those gatherings should be bombed which were actually engaged in the work of destruction. Am I right?

A. I should like to refer to my exact orders.

Q. For the time being I am dealing with paragraph 45.

A. I daresay you are, but my precise orders are contained elsewhere. This is only a report written afterwards.

Q. Therefore you have got those orders, and I take it they are practically correct?

A. I can give you the exact orders mentioned there.

Q. Further on you say that "this machine bombed and machine-gunned the crowds which were burning the civil lines?"

A. That is so.

Q. I am coming to Appendix VI, because I want to make it evidence. I will read it out to you. Here is the observation report: "Railway station on fire, bales of goods on platform burning. Passenger train in station, Up line, on fire. English church and four houses in the Civil Lines on the east of Railway burning. All these were still burning at 15-30 hours." Now this is what was done by these aeroplanes. "15-20.—Dropped three bombs on party of natives, 150 strong outside village about two miles north-west of Gujranwala. One bomb failed to explode. The others fell near party which scattered. Three casualties seen, 50 rounds machine gun fired into village. 15-30.—Party of 50 natives outside village about one mile south of above village; two bombs dropped, only one exploded within 10 yards of party. No casualties were seen, 25 rounds machine-gun fired into village. Party dispersed into village

15-36.—About 200 natives in the fields near a large red building on north-west outskirts of town. One bomb dropped which burst in courtyard of house; several people appeared to be wounded, 30 rounds machine-gun fired into party who took cover in house.

15-40.—Two bombs, which failed to burst, dropped on large crowd of natives in centre of town. 100 rounds machine-gun fired into parties of natives in the streets. At 15-40 when machine left for Lahore, no native could be seen in streets. At 15-40 station occupied by police."

That is what occurred and this is the report received on the 14th April?

A. That is so.

Q. And you consider even now that these officers practically carried out the orders that were given by you?

A. You cannot take these as my orders.

Q. They are your orders practically?

A. No; they are not my orders. I can give you my orders.

Q. Can you give this Committee your actual orders?

A. I can give you the exact orders. I can remember them fairly well. They were to proceed to Gujranwala and to break up any gathering that was found doing damage to the civil lines or station and disperse any crowds within, I think, two miles either proceeding or coming to Gujranwala. I think, so far as I remember, these were the verbal orders.

Q. Will you kindly give us a copy of that?

A. They were verbal orders, but they will be found embodied in a report from the Air Force. I will try and get that for you if you have not got it.

Q. It appears to me from these war diaries that have been supplied to us that for weeks and weeks during the time of Martial Law in Lahore there was always a conference at the Government House in the evening?

A. You must say generally. There were dates on which we did not meet.

Q. With regard to one question the President put to you about Martial Law Order about schools and students, you have informed the Committee that you were not consulted. The matter was never brought to your notice?

A. Was it one of Colonel Johnson's order?

Q. Yes.

A. I did not know about it.

Q. Are you or are you not aware, as a matter of fact, whether this order was sent to His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor for approval and he approved of it?

A. I am not aware.

Q. I will just now refer you to it. It was on the 24th of April. If this finds a place in your diary, it would be true?

A. I should take it so, we do not put in false information in our diaries.

Q. Here it is. It is War Diary No. 13 of the Lahore Civil Area from 15th to 30th April 1919; under date the 24th April, it said "Sent Martial Law Order No. 27" to His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor for approval.

A. Is this Colonel Johnson's diary?

Q. It is a Martial Law Order. Every diary was submitted to you?

A. Yes; long afterwards.

Q. Therefore if it is printed here, it is correct?

A. I think you may take it as correct.

Q. No. 27 is about students.

A. Very likely. If it is there, that is correct, that is all.

Q. I refer you to paragraph 69 of your report. You say that "the strong measures taken by General Dyer at Amritsar had a far-reaching effect and prevented any further trouble in the Lahore Divisional Area. His knowledge of the Indian and his popularity with the Sikhs did much to restore confidence and loyalty in the surrounding districts." That is your opinion?

A. Yes, that is my opinion.

Q. And the strongest measure that he took was what happened at Jallianwala Bagh?

A. Yes.

Q. In paragraph 70, there is your opinion about Martial Law administration. All this your own: "The measures taken by Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Johnson, D.S.O., in the security and administration of Martial Law was most effective; the justness of his orders and the personal touch which he established with Indians of all classes caused the administration of Martial Law to become a blessing which the poorer classes especially appreciated." Is that your opinion?

A. That is my opinion.

Q. Do you still adhere to it?

A. Yes, I still adhere to it.

26 November 1919.]

Major-General Sir W. BRYDON.

[Continued.]

Q. I now refer to Appendix I, under the date May 8rd you find this: "On being asked for grievances, the following were forthcoming. Existence of wine shops which attracted *badmashes*, who, under influence of drink, spread rumours." That was reported to you?

A. Yes, that was reported to me.

Q. On the same day report was made to you that the "attitude of all villagers respectful and loyal"?

A. That was the report.

Q. The last paragraph of Appendix XIII contains this: "At 22'00, I, accompanied by a force, visited all my pickets and marched through the city in order to make sure that my orders as to inhabitants not being out of their houses after 20'00, had been obeyed. The city was absolutely quiet and not a soul to be seen. I returned to headquarters at midnight. The inhabitants have asked permission to bury the dead in accordance with my orders. This I am allowing." It is dated 14th April.

A. Yes.

Q. I come to Appendix VII. It was reported to you as to what happened in regard to the railway station?

A. Yes.

Q. The men that were suspected were (1) Abdul Hakim, Booking Clerk, (2) Ram Lal, Train Cleaner, (3) Ganga Ram, Guard. Is that correct?

A. It is correct; it is all printed here.

Q. From the reports that you received from various officers when they were going to different villages, it is clear that they were taking also hostages from different villages and were informing you?

A. Yes.

Q. In Appendix IX, you have: "Fire was opened and one of the party was killed in a wheat field. The main body was chased into a village named Padiawala about three miles further on and we entered this village from the south, posting four men to stop exit from the north. We took eight men from the village who were all concealed in houses locked from outside and were said by an informant to have been in the mob that burnt Chuharkhana station. Among the prisoners was Fauza Singh, Sepoy of 8rd Guides, on leave from Mardan.

Ram Singh had passed through Padiawala and fled, probably on horseback, before we arrived. He is an ex-sepoy.

On returning to the line I found Sergeant Davis, D.L.I., who had gone off after another party. He reported that in following up a party of the group from the well he had run into an armed party, some of whom were mounted. It seems that two men were armed with rifles and two with guns. Sergeant Davis killed three of this party but their arms were taken away by their servants. He also killed one other man in following them.

Sergeant Davis had taken four prisoners, two of whom were strongly suspected by the Police and the other two were released.

The number of others hit is not known but several were seen with wounds."

This is the report which you received and you think that Sergeant Davis and the other officers were authorized to take these drastic measures and that they had received such orders and that it was part of their duty to do all these things?

A. Undoubtedly.

Q. May I know whether these were verbal or written orders which were given to Sergeant Davis or to those officers?

A. I am afraid you will have to ask Mr. Flowerdew who was in command of that party.

Q. Were any written orders given to Captain Flowerdew or Sergeant Davis?

A. The order practically was for them to go in any village and if there were any suspected persons, they might take action.

Q. If anybody tried to run away, they could be shot?

A. I think you may take it that I am responsible for anything that happened. I cannot say exactly what the orders were to Captain Flowerdew. He was ordered to proceed by special train leaving Lahore and I suppose the officer who sent him gave him orders.

Q. Appendix XI in the paragraph headed "Padhana," at the bottom it is stated "evidence was given on the evening of the 18th, a drum was beaten in Padhana, orders given for the meeting of an unlawful assembly and the closing of shops on the 14th. Nine men were therefore arrested and sent in, including a lambaradar who was a ringleader and two others in whose patti these occurrences took place." That was reported to you?

A. Yes.

Q. In paragraph 10, "Narwar," there is this: "The *zaildar* and lambaradars were present as they were told the evidence was strong, and they denied all knowledge, they were given 10 minutes to produce evidence. Failing that I told them I would have them beaten. They refused to give evidence and 2 lambaradars and 4 others were beaten by a *sowar* by my order. I then gave them 10 minutes again and as they still refused, I arrested the *zaildar*, 2 lambaradars and 5 others and brought them in." That was reported to you?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you take any objection?

A. No; why should I?

Q. Further on, in the next paragraph there is: "As the magistrate was just coming, I told them I would not arrest any of them, but I said what I had done at Narwar, and that if they did not give the evidence to the magistrate I should probably return and deal more strictly." That was reported to you?

A. Yes.

Q. The last paragraph runs: "The whole district was absolutely quiet and there was no question of resistance, but I think the display of force had a very decided effect, except perhaps at Padhana, which would be all the better for another visit and some severity." Therefore you thought that the man who said that he could not give you the names of those persons who were present at the Wagah station and disturbances should be beaten and that this officer was perfectly justified in ordering that he should be beaten?

A. I have perfect confidence in Col. Bourne in carrying out orders. He was an officer of knowledge and judgment, and I considered him to be perfectly capable of doing what he thought right.

Q. With regard to Appendix XII, paragraph 9 is as follows: "Orders have been issued for the arrests of Bishan Das and the lambaradars of these villages. I interrogated the principal inhabitants of Patti, regarding the occurrences of the 12th April. It appears that Durga Das, proprietor of 'Waqt' (an Amritsar paper), lectured on the Rowlatt Bill on the 5th and 6th April at the invitation of the local Arya Samajists. On the 6th *hartal* was observed for one day." That is what happened at Patti and that was reported to you?

A. Yes: all these reports came down.

Q. The lambaradars were ordered to produce evidence by the evening of the 20th?

A. That is written down.

Q. Now about hostages, I find that "the following hostages were taken to Amritsar:—

1. Arura Ram.
2. Amir Chanj.
3. Munshi Ram.
4. Pandit Davaraj.
5. Nund Lal.
6. Bishin Das.
7. Bhagwan Singh.
8. Wadawar Singh.
9. Tara Singh.

1—5 were from Patti.

1, 3, 4 and 5 invited Durga Das.

2 was manager of the local Arya Samaj school.

6 spoke at one of the lectures and is suspected of participating in the damage done to railways at Thakur Khaura on 15th and 16th April.

7 was arrested on information received from Officer Commanding, Kasur.

8 was Bhagwan Singh's host at Kucha Pucca."

You considered there was good reason for taking them as hostages?

26 November 1919.]

Major-General Sir W. BEYNON.

[Continued.]

A. The Officer Commanding the Column considered he had good reasons. He was the person to judge.

Q. In Appendix XII, item (c), it is stated that "Orders to Gharyala to clean and mend the road in the vicinity of that place."

A. Yes.

Q. Then in Clause II, paragraph (c), there is "Altogether 13 arrests as hostages were made and handed over with their papers to the Civil authorities. Twelve as leaders and seditionists." That was the report made to you?

A. Yes.

Q. About loyalty, it is stated "My impression as regards the loyalty of the district was that, outside the larger towns, the country folk seemed contented. They were at the time busy cutting their crops, and did not appear interested in anything else. Most outlying villages had not even heard of the Rowlatt Bill."

A. Yes.

Q. In the same clause, report (2) states:—"I never heard Lahore mentioned in the district I traversed, except that they had heard of riots there. I also think that rumours only filter out to the agricultural classes through people who have heard them when visiting towns on business." That is the report made to you?

A. Yes.

Q. In Appendix XIII, paragraph 3, it is stated: "A list of pleaders and barristers, who had taken an active part in the *hartal*, Gurdaspur, was obtained from the Superintendent of Police; this was forwarded to you under my No. P-2, dated the 22nd April 1919, with a request that the licenses be suspended." Further on he says "five arrests of men who caused shops to be shut on the evidence of Mr. Armstrong, I. D. F., were made."

"Also a Government servant who acted in an insolent manner was arrested."

That is the report that was made?

A. These reports all came in.

Q. I come to Appendix XIV. May I know as to whether the establishment of offences was made by you. It was a legal document. You would be responsible for its preparation?

A. Not entirely. I was selecting some of the offences out of the blue book that is given to us for our guidance, we had legal opinion on it and certain things were left out and certain things were put in.

Q. Am I right in supposing that that book applies when you go in an enemy country?

A. Not entirely. Martial Law orders do not necessarily obtain in an enemy country. I may say that this is not an enemy country.

Q. I understand you to say that under the Army Act you are authorised to create new offences?

A. That I am authorised to create new offences? I hardly know what would it mean. Every offence has been committed somewhere or other.

*The President to the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan.*  
—Under Martial Law, the military commander can create anything.

Q. May I know as to what was your authority for creating a new court or conferring jurisdiction on different officers to decide cases; did you do it under an ordinance? "The districts in which Martial Law has been declared shall be divided up into areas and for each such area an officer or officers will be authorised to dispose of offences summarily under Martial Law. Such officers shall be known as Area Officers."

In addition to the Area Officers, every Officer Commanding a station or regiment, every Field Officer and every officer nominated by a General Officer Commanding a Brigade, by the Officer Commanding Lahore Civil Area or by the Local Government, is hereby authorised to dispose of offences summarily under Martial Law."

Then may I know whether under the Army Act, you are authorised to constitute courts or confer jurisdiction on certain officers?

A. Evidently; must be; otherwise I should not issue that order.

Q. You have given us in answer to questions put by the President the duties of the moveable column, the mobile force, and there you have mentioned 4 things; may I know as to whether there will be any written record of these orders or instructions given by you, or you gave these from memory?

A. I think I could probably get the exact orders by going through the records or asking for a copy of them. An order like that is sent down in writing to the officer.

Q. The four things mentioned by you are: (1) to show the villagers outside that troops were at all times ready; (2) to find out if there was any unrest; (3) to correct false rumours that has been circulated; (4) to explain the Rowlatt legislation.

A. That would be the general directions of the Officer Commanding.

Q. Do you think that what was done by the moveable, punitive columns would be covered by these instructions?

A. I do not quite see.

Q. The President asked you what duties these moveable columns would be required to discharge and you in answer gave 4 things and said that these were their duties. Do I understand any other duties were given to them or, in your opinion, would the duties cover what had been done by these punitive columns?

A. I do not quite see what you are driving at. You do not put plain questions.

Q. Very plain questions. You suggested "I rely on the discretion of my subordinates." I want to know whether these mobile and punitive columns are authorised to do anything they like. All these villages were not martial areas?

A. No; they cannot do anything they like which is against the law.

Q. You practically find that in the majority of the villages Martial Law was declared?

A. I do not think you are right.

Q. In a considerable number of these villages?

A. I believe so.

Q. I am told, so far as Lahore is concerned, that is one Civil Area.

A. No, no. You are quite wrong.

Q. Therefore you think in all these villages Martial Law was declared?

A. I think so; that is my impression; that was for the area, Amritsar and Lahore Area.

Q. You see here Martial Law has been proclaimed in the districts of Lahore, Amritsar and Gujranwala. The civil area of the districts, I take it, includes all these places.

A. That is my belief.

Q. Then how was this Martial Law proclaimed in the villages?

A. I do not recollect. I think the authorities would do it or the columns would do it.

Q. Now, coming to another point, news would be carried from Amritsar to Lahore and the outlying districts within a day or two?

A. You know better about that.

Q. How far is Ferozepore from Gujranwala?

A. I do not know; I have not the ghost of a notion.

Q. I am not referring to the troops that were available on the 15th—they had been given by Colonel Johnson—so a number of troops were available on the 15th. I want to know why was it not possible for you to despatch a large number of British soldiers, about 100 or 150 to Gujranwala on the 14th?

A. I do not mind answering that question. I am not concealing anything; I have no object. I may, however, tell you that Gujranwala is in the 2nd Divisional Area and the nearest troops are at Sialkot. I had not too many troops to send; so I told the 2nd Divisional Commander about it and of course he sent troops there.

Q. I want to know why you did not consider it advisable on the 14th, to wire to Ferozepore or Sialkot to send troops to Gujranwala, as you did on the 15th?

A. What are we talking about?

26 November 1919.]

Major-General Sir W. BRYNOR.

[Continued.]

Q. I am talking of the 14th. You have said in answer to the President "I had not sent any military forces; I sent aeroplanes. Aeroplanes were necessary, because you could not send any force to Gujranwala." Therefore, as a matter of fact, on the 15th you wired to Ferozepore, and a certain number of troops were sent from Ferozepore to some other place, Bahawalnagar. So, I want to know why you did not on the 14th wire to Ferozepore or Sialkot for a certain number of troops to be sent to Gujranwala.

A. Ferozepore, I take it, would be a longer distance than Sialkot. As regards Ferozepore, it is not under my command.

Q. If you had sent a wire to Ferozepore, some soldiers, 50 or 60 men would be sent?

A. If I considered that I had troops at my disposal, I would have sent them.

Q. My point is, you have stated before this Committee that on the 15th you did wire to Ferozepore for troops?

A. Because it was the nearest place. You cannot send for troops from a far off place. It was impossible.

Q. Now, so far as that affair was concerned, there was no report that that party of rioters used any arms. The only report is, that 2 or 3 of the party had arms?

A. You refer to Captain Flowerdew's report.

Q. Yes, I think retired soldiers and retired pensioners are allowed to possess arms?

A. May be.

Q. Licensed soldiers are allowed to possess arms?

A. That is Civil; I do not know.

Q. The Indian Military Soldiers, who are going on leave or who retire, if I mistake not, are allowed to keep arms?

A. Not Government arms.

Q. They may not be Government arms?

A. They may be allowed private arms. I may answer that when they go on leave they are allowed to take their arms with them.

(Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate.—It is not quite correct, Sir, they may.)

Q. It appears to me that this war diary was written from the date of proclamation of the Martial Law in Lahore and does not go beyond the 30th April. May I understand that from the 30th of April it was not necessary to keep a war diary?

A. A war diary is always kept when anything is going on.

Q. Now is it or is it not a fact that in the last week of the month of April, so far as Lahore was concerned, the only report that was received was "all quiet; nothing to report"?

A. I think I must say that I do not know.

Q. Now, I do not think that it would be true that Colonel Johnson was issuing these Martial Law orders without first consulting Colonel Money, or would he issue if he thought best to issue them? What is your opinion? Is Colonel Johnson himself responsible, as he says, for issuing these orders or did he consult some superior authority and after consulting, issue them?

A. Colonel Johnson would issue his orders in the ordinary course on his own authority. If he had any doubt, he would no doubt consult me and the Civil authorities; he was always in touch with us.

Q. You have already said that the authority which Colonel Johnson had should be consistent with the instructions that you had already issued?

A. Yes.

Q. He was not authorised to promulgate any Martial Law orders which would be inconsistent with the power that you had delegated to different officers. You said that the subordinate officers were only authorised to issue orders consistent with your general orders?

A. Yes. And if any orders were not consistent with my instructions I should immediately stop them. He has no right to issue an order inconsistent with my instructions.

Q. About the continuance and maintenance of Martial Law after the end of April (I am not discussing this point with regard to the month of April, but after the 30th of April), what was there in the situation at Lahore which necessitated the maintenance of Martial Law?

A. There was the state of the Railways. It is rather hard to remember the exact dates.

Q. I can just help you. According to the Appendix which has been filed here,\* no offence was committed after the 18th April. After the 18th, nothing was reported throughout the Province. The last thing that was done in the Province was on the 18th. I give you another twelve days. My question is why did you consider that the maintenance and continuance of the Martial Law was necessary in the month of May?

A. I considered it was necessary on account of the state of railways and unrest on the frontier.

Q. With regard to the railways, I may refresh your memory: What I have been able to gather is that this task was taken up by the rural population and by the different states. Therefore I again ask you, Sir, why you said that the maintenance and continuance of Martial Law was necessary in the month of May, as all this duty was being done by the villagers?

A. Of course they were assisting and they were responsible for the particular lines running through their village area.

Q. Now, I have been putting this question to some of the witnesses but I have not been able to get a satisfactory answer. I say that all the help that has been given by the Military would have been available to the Civil authorities without the proclamation of Martial Law?

A. Sometimes we have to act in a hurry and Martial Law gives you a free hand to act. Take any case you like. A mobile column has to go through the area. They may not have been arranged for. The Civil Officer has not done his duty and asks the Military to assist him. The Military cannot act without the request of the Civil authorities; Martial Law being there, the officer can act promptly on the spot.

Q. Therefore Martial Law was necessary in the month of May because there was need to arrest people without sufficient evidence and punish them quickly which could not have been done by the Civil authority?

A. I object to your statement "without sufficient evidence." Why should you consider that the Military would do anything without sufficient evidence?

Q. I change it as "the procedure prescribed for the Civil administration of justice." One of the witnesses here said: "The amount of evidence that was required in Civil trial is much more than what is required before a Military Tribunal."

A. I disagree.

Q. My point is, would I be right in suggesting that the maintenance of Martial Law was necessary for the purpose of arresting people, convicting some of them speedily, while if the matter had been left to the Civil authorities it would have been a more cumbersome procedure and more evidence might have been required and there might have been legal difficulty?

A. You are long-winded, Sir.

Q. I had to be.

A. I consider that Martial Law was necessary for the better preservation of law and order than it would have been if it did not exist. I cannot say more than that.

Q. Did they do anything else in the month of May, these Military authorities, in any way to help the Civil authorities except in arresting people, in going to different villages and in punishing people summarily?

A. No; I think that was their duty.

Q. Could you inform this Committee as to anything that was done by the Military authorities in the month of May which could not have been done by the Civil authorities in the discharge of their duties?

A. Anything that is done by the Military authorities in the month of May the Civil authorities would not have been able to do?

Q. My point is this. There are two ways of helping a Civil authority. One way is to help the Civil authority under Martial Law, the second way is, no Martial Law existing, the Civil authority asks you to help them. Therefore I want to know if you can tell me anything that was done by the Military authorities in the month of May which they could not have done if there had been no Martial Law?

A. I cannot answer; honestly I cannot.

Q. Nor can you refer to anything which was done on the spur of the moment in the month of May and which was absolutely necessary?

A. I cannot guess; as a matter of fact, I cannot remember it.

Q. In the month of April you had already received a communication from the higher Military authorities that you should do your best to act in close communication with and on advice of the Civil authorities. Had you or had you not received any order from the higher Military authorities that you must always in these days consult the Civil authorities?

A. I cannot remember it.

Q. You don't remember it?

A. No. That is a commonsense thing. I was in touch with the Civil authorities.

Q. In your answer with regard to the continuance of the Martial Law there was a technical phrase used by you about "Military necessity resulting from it." What does it mean, I want to know what it means? It is not down in your written statement.

A. Well, supposing the trouble on the Frontier was organised as you say, by the Amir and he sent his emissaries to Lahore which was at that time quite peaceful and they had raised trouble there, you had a military situation arising out of the trouble on the Frontier.

Q. Now I think it has happened that in such an eventuality or when there was war on the Frontier you take possession of all the railways and put them under the Military authorities without introducing Martial Law?

A. You cannot do anything you jolly well please.

Q. Was it not done at different places, that is, without declaring Martial Law in a city, you placed the Military in charge of the Railway Lines and Stations?

A. If the Government think it necessary they do anything. I do not criticise their action. I simply carry out their orders.

Q. Supposing the railway lines and railway stations had been placed under Military control owing to declaration of war by Afghanistan then why do you say there was any need of proclaiming and maintaining Martial Law for the purpose of trying different offenders?

A. The railway, as a matter of fact, is a method of communication. They meet at Lahore and they have to be guarded. Perhaps I am very dull and I don't know what you want me to answer.

Q. Why Martial Law should have been proclaimed here if on account of trouble on the frontier railways had to be protected. Could not this have been achieved if the whole line had been placed under the charge of the Military? They have their own Regulations and restrictions. But how would the maintenance of Martial Law inside the city, except for the purposes of trying the cases, help this?

A. Maintenance of Martial Law was not only considered necessary inside the city of Lahore but it was considered with regard to the whole area. I consider that Martial Law being in force could enable me to protect the Railways better than if Martial Law was not there. Is that all?

Q. That is your answer. I cannot press you further. I do not think as a Military Commander you ever thought that there was an extreme and extensive cause for the introduction of Martial Law?

A. As a Military Commander?

Q. Had Civil Law been superseded by the Military authority?

A. They were certainly superseded. I entirely agree with Sir Michael O'Dwyer.

Q. But as a matter of fact the Civil authority was not superseded by the Military authority?

A. I beg your pardon. When Martial Law was proclaimed it was superseded.

Q. Had you any hand in arresting a large number of persons who had committed offences?

A. Not immediately. I was in supreme command.

Q. Were you consulted or was your advice taken?

A. If efficient people who acted under me arrested those persons in whose case such arrests were necessary, they could not consult me in each and every case, for instance they cannot come and say they are going to arrest Tom, Dick or Harry.

Q. No Military officer was consulted about these arrests during those days. No Military authority was consulted?

A. Were they arrested for Military offences?

Q. I said offences under the Penal Code.

A. Yes.

Q. By your order you did maintain the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember any previous case in which this was done, i.e., during Martial Law Civil courts were carrying on their duties?

A. These orders were practically brought out by Government. I was myself to obey those orders.

Q. With regard to one other point we have not been able to get reasons. Everybody has referred us to you. That is, what were your reasons for excluding the Legal Practitioners from entering the Lahore Area?

A. I dare say I look at it from a purely military point of view and it was not necessary from a military point of view that those excellent gentlemen should enter the Area.

Q. That is having regard to their ability or political views?

A. Having regard to nothing except that it was unnecessary from a military point of view.

Q. Under the Army Act is not even the meanest soldier entitled to have his Counsel or Counsel of his choice?

A. He has not. It does not affect this case because they all had Counsel.

Q. Has ever, under the Military Law or under the Army Act, anybody wishing to have Counsel been refused one? Has this request been ever disallowed? Suppose it is not the Law, has ever any such request been refused by any Military Commander if that request was made by them?

A. I regret that I cannot answer. That is a question of law.

Q. You practically treated Lahore as an enemy country?

A. No.

Q. You treated Lahore as Germans treated Belgium?

A. Not at all. We treated Lahore Area as a friendly country which was unfortunately misguided. The mass of people were law-abiding citizens.

Q. That is what I cannot understand. Had it been a conquered country, supposing an army entered Belgium and there were no civil courts and they had to establish order and they had the levies of soldiers, that I can understand, but here I want to know, if Lahore was not an enemy country, why did you consider it necessary to prevent Legal Practitioners from entering the Lahore Area and from helping the accused who were tried for a conspiracy under the Penal Code?

A. If you look through these papers I think you will find that all travellers were restricted from coming to Lahore and it was not only those very excellent gentlemen who were so prevented; but all movements except with my permission were stopped.

Q. What was the ground for refusing these gentlemen permission?



26 November 1919.]

Major-General Sir W. BARROW.

[Continued.]

A. Their presence was not necessary.

Q. What was the reason that you considered their presence unnecessary, i.e., why did you consider their presence unnecessary?

A. Because it was not considered necessary.

To Mr. Herbert.—Will you kindly give to the General a copy of the Military Reports regarding the Internal Disturbances in Lahore.

A copy\* was then handed over.

Q. There is a report at page 16. It is dated the 18th April 1919, and you find it in Part III:—"The Lahore City remained quiet. Police experiencing no difficulty in arresting men they require. All shops in Anarkali and 90 per cent. in the City opened. Situation appears to be permanently in hand." That was the report on the 18th April?

A. Yes.

Q. There is a report at page 18. It is dated the 18th April. Refer to paragraph 4:—"Chief directs you to act in close communication with and on advice of Lieutenant-Governor." That is what I was referring you to. On the 18th of April you received this?

A. Yes.

Q. Now at page 27 it is reported "Motor Column which visited Muridke neighbourhood reports Lambardar, Kamoke, very turbulent and insolent, duly tried and punished. Remainder villages quiet, no connection could be traced between villagers and persons who cut line on the 15th." That was the report and this man was punished because he was insolent?

A. Yes.

Q. At page 28 it is reported "Lambardar of Kamoke was sentenced by Kamoke Flying Column to 15 lashes and Rs. 200 fine." That was the punishment inflicted?

A. Yes.

Q. Further on it says "At Kasur 95 per cent. arrested including Mohi-ud-din, son of a pleader, Abdul Kadir."

A. Yes.

Q. Then "at 9 hours Sardar Jiwan Singh was brought in, his attitude is servile."

A. Yes.

Q. And then this Column, it says, made 150 arrests at Amritsar.

A. Yes.

Q. Then at page 29 the report is that "Agitation of Gurdaspur reported to be the work of pleaders and members of the Arya Samaj, also Hindus and Hindu Government servants who worked in secret." This was the report?

A. Yes.

Q. At page 30 it is reported "8 Kasur pleaders' houses searched and important conspiracy documents collected."

A. Yes.

Q. And at Lahore by the Military Authorities 65 men arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. At page 34, "50 arrests made by this Column at Patti." Last line.

A. Yes.

Q. At page 35 it is reported that "the opinion of some of the Military Authorities was that Delhi is responsible for nine-tenths of unrest in this portion of the Punjab." That was the report? That was the result of the inquiry of the Military Authorities here?

A. Yes.

Q. Further on at page 35, first paragraph, it is reported "A case of incendiarism is reported by Multan in the office of the Bad Punjabis on the night of April 28th. The Commanding Officer considers this to be an act of regimental *badmashi* and is taking necessary action."

A. Yes.

Q. Then at page 36 the report is "8 arrests were made by this Column on 2 identifications and 20 on 1 identification in Kasur."

A. Yes.

Q. This is very important. At page 41 there is a military report from Amritsar which says that "the principal cause of discontent appears to be attitude of the police. It is reported that the police are extracting bribes under cover of Martial Law." That was the report made to you on the 8th of May?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 19th April military patrol of the Civil Lines was prohibited. It is No. 13 which begins from the 15th April?

A. This is all right.

Q. There it is said the Officer Commanding gave instructions about Civil Lines?

A. That is in Amritsar.

Q. It is dated the 19th April?

A. What Station?

Q. It is Lahore Civil Area.

A. Yes.

Q. This man Govardhan Das was arrested under your orders, i.e., under military orders. We have been hearing about his case in the newspapers from time to time. On the 28th April there was a warrant for the arrest of Govardhan Das, a prominent agitator, who had absconded to Madras?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know why he was arrested?

A. No.

Q. Now the procession which went inside the city on the night of the 11th April, went inside it as a result of a Conference at Government House. It is No. 14, Volume I, last clause but one "should march through the city."

A. I think I can remember the facts.

Q. Take page 8. The reports are "all quiet, all quiet, nothing to report." This is at the end of April.

A. Yes.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. Did you consider that Martial Law as administered in Lahore had been administered with any undue severity or any severity which was greater than the circumstances warranted?

A. I did not consider so at all; I think it was administered with great leniency.

Q. There are degrees of Martial Law of course and Martial Law can be applied according to the circumstances of the case. Martial Law may be applied in foreign countries as well as in one's own country? For instance there would be absolutely no analogy or the faintest resemblance between Martial Law as administered by the Germans in Belgium and Martial Law as administered by us in Lahore?

A. I should not think there is any similarity at all.

Q. They both go by the name of Martial Law; beyond that there is nothing else?

A. No.

Q. Then we must come back to that old question about the continuation of Martial Law. You were strongly of opinion that it should be continued because of the military situation?

A. That is so.

Q. The military situation, I take it, is this that you have got a Province in which at various places in the Province risings have taken place, riots have occurred, public and private property is being destroyed, and a number of people killed; at the same time Martial Law has been introduced, and there is a war declared or about to be declared on the frontier, would you consider it reasonable on the part of Government or any military officer to take that opportunity to withdraw Martial Law, that is, considering the question that there are railways leading up to the frontier on which there are not only important railway junctions, but there are important railway bridges, the destruction of which would paralyse the concentration of troops and supplies for the frontier?

A. It is a very serious consideration whether you can weaken your powers at a time when the horizon is not altogether clear. I considered and I stated at the time that it would be advisable to continue Martial Law for a further period. We gradually reduced it, but we had to be very careful that we did not

\* Not reproduced.

26 November 1919.]

Major-General Sir W. BEYNON.

[Continued.]

throw away a weapon that it might be necessary, I do not say would be necessary, to use.

Q. That is to say you had the weapon ready, the sword drawn from the scabbard, and it was not used but ready for use?

A. That is so.

Q. And it was not weighing heavily on the people at the time?

A. No, very light.

Q. Then in reply to a question put to you this morning by the President I understood from what you said,—perhaps you will correct me if I am wrong—that your meaning was that, though a military officer or an officer administering Martial Law would consider the effect that the introduction and the application of Martial Law would have on the feelings of the people, and its ultimate effect on their feelings, still you consider that the military reasons out-weighed all others?

A. I did. It is unfortunate that when you have to use force you cannot always consider the feelings of people. Whipping, for instance, is an unpleasant necessity. One does not want to use it, but one has to use it, the same as shooting. You do not want to shoot people but you have to do so. You cannot always consider people's feelings.

Q. And Martial Law in your opinion is a much stronger weapon than simply military force brought to assist the civil, I take it because Martial Law has powers which the civil has not got?

A. In my opinion Martial Law more than doubles the fighting strength of the Commanding Officer.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. You said, did you not, that you formed the opinion that the rural population was not generally in sympathy with the disturbance?

A. That I stated on the strength of the reports furnished to me.

Q. On those reports you looked on the disturbances as mainly the work of townspeople?

A. Entirely so.

Q. From that would you draw any conclusion regarding the suggestion that has been made to us that the recruiting measures in the Punjab were one of the causes of the disturbances that had occurred?

A. I believe the recruiting had nothing to do with it.

Q. Recruiting I understand was almost entirely confined to the rural population?

A. Yes.

Q. You would not expect in those circumstances that recruiting measures would cause discontent and disturbances among the townspeople only?

A. Townspeople I believe only contributed a very small number of recruits to the army.

Q. And you think the recruiting measures were not one of the causes of these disturbances?

A. No, certainly not.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. Martial Law was proclaimed on the 15th April?

A. Yes.

Q. Who proclaimed it?

A. I cannot quite say.

Q. In the proclamation of the 19th April you say Martial Law had been proclaimed, by whom had it been proclaimed?

A. By the Government of India I understand.

Q. You are not sure?

A. I am pretty certain, in this way, that the question was referred to them of proclaiming Martial Law and I conclude they proclaimed it.

Q. I just wanted to know on what authority or basis you say at the opening paragraph of this proclamation of yours. 'Whereas Martial Law has been proclaimed and is in force in the districts of Lahore, Amritsar and Gujranwala.' What is the basis of that statement?

A. That is based on Government's orders.

Q. You received orders from the Government on which you based this?

A. Yes.

Q. Were those orders proclaimed in the Punjab?

A. As far as I remember the question was referred to the Government of India by the civil authorities advising Martial Law and the Government of India agreed.

Q. I am simply referring to the matter of the proclamation of Martial Law, not to the order of the Government of India sanctioning Martial Law.

A. The proclamation of Martial Law was this one issued by me.

Q. But you say in this proclamation, 'Whereas Martial Law has been proclaimed and is in force in the districts of Lahore, Amritsar and Gujranwala.' You are referring to an already existing fact, that is the proclamation of Martial Law by somebody.

A. I am afraid I cannot quite answer that question; perhaps the civil authorities would be able to answer it.

Q. You made that proclamation without knowing on what authority you were making it?

A. Oh no, that would be drawn up in collaboration with the civil authorities.

Q. But I take it you are responsible for everything stated here. This may have been drawn up on the advice of the civil authorities, but when you sign this document I take it you are entirely responsible for it?

A. Entirely so.

Q. And I say an officer of your position would not sign a document like this until he knew what it was and understood it properly, that is why I wanted to know on what authority it was based and whether Martial Law had actually been proclaimed before this in Lahore?

A. Rather a hard question to answer.

Q. I should have thought it was a simple question to answer?

A. It may appear so to you, but these matters were all discussed and brought out at conferences at which the civil and military authorities met.

Q. Therefore all the more reason that, if the statements made here were made after a good deal of deliberation and consultation, they must be founded upon fact; therefore I wish to know on what fact it was based?

A. The fact would be that the Civil would tell me that Martial Law has been proclaimed.

Q. Proclamation means, made public, published broadcast?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it published in the Punjab Government Gazette, or by means of papers, or how was it done?

A. I think the Lieutenant-Governor would issue the notice that Martial Law had been proclaimed.

Q. He would issue it, but do you know that he did issue it?

A. Of course I know he did.

Q. He did issue it?

A. Yes.

Q. He did issue that notice in the Punjab Gazette?

A. I am afraid I cannot say, I am not up in the civil methods.

Q. It is only a question of fact; it is not a question of law, civil or military; it is purely a question of fact?

A. It is a pure question of fact, but as to the means I am not quite certain.

Q. You say Martial Law was proclaimed on the night of the 15th, this Proclamation is dated the 19th, four days afterwards?

A. Yes.

Q. So Martial Law had actually been proclaimed and you issued this four days afterwards?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you were appointed as the supreme authority to administer Martial Law in these three Districts?

A. I being the senior Military officer in the district assumed command.

Q. You received orders to that effect I presume?

A. I would do that *ipso facto*.

Q. But you must be told by somebody?

A. Oh no, the senior Military officer, on the proclamation of Martial Law, assumes command.

26 November 1919.]

Major-General Sir W. BRYNOR.

[Continued.]

Q. That is why I asked in the beginning how it was proclaimed and you have not been able to answer that question?

A. I am afraid not.

Q. Then I take it that you were not aware that such an important fact had been proclaimed; you must have had some order or intimation that you were the officer to take charge?

A. The Civil authorities proclaimed their inability to keep the law.

Q. They proclaimed it, where?

A. They informed me.

Q. That is what I wanted to get at, as to how you assumed authority?

A. The Civil authorities informed me that Civil Law had ceased to run and Martial Law takes its place.

Q. They said so?

A. Yes.

Q. Who told you?

A. His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor.

Q. The Lieutenant-Governor himself told you "Civil Law has ceased to exist and Martial Law takes its place"?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it verbal or written?

A. Verbal.

Q. And on that you, as in command of these districts, assumed command?

A. Yes.

Q. He simply gave you the instructions that Civil Law had ceased to run and now Martial Law must take its place; there were no further instructions beyond that and you did not require any, it was quite enough?

A. We discussed the sort of Martial Law that should be brought in. This is a modified Martial Law; certain restrictions were brought in at the time that it was proclaimed.

Q. You discussed when you were told verbally that Martial Law should take the place of Civil Law, as to the kind of Martial Law that should be brought in?

A. That is so.

Q. Are there many kinds of Martial Law?

A. Well, to the best of my belief there is only one Martial Law and that is the authority of the Military commander. But there are modifications of pure Martial Law, and these were brought in by the Government. When they introduced Martial Law, they made certain restrictions. In this case the restrictions were as to the tribunals.

Q. What were the restrictions? As given here in this Proclamation?

A. Yes.

Q. You say here Martial Law has been declared 'subject to the maintenance of ordinary courts for ordinary offences and the establishment under Martial Law Ordinance,' etc. So I take it that Martial Law pure and simple but subject to these restrictions was introduced?

A. That is it.

Q. As given here in your Appendix XIV, No. 1, those two conditions were:—

(a) the maintenance of ordinary courts for ordinary offences, and

(b) the establishment under the Martial Law Ordinance, 1919, of Special Tribunals for offences specified in section 2 of the Bengal State Offences Regulation, 1804.

Subject to these two restrictions, it was left entirely to your discretion to do as you thought best?

A. That is so.

Q. Who imposed those restrictions?

A. The Government of India.

Q. Did you receive these instructions from the Government of India?

A. Through the civil authorities, through the Punjab Government.

Q. Were those restrictions imposed at the time you were told that civil law had ceased to run and Martial Law would take its place? You were told these two things at the same time?

A. It was not at one moment, the matter was under discussion and those restrictions were imposed upon me.

Q. Later on?

A. While we were working out these orders, this Proclamation.

Q. That was between the 15th and the 19th?

A. Yes, between the 15th and the 19th.

Q. You were working it out between the 15th and 19th and these were thought out and these restrictions added?

A. Yes.

Q. As I understood you to say, you were in supreme command and you had Colonel Money under you?

A. Yes.

Q. Assisting you generally?

A. His title was Administrator of Martial Law.

Q. His title; and your title?

A. I was the Officer Commanding the 16th Division.

Q. But in respect to Martial Law as supreme authority what was your title?

A. It did not alter my title.

Q. And then for these various districts of Lahore, Amritsar and Gujranwala you had three distinct officers as area officers to administer Martial Law under your directions?

A. That is so.

Q. And as regards Lahore District it was Colonel Frank Johnson?

A. Yes.

Q. And Amritsar?

A. General Dyer.

Q. Gujranwala?

A. Gujranwala was not under me.

Q. Under you were two districts, Lahore and Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. So those two officers were to carry out your instructions in administering Martial Law?

A. That is so.

Q. Colonel Johnson in one of his proclamations has given the definition with which I believe you agree, that Martial Law is the will of the military commander, and here it is in your view subject to these two conditions?

A. That is so.

Q. So any one who was working under you as administrator in any particular area would have strictly to follow what your will was?

A. Yes.

Q. It may be generally expressed or particularly expressed, and if he exceeded those limits he would be doing something in excess and his conduct would be illegal?

A. Yes, I agree with you.

Q. It was not the will of each individual commander under you, irrespective of your orders, to do what he liked? He had to act consistently with the general or particular instructions which you had chosen to give him?

A. That is so.

Q. Now I take it that this is the first proclamation that you issued on the 19th?

A. Yes.

Q. And this proclamation deals with two important matters, first it defines the offences and their punishments under Martial Law, and secondly, it also names the officers who are to administer Martial Law. It specifies them, it says:—'The districts in which Martial Law has been declared shall be divided up into areas and for each such area an officer or officers will be authorised to dispose of offences summarily under Martial Law. Such officers shall be known as Area Officers.' They were going to be appointed subsequently under this authority?

A. Yes.

Q. 'In addition to the Area Officers, every Officer Commanding a station or regiment, every Field Officer and every officer nominated by a General Officer Commanding a Brigade, by the Officer Commanding, Lahore Civil Area, or by the Local Government, is hereby authorised to dispose of offences summarily under Martial Law.' Now, when did you appoint Colonel Johnson as regards Lahore and General Dyer with regard to Amritsar?

26 November 1919.]

Major-General Sir W. BEYRON.

[Continued.]

A. General Dyer of course was appointed at once.  
Q. On the 15th?

A. Yes. Colonel Johnson took over command on the 15th, I see here in the diary of the Lahore Civil Area.

Q. So by virtue of assuming that command, he became Martial Law Officer under you at once?

A. Yes.

Q. You gave no other instructions to Colonel Johnson excepting these general instructions?

A. Yes.

Q. No other instructions, verbal or written, excepting these?

A. Those were his orders.

Q. He had to comply with these generally?

A. Yes.

Q. And anything he did consistently with those instructions would be quite all right, and if he did anything outside those instructions it would be perfectly wrong, you agree with that?

A. Yes, I agree with that.

Q. Now he issued certain orders on the 15th of April. These orders could not be either consistent or inconsistent with these instructions.

Witness.—Will you let me know what those orders were?

Member.—Martial Law Orders Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5. All these were dated the 15th April. Orders Nos. 6, 7 and 8. These are dated the 16th of April. There are sixteen orders he issued up to the 18th of April. But before the issue of this proclamation by you on the 19th he had already issued 18 orders which could not be consistent with this proclamation because then the proclamation did not exist, so I take it, this was *ultra vires*. It was acting without authority?

A. I disagree entirely.

(A discussion here ensued between Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan and the President and the above question was dropped.)

Q. I take it that whenever any new offence is committed the people to whom it applies should be in a position to understand what the offence is in order that they may not commit it?

A. Yes.

Q. Here you say in Appendix XIV, No. 4: Every person who receives information of gatherings or intended gathering of rebels.....but you have nowhere defined here who in your opinion for that purpose these rebels were. How are the people to know whom you meant as rebels?

A. Well I know who I should mean. But you mean to say is it necessary that the people should know?

Q. They should know clearly as to what they are to do in order to obey. Nowhere do I see in this proclamation the word "rebel" defined for the purpose of Martial Law.

A. No, but in Martial Law we use commonsense. I cannot perhaps define it well but it is someone who is not obeying the orders of constituted authority and rebels against this order.

Q. A person who does not obey constituted authority. If he rebels against it he rebels. A rebel is one who rebels, that is very simple but that does not go any further. It does not explain anything at all. I want to know what a rebel is?

A. If a person was charged under section 4 of receiving information of gatherings and intended gatherings he would have to prove that he did not know they were rebels.

Q. But how is he to know that they were rebels. You have not said who a rebel is?

A. Well he could look it up in the dictionary.

Q. I take it that the people have to look up the dictionary for the meaning?

A. If a man is ignorant of the meaning he can also look it up in the dictionary.

Q. But there are many people who do not know the English language in Lahore?

A. I am not out to educate the people in the meaning of English.

Q. May I ask you what you meant by it?

A. I am afraid I am not very good at splitting hairs.

Q. Now 100 people are holding a meeting, how is a person to know that that meeting consists of rebels or not? A mere holding of a meeting does not go against constituted authority. The meeting itself is not unlawful but the persons taking part in the meeting are rebels. If it has been prohibited, then anybody who takes part in that is a rebel?

A. Exactly.

Q. And if the meeting is not prohibited then in that case it can take place. The meeting itself is not prohibited yet it consists of rebels?

A. Not at all. A rebellion is constituted in the fact that it is against constituted authority.

Q. If the meeting is not against constituted authority I take it that it can take place. This is not what you say in this proclamation. It is assumed that the meeting itself is not prohibited but it consists of people who are rebels there. It might be a gathering of men or an open rebellion. How are we to know that they are rebels. It shows you that in your own mind you had no clear notion as to what a rebel is?

A. I think you are wrong. I have a very clear notion.

Q. You say it was drawn up after consultation with lawyers?

A. All these were drawn up from a book. I wish I had the book to give you. I think that case can be noted and the next time it is necessary your suggestion can be discussed.

Q. Did you satisfy yourself that your instructions as contained in this proclamation were faithfully carried out and that there were no excesses committed or did you leave it entirely to your subordinates?

A. I can recall none. Reports were constantly sent in. I am quite satisfied with the way in which my officers carried out their duties.

Q. As regards not permitting counsel from outside to defend accused?

A. There was no necessity for them to come into the city.

Q. They were coming here to defend certain accused?

A. That was what was stated.

Q. Who was to decide the necessity—the accused concerned or the military authority?

A. The military authority would entirely settle the question.

Q. Was it for you to decide or the accused in the case?

A. For me to decide.

Q. Did you apprehend any danger or any trouble on that account?

A. No, I cannot say that there was any danger or any trouble.

Q. The question is who was to decide the necessity. We will take it that every person has a right to be defended by counsel whom he likes?

A. I do not see that at all.

Q. What were the grounds on which you refused permission? There must be some grounds why you refused.

A. There are. They were not necessary. There was no advantage in their coming in from a military point of view.

Q. What was the advantage from the military point of view for refusing them permission?

A. Because everything had to be considered from a military point of view.

Q. In the ordinary way they are given every opportunity of defending their cases; and refusing permission to the counsel whom they like to employ was done from a military point of view?

A. There were other lawyers in Lahore. There was no necessity for these people to come in. There are numbers of lawyers in Lahore who are perfectly capable of defending people.

Q. But that is a matter which the accused person would decide?

A. There was no necessity for them to come here.

Q. Did you consult the accused why they were selected?

26 November 1919.]

Major-General Sir W. BRYSON.

[Continued.]

A. I have no idea why they were selected. I did not consider the case. Not from their point of view.

Q. I take it that you can judge of the ability of eminent lawyers very well?

A. God forbid: No.

(The President again intervened here and the question was dropped.)

Q. I heard you say that in Kasur when houses of certain pleaders were searched, certain documents were found?

A. I believe that was in the report by the officer at Kasur.

Q. Are those Kasur reports available anywhere? Can we have those documents?

A. I should think so.

Colonel Isemonger.—I think Colonel Macrae will be able to give evidence about that. He is coming here and he will be able to give evidence before the Committee.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Please refer to your war diary\* for March 30th—General Staff—16th Indian Division, page 23. It is a report from your Air Service, and you find it is dated the 15th of April. "Gathering of about 20 noticed in field under one mile west of town—scattered with Lewis gun." This is about Gujranwala, and the second item is "8.58.—Similar gathering outside held in village half mile west of town . . . . . one bomb dropped which hit adjoining house and blew side in." These reports made to you were on the 15th of April. All that was done by the aeroplane which left Lahore and came back again the same day?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. That proclamation was signed by you on the 19th of April. You had been the highest military officer in this part of the world for some substantial time before that, and may I take it that you were advised upon the question whether Martial Law was necessary before the question was referred to the Government of India at all?

A. It was mentioned to me but I do not think you can really say my advice was taken. At all events I had nothing to do with the bringing in of Martial Law.

Q. It is not true that the introduction of Martial Law into this part of the world was due to you? Were you the primemover in that?

A. No.

Q. You say it was mentioned but hardly sufficiently to enable you to say that your advice was taken or that it was done upon your advice?

A. Of course the civil and military were daily meeting and discussing the situation and one would naturally in the course of conversation talk about Martial Law.

Q. It is one thing to hear in the course of conversation and another thing altogether to make your recommendation.

A. The recommendation did not come from me.

Q. Therefore so far as you are concerned on the 14th of April 1919 the Viceroy made and published in the *Gazette of India, Extraordinary*, Ordinance No. 1 of 1919 which brought into effect Martial Law under the old Bengal Regulation. Have a look at it. (A copy of the Ordinance was handed to the witness). A special *Gazette of India, Extraordinary*, of the 14th of April was issued with that Ordinance and from that time the authorities and the Commanding Officer in this part of the world was the authority under which Martial Law existed?

A. Yes.

Q. And that by the time you had two or three days to turn round you put it into shape for the purpose of this area by the proclamation which you signed on the 19th of April, and you state at the beginning that Martial Law has been declared subject to the maintenance of ordinary courts for ordinary offences. That is merely a recital of that Ordinance

which you now hold in your hand. The Ordinance which was published in the *Gazette* of the 14th is really referred to by name in the beginning of your proclamation and that is where you get the statement that Martial Law had been proclaimed? The orders or proclamation of Colonel Johnson in Lahore which began from the 15th of April was after the Ordinance by the Viceroy and he was acting direct under that authority before you had time to give him directions on the 19th.

A. Not before that time. I had issued verbal orders as you see in my report to the different commanders to take such action as was necessary.

Q. And your proclamation of the 19th, was that intended to be of general application throughout your command so far as Martial Law applied?

A. That is it.

Q. Did you leave the Officers Commanding the various areas to make special orders as required by particular conditions?

A. They had to make special orders. You cannot cover everything with one proclamation.

Q. I do not want to keep harping on it, General, but I just want to put one or two questions about the matter of legal practitioners. As I understand, this order about legal practitioners did not come into force until the 14th May, it was an order made by the General Officers Commanding, Lahore and Rawalpindi Divisions?

A. That was the 2nd Division.

Q. That is to say, that you and the other Major-General, your neighbouring General, issued an order in identical terms on the 14th May about this question of legal practitioners?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell me from the beginning of Martial Law on the 15th of April until this proclamation of the 14th May was issued what was the position with regard to counsel or legal practitioners in the Martial Law districts?

A. You will see at Appendix XVI, instructions in regard to trials of persons charged with offences in connection with the present disturbances committed before the 19th April 1919.

Q. Paragraph 6. "It has been arranged that counsel for the defence shall be provided by Government for any accused person who is unable to engage a counsel for himself." That is from Mr. Thompson, Chief Secretary. But what I want to know is, what was the position so far as the legal practitioners were concerned? Before the 14th May, was it possible for an outside practitioner to come into the Punjab for the purpose of a trial?

A. I believe it was not, but of course it was a matter for the High Court.

Q. May I put that question again. I am reading from a book which has been supplied to us as the official Government case, Report of the Punjab Disturbances. I am reading from page 277, and it gives a version as to this matter in these terms. "On the 14th May the General Officers Commanding Lahore and Rawalpindi Divisions, issued proclamations to the effect that legal practitioners whose ordinary place of business is outside the Punjab will not be allowed to enter the Martial Law area including the limits of the Lahore and Rawalpindi Divisions without the permission of the Administrator of Martial Law." The first thing I am asking you is—you notice the date is said to be the 14th May; at that time Martial Law has been roughly a month—during that month was there anything, and if so, what was there, to prevent a barrister from Calcutta who was wanted by a prisoner before any of the Martial Law courts from coming into the Punjab?

A. That order as far as I remember, was brought about for this reason. There was such a large number of applications from persons who said that they were not satisfied with the barristers they could procure in Lahore, for permission for barristers from outside to come and defend them, and, in order to save these constant applications, that order was published.

Q. Can you explain it to me? I don't follow it. Why before the 15th May was it necessary to get

permission before one could employ an outside barrister to defend one in Lahore? What order or proclamation did you issue?

A. I do not think there was one, except the general order that no movement could take place or people could come into the Martial Law area. There was a general order. I think it is in the proclamations.

Q. There are general restrictions upon railway travelling. Did those restrictions upon travelling up to that time prohibit any class of persons? I don't think they did, did they?

A. I personally think that barristers may have come in, but the fact came to our notice through these applications. They may have come in before without our knowledge, but it was to save the constant applications of these men to come in that we published that order.

Q. Of course if travelling was restricted from places outside the Punjab, then everybody, whatever class of men wanted to come in, would have to get permission. I suppose you had a Bureau or Office busily engaged in dealing with these questions?

A. Everybody was not stopped from coming in. We had to restrict third class passengers altogether, but we tried to carry out Martial Law on common sense lines, and I do not think there was any restriction on people coming into Lahore who wanted to.

Q. Do I gather correctly that what you wanted was to stop having to keep an office dealing with the numerous applications?

A. That was why that order was published.

Q. The report of the Punjab Disturbances goes on thus. It does not bind you in any way. I want you to tell me whether it is right or wrong. "The intention of this order was not of course to prejudice the accused in their defence. It was dictated by the desire to prevent the disturbance of the political atmosphere, now rapidly clearing, by outsiders whose main purpose would not improbably be the revival of the agitation under the protection afforded by appearance before the courts." What do you say to that?

A. No, that is not in my office.

Q. So far as you are concerned, you say that was not your intention at all?

A. My intention was, it was not necessary to have all these people in. They were not an advantage to me. That is why I looked at it from a military point of view.

*The President.*—You had no right to exclude them? *Witness.*—I may have been wrong.

*The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin.*—It appears in the Government case they have imputed what appears to me a very well considered motive to you and to your brother Generals which you don't seem to have heard of before?

A. It was very kind of them to say so.

Q. On the ground that you did not want in those busy times to deal with those applications, you thought it advisable to restrict the right of legal practitioners. I see it goes on to say "without the permission of the administrator of Martial Law"?

Who did you mean by that? Did you mean yourself, Colonel Money or the Local Officer Commanding?

A. Colonel Money acted for me. The application would come to him and he would say yes or no.

Q. The only thing that occurs to me, General, if I may put it to you is this. An order in those terms would be more likely to produce a greater number of applications for permission addressed to the Administrator of Martial Law than to cut them down?

A. Why?

Q. Because if you say that you cannot come in without the permission of so and so, the first thing one would do is to apply for permission?

A. I do not think it did act that way. They did not worry. They came up to the Administrator of Martial Law. They might have increased them, there were so many of them.

Q. Of the barristers who did apply for permission, I notice that eminent English barristers and Indian

barristers, barristers with no political colouring or instinct have been refused entry into the Punjab.

A. I did not consider it from a political point of view at all.

Q. The permission of the Administrator of Martial Law for this purpose was not obtained any the more readily by a European who served as a Captain in the Indian Defence Force; it did not make it the easier that a man was well recognised, that he was a supporter of Government, that he served as a soldier or anything else?

A. If it had been necessary for an officer to come in, I should have made an exception in his case.

*By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate.*—

Q. With regard to the same question, General, are you aware of the fact that long before this order of yours was passed excluding the legal practitioners from other Provinces, and even before the disturbances arose, the High Court of this Province has itself passed an order to the same effect excluding legal practitioners from other Provinces from appearing in the High Court in their professional capacity. Do you know anything about that?

A. I know it now. I did not know it at the time.

Q. In regard to the bombing at Gujranwala and the aeroplanes sent there, was it a fact that when the aeroplane was sent from here the disturbances had already taken place or were then taking place?

A. Our information was that the Railway Station was on fire and mobs were wrecking the Civil Station and burning bridges.

Q. Was it not one of the reasons why an aeroplane was sent there that it could get there quickly and troops could not?

A. Of course aeroplanes were sent because they could go there quickly. It was not the reason that troops could not?

Q. They were pre-occupied at the time, and it was decided to send an aeroplane?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it not believed at the time here that the lives of the European community in Gujranwala were in danger?

A. I believe that the Civil authorities certainly feared that the lives of Europeans were in danger. I cannot answer for it myself because we simply got the suggestion that the aeroplanes should be sent out because of these riotings, and we at once sent them. There was always a danger of loss of European life at that time.

Q. You stated that two aeroplanes were placed at the disposal of the force at Amritsar. Is it not a fact that these aeroplanes did not remain there? They went during the day and came back for the night?

A. I think, as far as I remember, we used them chiefly as a means of carrying messages. Railway lines and telegraph lines had been broken. I cannot say whether they remained there any particular night or not, but as far as my recollection goes, they came back to their aerodrome every night.

Q. You saw full reports of General Dyer as to the incident at Jallianwala Bagh on the 13th? Did you then think and do you now think that sufficient warning had been given to the people at Amritsar?

*(The President.*—I don't think you can ask him that question.)

Q. Then in regard to the question put to you in the early part of the proceedings by the President in regard to the deferential treatment meted out to one section of the community or other under Martial Law, which particular community, the Indian or the European, was in rebellion?

*(The President.*—Surely it is the Indian. No one has suggested that the European community was in rebellion.)

Q. I put it this way. Of which particular community, the Indian or the European, was it necessary for the Administrator of Martial Law here to restrict activities?

A. I don't think we treated any differently. Martial Law applies for the whole population.

26 November 1919.]

Mr. ALAN MITCHELL.

## Mr. ALAN MITCHELL, I.C.S., late Additional Deputy Commissioner, Lahore.

*By the President —*

Q. I think for a certain part of the time during which Martial Law was in operation you acted as Deputy Commissioner at Lahore?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. That was from the 17th April till some recent date when you started to fulfil the duties of Deputy Commissioner at Gujranwala?

A. I came here on the 17th as an Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner. I did not become Deputy Commissioner till the 19th May. I was Additional Deputy Commissioner from the 19th May and actual Deputy Commissioner for a fortnight only.

Q. During that time Mr. Fyson was Commissioner? A. He was Deputy Commissioner.

Q. He was actually present at certain of the incidents that took place.

A. Yes, Sir, he was the Deputy Commissioner when the disturbances took place.

Q. For some time he was away on leave, and I think latterly he was ordered to go on six months' leave on medical certificate?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. At present he is in England?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. A report\* had to be prepared for the Government and that report was started by Mr. Fyson, I think. That was completed by you?

A. It went in in my time. Mr. Marsden, the Sub-Divisional Officer, collaborated part of the time. He really finished it off. Of course I had to go through it. I am actually responsible for it.

Q. You are responsible for it merely as a report. So far as the incidents and statements in it are concerned, you received the information from outside sources?

A. Yes, Sir, I was present during a certain time in a subordinate capacity.

Q. When Martial Law was in operation?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. But I may take it from you generally that that report in so far as it gives statistics, is correct, upon the information that was placed before you?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You refer in that report at the end to the trials before the summary courts?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In connection with the information you lay before us as to the number of trials by the Commission and the number of trials before the summary courts, those figures you give are correct?

A. Yes, Sir, to the best of my belief.

Q. And in connection with the punishments that were administered, you have also given us figures in your report with reference to fines and whipping sentences. Were all those whipping sentences pronounced either by the Commission or by order of the summary courts?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Does it include whipping cases, where the whipping was carried out by the Bourne column?

A. There are more details in the big statement.

Q. I see there is a note by Mr. Marsden. The only other case besides those mentioned by you of whipping carried out as a disciplinary measure so far as you know was that of two lambardars and four villagers and carried out by the Bourne column after the 18th April?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. With reference to whipping, was there any truth in the suggestion that any one had died or was seriously injured?

A. I never heard of any such case.

Q. Did you make full enquiries?

A. I was here from the 17th April and during that time the sentences of whipping were carried out. I never heard of any such case.

Q. If you were preparing a statement for the Government for which you are responsible in the absence of Mr. Fyson, and you give the statement that no one had died or was seriously injured, you make that statement in consequence of full investigations you made into all the cases?

A. Yes, Sir.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—*

Q. Had you anything to do with the arrests and charging of suspected persons and bringing them before the courts for trial?

A. No, Sir, that was all done in Lahore by the various police officers.

Q. You did not have to supervise them?

A. I tried a few petty cases of Martial Law.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—*

Q. This statement of Mr. Fyson, I believe, is an abstract of the report that was submitted to the Government. It is not the whole of the report that was sent under your initials?

A. This is an abridged copy of the main report.

Q. When you arrived on the 17th,—will you kindly see your statement—you found everything quiet in Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. Because the military authorities by that time had got complete control of the city?

A. Yes.

Q. And you found in fact that there was very little for you to do?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. Then Mr. Fyson again after his illness became Deputy Commissioner in the month of May?

A. Yes, Sir, the day I became Joint Deputy Commissioner.

Q. When you joined the second time, was it the end of April or the beginning of May?

A. I joined as Assistant Commissioner on the 17th April. On the 19th May I became Joint Deputy Commissioner.

Q. From that time really you had some experience of how Martial Law was managed?

A. Before that I had very little to do with it.

Q. By this time according to your observation and opinion the civil administration had practically resumed its normal course although Martial Law was in force?

A. That is so.

Q. Kindly look at the report of Mr. Fyson, because he is not here, I will only ask you one or two questions about it. You see the portion dealing with April 8th. It is there said that Dr. Gokal Chand was prepared throughout the day to help the authorities?

A. Yes, that part of the report was written by Mr. Fyson himself.

Q. You see paragraph 2. It is there admitted that the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest came to Lahore at 8-30.

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Just at the bottom of that paragraph, under the heading April 10th, he says: "They had no weapons and had done no damage beyond breaking young trees."

A. Yes, I saw trees broken.

Q. In paragraph 3 there is a dispute about what time was allowed by Mr. Fyson when Ram Bhaj Datt wanted him to give him certain time to disperse the crowd. There he says "He gave two minutes' time for the crowd to clear, intimating his intentions to Ram Bhaj Datt who seemed to be leading the mob."

A. That is so.

Q. Again he says: "The crowd at this place were carrying on a sort of Muharram and the nucleus sat down in the Chowk near Lahori Gate."

A. It is in the report.

Q. Under date April 12th, he says: "The demeanour of the crowd was hostile and they called out for the cancellation of the laws."

26 November 1919.]

MR. ALAN MITCHELL.

[Continued.]

A. That is in the report.

Q. In this report it is stated that the Extra Assistant Commissioner was sent inside the Badshahi Mosque to disperse the crowd. It runs thus: "After consulting General Clarke (who had arrived by car) and Colonel Johnson, the Deputy Commissioner sent Sheikh Rahim Baksh, Extra Assistant Commissioner, to enter the Mosque and order to disperse."

A. Yes.

Q. Paragraph 4 of Section IV refers to the intentions of the crowd. "Their intention of course was to make a demonstration, but there is no shadow of doubt that had they reached there they would have lost their heads and run riot and acted as their brethren at Amritsar did."

That was your opinion?

A. That is my opinion.

Q. Paragraph 6, Section V, says, "There is no trace of an effort to form an army. The *Danda Fauj* or gang of clubmen formed at Lahore was the only thing of the sort, and it was insignificant."

A. Yes; that is in the report.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. The first paragraph of section IV refers to the nature of the movement and runs thus:—"The movement at Lahore was primarily anti-Government. The idea was to stop Government work, paralyse communications, and inconvenience Europeans to such an extent that the Government would be forced to capitulate over the Rowlatt Act. Any other motives were secondary, and due to the fact that an Indian crowd is too excitable to be passive merely. Thus the movement incidentally revealed the real feelings of the urban population towards Britain. It may be said that they have no real feelings of loyalty or gratitude for favours past or to come. In their excitement they were willing to burn photographs of the King and Queen, and so to show that it is not merely the bureaucracy in India that they hate but England." Does it apply to the whole urban population or only to a few? Do you think that everyone of them is disloyal or is only a portion of the population that took part in the disturbance referred to? Were they in the majority or minority?

A. I only base this opinion on the papers and reports and things in front of me. I personally was not here during the disturbances. I could not say exactly as to the actual outbreak on the 10th.

Q. Is it the majority of the people in Lahore or Amritsar or Gujranwala and all these places that were disaffected and disloyal, or only a small minority that caused disturbances?

A. I should say it was the minority.

By the President—

Q. Are you expressing your own opinion? Or Mr. Fyson's?

A. The sections of the report dealing with the general position were not written by Mr. Fyson. They were actually drafted by Mr. Marsden and they pass for my opinion. I am responsible for them. As I have explained, I can only form my opinions on what I heard after my arrival and on the reports and other papers in my possession.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. In your opinion was the majority or the minority disloyal?

A. From the opinion that I formed on those reports, I consider that it was the minority only of the city inhabitants of Lahore that was not loyal on this occasion.

Q. Was it a large minority, out of a population of about 2 lakhs? Would it be nearly half or a very small number.

A. I would not like to give any number.

Q. Did you also inquire into the causes or reasons why they were disaffected or disloyal? This is a state-

ment of fact, that the majority of the people of Lahore and Amritsar were disloyal. Did you ascertain the reason for their disloyalty?

A. I could not form any opinion about Amritsar.

Q. I mean Lahore: I beg your pardon. The majority of the people of Lahore were disloyal. Did you enquire into the reasons for their disloyalty?

A. No; I made no particular enquiries myself. Up till a week before the date of submission of the report, Mr. Fyson was there, and so the enquiries were made by him. As I have signed the report, I am responsible, at the same time, I do not wish to disclaim responsibility. I was there for a short time before the report was made. It was entirely in the hands of Mr. Fyson. I simply read it through. If I found that I could not sign any portion of it and it was not my opinion, then I could cut it out. If Mr. Fyson had gone two months before the report was due, the report would be much more mine and I should have made much more detailed enquiries before I signed. There was only one week between Mr. Fyson's handing over and the presentation of the report. Feeling that I was responsible for it, I carefully read it through. At the same time I cannot see that there are any deep enquiries behind this opinion which I can give.

Q. Then I take it that you did not have any document before you or any reports before you which went into the causes of this disaffection or disloyalty. You did not have any. I presume if you had, you would have put them here.

A. There was a mass of papers. I cannot remember at this precise moment. I think this report was actually written from memoranda and notes and so on.

Q. There were memoranda?

A. Very likely; I would not like to say positively. There was a mass of papers.

Q. So far as your knowledge goes, nothing came before you which can show that some enquiry was made into the causes of this disloyalty. There may be papers, but you did not come across them.

A. I am sorry the enquiries are general. I was discussing the situation. I would ask opinions of various people and would form an opinion. So would Mr. Fyson. Similarly as Deputy Commissioner, we would receive reports from Subordinate Magistrates, police reports, and so on. We would get a mass of things that gradually go to form one's opinion. I cannot go into definite ones. At the same time I cannot say that I held any formal enquiry. When I am speaking to people, I would ask them their reasons.

Q. Did you ask anybody the reason why this disloyalty or disaffection existed?

A. I cannot remember any actual conversation with any individual. But I had conversations and formed various general conclusions as a result of those conversations.

Q. What were the conclusions?

A. One conclusion of course was the way the Rowlatt Bill had been misrepresented. I heard many people saying the same thing.

Q. So before the passing of the Rowlatt Act, I take it that this disloyalty did not exist?

A. No; I would not say that. Disloyalty of the nature that suddenly appeared on the surface cannot be a matter of a fortnight's growth. There must have been other causes. I do not know if anybody had made up his mind. I do not know what these other causes were. But undoubtedly there must have been a variety of causes. One of the items that got into the heads of people was the extraordinary stories that were told and spread broadcast about the provisions of the Rowlatt Act.

Q. It was the exciting cause. What the predisposing causes were you could not say?

A. No; I cannot say what the predisposing causes were.

Q. And it had been going on for a long time before this Rowlatt Act?

A. I can only judge from the result. I came here on April 17th. When I came here, I was very much out



26 November 1919.]

Mr. ALAN MITCHELL—concluded—Mr. W. G. CLARKE.

of the ordinary administration of the province in a rather special district where one did not see what was going on in the same way as one would have known had he been in the Punjab.

Q. These remarks only apply to the town of Lahore. They do not apply to the district?

A. The district is dealt with by Mr. Fyson, in the report on Kasur of Mr. Marsden.

Q. Kasur also comes under this?

A. In Mr. Fyson's abridged report it is not separately given. There is a separate report of Mr. Marsden.

Q. I take it that this applies to Kasur and to Lahore?

A. That paragraph which we are discussing about the movement at Lahore being primarily anti-Government refers to Lahore town only.

Q. And not to the district?

A. No.

Mr. W. G. CLARKE, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lahore.

By the President—

Q. You are Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lahore, Mr. Clarke?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On the morning of the 6th, did you get orders as regards patrolling and visiting the pickets?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you do that?

A. Yes.

Q. Would you just explain briefly what you saw as regards the mobs on the street on the 6th of April?

A. From the time the procession came down the Anarkali bazar?

Q. Yes.

A. Towards noon on the 6th, we were at the District Court Headquarters. The Inspector of the City came along and gave us information that there was a large procession coming down the Circular Road towards Lohari gate. Mr. Broadway told me to get on to Anarkali bazar and try and hold up the mob if it was coming through Anarkali way leading to Civil Lines. I got to Nila Gumbaz Chouk, which was the end of Anarkali bazar. I met the head of the procession and put up my hands as a signal for the procession to stop. They pressed forward. I turned my horse round and faced them again with the back of my horse towards Mul Chand's shop and again put up my hands and showed them signs to stop. They took no notice. I was forced forward and my horse turned. They began to strike the horse and wanted to go forward. I told them in the vernacular as best as I could that they were not allowed to go forward. There were some of them answering in English saying that they wanted to go forward. I told them that the orders were that they were not to go to the Mall. Then they struck the horse and pulled the reins and my horse ran forward and drove me as far as Mul Chand's shop. Looking down towards the Y.M.C.A. Chowk, I saw Mr. Fyson and Mr. Broadway coming down towards the Post Office just past the Y.M.C.A. building. They looked down my direction and I signalled them; then they came up. They also told the mob that they could not go on to the Mall. The mob was ordering us to get out of the way and to step back making way for them. While we were arguing with them Dr. Gokal Chand Naurang came on and said he would try and get the crowd back. As he could not get to the mob on foot, he asked for a horse; that was given. He led the mob back through Nila Gumbaz Chouk on to the Kutcheri Road leading to Bradlaugh Hall. I then went on to the Nila Gumbaz and found another mob being pressed back by certain Police Officers, foot Police and Cavalry. While trying to get those back, Dr. Gokal Chand turned up and eventually led that mob down Kutcheri Road to Bradlaugh Hall.

Q. And both mobs were taken away?

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Mr. Mitchell, you came to Lahore on the 17th April?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you find the ordinary civil courts and Magistrates doing their ordinary duties or were they closed or what?

A. The day I arrived was the day before the Easter Holidays and as far as I understand the ordinary criminal work was suspended at the end of the holidays on Monday. As far as I remember most of the ordinary criminal work of the criminal courts was suspended in the kutcheri.

Q. Monday, the 22nd?

A. The day after the Easter Sunday.

The President.—Practically the courts were just suspended for the ordinary period of Easter.

Mr. Herbert.—There are other witnesses to show that the courts were suspended after the Easter Holidays.

A. Yes, Sir; to Bradlaugh Hall. I returned rid Gol Bagh again to the District Courts and shortly afterwards Dr. Gokal Chand came along with Mr. Duni Chand. We discussed.

Q. Some arrangement was made with them?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. After that you were sent out by Mr. Broadway to make Police arrangements to close the roads, Nila Gumbaz Chouk and Market Chouk leading down the Mall towards the civil station?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think the meeting about which the arrangement was made did disperse in good time?

A. Yes, Sir; we had no trouble again that evening.

Q. You formed Police picquets after the meeting was over and returned?

A. Yes.

Q. I think you were not in the city afterwards?

A. No.

Q. On the 7th, as we know, the shops were opened as also on the 8th and 9th. Ram Naumi procession was on the 10th of April. Towards the evening, did you hear about the occurrences at Amritsar?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Then between 6.30 and 6.45, did you receive information that a large crowd was marching down the Mall?

A. Yes.

Q. You then proceeded on your bicycle and reached the Mall?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was the crowd at that time?

A. It was just between O'Dwyer Soldiers' Club and the English Warehouse, just about the last gate of the English Warehouse.

Q. Were there any police?

A. Yes.

Q. How many?

A. A dozen policemen.

Q. What were they doing?

A. I just saw they retired. As I was going up the Mall, a distance of 150 yards, I saw the Police trying to push them back, and heard of course *hato* and shouts of that kind. I saw the police showed back and heard the order "fire" given.

Q. Before the fire order was given, were policemen driven back?

A. They were being driven back.

Q. Could you see whether stones were being thrown at the police?

A. No.

Q. You were not in a position to see?

A. No.

Q. Then after the firing took place, what did the crowd do?

A. They backed; some of them went into the English Warehouse compound, and some went down the

26 November 1919.]

Mr. W. G. CLARKE.

[Continued.]

- big drain, and some through the O'Dwyer Soldiers' Club gate on the left side.
- Q. How many men were with you?
- A. From that line I took four men through the opposite gate cut-off the mob at the porch of the O'Dwyer Club, turned them back on to the Mall and joined the remainder at the Mall. Then we got orders to push and beat them back?
- Q. Into the city?
- A. Yes, down the Mall.
- Q. Who were with you?
- A. There was a Sub-Inspector, but at the time orders were given there were Mr. Fyson, the Deputy Commissioner and Mr. Cocks, Deputy Inspector-General of the C. I. D.
- Q. Had Mr. Cocks been with Mr. Fyson for some time?
- A. They were both there. Mr. Cocks was standing on the right and Mr. Fyson in the centre of the Mall.
- Q. Did you succeed in driving the mob back?
- A. Yes. I got them right up to Nila Gumbaz Chouk; a few broke off through different roads that go down leading into the city.
- Q. During this time did anyone assault you?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Who was that?
- A. I have been looking for him ever since.
- Q. And have not been able to find him?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Was he one of the crowd?
- A. One of the mob.
- Q. In what way did he assault you?
- A. There is a road coming down the Mall. There is one that branches off to Mul Chand's. A portion of the mob went to the left going towards the market. The larger portion of the crowd turned towards the right. Just as this division took place, a man who was seen to come across caught me by the coat and swung me on the road. He was down on me in a second. I was underneath him. Sub-Inspector Moratab Ali, who was with me at the time, rushed up and hit him on the back of his shoulder with a revolver. He got up and ran towards the gate. At the same time a constable came up and raised his gun to fire.
- Q. Did he fire?
- A. I told him not to fire and pulled his gun.
- Q. Was your horse pulled?
- A. I was on foot from the time I got off my bicycle.
- Q. After that incident what occurred?
- A. When I got to Nila Gumbaz Chouk, I met the head of the mob.
- Q. Tell me where exactly Nila Gumbaz Chouk is?
- A. As you get past the Bank of Bengal, you turn to your right at the Bank of Bengal. That is the place.
- Q. You halted your men there and closed the road leading out of Anarkali Bazar?
- A. I waited there for a few minutes, thinking of course the mob would disperse; I saw it was getting larger. So I decided to push them back; I gave an order to load and warned them that if they did not disperse, I would fire; at the same time I blew the alarm whistle; I had a very rough time of it then. Mr. Broadway came along with some armed sowars, some cavalry, and was later followed by some foot police; they were followed later again by the Inspector of the Headquarters, Mr. Grey. We were telling the mob that if they did not disperse, they would be fired upon. Chaudhri Ram Bhaj Datt came out of the crowd and asked for time to disperse the mob.
- Q. What did he say to you?
- A. He said he would disperse them; he said he could not get through on foot; we gave him a sowar's horse.
- Q. What happened?
- A. He could not control the horse; he was thrown off the horse. He went on foot. There was an electric switch box on the pavement. (If you get on to that you will be able to see the people all round). Eventually he got on to the box to address the crowd. He was waving a white cloth.
- Q. Was the crowd very noisy at the time?
- A. We could not hear what was said; he was waving a white *chadr* as he called. By this time we got stones and mud thrown at us. Mr. Broadway gave order to fire a few rounds. They did not stop stone-throwing, and we had to fire upon them; we had stones right and left of us.
- Q. You fired in the direction of the low shop roofs where there is a shrine just near the square?
- A. Stoning of course did not stop, but continued. Meantime, Mr. Broadway sent a sowar to bring the Deputy Commissioner. Mr. Fyson, the Deputy Commissioner, shortly after came and he also went forward into the mob and warned them that if they did not disperse they would be fired on again. Mr. Broadway was again obliged to fire; the stoning did not cease.
- Q. Mr. Fyson himself was stoned?
- A. Every one, the cavalry, the men.
- Q. How long did this parleying with the mob, the attempts to get the crowd dispersed last, before the firing took place?
- A. Anarkali Bazaar is a very long street before you get to Lahore Chowk; from the time I entered Anarkali with these men, telling them that if they did not disperse they would be fired on, it was three-quarters of an hour I should say.
- Q. During the whole course of that time, the crowd had been behaving in the way you described?
- A. Oh, yes; they rushed at us 2 or 3 times and tried to get round us.
- Q. When the firing took place, did the crowd disperse then?
- A. Not at the first firing; it was only at the second firing that the police and cavalry advanced.
- Q. So far as the first firing was concerned were any casualties imposed upon the mob—I mean the firing in the direction of the low shop roofs?
- A. We did not notice at the time that there were any casualties. As we advanced, we saw a man lying on the pavement, I believe shot by the first firing.
- Q. Was he dead or wounded?
- A. No, he was alive at the time.
- Q. You say that the firing on the shop roofs did not effect the dispersing of the crowds; then a further order was given to fire?
- A. Yes, Sir.
- Q. And on this occasion, what happened? The crowd dispersed then?
- A. Of course; firing was followed immediately by the advance of the cavalry and police.
- Q. Did the crowd then disperse?
- A. Yes, Sir, partly; some went across the Gardens between the Lahori Gate and the Anarkali Bazar.
- A. I think the cavalry and the police advanced through the Circular Road as far as the gate leading to the Akbari Gate?
- A. Yes, Sir.
- Q. Mr. Broadway instructed you to go to the City Kotwali to ascertain the state of affairs there?
- A. Yes, Sir.
- Q. Did you go with sowars?
- A. Yes, Sir; with 8 or 10 sowars. Mr. Broadway brought them. I went to the Kotwali.
- Q. On your way, did you come in contact with any crowd?
- A. No; not on my way to the Kotwali.
- Q. Did you hear, when you arrived at the Kotwali, any shouting of the mob?
- A. Yes.
- Q. In what direction?
- A. From the Delhi Gate; and from the Bazar which leads on to the Railway Station.
- Q. When you heard that shouting, what did you do?
- A. I took a guard of a Sub-Inspector and 25 armed men, and went in the direction where the shouts were heard; reaching in the centre, I saw this mob approaching. I cried out "halt!" The mob split up into two parties. I stood guard there. After waiting a second or two I saw them clear off from the Bazar. I then met Mr. de Gale, Assistant Superintendent of

26 November 1919.]

Mr. W. G. CLARKE.

[Continued.]

Police, coming from the opposite direction of the Railway Chowk. He told me he had been just attacked by these men in the bazar.

Q. Had he been injured?

A. No.

Q. He had been attacked?

A. Yes.

Q. Then what did you do after that?

A. I went as far as the Railway Chowk with the guard and found all clear there. I sent the guard back, and I went to the Telegraph Office and reported to Mr. Broadway about this crowd in the Anarkali bazar.

Q. Later on at night, did you patrol McLeod Road?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You stayed at the Telegraph Office?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. During the day of 11th you did not return to the city?

A. No.

Q. Why was that?

A. Mr. Broadway asked me to remain with him. There were no proper arrangements made.

Q. Was it a risky matter, entering the city without a large force?

A. From what I heard it was very dangerous.

Q. I think you made arrangements along with Mr. Broadway for entering the city on the 12th accompanied by the military?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On the 12th you did accompany the military under Colonel Johnson?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Now, near Hira Mandi on the 12th, did something occur?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Just explain in your own words what occurred.

A. As we got to what is known as the Hira Mandi, I saw a large crowd just opposite to what is known as Theatre Royal owned by Mr. Puri. It is a very high ground, and it looks on the big plain between the Fort and the city. We saw crowds there assembled with sticks. I was told that it was part of the *Danda Fauj*. General Clarke came along from the opposite direction. The cavalry were then sent down on to those plains and they tried to drive the mob into the city, the Hira Mandi side. Some of them went in and some bolted into the plains. Shortly afterwards, another large crowd came out of the Badshahi Mosque lane; the cavalry were then drawn up. In the meantime, a large crowd had assembled at a small grave in the Hira Mandi lane. The cavalry was drawn up at 80 or 40 paces from the mob. There is a clear road coming up to the Hira Mandi. Mr. Fyson advanced with the cavalry telling this mob that assembled at the Hira Mandi to disperse. While he was doing that, a second crowd that came in from the Badshahi Mosque got round the back of the cavalry and started throwing stones and sticks.

Q. On the cavalry?

A. Yes, Sir. Mr. Broadway called out to bring up the police; I galloped back to Puri's theatre, and I sent up a line of police and went to the head of the column and asked Colonel Johnson to go back. I said there was going to be trouble that side. The police were lined up in a line, and Mr. Broadway and Fyson were calling up to the mob that if they did not disperse they would be fired on. They began stoning. Eventually Mr. Fyson gave orders to fire. After that we advanced and the mob dispersed.

Q. You say that the crowd dispersed after that?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You then went back to your headquarters at the Telegraph Office?

A. Eventually; yes, Sir.

Q. Honorary Magistrates and Municipal Commissioners were asked by the authorities to do their best to prevent *hartal* and disorders on the 6th April?

A. I was not present at any of the meetings.

Q. You do not know anything about that?

A. No.

Q. Kindly look at your statement, paragraph F. There you say "on the 4th April Mr. Broadway attended a meeting convened by the Deputy Commissioner to urge Honorary Magistrates, Municipal Commissioners and others to do their best to prevent *hartal* and disorders on the 6th April." Is that your statement?

A. That, of course, I only heard. Mr. Broadway had attended a meeting held by the Deputy Commissioner.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Honorary Magistrates and Municipal Commissioners were then asked to prevent the *hartal*?

A. It is only Mr. Broadway that was present at the meeting convened by the Deputy Commissioner in connection with the *hartal*. That was suggested and proposed.

Q. We have been informed that on one occasion one or two crackers were thrown. I take it from your statement in the Lohari Gate case that 2 or 3 fireworks were thrown, and they did not explode at all?

A. There was a light thrown. It is an omission on my part, there was no noise.

Q. You know that Duni Chand is a Municipal Commissioner for very many years in Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. And at all the *Ram Naumi* affairs Honorary Magistrates and Municipal Commissioners do attend?

A. Certain Honorary Magistrates and Municipal Commissioners.

Q. You were also examined in the Hira Mandi case?

A. Yes.

Q. It is true that, according to you, no one was hurt with *lathis*?

A. I said they were struck with *lathis*.

Q. On the 12th no one was hurt?

A. So far as I can remember no one was hurt.

Q. The crowd, which cut off the cavalry on that occasion was the crowd which came out of the Badshahi Mosque and collected in the Hira Mandi open space?

A. Yes, as far as I could see.

Q. It is clear from your statement that at the time you were trying to disperse this mob Colonel Johnson was not present, but had gone ahead and you had to send a man to call him back?

A. I went back myself.

Q. See your statement. You say "seeing this I galloped back towards Puri's Cinema and sent forward some police and brought Colonel Johnson who was at the head of the column." Practically Colonel Johnson was somewhere near the Police?

A. Yes. He had gone on.

Q. On that occasion you arrested a person called Feroz Din?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. You asked him to go inside a mosque and clear off the mob there?

A. Yes.

Q. And he came back, and said he had cleared the mosque. There were 5 or 6 men behind the screen inside the room, and he was arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. You sent a sowar to the Deputy Commissioner?

A. I did not.

Q. Somebody. Mr. Broadway?

A. Yes.

Q. May I take it that that sowar went? There was no crowd?

A. No.

Q. It was cleared?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it not a fact that these lanes in the cities are very narrow?

A. This is not in the city.

Q. Is it not a very thickly populated place, i.e., Hira Mandi, Landa Bazar and Anarkali, are they not thickly populated localities?

A. Not thickly populated. There are shops there.

Q. It is not within the old walls of the city?

A. It is not in the city jurisdiction even.

Q. Do you consider it to be very strange and very extraordinary that if anything extraordinary happens

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, LAHORE.

26 November 1919.]

Mr. W. G. CLARKE.

50  
P. O. A.  
Concluded.

connected with these places, within three or four minutes, or near Hira Mandi, won't 400 or 500 men collect immediately?

A. Not in Hira Mandi. There are shops in the Nila Gumbaz.

Q. If anything unusual happens in the Anarkali, is it not a place where three or four hundred men would collect at once?

A. I should say not.

Q. Neither at Nila Gumbaz?

A. No.

Q. Nor at Hira Mandi?

A. Not at night time, I should say.

Q. And in day time?

A. Lohari Gate is a pretty busy centre of the city during the day. It leads to Anarkali. So is Nila Gumbaz.

Q. So is it not possible for 5 or 6 hundred men to collect at Nila Gumbaz or at Lohari Gate if anything unusual happens at either of the places?

A. Yes, if business is going on as usual.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. Mr. Clarke, when you came up on the Mall on the 10th: before you saw the police fall back and fire on the crowd, did you get near enough to hear the police ordering the crowd to fall back?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Was the crowd shouting or silent?

A. The noise was something awful.

Q. Then you describe it as a violent mob?

A. Most decidedly.

Q. Was that before it was fired on?

A. Yes. I could hear it from the Roman Catholic Cathedral. It was just like an electric engine noise.

Q. You mean that no reasonable person could possibly describe it as an orderly deputation of peaceful citizens whom it would have been safe to allow to proceed to Government House?

A. Not a bit.

27 November 1919.]

Mr. J. E. KEOUGH.

At Lahore, Thursday, the 27th November 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.L., C.I.E., L.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

Sarfaraz Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., *Secretary*.

Mr. J. E. KEOUGH, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Lahore.

*By the President—*

Q. Are you a 1st Class Magistrate in Lahore?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On the 6th of April I think you were in charge of the Railway Station?

A. I was.

Q. On that day *hartal* was held?

A. Yes.

Q. From your own experience can you say whether in connection with the holding of the *hartal* means were taken to prevent those who wanted to do their work from doing so?

A. That was the case.

Q. What instances did you see of attempted interference with individuals who were not anxious to participate in the *hartal*?

A. On the 6th itself I did not see very much in that way, but I was informed that some of the 2nd guards of the Railway had been interfered with when going to work, but I did not myself see any cases on the 6th.

Q. On a later date did you see any instances?

A. I was there again from the 10th to the 13th and then I saw some of the 2nd guards of the railway coming to work in disguise, and when questioned they said they had come in that way as they were afraid of being molested on the roads and having their uniform torn off, that there were men about holding them up from going to work. And later as a matter of fact four men were caught actually doing it and brought up to me, one of whom turned out to be a clerk in the Office of the Chief Examiner of Accounts, North-Western Railway.

Q. They were brought up to you in your Magisterial capacity?

A. No, they were brought up to me at the Station for a remand; they wanted a remand to put the men into the lock-up.

Q. I think you made arrangements for the deportation of Messrs. Harkishen Lal, Duni Chand and Ram Bhaj Dutt?

A. I took part in that, yes.

Q. On what date were they deported?

A. I am not quite certain of the date, but I think it was the 14th.

Q. They were subsequently tried?

A. By one of the Tribunals, yes.

Q. What was the offence with which they were accused?

A. I could not tell you, I did not have that before me.

Q. You yourself tried a number of cases of minor offences?

A. I did, Sir.

Q. Was that sitting alone as a Judge in the special Summary Courts?

A. That was sitting alone.

Q. How many cases altogether did you try?

A. I have not got my records, I should say about 22.

Q. Did you pass many sentences of flogging?

A. Yes, I passed, I think it was about 12 sentences of flogging.

Q. And did you superintend the carrying out of the floggings?

A. I superintended the carrying out of 11 of them.

Q. What was the maximum number of stripes that you administered?

A. Eighteen in one case. The rest were between 6 and 8.

Q. What were the nature of the offences for which you passed sentences of flogging?

A. They were for breaches of Martial Law orders, the breach of the Curfew order, and I think one case was the tearing down of a notice.

Q. Did you pass sentences of flogging for breach of the order as regards selling at a fixed price?

A. No, Sir, I had none of those cases. The only other cases besides those of breaches of Martial Law orders that I had were, a case of an ex-constable of police who was arrested for holding up the Deputy Superintendent of Railway Police from travelling in a tonga and making him get out and walk, and immediately after that the gang breaking the large street lamp near the underpass across the railway lines on the Shahdara side of the Lahore Railway Station. I tried the case under Martial Law and I tried two other cases of clerks trying to bring about a strike in the Military Accounts Office.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—*

Q. Apart from breaches of the Curfew order, did you try any cases of unlawful assemblage, more than so many people together?

A. No, Sir.

Q. After a certain date is it not a fact that the infliction of flogging in public was stopped?

A. It was.

Q. About what time was that prohibition brought into force?

A. I think it was about the 18th of April.

Q. So that it was only carried out for two or three days?

A. It was only one day. I flogged publicly on the 17th and the very next day I think it was that we received orders. It was the 18th I think that the orders came.

Q. The carrying out of these floggings in public, was that an order made by your superiors?

A. I received that order from my superiors.

Q. On those occasions was there a large assemblage of people looking on?

A. Not very many at the Market Square. There must have been a couple of hundred people who had passed and some of them had stood there watching it. But just outside the Delhi Gate near the Kotwali there was a larger crowd.

Q. Were they all flogged one after the other on the same triangle?

A. On the same triangle.

Q. And how long did these proceedings go on at the Delhi Gate?

27 November 1919.]

Mr. J. E. KROUGH.

[Continued.]

A. I do not think they lasted more than half an hour all told.

Q. Was there a cordon of police round about the triangle keeping people back?

A. No, there were only about 4 constables and a European Inspector of Police with me. Of course the Kotwali where the police were was only about 25 yards away.

Q. I do not want to go into details, I take it the persons who were flogged, their hands were fastened to this triangle?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they fastened by the feet?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they stripped naked?

A. Yes, all but a cloth put round them.

Q. And was the flogging administered with a cane?

A. With a thin rattan cane, the usual one used in the jail. They came from the jail with the triangle.

Q. A triangle with a platform or on the ground?

A. On the ground.

Q. And the actual Curfew order was dated the 16th of April?

A. That was dated the 15th of April.

Q. Then it would come into force for the first time on the evening of the 16th?

A. On the evening of the 16th.

Q. And these persons were flogged on the 17th?

A. On the 17th morning.

Q. They were flogged for breach of the Curfew order on the first day on which it was brought into effect?

A. The first day was really the 15th night.

Q. Was the order proclaimed in the morning?

A. The order was given some time about 12 o'clock.

It was sent out into the city for the information of the general public and posted up on all posts in the civil station.

Q. And the people whom you tried for breaches of that offence on the 16th and 17th were there any who were acquitted?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you have any cases in which it was alleged that there was insufficient time to appreciate the order, or insufficient notice?

A. No complaint of that sort was made to me.

Q. Did any of the persons whom you convicted at that time make that sort of defence?

A. Well they did not say they did not know. One man told me, for instance, that he had been overtaken while he was going home. He was a man belonging to Mozang village and he was caught right out the other side of the Mall going in quite a different direction, so that he was not going home. Statements of that sort were made to me, but they never said they did not know or that they had not sufficient time.

Q. What other defences were made apart from this?

A. Simply that the men were belated and were overtaken, that the gun went off before they had time to get home, that is what they tried to make out.

Q. Did you regard that as a relevant defence?

A. If the man had anything to substantiate his statements.

Q. Did you consider when you were trying those cases whether a sentence of fine might meet the case?

A. I gave a sentence of fine in a couple of cases; men who were obviously not fitted for flogging I fined.

Q. But apart from cases where you could not very well flog them, did you ever treat the sentence of flogging as the normal sentence for that sort of thing?

A. I did; I thought it the most salutary punishment that could be awarded. Most of them could ill-afford to pay fines; it would have operated hardly against them.

Q. Do you think they would have preferred a sentence of fine to a sentence of flogging?

A. I was not out to see their preferences, I was carrying out my duty.

Q. It was in your discretion to see that at any rate to begin with, an offence of this sort was not visited by an

unnecessarily severe or unnecessarily humiliating punishment; that obviously was your duty as a Magistrate.

A. Yes.

Q. Did you sentence people who were convicted to flogging in exceptional cases of obstinacy or contumacy, or was that a *prima facie* sentence that you always meted out for that offence?

A. It was not exactly the *prima facie* sentence meted out; there were sentences of fine I gave. But the cases I sentenced to whipping I certainly thought that was the most deserving punishment for them at the time.

Q. Were the cases with any special circumstances of aggravation?

A. They seemed to me to be cases of deliberate disobedience of the order.

Q. Had you any general instructions from your military superiors as to the sentences to be meted out for breaches of the Proclamation?

A. No, Sir, except that we were told what sentences could be passed by us.

Q. You were told the limit was 30 lashes and so on?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. But had you any memorandum to work on as regards the normal standard of sentences for particular types of crime?

A. No, we had not, but I understood from Colonel Johnson that whipping would be a proper sentence for breaches of Martial Law, but we were not actually told to give any particular sentences.

Q. When you say you understood from Col. Johnson, was this before you commenced acting as a military Magistrate at all, or was it later on?

A. No, it was after I had flogged them.

Q. To begin with, before you started acting as a special Martial Law Magistrate had you anything to guide you apart from the statement of your powers, as to your discretion in awarding punishments, a memorandum or instructions of any sort?

A. No, Sir, except that when I went to the place I saw the triangle there.

Q. That is not much of a guide?

A. No, but I understood it was there in case I wanted it.

Q. You do not mean to say you sentenced people to flogging in order to give the triangle some use?

A. Oh no, not that.

Q. Can you tell me the maximum amount by which any person was out of time whom you sentenced to flogging on the first two days that you sat as a Military Magistrate?

A. Yes, some were found out between 12 and 1 at night. The Curfew order in those days I believe was 8 o'clock.

Q. Can you tell me if you remember the minimum amount of time in the case of any person you sentenced to flogging?

A. I don't believe I had any under 2 hours, after 10.

Q. So that there is no question of anything except a very substantial breach?

A. Yes.

Q. I see the sentence was carried out under your orders. Was there any medical man in charge at that time?

A. There was no medical man in charge.

Q. Were the sentences carried out on the same day that they were pronounced?

A. Yes.

Q. Then I take it, after being carried out, the offenders were simply released?

A. They were released and went away. In one case I might mention we had no medical man, but those men who were obviously unfit were not whipped. I sentenced one man to whipping and when they stripped him I saw he was suffering from hydrocele and I altered his sentence to a one rupee fine and he came to me and said he would rather be whipped than pay the fine. But I said he could not be whipped.

Q. After that were steps taken to see that the men were examined?

A. I saw them myself. I could not examine them medically as I had no knowledge.

27 November 1919.]

Mr. J. E. KROGH.

[Continued.]

Q. It may have been a bit of luck that the fact that this man was suffering from hydrocele was discovered by a layman. But you will agree with me that if that is a good reason why a man should not be flogged, that sort of thing should be looked for?

A. Yes.

Q. After this case were any steps taken to make sure that a competent person should examine every prisoner?

A. After that the whippings all took place in the jail and the men must have been examined there.

Q. If the whippings took place in public there was no provision for medical examination?

A. None.

Q. Where were they examined in the jail?

A. In the jail no man is whipped unless he is medically examined.

Q. Can you tell me as regards your own cases on those two days what was the age of the oldest person whom you sentenced to be flogged?

A. I should say about 35, Sir.

Q. And had you any cases of young persons?

A. Down to about 20 years of age.

Q. Did you, in sentencing them, have regard to their caste or to their social status?

A. The men I whipped were all men of the lower strata of life. They were all men of the servant class and menial class.

Q. In the cases that you tried like that were any of the accused represented by a pleader or anything of that sort?

A. No, Sir.

Q. How long a time elapsed between the actual arrest and the whipping?

A. I cannot tell you, some of them had been arrested the night before and were flogged the next morning. The flogging took place at about 10 o'clock and they were in the lock-up possibly for 12 hours before being flogged.

Q. They would be arrested, say in the case you mentioned, at 1-30 or some time on the night of the 16th-17th and they would be brought before you on the morning of the 17th and tried and the sentence carried out the same morning?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they told that if they wanted to call evidence they would get an adjournment for the purpose?

A. Yes, I asked them if they had any evidence to produce and they said they were alone and had none.

Q. Were they asked if they would like to consult anybody or take any advice?

A. No, that I did not say to them.

Q. You simply asked them if they had any witnesses?

A. That is all.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—*

Q. I think the procedure was that only the constable or the person who arrested them, only he made a deposition before you that the man was arrested at such and such a time?

A. It was not only constables, they were also arrested by the Indian Defence Force.

Q. It was only the one man who arrested him?

A. No, in the case of the Indian Defence Force it may have been three or four of them at the same time.

Q. Did you examine one person or all four of them?

A. Sometimes three or four.

Q. Was there any evidence before you that the arrested people belong to the criminal classes?

A. No.

Q. Was any evidence produced before you that they intended to do any mischief?

A. No, they had already done the mischief, they had disobeyed the order.

Q. Except that?

A. Nothing else, no.

Q. And was there any evidence produced as to what was their caste and what was their status?

A. In taking a man's name, I took his caste and his status. The accused gave me that himself.

Q. That is as to what his status was?

A. His caste and status; I would ask him what his occupation was and he would tell me.

Q. From the record will it appear as to what time he was arrested?

A. Yes, it would be apparent where he was arrested and at what particular hour.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—*

Q. Did you notice any instances of students taking a prominent part in the proceedings you have described about molesting people in tongas and that sort of thing?

A. I did not myself see those cases; I was on duty at the Station, but I was informed that there were students amongst them.

Q. Did you see students at all?

A. Yes, the station was visited all day long by numbers of students, many of whom had badges on their arms, or other distinguishing badges showing that they were prominently identifying themselves with the movement.

Q. As regards the severity of the sentence of flogging, you presumably realized that you had to see that Martial Law orders were obeyed?

A. It was my duty to see that.

Q. Do you think that if you and the other Magistrates had begun by inflicting fines as the ordinary penalty for breaches of Martial Law orders, such sentences would have been sufficiently deterrent for the purpose?

A. I do not think it would have been.

Q. Do you think the practice would have led to more numerous breaches of Martial Law orders?

A. It would certainly have done so.

*By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—*

Q. You said that flogging was administered because there had been deliberate disobedience of orders?

A. Yes, in my opinion.

Q. Is a conviction not in all cases due to a deliberate disobedience of orders?

A. It would be I should say.

Q. So how do you differentiate when you say flogging was given because of a deliberate disobedience of orders? Every case is a deliberate disobedience of orders in which a conviction was held?

A. In which a conviction was held it must have been.

Q. What was the force of saying that flogging was administered because of a deliberate disobedience?

A. That was only in exercise of the discretion vested in me.

Q. But you said flogging was administered because of a deliberate disobedience?

A. Yes, that is so; I held it to be so.

Q. Every conviction implies that, so there is no special significance?

A. No special significance attached to these particular cases.

Q. You have said they were mostly cases in which they had been seen out two or three hours beyond the time they were allowed to be out?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you any cases in which people were brought before you for a less duration of time?

A. I could not tell you now what duration of time it was, but I don't think there were any cases which came to me of less than a man who was caught before 9 o'clock.

Q. One hour?

A. Yes.

Q. You convicted those also?

A. Yes.

Q. And would you have convicted also if any one had been seen out half an hour after the time?

A. It would all depend on the circumstances of the case. I cannot say whether I would have convicted, but if it was a case that required it I would have done so.

Q. My point really is this; it would certainly be a breach of the order if a man was caught only 5 minutes late?

A. I acquitted some, but I cannot say if I would if a man was a few minutes late.

27 November 1919.] Mr. J. E. KEOUGH—concluded—Lt.-Col. the Hon'ble W. F. NORTH.

Q. You acquitted some ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Merely because they were out for a short time ?  
 A. No, where a man was obviously overtaken by the Curfew signal, where he was possibly a servant of some gentleman going home, and if I found that he was caught anywhere near his home, that he actually was going home, I held he was going home and acquitted him.  
 Q. I suppose the sentences when passed were immediately carried out ?  
 A. They were immediately carried out.  
 Q. About the presence of a medical man and medical examinations I suppose it is a rule in jails that no one is flogged unless he is medically examined ?  
 A. As a Magistrate I have sentenced people to sentences of flogging and the man has been sent back to me pronounced unfit for flogging, and I have had to alter the sentence.  
 Q. So I take it that is a regular rule that no one should be flogged unless he is medically examined ?  
 A. Medically examined in the jail.  
 Q. That did not apply to floggings outside ?  
 A. It did not ; the day I administered floggings outside there was no medical man present outside.  
 Q. Do you not think the rule applies to the people and not to the place ? The object is to see that weak persons are not flogged ; it does not matter whether they are flogged in jail or outside ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Why was it not thought necessary to examine them outside ?  
 A. I am not out to criticise the orders of my superiors. My superiors did not order it, and I carried out my orders.  
 Q. And you said these people who were flogged before you were all of them men of the lower strata of society ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. And therefore I take it they were generally illiterate ?  
 A. I do not say they were all illiterate, some might have been able to read and write.  
 Q. Perhaps one in a hundred might have been ?  
 A. I could not give you the proportion, there are so many who can read and write now.  
 Q. At any rate not educated people ?  
 A. They were not what you call educated but I do not think they were illiterate.  
 Q. They might know reading and writing ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Did you take any evidence that the men who were brought before you knew about the orders ?  
 A. They all knew about the orders. They obviously knew from the statements they made.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Do you know whether the civil and criminal courts were open or closed from the 11th to the 13th ?  
 A. The criminal and civil courts were closed from the 11th to the 13th. I think it was on the 14th that the Treasury Officer alone was able to return to his duties. The courts did not open till the 22nd.

By the President—

Q. What is the ordinary vacation at that time ?  
 A. From the 18th to the 21st were holidays, but from the 11th to the 17th the courts were not open.  
 Q. What was the reason for their not opening ?  
 A. The disturbances commenced here on the night of the 19th.  
 Q. I take it it was not safe ?  
 A. Personally I was not able to go as I was at the station from the 10th to the 13th afternoon ; and the other courts were certainly not open till the 14th.  
 Q. Have you any personal knowledge as to whether the High Courts were sitting from the 11th to the 14th ?  
 A. I have no personal knowledge.  
 Q. Have you any knowledge that any cases were decided by the subordinate judges ?  
 A. I have personal knowledge that no cases were decided by the subordinate judges. They were all on duty in different parts of the city.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. May I take it that from the 11th to the 14th the criminal magistrates were not doing their ordinary work because they were posted in different parts of the city ?  
 A. It was considered that the courts should not be held.  
 Q. Were any such orders passed ?  
 A. Not that I have seen except the orders posting these magistrates.  
 Q. Is it not a fact that on every occasion when a big fair takes place the criminal magistrates are assigned different duties and they do not hold their regular courts on those days ?  
 A. I do not know.  
 Q. Take for instance the *Ram Naumi* affair, are not magistrates assigned different duties on occasions like this ?  
 A. Not except there are holidays. On such days the court is closed and a magistrate may be on a different duty.  
 Q. How many subordinate magistrates are there ?  
 A. About six.  
 Q. And the treasury was open ?  
 A. I believe it was.

Lt.-Col. the Hon'ble W. F. NORTH, Officer Commanding Fort, Lahore

By the President—

Q. You are Officer Commanding the Lahore Fort ?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. You commanded at the fort for some time prior to these disturbances ?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. Were you in the habit of going out daily about the city ?  
 A. Not in the city.  
 Q. For some time prior to the 10th of April last did you notice any thing about the demeanour of the people whom you met ?  
 A. They had changed considerably from two years before.  
 Q. Then coming to the period of the riots did you notice any of the incidents of the 10th of April ?  
 A. No, not on the 10th, we were all down at the club at six o'clock.  
 Q. On the morning of the 11th did you notice anything ?  
 A. I was making arrangements round the fort and while I was just getting back to my orderly room a message came up from the sergeant of the guard to say that

a very large and noisy crowd had collected outside the iron rails at the gates of the fort—the only entrance—so I hurried down at once to see and I found that there was a very large crowd outside the gate. The crowd was very dense, probably several thousands. I found that they were trying to pull the rails down and they were abusing all the men who were standing just inside the gate.

Q. In what sort of language were they abusing them ?  
 A. There was one expression that I heard a good many times which I was told afterwards meant " let us kill the white pigs ". This expression was shouted at us.  
 Q. Was anything else done ?  
 A. They were trying effectively to pull the gates down.  
 Q. Did they adopt any threatening attitude ?  
 A. They were armed with *lathis* and bamboos with iron axes fixed on at the top.  
 Q. Were any missiles thrown ?  
 A. Not through the rails but when a young officer was going out of the fort—he was in charge of the clothing department—he had a great deal of trouble in getting out of the gate—he was going on his motor bicycle ;



27 November 1919.]

Lt-Col. the Hon'ble W. F. NORMAN.

[Continued.]

and as he went away they threw brickbats at him but he got away without apparently being touched, but they threw a great quantity of stuff after him.

Q. Did they spit at you ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was that done by one or two or were there many cases ?

A. They were doing it all along the circular road. I saw this personally at a period before the 10th. They were spitting through the rails and at the men.

Q. In what state was the crowd when you saw them ?

A. They were very hostile. They were trying to pull the rails down.

Q. Did the crowd seem to be in a state to respect law and order ?

A. No, in fact it looked at one time that we would have to fire.

Q. I think you reinforced your guard ?

A. Directly I got a message I rushed about twenty men down to reinforce the guard.

Q. Had you given any orders as to what was to be done ?

A. I gave them orders that the crowd should not be allowed to try and pull down the rails.

Q. Was it possible for the rails to have given way with the number of people pushing them ?

A. They were pretty stout rails but there were five or six thousand people. The weight of the people might have brought them down.

Q. How long did the crowd continue in front of the gate ?

A. I suppose it must have been from 8 o'clock up to noon.

Q. And during that time the crowd showed a defiant attitude ?

A. Yes, the crowd gradually grew from a crowd to a mob during that period.

Q. Were you on the fort walls overlooking the Badshahi Mosque when a large meeting was held ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you notice whether an official was assaulted ?

A. As far as I could see the crowd was very hostile. With our glasses we could see that there was a party made up of a mixed crowd who were hustling some one. They were hustling him with the idea of pushing him down the steps.

Q. Were you on the wall along with other officers ?

A. Yes.

Q. What attitude did the crowd adopt ?

A. When we showed ourselves they began to shake their fists and put out their tongues.

Q. At about what time was that ?

A. It is hard to say. It would be about midday. It was very difficult to fix the time as I had to make arrangements inside the fort.

Q. Were you making arrangements in the fort to deal with any contingency that might arise ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you consider the situation a serious one ?

A. It was serious for the fort because we were entirely isolated from the rest of the town.

Q. What forces had you in the fort ?

A. I had before Colonel Johnson sent me reinforcements about 120 men all told. He sent me reinforcements for the purpose of garrisoning the waterworks.

Q. Did you hear that the crowd were fired on some time later ?

A. Yes, they were fired on by the police at a point where the road comes out of the city very nearly due south of the fort.

Q. Was that subsequent in time to what you observed ?

A. Yes, Sir, that was during the afternoon.

Q. I see you say that you noticed two policemen fire in the air ?

A. We all did because we were looking to see what would happen. The police were trying to push them back into the city. And two policemen deliberately fired into the air. We could see the flash and the smoke go above the crowd. Their rifles were at an angle of 45

degrees. And at the time I mentioned it to another officer—why are the police firing in the air ?

Q. I think you got a message to be ready to handle a large hostile crowd moving through the city in the direction of the fort ?

A. Yes, a telephone message came to the effect that a very large crowd were coming out of the city. I had already had orders to assemble at the south gate of the Badshahi Mosque where there was cavalry. I rushed about 100 men on to the south wall at once with two Lewis guns.

Q. How far was that from the crowd ?

A. I should think inside 300 yards.

Q. On that occasion what was the demeanour of the crowd ?

A. Well as far we could make out they were taking with them some body for burial and the crowd when they came out tried to break up from the road down towards the south gate of the Badshahi Mosque. When they saw us they stopped and jeered and shook their fists. There was a good deal of shouting. Of course they were too far away to offer any violence but they were shaking their *lathis* and making a great deal of noise.

Q. On any of the subsequent days did you take any measures to deal with the crowd ?

A. No, Sir, we were not troubled.

Q. Were you kept in the fort ?

A. We were kept in the fort for seven days.

Q. During that time were you isolated ?

A. Yes.

Q. How did you communicate ?

A. We had our signal station at the top of the tower. We signalled to the cantonments.

Q. Did you think it safe to allow a single man to leave the fort ?

A. No man was allowed to leave the fort for seven days ; and after that in parties of ten with their rifles.

Q. Were these precautions in your opinion necessary in view of the situation ?

A. Yes, Sir. I communicated with the Officer Commanding, Civil Area, to get sanction that the men might be allowed to go out as they had been shut in. He agreed that they should not go out singly but that they should go out in parties of ten and that they should take their rifles. They had to be back in the fort by six o'clock.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin.—

Q. Did they use the fort during Martial Law for any special purpose ?

A. Yes, for prisoners.

Q. How many prisoners did you have at the beginning of this time to look after ?

A. I first had four sent up to me. They had chits on them to say that they were very bad and that they should be carefully looked after. Then there came a lot of students. They were about four or five hundred. I think these came from the various colleges. That would be the occasion when a party of them and their professors were marched to the fort. I think there must have been over 400 because I had two long double lines drawn up when they were marched in.

Q. Apart from that were any locked up during the period of Martial Law ?

A. I think only three men were locked up and confined. The guard room was very small. I had room for three.

Q. A party of students who came—were they with you for any length of time ?

A. They were with me for about thirty-six hours.

Q. Where were they kept during their stay ?

A. It was very hot in the day so we put them in the Darbar Hall, a very big place with pillars, and at night time we put them on the top of the roof after the sun had gone down. I had no men to guard them so I put them on the top where they would be safe. I put a sentry at the bottom. It was about 60 feet up.

Q. Speaking broadly were their conditions during their confinement quite reasonable ?

27 November 1919.]

Lt.-Col. the Hon'ble W. F. NORTH.

[Continued.]

A. As much as we could do for them we did. They had cooks for Hindus and cooks for Muhammadans and they had their own *bhistis* and sweepers and I had a party of 18 Afghans who were sent in too and they were accommodated in the same way.

Q. Was the fort used for carrying out punishments at all?

A. No, Sir. I had some of them whipped for misbehaving themselves. They were given six light strokes by our Police Sergeant.

Q. These were people who misbehaved themselves in the fort?

A. Yes, Sir. I had no punishment given outside.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. On the day on which these rails were being pulled was any meeting going to be held at the Badshahi Mosque?

A. I could not tell you, Sir. I was up at the fort and this crowd was notified to me by the commander of my guard.

Q. I want to know whether you consider that the crowd was collecting there because a meeting was going to be held and a part of that crowd misbehaved or as a matter of fact the object of the crowd was to assault the fort?

A. I think the object of the crowd was to get into the fort.

Q. Had any of them any fire-arms or any other kind of arms?

A. They had *lathis* and some of them had iron rings on top of them.

Q. About this pointing of fingers and putting out their tongues which you saw, you saw it through your glasses?

A. No, Sir. The men that were down at the gate of the fort saw them. They were then 20 feet from them. But the men in a body at the Badshahi Mosque I distinctly saw with my glasses.

Q. When were you asked for the first time to give your statement to this committee?

A. About three weeks ago.

Q. Before this you were never asked to detail these facts either in connection with the Badshahi Mosque case or the other riot case?

A. I went down to Amritsar about the middle of May while Martial Law was going on. I did not get back here till the end of October.

Q. The fact that they were trying to pull down the railings, was it anywhere reported?

A. No, in fact we did not allow it.

Q. What I mean to say is that a sort of diary is kept, and I want to know whether this fact, that on the 11th a large crowd came and wanted to pull down the railings, is entered in that diary?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Had you given that information to General Beynon?

A. I think I told Colonel Johnson.

Q. There is no entry anywhere that there was an attempt made to pull down the railings, is there no written information anywhere to that effect?

A. If there had been any serious steps taken to repulse the crowd, it would appear in the official report.

Q. About this firing, on what date did you see this firing?

A. Well, Sir, it might have been the afternoon of the 11th, or it might have been the 12th. I could not say exactly. I would not commit myself to which date it was, but it is one of the dates.

Q. Is it not a fact that the firing on the 12th did take place when it was night?

A. Not at this particular spot. I could not say which date it was. I think it must have been on the occasion when Colonel Johnson had marched through the city and his rear-guard had been attacked. We saw two men fire in the air.

Q. Could you see Hira Mandi from where you were in the Fort?

A. I don't know whether it comes out of the city.

Q. There are two or three mosques near by, could you see them?

A. No, I could not see the mosques.

Q. If there were any low buildings near the mosque, would they be visible to you?

A. No, Sir, because the street comes right down like that and turns away towards the Taksali gate.

Q. So the firing which you saw was probably on the 10th?

A. No, Sir, certainly not.

Q. You are quite certain?

A. I am quite certain.

Q. It might be on the 10th, I suggest it?

A. No.

Q. Practically you say there was no firing on the 11th, it was probably on the 12th?

A. Yes.

Q. That is, it was the occasion when Colonel Johnson went inside the city?

A. I think it must be so.

Q. Did you report this to the police officers or to anybody else?

A. No, it is no business of ours.

Q. Now about the behaviour of the students, was any complaint made to anybody, was any attempt made to find out who they were? I am talking of what happened before the 10th. Some boys misbehaved themselves. Was any attempt made to find out who the boys were?

A. No.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. You had 100 men in the Fort?

A. About that.

Q. Had you any machine guns?

A. I think there were 6 of the old Vickers maxim guns, and I had 4 Lewis guns of the old pattern.

Q. Any artillery in the Fort?

A. There are 63 old-fashioned ones and 4 field guns.

Q. The old 15-pounder?

A. Yes.

Q. Then it is a large fort besides the garrison?

A. It is a mile and half round.

Q. Does it contain a large amount of Government stores and ammunition?

A. It is full of Government stores and ammunition.

Q. If the mob had succeeded in breaking down that gate and getting in would you have kept them back?

A. Yes, Sir, because we had machine guns on the wall. They were all moveable and we could have moved them about.

Q. If they have broken down that gate, you would have considered it absolutely necessary to fire?

A. Quite so.

Q. Did those students who were in the Fort make any complaints to you regarding their treatment?

A. No, Sir. We provided them everything according to their religion. Everything they had was their own, they had their own cooks, their own rations, their own *bhistis*. Everything was supplied to them individually. They had plenty to eat and were not put to any discomfort.

Q. Was their behaviour all right?

A. Excellent. I had to warn them as to what would happen if they misbehaved. I had at one time nearly 600 prisoners.

Q. You say that you think the date when the police fired was the 12th?

A. I am quite certain, because I was in the Gymkhana Club at the time, and I did not get away from the Club until after 9 o'clock because of the crowds.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. Now this railing outside the Fort, is it a very strong railing?

A. Quite sufficiently strong. If there is anybody to maintain it from behind it is strong enough but a crowd could quite easily pull it down.

Q. And the crowd at the time was sufficiently strong to do it?

27 November 1919.] Lt.-Col. the Hon'ble W. F. NORTH—continued—SAYAD MUHAMMAD SHAH.

A. They were five or six thousand strong.  
 Q. Did they damage any railing at all?  
 A. No.  
 Q. And you said that Lieut. Tapp went out of the Fort. Did he go through the crowd?  
 A. Yes, he had to go through the crowd.  
 Q. He went alone?  
 A. He went on his motor bicycle.  
 Q. He was not hurt in any way?  
 A. Luckily he was not hurt, but they were throwing brickbats and stones.  
 Q. When such a large crowd had been throwing stones, don't you think that some one from such a large crowd, through which he passed, would have hurt him?  
 A. It all depends. He got on to his motor bicycle. It had a self-starter.  
 Q. The crowd being very thick and he being aimed at by the crowd, don't you think that even one would strike him?  
 A. It was curious. I never heard that he had been hurt. He did not complain.  
 Q. Now about this, you say "I had a telephone message to be ready to handle a large hostile crowd moving through the city in direction of the Fort. This was found to be a big procession taking the bodies of some people killed by the firing to be buried. The demeanour of the crowd on emerging from the city was so threatening, great shouting and shaking of fists, that, owing to orders I had received to keep the space opposite to the south

gate of the Badshahi Mosque clear, I rushed 100 men on to the south wall of Fort to support the cavalry picket down below us. I also had some Lewis guns on the wall. I was quite certain at the time that if we had not had the men quickly on to the wall, the crowd would have tried to rush the Badshahi Mosque gate. From the wall to the road on which the crowd were, is not more than 200 yards at the most." What was the objection to the crowd going into the Badshahi mosque?

A. I had received written orders or orders given by signal that nobody should be allowed inside the mosque.

Q. There are no Military stores there?

A. No, but those were my orders.

Q. In your opinion no harm would have resulted if they had gone into the mosque?

A. I had no opinion of my own, but I had orders that nobody should be allowed inside the mosque.

Q. Don't you know among the Muhammadans it is considered a very good thing to hold funeral prayers in an important mosque?

A. I don't know that.

Q. That crowd was, I notice from this paragraph quite orderly in the sense that it did not molest anybody?

A. I would not like to say orderly. I would say it was very hostile in its attitude and it was shouting at us. If the cavalry had not been there, they would have gone into the mosque. There is no doubt about that. There was a procession coming and it went off, but the crowds did not molest anybody.

#### SAYAD MUHAMMAD SHAH, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Lahore.

By the President—

Q. You are an Extra Assistant Commissioner at Lahore?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On the 6th April, were you at the kutchery?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You were posted there by the Deputy Commissioner?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What instructions did you get?

A. I had to sit there in the Deputy Commissioner's place and receive all communications from different quarters. As the pickets were posted they had to send me the messages by telephone and these I had to communicate to the proper places.

Q. At about half-past 11 you got information as to a large crowd that was gathering?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you got that information did you accompany the City Inspector to the place where it had assembled?

A. Yes Sir, I did.

Q. Would you tell us what you saw on that day as regards the conduct of the crowd?

A. I met them in the bazar near the Lohari Gate. They were in thousands, bare headed, and they were shouting "Rowlatt Bill ki Jai" At the same time they were not allowing anybody to pass by that street. They even told me to take off my turban which I did, because I knew that if I did not do so there would be trouble which I wanted to avoid. They did not allow any person to pass by those two bazars and they gathered both in Anarkali and in the Changar Mohalla behind Anarkali because they did not want people to pass by that route.

Q. Was that at the time when the City Inspector was with you?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did he endeavour to get the mob to return?

A. He requested them because it was impossible to make any endeavour at the time.— He and I requested some of them that they should change the route because that was not the Bradlaugh Hall route. They were very much excited and they threatened to assault him. Practically they lifted their hands, but I came in between and said that we should stick to what we had decided and I took him aside to a street and asked him to go away, otherwise there was a great danger of his being assaulted.

Q. About this time the City Inspector went one way and you went another way?

A. He left, and then I was alone.

Q. Were you alone with the mob?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Where did you go to with the mob?

A. Of course I had also brought with me one of the orderlies of the Deputy Commissioner so that I might send news to the Deputy Commissioner where he should meet, because I found that it was not safe for European officers to walk on the streets as the mob was very much excited and their appearance would aggravate matters. So I asked him to come to a safe place near the Nila Gumbaz, and I sent for them there.

Q. Did you think that there was a prospect of the mob resorting to violence?

A. Of course, much toleration was shown by the authorities otherwise there was every chance of a great trouble.

Q. When you accompanied the mob as far as the Nila Gumbaz, did you find the Deputy Commissioner, the Superintendent of Police and some other police officers?

A. Yes, Sir, they had come there.

Q. On that point, as we have heard already, you managed to get the mob to go in the direction of Bradlaugh Hall?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think we have got the incidents of that day, and therefore I shall not trouble you. Now on the night of the 9th April, were you put in charge of the Ram Naumi procession along with Lala Ram Lal and the City Kotwal?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did that procession start at about 7 o'clock and reach Dabbi Bazar at about 1 o'clock in the morning?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. That was one o'clock on the morning of the 10th?

A. Yes, Sir, exactly.

Q. During the route what was the attitude of the people forming the procession? Did they make any references to Government or Government action?

A. Well, Sir, in the speeches of course some references were made but not by the general public. Only the speakers who made the speeches made certain references.

Q. Were speeches made at different points where the procession halted?

A. Yes, Sir.

27 November 1919.]

SAYAD MUHAMMAD SHAH.

[Continued.]

Q. What sort of speeches did they make about the Government?

A. They were on Hindu-Muhammadan unity, that was the subject.

Q. Did they say anything defying Government or anything of that sort?

A. They said 'we should not care for this. We should only unite together. Then we need not fear anybody.' Naturally there are two parties, one is Government and the other is the public. So any reference in which the Government is not respected or its officials are not respected, it means that they avoided it.

Q. Was that the ordinary sort of *Ram Naumi* procession to which you have been accustomed in the past or was that anything different?

A. Quite different, Sir.

Q. What was the difference?

A. *Ram Naumi* procession is held on the birthday of Maharaja Ramchandarji. On that sacred occasion generally, processions are formed with the object of explaining certain historical events and certain poems are recited and ceremonies performed, but nothing of the kind was done in this procession. Instead of all this the attitude of the people was so rude that they did not allow any Honorary Magistrate or respectable gentleman of the town to join them, and secondly they had particularly requested the Deputy Commissioner to put me in charge of this procession and nobody else. When I went there, I saw that none of the City fathers were there. All the leaders who had signed the meeting to protest against the Rowlatt Bill were there in place of the old leaders, and those leaders were garlanded and they led the procession.

Q. Does it come to this, that this procession became rather a political demonstration than a religious procession?

A. Quite so, Sir.

Q. I think you reported what you say the next morning or on the morning of the 10th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. After the stone-throwing incident on the 10th, were you put in charge of the Anarkali Civil Area?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you continue in charge till the 25th April?

A. Yes, Sir, with the exception of one day when Martial Law was declared I was sent back to do my ordinary duties, but again I was recalled under the Martial Law orders.

Q. What sort of duties during that period did you discharge?

A. My duty was to see that nothing happened in those places, that there was no breach of the peace in the Anarkali Bazar, because it is a very important place in this town. It is a road which leads to the Upper Mall, and most of the respectable citizens of the town, Rases and gentlemen of all classes, Pleaders and others, generally pass by that bazar. From morning till evening, people pass by that side, and I had to see that no breach occurred.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Were you here in the time of Mr. Tollinton?

A. Yes, Sir. I came here in September. For two or three months I worked under him.

Q. Do you know that his best endeavours were directed towards bringing about Hindu-Muhammadan unity?

A. It may be so, I was his subordinate.

Q. Do you know that at such big fairs he used to give Sanads to people who had endeavoured to bring about Hindu-Moslem unity?

A. Everywhere it is done.

Q. I am asking you about Lahore. At such big fairs if he knew that everything had passed off smoothly and that any person had done his best to bring about Hindu-Muhammadan unity, Sanads were issued by Mr. Tollinton. Do you know anything about it?

A. I don't remember. I have not seen anything.

Q. You said for one day you did your ordinary duty?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What was that date?

A. I don't exactly remember. It may be the 16th or 17th.

Q. Approximately it would be either the 16th or the 17th when you did your ordinary duties as an Extra Assistant Commissioner?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Do you remember hearing any speeches where any speaker gave expression to his views saying that they would turn out the British Government from India or did you hear any disrespectful references towards the King-Emperor?

A. I cannot exactly give you the names, because it was not my duty to record these things. This was the duty of other officers. I had to look to the arrangements.

Q. Practically you were not always present at the points where the speeches were delivered?

A. Yes, I was always present.

Q. If you were, you may have heard those speakers?

A. I did.

Q. Then I want to know whether in any one of those speeches any one had said anything disrespectful towards the King-Emperor?

A. I do not mean to say that they openly said anything. As an Indian Judge, you know that when we talk in the vernacular sometimes it has a double meaning, and so they were speaking in this way.

Q. Therefore you say that ironical speeches were made?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Against the King-Emperor?

A. I cannot say so, not against the King-Emperor.

Q. I want to know if any ironical speeches were made against the King-Emperor?

A. The King-Emperor was not mentioned.

Q. Were any speeches made to sever the connection of the British Empire?

A. No, not in that way.

Q. Therefore according to you anything that was said was against the officials, against the Local Government or against the Deputy Commissioner or the Commissioner, that is against the Government?

A. Deputy Commissioners and His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor were not in question. It was a question against the Government.

Q. And therefore the Government constituted by whom?

A. The Government is constituted by all the officials.

Q. Therefore I want to know whether there was any resentment against something done by the officials, against the King-Emperor or against the British Empire?

A. We people are generally sent by the Government to look after these things and we are in charge of these things. Generally we know people give due respect to us and the mob always obeys our orders, but on that day we were altogether absolutely ignored. We were there as their guests. You know, Sir, that processions are generally carried on under certain licenses, and in those licenses conditions are laid down which are explained to the conveners.

Q. Therefore I understand that because the mob did not show that respect which was due to you, you took them to be disrespectful?

A. Personally, I don't mind that. They were not respecting the conditions of the license which was issued to them by the authorities.

Q. When you say that there was a defiance of authority, do you mean that the procession was not caring for the conditions that were laid down in the license that was issued to them?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Now what was the condition that was laid down?

A. Generally, the condition is that the procession should go on smoothly because, you know, Sir, that it was just after the excitement of the 6th April. So Government very liberally,—of course it should not have been allowed,—allowed them to have this procession. They had not expressly told that on this occasion they will hold public meetings and will give political speeches,

27 November 1919.]

SAYAD MUHAMMAD SHAH.

[Continued.]

but if they had done so that would have been quite a different thing.

Q. I have not yet understood. What was the condition in the license issued to the procession, there should be no violence used, is it not so?

A. Not only violence.

Q. What was the condition of which there was a breach?

A. It rests with the authorities.

Q. I want to know what was the condition of which there was a breach. Will you kindly give me the words of that condition? What was the breach of the order that was made? Was it that the procession should not stop, or that there should be no violence used? Is it not so? What was the condition of which there was a breach?

A. It rests with the authorities to see what sort of processions should be allowed.

Q. I want to know what was the conditions of which there was a breach. Will you kindly give me the conditions which were not observed?

A. Instructions were that they should not cause obstructions. They obstructed and people were not allowed to pass through that street, because they were holding meetings and making speeches. I had to manage to let people pass through that street. It was not in the conditions of the license. They halted at places and thousands of people would collect and they could not be let to have the place at their pleasure.

Q. Again I request you to give me the condition of the license of which there was a breach.

A. That was that they should not obstruct the streets.

Q. Was it in that license?

A. They should not obstruct the streets. They should pass on smoothly; they should not sit somewhere.

Q. Was it stated in the license that they should not stop at any place?

A. I have not seen the license exactly.

Q. You have not seen the license?

A. No.

Q. Therefore you cannot say as to what were the words of the license?

A. At least I knew my own duties.

Q. I am not concerned with your duties. You have not seen the license and therefore you are not aware of it. That is what I want to know.

A. I was only in charge to see that no breach occurred.

Q. I know that. I know what your duty was. I want to know this as a matter of fact. You had not seen the license and therefore you were not aware of the conditions of the license?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the number of the crowd? Was that about 15,000 or 20,000 or more than that?

A. It might be more than that.

Q. And according to you a procession in which there are more than 20,000 persons would not obstruct any road, street or bye-lane?

A. If they do not sit.

Q. You were not aware that they were prohibited from sitting or stopping any where by the Deputy Commissioner?

A. I had to use my own discretion.

Q. I am not concerned with your discretion just now. I will come to it in a minute. So far as the order of the Deputy Commissioner was concerned, were they prohibited from stopping or from sitting any where?

A. There were no express instructions to me.

Q. Have you seen any *Muharram* procession in your life?

A. Yes, many, Sir.

Q. Is it not a fact that every *tazia* that passes through a street passes 10, 20 or 30 yards, then stops for 5 minutes, 10 minutes or 15 minutes, and then again passes, then stops and again proceeds? Is that your experience or not?

Q. Yes.

Q. And you considered that also to be a breach of the license?

A. No.

Q. Are you or are you not in favour of Hindu-Muhammadan unity?

A. Yes, certainly.

Q. Do you or do you not know that this disagreement between the Hindus and Muhammadans has been made much of by the officials here so far as the granting of reforms is concerned?

A. Yes, I know.

Q. Then if any person tries to bring about Hindu-Muhammadan unity, is he to be condemned or to be praised?

A. Yes, he is to be praised, but... (not completed).

Q. What is your qualification?

A. If in reality there is Hindu-Muhammadan union, it is welcome. Merely making a show on certain occasions, which of course as an Indian you as well as myself know, is done generally. They were simply showing it one night just after the occurrences of the 6th. If it meant to make a show to anyone, it must be to Government, I think, and to nobody else.

Q. I think you are in touch with Muhammadan opinion or with Muhammadan feelings.

A. Yes, both.

Q. You must have been reading newspapers of the last three or four months?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. Do you not agree that a great change has come about in the Hindu-Muhammadan relations, during the last six months?

A. I do not agree with you.

Q. Do you or do you not know that there have been no riots on the *Bakr-Id* occasion throughout the Province this time? That is the important occasion when the Hindus and Muhammadans quarrel?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you or are you not aware that throughout this country, there have been no quarrels between Hindus and Muhammadans during the last *Bakr-Id* festival?

A. Yes.

Q. There have been no quarrels and riots?

A. Not in this Province.

Q. Have you heard that there have been any riots anywhere else during the last *Bakr-Id* occasion and quarrels between the Hindus and Muhammadans, either in Calcutta, Madras, Bombay or the United Provinces?

A. There were riots in Katarpur.

Q. Was there a riot in Katarpur this year?

A. Of course I cannot say.

Q. Was there been any riot between Hindus and Muhammadans on the *Bakr-Id* occasion this year throughout the length and breadth of India?

A. No.

Q. Don't you think that this is a very great achievement?

A. Because the Katarpur trial was going on and they had already done a good deal.

Q. So you think that this was the result of the Katarpur trial. May I understand, according to you, that this Hindu-Muhammadan unity was the result of the Katarpur trial which was going on?

A. I do not mean that.

Q. No riots did take place?

A. Riots did not take place.

Q. It was the result of Katarpur affair?

A. It was not concluded yet. Only a few months ago it has been concluded. They might be watching the results.

Q. Who?

A. The Hindus and Muhammadans, both.

Q. That would prevent Muhammadans from killing cows in the way which was objectionable to the Hindus?

A. That I do not say. That might have.

Q. When you refer to the Katarpur case, do you mean to say that because the Hindus were being tried for what had happened the previous year, therefore Muhammadans did not resort to cow-killing this year?

A. Muhammadans generally do not kill cows.

Q. No question of generally killing. You quite understand my meaning. May I understand that you mean

27 November 1919.]

SAYAD MUHAMMAD SHAH.

[Continued.]

to say that because the Hindus were being prosecuted in the Katarpur case and the trial had not finished, therefore Muhammadans abstained from doing anything which might be resented by the Hindus and there were no riots. Is that your meaning?

A. I do not mean that.

Q. In many places, Muhammadans abstained from killing cows this time?

A. I do not say they abstained. My words are generally the Muhammadans do not kill cows in our Province. Only goats, etc., are killed.

Q. You are bent upon hair-splitting. Why did the Muhammadans who are generally in the habit of killing cows abstain from killing cows on the last *Bakr-Id* occasion?

A. They might have killed.

Q. Has it not been the endeavour of every Muhammadan and every Hindu who wanted to prevent these quarrels during the last three years to do their best to take part in each other's festivals? You are reading newspapers. On the *Muharram* occasion, on the *Dussehra* occasion, and on other big festivals, have you or have you not read that the Muhammadans took part in Hindu festivals and that the Hindus took part in Muhammadan festivals?

A. They did sometimes.

Q. Therefore this is not the only festival in which the Hindus and Muhammadans made a show of their unity, on the *Ram Navami* day?

A. That was an unparalleled affair. This was never done before.

Q. Is not *Ram Navami* a day previous to the *tazia*?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you not read in the newspaper that on the last *Dussehra* occasion all over the Province Muhammadans joined the Hindus and took part in the festival and they arranged for meals and refreshments at all these places? Have you not read that?

A. Yes. I was also in charge of *Dussehra* in Kasur and I saw these things. I remember every year Hindus and Muhammadans used to do things in this way.

Q. As a thoughtful Muhammadan, I think you will agree with me that this is such a big question that you cannot bring about genuine and real reconciliation all at once in a large country where 700 lakhs are Muhammadans and the remainder Hindus. Efforts are required and a beginning has to be made.

A. If pious and honest efforts are made.

Q. You judge the results from efforts or anything else?

A. I do not agree with the way in which efforts are made; they were hasty.

Q. Do you judge the effort by the results or by anything else?

A. Yes.

Q. As a Muhammadan are you not prepared to say that during the last six months, the relations between Hindus and Muhammadans have improved greatly?

A. Provided everything is done in confidence with the Government. Of course if you think that we should go on doing these things secretly, in which our Government cannot trust us, I do not agree with you.

Q. I never asked you as to whether that was good, bad or indifferent. I wanted to know in fact whether or not you agree with me that during the last six months the relations between Hindus and Muhammadans have improved. It may be a very objectionable thing; that is a different matter, and I will come to that subsequently. Do you or do you not agree that during the last six months, the relations between Hindus and Muhammadans throughout the whole of India have greatly improved?

A. Do you mean the educated classes of Hindus and Muhammadans or Muhammadans and Hindus in general?

Q. In general and educated classes in particular?

A. Then my reply would be that the relations between Hindus and Muhammadans in general before were most good, and better in the case of the masses with the old leaders than now.

Q. You are quite competent to hold your own views. Therefore you say that the relations between Hindus and

Muhammadans now existing are not better, but are worse than what they were?

A. Only in cities, not in the rural areas, where they did not know what people were meaning.

Q. So far as cities are concerned, the relations between Hindus and Muhammadans are worse than they were before?

A. I think so, because they are not honestly doing things.

Q. So far as educated classes are concerned, are their relations better or worse?

A. Their relations of course are becoming better.

Q. You agree with me that one of the vexed questions of the Hindus and Muhammadans was about their representation in municipal questions. Was that not one of the most important and vexed questions upon which they differed?

A. I do not study these things.

Q. You know nothing about that?

A. No.

Q. I am satisfied with that. These men who were delivering speeches were educated men. Is it not so?

A. Yes. But they were not addressing, excuse me, learned judges like yourselves. They were addressing people.

Q. You are paying me an unnecessary compliment. You are more learned than myself.

A. They were addressing the shop-keepers and illiterate people.

Q. Therefore you think the educated classes should not address masses to bring about union?

A. They should, but in the right way.

Q. In your opinion everything is wrong whenever any action done by the Government is talked about?

A. Not wrong; they can criticise, but of course respectfully.

Q. Do you mean to say. Supposing I have to criticise the action of a certain Deputy Commissioner, I should say, he is very good, he is omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, but I am sorry to say that somehow he has been misled by somebody and unconsciously has done something. Therefore (with folded hands) I pray that this should be rectified. That is the way in which this should be done?

A. No. I do not mean so. This should be brought to his notice in a respectful way. If it is not granted there are other places where this grievance should be submitted.

Q. Supposing that is done respectfully and supposing no heed is paid to that then what should be done?

A. We must go to the Commissioner.

Q. If he does not hear?

A. There is the Lieutenant-Governor.

Q. Supposing one cannot get redress from the Lieutenant-Governor? Then the best thing is to keep quiet?

A. You should make representation to the proper places not by only beating breasts.

Q. What is the proper place after the Lieutenant-Governor has declined to listen?

A. There is the Viceroy.

Q. After the Viceroy?

A. To the King.

Q. If the thing is done by the Viceroy where should you go?

A. We are subjects and have to obey their orders.

Q. Therefore we should only send a memorial to the Viceroy. If there is a grievance against something that was done by the Viceroy take, for instance, the Rowlatt Act that was the action of the Viceroy (it may be right or wrong, that is a different matter), we cannot go to the Commissioner, we cannot go to the Lieutenant-Governor, we cannot go to the Deputy Commissioner, because it is a thing that was done by a superior authority. Therefore you think that if we are aggrieved of anything that was done by the Viceroy, the only legitimate way of doing anything is to send a petition to the King, and if we do anything else, we are wrong?

27 November 1919.]

SAYAD MUHAMMAD SHAH.

[Continued.]

A. Petition may be sent to England and the matter brought to the notice of the public.

Q. The only proper way that is open to those who are aggrieved by what was done by the Viceroy and his Council is to petition the King. That is all. If he does anything else, he is wrong?

A. I do not think it is wrong, but it must be done in a decent way.

Q. What do you mean by saying it should be done in a 'decent' way in reference to political agitation?

A. Not to defy the authority in any way.

Q. Supposing we have a complaint against the authority?

A. You have no complaint. A passer-by who is a subject of the Crown and who has been passing in the street has been made to get down from his tonga, his turban taken off and Government officials are not required to interfere.

Q. I am talking of what happened on the *Ram Naumi* day about speech-making. I am only confining myself to one point. On the *Ram Naumi* day, they were delivering speeches that were defying authority. I want to get at what you mean by saying defying authority?

A. That was my personal view which I have given to you.

Q. What were the facts which came to your knowledge from which you draw the inference?

A. We heard speeches that were trembling and shivering and words were spoken, it seemed to me, as if there was an enemy whom we met. Such were the speeches that were made, and those who heard know the mode of expression, the manner and the demeanour.

Q. The mode, demeanour and the manner was not satisfactory. That is why you said these speeches were in defiance of authority. I think you must have some knowledge of political agitation at other different places, America, England, Scotland, Ireland and other places?

A. I have heard them. India is a country which has great a diversity of races. Different sorts of races are here. In America and other places, even the peasant is an educated man. Here, he is not.

Q. You are against all sorts of political agitation, unless and until it only takes the form of a petition to the higher authority. I will just leave this point. What do you mean by saying that political agitation should be made in a decent manner? If you mean that there should be no incitement to violence, I will quite agree with you. There will be no difference between your opinion and my opinion?

A. I quite agree with you here.

Q. If you mean that there should be no incitement to violence then there is no difference between you and me?

A. I quite agree with you here, Sir.

Q. No incitement to violence?

A. It covers everything.

Q. Well, I am quite satisfied. Why don't you use the words there should be no incitement to violence?

A. Yes.

Q. You know what happened on the 30th at Delhi was known all over the city on the 6th and the 10th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you are also aware that during the last three or four years there has been such an association as *Seva Samiti* and volunteers, etc. Have you heard of them?

A. Yes, Sir, I have heard of them.

Q. I believe you also know that on big occasions, fairs and *melas*, etc., during the last three years constant efforts have been made that the regulations of these *melas* and processions or the management of the whole thing should be handed over to the local management or *Seva Samitis*?

A. I am not aware of this, Sir.

Q. You have never heard of it up to this time?

A. No.

Q. You have not read in any newspaper that on big occasions, ceremonies or big fairs processions were managed by these people?

A. Sometimes when their services were required.

Q. Then you say that they do not offer their services, but their services are required?

A. I have read that.

Q. During the last three or four years various attempts have been made by various public bodies and volunteers and *Seva Samiti* to manage processions on such occasions, and these have done such good work that on and off they have been praised by Government?

A. It may be so.

Q. I am asking you that according to you the people asked that Honorary Magistrates and Municipal Commissioners should have nothing to do with this *Ram Naumi* procession. What was wrong there if they so asked the authorities?

A. But where were those on the 6th? The people assaulted Rai Ganga Ram, etc.

Q. This is a different thing. I am asking you a question as to whether or not the request that was made to the authorities that Honorary Magistrates and Municipal Commissioners should not be allowed to have anything to do with the procession, was it or was it not a part of the general movement?

A. The Deputy Commissioner might know about these things. I am not a proper person to know these things. He might have all the facts in his possession.

Q. Do you know why there was any objection to Honorary Magistrates and Municipal Commissioners?

A. I think to this I have already replied.

Q. There must be some reason?

A. You know better than myself?

Q. I am not an inhabitant of Lahore. What was the reason then?

A. You are one of us; you are an Indian.

Q. I want to know why there had been any objection?

A. Had you been here on that occasion you would have certainly known it.

Q. I don't know at all because I belong to a different province. Why was there any objection to the Honorary Magistrates and Municipal Commissioners?

A. I can only make out from the 6th incident.

Q. I don't want the 6th incident because that was before the 6th. Then why before the 6th a request was made to the Deputy Commissioner that Honorary Magistrates and Municipal Commissioners should have nothing to do with the affairs?

A. It was not for the purposes of management. Honorary Magistrates and *raisers* do simply assist. They are only required in an ornamental way to give the procession importance. In processions like the *Ram Naumi* such big people join to give it importance.

Q. These people are required to give dignity to these processions?

A. Yes.

Q. I want to know why this request was made to the Deputy Commissioner that these people should not be ornamental on that occasion?

A. The Deputy Commissioner might know these things.

Q. You don't know?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. Sayad Sahib, Can you tell us about the *Danda Fauj* of Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. Tell us what it was.

A. The people had big lathis in their hands. They were joining in a sort of crowd uttering some unpleasant words which of course I am not prepared to explain here.

Q. Used all sorts of words?

A. Certain words were used in the procession against the King and they were in a threatening mood. I received several times telephone messages that I should be ready. Mr. Grey, Inspector was with me. This party was coming from the city and going to the Upper Mall.

Q. This was the *Danda Fauj*?

A. Yes, Sir, *Danda Fauj*.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. Sayad Muhammad Shah, you have said that in spite of several requests people behaved improperly?

27 November 1919.]

SAYAD MUHAMMAD SHAH.

[Continued.]

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What did they do?

A. They were obstinate. I requested them that as it was *Ram Naumi* they should go on observing the necessary ceremonies and that they should not make it a political procession. They were making speeches which excited people and I told them that such speeches should be stopped.

Q. It was in your opinion a political procession because certain speeches of a political nature were made?

A. Yes.

Q. And you asked them not make those speeches?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And they did not comply with your requests?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And I want to know if it was for this reason that you called them behaving improperly?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And here you say that the details of the speeches and the names of the speakers had already been reported to the authorities?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You mean to say that proper reports had been made of those speeches.

A. That was not my business. They were made to the proper authorities.

Q. And the names of the speakers were also given?

A. Not by me but by the proper persons. In fact my duties were different. There were other people to record the speeches.

Q. They made their reports and given the details of the speeches.

A. Yes.

Q. Can you give us any illustration of any violent language being used against Government or any expression that may have been used?

A. May I give it in vernacular or in English?

Q. I would have it in vernacular.

A. In vernacular the sense would be better understood.

They said *Tainun aur sanun kisi da fikar nahin karna chahida. Kise kolon na daro. Apas wich ultiqar karke rahna chahida. Hor kisi da dar nahin karna chahida.*

Translation.—You should unite amongst yourselves and should not be afraid of any one else.\*

Q. Then I take it this is the illustration?

A. This is one of them. I do not exactly remember them now.

Q. This was the more violent language used?

A. There must be certain others. I gave you one of the illustrations.

Q. Others may be equally violent?

A. May be more than that.

Q. Can you give us an illustration of the more violent language?

A. Such a length of time has passed that I don't remember it.

Q. You cannot remember it?

A. Yes, I cannot.

Q. Are you aware to whom the license of this procession was issued?

A. From my memory I can say that it was Jai Gopal Tandon, one of the conveners of those processions of the *Ram Naumi*, in whose favour the license was issued. He is the man who was the Secretary of that *Sabha*. Something like that.

Q. This was issued not by you but by other authority?

A. It must have been issued by the Superintendent of Police.

Q. Did you have a copy of this license?

A. No, Sir.

\* *En.* We should not care for anyone. Fear no one. We must live in harmony. We should fear no one else.

Q. You did not have it?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever seen any license of such a procession?

A. I have seen sometimes.

Q. There are generally conditions printed on it and the routes and times are mentioned in it?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What are generally the conditions?

A. It depends upon what sort of procession it is. Times and routes are allotted according to its importance.

Q. But what are generally the conditions?

A. I don't remember exactly.

Q. You have no idea of them?

A. No.

Q. Are there any prohibitions for the procession not to stop at any particular place for any short time?

A. There are general conditions under the Police Act. Routes are obstructed for an hour or two and there is no room for the people to pass.

Q. Is it not reasonable for the procession to stop for a short time?

A. If it is reasonable for a short time speeches can go on for an hour. It is unreasonable if these things are not brought to the notice of the officer who issues that license. This procession took more time.

Q. How many hours were allowed?

A. I think it may be up to 12 or 1, but it exceeded the time which was allowed.

Q. But do you know what was the time now?

A. It was allowed from 6 to 12. I don't remember exactly.

Q. Did you know it at the time when you went with the procession?

A. I remembered it. I inquired from the Secretary of the *Sabha*.

Q. But you as an officer were not informed of the time that was allowed?

A. No.

Q. You did not see the license with a view to see that the procession was exceeding the time limit given in it?

A. No. If I required I could have seen it.

Q. Did you ask any officer about it?

A. I heard from some officer that the time limit had been exceeded.

Q. From which officer?

A. I was in charge of all these people. There were some Police officers, and some Criminal Investigation Department Officers who were in charge of these things. I had to see to the people.

Q. You have no idea who told you?

A. No.

Q. From what time to what time was the procession to remain?

A. It ended at about 1. It started from 7 and ended at 1.

Q. But what was the time limit in the license which you were told by some officer?

A. I was told that it had been exceeded.

Q. Was it before 1 o'clock?

A. It may be. I am not certain on this point.

Q. How many people took part in the *Danda Fauj*?

A. Many.

Q. Were there many?

A. I did not count them, Sir.

Q. But how many?

A. They were from different parts of the town.

Q. Altogether how many? You have no idea?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. On the 11th and 12th you were put in charge of the Anarkali Civil Area?

A. Yes.

Q. You did not leave that area on the 11th and 12th? See paragraph 3 of your statement? It is "I was immediately put in charge of the Anarkali Civil Area which duty I did till the 25th April." Therefore may I



27 November 1919.]

SAYAD MUHAMMAD SHAH—concluded—SHEIKH RAHIM BAKHSH.

take it to mean that you were present in the Anarkali on the 11th and 12th ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you did not go to any other part of the city but you remained inside the Anarkali Bazar ?

A. Sometimes I used to go inside the Lohari Gate where a picquet was posted. It was in my jurisdiction.

Q. From Lohari Mandi to Lohari gate.

A. Yes.

Q. Was Lohari Mandi in the Anarkali Area ?

A. Not in it but it is nearer to Anarkali than any other place.

Q. You were only put in charge of the Anarkali Civil Area ?

A. That, I have told you, is quite correct.

Q. Therefore on the 11th and 12th you, leaving Anarkali, went to other places also ?

A. Not generally.

Q. But when you were afterwards required you had left Anarkali Civil Area ?

A. I do not remember, Sir.

Q. So far as you remember you did not leave Anarkali Civil Area ?

A. That was the place where I had to come on my duty. I had to leave it when I had to go to take my meals.

Q. The point is that to a question put to you by Mr. Rice you have stated that such things were said and done by the *Danda Fauj*. Who informed you ?

A. Certain officers who were put on duty for this purpose.

Q. They came and informed you what was being done by this *Danda Fauj* ?

A. They told me to be careful.

Q. You had no personal knowledge ?

A. When they reached in my jurisdiction, i.e., Lohari Mandi, there were officers who told me this.

Q. So far as your knowledge extends the officers who told you were deputed to see what was being done by this *Danda Fauj* ?

A. Yes.

Q. You yourself did not count the number of these ?

A. No.

Q. What was the number of *Danda Fauj* in different lanes and *mohallas* ?

A. I have no knowledge.

Q. Your information about *Danda Fauj* is based upon the information you had received from different officers. You had not seen them with your own eyes ?

A. No.

By Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate—

Q. About this time when this *Ram Naumi* procession came off, shortly before it, you know, a general prohibition of processions had been notified and an exception had been made in favour of this procession because it was a religious function ?

A. Quite so.

Q. So that converting it into a sort of political demonstration, was it or was it not the chief breach of the terms of the license ?

A. Quite so.

Q. You have said that you objected at the time, when political speeches began on this occasion, to those speeches. Can you refer us to any persons specifically from among the leaders who spoke on that occasion ?

A. I have already stated before the Martial Law Commission. They were generally addressed by Pandit Ram Bhaj Datt.

Q. When you told them to stop, did it have any effect on them or did they go on speaking ?

A. Whenever I used to tell them they used to move further on from that place and used to go on again with their speeches.

Q. So that it had no effect ?

A. No, Sir.

Q. This fact you have mentioned before the Martial Law Commission ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You gave some names. It may have been done by somebody else. Still it is in your statement that you gave certain names of persons who spoke ?

A. I gave those names to the Deputy Commissioner.

Q. And you also gave those names before the Commission ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Can you mention those names again ?

A. These are several, Sir.

Q. Can you give any of those you remember now ?

A. Some of these were Lala Duni Chand, Ram Bhaj Datt and Dharam Dass. These were the people.

Q. There have been riots on cow-killing. Are you aware of that ? In the Punjab itself, in the district of Lyallpur, there have been a considerable number of riots in one of the villages and the cases of the rioters are the subject of trial in these days ?

A. No, I am not aware of it.

SHEIKH RAHIM BAKHSH, Senior Sub-Judge, Lahore.

By the President—

Q. Are you Senior Sub-Judge, Lahore.

A. Yes.

Q. On the 6th of April I think you went to the District Magistrate ?

A. Yes, on the 6th April I went to see the District Magistrate at the Kutcheri, hearing that there had been a *hartal* and that he might require my services. I just went to see him.

Q. On the 6th did you notice anything about the attitude of the crowds ?

A. I was passing by the Kutcheri Road through these very gardens. Some of the Military sowars were posted in the Municipal Gardens and any movements of their would lead people to shouting, hissing and hooting these sowars and clapping the hands and this and that, just to frighten the horses and to let them know that they did not approve of their being there.

Q. On the 10th you were deputed to have a notice published. What was that notice ?

A. I have been able to get hold of it from the Publicity Committee office. In it everybody is warned that every crowd or body of men, of whatever sort it may be, is prohibited to assemble and if there is any such crowd

it would be dispersed. This notice had effect till the morning of the 12th April.

Q. When was that made out ?

A. It was on the evening of the 10th. The Deputy Commissioner signed it between 10 and 11 p.m. at night.

Q. On what night ?

A. On the night of the 10th.

Q. When did you publish it ?

A. I went to the Publicity Committee at about 11-30. We got it translated there by this gentleman (pointing to the interpreter) who is here. From there I took Sheikh Abdul Aziz to the *Mufid-i-Am Press*, i.e., Rai Sahib Gulab Singh's Press. We were there at about 2 and we were told that it could not be arranged then as the men were all away.

Q. How did you get the copies printed then ?

A. We then got the copies printed early on the morning of the 11th.

Q. In what way did you publish the notice ?

A. I collected all possible men from the Kutcheri. I took my orderlies; I took men from the Telegraph Office and sowars from the municipal office and other people I met. I then purchased some paste from Lala Mul Chand early in the morning and told them to paste

27 November 1919.]

SHEIKH RAHIM BAKHSI.

[Continued.]

the notices in every available public place. That was how the notices were published.

Q. Then on the 11th you heard that a large crowd had collected behind the High Court?

A. Yes.

Q. And you were sent to disperse it?

A. Yes.

Q. When you arrived what did you find?

A. There were only the clerks of the Accountant-General's office. They wouldn't attend to duty or leave the premises. Probably they wanted leave. They were forcing the hands of the authorities to grant them leave. That was probably their object.

Q. Did you reason with them?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did they go home when you asked them to go?

A. No.

Q. What explanation they gave?

A. I told them that my orders were that they should either resume work or leave the premises. Some of them said that it was their mourning day; and they were not going to work. At the same time they were anxious that they should not be dismissed and said they ought to get leave. I spoke to the Accountant-General. He said that he could not grant leave to the clerks of the Currency Office. Others were granted leave for one day and they were told distinctly that anybody absenting himself will be liable to dismissal.

Q. On the following day you rode with the District Magistrate and the Military through the city. What was the attitude of the crowd as you passed through the city?

A. Everyone said "Rowlatt *na manzur*," i.e., they did not accept the Rowlatt Act. The Deputy Commissioner and the City Inspector, at the orders of the District Magistrate, explained to them the meaning of the Rowlatt Act, saying that it was not the Defence of India Act. They would not listen.

Q. After your endeavours to disperse them you know some affray took place?

A. That was at Hira Mandi.

Q. Where were you at the time when the firing took place?

A. I had just gone to the gate which is the first gate facing the southern side of the road leading to the fort; it is called the Hazuri Bagh Gate.

Q. How long before the firing did you leave the crowd? How long was it before you heard the firing that you had been with the crowd?

A. I was in the crowd myself for some time asking them to move on. After most of the people had left that garden, I went into the mosque. Some 5 or 6 minutes later I heard firing.

Q. When you were endeavouring to disperse the crowd, did they pay any attention?

A. No, if you want incidents, I will give them. I was reasoning with them telling them that the patience of the authorities was being exhausted, and that I was told by one of the Military officers that if they did not move there will be firing. They said "No, we are here; we do not mind." Afterwards I said: "It is against the law; you should obey the law." One man in the crowd said, "No. Look at his turban"; another; "Keep your *jai*." The *jai* was so cheap in those days. Thus I was insulted.

Q. When you were there, were the mob throwing bricks and stones?

A. No, as soon as they came out with a loud cry, I heard people saying to the boys standing there: "Don't throw stones." I did not see stones.

Q. Were there any posters that you saw (at the Hazuri Bagh)?

A. Yes; I removed the poster and handed it to the Senior Superintendent of Police.

Q. What sort of a poster was it?

A. It is difficult to give it from memory. I saw it; many read it and the Military officers read it. It was in every sense seditious, but I do not remember what it actually contained.

Q. You do not remember?

A. I could not really say. The words *gora* and *kala* were specially mentioned; it was about the disobeying of the orders of Government, and there was also something which struck me; it was "not to carry out what the Government wants to do."

Q. Now what was the attitude of the mob? There was a large mob. Were they out of control?

A. Yes; there was nobody to control them.

Q. In their attitude they were defiant?

A. Certainly.

Q. When you saw them, were they resorting to violence?

A. No.

Q. Why not?

A. I had so many Military sowars with me.

Q. You do not think that the Military would restrain them?

A. It never struck me that they were going to assault me.

Q. You had to look after the publication and posting of Martial Law orders. How did you do it?

A. I had about 16 or 18 men, sometimes 20 to 22; according to urgency; and as soon as it was received from the press I sent the required number to the town proper. There was an officer in charge who had them posted inside the city; then there were others who posted them in the civil area and Anarkali Bazar and round about the town. I sent all my men at once to post them at the places mentioned in their order.

Q. You issued them and also posted them in conspicuous parts?

A. It was my duty and I went round to see if they were actually being posted.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. About the posting of the seditious poster, did it give you an idea at the time that it was deliberately done by the whole body of the Lahore citizens or by some fanatics in the crowd?

A. I do not know whether I formed any opinion at the time.

Q. Did you consider whether it was the act of some responsible body or of a man of extreme views or of some fanatic?

A. I told you, Sir, I did not form any opinion. It was meant for those people who were there and excited the feelings of the crowd.

Q. That was the object of it; I have no quarrel with that, but what was your impression? Whether it was the act of individual persons or of large bodies of the Lahore citizens?

A. I did not think of it at the time, whether it would be the action of a large number or of a fanatic.

Q. Now have you formed any opinion?

A. Yes, I can give you my opinion. I think I should say the action of some very zealous members.

Q. It is not the deliberate action of any society or any large body of persons?

A. I do not think so, Sir.

Q. How many sub-judges are there in Lahore?

A. At the time, there were 4; the 5th is the Small Cause Court Judge.

Q. On what dates were the Civil Courts closed? After the 10th, an order was passed to close the Civil Courts?

A. No order was passed. We informed the District Judge that our services were required by the Deputy Commissioner.

Q. You informed your superior officer that your services were required by the District authorities and as you were going to take up those duties, they closed the court?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 11th, you said you asked some of your court peons to do certain work of publication or printing or something like that?

A. Yes; morning of the 11th.

Q. What time was it?

A. I got them at 6. I called them at the Kutcheri.

Q. They were at the Kutcheri?

27 November 1919.]

SHEIKH RAHIM BAKHSH.

[Continued.]

A. Some of the peons and some of the orderlies are living in the Kutcheri.

Q. From the 11th to the 30th April did any of the sub-judges work?

A. Yes; I was on my duty after some 8 days.

Q. You took up your regular duties after some 8 days?

A. Yes.

Q. And the other sub-judges?

A. All the four, excepting the judge of the Small Cause Court, took up their duties.

Q. Then after 8 days, after a week, you recorded evidence, passed orders, pronounced judgments, and did such other work?

A. Yes.

Q. Now about this assembly which you saw on that day just near the Hira Mandi?

A. Before firing or after firing?

Q. Before firing. I am not here to justify what they were doing, I want to make my point clear.

A. That is good.

Q. The point is whether or not at the time you had the least idea that this assembly was an assembly of rebels; it might be doing something very wrong, it might be insolent or having recourse to passive resistance or disobeying the authorities: did it strike you then that you could have described them as rebels?

A. Would you bring it under any sections of the Indian Penal Code?

Q. They might be examined. Take for instance the conditions of a thief; you call him a criminal but not a rebel. Therefore I want to know apart from the Criminal Procedure Code, as to what impression was created in you? Was it that they were rioters, that they were rebels and that they wanted to get hold of the civil area and to administer and rule over it?

A. I do not say that they wanted to turn out the Government.

Q. You may call it a turbulent crowd. Are you prepared to go further and say that it was a crowd of rebels?

A. I won't go so far.

Q. No doubt you will agree that if there is a crowd of five or six thousand persons, in that crowd there may be a lot of mischievous persons, as you yourself said that when boys were about to throw stones, people near by said "do not throw stones." I am not talking of that; if that crowd had any intention of assaulting, serious intention of assaulting the authority, was that crowd competent?

A. I think they were not competent to assault us, but I do not know their intentions until they carry them into effect.

Q. By competent men you mean that these 6,000 people would not be able to attack the authority.

A. No; there were machine-guns.

Q. What were the forces that would protect it?

A. The people posted on our side, the sowars and the infantry.

Q. You could not form any rough estimate?

A. I cannot give you any rough estimate.

Q. However, you thought that this army with you would be sufficient to quell the people.

A. If there were any disturbances, if they had assaulted anybody, I think they would have been soon brought to their senses. A little firing would have brought them to their senses.

Q. I again want to know your opinion about the mood of the crowd. If you say that a crowd of 6,000 could be brought to its senses by only a little firing, what is your idea; was that crowd there to disobey orders and demonstrate a sort of passive resistance or was that crowd there for the purpose of looting or for turning out the police or for establishing their own rule or was it only a demonstration that they were going to have a sort of passive resistance?

A. You have mixed up too many points. I do not think they were bound upon looting or turning out the police.

Q. That is, from passive resistance, they were just on the point of active resistance?

A. Yes.

Q. When they refused to disperse—you know only of the 11th, or you know of the 10th also?

A. I do not know anything of the 10th.

Q. You know what happened on the 11th and 12th?

A. I know.

Q. Now from your experience of the 12th, can you tell me was this crowd making a demonstration and showing their resentment against what has been done on the previous day, i.e., on the 10th and trying to show their resentment on account of the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi or was it anything else? What you saw, could it not be ascribed to the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi and to the fact that on the 10th some of the persons had been innocently killed?

A. They did not do any act which could be called lawlessness, I could not say anything about their intentions.

Q. I want the cause.

A. You want me to say what was the cause of it? I have put two things before you, the arrest of Mr. Gandhi and the fact that, wrongly or rightly, some persons were killed on the 10th. As far as I know the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest was received in the afternoon of the 10th. There was some trouble of course by that time; they were issuing posters and so forth; there was a poster of that kind.

Q. What was that poster?

A. It was an ode to Mr. Gandhi. I found one of them in the Police lines.

Q. You removed them on the 12th?

A. Probably it was on the 12th; it may be a little later, might have been on that very day; I do not remember exactly. That was one of the odes to Mr. Gandhi. Then there was a talk. It may be news to you and even of amusement to some of the learned Commissioners. It was some such thing "If you have *hartal* for 3 days the Lieutenant-Governor will be dismissed; if for 5 days the Viceroy will be dismissed." I only say what I heard. They were so displeased. Afterwards, there was firing on the 12th and on the evening there was that procession which I referred to in that statement. I was told they took a vow not to open their shops for 4 days until the *chauthas* for the dead bodies were performed, i.e., until the dead bodies were burnt.

Q. Because certain persons were killed, they said "we should mourn for 4 days and not open shops"?

A. Yes, quite so.

Q. I do not want your abstract opinion. From what you heard on the 11th and 12th at different places, from the crowd itself, I would only ask you to give your reasons based upon that. Why did they want Sir Michael O'Dwyer to be dismissed?

A. Is it fair to discuss that? They are my superior officers; I seek protection.

Q. I do not want your own opinion. You informed us that public meetings about the *hartal* occurred. Therefore from what the crowd had been saying, did you hear anybody saying why he wanted Sir O'Dwyer to be dismissed?

A. No, he was Lieutenant-Governor at the time, and therefore they meant him.

Q. Did you hear them give any reasons?

A. I did not discuss with them the question of Sir O'Dwyer.

Q. I did not mean that you discussed them. They gave expression to their feelings. Did they express within your hearing?

A. I could not say of any particular talk. I do not know whether it would be right to say so. I would give you one instance if you care to have it:—

When that procession of 6,000 or 7,000 passed to the Ghat, one of the second-lieutenants there with the cavalry reported that a big crowd was coming out of the city.

27 November 1919] SHEIKH RAHIM BAKHSI—concluded—Rai Sahib SETH DWARKA NATH.

We got ready. I had sent away my horse, a sowar's horse, and we put the machine in order. It was everywhere reported that thousands were coming; there was a great noise and so we got ready. Later, I was informed that some police officer had given them permission to take away the dead body. I was talking to one of the persons that was in the crowd, the next day or the day after. He said to me:—"They had a mind to assault that one young man on a black horse." I said "what do you mean by that?" "Don't you know he is our Lieutenant-Governor's son?" He said "I do not know. Had they known people would have attacked

him, not caring for any consequence." You may draw your own inference from that.

Q. You have not given me the cause of their reasoning against the Lieutenant-Governor.

A. Yes; I think I do not know. Am I bound to answer that?

Q. I put to you again. Was it not due to the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi? Some resentment was due to that? The *hartal* came only after that.

A. The *hartal* came after the arrest of Mr. Gandhi, soon after the arrest of Mr. Gandhi. That was the immediate cause.

Rai Sahib SETH DWARKA NATH, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lahore.

By the President—

Q. You are Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lahore?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. We have had a good deal of evidence as to what occurred on the 6th and the 10th, but there are just one or two questions I would ask you. On the 6th do you remember a case where there was a threat of assault on you?

A. No Sir, I was simply jeered at and hissed at?

Q. That was on the 6th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think at that time Dr. Gokal Chand Naurang was near you?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What position did he take up?

A. He was leading the mob back on a police horse and then he took them to the Gol Bagh and returned, and there was a mob in the Market Chowk and he called to them to come back. Then somebody in the mob hit him and abused him, and then some people cried "This is Doctor sahib, our own man." I thought he was hit because he was thought to be a policeman.

Q. Was the feeling of the crowd bitter on that occasion?

A. Yes Sir, they were very defiant.

Q. On the 10th evening you were going in your trap in the Lohari Chowk?

A. Yes Sir, in the evening at about 5.

Q. At that time were crowds about?

A. People were collecting. There were some students who were coming along and they shouted at me to take off my cap. I was wearing a cap. I did not do so. I saw there was something wrong and I found that Mahatma Gandhi had been arrested. This was the answer given to me by some people there; then I drove on.

Q. As you drove on did you find people collecting?

A. Yes Sir, they were collecting and shutting their shops and shouting "*Mahatma Gandhi ki jai*."

Q. I think you went out of the Taxali Gate and drove to the Police Office, and there you found the Senior Superintendent of Police. Who was that?

A. Mr. Broadway.

Q. And you made a report to him?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. He asked you to get men and post guards at certain posts?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you got men and went to the Police Station at Anarkali?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you got there, did you find the mob had gone on the Mall and a small body of police were endeavouring to intercept them?

A. Yes, I heard the police had doubled up to intercept them.

Q. Did you proceed to the scene of this?

A. I galloped up in my trap and at the Telegraph Office I met the tail of the mob. After some distance the mob was very thick, so I drove on the tan ride.

Q. Were the mob carrying anything in their hands?

A. I did not notice anything. I noticed a black flag when I reached the place.

Q. Who was carrying the black flag?

A. Some young men, probably students.

Q. What was that meant to represent?

A. I think it was meant for mourning on account of the arrest of Mr. Gandhi.

Q. Where was the police guard at that time?

A. They were on the Mall facing the crowd, I think near Lord Lawrence's Statue, and the mob was getting along in small rushes and the police were falling back.

Q. Were the mob driving the police back?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What did you do?

A. I jumped from my trap and ran to the front of the mob and tried to persuade them and asked them not to go any further. I did not succeed and there was some time spent in doing that when I saw two of the young men run past me. I turned round and saw both of them snatching hold of muskets of the constables. Suddenly after that I heard shots. Some shots passed just near me so I ran behind the constables.

Q. I think Mr. Cocks, Deputy Inspector-General and Mr. Fyson were with the policemen?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. At the time the firing took place was the mob defiant?

A. Quite, Sir.

Q. As a consequence of the firing I think one man was killed and some wounded?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did the majority of the people flee away after the firing?

A. The majority of the people ran away; some stood.

Q. I think you remained near there for a considerable time?

A. Yes, Sir. The remnants were driven back and when we reached the Lawrence Statue again I was asked to stop there and guard the *chowk* there in case any mob returned from those sides.

Q. Then on the 12th you were in the city when the funeral procession took place?

A. Yes Sir, I saw that.

Q. On the 13th of April the Railway Station of Wagah was burnt?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you receive information or did you know of that?

A. I was in charge of that *ilaga* and I received information and reports about that. I went to visit the spot also.

Q. Were telegraph wires cut as well?

A. Yes Sir, the station burnt, lines uprooted, telegraph wires cut.

Q. Did any offensive notices come under your observation?

A. Yes Sir, I was also patrolling with an escort and on some occasions I saw posters pasted on walls or on telegraph posts. Some I removed and sent to the office and some I destroyed there.

Q. What sort of notices were these?

A. They were abuses of the Government and of partisans of the Government. *Raises* and Honorary Magia-

27 November 1919.]

Raj Sahib SETH DWARKA NATH.

[Continued.]

trates whom they thought to be on the side of Government they abused and called names.

Q. Where is Rakh Bhangali ?

A. It is at a distance of 4 miles from Lahore Cantonment.

Q. There were some stacks burnt there ?

A. Grass farm stacks there were burnt.

Q. Where are the villages of Ghawindi and Barki ?

A. On that side.

Q. At a distance from Lahore ?

A. At a distance of five to seven miles.

Q. What occurred there ?

A. The people of those villages forcibly grazed their cattle on the Grass Farm, and in one instance they used the canal water channel. When the guards of the Grass Farm told them not to do so, they were told: 'It was not the Government Raj now; people are independent and they would do as they liked; the property was their.' Those people were prosecuted and convicted by the Area Officer.

Q. What was the effect of the proclamation of Martial Law ?

A. I think things calmed down after that; it had a sobering effect.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—*

Q. These statements by the villagers that it was not the Government Raj now, were they made in your presence ?

A. No, I simply came to hear of that in the course of my duties.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—*

Q. There were one or two cases of people prosecuted in connection with the riot on the Upper Mall ?

A. There was a case.

Q. Were you a witness in that case ?

A. No.

Q. Were you asked to give evidence in that case ?

A. No.

Q. The party of police that was there and being pushed back was in charge of Moratab Ali ?

A. Yes.

Q. And he was a witness in that case ?

A. I do not know for certain, but perhaps he was.

Q. And you know Mr. Broadway and Mr. Fyson were witnesses in that case ?

A. I do not know, probably they were.

Q. When did you give your statement in this case for the first time ?

A. Do you mean before you ?

Q. Yes, this statement ?

A. I do not exactly remember the date; it was at the time other people were asked by the Deputy Commissioner to write up a statement. I gave a synopsis and was informed by the Government Advocate that the Committee wanted a full statement.

Q. Did you give your statement about what happened at the Upper Mall on any previous occasion ?

A. Yes.

Q. To whom ?

A. I did not give a written statement; I reported to Mr. Broadway who passed me at that time. Then I returned home and I spoke to Mr. Cocks, Deputy Inspector-General. He spoke to me and I told him about that.

Q. You were not present at the first firing that took place on the Upper Mall ?

A. I was there.

Q. And the Deputy Commissioner and Mr. Broadway were before you ?

A. Not Mr. Broadway.

Q. Mr. Fyson was before you ?

A. Probably he was, I did not notice. When I turned round to escape the shots myself, then I noticed both these gentlemen there.

Q. Were you in your uniform ?

A. No I was in mufti.

Q. Are you quite well known to Muratab Ali and the constables or not ?

A. I should think so.

Q. And although these constables were behind, you say they fired and took the risk of your being shot ?

A. Yes, but you are not taking into consideration the fact that there was a huge mob.

Q. You were in front of the party that had fired ?

A. Yes, my back was towards them.

Q. You take it from me that in that Upper Mall trial neither Mr. Fyson, or Muratab Ali nor any one else did mention this very fact that two members of the crowd seized hold of the muskets of the policemen. How do you account for that ?

A. Everybody cannot see everything when there is a huge mob rushing about. There is one thing which I would like to say here, that this was put down in the first information report, written immediately after the occurrence.

Q. But surely if Mr. Fyson was there before you, he must have seen it.

A. No, I could not see Mr. Fyson myself when I ran back; there was such a crowd and clamour and noise and all that sort of thing that it was impossible for everybody to see everything.

Q. I do not suppose you mean to convey that Mr. Fyson was mixed up with the crowd ?

A. No he was not, but he was mixed up with the policemen who were on that side.

Q. What distance was there between the crowd and the policemen ?

A. Between 5 to 10 paces.

Q. And therefore Mr. Fyson would be in a position to see if two men came from the crowd and snatched the muskets of the policemen ?

A. Not necessarily.

Q. The number of the policemen was not more than 8 or 10 ?

A. No more than a dozen in all.

Q. Here you say "I saw a group of young men coming from the opposite side." Now in your deposition here you say they were students ?

A. I think they may possibly have been students, because there are so many here.

Q. Were any of them known to you ?

A. You mean inside the city ?

Q. These young men on the Mall ?

A. No, I do not think so, neither did they know me, most probably.

Q. And these young men here near the Nila Gumbaz, were they known to you ?

A. I could not tell you, it is 6 months ago, and I did not note down any names, and I do not know many students and young people here. With the exception of Dr. Gokal Chand Naurang, and Lala Duni Chand, I cannot remember any one. They were not of sufficient importance for me to remember them.

Q. What I want to know is whether you had any definite knowledge that these young men were students or you simply thought so ?

A. I simply thought so from their demeanour.

Q. And the crowd you met at Nila Gumbaz, that crowd consisted of men the majority of whom were beating their breasts ?

A. Yes.

*By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—*

Q. In the first paragraph of your statement referring to the 6th of April, you say that at about 12 noon Mr. Broadway, Senior Superintendent of Police, received information that an unlawful procession had come from Anarkali. Why was it an unlawful procession ?

A. Because it was prohibited by the Senior Superintendent of Police under the Police Act.

Q. That there should be no procession ?

A. Yes.

Q. And because it was contrary to that you have called it unlawful ?

A. Yes.

Q. So no procession was allowed on the 6th ?

27 November 1919.]

Rai Sahib SETH DWARKA NATH—concluded—Mr. G. A. COCKS

A. I think so.  
 Q. And the attitude of the crowd was very threatening and excited?  
 A. I never said that, I said they were defiant.  
 Q. What was the attitude of the crowd?  
 A. They were very defiant; they would not obey orders; they were doing a thing which was illegal and when asked not to do it, they were very defiant.  
 Q. And they were also excited?  
 A. Yes, of course, they were.  
 Q. And also threatening?  
 A. What do you mean by threatening? Do you mean to say to assault us?  
 Q. Threatening to attack you?  
 A. I think we were too big a force for them to be threatening. I have given an instance that when I passed they jeered and abused and that sort of thing, but they did not actually assault.  
 Q. What was the amount of your force?

A. My own guard was 50 rifles, plus four or five Indian Officers, myself and a European Sergeant.  
 Q. And the number of people in the crowd?  
 A. Well, the crowd was spread over a long way. The people who were actually near me may have been a thousand or so.  
 Q. They were in different directions?  
 A. No, there was a big mob tailing from the Young Men's Christian Association up to the place where I was then they were up to the Market Chowk and there were some in Anarkali also. It was not a very big space so the people actually near me might have been about a thousand.  
 Q. It was not a continuous thing?  
 A. It was a continuous thing.  
 Q. And was there any other force besides that?  
 A. Yes there was a troop of cavalry and a couple of machine guns; that is all I can remember.  
 Q. On the 6th?  
 A. On the 6th.

Mr. G. A. COCKS, Deputy Inspector-General, Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab.

By the President—

Q. You are Deputy Inspector-General in the Criminal Investigation Department?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. I think you were in your office on the 10th April at about 6 P.M. when the news of the outbreak and what had occurred at Amritsar reached you?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. Did you go from the office to your own home?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. How far is that away?  
 A. About two miles.  
 Q. And when you were there did you receive a telephone message as to a crowd gathering in the city?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. When was it you received the message?  
 A. That must have been between 20 past and half past six.  
 Q. Was it feared that the crowd might make for the civil station?  
 A. That was the fear the whole time.  
 Q. And if it got to the civil station was there danger of it doing damage?  
 A. If you can cut a crowd off from the civil station it is easier to guard the civil station. Once it gets loose in the civil station there would be no holding it except with a large body of cavalry.  
 Q. I think you rang up the Senior Superintendent of Police, Mr. Broadway?  
 A. Yes, to warn him.  
 Q. And you found he was in Government House. Did you motor there and find Mr. Fyson and Mr. Broadway with the Lieutenant-Governor?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. I suppose you discussed the situation?  
 A. They were discussing the posting of reserves and pickets when I arrived.  
 Q. Did some message come when you were there?  
 A. Yes, Colonel Bayley said a message had come in the vernacular from the city which he was unable to make out and I went and received it.  
 Q. Was that from one your Indian subordinates?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. To what effect was it?  
 A. It was to the effect that a crowd had collected in the city and was proceeding down Anarkali Bazar towards Nila Gumbaz, which is where the Anarkali Bazar hits the Mall near the Alliance Bank of Simla.  
 Q. What was done when that communication reached you?  
 A. The Lieutenant-Governor asked Mr. Broadway whether his reserves were out. Mr. Broadway said no, some pickets had been posted and he would go off to the lines to turn out the rest of his reserves, and I drove Mr. Fyson down the Mall in my car.

Q. By that time it was getting dark I suppose?  
 A. Yes, it was more than dusk.  
 Q. Where did you go on the Mall?  
 A. The mob must have been about 50 yards west of the O'Dwyer's Soldiers' Club, the old Punjab Bank.  
 Q. What occurred when you came up to the mob?  
 A. Until we got very close to them we did not know that there were any police there. They were mixed up with the crowd; but when we actually got in contact with the mob there were about a dozen uniformed men with muskets who were doing their best to push the crowd away. They were quite unsuccessful. Then Mr. Fyson and I went and harangued them and we were hustled about a great deal. There was a good deal of abuse given. There were certain struggles going on between the constables and members of the mob and Mr. Fyson said you must fire. But the difficulty was to collect the men to get them back from the crowd and also to make one's orders heard. The noise was tremendous. It was impossible to pass orders. Eventually we pulled a few men from the crowd and got them to load and fire.  
 Q. At the time this order was given, was there an imminent danger of the police being entirely overpowered?  
 A. Quite, they were getting round us from the compound of the O'Dwyer Club.  
 Q. Did you apprehend that serious consequences might result?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. I think some of the soldiers had joined?  
 A. Two.  
 Q. And after the firing what happened?  
 A. The mob broke. The front rank of the mob at once gave way. There was no question that we should hold them.  
 Q. I think about twenty rounds were fired.  
 A. I should think so.  
 Q. What casualties were caused at the time?  
 A. I actually saw about three, but I believe one man died from the effects of his injuries and about seven were wounded.  
 Q. You gave instructions to Mr. Clarke to continue to drive back the crowd?  
 A. Yes. My voice had gone when Mr. Clarke turned up and he took them on.  
 Q. What means did he employ?  
 A. They did not fix bayonets; they turned their rifles the other way round and pushed them.  
 Q. Did the crowd yield willingly?  
 A. Not willingly but they went on.  
 Q. This was after the firing?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. How far did these men drive back the mob?

27 November 1919.]

Mr. G. A. COCKS—concluded—Mr. I. W. BOWRING.

A. We drove them before we were actually reinforced from where the firing took place at the eastern gate of the O'Dwyer Club and beyond the Telegraph Office. Mr. Clarke took them on beyond the Telegraph Office. At that point Mr. Broadway turned up with mounted police.

Q. On his arrival you handed over control?

A. I told him what happened and then handed over control to him.

Q. You yourself did not follow the crowd?

A. No, Sir.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. As Deputy Inspector-General of the C. I. D. you have to deal with the province?

A. Yes.

Q. And it is your special duty to get yourself acquainted with what is going on in the province. Have you any information or any evidence in your possession leading to the inference that in Lahore or in any other district of the Punjab there is any organization, secret or otherwise, the object of which is to overthrow the British Government?

A. I think my answer is probably in the negative, that I have no such evidence.

Q. I want to know the number of people in the crowd on the 10th of which you have just been speaking—an approximate number.

A. I can tell you the way I tried to estimate it. I estimated it by the area it covered. I should think the front was about twenty yards and as far as I could see it certainly went back more than fifty yards. The crowd must have run to thousands.

Q. What was the force at your command?

A. Actually about a dozen men.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. From the place where this firing took place opposite the O'Dwyer Club how far is Walter Locke's shop?

A. Walter Locke's shop is only about 50 or 100 yards away.

Q. Is that a place where you get ammunition, gun and explosives of every kind?

A. Yes.

Mr. I. W. BOWRING, Superintendent of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab.

By the President—

Q. Are you the Superintendent of Police, C. I. D.?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think you were not in Lahore on the 10th of April?

A. No Sir.

Q. But you had been in Lahore on the 6th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You attended a large meeting at the Bradlaugh Hall on that occasion?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you in uniform?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And were you accompanied by two other officers of the C. I. D.?

A. Yes.

Q. What attitude did the audience adopt towards you?

A. Before I attended this meeting I sent a letter to Mr. Duni Chand who was convening the meeting informing him that I proposed to attend the meeting with two other officers. I attended the meeting by the orders of His Honour. I received no answer to my letter. When I arrived at the Bradlaugh Hall I was conducted by Mr. Dharam Dass to the main door of the Hall. There was a large crowd and it was very difficult to go in. Mr. Duni Chand came out from behind and said that he would go and see and make arrangements for us and asked us to wait a few minutes outside. We waited outside for three minutes. Then he said "everything is all right, will you please come in." As soon as we entered the room the whole audience proceeded to howl and hoot and yell. It displayed every sign of animosity towards us. We advanced towards the dais in the middle of the hall where Mr. Gokal Chand Naurang was delivering a speech. The speech was interrupted and there was a most deafening uproar. There were no arrangements whatever for our accommodation in the middle of the Hall and Mr. Narain said that he did not know what to do and that we could see the attitude of the crowd towards us. He said that British officers had never previously attended their meeting, that we had come there in uniform and he did not know what to do. I then noticed that some of our officers were beckoning to me from the gallery and I saw there were some chairs up there. So we left the Hall, went upstairs and got our seats in the middle of the gallery where we remained during the remainder of the meeting.

Q. Did anything occur at that meeting that you think it necessary to bring to our notice?

A. In what way Sir.

Q. As regards anything indicative of turbulence or sedition or anything of that sort?

Mr. Herbert.—The speeches made have been produced before you.

The President.—I do not want to read through speeches as it is very tiresome work. I want to know what the witness heard. Was the meeting a violent meeting? Were references made to popular heroes, was there any announcement made about the victims at Delhi or to the All Brothers or to Mr. Gandhi? Was anything said in the way of exciting the populace to do acts of violence?

A. Not definitely, Sir.

Q. You said you were away from Lahore and I think you returned about the 15th. After that were you entrusted with the prosecution of cases before the commissions that were set up?

A. Yes. The Punjab Government had deputed Mr. Tomkins, Deputy Inspector-General, to investigate the causes and sources of the disturbances and to investigate cases which arose out of them and I was deputed to take up the cases which occurred in the Lahore area.

Q. Would you explain to me your method of procedure in investigating these cases?

A. When I took over charge there were a large number of people who had been already arrested during the disturbances, the majority of whom were in the jail I dealt with these. There were about thirty people who had been arrested for creating disturbances in the city, for inciting people against Government and forcibly closing their shops. These were petty cases. I sent for them and recorded the evidence against them. I gave my opinion as to whether they should be punished or let off and I sent these cases to my superior officers. As regards the other cases, which concerned chiefly those in which the mob had actually assaulted the authorities, we were asked to conduct our investigation with as much despatch as possible so we dealt practically with those who had been wounded.

Q. Were there thirty or forty cases of conspiracy?

A. There were eleven cases.

Q. Did you determine the nature of the offence with which they were to be charged?

A. No, Sir. I put up the information which we recorded and it went to the Legal Remembrancer. Then it was the Legal Remembrancer who tested the charges we referred against these accused.

Q. After the case went before the Legal Remembrancer did you have anything further to do with it?

A. No, Sir. I was not allowed to attend the Court once I gave evidence.

27 November 1919.]

Mr. I. W. BOWRING.

[Continued.]

Q. When did that trial start?

A. I am afraid I do not remember.

Q. It started after the date when the Military authorities prevented the entrance into the Punjab of advocates or pleaders who were proposed to defend certain accused?

A. I am afraid I cannot answer that question.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—*

Q. It has been said that when you commenced to investigate these cases a large number of persons were in jail?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. About how many?

A. About fifty I should say.

Q. Were you told that you should deal with thirty minor cases and then there was the main conspiracy case? You did not deal with very many others. Out of the thirty do you remember whether the bulk of them were prosecuted?

A. I prosecuted two.

Q. How many were prosecuted altogether out of thirty?

A. Only two.

Q. Only two, so that the other twenty-eight never were brought to trial in Court?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Can you give any idea as to the average time these persons were kept under arrest?

A. One week—that is the average.

Q. Do you remember what was the longest time in any individual case?

A. Three weeks.

Q. They were arrested on the 10th or 11th or when?

A. I think on different dates while disorder was going on in the city or just after the disorder.

Q. They had been arrested by somebody who noticed their conduct in the street?

A. There was considered to be an order given from above later, but they were arrested by the local police who had seen their conduct.

Q. One man was kept for three weeks. What was the necessity for keeping him for three weeks before his case was investigated?

A. The majority of people whom I dealt with in these cases were men who had shops or had avocations in the city and their livelihood depended a good deal upon their freedom. This particular man was a rich man and he could afford to wait. So I dealt with the poor people first so that they could go back to their shops.

Q. Was there a system of allowing anyone out on bail?

A. I released all those people on bail while I was enquiring into their cases.

Q. There was one man who was kept in arrest for three weeks?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did he offer bail?

A. No, Sir. I had various letters about him from gentlemen and other important people.

Q. Letters to what effect?

A. Making a recommendation on his behalf.

Q. If you let some people out on bail why was not this man allowed out on bail? If he is a rich man why did you not let him out on bail?

A. Because he was a more important person and his case required a great deal of looking into.

Q. Is that any reason why he should be kept in arrest?

A. He had no occasion to do any harm while he was under arrest.

Q. You could not attend to everybody and you were taking the other people first and he was a substantial man—does it not seem a little strange that a man should be kept in arrest for three weeks and then ultimately released?

A. The charges against him were of a serious nature.

Q. What was the nature of the charges against him?

A. That he held meetings to prevent Government clerks from attending their offices and that he headed

a large mob of several thousand persons and demonstrated against Government.

Q. That was a greater crime than the other members of the thirty. What was his name?

A. Rai Bahadur Ram Pershad.

Q. Still instead of dealing with the minor cases first, was it not suggested to you by this gentleman or anybody else on his behalf that Mr. Ram Pershad's case ought to be dealt with first?

A. No, Sir.

Q. And did you receive those letters?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What was the object of sending those except to indicate that he might be released on bail?

A. I don't know why they sent them.

Q. Did he ever ask that his case should be tried before any other cases were tried?

A. No, Sir.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—*

Q. Is it true that when you went to that meeting, Mr. Razak and Mr. Hassan, two barristers, were requested by the chairman to take you to the gallery and to provide you with a suitable seat?

A. I did not hear the chairman ask them. I myself asked them to come with me. They went with me.

Q. And you remained there for an hour and a half?

A. Till the meeting ended.

Q. Approximately how long had you to stay there?

A. About that, an hour and a half.

Q. During that period there was no second demonstration against you?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Do you remember this man, Gokal Chand Naurang, he appealed to the audience not to cause any disturbance, not to loiter in the streets, but to go straight to their homes?

A. At that time?

Q. When he made his speech and when the audience were about to go, did he make an appeal to them in these terms?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. Had you anything to do with the case of Goverdhandas?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. The man who was arrested and brought back from Madras?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Are you aware that in the first instance he was discharged and acquitted?

A. I don't think that is quite right. I think they found that the dates prevented his being tried by this particular tribunal.

Q. On the question of jurisdiction for the offences he was charged with, he was discharged?

A. He was never tried. The case never came into court at all. They would not take it.

Q. The case was before the court, and an objection was raised, and that objection was allowed?

A. The case was before the court, but they did not take it.

Q. On his objection?

A. The counsel objected.

Q. So his counsel objected to the jurisdiction of the court, and he was discharged from that case. The case was not taken up?

A. No, I should not say he was discharged from that case.

Q. In the meantime Martial Law was abrogated?

A. Yes, it ceased to exist.

Q. You know that without anything against him for the next 8 or 10 days he was kept in jail?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. Then do you know anything about Mr. Manohar Lal's case?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Except that he was a trustee of the *Tribune*, had you anything against him?

A. No.



27 November 1919.]

Mr. L. W. BOWRING.

[Continued.]

Q. Do you know one very respectable gentleman by name Rattan Chand who subscribed a lakh of rupees to the war fund.

A. Do you mean the man in the electrical company?

Q. He is a well known man in Lahore, who had actually subscribed one lakh of rupees to the war fund.

A. So many people subscribed to the war fund.

Q. Therefore you do not remember his name?

A. There was a Rattan Chand who was arrested.

Q. What offence had he committed?

A. He wanted to bring about a strike in the electrical power house.

Q. Is there any reliable evidence before you that he did so?

A. Very reliable evidence.

Q. He was not prosecuted?

A. We decided not to prosecute him.

Q. Is it not a fact that this man Rattan Chand was going to be prosecuted because he attended the funeral ceremony of one of his tenants or something like that or that he had subscribed to the *langarkhanas*?

A. I never heard of that.

Q. Or that he subscribed to the local *langar* fund?

A. No.

Q. Those men who were arrested in Amritsar and brought to Lahore did you also enquire into their cases?

A. No, I had nothing to do with those.

Q. Had you anything to do with the Gurdaspur Pleaders' case?

A. I was responsible for only the Lahore area.

Q. It appears to me that he was arrested, because a table was provided for the C. I. D., but as there was no information that two European officers would be coming, there was no room on that table?

A. There was only one table on which the speaker stood.

Q. Do you think that was deliberately done from what they said?

A. When arrangements were made in the gallery, there was no necessity to take us into the main body of the hall. We were supposed to sit in the gallery, and I presume arrangements were made.

Q. Do you know that in the principal conspiracy case, as soon as the prosecution evidence in that conspiracy case was finished, Martial Law ceased to exist? Is it true that within a day of closing the prosecution case in the principal conspiracy case, Martial Law ceased to exist as soon as the prosecution evidence was finished?

A. It may be a coincidence. I do not know of any facts in that case.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Is it not a fact that, after the prosecution witnesses had been concluded, Martial Law was abrogated?

A. That is not true. Many defence witnesses had also been examined.

Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate.—

It appears from this printed record that the 27th May was the last day on which they took the last of the prosecution witnesses.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Is it true that although Martial Law ceased to exist in the civil area, it continued for many weeks after that so far as the stations and railways were concerned?

A. Certainly it did. It was required for military purposes. The Afghan war was on.

Q. It did work? It was considered that there is no difficulty would be experienced?

A. Yes.

Q. Now about this man Ram Pershad, was it proved that he, as a matter of fact, did persuade the goods clerks to strike?

A. I was not satisfied with the evidence.

Q. Then, may I take it there are many persons who were prosecuted and the only offence against them was that either on the 30th or on the 6th they had delivered speeches or attended the meetings that were convened

for holding the *harkat*, or they had persuaded certain people not to open their shops, and the offence against them was waging war against the King?

A. If you mention a few people I may know exactly what you mean.

Q. I am only asking you of those who were afterwards released?

A. May I ask you if you are referring to the main case?

Q. I am referring to the people whose cases were enquired into by you as having waged war against the King-Emperor simply on the allegation that either they had attended certain meetings or they had proposed certain resolutions or they had asked somebody not to open their shops?

A. Their offence was not waging war against the King. They were charged with creating disturbances in the city.

Q. Under which section?

A. The section would be applied after we decided how the case stands. The section is applied by the Legal Remembrancer, not by the police.

Q. When the question of bail for these men was raised, you said that they never asked for bail. What I want to know is unless and until you tell me what was the offence with which they were charged how could the question of bail be decided by you?

A. That was an irregularity for which we require an indemnity.

Q. You said you were ready to admit certain people on bail, and you said they were not admitted on bail because nobody, neither they themselves asked for bail nor any one else offered bail for them.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. You have said in your statement a very great feeling and tension appeared to be prevalent throughout the country. What was the tension and apprehension due to? Can you account for it?

A. I do not quite follow you.

Q. You say in your statement, paragraph 2, a very great feeling and tension appears to be prevalent throughout the country. What was the apprehension due to?

A. I came up from Bombay. The railways were disorganized. One could not get any food. The people were very excited. I did not know what had happened in the Punjab. The rails were torn up and communications were cut, and naturally people were in a state of apprehension.

Q. What was the apprehension?

A. The fear that rebellion had broken out.

Q. Why?

A. These things always accompany rebellion.

Q. Simply from these things you formed your opinion?

A. Yes.

Q. You say "my personal experience of the mobs in Lahore was on the 6th April when I was myself a witness to the attitude of the crowd who attempted to come down the Mall on the morning of that day." Was it a very threatening or excited crowd on the 6th?

A. Like screaming maniacs. They did not know what it was about.

Q. What was the number of the crowd that you happened to see, a very large number?

A. I only came up at the end after they had been dispersed. I did not see them at the beginning.

Q. You cannot say what the number of the crowd was?

A. I cannot say that.

Q. Then in answer to a question about a meeting which you attended you were asked whether there was anything said in the speeches to incite the people to do anything and you said 'not definitely'?

A. Yes.

Q. What do you mean by 'not definitely'?

A. May I refer to the speeches?

Q. Yes, certainly.

27 November 1919.] Mr. I. W. BOWRING—concluded—Khan Sahib SHEIKH ABDUL AZIZ.

A. The President said, "There was no difference to an act of passive resistance when they took the two states of mind and speech into consideration. It was

the easiest matter for them to lay down their lives in a just cause. Government's action was based on injustice." That is all, I think.

**Khan Sahib SHEIKH ABDUL AZIZ, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Political Branch, Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab.**

*By the President—*

Q. Are you a Deputy Superintendent of Police, Political Branch of the Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In the prosecution of your duties have you to make yourself acquainted with public questions agitating the people?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was there in the Punjab a considerable agitation against the Rowlatt Bills?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When did that agitation start in the Punjab?

A. It started in February, Sir.

Q. And did you receive information that it was going to be on an extensive scale?

A. Yes, Sir, on a scale which was not imagined then.

Q. Were there many meetings held in Lahore?

A. Not many, there were three meetings; on the 4th February, 9th March and 6th April.

Q. At the meetings were speeches made in denunciation of these Bills?

A. Yes, strong speeches were made.

Q. Can you speak as to the effect upon the people of the speeches?

A. Well, the effect of the speeches was it created misunderstanding against the motive of Government in passing this Bill.

Q. Can you say whether there were current among the people entirely erroneous rumours as to the effect of the Rowlatt legislation?

A. I think, Sir, many of rumours were started by certain people with intentions?

Q. What intention?

A. Bad intentions against the Government.

Q. So far as the political leaders are concerned, I mean the leaders who made speeches at these different meetings that were held, do you suggest that they made deliberate misrepresentations of the Rowlatt Act?

A. Well, in this connection the important thing is that they did not explain the Rowlatt Act at all. They were saying that it curtailed the liberty of the Indians, it tightened their chains, but of course they never went into details and explained what was the Rowlatt Act.

Q. Is the gravamen of your complaint against these political leaders that they did not explain the Rowlatt Act?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. But so far as their actual statements are concerned, you suggest that they represented that the Rowlatt legislation would have certain effects which the people believed it would have?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Do you suggest that?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What misrepresentations were made by the political leaders as regards the Rowlatt legislation apart from these general expressions of denunciation which you referred to? We have been told that there were rumours current among the people that the Rowlatt legislation would prevent more than a few people meeting together, that it would prevent marriages and funerals being held and that a great portion of the property of the individual will be confiscated by Government under taxation. Was any such statement as I have indicated now, made to your knowledge by any of the political leaders at any meeting?

A. The misunderstandings were created as it was said that these Rowlatt Acts gave great powers to the police and they could do anything they liked, and this resulted into forming an opinion that the Rowlatt Act was a weapon which the police could use in any way they liked.

Q. I think subsequently Mr. Gandhi's *Satyagraha* propaganda came on?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. According to Mr. Gandhi, that was a movement of mere soul force. In your experience would you expect the great majority of the population, as you have in Lahore, to observe passive resistance without the passive resistance leading to measures of violence?

A. I do not think that it could have been carried on on the lines Mr. Gandhi suggested.

Q. In point of fact as regards the *hartals* that were held, did it come under your knowledge that people not merely voluntarily refrained from going about their own business as usual, but actually used means to prevent other people from doing as they wanted?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you form any opinion as to the sense in which the populace understood this *Satyagraha* movement?

A. What people generally understood was to disobey the orders of Government.

Q. Did they appear to consider that there was merit in that form of disobedience?

A. Yes, they are not people like Mr. Gandhi.

Q. I suppose in that connection you are referring not to leaders of the movement like Mr. Gandhi, but to the common people who do not understand the nature of soul force?

A. Yes, to the people generally.

Q. Were there rumours in Lahore also as regards the attitude of the Government towards the Turkish Empire?

A. That was one of the causes which upset the minds of the people. They had grievances of their own.

Q. In that state of feeling the news came of what had happened at Delhi on the 13th March?

A. There were disturbances there. People were fired at, and we heard lot of news which came from irresponsible sources and spread in the city, to the effect that the leaders in Delhi had taken up the cause of the people who had been wounded and killed and who had created the disturbances, and that lakhs of rupees had been collected by several of the leaders there in support of those people who stood against the Government. Of course all sorts of news came here, and this last piece of news emboldened the people.

Q. I think the *hartal* had taken place both at Delhi and Amritsar on the 30th March?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I see in your statement you referred to seditious posters appearing about the beginning of April in Lahore. What sort of posters are you referring to? Have you got a copy?

(The Government Advocate handed up a copy to the President.)

Q. I see you refer to a series\* of posters, did they appear in one of the cases?

The Government Advocate:—In the Lahore Main case.

Q. I see the first of these posters is one on the 6th April 1919 and was removed from the Bradlaugh Hall?

A. Yes, Sir.

\* Vide Annexure page 106.]

27 November 1919.]

Khan Sahib SHEIKH ABDUL AZIZ.

[Continued.]

Q. In that poster it was said "to practise tyranny and to give it the name of love, what a fine trick is this of the civilization of the West." "Muhammadans and Hindus raised a thousand cries and lamentations, but could not cure Government of its obduracy." The next one is Exhibit P-19, that was upon the Lohari Gate on the 6th April?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In it is the statement "This is unjust, and we are not going to submit to this."

"Be brave and observe Mahatma Gandhi's fast. Don't obey the black Bill."

"Alright, Sir, it will be done as you say."

Q. Then there is another poster Exhibit P-20, dated 15th April 1919; it was found at the Shahalmi Gate.

A. That is about the question of opening shops.

Q. The next one is dated 12th April?

A. There were some posters found on 3rd April, before 6th April.

Q. On the 3rd April? Yes, There is Exhibit P-28:—

"If the mountain of calamity be about to fall on your motherland, and you do not render a bit of assistance to your country—who would be such a wretch as would not join in the mournful state of the country by closing his shop and observing a fast this (next) Sunday?"

There are one or two others, to which I would refer you. One was exhibited on the 12th April, in which there is this statement: "We are the Indian nation whose bravery and honour have been acknowledged by all the Kings of the world. The English are the worst lot, and are like monkeys, whose deceit and cunning are obvious to all high and low. Have these monkeys forgotten their original conditions?" etc., etc. "Now these faithless people, having forgotten the loyalty of Indians, are bent upon exercising limitless tyranny. O Brethren! Gird up your loins and fight. Kill and be killed. Do not lose courage, and try your utmost to turn out these mean monkeys from your holy country."

There are a number of other similar posters, but this one is the worst of the lot. Were these posters inflaming the minds of the people?

A. Certainly; they were very commonly read.

Q. Then there is P-25?

A. The *Danda Fauj* also started a newspaper in those days.

The President:—I have seen it before—"Danda Akhbar."

Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate:—I wish to bring to your Lordship's notice that we have got the man who removed it, and he will come later on.

The President:—We have already had that. Those three are in the same strain as the one that I have just read, dated 12th April.

Q. Did you see from the attitude of the mobs that they were getting more and more out of hand from day to day from the 6th April?

A. Yes.

Q. Were these different posters inflaming them?

A. Yes; more and more.

Q. Did you yourself fear that there might be some very serious trouble in the way of a rising?

A. Yes; I feared it and brought this matter to the notice of my officers in the end of March, and said that something very serious would soon happen here if this agitation went on in the way it was going on.

Q. Then on the 6th April, there was a complete *hartal*. Did you notice anything particular on that day?

A. There were lots of processions going on in the city.

Q. On the 9th April, there was the *Ram Naumi* procession. We heard about it?

A. I did not go personally to the *Ram Naumi* procession. But it was reported to me.

Q. Were you personally at the Badshahi Mosque on the 11th April?

A. I was not there personally.

Q. I see that you refer in your statement that pictures of Their Majesties the King and Queen have been destroyed?

A. This fact was reported to me by the officers who were present there the same evening, and it was reported shortly after these things took place.

Q. Were there also reports as to the disfiguring of the portraits of Their Majesties and signboards?

A. This was also reported to me very soon after this occurred by our officers.

Q. On that day, i.e., the 11th April, did the mob appear at the Railway Booking Office?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they prevent the Government employees from doing their work?

A. Yes, and forced them to close.

Q. Did they do any destruction?

A. They damaged the notice boards there.

Q. Did you visit that spot yourself?

A. I visited, that spot personally.

Q. I think you removed the broken board?

A. Yes. I removed the broken board which was produced in the Main Lahore case.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Were you present at the Badshahi Mosque on the 11th April?

A. No, Sir; I was not personally present.

Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate:—There is a witness coming who was present on the 11th. There was a report and Mr. Justice Rankin called for that report the other day. There is a printed copy. It is this witness who compiled that.

Q. If there is a witness coming who was actually present, then I would not do more than put this to you. You compiled the report\* from information given to you by subordinates?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you do it at the time?

A. Yes; as soon as the men came from the spot.

Q. Is this a copy that was produced in the Main Conspiracy Case?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. How long have you been in this Province?

A. I have been here since 1911.

Q. Where were you in the months of February, March and April?

A. I was at Lahore.

Q. Did you leave Lahore during these months?

A. I may have gone out for some enquiries.

Q. Except that you may have gone for a day or two, you were here permanently?

A. Yes.

Q. Are the other districts in your jurisdiction?

A. The C. I. D. has got the whole of the Punjab.

Q. Different officers are not appointed for different places?

A. No.

Q. Except what happened at Lahore, what occurred at any other place would be only second-hand knowledge?

A. Yes. Except in cases when we receive reports direct from our own officers.

Q. Whether it be any report direct from your officer or whether it be a report received from some other officer, it would be your hearsay knowledge, not your personal knowledge?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you aware that for the last 2 or 3 years the public are against the C. I. D. and that they are not satisfied with their work?

A. Yes, I know.

Q. Has it not been repeatedly asserted that the reports that they make are not correct reports? Has that been alleged? It may be wrong. Are you not aware of it?

A. It is alleged.

27 November 1919.]

Khan Sahib SHEKH ABDUL AZIZ.

[Continued.]

Q. Not only that but complaints against the C. I. D. have been made even in the Imperial and Local Legislative Councils ?

A. I do not know of any case.

Q. Don't you know whether any complaint was made either in the Imperial Legislative Council and in the Local Legislative Councils against the C. I. D. ?

A. I do not know of any complaints having been made against any C. I. D. officers.

Q. I do not say against any particular person. I want to know whether or not you are aware that complaints were made against the C. I. D. both in the Imperial and the various Local Legislative Councils ?

A. On any particular charge ?

Q. Not on any particular charge, but against the way in which they are working ?

A. Yes, there were.

Q. Even in the Imperial Council in connection with the Rowlatt Act complaint was made against the C. I. D. in one or two speeches ?

A. I forget it now.

Q. What I want to know is whether in connection with these Rowlatt Bills any complaints were made against the C. I. D. in the Imperial Legislative Council (not against any particular person) ? I think the Hon'ble Mr. Sastri complained ?

A. So far as I remember, I did not read anything.

Q. I think you are constantly in touch with all the local and provincial papers and all the leading papers ?

A. Generally not constantly.

Q. Do you read the *Statesman* ?

A. No.

Q. Do you read the *Pioneer* ?

A. Sometimes.

Q. Do you read the *Independent* ?

A. I have been reading it now and then.

Q. The *Leader* ?

A. Yes, the *Leader* too.

Q. The *Bombay Chronicle* ?

A. Not except on one or two occasions.

Q. One of the reasons why there was unrest and discontent, you yourself say, was that it was believed not only by the masses, but even by the leaders and by every body that the Government of India, was going to whittle down the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms ?

A. There were rumours.

Q. You call them rumours ?

A. Rumours.

Q. As a matter of fact was it not everywhere that that feeling was given expression to in broad daylight ? There is no question of rumours.

A. Yes ; it is true.

Q. I think you must have refreshed your knowledge of the Rowlatt Bills. Your complaint against the leaders was that they did not go into details ?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it necessary for them to do so ?

A. I think it is necessary. Why should one side of the case alone be put ?

Q. Take Rowlatt Bill No. 1. Was it not sufficient for them to say that a new crime, viz., the possession of seditious matter, has been created. Was it not sufficient ? And that extensive or more powers had been given to the Police than they had before ? Do you think anything more was required so far as this Rowlatt Bill No. 1 was concerned ?

A. I should say that I have got no complaint about this.

Q. I am quite sure from the way in which that section is worded, it would be very difficult to understand and explain it ?

A. I have read it long ago.

Q. And most probably, I beg your pardon, I think even now it would be very difficult for you to explain it, if I gave you the text of that section ?

A. I cannot say.

Q. Therefore so far as Rowlatt Bill No. 1 is concerned, you have no complaint that the leaders only said that

this Rowlatt Bill No. 1 creates another offence. I will give you an instance. Supposing a medical man is dispensing medicine, and he gets hold of a seditious leaflet, and sends the prescription in that paper, and if all of a sudden that paper, through the kindness of the C. I. D., is found in possession of a political leader, then the onus of proof is with that leader that that leader came honestly by it. Is it not so ?

A. It was said so.

Q. Therefore so far as that Bill No. 1 is concerned you have no complaint on this ground that the sections were not explained. That was the only thing that was said, and it was absolutely sufficient so far as the masses were concerned ?

A. I did not hear the speeches.

Q. Not about the speeches. I am confining myself to Rowlatt Bill No. 1. Are you aware that Rowlatt Bill No. 1 gives more power to the Police than they already possess ?

A. I do not know that.

Q. Have you ever read Section 196-B of the Criminal Procedure Code ?

A. Yes.

Q. Under that section, have you any right without the permission of the Deputy Commissioner or some constituted authority to enquire into seditious or anarchical crime and to make regular investigation into these matters ?

A. No.

Q. Are you aware that section 196-B is going to be modified by this Act ? Are you or are you not aware ?

A. I did not see it.

Q. I want to know whether or not you are aware that this section 196-B is going to be extended ?

A. Yes.

Q. And that if that section 196-B becomes law, this restriction is removed ?

A. Yes.

Q. You will agree with me that the powers of the C. I. D. have been increased ?

A. Yes, at least to some extent.

Q. So far as Rowlatt Bill No. 1 is concerned there are only two important points. Can you suggest to me any further important points ?

A. No.

Q. Take Rowlatt Bill No. 2, which has already become an Act ?

A. Yes.

Q. What explanation do you want ? Did they not say that in certain cases the right of appeal has been taken away ? Is that not pointed out in any number of speeches ?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that true or false ?

A. That is true.

Q. Was there any further explanation required so far as the masses of people are concerned ?

A. No.

Q. Did they not say that under certain conditions a man who is run in will not have the right to be represented by counsel ?

A. Yes.

Q. Does it require any further explanation ? Do you require the reading of section word by word ?

A. You will see the speeches.

Q. I am coming to that. If you tell me anything else I am quite prepared to accept it. Was there any general complaint that in certain cases of the prosecutions or actions being taken under the Rowlatt Bill the right of representation by counsel was taken away ?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it not explained that under certain circumstances, the executive can arrest a man and put him into jail for about one month or two months, and further that he cannot get a judicial trial by a legally constituted judicial court ? Was that not the complaint against the Bill ?

27 November 1919.]

Khan Sahib SHAIKH ABDUL AZIZ.

[Continued.]

A. Yes.

Q. Does it require any further explanation?

A. But where was it explained? Excuse me, I am asking you.

Q. I am coming to it. Does it require any further explanation? If a speaker stands up and says the right of appeal has been taken away under certain conditions, right of representation by consul under certain conditions has been taken away, and that under certain sections, the executive will be so just as to keep a person in jail for one month or more, does it require any further explanation? Does it require it to be stated like this? Section... clause B, says....; and the interpretation of this clause is this... Is it really for a public speaker to go into these details?

A. That is a point for argument, excuse me.

Q. According to you it was necessary for every speaker who wanted to say anything against this Bill to see that all kept a copy of the Bill before them and to read it word for word, first in English in original, then to translate it. If he could not translate, he must have an authorised High Court translator, so that there may be no question raised by the C. I. D., then translate and translate it section by section and clause by clause to the public. You would have been satisfied with that. That is the Government case and you are putting it on behalf of Government. I have heard it. Your complaint is that the Bill was not explained. I cannot understand it. Therefore I want you to explain it to me, because you have come forward to put the case for the Government before this Committee. What do you mean by saying that the Bill was not explained?

A. In the speeches that were made at Amritsar, these things were not explained by the speakers.

Q. Which was not explained?

A. Nobody explained that this was intended for revolutionaries; it was intended for anarchists, and the Police have no power to use it unless the Governor-General in Council applies it to a certain portion.

Q. Do you know when this modification or amendment was made? When was it made? On what date?

A. I think it was in March.

Q. So far as the Bill was concerned, was it very clear when these speeches were being made, when these meetings were held? Was this not the main ground, and was it not upon the agitation that followed that this was modified by the Imperial Legislative Council?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore where is your complaint in regard to speeches made before the passing of the Bill? What is your complaint?

A. My complaint is it was not referred to.

Q. That this would apply only to anarchical crime? Is it not an amendment that was accepted after the whole country agitated for 15 days or three weeks, and subsequently this amendment was accepted in the Imperial Legislative Council? It is only then they said that they would make it clear that it applies to anarchical crimes?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore this has not been there from the very beginning?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. You do not know what was in the Act in the beginning and what form it took in the end?

A. There were some changes finally. It was for 3 years.

Q. You have said that your ground was that these speakers in public did not explain that it would apply only to anarchical crimes. I am coming to that. When meetings were being held against this Bill, is it or is it not a fact that up to that time it was not clear whether or not it would apply to anarchical crimes, and subsequently on the date of the passing of the Bill, a resolution was passed, speeches were made and then this amendment was accepted by the Government? Are you aware of that fact?

A. Yes.

Q. Very well, let that ground go. Then is there anything else?

A. You might ask me please definitely.

Q. What is your complaint against it? I can understand and I will not dispute. If violent speeches were made inciting people to have recourse to violence, then there is no difference between you and me. For the time being, you had not referred to any incitement to violence. Apart from that what is your complaint against these speakers?

A. Various speeches were made at Amritsar and Lahore, and I will leave that thing to you to judge and come to a finding.

Q. Therefore you cannot put your case?

A. My reply is based upon the tone of the various speeches that were made at Amritsar and Lahore.

Q. That may be; according to you they were violent or they were seditious. I am not asking that; I will concede that for a moment. Apart from being seditious, what is your ground of complaint against the speakers at these various meetings which were held before the passing of the Rowlatt Act?

A. They magnified matters and did not explain things impartially.

Q. It comes to the same thing again. They did not explain that this Act was intended for special circumstances. That is your complaint?

A. Yes. The speakers did not explain to the audience that the Act would apply only under special circumstances.

Q. And that it would apply only to anarchists? Is it not so?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you not aware that in hundreds of papers and in any number of speeches this point was taken up by speakers and writers, rightly or wrongly? Their argument was that it is just like the Press Act and as other Acts were at the time of the passing of the Act, viz., that it is intended that the Act should apply only to a particular set of circumstances, and that they were not satisfied that it would be confined to anarchical crimes? Was this not explained in speeches and papers?

A. They said so.

Q. I am quite satisfied with that. Then you said that seditious posters were being published in the month of April and there was great activity?

A. Yes.

Q. You have placed these before us?

A. Yes.

Q. Will you kindly let me know about the posters before the 10th April to which you object. I do understand and I will not discuss as to what happened after the 10th April; but before the 10th April, which is the poster to which you take the greatest objection? Is it P. 28, that was the one that was referred to by the Council?

A. First of all P. 18.

Q. Which was found posted at Bradlaugh Hall on 6th April?

A. Yes.

Q. It is this "That which we apprehended has happened. The fortune of India in falling has assumed the form of the Rowlatt Bill." It is poetry, everybody remembers it. It is not prose?

A. Yes.

Q. Then it goes on:—

"2. There is confusion in every town, province and throughout the Empire. Is this the Law or the tremour of an earthquake?"

"3. To practise tyranny and give it the name of love, what a fine trick is this of the civilization of the West!"

"4. This pitcher of the East was full of the honey of loyalty and now its sweetness has become bitter to the British."

"5. Muhammadans and Hindus raised a thousand cries and lamentations, but could not cure Government of its obduracy."

27 November 1919.]

Khan Sahib SHEIKH ABDUL AZIZ.

[Continued,

"6. Their arguments had no effect on Vincent, though Jinnah much beat his face and Sapru struck his head a great deal.

"7. In vain have we rubbed our foreheads for years in the Council chamber. Now we are going to search for Gandhi's threshold."

Now may I take it that according to you this is the worst seditious poster that you have come across before the 10th April?

A. I am only referring to it as objectionable.

Q. That is the worst specimen of the poster you can give me before the 10th April which breathes sedition?

A. I have never said that this is the worst.

Q. That is why I wanted you to give me the worst, so that I may not waste time. Are you not aware, as a C. I. D. officer, that during the last 6 or 7 years hardly a year passes without seditious posters being pasted either at important places or at hostels or schools or other places both in prose and poetry?

A. Yes, occasionally.

Q. Therefore the mere fact of a certain seditious poster being posted in Lahore on the 10th would not necessarily be an indication of the fact that there was something abnormal in Lahore?

A. That it does not mean.

Q. Are you aware that seditious posters of worse type, one or two, were found every month, and you know that you have not been able to trace who was responsible for them?

A. Yes.

Q. You yourself admit that after the firing on the 10th took place there was on the 11th and 12th a very great deal of excitement. Is it so?

A. Yes.

Q. Will it not be natural for the party, or some anarchists, or fanatics at such time to publish these posters?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you prepared to state before this Committee that the publication of these posters or pasting of these was the work of any organized society, or had you any information that on any subsequent date it was the organised work of any seditious society? Have you any evidence?

A. Evidence?

Q. Yes, I want to know if you have any evidence?

A. I have no evidence.

Q. You say that people only understood that orders of the Government should be disobeyed?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you aware, as the head of the C. I. D., as to how many people there are throughout the province who had taken the *Satyagraha* vow before the 10th?

A. The movement had not yet started.

Q. You have not got my point.

A. No.

Q. You are aware as a C. I. D. officer that the vow was taken for the very reason that those persons who may take the vow, whatever laws he chose, he will have to disobey?

A. Yes.

Q. It affected only those who took it?

A. It will affect others too.

Q. I am now coming to the point. You say disobedience must be confined to those persons who had taken the vow?

A. It was meant.

Q. It was said so?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you aware that it was announced that Mahatma Gandhi or any of his committee fixed upon certain laws that those laws should be disobeyed?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it not a fact that, so far as *Satyagraha* movement is concerned, whatever may have been the laws chosen for disobedience, it was everywhere without exception given out that you must obey the orders of the Police and of the District authorities, and that you should not commit riot?

A. Yes, it was said.

Q. Was it not distinctly stated that disobedience of authorities and forming of unlawful assemblies should not be had recourse to?

A. Yes, it was stated that they should disobey civil law.

Q. For instance, you mean not paying Municipal taxes. Those orders were to disobey the executive orders of the authorities?

A. Yes, practically it would lead to it.

Q. Now there were only three meetings held on the 4th, 9th and the 6th?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore if there was anything seditious in those speeches or if any instructions were given to the masses against the Rowlatt Bill of what Mr. Gandhi meant or in your opinion whatever was explained to the masses will be found in the speeches-reports of which have been submitted to this committee, and they formed part of the Conspiracy Case?

A. Yes.

Q. You have no other material beyond this?

A. About the speeches.

Q. What instructions were given to the masses and how was *Satyagraha* was explained to them?

A. I do not know.

Q. And when you say that the masses understood that they ought to disobey the orders of the Government you mean to say that they understood it from what was urged in those speeches?

A. Well, they would only understand it to mean disobedience of orders.

Q. Don't you think they will think twice or thrice before they accept what is said in the speeches?

A. When open speeches are made on the platforms?

Q. When you make that statement that the masses understood that Government should be disobeyed they understood it from what was said in those speeches? Is it not so?

A. Well, they certainly heard what was said. I do not know in what light they understood.

Q. Their attitude was the result of the speeches which you have placed before us?

A. Yes.

Q. With how many persons had you any discussions about the Rowlatt Bill in the month of March?

A. I had no discussions.

Q. Had you or had you not any discussions about the Rowlatt Bill? I am sure you had no discussions with any of the shop-keeper, etc.?

A. No. With none.

Q. And you never made it your point to go to the different people and ask their opinion about the Rowlatt Bill?

A. No.

Q. Therefore when you have made that statement, you have based it upon the reports and rumours which you had received from time to time from your officers?

A. Yes, and from what I heard at various meetings.

Q. Then you had conversations?

A. No conversation.

Q. Then you mean that some people came to you and said that that was the attitude of the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. That is also hearsay knowledge?

A. Yes.

Q. And that is from information that you received from some persons who informed you that this was the attitude of the public of Lahore?

A. Yes, I was told personally by some people about the rumours.

Q. I am coming to rumours now. So far as rumours are concerned, are you or are you not aware that rumours, about any restrictions upon marriages or of that sort were current after the Hon'ble Mr. Patel introduced his Bill in the Imperial Council?

A. There was no special mention of Mr. Patel.

27 November 1919.]

Khan Sahib SHUKH ABDUL AZIZ

[Continued.]

Q. Did you or did you not receive reports from your subordinates as to the rumours about any restriction upon marriage freedom and these reports came into currency after the Bill of Mr. Patel was introduced?

A. No doubt this was a rumour. It was in March, April and February.

Q. Before February they were not in currency?

A. No.

Q. What I want to know is this. Whether those rumours of restrictions upon marriages, promptly or less promptly were in circulation before March or they were not in circulation?

A. I think they came in the month of March. I heard of these rumours in December or November.

Q. Do you know in what month this Bill was introduced in the Council?

A. I do not know. I could not tell you the exact date.

Q. Do you know it is a matter of more than a year? I know.

A. I had nothing to do with it.

Q. Further, this rumour about the rights of landlords and of what Government is going to take, is it not connected with the Land Alienation Bill? It may not be according to you very prominent; but was it or was it not in circulation?

A. It was in circulation.

Q. Then do you know that from the time the income-tax has been introduced and these new forms have come into use there were rumours about the intentions of the Government in regard to the rights of the people?

A. Yes.

Q. From these things I think you will agree that all sorts of wild rumours got currency and they were swallowed by the masses, and even the educated classes believed in them, during the last 3 years.

A. During the last three years, they were generally about the war.

Q. Many absurd things were said.

A. Yes; many absurd things about the war.

Q. About many things happening in India, is it not so; about aeroplanes and many other things. These are war incidents?

A. But not these rumours.

Q. Have you yourself personally heard anybody giving currency to these rumours?

A. No.

Q. We are told that so far as the surrounding villages are concerned, those villagers never even heard the name of the Rowlatt Act. Is it not so? We have been repeatedly told so, and these are reports of people who have gone through the villages that many of them do not even know the name of the Rowlatt Act?

A. In my opinion they knew it.

Q. According to you, the majority of the villagers knew about the Rowlatt Act?

A. Yes.

Q. And according to you the majority of the villagers were not loyal and were disaffected?

A. There were rumours prevailing, and they may grow disloyal.

Q. What I want to know is whether these rumours were or were not believed in by them? If they believed in them what was the frame of their mind?

A. The frame of mind of anybody who believes in these rumours would be undesirable.

Q. Were or were not the villagers believing in these rumours?

A. Probably.

Q. According to your opinion?

A. I have no opinion; they would certainly believe to a certain extent.

Q. According to your opinion, the majority of the surrounding villages in the districts of Amritsar, Lahore and Gujranwala were all disaffected?

A. I could not say that about each and every village.

Q. I say the majority of the villagers? I am talking of the villages in Lahore, Amritsar, Gujranwala and Lyallpur. They were disloyal?

A. I have not said that they were disloyal.

Q. This small minority, that is, the pleader class, Mukhtar class, and young boys?

A. I would not attribute disloyalty to anybody as a class.

Q. Then I want to know the proportion. Supposing there is a village of 1,500 inhabitants. There may be 5 disloyal persons. In the same way. Do you ascribe disloyalty to any appreciable fraction of the population on account of these rumours?

A. In my opinion, there is a lot of difference between disloyalty and discontent.

Q. Now that we are agreed that there is a great difference between disloyalty and discontent, therefore according to you the majority of the villagers were discontented. Only you won't say that because that would be prejudicial to the Government case?

A. I cannot say that.

Q. Can you give me any idea as to what was the proportion?

A. I cannot give you any proportion. What I know is that these rumours were prevailing and, especially, I have information about Sialkot. I know nothing about Gujranwala and other places. But I had information about some places in Lahore.

Q. That is, you have no information about Gujranwala. I am just taking the month of February. Can you place any information in your possession before this committee showing that on account of these rumours people were discontented in the Amritsar District or Gujranwala?

A. I only say there were rumours; but I could not say they were discontented.

Q. That is, there were no reports about the behaviour of these villagers?

A. No.

Q. As to what effect these rumours had upon them?

A. No.

Q. Practically before that poster, there was no such thing as *Danda Fauj* in Lahore. It was started for the first time when that poster appeared?

A. It came into existence on the 11th April.

Q. You say that you got this information from your officers?

A. Yes. If it were necessary I could give their names.

Q. I do not want their names. They are from your C. I. D. men, C. I. D. Inspectors.

A. Yes.

## ANNEXURE.

## EXHIBIT P.-18.

*Copied by Charanjit Lall on 6th April 1919 from the Bradlaugh Hall.*

1. That which we apprehended has happened. The fortune of India in falling has assumed the form of the Rowlatt Bill
2. There is confusion in every town, province and throughout the empire. Is this the law or the tremour of an earthquake.
3. To practise tyranny and to give it the name of love, what a fine trick is this of the civilisation of the West!

27 November 1919.]

Khan Sahib SREIKH ABDUL AZIZ.

[Continued.]

ANNEXURE—*contd.*

4. This pitcher of the East was full of the honey of loyalty, and now its sweetness has become bitter to the British.
5. Muhammadans and Hindus raised a thousand cries and lamentations, but could not cure Government of its obduracy.
6. Their arguments had no effect on Vincent though Jinnah much beat his face and Sapru struck his head a great deal.
7. In vain have we rubbed our foreheads for years in the Council Chamber. Now we are going to search for Gandhi's threshold.

## EXHIBIT P.-19.

*Removed by Charanjit Lall, Constable, C. I. D., on 6th April 1919, from Lohari Gate.*

Remember the true fast of the 6th April.

May the devil fly (*lit.*, There is no power, there is no power, there is no power).

Passed! Rowlatt Bill passed.

Sir, What is this evil?

"Do you not know that an innocent gentleman will now go to jail without a warrant (*lit.*, permit)."

"Why? What harm have we done?"

"Why? Sir, we rendered so much service in the War, sacrificed hundreds of thousands of heads, and offered crores of rupees. Should not the Government reward us in return for this?"

"Well, Sir, this is very nice, indeed."

"Well done; foolish people always get such reward."

"This is unjust, and we are not going to submit to this."

"Be brave and observe Mahatma Gandhi's fast. Don't obey the Black Bill."

"Alright, Sir, it will be done as you say."

## EXHIBIT P.-20.

*Removed by Charanjit Lal, Constable, from Shahalmi Gate, on 15th April 1919.*

## HOW THEY TOOK AWAY OUR LEADERS.

*Deputy Commissioner.*—How can the *Hartal* be ended?

*Krishan Kishoram and Nawab Fatoo.*—Sir, by your arresting the national leaders.

*Deputy Commissioner.*—Well, Lala Duni Chand, you should get the shops opened.

*Lala Duni Chand.*—They can never be opened until—

*Deputy Sahib.*—What is that?

*Lala Duni Chand.*—Until the Government fulfils the following conditions:—

1. Mahatma Gandhi be permitted to come to the Punjab and to deliver lectures.
2. All national leaders be released.
3. The Rowlatt Bill be repealed.
4. Who is responsible for the death of the national martyrs?
5. Those who fired should be handed over to us.

*Deputy Sahib.*—This is impossible.

*Ch. Ram Bhaj Datt.*—Then the termination of *Hartal* is quite impossible.

*Deputy Sahib.*—(After showing a warrant.) Well then be ready.

*Lala Harkishen Lal.*—We are ready.

*The Chronicler.*—Just then our brave leaders were—

NOTE.—O dear fellow countrymen, if you have a regard for their honour, continue the *Hartal*; so that their honour may not be speckled. On this is your "Jai."

Writer—SOMEBODY.

## EXHIBIT P.-21.

*Removed by Head Constable Ghulam Hussain Shah on 12th April 1919, from inside Yakki Gate.*

Are we to remain the life long slaves of tyrant Englishmen?

"No, never."

We are the Indian nation whose bravery and honour have been acknowledged by all the kings of the world. The English are the worst lot, and are like monkeys, whose deceit and cunning are obvious to all high and low. Have these monkeys forgotten their original conditions? In the time of Alamgir they could get the service of a Durban (gate-keeper) with difficulty. Now these faithless (*namak haram*) people, having forgotten the loyalty of Indians are bent upon exercising limitless tyranny. O brethren! Gird up your loins, and fight. Kill and be killed. Do not lose courage, and try your utmost to turn out these mean monkeys from your holy country. God will surely help you; trust Him and you will be victorious.

SERVANTS, HINDUS AND MUHAMMADANS.



27 November 1919.]

Khan Sahib SHEIKH ABDUL AZIZ

[Continued.

## ANNEXURE—contd.

## . EXHIBIT P.-22.

*Copied from Bazar Tezabian on 12th April 1919 by Head Constable Ghulam Hussain Shah, C. I. D.**Muhammad Ali aur Shaukat Ali ki jai (Victory to, etc.)**Mahatma Gandhi ki jai (Victory to, etc.)*

"Has India got a turban upon its head?"

A proclamation worthy of consideration.

"O God! Thou dost pay heed to our painful lamentation.

"Preserve the honour of us, of India.

"Our India was a garden full of fruits, the tyrant has robbed the whole of our garden.

"The autumn wind of Europe blew at it, because our gardener was in a sleep of carelessness.

"The autumn wind itself enjoyed sweet delights, but dried up our garden.

"It scattered the branches everywhere, and the enemy of our life inflicted oppressions.

"We have suffered millions of shocks and still did not open our lips. Our caravan remained silent.

"How long will our hearts control sighs and cries? How will not the sign of our excitements show itself on our heart?"

"O God! to whom is India to appeal? Thou art our sole benefactor.

"Darkness and gloom prevail, no one hears our cries and lamentations?"

*Question.*—How should our Hindu and Muhammadan brethren be wise and united?*Answer.*—In this way, that (1) we think all English business should be stopped; (2) do not pay the income-tax to any one; (3) do not pay the octroi tax; (4) our zamindar brethren should not pay the revenue; (5) give up the English fashion and position; (6) help your poor brethren secretly.

## EXHIBIT P.-23.

*Copied by Head Constable Ghulam Hussain Shah, from Gumti Bazar, on 12th April 1919.*

1. "This India will not forget you, O Gandhi!  
"As we remember the 6th of April.
2. "It will bring you out of the prison, remember, O Gandhi!  
As you have knitted the Hindus and Muhammadans together.
3. "Do not be anxious, my Gandhi, if you are in prison, O dear,  
"Your imprisonment will serve to raise us.
4. "Until it takes you back in its own lands, India shall never sleep.  
Until it gets you released, O Gandhi!
5. "When you have sown the seed of love among us, do you expect India will remain quiet, O Gandhi!
6. "India will prove to these white people that the Hindus and the Muhammadans are made of one clay, O Gandhi!
7. "In the end this is my appeal to Hindus and Muhammadans, that they should compel these white people to give up our Gandhi."

## EXHIBIT P.-24.

*Removed by Head Constable Ghulam Hussain Shah, on 14th April 1919, from near the Golden Mosque.*

• 786[+]OM.

*Mr. Muhammad Ali, Shaukat Ali ki jai.**Mahatma Gandhi ki jai.*

He who tears off this notice will surely bury the corpse of India's freedom.

Woe to renegades and unlucky traitors!

The brother who gives votes to these will be bastard. He will not be the son of his father.

Gentlemen, your hope will be fulfilled, and the time is drawing nigh, provided you do not open your shops at least on Monday next; otherwise the *Hartal* of so many days will prove useless; because Monday next is the last day of the tyrant and unlucky Lieutenant-Governor. If any Government Officer forces you to open shops, discuss with him patiently and perseveringly as to under what law and what Rowlatt Bill they can force shops to be opened.

Courage brings happiness. "Help is from God and victory is near."

*Well-wisher of India.*

NOTE.—He who tears off (this notice) is the son of a pig.

27 November 1919.]

Khan Sahib SHEIKH ABDŪL AZIZ.

[Continued.]

## ANNEXURE—contd.

## EXHIBIT P.-25.

*Removed by Head Constable Ghulam Hussain Shah, from near Muhalla Kakezaiian.*

## NOTICE.

“ Mr. Shaukat Ali ki jai.”  
 “ Mahatma Gandhi ki jai.”

## “ DANDA AKHBAR.”

*First event.*—When Mahatma Gandhi arrived at Palwal, the English Monkey informed him that his entry into the Punjab was forbidden, and that he should please go back. He replied that he would never go back; then that pig monkey arrested him. Reports of his arrest reached here at once.

*Second event.*—When the news reached Amritsar, the *Danda Fauj* of the brave Sikhs set fire to the Bank, the Railway Station and Electric Power House. They cut the telegraph wires and removed the railway line. The *Danda Fauj* of Amritsar bravely killed a number of European monkeys and their Sikh Regiments have revolted and deserted. O Hindu, Muhammadan and Sikh brethren, enlist at once in the *Danda Army*, and fight with bravery against the English monkeys. God will grant you Victory. Do not apprehend that God does not help us. Cast away such a notion out of your heart. God helps us at all times and hours. Conquer the English monkeys with bravery. God will grant Victory. Leave off dealings with the Englishmen, close offices and workshops. Fight on. This is the command of Mahatma Gandhi.

*Third event.*—O Hindu, Muhammadan and Sikh brethren, do you know of the incident that took place at the Mall Road on the night of the 10th April? The Hindus and Muhammadans who were martyred that day were your own and they sacrificed their lives. Does not this incident excite you? What is the reason? Were not those who were made martyrs in Hira Mandi on the 12th April your own bretheren, and died at the hands of the tyrants? Does the Prophet of God command you not to fight against the tyrant? No, never, the Prophet himself fought, and has commanded us too to destroy the tyrants as he did. Should we not be ashamed of ourselves that while the tyrant is up to all sorts of cruelty, we are sitting quiet? O Hindu, Muhammadan and Sikh brethren, raise the cry of *Allah Akbar* and kill the *Kafirs*. Get ready soon for the war and God will grant Victory to India very soon. Fight with enthusiasm and enlist yourselves in the *Danda Army*.

DANDA AKHBAR,

*Servants of the Nation,**Hindus, Muhammadans and Sikhs.*

## EXHIBIT P.-26.

*Removed by Head Constable Ram Kishen on 6th April 1919, from Lohari Gate.**Sorrowful, Gloomy.*

- “ To-day morning is about to befall the garden of hope. The flower of love, kindness and faith is about to fade.
- “ Autumn is about to set in the garden of liberty. The topic of the Rowlatt Bill is about to engage every heart.
- “ They say that the tree of restriction is about to bloom.
- “ The nightingale and the dove are about to burst into a mournful tune.
- “ To-day Gandhi's message is about to mingle in every heart.
- “ The proud cyprus is about to bend its head low with a sigh.
- “ Young and old all are about to beat the muffled drums.
- “ Despair is soon about to spread over the world.
- “ Meetings of *Hartal* are about to be convened at all places.
- “ The secret is about to be opened to the Government of India.
- “ This system is about to vanish soon.
- “ Success is about to show us her face.
- “ The enemy of the Indians is about to show his back.

*A Bengalee rambling traveller.*

NOTE.—Brothers, see the Rowlatt is just approaching from behind.

## EXHIBIT P.-27.

*Removed by Head Constable Ram Kishen on 6th April 1919, from the Sahalmi Gate.*

## O.M.

We were born in the *Bharat* (India) and all of us are the children of *Bharat*.  
 As *Bharat* has been involved in trouble, our bodies are at the disposal of *Bharat*.  
 Whether they imprison us, cut us to pieces, or open the machine gun fire on us.  
 We will save our *Bharat*, whether they sever our heads from our bodies.  
 May we be cursed if we hide ourselves to save our lives.  
 We will sacrifice our worthless lives to save the *Bharat*.  
 Be courageous, now we will sacrifice our lives, but will lift thee up, from the abyss of misery.  
 We, by a mistake, gave our lives to save the country of others.  
 Now we have come to our senses and shall sacrifice ourselves for the *Bharat*.  
 Blessed art thou, O Hero of action! Gandhi! blessed be the mother who gave birth to thee. These lives, which were duped formerly, are now at thy feet.

*Flower.*

27 November 1919.]

Khan Sahib SHEIKH ABDUL ANS.

[Contd.]

ANNEXURE—*contd.*

## EXHIBIT P.-28.

*Removed by Head Constable Sajdar Ali Shah, from the Gumti Bazar, on 3rd April 1919.*

## CONSIDER A WHILE.

If the mountain of calamity be about to fall on your motherland, and you do not render a bit of assistance to your country—who would be such a wretch as would not join in the mournful state of his country by closing his shop and observing a fast this (next) Sunday.

May God cast them into the hell who do not close their business this (next) Sunday, and do not keep a fast.

## EXHIBIT P.-29.

*Removed by Head Constable Sajdar Ali Shah, on 3rd April 1919, from the Machhi Hatta Bazar.*

## THE LAMENTATION OF BHARAT MATA.

Ah! the tyrant is ready with the gallows to kill me.

O! Hindus and Muhammadans, my two sons! will you not help to rescue your mother from this misery? Is this the return that you will give me for my feeding and bringing you up, that fearing the tyrants you too will remain quiet? No, never, my sons are not cowards. Sons like Mahatma Gandhi and Mr. Shaukat Ali are still alive; they will rescue me from the gallows. O! the inhabitants of the Punjab! you should also follow these two Mahatmas and should comply with this order of theirs. On Sunday next, the 6th of April, you should observe a fast of 24 hours, and the suspension of all business is faith and Dharam. This can do good to your country, otherwise, remember, you will be ruined.

## EXHIBIT P.-30.

*Copied by Head Constable Sajdar Ali Shah, from the Bradlaugh Hall, on 6th April 1919.*

## THE ROWLATT LAW.

1. That which we apprehended has happened. The fortune of India in falling has assumed the form of the Rowlatt Law.
2. There is confusion in every town, province and throughout the Empire. Is this the shock of law or the tremour of an earthquake?
3. To practise tyranny and to give it the name of love, what a fine trick is this of the civilisation of the West!
4. The pitcher of the East was full of the honey of loyalty, and now, its sweetness has become bitter to the British.
5. Muhammadans and Hindus raised a thousand cries and lamentations, but could not cure Government of its obduracy.
6. Their arguments had no effect on them all, though Jinnah much beat his face and Sapru struck his head a great deal.
7. In vain have we rubbed our foreheads for years in the Council Chamber. Now we are going to search for Gandhi's threshold.

## EXHIBIT P.-31.

*Copied from the Chitta Gate on 6th April 1919, by Head Constable Sajdar Ali Shah.*

“Arise, gird up thy loins,  
“Why shouldst thou fear?  
“Then see what God doth.”

If you have to put the sea in commotion, then raise the tempest. If you want to invoke (*lit. conciliate*) a hundred years' old spirit (*lit. incarnation*), create force in your voices. If you want to reconcile an indifferent idol, then beside imploring him, ministering to his fancies, saluting him with folded hands from a distance, present yourself at his mansion of loftiness; and in addition to words, move your hands of deed and foot of practice. The world of practical deeds cannot be conquered by mere toys of words.

“O Indians! why are you so heart-broken?  
“Why do you look a picture of sorrow?”

## EXHIBIT P.-32.

*Copied by Head Constable Munshi Ram on 6th April 1919, from the Lahori Gate.*

“To open the shop is a sin,  
“To observe the fast is a blessing.”

27 November 1919.]

Khan Sahib SHEIKH ABDUL AZIZ

[Concluded.]

ANNEXURE—*contd.*

## EXHIBIT P.-33.

*Copied by Head Constable Munshi Ram on 6th April 1919, from the Lohari Gate.*

## A RESTLESS CHILD.

" Sons of Bharat (the motherland), hearken before you go ;  
 " For your country, do something."

Oh ! Worthy sons of Bharat Mother, are you in your senses ? (If so) open your eyes and see what tyrannies and cruelties are being wrought in our country. The tyrants are bent upon crushing your nation and putting it to the sword. If you have the blood of Arjun, Yudhishtir, Karṇa, Bhishma Pitamaha (in your veins) rise, be courageous, and do not stamp your forehead with the stigma of cowardice. Remember that each and every child of your nation will be put to the sword by these tyrants. Sustain the drowning boat of the nation ; otherwise you will repent and rub your hand to sorrow.

## EXHIBIT P.-34.

*Copied from the Lohari Gate by Head Constable Farzand Hussain on 6th April 1919.*

" The Mother country (Bharat) has suckled us with milk,

" With great tribulations.

" Share her sufferings,

" By shedding your blood.

" National leaders are awakening you up,

" With loud exhortations.

" Follow their footsteps,

" By marching onward."

*A Happy News.*—" The Rowlatt Act will be cancelled, and the report is about to be published."

## EXHIBIT P.-35.

*Removed by Kashmiri Lal, witness, on 16th April 1919, from a wall near a letter-box in the Gumti Bazar.*

I will make my heart a target for millions of spears and lances. I will make my body a sieve in the path of God. Every one, whether of the classes or masses, should wear mourning dress, viz., black clothes, and if one cannot afford to do so, he should wear a crape on the arm as we cannot fight we should mourn for (King) George ; otherwise, we ought to raise the cry of Allah Akbar (God is Great) ;

" You are on oath, namely, by spear, lance and the blood-thirsty dagger and by every gate and wall of the city."

O brethren ! It is a sad thing to relate that I intended to go to the Badshahi Mosque to-day, but I was prevented (from entering it) by Englishmen, the progeny of monkeys. Alas, they have deprived us of the house of God also. Mark ! how your brethren of Amritsar are fighting. That city is in their possession, and here all the doors of the Shahi Mosque have been closed.

O, Punjabis ! muster up your courage and suppress not the sentiment of Hindus and Muhammadans. If you are men, take possession of the Shahi Mosque to-day. Fight, kill or be killed.

" Do not lose your heart before the army of the enemy. Kill him, or be killed by him."

" When the cry of Maula Ali will be raised, and the crescent flag of Ali will be hoisted over the heads."

**NOTE.**—Any Muhammadan who removes this notice or tears it off, shall be called to account on the day of Resurrection.

And one who tears it off, his mother be ravished by an Englishman.

## EXHIBIT P.-36.

*Removed by Kashmiri Lal, witness on 4th April, from Said Mitha Bazar.*

## MEASURES AGAINST THE BABUS.

*Lalaji.*—*Hartal* is complete, victory is ours, but one defect still remains.

*Servant.*—What is that ?

*Lalaji.*—These bastard Babus do not give up attending their offices

*Servant.*—Well, you have the remedy in your own hands.

*Lalaji.*—Tell me soon, why are you silent ?

*Servant.*—Almost all the Babus live in hired houses give them 24 hours' notice at once to vacate your houses, so that they may have to take their wives also with them to the offices.

*Lalaji.*—Well, you have told this at the opportune time. Our *Hartal* will never cease now, and victory is ours.

27 November 1919.]

Khan Sahib SHRIKH ABDUL ABB

[Concluded.]

## ANNEXURE—concl'd.

## EXHIBIT P.-37.

*Removed by Kashmiri Lall, witness, on 15th April, from Lohari Gate.*

## TYRANNY.

## TYRANNY.

Many innocent brave Indians (Hindus and Muhammadans) have been killed in India.

Time for India to wake up. Rise, wake up and show courage.

1. The tyrannical Faringee has deceitfully used his arrow and shaft against the red-headed water-fowl. He has laid waste our garden, desolated it and plucked the beautiful luminous rose.

2. He sets fire with the hands and then puts it out with the feet. From where has this great Godless sinner come? He is like the drop of acid.

Rise up, ye Indian heroes! Draw out the sword and look at the declaration of war made by the chivalrous Punjab.

3. The tyrannical Faringees have sucked blood like leeches and the complexion (of Indians) has become pale like the sugar-cane pressed underground. By robbing us the tyrants have made us penniless. Settle accounts with them now.

4. The earth will not open out to swallow us up, even though we see the blood of Indians gather like water in a pool. (*Expl.*—We are eager to be buried in the bowels of the earth out of shame). Rise, sons of lions! Draw out the sword and look at the declaration of war made by the chivalrous Punjab.

5. The Faringees have killed dear Indian brethren and roasted their flesh on spits like a morsel. They have left neither cloth to wear, nor grain to eat. They have robbed the treasure of our fair honour.

6. They have half slaughtered us like a butchered goat, and the hand of the tyrannical Faringees has worked like that of a butcher. Rise, O brave Indians! Draw out the sword and look at the declaration of war made by the chivalrous Punjab.

The battle-field is hot now. Rise up, brethren. Delay not (or) the hour of your sinking is close at hand. How long will you remain quiet in slavery, even though you see the blood of Indians gather like water in a pool?

8. The whole world is awake and has become happy by becoming free. Why has the water of our tank become dry?

Rise, O sons of lions! Draw out the sword and look at the declaration of war made by the chivalrous Punjab.

9. We fought for the sake of the tyrannical Faringees and lakhs of battle-fields were dyed with our blood. By robbing us the tyrants have made us penniless. They have (only) promised after our repeated demands.

10. They have to-day become black cobras and are hissing loudly. The tyrannical Faringees have been bit by our bite. Driven to desperation, Indians—Hindus, Muhammadans and Sikh youths—have at last gone to fight.

11. The police came and with it the cavalry. The faces of Indians have also become red with rage. We see not the white faces moving (to-day) for they have been confined to towers.

12. The dutiful sons of India who have died have fallen in a right cause. They have become martyrs and sacrificed life to honour.

13. What bravery can we show in this age without arms? Lose not courage, though we are overwhelmed with afflictions.

14. The battle has begun. Let the brave come to the field. The call has gone out for the heads of Indians. Dear Brethren,

It behoves you not to touch any Government work. No clerk should attend his office, etc., nor any railway servant should go to the railway business. You know it was only recently that the blood of several of our innocent brethren has been shed. You should therefore not pay any kind of tax to the Government. Nor should any one pay Government land revenue, nor do any kind of help to Government. If all brethren, Hindus and Muhammadans, unite and work together, then you will see how the tyrannical English will disappear in no time. These white-skinned Englishmen are tyrants, and there is no cruelty which they have not practised on us. Avenge yourselves now on them. The time is favourable; this opportunity will not come again *Mahatma Gandhi ki jai* (Victory to Mahatma Gandhi) who has caused a wave of union to surge through us. Shout, *Hindu-Muslim ki jai* (Victory to the Hindus and the Muhammadans!)

The writer:—

A WELL-WISHER OF THE NATION.

28 November 1919.]

Mr. A. DALE-GREEN.

## At Lahore, Friday, the 28th November 1919.

## PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.L., O.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.F., *Secretary*.

Mr. A. DALE-GREEN, District Traffic Superintendent, North-Western Railway, Lahore, District.

*By the President—*

Q. You are District Traffic Superintendent of the Lahore District?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I do not propose to trouble you about the actual incidents on which we have had a good deal of other testimony, but I want to get some information from you about railway matters. Had you, some days prior to the 10th of April, information as to disaffection among the staff of the railway?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. How long before the 10th of April?

A. I first heard about it about the end of February.

Q. What was the disaffection?

A. I would not call that disaffection. I heard that they were getting up petitions and things like that for increases of pay.

Q. That was all you heard at the end of February?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. But within a few days of the 10th of April did you hear about prospects of a strike?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. How long before the 10th of April?

A. I think I first heard about that on about the 30th of March.

Q. On what ground was a strike threatened then?

A. The idea was that it was to get more pay.

Q. At the time did you consider it probable that the strike would come off?

A. No, Sir.

Q. In fact a strike was averted at the time?

A. That was after the trouble had begun.

Q. Did you connect the railway trouble in any way with anti-British or anti-Government agitation?

A. When the trouble occurred, I then connected it.

Q. But when you first heard of the prospects of a strike did it occur to you that it had its foundation in anything else than an agitation to get increased pay?

A. Not when I first heard of it; I thought it was the usual thing.

Q. Now what made you change your mind?

A. What I heard personally.

Q. Personally when and from whom?

A. One example was we had trouble on my control phones—a system of working railways.

Q. What sort of trouble?

A. We were trying to get the One-Up Mail through as far as Gujranwala and the staff on the phones by which one passes orders to let a train go on or another train come in would not allow us to do this.

Q. Who would not?

A. The Station Master on the phones between Shahdara and Gujranwala.

Q. What date was that?

A. 14th April.

Q. On what ground would the Station Masters not allow you to do that?

A. They kept calling out and interfering with any order that was passed and giving each other in a loud

voice incorrect information as to what had happened, which I knew was incorrect, and suggesting that very soon Europeans would all be killed and places would be burned down, and things like that.

Q. Did you hear that conversation over the phone?

A. I heard that conversation personally.

Q. Who was the person communicating that?

A. There were four or five stations on the phone and it is impossible to say when they were all on the controlled phone which one did it, and they took care to change their voices so that the staff who deal with them every day could not tell who it was.

Q. Were any Station Masters on that branch of the line dealt with?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. How many of them?

A. Four of them I had to suspend and bring in as soon as I could relieve them.

Q. Did the staff in certain places strike or cease work during the period of the *hartal*?

A. Not in my district.

Q. Can you speak to the rationing of the staff?

A. The rationing of them, yes, Sir.

Q. Do you know that from your personal knowledge?

A. Yes, Sir, I gave the orders personally.

Q. What was the difficulty there?

A. First at Amritsar. While I was there the staff found they could not get food, people would not sell them food, so I arranged to supply them.

Q. On what ground would the people not supply them with food?

A. They said because they were Government servants and were working they could not get it.

Q. And in consequence of that special steps had to be taken to ration them?

A. Yes, Sir.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—*

Q. I want to know a little more about this trouble on the control phone. Between Shahdara and Aminabad how many stations are there?

A. There is Kala Shah Kaku, Muridke, Sadhoke and Kamoke. The next is Aminabad, that was not affected.

Q. Four were affected?

A. Four were affected.

Q. At the time you heard what was going on, was that a question of interfering with the control of ordinary trains or was it a question of interfering with the control of trains that were carrying troops?

A. It was the 1-Up Calcutta Mail.

Q. That was simply ordinary passengers?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there any movements of troops at the time on that line?

A. Probably there were a few, I am not aware of that personally.

Q. But were there any substantial movements of troops on that portion of the line?

23 November 1919.]

Mr. A. DALE-GREEN—concluded—Major J. C. HUNTER.

A. Not on that section.

Q. I mean apart from that train altogether, were troops at that time being passed over that line?

A. You mean when this trouble on the phone went on?

Q. About that time.

A. I do not know.

Q. So as far as your information goes, this attempt was an attempt to interfere with the ordinary work of the railway, not an attempt to interfere with special precautions being taken to preserve the peace by the military or police?

A. Yes, Sir, that is right.

Q. You said these men were suspended and afterwards called in, were they dealt with otherwise than as a matter of discipline by the railway, were they prosecuted in any way for what they were doing?

A. The case was handed over to the police, and after the evidence had gone on, the police said as they were on the phones and it would be hard to deal with a particular man and bring evidence that he himself personally spoke, it would be better to deal with them departmentally.

Q. Was what you saw attributable simply to the strike, do you think?

A. No, Sir. Appeal had gone on for more pay or anything else for sometime and it was purely a question of what was going to be done in the matter.

Q. They had not gone on strike at the time?

A. They did not go on strike at all.

Q. By the 14th had the demands which seemed likely to bring about a strike been met or not?

A. Nearly every class of railway man, including myself, had put forward a request for better salaries, and we knew the matter was being considered. The staff particularly knew they were being considered, and small matters that could be dealt with locally had been dealt with. Larger matters which had to go to the Government of India were being worked out and the staff knew that.

Q. So that it was in process of being worked out, the concessions, if any, had not yet been granted?

A. A few small ones which could be done locally had been granted, but the bigger ones had not been; they were likely to come out shortly.

Q. And it was the talk about Europeans being killed that really made you think that it was something special and not a mere attempt to prevent ordinary traffic going on?

A. Yes, Sir. And they abused one of the men who was going to work. The man at Aminabad wanted the train to get on and the others turned round and abused him for allowing it to go on.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You said the staff had difficulty in obtaining food?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. This staff included a majority of Indians, and therefore, so far as this staff was concerned, it was not in league with those who were promoting the *hartal*?

A. Not the staff who were working.

Q. The staff who had difficulty in getting food was not in collusion with those who were promoting the *hartal*?

A. I could not answer that.

Q. The very fact that they were not allowed to buy food is evidence that they were not?

A. You may think that; I would not like to guess anything like that.

Q. I would like your opinion whether that staff who had difficulty in buying food was in any way connected with those who were promoting the *hartal*?

A. These four Station Masters whom I had to suspend and bring in; they also had difficulty.

Q. About getting their food?

A. Yes, I had to send them food.

Q. Therefore, from that it is clear that this staff and these four Station Masters who were suspended by you were not in collusion with those who were promoting the *hartal*?

A. I entirely differ from you, Sir.

Q. Why then did they have difficulty in buying food?

A. They said so.

Q. And had you anything to the contrary?

A. No, I could not go out there.

Q. You know that a large majority of the Indian staff had difficulty in buying food. What do you say about them, were they in collusion with those who were promoting the *hartal*?

A. I would not like to guess, I think some were and some were not. I think the majority were loyal.

Q. And therefore about this staff for whom you made arrangements you are still of the opinion that they were also in collusion with the promoters of the *hartal*?

A. It is quite possible some may have been.

Q. What was your opinion then?

A. My opinion was that some may have, some may not have been.

Q. Notwithstanding that they had difficulty in buying food?

A. Yes, because I had rather a bad example with these four Station Masters before me.

Q. Except what you heard on the phone so far as these four Station Masters were concerned, can you give me any instance of the staff being *anti-British* or *anti-Government*?

A. Yes, at Jullundur.

Q. That was within your jurisdiction?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What happened there?

A. They attended meetings that were held by certain people there and came back to the station and suggested that work should be stopped.

Q. Therefore because they attended certain meetings and said there should be a strike so far as the railways were concerned, you thought they were *anti-British* and *anti-Government*?

A. Yes.

Q. Anything else?

A. No.

Q. No other instances? There is this one of the four Station Masters and this one at Jullundur?

A. No others.

Q. Therefore when you in your statement say the staff was *anti-British* and *anti-Government*, you base your opinion on what happened at Jullundur and at these four railway stations?

A. The staff that gave trouble, yes.

Major J. C. HUNTER, R. E. (Temp.), Carriage and Wagon Superintendent, North Western Railway.

By the President—

Q. Are you Carriage and Wagon Superintendent, North Western Railway?

A. I am.

Q. Were you Area Officer in Moghulpura?

A. I was.

Q. When did you assume command of that Area?

A. At about 9 P.M. on the night of the 10th.

Q. On assuming command what did you do?

A. I proceeded to the armoury in Moghulpura and made all arrangements for the safety of the women and children.

Q. By this time had members of the Indian Defence Force been called out?

A. They had been called out and they had formed in front of the armoury and had been told off for the armoured trains.

Q. Where were the armoured trains?

28 November 1919.]

Major J. C. HUNTER.

[Continued.]

A. The armoured trains are stabled in the Carriage Shops at Moghulpura. They have two there.

Q. Were they ordered out in response to a telephonic message from the Adjutant, Indian Defence Force?

A. Yes, they had been ordered out shortly after 8 o'clock to be in readiness. It takes about three or four hours to get them ready.

Q. You told off crews for these trains?

A. That is so.

Q. After they were told off, what available strength had you for the defence of Moghulpura?

A. There were 75 Indian Defence Force, 50 armed police and about 50 of the 2-10th Jats.

Q. Are these figures in addition to the crews of the trains?

A. Those are in addition to the crews.

Q. How many constituted the crews of the trains?

A. Thirty ranks and two officers for each train, that is 64 altogether.

Q. Were patrols then detailed for duty in Moghulpura area workshops?

A. They were.

Q. And the reserve detained at Moghulpura armoury?

A. The 2-10th Jats were in reserve there and some Indian Defence Force. The armed police were distributed over the area at different points.

Q. In your statement you say they were retained at the Moghulpura armoury with three motor cars ready for any emergency?

A. Yes.

Q. What was your reserve after patrols had been fixed?

A. We had in addition to the 2-10th Jats about 20 men left. Of course those figures varied, they were not alike for two days. That was on the night of the 10th.

Q. A motor car I think patrolled the road?

A. I arranged that at once, for a motor car to patrol every 2½ hours. That went right through the whole area.

Q. Was there any disorder in any part of Moghulpura colony on the 10th or 11th?

A. There was no disorder there at all.

Q. The place is occupied almost entirely by Government employees?

A. It is entirely a Government colony.

Q. And are the Government quarters for Indian workmen situated about a quarter of a mile to the north of the European colony?

A. That is so, there is quite a large Indian colony there.

Q. What did you see as to the behaviour of the railway workmen there?

A. Generally the behaviour of the workmen was quite satisfactory. They made several complaints about outside influence, but they would not give any information.

Q. What do you mean by outside influence?

A. Well interference in getting to their work and difficulty in procuring commodities.

Q. Were you aware at the time what was causing them this difficulty in getting to their work?

A. As far back as November the workmen complained about difficulty in getting food owing to the high prices.

Q. That is not the point, I am referring to the incidents of the 10th when you were acting as Area Officer. I understood you were speaking with reference to the circumstances that there were complaints made as to some of them being prevented from going to work. What was preventing them going to work?

A. The roads were picketed by men at different points and men from the city had difficulty in getting out of the city. Those complaints were made in some cases direct to me and in some cases to the headmen.

Q. Did the cases increase?

A. They did from the 8th and 9th right on to the morning of the 16th or 17th.

Q. On the 16th, did you receive a phone message from Mr. Gantzer, the Superintendent of the Printing Press at Moghulpura, about men in his vicinity preventing workmen from attending to work?

A. I did, Sir.

Q. What did you do when you received that message?

A. I took four ranks of the Sussex in my motor car and went straight down to see what was the matter.

Q. Did you see any gangs or pickets on the road?

A. I saw one picket of between 40 and 50 men, at about 500 yards off.

Q. Did they do anything as you approached?

A. As the car reached to between four and five hundred yards of the place they were in, they dispersed across the maidan.

Q. Did you take any action or order anything to be done?

A. When I reached the point the men were between three and four yards away so I thought the only action to take was to fire two rounds over them.

Q. That was firing into the air?

A. Firing into the air. I knew it was against regulations, but I thought it was the action to take and I would take it again.

Q. And what was the effect of your taking that action?

A. One of the men got scared and hid there, so we brought him back and handed him over to the Special Tribunal, but he was released later.

Q. Were complaints made by workmen in Bhogiwal and Bhagwanpura about the *hartal*?

A. Yes, and I reported the matter to Colonel Johnson.

Q. Where are these two villages?

A. They lie about a mile and a half to the north of Moghulpura.

Q. And how far is Moghulpura from Lahore?

A. Is it about three miles—three miles from the post office.

Q. Did you get instructions to visit these villages in the afternoon of the 16th April?

A. I got orders to go and see that all the shops in the bazar were opened. Most of the shops had very few commodities on view because I believe that had been closed for two or three days.

Q. I think you were accompanied through the villages by the *lambardar*?

A. I did not know the villages so I sent for the *lambardar*.

Q. Who is a *lambardar*?

Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate.—He is the headman of the village.

Q. Then I think you paid further visits?

A. I paid periodical visits to both villages and found that commodities were being sold in a great many instances at prices at lower rates than those fixed by the Martial Law order.

Q. What, in your opinion, was the effect of Martial Law in the area you had to administer?

A. I think it was the means of putting an end to all the disturbances.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Before the 10th of April in Moghulpura Works was a strike beating up? Were you apprehending a strike before the 10th of April owing to economic conditions?

A. Do you mean just immediately before?

Q. Just immediately before?

A. About the end of January the workmen complained bitterly about the high prices of food and we opened grain shops and gave them payment rations of grain and that caused a certain amount of discontent among the workmen.

Q. What I mean is this: you are Superintendent of the Carriage and Wagon Department of the works at Moghulpura. Then before the 10th when these political troubles started—just before that, were you apprehending a strike among your workmen in that department for any reason?

A. No, but there was just a possibility of a strike taking place.

Q. You mean you were preparing yourself as a strike might come along?



28 November 1919.]

Major J. C. HUNTER.

[Continued.]

A. Well we are always prepared for that.  
 Q. But still there was more discontent than usual?  
 A. Yes, there was.  
 Q. When the riots were going on your men were interfered with going to work. This happened between the 10th of April and the 16th when it was practically stopped. Now before the 10th had there been any workers trying to prevent people going to work?  
 A. There may have been, but none were reported to me.

Q. Do you think that if there had been any that they were fairly sure to have come to your cars?  
 A. Yes.

Q. These people who stopped men going to their work, did you ever find out at all what sort of people they were?  
 A. I tried my best to find out but I was not able. Had I found out who they were I would have had them arrested.

Q. Did the people who made these complaints to you—were they employees of your works or were they outsiders.  
 A. They never gave information. They said they would get into trouble if they gave any information.

Q. You could get no description of the people. You did not know whether they had anything to do with the railway?  
 A. I tried my best but I could not get any information at all. Not the slightest.

Q. Take the case referred to by Mr. Gantzer, the Superintendent of the Printing Press, who had these men annoying him on the 16th. Had he any information that these men were people connected with the printing press or not?  
 A. I tried my best. Mr. Gantzer could give a proper description of some of the men.

Q. One of these men was arrested. Did you ever find out what he was?  
 A. I found out that he was employed in the Locomotive Department at Moghulpura and I handed him over to the Special Tribunal. I believe he was released later.

Q. This Printing Press—does it have anything to do with the railway?  
 A. It belongs to the railway. It is the railway printing press. It is a part of the Moghulpura Workshop. At any rate as far as this man was concerned he was apparently trying to produce a railway strike. I take it that was the reason for him being there and that is why I handed him over to the Special Tribunal but he was released.

Q. Does your railway have a good many employees in Lahore city?  
 A. I think about 7,000 to 8,000 live in the city. I think about 7,000 or 8,000 come by train daily.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat-Narayan—*  
 Q. Were you informed that about fifteen days before the 10th of April there were very strong rumours that railway signallers and the running staff intended to strike?  
 A. No, I have nothing to do with that.

Q. And the time of the strike was fixed for 2 P.M. on the 30th of April?  
 A. I do not know anything about that. I am afraid you misunderstand my position. I am in charge of the Workshop.

Q. Were you aware of the fact that about 300 workmen of the shops tried to stop the other workers from going to work on the 13th? This is from the statement of Mr. Ryan.  
 A. Well that took place two miles off. That was not in my area.

Q. As regards the workmen with whom you were concerned you do not think that they were with those who were promoting the *hartal* or that they were in any way practically connected with it. Whenever any person was persuaded not to go to work he came to you and complained about it and I think you drew the inference that.....

A. It was the older employees that came to me and complained bitterly about it and I had no reason to think that there was any collusion with those who were promoting the *hartal*. After the 16th there was no falling off in the number of attendants. The action that had been taken raised the number by a percentage higher than ever it was before.

Q. Between the 10th and 15th how far had the attendance fallen?  
 A. Roughly I should think between 60 and 70 per cent. of absentees.

Q. That would not give me any idea?  
 A. Roughly about 6,500 absentees out of a total of 12,000. Practically all these complaints were made to the Works Superintendent. Some complaints were made direct to the Works Superintendent. Some were made through the Foreman to the Works Superintendent, but all complaints reached me.

*By Major-General Sir George Barrow—*  
 Q. I see in your statement that you say you had a petition about two months ago from workmen residing in Bhogiwal requesting for Martial Law to be re-instated. Why did they do that?  
 A. I had a conversation with some of the senior workmen and they liked Martial Law and they wish it would have been continued a little longer.

Q. They did not think it had been removed a moment too soon?  
 A. No, I do not think so. I think it was administered very well.

Q. How long did it continue in the railway?  
 A. It was continued up to the 1st of September in railway lands. Elsewhere outside railway areas it was repealed very much earlier.

Q. They honestly wanted it back?  
 A. Yes.

Q. Did they give any reasons for wanting it back?  
 A. They said they had no trouble in getting food. The food was controlled and they got food at reasonable prices and if the *banias* refused to sell he was dealt with immediately. If it had been ordinary law it would have taken months.

Q. In this place Bhogiwal—was Martial Law taken off in June or September?  
 A. It was taken off when Martial Law was repealed outside the area.

Q. So these men lost through Martial Law in June?  
 A. They were only under Martial Law when they were in the railway area.

Q. Was it the state of things prior to June or the state of things prior to September that they looked on with fond regret?  
 A. Prior to June.

*By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—*  
 Q. With regard to Martial Law, I suppose it would have been good if the prices were fixed permanently and everyone would like the prices permanently established?  
 A. I suppose everyone would.

Q. You said you always apprehended a strike?  
 A. No, I do not say that.

Q. There is always a danger of a strike?  
 A. I am always prepared for it.

Q. Why are you always prepared if there is no apprehension?  
 A. We are always prepared to cope with a strike.

Q. Which means that you have an idea that a strike might take place and therefore you are ready to cope with it?  
 A. Yes.

Q. Why do you say there might be a strike?  
 A. There had been a certain amount of discontent due to high prices. There is always a possibility of strike when they do not get what they want. And of course there is a tendency for them to strike for more money. If we give an increase to the workmen the *banias* just put up their prices, so practically they are not much better off than before. I recommended that rations

28 November 1919.]

Major J. C. HUNTER—concluded—Mr. O. W. WATKINS.

should be given to the workmen. I recommended that as far back as November.

Q. Don't you think that the prices are based on the ordinary law of supply and demand? It is not entirely in the hands of the *bania*?

A. Yes, entirely. Martial Law proved that.

Q. This strike of which you spoke of which might have taken place before the 10th—was it due to high prices?

A. I should think it was due to high prices.

Q. Of course under Martial Law when prices were proclaimed that was not a solution of the difficulty of the strike so far as Moghulpura was concerned.

A. We gave our payment rations of grain to the workmen.

Q. What is the total number of workmen under your charge?

A. Do you mean in my direct charge or in the workshops?

Q. Under your direct charge?

A. 6,200. In Moghulpura there are 12,100.

Q. Most of them live in the city?

A. I should say about 7,000 or 8,000 and the rest come in from the surrounding villages.

Q. They come every day from the city?

A. We run a special train for them.

Q. Do you know why this man who was arrested on the 16th was released?

A. I am afraid I could not say. The Special Tribunal will probably answer that question.

Q. Did you enquire?

A. No, my duty was to hand him over.

Mr. O. W. WATKINS, Works Manager, Loco., North-Western Railway, Moghulpura.

By the President—

Q. You are Works Manager, Loco., North-Western Railway, Moghulpura?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think you were doing Indian Defence Force duty throughout the night of April 10th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. After being on duty you paid a hurried visit to the Loco. Works on the 11th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In what state did you find the works?

A. Absolutely quiet.

Q. You say the number of absentees compared to the ordinary number was rather below the average? There was a reason for a good attendance as it was pay day and absentees are not paid till a later day?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did a commotion take place outside the works during breakfast hours?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What was the cause of that?

A. It was apparently due to the fact that the audit clerks who are responsible for payment were not at work. The men therefore thought that they would not get their pay and made that one of the reasons for causing a commotion.

Q. Do you know what had prevented the audit clerks being at work?

A. I had actually been told but the clerks were away then and on the following days.

Q. I think you made special arrangements about disbursing pay?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you were relieved of Indian Defence duty on the 12th did you ask for a military guard to be put near the works during the meal hour?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Why did you ask for that action to be taken?

A. Because I considered it necessary to protect the works.

Q. On the 12th what percentage of the employees were absent?

A. Forty per cent. in the morning and in the afternoon only 250 out of 4,560 were present.

Q. In the morning did you get any explanation as to the difficulty they had in attending the works?

A. I did not see them; they were not present; and the men who were present said they had difficulty in coming to work.

Q. Did these workmen communicate to you the difficulty they had in attending their work? What was the difficulty?

A. They said that they had been prevented on the roads by bands of men with sticks in every direction.

Q. Did they say anything about the prospect of having their houses destroyed if they attend their work?

A. There was a rumour given out that if they attended work their houses would be looted and their families molested.

Q. I think they wanted the works to be closed instead of working the usual Saturday afternoon overtime?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. But that request was not acceded to?

A. A wrong construction would have been put on it if I granted that request.

Q. On the 14th what per cent. of the staff was absent?

A. 85 per cent. of the staff were absent in the forenoon and about a hundred more men attended work in the afternoon.

Q. Was any explanation given as to the small numbers attending by those in fact attending?

A. The same as on Saturday, that is they were prevented by bands of men.

Q. Did the numbers decrease on the 14th?

A. From the 14th they gradually decreased. The attendance gradually improved till it became normal on the 21st.

Q. Were many of the clerical staff late in attending duties?

A. Many of them were late and others were absent.

Q. What was the explanation—they gave?

A. The same reason as the workmen gave that some of them had to go many miles out of the way to get to their offices.

Q. Did any of them resort to disguises?

A. Some of them came dressed in students' clothes which they worked in.

Q. On what date did the attendance become normal?

A. On the 21st.

Q. To what did you attribute that improvement in the situation?

A. A gradual settling down of the situation generally.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. With regard to those men who absented themselves—what steps did you take to find out whether they put forward a false excuse or told the truth?

A. The men who told me that were the men who had difficulty in getting in.

Q. Not those who were present? You never made enquiries from those who were present? I want to know as to whether you satisfied yourself that it was not a false excuse?

A. I did not consider it false because they had been seen by the I. D. F. on duty.

Q. Were you aware of this fact that a threat was held out about robbing the people and molesting their families at night by 300 workmen?

A. I think it is a misstatement. The 13th was a Sunday.

Q. Leave the date, possibly there may be a mistake in the date. But I want to know whether or not it was

28 November 1919.]

Mr. O. W. WATKINS—concluded—Mr. C. C. RYAN.

brought to your notice that 300 workmen of the shops had tried to persuade other workers to secede from going to work and that they intimidated them in case they went to work?

A. It was only brought to my notice on the morning of the 14th. There was a commotion at the railway station at the workmen's train. I was not informed either officially or unofficially that the 300 workmen were railway workmen.

Q. You were not informed that a large number of shop-men were trying to intimidate other worker?

A. I personally know that they tried to persuade others not to work.

Q. About the threat held out by them that their houses will be looted at night and their families would be molested, was it held out by the 300 shop-men?

A. I do not know that.

Q. Have you any reason to say that this statement of Mr. Ryan is not a true statement, either he was misinformed or something like that?

A. I have no information.

**Mr. C. C. RYAN, Station and Assistant Traffic Superintendent, North-Western Railway, Lahore Junction.**

*By the President—*

Q. Are you Station and Assistant Traffic Superintendent at Lahore Junction?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. At about 1 on the 10th April, did you hear of this trouble at Amritsar?

A. Yes, Sir, I did.

Q. I think at about 1-45 an Indian Police Officer came to you to arrange accommodation for a party of police to go by the Down Calcutta Mail to Amritsar?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was that in consequence of the fear of rioting?

A. He told me that they had heard of something serious and they wanted assistance.

Q. Was that done?

A. Yes, it was done.

Q. In doing so did you try to get into touch with Amritsar?

A. I did, Sir, at about 2 P.M.

Q. What means did you adopt?

A. I tried to get the staff at Amritsar on the Railway phonophone.

Q. Were you successful?

A. I was not successful. I tried the Telegraph Office instrument.

Q. Now what exactly is the phonophone?

A. It is a sort of telephone. You press a button and you get a buzz. It is a long distance telephone.

Q. Is the sound communicated over the telegraph wire?

A. Yes.

Q. How could you do it when the telegraph wire was cut?

A. The Government telegraph wire between Amritsar and Lahore was cut, but the Railway telegraph wire was not affected. I presume that while the disturbance was on the workmen were all occupied at the time and could not attend to these little matters. But eventually Mr. Bennett, Station Superintendent at Amritsar, called me on the phonophone.

Q. That was after 3, I think?

A. At about 3.

Q. You were told that Guard Robinson had been murdered?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did the Deputy Commissioner also speak to you?

A. He did. He also gave me a message to the Lieutenant-Governor.

Q. Did you learn then that the telegraph communication was interrupted?

A. Yes, I learnt that the Government telegraph wires also cut.

Q. And you passed some messages on the phonophone?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you had any previous indication of a disturbance?

A. No, Sir, not till about the early part of April. There was some talk among the guards about a strike but there was no such thing among the other staff.

Q. Among the guards?

A. Yes, the Running staff.

Q. Did you connect that strike in any way with the political movement?

A. I was told a little before that there were some outsiders interfering with our Indian Guards, I mean the Running staff, and that they were trying to get up a strike among them, and later on, probably about the 11th April, I heard that the Signallers were similarly affected.

Q. I think you made arrangements to meet the situation in case of strikes?

A. Yes.

Q. When did you get confirmation of the intended strike by the Signallers?

A. On the day when the Kasur riots took place.

Q. Can you explain what occurred on the 12th?

A. I tried to get information as to how things were progressing at Kasur so as to telephone the matter up to the Lieutenant-Governor for his information. I got Mr. Harding, Deputy Superintendent, Railway Telegraphs, on to the wire and asked him to converse with the man at Kasur. He did so, and the man gave him a detailed account of all things because he was apparently under the impression that he was talking to an Indian Signaller, and Mr. Harding took that down, and he said that they were looking forward to Lahore to strike on the 13th at 2 o'clock.

Q. Prior to that, had you seen anything taking place among the Signallers to indicate that they had an intention to strike?

A. There were constant meetings among them.

Q. What action did you take when you got that communication from Kasur on the 12th?

A. I got into touch with the Deputy Superintendent and we fixed that we would speak to the staff about it. I spoke to them when they were going off duty and told them that if they had a genuine complaint they must wait until all this trouble was over.

Q. What attitude did they adopt?

A. They all agreed to come to work, and on that day they had no intention to strike.

Q. I think so far as Lahore was concerned, there was no strike?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Did you make arrangements, however, to have a Military guard placed over the Telegraph Office?

A. Yes.

Q. What was your object in having that guard?

A. To prevent any intimidation from outside.

Q. Were you apprehensive of any intimidation from outside?

A. The staff was prevented from going to work.

Q. You make some reference in your statement to the bogus telegrams that were received?

A. There was more than one telegram received.

Q. Who received them?

A. They were all received in the Telegraph Office. The one appertaining to Malakwal was received by Mr. Row, the Telegraph Inspector. He was actually at the instrument and received the message as having come from Gujranwala. I went up to the control instrument to find out if the man there had received and transmitted a wire of that kind, and he replied in the negative.

Q. To what effect was this communication?

28 November 1919.]

Mr. C. C. RYAN.

[Concluded.]

A. It was to say that the Malakwal station had been burnt down and that some Europeans had been killed and the staff had struck work.

Q. Was there any truth in it ?

A. None at all. I could not get confirmation.

Q. Are such communications likely to have a bad effect on the staff ?

A. Well, I take it that they would have some effect.

Q. Did you take means to prevent a repetition of such occurrences ?

A. The staff saw that I was making enquiries. They heard the enquiries on the telegraph and on the control telephones. That was all I could do.

Q. On the 13th, did you hear that the mob in the city were preventing the staff from coming to duty ?

A. I am not quite sure about the date, but they certainly were.

Q. Were a number of your men prevented from coming to work ?

A. They were.

Q. How did you discover that ?

A. A number of men were prevented from coming from Badami, others took off their uniform, hid it under their beds and came without it. Besides that, on one occasion from the overbridge I could see them prevented from coming to work.

Q. Who was preventing them ?

A. The crowds from the Lahore city.

Q. What means were being taken to prevent them from coming to work ?

A. The crowd that I particularly refer to were forcibly pulling the workmen and stopping them, and some few had sticks, but I did not see any of them using those sticks.

Q. You have made a reference in your statement to 300 workmen at the shops ?

A. Yes.

Q. Who were these 300 workmen ?

A. I could not say whether they were Loco. or Carriage Shop workmen but the train starts from my station. The workshops are situated about 2½ miles from my station. These men had all got into the train, and there was word sent to say that there was in the workmen's lines some trouble and some men were interfering with others and were preventing others from coming to work. I then went up to Captain Phillips, who was the officer in the station, and he sent down an armed guard. As soon as this armed guard arrived, these men got into the train, and as the train slowly moved along they began to jeer at the workmen on the Railway. They came over, some passed through the yard, the majority passed over the bridge, and then they began to threaten the staff.

Q. What sort of threat ?

A. They threatened the cabin men that they would assault them. They threatened to visit their homes, rob them, loot them and molest their families. I went up to Captain Phillips to send some men so as to assure the staff that they were all right.

Q. Did these 300 men actually assault or stone anybody ?

A. One cabin man reported that stones were thrown out.

Q. Were you able to get food stuffs from the city ?

A. No.

Q. How was that ?

A. The mob would not allow any food stuff to go out of the city.

Q. Did that cause any inconvenience to the staff and passengers ?

A. Yes, it did.

Q. Both the European and Indian ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Had you to make any special arrangements to deal with the question of rationing ?

A. Yes, Sir. We had to arrange for food for refreshment rooms and sweetmeat vendors.

Q. Owing to the railway tracks and stations being interfered with, were the night running trains stopped ?

A. Yes.

Q. For how long ?

A. I should think for about 10 days. It may have been more, but I don't think it was less than 10 days.

Q. Did that mean that you had to hold up trains at Lahore instead of running them through ?

A. Yes, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Do you say that the strike was being engineered by the Indian guards who were financing the whole thing ?

A. Yes.

Q. You also found out that 2 P.M. on the 13th April was the time fixed for a general strike ?

A. Yes.

Q. With regard to buying food stuffs, is it not a fact that all the shops inside the city were closed from the 10th up to the 15th ?

A. I do know that, but I also know that stuff could be obtained and efforts were made to get stuff out but people were not allowed to get it out.

Q. Do you know that in order that poor men might get their food stuffs, *lanjarkhanas* were opened inside the city ?

A. I heard it. I do not know it.

Q. Their object was to ease the situation so that poor men might not feel any difficulty ?

A. It might have been so.

Q. Do you know that there are some Associations in Bombay and Madras which look after the interests of guards and other railway employees ?

A. I am sorry, I do not know that.

Q. Whenever drivers or guards get into trouble, these Associations take up their cause ?

A. There is a Railway Association called the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, they have got their head-quarters in Bombay.

Q. These men will be defended by that association in case of trouble ?

A. This was not being helped by them.

Q. They have also got legal advisers, they have got a sort of Association ?

A. Quite so.

Q. Do you know that attempts were made to organize similar Associations so far as the O. and R. Railway was concerned ?

A. I do not know that.

Q. As a matter of fact an Association did come into existence ?

A. I do not know that either. This is the first I have heard of it.

Q. Certainly you will have no objection if the Railway employees, as in European countries, organise themselves for the purpose of protecting their rights ?

A. Absolutely no objection.

Q. When you say that some outside influence was being brought to bear on these railway guards, may I know what you mean by 'outside influence' ?

A. My information was that there were some men of the legal profession who were advising them.

Q. Some men of the legal profession were asking them to demand higher wages ?

A. I suppose it must have been so.

Q. They took up their cause ?

A. Oh, no.

Q. They promised them help ?

A. I do not know anything about the promise of help.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. What pay do these Indian guards get ?

A. They are all graded, A, B and C Class.

Q. What is the pay of the different grades ?

A. I think the A Class men get Rs. 25 to Rs. 50, the B class men get from Rs. 51 to Rs. 90 and the C Class men get from Rs. 100 to Rs. 165. That is the present rate.

Q. Was not this movement started by guards with the object of improving their pay ?

A. To improve their condition generally and their pay.

28 November 1919.]

Mr. C. B. HARDING—Rev. E. D. LUCAS.

**Mr. C. B. HARDING, Deputy Superintendent, Railway Telegraphs.***By the President—*

Q. I only want to ask you one question. During the disturbed days, were your wires being cut ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In many directions ?

A. Certainly, in many directions.

Q. You might indicate the different lines that were being cut during the period between the 10th and the 16th April ? What lines were cut ?

A. Karachi, Ambala, Sukkur and Rawalpindi.

Q. Had the cutting of the wires effect of interrupting the telegraph communication for some time ?

A. Very much.

Q. How long ?

A. Sometimes for a day, sometimes for a few hours.

Q. Was there any disastrous effect on through urgent traffic ?

A. Very heavy delay.

Q. I think you can speak on the same points upon which we heard Mr. Ryan's evidence with reference to the interference with workmen ?

A. Not beyond what my signallers told me that they were troubled by the populace.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—*

Q. You came to know during the course of your enquiries that certain signallers tried to canvass for a strike ?

A. They did.

Q. But as the majority of them were not ready the strike failed ?

A. Yes.

**Rev. E. D. LUCAS, Principal, Forman Christian College, Lahore.***By the President—*

Q. I think you are the Principal of the Forman Christian College in Lahore ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. How many students are there ?

A. This year there are 835. Last year there were about 750.

Q. From what age to what age do they run ?

A. 16 to 23 or 24.

Q. What sort of instruction do they receive in your college, is it just the ordinary University course ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Do you give instructions for the different learned professions ?

A. No Sir, Arts and Science.

Q. Generally speaking, are your students taking much interest in political affairs ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did they display a larger amount of interest last year than they did before ?

A. Last year they took a particularly keen interest.

Q. In connection with the agitation against the Rowlatt Bill ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In what way did they show their interest in that agitation ?

A. It is very difficult to say just in what way. One could know it, because they were constantly talking about it in their group meetings and in their conversation generally.

Q. Did you in the college see or did you make yourself acquainted with any indication of unrest among the students ?

A. No acts of unrest, but there was a great deal of excitement among the students.

Q. On the 10th April where were you ?

A. I was in Lahore.

Q. Did you see any of the rising that took place ?

A. Yes, Sir, I saw the mob.

Q. Where did you see the mob ?

A. In front of my house on the Mall opposite the Y.M.C.A.

Q. Were there many students in the mob ?

A. A good many.

Q. Did you see any incident yourself indicative of the attitude of the mob on that day ?

A. I will recount an instance of what happened. I had reason to believe that this crowd would be fired on, and I ordered one of the students of the college to return to his hostel. I had difficulty in sending word to him. Finally he came over. I ordered him to return to his hostel which order he disobeyed. I again asked him to return to his hostel and told him that he would be expelled from the college if he disobeyed, but the crowd thinking that I was trying to interfere with the procession began to shout "shame, shame" and used very abusive terms. That is why I considered it was a dangerous crowd.

Q. You thought that it was a crowd that would be fired upon. How did you know that ?

A. I had been over to the police station and seen the police had lined up there. I asked the Superintendent of Police why they were lined up with their muskets. He said there was trouble in Amritsar and they were expecting trouble in Lahore.

Q. From the appearance and demeanour of the crowd, did you consider it was an unruly or ruly crowd ?

A. Unruly crowd.

Q. Was it a crowd which was likely to commit acts of violence ?

A. It was very excited, and I suppose an excited crowd will commit acts of violence.

Q. Was that the reason for your anticipating that firing might take place ?

A. No, Sir. The Deputy Commissioner had called together the principals and head-masters of schools and colleges and had told us that there should be no crowds on the streets, and if there were so the Government would stop them I understood he meant that he would stop them if necessary by firing. I mentioned this fact before the students the next day when we assembled in the hall. The students were aware of this order.

Q. Although they were aware of this order, you saw a large number of students in the mob ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In the evening did one of your students turn up with his clothes covered with blood ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did he say anything as to what actually occurred ?

A. He said that he had carried a man who had been shot and had helped to put him, as I understood, in some friend's house.

Q. Was there any other incident during the period of the disturbances which came specially under your notice ?

A. What kind of incident, Sir ?

Q. I mean indicative of the unrest in the crowd ?

A. There was a state of tension and high excitement. I felt that there might be an act of violence any time.

Q. Did that state of tension continue for a substantial period of time ?

A. It continued till the 13th.

Q. For 3 or 4 days beyond the 13th ?

A. It lasted up to the 14th. On the 14th things began to quiet down.

Q. During the period of Martial Law certain orders were issued by Colonel Johnson, did he consult you about issuing these orders with regard to the students ?

A. He called the Principals together and consulted us.

Q. As to maintaining order among the students ?

A. And the nature of punishment to be given.

Q. In connection with the orders that were actually issued by him did he get the approval of the Principals ?

A. No.

28 November 1919.]

Rev. E. D. LUCAS.

[Continued.]

Q. Would you give me your own opinion? Do you or do you not approve of the orders that were in fact put in force by the Military authorities?

A. I do not approve of all the orders.

Q. Which of the orders do you not approve?

A. It is very difficult to say, Sir.

Q. There was an order that was referred to under which students had to report several times a day at roll call. As I understand, that necessitated their walking about 16 miles a day. What do you say as regards that order?

A. That is one that I would not give.

Q. It caused a lot of feeling and resentment among the students?

A. Yes.

Q. So far as you are able to see, did it serve any good object?

A. No, I do not think so.

Q. There was also some reference to a number of students that some Professors marched to the Fort for some offence connected with the destruction of notices or tearing down notices. Do you know anything about that?

A. No, Sir.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—*

Q. Can you tell me, Mr. Lucas, something about the age of students in your college at which they begin to take an interest in politics? What is the average age at which students in your college begin to take an interest in politics in the sense of attaching themselves definitely to political propaganda of any sort?

A. The older students are more interested. I should say after the Intermediate examinations.

Q. Above what age do they finish their Intermediate examination?

A. Eighteen or nineteen.

Q. When you talk about students being used as propagandists and getting excited about political matters, that applies, broadly speaking, to people of about 18 or 19 years of age, not to the young men?

A. No; from 18 up to 24.

Q. For this purpose one may fairly consider one is dealing with youths or young men and not the boys?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Your college is called Forman Christian College. As I understand, your students belong to either the Hindu or Muhammadan religion as well as Christians?

A. There are a few Christians.

Q. There are a few Christians, but the bulk of them are Hindus and Muhammadans?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Apart from a particular interest in the Rowlatt legislation, was the influence of the *Satyagraha* movement noticed by you in February and March this year?

A. Not until March, I should say.

Q. That would be as soon as it was formulated?

A. Yes.

Q. They took an interest in that pretty well at once?

A. Yes.

Q. So far as you know were there any students in your college who were endeavouring to promote principles of resistance to law, not accompanied by violence, on the lines of Mr. Gandhi?

A. Not in my college, but there were students.

Q. As regards the excitement that was prevailing in your college, do you attribute it at all to the effect of the *Satyagraha*, *hartal*, resistance to law, or do you attribute it simply to the interest taken in the Rowlatt legislation?

A. I did not catch the first part.

Q. Do you think the influence of Mr. Gandhi's movement heightened the excitement about the Rowlatt legislation to any appreciable degree in your college?

A. Yes.

Q. You said that students were insulting European ladies in the street and racial feeling was very strong. How long did you notice any indication of racial feeling? How far back does it date?

A. Very short period.

Q. Do you think it arose out of the antagonism to the Rowlatt legislation or do you give it any other origin?

A. I think the Rowlatt legislation led to a very strong feeling and anti-Government feeling and then when the excitement became intense, it turned into racial feeling.

Q. The *raj* being a British *raj*, opposition to the Act of Government took a racial form?

A. Yes.

Q. But prior to the discussion about the Rowlatt legislation, have you seen anything among your students that leads you to the belief that students as a body had been particularly antagonistic to Europeans?

A. No; not amongst our students.

Q. I take it that students more than other classes of the community get chances to know something of European literature and work?

A. Yes.

Q. One would expect or one would like to think that they were less antagonistic for that reason?

A. It depends on how many they come to know personally.

Q. It depends more upon the Europeans they have actually to do with?

A. Yes.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—*

Q. When you saw that crowd for the first time on the 10th, I believe that in your opinion they were far more excited than they were on the 6th April?

A. Yes.

Q. You will not be prepared to say that they were bent on violence at the time when you saw them?

A. No.

Q. Your opinion probably was that they wanted to have their way, i.e., it was a sort of determined crowd that wanted to get the release of Mahatma Gandhi by this demonstration. Were you not of the opinion that the demonstration was in order to get the release of Mahatma Gandhi?

A. That is what I understood.

Q. How many students were rusticated or punished by you on account of communications that you had with Colonel Frank Johnson?

A. None were rusticated or punished by me. It was done by the Martial Law authorities directly. I simply recommended. There were 5 cases in the Forman Christian College, one of expulsion, 2 of rustication and 2 of detention.

Q. Out of a total of about 750?

A. Yes, 750.

Q. So far as you were concerned, you thought that except these 5, nobody deserved any sort of punishment in connection with these disturbances?

A. Every student who stayed away from his work on Friday was fined, because he disobeyed the rules of the college; otherwise there were no offenders whom I could pick out for punishment.

Q. That is you had no information that anyone of your students except those 5 did take any active part in the disturbances?

A. Those 5 were the leaders.

Q. How many were suspected of having taken part in the actual rioting?

A. I have no way of telling.

Q. That is my point. You had no evidence before you as to what number of students actually did take part in the riot on the evening of the 10th?

A. No; I have no way of telling.

Q. I think your list was not considered satisfactory by Colonel Frank Johnson; it was sent back?

A. No.

Q. Only those 5 were punished and no more?

A. No.

Q. What was the number of those who were punished on Friday for absenting themselves?

A. All the students of the 3rd and 1st year classes living in the college hostels.

Q. Did not all the students want to keep that as a sort of funeral day?

28 November 1919.]

Rev. E. D. LUCAS.

[Continued.]

A. That was the idea. The 2nd and 4th year classes were not attending their lectures, because of the coming University examinations; the 1st and 3rd year classes were still attending lectures and they absented themselves.

Q. They absented themselves, because they said that this was mourning day and they would keep mourning?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On Friday did they absent themselves because Mr. Gandhi was arrested on the 10th?

A. No.

Q. They absented themselves because some of the students were shot?

A. Yes.

Q. They wanted to observe it as a mourning day because one or two students were shot and they said they would go and accompany the dead body to the burial ground?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it not a fact that those students who were punished on account of these Martial Law orders between the 10th and 15th, have been prohibited from getting any Government employment and that if any one of them applies for any employment, then his case should be referred to Government before he gets employment?

A. That was not due to the orders issued by Principals.

Q. I do not say it was issued by Principals. You know that such order has been passed by the Government?

A. I have heard it.

Q. You further know that an order was passed that the students who had any connection with these matters should not be allowed to appear any further at any other examination. Supposing a student passed the second year examination, he should not be allowed to take his degree if he was punished during these days?

A. It depends on the punishment. If he was simply detained he would appear a year or two years later. It depends upon the nature of the punishment entirely.

Q. Supposing the punishment was that he should be rusticated for one year, and supposing the punishment was not so, was any order passed that those students who had completed their course of examination would not be taken back afterwards either for the same examination if they failed; or for a higher one if they passed?

A. Because of expulsion simply.

Q. Did you consider it to be a reasonable punishment so far as the student community is concerned, that for the whole of their life, they should not be allowed to have any educational career, not pass the B.A. or M.A. examination or to appear at any other examination for the whole of their lives?

A. The order of expulsion, I take it, is only passed in very serious cases and then, after some time and perhaps after reform of the students, those punished can be permitted to appear.

Q. So far as your order was concerned, there was no exception or reservation under any circumstances or modification?

A. I see no necessity for making reservation. Expulsion is expulsion.

Q. How many students were expelled from your college?

A. One.

Q. What did he do?

A. He was extremely obnoxious in statements that he made in my hearing.

Q. You had no evidence as to what part he took in the riot itself; neither did he confess to have taken any part, nor had you any evidence?

A. I do not believe he took actual part in the riot. His statements were sufficient.

Q. You did not believe that he took part actually in the riot? You thought he was a boy of extreme views?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. That is why he was expelled?

A. Yes.

Q. In your opinion would that correct him for the rest of his life, or will he become more bitter?

A. I think if a student is opposed, bitterly opposed to organised society, he is a danger to society.

Q. I believe he was not rude or insolent to you? Was he?

A. His statement before me was very objectionable.

Q. The statement may be very objectionable, at the same time he was candid enough to express his views to you, you being the Principal, taking the place of his father?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You would prefer that student to a student who does not give candid expression to his views before you and is deceitful?

A. Pardon me, I think you misunderstand the situation. This was on Friday. The statement was made in the midst of excitement and difficulties and made in the presence of about 150 other students, so as to inflame and perhaps lead them to commit acts of violence. I considered it a dangerous statement to make in the then condition of affairs.

Q. That was the one that was expelled from your college?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the punishment given to the other 4?

A. Two were rusticated for one year and 2 detained.

Q. What was the fault of those two who were rusticated?

A. One of them was the most impertinent, a Mahomedan student who came in with his clothes covered with blood and boasted over it to the other students and said he was in the front ranks of the crowd.

Q. With regard to the boy who boasted, I just appeal to you, would not the same thing have been done by any European student throughout the world, that if any comrade of his was shot by the Police, he will just try to take him away and save him from being arrested?

A. I take it that was not the thing that was boasted of.

Q. These are the words "I took him away from under the nose of the Police." These were his words?

A. He was boasting in such a way as to excite and inflame the students at the time. There was a very dangerous situation; you have to recognise that.

Q. I think you have given your statement. Whatever he may be these were his words?

A. He said these words among others.

Q. You said 2 were detained. What was their offence?

A. They were leaders in organising the students who stayed away from the College.

Q. They were those who induced other students to absent themselves and prevent them from being present on the 11th?

A. Yes.

Q. Beyond that you could not discover anything so far as your students were concerned?

A. Nothing; no outward act.

Q. No expression of opinion just like the first student?

A. Many expressions of opinion.

Q. Not so violent as that?

A. No.

Q. I think you will allow students to have something to do with politics at some stage of their education?

A. Yes certainly.

Q. I would like to know because you want us to appreciate their situation. There are difficulties?

A. Yes.

Q. And what are those difficulties?

A. I think one of the difficulties is that older men who should have better judgment make inflammatory speeches and write articles of an inflammatory nature and that the students at a most impressionable age of their lives read these statements and have not got the balance and judgment to weigh them and to know that a large part of it is political agitation; they are carried away and swept off their feet and are led into trouble. I think those who are principally guilty are those who write such articles and make speeches, not the students.

Q. I do not know what has happened during the last six months. But I think you will agree with me as a matter of fact that the Principals and Professors were not allowed to have anything to do with politics or to guide boys so far as politics was concerned. That is, politics

28 November 1919.]

Revd. E. D. LUCAS.

[Continued.]

was altogether prohibited from Universities and Colleges. Neither students, nor Professors, nor Principals were allowed, under Government regulations, to have anything to do with politics so far as the students were concerned. Was it not so?

A. No. We were there to guide them.

Q. You think that was not against the spirit of Government rules?

A. No.

Q. Were there any such rules?

A. During the war, Principals were asked to keep students away from political meetings of a certain type. Those were the only rules I have seen.

Q. Quite possibly it may not be in the Punjab, but have you or have you not read or heard that the Government asked students to have nothing to do with politics so far as college life is concerned?

A. I think the Government generally has given advice that students should not take active part in politics and I agree with that entirely.

Q. Then, so far as your college was concerned, there was more fraternising between Hindu and Muhammadan students during these days than there was before?

A. Yes.

*By Major-General Sir George Barrow—*

Q. What was the age of the boy who was expelled?

A. He was a sixth year student, I should say he was about 25.

Q. He was not a boy?

A. No.

Q. He was at the end of his education?

A. He was at the end of his education and that made the offence much more serious.

Q. You say that "the students regathered on the 19th, a few weeks were occupied in victory celebrations. One felt that the students were very enthusiastic about the victory, in fact their whole attitude was one of extreme indifference." Where do the students come from?

A. They come from all over the Punjab.

Q. From villages, towns, cities and all parts of the Punjab?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. They are representatives of the whole of the Punjab?

A. The whole of the upper and middle classes of the Punjab.

Q. I take it that not many come from the class which has been fighting in the war?

A. They have relatives who are in the Army, specially amongst the Sikhs and the Muhammadans.

Q. Still they were indifferent whether they had to go on fighting or not?

A. My answer is that students were indifferent.

Q. You say that "students regarded the Rowlatt Bill as an attempt to destroy the political liberties of India" and you also say "in conversation with students, I found that none of them had read the Rowlatt Act, but they believed it to be a very practical threat to all forms of political agitation." Do you mean that the Rowlatt Bill was talked about to them and that it had not been very squarely put to them?

A. No, the speeches that were made in Delhi in January were published in full in the papers and the majority of the students read these speeches in full.

Q. They got from that an entirely false impression as to the meaning of the Act?

A. They got impressions largely from the speeches made in the Legislative Council.

Q. You said to the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan that you did not think that expulsion was a very harsh punishment in the circumstances when speeches of an inflammable character have been made. Would you say that such things are not tolerated in colleges all over the world? In England, for instance, would such political agitation and inflammable speeches of that kind be tolerated in an English college?

A. It is very difficult to compare, but I think, if the Government in force were attacked in such a way, they

would certainly punish the students and punish them severely.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—*

Q. I want to put only one question, about the crowd that you saw pass your house on the 10th. You could not form any idea as to whether the crowd had been largely increased in numbers by the time it was stopped by the Police on the Mall near O'Dwyer Club?

A. I have no way of telling.

Q. From what you did see of the crowd on that occasion, would you regard it as reasonable to allow it to proceed, as it professed wish to go to Government House and see the Lieutenant-Governor; or would you support the view that the Police have expressed that it would not have been safe to allow them to proceed into the civil station?

A. I think the Police were justified in stopping it, Sir.

*By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—*

Q. Mr. Lucas, are you aware generally of the conditions prevailing in other educational institutions besides your own college in Lahore?

A. Not intimately.

Q. You have referred to the difficulties of the students, and when you were asked to explain what these difficulties were, you referred to the inflammable speeches of some of the political speakers which the students read and naturally were thereby influenced?

A. Yes.

Q. You have also referred to the order of the Government that students should not take part in political meetings. What I want to know is was there any attempt made by you in your college with regard to the senior students to influence them properly as regards political ideas?

A. Yes, Sir. We have tried to influence them.

Q. In what manner?

A. By making addresses on the current situation, and having addresses made by men who are quite familiar with the situation; for instance, the Hon'ble Mr. Srinivasa Sastri addressed our students about a year ago.

Q. Did you have any debating society in which students also could express their views and the Principals and other Professors also could express their views and by mutual discussion come to some conclusions about political matters?

A. I think our Professors and students were discussing these things in group meetings. Group meetings are managed by students and students can discuss a great deal of what they please in these meetings.

Q. And in that way you are generally acquainted with the views which most of the students hold?

A. I think so.

Q. How is it that these students were affected by these undesirable speeches which were addressed to them and they were not kept in hand by the Professors and the University authorities?

A. It was impossible to control them after about the middle of February.

Q. It was just about the middle of February that they were out of hand?

A. Yes, they then got out of hand.

Q. You have no Debating Society as most of the Institutions in the West have, just as in Cambridge, in which most of these topics are discussed by the students?

A. There are Voluntary Societies. We have several of them.

Q. In which they discuss these topics?

A. Yes.

Q. And I presume that you and other Europeans or your Professors, who are with you, take part in the games of the students and look after them socially?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Then what the effect of this seems to be on the majority of the students, generally, is a salutary effect?

A. Yes.

Q. In your discussions of the political matters with them what effect has it generally on their ideas?



28 November 1919.]

Rev. E. D. LUCAS—concluded—Mr. A. S. HEMMY.

A. Generally friendly.

Q. Apart from your relations having been good, their views on politics were different?

A. We don't mind that. Possibly their views are different.

Q. That is a different thing. But to have notions which are not desirable and which lead to violence and incitement or any feeling of disloyalty is not good. Probably a majority have not those notions?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Don't you think it would be desirable that every college should have a Chair of Politics. It is a matter of opinion?

A. I should not think so. Specially in view of the Reforms.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Mr. Lucas, were any posters found on your college gates or in your own compound, of any kind?

A. I don't think so, Sir.

Mr. A. S. HEMMY, Principal, Government College, Lahore.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Hemmy, you are Principal of the Government College of Lahore?

A. I have been since the 1st of September.

Q. 1st of September this year?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you at that College before?

A. Yes, I was one of the staff.

Q. You were one of the Staff Professors?

A. Yes.

Q. For how long have you been in the College?

A. For 21 years.

Q. Did you notice latterly that the students were more interested in politics?

A. There has been a gradual increase in interest but it was towards the end of February, I should say, that they began some excitement about it.

Q. What was the cause of the excitement?

A. Well, I should think it was a reflex of the general political excitement throughout India.

Q. Did it show itself mainly in antagonism to the Rowlatt legislation or did it show itself in other directions?

A. Mainly in talking political matters in connection with the Rowlatt Act; partly in connection with the question of reforms.

Q. But, I think, in your college as in the college of Mr. Lucas, did you find in consequence of the debates in the Legislative Council over the Rowlatt Act that any keener interest was taken by the students?

A. Speeches made in the Legislative Assemblies undoubtedly were a great cause of the excitement at that time. Much interest was taken in those speeches.

Q. I want to know when Mr. Gandhi proposed a general fast or *hartal* what attitude did the students take up?

A. They were in sympathy with it on the whole.

Q. As regards the students as a body you say that they showed no signs of hostility towards the college authorities nor did they show any bitterness towards Government?

A. As far as college authorities were concerned there was no hostility before the 10th April. They may be evasions of orders on the part of individuals.

Q. That is natural enough for students.

A. But there was no defiance of orders.

Q. Did you see any indication among the students generally of bitter antagonism towards Government?

A. They strongly disagreed with the view of the Government in many cases but without bitterness of feeling about it.

Q. You mean they disapproved of the measures of Government? It may not necessarily be antagonistic towards Government?

A. Yes, they were only criticising Government but not in a bitter spirit.

Q. In connection with the agitation that took place on the 10th. What part did the students of your college take in it?

A. Well, one student was wounded in the firing which took place on the Mall on the 10th.

Q. Had many of the students been in the mob that had been fired upon?

A. There must have been. It is likely there were some there. But I don't think it was a large body of the college students.

Q. Amongst the students the fact that one of their members had been wounded caused resentment?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there a general resentment throughout the college or was it a particular one?

A. It was the first year that showed itself in the most marked manner.

Q. Were lectures given daily at this time?

A. It so happened that on the 10th some examinations started. University examinations were shortly to be held. Second and Fourth Years had been dismissed a few days before and Terminal College examinations commenced. Third Year examinations started on the 10th and the First Year examinations started on the next day.

Q. On the 11th I think the Third Year students did appear for their examination?

A. They appeared.

Q. As regards the First Year, what did they do?

A. With the exception of about a dozen they did not come into the Examination Hall.

Q. Was any notice taken of their action?

A. Colonel Stephenson was Principal at that time. He called the students and gave them a long address pointing out the error of their ways and telling them that they should appear and he gave them next day as a chance to obey his orders.

Q. On the 12th did they appear?

A. A few more appeared but still a majority from the First Year class absented themselves.

Q. Was any action taken as regards those who failed to appear on the 12th after absenting on the 11th?

A. They were sent home.

Q. By having sent them home, what did you mean?

A. They were told that by the rules of the college they were liable to have their names struck off. They were sent home and informed that they would hear later on as to when they would be allowed to rejoin the college.

Q. On the 12th were the Third Year students mostly absent as well as the First Year students?

A. On the 12th most of the Third Year students did not appear. Colonel Stephenson called them together and spoke to them and the effect of his speaking to them was to make them repent of disobedience and promise to appear at the examination. They asked to appear on the spot.

Q. Was there anything hostile in the attitude of the Third Year students?

A. No. They did not want to disobey but there had been considerable pressure brought to bear upon them to make them disobey. After the talk from Colonel Stephenson they were sorry they listened to others and were prepared to obey.

Q. Did you see the same signs of repentance amongst a number of the First Year students?

A. There were a number of the First Year students who would like to tell the members of the staff that they were only compelled by the persuasion of stronger spirits not to appear and as far as their wishes were concerned they did not wish to disobey.

Q. On the 12th the Principal was at that time Colonel Stephenson. Did he take steps to close the college?

28 November 1919.]

Mr. A. S. HEMMY.

A. He then decided that the whole atmosphere of Lahore was at that time highly charged and that the best thing he could do was to close the college. It would have been the ordinary way to close for a week at the end of these examinations, so he closed at once and arranged for the students to go home.

Q. Then when did the students return to the college?

A. The First Year and Third Year students did not return until after the vacation, i.e., the 1st September. The Second and Fourth Year students returned at the time of the University examinations which were postponed, I do not remember the exact date, to the 14th of May. The college itself was occupied by a regiment so that it was not possible to have the First and Third Year students back again.

Q. When the students returned what was their attitude?

A. Their attitude was that they wished to show that they were loyal citizens and asked for an opportunity to prove their loyalty.

Q. Since the re-opening of the college has the attitude of the students been friendly?

A. Oh, thoroughly friendly. The tone of the college is quite normal.

Q. Were your students affected by the several orders that were issued by the Military authorities during the Martial Law régime?

A. They were sent home. None of them were affected.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. I see there was trouble with the First Year students?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the average age of the first year students?

A. I think about 17.

Q. I have been looking at the Martial Law Order No. 46, dated the 13th May by which certain punishments were meted out by Colonel Johnson. By this time all the students had gone home?

A. Yes.

Q. As regards the punishments I see that they were the First Year students upon whom they were inflicted?

A. They were after a warning from the Principal, at that time Colonel Stephenson, because they still disobeyed him and refused to appear.

Q. They refused to appear and get on with their work?

A. Yes.

Q. Rustication was applied for one year in the case of these First Year students?

A. For various offences; and other punishments were inflicted on the people either for organising a strike or having shown active political views, i.e., they had been trying to stir up political trouble amongst the students.

Q. Tell me, Mr. Hemmy, whether these punishments in the case of a Government College, which were inflicted under Martial Law Order 46, were forced upon you by the Military authorities or that you agreed to them?

A. The Principal at that time was asked to furnish a list of the students who, he considered, had been misbehaving themselves, with the punishments which he thought fit and proper. He made out a list on his own responsibility which was seen by the Director of the Public Instruction and was then forwarded.

Q. Then was that acted upon or was returned as insufficient?

A. It was acted upon and not returned as insufficient.

Q. One thing more I want to ask. Some stress has been laid on the fact that on the 10th a first year student was wounded. Was he severely wounded?

A. He was severely wounded.

Q. And you say that roused a great excitement and anger amongst the students. Was that in your opinion genuine or put on?

A. It was genuine for the time being.

Q. Students of the First Year had a notion that if one was in the front of the mob and if the police had to stop it, it was very hard that somebody should be hurt?

A. There wasn't much argument behind the matter. The fact was that one of their friends was wounded, rightly or wrongly.

Q. You think it was a genuine excitement in that particular case and to that extent it was genuine as to make it a special excuse for the first year students?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. With regard to your students, generally speaking, only I think a very small proportion of them take extreme notions in politics. The majority had no strong feeling?

A. As you take it, you are right.

Q. It is the custom of your college to give a dinner when the college is about to close, that is a sort of annual function?

A. Annual feast.

Q. It is given by the students to each other?

A. Yes.

Q. And this year I think the date fixed for this function was the 6th April?

A. Yes.

Q. Objection was raised by students that 6th being a general *hartal* day the feast should not be given?

A. Yes they asked for the date to be changed.

Q. Then there is a sort of branch hostel where speeches are delivered and meetings held by the students?

A. Yes there is a branch hostel where certain speeches were delivered.

Q. And before the 10th there was meeting of that club or association?

A. There is no association exactly that held meetings in that hostel, but meetings might very easily be called on occasions.

Q. Were you or were you not informed that as a matter of fact before the 10th April a meeting was held in your college where students delivered speeches on Hindu and Muhammadan union?

A. I cannot remember the exact date.

Q. It was some time in the beginning of April, it may be before the 10th?

A. No affair took place after the 10th April. I do not think so. I did not inquire into this particular matter myself.

Q. But you were informed?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it not a fact that some of the students that were punished, were punished because they had spoken at this meeting on the question of Hindu-Muhammadan union?

A. I believe they were punished for making statements which were in the opinion of the Principal seditious.

Q. I don't think you keep any Criminal Investigation Department for the purposes jotting down the speeches of the students?

A. We do not.

Q. Therefore the opinion of the Principal was based upon the report that was made on those speeches?

A. I presume so.

Q. Perhaps you know nothing of what was the context of those speeches or what was said at those meetings. You cannot give us an account of the speeches?

A. Personally I did not conduct that inquiry.

Q. Is it true that on account of the speeches that were made at the meeting a certain number of students were punished?

A. This was one item including a number of others.

Q. There were some other students against whom there was no other charge?

A. They were not punished.

Q. Now take one student of your college. You know Ghazanfar Ali Khan?

A. Yes, I know him.

Q. He did very good work so far as war work was concerned?

A. He did during 1917.

Q. He was praised by His Honour?

A. He received a Sanad from Government

28 November 1919.]

Mr. A. S. HENRY.

[Continued.]

Q. This man was expelled from the College ?  
 A. He was expelled at the time.  
 Q. Is it a fact that the only charge against him was that he was present at that meeting and delivered a very strong pro-Hindu-Muhammadian address ?  
 A. It is not a fact.  
 Q. What else he did ?  
 A. He did a number of other things. I did not know one was supposed to go into a particular case of a particular student on this occasion.  
 Q. You do not remember just now what he actually did ?  
 A. I know that he did some things.  
 Q. I want to know some of them ?  
 A. He did a number of things. He attended every political meeting which was held about that time at which speeches were made which were not regarded suitable. It was contrary to rules to attend political meetings.  
 Q. Therefore to attend political meetings was contrary to rules and college regulations ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. No student should attend political meetings. I take it that these meetings were held before the 10th April ?  
 A. I am referring to outside political meetings. Some of these he attended before and some after. He was present at the meetings which, as far as I know, were prohibited by Government.  
 Q. At any meetings prohibited by Government ?  
 A. I do not know; he attended certain meetings at the Badshahi Mosque.  
 Q. Before the 10th April, there were only 3 important meetings, 4th, 9th and 23rd. Do you recollect any of these meetings, that is, meetings held for the purpose of proclaiming the message of Mahatma Gandhi ?  
 A. I do not remember the exact meetings.  
 Q. May I know what was the object of these meetings ?  
 A. I was not present at these meetings; I cannot tell you.  
 Q. If there is nothing objectionable in these meetings, why should the students be punished ?  
 A. You must ask the authorities as to the objectionableness or otherwise of the meetings.  
 Q. I can ask you because you as Principal know it. I want to know what evidence there was in your possession that they attended these meetings. I want to know whether the meetings were objectionable or not.  
 A. I have not come here with the particular evidence that could be adduced in the particular case.  
 Q. You do not remember what the charge was ?  
 A. I can tell you of the general nature.  
 Q. You do not remember as to what these meetings were; the meetings which he attended and for which he was punished ?  
 A. I cannot remember the precise meetings that he attended. There were certain meetings. I have a general recollection now that these were referred to in the Martial Law cases which were held in the month of May. I cannot remember at the present time.  
 Q. That is, you refer to those meetings which were referred to in the conspiracy cases which were held in the months of April and May ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. May I understand that you referred to the attendance at these meetings which were publicly or secretly held ?  
 A. I do not know whether these meetings were public or secret. My impression was they were public.  
 Q. In that conspiracy case, there is reference to certain meetings about which notices were issued, and certain other meetings that were held at the houses of different persons. I do not think you mean to say that he attended those private meetings ?  
 A. No.  
 Q. In your opinion, if any student attends a political meeting where no violence is preached, where nothing is said against Government as such, and where the subjects of the Rowlett Bill and *hartal* are discussed, he should be punished so severely as to be expelled from college ?

A. My view is that if a student has been told not to attend a particular meeting and he does attend it, he is guilty of a flagrant disobedience of orders.  
 Q. It is very good for a student to obey every order of the Principal. The question is there are several rules. It is not the disobeying of hundreds of these that I speak of.  
 A. As regards this particular case, this is one count among several.  
 Q. My point is: because he disobeyed an order of the Principal therefore you considered the punishment just, the penalty being that he should be expelled and that he should not enter the precincts of any college or any University. You consider that a just punishment ?  
 A. In the first place, I may remark that I did not give this punishment.  
 Q. I did not mean you, but your authority. You thought that in your opinion that is a just punishment inflicted ?  
 A. The punishment was not inflicted simply upon that count. This was one of the several.  
 Q. I think there will be a record of the several charges against the students ?  
 A. May be.  
 Q. I want to know whether there is or there is not. Is there a record of the different charges that were framed against the different students, and of the punishments awarded ?  
 A. The punishments were not inflicted by a Court of Law and therefore it was not necessary to frame charges, the Principal inflicted the punishment upon these when he considered they should be punished.  
 Q. I am very sorry, you have misunderstood me. I do not mean to say that formal charges should be made against these. There must be some form of paper in which the boy's name would be written, as information, he has attended such and such meeting which was prohibited; he expressed extremist views, or delivered inflammatory speeches or he was one of the members of the mob; and therefore he was rusticated for the whole of his life. I expect only some record of this kind.  
 A. It would be necessary for you to ask Colonel Stephenson. There is no formal record with me. It is not kept on a file.  
 Q. So we cannot get this information anywhere except by approaching Colonel Stephenson ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. I do not suggest that the Principal at that time did not exercise his powers justly. Supposing the question were raised that these sentences, these punishments that were awarded to different students were unjust and were inflicted through pressure, then there is no record from which we will be able to judge as to whether there is any truth in the allegation or not ?  
 A. I have no complete papers on the subject, but Colonel Stephenson might have some papers.  
 Q. You are not aware where they could be found ?  
 A. They are not with me.  
 Q. It is possible to get them from the office of the college ? It is a very serious and important matter; therefore there ought to be some record ?  
 A. The punishment was given for reasons which the Principal considered sufficient, namely, that he was an undesirable member of the college.  
 Q. This being an important matter, so far as the students are concerned, there ought to be some record of reasons or grounds for inflicting such punishments.  
 A. The record is simply of the punishment which was inflicted. No reasons.  
 Q. No charges—not in the sense of a regular charge sheet ?  
 A. It is not usual in recording sentences of expulsion from the college to frame any formal indictment. The student is expelled because he is not regarded as a desirable member of the college.  
 Q. Any minutes of evidence ?  
 A. No record.

28 November 1919.]

Mr. A. S. HEMMY—concluded—Rai Bahadur AMAR NATH.

Q. Suppose the boy has attended several meetings, how will the Principal satisfy himself that the boy did attend several meetings, before he passes the order of expulsion?

A. That question you have to ask Colonel Stephenson.

Q. Now I will take the case of another man. Perhaps I may be wrong. His name is Krishna Dayal Kapoor of your college. He was the student of the 4th year class, and he has passed the B.A. examination. On the recommendation of the college authorities the degree was taken away from him.

A. No. That is not the case. He failed.

Q. Did he come to you and ask as to why he was punished?

A. He has not come.

Q. He never came to you?

A. No.

Q. Was he or was he not present at that period in Lahore? He left Lahore at the end of March.

A. His case I have not gone into personally myself, because he was one of the students who did not appeal. Therefore the punishment may be a minor one and I understand he had not any intention of coming to any college.

Q. You do not remember his appealing to you?

A. No.

Q. You know he was absent from Lahore?

A. I have not gone into his case because he did not appeal. If he had appealed I would have gone into his case.

Q. Therefore you are not in a position to give us any information as to the offences for which and the grounds on which students were punished.

A. My knowledge is of a general nature. I did not go into the evidence. That was the Principal's duty.

Q. You think that if the educational career of a boy is cut off as it has been cut off in the case of a number of students, it is a very mild punishment?

A. Yes.

Q. You consider that if an order is passed on the 1st year or the 2nd year students after passing the examination, that they would not be allowed to appear for any examination, it is a very mild punishment?

A. What case are you referring to?

Q. I am referring to the case of boys against whom an order was passed that, having completed their course, they will not be taken for the same examination if they fail and any other examination if they pass?

A. They are at perfect liberty to go to another college. That is what that means.

Q. Do you think that it would be possible for them? Under the rules they won't be taken?

A. We won't refuse them the necessary leaving certificates.

Q. Will there be any college throughout the province which would admit them if they were once expelled?

A. They were not expelled.

Q. I am using the word loosely. If a man, after finishing his course of studies, wants to re-enter the college, the college won't take him?

A. At the end of each session of 2 years there is a University examination; if a student wishes to continue in the college, he has to apply for re-admission. There were plenty of students that have not been re-admitted for various reasons.

Q. I am quite familiar with this procedure as a layman. You will agree with me that this rule applies in normal cases, as, when there is no accommodation. Suppose there are 60 applicants; you can under the rules, it may be, take only 40. But here the boy under Martial Law was punished. Do you think he would ever be taken in a college?

A. I may remark that other boys were taken by other colleges.

Q. Punishments remitted?

A. They were not taken into Government colleges.

Q. You know these men who were punished in your college were taken by other colleges?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there a sort of repentance for the order that was passed?

A. Not at all; nothing to do with repentance.

Q. Were not a number of students, as Nandi Lal, Balwant Rai, Hari Dutt and Prakash Chandur, were they not all punished because they delivered a lecture on Hindu-Mussalman unity (and that was a sore thing, and therefore punished)?

A. None of these students were punished on a single count.

Q. This was one count which was taken into consideration?

A. Presumably.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. I take it that the relations between the staff and your students are quite friendly?

A. Quite friendly.

Q. Do the professors take an interest in the welfare of the students?

A. A great deal.

Q. Join with them in their games?

A. They organize games and so forth.

Q. Do you also make an attempt to inculcate sound political views in the students?

A. Not directly, but indirectly, by inculcating the duties of a good citizen. We don't deal with political matters, current political matters.

Q. But apart from discussing these political matters, do you not take up questions like the Rowlatt legislation with the higher students? Apart from discussing with them general questions, do you not take up particular questions which are interesting people generally and call their attention to any important legislation or such other matters?

A. Only in a general sort of way. We do not deal with a particular measure and discuss a particular measure, but we deal with the general questions bearing on it.

Q. In that way you inculcate broad principles?

A. There is a great deal of freedom between the members of the staff and the students and these things are discussed informally no doubt and there is for instance the Round Table Society which deals with economic questions where many things are discussed incidentally.

Q. Have you any debating society in your college?

A. We have two debating societies and a large number of societies dealing with various subjects, run by the students, and a member of the staff makes it a point to be present at these meetings.

Rai Bahadur AMAR NATH, M. B. E., Joint Registrar, Lahore.

By the President—

Q. You are a Joint Registrar at Lahore?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you Honorary Joint Secretary of the Provincial War Loan Committee and Honorary Secretary of the Lahore District and Town Committee?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you in a position to state what was done in the way of inducing people to subscribe to War Loans?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What do you say as regards that?

A. I say, Sir, that no pressure was brought to bear on the people, but we used persuasion. A Central Committee composed mostly of non-officials was appointed and

28 November 1919.]

Rai Bahadur AMAR NATH.

[Continued.]

all sub-committees in the districts, and we distributed posters, appeals, etc., explaining the objects of the loans and their terms, and to my knowledge or to the committee's knowledge we never heard, except in one case, that any irregularity had occurred.

Q. Besides the Provincial Committee at Lahore, were district committees and sub-committees constituted in all the important cities and towns?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And did these committees and sub-committees consist of both officials and non-officials?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What was the method of procedure adopted by the committees with a view to getting people to subscribe?

A. For instance, in Lahore, I, from my own experience, and others knew who were the well-to-do people. We first subscribed ourselves and then we used to ask and persuade others to subscribe liberally, and I have compiled a statement for each district.

Q. A statement about what?

A. A statement showing the population of each district and certain towns as well, and the number of assesses; that is, those who paid income-tax, and the amount of income-tax, and also the number of subscribers to the war loan and how much each district subscribed.

Q. Do you know anything about a complaint which we have heard that people who did not subscribe to the war loan had their assessments raised against them?

A. No, Sir, that is wrong. Of course some over-zealous Tahsildar may have said this, but I never heard of it.

Q. And if it was done it was not a thing authorised by those responsible?

A. No, Sir, the committee and the authorities were against that.

Q. I think all classes of the community subscribed?

A. Yes, Sir. Mostly the people of the town subscribed, lawyers and merchants and traders and other well-to-do people, *jagirdars*.

Q. And I think you got subscriptions from Punjabi business men who were resident in Calcutta and other commercial people?

A. Yes, Sir, because there was keen competition between the three Provinces, Madras, United Provinces and the Punjab, so we tried our best to beat the other two Provinces, although they were the wealthiest and the biggest provinces. We knew certain people in Calcutta and Burma who originally belonged to the Punjab, and we wrote to them to help us and they did help us.

Q. And you got some large subscriptions from them?

A. Yes, Sir, one gentleman from Calcutta, when we told him of the keen competition and that the United Provinces was approaching us, sent us 10 lakhs at once on his own behalf and one lakh on his wife's behalf.

Q. Now, so far as the agricultural classes were concerned I do not think you obtained so much?

A. No, Sir. In one or two cases of course we did. Perhaps you know, Sir, that on account of these high prices the agricultural classes are now better off than the people in the towns and the big zamindars are making lots of money. I knew and others knew that they had lots of rupees in the banks. We approached them, and they did give us a good sum, but the small ones we did not touch.

Q. But in approaching them did you use any threats?

A. No, Sir, they gladly and willingly gave.

Q. I think there was an offer made by the zamindars in one of the districts that was not accepted?

A. The Lyallpur people wanted to make a present to the Government. The Government has made grants of lakhs of acres of land free, or at a nominal price, and they are making lots of rupees now-a-days, so when Government asked for subscriptions the people said "we will give one *killa* of wheat for every *murabba* free." But Government refused to accept that, and said they did not want it as a gift, and said it would be better, in the interests of the zamindars, if they invested this sum in the War Loan, and the interest of that sum could be utilised for the benefit of the agriculturists. And these people are doing that. A few days ago I heard

that several dispensaries are in contemplation to be opened there from this very fund for the benefit of the zamindars.

Q. Have you compared the figures of population and income-tax of the different districts and towns with the amount subscribed by each?

A. This is a big statement which I have made, but take, for instance, Lahore. There are two kinds of War Loan, one which was subscribed through Treasuries or Banks and the other through the Post Office, and the Post Office also had two kinds, War Bonds and Cash Certificates. For instance, to the second war loan Lahore subscribed 48 lakhs, and War Bonds Rs. 5,41,000, Cash Certificates Rs. 5,29,300, total Rs. 58,72,000. Now the population of the district is 1,036,000 and of Lahore town itself 210,000. The number of assesses who pay income-tax is 3,243 and the amount of the income-tax is Rs. 4,31,910. We could not get figures from all the districts of the number of subscribers, but the Committee had issued a circular that a list should be sent of those who had subscribed a thousand rupees and above. I found that only 269 people subscribed to the war loan, and the people who subscribed big sums in Lahore were very few. Next as to Hissar. I specially want to say about Hissar that the war loan had nothing to do with the disturbances. The total amount subscribed by Hissar is Rs. 57,59,000 and the population is 8 lakhs, the number of assesses 1,893, and the amount of income-tax is Rs. 1,54,000. Hissar has not got large canals, but there are large traders there. There is an Indian Deputy Commissioner there, Mr. Latif, and he and his wife tried their best, and we secured a large sum. Leaving Lahore aside, I think Hissar stands first in the whole Province.

Q. Considering its size and population?

A. Yes.

Q. Then how did Amritsar subscribe?

A. Amritsar is more a trading class. We expected much more from Amritsar than even Hissar. We got a total of 26 lakhs from Amritsar; that is, Hissar 57 and Amritsar 26 lakhs. The assessment of income-tax is Rs. 3,58,000 and the Amritsar town population is 151,000 and the number of subscribers to the war loan is only 230.

Q. Then how did Kasur do?

A. For Kasur I have not got the figures. Rs. 4,60,000 was subscribed.

Q. As regards Gujranwala District?

A. The Gujranwala total is Rs. 10,19,500 and the population is 923,000 and Rs. 92,515 is the income-tax. That is, Gujranwala did not give a large amount.

Q. I should like to ask you a question or two about the application of Martial Law in Lahore. Did you take an active part in the movements for restoring peace and order?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Did you find the people were amenable to reason or not?

A. No, Sir, they were not.

Q. In your opinion was Martial Law essential to the restoration of order?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did the *hartal*, started on the 10th and continued till about the 15th, cause great inconvenience to the public?

A. It did, Sir.

Q. And during that period do you know that means were being taken to prevent those who wanted to open their shops and do business from doing as they wished?

A. Yes, Sir, I was myself one of those who tried to persuade the people to resume work, but they would not.

Q. And do you know whether shop-keepers desirous of opening their shops were prevented by others from doing so?

A. Some.

Q. Had the population got, in your opinion, out of hand? Had it got unruly?

A. Yes, Sir, unruly.

Q. Were people not allowed to go about in carriages and tongas and tum-tums for a while?

A. Tongas could not ply.

Q. Why was that?

28 November 1919.]

Rai Bahadur AMAR NATH.

[Continued.]

A. They were afraid of the people.

Q. If they tried to ply what happened to them?

A. They were punished; some pressure was brought to bear on them.

Q. When the troops first came to the city did you accompany the Deputy Commissioner and the Officer Commanding?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What did you find was the attitude of the people?

A. They were very rude and defiant in their attitude towards us. Of course most of them could not understand. When we, the Deputy Commissioner and Honorary Magistrates, explained to them that they should resume work, they said they would not do so until Government passed the Rowlatt rule; they did not know what passed meant; they meant until the Rowlatt Act was repealed.

Q. Did you do any recruiting work in Lahore?

A. Yes, Sir, I did some.

Q. In connection with the getting of recruits was there anything in the nature of conscription or compulsion?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Were recruits got so much from the cities as from the villages?

A. To my knowledge there may be two or three from Lahore town, none was recruited from the city itself. Two tahsils of the district consist of Manjhas, but they did not enlist freely, and the Jats also did not enlist. Kamins, low class people, were enlisted.

Q. In your opinion had recruiting methods anything to do with the unrest that existed in Lahore?

A. In Lahore, no, Sir. It was left to the people.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—*

Q. You said something about Hissar District which rather interests me. I understand you said the Hissar district, considering its population, did the best as regards the war loan?

A. Yes.

Q. Am I right in saying that in the Hissar District there was no firing upon anybody and no serious trouble?

A. No, Sir. Because as I just mentioned most of the money came from very few people. We knew the wealthy people there, and they subscribed most of the money. Bhiwani alone I think subscribed 25 lakhs.

Q. When you said Hissar District did the best considering its population, are you also taking account of its wealth, as shown by the assessment figures?

A. It is from my own knowledge; I know Hissar District myself. These two or three places Bhiwani and Sirsa gave good subscriptions.

Q. And I think you attribute a good deal of the success of the war loan there to the Indian Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Latifi?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Looking at the matter as a whole with all the figures you have got before you, do you think the subscriptions to the war loan were any part of the explanation of the troubles in the Punjab in April where they did arise?

A. Not at all, Sir, absolutely not.

Q. In looking for the explanation of trouble such as that, there are some direct causes and some remote causes to look to. Do I understand it to be your opinion that the war loan is not one of the causes?

A. There are other causes, but not war loan.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—*

Q. What is the number of those people who subscribed to the war loan and cash certificates and Post Office war loan?

A. I have not got the figures for cash certificates, I have got....

Q. Therefore you cannot give us any information as to how many people took cash certificates for Rs. 10?

A. I cannot.

Q. Were not all those who were not bankers or who were not well off asked to take cash certificates for Rs. 10 each, Government servants, clerks and agriculturists and every body?

A. I did not see all, but clerks in some offices and zamindars also were asked.

Q. If there be any dissatisfaction it would be with regard to those persons who invested their money in cash certificates and in Post Office war bonds?

A. May be, but we did not hear of it.

Q. Now I want to know what inference you wish us to draw. May I take it that, so far as Hissar is concerned, big bankers and merchants subscribed to the war bonds?

A. Yes.

Q. They were business men; they thought it was a good investment and they subscribed largely?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, so far as the general public of Hissar was concerned, there are very few who subscribed?

A. I think so because most of the money is from big people.

Q. What inference do you wish to draw? You have given us the population of Gujranwala; you have given us those persons who pay income-tax in Gujranwala, and still its number was very low; therefore what inference do you wish us to draw?

A. That is according to the population and the assessment the Gujranwala people were not hard pressed.

Q. They were not hard pressed, that accounts for their not subscribing according to your estimation?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Though they were not hard pressed, notwithstanding the general persuasion applied to them as well as to all other places, they were not amenable to that persuasion?

A. I do not understand you, Sir.

Q. They were not amenable to reason to subscribe?

A. They willingly did, but the majority did not. It is only 185 persons who subscribed.

Q. Over Rs. 1,000.

A. Rs. 1,000 and above.

Q. Only 185, therefore I want to know as to whether the rest did not subscribe because nobody persuaded them, or they did not subscribe because they did not listen to your persuasion?

A. In several places people never told us what they were going to do and still they subscribed.

Q. That is not my point; you have given us the figures of Gujranwala, you want us to draw certain conclusion from those figures. What is that conclusion, that the amount of subscription that was realised from Gujranwala, the smallness of that subscription, was due to the fact that persuasion was not fully exercised or persuasion was exercised as in other districts, but the people did not come forward notwithstanding that?

A. What I meant by the comparison of these figures is that if you take all these things into consideration, the assessment and the population, and the amount placed in the war loan, you won't find that in Gujranwala there was any undue pressure or that we got the amount which we expected.

Q. Therefore you take it both ways. If there was a large sum subscribed you say the people have given willingly, they have subscribed this large amount, and there was no pressure. If the amount of subscription is small you say the amount of subscription is small because no persuasion was used?

A. You can draw whatever conclusion you like; I have given you my reasons.

Q. For this war work you have been made M. B. E.?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you are also a jagirdar?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. A jagir given by Sir Michael O'Dwyer?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Before these occurrences, that is to say, before the 6th of April, were you a popular figure?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. That is the people were not against you—you were very popular?

A. I do not say I was very popular. It is not for me to say that.

28 November 1919.]

Rai Bahadur AMAR NATH—~~continued~~—Rai Sahib BADHAWA MAL.

Q. Were you one of those persons whom you describe in your statement as for the Government?

A. I was also one of them.

Q. Are you or are you not aware that a particular class of persons purchased recruits? Why did they do that?

A. Some of them spent money and got recruits. They considered it their duty to help Government.

Q. It was loyalty?

A. Yes.

Q. If a person has very few recruits in his village, he, therefore, purchases 20 or 30 recruits?

A. If a man has lakhs he can offer money to people to come forward and use his money for that purpose.

Q. Supposing they failed to supply the number of recruits?

A. It is optional for him.

Q. Was any number fixed or a quota assigned to villages?

A. I do not know.

Q. With regard to the city are you or are you not aware that before the war there were only certain areas from which recruitment used to take place, or among certain classes of persons only there was recruitment?

A. That I do not know; but I know that certain classes were not taken.

Q. Are you aware that no recruits were taken from the city?

A. Yes.

Q. There was no recruitment from the city in pre-war days?

A. Yes. They were not taken because none came forward.

Q. Therefore so far as the city were concerned they were not good recruiting grounds for the army?

A. Yes.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. Do I understand you to say that no matter what the subscription was—whether it was large or small—whatever it was—in your opinion no undue pressure was brought to bear?

A. Yes, Sir. No undue pressure was brought to bear.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. You say in your statement "I can honestly and confidently say that if this unruly spirit had been allowed to continue longer, *badmashes* of the city would have been encouraged to commit loot and other outrages upon the weaker citizens." At what figure do you put down the number of *badmashes* in the Lahore City?

A. I cannot give the number.

Q. You do not suppose that all the people in the city were *badmashes*?

A. No.

Q. Are they in the majority?

A. No.

Q. How many do you think there are? About one thousand?

A. I should say a few hundreds.

Q. About one thousand?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think that on account of the lawlessness of these people it was necessary to have Martial Law for the whole town of Lahore?

A. Not only for that reason.

Q. You give this as a reason for Martial Law, and what are the other reasons?

A. I have already given that the people did not resume their work. There was no order in the city. They were just like madmen. They used to walk in parties, and people could not get food and tongas could not ply.

Q. The second reason was to prevent *hartial*. The first reason refers to *badmashes*. Any other reason?

A. When I went to my village every week I found that the people were making rumours.

Q. I am referring purely and simply to Martial Law in the town. For these two reasons?

A. I have stated that.

Q. One to keep *badmashes* in order and the second to prevent *hartial*? Any other reason?

A. No.

Q. And in the villages?

A. In the villages there were all sorts of stories being spread. The people said that they heard that the Government are going to take three-fourths of our wheat, and after hearing these things they were going against Government.

Q. In what manner?

A. If they come to know that when the wheat crop is cut they will only get one-fourth there will be dissatisfaction.

Q. Are you cognizant of the facts?

A. This is in my own village.

Q. What did you say?

A. I said it was all lies.

Q. Did they believe you?

A. My men believed me.

Q. Have you any experience of any other villages?

A. In other villages I also heard similar stories, but this is hearsay—nothing beyond that.

By Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate—

Q. About these cash certificates will you please tell me whether the money for these cash certificates can be withdrawn at any time? And did it come to your notice that some of the people who had invested in cash certificates withdrew the money from time to time?

A. Yes; they withdrew.

Q. With regard to subscribing to the war loan you say you went about persuading other people, and it is possible that they agreed to pay one thousand or two thousand, but in reality they subscribed much greater sums than that?

A. When we persuaded them they increased the sums.

Q. Did it not happen in any instance where you said you are good enough for one thousand, give that amount?

A. I heard cases quietly where a man would tell me that he would give two thousand, but in the bank he placed fifty thousand.

Q. Later on when he knew it was a good investment he himself increased the amount?

A. Yes.

Rai Sahib BADHAWA MAL, Head Accountant, Moghulpura Workshops, North-Western Railway, Lahore.

By the President—

Q. You are the Head Accountant of the Moghulpura Workshops?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. The 11th of April was the fixed date of payments?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You started from your house at about 9 A.M. to be in time to make payments?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you go from Lohari Gate via Amrithdara Road?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you find difficulty in making your way?

A. Just near the Islamia College.

Q. How was that?

A. Some people were standing here and there. When they saw me going that way they came and asked me where I was going, and I said to my work. They then said this is a day of mourning, we will not let you go. They persuaded me not to go, so I had to take another road just a little this side and went my way and reached my office and did my work.

Q. The same thing occurred again on the 12th?

28 November 1919.]

Rai Sahib BADHAWA MAL

[Concluded.]

A. Yes on the 12th when I was going between the Kashmiri and Sheranwala Gates two people came to me saying that the road is not clear. They advised me to change my road so I went to the Badami Bagh Station by the new road made for the Goods Shed and reached my office without any further obstruction.

Q. On Sunday night did anything happen to your house ?

A. I was only told my house was set on fire.

Q. Who did that ? Was it the crowd ?

A. It is not known. On the 13th night between 11 and 12 P.M. some one perhaps clandestinely came and put something there, and it was ignited. My boy was reading. He was studying for the college examination and when he saw the flames he made a noise and the neighbouring people came running to subdue the fire.

Q. Did you report this matter ?

A. I reported the matter through the Loco. Superintendent to the Police who made enquiries but nothing came of it.

*Mr. Herbert* :—My Lord, we do not put forward witnesses unless there is a particular reason for their attending. We select our witnesses on two principles, one is that either the witness will depose as to particular facts, or secondly, where the matter is one on which information is sought, for instance, causes of the disturbance, the continuance of Martial Law, or the introduction of Martial Law, the principle being that a witness whose evidence is worth recording, because we know very much better than we did before the principal facts, and we should take measures to cut down our lists in the other cases as far as possible. It is inevitable that a certain amount of overlapping might take place, but we are bound to bring them forward. The reason of that is we think it possible the Committee may be able to accept the evidence of one witness when it would not accept the evidence of perhaps another. We have put up a list of a number of witnesses and many of these have not been examined. We want something on record

to show that these witnesses were not being examined not because the Punjab Government does not desire to take their evidence, but because the Committee do not require it. All sorts of misrepresentations may afterwards be represented, viz., that the Punjab Government deliberately withdrew witnesses because they knew they were going to depose against the Government. We desire therefore that a note should be made that a particular witness was not examined because the Committee did not care to receive his evidence.

*The President* :—I think a number of witnesses whose names are given have already given their evidence, but we have to exercise discretion in not examining a certain number.

*Mr. Herbert* :—I do not dispute Your Lordship's discretion.

*The President* :—The Committee will accept the responsibility for not having examined them.



1 December 1919.]

Nawab FATEH ALI KHAN.

At Lahore, Monday, the 1st December 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.L.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.F., *Secretary*.

Nawab FATEH ALI KHAN Qasibash, C.L.E., Lahore.

*By the President—*

Q. There are one or two questions I would ask you generally. First about the 6th April. Were there large crowds marching through the city on the 6th April?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What sort of cries were the crowds shouting?

A. *Hai, Hai King George Mar Gaya* (King George is dead).

Q. Were there other similar cries?

A. Yes, Sir, numerous other cries.

Q. Did the crowd pass your house?

A. Yes, Sir, it passed my house in the city.

Q. Did they say anything as they passed your house?

A. They abused me also.

Q. Why did they abuse you?

A. Because I had published a letter on the 5th April against the passive resistance movement in the *Civil and Military Gazette*.

Q. Were there other people besides yourself abused by the mobs on that day?

A. Many others also were abused.

Q. What other people were abused?

A. Diwan Kishan Kishore and other people who were looked upon as friends of Government.

Q. There was another *hartal* on the 10th April. How do you account for that *hartal*?

A. People were very much excited on account of the procession of *Ram Naumi* which preceded the *hartal* of the 10th April, and they also received the news of the arrest of Mr. Gandhi, and therefore they made the *hartal*.

Q. You did not see what occurred between the people and the mob at Anarkali or at Lohari Gate?

A. No, I did not see anything personally.

Q. Did the *hartal* on the 10th continue on the 11th also?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did the disorderly element in the crowd appear to have control in the city?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Had the civil authority any power?

A. The civil authority had no power in the city.

Q. Did you notice groups of men at the city gates?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What were these groups of men doing?

A. They were obstructing people from going to the Government Offices.

Q. Were tongas allowed to ply?

A. They did not allow the tongas to ply.

Q. What did they do to prevent the tongas running?

A. They cut the gear of the tongas.

Q. Did you see that done in any case?

A. I did not see anything with my own eyes.

Q. Were the police able to protect tonga drivers?

A. They could not do that.

Q. In your opinion was this *hartal anti-British*?

A. Yes, Sir, it was.

Q. Was public property damaged by the crowds in these days?

A. The municipal lanterns were damaged.

Q. What effect had the meetings on the people in the Badshahi Mosque on the 10th and 11th April?

A. They kept up the excitement among the mob.

Q. Were law-abiding citizens in your opinion in danger during this time?

A. Yes, Sir, they were in danger.

Q. Did anything happen to your servants?

A. Two of my servants were caught hold of by the mob, because they were my servants and the tutor of my children was also threatened.

Q. Why was the tutor of your children threatened?

A. Because the tutor was coaching my children and I was considered as a friend of Government and so they threatened him.

Q. Was anything said about your house being burnt at all?

A. Yes, Sir, the rumour was that my house inside the city was going to be burnt.

Q. Did you do anything in consequence of hearing that rumour?

A. I removed the women and children from my house to my country-house about 12 miles away from here.

Q. Were many Europeans seen on the streets either in the city or in the neighbourhood?

A. None whatever.

Q. Were alarming news reaching you as to what was occurring in the outlying districts?

A. Alarming news from outside were reaching me to the effect that railway lines were being damaged and telegraph wires were cut and Europeans were being killed.

Q. How did the mob receive the news of these incidents?

A. The mob was welcoming all this news.

Q. Was anything said as to the attitude of the soldiers of the Indian Army?

A. Rumours were set afloat that the Gurkhas and Sikhs refused to fire at Amritsar.

Q. How were these rumours received by the crowd?

A. The people were welcoming this news also.

Q. Do you know whether any statements were made against the Government or against the King-Emperor?

A. Yes, they were abusing Government and the King-Emperor and they destroyed the pictures of King-Emperor wherever they found them in the city.

Q. Was a great effort made to bring the *hartal* to an end?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was it necessary in your opinion for the restoration of peace and good Government that the *hartal* should be brought to an end?

A. Yes, Sir, I thought it necessary.

Q. How was it brought to an end?

A. Martial Law brought about the end of the *hartal*.

Q. In your opinion was Martial Law necessary?

A. It was necessary at that time.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—*

Q. I think your house is on Empress Road, is it not?

1 December 1919.]

Nawab FATEH ALI KHAN.

[Continued.]

A. I have one house in the city inside the Akbari Gate and another house on the Empress Road.

Q. At that time which house were you living in ?

A. In the house on the Empress Road.

Q. Were you in the city itself on the 11th or the 12th April ?

A. No, I was in my house on the Empress Road.

Q. So that you did not yourself go into the city on the 11th or the 12th and see what the state of affairs there was ?

A. I did not go.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You have stated that the mob destroyed the pictures of the King-Emperor, that is what you heard, you did not see anything yourself ?

A. I only heard it.

Q. You have stated that the mob wanted to burn down your house, that was also a report made to you by your servants ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. About the fact that your servants were threatened, that also was a report made to you by your servants ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You have stated that all these things were done by the mob because you were supposed to be a pro-Government man ?

A. At that time I was looked upon as friend of Government.

Q. Is it not a fact that in the Lahore city there was a large body of men who, even before this occurrence, were prepared to defame you, to libel you and cause you injury ?

A. There was not a large body of people.

Q. There was a body of persons, a small number of people, among the Muhammadans ?

A. Yes, there were a few persons who on personal grounds were going to defame me and libel me.

Q. Was not this attempt carried out in the Urdu papers against you even before this occurrence ?

A. Yes, by way of blackmailing they had done it.

Q. These things had been going on for about a year, ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you ever informed as to who were the persons who threatened to burn down your house or who threatened your servants ? Can you give the names ?

A. The mob generally.

Q. Have you any reasons to believe that the mob and the people who were threatening your servants or who were threatening to burn down your house, were not instigated by your private enemies ?

A. No, they were not instigated by my private enemies.

Q. How do you know it ?

A. My private enemies were taking no part whatever in this movement.

Q. You were not present at the Badshahi Mosque when these meetings were held ?

A. No, I was not present.

Q. You have not yourself seen any municipal lanterns that had been broken ?

A. I have seen the broken lanterns.

Q. How many have you seen ?

A. One lantern at my own house.

Q. Have you seen any other lantern ?

A. Yes, one at my own house and the other near it.

Q. You saw only two lanterns ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Is it not a fact that after the 10th the mob was not allowed to come to the Civil Lines ?

A. The mob was not allowed to come to the Civil Lines after the 10th.

Q. And notwithstanding this fact, you went to the authorities and asked that a British Guard should be placed at your house on the Civil Lines ?

A. A guard of British troops was sent to protect my house after the 15th, when the mob was not allowed to frequent those roads.

Q. After the 15th ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Even when all the Civil Lines were picketed by the soldiers ?

A. Yes.

Q. Even when you knew that nobody was allowed to come there after 8 o'clock and that even more than two persons were not allowed to walk abreast ?

A. Yes, people could come there without the knowledge of the pickets.

Q. During those days when Martial Law was in force ?

A. Yes.

Q. You have made mention of a letter which you say you published in the *Civil and Military Gazette* about the passive resistance movement ?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it not a fact that in that letter you insinuated that the leaders of the people were as a matter of fact responsible for the circulation of false news, that they were keeping themselves behind the *pardah*, and that in order to get notoriety they were doing all these things at the expense of the public ? Did you or did you not publish that in your letter ?

A. Yes.

Q. And by the leaders of the people you meant Duni Chand, Ram Bhaj Datt Choudhry, Harkishan Lal and others ?

A. These kind of people.

Q. Why did you complain if Ram Bhaj Datt and others resented this ? You have said that you were taken to task by Harkishan Lal and Ram Bhaj Datt ?

A. I have made that statement.

Q. You were one of the deputation that went on behalf of the people to the Chief Secretary ?

A. I was one of the people who went to the Chief Secretary.

Q. It was either on the 12th or 13th April ?

A. Yes, on the 12th.

Q. You placed certain proposals before the Chief Secretary ?

A. Yes.

Q. The spokesmen of that deputation were Raja Narendra Nath and the Hon'ble Mr. Muhammad Shafi ?

A. Yes.

Q. And there were three things placed before the Chief Secretary ?

A. Yes.

Q. One was that the Military be removed from the city ?

A. Yes.

Q. The second that the arrested persons be released on bail ?

A. Yes.

Q. And the third was that the wounded be returned ?

A. Yes.

Q. These conditions were not accepted ?

A. They were not accepted.

Q. At the meeting where these proposals were agreed upon all had agreed to make this representation to the Government ?

A. All of them did not agree to these proposals, but there was no alternative, so they had to represent those conditions to the Chief Secretary.

Q. If Mr. Muhammad Shafi, Raja Narendra Nath, Bakshi Sohan Lal and those who were present said that all of them agreed to these proposals, will they not be making an incorrect statement ? If these people have made any statement that all of them agreed, would they be making an incorrect statement ? Did you raise any objection at that meeting ? Did you dissent ?

A. I took objection to the condition that the Military should be withdrawn from the city.

Q. You admit that although the people were ready to co-operate with the Hon'ble Mr. Muhammad Shafi, Raja Narendra Nath, Bakshi Sohan Lal and Ram Saran Das Bahadur, they refused to do anything with you ?

A. I never made that statement.

Q. I do not say you made this statement. Did people refuse to cooperate with you and have anything to do with you ?

1 December 1919.]

Nawab FATEH ALI KHAN.

[Continued.]

A. I said that about the particular meeting which was held in the Town Hall

Q. Is it or is it not true that although Ram Bhaj Dutt, Harkishan Lal and all these people were ready to consult and co-operate with the Hon'ble Mr. Muhammad Shafi, Raja Narendra Nath, Rai Ram Saran Das Bahadur and Bakhshi Sohan Lal, they refused to consult with you and to have anything to do with you with regard to the opening of the *hartal*?

A. Yes. I do not know anything about other people; they were co-operating with Mr. Shafi and I was given that information.

Q. Mr. Shafi informed you that they refused to have anything to do with you?

A. Yes.

Q. About these rumours, you have no direct knowledge, that the so-called leaders according to you, as a matter of fact, ever gave currency to these rumours?

A. No.

Q. I think you are aware that at a later stage, between the 11th and 15th, even at the request, according to you, of the so-called leaders, shop-keepers refused to open their shops. They were not even amenable to reason so far as they were concerned?

A. They did not agree to open their shops.

Q. I want to know one more fact. You say that this was *anti-British*, i.e., that the action of *hartal* was *anti-British*. May I understand that by this you mean that they wanted to have nothing to do with the British Government and would have their own rights? Did they want to establish their own rights or was it against certain officers of Government?

A. It was against the British people. They were doing things from which I inferred that they were against British people. They tore the pictures and abused the King-Emperor and from this I inferred they were against the British.

Q. From this rumour, i.e., from the two things, viz., that they destroyed the pictures of the King-Emperor and they abused the King-Emperor you inferred that they were *anti-British*. Do you mean by *anti-British* they wanted to have nothing to do with the British rule and to establish their own rule? Is that what you mean?

A. At that time they were in that mood.

Q. You thought without any arms, without anything, that was seriously meant?

A. They may not be able to do that, but their moral temper was so.

Q. Do you make any difference between military aid and Martial Law?

A. Yes; there is difference.

Q. What is the difference?

A. Under Martial Law the administration is in the hands of Military people. Military aid means that the administration is in the hands of the civil people and it takes only aid from the Military soldiers.

Q. Then, am I right in deducing this inference, that even on the date when Martial Law was abrogated, according to you it should have been prolonged for the benefit of the masses of the people?

A. I never said that.

Q. Do you think that it was not maintained for a longer time than was absolutely necessary?

A. Peace and order had already been established within a week and the people's wrong ideas were corrected.

Q. I think you approve of every order that was passed by the Martial Law authorities?

A. I do not know all the orders, but when I came to know most of them at that time, they were not bad.

Q. Then do you approve of the Martial Law Order which ordered students to attend at a certain place 4 times a day?

A. Yes; students were asked to attend 4 times, because the authorities wanted to prevent them from taking part in the disturbances and save them from the danger of being killed.

Q. Was there any danger of any person being killed after the 15th?

A. There would have been again disorder and there would have been danger of their being killed again.

Q. There was a danger of their being killed after the 15th?

A. Yes; they wanted to keep students away from taking part in any movements so that these boys may not do any mischief or anything against the law and so that the Government may not be put to enforcing more drastic Martial Law.

Q. Do you think that it was necessary for the maintenance of peace and order to ask every householder who has got more than 5 maunds of grain to report to the Martial Law authorities?

A. The Martial Law authorities must have done it according to their own requirements.

Q. And you saw no objection to that?

A. For that particular occasion, there was no objection to be found.

Q. Therefore practically you have heard of all the important Martial Law orders that were passed and you have no objection to any of them?

A. I have already replied that whatever I have seen of the Martial Law orders, I have no objection to any one of them according to the occasion.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. You have stated that people were abusing His Majesty the King-Emperor? Is that within your own knowledge or did you simply hear people say so?

A. Other people informed me; I did not hear myself.

Q. Did people single out only His Majesty the King-Emperor or did they also by name abuse any official of the Government?

A. They included the Lieutenant-Governor.

Q. How is it that you do not mention it in your statement here?

A. It is possible that it might have been left out.

Q. It is not possible; it is not here.

A. Perhaps it is not there.

Q. When the *hartal* took place on the 6th of April, then also there was a great deal of excitement in the town?

A. Yes.

Q. Similar to what happened on the 10th or 11th?

A. No.

Q. What was the difference?

A. On the 10th and 11th the excitement was increased.

Q. Why?

A. The news about Mr. Gandhi's arrest had reached Lahore.

Q. That was the reason?

A. Yes.

Q. No disturbances took place on the 6th of April?

A. No.

Q. How do you account for that?

A. The excitement had not reached that degree yet.

Q. Which degree?

A. That was reached on the 10th or 11th.

Q. Did any looting or any disturbances take place on the 10th?

A. There was opposition between the Police and the mob.

Q. Apart from that, was there any looting or disturbance in the town or any trouble?

A. I have not heard anything of it.

Q. How do you account for that?

A. I think they were doing these things against the Government and not among themselves.

Q. What things?

A. They opposed the Police and the Government officials, and they were not to fight amongst themselves. That is how I account for it.

Q. You say they opposed the Police and Government officials. Who were the Government officials besides the Police whom they opposed?

A. The Police, Military, etc.

Q. Was there any Military on the 10th?

A. I heard that some of the Military was here.

1 December 1919.]

Nawah FATEH ALI KHAN.

[Continued.]

Q. Because there was a collision between the police and the people therefore you thought they were doing something against the Government?

A. Their advance towards the Mall and the Lieutenant-Governor's residence was being checked by them.

Q. They wanted to go to the Lieutenant-Governor?

A. Yes.

Q. Why did they want to go to the Lieutenant-Governor?

A. I think it was not done out of good intentions. Had it been so, they would have approached him by other constitutional means.

Q. What do you mean by other constitutional means?

A. By request or peaceful means and not by this fight and quarrelling and through blood and killing.

Q. You said through blood and killing. What do you mean by that?

A. I mean by fighting and struggling hard towards it.

Q. Whom did they fight?

A. When they were checked, they still wanted to advance. That is not the way of requesting.

Q. Did they fight with anybody?

A. They did not fight, but whatever they could do, they did, by throwing brickbats and other things.

Q. Did you see that or did anybody tell you that?

A. I have heard so.

Q. Is it not a fact within your knowledge as you are well acquainted with the conditions, that whenever people are in trouble or distress, they go to the head of the administration in the body to lay their grievance before him? Do you not know that?

A. I have already stated that these are not the ways to approach the authorities.

Q. Then you said in your statement that the *hartal* became openly *anti-British*. What do you mean by that?

A. The whole thing was *anti-British*.

Q. You said the *hartal* was *anti-British*. I asked you about that.

A. The *hartal* was prompted by the interpretation put on the Rowlatt Act; therefore I considered it to be *anti-British*.

Q. Because it was a protest against the Rowlatt Act and the protest was made on these wrong interpretations by means of *hartal*, therefore you call *anti-British*. Is that the only reason?

A. That is the only reason.

Q. Now, you have referred in your statement to the excitement as follows: "The excitement was kept up by meetings in the Badshahi mosque organised by the political leaders on 11th and 12th April, resulting in another collision between the authorities and the people near Lohari Mundi." Why did this collision take place? Were people doing anything seriously wrong? (The witness pointed out that it was Hira Mundi and not Lohari Mundi and the correction was accepted.)

A. This collision was the result of that excitement which was nurtured and produced by the meetings at the mosque.

Q. How was it produced at the meetings?

A. Because there were speeches of that sort in the mosque, and an officer of the C. I. D. was beaten.

Q. In the mosque?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the crowd after that begin to loot or make any disturbance?

A. They did not do anything.

Q. Did they attack anybody?

(The Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan here observed that they wanted to go in a body, but the police wanted to divide them.)

Q. What is the harm in going in a body?

A. The officer apprehended some danger if they moved onwards in that compact body.

Q. It was his apprehension that caused this trouble?

A. Yes.

Q. You said that open sedition was being talked in the city. What was that open sedition?

A. What I meant was this: that people were saying all these things against Government and there was that *Danda Fauj* organised in the city.

Q. These things? What things?

A. Abusing the King and abusing the authorities and defaming the citizens who were working on behalf of the Government.

Q. If these people were working with the Government what help did they render in trying to stop these?

A. They tried, but of no avail.

Q. In what manner?

A. In this manner; that they went to the leaders of the people and talked with them and tried to put a stop to this *hartal*.

Q. So I understand from what you say that those who co-operated with the Government were not the leaders of the people? Is it so?

A. At that particular time, they were not.

Q. At other times, they were?

A. Yes, Sir; always.

Q. Did they have the influence of those people who constituted the crowd, these leaders?

A. Not at that time.

Q. Have they influenced those people now?

A. Certainly.

Q. And if any cause for excitement arises would they be able to influence them?

A. It will depend on the shape it takes.

Q. How do you know that they had influence?

A. This loss of influence with the people was only a matter of some days, existed only for some time; and this influence can be traced in the days of *Muharram* when Hindus and Muhammadans both ceremonised the *Muharram*.

Q. My question is if anything were to happen in the future, would they be able to influence them?

A. It will depend on the occasion, Sir, the state of things during those days.

Q. On what dates were the Military pickets put in the city?

A. Probably on the 15th.

Q. Not before?

A. The Martial Law was proclaimed on the 15th.

Q. And from that date, the Military pickets were put in the city, not before?

A. I heard that they had come, some of them.

Q. I want to know when for the first time?

A. Perhaps on the 12th.

Q. Was there any looting or any disturbance in the town between the 10th and the 12th, before they came?

A. No, Sir. I did not hear anything.

Q. Here you say that the leaders of the people, when you interviewed them, imposed certain impossible conditions and one of them was the removal of the military. Why did you consider that as an impossible condition?

A. Because had these Military pickets been removed from the city, then people would have been freer and a similar state of affairs would have taken place at Lahore as in Amritsar.

Q. So, nothing happened on the 6th, on the 10th, on the 11th up to the 12th, i.e., till the time when the Military pickets were put in the city? I can tell you there were military in the town up to that time; you can take it from me.

A. Probably they meant the police.

Q. When you put here the military, they meant the police?

A. When I went to these leaders of the people, they mentioned these things; probably they meant the police.

Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate.—

Q. That was on the 13th.

A. I know.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. So you think they might have meant the police?

A. Those were the words used by them; I do not know what they meant.

Q. Did you understand it as the military or the police?

[ 1 December 1919.] Nawab FAYEE ALI KHAN—concluded—The Hon'ble Rai Bahadur BAKHSHI SOHAN LAL,

A. The military; the words conveyed that idea.

Q. When there had been no military on the 6th, 10th and 11th, there had been no disturbance in the town. Why should it be necessary afterwards?

A. The excitement was increasing and had the military pickets not been stationed in the city, the state of affairs would have been the same as at Amritsar.

Q. It has been said that attempts were made to burn your house. Were attempts made to burn any other house as far as you heard?

A. I did not say attempts. What I meant was I heard a report about it.

Q. About what?

A. That my house would be burnt.

Q. How?

A. I heard this report.

Q. That is, those who informed you must have heard that somebody intended to burn it?

A. Those who informed me told me that they had heard it from people that they had intended to burn it.

Q. Did you hear anything about anybody else's house?

A. No.

Q. These excitements were going on from the 10th to the 15th; the military were being picketed in the town on the 12th and 13th, and you asked the authorities to put a guard at your house at the Empress Road some days later. Why did you not ask for the guard between the 11th and 15th?

A. I did not want to burden the Government at that particular time. Martial Law had established peace and

order and the burden was removed to a certain extent; it was then that I requested the Government to locate a picket there.

Q. You wanted the picket when there was quiet, but when there was excitement you did not want it?

A. Yes.

Q. You said in answer to a question but by another member that you did not know all the orders issued by Martial Law. Is it so?

A. Just possible that some might have been left out.

Q. Probably you know them all?

A. Almost all.

By Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate—

Q. With regard to this matter of the *hartal* being anti-British, you say in your statement that "it was common talk that the institution of *hartal* would not be confined merely to shop-keepers, but that its further development would be the complete boycott of the European community by the Indian servants, *Ahid-malgars* and bearers." Would that be anti-British spirit?

A. Yes.

Q. You were asked that you should take certain terms to the Chief Secretary. You along with other gentlemen took certain terms to the Chief Secretary and you were asked whether or not you agreed with those terms. What I want to ask you is, who dictated those terms, who suggested those terms?

A. Mr. Duni Chand, Ram Bhaj Dutt and others.

The Hon'ble Rai Bahadur BAKHSHI SOHAN LAL, Vakil, High Court, Lahore.

By the President—

Q. You are a Vakil in the High Court?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. The *hartal* of the 10th, did that cause serious disturbance?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In what respects?

A. There was trouble between the police and the mob, and I heard there was also firing.

Q. Were attempts made to make shop-keepers open their shops?

A. They were made afterwards.

Q. Was it a difficult thing to get them to do so?

A. I think it was difficult. Private gentlemen as well as some officials tried to open the *hartal* after the 10th, 11th, 12th and 13th, but all their effects failed, and it was only on the 14th that some shops in the Anarkali Bazaar and Nila Gumbaz were opened before Martial Law was announced; but they were very few, these people being given an assurance of protection by the police, police guards having been stationed there patrolling in the Anarkali and Nila Gumbaz.

Q. What brought the situation of anxiety to an end?

A. Complete anxiety came to an end after Martial Law was proclaimed and the *hartal* was closed, when all the shops re-opened and people began to work. Then all anxiety was removed. Until then, there was anxiety.

Q. In your own opinion, was it necessary to have Martial Law to restore order?

A. From the facts which I saw it was necessary.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Was not the *hartal* in your opinion due to the from message Mahatma Gandhi and the fact that all the Indian members of the Legislative Council were opposed to the Rowlatt Act?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it due to any organised conspiracy?

A. Not in my opinion.

Q. In your opinion, if there had been any firing, would the *hartal* have continued after the 10th?

A. That is my personal opinion.

Q. I am concerned here with your personal opinion only?

A. I believe it could not have continued.

Q. The *hartal* of the 10th, was it not due to the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi?

A. Yes, in my opinion due to the information which we received here that Mahatma Gandhi had been arrested.

Q. Now, there was a meeting at Government House on the 11th; you were present there; you were also a member of the Provincial Legislative Council. Was it not suggested in that meeting that Gokal Chand and Duni Chand were to be consulted?

A. Some mentioned their names and said they were consulted.

Q. Was it because they were considered to be the leaders of the mob or the organisers of the *hartal*?

A. They were at that time believed to have some influence with the people.

Q. In your own opinion they were not the leaders or organisers of the mob?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Then there was another meeting at Muhammad Naqi's house?

A. Yes. There had been 2 or 3 meetings.

Q. But there was one on the 11th?

A. Yes.

Q. And there you sent for about half a dozen shop-keepers?

A. Yes.

Q. The idea was that these shop-keepers being Municipal shop-keepers, if they opened their shops, others would follow suit?

A. Yes; by setting an example to others.

Q. And when you sent for the shop-keepers, did they suggest sending for anyone else?

A. I think it was about Duni Chand and Gokal Chand.

Q. And upon this you did send for these men?

A. Yes.

Q. You heard that Duni Chand was ill and could not come?

A. Neither of them were present.

Q. Did at that meeting any one suggest that these men were the leaders of the mob and organisers of the *hartal*?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Leaving aside what happened on the 10th, is it within your knowledge, that these two men, Duni Chand

1 December 1919.]

Rai Bahadur BAKSHI SOHAN LAL.

[Continued.]

and Gokal Chand, practically had any influence with the shop-keepers?

A. I cannot say they had any influence. I cannot go to the extent of saying they were the leaders of the people.

Q. There was a contest in the municipal elections and one of them was a candidate?

A. Yes.

Q. And these shop-keepers were voters on the electoral roll?

A. There were shop-keepers as well as others, and he was defeated so far as I learnt, he had to withdraw because he had not sufficient support.

Q. And who was opposing him?

A. Badri Shah, a *Sahukar* of Mozang.

Q. Then there was a meeting at the house of the Hon'ble Mr. Muhammad Shafi on the 12th?

A. Yes.

Q. You were present there?

A. Yes, I was present.

Q. Rai Bahadur Ram Saran Das was also present?

A. Yes.

Q. Raja Narendra Nath?

A. Yes.

Q. And Rai Amar Nath was also present?

A. Yes.

Q. Nawab Fateh Ali Khan was also there?

A. He was there.

Q. They were there to find out the best way to end the *hartal*?

A. Yes.

Q. There were also there Pandit Ram Bhaj Datt, Mr. Duni Chand and Dr. Gokal Chand Naurang?

A. Messrs. Duni Chand and Naurang were there from the early stage, but Pandit Ram Bhaj Datt arrived a little later.

Q. These people you had sent for?

A. Yes.

Q. The points that were put forward at that meeting, is it not within your knowledge, that they were put forward on behalf of the shop-keepers who had closed the shops?

A. Many matters were discussed, but after some discussion three points were noted down.

Q. And was it not suggested at that meeting that nobody could say what the shop-keepers would do; but if these points were favourably considered by Government there was every possibility of the *hartal* ending?

A. At least most of the persons who had assembled there thought that this would very much help in opening the shops.

Q. You were one of those persons?

A. Yes.

Q. And practically the three or four points that were afterwards discussed and settled were agreed upon by everybody?

A. I cannot say they were agreed upon by every person. The sense of the meeting seemed to be that these were the points.

Q. Did Nawab Fateh Ali Khan raise any objection that he would not form part of the deputation or that he agreed to these points?

A. No.

Q. Now you have known Pandit Ram Bhaj Datt, Duni Chand and Dr. Gokal Chand Naurang for a long time?

A. Yes.

Q. You have known them practically for the last 20 or 15 years?

A. Yes.

Q. They were carrying on the same profession as you do?

A. Yes.

Q. You had the chance of meeting them every day?

A. Not every day, but very often in the month.

Q. Did you find any seditious or revolutionary tendencies in them to the best of your knowledge?

A. Well, I have not found any in my presence. So far as I have known them I never formed an opinion that they were revolutionary or seditious.

Q. My point is this that, even supposing for the sake of argument that this *hartal* was organised by them, that they held meetings knowing, as you do these men, would you come to the conclusion that there was any revolutionary or seditious movement behind their action; and supposing that these people in some way were the organisers of this *hartal*; knowing then as you do, would you in any way infer that whatever they did was seditious, so far as they were concerned?

A. I cannot say that I could form that opinion, but I think it was a very objectionable matter to do this *hartal*. If they had any hand in it, I would have certainly considered it objectionable.

Q. Supposing, I want to know, that you knew all the circumstances in Lahore, i.e., what meetings were held and what speeches were made, knowing all these things, would you come to the conclusion that there was some conspiracy behind this?

A. I don't think there was any conspiracy so far as my humble opinion or knowledge goes.

Q. I don't think that you know as a matter of fact that it was brought to your notice, when you people were trying to end the *hartal*, that these people asked the shop-keepers never to open their shops. You received no information that Dr. Naurang, etc., persuaded the people not to open the shops?

A. The shop-keepers said that they were afraid of the unruly groups of people in the mob who were passing in processions in front of their shops.

Q. It appears to me from the statement you have made previously that at least up to the 30th March you were yourself against the Rowlatt Act. You were not in favour of it?

A. Until it was passed. Until it received the sanction of the Legislature I was against it.

Q. Now, you people made an attempt on the 14th and 15th?

A. Yes, on the 14th and 15th.

Q. Do I understand correctly, according to what you have stated, that as a matter of fact you had succeeded in inducing people to open their shops to a very large extent?

A. Not to a very large extent, but a very few of the people did open their shops. It may be 20 or 30 in the whole of the Anarkali, Commercial Buildings and Nila Gumbaz.

Q. Anyhow, before the 14th you had succeeded in breaking up the *hartal*?

A. Not before the 14th so far as my recollections go, but it was on the 14th.

Q. I said on the 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. The improvement continued from the 14th?

A. It did continue.

Q. And on the 15th you had greater measures of success?

A. We expected greater measures, but only a little success.

Q. You expected only a little success but greater success attended?

A. Yes, it attended but at the same time I must say that there was a rumour that Martial Law was going to be proclaimed and our efforts were attended by greater success on account of that rumour.

Q. I now read out to you your letter. It has been the subject of great cross-examination. It was dated the 7th May. There it says that you succeeded in getting the shops opened in the Bazar, and outside the City the improvement continued, and greater success attended on the 15th, etc. That was your opinion on the 7th May?

A. Yes.

Q. That was correct?

A. Yes, but I may refer to the latter part of my writing. "The enforcement of Martial Law had a salutary effect in breaking up the *hartal*." This is to be read with that.

Q. I take it then that as you were expediting the bringing of the *hartal* to an end, you would have succeeded

1 December 1919.]

Rai Bahadur BAKSHI SOBAN LAL.

[Continued.]

in breaking it up even without Martial Law because you were actually expediting it?

A. Yes.

Q. Even without Martial Law you would have been able to break up this *hartal*, though instead of 15th or 16th it would have ended on the 18th or 19th.

A. Yes, it had to break up sooner or later. If there had been no Martial Law, it would then have taken a longer time. Martial Law was a great means of correcting excited people.

Q. Whether the people knew Mahatma Gandhi personally or not they as a matter of fact had a great respect for him and treated him as an unusual man or a sort of saint?

A. They had great respect for him even before they had seen him.

*By the President—*

Q. When did he first appear in Lahore?

A. He did not come to the Punjab before the month of October. It was on account of his sacrifices in South Africa that the people became very much devoted to him.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—*

Q. According to you the *hartal* was due to Mahatma Gandhi's message regarding passive resistance, writings in the Press, and speeches in Council. These were the three causes?

A. Yes.

Q. Now there is some evidence before us that at that meeting there was some excited talk between Mr. Ram Bhaj Datt and Nawab Fateh Ali Khan. He has made a mention of it that he was abused by certain leaders. Is it or is it not a fact that that abuse or excited talk was to this effect? He said "You are a Nawab" and referred to Nawab Fateh Ali Khan and "You are a Raja" and referred to Raja Narendra Nath and "You ask people to do this and that. Is it not your duty to represent to Government that so many innocent people are being killed?"

A. Yes, it was to that effect.

Q. After the 30th March you changed your opinion about that Rowlett Bill?

A. Not 30th March, but after I heard that the Act had been passed I withdrew my opposition. It might be even in March, about three or four weeks after that I heard that the Act had been passed, I withdrew my opposition.

Q. One thing more I want to ask. Was there a very great disturbance on a very extensive scale in 1915?

A. Where.

Q. In Jhang?

A. Yes, there was.

Q. A number of gentlemen were appointed to make investigation?

A. Yes, the Punjab Hindu Sabha deputed certain persons to make investigation after consulting and referring the matter to Government.

Q. Were Rai Bahadur Ram Saran Das and yourself members of that body?

A. The Punjab Hindu Sabha appointed me, but Rai Bahadur Ram Saran Das did not take part in it.

Q. You were one of those who referred this matter to the Lieutenant-Governor as also Rai Bahadur Ram Saran Das?

A. Yes.

Q. Was not that disturbance on a very large scale?

A. Yes, it was. It affected parts of three districts: Jhang and Muzaffargarh mainly and Multan to a small extent.

Q. Hundreds of shops were looted in the broad daylight?

A. Yes.

Q. And the police were paralysed. They were not able to help in any way?

A. Yes.

Q. At the same time the people who were looting were saying that they were going to be German subjects and there was no English Raj?

A. They said so or rather one of them pretended to be a German Emperor or a Sultan of Turkey.

Q. And this went on for four days?

A. Yes, I think so. This went on for rather more than four days.

Q. And all these matters were put down by you in the Memorial that was submitted to the Lieutenant-Governor?

A. We submitted it to the Punjab Hindu Sabha, and they sent some of its copies to the Punjab Government.

Q. And all these dacoities were committed in large numbers: 400 or 300 persons were going beating drums and looting?

A. Yes. In some dacoities we were told that the number of rioters amounted to thousands.

Q. No Martial Law was proclaimed at that time?

A. No.

Q. And you admit that the authority of Government was paralysed in the districts that were affected?

A. Yes, what we have written in our report is correct.

Q. I am just reading the very words of the report itself. And there were also wild rumours current that the country would be evacuated, etc.?

A. Yes, there is a full detail.

Q. And you submitted that as a matter of fact it was not only the economic causes, the realising of which must be of interest, but these were political disturbances?

A. Yes. That was our view though finally the Court's view differed from us.

Q. Well, do you remember, in replying to one of your deputation the Lieutenant-Governor admitted that this was a political agitation?

A. Yes.

*By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—*

Q. You told us that so far as you know the leaders of the people who dictated the terms of the representation to Government at Mr. Shafi's house were not also the promoters of the *hartal*?

A. Yes, so far as my knowledge goes.

Q. Are you aware that Duni Chand and Ram Bhaj Datt did dictate those terms, while they were members of the Indian Association?

A. I had heard that they were members of the Indian Association.

Q. Do you know that under the auspices of the Indian Association handbills were distributed in Lahore not to hold the *hartal*?

A. I may have heard, but I don't know personally.

Q. But did you hear of it?

A. No. I have some handbills that were distributed, but I don't know who distributed them or who were the organizers of those handbills.

(The Government Advocate then pointed out that he had intended to produce the witness who had distributed those handbills).

Q. Another thing which you have stated is that you asked Ram Bhaj Datt to distribute them and that Ram Bhaj Datt merely said to Nawab Fateh Ali Khan "You are a Nawab" and to Raja Narendra Nath he said "You are a Raja." Is it not a fact that they were extremely annoyed at that meeting?

A. He looked to be very much excited, and when he entered the room where this meeting was being held from his appearance he looked to be very much excited and addressed Raja Sahib and Nawab Sahib in a very excited and disrespectful manner.

Q. But you also suggested extreme terms to Government about the Jhang matter?

A. No. I don't remember.

Q. You were not deputed by Government?

A. No. We were appointed by the Punjab Hindu Sabha, but the matter was brought to the notice of the Government.

Q. Was it a matter between Hindus and Muhammadans?

A. Yes. The rioters were Muhammadans and the victims were Hindus.

1 December 1919.]

The Hon'ble Rai Bahadur LALA RAM SARAN DAS.

The Hon'ble Rai Bahadur LALA RAM SARAN DAS, C.I.E., Lahore.

*By the President—*

Q. You have heard the evidence given by the last witness. You would agree with the views he put forward?

A. With most of them.

Q. Is there anything that came under your notice which you would like to bring to our notice during the periods of these riots? Is there any point that you wish specially to draw our attention to?

A. Any point which you would like to ask me. Most of the points I have already put forward in my statement.

*The President.*—I have seen your statement. Your evidence is practically the same as given by the last witness. I do not really think there is any matter on which I would like to question you.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan*

Q. You are one of the office-holders of the Indian Association?

A. No.

Q. Raja Narendra Nath probably is?

A. I don't know.

Q. On the 6th April it was the mourning *hartal* on account of the Rowlatt Bill?

A. Yes.

Q. And the *hartal* on the 10th was due to the detention of Mahatma Gandhi?

A. Yes.

Q. Now were not, in your opinion, Messrs. Duni Chand and Gokal Chand Naurang, on the 12th and 13th anxious to put the *hartal* to an end?

A. They seemed to be anxious.

Q. The conditions were agreed upon by all those who were present?

A. All agreed to represent those conditions to Government.

Q. Actually the conditions or proposals that were written by Rai Amar Nath were dictated by Raja Narendra Nath?

A. Yes, they were taken down by Rai Amar Nath and Mr. Duni Chand and Raja Narendra Nath was only dictating what he was told to dictate.

Q. Suggestions were made by these people and the words of those suggestions were dictated by Raja Narendra Nath and taken down by Rai Amar Nath?

A. Yes.

Q. I am not talking of the fact that certain notices were issued and meetings held, but apart from it are you aware of any person who organized and preached *hartal* in Lahore?

A. There was a notice issued as a matter of fact by some signatories and I inferred from that that the signatories whose names appeared on the notice were the organizers of the *hartal*.

Q. And by preaching *hartal* I understand a notice was issued and in a public meeting it was decided—rather a resolution was carried. After that do you know if there was any organization?

A. Yes, certain canvassing was done by certain people.

Q. Persuading people to close their shops?

A. Yes.

Q. Those leaders, so far as they are concerned, was there any organisation?

A. I heard so.

Q. I will refresh your memory. You were a witness in the Conspiracy Case on behalf of Government?

A. Yes.

Q. To a question put by the Court you clearly stated that these were the people who organised and preached *hartal* in Lahore. Did you use those words or not? Did you make that statement?

A. Yes, I made that statement and meant there that they were at the bottom of these organizations.

Q. That is my point. No doubt certain persons were persuading people or threatening them; you don't

know if there was any organization behind it or if the leaders took any part in it?

A. I don't know that there was any organization behind these leaders.

Q. And further on, you were not in a position to know the fact that the compulsion or threats that were used, because these leaders asked people to use these threats?

A. I do not quite pick your question.

Q. The question is that according to you, certain threats were used. I want to know if it came to your knowledge that for these threats or compulsion is any of the leaders responsible?

A. I cannot say that but I must say that certain threats were used against the shopkeepers.

Q. I admit that and I have no quarrel with that. As a leader of the Hindu community, has it ever come to your knowledge that the so-called leaders of the mob were responsible for the use of this compulsion and threats?

A. I cannot say.

Q. And you tried your best to find it out who was so responsible or to curb this matter?

A. Yes, I did but I failed.

Q. Now there is one thing more. Some *langarkhanas* were established on the 12th and 13th.

A. Yes.

Q. And you must have seen one or two with your own eyes?

A. I saw one and it was started on philanthropic lines.

Q. You are the foremost citizen of Lahore and a man who has got hundreds of persons employed in his mills. I want to know whether it ever reached your ears that these *langarkhanas*, apart from the fact that they were or they were not philanthropic institutions, were meant to prolong *hartal*?

A. Yes they were philanthropic institutions.

Q. On account of *hartal* the shops were closed and people were not able to get their food, and it was suggested that as the very poor could not get their provisions, *langars* should be opened?

A. Yes, the *langar* is an Indian institution, and when people think there is a necessity for it, they start it.

Q. You have nothing to do with the High Court?

A. No.

*By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—*

Q. You have stated that there was a meeting at the house of the Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Muhammad Shafi where some of the leaders were present and some conditions were suggested and that the object of the meeting was to see how to end the existing state of things?

A. The idea was to co-operate with the leaders and bring about an end to the *hartal*.

Q. What were the conditions suggested at that meeting?

A. As far as I can recollect, one of them was that the military should be withdrawn from the city for at least 48 hours, the second was that all the wounded and dead be handed over to their relatives, and the third was that people under arrest should be released on bail.

Q. And you also agreed with these suggestions?

A. Yes, I agreed to these suggestions being put before the Government.

Q. And you thought if these were carried out it would help to remove the existing tension and excitement?

A. That was the reason why we decided to put them before the Government.

Q. Were these put before the Government?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you go in a body or did some single individual go?

A. A deputation went.

Q. Consisting of?



1 December 1919.]

The Hon'ble Rai Bahadur LALA RAM SARAN DAS.

[Continued.]

A. Raja Narendra Nath, the Hon'ble Mr. Muhammad Shafi, the Hon'ble Rai Bahadur Bakhshi Sohan Lal, Khan Zulfiqar Ali Khan, myself and one or two others.

Q. You laid these matters before the Government

A. Yes.

Q. What reply did the Government make?

A. The Chief Secretary told us that he would lay the papers before His Honour.

Q. You waited upon the Chief Secretary?

A. Yes, and asked him to put this matter before His Honour.

Q. He promised to do so?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he communicate with you afterwards as to what was the result?

A. Yes, late in the evening Mr. Shafi got a letter from the Chief Secretary in which, as far as I remember, it was said that the military would be withdrawn simultaneously with the opening of the shops, and that the dead and wounded would be given over to their relatives on certain conditions, and about the third I cannot say.

Q. Were the conditions given in the letter?

A. That was what Mr. Shafi told me and the others.

Q. He did not tell you what the conditions were for the handing over of the dead and wounded?

A. No, I did not ask the conditions.

Q. And the third?

A. With regard to the third condition, Government could not agree to the release on bail of those who were arrested. This is as far as I can recollect it.

Q. Did this partial acceptance of these conditions have any effect? Did you carry it out or what did you think of it?

A. Mr. Shafi communicated it to the leaders of the moment.

Q. Who were they?

A. Dr. Gokal Chand Naurang, Duni Chand, Harkishan Lal and others.

Q. What did they say?

A. That I do not know, but another meeting was called at the Town Hall.

Q. And this happened on what date?

A. On the 12th, I think.

Q. After this there was another meeting?

A. There was another meeting at the Town Hall.

Q. Were you present at that meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. And who else?

A. There were about two or three hundred present.

Q. I do not want to know the people in the audience, but the principal people among them, whom you call leaders?

A. Chaudhri Ram Bhaj Datt, Lala Harkishan Lal, Dr. Gokal Chand Naurang, Raja Narendra Nath, Nawab Fateh Ali Khan, Mr. Shafi, Nawab Zulfiqar Ali Khan, myself, Rai Bahadur Amar Nath, Bakhshi Sohan Lal, and many others.

Q. Then the subject for consideration at that meeting was, I suppose, this correspondence between Government and these leaders?

A. It was co-operation with these leaders to end the *hartal*.

Q. Did you not at that meeting take into consideration what had gone before on the previous day at your private meeting in Mr. Shafi's house and the representation you had made to Government?

A. Yes, there was a meeting at Government House on the 11th.

Q. I am talking about this meeting in the Town Hall on the 13th.

A. I mention this meeting on the 11th because the meeting on the 13th was a result of it.

Q. It had nothing to do with the meeting of the 12th?

A. Yes it had, it was a continuation of our efforts to bring about an end to the *hartal*.

Q. Then there was a meeting at Government House on the 11th? Who were present at that?

A. Narendra Nath, Nawab Fateh Ali Khan, Hon'ble Bakhshi Sohan Lal, Hon'ble Mrdhi Shah, Hon'ble Malik Umar Hyat Khan, Hon'ble Gajjan Singh, Nawab Behram Khan, Raja Fateh Singh and a number of other people.

Q. Was any Government official present?

A. Yes, there were Government officials present as well. It was a sort of informal conference.

Q. Who were they?

A. Hon'ble Mr. Thompson, Hon'ble Mr. Fagan, His Honour, Col. Bayley, Hon'ble Mr. Maynard and certain other officers.

Q. At that meeting you discussed the measures which might be taken?

A. At that meeting certain people suggested that the situation was getting very serious and there was a need for repressive measures.

Q. That was discussed on the 11th, that the situation was becoming serious and there was a need for repressive measures?

A. Yes, and certain people suggested it was advisable to co-operate with the leaders of the moment.

Q. Who suggested that?

A. Raja Narendra Nath, Mr. Shafi and one or two others.

Q. They suggested that the better course would be to co-operate with the leaders of the moment?

A. Yes.

Q. Then what did you ultimately decide?

A. We ultimately did decide to co-operate with them and we had a meeting at Mr. Shafi's house and a meeting at the Town Hall as well.

Q. Then you had this meeting of the 13th at the Town Hall as well as a result of these two meetings?

A. Yes.

Q. What happened at that meeting on the 13th at the Town Hall?

A. The meeting had no President and it was a very peculiar sort of a meeting and some violent speeches were made at that meeting.

Q. Who made violent speeches?

A. Mr. Allah-ud-din made a very violent speech, and some other people also made violent speeches.

Q. What was the burden of those speeches, what did they say?

A. They said that there was a lot of *Zulm* in the Rowlatt Act and that people were massacred and a good many other things relative to this.

Q. What just were they, if you remember them?

A. They said that mobs were fired upon, people were murdered, they were not attended to medically, and that nobody heard the grievances of the people; the Rowlatt Act was to be repealed and it had not been repealed and no effort was being made to repeal it, and they said the Deputy Commissioner was a liar, and one thing and another.

Q. Those I understand were speeches made by those who were siding with the mob?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. But did anybody on your side make any speeches to pacify them and bring about a better state of things?

A. Raja Narendra Nath spoke and Mr. Muhammad Shafi spoke.

Q. What did they say?

A. They said the people ought not to be so nervous and that they ought not to be so unruly, and that the *hartal* should be ended, and that we must all unite in restoring peace, and order.

Q. What was the result of it, how did it end?

A. It ended in a fiasco, nothing came of it practically.

Q. You have said the people of substance and property were in great fear. Why was that, was there any looting or house-breaking going on in the town?

A. No, there was no house-breaking going on in the town, but there was fear that in case the *hartal* should be ended, the hooligans would come and loot the shops.

Q. People were not opening their shops because they were afraid?

A. They were afraid of being looted.

1 December 1919.] The Hon'ble Rai Bahadur LALA RAM SARAN DAS—Concluded—LALA JIWAN LAL.

Q. That is why they kept on the *hartal* ?  
 A. Yes, that is why the *hartal* continued.  
 Q. It was not the desire of the shopkeepers to keep their shops closed, but it was fear operating on their minds, that if they opened their shops they would be looted ?  
 A. There was desire on the 6th and 10th, but after that it was fear of being looted.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. How many men do you employ yourself ?  
 A. About 500.  
 Q. These men, did they come to work during the period of the *hartal* or not ?  
 A. No.  
 Q. Did you ascertain why they did not come ?  
 A. The majority of them were absent and those who turned up said the others were being stopped in the way.

Q. Stopped by whom ?  
 A. By hooligans.  
 Q. Did you, before the *hartal* on the 6th, make efforts to prevent the *hartal* taking place ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Did you hear any news on the 5th, the day before the *hartal*, that emissaries had come from Delhi and Amritsar to encourage the *hartal* ?  
 A. Yes and these emissaries practically spoilt the work which we did, I mean the work of the party who were organizing to prevent the *hartal*.  
 Q. Did you, Raja Narendra Nath and Mr. Shafi on the 13th go through the city trying to induce people to open their shops ?  
 A. I think it was on the 14th or 15th.  
 Q. What treatment was meted out to you ?  
 A. We were jeered at and hooted and hissed.

LALA JIWAN LAL, Inspector, Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab.

By the President—

Q. You are an Inspector of the Criminal Investigation Department ?  
 A. Yes, my Lord.  
 Q. Was there a meeting at Lahore on the 6th April in connection with the *hartal* ?  
 A. Yes, a meeting was held in the Bradlaugh Hall on the 6th.  
 Q. Were you ordered by the Deputy Superintendent to report the proceedings of the meeting ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. And also to report as to the behaviour of the people in connection with the observance of the *hartal* ?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. Did you see yourself any acts of the mob directed to preventing people doing work or engaging in their ordinary business affairs ?  
 A. Some passers-by were forced to take off their caps and pugries, and I noticed a motor-car carrying some friends of Rai Bahadur Ram Saran Das was stopped on the Mall Road in the morning. After that at about 9 A.M. I saw about 2,000 people collected in front of the Islamia School and they forced the School authorities to close the school.  
 Q. Did the mob continue till the school closed ?  
 A. They did not disperse until the school was closed. Then at about 10-30 A.M. I saw certain disorderly crowds emerging from Mochi Gate and other gates and they wanted to go to the Mall Road. I reported this to my Deputy Superintendent verbally.  
 Q. Then at about 2 P.M. did you go to the Bradlaugh Hall ?  
 A. Yes; the proceedings started before time.  
 Q. Did you take notes ?  
 A. I took notes of the meeting which was held inside the Hall.  
 Q. Then as regards this meeting at the Bradlaugh Hall, was it an orderly meeting or not ?  
 A. There was a lot of excitement among the audience and Messrs. Bowring and Beaver, Superintendents, and Mr. Askwith, Assistant Superintendent, Criminal Investigation Department, were hissed when they came to the Hall and shouted at. They were taken into the Hall, but not given chairs to sit on, and cries of shame were also shouted by the audience.  
 Q. Cries of shame, was that against them ?  
 A. Against them.  
 Q. When the meeting was over and these officers went out again, they were hissed and cries of shame were shouted ?  
 A. After that a crowd marched through the city. They formed a procession and they burnt copies of the Rowlatt Bill outside the Mochi Gate and I heard they cursed the Municipal Commissioners in the town.  
 Q. You went, as we know, to Amritsar ?  
 A. On the 9th of April.

Q. When did you return from Amritsar ?  
 A. I returned on the night of the 9th-10th April.  
 Q. When you returned from Amritsar did you find that all the shops were closed ?  
 A. I returned very late at night; it was at about 2.  
 Q. The next morning ?  
 A. Next morning when I was going to office, I saw that almost all the shops were closed. When I went to office I was ordered to attend the Badshahi Mosque meeting.  
 Q. It was composed of Hindus and Muhammadans ?  
 A. Yes, and I found some *chhabils* in the bazar where Hindus and Muhammadans were taking water together from the same glasses. Then I went to the Badshahi Mosque at 1 P.M. There were Hindus and Mussalmans inside the mosque and inside the door was a piece of draped cloth with a motto in Persian; that motto meant 'The King who practises tyranny cuts his own root underneath.' Ram Bhaj Datt, Mohsin Shah, Taj Din and other leaders were in the mosque.  
 Q. Was a speech made from the pulpit of the mosque ?  
 A. Yes at about 2 P.M. Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din made a speech from the pulpit of the mosque.  
 Q. Was that a political speech ?  
 A. He said the Deputy Commissioner had desired speeches to be made to dissuade people from the *hartal*, but that he told the Deputy Commissioner that neither the police nor the military should come into the city and there should be no military arrangements. Then as far as I remember he read out Gandhi's message from some vernacular newspaper.  
 Q. Were the speakers trying to persuade the people to bring the *Hartal* to an end, or were they encouraging them to continue it ?  
 A. He only said he was asked by the Deputy Commissioner to ask people to stop the *hartal*.  
 Q. Then I think Ram Bhaj Datt also made a speech ?  
 A. Yes, he also spoke from the pulpit. He said something about the occurrences of the 10th April and that the police had fired on the 10th of April at the mob after they had retreated and he said this action was a tyrannical action, and he said kings should not depend on arms but should depend on management.  
 Q. Then did he again refer to what had occurred on the 10th and say that the people only retired when they were fired upon ?  
 A. Yes; he said this was cowardly, they ought to have stood there and died. Then certain chits were written by different people in the audience and these were passed on to the speaker. Those chits were given to Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din and he read them out. They were questions from certain shopkeepers and clerks asking whether they should continue the *hartal* or not and whether they should follow the instructions of Mr. Gandhi and whether orders to the contrary should be disobeyed. On this Choudhri Ram Bhaj Datt said

1 December 1919.]

LALA JIWAN LAL.

{Continued

he was not in a position to give an answer to all these questions. He said a committee would be elected and it would decide about this and he said every one would have to abide by the decision of the committee even if it involved death for them.

Q. Did an aeroplane pass over the mosque?

A. Aeroplanes were passing over the mosque. When an aeroplane passed Chaudhri Ram Bhaj Datt pointed to it and said 'We cannot fight this; God shall have to decide.' Then he gave certain instructions to the school boys and college students. He said that they should not go to their schools and colleges and they should tell their parents that Chaudhri Ram Bhaj Datt had advised them not to do so. At the same time he instructed the audience that no one should go to the Mall Road for five days.

Q. Was there another speaker?

A. After that Maulvi Allah Din spoke from the pulpit. He said what was happening in the city was quite all right but the drawback was that they had not appointed any leader. And he advised that they should appoint a leader and he said that they should try their best to get the dead bodies back.

Q. What name did he give for a leader?

A. He did not suggest a name.

Q. But he advised the appointment of a dictator, he did not suggest a name?

A. No, my-Lord.

Q. Did you understand what he meant by the appointment of a dictator at the time?

A. He meant that one man should be appointed who should carry out all the plans and they should follow him.

Q. While he was speaking did any one shout out anything?

A. One Balwant Singh who was probably a *khalasi* of the Railway Volunteer Corps came in and shouted about the mutiny, and said he had killed some European soldiers. On this there was great excitement among the audience and people shouted 'we are very much delighted, now our armies are coming in.'

Q. Were these shouts of the people heard on the platform?

A. Quite distinctly; they were all near the pulpit.

Q. Did the people who were addressing the crowd take any action when they heard those shouts by the crowd?

A. They were jumping.

Q. How do you mean jumping?

A. They were jumping in delight, they said 'our armies are coming in now.'

Q. But I asked about the people on the platform, the speakers, did they reprove the crowd for that demonstration?

A. There was a great noise there and I could not see what they were doing.

Q. Did you telephone that to the Deputy Inspector-General?

A. Yes, at that time I left the mosque and went to the police post and telephoned to the Deputy Inspector-General that this was happening, and then I returned. It took me about a quarter of an hour.

Q. Who was speaking when you returned?

A. One Mota Singh was speaking from the pulpit and by this time Lala Harkishen Lal, Lala Duni Chand and others had arrived. He said that he did not believe in the Bible saying about turning the other cheek, and as far as I remember his last words were that to bear tyranny was to encourage it. He was followed by Lala Duni Chand who got on to the pulpit and wanted people to elect the committee which Ram Bhaj Datt had already proposed. Then different names were suggested by the audience and a committee was formed.

Q. Who composed the committee?

A. The names of Harkishen Lal, Ram Bhaj Datt, Duni Chand, Dharam Das Suri, Doctor Gopi Chand, Sardar Habibullah, Moshin Shah, Pleader, Doctor Nihal Chand and Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din were shouted out.

Q. Were these gentlemen elected members of the committee then?

A. All of them were not present there though most of them were.

Q. Was anything said about the establishment of *langar*?

A. Duni Chand said that the *kartal* made it necessary to arrange for food and drink for the poor people. After that Harkishen Lal announced a subscription of Rs. 1,000 towards the committee for the *langarkhana*. It was time for prayers so the meeting dispersed.

Q. Was an arrangement made that there should be another meeting?

A. It was announced that another meeting will be held in the same mosque at 8 A.M. the next day and it was also announced that the *kartal* should continue. There were the usual shouts "*Delhi ke Shahidon ki jai*," "*Amritsar ke shahidon ki jai*."

Q. What exactly is the meaning of that?

A. They shouted "*ki jai*" for the martyrs of Delhi and Amritsar.

The audience then formed up in a procession with *lathis* and *dandas* (Bamboo staves and bludgeons).

The people with the *dandas* led. The procession passed through the Hira Mandi to the Gumti Bazar. On the way pictures of Their Majesties the King and Queen on the house of Raghu Nath Sahai were destroyed by the mob.

Q. Did you see that done?

A. I saw that personally.

Q. In what way did the mob do it? Was it done by one member of the mob or was it done by several?

A. I saw about six men who had *dandas* in their hands tear the pictures.

Q. And after this was done what else did the mob do?

A. The mob then pulled down and defaced a sign board of one Fakir Chand, contractor, bearing pictures of their Majesties the King and Queen. They then shouted "King George is dead." I went to the Deputy Superintendent the same evening and reported this orally to him and he reduced it to writing.

Q. I think at the time you did not take written notes at the meeting?

A. No, it was not possible.

Q. Did you investigate the *Danda Fauj* case? What body is called *Danda Fauj*?

A. This is a body organized by one Chanan Din and he recruited certain people and armed them with *lathis*. He himself used to lead them. This was formed on the 11th and I think it all finished on the 12th. Chanan Din used to go about the bazar delivering seditious lectures saying that King George was not their King, that the Amir of Afghanistan and the King of Germany was their King?

Q. Did you hear that stated by them?

A. I did not hear it personally. I found this out through investigation.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Is this the first time that you have made the statement that you made no written report and that your report was recorded by your superior officer. Did you ever make that statement in any of the cases in which you appeared as a witness?

A. I do not exactly remember.

Q. You make this statement before this Committee that you never took any notes and that subsequently you went and made an oral report and that your oral report was recorded by your superior officer. I want to know whether this is the first time you have made this statement or did you make it in the previous cases where you were examined?

A. I am sorry I do not recollect.

Q. Supposing this statement was not made by you on any previous occasion what would be the reason for it?

1 December 1919.]

LALA JIWAN LAL.

[Continued.]

A. I was examined by the court and counsels and had they asked me the question I would have answered it. Probably the question was not asked.

Q. On page 18 you have made a statement. As you made a statement within two hours of what happened you will therefore remember things more correctly than you would now?

A. I am supposed to remember these things. I have to go and inform my officers what I have seen but I am not supposed to tell my officer what I was asked by the court.

Q. You explain that in the statement which you put before the Committee you were asked questions by nobody?

A. I was not asked questions.

Q. You were only asked to put in your statement?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it a fact that the report which you made was not shown to you when you were being examined?

A. It was not shown to me.

Q. May I know as to whether at the time that you were examined as a witness this report formed part of your report?

A. I am not in a position to know it.

Q. In this report there is no mention of destroying the effigies of the King-Emperor and in this report which is now before us there is no mention of Balwant Singh coming. How do you account for that?

A. I think this report is put in by the Defence Counsel and it is not a complete report. If you look up the original report you will find it there.

(A copy of the report\* was handed to the member by Mr. Herbert.)

Q. It appears that compared with your statement in the Conspiracy Case, your statement before this Committee is a little more coloured and has put a different interpretation upon what you heard, because according to the translation that we have been given, it appears to me that what Badr-ul-Islam Ali Khan said was this:—"The next speaker was Maulvi Allah Din of Hoshiarpur who said that what had been done by the people was very good and he admired it but he pointed out one defect which he said was that the whole thing had been done without any organisation and proper guidance. He advised that the people should appoint a leader to guide them." Is that what you stated to your superior officer on that day?

A. Yes.

Q. You were not here on the 10th?

A. No.

Q. At what time did you arrive?

A. At about 2 A.M.

Q. No notice was issued for this Badshahi Mosque meeting?

A. At least I did not see it.

Q. Therefore the very opening words of your report are based on hearsay when you say huge crowds gathered at the Badshahi Mosque at about one on the 11th?

A. Yes, it is not my personal knowledge.

Q. And it is true that when Ram Bhaj Datt and Khalifa Shuja-ud-din came to the meeting they made a statement that had been deputed by the Deputy Commissioner to go to this meeting and use their influence in pacifying the people. Khalifa Shuja-ud-din said so? Did he or did he not?

A. I do not recollect.

Q. I will just read out "After the prayers were over Khalifa Shuja-ud-din spoke on Mahomedan unity" this is what is recorded by your superior officer. You gave that report and that report was reduced to writing. It is a translation of the original? May I understand whether it is correct or incorrect?

A. I think it is quite correct.

Q. He made the following statement "they told the Deputy Commissioner that as the Military and Police were made to fire on peaceful and unarmed people there was a danger of peoples getting excited at the

sight of them again and therefore he added they advised the Deputy Commissioner that in case the military and police were kept away they would undertake to keep the people in order."

That is what you heard and you made that statement to your superior officer?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. "He then read Gandhi's message issued by him at the time of his arrest and advised the people to strictly observe Gandhi's instructions and not to create any sort of disturbance."

A. Yes.

Q. "He was followed by Ch. Ram Bhaj Dutt who referred to the shooting affair of the 10th instant which took place outside Lohari Gate. He said that he was personally present on the spot and delivered a speech persuading the people to disperse and retire to the city but he regretted to say that the military and the police opened fire on the unarmed mob at a time when they were actually retiring. He described the action of the authorities in firing on a peaceful and unarmed crowd as an act of folly and cruelty (actually words used being "nadani aur zulm"). He said that the Government cannot be maintained by armed force but by humanity, justice and moral force and if Germany had fallen, he added she had fallen on account of internal troubles. He further said that the few boys who have been killed were not losses only to their parents but were losses to the whole Indian nation. He did not consider it a time he opened for mourning but they should ponder over their future. He went on to refer again to the shooting incident of 10th instant coming outside Lohari gate and said that when he advised the crowd to retire they did not move and when the firing started they began to flee, which course if they were men they ought not to have taken and got killed there. This may be noted was not consistent with the version of the same affair which he had given in the beginning part of his lecture. He however made it clear that he never meant that the crowd should go creating disturbances and displaying obstinacy. He informed the audience present there saying that the Deputy Commissioner had issued orders against the people collecting together but he said it was the hand of God which has brought this enormous assembly of Hindus and Muhammadans together in a place where they could not be touched by any earthly power." He clearly said and gave out to the audience that they should not create any disturbance?

A. Yes.

Q. "It was really the hand of the Almighty at work in that a complete "Hartal" prevailed without any persuasion from any one. He informed the audience that in the morning when leaving his house on Deputy Commissioner's call he bid good bye to his wife and children as he thought he would not be allowed to return to his house but his wife who was in no way inferior to any political worker advised him to go leaving behind all feelings of anger and revenge and to go calmly in pursuance of Gandhi's advice. He said whatever has happened has happened and they had suffered by they have to see that their present Lieutenant-Governor was entirely a different man as compared to the Governor of Bombay. Pointing out to a military aeroplane which had been hovering round the mosque at the time he said, that they could not stand against the aeroplanes and the machine guns but said that God was just and would judge the right."

The next paragraph goes on to say "after he had finished lots of people asked him questions through written chits. Some clerks of the Government offices enquired if they should attend the offices tomorrow. Certain shop-keepers enquired as to the period of the "Hartal" to be observed and some people asked the course they should take in following passive resistance by disobeying laws of the Government which were against their conscience. Some people also asked what was to be done in future. These question chits were read out by Khalifa Shuja-ud-din and in reply Pandit Ram Bhaj Dutt informed the audience that he was not

1 December 1919.]

LALA JEWAN LAL.

[Continued.]

in a position to give them any advice in the matter but he wanted to establish a Committee which would decide the various matters connected with the movement."

"He exhorted the audience that they should conform to the instructions issued by the *Satyagraha Sabha* of Bombay. He then appealed to the audience to be calm and dissuaded them from any attempt from going to the Upper Mall and Anarkali for the next five days."

A. Yes, that is true.

Q. "He advised the students not to go to the colleges at all and to inform their parents that he had advised them as such. The next speaker was Maulvi Allah Din of Hoshiarpur who said that what had been done by the people was very good and he admired it but he pointed out one defect which he said was that the whole thing had been done without any organization."

Now I want to know why is it that the arrival of Balwant Singh was not mentioned by you in your report when you were giving a chronological statement of facts to your superior officer? That was the whole point in the conspiracy case.

A. Do you think it is possible for me to remember everything? I was giving the whole story and therefore I missed this fact.

Q. And you forgot to mention it?

A. Yes.

Q. And the audience were asked to suggest certain names?

A. Yes.

Q. And it was suggested that many of the names on this committee were largely the names of those who were present at the meeting and that those who were not present might be willing to be on it?

A. It was said that other gentlemen could also be appointed.

Q. According to you, Harkishen Lal at this stage said that the *hartal* would at least continue on the 12th and that at 8 A.M. on the 12th members would meet and decide?

A. Yes.

Q. You say these were the only speeches made inside the mosque?

A. Yes.

Q. The appearance of the Sikh is described in the following words in this statement. I will read it just now. "The appearance of Sikh, name unknown, created further excitement as he went about informing the people that he belonged to a regiment stationed at Lahore and that he had come there to inform the audience that this regiment had mutinied, that they had deserted .....After a certain while the Sikh disappeared and was not to be seen. When the meeting came to a close, the people looked out for him to enquire of his disappearance and as to the correctness of what he had said." Was that report made by you?

A. It was made by me.

Q. You say that you made this report the same evening to your Deputy Superintendent of the Political Branch?

A. Yes, I made that report to Khan Sahib Abdul Aziz.

Q. And that report was made from memory, you had no notes?

A. I had no notes.

Q. Did he take it down?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you make your statement in Urdu or in English?

A. I made it in Urdu.

Q. Did he ask you to sign it?

A. No.

Q. Was it taken down on a piece of paper or in a book?

A. It was taken down on a piece of paper.

Q. Will that piece of paper be in existence now?

A. Only Khan Sahib can say about it, I don't know.

Q. At what time did the meeting disperse?

A. I think it was about 5 P.M., just before the evening prayers.

Q. How far is the telegraph office from this mosque?

A. I think it will be about 2 miles or so.

Q. What will be the time taken by any person for going from the mosque to the telegraph office?

A. It all depends on whether he walks or bikes.

Q. Supposing he has got a carriage?

A. I think it will take about 10 minutes or so.

Q. At what time did Pandit Rambhaji Datt, Harkishen Lal and Pir Taj Din leave the mosque?

A. After the meeting dispersed. I did not see them myself going out of the mosque. They were there till the meeting was closed.

Q. You were there at 5 P.M.?

A. Just before the evening prayers, because it was said towards the close of the meeting that Muhammadans had to say their evening prayers and that they might disperse.

Q. You are quite sure that they were present there up to the time the meeting dispersed?

A. I saw them there when Duni Chand made those announcements about *hartal*.

Q. So far as these names are concerned you gave them from memory?

A. I have already said that there is no written memorandum.

Q. The 10 or 12 names which composed the committee?

A. Yes.

Q. The crowd was about 10 or 15 thousand?

A. It may be more.

Q. They dispersed in different directions?

A. I saw most of them going to Gumti Bazar. Only a few might have gone the other side, but most of the crowd went to the Gumti Bazar side.

Q. Therefore I take it that the crowd of 15 or 20,000 dispersed in different directions, and only 400 people went to the Gumti Bazar side?

A. That was the biggest crowd that went together.

Q. At what time did you make your report to the Senior Superintendent?

A. Just before sunset. After seeing these demonstrations I went straight to the Deputy Superintendent's house.

Q. Where is it?

A. At Gawal Mandi.

Q. How far is it from the mosque?

A. I think it is about one mile or a mile and a quarter.

Q. Did you go on foot?

A. Yes.

Q. And then how long did it take you to give him the details of all that took place?

A. About half an hour.

Q. After half an hour what did you do?

A. Then I came back to my house.

Q. You did not follow the crowd?

A. I followed the crowd from the mosque to the place where the pictures of King George were broken.

Q. Therefore according to you, the pictures were destroyed between 5 and 6?

A. I can't say it was done between 5 and 6.

Q. You reached the Deputy Superintendent of Police's house at 6 o'clock?

A. I said at sunset. The pictures were broken at 5.

Q. In the month of April sunset will be before 6-30? Therefore the destroying of the pictures took place between 5 and 6-30?

A. Something like that.

Q. However 6-30 P.M. would be after you had walked a mile?

A. Something like that.

Q. How far is the Gumti Bazar from the mosque?

A. It is about two furlongs.

Q. You don't know what became of the mob after the occurrence at Gumti Bazar?

A. I could not tell you. I left there. But I heard that it paraded through different streets. I did not see it personally.

1 December 1919.]

LALA JIWAN LAL.

[Continued.]

Q. Therefore you have no personal knowledge as to what the mob did after leaving Gumti Bazar?

A. I did not see anything with my own eyes or where the mob went to.

Q. Just after crossing the Mochi Gate you heard the mob was coming?

A. Yes, but I did not see it personally. It came out of the Gumti Bazar without stopping at any place.

Q. Who was the man who destroyed the pictures?

A. I could not tell you his name. I don't know his name.

Q. I don't want his name, was he a Hindu or a Muhammadan?

A. I could not tell you that even.

Q. How did he destroy the pictures?

A. With a long bamboo sticks and *dandas*. It was not done by one man alone, but there were 6 or 7 men who were breaking the pictures.

Q. In what *mohalla* is the house of Fakir Chand?

A. In the Gumti Bazar, about 10 or 20 yards from the house of Raghunath Sahai.

Q. From Gumti Bazar where did the mob go to?

A. I left the mob there. It went to the Dabbi Bazar side.

Q. Did you meet the *Danda Fauj* between the mosque and Gumti Bazar?

A. No.

Q. That is on the night of the 11th you did not see with your own eyes the *Danda Fauj*?

A. No, I did not.

(At this stage at the instance of Pandit Jagat Narayan the President asked the Government Advocate if he had the original of the report that was made by the witness on the evening of the 11th. The witness replied that Khan Sahib Abdul Aziz took notes of what he (witness) had reported to him in Urdu. The Government Advocate suggested that it might be an English translation.)

*The Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan* :—Therefore may I take it that the translation of the report which the witness made on the evening of the 11th is not available?

*The Government Advocate* :—I don't know whether it is a translation. Possibly it was taken down in English.

*Witness* :—The report was made to Khan Sahib in Urdu.

*The Government Advocate* :—I understand that Khan Sahib made notes and translated them into English. The witness made the report to Khan Sahib in Urdu.

*The Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan* (To the President) :—This cannot have been done. The statement which I have contains a report of the whole situation from the 10th. It cannot be his statement. There are many other things in it. It is quite clear to my mind this is not what I am asking for. I may be wrong, but I am quite certain that this is not a translation of the notes recorded on the evening of the 11th, and therefore I want to know if that translation that was written down by Mr. Abdul Aziz is available, if so, I should be glad to have it.

*The Government Advocate* :—I do not propose to take any action on a request made by an individual member of the Committee unless it comes through the President.

*The President* :—If you have got the original, there is no reason why you should not produce it.

*Witness* :—This contains all the information which I gave to Khan Sahib.

*The President* :—If there is any translation, you can find out.

*By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan*—

Q. Was there any secret organization behind these disorders?

A. Not to my knowledge.

*By Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate*—

Q. You have just proved, Pandit Jiwan Lal, the reports of the speeches that you reported. Among them there is a report of the speeches of a meeting held on the 9th March at Bradlaugh Hall. In connection with that meeting, I just want to put to you one speech in particular by a gentleman named Habib, the late editor of the *Nakash*. This is at page 5 of Ex. 9\* in those printed exhibits. "At that time self-government was promised, but as soon as the danger decreased, the state of affairs got changed." And then at page 6, this is a recommendation by the speaker "they should however adopt such means that all Lahore should be converted into jail." Did you hear this yourself?

A. I heard it myself.

Q. Can you tell us what the usual procedure is about the compilation of these C. I. D. reports in cases in which they are not from a single individual officer but what is called a joint report compiled by the superior officer based on the reports of so many officers reporting. What is the usual procedure?

A. In the political branch all the subordinate officers go to the Deputy Superintendent of Police and report to him all the information in their possession. He then writes out a note himself.

Q. Is there a system of preserving those notes or not?

A. We do not preserve those notes. We have got short-hand writers and typists. The notes are typed and are destroyed then and there.

Q. You were asked a question about Ram Bhaj Datt having addressed a crowd outside the Lohari Gate asking the people to assemble at Shah Almi Gate on the following day. Did you see it at the time or did you read anything about this fact in any newspaper after that?

A. After that I read it in the Urdu paper called "Leader," a local paper of Lahore, and I think I also saw it in another paper. I don't remember if Ram Bhaj Datt made such a speech.

\* Not reproduced.

## ANNEXURE.

### *The Rowlatt Bill agitation.*

#### NEWS OF GANDHI'S ARREST AND A GENERAL "HARTAL" AGAIN.

The matter are taking rapid turn in Lahore and there does not appear to be any change in the general temper of the people. There prevails a general "hartal" in the city again since the evening of 10th instant when the people began to close their shops as soon as the news of Gandhi's arrest spread in the city. It was stated then that the "hartal" would last for Friday, Saturday and Sunday and in consequence there was a heavy rush on the shops all over the city when most of the people purchased provisions to last for the period and the shop-keepers raised the prices and made a good deal of money. The news of Gandhi's arrest went to raise the general excitement to a high level again with the result that two huge crowds consisting mostly of the college students and bazar people moved about for demonstrations, one of which was checked and fired at outside the Lahore Gate and the other at the Mall which was advancing towards the Government House for demonstrations there.

1 December 1919.]

LALA JIWAN LAL.

[Continued.]

## ANNEXURE—contd.

## GATHERING OF HINDUS AND MUHAMMADANS AT THE SHAHI MOSQUE.

The remarkable feature of the day was the rapidly advancing feeling of unity between Hindus and Muhammadans and at the instance of Pt. Ram Bhaj Dat huge crowds of people both Hindus and Muhammadans gathered at the Shahi Mosque at Jumma prayer time at about 1 P.M. on 11th April 1919, the Hindus freely going inside the mosque and taking their seats. The audience is roughly estimated to thirty five thousand, about one third of which is reported to be Hindu shop-keepers, students of various colleges, clerks and other common folk. Sub-Inspector Pt. Jiwan Lal and Sher Muhammad with a selected staff of our men were present in mufti mixed up among the audience. There were a few Sikh women wearing black clothes and carrying Kirpans also present.

Pt. Ram Bhaj Dutt arrived at the mosque at about 1-30 P.M. in company with S. Mohsan Shah, Khalifa Shuja-ud-din and Pir Tajuddin, who, it is said, had been advised by the Deputy Commissioner to use their influence in pacifying the people there and the Jumma prayers were held at about 2 P.M. There was a piece of dark cloth put up on the wall inside the entrance gate bearing the following couplet in Persian by the famous Saadi poet.\*

The real feature of the occasion was that the general arrangements of the mosque were in the hands of the Hindus and a party of dozen of the Hindus armed with *lathies* and officered by one Mani Ram betol leaves seller of Wachhowali, Lahore, were on duty at the entrance gate of the mosque who made every one entering the mosque to take off his shoes. There were several other Hindus who served water to both Hindus and Muhammadans for whom the same tumblers were used. When the Jumma prayers were thus in progress, Hindus remained seated in the mosque. After the prayers were over Khalifa Shujauddin stoop up. He spoke on Hindu Muhammadan unity and then informed the audience that he and others had been summoned by the Deputy Commissioner this morning and asked to assist him in restoring peace in the city. He added that they told the Deputy Commissioner that as the military and police were made to fire on peaceful and unarmed people there was a danger of peoples getting excited at the sight of them again and therefore he added they advised the Deputy Commissioner that in case the military and police were kept away they would undertake to keep the people in order. He then read Gandhi's message issued by him at the time of his arrest and advised the people to strictly observe Gandhi's instructions and not to create any sort of disturbance. He was followed by Ch. Ram Bhaj Dutt who referred to the shooting affair of the 10th instant which took place outside Lahori Gate. He said that he was personally present on the spot and delivered a speech persuading the people to disperse and retire to the city but he regretted to say that the military and the police opened fire on the unarmed mob at a time when they were actually retiring. He described the action of the authorities in firing on a peaceful and unarmed crowd as an act of folly and cruelty (actual words used being "*nadani aur zulm*"). He said that the Government cannot be maintained by armed force but by humanity, justice and moral force and if Germany had fallen, he added, she had fallen on account of internal troubles. He further said that the few boys who have been killed were not losses only to their parents but were losses to the whole Indian nation. He did not consider it a time he opined for mourning but they should ponder over their future. He went on to refer again to the shooting incident of 10th instant evening outside Lahore Gate and said that when he advised the crowd to retire they did not move and when the firing started they began to flee, which course if they were men they ought not to have taken and got killed there. This may be noted was not consistent with the version of the same affair which he had given in the beginning part of his lecture. He however made it clear that he never meant that the crowd should go creating disturbances and displaying obstinacy. He informed the audience present there saying that the Deputy Commissioner had issued orders against the people collecting together but he said it was the hand of God which has brought this enormous assembly of Hindus and Muhammadans together in a place where they could not be touched by any earthly power.

He said that it was really the hand of the Almighty at work in that a complete "*hartal*" prevailed without any persuasion from any one. He informed the audience that in the morning when leaving his house on Deputy Commissioner's call he bid good bye to his wife and children as he thought he would not be allowed to return to his house but his wife who has in no way inferior to any political worker advised him to go leaving behind all feelings of anger and revenge and to go calmly in pursuance of Gandhi's advice. He said whatever has happened has happened and they had suffered but they have to see that their present Lieutenant-Governor was entirely a different man as compared to the Governor of Bombay. Pointing out to a military aeroplane which had been hovering round the mosque at the time he said, that they could not stand against the aeroplanes and the machine guns but said that God was just and would judge the right.

After he had finished lot of people asked him questions through written ohits. Some clerks of the Government offices enquired if they should attend the offices tomorrow. Certain shop-keepers enquired as to the period of the "*hartal*" to be observed and some people asked the course they should take in following passive resistance by disobeying laws of the Government which were against their conscience. Some people also asked what was to be done in future. These question chits were read out by Khalifa Shuja-ud-din and in reply Pt. Ram Bhaj Dutt informed the audience that he was not in a position to give them any advice in the matter but he wanted to establish a Committee which would decide the various matters connected with the movement. He said that they should follow the instruction issued by the Committee when it came into existence and if it wanted them to die they should die. He exhorted the audience that they should conform to the instructions issued by the *Satyagraha Sabha* of Bombay. He then appealed to the audience to be calm and dissuaded them from any attempt from going to the Upper Mall and Anarkali for the next five days. But he advised the students not to go to the colleges at all and to inform their parents that he had advised them as such.

The next speaker was Maulvi Allah Din of Hoshiarpur who said that what had been done by the people was very good and he admired it but he pointed out one defect which he said was that the whole thing had been done without any organization and proper guidance. He advised that the people should appoint a leader to guide them.

At this stage Dharam Dass Suri, Lala Harkishan Lal, Duni Chand and Piyare Mohan also arrived. The next speaker was one Mota Singh Granthi of Patiala State. He exhorted the audience to be resolute in any line of action they decided to follow and said that he did not approve the action of the crowd of 10th instant having fled away when they were fired at but he added they ought to have got killed there. He referred to the Biblical saying of offering the other cheek when one is slapped and said that according to his views to submit to oppression was to encourage it.

## A COMMITTEE IS FORMED.

Lala Duni Chand then stood up and proposed to form the Committee, suggested by Ch. Ram Bhaj Dutt, which he said should be formed at once and asked the audience to suggest such names as the members of the Committee

\* Persian not printed [Engl: a king who lays down the foundation of tyranny cuts his own foundation.]

1 December 1919.]

LALA JIWAN LAL.

[Continued.]

## ANNEXURE—contd.

who might be in a position to render pecuniary assistance also with a view to enable the Committee to supply food to the poor during the period of the 'hartal.' The audience suggested names and a Committee was accordingly formed with following members:—

*Committee formed at Shahi mosque.*

- |                                 |                         |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. Dharam Dass Suri.            | 6. Gokal Chand Naurang. |
| 2. Duni Chand.                  | 7. Lala Harkishan Lal.  |
| 3. Mohsan Shah.                 | 8. Dr. Nihal Chand.     |
| 4. Mota Singh Granthi, Patiala. | 9. Dr. Gopi Chand.      |
| 5. Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din.        | 10. Sardar Habib Ullah. |

It was announced that all the members were not present and therefore if any of them was not willing to accept membership, his name would be struck off. At this stage L. Harkishan Lal announced a donation of Rs. 1,000 and informed the audience that in any case the 'hartal' will continue on 12th instant, when at 8 A.M. the members of the Committee will meet and decide about 'hartal' and other matters. These were the only speeches made inside the mosque and all the speakers stood on Imam's pulpit when addressing the audience. During these proceedings shouts of "Gandhi ki Jai" were often uttered and the appearance of a Sikh, name unknown, dressed in Khaki, who was a young man of about 25, wheat complexion, medium height and build, created further excitement as he went about informing the people that he belonged to a regiment stationed at Lahore Cantonments and that he had come there to inform the audience that his regiment had mutinied that day and deserted after killing a lot of British soldiers. The Sikh disappeared shortly afterwards and was not to be seen when the meeting came to a close and the people looked out for him to enquire further details from him. His disappearance created doubts among the minds of peoples as to the correctness of what he had said.

## A MOB PROCEEDS THROUGH CITY DOING DAMAGE.

The audience dispersed at about 5 P.M. to different directions but a crowd of about four hundred men armed with *lathis* formed into a procession shouting *Gandhi ki Jai, Hindu Musalman ki Jai, Shahidan Delhi ki Jai, Shahidan Amritsar ki Jai and Shahidan Lahore ki Jai* made their way to the city. They were Muhammadans and Hindus and mostly the bazar people and no responsible man accompanied them. On arrival at Gumti bazar the mob noticed pictures of His Majesty the King George and Queen on the balcony of one Raghunath Sahai, Pleader of Lahore opposite the water works reservoir. Some one out of the mob struck the pictures repeatedly with a long bamboo stick which he had with him with the result that the glasses got broken and the pictures completely destroyed. At this time the crowd shouted "Hai Hai George Mar Gaya" (Ah! Ah! George has died). A little further up there was a double storied House of Fakir Chand Contractor on which hung the owner signboard containing also the portraits of Their Majesties the King and Queen painted over it. One of the mob people climbed up and threw the board down when it was trampled down badly by the mob the crowd after passing through Dabbi and Kashmir bazars came to the Mochi Gate where a large number of Muhammadans also joined and thus the crowd grew up to about ten thousand men. The crowd had all sorts of sticks, bamboos and pieces of fuel, wood etc., in hands and were very much in an excited condition. Some of the saner heads in the crowd advised the crowd not to come out of the Mochi gate with result that it turned towards Rang Mahal shouting "Hai Hai George Mar gaya" (Ah! Ah! George is dead) and circulating exciting news on the route such as follows:—

1. At Amritsar the Indian Military forces had mutinied and killed the British soldiers and taken possession of the fort.
2. Similar rising had taken place in Lahore Cantonment killing a lot of British soldiers and going away in large numbers to join hands with the Amritsar rioters.
3. The Indian regiments of Peshawar, Jullundur and Ferozepore had similarly mutinied and that fighting was going on at Peshawar.

Thus this unruly crowd continued on its course through Shah Almi gate, Chauk Mati and finally arrived at water works reservoir where it dispersed at about 11 A.M. on 11th April 1919. The important point in this connection is that the mob did not come out of the city proper, but all sorts of false rumours are afloat and I am told that on 11th instant a Sikh was seen going about in the bazars telling people that the time for forbearance was over and they should rise and out on the telegraph and phone communications and so on.

It would not be out of place to mention here that to assist this lawless and mischievous combination and to continue on the 'hartal' propaganda subscription is being collected throughout the various bazars and quarters in the city on a universal scale and a shop was opened on 11th April 1919 in Machhi Hatta where flour is sold to the poor at the rate of eight seers a rupee strict instructions to the salesman being not to sell any provision to any Government servants and particularly to a policeman even if Rs. 50 were offered for one seer of flour. Besides this free kitchens have been opened one in Landa Bazar, one in Akhri Mandi, one in Sutar Mandi, one outside Shahalmi Gate and one in Anarket where food is being supplied free to the people. Opening of further free kitchens is being arranged in other quarters. To extend the *hartal* to the Government offices a movement is on foot at Lahore and the clerks are being told not to attend the offices and it is reported that at some places writings in Urdu with Chalks have been inscribed on doors and walls as follows:—

"Oh brother do not attend the offices and attend the Shahi Mosque at 8 A.M. on the following morning." This movement was actually at work on the morning of 12th instant and Government employees, clerks, etc., proceeding to their offices were met with other peoples at the city gates and prevailed upon them to return to their houses. A crowd of about 150 Railway Shop labourers passed through Railway Road to city shouting "Hai Hai" saying that the Railway Shops were closed and not one is to go there and another crowd was noticed carrying a bed covered with cloth representing the same as the *cussen* of His Honour.

The Bangalore Seva Nand of the Rama Krishna charitable Dispensary, Lahore, who figured prominently on the 6th instant is reported to have been noticed going about in the city on the afternoon of the 11th instant on a tonga accompanied with a companion in Bhagwa clothes exhorting the people collecting subscriptions and opening free *Langars* in bazars and lanes to feed the poor peoples and proclaimed that all poor people such as labourers, etc., should suspend their work and have free food at the "Langars," and the extent of this movement could be well judged by the fact that on the morning of 11th April 1919 when the employees of the branch post and telegraph office and booking office situated in old Kotwali Chauk Lahore came to work, a crowd of about 500 people of the locality assembled on the spot and stopped them from opening the said offices stopping at the same time a lot of railway people from attending their offices who generally pass that way.



1 December 1919.] LALA JIWAN LAL—concluded—SARDAR AYYA SINGH, Mr. J. A. FERGUSON. [Continued.]

ANNEXURE—concl'd.

In short, there are every indications of the things taking to serious turn on any movement.

I may add in conclusion that the Sikh referred to at A in this report is one Babant Singh, son of Natha Singh, caste Sikh, employed at present as a Khalasi in 1-24th Battalion, Railway Volunteers, Lahore, and in case he is to be arrested a Warrant under Rule 12 A of the Defence of India Rules would be required.

Dated the 12th April 1919.

ABDUL AZIZ

SARDAR AYYA SINGH, Head Booking Clerk, Golden Mosque Booking Office, Lahore.

By the President—

Q. Are you head booking clerk, Golden Mosque Booking Office, Lahore?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you there on the 11th April?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In the evening at about 7 P.M. on the 11th April did some people come and hammer at the doors.

A. They came in the morning at 7 A.M. and hammered at the door.

Q. Who were these men?

A. They were both Hindus and Muhammadans and there were men of other castes also.

Q. Was there anything in their hands?

A. Yes, they had *lathis* in their hands.

Q. Did you make any request to them?

A. I requested them not to hammer at the door and trouble us.

Q. What did they say?

A. They took off all the fare rates and other boards which were fixed on the windows. I again requested them not to do so, and then they came inside the door and one gentleman said that if he does not close the office, "crush him up."

Q. They threatened to crush you up if you did not close the office?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you do then?

A. I thought it better to close as I was unguarded then.

Q. Had you any desire or intention to close the office if these threats had not been used?

A. No.

Q. Was your notice-board pulled down and the notices torn off?

A. Yes.

Mr. J. A. FERGUSON, Registrar, High Court, Lahore.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Ferguson, are you Registrar of the High Court, Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you there on the 11th April?

A. Yes.

Q. At about 11 o'clock did you find that anything had occurred?

A. There was a crowd outside my office and I went out to see them. They told me what difficulties they had in reaching the office.

Q. That was a number of the clerks of the High Court?

A. Yes, about 100.

Q. Were they in an excited state?

A. They were very frightened.

Q. What explanation did they give about the difficulty in reaching the office?

A. They started by telling me that the Accountant-General had permitted all the clerks to go home. I thought it was incredible at the time but they persisted in it. They said their houses would be looted and I tried to cheer them up and Mr. Justice leRossignol who sits next to my office came out. We asked them to give the names of anybody who stopped them when they tried to come to the court and they were frightened to do that.

Q. Did they do any work on that day?

A. We gradually got them into the office and got the work done.

Q. The next day, i.e., the 12th, did they work?

A. The next day I made a point of making a round of all offices first thing in the morning at 10. They had experienced the same difficulties and they said that special arrangement was going to be made for Monday the 14th to stop them. I said if they have not been able to stop them now, they were not likely to do anything more effective on Monday.

Q. Did they say whether they had been able to reach the court by direct route or had they to take a round-about route?

A. Some of them had to go round the back of the city. One man said that he had just been chained into his house.

Q. Was that done by the mob?

A. Of course he could not tell. He found he could not get out of his house in the morning.

Q. Did the High Court go on working as usual during this time?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was there any period in which it did not work in consequence of the riots?

A. No; there is no original work in the High Court, therefore there was no delay in the work. There was no difficulty. Counsel were always there if the clients were not there.

Q. Do you know anything about the other courts besides the High Court?

A. I asked Mr. Prenter, the District Judge, about it and he said that one or two clerks were absent, but he had been able to carry on all right.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. I think you employ about 165 clerks in your office?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 11th and 12th, only one or two of these were absent?

A. Yes.

Q. And throughout this period there were never more than three or four absent?

A. Leaving out one or two men who were allowed to go to Amritsar and could not get out from Amritsar at all during these days, of the Lahore clerks, three or four were absent.

Q. When one of the Judges asked them, they said that they had great difficulty in reaching the court and that people in the city tried to stop them and some of them were to take a solemn affirmation that they were not going to office?

A. Yes.

Q. None of them said that they were beaten or assaulted?

A. I believe the treasurer actually was assaulted. He did not state that to the Tribunal, but I think the treasurer, Jairam Das, was assaulted.

Q. Except the treasurer, nobody made a statement in your presence or to the Judge?

L. December 1919.]

Mr. J. A. FERGUSON—concluded—Mr. GULSHAN RAI.

[Continued.]

A. That is in my department. In other Departments there may be people who were beaten.

Q. They came to you and informed you?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that information given to you by the clerks or did you hear about that?

A. About other departments, I consulted the officers.

Q. That information was given to you by the heads of those departments?

A. Yes, the Punjab Veterinary College and the Buildings and Roads Branch.

Q. Did they really inform you on the 11th and 12th that anyone of those who were preventing them from attending the court said "if you go, we will loot your house" or something like that?

A. No.

Q. Not a single one of them gave any names?

A. No; I could not get the names at all.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Mr. Ferguson, did your servant make any complaint during these days?

A. My bearer who is a *lambardar* of the Ludhiana district of the village of Gulwal said when he tried on the 13th to get food from a shop at the Shahalmi gate, the owner of the shop told him that only those with special manuscript *parchis* were given food from that shop. The owner of the shop asked him who he was. He said "I am a sahib's servant, servant of Mr. Ferguson, living near the jail."— He said that they would not supply food to the servants of sahibs.

I might explain that I gave that statement on solemn affirmation and I put it to the Tribunal, but I was not asked any questions on it. It had been in before the hearing.

Mr. GULSHAN RAI, Vice-Principal of the Sanatan Dharma College, Lahore.

By the President—

Q. Are you Professor in one of the Colleges?

A. I am the Vice-Principal of the Sanatan Dharma College.

Q. In recent years are your students taking more interest in politics than they used to do?

A. That is so.

Q. Is that a matter you encourage or discourage or give the students their own way?

A. I would encourage them if they took an intelligent interest in politics, but I would not encourage if they begin to lose faith in British people.

Q. Laterly have their views been rather extremist?

A. That has been the tendency.

Q. I suppose probably that such University students are people of mature age in India as in every place?

A. That is due to several causes. In the first place, I quite recognize that they live in an atmosphere of idealism and that tends to make them idealists, but on the other hand that is also due to the fact that there were extremist speeches and writings by officials and Europeans as well as Indians, both.

Q. In connection with the riots that occurred from the 10th April onwards what part did your students take so far as you know?

A. So far as my knowledge goes, students did not take any part in the actual violence that was used. It was perhaps the hooligans of the city that took part in these riots, not the students.

Q. There were very serious riots about that time. There is no doubt about that. The rioting was very serious on the 10th and 12th of April in Lahore.

A. Yes; In these riots students were not taking any part.

Q. I understand that. But some students had joined the processions?

A. Some of the students did take part in these processions and demonstrations.

Q. We have been told that some of the students were injured in connection with the firing that took place?

A. I have heard so.

Q. I understand that none of your students had been injured?

A. None of my students.

Q. Were you consulted by the Military authorities in connection with the measures that were adopted with a view to preventing students participating in rioting at the time of Martial Law?

A. Our Principal was consulted by the Martial Law authorities as regards the punishments that were to be given to the students. There was a conference of Principals in Lahore and in that Conference that Martial Law authorities, I understand, told them that they should be punished and punished adequately.

Q. Do you remember, what punishment, if any, was suggested from your school?

A. My principal suggested Rs. 10 security in the case of 53 students and Rs. 20 security from 18 students.

Q. Were these students those that had been active in connection with political agitation or in connection with disturbances?

A. No, My Lord, we took the register, and those whom we found absent on the 11th and 12th were fined.

Q. It is a question of being absent then?

Q. Quite so.

Q. Certain regulations were made by the Military authorities with reference to the students.

A. Yes.

Q. What have you to say as regards these regulations?

A. I understand that on the 15th April two students of the Dayal Singh College wanted to leave the station for outside stations, for their homes probably. They could not get a Railway ticket from the Lahore and no ticket from the Lahore cantonment station. They wanted to go on foot. Perhaps the happenings in Amritsar, Kasur and other places had upset their minds and they wanted to be at their homes as early as possible. But they were arrested between Lahore cantonment and Kot Lakhpat and they were brought to Lahore Fort and interned there for six days. The Military authorities thought that they were probably D. A.-V. College students, in fact they were Dayal Singh College students. The next day Martial Law Order No. 7 was issued to the D. A.-V. College students. It required all the students of the D. A.-V. College to attend roll-call at Bradlaugh Hall four times a day. On the same day Martial Law Order No. 9 was issued. There were some 40 names in that list and one of the houses mentioned in that list was the D. A.-V. College hostel. No other hostel appeared in that list. Then on the 17th all the students of the Sanatan Dharma College were arrested. It was alleged that some notice that was put up at the College hostel premises was torn up, and for that all the male inmates of the hostel were arrested and taken to Fort; they had to carry their beddings on their heads and were taken three miles. I was told by the students whom I examined that they were subjected to very harsh treatment in the Fort. They were very grossly abused. They were taken to the uppermost storey of the Shish Mahal, the audience hall of Ranjit Singh, and they were made to sleep all of them there. Then there was a change of guards after every 4 hours, and they were awakened, and in fact, I understand, that they were not allowed to sleep. I also understand, that there was no arrangement for their meals. When they wanted food, the Military authorities told them that they had received no order, and that nothing could be arranged for them.

Q. I wanted to know with reference generally to the nature of the allegations rather than about particular complaints that were made to you through individual students.

1 December 1919.]

Mr GULSHAR RAI.

[Continued.]

A. That was not the case of any individual student. My Lord, It was the whole lot of students, that were arrested at that moment. I understand that they were also made to remain there while it was raining; all their clothes were drenched, and it was after that they were taken down. Then the next Martial Law Order was No. 6. That was against the Dayal Singh College. There also was prescribed attendance 4 times a day. Then perhaps on the 19th, there was another Martial Law Order against students. That was Martial Law Order No. 17. All the students of D. A. V. College, Sanatan Dharma College and Dayal Singh College were ordered to hand over their bicycles. I might point out that this was very hard on the students. Those were examination days. The University examination was to begin on the 12th of May and all these students were preparing hard for their examinations. During those days they were made to walk about 20 miles for those 4 rolls, calls, and then if they wanted to save some time by using their bicycles, even that conveyance was taken away from them. Usually these Lahore students go into the gardens in the suburbs of Lahore and study there. As they had no bicycles, they could not go to the gardens, and it interfered very much with their studies.

Then on the 20th, I do not know why, the original Martial Law Order No. 9, which was issued on the 16th was revised and all the College hostels and all private hostels in Lahore, about 18 in number, were also put in the list where these posters were to be put up, and the Superintendents of the Boarding Houses were compelled to put these students on guard; and that also interfered with their studies. Then Martial Law Order No. 27 was issued against the Medical College students for their attendance. On the 27th April, of course it is already before the committee, the Principal of the Dayal Singh College was fined Rs. 250. Then there was another order which was very troublesome. That was Martial Law Order No. 30. It was put down that all those who defaced books or illustrations in books were to be held responsible for infringing Martial Laws. Now, this affected mainly little children who attend schools, and little children, of course, do not know how to deal with books and these illustrations. The result was that many parents were obliged to take away those books from students and replace them by new books.

Q. I understand that that has been passed in consequence of certain illustrated papers being marked in a very objectionable way?

A. Quite possible, My Lord, but still it inflicted a very great hardship on the little children. They did not understand very much these things, and the parents, of course, had to place new books in their hands.

Q. How old were the students?

A. The age is not stated, I know as a matter of fact that it was applied to all schools in Lahore. There is no age given in that. It is Martial Law Order No. 30. It was said that all students and all teachers were held responsible.

Q. What is the age of your students?

A. From about 16 to 20 or 21.

Q. Is there any objection to preventing boys and young men from defacing illustrated papers?

A. It all depends upon the intention. If it is done in good way, I would not object.

Q. Do you impute a bad intention to the Military authorities in connection with that?

A. It is very difficult to say whether the intention is bad or good.

Q. You were describing it as bad, and I want to know your reasons?

A. I was just saying that this Martial Law Order put the students to a great amount of difficulty. These were young people who did not understand whether it was objectionable or not. I would refer to one other case. That was that one of our students who was reading in the Second Year Class went to purchase medicine in the bazar, and perhaps he was giving the story of his

internment in the Fort to some of his friends. He was arrested by some Police officer or some officer, and he was interned in jail up to the 10th of June. He was brought before the Court of Summary trial and then let off for want of evidence. He failed to appear for the examination, so he has lost a year. Then on the 13th May, all the Principals were ordered by the Martial Law authorities to furnish to them a list of all the students who had been punished by them together with their parentage, their caste, their villages, *thanas*, etc. I understand specially in Multan division all these students were subjected to espionage, and harassment and trouble. And then, lastly on the 7th of August a notification was issued in the "*Maq* bulletin" wherein it was stated that all those students who had been expelled from the different colleges should be debarred from Government employment. This is how it runs: (The witness read the notification which was in the vernacular.) It is stated there that a certain number of students were punished by the Principals after making necessary enquiries and they were expelled from colleges. Now the Punjab Government orders that if any one of the those students applies for Government employment, he should not be given any post without the special permission of the Government, and that their applications should be forwarded by the officers in charge with their remarks or recommendations to the Punjab Government. This was issued on the 7th August, and it affected some 47 students. My view, as I have stated in my statement, is that these different measures that were taken against these students have embittered their feelings very much, and that has made the situation still worse. In fact, I might just point out that the student population was excited over these questions, the doctrine of self-determination—they had been reading articles in the papers with great interest—then Mr. Montagu's announcement of progressive responsible Government in India, the League of Nations. When their minds were excited over these things they found they were upset by the Rowlatt Act and the speeches of Sir Michael O'Dwyer discouraging any political agitation in the country. Then I might also say that during the Martial Law days, it also confirmed practically what was said by Sir Michael O'Dwyer and the other Anglo-Indian papers, who opposed the grant of any reform scheme to India. For instance, I have noted down one or two passages from the notices that were put up in those days in Lahore. There was a passage in that, which (translated) practically means 'that people should take no interest in politics; it is the rulers who know the secrets of the art of Government; you, Hafiz, should live a life of seclusion and not dabble in politics.'

Q. Who issued that?

A. That was issued by the Publicity Board.

Q. What are the Publicity Board?

A. It is a body appointed by Government. It is intended to remove false impressions and ideas among the people. Then there was another notice which (translated) means:—'These who criticise the opinions of rulers wash their hands in their own blood.' Then, Sir Michael O'Dwyer quoted the verse of a well known English poet:

"For forms of Government let fools contest,  
Whatever is best administered is best."

That was used in one of the budget speeches. And these speeches of Sir Michael O'Dwyer during his regime were read with great interest by the student community. I know, for instance, that in these days students read the *Englishman* a great deal. In some place, the *Englishman* is said to have stated, which was quoted in the *Civil and Military Gazette*, of the 8th April:—"As a leader of the people Mr. Gandhi exerts about as much influence as a weathercock does upon the piety of the congregation inside." The students wanted to show to the authorities that really Mr. Gandhi does not exert that sort of influence by taking part in the demonstration when he was arrested, and they tried to show that that was wrong.

1 December 1919.]

Mr. GULSHAN RAI.

[Continued.]

Q. I think it comes to this; on the one hand you think that students should not take active interest in politics; they seem to have been too much discouraged, on the other hand, and they have begun to distrust the grant of the reforms scheme to Indians?

A. It is not my view that the students should be discouraged from taking interest in politics. On the other hand, in one of my letters to the Vice-Chancellor, I suggested that a course of civics should be introduced in the University. They should be able to follow the discussions properly, but at the same time, I do not think that they should have this feeling produced in their mind, the present feeling of distrust or lack of confidence in the British people. That feeling I wanted to discourage; but that can only be discouraged if they are given proper instruction in civics.

Q. Do you think that these measures have increased the distrust that have arisen in the minds of the people?

A. What I consider is this, that on the one hand, the Anglo-Indian papers, a very large number of officials, the Indian Civil Service Association and the different Chambers of Commerce showed by their attitude that Indians should not get any Reforms; on the other hand, the extremist papers wanted to get too much at once. They were between two fires; and naturally students could not have any moderation in their views.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—*

Q. The question was repeatedly put by the President and you have not answered it; he asked you what were the ages of those children who destroyed their books and who were supplied with fresh books?

A. You mean the infant classes?

Q. That was the question put. What was the age of the children in the different classes?

A. The students leave at the age of 15 or 16 and they enter these schools at the age of 5 or 6.

Q. Do you call the students who are 16 years old children?

A. I do not call them children; what I meant was a portion of the student community.

Q. That is, when the President asked you as to what was the age of these children?

A. Which children?

Q. Those who destroyed their books and were supplied new books by their parents?

A. I think below 8 or 9.

Q. The President repeatedly asked you and you said always 16?

A. I never followed that question.

Q. You referred to regulation No. 30 of Martial Law Orders. It runs thus:—"Whereas it has been proved to me that certain students in Lahore colleges are in the habit of defacing, with obscene and filthy comments pictures appearing in illustrated papers of members of His Majesty's Naval and Military Forces, Civil or other services,

"And whereas such obscene and filthy comments are calculated to promote disaffection and bad feeling and to be prejudicial to good order,

"Now therefore I warn all concerned that it shall be deemed to be contravention of Martial Law for any person to deface or mark any picture or letter-press purporting to represent or refer to British subjects, by signs, drawing or words calculated to bring contempt, ridicule or dislike on such British subjects.

"And such prohibition is also extended to the use of words signs or gestures directed at, addressed or referring to any such British subjects.

"And I shall hold responsible for such outrages on illustrations all who are inmates, owners <sup>and</sup> <sub>or</sub> occupiers, students and teachers, of the premises in which such damaged or defaced picture or literature is discovered."

The question is how did you bring in the small children under this regulation?

A. I would invite your attention to the last paragraph 'I shall hold responsible, etc.'

Q. Here no age is put down for any student?

A. That includes everybody.

Q. Probably under this Martial Law, the onus of proof will be on the children and they would have to prove that they did not draw a line across the nose of this or that picture or did some other thing?

A. Quite so; in fact, in all Lahore schools, this Martial Law order was enforced.

Q. We have been told that 60 students were asked to take their bedding on their head and walk to the Fort; were they compelled to take the bedding or did they themselves take it at their own sweet pleasure when they were ordered to get themselves ready?

A. Only a few days before that one of my senior students had read in a newspaper a report that 500 students in Egypt had been deported. These students thought they were also going to be deported somewhere. They desired to make the necessary preparations, and they were also told that they were to be taken 3 miles off. They naturally thought they were being taken to the Railway Station.

Q. Now it is clear they were not ordered?

A. No.

Q. Have you read the proceedings anywhere of the last meeting of the Senate?

A. It has not reached me as yet.

Q. You know nothing about it?

A. I have heard something about it.

Q. Now, do you know whether, of any of the students that were expelled, one or two subsequently passed the examination and their degrees were withheld?

A. I understand there was one case Ghazan'ar Ali brought before the University 2 or 3 days back; I do not know what speech was made by him in the Robson Hall.

Q. I want to know whether as professor you know that the degree of one of the students that were expelled had been kept back and he was not awarded this degree?

A. I have no definite knowledge about it.

Q. We have been informed they were being kept on the upper storey of the Sish Mahal, where accommodation was limited; in the day time the students were kept inside and during night time made to sleep on the roof. I am not putting the question with reference to the confinement but with reference to the method of treatment of the pupils who were so confined in the Fort.

A. 64 boys were kept during the day and in the night time they slept on the roof. Sish Mahal is a very commodious place and the military authorities if they liked could have kept them in the great quadrangle downstairs, but that was not done; as it was the topmost part of the storey, it was naturally cooler and they were throughout the night shivering with cold.

Q. Did they make any complaint? They were shivering with cold in the month of April?

A. Yes, in the morning there were showers also. They of course did not make any complaint to the authorities; they could not find courage.

Q. I am not clear about your complaint. Leaving the question of their being arrested and kept in confinement, you cannot expect that for the 60 or 100 that were arrested, there would be so many cells and a lot of British Officers to guard them?

A. They could have been as well kept in the lower storey. They could be crowded as well there as upstairs.

Q. Your complaint is that they were sent to the top of the roof?

A. Deliberately.

Q. That is your contention?

A. Yes.

Q. About food and other arrangements, they were completely left in the hands of the students?

A. That is not correct. There were no cooks provided for them. I understood that they felt very hungry; they subscribed some money, and with that collection, about Rs. 10 or so, they asked at about 10:30 or 11 some soldiers to bring them some biscuits and cakes. These were brought out of that money.

Q. Then with regard to this order, that they should not get Government employment; suppose these students

1 December 1919.]

Mr. GULSHAN RAI

[Continued.]

were lightly punished for taking part in these riots and in these seditious meetings; what is your complaint? Why should Government be obliged to give employment to these students who according to them were lightly punished?

A. I would say that these boys are yet in an impressionable age and we should not treat them as if they were hardened criminals; their actions should have been overlooked; instead of overlooking whatever conduct they may have been guilty of, by punishing them we are making them confirmed seditionists even if they were not already so. That was a most ill-advised order.

Q. Was your Sanatan Dharma College one of those buildings which were mentioned in the Martial Law order as subject to Martial Law rules, in the first instance?

A. It was not.

Q. Was this matter represented to the authorities, why they had taken steps against this school?

A. Yes, it was represented.

Q. What was the reply?

A. Perhaps it was on that representation that the boys were released.

Q. Were any books or magazines or papers found in your college in which there was marking or defacing of the members of the Royal family?

A. I was specially asked to go into the hostel and see the books and I did not find any magazine or book defaced in this manner.

Q. Surely you would not encourage boys to make identical remarks about the members of the Royal family?

A. Certainly not.

Q. If, as a matter of fact, any student did actually take part in defying the authorities on the 10th April, do not you think he is liable to punishment?

A. Yes, it would be desirable to punish him.

Q. Supposing there were students in that crowd which intended to go to the Deputy Commissioner's office and they were prevented by the police from proceeding further, would there be any justification for that crowd to throw stones?

A. No, I would not justify it.

Q. Now having regard to what you have said about Sir Michael O'Dwyer's speeches and the state in which the boys were and having regard to what happened during the last 9 or 10 months the reforms and the speeches that were made about these things why do you say that the police were wrong in stopping this crowd from proceeding further?

A. From what I know of the students, I do not think that they would do any mischief; what probably they wanted was this. They had seen for instance the demonstration of last year in honour of the armistice and they had seen people moving on the Mall, a very large number of European people and also soldiers, moving about in a drunken condition. They did not think that was wrong. They probably wanted to make a similar demonstration.

Q. Were you quite sure in your mind that they did not intend any mischief?

A. Certainly not.

*By Major-General Sir George Barrow—*

Q. Did you say that the students on the top were not allowed to sleep?

A. Yes. They were kept awake all night. In fact they were not allowed to sleep. There was a change of guards every 4 hours and there was a fresh awakening of students then.

Q. Is it a great hardship to wake up every 4 hours?

A. A guard while he was patrolling took a dog behind him. It was making all sorts of mischief on the roof. It was catching hold of rugs and sheets and doing such like mischief.

Q. Was that intentional?

A. I do not know. That may be intentional. My contention is they did not sleep and they could not sleep.

Q. Is it a fact that very often in the hot weather people do sleep on the roofs of houses?

A. Yes. The roofs in the fort are not very high.

Q. Do people in Lahore shiver in the hot weather?

A. No, if they have sufficient clothing.

Q. How much clothing do you want on a hot weather night?

A. It was just the beginning of the hot weather; the temperature was not so high.

Q. They were put to hardships because they could not pursue their studies in the garden?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it absolutely necessary to have a garden to work in?

A. So is the habit here in Lahore; the students all study in the open and not in the study rooms.

Q. Can you call it a hardship if they cannot study in a particular garden?

A. They do not get uninterrupted periods of study in their own rooms; they have no single rooms.

Q. It is a great hardship that a student cannot go and study in the garden?

A. It is a question of habit. A man who has a particular habit may find it inconvenient.

Q. Ah! Inconvenient that's the word! It is a very different thing from hardship?

A. I would still maintain that it was felt as a hardship by the students.

Q. It was stated that trouble was given to the students who went to the Multan District? Do you know that as fact or is it hearsay?

A. Certain students who were subjected to this espionage were treated in this way.

Q. In what sort of way did they suffer?

A. Enquiries were made about them; they were followed.

Q. That did not matter to them?

A. I won't like to be followed by a C. I. D. man; that would be very inconvenient to me.

Q. Do all the students who read those speeches take an interest in politics or only a portion of them?

A. Specially senior students take keen interest.

Q. These who go up for examinations?

A. Just a month or two before examination they won't read the papers.

Q. They will be too busy?

A. Yes.

Q. I suppose there are sufficient places in Government for all students who take a degree?

A. There is not.

Q. Some have to suffer the injustice of not being employed by Government?

A. I recognise that.

Q. Why should there be a complaint then if some fail to get employment under Government?

A. When you make a distinction between those who are expelled and others, that is a different matter.

*By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—*

Q. What was the time of the day when the students were marched to the Fort?

A. I should think about 5 P.M.

Q. And they got some food?

A. They purchased some.

Q. How long were they kept in the Fort?

A. They were released at 10.30 the next morning.

Q. Did they have any food in the morning?

A. No.

Q. They didn't have? They were let off in the morning?

A. The Principal got the release order from the Officer Commanding Civil Area, and they were released at 10.30.

Q. They were kept only one night not very long?

A. They had their meals on the 17th at about 8 o'clock in the morning.

Q. They were next day released at 10 o'clock?

A. They were told to march in couples with a difference of some yards between; it took them over 1½ hours to reach their destination; they didn't get their food till 1.30 or 2 next day.

Q. I say they were not confined for 24 hours?

A. No, they were not confined for 24 hours.

1 December 1919.]

Mr. GULSHAN RAI.

[Continued.]

By Mr Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate—

Q. I understand you gave your opinion that it is good for students to study civics in order to get sound notions and you have advocated that in your statement. You have also recommended the same to the Vice-Chancellor. Do I understand you to say that you are of opinion that they should not take active part in current politics at the time they are students? Do you advocate that opinion?

A. I do not advocate the opinion that they should take active part in politics.

Q. So far as your College is concerned, have you taken any steps against the students going to join either a big political demonstration or a big political meeting protesting against particular measures? That is the shape which active part in politics takes here.

A. Personally I would differ from that view. I would not consider that mere attendance at political meetings as spectators is taking active part.

Q. I have not yet asked you about that; if you like you may say later what your views are. What I ask is; in your College whether any steps have been taken to tell students that it was not proper for them to go and join big political demonstrations and attend big political meetings to swell their numbers?

A. We have taken steps.

Q. That is, in what form, by notices or orders?

A. I give you an example. Only the other day, there was a big meeting in the Bradlaugh Hall at which was present Mr. Andrews, and the Principal prohibited the students from attending the meeting.

Q. That is after the Martial Law. I want to know of things that were done before the last disturbances. Was that step ever taken by the Principal?

A. Even before that, notices were always put up on the notice boards and the students were warned not to attend these meetings. I very well remember that students were warned not to attend the meetings of 6th April.

Q. Well, then, I would like to know in this connection whether the College authorities, Principal or yourself did try to ascertain whether that warning was observed or not; whether the students withheld or whether they attended in spite of that warning?

A. I understand that some may have attended in spite of our warning.

Q. Some may have attended in spite of those orders?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you take any kind of disciplinary action against them to see that discipline is observed in the college and that orders are obeyed?

A. Well, Sir, perhaps I may not have understood the question. I would not consider the attendance of students at those meetings as a crime or undesirable, or I might give an example. The municipal laws of the country do not punish drunkenness, if it does not result in nuisance. You don't prohibit drinking. You would consider it undesirable. I would also in the same way not consider the attendance of students at such meetings as an offence to be punished.

Q. What I understand from your answer is that no action was taken against those students as you did not consider that offences had been committed by them?

A. That is my personal view.

Q. That is your personal view but not your Principal's?

A. Yes.

Q. If anybody did disobey there was no harm in it?

A. It was impossible to find out who was to blame for it.

Q. That was your first reason. Now I come to the second reason. The first reason you gave was that there was nothing wrong if they disobeyed?

A. That is my own opinion.

Q. Coming to another part of your written statement for a moment you say that "during recent years students have been led to believe that the professions of Government have very often been at variance with the actual acts of officials." What do you mean by that? By whom had they been led to believe that?

A. Mr. Montagu made an announcement, in the House of Commons, that Indians were to get responsible Government, but big officials of the Government and the head of the Provincial Government made speeches opposing all constitutional reforms.

Q. Then I understand you to say that being led to believe so you mean they were led by the utterances of certain officials or by the utterances of certain non-officials or certain writings in the Press. Do you comprehend all that in that word?

A. I simply mean official utterances.

Q. You are not of opinion that the non-official utterances led them to believe that?

A. I think they should not. That only makes them more idealistic.

Q. That is a different thing. I want to know whether any writings in the press have led them to believe that Government professions are different from the actual acts of officials?

A. They also support that theory.

Q. To what extent do you attribute that?

A. Not mainly; to a very small extent.

Q. You similarly go on to say "They are made to think that Europeans, at least in India, are opposed to all constitutional reforms in the country." Do I take it that you attribute it to official Europeans or utterances of non-officials?

A. Not to official Europeans but to all Europeans for the Europeans in the Chambers of Commerce are not officials.

Q. Including Anglo-Indian papers?

A. Yes.

Q. You have expressed yourself in this connection and also in the previous part of the statement you have criticised some writings of what you call Anglo-Indian papers. May I know whether the Indian papers are not to blame in any way in this respect?

A. Well, they are also to blame in this respect because they put forward certain claims which perhaps it is not practicable to get. So they put them on the one extreme and the Anglo-Indian papers put them on the other extreme.

Q. You say "the result is that they have lost faith in British justice, British ideas of impartiality, in the *bona fides* of officials, and in the intellectual and moral superiority of Europeans." So far as you are concerned, will you tell me whether you retain your faith?

A. I do.

Q. And so far as your students are concerned can you say whether they do retain it or whether they have gone with the majority?

A. It has considerably shaken their faith.

Q. Not only the students of your College alone?

A. It has shaken the faith of students in general.

Q. In your College have you done anything with regard to it?

A. I have always been doing so in my lectures.

Q. Does that have a good effect? Is it welcomed by the students?

A. Well those who are sensible students they of course believe while others sometimes call me a toady.

Q. Coming now to Order 30 to which you have made a reference. You refer to it expressing (last paragraph) that it was applicable to young men of all ages, say to children and boys of infant classes. Are you prepared to say that? You are not only a professor but you have been a practising lawyer?

A. I have been practising law for 8 or 9 years.

Q. Are you entitled to read it as divested from the context? Did the order refer to Colleges alone or to the inmates of the schools as well?

A. I would not suppose that all the heads of institutions are lawyers. This order was enforced in the case of infants as well.

Q. I want to know whether this order refers to Colleges alone or to Schools as well?

A. Colleges alone.

1 December 1919.]

Mr. GURJAN RAI—~~continued~~—Pandit K. N. AGNIHOTRI.

Q. What do you mean when you say that children in Schools were put to a great deal of trouble on account of this order?

A. In fact I have 5 or 6 little boys under my charge. I was made to buy new books for them.

Q. To buy new books for them?

A. Yes.

Q. May I know in this connection how long have you been in the Educational line?

A. For about 2½ years.

Q. Now coming to this affair of the Fort, has it come to your notice or have you read the evidence that was given by the Officer Commanding the Fort with regard to this question of supply of food, etc., inside the Fort?

A. I was present here in this Hall.

Q. And you mean to say that you would sooner believe what had been said to you by your students rather than what has been said by the Officer Commanding?

A. I know my students and I have faith in them. I would believe them more than him whom I do not know.

Q. Now with regard to this matter you say that on the roof they were shivering with cold. They were treated with great hardship. In part of your own statement you have said that when they went to the Fort they had heavy beddings with them?

A. I have never used the expression "heavy."

Q. I think somebody did?

A. I don't know.

Q. Some rugs and sheets they took?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think they would shiver in spite of the rugs and sheets they had? Do you contest or support that?

A. I don't know whether you have followed me. I did not say that each and every one of them took his own bedding. A large majority of them did but even those rugs were not sufficient for them.

Pandit K. N. AGNIHOTRI, Proprietor, "The Capital Sports Works," Lahore.

By the President—

Q. You belong to the Capital Sports Works?

A. Yes.

Q. You are the Manager?

A. I am the Proprietor.

Q. Well you had a complaint to make in connection with a request to contribute to the War Relief Fund?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What was that complaint?

A. In those days the War Relief Fund was being raised. We raised a certain amount of money and remitted to the Government. When I reached my shop in the evening a deputation consisting of about six persons, whom I have named in my written statement, were waiting for me. One was Khan Sahib; one was *qanungo* in the Income-Tax Department; two or three merchants and one peon of the Tahsildar. They wanted me to subscribe. I told them that I had already done so. Thereupon they threatened me and told me that my name would be noted down and that I would be compelled to pay the subscription. They did not believe my word at all. This troubled me greatly because I had given them my word of honour but they would not listen to it. They threatened me by noting down my name and the next day or the day after a chit was sent to me by the Tahsildar to present myself before him but I did not go. There the matter ended. My income-tax was thereafter doubled.

Q. Many people might have suffered during those days. What I want to know is did you complain that you had been made to pay more income-tax than was due from you?

A. I did lodge my appeal but it was dismissed.

Q. Who heard it?

A. The Commissioner.

Q. I suppose it was dismissed on the grounds that you were in fact earning more than you did before?

A. Yes. I did not fill up the form promulgated by the Income-Tax Department and submit in detail my income on a paper. Simply because I did not do this on a proper form, my appeal was dismissed. I did give information of every item that I earned.

Q. What justification had you to say that the Income-Tax authorities were liable because you did not subscribe to the War Relief Fund?

A. I had an occasion to go to the Revenue Officer. The same *Qanungo* was there. He alluded to that matter just in my face, saying "You have come now to ask for this thing. Don't you remember about the subscription towards the War Relief Fund?" That of course made me to think that they still had that matter in their mind.

Q. Did you put that before the Commissioner?

A. No, because it was not relevant. I had not filled up the prescribed form.

Q. Who is this man *kanungo*? Who is he?

A. A *kanungo* is an officer above a *Patwari*.

Q. What is his name?

A. I think I should not tell his name.

Q. You are quite entitled not to tell us. We cannot press you, but we would like to know his name?

A. His name is Haveli Ram.

Q. Where does he reside?

A. He was in the Income-Tax Department previously and was transferred to the Revenue Department.

Q. Had he anything to do with the fixing of the Income-tax?

A. He was in the Income-Tax Department. Generally the *Peshkars* did the whole thing. We had to go to them and they would do anything they liked.

Q. Do you of your own knowledge know of any other case where there was an increase in the income-tax in respect of failure to subscribe to the War Fund?

A. I do not know of my own knowledge, but I heard my neighbours and others complaining that they were called by the Tahsildar very often and many times they had to go and come back. Thus they were worried.

Q. You mean they were worried. People were worried in Scotland on similar occasions. Do you think that as in a crisis of unrest they were asked to subscribe they were worried?

A. I think they ought not to have so worried us. I did contribute towards the Fund. If I had to do it I would do it of my own accord. However trivial the matter may be, if I am compelled to do it, I would look upon it as a great contempt.

Q. About the occurrences themselves in Lahore did you see any of them? Which of them did you see?

A. On the 10th I saw a mob coming from the Anarkali Bazar, I saw lots of people being flogged.

Q. About the first incident, you saw the mob coming. What time was it then?

A. It was evening.

Q. Where was that mob going?

A. I saw them coming from the Lohari Gate and through the Anarkali Bazar they were proceeding to the Mall. I saw this mob and then I went to my house.

Q. You did not see what the mob was doing?

A. They were only going and they had no *lathis* in their hands. I saw them going.

Q. They had no sticks in their hands?

A. At the time I saw them they had no sticks in their hands.

Q. Possibly it was a well regulated crowd. Perhaps they were going to make a representation to the Commissioner?

A. There were a number of people there.

Q. Were they excited?

A. They seemed to be slightly excited by the arrest of the leaders.

Q. Were they shouting?

A. No.

Q. What did you hear them say? Can't you recollect hearing them say anything?

1 December 1919.]

Pandit K. N. AGNIHOTRI.

[Continued.]

A. No, I cannot recollect anything.

Q. What was the object of the mob?

A. I cannot say anything. I saw them and then I retired to my house.

Q. You did not see anything that occurred on the 12th?

A. No, Sir.

Q. I think you had a complaint to make in connection with the Martial Law Regulations as regards your making a return of wheat?

A. Regarding wheat, yes, Sir.

Q. That was an obligation imposed upon every one on account of the situation?

A. Yes, Sir. The notification was not very clear. I thought it dealt with grain-dealers who had withheld wheat. Further on it affected all individuals. We were not withholding wheat from selling it to the public but we had it for our own use. I thought that order was not intended for individual persons. I had also to report the amount of grain I held explaining the cause of my delay. I was called at the Punjab Club and was made to stand between two European soldiers with fixed bayonets. That was simply a very painful scene.

Q. You stood between the soldiers in the Court?

A. I stood outside.

Q. Did the trial take place?

A. I was in the verandah.

Q. You were not handcuffed?

A. No.

Q. Your objection is as regards the neighbourhood of these European soldiers?

A. Yes, my objection is as to the way in which I was placed between the two soldiers which looked as if I had committed a great crime.

Q. In the Martial Law days was it not customary to place people between two soldiers?

A. That was the very offensive way. I had European friends there but I was placed in a position as if I had committed a very serious offence. As soon as I was released people said to me "Have you done anything seditious or committed any offence?" My reputation was spoiled at that time and my European friends, I noticed, would not like to look upon me as if I had committed a great crime.

Q. Your reputation was restored as soon as you were released. You were only fined Rs. 50, I believe?

A. At that time my relatives had become most anxious and other people were looking upon me as if I had committed a very serious offence. Whatever has passed cannot be brought back.

Q. You saw some cases of flogging? Where did that flogging take place?

A. Just in the Market Square.

Q. On what date?

A. It was 16th or 17th. I saw firing twice.

Q. Did it occur twice?

A. Yes. Two men were killed.

Q. You were unfortunate in seeing two incidents?

A. Yes.

Q. Personally you are of opinion that flogging should not have taken place in public at all?

A. Particularly not in civilised nation.

Q. Therefore you think it was regrettable that during the administration of Martial Law these floggings should have taken place in public?

A. Yes. My point is also another. They were perfectly ignorant people. They did not understand the meaning of Martial Law. There were strangers as well who had never heard about Martial Law. They did not know what they were being flogged for.

Q. How did you know that?

A. Because I was present there near the triangle.

Q. Did you hear them tried?

A. There was no trial. They were brought and given 20 or 15 canes.

Q. Who was the Magistrate?

A. I think Mr. Keough was the Magistrate.

Q. Some evidence was taken?

A. No evidence.

Q. We have been told if evidence was given before the Magistrate that one had a reasonable excuse for the ignorance of this order he was not flogged?

A. I witnessed the whole affair. There was absolutely no evidence, no explanation; none whatsoever. They were brought there in my presence and had their chance with 15 or 20 canes and like orders were given and they were at once put up on the triangle.

Q. Where were they tried?

A. Just near the triangle.

Q. Were they not tried in the Court house?

A. I don't know.

Q. You are not aware that these men were tried in the Court house?

A. I am not aware of that.

Q. They might have been tried?

A. Yes. They might have been.

Q. Simply at the place where the triangle was put up and where the flogging took place you say what happened was that an indication was given to the person?

A. The order was announced then and there.

Q. They might have been tried by the Magistrate?

A. At the Square. Then the order was announced. I also saw another man who was very old. He went to offer his *namaz* in the mosque. From his statement I knew that he was telling the truth.

Q. Was he flogged?

A. No. He was fined. The order was announced in my presence. As he had gone to say his *namaz*, therefore he was fined. First of all he was going to be flogged. I think his old age was considered, therefore he was fined.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Do you remember the date on which you were pressed by the *kanungo* to contribute towards the War Loan?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Do you remember it approximately?

A. No, Sir. I can refer to my records and then can say.

Q. You have not got them here?

A. No.

Q. In 1915, 1916 or 1917 or 1918. Have you any idea at all?

A. I cannot name the year. It was exactly just near the end of the War.

Q. That was probably at the time of the Armistice, i.e., November 1918?

A. It may be a matter of 1917 or 1916. I cannot say.

Q. At that time how much income-tax were you paying?

A. I used to pay Rs. 104.

Q. That was an assessment on what figure?

A. On no figure at all. They did not take into consideration my income. They assessed it automatically.

Q. You used to send in a return and they used to assess you on the figure contained therein? Was that they used to do?

A. Yes.

Q. From the time you had been pressed to subscribe to the War Loan, did you make out a return? What was the amount of your income?

A. Over Rs. 3,000.

Q. What was the amount you said you should be assessed upon?

A. Rs. 3,000.

Q. According to your own return what amount of income-tax was due from you?

A. I don't know.

Q. You put down your income as Rs. 3,000?

A. Between Rs. 3,000 and Rs. 4,000.

Q. That year what happened that they assessed you at a larger figure?

A. At about Rs. 9,000.

Q. Now do you remember how long it was before you got that assessment? How long before had this conversation about the War Loan taken place?



1 December 1919.]

Pandit K. N. AGNIHOTRI.

[Continued.]

A. I don't remember.

Q. You remember in what year you were assessed upon this Rs. 9,000 ?

A. It was last year.

Q. That is to say in 1919 or in 1918 ?

A. You mean the last amount I paid.

Q. You must know what time the last amount was paid ?

A. I think it was 1918-19.

Q. Last assessment was in 1918 ?

A. Yes.

Q. 1919 would not be in this year ?

A. Last year's assessment has not yet taken place. They count two years like 1917-18.

Q. When you were put up in 1917 did you appeal on that occasion ?

A. Yes.

Q. You say that your appeal was dismissed because it was not on a proper form ?

A. Yes.

Q. About the following year did you raise the question again ?

A. This year ?

Q. Now it is for 1918. Did you raise the question again ?

A. This year it would be 1918-19.

Q. Did you appeal on that occasion ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you say that appeal was dismissed because it was not in proper form ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. The following year did you raise the question again ?

A. This is the next year ; we are now at the end of 1919.

Q. Did you raise the question again ?

A. That is calculated for two years ; it will come afterwards.

Q. You have not been assessed because you say it is two years at a time.

A. I have not been assessed up to this time.

Q. When you put in your appeal and it was turned down on a question of form did you take any steps to bring to the notice of the authorities the fact that you thought your contributions to the war loan were being used as a reason improperly to raise your assessment ?

A. I did not know whom to put this petition to.

Q. You know who is above a *kanungo* ?

A. Yes.

Q. You know who is above a *Tahsildar*.

A. Yes.

Q. You know all about the Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner ?

A. Yes, but I did not know whether my petition would be of any avail or not, and at the same time whether it would be legal or not.

Q. But can you not complain to the Deputy Commissioner or the Commissioner, if you think some underling of his has been using *zulm* towards you ?

A. Some things I will bear and some things I will appeal against.

Q. When you made this complaint referred to in your statement had you sent it in to any one else ?

A. My friends knew it.

Q. Had you, until you sent this in to us, made any complaint to any one ?

A. No, not to the officers.

Q. When you saw this mob on the 10th of April what was the mob like in Lahore ?

A. At that time the mob consisted of young men and middle aged people also.

Q. And what were they doing ?

A. They had a flag in their hands and they were going to the Mall.

Q. When you saw them was there anybody preventing them from going ?

A. No.

Q. And how many were they when you saw them ?

A. I think about 500.

Q. Were they singing anything or shouting anything ?

A. No.

Q. Were they marching all over the roadway or marching four abreast or how ?

A. I saw them in front of the Punjab National Bank ; a hundred yards from the turning which goes to Nila Gumbaz.

Q. You saw them only for a short distance ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they making noises ?

A. There was some noise.

Q. Could you tell what the crowd was shouting about ?

A. They were shouting that Gandhi had been arrested.

Q. Did you gather from them or from anything they said where they were going, or why, because Mr. Gandhi had been arrested, they were going to the Mall ?

A. No I did not hear.

Q. Had they any sticks ?

A. No.

Q. How many flags had they ?

A. One.

Q. What sort of a flag ?

A. A black flag.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. You say in your statement after the second *hartal* you had been in the city and to your utter surprise and astonishment you found that the people were perfectly peaceful ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Why should you be surprised to find the people in Lahore peaceful ?

A. I saw the people were going about their ordinary business ; nobody molested anybody.

Q. Why should they not be peaceful ; are they not ordinarily peaceful ?

A. Yes ; ordinarily peaceful ; I was quite surprised to see the scene.

Q. Why were you surprised ?

A. Because we heard the officials were so much perplexed, but the situation was peaceful and there was no disorder at all.

Q. Then you thought it was natural for a serious situation to arise ?

A. Whatever it was, only the whole bazar was closed, and there was no violence.

Q. And you were surprised that there was no violence ?

A. Yes.

Q. You expected that there should be ?

A. From the reports that we heard that the whole police and others were paralysed.

Q. You say for a few days you were utterly surprised and astonished that the people were perfectly peaceful, why ?

A. Surprise after the reports we heard. We thought the situation must be very serious, but when I went into the city I saw the situation was peaceful.

Q. You say the students of the college were being marched to the Fort with heavy beddings on their shoulders. We were told by the Officer Commanding that they took only light beddings.

A. When they are walking three miles.

Q. I did not ask about the distance, I was talking of the weight. You said they were heavy beddings ?

A. I thought they were heavy ; it all depends on the distance you go.

Q. The Officer Commanding said they were light beddings and you say they were heavy to us ?

A. You may call them light then.

By Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate—

Q. You speak about this flogging at the Market Square. Your shop is situated at some distance from the Market Square ?

A. Yes.

Q. What distance, may I know ?

A. About 200 yards from the Market Square.

Q. Well then did you go to this place on hearing that flogging was going to take place there ?

1 December 1919.

Pandit K. N. AGNIHOTRI—concluded—Mr. RAHMAT ILAHI.

A. On the first day of course I was informed. People were going there and they told me the flogging is going to take place and I went. The second day I was coming to my shop and I saw that.

Q. It did not occur to you that it would be shocking to see flogging?

A. I never saw it before in my life. I never thought it would be so shocking.

Q. So you went to that shocking scene yourself?

A. I wanted to see whether it was shocking or not because I never saw that punishment in my life before.

**Mr. RAHMAT ILAHI B.A., LL.B., Pleader, Lahore.**

*By the President—*

Q. You would like to make a statement?

A. My report about grain returns reached the Commanding Officer some 5 hours late and he ordered me to be present at 8 o'clock. I went there at the appointed time and I had to wait there till 5 o'clock in the evening and had to sit in my tonga for the whole day while it was raining. At 5 o'clock I was called by the Officer and two guards with arms were alongside and I was brought before the Officer, and without hearing anything he fined me Rs. 20.

Q. For what?

A. For speaking the truth, because I had sent up the return late because I was under the impression that that order was made for the dealers in wheat only and I was not meant to send any information to the Officer.

Q. What were you doing at the time; what was your business?

A. My business with respect to what?

Q. What is your profession?

A. I am a Pleader.

Q. Were you asked to make a statement in connection with your case?

A. Yes.

Q. And you made a statement?

A. I sent up a statement in writing.

Q. To the officer?

A. To the officer here.

Q. And your complaint is that you were fined?

A. I was made to sit and wait the whole day. In the first instance I thought the order did not apply to any other person than the dealers in wheat because it began with the dealers in wheat; but in the last portion of it it was stated 'or any other person.' When I came to know that it applied to each and every body then of course I sent up information but it reached late.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—*

Q. The order under which you were troubled was I think Order No. 34?

A. Yes.

Q. It begins 'Whereas I have trustworthy information that certain dealers in wheat in the area under my command are avoiding Martial Law No. 32.'

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And it goes on to say 'Every trader, banker, bunnia, or other person in the said Area who owns or possesses wheat exceeding 5 maunds in weight'—that is the phrase you are referring to?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you have a copy of this Order individually sent to you, or did you simply see it?

A. I simply saw this Order pasted on the walls.

Q. Now tell me, the return was to be sent in apparently by about 9 o'clock on the morning of the 7th May, according to this Proclamation. It was published on the 5th of May and the return was to be sent in on the morning of the 7th? And how late were you?

A. My information reached the Officer at 3 o'clock in the evening of the 7th.

Q. And when had you come to know that you were included, though you were not a dealer?

A. I came to know on the evening of the 6th. I wrote a letter and through the mistake of my Munshi it was posted. He did not take it personally to the office but posted it and on this account it reached late.

Q. Then you were summoned to go where, somewhere outside the Punjab Club?

A. I was summoned to the Punjab Club.

Q. What day was that when you went to the Punjab Club, how long after the 7th?

A. I was called, I think, two days after this.

Q. And you were summoned for what hour in the day?

A. I was summoned to be present there I think at 8 o'clock in the morning.

Q. And you say they did not reach your case till 5?

A. Till 5 in the evening.

Q. Was there an officer sitting there hearing cases all the time?

A. An officer was there; I do not know whether he was hearing cases.

Q. Did you see a lot of people there?

A. There were not so many people on that day because it was raining. On other days when there was no rain there were other people who applied for certain things, say for passports or railway tickets; there were not many people that day.

Q. Did you go up to the officer and ask to know what was wanted with you? What steps did you take to get your matter attended to?

A. I tried to send in information through a sentry who was standing outside there. Of course he did not take much heed of myself.

Q. But you were summoned to go and see somebody, whom were you summoned by?

A. By the officer in command there.

Q. Colonel Johnson himself?

A. Yes.

Q. And when you got there did you give somebody your name and say 'here I am ready'?

A. More than once I gave my name to the sentry there.

Q. And as far as you could see Colonel Johnson was there?

A. I could not see.

Q. Did you see anybody doing business there?

A. There were many officers coming and going from there.

Q. You are a pleader and would be able to know what was going on. As far as you saw what were the facts? It may perfectly well be that Colonel Johnson was there all the morning dealing with as many cases as he could?

A. I do not think he was doing many cases; he may have been doing certain other work. My case was also not tried by him.

Q. Who tried your case?

A. I think Major Barnes.

Q. Was Major Barnes there all that day?

A. I think he was there from early morning.

Q. Was he for anything you know busy trying cases all day long, doing work all day long?

A. I think I was made to sit there purposely.

Q. Did you see a lot of other people sitting there for a great many hours?

A. There were only two of us I and Mul Chand's son.

Q. You went in before Major Barnes and told him of your excuse and he did not accept it?

A. That I was under the *bona fide* belief that the Order did not refer to me.

Q. And he fined you Rs 20?

A. Yes.

Q. You did not have to go again? That was on one day?

A. I attended only for one full day.

Q. How many maunds of wheat in fact did you put in your return?

1 December 1919.]

Mr. RAHMAT ILAHI.

[Continued.]

A. I was in possession of some 10 maunds; only 5 maunds more than the amount allowed.

Q. You had not a large stock of wheat?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Who was Mul Chand's son?

A. He was also fined Rs. 20. He is the son of the great merchant of Lahore. Mul Chand was called for and he was sick, therefore his son attended the court and he was also fined Rs. 20.

Q. Why was he fined?

A. He was fined for not sending in a return of wheat. His father was sick and he said he was busy with his treatment.

Q. And why were you troubled, because you are a pleader?

A. Yes, I was a pleader and therefore I was made to sit for the whole of the day.

Q. In what state were the people there?

A. The pleaders?

Q. No the citizens of Lahore?

A. They were very much frightened and in a bad plight.

Q. Would they dare to complain and to file appeals and do things which could be done in ordinary days?

A. They could not do anything at all. They could not even come near the camps.

Q. Would they dare to enforce their demands on any of these area officers or people trying these cases?

A. Not in the least.

Q. Could they complain during those days safely against any of the subordinate officers for anything done by them?

A. I think not.

Q. And in your opinion there was an absolute reign of terror?

A. I think so.

Q. So in the opinion of the citizens of Lahore their lives and liberties were not safe, however high they might be?

A. I think it was not safe.

Q. However that was a general feeling, whether it is true or not?

A. The general feeling.

Q. Now do you know how many people were arrested and not brought to trial amongst your friends or neighbours?

A. I cannot give you the exact number.

Q. I do not want the exact number; I want to know of those with whom you were acquainted, those who were arrested and not tried?

A. I remember from amongst my neighbours some three persons.

Q. How many days were they kept in custody?

A. For more than 10 days.

Q. Can you give me their names?

A. One of them was Niruddin, father of Ferozedin, who was convicted for 10 days.

Q. Was it because Ferozedin was arrested in the riot at Hiramandi?

A. In that *Danda Fauj* riot.

Q. Therefore his father was also arrested?

A. He was also arrested.

Q. And how many days was he kept in custody?

A. I think for more than 10 days.

Q. And no trial was held?

A. He was discharged, I think.

Q. Was any bail granted to him?

A. No.

Q. The other two, can you give me their names?

A. I cannot recollect at the present moment.

Q. What were their offences?

A. Their offences were not known to anybody.

Q. Has the offence of Niruddin been known to you?

A. No.

Q. Or any of the neighbours?

A. No. I think I remember now one more name, Seth Ram Pershad.

Q. He is your neighbour?

A. Yes. He is a man who subscribed a lakh of rupees to the Government for war bonds.

Q. And what was his offence?

A. His offence is as yet unknown exactly, but they say he was arrested for this *langar* business, that he had started some *langar* for charitable purposes.

Q. That he had subscribed to charitable *langars*, that was his offence?

A. That was his offence.

Q. How many days did he remain in jail?

A. I cannot give you the exact number, probably more than 10 days.

Q. And having regard to his status, to what extent could he offer bail?

A. I think he could offer two lakhs; as many lakhs as the Government wanted; he is up to anything.

Q. And the third man do you remember now?

A. I do not remember.

Q. And how many days was he kept in custody?

A. I think the same number of days, more than 10 days.

Q. And do you know for what offence?

A. I think an offence of a similar sort, subscribing towards *langars*.

By the President—

Q. How did you know the offence with which these gentlemen were charged was subscribing to *langars*?

A. Because people had been talking.

Q. It is only from talk? You have no personal knowledge, you did not hear the case tried against them?

A. No personal knowledge; the case was never tried.

Q. And you have not seen the gentlemen themselves personally about it?

A. I have seen them.

# Minutes of Evidence, Kasur

At Lahore, Tuesday, the 2nd December 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., L.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., L.P., *Secretary*.

Mr. P. MARSDEN, L.C.S., Sub-Divisional Officer, Kasur.

*By the President—*

Q. You are Sub-Divisional Officer at Kasur ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You took charge apparently on the 15th of April ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Martial Law was proclaimed on the 16th ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You do not know what had occurred prior to the 15th ?

A. I had not been in Kasur—I had been in the Punjab.

Q. I see you gave a report dealing with the predisposing causes in their chronological sequence. Is that simply based upon information that you received ?

A. As soon as I arrived I thoroughly investigated the causes after seeing the accused and the people concerned and I think this is the only real connected narrative that anybody had produced taken from the actual accused themselves.

Q. As a result of these investigations you formed an opinion as to the predisposing cause of the riot ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Putting it briefly what was your view as to predisposing causes ?

A. Well I found that Kasur was inclined to be a very disloyal place and ready for any riot of that sort. I thought that the legal profession had behaved very badly and took no trouble whatever to inform the people of what the Rowlatt Act was. In fact they excited them to be more troublesome. Then there was considerable outside pressure put on Kasur. First of all it did not have an *hartal*.

Q. They did not have a *hartal* on the 30th March or 6th April ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Do you think that Amritsar and Lahore had anything to do with bringing pressure to bear ?

A. There was actual proof of documents from Amritsar and it was rumoured that places like Delhi, Karachi and Bombay had been exercising pressure.

Q. The pressure exercised was to get Kasur to form into line with the passive resistance movement ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. It is only in that sense you refer to pressure ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You do not suggest that there was pressure from any of these towns instigating the populace in Kasur to rise against the King-Emperor ?

A. I think there was pressure of that sort at Patti. There was a regular system by which lectures used to be given to excite the people. One lecturer Durga Das who was an *Arya Samajist* and also another man called a Swami came and told the people that, although they should obey the King, they should have no compunction in disobeying his servants.

Q. How far is Patti from Kasur ?

A. 28 miles.

Q. On what day was the *hartal* in Kasur ?

A. There was one on the 11th and then on the 12th.

Q. I think you refer to a crowd being led by Nadir Ali Shah ? Who is he ?

A. I think he was a shopkeeper.

Q. I think he was tried and convicted and sentenced to death. He has since been executed ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. This crowd led by Nadir Ali Shah went round the city insisting on shops and places of business being closed ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On the following day a general *hartal* was again observed and some crowds paraded the city closing places of business and schools. Did you find out what method was adopted by the crowd to ensure the closing of shops ?

A. They went round and just insisted on the shops being closed. If people refused they were forced to do so. There was an Honorary Magistrate who was stopped in the street and forced to take his *pagri* off and then he was afraid so he shut his own shop. There were other cases like that. There were two men who had a soda-water factory and the crowd swarmed in and forcibly closed the doors.

Q. On that day did the school boys take a conspicuous part in what was happening ?

A. I think most of the school boys from the two schools joined in and one school boy was first of all sentenced to be hanged and then it was commuted to 7 years.

Q. How old was he ?

A. Seventeen.

Q. Did these school boys who were taking part appreciate the serious nature of the movement ?

A. It was merely the atmosphere of excitement that their leaders created.

Q. On the 12th were there outside people among the agitators ?

A. Yes, Sir ; apparently there were about half a dozen outsiders helping to lead them. One informer who gave evidence mentioned three outsiders and he gave a detailed description, but we could not lay hands on them afterwards.

Q. On that day I think the mob had a black flag carried in front ?

A. They had a black flag laid over a *charpoy*. These were the emblems of mourning.

Q. And about 9-45 A.M. the crowd made its way to the railway station ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. It was headed by Nadir Shah to whom you have already referred ?

A. Yes. The crowd was in a state of excitement. Nadir Shah made a speech and said that this is our last chance—we must remove the knife which is at our throats. Then everybody wailed and moaned and beat their breasts which is the same as a mourning ceremony in India.

Q. The crowd by that time did considerable damage to the station ?

A. The shed was burnt out and all the telegraph wires out and all the goods inside the station buildings

2 December 1919.]

Mr. P. MARSDEN.

[Continued.]

were destroyed, the tickets were stolen and the windows were broken.

Q. Did they burn much?

A. The actual burning, I think, was only the oil shed.

Q. Were the leaders shouting out cries against the Rowlatt Act or in favour of Gandhi and others?

A. Yes. There were various cries of that sort. I was told that some people also said:—"The King's reign is now over."

Q. At about this time three trains came up to the distance signals from Lahore, Patti and Ferozepore?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. They apparently, drew up at the signals in consequence of the crowd that were at the station?

A. They saw smoke rising and they saw that something was happening at the station, and they were doubtful what to do.

Q. Did the crowd run towards the Ferozepore train, some 400 yards off?

A. That was the closest train.

Q. What attitude did the railway staff take up?

A. Apparently they were entirely disloyal and were assisting the rioters either actively or passively.

Q. Was there any movement for a strike among the employees?

A. It is believed that there was. And there is one actual proof. A signaller from Kasur signalled a message to Lahore saying that all the Europeans had been murdered here and the station looted and will all your people in Lahore strike to-morrow.

Q. In this Ferozepore train which the crowd proceeded to there were several Europeans? As regards what actually occurred to the Europeans Mr. Sherbourn is to be a witness?

A. I think he is here to-day.

Q. I think that on that day certain firing took place?

A. Yes.

Q. No firing took place until the mob had done a considerable amount of damage and destruction?

A. The first shots were fired by the two soldiers who were murdered, from revolvers. The later firing by the police took place right at the end of the day when various buildings had been burned out.

Q. Tell me about these two soldiers who were murdered.

A. They were in the Ferozepore train and there along with the others they were attacked and stoned and then when the other Europeans got out, the two soldiers who were murdered got into the train again and it slowly moved forward to the Kasur platform. When they emerged from the carriage they were stoned again and when the stones actually touched the two men who had revolvers they fired one or two shots towards the crowd. The crowd then thought that they were blank because only one man was hit on the foot. They then closed in on the soldiers and pursued them up and down the platform and apparently none of the staff assisted them or gave them any help. They were hemmed in against some railings and beaten to death.

Q. Did the crowd come armed with lathis?

A. They had lathis with them, but their chief weapon was stones which they took up from the railway track.

Q. Did the stoning have something to do with the killing of these two men?

A. All the people present were stoned including the soldiers but they were actually killed with lathis.

Q. What was the nationality of these two soldiers?

A. They were English.

Q. I think on the afternoon of the 12th a Military force arrived under Colonel McRae?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And the situation then quieted down?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think that from the 13th to the 15th no arrests of any one were made for what had occurred on the 12th?

A. No, I think not, Sir.

Q. Did you regard that as unfortunate?

A. Yes, I think more earnest steps should have been taken at once to investigate the case and arrest people.

Q. And when you arrived on the scene did you take steps to arrest those who had been responsible?

A. Yes, Sir. The Deputy Superintendent of Police had a considerable list ready of people suspected and at once arrested most of these. Then we took steps to call back the people in the train who might identify the accused and by that means we got most of our accused.

Q. When did you make your first arrest?

A. After I had arrived on the 16th. These were the first arrests that were made since the 12th.

Q. On the 16th was there a meeting in the Town Hall?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And Martial Law was proclaimed by Colonel McRae. Were you present at the proclamation?

A. Yes.

Q. I think at that meeting Lala Dhanpat Rai was arrested?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And altogether 21 arrests were made that day?

A. That is correct.

Q. On the 17th there were further arrests—three on the 17th, four on the 18th, and forty on the 19th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On what information did you effect these arrests?

A. It was largely from enquiries that were made by the police on the spot, from people who were arrested mentioning other people and chiefly from actual people who had been present and struck identifying people, and also gradually the people resident in Kasur began to give in the names of people that they knew. For instance the railway staff ultimately gave a considerable number of names of rioters. Officials in Kasur were then called upon and they were gradually more willing to give the names of people who had been seen rioting.

Q. What means did you take to find out that these men were really the rioters?

A. We had a very careful investigation made. We perused every set of evidence very carefully. We had a large number of the classes that were suspected brought to the station. For example some butchers and their assistants and *sadhus* who were resident in Kasur. Then each witness was made to look at them and occasionally they identified them by remembering them. Then on May 1st, in order to shorten the system of identification, we called all the possible witnesses from all over India. There were about 50 or 60 and then we made all the men of Kasur assemble and there again a certain number were identified.

Q. Before you actually effected arrests had the people arrested been identified as having participated in the riot by more than one witness?

A. I think some were arrested because the police suspected them.

Q. Were many so arrested on suspicion?

A. I cannot recollect. As far as I remember there was actual evidence against anybody who was actually arrested.

Q. Were any prominent local men arrested?

A. The most prominent were M. Ghulam Muhi-ud-din and Mr. Abdul Kadir, both pleaders at Kasur.

Q. I think you had evidence at the time of arrest that these gentlemen took part in the riots but it was afterwards found that the evidence was not correct?

A. I was quite convinced after some days after hearing further evidence that it could not have been correct. First of all it was obvious that the evidence against Mr. A. Kadir was not correct and afterwards that against M. Ghulam Muhi-ud-din.

Q. How long were these gentlemen kept in custody before they were released?

A. Ghulam Mohi-ud-din was arrested on the 19th of April and released on the 10th of May. Abdul Kadir was arrested on the 19th April and released on the 28th April.

Q. During the period of their detention where were they kept?

A. In the police station. There were also other places for prisoners because there was not enough room, so we had a wired enclosure made for them. The most respect-

2 December 1919.]

Mr. P. MARSDEN.

[Continued.]

able people were sent to the police station. They were allowed to have their beds and small comforts that they wanted.

Q. Were they provided by you with food or had the food to be supplied at their own expense?

A. In the ordinary course they would have been supplied with food by the prison authorities but their relations were allowed to bring them food.

Q. I see in your report you mention that on the 12th there were not only disturbances at Kasur but also trouble at Khem Karan Station and at Patti?

A. Yes.

Q. Khem Karan is about six miles from Kasur?

A. Yes.

Q. What damage was done there?

A. Station property was looted and wires cut.

Q. Who had that done?

A. That had nothing to do with the people who were at Khem Karan. The damage was done by about 20 men, mainly sweepers from Pattu village near by.

Q. Did you find out that that occurrence took place immediately after the trouble at Kasur?

A. Yes, as far as I remember about two or three hours.

Q. Had the sweeper from Kasur been an inhabitant of Pattu?

A. I do not think he was an inhabitant. I think he lived at this village.

Q. Where is Pattu then?

A. That is a village just near Khem Karan.

Q. Did you find out that he had instigated the people to burn the station at Khem Karan?

A. He did not instigate them to loot the station.

Q. Patti is 28 miles—what happened there?

A. There the crowd gathered together towards the evening and wandered through the city seeing what mischief they could do and ended up at the railway station.

Q. So far as that riot at Patti is concerned who had taken part in it?

A. Apparently it was the lower classes—the riff-raff—artisans and labourers and people of that type.

Q. They appeared to have been actuated by a desire to loot?

A. No, I think they were primarily excited by the leaders, I mean the people in general. Patti is closer to Amritsar than to Kasur.

Q. Did the chief inhabitants of Kasur and the police give assistance?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And the result was that the rioters were soon brought under restraint?

A. Yes.

Q. In Kasur itself was the mass of the crowd composed of the lowest classes just as in Khem Karan?

A. No, Sir. They were a representative crowd. There were well-to-do shop-keepers largely, it was really representative of every class.

Q. I see in your statement you say that the mass of the crowd is composed of the lowest classes, sweepers and artisans and leather workers, etc.?

A. They must have been the mass, because they form the mass of the population of Kasur; I mean in proportion to their numbers every class was represented.

Q. In connection with the measures that were taken at Kasur to deal with the situation after the riot, you say that on the 12th a military force of 300 men arrived under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel McRae. That includes 50 British troops I suppose?

A. Yes.

Q. How were the others composed?

A. There were the 2-15th Sikhs and the 2-17th (Indian) Infantry.

Q. Did that force of soldiers remain for a considerable time to protect Kasur?

A. No, it remained for a short time at 300, I forget the exact date. Afterwards it was reduced to 150.

Q. You say in your statement "On the 8th May a further reduction was made to 100 men of the 2-17th (Indian) Infantry.

A. Yes.

Q. Then you say that on the 11th May this force was further reduced to 50 men. I am not quite certain from your statement if you had the British troops that you refer to?

A. As far as I remember they had gone by that date.

Q. Perhaps you are right. I see you say that 300 men were reduced to 150 in a comparatively short time. Then on the 8th May there was a reduction to 100 men and on the 11th May there was a further reduction to 50, and on the 21st June you were left with 15 rifles?

A. Yes.

Q. In your opinion what was the effect of Martial Law in your District?

A. Well, it is always very hard to say what the effect was. But the only obvious effect was that the people were powerless to do anything that they might otherwise have done.

Q. On the 16th April in your opinion was Martial Law necessary to restore and maintain order?

A. It appeared to be necessary. The leading people were or pretended to be in a state of terror.

Q. Did a moveable column visit Kasur?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What functions did it fulfil?

A. It only halted for a little time at Kasur. Its functions were to move between Amritsar and Kasur and to take any steps that they deemed to be necessary and to arrest any bad characters or people who were likely to cause sedition or rebellion on the way.

Q. You say various persons were arrested. Does that mean some men at Kasur were arrested by this column?

A. No, Sir, they did not arrest any one at Kasur. They arrested men at Patti and other places.

Q. You have stated that the effect of this column was to keep the people quiet?

A. Yes. They had a very serious situation to deal with. It was known that all the *badmashes*, that is, the professional bad characters in all the villages, were endeavouring to bring about a small sort of rising: I do not think the zamindars were likely to rise, but all these *badmashes* were bent upon doing considerable mischief, and it was necessary to have a large overawing force.

Q. You say that a column of the sort cannot take the place of the police?

A. The police authorities did not know how far they should act if the mobile column was acting.

Q. You say that *Thikri pahra* was established in the villages? What do you mean by it?

A. Yes, it is a sort of keeping watch and ward in the villages.

Q. That was established in the villages along the railway line?

A. Yes.

Q. That means the villages became responsible for the watch and ward of the railway line?

A. Yes.

Q. After the establishment of that system, did the cutting of telegraph wires gradually cease?

A. As far as I remember, the cutting ceased about the 20th April. *Thikri-pahra* had not been properly organized till after that date.

Q. After it was organized was there any further serious damage to telegraph wires?

A. No, Sir.

Q. As regards the trials of the accused in your district, so far as the serious offences were concerned, they were tried by the Special Tribunals at Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. But the minor offences were dealt with by summary courts?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you acting as a Judge in this summary court?

A. I had the power, but I never tried any case. The Martial Law administrators tried the cases. I think Captain Doveton heard all these cases.

Q. I see you give a detailed statement as to the personnel of the convicts, in what sense do you use the word "convicts"?

2 December 1919.]

Mr. P. MARSDEN.

[Continued.]

A. People who were actually sentenced.

Q. You say that of the convicts, 12 were shop-keepers, 3 Government servants, two students. No pleaders were accused?

A. No.

Q. In a previous part of the report you seem to lay a considerable amount of blame upon the pleader class for what has occurred?

A. Yes. I have explained that in my opinion they were largely responsible for what actually occurred, but you could not actually say that they had committed a crime.

Q. The complaint you are making against them is rather a complaint of political agitation than of crime?

A. It is almost more than political agitation, I think. They made speeches on the 11th, and they were holding a meeting on the 12th while the riot was actually proceeding, and in those speeches they made awful hints to the people about the Rowlatt Act, but they never attempted to explain what the Rowlatt Act was. The people thereupon got excited, and immediately we had the murder of Europeans. So I think a grave responsibility lies on the pleaders.

Q. Only two *sadhus* were accused, and one of them was convicted?

A. Yes, there was one *sadhu* who got off because there was only one witness. My opinion is the man was certainly guilty, but I think the plan of the Martial Law Commissioners was to convict no one if there was not more than one witness.

Q. That is a very wholesome rule in administering Martial Law, is it not?

A. Yes.

Q. Were almost all the people convicted residents in Kasur, as you say that with the exception of 7 men all the convicts were of Kasur?

A. I think of those convicted in the Lahore cases, in the Kasur cases properly so-called, they were almost entirely residents of Kasur, but there were others implicated as regards the riots at Khem Karan and Patti, and there were separate cases against them, but the men implicated in the Khem Karan and Patti riots were not residents of Kasur.

Q. No particular caste or religion seems to have predominated among the accused?

A. No.

Q. In the summary court of the Martial Law Officer, altogether 79 persons were convicted?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And the chief case there seems to have been the riot at Patti?

A. Yes.

Q. Thirty one accused were convicted and 15 acquitted?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were they all tried in a batch?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you present at their trials?

A. No, Sir.

Q. You don't know what procedure was adopted in trying them?

A. I know the procedure that was adopted. I enquired about it from Captain Doveton who is himself going to give evidence.

Q. Of the 31 convicted, 21 appear to have been sentenced to imprisonment and 4 to whipping?

A. Yes.

Q. Now in connection with whipping, how many sentences were there in Kasur District?

A. Thirty. Well, there were 40 cases in all of actual whipping taking place in Kasur.

Q. How is it that there were more cases of whipping than of sentences?

A. I have mentioned that there were 4 whipping sentences in the Patti case, and 6 school boys were whipped by order of the Officer Commanding.

Q. The total number of stripes appears to have been 710. That gives an average of 18 stripes to each individual?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. To what class of community did the people who were whipped belong?

A. I understood they were all of the lower classes. I never actually saw whipping, except in the case of one man who was a fairly respectable man; he was a Ticket Collector at the Kasur Station.

Q. Except the 8 school boys, were they all of mature age?

A. Yes. Of the 6 school boys, I think 3 were about 16 or 17 who were beaten with a bamboo stick, and they got 6 cuts each, and the three smaller boys who were about 13 or 14 were given 3 cuts each with a cane.

Q. What were the school boys whipped for?

A. The Head-Master wrote to us saying that the boys were still insubordinate, and he asked for Military help. The Officer Commanding called them to the station, and he thought that whipping was the best course to restore order and to give the school authorities Military help, and as a disciplinary measure the offending and insubordinate boys were whipped.

Q. Who carried out the sentences of whipping?

A. It was carried out by a Sikh.

Q. Why did not the school authorities do it?

A. Because the school authorities were not doing well at that time.

Q. Where were these boys whipped?

A. Just outside the station entrance.

Q. Were they whipped in public?

A. Yes, it was really in the presence of the school, the whole school was made to assemble in a ring round and the boys were whipped more as an example to others.

Q. What was the object of not whipping them in the school premises?

A. There was no particular object. I think the Officer Commanding wanted to see the school and hear what they were saying.

Q. Was the sentence of whipping given in any other than serious cases in Kasur District, and for what sort of offence was the punishment of whipping given?

A. For all sorts of cases, for rioting or brawling at the Station. I remember four or five men were whipped because they had trespassed into a women's apartment when they were drunk. Two or three men were whipped because they had assaulted a *lambardar* as he had given information to the authorities about the rioters; also for a large number of miscellaneous offences.

Q. Did these whippings take place in public or private?

A. I would say that they took place in private. I have explained in my report that they were whipped at the Military head-quarters on the station platform just outside where the Military had their head-quarters. The platform at that time was closed to the public. So it was a question of opinion whether it was public or private.

Q. Could the whipping not be seen by people outside the station?

A. No, it could not be seen.

Q. Did all the whippings take place at that point?

A. Yes, they all took place at the station platform. I believe there was one case which took place a little further away outside which might have been seen by the public if they were there.

Q. In connection with sentences under Civil Law, do you pass sentences of whipping at all?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Ordinarily where do you whip?

A. In the jail.

Q. Did you make investigation into certain rumours as to causes of unrest such as recruiting?

A. Yes, I was very careful to find out about that. I found that recruiting was never mentioned in the agitation or in the speeches. In fact Kasur had been a very backward place and certainly no pressure was exercised whatever, and the number of men recruited was extremely small in Kasur.

Q. Were the classes involved those drawn upon for the army?

A. I do not think so.

2 December 1919.]

Mr. P. MARSDEN.

[Continued.]

Q. Recruiting seemed not to have been mentioned during the agitation and in the speeches?

A. That was mentioned in none of the speeches.

Q. Was the case of any accused or of any one suspected connected in any way with recruiting?

A. I don't think so.

Q. And the Military themselves, both active and retired, were they loyal throughout?

A. Yes, they were absolutely loyal.

Q. Were there also rumours, as regards emigrants' grievances?

A. No, there was nothing of that sort.

Q. About provocation by the authorities. I think it was suggested that a great deal of the disturbances was really due to the action of the authorities. Had it anything to do with the risings in Kasur?

A. None whatever. The authorities were only anxious not to annoy the crowds in any way. When I questioned the Deputy Superintendent of Police at that time he said that he had special instructions from headquarters to see that the crowds were not disturbed or annoyed in any way, and I think that made the police too kid-gloved in their measures.

Q. During the administration of Martial Law, were there two cases of firing by sentries?

A. Yes.

Q. How did they occur?

A. One case was at the station which I saw myself. There was a British sentry on duty at the station, and he had seen some one creeping towards him as he described afterwards. On account of the dust-storm then raging it was very difficult to see how many men were there. Well, the man who was creeping towards the sentry was challenged repeatedly both in English and in Urdu, and the man did not answer, but he made a sort of run towards the sentry. Then the sentry fired and killed the man. Sometime afterwards we were told that the man was dumb, which really explained the reason.

Q. So it was an unfortunate accident?

A. Yes.

Q. The other case was in a village?

A. I was not present there. I do not know how it happened.

Q. Were some complaints made to you as to the administration of Martial Law by the officers?

A. There were no complaints whatever at the time. In fact the officer administering Martial Law in Kasur proper was very friendly with the people. The people used to go to him when he went into the city and talk and chat with him. He was extremely popular. But right towards the end of his time after Martial Law was removed, one or two people told me that he was doing things which they did not like. I asked him about it. What happened was that he did not like to go through the formalities of passing sentences of imprisonment for petty offences, so he used to make them do manual labour, climb ladders, perform exercises, etc. I think he made one man skip, or something of that sort. But even that was not looked upon by the people with annoyance, in fact they used to be very amused by it. There was one thing which I thought more serious. I think it was the subject of a letter from some one outside Kasur saying that a Hindu *sadhu* had been white-washed by the Martial Law officer. I asked him about that, and he denied it.

Q. Was that Captain Doveton?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I understand that in connection with the trials of some men who were charged with more serious offences, a scaffold was erected?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it contemplated to have an execution in public?

A. That was the idea, I presume.

Q. That idea was abandoned?

A. Yes. They had started putting up a scaffold at Kasur on the 3rd May, and on the 9th May the Government ordered it to be removed. It was not quite complete by the 9th May, so it was removed.

Q. I suppose the practice of having executions in public has long been discontinued in India?

A. The idea on this occasion was to have it on the actual scene of murder at Kasur.

Q. The murder of these two Warrant Officers?

A. Yes, because it was at the waiting shed station.

Q. In point of fact where did the execution take place?

A. I think it took place in the jail at Lahore because the trials were here.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Martial Law was actually proclaimed in Kasur, I think, by Colonel McRae, on the 16th April?

A. Yes.

Q. Kasur is a part of the Lahore Division?

A. It is a part of the Lahore District.

Q. I take it, therefore, that on the 16th Colonel McRae's proclamation was simply carrying out Ordinance No. I of 1919 which was proclaimed on the 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. Apart from the question of whipping school boys as a military action, was any action of the nature of Martial Law taken before the 16th in Kasur, and anybody purport to exercise Martial Law powers in Kasur before the Proclamation of Martial Law before the 16th?

A. No.

Q. Now as regards the outbreak of the trouble in Kasur, I understand that there was no *hartal* till the 11th, and that the grave outrages occurred on the 12th?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you been able to collect any definite evidence as to what it was that caused the excitement to break out on the 12th?

A. Well, on the 11th there was the news of Mr. Gandhi, which increased the excitement. Then they had the meeting on the 11th. The people were more wildly excited on account of that meeting on the morning of the 12th. They started promenading throughout the town, and they were very much excited. Either by preconcerted action or by chance they arrived at the Station when the train came in and their excitement was such that they did what they did.

Q. Do you attribute to any extent the outbreak on the 12th as a consequence of the news being received in Kasur of the happenings on the 10th at Amritsar or at Lahore on the 10th?

A. I don't think very largely, because the chief people whom I questioned about the meeting on the 11th said that they had only vaguely heard of what had happened at Amritsar and Lahore, and that they were not thinking about that.

Q. I see you say in your statement that on the 11th or 12th, at any rate on the 12th, there were some strangers noticed among the leaders of the mobs? Have you been able to find out whether they came from Amritsar?

A. It was suspected that they had come from Amritsar, but we did not know it for certain.

Q. If the people did not really know what happened on the 10th at Amritsar, it is not probable that that agitation at Kasur was manufactured from Amritsar?

A. They must have known it by the 12th.

Q. After your investigations, you do not regard the events in Kasur on the 12th as really a consequence of what happened in Amritsar on the 10th?

A. No, I should not say that the events happened as a consequence of what happened in Amritsar.

Q. You do not say that the trouble at Kasur on the 12th was engineered from Amritsar?

A. Only the trade boycott was started.

Q. I understand there was pressure put upon business people to observe *hartal* on the 6th?

A. Not on the 6th, but later on. They had not observed *hartal* on the 6th. The rumour was that if Kasur did not fall into line with other places in the matter of *hartal*, traders would be boycotted.

Q. As a consequence of having known that Kasur had not joined with the *hartal* on the 6th?

A. Yes, that was the idea.



2 December 1919.]

Mr. P. MARSDEN.

[Continued.]

Q. As regards the ultimate influence from places like Delhi, Bombay or Karachi, so far as you are concerned, you have not verified any particular cases?

A. We could not find any cases of that sort. That is merely what people were saying.

Q. Have you got any evidence of people dishonouring *handis* in order to bring pressure to bear upon Kasur?

A. Yes, there are three instances of that, which I think, the Deputy Superintendent of Police will produce in his evidence, if necessary.

Q. We will get that?

A. Yes.

Q. So far as it goes, was action taken from Amritsar or Lahore?

A. I think there were two documentary pieces of evidence from Amritsar and one from Lahore.

Q. It does not take tangible evidence of the influence further afield than that?

A. No.

Q. As regards the pleader element, I understand, in Kasur there is a large one?

A. Yes; it is large.

Q. How many pleaders are there for practical purposes?

A. I do not know for certain, but I should think there are about 30.

Q. I suppose in an important place of that sort, public meetings are always largely carried on by pleaders and speeches made by them?

A. Yes.

Q. Whenever there is any eloquence made, I take it that the pleaders would be the most helpful source of supply?

A. Yes.

Q. As regards political meetings, about the Rowlatt Act, have you seen any actual Criminal Investigation Department reports of the speeches on the 11th and 12th?

A. There was a man deputed by the Police to make an account of the speeches but unfortunately what he gave was quite useless; it had nothing. Apparently he did not want to say what the people had been saying. We had to take that indirectly afterwards.

Q. What is the source of information about the inflammatory nature of the speeches on the 11th?

A. The informer who gave evidence told us a certain amount of the actual expressions used; then sometime after this, at the beginning of May, I called together 8 or 9 people who had been present and made speeches, and they told me just a few sentences which had been mentioned. Piecing them together, I found the sort of speeches they made.

Q. Still the material is rather scanty for drawing a line between eloquence and sedition?

A. I could tell you what one of the speeches was; for instance, I found certain sentences had been used.

Q. Were these taken from the evidence of the approver?

A. These are from the sentences given by those speakers. I questioned 7 or 8 speakers, one after another.

Q. About what they had individually said or about what other people had said?

A. About what each individually said and what other people said. As far as I remember, one of the speakers, who was a Hindu pleader there had stated "We Indians are unarmed cows in the presence of the Government." When I questioned him, he did not use the word "cow," but said they were of the male gender of that species. Then he said that "the Rowlatt Act was a rope round our necks," and then he quoted a Persian couplet which said that the Government against the people was like an ox trying to destroy flies. He largely insisted on the fact that the Anarchical Crimes Act had been carried by Europeans over the heads of the unofficial Indians. That was more or less his speech.

Q. They are all common forms. Are they not, Mr. Marsden?

A. He was saying all this to the crowd in that state. I should also mention one more point. When I questioned him afterwards, he said at that time he had never

read the Act through. He had only seen it commented on in the *Tribune* newspaper. To my mind that shows very great irresponsibility, and it shows how these pleaders simply relied on distorted accounts from the Press. Then they said what they read in the vernacular papers, the native press, to the crowds and made their speeches. Naturally the crowds got violently excited. He never attempted to tell them what the Act really was; he never attempted to take them through the Act and point out what safeguards were there, what the Act really meant, he simply said that it threatened their liberties and in a moment they might have thought it was horribly bad. That was the effect on the crowd.

Q. Were any of these pleaders arrested on charges of uttering sedition?

A. No, they were not arrested for that.

Q. I rather understand that none of them were arrested at all?

A. None, except those mentioned.

Q. Were those two whom you mentioned arrested largely because of their having attended these meetings?

A. These that I have mentioned.

Q. Not for that reason at all?

A. The two that I have mentioned were arrested for that reason, viz., Moulvi Abdul Kadir and Moulvi Ghulam Mohi-ud-din. Latterly Dhanpat Rai whom I mentioned was arrested on the Martial Law proclamation. He was really arrested because the higher authorities had come to the conclusion that he should be arrested as he was probably the cause of the trouble. He was removed for some time from Kasur.

Q. You say in your statement "Mr. Ghulam Mohi-ud-din and M. Abdul Kadir had been prominent at the Rowlatt Act meeting on the 11th and had been at a meeting held with the object of establishing *langars* for Hindus and Muhammadans on the 12th morning; and furthermore were said by certain witnesses to have joined in the riot." What I am asking is whether it is a fact that they were arrested for being at these meetings or was there any specific offence about joining the riot?

A. No; it was for specific acts; not on account of speeches. They were not the most violent; there were much longer and probably more violent speeches than they gave.

Q. Would you mind just telling me shortly for my own information the actual occasions of firing? I do not mean firing at the station by one of the soldiers, but the actual occasions when the Police or Military fired on the crowds at Kasur. How many such cases were there?

A. The Military never fired on the crowds. There was no other firing except the two occasions mentioned, by sentries on the crowds. No Military ever fired.

Q. On how many occasions did the Police fire at Kasur?

A. It was on one occasion at the end of the riot in Kasur when the crowd had just burnt down the Munsiff's court and were about to attack the Tahsil.

Q. That is the only occasion of firing?

A. Yes.

Q. You of course were not there at the time?

A. No.

Q. You had to enquire afterwards?

A. Yes.

Q. As regards the action that was taken under Martial Law, as you say, of the persons who were whipped, none of them belonged to respectable classes except probably in the case of one man, a ticket collector?

A. Yes.

Q. What was his offence?

A. There again I was not present at the trial of that man. I was told what happened and that was that there was a seditious or at least an illegal meeting the whole night of the Railway staff. I think there were 13 or 14 men present; and under Martial Law Orders that was illegal and they were all arrested. I understand that this man was considered to be the ring leader and so he was selected for punishment and the others were let go.

Q. How many lashes did he get?

A. I think he got 30.

Q. That is to say the maximum?

2 December 1919.]

Mr. P. MARSDEN.

[Continued.]

A. Yes.

Q. Did he get any punishment in addition to that?

A. I do not think so.

Q. So far as you observed at the time, was there any distinction made in awarding punishments for breaches of Martial Law Orders according as the offender was a man of respectable class or not?

A. Yes. If he belonged to the respectable class, he was fined. If he was of a lower class, he was probably whipped. But I am only going by the list of the Martial Law Administrator's cases that were sent to me.

Q. In this case they made an exception to that rule?

A. I suppose this was an exception.

Q. You had nothing to do with the administration of Martial Law?

A. No.

Q. Although you had the powers, the Military took them in hand?

A. I agreed that Captain Doveton had more time to try all the cases.

Q. I understand the cases that he tried were all of them cases for breaches of Martial Law proclamations?

A. Yes, and the Patti case. He also tried the Patti case which occurred before the Martial Law.

Q. He tried this case before Martial Law was proclaimed?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you anything to do with having that case sent to him? Why did he try that?

A. It was sent to be tried by the Martial Law Commission, but they considered that the punishment that he could inflict would meet the case.

Q. The Legal Remembrancer urged that it should be sent in for trial by the Summary Court?

A. Yes.

Q. They were prosecuted before Captain Doveton?

A. Yes.

Q. Did any movable column work from Kasur to any district that was not covered by Martial Law proclamations?

A. No; I do not think so. It was only in Lahore and Amritsar districts so far as I remember.

Q. Is Patti covered by the Martial Law proclamation?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you any recollection of a movable column moving beyond the district after Martial Law had been proclaimed?

A. I never heard of any.

Q. As far as you are concerned, when the movable column arrested anybody, did they come and hand them over to you?

A. As far as I remember, they took them to Amritsar or Lahore and put them down there. There was only a small room in Kasur so they were put down in Amritsar or Lahore.

Q. About the fines that were inflicted by the movable column, were they inflicted by to the Officer-in-charge of the column?

A. I believe so.

Q. Were these columns attended by a civilian officer?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell me whether it was the idea that he should hold trials or was that left to the Military Officer-in-charge?

A. In some cases, I think, the civil officer was asked to hold the enquiry, but I do not think that that particular movable column that went in Kasur had any definite trials of any sort.

Q. As regards people who were taken as hostages, did the column that moved from Kasur bring back any people as hostages, or were they taken over to Amritsar or Lahore?

A. They did not bring any one to Kasur as hostages, as far as I remember.

Q. As regards the hostages that were taken from bad villages, did the Military apply to you or to any civilian under you for a statement as to which of the villages were bad or disaffected villages?

A. Yes; they were always asking us for information and whenever information or rumours were heard, we let them know.

Q. That is to say you passed on whatever information or rumour reached you?

A. Yes.

Q. You did not select the particular villages that were certainly so bad as to require this treatment?

A. No.

Q. That was left to the Military Officer?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever hear of any cases in which the conditions of the hostages bond had been broken and as to what happened to the hostages in those days?

A. I do not think there were any cases, I heard of no cases.

Q. Speaking about the school boys, you said that the school authorities themselves were not doing well?

A. Yes.

Q. I do not quite catch the meaning of that expression?

A. The Headmaster was an old and a feeble sort of man. He was never keeping any order and one of the masters had actually been found to be a leader during the processions in the city during the disturbances. We were all very doubtful as to what the position of the school masters was. They certainly did not seem to be in a hurry to take any steps to punish boys if they took part in riots, although it was obvious that perhaps a majority of the young boys had been engaged in throwing stones.

Q. That was when all was over, I understand, and then the Headmaster complained that he still could not bring them to order?

A. He sent a note and said that his boys were very insubordinate and added "kindly give me Military guard."

Q. Insubordinate to their school master?

A. I suppose they were insubordinate to their masters.

Q. Were these boys a bit above themselves and cheeky to the master or were these boys doing any thing in the way of disorder?

A. I took his meaning to be that they were still in a great state of excitement, that he could not keep order and it might be a source of further trouble.

Q. Had they done anything which you could lay to their charge in the way of disorder or breach of regulations?

A. No.

Q. What was the date? Can you give me approximately how long after the riot he sent this demand for Military assistance?

A. I cannot remember the actual date.

Q. Roughly, was it a week or a month after the riot?

A. I should think it was about 6 days.

Q. Did he nominate the boys that deserved to be flogged?

A. He and the master of the other school were asked to select the 6 boys that they considered to be the most naughty boys. The result was that 6 boys were produced who were obviously the poorest, the thinnest, the most badly clothed and of the lowest class. I think the Military Officer said "you must bring boys that are a bit fatter, select better boys."

Q. He rejected the selection of the Headmaster and took out the 6 at random?

A. The Headmaster would not select any one; then I think the boys themselves were told to select six of them. The result was they were obviously of the lowest caste, badly clothed and feeble specimens of boys.

Q. They were properly rejected. Then 6 were chosen at random on the spot by the officer?

A. Yes, as far as I remember.

Q. How many stripes did each of those 6 get?

A. Three big boys got 6 and the three smaller got 3 each.

Q. This was at the time before the pronouncement of Martial Law at all?

A. That was after Martial Law was proclaimed.

2 December 1919.]

Mr. P. MARSDEN.

[Continued.]

Q. I see you said before the arrival of the Martial Law Officer?

A. I do not think the Martial Law Officer had arrived.

Q. Had Martial Law been proclaimed?

A. Martial Law had been proclaimed, but later on a special Martial Law Administrator was sent to try cases.

Q. Who was the officer who actually ordered and is responsible for the thrashing of the 6 school boys selected in that way?

A. The officer commanding, Colonel McRae.

Q. What Battalion?

A. He was Commanding the 2-15th Sikhs.

Q. He was Officer Commanding Kasur at this time?

A. Yes.

Q. I see that you say that some punishments were meted out to people who were proved to be guilty of various vulgar forms of cheating?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there anything dealing with the question of cheating in any Martial Law proclamation?

A. No; I do not think so.

Q. Cheating was one of those offences which is not in the list, either in the Bengal Offences Regulation or Martial Law Proclamation?

A. Yes. I am not particularly well versed in Martial Law. I take it that any offence that the Martial Law Administrator cares to take can be dealt with by him. These were offences committed in the precincts of the Railway so far as I remember.

Q. That proposition is not clear to me. Assuming that this was not an offence with regard to the Bengal State Offences Regulation of 1804 which stopped the Civil Courts Act, assuming that it was not an offence which was a breach of Martial Law proclamation, at any rate, the view practised in Kasur at this time was that still for any ordinary breach of the Indian Penal Code, the officer administering Martial Law was entitled not only to try but to sentence them to sentences for which they could not find sentences under the Indian Penal Code, viz., whipping in the case of cheating?

A. I do not think it was ever deliberately and clearly put in that way. I do not think for a moment he would have tried any cases under the Penal Code, but petty offences and offences committed on the railway in connection with Martial Law. Those he tried. I remember one case of cheating. It was done by a soldier from outside. He pretended to be an official at the station and cheated some women of their money.

Q. That is all right. It is Military Law and comes under Military discipline and has nothing to do with Martial Law.

A. Yes.

Q. Then you say "many of these punishment inflicted on cheats, on Government servants who misbehaved, and on dangerous *badmashes*, were very popular with the community at large. It was extremely effective, for example, when a *lambardar* from a distant village came before the Sub-Divisional Officer in the morning complaining of an assault by *badmashes*, and troops forthwith went out and secured the offenders, and produced them before the Martial Law Officer, and before the day was out the five *badmashes*, scoundrels of the worst type, had all received 30 lashes, and started on a course of 2 years' rigorous imprisonment. Such things made the people relish Martial Law." In the case of an assault by a *badmash* on a *lambardar*, it might or might not come under the Martial Law proclamation. It probably would. But as regards punishments inflicted on cheats, I want to know whether there were many people who committed an offence under the Penal Code which had nothing to do with the Regulation of 1804 and had nothing to do with Martial Law proclamations, dealt with by the Military Officer and sentenced to whipping?

A. It would be best to ask him. I can only recollect two instances that I may quote here of cheating committed at the station. He could answer your question.

Q. We know one was committed at the station; was the other also committed at the station?

A. There was some offence in the station precincts, as far as I recollect.

Q. And you do not remember any other case where the Military officer dealt with what one would call ordinary offences under the Civil Law?

A. I have already remarked that there were cases in which the punishments were inflicted by him. A large number of them could have been tried under the Penal Code.

Q. A good many cases might have been tried for rioting?

A. Yes.

Q. I quite agree; there is no objection. It might have been an offence under the Penal Code. Did it come under Martial Law Regulations? This Martial Law Officer, as I understand, was sitting as an area officer under the proclamation of General Beynon dated the 19th of April. That was his position?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it not the case that under that proclamation he was entitled to inflict only what were recognised forms of punishment, viz., two years' imprisonment, 30 lashes and fines up to a certain limit.

A. I think that is the case.

Q. Do I understand you to say that the Martial Law Officer in Kasur abandoning those three various forms of punishment made a regular practice of subjecting people before him to fancy punishments of his own invention?

A. That is what I said.

Q. What is the name of this gentleman?

A. That is the same one all the time.

Q. Captain Doveton?

A. Yes. Those later proceedings that I mentioned took place as I know after Martial Law had been withdrawn from Kasur. He was then only acting as Martial Law officer along the railway, and these offences were offences committed actually on the platform or in the station precincts.

Q. I see it did not apply to what you may call Martial Law, but that which continued later as regards the Railway.

A. Yes.

Q. So far as detention is concerned of the arrested persons, I do not know whether you have given the information in your statement. Can you give us the number of people who were arrested in Kasur and ultimately released without being brought to trial?

A. The total number of arrests was 172 and 97 of those were ultimately discharged without being sent up to trial, that is to say, that 75 were sent for trial and 51 of those were actually convicted.

Q. Ninety-seven were not sent for trial?

A. Ninety-seven were not sent for trial.

Q. Some of them were arrested at a later date than others, but I gather that the bulk of them were arrested by, shall I say, the 22nd April?

A. No. The first arrest was made on the 12th. By May 11th, everybody who was not sent up for trial had been released, so that the investigations and the detention of persons were all inside the month. Of course, if it were the ordinary criminal courts where a thousand people had committed murder, it would take about a year and the prisoners would have to be detained.

Q. Is it the case in Kasur as in other places (I am not quarrelling over it, I only want to know the fact) that the practice was to get all complete the investigation before the cases were sent before the magistrate at all, or before any sort of court? Was the investigation always complete before a case was sent before the magistrate or any court?

A. Yes.

Q. The practice was not adopted of bringing the offender before the magistrate within 24 or 48 hours and taking a remand?

A. We took remands.

Q. That is what I want to know. How long after the arrest of a person was he brought before the Magistrate?

2 December 1919.]

Mr. P. MARSDEN.

[Continued.]

A. I was a magistrate and he always came before me almost at once.

Q. And you made an order remanding him until a certain date?

A. The police used to put up the case for remand, I think, before different magistrates. It is the duty of the Police to put the case up whenever any remand is required. I do not recollect who they used to put the order before, but I know that remands were always taken.

Q. I have never been a magistrate in India, therefore perhaps I am not familiar with it, when a person is brought before a magistrate soon after his being arrested he is brought so that the magistrate may put a limit to the time for which he can be kept in detention without coming before a magistrate again?

A. Yes.

Q. You never make a remand without specifying the actual number of days.

A. 15 days.

Q. You remand for 15 days at the time?

A. Yes.

Q. Do I understand that the practice in Kasur was that the ordinary procedure under the Criminal Procedure Code was complied with in spite of the fact that you had so many people to deal with?

Remands were properly taken and nobody was detained longer than his remand period without being put before a magistrate and an extension of time obtained?

A. That was so far as I recollect, in every case.

Q. As regards those 97 people that were ultimately not put up for trial at all, so far as the Police or the C. I. D. were concerned, I gather they went before a magistrate and satisfied the magistrate that they were proper cases in which he would make remands?

A. Yes.

Q. One gentleman was kept in the *thana* from the 19th April to 10th May; that would be a long period to be kept in the *thana* without being tried?

A. Yes.

Q. About the 97 men that were arrested?

A. Most of them were in the same case. We had to continue enquiries up to May 1st. We had a big identification parade, but even after that witnesses had to come, and we were anxious to show to people that no men were taken without sufficient justification.

Q. Can you tell me, with regard to these 97 men, whether on the occasion of the remands being taken, there were cases for appeal for bail pending investigation?

A. I think some applications were made, but they were refused.

Q. You knew, as a matter of fact, that you did not have any proper case for bail; or you refused the applications without inquiry?

A. They were non-bailable.

Q. Non-bailable?

A. Yes.

Q. The applications were all non-bailable cases, were they?

A. I thought all these cases were non-bailable.

Q. So, you never had any application where you would be entitled to exercise the power of granting bail?

A. I do not think so.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You know that so far as these remand orders are concerned they are judicial orders under the Criminal Procedure Code, and generally the application has to be made before a magistrate, either by the Court Inspector or the Court Munsarim, that the remand is required?

A. Yes.

Q. And the remand is required on the ground that an investigation is going on and some evidence has to be procured?

A. Yes.

Q. But you knew that under the Criminal Procedure Code, no remand can be granted until the accused person is brought before the magistrate?

A. Yes.

Q. May I understand that all these persons were brought before you from time to time whenever a remand was obtained?

A. I cannot recollect whether they were brought before me.

Q. And you gave them an opportunity of making any complaints before you?

A. I cannot recollect if actual remands were confirmed or not. I can tell you the best authority to give evidence would be the Deputy Superintendent of Police. I cannot recollect now.

Q. These remand orders being judicial orders, I think they will be yours?

A. I expect so.

Q. These different orders being judicial, they would be available to us?

A. Yes.

Q. I believe that a number of these arrested persons were sent to Lahore, and practically you would not be able to produce them for the purpose of obtaining remand order before any magistrate at Kasur?

A. Not before him.

Q. Are you quite sure from your personal knowledge that no remand orders were obtained?

A. They were obtained.

Q. Under the C. P. C. 15 days is the limit, that is the police cannot obtain a remand for more than 15 days?

A. 15 days is the time.

Q. Generally it is given for 3 or 4 or 5 days. 15 days is the extreme length of time. They cannot ask for remand for a month?

A. They should not.

Q. You took over charge on the evening of the 15th April. Had you anything to do with Kasur?

A. I had everything to do in the sense that I was stationed in the district.

Q. And between the 11th and 15th did Mr. Mitter or the Deputy Superintendent of Police inform you that any disturbance was caused or created by the crowd after 3 p.m. on the 11th.

A. No. I do not think so.

Q. Whatever may be the reason, after that ebullition or after those murders were committed, after 3 p.m., up to the time you arrived, nothing was done at Kasur; so far, everything was quiet?

A. Not in the neighbourhood of Kasur. I am not in charge of Kasur city only.

Q. You were also informed that the police were able to make arrests on the 11th, that is the date of the murders?

A. On the 12th; yes.

Q. And further you were informed that the officials there and the police were never assaulted?

A. Have I said that?

Q. None of them were assaulted, the police constables were not assaulted?

A. What is your question?

Q. That on the 12th or the subsequent date the police constables or the police officials or the tahaldar or the Sub-Divisional Officer were not assaulted and no attempts were made either on the 11th or 12th, up to the 15th?

A. Yes; attempts certainly were made.

Q. To attack Mr. Mitter? I am talking of the police officials.

A. There were attempts made by the mob; on the 12th the mob endeavoured to burn the tahsil, containing the Sub-Inspector and the *munsif*, who was standing there.

Q. The *munsif* was standing on the roof of the house and the mob were going to burn that house and were going to attack the treasury. Now leaving that aside, had any one of the officials ever made a report that an attempt was made by the crowd to assail them?

A. No; I do not think so.

Q. You may draw the inference, because a *munsif* was standing there. Is it a fact that all these officials, all these witnesses who are coming before us, Sardar Ahmad Khan, Mr. Mitter and other police officers, were constantly passing through this crowd?

2 December 1919.]

Mr. P. MARSDEN.

[Continued.]

A. No; there were not. The Tahsildar was the only one who came in contact with the crowd, the tahsildar and the Sub-Inspector.

Q. And they were never assailed; as soon as they saw the Police officer, the mob cleared away?

A. There was no attempt to assault any.

Q. Simply because the *munsif* was standing there they were burning the Tahsil?

A. They burnt his court room and the documents inside.

Q. Have you got any statement that the crowd was stoning the Munsif?

A. They were throwing stones at the tahsil.

Q. Did you examine the *munsif* and did he make any statement before you that stones were thrown at him?

A. He told me that he was watching the crowd from the tahsil and the stones were thrown at the tahsil.

Q. My point is this: Is it a fact that the military from Lahore arrived on the 12th or 13th?

A. There was one official, a Sub-Inspector of Police, who came from Patti on the 11th afternoon; the crowd met him and assaulted him and made him take off his *pagri*. Those incidents I forgot.

Q. Because they wanted him to observe the *hartal*?

A. Yes.

Q. That is an assault; but what I want to know was whether they disregarded the authorities and wanted to establish their own rule and establish anarchy. As a matter of fact you cannot say from what happened on the 11th and 12th up to the 15th that the Civil authorities were not able to exercise their own powers so far as the town of Kasur was concerned?

A. They were absolutely unable to exercise any authority, control or power.

Q. They were able to make seven or eight arrests?

A. At the time they fired, one or two people were arrested. They arrested the people who were wounded.

Q. Mr. Mitter and the Deputy Superintendent of Police made a complaint that they were not able to make arrests. Their explanation was that they were in doubts and therefore they did not make any arrests?

A. Yes.

Q. Similarly, there were Military authorities at Kasur on the 14th, 15th and 16th and they also did not arrest any person? They were also in doubt as to their authority?

A. Arrests? No, they left that to the police.

Q. Then this matter was referred to Mr. Kitchin, Commissioner of Lahore, and he said that arrests should be made?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore what I wanted to establish was that the arrests were not made not because the Civil authorities were not able to make these arrests but because there were some doubts about the orders passed and on account of that doubt Mr. Mitter and the Deputy Superintendent of Police did not make any arrests?

A. Yes; that is correct.

Q. With regard to the occurrence at the Railway Station, of course you were not there and you have no personal knowledge. I only ask you with regard to one affair. The first firing which caused any death, was in front of the Tahsil or of the Treasury?

A. Yes.

Q. If I understand aright, according to the Government case, I think those two soldiers emptied the chambers of their revolvers, but as a matter of fact they did not do any damage to the crowd?

A. There was one man hit on the foot.

Q. No man was killed, one was wounded?

A. It was not known how many chambers were loaded. There are two pieces of evidence; one was that of the informer. He said that they fired one round, and then another crowd came and this crowd closed in on them. Another man who was present, I think he was contractor of the Queen's Regiment, he stated that they fired a considerable number of rounds. These were the eye-witnesses' statements.

Q. This report of yours before us is practically an abstract of the report which you submitted in obedience to the Circular issued by the authorities?

A. Yes.

Q. Instead of mentioning that these two officers were mobbed and stoned by different crowds you put it in this way. You describe it thus—"The crowd followed it and inside it, as I have mentioned, were the two warrant officers. They got out and stood at the door of their carriage. The crowd were by some railings about 60 yards off, and throwing stones at the two men; one fell on one of them. Then they lost their heads and fired off all their rounds towards the crowd, without doing any damage."

This statement which you made in your report to the Lieutenant-Governor was in June or July.

A. Yes; July. I am wrong then; this is the statement of the Contractor of the Queen's Regiment. I took that to be a correct account.

Q. Up to this time you considered it as correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Practically no one was killed at the railway station so far as your information goes?

A. No one of the mob.

Q. Were you informed, in the course of your investigation, that an allegation was made that previous to what happened to these two men or to anybody, the mob was saying that two of their number had been killed?

A. No; I never heard any such rumour.

Q. Not even from Mr. Sherbourn?

A. No.

Q. And you did not even read the letter that was sent you by Mr. Sherbourn or the Military authority?

A. I have subsequently read the report that he sent.

Q. It appears to me, from the papers on the record, that it was stated that when the crowd was in front of that hut where Mr. Sherbourn and his family had taken shelter, two persons had been killed?

A. No; I think you have got muddled.

Q. I am quoting chapter and verse. You will find it in the two statements of Mr. Sherbourn and also in the letter.

A. Can you read the passage?

Q. "A few minutes later some one came and informed the leader that two of his men had been killed."

A. Oh, now I understand. Yes.

Q. My point is that you were informed.

A. You have got it wrong.

Q. I understand it. Neither you nor I were present then. I want to know whether or not in the course of your inquiry you were informed, rightly or wrongly, that an allegation was made by some persons of the mob that two persons were killed.

A. You ask me! Was that allegation made by the crowd?

Q. At the time in front of the hut of that man?

A. It is after they had attacked the Europeans and after two corporals had been wounded and dragged on to the hut.

Q. That would be before the occurrence at the station?

A. No; after the two men had been ordered to fire, after they had fired the revolvers, these men hearing the noise said: "They were killing our men." It is not before the attack. It is after the attack had taken place.

Q. Therefore you were informed that such a statement was made?

A. I have seen it.

Q. In the course of the inquiry, you did not know that any such allegation was made?

A. No such allegation was made.

Q. You know that this was made at the hut where those persons had taken shelter?

A. I remember after your reading from it.

Q. What was the interpretation of that?

A. The crowd attacked the Europeans as soon as they arrived and pulled them out of the train. These men were obviously running back to the other part and attacked.

2 December 1919.]

MR. P. MARSDEN.

[Continued.]

Q. I won't like to discuss that. There were two soldiers of the Queen's Regiment; they (the Sherbourn family) were taken to the hut by these soldiers; then the train steamed into the station; what was happening in front of the hut had nothing to do with that at the station. Therefore the soldiers that were attacked when they were defending the Sherbourn family were not the soldiers that were at the station.

A. They were also attacked; they were also stoned. Afterwards three soldiers got into the train and then the train moved into the platform.

Q. Now in the course of the inquiry, it was proved that except these two soldiers, none of the other soldiers had any arms with them; that was the Government case. None had either revolvers or guns or anything of that sort?

A. No.

Q. When proclaiming Martial Law by holding a Durbar in Kasur, you were also there, and therefore under your orders the arrest was made of Dhanpat Rai?

A. Not under my orders; I know he was arrested.

Q. Did you deliver any speech on the occasion?

A. No.

Q. You said nothing about the pleaders or anything of that sort?

A. No, I said nothing.

Q. Is Dhanpat Rai not the leader of the Bar there?

A. No.

Q. What is his age please? Between 60 and 70?

A. I should have thought he was bordering on 60; I do not know.

Q. To your knowledge, was any information given to Colonel McRae by Mr. Mitter or by the Deputy Superintendent of Police of Kasur about Dhanpat Rai as having taken part in the riot or being present at the murder?

A. I do not think so.

Q. I say at that time when Dhanpat Rai was arrested, there was no information against him of having committed any offence on the 12th?

A. No, not on the 12th; I think it was on the 11th.

Q. So far as your information goes, the arrest of Dhanpat Rai was not due to any action on his part on the 12th?

A. No.

Q. Now, who was responsible for his arrest, you or Colonel McRae or somebody else?

A. I should say the Commissioner was responsible; he had sent orders that he should be arrested and removed.

Q. He was arrested because he had taken part in the *hartal* on the 11th?

A. No; the Commissioner had knowledge of this man's past career, that he was leading an agitation there and causing trouble.

Q. Has he got a very bad political record?

A. Yes.

Q. As what? As being a criminal or in that he delivered speeches?

A. Not as being a criminal and not only as having delivered speeches.

Q. Only that he was an agitator?

A. Yes.

Q. That was the only accusation?

A. Not only that he was an agitator but the nature of the agitation was very serious. He was known to be a dangerous man. Some years ago his father-in-law was deported to Burma.

Q. Not because his father-in-law was deported?

A. But I am explaining to you that he has himself been in a dangerous position before now.

Q. You remember a Municipal Commissioner was deputed to take down what was said at the meeting of the 11th?

A. Yes.

Q. And the name of that Municipal Commissioner was Rahim Bux.

A. Yes.

Q. And he did submit a report to you?

A. Yes.

Q. Will that be available to us?

A. Yes.

Q. From that report you will find that as a matter of fact so far as the principal speakers were concerned they were trying to pacify the crowd saying that there should be an orderly meeting and saying that there should be a *hartal* and asking them to fall in line there, and that their speeches were moderate and restraining?

A. That is what he says.

Q. Did you report anything else to the Government or did you report the same thing?

A. I did not accept his report at all because it was given without motive. I questioned him. He said he could not remember a word of what he had heard.

Q. In this statement you say nothing about it. In your letter attached to the report to Government had you said anything else except that the speeches were moderate? I want to know whether in your original report submitted to the Government you said that the meeting was rowdy. I just want to know whether or not you had reported to the Government that the speeches of the majority of them were moderate or that the meeting was a rowdy one?

A. I never said it was a rowdy meeting.

Q. I want to know whether you complained against everyone or against one speaker?

A. I did not complain against anyone.

Q. By complaining I mean that a report was made against them that they were not sufficiently moderate?

A. Yes, that they were not sufficiently moderate. Had they committed any offence we would have proceeded against them and have them tried. I said their speeches were inflammatory.

Q. Is it not a fact that these were the principal men of the town, viz., Maulvi Ghulam Mohi-ud-din, Maulvi Abdul Kadir, Gokal Chand, Uma Dutt, Dhanpat Rai and Seth Mohan Lal. Are not these men the principal men who took part in this meeting?

A. They were the principal men but they were not the leaders of the city.

Q. Was not, according to your information, the speech made by Ghulam Mohi-ud-din very moderate and did he not practically preach that there should be no disorderly crowd and did he not try to pacify the crowd?

A. He told them not to be disorderly and that Mr. Gandhi had advised not to use force. But he did not pacify the crowd.

Q. Neither you were there nor I was there. It is not a matter within the knowledge of either of us.

Is it not a fact that after these men, who were responsible for this political meeting, had left, one Nadir Ali came and gave a speech and incited people?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore this excitement was created by Nadir Ali and was not in the presence of these men?

A. Five or six of them were just going when he started making his speech.

Q. And at the time this crowd was committing all this mischief and damage at the Railway Station, these men were practically inside the city in the house in which this meeting was being held for having *langarkhanas* in case the *hartal* remained for some time?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it your opinion that all these men, when the crowd damaged the station and committed other mischief, were inside the city?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know the name of the man in whose house the meeting was held?

A. Yes, Maulvi Abdul Kadir.

Q. Therefore your opinion was that between 9 and 11 A.M. when this mob was damaging the station and murdering the Europeans, they were holding a meeting in that house, devising *langarkhanas* in case the *hartal* was prolonged?

A. Up till about 10 o'clock, when they were informed of the riot.

Q. What is that information? Was that in writing or oral information that Ghulam Mohi-ud-din and Abdul Kadir took part in the rioting and murders?

2 December 1919.]

Mr. P. MARSDEN.

[Continued.]

A. You must ask the police about it. I have not got it.

Q. Have you seen it?

A. It was taken in my presence.

Q. Ghulam Mohi-ud-din was arrested. Therefore the information was in your possession that he was leading the mob and took part in all these things?

A. Yes.

Q. Who gave that information? What is that and where is that information?

A. It was available with the Deputy Superintendent of Police. One piece of information I remember given by a trolleyman who in the presence of Ghulam Mohi-ud-din stated that he was inciting the crowd near the Railway Station. Ghulam Mohi-ud-din was allowed to cross-examine him but he failed to shake him.

Q. Anything else?

A. Then I remember one man, an Indian Christian, who said that he had seen Maulvi Ghulam Mohi-ud-din and Maulvi Abdul Kadir at various points during the riots inciting the people.

Q. On what date were these statements recorded and how many days after the riots?

A. Shortly after I arrived.

Q. That is on the 17th or 18th?

A. I should think so. It was about then.

Q. At the same time you were in possession of the fact that Ghulam Mohi-ud-din did help the two Europeans, Mr. and Mrs. Sherbourn?

A. I had. Seeing the position, he did extremely good work. He turned round. Mr. Sherbourn in his statement said that he was under the impression that he had turned round to save his face.

Q. And at least your Deputy Superintendent of Police and your Sub-Divisional Officer, from whom you took over charge, Mr. Mitter, did they support your impression that Ghulam Mohi-ud-din was one of these persons who were inciting the mob?

A. No, they never saw the mob right through. They were at the very end of the tahsil.

Q. They did see the mob that was in front of the tahsil?

A. They did see that mob.

Q. So far as the District Officers were concerned, did they inform you that Ghulam Mohi-ud-din was a man of that type or that he was inciting the mob?

A. No, I don't think they could tell me that he was inciting the mob because they did not know that he was there before. After an hour it was very difficult to see.

Q. Is it not a fact that at least three or four other pleaders did help the authorities on that day in guarding the station and quenching the fire?

A. I do not think that anybody gave any real assistance. Two pleaders were seen helping in putting out the fire. Subsequently they were not seen again. I don't know whether they returned again or ran away. They did not give any real help.

Q. I am not talking of real help. Notwithstanding the fact that you admit that they were extinguishing the fire and that they were so seen, you say they were not seen again. Is it that they were helping the mob?

A. Or they ran away.

Q. Where is the reason for you to suppose that?

A. I said they must have done one of the two things.

Q. Therefore when they were seen extinguishing the fire, that was not a help to the authorities?

A. Not real help.

Q. In making reports or giving their tongas to the authorities?

A. Certainly they lent their tongas.

Q. Were any public meetings held in the month of March in Kasur?

A. None that I know of.

Q. In the month of February?

A. I know of none.

Q. In the month of January?

A. None.

Q. Not even in the month of December 1918?

A. I cannot tell you. You can ask the Deputy Superintendent of Police.

Q. In your statement you say that so far as your knowledge goes no public meeting was held at Kasur from December 1918 to March 1919. You are very emphatic about this and I want to test your knowledge. Were any public meetings held at Kasur from January to April 1919?

A. You can ask Mr. Mitter or the Deputy Superintendent of Police.

Q. Except the one which was held on the 11th?

A. I know of none. I never asked if there was any. There had been one public meeting on the occasion of the peace celebrations.

Q. But the meeting in connection with the peace celebration was not a political meeting?

A. I cannot recollect.

Q. You say that the pleaders are practically responsible for what happened at Kasur. To test that ground of opinion I want to know whether you are aware that any political meeting of the public was held at Kasur, except the one that was held on the 11th or 12th of which you were informed?

A. I do not know of any.

Q. Were you ever informed that any public political meeting was held at Kasur in the year 1918?

A. I don't know at all.

Q. Are you aware up to this time that any political speeches were made by any of these pleaders in the year 1919 or 1918?

A. I am sure that there were. I did not know but I conclude that they did make speeches because people fell into politics.

Q. You have no information?

A. I have no information.

Q. Have you sufficient grounds for coming to that conclusion?

A. I can tell you my grounds.

Q. Your own grounds?

A. I thought you wanted my own grounds.

Q. So far as their speaking was concerned did they make any inflammatory or seditious speech in 1918 or 1919?

A. None except on April the 11th. You mean in Kasur?

Q. Yes, at Kasur?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore they are responsible?

A. Yes.

Q. The question was as to whether in the year 1918 or 1919 had you any information that these men had ever made any political speech?

A. I never attempted to find out.

Q. Another complaint of yours is against one of these pleaders that he admitted that he had not read the Rowlatt Act; or is it against the majority of them?

A. I believe none of them had.

Q. Have you read General Beynon's Order?

A. I have read some of his orders. Which order do you mean? On the Rowlatt Act?

Q. Not on the Rowlatt Act but about the Martial Law.

A. I have read the original order.

Q. Have you read the Defence of India Act?

A. Yes.

Q. You know its context?

A. I have forgotten it.

Q. What were the two important Acts that were passed between 1908 and 1915?

A. You mean the two Defence of India Acts.

Q. I mean the Amendments of the Penal Code.

A. I cannot tell you the details now.

Q. You know what they were about?

A. Which Acts?

Q. Changes in the recent Amendment of the Penal Code between 1908 and 1915?

A. I recollect no particular changes.

Q. Now I think you will agree with me that in the majority of places at least all over the world, I mean to say in every political agitation, the people take their cue from their leaders. Every one of the rank and file come to the same conclusions. Supposing that a certain

2 December 1919.]

Mr. P. MARSDEN.

[Continued.]

view is taken by the political leaders that lead is taken by every body. You will agree with me?

A. I do.

Q. Therefore I think no crime was committed by these Mufassil pleaders living in Kasur where there is no political life?

A. There is political life distinctly at Kasur.

Q. You will not blame them if they adopted the view that was put forward before them by their own press or by their own leaders?

A. It is a foolish irresponsibility.

Q. And your experience of your own country is that every one of the rank and file forms an opinion upon these matters?

A. I do not call the members of the Local Bar Association and political speakers such as Ghulam Mohi-ud-din rank and file. They are leaders and they had been to other places. Two men were very keen on the Congress. One was the President of the *Arya Samaj* and the Secretary was present. They are by no means rank and file. They are leaders and should be responsible leaders.

Q. Therefore I want to know on what grounds you say that they were leaders of this movement?

A. Because they admitted it.

Q. You base your opinion upon their admission?

A. Yes.

Q. They said the people came to them?

A. They accused the crowd that they had asked them to become leaders of the mob.

Q. There was no *kartal* on the 6th?

A. Yes.

Q. Now pressure was brought to bear on certain merchants that they should also follow and some of the shop-keepers went to these men and said "let us have a speech." That does not show that they were leaders?

A. But they were, as a matter of fact, at the meetings.

Q. I am prepared to concede that. Therefore you call them leaders because the shop-keepers went to them and they delivered a speech. You call them leaders?

A. Not only the shop-keepers but all the population went to them.

Q. And they delivered some speeches?

A. They asked some of them. Others went of their own accord.

Q. They were not themselves willing to deliver speeches. No public notice was announced but some of them delivered speeches?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore I would come back to the question that, according to you, in your own country men of this position as were in Kasur, do not rely upon what view is taken by the important papers like "Times" and other papers, that they do not rely upon what view was taken by Mr. Gladstone and other towering personages, but every one of them reads every Act and studies it for himself?

A. They certainly inform other people as in other countries.

Q. I think that the explanation is in the difference in education between India and England?

A. Yes.

Q. Because there there is responsible Government and here there is no responsible Government?

A. That is not so.

Q. Then is it not a fact that all these pleaders, who were arrested and who were never brought to trial, were arrested because the authorities wanted to kill the political life of the whole province and because they had taken a part in the meeting of the 11th, although that meeting was a moderate meeting, but still their sole object was to deliver a speech?

A. Maulvi Ghulam Mohi-ud-din, who was arrested, did not speak at all. The two pleaders were not arrested for that.

Q. I ask you because that is your allegation?

A. If it had been for that, of course, we should have arrested the other pleaders.

Q. Now in many places you have stated that all these things, that were done by the Martial Law authorities, were relished and approved of by the people. Are you still of opinion that all these things, that were done by the Martial Law authorities, were relished and approved of by the inhabitants of Kasur?

A. Obviously at the time.

Q. Now the authorities there, i.e., you, blame the pleaders at Kasur. To your knowledge from November 1918 to April 1919 did they take any steps to meet the false rumours which, according to you, were current there?

A. I think the publicity campaign had started.

Q. And what steps had the Sub-Divisional Officer in charge taken before your going there?

A. I did not go officially. I was on Military duty.

Q. You had nothing to do with the civil administration?

A. No.

Q. Therefore you blame them also for not doing their duty?

A. No. I do not blame them as I was not there.

Q. What did Mr. Mitter, the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the Tahsildar do?

A. They just carried on.

Q. You blame the pleaders as they did not stand up and say that these rumours were false. It was their duty?

A. Because they actually made speeches.

Q. And you have not got any record of their speeches?

A. No.

Q. In answer to a question you have made a statement to Mr. Justice Rankin in which you have specified their irresponsible way of speaking?

A. They all showed irresponsibility. Another speaker said they should invoke help from God and that they must do God's work. There is nothing specific.

Q. In a certain statement to Mr. Justice Rankin you stated that one of them said "Our trust is in God." Then I want to know whether you remember any other statement made by this speaker?

A. Maulvi Ghulam Mohi-ud-din said "Hindus and Mussalmans are all one. Both have one head, two feet, two eyes." As far as I remember he said, "We are all the same and one and should act together."

Q. And you take serious objection to that?

A. Well, at a recent meeting he was careful to say "Christians and Europeans." Whereas in those meetings he simply said "Hindus and Muhammadans" and they thought they were incited to do something.

Q. The crowd was so very intelligent that they understood this?

A. Obviously.

Q. According to you they were so intelligent as to draw inferences or were they splitting arguments?

A. Not splitting arguments. It was mostly speeches which stirred them up.

Q. Anything more serious than this? I think there must be some?

A. I have told you the stories of the two pleaders.

Q. That was the worst they said?

A. I should say that was the worst I heard repeated.

Q. It did not strike you what was the obvious meaning of that sentence?

A. Yes, that was the obvious meaning, that all Hindus and Musalmans were to act together.

Q. You have stated that the military authorities were left to select the villages where they were going to make raids?

A. They were to take whatever steps they thought necessary to stop the rebellion.

Q. Were you, as the civil authority, responsible for supplying them with information, or was it the police authorities headed by you?

A. No, they went there and formed their own conclusions, accompanied by a civil officer to advise them.

Q. I find from the information supplied to us that every one of those raids was based on some information. May I know what that information was?



2 December 1919.]

Mr. P. MARSDEN.

[Continued.]

A. I thought you were referring to the mobile column. These villages were quite distinct. The parties to these villages actually went from the forces at Kasur. Whenever the police wished to arrest anybody they merely asked for military aid to accompany them, and as to the information, as usual in criminal cases, someone had given information.

Q. The information upon which more than a dozen raids were organised was given by the police?

A. The information was given to the police.

Q. And the police handed that over to the military?

A. They informed the military that such and such were affected in the village.

Q. Will that information be available to us?

A. The Deputy Superintendent of Police could give you that.

Q. Did that information contain names?

A. Yes, there were names given by accused in the trial.

Q. And the information was reliable information given to the police?

A. Yes.

Q. And that information was taken down in writing?

A. I expect so.

Q. And on the basis of that information a very large number of arrests were made?

A. The people were arrested whom the police wished to arrest.

Q. A large number of arrests were made on the basis of that information?

A. Yes.

Q. And all these arrests were made between 12 at night and 4 or 5 in the morning?

A. Yes.

Q. Fines were imposed on certain villages?

A. Not in my sub-division, I think.

Q. Were any hostages taken from any village?

A. I think some were taken from Patti, but they were not brought to Kasur.

Q. Some villages were raided because the information was that they were very bad and *badmashi* villages?

A. What do you mean by raided?

Q. I mean a party went there and arrested people because the village had a bad reputation?

A. The movable column moved through tracts where the people were supposed to be bad just to show them our power.

Q. And because the village had a bad reputation therefore people were arrested there?

A. I do not think so.

Q. There was a cage, a thing was made which was described as a cage outside the railway station?

A. Yes.

Q. And at certain times the number inside those cages was 108 or 107 persons arrested?

A. I heard so, but I do not think it was more than 70 or 80, but I am not certain of the figures.

Q. According to your memory there were sometimes at least 80 persons in one cage?

A. Yes.

Q. And that cage was open to the public, it is of bars?

A. Yes, you can see into it.

Q. Were these pleaders who were arrested handcuffed?

A. Yes.

Q. The allegation is that they were handcuffed and passed through the bazar?

A. They were handcuffed and taken from the police station to the railway station when required for the case.

Q. Why was Dhanpat handcuffed?

A. It was a state of rebellion and you had to take very great precautions.

Q. You thought that this man, who was 60 years old and a pleader, would run away?

A. No, but his rescue might have been effected.

Q. What were your reasons for supposing that, on the 16th when you arrested that man, when the military were present, there might be an attempt at rescue? You said he was not an important man?

A. I said he was not the leader of the local Bar; he was an important man.

Q. He was handcuffed because there was a risk of his rescue being attempted?

A. No special reason, the country was in a state of rebellion and prisoners were always handcuffed and taken to the station accompanied by soldiers with drawn bayonets. It would have been folly to do otherwise.

Q. I think as a Civil Magistrate and the civil head of the sub-division it was your duty to see what was the effect of Martial Law and General Beynon's Proclamation?

A. Certainly.

Q. And any duties that were not taken away from you it was your part to see that you did perform those duties?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you study the point as to where the authority was for these military officers to try ordinary cases under the Penal Code? How did you satisfy yourself and why did you allow the military authorities to try offences which came under the Indian Penal Code and which were not covered either by the Act of 1804 or by the Martial Law Proclamation of General Beynon?

A. It never entered my head that he was not empowered.

Q. I think that was a very responsible duty of yours to see how far you had been divested of your civil authority; is it so?

A. Yes.

Q. And you will agree with me that the only thing which could divest you of your civil authority was the Proclamation of General Beynon and the Regulation of 1804?

A. Yes.

Q. Was ever any husband punished when four or five persons were punished on the complaint of a woman?

A. Do you mean a husband punished on the complaint of his wife?

Q. A woman complained of assault and the husband was punished along with others?

A. The only case I heard in connection with a woman was that there were five persons who were drunk and trespassed in a woman's room.

Q. And are you aware that one of them was her own husband?

A. No, I was not aware of that.

Q. You have stated about these school boys, that one of the masters of these schools was a leader in the crowd on the 12th?

A. On the 11th, I said during the processions.

Q. Who gave you that information?

A. I cannot recollect, but there were several statements mentioning him; the Police could tell you. There was no doubt about it, he was dismissed afterwards from the Educational Department.

Q. But so far as I can gather from your statement, at this *hartal* he was promptly obeyed by everybody at Kasur, the *hartal* on the 11th? So far as your report goes, you do not say any steps were taken to enforce the *hartal*?

A. I have stated in my report that pressure was used.

Q. You say there was persuasion used and everybody promptly responded?

A. I think I used the word "mainly."

Q. And the only distinctive example you could give was of this man who was ordered to take off his *pugri*?

A. The Honorary Magistrate, that was one case.

Q. I think you said the *hartal* was promptly obeyed?

A. In the main, I think, I said it was promptly obeyed. There were many cases of people not obeying.

Q. Did not the news of Mahatma Gandhi's arrest arrive at Kasur on the 11th?

A. I should say so.

Q. And at about 3 or 4 p.m. on the 11th there was a complete *hartal* at Kasur?

A. The people mentioned in their speeches at the meeting that Gandhi had been arrested.

Q. At what time was this meeting held?

A. At 5-30 in the afternoon.

2 December 1919.]

Mr. P. MARSDEN.

[Continued.]

Q. And what time did the *hartal* commence ?  
 A. I think that night immediately  
 Q. And it was practically a complete *hartal* ?  
 A. I believe so.  
 Q. Therefore my point was this, there was very little time for threats being used and people being compelled to keep the *hartal*. The news arrived, there was a meeting at 5-30 and as soon as the meeting was over there was a *hartal* ?  
 A. The meeting was not organised because of the arrest of Mr. Gandhi. I said the news had arrived and it was mentioned in the speeches.  
 Q. But there was a complete *hartal* that night ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Therefore where was the time for threats being used ?  
 A. Because the crowds went round enforcing the *hartal* that night and the next morning. There was a sweetmeat seller who had remained open, but was compelled to observe the *hartal*; and there was a big factory which had not closed its shops, but when they saw the crowds coming they complied. That happened in lots of cases.  
 Q. Then about these boys. There are three schools at Kasur ?  
 A. There are seven schools.  
 Q. The boys who were flogged were boys of the Islamia School and which two other schools ?  
 A. Of two schools, the Municipal Board High School and the Islamia School.  
 Q. Only two schools ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Did the Head Master of the Islamia School make any complaint ?  
 A. No, he did not make any complaint.  
 Q. It was only the Head Master of the Municipal Board School who made a complaint ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. And did the Head Master of the Islamia School send in any names to you or to any Military authority ?  
 A. No.  
 Q. And still the boys of the Islamia School were flogged ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Therefore the reason given by you would not cover the Islamia School ?  
 A. No, it would not cover it.  
 Q. May I know why the boys of the Islamia School were flogged ?  
 A. Because when we talked to them we came to the conclusion that all the boys of these two schools were still in a disturbed state. We did not call the other schools up.  
 Q. You have already informed us that you were not in possession of any evidence as to whether anything was done by any of these boys. At the time that they were flogged you were not in possession of any tangible thing that was done by these boys ?  
 A. No, merely what the Head Master of one of the schools said.  
 Q. Is the allegation true that there was no complaint and no trouble, that it was supposed that school boys were taking part in politics, and that it was part of the common policy intended to strike terror and make an example that these six or seven boys were selected by the military authorities and flogged ?  
 A. No such thing; Colonel McRae knew nothing about local politics of that sort. It was merely because he wished to keep order.  
 Q. It may not be a part of local policy; it would be a part of the general policy of the administration of Martial Law ?  
 A. No, there was no shadow of such an idea.  
 Q. Is Dhanpat Rai President of the Hindu *Sabha* also ?  
 A. I do not know that.  
 Q. You have stated that all the male population of Kasur was summoned to you for the purpose of facilitating their identifications ?

A. Yes.  
 Q. From what time to what time were they kept there, was it from 8 A.M. to 4 P.M. ?  
 A. No, as far as I remember from 8 till about 1-30 or 2.  
 Q. Did this happen on one day or on two days ?  
 A. It only happened on one day. We had intended to do it on another day but the witnesses did not appear.  
 Q. They were summoned for two days but the identification took place on one day ? They were summoned twice ?  
 A. They were summoned for one day and the witnesses did not turn up and they were summoned the second day.  
 Q. At the time that all the male population was summoned to the station were the houses of any persons searched in the city ?  
 A. No, as far as I remember they were not. But parties went into the city to see that they had not remained behind.  
 Q. And were the houses of some of the respectable pleaders of Kasur touched ?  
 A. On that day ?  
 Q. On any day ?  
 A. Not on that day, on another day some houses were searched.  
 Q. How many ?  
 A. About eight.  
 Q. Probably to find out the broken pieces of wire or the parts of a telegraph instrument ?  
 A. No, they were not people likely to do that.  
 Q. To find seditious writings ?  
 A. Seditious writings.  
 Q. Not with a view to find out any stolen property, any property which had been looted ?  
 A. No.  
 Q. And what was the evidence in your possession that these people were seditious people ?  
 A. Some of them had for a long time back been political suspects and considered to be bad characters. And the others had been very prominent, as I have described, before the disturbances and for that reason these eight people were suspected.  
 Q. Now this Booking Clerk, Lala Bhagat Ram, were you present when he was flogged ?  
 A. No.  
 Q. Do you remember the date of his flogging ?  
 A. No, I cannot remember it.  
 Q. Do you know that before he was flogged he was repeatedly asked to identify persons and he failed to identify them ?  
 A. No.  
 Q. Do you know whether up to the date when he was flogged he was ever asked by you or the Military authorities to identify arrested persons or people concerned in the riot ?  
 A. Not that I know of. Some Railway officials were occasionally there and they several times told the Railway staff as a whole that they ought to give evidence of what they knew. He may have been one of the Railway staff who was told that. I do not know of him being individually told.  
 Q. Railway employees there were reluctant to give any names in the first stages ?  
 A. Yes, they did not give any names in the first stages.  
 Q. And is it not a fact that this man was flogged during those very days and that any information that was given by Railway servants was given after the flogging of Bhagat Ram ?  
 A. No, I believe evidence was given before the flogging.  
 Q. Do you remember that he failed to name or identify any persons ?  
 A. I do not remember any such thing.  
 Q. You mean as soon as he was asked he was willing enough to give out names and information ?  
 A. The Railway staff assembled at the identification and identified some people.  
 Q. Was Bhagat Ram one of them ?  
 A. He must have been.  
 Q. And was it before or after the flogging ?

2 December 1919.]

Mr. P. MARSDEN.

[Continued.]

A. I believe it was before the flogging; I am not certain on that point.

Q. Now you went to the village Khaira with the Military?

A. No, I don't think I did.

Q. Were you aware that any complaint was made by Bhagal Singh that his cash box was taken away by the party who came to his village?

A. Yes; if that is the village, I was present.

Q. That his property was damaged, his cash box taken away and subsequently returned through the Tahsildar with Rs. 250?

A. Yes.

Q. And this property was taken away by the soldiers?

A. Yes, one soldier was found to have stolen it.

Q. And this Bhagal Singh of Khaira was arrested and kept in the lock-up for 18 days?

A. I believe there was a man from there arrested. I cannot remember if he was kept for 18 days.

Q. Was he ever brought to trial and punished?

A. I do not know. The soldier who stole this was punished and dismissed from the Army as far as I remember.

Q. The saluting order was introduced in these villages?

A. There was no definite order.

Q. It was insisted on?

A. It was insisted on by officers.

Q. Although no such Martial Law order was issued?

A. No there was no Martial Law order.

Q. And the people were punished for not saluting, the villagers of Kasur?

A. I did not see any example of anybody being punished for not *salaaming*.

Q. Were people punished, I do not say prosecuted and convicted, who by mistake did not salute?

A. I know of no such cases.

Q. And was any proclamation made that now that Martial Law has been introduced the people should salute every officer?

A. I think the people very soon understood it; they naturally would know.

Q. Your village is very advanced; as soon as Martial Law is introduced the people would understand that it is necessary for them to salute every officer?

A. I should be very surprised if they did not salute a British officer.

Q. This man who was shot down and was found subsequently to be a deaf man, was that on account of a breach of the Curfew order?

A. The dumb man? No, he was shot down by the soldier because he challenged him and got no answer.

Q. It was a breach of the Curfew order?

A. No, the soldier did it as part of his duty. He was there on duty and this man, after being repeatedly challenged, attempted to make a dash for him as described and so he shot him.

Q. And it was not any breach of the Curfew order?

A. No, solely done by the sentry under suspicious circumstances.

Q. These Martial Law notices were also posted up in Kasur as in Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. And the grounds of selection of the houses for the notices was that the majority of the pleaders were those who were taking part in the disorders and so their houses were selected?

A. Not only their houses; we put up the notices on public gateways, and so on.

Q. But so far as houses were concerned, were not the houses of pleaders and those politically-minded selected?

A. Not those politically-minded, those concerned in the riots and disturbances.

Q. Were not the majority of pleaders' houses selected?

A. Not a majority, I cannot recollect but all sorts of people were chosen. There were a number of people among them.

Q. Also were the people of Kasur prevented from leaving the village without a permit?

A. Yes.

Q. And did any complaint come to your notice that, although in some cases permits were given by you, they were not honoured by the Military authorities?

A. Yes, I remember one case.

Q. And that one man was punished?

A. I believe there was a man punished. I remember the Military authorities found he had been cheating. He pretended to them that he had not been to anybody else, and they found out afterwards he had been to me all right. There was one some such case.

Q. Before the 16th of April you had nothing to do with recruiting at Kasur?

A. No.

Q. And therefore you have no personal knowledge as to how the recruiting campaign was carried on?

A. No, the Tahsildar could really tell you that; he is giving evidence, I think.

Q. I think you know one Sundar Dass, Kapur, a shop-keeper of Kasur?

A. I do not know him.

Q. Was he punished by the Martial Law authorities for the offence of theft?

A. I do not know.

Q. Was any old man between 60 and 70 years, a shop-keeper of your village, punished by the Martial Law authorities, flogged and sentenced to imprisonment, and as soon as he left the jail he died? Do you remember this incident?

A. No, I never heard of it.

Q. About these fancy punishments were you informed that one person named Kashur Das was made to draw lines with his nose?

A. On paper?

Q. No, on the ground?

A. No, I have not heard of that.

Q. Was any person awarded these fancy punishments for purchasing rice for more than Rs. 4?

A. No, I do not know of that.

Q. Were you informed that some *Arya Samajists* were arrested because they were *Arya Samajis's*, at Kasur?

A. Yes, not at Kasur, but at Patti the *Arya Samajists*, as I have said, had invited *Arya Samajist* lecturers and there were I believe about five or six *Arya Samajists* who were arrested because the police said that they had been promoting the disturbances.

Q. Was any evidence produced before you by the police or was that only an allegation of the police?

A. I actually saw the Police Inspector's report.

Q. Was the statement of any witness or the record of their speeches prepared?

A. Yes. He in his unofficial report made a memorandum of the speeches that were delivered.

Q. What is the worst thing that you remember about these lectures?

A. I have mentioned it already. "You can obey the King but you must not obey the King's servants," meaning the Government of India.

Q. That is the worst?

A. That is the worst that I know of.

Q. Anything else?

A. That he had invited them to take the *satyagraha* vow.

Q. When you say the Civil authorities were not able to check what was being done on the 12th it is not a fact that the Civil authorities were informed very late and practically when they arrived everything was over. So far as the Civil authorities were concerned the first information was given to them when the riot at the station had already finished?

A. It was not all over. The Tahsildar arrived when the mob first of all made their attack on the station buildings. Then he went away and brought the Sub-Divisional Officer; meanwhile the crowd went on doing damage.

Q. The damage was not done when the authorities were present at the station?

A. No.

2 December 1919.]

Mr. P. MARSDEN,

[Continued.]

Q. Similarly as to what happened at the Treasury, the Civil authorities arrived, and naturally seeing what was happening, the Sub-Divisional Officer ordered the police to fire on the mob.

A. When you say the Civil authorities were not present the whole of the police, I suppose, are included in the Civil—the whole of the police were present.

Q. But there was no Magistrate present. When he arrived he ordered the police to fire on the mob to disperse them?

A. When he arrived at the place he ordered the police to fire and the mob dispersed and after the dispersing of the mob seven or eight were present.

Q. There was also a Martial Law order promulgated saying that all those persons who were residents of Kasur must return within four days otherwise their property will be confiscated?

A. Yes.

Q. That was promulgated?

A. Yes.

Q. And you raised no objection to that?

A. No, I insisted on that. We wanted all the people who had run away to come back. We wanted them for the purpose of identification.

Q. You had not been able to ascertain the names of any of the outsiders who were present on the 12th?

A. Well, one man who, I think, was hanged. Duni Ram was present and he is really a man of Amritsar. Then there was another man who was identified by Mrs. Sherbourn. He was a *Sadhu* from Amritsar. These are the two names known to us.

Q. Except these two men there was nobody else?

A. No.

Q. Surely you do not consider this *Sadhu* to be a political leader of any place?

A. No, not a political leader.

Q. Is it not true that the mob which went to the Railway Station and did damage to the Telegraph Office—when they were going away somebody stood up and harangued them? Therefore from this I infer that the original intention of the mob was not to go and commit murder. They only went there for the purpose of doing damage to the Railway Station and when they were going back somebody harangued them and they came back again?

A. Yes.

Q. The object of the crowd in going to the station was that they thought some trains would be passing with passengers and they would then show the mourning ceremony, that was alleged?

A. Yes.

Q. That is, it might have been their intention to do certain damage to the Railway Station, but one of their objects would be to demonstrate to the passengers that they were against the Rowlatt Bill, so I take it that they wanted to meet the train?

A. They were going to show them this liberty funeral. They were brought back by that one man. He made a speech through the main entrance.

Q. Have you any record or is it your opinion that practically there were no villagers lying in wait who were concerned in what happened at Kasur?

A. I came to the conclusion that the zamindars as a whole were not affected but only the *badmash* element in the villages.

Q. Was it your opinion that there were traces of general rising in the villages or that gangs of men were lying in wait outside Kasur?

A. There were traces of it. I did not believe it personally. There was statement to that effect.

Q. Were not permits refused to pleaders, who wanted to go to appear in their cases outside Kasur?

A. Almost everybody was refused for a time. There were certainly some pleaders amongst them. I remember some cases of pleaders, and I remember some pleaders were allowed to go.

Q. On what ground was that restriction made? If a pleader was considered loyal he was allowed to go and if he was an agitator he was not allowed to go?

A. I do not think that was the general idea. Each case was considered on its merits—whether he was a pleader or not.

Q. To-day you have stated that the crowd were saying on the 12th "*Angrezi Raj khatm hogaya*" (Translation: British rule is finished.) May I know why this did not find a place in your report? You have described the other cries of the crowd, but this one which is rather important has been omitted. What is the reason for that? This expression is very seditious.

A. I have no doubt that they raised some cries there. I remember there were other cries.

Q. Was a villager shot down, when he began to run, by British soldiers?

A. I was informed about that. But he was threatening a soldier with a *lathi* when he was shot down.

Q. With regard to those persons who remained for a long time under arrest and were not brought to trial, were they too brought on the 1st of May for identification?

A. I think they were all brought. I cannot remember for certain.

Q. Were these people in Lahore or Kasur itself?

A. As far as I remember I asked the prisoners who had been sent to Lahore to be brought back again. We certainly had a large number brought back from Lahore.

Q. What evidence was there before you that those whom you described as riff-raff did this damage at the railway station? Have you got any names of the persons who were present?

A. We have got no such list.

Q. What was the reason why they committed these outrages at the station? You said, because they were excited by the speeches that were given by those pleaders. What evidence is there before you, that as a matter of fact those persons that committed these outrages were present at the lectures that were delivered?

A. There are two reasons. One is obviously a large number of the crowd must have been present and, secondly, the questioning of several accused. The crowd told the man who had made a speech "this is not what you told us yesterday."

Q. The crowd said that was the man who subsequently supplied milk and food to the Sherbourn family?

A. I do not think that was the man.

Q. That was the very man who was ordered to be hanged and on this very ground his sentence was commuted?

A. Yes.

Q. With regard to flogging you said the people outside the station could not see what was happening at the station. The flogging could only be seen from one side of the station. Supposing if any people were present on the other side they would be able to see what was happening?

A. They could have seen but there was nobody there.

Q. What was the last occasion so far as your Sub-Division was concerned on which any violence occurred? I think there was no violence after the 17th or 18th? Is it not so?

A. I think the 18th was the last.

Q. There was one other similar sort of occurrence in the Sub-Division some days later after the 18th.

A. The other occurrence was on the 23rd and after that there was no other occurrence.

Q. Now I want to know, except that a large number of persons were arrested on suspicion and a large number of them flogged and punished under Martial Law, what else did the Martial Law do in your Sub-Division in the matter of bringing about peace and order?

A. The presence of soldiers in the District outside Kasur helped to keep the *badmashes* in order. There were still a large number of *badmashes* about here still. There was obviously still danger to be feared.

Q. Now you all were searching villages some time afterwards. There were many rumours to the effect that there were large numbers of *badmashes* about to rise?

2 December 1919.]

MR. P. MARSDEN.

(Continued.)

A. Yes, we found weapons on several occasions in our searches. We found a number of *chassis*, an instrument which is commonly used by villagers.

Q. I think you will agree with me that there are lots of dacoits, there are lots of *badmashes* and there are people who are in possession of arms with a license?

A. Yes, it is a criminal offence to have arms without a license.

Q. Further on, I think, you will agree with me that if instead of inflicting the punishments described, you had had recourse to summary procedure and for every offence that was committed you prescribed flogging or shooting, the number of crimes would come down to a large extent? Would there be any reason for the maintenance of Martial Law? And that because there was Martial Law therefore there was a decrease in crime?

A. I did not find that crime had come down. I looked up the statistics and found that it had not diminished. I should say the reason was obviously the people. After they ran riot and attacked every European in the city and burnt down Government buildings and hunted down British soldiers they were mad. The presence of the troops prevented them from showing what they would otherwise have shown. I think it was dangerous to remove Martial Law at a time like that.

Q. That would be a reason for continuing Martial Law even now?

A. I think it would be a reason.

Q. You think it would have been far better if Martial Law had been continued even to this day?

A. I don't think that the people to-day are really of the spirit they should be, i.e., I don't think even now they have respect for Government, for Government officials and for European soldiers.

Q. In your opinion in order to enforce that respect the maintenance of Martial Law is absolutely necessary?

A. I consider that at any moment the situation is dangerous. If anybody were to go to Kasur to-day and advise the people to have *hartal*, they may rise at any moment.

Q. Even now the situation is the same?

A. I don't say it is the same, but still it is dangerous.

Q. Am I to understand that according to you, you do not approve of any of these political movements?

A. I entirely approve of all political movements, but I do not approve of keeping the crowds unoccupied by *hartals*. If they are kept unoccupied they are bound to do considerable mischief.

Q. Therefore you are not against political movements, but you are against *hartals*?

A. Quite so.

Q. Have you heard of *hartals* ever being practised before on different occasions?

A. Certainly. When war was declared I believe the Raja of Chamba declared *hartal* in his State.

Q. Further on you find that the *hartal* is declared on the occasions of deaths of certain important persons?

A. I have not heard of that.

Q. I think you are aware that *hartal* has been declared in India on various occasions as a sort of protest against grievances that are felt by any class of people?

A. Certainly in this connection I believe it has happened.

Q. Having regard to these facts and the statement which is before us, practically this *hartal* at Kasur was the effect of pressure that was brought to bear on the merchants at Kasur by dishonouring their *hundis* by outside merchants?

A. There was practically no *hartal* on the 6th.

Q. And so far as you know, there were no public meetings from the 1st January up to the 6th April?

A. No.

Q. And all of a sudden these occurrences took place because Mr. Gandhi was arrested on the 11th?

A. I don't say because he was arrested.

Q. That news was spread?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore what is your reason for supposing that this *hartal* would have continued for any length of time?

A. Anybody in the Punjab knew that it was to go on indefinitely. There was no reason why it should not go on indefinitely.

Q. Up to what time, do you mean for months and years?

A. Absolutely indefinitely so long as the Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act was in force.

Q. Do you think it would have been to the interest of the shopkeepers to continue it?

A. I think it would have been foolish even from their own point of view.

Q. Notwithstanding that, it would have continued in Kasur?

A. In other places they went on doing it, day after day.

Q. Whatever was effected in Kasur, could not that have been effected only by the aid of the military without having recourse to Martial Law ordinances?

A. No. Martial Law notices enjoined certain things to keep the people quiet and prevent them from committing mischief.

Q. Perhaps I have not made my point clear. Supposing what you say is true, then the only difference would have been that instead of these people having been tried summarily they might have been tried under the Criminal Procedure Code and there would have been no Martial Law ordinances. May I understand that according to you the Martial Law orders which were promulgated in Kasur were effective in maintaining peace and order even with the help of the military?

A. No, I think with the help of the military we could have maintained order.

Q. Therefore if military aid was available, why was there any necessity for proclaiming Martial Law?

A. Martial Law was proclaimed over the whole district. The danger was outside Kasur as well as in Kasur and near to Kasur. As I said, the communications were absolutely cut and things for a time came to a standstill, every head-quarter was being isolated. It was an absolute state of rebellion against Government. Therefore nothing but the declaration of Martial Law could have brought about safety, and I may say that not only Europeans but Indians themselves were getting very much alarmed at the state of things prevailing then.

Q. Now rebellion consisted in the fact which you have stated before us. There may be two opinions whether there was a rebellion or not, but leaving aside the introduction of the word 'rebellion,' I want to know what did the introduction of Martial Law notices and the change of procedure bring about?

A. A stable population.

Q. And could you not have achieved that end with the aid of the military?

A. Certainly not. The trials would have dragged on. We would not have had enough force really to investigate cases properly, specially out in the villages.

Q. So practically the whole thing was being done by the police and the military was supplying an escort?

A. That was practically the thing.

Q. The whole investigation was carried on by the police?

A. Yes.

Q. Remands were applied for by the police?

A. Yes.

Q. The arrests were made by the police?

A. Yes, the arrests were made by the police assisted by the military.

Q. Therefore the only duty of the military was to supply an escort?

A. That was not the only duty.

Q. So far as arrests in the investigation of cases were concerned?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore the only change brought about by the Martial Law was in regard to the procedure in the matter of trials?

A. As regards the trials that was the only change.

2 December 1919.]

Mr. P. MARSDEN.

[Continued.]

Q. And instead of having experienced Magistrates, anybody and everybody was appointed to exercise the powers of a first class Magistrate. A large number of persons were authorised to exercise the powers of a first-class Magistrate?

A. What persons?

Q. All the Area Officers and others?

A. There was one officer, the Martial Law administrator in Lahore, who was given the power of a first class Magistrate in that way.

Q. Is it not a fact that the Martial Law order was promulgated only in the city of Kasur and that it was not proclaimed in any other place?

A. As far as I remember, it was proclaimed outside Kasur.

Q. Was it?

A. As far as I remember, but I am not certain. The Tahsildar who will give evidence may be able to tell you that. It was promulgated through him by the military authorities. I believe it was promulgated at all *thanas* and railway stations and at various other places, as far as I remember.

Q. So far as your sub-division is concerned, it was only at Khem Karan and at Pattu that anything happened?

A. What do you mean by "anything"?

Q. Any disturbance or any wire cutting, any burning of building, etc.?

A. Wire cutting was done at various places. At Kot Radha Kishen stones were thrown at a passing train and wires were cut at various different places.

Q. If I remember rightly, only one or two stones were thrown at a passing train?

A. That is all.

Q. Do you think this has never happened up to this time anywhere in India and does it not happen every month and at every place?

A. It often happens.

Q. Therefore, because during the Martial Law period a stone was thrown at a passing train at Kot Radha Kishen, according to you that was a proof of a state of rebellion?

A. That was one of the things which showed which way the wind was blowing.

Q. So far as Patti is concerned, it was one of the sweepers who went there and instigated certain riff-raffs to loot the station? What happened at Patti?

A. All the towns folk rose, several hundreds of people rose.

Q. What did they do?

A. At Patti they did very much the same thing as they did at Kasur station. They destroyed the telegraph wires and tried to damage the line and damaged the station property.

Q. This was done on what date?

A. That was on the evening of the 12th April.

Q. Therefore I want to know if anything happened after the 18th in your sub-division?

A. Something happened, wire continued to be cut after that date.

Q. You have already informed us that after the 18th there was no wire cutting?

A. You said after the 18th.

Q. After the 18th?

A. The only incident I can remember is that the road from Amritsar to Kasur was tunnelled one day.

Q. You may take it from me that throughout the whole of the Punjab after the 18th or 19th except on the 23rd, no disturbances took place, and there was no cutting wires?

A. That happened between the 10th and 18th.

Q. Therefore I would like to know your reasons why, even supposing Martial Law was necessary in the first stages of the disturbances, it was necessary to continue it after the 20th or 30th April?

A. Because the same causes that had caused these disturbances were still in existence: the Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act were still in existence; Mr. Gandhi was still in existence.

Q. I think the Crimes Act is still in existence, but I have not yet heard that Mr. Gandhi is dead.

A. You have heard me say that the situation is still dangerous for that reason.

Q. In your opinion it would be more advisable to continue Martial Law?

A. I should feel it much safer at Kasur if it had continued there.

Q. I think you are one of those who are strongly of opinion that so far as India is concerned the maintenance of peace and order depends upon the enforcement of Martial Law and the Government should always be ready with strong measures?

A. It should be ready, certainly.

Q. And that the maintenance of peace and order so far as India is concerned would depend on the use of force?

A. Ultimately all authority depends on force.

Q. Of course that proposition I know, but I want to know whether, so far as India is concerned, you are of opinion that the maintenance of peace and order depends upon the use of force and on strong measures with which Government should always be ready?

A. That is the case with every country.

Q. That being the case in every country, have you ever found that Martial Law has been introduced in any other European country under similar circumstances?

A. I did not say that Martial Law is always necessary, but I said that ultimately all authority depends on force.

Q. Are you against or in favour of the Khilafat movement?

A. How do you mean that I am in favour of the Khilafat movement?

(This question was not pursued further.)

Q. Do you know anything about the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908?

A. No, nothing specially.

Q. Anything general about it, do you know with what it deals?

A. I really forget what it was.

Q. Being a Magistrate entrusted with the liberties and lives of the Indian public, you don't think that there is anything to blame, in your not knowing, and still you blame the pleaders for not knowing the actual sections of the Rowlatt Act?

A. I had not come to India at that time. When I came to India I accepted the Indian Criminal Law as I found it.

Q. When did you arrive in India?

A. In 1912.

Q. Surely from 1912 up to the time the occurrences took place at Kasur you were exercising the powers of a first class Magistrate?

A. I should accept the Criminal Procedure Code as I found it. I am not a student of Jurisprudence.

Q. Certainly you accepted it as you found it, but how is it that you do not know what were the important amendments that were made between 1908 and 1915 in the Indian Penal Code?

A. I do not quite see the point of your question.

Q. My point is, I want to know what grounds you have for blaming the pleaders and saying that they are not conversant with the provisions of the Rowlatt Act and whether or not, entrusted as you are with the lives and liberties of the Indian people and being a Magistrate of the 1st class, you know the provisions of the Act with which you have to deal every day?

A. Of course I do. As regards the first part of your question, that was obviously a Bill which was very much before the public and what was causing excitement and the pleaders were actually making speeches on it. If I was making a speech on the Criminal Law Amendment Act I should certainly have taken the trouble to acquaint myself with its contents.

Q. Do you think the making of a speech is a more responsible task than trying persons for criminal offences?

2 December 1919.]

Mr. P. MARSDEN.

[Continued.]

A. I say that if pleaders are making a statement about law and if these pleaders are going to make out that it is a terrible thing for liberty, naturally people get excited.

Q. You have not any evidence before you that anything was said which was against the provisions of the Rowlatt Act and which was meant for the purpose of inciting the public; rather if I understand you in any way, you said that at least two of them were there and they were trying to pacify the crowd and they advised them that they should not adopt a disorderly attitude.

A. Quite so, I said so.

(The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin asked the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan what the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1914 was. Pandit Jagat Narayan in reply explained that by the application of the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1914 seditious meetings and unlawful assemblies could be prohibited.)

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin:—I have not the faintest notion of the Criminal Law Amendment Act.

The Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan:—It is Act XIV of 1908.)

Q. Therefore when you say that you are in favour of political movements, may I know what your idea is, what should the pleaders do if they want to agitate on any matter, because you have described them in your report as seditious and you have called them rebels? I would like to know how you would like them to agitate provided in your opinion they may not be seditious or rebels?

A. I should say that those who are interested should meet together in some place and discuss the law and consider it and discuss whatever they want to discuss, and if they want to send a petition to Government, send it.

Q. Is it not general practice that before arresting persons under normal conditions the police investigate the case, collect some evidence and after that the man is arrested, and if they think that in a day or week some more evidence will be available they apply for a remand?

A. Yes, that is the normal procedure.

Q. Rather I think that in 80 per cent. of cases there are no remands?

A. Well, in most important criminal law cases there are usually one or two remands.

Q. I am talking of 80 per cent. of cases?

A. I have never looked up the actual percentage.

Q. Do you think that the application for remands is a normal thing?

A. In big criminal cases it is a normal thing.

Q. When the investigation is to be carried on in different provinces?

A. Well, in any fair sized dacoity case, sometimes it takes the police several months. In the conspiracy case in the Punjab, the *Komagata Maru* case some years ago, there were numberless remands.

Q. Conspiracy cases?

A. Not only. In big cases the police cannot finish investigations in 15 days sometimes.

Q. Where was the need of keeping that old man who was arrested because he was an agitator for so many days? What further evidence was available?

A. I have already explained that in his case he left Kasur and was at Lahore, and it was really for the Punjab Government to pass orders. There was no actual evidence against him of having committed the riot.

Q. Even in the case of the other pleaders, what further evidence was available?

A. Well, as I said, the actual evidence against them was existing, and until they were released the idea was that they should be tried after 8 days in one case, and in the other case after 15 days. When I found that nobody identified them and when I put all the facts that were available together I thought the evidence was false and so they were released.

By Major General Sir George Barrow—

Q. Mr. Marsden, I see you are an advocate of Martial Law. I will only trouble you by asking you one or two questions about Martial Law. Do you consider that Martial Law, with the military called in to assist the civil power, would have any more than a local effect?

A. Certainly, more than a local effect in the actual place where the military was residing.

Q. If you have military brought in to assist the civil power in a certain place, does that have more than a local effect?

A. Yes, the people in the surrounding places would realise. It would have an effect of course all through the neighbouring districts.

Q. Do you think it would have the same effect as Martial Law?

A. No, not the same effect. Under Martial Law the procedure is much more speedy. In an average criminal case every criminal has got 100 per cent. chances of getting off. Under Martial Law they have to give reasons at once in their defence, so that it is very much harder.

Q. Therefore Martial Law has really a much greater effect than the introduction of the military to assist the civil power?

A. Because they know that the Military officers administer the law.

Q. It therefore has a very wide moral effect?

A. Yes.

Q. I believe it is recognised in all countries that where the Civil Law cannot control the situation Martial Law can be introduced?

A. I believe that is the idea.

Q. Martial Law has been applied not only in India but in other countries as well where a similar state of circumstances arose?

A. I believe it was applied in Ireland, France, and in England too.

Q. You said no disturbances practically occurred after the 19th. Might that be attributed to a certain extent to the fact that Martial Law had been introduced?

A. I think that was the entire reason.

Q. As regards the two Warrant Officers who had been murdered, you said that they lost their heads and fired off two or three rounds without doing any damage. Now that statement can be taken in two ways, either that the act of firing showed that they lost their heads or that having fired they did not hit anybody? Which interpretation do you put on it?

A. I think that when they were actually stoned and when the crowd was threatening them, they became alarmed and fired off either two or three or more rounds, but the crowd were not as a matter of fact at a range close enough, they were about 40 to 60 yards off, and that is why no damage was done.

Q. Why I ask you that question is everybody who has experience of such a situation would believe it a most natural thing for a man to let off two or three rounds at the time?

A. Yes. But I did not mean that they lost their heads for letting off two or three rounds, I meant to say that they were rather too far away.

Q. You say that the soldiers' behaviour was very good as a rule?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you have any other instances of breach of discipline beyond that case you stated of a cash box having been stolen?

A. I don't think there were any other cases. I remember one case and that was the only case. I think once a shop-keeper accused a soldier of entering his shop and taking some goods away not at the shop-keeper's prices. An enquiry was held, but the shop-keeper could not identify any one, but I remember no other case at all of a breach of discipline.

Q. Was this soldier who stole the cash box punished?

2 December 1919.]

Mr. P. MAESDEN.

[Continued.]

A. I think he was given a long term of imprisonment and dismissed from the army. Colonel McRae will give evidence on that.

Q. As regards these floggings, I would like your opinion whether they are not administered under Civil Law too under similar circumstances?

A. Yes.

Q. But was there any other form of punishment than floggings which could have been as effectively used to meet the situation in the cases to which it was applied?

A. No, that is the most effective.

Q. Was there any other way of punishing instead of flogging which could have been equally effective? If you had to revise Martial Law regulations or administer Martial Law and you wanted to do away with flogging, what form of punishment would you suggest?

A. Well, I think that is the best form of punishment, because it is speedy as well as effective under the circumstances. Of course extremely heavy fines might possibly meet the case.

Q. Of course the class of people to whom flogging was administered, could hardly meet such heavy fines.

A. I think that is the best punishment because it is speedy as well as effective. If you wanted to have a longer punishment, it would be effective, but this is more speedy and I think this is the best under the circumstances.

Q. Is there no other punishment which would be equal to this?

A. Extremely heavy punishments might possibly meet the case. The class of people to whom flogging was given could not pay the fines.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. There is just one point which has to be cleared up, though you have been questioned already on it. As far as you know before the crowd murdered the two warrant officers at the railway station, had two men of that crowd in fact been killed?

A. No.

Q. Do you think it likely that the crowd believed that two of their men had been killed?

A. No.

Q. Do you think there is any possible excuse or explanation to be found for the murder in any such rumours?

A. There is absolutely no excuse.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. Do I understand that after the introduction of Martial Law, the Civil authorities continued to work in conjunction with the Military authorities in the various measures that were taken?

A. Yes.

Q. The Military Commander was in sufficient touch with you and he was advised by you in the measures that he took?

A. Yes.

Q. In this report of yours you say "Persons accused in connection with the Kasur and Khem Karan riots were tried by the Special Tribunals at Lahore; and also one man accused of abetting rebellion and of spreading false reports from Khalra in Kasur Sub-Division."

A. Yes.

Q. There was one man who was run in for abetting rebellion and for spreading false reports?

A. Yes.

Q. Was anybody else also run in for the specific offence of rebellion?

A. Yes, I think a large number of the people tried before the Martial Law commission were tried under the rebellion clause.

Q. The charge was rebellion against a good number? The section does not matter.

A. Yes.

Q. People were in a state of rebellion in Kasur?

A. Yes, certainly.

Q. In other words, there was an organized movement to overthrow constituted authority?

A. I conclude that because all the Government buildings were attacked and looted.

Q. You came to that conclusion because there was an organized attempt or movement against constituted authority?

A. Yes, and of course the *hartal* itself was made to paralyse Government and communications were destroyed.

Q. Outside these disturbances that took place, that is, the burning of the kutcheri and the post office and the cutting of wires, and so on, was there any other evidence before you to make you conclude that there was any conspiracy or organization for that purpose?

A. Not beyond what I mentioned.

Q. There were only these occurrences and from these you concluded that there was an organized movement with that object?

A. I remember near Kasur there was a man who had been suspected of political movement in connection with Afghanistan. Effort was made to arrest him some years ago, but he escaped.

Q. There might be men suspected like that. I am not considering that now. My question related to whether there was any organized movement.

A. None beyond what I mentioned.

Q. Also as regards these rumours, did they relate to a period which was antecedent to the introduction of Martial Law? Some people were run in for spreading false rumours and reports.

A. Where is it mentioned?

Q. It is mentioned in your report (not statement) under the heading 'judicial proceedings.'

A. Yes, one man was accused of that. He was in a village about 25 miles from Kasur.

Q. Was he run in for spreading false reports during the time before the introduction of Martial Law?

A. I think so.

Q. As regards flogging of certain boys, you did not give any reason why they were flogged. There was no complaint from the Head Master of the school about his boys. What was the reason for flogging these boys?

A. The reason was it was understood that all these boys of both schools behaved very badly at the riots. On the 12th all the boys were in the riot. It was understood that all the boys at the M. B. School were still in an uncontrollable state. We also wanted to see in what state the boys of the Islamia School were.

Q. In your report, the reason given for punishing the boys of the M. B. School is that the Head Master complained that the boys were still not obeying his orders?

A. Yes.

Q. There was no such complaint from the other school?

A. No.

Q. Why were they also called and why were they flogged?

A. We called up the two schools and came to the conclusion that they were likely to give trouble.

Q. To prevent them from giving trouble, they were punished?

A. Quite so.

Q. They did not do anything to deserve punishment. It was only to prevent them for the future that you punished them?

A. Yes.

Q. That was the reason why you selected three and flogged them?

A. Not quite that, because, as I say, one school was reporting that the boys were still being insubordinate.

Q. Necessarily it follows that the other school also is in the same position?

A. We knew that the boys of the other school had taken part in the riot, and we wanted to see how they were behaving also.

Q. I understood you to say that there was a general belief in the Punjab that the *hartal* was going to be made indefinitely. Did I hear you correctly?

A. That was my idea, I was giving that.

Q. Was that belief held by the general people in the Punjab, by officials only or by the public also?



2 December 1919.]

Mr. P. MARSDEN.

[Continued.]

A. I think we all knew it and felt that it was going on indefinitely.

Q. Was it indefinite throughout the Punjab?

A. It was never throughout the Punjab. It was going on in these parts where it was going on, South Punjab chiefly.

Q. Are you aware as to the numbers of places where the *hartal* was observed in the Punjab on the 6th?

A. I cannot tell you the numbers. It was observed in a good number of places.

Q. Was there complaint in places outside the area of Martial Law?

A. Yes.

Q. Did it continue there indefinitely?

A. No; I think the effect of Martial Law in some of the places in the Punjab prevented the *hartal* continuing elsewhere, because they thought that Martial Law would also come there if they continued the *hartal*.

Q. Did the *hartal* of the 6th continue anywhere beyond the 6th?

A. The *hartal* of the 6th became the *hartal* of the 7th. There was a *hartal* again on the 12th.

Q. The *hartal* stopped after the 6th. Did it continue in other places and for how many days?

A. I have not got the facts, but I know it did continue some time.

Q. It did not exist on the 10th anywhere? So far as the evidence before this committee goes, there was no *hartal* beyond the 6th except the ones at Lahore and other places?

A. I believe it took place in unaffected areas outside.

Q. In Amritsar it did not go beyond the 6th. I was under that impression. For instance, take these worst places, Ambala for instance? Was there any *hartal* on the 10th?

A. I think it was there on the 8th, 9th and 10th, but I would not swear to that.

Q. It was from the 6th up to the 10th?

A. Yes, as far as I remember.

Q. When did it stop?

A. I cannot recollect; about the 14th.

Q. My reason is if it had not continued beyond the 15th, it could not have been stopped by Martial Law, because Martial Law had not come before the 15th.

A. I cannot remember actually.

Q. I think perhaps the serious consequences of the *hartal* at Amritsar had some effect in other places?

A. When the crowd was fired upon in Amritsar, I think it had widespread effect.

Q. You said there was no effect on the 6th?

A. Elsewhere people were very careful.

Q. There was the condition of Martial Law threatening the *hartal* beyond the 16th. In other places still there was *hartal* for a longer time?

A. That is what I believe, as far as I remember. I have not come to give evidence on that point.

Q. In answer to General Barrow you have stated that Martial Law was more effective because the procedure was more speedy?

A. Yes.

Q. Does it not mean in other words because Martial Law is striking terror by speedy procedure and by punishments?

A. Yes.

Q. That is the idea?

A. That is part of the idea.

Q. By terrifying people against committing offences?

A. Yes.

Q. You were also asked about Martial Law in other countries and in Ireland?

A. Yes. I should think it happened in all European countries.

Q. When was Martial Law introduced in Ireland? Have you read about it or have you any personal knowledge?

A. I have no personal knowledge.

Q. Were you in Ireland at all at any time?

A. I have never been in Ireland.

Q. And as you do not know the conditions under which Martial Law was introduced in Ireland?

A. I know nothing at all.

Q. You cannot therefore say whether the conditions were the same as those in Punjab?

A. No. I cannot say.

Q. Similarly you do not know anything about the conditions under which Martial Law was introduced in France?

A. No.

Q. The same applies to Germany?

A. Yes.

Q. As regards the railway station incidents, you said that the crowd was at a distance of 40 or 50 yards from the place and therefore they were not hit by revolver shots?

A. Yes.

Q. We have been told that stones reached that distance, i.e., the distance from the crowd to the train?

A. The soldiers were hit by stones possibly. I made a mistake in stating that the distance was 60 yards. It may have been only 35 or 40.

Q. You will agree with me that stone throwing by hand from a body of men will not go the same distance as a bullet from a revolver?

A. No.

Q. So if the stones could go as far as the train, the bullets would also strike the crowd?

A. One man was wounded and I mentioned that.

Q. Was there any gallows erected outside the station at Kasur?

A. Yes, just outside the station.

Q. With the object of hanging people there?

A. With the object of hanging people who committed murders.

Q. That was also to strike terror?

A. Yes. I cannot say what the object was. I only say that would be the effect.

Q. If that was not the object, I do not see why it should have been erected?

A. I think that should be the object, just as you think. I did not give the orders. That would be the effect.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. At the time when these happenings took place at Kasur, was there any European official in charge there?

A. There was no European.

Q. You said that you held enquiries into these matters. Did your enquiries satisfy you that the Europeans were attacked there without any provocation whatever?

A. There was no provocation whatever.

Q. Then you were telling us about the cries of the mob at the tahsil?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there cries other than that which you named about British *Raj* having gone? Will you tell us what other cries were heard?

A. I am not certain, but as far as I remember, I was told that they mentioned Satyapal, the man at Amritsar. I think that was one of the cries that I was told. I do not recollect more, but there were a whole lot of cries.

Q. About whipping, is it an exceptional kind of punishment in normal conditions in the Punjab?

A. Whipping, in itself, is not abnormal so far as Kasur is concerned. I never saw it. It was done with a rope in Military fashion. It was more severe than that with a rattan as is done in jails.

Q. So far as sentences in Kasur are concerned, are they not carried out in public in ordinary times outside the sub-jail?

A. I believe it is so, but I have never seen any whipping done in normal conditions.

Q. Surely it is done there still?

A. I had better not answer that question. The Police will tell you.

Q. Public flogging does not seem to be exceptional in the Punjab?

A. It was not done under Martial Law only.

2 December 1919.]

Mr. P. MARSDEN—concluded—Mr. TARA SINGH NARULA.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Is there any authority for flogging in the ordinary course in the Punjab other than the Whipping Act which applies to the whole of India? There is no special legislation?

A. No.

Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate:—I might mention that 600 to 700 floggings are meted out in a year in the Punjab.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin:—Cases that come under the Whipping Act?

Mr. Herbert Government Advocate:—Yes.

Mr. TARA SINGH NARULA, Bar-at-Law, Kasur.

By the President—

Q. You are a Barrister, I think at Kasur?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think you were resident in Kasur about the time when the riots took place?

A. I was at Kasur on that day.

Q. Up to the 11th, was Kasur absolutely quiet?

A. Yes, up to the 11th, there was absolute quiet.

Q. On the 11th when was the *hartal* declared?

A. I came to know about it at about 3 P.M.

Q. Was there a meeting held in the evening?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you present at that meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. Who spoke at that meeting?

A. Speeches were made by Messrs. Uma Dutt, Ghulam Mohi-ud-din and Seth Mohan Lal, supported by several other gentlemen.

Q. Were those speeches of an inflammatory nature?

A. I do not think so.

Q. At the end of the meeting was any question put as to whether there should be *hartal* the next day?

A. Several people asked Ghulam Mohi-ud-din whether there should be *hartal* the next day. He replied that it was their own business. If anybody wanted to close his shop, he could close it. It was not his business.

Q. That was said by Ghulam Mohi-ud-din?

A. Yes. That was his reply.

Q. Then did he say also anyone was free to do just as he liked?

A. I heard one saying "now that the flatterers have left, let us decide the matter among ourselves."

Q. As you were leaving the meeting, did anyone get on the table?

A. One of them, Nadir Shah, got on the table and he said "now that the flatterers have left, let us decide the matter among ourselves."

Q. Whom did he refer to as flatterers?

A. Probably those who were delivering speeches first.

Q. Was any decision come to afterwards?

A. It was decided to send telegrams to His Excellency the Viceroy about the withdrawal of the Rowlatt Act and perhaps to the Secretary of State for India. Telegrams were arranged to be sent.

Q. Was anything else resolved?

A. Nothing else.

Q. You mention that after these gentlemen left the meeting Nadir Shah got on the table and made certain remarks to the effect that as the flatterers had gone, they should decide among themselves. Was anything resolved?

A. I only heard him say so.

Q. You did not hear the meeting being dissolved?

A. No.

Q. In point of fact, there was *hartal* on the next day, i.e., the 12th?

A. Yes.

Q. We know that there was a lot of damage done. Were you near the Railway station on that day?

A. No.

Q. Did you go at about 10-30?

A. Yes.

Q. You were not there when the disturbances took place?

A. I reached the station after the disturbances.

Q. About what time did you get there?

A. About say 10-30.

Q. Did a wounded man meet you on the way?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was that?

A. I cannot say.

Q. What was he?

A. He was on a charpoy and was carried away by people.

Q. When you reached the Railway Station, were you put in charge of a wounded English gentleman?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was that gentleman?

A. I do not know.

Q. When you were in charge of that gentleman, did anyone make any attempt to attack him?

A. Some 10 or 12 persons came armed with *dangs*. They wanted to kill him. But on my telling and threatening them that it was no use they went away.

Q. I think about this time the post office was put on fire?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you do when you saw that?

A. When I was there the Assistant Surgeon was coming and a constable came there also. At that time I left them and I went to see the Sub-Divisional Officer who had gone to Court. There I met the Sub-Divisional Officer and came back. We learnt that the Post Office was on fire. Then we were told that the mob was going toward the Mission House. The Sub-Divisional Officer asked me to get my tonga and I got my tonga.

Q. Did you learn then that the ladies and girls of the Mission House had come to the District Superintendent of Police's house?

A. After taking my tonga, I went there and the ladies had been removed from the Mission House.

Q. Were you then asked to go and disperse the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you go towards the Munsif's Court?

A. Yes, with the Tahsildar and two constables.

Q. Did you try to persuade the people to go away?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the effect of your persuasion?

A. I saw some people whom I persuaded still going forward; and several people who were afraid of us concealed themselves in the fields, etc. No body would like to go back. When I saw it was of no use, the Naib-Tahsildar and I came back to the District Superintendent of Police and reported the matter.

Q. Did the mob do anything there?

A. At that time they were going from the city towards the Munsif's Court.

Q. They would not be advised by you to go back?

A. No.

Q. Did they set fire to the Munsif's Court?

A. Not in my presence.

Q. After you left, they set it on fire?

A. After we left, they set fire.

Q. Did they also attempt to put the tahsil gate on fire?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you hear orders being given to fire?

A. The Sub-Divisional Officer gave orders to fire.

Q. Did you hear the orders given?

A. Yes.

Q. At the time when orders were given to fire, were the crowd engaged in these acts?

A. The crowd tried to set fire to a *chappar* and put it before the tahsil gate. Their backs were on our side. We were near the petition-writer's place.

Q. Had the crowd refused to refrain from these acts of lawlessness and violence before the firing?

2 December 1919.]

Mr. TARA SINGH NARULA.

[Continued.]

A. The second time that I went with the Sub-Divisional Officer, we did not try to persuade the people, and I do not think it was any use to do so.

Q. It was no use trying ?

A. They were determined.

Q. Were some arrests made on the spot in connection with that incident ?

A. Several arrests were made.

Q. I think you made one yourself ?

A. Yes.

Q. So far as the administration of Martial Law is concerned, have you yourself any cause of complaint ?

A. Martial Law was proclaimed in Kasur on the 16th April. Martial Law means practically the will of the commander. It is better not to meddle with that affair. So I was always at home or in the Court. So I do not know anything or much about Martial Law.

Q. You do not know ?

A. Except in one case when I was engaged for a prosecution. I went and asked Captain Doveton to allow me to appear for the prosecution. He allowed me to do so. He was of course kind. That is the whole thing.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Was this prosecution before the Military court at Kasur or outside ?

A. At Kasur, at the railway station.

Q. It was a case which had to be defended before the Martial Law court. Did you appear for the prosecution ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Who was prosecuting in that case ? Was it a private prosecution ?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the complaint ?

A. The complaint related, if I mistake not, to an old woman ; her daughter was carried away by some man and of course the charge was "breach of peace."

Q. You actually were present at the railway station on the 12th. When you arrived there is it the case that all the worst incidents had happened ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You say that 10 or 12 persons armed with *dangs* attacked an English gentleman ?

A. Yes, Sir. He was an English gentleman, who was wounded and who died.

Q. A military man ?

A. Yes.

Q. A Volunteer Officer ?

A. I cannot say.

Q. He had stripes in his arms ?

A. Yes, Sir. I can tell you he died at 4 P.M.

Q. You say they were armed with *dangs* ? What are *dangs* ?

A. Long sticks.

Q. Same as *lathi* ?

A. Same thing.

Q. Later on the same day you were present at the actual firing from the Munsif's Court ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I do not want to go into details. I gather from what you say as eyewitness that before the time the order was given to fire, the time the police fired the crowd were in a thoroughly rebellious mood and thoroughly deserved the firing ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. It was absolutely necessary to fire ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. They were still persistent in trying to set fire to buildings and in refusing to go away ?

A. After the firing they went away.

Q. Nothing short of firing on them would disperse them ?

A. I think so.

Q. Did they get a good dose of it ?

A. They began to run away.

Q. Was it a good firing or a straggling firing ?

A. Very few shots were fired. They began to run away, and the D. S. P. tried to arrest them, then he gave orders to cease firing.

Q. As far as you could see, did the D. S. P. wait as long as possible before giving orders to fire ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. He exercised all reasonable patience ?

A. Yes, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You were appearing on behalf of the old woman ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Her complaint was that her daughter was kidnapped ? What was her complaint ?

A. If you like I will give it in detail.

Q. In full detail. What was her complaint ?

A. That her daughter has been carried away by some man.

Q. Did she give the name of this man ?

A. She did.

Q. How many persons were accused in that case ?

A. I think 11 or 12.

Q. How many were convicted ?

A. Nobody.

Q. And that woman was all alone with her daughter when she was carried away ?

A. I do not think so. There was I think her husband or some other relative was with her. The woman, her daughter and one other person.

Q. Husband ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. The husband did not complain ?

A. It was not her husband ; it was some relative, I think.

Q. I won't trouble with that.

A. Thank you.

Q. Was hurt caused to anybody ? To whom ?

A. I think there were some injuries upon the woman. It was said that her daughter also got injuries.

Q. Where did you file your complaint ?

A. I did not file the complaint.

Q. And you considered it a case of kidnapping or abduction ?

A. I thought so.

Q. Therefore it was not under section 107, Criminal Procedure Code ?

A. She had already filed the complaint.

Q. What was your opinion ?

A. It came under section 107.

Q. Who was appearing on the other side ?

A. Maulvi Ghulam Mohi-ud-din.

Q. At that time he was not arrested ?

A. He was afterwards discharged.

Q. This was all after he was discharged ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Now, you were present at that meeting ; it would be wrong to say that Seth Mohan Lal delivered any inflammatory or inciting speech ?

A. I have already given that opinion. I do not think his speech was inflammatory.

Q. Then, is it a fact that this Uma Dutt and Ghulam Mohi-ud-din in that meeting exhorted the crowd not to use violence or to be disorderly ?

A. Yes ; they did say so.

Q. I believe you were not present in your house during the Martial Law period ?

A. Only in court, or to obey Martial Law orders whenever I was called to the Railway Station.

Q. Therefore the courts were not closed ?

A. No.

Q. I forgot to ask you about something in the case in which you appeared. Where was this woman living when this abduction did take place ? Not at the Railway Station ?

A. No, Sir.

Q. It was inside the city or *mohalla* ?

A. Somewhere in Kasur Tahsil.

Q. Is it not at the Railway Station ?

2 December 1919.]

Mr. TARA SINGH NARULA.

[Continued.]

A. No.

Q. It was in the city ?

A. In some village.

Q. Previous to this, was there any public meeting held in Kasur ? May I know as to whether there was a meeting which was advertised by Seth Mohan Lal whom the shopkeepers asked to deliver a speech—and he delivered it ?

A. I do not think it was advertised by 3 P.M. There was no sign of any *hartal* being declared. I remember that this meeting was held to keep the mob in order by the leaders.

Q. The *hartal* was declared in Kasur at 3 P.M. on the 11th ?

A. It may have been earlier.

Q. This meeting was held about 5-30 in the evening and the object of the meeting was to pacify the crowd, that they might not do any disorderly thing ?

A. That is what I think.

Q. There was no *hartal* previous to this ?

A. No.

Q. And before this, was any public meeting held in Kasur in 1919 ?

A. I do not think so.

Q. You do not think there was any meeting ?

A. No, not to my knowledge.

Q. So far as Seth Mohan Lal, Uma Dutt and Mohi-ud-din are concerned, you did not hear them deliver any speech in 1919 except on that date, the 11th, to the public ?

A. No, Sir.

Q. I think you know them very well ?

A. Certainly.

Q. Are they seditionists or extremists or anarchists ?

A. I cannot tell you of their political views.

Q. I am not talking of political views. Having known them for many years, they being your brother professionals. I want to know what you considered of them.

A. I think Ghulam Mohi-ud-din and Seth Mohan Lal are reasonable men. I know nothing about Uma Dutt, he being a shopkeeper.

Q. So far as Mohi-ud-din and Seth Mohan Lal are concerned, you know they are reasonable men ?

A. Yes.

Q. Is there a great deal of political life in Kasur ?

A. I do not think there is any political life in Kasur.

Q. How many years have you been practising in Kasur ?

A. Since December 1912.

Q. Therefore you have an experience of 7 years. ?

A. Six years.

Q. You belong to what place ?

A. Gujranwala District.

Q. So far as your experience is concerned you can say whether Kasur is a centre of political activity ?

A. No.

Q. And even this *hartal* is the result of following suit with other places, and so Kasur followed it ?

A. You cannot say that, because if it were universal, the *hartal* would have been declared on the 6th, but it was declared on the 12th; there are some other reasons.

Q. So, I see even Kasur was not prepared to follow suit, and some pressure was brought to bear upon it ?

A. This was the rumour.

Q. Leaving aside the pleaders, so far as the shopkeepers and other classes are concerned, has there been a great deal of political activity or agitation among these ?

A. No.

Q. Now, I think you know how Martial Law was administered. When you were coming from and going to court, you must have heard of persons known to you being arrested from day to day, from time to time ?

A. I heard a lot; but personal knowledge I have none.

Q. Do you know of the old shopkeeper named Sunder Das in Kasur ?

A. I do not know.

Q. Do you know of any man who was punished by being made to draw lines on the ground with his nose ?

A. No, Sir.

Q. You never heard of any fancy punishment that was awarded to any of the persons ?

A. No, Sir.

Q. You never heard of any persons being shot ?

A. I heard it; I heard there were 4, but afterwards I found out it was only one.

Q. Do you consider your clerk or *munshi* to be a man who dabbles in sedition ?

A. No.

Q. There are no *munshis* or clerks who are seditionists and who propagate sedition ?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Therefore, if Martial Law is promulgated on the ground that the *munshis* and clerks and pleaders and barristers are seditionists and they propagate sedition, that would not be correct so far as your knowledge goes ?

A. I do not remember the exact words of the order; but there is the order.

Q. So far as your knowledge goes that order was not based on correct information ?

A. I think Martial Law was necessary in Kasur.

Q. There you are wrong; the order was also promulgated in Kasur ?

A. Afterwards.

Q. So far as Kasur is concerned, that will not be correct to the best of your knowledge ?

A. No.

Q. Can you tell us what was the object of promulgating this Martial Law in Kasur ?

A. I do not know; nobody consulted me.

Q. There are many things about which men can form their opinion without being consulted. You being a barrister, you being an educated man, you must have formed some opinion as to what was the object of Martial Law being proclaimed ?

A. I thought it is best to keep quiet, because there was an order that if anybody gives a false rumour, he will be sent to gaol.

Q. You thought by opening your mouth you would be circulating false rumours ?

A. They might make it a pretence to send me to gaol.

Q. Because you thought that it would be made a pretence to send you to gaol you did not open your mouth ?

A. Yes; I thought it better to keep quiet.

Q. Therefore may I take it that although you are not prepared to give us any opinion about the methods of Martial Law, still it was a fact that it was terrorising all the inhabitants of Kasur ?

A. Yes; it did so.

Q. And practically they were not in their normal condition at the time when this Martial Law was in force ?

A. What do you mean by normal condition ?

Q. That means they were not making complaints or opening their mouths in their conversation with their friends about these things ?

A. There were no orders to restrict that.

Q. There were no orders to form an opinion. You were so cautious that you would not form any opinion; also because you had to close your mouth. You were an exception ?

A. I know nothing about others.

Q. There is nothing to prevent your giving the benefit of your opinion ?

A. I never made one. And I think it is very difficult to make one now.

Q. You never made any opinion ?

A. No.

Q. In your own opinion, there was no hardship under Martial Law in Kasur ?

A. There was hardship.

Q. Were the people quite happy and relishing these things ?

A. I cannot say; I never went to the town. My house is outside.

Q. I am satisfied with that answer. You are a barrister and you have to carry on your business. If you venture out or if you want to go to the Railway Station on behalf

2 December 1919.]

Mr. TARA SINGH NABULA—concluded—Khan Sahib AHMAD KHAN.

of a complainant you would not be afraid of facing Martial Law authority. Further on, you were going to the Court and you must be there from 10-30 to 4-30. You can get all sorts of information and you will be in a position to know what is going on in the city, especially connected with the methods of Martial Law, who were arrested, who were convicted, for what offences they were convicted and so on.

A. For the very reason that I did not like to hear the remarks I kept aloof.

Q. You went to the Court? What is your attitude?

A. If anybody wanted to speak about the Martial Law I asked him not to talk anything about it.

Q. There are two ways of remaining in Court; there is a bar room where everybody sits or the open grounds under the shade of big trees where there might be placed half a dozen or 20 tables and the pleaders there form a circle and speak about things good and bad?

A. There was an order that not more than 5 persons should meet at a place.

Q. That is good. The pleaders who were attending the Civil Courts during those days, not more than 5 of them were allowed to sit in one place, in one compound: is that so?

A. I thought it proper not to sit there.

Q. Then did you relish it and were you very happy so far as this Martial Law was concerned?

A. Nobody can be happy under Martial Law.

Q. We are told by Mr. Marsden they were very happy,

they relished it and they enjoyed the scenes. Were you also of that opinion?

A. I was not happy at least.

By Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate.

Q. Mr. Tara Singh, you have told us about the meeting of the 11th which you say you left when the man named Nadir Shah came to take possession of the platform. Did you or any of the pleaders who were leaving at that time, when he was coming to take possession of the platform and to advise against what the pleaders had been advising, make any effort to regain possession of the platform or ask the people not to listen to an incendiary like him?

A. No.

Q. He was the same man who was afterwards convicted and sentenced to death?

A. I think so.

Q. You have told something about the rumours of pressure from outsiders; was that pressure from Amritsar?

A. Amritsar and Delhi.

Q. Talking of your experience of Martial Law, you stated that the only experience was that you were once allowed to appear before a Martial Law Court on behalf of the prosecution. You mentioned one thing more, in your written statement, viz., you had easily obtained passes.

A. Whenever I required passes I posted a letter and I always got a reply by a messenger.

Khan Sahib AHMAD KHAN, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Kasur.

By the President—

Q. You are Deputy Superintendent of Police at Kasur?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On the 11th of April, was a *hartal* held there?

A. Yes.

Q. What in your opinion was the cause of that *hartal*?

A. Pressure on the traders from outside; that was the chief reason of the *hartal*.

Q. What do you mean by outside?

A. Amritsar and Lahore and other places.

Q. What was the sort of pressure that was brought to bear upon them?

A. They boycotted them.

Q. I think you learnt about the *hartal* that was taking place when you were at Ganda Singhwala?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you returned to Kasur at about 4-30 on the 11th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was there a large crowd in the town at that time?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What was the crowd doing?

A. They were moving about in the various Kots and asking the people to close their shops.

Q. Did they visit all the different places?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What sort of persuasion were they bringing to bear upon the people to close their shops?

A. Their appearance was quite enough for the shop-keepers to close their shops.

Q. Had they anything in their hands?

A. Nothing.

Q. Why do you say "their appearance"?

A. Because a big mob was coming and the shop-keepers thought that if they did not close their shops they might do mischief.

Q. They might destroy their shops?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On that evening, was there a large collection of people at Hari Har Tank?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. After the meeting, there was a man, Nadir Ali Shah, who addressed the audience? Did you hear him?

A. I had deputed a man to watch the proceedings.

Q. Then you got a report?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think there was a *hartal* again on the 12th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In consequence of the state of the town, did you take precautions to guard certain points?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Which points were those?

A. The Mission compound, the honorary magistrate's court, the *Thana*, Judicial lock-up, *Sadr thana* and Treasury.

Q. How many constables had you in the city police at the time?

A. 49.

Q. Was that exclusive of certain men somewhere?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. How many were there in those places excluding them?

A. In the city *thana*, 2 Head constables and 10 constables; Treasury, 1 Head constable and 5 constables; Lock-up, 1 Head constable and 5 constables and S. D. O.'s Court, 4 constables.

Q. Of the 49 constables, were 13 untrained?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Why was that?

A. They were enlisted on account of the formation of police battalions some months before, they had not been given regular training.

Q. Had 12 men to do fixed duties?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What sort of duties they were?

A. For instance, there was one sick prisoner in the hospital and there were 4 men to attend on him and of course there were other persons who were watching the prisoners.

Q. So at the time you had only 25 constables to guard the city police station, the Deputy Commissioner's Office and the police posts in the city?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On the 12th, did the mob form and visit different places of business?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did that mob do anything?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Not at that time?

2 December 1919.]

Khan Sahib AHMAD KHAN.

[Continued.]

- A. Not at that time.
- Q. Its object was to stop business ?
- A. Yes, Sir.
- Q. About what time was the Railway Station attacked ?
- A. About 10.
- Q. Did you see that attack being made upon the Railway Station ?
- A. No, Sir. When I reached the Railway Station, the attack had been finished. Persons were carrying bundles from the train. These people were dispersed.
- Q. The first report you got was as to the indication that the Railway Station had been attacked by the mob and that the lamp room was burnt ?
- A. Yes, Sir.
- Q. On receipt of this information did you go to Mr. Mitter ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. By the time you arrived I think there had been a very serious occurrence ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Two of the officers were very seriously assaulted ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did you see them ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Was one of them dead at the time ?
- A. One was dead and one was in a bad state. I put a Head constable and Mr. Narula there and sent for the doctor.
- Q. Where they were ?
- A. They were lying outside the Railway Station between the Subordinate's Rest Room and the Third Class Waiting Room.
- Q. In what conditions were they ? I think they were very badly assaulted ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Were there many marks of injuries upon them ?
- A. Especially on the head.
- Q. What caused those marks, sticks or stones ?
- A. I think sticks.
- Q. Where was the mob at the time when you reached the Railway Station ?
- A. I was attending the Warrant Officers when I received the information that an European Lady and children were in danger. We rushed towards the station and we thought the mob might be there.
- Q. Did you find them in a hut on the Ferozepore Line ?
- A. They were removed to Kot Halim Khan.
- Q. They were removed to Kot Halim Khan. Where is that Kot ?
- A. Further on, on the Ferozepore Line.
- Q. Then you took the Sherbourns. Did you bring them to Kasur ?
- A. I brought them to my house.
- Q. When you arrived at your house, did you learn anything as to what the mob had done ?
- A. The first thing I learnt was that they had intended to assault Mission ladies ; so I got them into my house. There were also Christian girls about 50 in number. Then I learnt that the Post Office had been burnt. The Tahsildar was with us and I sent him with a Sub-Inspector. As smoke was coming out I thought it was the Post Office that had been burnt.
- Q. On learning of these occurrences did you consider the situation very grave ?
- A. Certainly, Sir.
- Q. Was there a risk of general destruction of property and massacre of human lives ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What steps did you take to check them ?
- A. After guarding Mrs. Sherbourn and the Mission ladies and the Christian girls I took my men to disperse the mob.
- Q. Did you communicate this to the Officer Commanding, Ferozepore ?
- A. Yes, Sir. Mr. Sherbourn took the message.
- Q. To get the military ?
- A. Quite so.
- Q. Was the situation one where it was necessary to have military ?
- A. Yes, we had only a few police.
- Q. How did you arrange for Mr. Sherbourn to take the message ?
- A. He was given a horse, and Indian head dress and my revolver.
- Q. Did you consider it was dangerous for him to carry this communication unless he was disguised ?
- A. Yes. He was sent out of the way through the fields on to the road with a guide.
- Q. Meantime you were with four armed constables and other persons who were unarmed ?
- A. There were other gentlemen, for instance the Sub-Divisional Officer, Honorary Magistrates, Mr. Narula and others.
- Q. You met them at the Treasury ?
- A. Yes, Sir.
- Q. What did you find at the Treasury ?
- A. There we found that the Munsif's Court was on fire and some men were carrying a big *chappar* towards the Tahsil Gate to set fire to it to effect an entry.
- Q. *Chappar*. What is that ?
- A. It is made up of reeds ; a kind of thatching.
- Q. Had the mob any other inflammable material ?
- A. No, Sir.
- Q. Did you think that the mob intended to set fire to the Tahsil ?
- A. Certainly, Sir.
- Q. When you arrived you found that efforts had been made to drive the mob back ?
- A. Yes, Sir.
- Q. What was the attitude of the crowd ?
- A. They were bent upon mischief.
- Q. Were the crowd throwing anything ?
- A. Not at that time.
- Q. Did you learn that your Sub-Inspector had fired some shots ?
- A. I heard on my way.
- Q. Had these shots been fired at the crowd or over the heads of the crowd ? So far as you know no damage was done ?
- A. No.
- Q. When you reached this place did you warn the crowd ?
- A. Yes, Sir.
- Q. How many people were in this crowd who were doing this damage ?
- A. I would say 1,000 to 1,500.
- Q. Had your warning any effect upon them ?
- A. No, Sir.
- Q. After warning the crowd what action did you take ?
- A. I asked Mr. Mitter if he had any objection to firing. He had none, so I told my men to be ready and fire. I also told the Sub-Inspector who was on the roof to fire at the same time.
- Q. How many shots were fired ?
- A. 57.
- Q. What effect had firing ?
- A. It dispersed the mob.
- Q. The fire took place between one and two ?
- A. One and two, Sir.
- Q. How many casualties were caused ?
- A. One was found dead on the spot and three wounded. But subsequently we found that three others also died at home and in all 14 men were arrested. That is what we discovered.
- Q. About 3 P.M. Colonel McRae arrived with his men at Kasur ?
- A. Yes, Sir.
- Q. Your house is about a mile from the Station ?
- A. Yes, Sir.
- Q. And you had placed Mrs. Sherbourn and children in your house before you had gone ?
- A. Yes, Sir.
- Q. Did you investigate into who had committed these crimes on that day ?
- A. Yes, Sir.

2 December 1919.]

Khan Sahib ARMAD KHAN.

[Continued.]

Q. When did you start the investigation ?  
 A. The very day.  
 Q. And certain arrests were made on that day ?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. There were no arrests made on the 14th and 15th ?  
 A. No, Sir, because we had wired for instructions and we had not received any reply and so we personally went to Lahore and got the instructions.  
 Q. You personally went to Lahore ?  
 A. Mr. Mitter also.  
 Q. After you got the instructions Mr. Marsden appeared at Kasur ?  
 A. After we had been to Lahore.  
 Q. Then you started the investigation ?  
 A. In these two days I had collected the material. I found out the persons who were wounded or were concerned. After return from Lahore I started the arrests on the 16th.  
 Q. The investigation involved a certain amount of work ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Taking down depositions of people before you could arrest them ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. In all 167 people were arrested by you ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Of these, we have been told, only 75 were tried ?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. Of those tried 25 were discharged and the remaining people were given various punishments ?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. In your statement you say against 92 persons there was not sufficient evidence to warrant their conviction ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Does this 92 include 75 referred to above ?  
 A. No, Sir.  
 Q. What does it refer to ?  
 A. 92 were the persons who were not sent up for trial because there was not sufficient evidence against them.  
 Q. Were you careful in making investigation before arresting any one ?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. You had also to make searches of the houses of the people ?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. How were they made ?  
 A. They were made lawfully in the presence of the owner of the house or his representative.  
 Q. The Military co-operated with you in maintaining order ?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. Was there any friction between the Military and the Police ?  
 A. Not at all, Sir.  
 Q. Did you find it easy to get information about people who had been guilty of the various outrages ?  
 A. As a matter of fact no private person was willing to give any information.  
 Q. How do you account for that ?  
 A. Well, this is due to their sympathy with the accused.  
 Q. Sympathy or fear ?  
 A. I will say sympathy.  
 Q. Sympathy ?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. Was that sympathy with the acts of outrages and the murders that were committed ?  
 A. In the *Manjha* specially even if their own relations are killed they always sympathise with the accused. They are won over for certain reasons.  
 Q. So far as the mob was concerned, before they started acts of lawlessness, had they received any provocation of any description ?  
 A. No, Sir.  
 Q. How do you account for the sudden outburst of fury in the Kasur mob ?  
 A. From the evidence I found that there were strangers in the mob.

Q. What do you mean by saying that there were strangers in the mob ?  
 A. I mean people who did not belong to Kasur. The belief is that they were from Amritsar and after they had formed that liberty funeral they wanted to take it to the Railway Station to show to the passengers. Of course this is what was said and when the mob reached the Railway Station there the mischief was started.  
 Q. People, who were responsible for the rioting and the acts of lawlessness, were all villagers or townsmen ?  
 A. Mostly townsmen.  
 Q. I think you had 167 persons arrested and of all these there were only 40 villagers and 127 townsmen ?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. Out of the 40 villagers there were 30 zamindars who were examined at Kasur on the 14th April ?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. They seemed to have joined the rioters without knowing it to be a pre-concerted scheme ?  
 A. Yes, quite so.  
 Q. Of the townsmen the great majority was shopkeepers, i.e., 110 shopkeepers and workmen, leaving a balance of 17 persons, mostly belonging to the educated classes ?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. How are the educated classes described by you ?  
 A. I have given this detail of the persons who were arrested. They were railway officials, pleaders, *munshis* and schoolmasters.  
 Q. On the 13th April shops were opened and work was resumed ?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. You know about the Khem Karan case ?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. What occurred at Khem Karan ?  
 A. After the mob was dispersed at the Kasur Tahsil some of the rioters went to Pattu village and collected about 25 men there and attacked the Khem Karan station.  
 Q. Was the station fired or what happened ?  
 A. They damaged the telegraph apparatus and carried off the articles of the station staff.  
 Q. They stole what they could lay their hands on ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Who saved the situation at Khem Karan ?  
 A. Men in the neighbouring fields. They came up and dispersed the mob.  
 Q. Who are these people ? Were they ordinary inhabitants ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Were there no police in the village ?  
 A. There were police in the town. Before the police arrived they had made off.  
 Q. The rioters had made off ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Do you know what occurred at Patti ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. What was that ?  
 A. In the Patti town, as a matter of fact, on the 5th of April one Durga Das was called there and he held a meeting and asked the people to observe *hartal* on the following day, which was done. After that when the incidents of Amritsar and Kasur reached Patti about the evening of the 12th they formed a mob and attacked railway station, goods shed, goods trucks, cut telegraph wires and damaged the railway level crossing gate.  
 Q. Who is this Durga Das ?  
 A. He is the proprietor of the "*Waqf*" newspaper.  
 Q. That paper was stopped ?  
 A. I don't know. He was subsequently arrested and tried.  
 (Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate :—It was in the Amritsar Case that he was arrested and tried.)  
 Q. You were going to indicate what happened on the 10th at Patti ?  
 A. I said, Sir, on the 12th.  
 Q. Yes, what happened on the 12th ?  
 A. When news of rioting at Kasur and the incidents of Amritsar reached Patti, a mob was formed of several

2 December 1919.]

Khan Sahib AHMAD KHAN.

[Continued.]

hundred and they attacked the railway goods shed and goods trucks and damaged the railway line and out telegraph wires.

Q. Was serious damage prevented at Patti ?

A. Well, some respectable men and the police arrived soon, and of course no serious damage was done.

Q. What was exactly the damage that was done ?

A. They broke the goods shed and goods trucks and the gate, and I think they also broke the distance signal wire. These are not very serious things.

Q. Did you form any opinion of this serious damage to the railway line at this time ?

A. No.

Q. Did you form any opinion as to what was the cause of all that ?

A. That was an anti-Government movement.

Q. Did it appear to you that they had for the intention of making Government impossible ?

A. Yes, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Khan Sahib, do you attribute these outrages of the 12th to the news that arrived from Amritsar or to the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest ?

A. I would say that the news of Amritsar had the bad effect.

Q. You say that the news of what happened at Kasur started the trouble at Patti ?

A. Also the news of Amritsar occurrences.

Q. Well, as I understand, you had 13 untrained men and 25 trained constables to guard all the important places of the town before this object of going to the railway station of the mob was carried out on that morning. Had it been noticed by any of your *pahrawalas* ?

A. As a matter of fact *pahrawalas* were taken off with a view not to go inside the town and not to give the mob any provocation.

Q. Before they got to the railway station, the police noticed them moving to the railway station ?

A. As the mob issued from the Main Kot, a head constable was following them who reported to the sub-inspector that they had formed a liberty funeral, and that they were going to the railway station. Then he was instructed to follow up the mob. On the previous day the mob had visited the station and had done no damage.

Q. You simply directed him to follow up the mob or to take any measures ?

A. A handful of men could not do that.

Q. Were any of your 25 men armed ?

A. They had arms.

Q. In fact they were carrying arms ?

A. No, Sir.

Q. You did not think it necessary to tell him to take some armed men and follow up the mob ?

A. No.

Q. I understand the excuse for going to the railway station was that the mob wanted to show the liberty funeral to the passengers, especially to the Europeans, of these three trains ?

A. I understood they wanted to show to all the passengers and not to Europeans only that Indians had lost liberty.

Q. To Indians as well as to Europeans ?

A. Yes.

Q. Is not the arrival time of these three trains a big event at Kasur ?

A. Yes, they come at the same time.

Q. Assuming that that was the original intention of the mob I presume a good many people might have joined the mob who had no intention of committing all these outrages ?

A. Yes.

Q. If these people had no disloyal or vicious intention have you been able to account for the fact that no effective steps were taken to stop them ?

A. No, Sir.

Q. You tell us that neither from any of the railway officials nor from the public nor from the postal officials you could get help ?

A. No.

Q. Is it that you think that people of Kasur were in a rotten and disaffected condition ?

A. That is my idea.

Q. Apart from that and apart from what they did at the station, you actually saw yourself a mob of between a thousand and two thousand again in front of the Munsiff's Court ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you saw the order to fire given and the firing take place ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. How long had you been on the spot before the order to fire was given ?

A. Only a few minutes.

Q. From the condition of the mob were they a determined and hostile mob at the time of the firing ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I see what happened: you did rather better than I thought, one man killed and three wounded, you wounded 14 as well ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. How many policemen fired on that occasion ?

A. I should say about 10.

Q. And do you know for how long they fired ?

A. I think it took about 5 to 10 minutes.

Q. Firing at the mob that was trying to burn down the building ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And what excuse do you give for their killing only one man ?

A. Because these police muskets are not good ones.

Q. Were those rifles that had been bored out? Were they firing buckshot or ball ?

A. Buckshot.

Q. Don't you think it would be a good plan from your experience that the police should be given better rifles, so that when they do have to fire at a murderous mob, they could do so more effectively ?

A. Certainly they should have better arms.

Q. Have you any experience of Military firing on murderous mobs ?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Now then as regards people who were arrested and not brought to trial, there were 32 of those, as I understand ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Is it true that the longest time anybody would be kept was from the 19th of April till the 10th of May ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. That would be the longest time? Is it the case that practically everybody was released, unless he was sent up for trial, by about the 11th of May ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I understand that a good many were kept for about that length of time, a fortnight to three weeks ?

A. Not a good many,

Q. How many ?

A. As a matter of fact, after hearing from the officers that, unless there was more than one witness, no body should be challaned, and after seeing that in the first batch, although Mrs. Sherbourn had identified one *sadhu*, her statement was not accepted, then if there was any person identified by one person I allowed him bail on the very day he was identified. I did not put him in the lock-up. So out of these 92 I should say there would be about 30 to 40 men who were in the lock-up for 20 days.

Q. Of the 92 a great many were bailed ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. How many do you suppose were bailed by the police ?

A. I should say between 30 or 40.

Q. Of course there are some offences for which the police cannot give bail ?



2 December 1919.]

Khan Sahib AHMAD KHAN.

[Continued.]

A. For the reason that one witness was not considered sufficient to warrant trial, therefore we did not like to keep the men in custody.

Q. But in that case did you release the men altogether or put them on bail?

A. I put them on bail just to secure their attendance in case they were wanted.

Q. Murder is not a bailable offence by the police?

A. No, Sir, it is not.

Q. Supposing a man was suspected of murder and his case depended on one witness, you did not release him but you let him out on bail?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Of course at this time, although the police were acting, you were acting as officers of Martial Law?

A. I think under the ordinary law we are authorised to let a man out on bail even if the offence is non-bailable.

Q. During this time did you carry on under the ordinary law or did you regard yourself as under the officers of the Military Law?

A. No, Sir, I carried on under the ordinary laws.

Q. During the time the cases of those people who were not bailed were being investigated, did you take the usual remands before a magistrate?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. The only other thing I want to trouble you about is this. As I understand during this time there were two sets of Military expeditions from Kasur, one a moveable column to go round and show the power of the Raj and impress the people in that way, and other expeditions, as I understand, that went to places where there were a lot of *badmashes* or disaffected people for the purpose of visiting those places with a certain amount of punishment?

A. There was one moveable column. Another force went from Kasur. The military with the magistrate and police raided certain villages where we had information that the men were concerned in the riot.

Q. I want to distinguish those cases where, as you say, they raided the villages from the villages through which moveable columns passed merely to impress the people. I will deal with those cases where you say they raided the villages.

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In those cases did the police have information upon which it was supposed that these villages were particularly bad?

A. We had information against certain persons; I mean before the village was raided.

Q. I want you to explain it. Information against certain persons, and what did you do on getting that information?

A. I consulted the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Officer Commanding, and then a party of Military was arranged with the Magistrate and a Police officer to guide them, and they were sent out to reach the spot early in the morning, to surround the village and to arrest the man.

Q. That is quite all right, that merely means that you arrested the man you wanted to arrest. What did you do in cases of levying fines and taking hostages for subsequent good behaviour? Had that anything to do with you?

A. In certain cases when the Magistrate or the Officer Commanding received information that other persons were concerned, they brought them with them. But the hostages were taken by the moveable column, not by the raiding parties.

Q. As regards the moveable column, did you as head of the police have anything to do with that?

A. Nothing, except that we received certain hostages.

Q. You looked after the hostages after they had been taken?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. How many of those hostages did you keep in Kasur yourself?

A. Three from Khem Karan and three from Sur Singh.

Q. Was anything done to these hostages?

A. They were let off after that.

Q. How long were they detained?

A. The hostages from Khem Karan I should say for two or three days.

Q. That was all?

A. And the Sur Singh people were dangerous *badmashes* of the *shaka*, so they were kept for some time.

Q. For how long?

A. I should say for three weeks, and even then when they were let off they had a quarrel with the Daffadar of the Military and they were warned not to molest him, but eventually they killed him.

Q. What happened upon that?

A. The case is going on in Court.

Q. What was the point of taking hostages and keeping them only two or three days?

A. Because after enquiry we found the information given to the moveable column was not correct.

Q. What was the condition of the hostages' liberty?

A. When the moveable column received information that certain persons were concerned in the disturbances they took them as hostages.

Q. Well.

A. From subsequent enquiry we found they were not concerned.

Q. But the hostages had nothing to do with that, they were not the people who were concerned?

A. They were considered then to have been concerned in the outrages.

Q. But you don't call people taken for that reason hostages, do you?

A. That was the idea; that was the order from the Military. Persons who were connected with the disturbances in any way, they should be taken as hostages.

Q. A hostage usually means some one taken from out of the village or other body. Then if that village or other body does not behave, something happens to the hostage or hostages although it may be no fault of theirs. These hostages seem to have been taken because they were suspected persons. Those are not hostages really, are they?

A. It was decided to take them then without any evidence.

Q. That is a very different thing, you were going to arrest them on 'spec'?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. About the officer, Captain Doyton, who acted as Area Officer and tried people in the Summary Court, who presented cases before him, was it the police?

A. The cases we sent of course we presented.

Q. Who else presented cases, the Provost Marshal or who?

A. Some cases he took.

Q. Cases apart from the police and apart from the cases he took, who else was prosecuting cases before him?

A. He himself was dealing with them.

Q. Some one was responsible for sending them up to him?

A. When he received any complaint he dealt with it.

Q. As far as you are concerned, were the ordinary courts, the Honorary Magistrates, or the Deputy Commissioner or any other Magistrate acting during this time for ordinary cases in addition to the Military court?

A. Yes, Sir, they were doing ordinary work.

Q. I do not mean were they assisting in the administration of Martial Law, but were they trying ordinary cases under the Penal Code?

A. Yes, Sir, the cases were being sent to them.

Q. In your case as head of the police how did you discriminate between cases to send to the Military court and cases to send to the ordinary court?

A. I sent those cases to the Military court which I was ordered to send by the Legal Remembrancer. Other cases on account of the seriousness of the offence I sent to the Deputy Inspector-General for orders and to the Legal Remembrancer.

---

2 December 1919.]

Khan Sahib AHMAD KHAN.

[Continued.]

---

Q. And the person who decided whether it should go before Captain Doveton or the ordinary court was the Deputy Inspector-General, except such cases as went up to the Legal Remembrancer?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Who was he?

A. Mr. Tomkins.

Q. You did not exercise your own discretion on that matter?

A. No, Sir.

Q. We have heard of some cases of cheating.

A. I never sent any cases of cheating before the Military court.

3 December 1919.]

Khan Sahib AHMAD KHAN.

(Continued.)

**At Lahore, Wednesday, the 3rd December 1919.**

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., L.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., L.F., *Secretary.*

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

Sir C. H. SUTALVAD, Kt.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Khan Sahib AHMAD KHAN—*continued.*

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—*

Q. You have given evidence about some outside pressure being brought?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I would just like to have some more details. There was no evidence of any outside pressure up to the 6th of April?

A. No, Sir.

Q. It was after the 6th?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore I take it that so far as Kasur is concerned no outside pressure was brought to bear for observing a *hartal* on the 30th of March or 6th of April?

A. No.

Q. Even after the 6th of April you had only two instances where outside pressure was being brought to bear and these were: one where Sheikh Ghulam Farid of Kasur despatched his articles from Kasur and sent the railway receipt to Abdul Rahim and Karam Ilahi of Lahore refused to accept it, and the other where certain goods were sent by somebody to Amritsar and these goods were not sold?

A. Yes.

Q. Except these two instances you had no tangible evidence about Karachi or Bombay?

A. No, Sir.

Q. There were no letters discovered by you showing whether these two men had been asked by the inhabitants of Kasur to observe a *hartal* at some future date?

A. No.

Q. So far as the happenings of the 11th are concerned it appears to me that a *hartal* was observed about 1 or 2 P.M., and bands of men were going about, and it was these men who approached the pleaders and asked them to give some lectures and in consequence a meeting was held at Hari Har tank. It is not true that the pleaders organised the meeting and sent out notices that the meeting should be held?

A. No.

Q. From the papers it appears to me that you had three sources of information as to what happened at this meeting. One was that one Rahim Bakhsh was sent there to report and attend the meeting and probably submitted some report. Another source of information was one Muhammad Din, a Head Constable, and the third source of information was subsequently a Gul Muhammad who was an approver in these cases. So far as this man Gul Muhammad was concerned, it appears to me that his report was that Seth Mohan Lal, Ghulam Muhi-ud-din, M. Abdul Kadir and Gokal Chand all spoke and advised the people to combine and to ask Government for mercy in the matter of the Rowlatt Bill. I am reading this from the statement which he made before?

A. But in his detailed statement before the Magistrate I think he has given more details.

Q. This is what he said about these men?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Further on he says that one Nadir Shah stood on a table and said that the leaders were doing nothing and "we should kill or be killed." Did he report that Nadir Shah said "we should kill or be killed"?

A. The words in his report are *hamko apni जान par khelna chahie* which means "we should take risks in getting the Rowlatt Bill abrogated."

Q. So far this was the second source of information. With regard to the approver he said that what Nadir Shah said was "that a blunt knife was being dragged against our throats and that we should do nothing which would bring us into bad books with the Government." That was the information?

A. Yes.

Q. Except this, what Nadir Shah said that we should observe a *hartal* and that the leaders have done their part, and that we should do something, so far as the other speakers were concerned I think they ordered the crowd to be orderly and not to get out of hand. That was the gist of their speeches so far as Muhi-ud-din was concerned?

A. There were some passages which were exciting in my opinion.

Q. The passages referred to us by Mr. Marsden?

A. Yes.

Q. Nothing more?

A. No.

Q. I think you were the head of the police before the 11th of April for more than a year. Before the 11th, I believe, you had no idea that any such thing would happen as did happen in Kasur itself?

A. No.

Q. There was no secret information ever given to you that there was any conspiracy or that any persons were being approached from outside for the purpose of creating any trouble or disturbance?

A. No.

Q. So far as Kasur itself is concerned during the previous six months were there any political public meetings held?

A. No.

Q. Were any public political speeches ever delivered by any of these pleaders?

A. No.

Q. So practically I think there was very little political life in Kasur?

A. Yes.

Q. At what time on the 11th—you as head of the police did you hear of the occurrences that had happened at Amritsar on the 10th—or did you come to know of it on the 12th?

A. At about 2-30 P.M., when I was at Ganda Singhwala.

Q. How far is Ganda Singhwala?

A. About seven miles from Kasur.

Q. And did you also hear of the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi?

A. I do not remember hearing about the arrest of Gandhi. I heard of the incidents in Amritsar.

3 December 1919.]

Khan Sahib AHMAD KHAN.

[Continued.]

Q. You say in paragraph 3 of your statement "consequently on the 11th April, when trains from Amritsar and Lahore reached Kasur at 10 A.M. and brought news of incidents which took place there and of the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi the Kasur people started *hartal* . . ." Is this true?

A. So far as Kasur is concerned. I am talking of my knowledge at Ganda Singhwala. When I heard of the Amritsar incidents I might also have heard other things when I reached Kasur.

Q. Therefore what you state here is correct?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you say "the acute cause of *hartal* was pressure of boycott by other cities, but the chronic causes were economic conditions and excitement over the Rowlatt Act"?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. As to outside agency on the 11th and 12th. You practically depend on the basis of the statement of the approver Ghulam Muhammed because he was in the thick of it and knew everything about it. It is said that two men were actually in the mob on the 12th—not only Ghulam Muhammad but Kamal Din and other persons. Do you know that so far as he was aware there were only two persons?

A. If I am not wrong I think there were more than two.

Q. There were only two strangers who were asking the people to keep their shops shut.

A. In his detailed statement he has given a description of several persons whom he calls outside persons.

Q. Therefore he is not correct when he says only two? He has probably made a mistake?

A. Yes.

Q. You have not been able to ascertain their names?

A. No.

Q. Neither have you been able to ascertain their profession?

A. I think they belonged to a theatrical company.

Q. Practically so far as your investigation goes there was no information before you that any political leaders of Amritsar had anything to do with it?

A. No; not political leaders.

Q. Some persons belonging to a theatrical company?

A. Yes.

Q. I will now finish with the part played by Muhi-ud-din on the 11th and 12th so far as you are concerned. You do not think that Ghulam Muhammad was in any way in collusion with Mr. Muhi-ud-din, pleader?

A. No.

Q. And he made a clean breast of everything that he knew?

A. That is my opinion.

Q. Now, this man who was with the mob on the 11th and 12th was practically a leader and was sometimes asking and instigating the people to do certain things?

A. Yes.

Q. But it is nowhere stated that Muhi-ud-din was with the mob when they were asking the people to close their shops?

A. No.

Q. It is nowhere stated that Muhi-ud-din was with the mob who were doing damage to the railway station and assaulting Europeans?

A. No.

Q. He has stated that at the time, "after doing the damage, when we were going away, Muhi-ud-din came to me, caught hold of my arm and said 'what are you doing, it is a very bad thing.' I never listened to him and I went forward." He also says that some advice was given to him by M. Abdul Kadir. How old is this Abdul Kadir?

A. He is a man of about 55 or 60.

Q. So far as the *hartal* was concerned it came to an end on the 12th and on the 13th April the bazars were opened and work was resumed as usual in Kasur. Therefore there was no *hartal* on the 13th, 14th and 15th or on any subsequent date?

A. No.

Q. I think there are some railway police at the railway station. There was a Sub-Inspector and constables?

A. Yes.

Q. They did nothing to prevent this crowd from damage?

A. No.

Q. You are also aware that two sons of a pleader were arrested?

A. They were arrested subsequently.

Q. Both of them were sent off and one of the sons who was probably a graduate of Cambridge was arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. He was never brought to trial?

A. No.

Q. The Post Office which was burnt is next door to the police station?

A. Not next door. There is a court room between it and the police station.

Q. About how many paces away?

A. From the police station it would be about a hundred yards.

Q. At least you saw a part of the crowd that was present before the 13th?

A. Yes.

Q. And that crowd was, I think, about one thousand or two thousand strong?

A. Yes. About one thousand or more.

Q. Did you see any of these pleaders or any of those respectable men who were arrested, in that crowd?

A. No.

Q. Even you yourself out of that crowd could not identify more than a dozen persons?

A. Well I identified those persons who were arrested.

Q. You cannot blame the railway clerks at the time when this mob was doing damage to the railway station for not being able to identify a large number of persons. I want to know whether you-as head of the police were able to identify more than a dozen or so persons.

A. My job was quite different to that of railway officials. I was loading and unloading my rifle while they were spectators.

Q. That was, according to your statement, five or six minutes after your arrival. First of all you remonstrated with the crowd, according to your evidence. You asked them to disperse and they refused. On your seeing that the crowd was taking up an obstinate attitude and would not disperse, you fired. Even you as head of the police there and being present—out of this mob of two thousand you were not in a position to identify more than half-a-dozen?

A. No.

Q. Now with regard to the question of identification you made a statement that the people were reluctant to come forward and identify persons.

A. When Martial Law was proclaimed for three days on account of some doubt about procedure nothing was done, so practically no arrests commenced until after the 16th.

Q. Don't you think that the natural explanation of that diffidence was that the people were unwilling to come forward and to say that they were in the crowd lest they should be arrested, because anybody who could give information should be in the crowd, and don't you think that one of the reasons why the people were unwilling to come forward was the proclamation of Martial Law and so they were not willing to come forward and say that they were in the crowd lest they should be arrested?

A. It was one of the reasons.

Q. What I mean to say is this that the sympathy of the public was not with the doings of the crowd, they were not in sympathy with the murders that were committed, but when you spoke of their sympathy you meant that they did not want to get their men hanged?

A. Yes, they did not want their men hanged.

Q. You will agree with me, I think, when I say, that is the feeling all over the province. You are an experienced officer and know that even in ordinary cases there

3 December 1910.]

Khan Sahib AHMAD KHAN.

[Continued.]

is always reluctance on the part of people generally to come forward and give evidence against their neighbours despite their knowledge of the fact that they are criminals?

A. Yes.

Q. What I mean to say is that that sympathy was not a peculiar sympathy for that occasion, but is a general weakness of the inhabitants of these provinces?

A. It was combined with other reasons also.

Q. You do not attach any importance to their not coming forward to give evidence except that they were unwilling?

A. I attach importance to this fact that when so many outrages took place at various places, not a single man came forward to give evidence. That was the exceptional fact on these cases.

Q. Therefore may I take it that all those witnesses whom you produced before these Commissions were unwilling witnesses or forced witnesses?

A. They were not connected with these things, they were private persons, they were more or less officials.

Q. So may I take it that the conviction of these 60 or 70 persons was absolutely based on the evidence of officials?

A. Mostly.

Q. You did not arrest any persons who were concerned with this riot on the 13th, 14th and 15th because you had some doubt as to the policy of Government and not because you were unable to arrest them?

A. No, I had collected the information in the meantime against certain persons.

Q. There would have been no difficulty in your arresting these men if you were not in doubt?

A. No difficulty at all.

Q. On the 13th, 14th and 15th Mr. Mitter held his court?

A. That I can't say, Sir, because I don't remember whether he held his court or not.

Q. Now some Military officer came to Kasur on the evening or on the night of the 12th?

A. Yes, Sir, at about 3 P.M.

Q. Was any request on the 12th made to the civil authorities to arrest two or three persons and you refused?

A. No such request was made, there was no such talk.

Q. Now about the cage which was erected for the purpose of confining the arrested persons, I find from your papers that sometimes there were 107 persons kept in that cage?

A. Yes.

Q. There was no covering over that cage?

A. It was open on all sides. In the day time they used to take tarpulin from the railway station.

Q. These people remained in that cage for days and days, sometimes there were 60 or 70 persons and sometimes there were 107 or 108?

A. They remained for a few days.

Q. I never said for months, but for a few days they remained?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the arrangement for the ordinary conveniences for these men, was any special arrangement made?

A. I don't follow your question, Sir.

Q. I mean to say, were any sanitary arrangements made?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the arrangement?

A. Latrines were put up.

Q. How many?

A. I think three or four, if not more.

Q. There was one *thalli*?

A. There were several *thallis*.

(Lt.-Col. Isomonger:—This question is answered in paragraph 17 of Col. McRae's report.)

Q. I will now ask you about some cases. You were associated with the military authorities in the investigation of certain cases from the 16th April. I am only asking you about investigation of cases?

A. Yes.

Q. The cases which you investigated you used to send on to the Legal Remembrancer and it was he who determined which court should try those cases?

A. Yes.

Q. You had nothing to do with the investigation of those cases which were taken up directly by the military authorities at Kasur?

A. Some cases were investigated by my subordinate staff.

Q. Some, not all?

A. I don't think all.

Q. Those that were not investigated by you, were sent direct to the military authorities, and they decided those cases?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember one temple at Kasur called the Khatrianwalla *mandir*?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the name of its trustee?

A. I don't know.

Q. Do you know there was a case tried by the military authorities about this *mandir*?

A. I heard of it.

Q. Do you know that the treasurer and the trustee of this *mandir* were ordered to hand over Rs. 1,500 to one Jagannath by the Military authorities?

A. I don't remember.

Q. The tenants were asked to pay the rents at once to Jagannath, it is a well known case.

A. I heard about it.

Q. You have also heard about the fact that one Durga Das refused to pay the rent and was fined Rs. 10 and was shoe-beaten?

A. I heard it casually. I don't know it.

Q. Do you know one Bhagat Ram, Booking Clerk, who was sentenced to be flogged?

A. Yes.

Q. For what offence?

A. Unlawful assembly.

Q. May I take it that 7 or 8 of these clerks were consulting in a room on the platform? Do you call that an unlawful assembly?

A. Not on the platform, I think in some quarter, that is what I heard.

Q. Therefore, so far as you know, the unlawful assembly was that these 7 or 8 clerks were sitting either in a room, on the platform or in some railway quarter?

A. I mean outside their quarters.

Q. That was an unlawful assembly? Now, do you know one Mustanchand, Station Master, who was arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. For what offence?

A. They were arrested by the Sub-Divisional Officer in my absence when I was at Lahore.

Q. They were arrested on the 16th, 17th or 18th?

A. They were arrested about the 27th or 28th April.

Q. And Chunilal also, Officiating Station Master, was arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. Mustanchand and Chunilal were never brought to trial?

A. No.

Q. Do you know the case of Sham Din, the train clerk?

A. No.

Q. Was there any circus near the railway station during those days at Kasur?

A. There was none in April, May or June. A circus did come there, but it was some time afterwards.

Q. You don't know anything about Sham Din?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Do you know one Keshavdas of Kasur?

A. There are many people of that name, so I can't say if I know the particular individual to whom you refer.

Q. Just tax your memory a little please.

A. If you will kindly let me know the incidents, I might be able to say.

3 December 1919.]

Khan Sahib AHMAD KHAN.

[Continued.]

Q. Did you hear that one or two persons were made to lie down on all fours and to draw lines with their nose on the floor?

A. I think it came to my hearing, I don't know who the persons were.

Q. You don't remember the names of the persons, but this incident did come to your hearing?

A. Yes.

Q. You were informed that such a thing did happen?

A. Yes.

Q. This was done under the orders of Capt. Doveton, who was the area officer then? And you don't remember the names of the persons who were made to do it?

A. I don't remember their names.

Q. Were you informed, and did it come to your notice as the D. S. P. of Kasur, that certain *sadhua* were white-washed with quick-lime?

A. Yes.

Q. And they were made to stand in the sun?

A. I don't know so many details, but they were white-washed.

Q. What was the thing with which they were white-washed?

A. Lime.

Q. What sort of lime?

A. That I can't say, but they said *chune se kia gaya hai*.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Do you know if it is used for white-washing the walls?

A. That I can't say, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Were any special officers sent to make any enquiries at Kasur, I mean Mr. Malan and Khan Bahadur Jaffar Khan?

A. Mr. Malan was sent with the moveable column and Khan Bahadur Jaffar Khan was with *Thikri Pahra*.

Q. On what dates did they arrive?

A. Mr. Malan on the 13th or 14th April. Khan Bahadur Jaffar Khan, I think, came sometime after that.

Q. Did Mr. Malan make any enquiry?

A. No, he was only for the night at Kasur, he did not make any enquiry.

Q. Most probably you and Mr. Mitter made some report to him?

A. We saw him and asked him about our own enquiry.

Q. You did not make any report to him?

A. No.

Q. When Mr. Marsden arrived, did he take your opinion or Mr. Mitter's opinion about the introduction of Martial Law on the 15th?

A. No. It had already been proclaimed in Lahore.

Q. It appears to me that Martial Law in your Sub-Division at Kasur and at Khem Karan, was proclaimed when you say it was proclaimed at Lahore?

A. That I don't know.

Q. It was proclaimed at Khem Karan at 5 P.M. on the 16th April?

A. I know nothing about it.

Q. Therefore may I know, if it was proclaimed at Lahore, what was the need of proclaiming it at Khem Karan?

A. I would say it is the business of the military officers.

Q. You cannot give any reason?

A. I don't think there was any need.

Q. It appears to me that many parties of soldiers and policemen went to different-outlying villages, and that all those expeditions were sent on certain information that was supplied. May I know as to whether you were the person who supplied that information?

A. Yes.

Q. Can we get all the detailed information?

A. Yes.

Q. In that information were the names of persons always given?

A. We had already the names of persons who were suspected of having taken part in the riots, so each day

we used to select a village in which that suspect could be found and then make a raid. It was done mostly on my information, and in one or two cases it was done on the statement recorded by the Sub-Divisional Officer.

Q. Therefore, so far as the mention of this information occurs in these orders, may I take it that that was the information that was supplied, and it was only in one or two instances where the statements of the informers were recorded by the Sub-Divisional Officer that raids were made?

A. Quite so.

Q. So far as your information is concerned, did you make a record of it?

A. Yes, it is recorded.

Q. In every case the names of the persons were mentioned?

A. Yes.

Q. May I take it that no one else was arrested who was not mentioned in your list?

A. Some persons who were not mentioned in the list were also arrested. They were arrested on the information given to the Military Officer and the Magistrate at the spot.

Q. Is it not a fact that there was one general information to the effect that there were 12 villages in your Sub-Division which were not loyally disposed and that all those villages were raided?

A. No.

Q. How many were raided?

A. We raided only the villages about which we had information.

Q. But it appears to me that information was supplied to you by informers, and I want to know whether any of these villages was raided or not?

A. Not on account of disaffection.

Q. You were informed on the 11th that the mob did go or intended to go to the railway station?

A. It did go to the railway station.

Q. You were further informed on the 11th that the mob was not a very passive mob. May I know why you did not take any steps to guard the railway station either on the 11th or on the 12th?

A. On the 11th there was no information that the mob was disorderly, and as it passed the railway station on the 11th, no troubles were anticipated. Besides, there were separate police for the railway station.

Q. But you had already heard of what had happened at Amritsar and at Delhi?

A. Yes.

Q. Notwithstanding this fact and having regard to your knowledge of the inhabitants of Kasur, you did not consider it necessary to guard the railway station?

A. I don't think the police were sufficient to guard every place.

Q. Did you send any information to the railway authorities or to the railway police to make any arrangements?—I think it was more important than guarding the house of Deputy Superintendent of Police or the Sub-Divisional Officer because they were not in danger? You did not consider it necessary?

A. No.

Q. Was any attempt made by your police force to defend a post office?

A. No.

Q. Why not?

A. They could not. There was no place for them to take shelter, and if a few men assaulted the mob there was a danger of the *thana* being looted and the prisoners rescued.

Q. What I don't understand is, according to you, it appears to me that they had no courage at all, they were all cowards, you had only a few constables, you ordered them to fire and the mob dispersed; not only this but different persons were able to make arrests from the mob. Under these circumstances why was not any attempt made to save the post office when it was being burnt, and why did not the constables go and make some show of force?

3 December 1919.]

Khan Sahib AHMAD KHAN.

[Continued.]

A. I had only a few constables at the time.  
 Q. What was the number?  
 A. The number was about 10 to 15 muskets.  
 Q. Did you take any explanation from the railway police or from any others as to why they did not do their duty?  
 A. It is the duty of the railway police authorities, the railway police are not under the District police.  
 Q. You are aware that only one or two men were able to save the lives of Mr. and Mrs. Sherbourn and their children?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Did you make any enquiries as to why no attempt was made?  
 A. I think the railway police officials are making enquiries or have made enquiries into the conduct of the railway police. That is my idea.  
 Q. It appears to me from these files that there were at the railway station at the time at least 30 persons including the police, the clerks and all the men in the goods shed?  
 A. Not at the station, but at the railway quarters.  
 Q. Then why was no attempt made by any of them to defend the railway station?  
 A. I think they had no courage.  
 Q. Or there might be another possible suggestion that they wanted some of the railway property to be destroyed?  
 A. It is in evidence that some of the railway officials encouraged the rioters to destroy the property.  
 Q. Now I think you know that practically throughout India all sub-divisions are under Indian Magistrates with very few exceptions?  
 A. Yes, mostly.  
 Q. May I know whether if there had been a European Magistrate in place of Mr. Mitter, he could have done better or whether everything that was possible was done by Mr. Mitter and it was unfortunate that these things happened?  
 A. Quite so.  
 Q. Had any European D. S. P. been in your place, could he have done anything better?  
 A. Nothing I can think of. My idea is his life would have been in danger.  
 Q. Do you know on what date judgment was passed in the second supplementary conspiracy case?  
 A. 28th of May I believe.  
 Q. And the first conspiracy case?  
 A. 30th of April. I am talking of Kasur. The first batch was on the 30th April and the second batch on the 28th of May, I believe.  
 Q. Mrs. Sherbourn's case?  
 A. Mrs. Sherbourn appeared in both cases.  
 Q. There was no separate case?  
 A. No.  
 Q. Therefore in all these cases the judges held that they would not convict on the evidence of one person only?  
 A. It was in the first case.  
 Q. That of the 30th April?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Were or were not a very large number of persons arrested after the 30th April on only the evidence of one person or statement of only one person?  
 A. They were arrested but allowed bail mostly.  
 Q. May I take it that between the 30th April and the end of May all those persons who were arrested were allowed on bail, all of them?  
 A. Except those against whom there was tangible evidence and it was hoped that further evidence would be obtained.  
 Q. Was one Ojagar Singh or Arjan Singh one of your informers?  
 A. No.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. There was a procession on the 11th of April?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. And it passed off quietly?  
 A. Yes.

Q. Did it go to the railway station also?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Have you any information as to the number of people who formed the crowd that day? Was it several thousands?  
 A. Several thousands.  
 Q. Did any riot or looting take place on that day?  
 A. No.  
 Q. How do you account for that?  
 A. Because there was no intention to cause any damage but only to observe *hartal* on that day.  
 Q. My question is, how do you account for it? Why was there no riot or disturbance but only the observing of *hartal* or holding a procession?  
 A. I think there was no disorderly material in it.  
 Q. How do you differentiate that procession and the crowd from the crowd of the 12th? What was the disorderly material on the 12th?  
 A. On the 12th I saw some strangers.  
 Q. How many strangers were they according to your information? Were they a large body or a small body?  
 A. Not a large body.  
 Q. About how many?  
 A. From what I have come to know from the statement of accused and other persons I think they were about a dozen.  
 Q. Were they prominent people or ordinary people? What class of people were they?  
 A. They were prominent in taking part and exciting the mob.  
 Q. Where did they come from?  
 A. Possibly from Amritsar.  
 Q. But you have no definite information?  
 A. No.  
 Q. In all they were about a dozen?  
 A. That is my idea.  
 Q. Was any of them arrested or identified?  
 A. One *sadhu* was arrested from Amritsar.  
 Q. Was he convicted?  
 A. No. There was only Mrs. Sherbourn's statement against him.  
 Q. Were these strangers seen by anybody to be exciting the crowd by making speeches or other means?  
 A. They were taking active part and leading the mob to the railway station.  
 Q. What do you mean by active part?  
 A. The men of the mob intended to move about only in the *kots* of the main city and attempts were made by these men to lead the mob to the railway station and at every place they were checked, but eventually after forming the funeral they succeeded.  
 Q. The town of Kasur is divided into various divisions called *kots*?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. The distinguishing feature was that these people wanted to remain inside the town in various *kots* and these people tried to take them to the railway station?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Is that all?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. But the procession and the crowd did go to the railway station on the 11th as well and you said these people were not present?  
 A. Yes; but they passed through to persuade other *kots* to observe *hartal*.  
 Q. I quite see that. But you said these strangers took them to the railway station?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. On the 11th also the mob did go to the railway station and yet these strangers were not present?  
 A. Quite so.  
 Q. Why?  
 A. At this time on the 12th, they had intended some mischief. That was the reason. They urged the mob to go there, while on the 11th they passed as usual, I mean going this direction and that direction and passing through the city.  
 Q. About how long after the arrival of the train at Kasur station did this mob go to the station?

3 December 1919.]

Khan Sahib AHMAD KHAN.

[Continued.]

- A. I should say about 10 or 15 minutes.
- Q. And they remained outside the fencing of the station ?
- A. They went inside on the station.
- Q. They were on the platform ?
- A. Yes, on the platform.
- Q. Before the arrival of the train ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. When the train from Ferozepore arrived, were these people there ? From which direction did the train arrive on the platform on the 12th ? Was it from the Ferozepore side ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And this train stopped far from the station.
- A. It stopped outside the station at the distance signal.
- Q. You say in your statement that they held up the train. What do you mean by saying that the train was held up ?
- A. Because the crowd went in that direction.
- Q. Which direction ?
- A. In the Ferozepore direction, and then they stopped the train.
- Q. Were they on the line ?
- A. Yes, on the line and all over the place.
- Q. Were they on the line in front of the train ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And then the train started when they were on the line and came to the platform. It is not so ?
- A. Yes, after they had assaulted the Europeans and the Indian passengers had got out.
- Q. The train did not start from this distant signal until the assault on the Europeans had taken place ?
- A. Yes, after the assault on the Europeans had taken place.
- Q. Were Europeans assaulted while they were in the train ?
- A. Of course when the train stopped passengers as usual came out of the train to see what it was.
- Q. The train was still at the distant signal ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And the crowd went as far as the train. They were very close to the train, I take it ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. They were a few feet away ?
- A. Yes, on all sides.
- Q. They were surrounding the train ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did they throw any stones while the train was still standing and passengers were in the train ?
- A. They did throw stones.
- Q. They did throw stones. Was it before anybody came out of the train ?
- A. Some passengers might have come out.
- Q. Then while the train was still standing away from the platform these European passengers came down ?
- A. Yes, except the two warrant officers.
- Q. Those who fired at the mob came out ?
- A. They did not.
- Q. They came out of the train, and then went back into the train ?
- A. No. They did not. European passengers who came out of the train, did not go into the train, but the two warrant officers remained in the train.
- Q. Then the train started ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Leaving those Europeans who had come out of the train at the distant signal ?
- A. Yes. The Sherbourns went into a hut.
- Q. I am not talking about Mr. Sherbourn, because he got off before that.
- A. No ; after some time.
- Q. Then the train started off ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And came to the platform ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Then these two gentlemen who were inside came out ?
- A. Yes ; also Corp. Battson who had also joined them.
- Q. Where was the crowd when the train came to the platform ?
- A. Round the railings.
- Q. They were not on the platform then ?
- A. No.
- Q. They had left the platform ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Then what was the distance between the train and the crowd ?
- A. At some places it was 30 yards and at some places it was 60 yards. The distance differed.
- Q. Then they came out of the train (these two gentlemen) and fired at the mob ?
- A. They received stones.
- Q. Stones were thrown at them and then they fired ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And when you got to the *kutcheri*, you had 4 constables with you ?
- A. Yes, but we had already a Sub-Inspector, a head constable and constables there.
- Q. I want to know whether you had 4 constables with you and they had already about 12 ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. The fire of these 4 people was effective in dispersing the crowd of about 2,000 people ?
- A. Combined with that of the men in the tahsil.
- Q. There were 16 people ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You have stated that there was practically no political life in Kasur, there had been no meetings and no agitation of any sort before these disturbances took place. Is that so ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Was there any organisation for waging war against the King ?
- A. No.
- Q. None whatever ?
- A. No.
- Q. Either local or through any outside influence ?
- A. No.
- Q. Then were any people in Kasur run in for waging war against the King ?
- A. No.
- Q. Nobody was run in ?
- A. No.
- Q. Then I want to know a little about those cages near the station. How many were there ?
- A. There was only one cage.
- Q. What was the dimension of the cage ?
- A. About 30 yards by 40 yards.
- Q. Was there any covering on the top ?
- A. Yes ; there was a thatched roof.
- Q. Was it locked up ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How did the people who were put inside that cage go to the latrine ?
- A. A latrine was also made for them inside.
- Q. At what distance ?
- A. In the same compound. From the seat it would be about 15 yards ?
- Q. Could they go very freely ?
- A. Yes, quite freely ; it was inside.
- Q. Inside that cage ?
- A. Yes, a separate place was set aside with *thatti*.
- Q. And also washing arrangements were made ?
- A. Yes ; it had good sanitary arrangements and an officer used to see it.
- Q. What is the condition of Kasur now ? Is it in a very unsatisfactory condition ?
- A. No ; I should not say that.
- By Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate—
- Q. Khan Sahib, you mentioned about this particular funeral that they started on the 12th at Kasur ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Have you learnt since that the idea of a funeral of liberty was started by a paper called *Waqf* at Amritsar which published an illustration or cartoon and several



3 December 1919.]

Khan Sahib AHMED KHAN—concluded—Mr. R. F. MITTER.

people were taking the funeral of liberty on their shoulders?

A. Yes; this is the paper of the same man Durga Das, who visited Patti.

Q. There is just one thing about this funeral. You said at that time what they gave out was that they were going towards the railway station in order to show this funeral of liberty to the passengers coming by trains at the Kasur Railway Station?

A. Yes.

Q. From that time afterwards are you of opinion that this was their real object or was that simply a pretence to get to the station without molestation by the authorities?

A. It was ostensible show; it was not real.

Q. That is your opinion?

A. Yes.

Q. Just one word more. You mentioned that in the report you got about the speech of that man Nadir Ali, in a portion of it he said the translation of that would be that we should take some risks. I put it to you does it not include 'risks of our lives'?

A. Yes.

Q. You did not make that clear. I think the translation was not the exact translation of the words. You agree that it includes risks of their lives. Therefore what you heard would amount to this "they should be prepared for killing or being killed"?

[ See also p. 206 where further examination of this witness is recorded.]

Mr. R. F. MITTER, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Kasur.

By the President—

Q. You are an Extra Assistant Commissioner?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 12th, did you get information as to a mob that was doing violence?

A. Yes.

Q. About what time was that?

A. About 10 o'clock.

Q. And when you got that information, did you start for the Railway Station?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you accompanied by the Tahsildar and two or three gentlemen who had just come to your house?

A. Yes.

Q. As you were near the Railway Station, did you notice anything that had occurred?

A. Yes.

Q. What was it?

A. Wire cutting was going on.

Q. Who was cutting the wires?

A. Some of the rioters.

Q. That was about 10 o'clock in the morning?

A. Yes.

Q. What were they cutting with?

A. With nippers.

Q. What are these nippers?

A. I think the Telegraph people have them; scissors for cutting.

Q. Had they been taken from the station?

A. I cannot say that.

Q. Did you see any man taking packages?

A. Yes.

Q. Where did the packages come from?

A. They came from the goods shed and also from the passenger shed.

Q. Were these packages the packages obtained by the mob to which they helped themselves?

A. Yes.

Q. When you arrived at the Railway Station what did you do?

A. We tried to disperse them and dispersed them actually, and then attended to the wounded, the two soldiers.

Q. These were the two Warrant Officers?

A. Yes; one was dead and the other was living.

Q. Were there any wounded among the crowd?

A. No; not there.

A. Yes.

Q. That would be the idiomatic sense of that expression?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. I think you have already stated that you believed Gul Muhammad, the approver?

A. Yes.

Q. He gave you a true story of what happened?

A. Yes.

Q. The story that he gave about the *charpoy* was he was one of the leaders. A black cloth was spread over the *charpoy*. The procession started through the bazara. There was a quibble as to whether it should go to the station or to the pleaders' quarters. Eventually the funeral procession went to the station so that the passengers might see and it went to the platform, weeping and wailing. Have you any reason to doubt the statement of this approver?

A. So far as his information went, it might be true. I see from the subsequent act that it was done.

Q. That is your inference?

A. Yes.

Q. I thought it was the accepted conclusion; you never said that it was your inference.

Q. No one was wounded there?

A. No.

Q. Did you get an account from the wounded man as to how he came by the wounds?

A. He was almost unconscious.

Q. The Non-commissioned Officer?

A. Yes; he was dying.

Q. Did you get an account at the time from the people as to how he received the wounds? Did you get it from anyone?

A. That is the account that the Khan Sahib has given.

Q. Then you sent for an Assistant Surgeon?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you go on then to the rescue of Mrs. Sherbourn and her children?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you learn that they were in a critical condition?

A. Yes.

Q. From the attitude of the crowd had you any doubt that their lives were in danger at the time?

A. No; I did not see any crowd when I got to them.

Q. You went to the place where they were and then you returned to your own house?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you then send a messenger to Lahore for Military aid?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you consider that step necessary?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the situation so serious that the Civil authorities were unable to deal with it?

A. Yes.

Q. Why did you send a messenger to Lahore?

A. The wires were cut and trains were not running. It is only 32 miles by road.

Q. The wires had been cut and trains were not running in consequence of the action of the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. After the despatch of the messenger to Lahore, did you go to the Deputy Superintendent of Police's house?

A. Yes.

Q. I think you got word from there that the mob were beginning to plunder or were intending to plunder the Treasury?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you proceed then with the Deputy Superintendent of Police in the direction of the Tahsil?

3 December 1919.]

Mr. R. F. MITTER.

[Continued]

A. Yes.  
 Q. When you got there, what did you find as to the situation?  
 A. They were burning chairs and setting fire to things.  
 Q. Were there any constables on the spot?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. How many?  
 A. I cannot say. I think he has given you the number.  
 Q. Did you endeavour to get the mob to desist from proceeding further?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Were your endeavours successful?  
 A. No.  
 Q. Were the mob completely out of hand?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Did you give orders to fire on them?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Did you delay as long as you thought it was possible to delay before you fired?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Had the order to fire not been given, what did you think would have happened?  
 A. Further destruction of property and possibly murders also.  
 Q. The attitude of the crowd was extremely dangerous?  
 A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. I think on the occasion of this firing one person was killed, and about 4 wounded altogether?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Were there any people who died subsequently?  
 A. Two of them.  
 Q. Was the firing continued for a length of time?  
 A. About 5 minutes in all.  
 Q. At all events, was it after the crowd was trying to disperse?  
 A. No.  
 Q. It was checked?  
 A. It began to disperse and we tried to stop it.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. How many years were you in Kasur in your official capacity?  
 A. In all 8 months.  
 Q. Where were you before?  
 A. At Dharmasala.  
 Q. How far is it from Kasur?  
 A. Very far off; about 200 miles.  
 Q. At Kasur, before these incidents of April, was there any anti-British or anti-Government feeling?  
 A. Not at the time I know of.  
 Q. And people were peaceful and law-abiding?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Had you anything to do with recruiting in Kasur?  
 A. No, Sir.  
 Q. There were certain Darbars held at Kasur by the Lieutenant-Governor about Recruiting and War Loan?  
 A. Yes, I was there.  
 Q. Kasur has done very well so far as recruiting is concerned?  
 A. Yes; and the Lieutenant-Governor had on various occasions complimented Kasur on their recruiting efforts.  
 Q. Can you account for the several outbursts in Kasur in April?  
 A. I think it was due to the people from Amritsar; that is my opinion. They can very easily be engineered. You have simply to collect a crowd of 5 or 6-people, others will follow, unless there is firing. At the time it was not very difficult to manage.  
 Q. You think the trouble arose because of emissaries from Amritsar?  
 A. Yes; that is my opinion.  
 Q. Have you any tangible evidence of that?  
 A. No certain evidence.  
 Q. What do you mean by 'no certain evidence'?  
 A. That is, we heard they were there; I do not think the Kasur people were capable of doing anything like that.

Q. What I want to know is: What do you mean by 'no certain evidence.' That you have no tangible evidence, that you have only heard?

A. Yes.  
 Q. Did you make any investigation to ascertain whether what you heard had any foundation?  
 A. I did not make any investigation.  
 Q. You grant that a few emissaries come from Amritsar would not be able to create all this outburst in Kasur unless things were there already to help it?  
 A. Yes: I think discontent was universal. But they would not have gone in for that kind of thing without some external influence.  
 Q. What was the cause of the discontent?  
 A. Discontent was universal in India.  
 Q. Owing to what reason?  
 A. The reasons are a good many, chiefly economic, as I stated. I think the industrial needs of the country have been neglected for a long time.

Q. By whom?  
 A. By the Government.  
 Q. And people felt that greatly?  
 A. Yes, they began to realise the effects of it at any rate.  
 Q. And the people were beginning to realise the effects of neglect as regards the industrial development of the country?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. The high prices I suppose were also a pre-disposing cause?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Then came the agitation about the Rowlatt Act?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. All these causes caused the riot?  
 A. The time was ripe for that.  
 Q. Before the 10th April, was there any political activity in Kasur? Were there any political meetings at all?  
 A. None.  
 Q. Why do you say that the Rowlatt agitation was one of the causes, so far as Kasur was concerned if there was no political activity till before the 10th?

A. The Rowlatt Act in my opinion was passed at an inopportune time, as I have said in my statement; people were expecting praises and rewards for their efforts in the War. They thought that it should not be passed at that time; even the sensible and educated people thought that it was not the time for it.

Q. People expected that their War services would be recognised and they felt that this legislation was thrown at them instead.

A. Yes.  
 Q. You told us there was no political activity at Kasur, no political meetings at all up to the 10th, and the Rowlatt Act did not visibly affect them. Did it begin on the 10th, this political unrest?

A. The riot does not require much of political life for agitation.

Q. Then what do you think the riot requires?  
 A. Only 4 or 5 people collect together and begin doing something, others will follow.

Q. Then according to you, the crowds collected on the spur of the moment without any design beforehand?

A. Yes; and these crowds had no objective to start with.

Q. In your view, there was no design, no conspiracy behind what happened at Kasur?

A. No.

Q. Now, when you went to the station how many people did you find there?

A. About 50 altogether scattered in groups. No more than that.

Q. Was it this mob that has done all this mischief at the station?

A. No; the mob that moved on to the trains, which came to a standstill; and then they divided.

Q. How many rifles had you at the station?

A. Only two rifles

3 December 1919.]

Mr. R. F. MITTER.

[Continued.]

Q. And you were with their aid able to disperse the crowd at the station ?

A. Yes.

Q. Now Martial Law was proclaimed on the 15th or 16th ?

A. 16th.

Q. And after that you had nothing to do with the administration of Kasur.

A. I was still there in my original capacity ; as Deputy Magistrate I remained there ; but I was not Sub-Divisional Officer.

Q. What were you doing during the Martial Law ?

A. I was doing my ordinary work, Section 30 work, as Additional District Magistrate.

Q. You were both Additional District Magistrate and Sub-Divisional Officer ?

A. No. I was not Sub-Divisional Officer after the 15th, then Mr. Marsden came, I was only 11 days Sub-Divisional Officer.

Q. It is not your permanent office, you were merely in charge of the office for a short time ?

A. Yes.

Q. Even after the declaration of Martial Law you continued your work as District Magistrate.

A. Yes, Section 30 Magistrate.

Q. And you continued in your office after Martial Law, there was no change in your work ?

A. No.

Q. Did the other courts in Kasur go on working as before ?

A. Yes.

Q. There was no change in their work either on the 11th, 12th or subsequent-dates ?

A. No.

Q. Were you present when the whole town was turned out for the purpose of identification ?

A. Yes.

Q. What date was that ?

A. Mr. Marsden gave the date yesterday.

Q. Somewhere about the 1st May ?

A. Yes.

Q. Who gave the order for the identification parade ?

A. Mr. Marsden and the Military authorities, I believe.

Q. How did you happen to go there ?

A. I was asked to help in the identification of witnesses. All the witnesses had been called to identify if they could.

Q. How many people were present ?

A. The whole town.

Q. How many thousands ?

A. About 15,000 or 20,000 ; women and children were not called.

Q. Children were not called ?

A. Some children were called.

Q. From 12 upwards ?

A. Yes.

Q. Where were they made to assemble ? On the roads leading to the station ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there 15,000 located near the station ?

A. They were made to sit along the side of the roads leading to the Railway Station.

Q. Must be a very long line on both sides, it must have gone into the city, to accommodate the 20,000.

A. Yes, they were long lines.

Q. When did they first assemble, what time of the day ?

A. Early in the morning, say about 7.

Q. And how long were they kept there ?

A. I came away at 10. I think they dispersed at about 12 o'clock.

Q. You were there till 10 A.M. ?

A. Yes.

Q. And what was done during the period you were there ? You asked them to sit on the ground lining the roads ?

A. Yes, in two lines, sometime three deep.

Q. What process was gone through for identification ?

A. Some were made to pass the witnesses bare-headed.

Q. How many people were there to identify ? I mean who were all the people that were there to identify ?

A. The Sherbourns and some others.

Q. How many ; a dozen or half a dozen ?

A. About 15 altogether.

Q. What was done there ? Did these 15 people pass past the lines looking at those people or were the people made to march past the witnesses ? I want to understand precisely what took place. When the people came there, they were made to sit down in lines, 2 or 3 deep. Where were those who were going to be identified sitting ?

A. They were sitting just midway between the 2 roads. These 2 roads are at an angle to each other.

Q. How far from the station ?

A. They are near the station, 2 or 3 hundred yards from the station.

Q. The lines were towards the town, extending into the town ?

A. Yes.

Q. How were the people made to march through ? How was it done ?

A. One line of men was made to stand up and asked to go past them.

Q. Extending from where ?

A. From the Railway Station ; I took them by sections.

Q. They were made to walk past those people bare-headed ?

A. Yes.

Q. Where were they made to go ?

A. They were allowed to go by some road and sit down again.

Q. You are not sure what was done ?

A. No. I was asking some other witnesses if they could identify, some railway witnesses.

Q. Some witnesses were going between the lines ?

A. Some of the witnesses I took round.

Q. There must have been considerable confusion if some of the witnesses were to go through the lines, other people had to be marched through some other lines. I do not think that day's work led to any result ?

A. So far as I know all this trouble ended in almost nothing.

By the President—

Q. Were any arrests made ?

A. Not so far as I know.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Were anybody identified ?

A. Yes : Some.

By Sir C. H. Selvad—

Q. Then they must have been arrested ?

A. No, I do not think they were arrested or they might have been arrested and let go a day or two after.

By the Hon'ble Panjit Jagat Narayan—

Q. One of the reasons given by you in your statement for the riot was excess of zeal on the part of some officials, the Tahsildar class and Zaildars in obtaining recruits for War ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. There was some discontent about recruiting for War ?

A. Yes.

Q. This experience of yours is based, not on what happened in Kasur, but in other places ?

A. On my tours in Kasur.

Q. Were not *panchayats* organised for the purposes of recruitment ?

A. Yes.

Q. These *panchayats* used to go with the Honorary Magistrates or Municipal Commissioners ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And they would go to different villages and would not come back unless and until they had done some prescribed work.

A. Of that I cannot say.

Q. Are you aware that so far as Kasur was concerned, there was a complaint before Mr. Thornton that 15 or

3 December 1919.]

Mr. R. F. MITTER.

[Continued.]

20 men of the labouring classes were recruited and as a result they had come back?

A. Yes; they had come back.

Q. The Tahsildar or the Honorary Magistrate was responsible for these 15 persons?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You know nothing about 1918, so far as Kasur is concerned?

A. No.

Q. Do you know that at the identification parade the people were being marched bare-headed?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you hear of the vagaries of the sentences of the Martial Law authorities. You were there all along.

A. Yes.

Q. You heard what sorts of fancy punishments were being awarded?

A. Yes, I did hear.

Q. You also heard that in many cases, which could be tried under the Indian Penal Code, the Martial Law authorities awarded punishments?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you informed of this temple affair?

A. The temple affair? I did not hear of it.

Q. Did you hear of the nose-rubbing affair?

A. I did.

Q. And were you informed of the white-washing affair?

A. Yes; it was not my business.

Q. You were there as Sub-Divisional Officer and naturally people would come to you and say what had happened?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you informed that sometimes at the time of flogging, prostitutes of the town were called to witness the scene.

A. In one case only.

By the President—

Q. Called by whom?

A. By Captain Doveton.

Q. Do you profess to know it, to your own knowledge?

A. I heard about it.

The President: That was what I wanted to know.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. In your own opinion, was there any conspiracy to wage War against Government?

A. No, Sir..

Q. On the day when these men were collected for the purpose of identification, are you aware that parties were sent to search the houses of respectable people and important citizens to find out whether any persons were kept back inside the house?

A. Parties were sent to make sure that none were in hiding.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. Mr. Mitter, were those recruits obtained in the towns or country districts?

A. In the villages.

Q. Was any recruiting done in Kasur town?

A. Some might have come from Kasur.

Q. There was large recruiting in Kasur?

A. No; there could not be.

Q. Did these excess of zeal measures take place in Kasur town, or in villages?

A. Not in the towns.

Q. How then did they cause discontent and rioting in Kasur town?

A. Rioting is a very easy thing to get up if there are some predisposing causes.

Q. This excess of zeal was resented by the inhabitants of the town?

A. Yes; there was some resentment. It was youthful mischief that caused most of the riots.

By the President—

Q. I want to ask you one question: You say there was agitation in the country about the Rowlatt Act. Do I understand that it existed prior to 10th April?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there rumours in circulation as to the effect of the Rowlatt Act?

A. Yes.

Q. Who circulated the rumours?

A. A lot of newspapers come to Kasur daily and people read them.

Q. The rumours or the statements in the papers as to the effect of Rowlatt Act were circulated in the town?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know by whom they were circulated?

A. The newspaper reports.

Q. What is the population in Kasur that are able to read and write?

A. If one reads, another hears and thus the news circulates.

Q. Do you know the nature of these rumours? Were any specific rumours in circulation as to the effect of the Rowlatt Act?

A. Yes. That liberty would be endangered, people would be arrested on mere hearsay information and so on.

Q. There was a statement that 2 or 3 gathering together would be arrested, that marriages would not be allowed to proceed?

A. That was what the Missionaries told me that they heard in villages.

Q. Did not there seem to be some influence behind the circulation of all these rumours?

A. No.

Q. How can you account for the similarity of false rumours as to the Rowlatt legislation in Kasur to those in a great number of other towns in the Punjab? All were arising at the same time. Necessarily some one intentionally circulated these rumours?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Could you account for it at all?

A. I am not sure of the fact that they were really in circulation in all the villages, but if they were there would be an agency behind, but I am not sure.

Q. The similarity of the rumours as to the effects of the Rowlatt Act existed at the same time in a great number of different towns? It will not therefore be unreasonable to suppose that it must be due to some agency behind them?

A. No, Sir.

By Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate—

Q. May I know what the total population of Kasur is?

A. About 24 thousand.

Q. Well, the estimate you gave of the male persons who actually were made to attend the identification parade must be considerably lower than what you just put it. About ten thousand?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you said you were not aware that any arrests were made on that day?

A. No.

Q. I now remind you of something that you said; "8 arrests were made on the evidence of two or more witnesses and 20 arrests on the evidence of one witness."

A. Then I am wrong.

Q. Does it occur to you now?

A. I had nothing to do with that, I am sure.

Q. With regard to this excess of zeal about which a question has just been put to you, do you remember whether you heard of any specific instance or did some Tahsildar or any Sub-Inspector tell you?

A. When I went to Pattoke in connection with leases of *chals*, there I heard that people had been told that they would be deprived of their leases unless they furnished recruits for each of whom they had to pay Rs. 400 to Rs. 600. Those who came voluntarily used to pay it to their relatives.

Q. That is what you were told by the tahsildar?

A. That is what people said.

Q. Did you take any steps to verify whether the tahsildar had actually said it or whether it was attributed to the tahsildar?

3 December 1919.]

Mr. R. F. MITTER—concluded—LALA KHAN CHAND.

A. No, I did not verify it.

Q. One thing more, about the matters relating to the Martial Law days in Kasur, you heard of this story of people having been made to rub their noses on the ground and about white-washing. May I enquire whether

there was any truth in these rumours about Captain Doyton?

A. No.

Q. After you heard those rumours did you take any steps to justify this report?

A. No.

LALA KHAN CHAND, Tahsildar, Kasur.

By the President—

Q. You are a Tahsildar at Kasur?

A. Yes.

Q. On the morning of the 12th, did you go through the bazar and see that a *hartal* was going on?

A. Yes.

Q. And you gave information to Mr. Mitter?

A. Yes.

Q. On your way back to your house did you notice a small crowd? About what time was that?

A. Yes. It may be about 8-30; after 8 and before 9.

Q. I think after getting to your house you were informed by the *chaprasi* that the Railway Station had been set on fire?

A. Yes.

Q. When you heard that, you proceeded to the station?

A. Yes.

Q. On reaching the Ostroi Post did you see that the furniture of the Railway Department was on fire?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you go inside the Station?

A. I did.

Q. Did you see anything further on fire?

A. I saw the lamp room burning and everything was upset in the booking office.

Q. You mean that there was great disorder?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see any Railway officials about the Station?

A. About 3 or 4.

Q. Any constables?

A. Only one constable.

Q. What were these officials doing?

A. Porters were putting out the fire and the clerks were assisting.

Q. Were you told that the Station incident was over?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you told that something might be done to save the Railway Bridge?

A. Yes.

Q. Why was that?

A. Because the mob had gone to pull it down.

Q. When you heard that what did you do?

A. I asked the constable to go to the Deputy Superintendent of Police and report to him, but he expressed his inability to do so because he was alone at the Station and could not leave it. I intended to go to the Sub-Divisional Officer and thought of sending some one else to the Deputy Superintendent of Police. I did go myself to the Sub-Divisional Officer.

Q. The constable did not want to go alone?

A. He said that he was alone at the Station, and that it was improper for him to leave the Station without a constable.

Q. Did you then go to the Sub-Divisional Officer?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Some one went to the Deputy Superintendent of Police?

A. Some one was sent.

Q. I want to take you now to the point, where did you go then and what did you see on your way?

A. On my way just before starting I saw one Seth Mohan Lal and I asked him to go towards the Railway Bridge and also asked him to take the constable with him, and I told him that I was going to the Sub-Divisional Officer.

Q. As you were going along did Khan Sahib Ahmad Khan join you?

A. When I was coming back from the Sub-Divisional Officer's house to the Railway Station he joined me.

Q. Well, after you had been joined by Ahmad Khan, did you come across some people pulling down the Railway wire?

A. Yes.

Q. How many people were doing that?

A. About 50.

Q. Did you stop them?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you joined by some constables?

A. Yes, Sir, a few more joined.

Q. And the Deputy Superintendent of Police and some constables joined you?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you see people carrying away goods?

A. Yes.

Q. Were those goods the same that had been looted from the Station?

A. They had taken them out from a wagon. Some were lying on the ground and some were taken by them.

Q. About this time did you get information that two Military Officers had been killed by the rioters?

A. Yes.

Q. Also that one soldier had been wounded?

A. Yes.

Q. I think you went then to the wagon?

A. We had passed the wagon and then we went where the third man was kept. Sardar Kishan Singh said that he had shut in the third man to protect him from the crowd.

Q. Had he been shut in for protection from the crowd?

A. Yes.

Q. But you understood that the crowd had intended to kill him?

A. Yes, I was informed so.

Q. Did you see the train standing at a distance from the Railway Station?

A. I could not see it.

Q. In your statement here you say we went towards the train?

A. Yes, where the train had been standing; the train had moved immediately.

Q. The train moved back to Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. You went to where you saw the two officers that had been killed?

A. Yes.

Q. After you had been at the station this time, again, did you go back to your own quarters?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Where did you go then?

A. I went to Kot Halim Khan. Some one told us that a European gentleman and a lady had been assaulted near the gangmen's hut.

Q. Did you go to the Mission House?

A. After that. At first we went to Kot Halim Khan.

Q. You first went where Mr. and Mrs. Sherbourn were?

A. Yes.

Q. After that you went to the Mission House?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you take them with you to the Mission House?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Before you reached the Mission Compound did you notice a big smoke coming out of the town?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you informed that the Post Office was set on fire?

3 December 1919.]

LALA KHAN CHAND.

[Continued.]

A. Some were saying that the Post Office was set on fire and some were not.

Q. And on reaching the Mission Compound you met the Mission lady ?

A. Yes.

Q. What did she say ?

A. She said that she was not safe there.

Q. Then did you go to the Post Office ?

A. Yes.

Q. When you reached the Post Office what did you find ?

A. I found that the Post Office was on fire, much of it had been burnt. Several persons were quenching the fire and other gentlemen were also putting down the fire.

Q. When you were there did you hear that the rioters were collecting to go to the Judicial lock-up ?

A. They had intended to collect.

Q. With what object ?

A. To rob the Treasury and set free the prisoners.

Q. Then did a small crowd start towards the Station ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they go towards the Station ?

A. They went a few paces, but on our checking them they turned towards the Police *Thana*.

Q. At the Police Station some police were on the roof and some at the door ?

A. Yes.

Q. The crowd did not make any attack on the Police Station ?

A. They did not actually attack the Police *Thana*, but they were discussing about it. The police was asking the mob to go away and they were resisting.

Q. The crowd did then proceed to the Station ?

A. Yes.

Q. It is situated not very far from the Police Station ?

A. Yes.

Q. How far is the Tahsil from the Railway Station ?

A. May be nearly a mile.

Q. Did you follow them in the direction of the Tahsil ?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you got some people with you ?

A. Yes.

Q. How many people were with you ?

A. One Kishan Singh, Exoise Sub-Inspector, Sayed Ahmad Shah, Municipal Commissioner, and three of my Munshis, and one Sub-Overseer and perhaps three Chaprasis. We all started in pursuit.

Q. Had you any arms with you ?

A. No.

Q. Where did you come upon the mob ?

A. Passing the Id-Gah Bridge near Ghulam Hassan Khan's house.

Q. When you came upon the mob what did they do ?

A. They were going along. When we stopped them they stopped.

Q. Did you stop them for any length of time ?

A. They stood for only a minute or so.

Q. After that they again turned to the Tahsil ?

A. Yes.

Q. How often did that occur ?

A. Perhaps three or four times ; at least three times.

Q. When you reached the tank near the Tahsil was the mob greatly increased in number ?

A. It was gradually increasing in number.

Q. At that time did they seem to hesitate whether they should go to the Tahsil or to the Judicial Lock-up ?

A. They were thinking whether they should first go to the Tahsil or to the Judicial Lock-up.

Q. Did one of the mob persuade them to go anywhere ?

A. They decided to go to the Tahsil. One of them persuaded them.

Q. What was their object in going to the Tahsil ?

A. The object was to loot the Treasury.

Q. Did you reach the door of the Tahsil yourself ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you reach in front of the mob ?

A. Yes. I came in front of the mob at the Railway Station.

Q. Then did you and the company that was with you keep the mob for a while in check ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they remain in check for some time ?

A. They were quite in control.

Q. Then what did they do ?

A. I saw a petition-writer's hut burning, and one of them took a piece of *chappar* in front of the tahsil door on the approach road, and again Bawa Kharak Singh fired two blank rounds and then they became furious.

Q. Did they succeed in setting fire to the Tahsil gate ?

A. No.

Q. How were they prevented ?

A. They were prevented by us and by the police on the roof of the door.

Q. Then was one of the petition-writers' huts set on fire ?

A. Yes, behind the mob.

Q. Where is the Munsif's Court ? It is behind the Tahsil ?

A. About 40 or 50 *karams* on one side of the Tahsil. There is a small building intervening between the Chaukidar's hut and the *chappars*.

Q. Was it set on fire ?

A. It was subsequently seen ablaze.

Q. Was there some firing at this time which did not take effect ?

A. Two shots.

Q. Were they discharged in the air ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they have any effect on the mob ?

A. The mob became more furious ; otherwise before that it was quite in control.

Q. Then about this time did the Deputy Superintendent of Police with his men come up ?

A. Yes.

Q. And I think the order to fire was given ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you hear that order being given ?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Did you see the firing taking place ?

A. Only one shot on the mob. They were coming behind the mob and I was in front of the Tahsil door. The faces of the mob were towards us.

Q. Were you yourself in a critical position ?

A. I thought so at that moment.

Q. Was it on account of the attitude of the mob ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were the mob throwing anything ?

A. Yes.

Q. What ?

A. Stones.

Q. At whom were they throwing ?

A. At the police. When they were fired at, they became furious and the police became hidden behind a wall.

Q. After the actual firing had taken place was order restored ?

A. The mob began to disperse. They were running back. All was quiet and calm.

Q. Firing in the air had infuriated the mob ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did actual firing at the mob disperse the mob ?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think it was essential to fire at the mob ?

A. I think it was quite essential.

Q. I think this all occurred before 2 o'clock ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Then about 4 o'clock military help arrived ?

A. A little before 4.

Q. Were a number of searches conducted in your presence in the evening ?

A. I was in charge of the investigation.

Q. What was the object of these searches ?

A. Property was stolen, and we conducted these searches with a hope that we might perhaps recover some of it. They were all of the menial class.

Q. Then on the 16th Martial Law was proclaimed and some arrests were then made ?

3 December 1919.]

LALA KHAN CHAND.

[Continued.]

A. Yes.

Q. Were you one of the people who were asked to identify those who had been in the crowd?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the procedure adopted to carry out these identifications?

A. They were made very publicly, and the identifications were made in public.

Q. In connection with the administration of Martial Law, I think a case came to your notice in which a man was shot after being challenged. Is that the case about which we have been told by Mr. Marsden?

(This question was given up.)

Q. Did you conduct the search of the house of one of the leading pleaders?

A. Yes, Sir, Maulvi Abdul Kadir's.

Q. You mention in your statement a case of harshness of Military people at Patto Kohna?

A. Yes, at Patto Kohna.

Q. What was that?

A. The Military people broke some earthen vessels of the residents of that village and some things were broken with their bayonets.

Q. Was any investigation made about that?

A. I don't know.

Q. Then how did you come to know about that?

A. I was myself present. I went there with the Military officers.

Q. Then what occurred?

A. When we came back we arrested some persons from that village and brought them to Kasur. The harshness took place with regard to a suspect who was not present in Patto Kohna. He had absconded, and his house was shut.

Q. What actually occurred?

A. Some earthen vessels were broken to pieces with bayonets.

Q. But were they broken with bayonets, *lathis* or *dangs*?

A. With bayonets.

Q. Who did it?

A. It was done by the British soldiers.

Q. Under whose instructions?

A. Under the instructions of a junior officer.

Q. What was the object?

A. To frighten the people.

Q. How do you know this?

A. It was their purpose.

Q. You were present at the time?

A. Yes.

Q. It was done under the instructions of a junior officer. Who was he?

A. I don't remember his name. Perhaps he was a Lieutenant.

Q. On what date was that done?

A. It was done on the night of the 19th April.

Q. What other places did you visit besides that place?

A. I went to village Khara and village Lakhna.

Q. Where is that village? How far is that village from Kasur?

A. It may be 18 or 20 miles from Kasur.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. You say you do not remember the Lieutenant's name?

A. You mean the name of that officer?

Q. Yes.

A. I do not remember.

Q. You say he was a Lieutenant?

A. I remember he was a Lieutenant.

Q. Do you remember the regiment or the Corps to which he belonged?

A. Yes, he belonged to 30th Cavalry under Major Paske.

Q. I understand you heard him tell his men to break the earthen vessels. Did you hear him tell the men to do so?

A. As far as I remember he himself started it and the men followed him.]

Q. As far as you are concerned I want to know whether you distinctly remember you saw him do it?

A. Yes, as far as I remember.

Q. That is not a question of as far as you remember, but that is a question whether you have any recollection of seeing him do this?

A. The thing is this that there were two persons. Both of them were lieutenants. One was in charge of the whole military guard and the other was perhaps his junior or may be equal to him and that person started it. I don't remember whether he was a lieutenant or below lieutenant, but I imagine he was a lieutenant.

Q. You know he was a Lieutenant?

A. Perhaps.

Q. Whether he was a commissioned officer or non-Commissioned Officer?

A. I cannot say.

Q. He was not a Corporal?

A. He was above the rank of Corporal.

Q. He may be a Sergeant?

A. He was above a Sergeant.

Q. You think he was an officer?

A. Yes.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. For how many years have you been a Tahsildar at Kasur?

A. Tahsildar of Mal?

Q. Yes.

A. Nearly three years.

Q. Before that you were settlement tahsildar at Kasur?

A. For one year I remained Settlement Tahsildar.

Q. How many years have you been at Kasur?

A. From the 1st of March 1913 to the end of December 1914 I was in Kasur as settlement tahsildar. Then I was transferred to Chunian.

Q. From 1913 you are connected with Kasur?

A. From 1913 my connection is with Kasur.

Q. You have known the people intimately all that time?

A. Most of them.

Q. During all that period did you observe any anti-Government or anti-British feelings amongst the people of Kasur?

A. I did not.

Q. Any seditious movement?

A. Not much of it.

Q. Not much; did you observe any?

A. No seditious movement.

Q. How do you, then, account for this sudden outburst on the 12th April?

A. Similar offences occurred everywhere and Kasur did not escape, on account of being the neighbour of Amritsar. Mostly it is due to Amritsar.

Q. Because things happened at Amritsar?

A. People were freely coming and going to Amritsar which is just near Kasur, and people were going and coming back to Kasur for their business.

Q. But you said that there was no seditious movement in Kasur and the people were very quiet so far as you knew. They would not suddenly burst into these outrages simply because people at Amritsar did?

A. Amritsar people made them ashamed at not keeping *hartal* on the 30th March and 6th April.Q. On the 30th March and 6th April there was no *hartal* at Kasur?A. No *hartal* at all at Kasur.

Q. And what do you mean by saying the Amritsar people put them to shame? What did they do?

A. There were rumours that some of their *kundis* had been dishonoured, and one man who purchased some ghee from Amritsar was asked, before payment, who he was.

Q. Have you any evidence of this?

A. No evidence at all.

Q. Did you take any pains to find out whether what you had heard in regard to that had any substratum of truth?

3 December 1919.]

LALA KHAN CHAND.

[Continued.]

Q. On all these journeys from Kasur to Lahore and back from Lahore and from the *hazas* to the cage was he taken handcuffed?

A. I do not remember exactly. I saw him once at Lahore.

Q. Where did you see him at Lahore?

A. Near the Railway Station at the Naulakha Police Station.

Q. What was being done to him there?

A. He was on a *tum-jum* under guard.

Q. Was he handcuffed?

A. I do not remember whether he was handcuffed, I think he was; my idea is that he was, but I cannot remember exactly.

Q. Now this man Maulvi Abdul Kadir whose house was searched by you, he is also a pleader?

A. He is a leading pleader.

Q. You have known him many years?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was he arrested?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When?

A. On the same date as Maulvi Ghulam Mohi-ud-din.

Q. How many weeks was he kept in prison?

A. Much less than Maulvi Ghulam Mohi-ud-din.

Q. How long, two weeks?

A. Less than two weeks.

Q. Was he kept at Kasur or was he also sent to Lahore?

A. No, he was not sent to Lahore, he was kept at Kasur.

Q. Where?

A. In the *thana* lock-up.

Q. Was he also brought up for identification?

A. Yes.

Q. And was he handcuffed?

A. Yes.

Q. What was he arrested for?

A. I do not know.

Q. And he was released ultimately without any trial?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You speak in your statement of having taken part in all the raids on villages?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. How many villages did you raid in that manner?

A. Only two.

Q. You speak of several in your statement?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Some raids were made by military guards to arrest suspects?

A. Military guards made several searches, but I went with only two of them.

Q. How many villages in all were raided by them?

A. Six or seven I remember.

Q. Your statement then is inaccurate? You make this statement:—

'Identifications were made in public, and in many cases I was present.'

A. Yes, identifications at the Railway Station I mean.

Q. You are not there speaking of the identifications in the villages that were raided?

A. No, Sir.

Q. By identifications you mean the Kasur identifications?

A. Yes.

Q. You know there was one general identification when the whole town was turned out?

A. Yes, on 1st May.

Q. Was there any similar identification process gone through?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the whole town turned out?

A. Not the whole town, but several persons, most.

Q. Most of the inhabitants?

A. Yes.

Q. How often did that take place, you say in many cases you were present?

A. There were several small identifications.

Q. On how many occasions were these?

A. Identifications were made perhaps 7 or 8 times.

Q. In one you had the whole town turned out?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you said in some others almost the whole town?

A. Almost the whole town.

Q. On how many occasions was that the case?

A. In all the remaining cases. In one case only I remember almost the whole town was sent, but in others only several persons.

Q. On one occasion the whole town; on the second occasion most of the population?

A. And in other only a few.

By Major General Sir George Barron—

Q. Those things which you saw broken up, what do you put the value of them at?

A. Very little. That suspect was a sweeper by caste, and the whole property would amount to about 20 or 15 rupees, I think less than 15 rupees.

Q. What were they?

A. Earthen pots and some quilts.

Q. Was he a poor man?

A. A very poor man, he was a sweeper.

Q. So it meant a good lot to him?

A. Yes, Sir, though they were rubbish things.

Q. Of value to him?

A. Yes, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. In your opinion in the first place the cause of the disturbance was the news of Mr. Gandhi's alleged arrest?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And when you were in your Tahsil on the 11th the first news that you received was that on account of Mr. Gandhi's arrest the people were closing their shops and a *hartal* was arranged for afterwards?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In your statement you do not make any mention of the news having arrived from Amritsar as to what was done there on the 10th?

A. No, Sir. I myself was not acquainted with any news, but afterwards came to know about that.

Q. With reference to clause four of your statement where you say "the alleged arrival of certain persons from Amritsar side, whose stories had a bad effect on the people." I take it therefore that you had no definite knowledge of any person having arrived?

A. When I came near the Rohi Bridge I was told that two or three persons had arrived from Amritsar on the morning of the 12th.

Q. My point is this—up to the time that you sent in this application you described the alleged arrival of certain persons from Amritsar, you had no definite knowledge—you do not know their names?

A. No, I do not know their names.

Q. We have been informed that no public political meeting was held at Kasur during the course of one year?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Now your clause 5 says "no responsible educated person took the trouble to satisfy the public discontent by holding meetings and contradicting false rumours"

—What do you mean by this?

A. I simply mean that it was the duty of every educated person to pacify the minds of the persons.

Q. Did the District Superintendent of Police or you yourself or Mr. Mitter hold any meetings in order to remove this discontent and to disillusion the mind of the public?

A. Not before the occurrences.

Q. Therefore you were as much to blame in the discharge of your duties as the other educated classes not of your service?

A. Yes.

Q. You say something about a *hartal*?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You have been in this tahsil for a number of years?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think when His Honour held a Darbar at Kasur you were there?

A. Yes.

Q. And the recruiting was not very encouraging?

A. Yes, Sir.



3 December 1919.]

LALA KHAN CHAND.

[Continued.]

Q. And that you people were taken to task for not paying enough attention to this ?

A. Yes.

Q. So that remark then was applied that "if this goes on any longer it will be better if the seat of Government is removed from Lahore to Amritsar" ?

A. It was said, but it did not concern Kasur only.

Q. He said that it would be better to remove the seat from Lahore to Amritsar ?

A. Yes it was said.

Q. And it was in connection with recruitment ?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know one of your Sub-Divisional Officers, Khan Bahadur Sultan Ahmed—in the years 1917-18 when this recruitment was going on ?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know that any number of persons who were *chalaned* under sections 107 and 110 were given the alternative to go into the army ?

A. Yes ; several of them.

Q. Can you give me any idea as to what was the average number of persons *chalaned* previous to that under sections 107 and 110 and the number *chalaned* in the years 1917-18 ?

A. I am afraid I do not know.

Q. Are you aware that they had enormously increased ?

A. I cannot say.

Q. There were two *panchayats* formed in Kasur and you were president of one and another man was in charge of the other ?

A. Yes.

Q. And it was the duty of the *panchayat* to go to every village and to get the appointed quota of recruits, and so long as they were not forthcoming they were to remain in the village. As a matter of fact that was the procedure, that the *panchayats* should go to a village and insist by persuasion on getting the proper number of recruits and so long as..... ?

A. It was not that we should remain there. We were staying there for one, two or three days in order to get recruits by persuasion.

Q. Were not a number of tahsildars of your place sent to Ferozepore, for the purpose of learning the method of recruiting ?

A. They were sent to see how recruiting was going on in the Ferozepore district.

Q. Because in that district recruiting was very brisk ?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it not a fact that one of your *panchayats* had got hold of 15 or 19 recruits from the labouring classes and they were brought to Kasur. Then an application was put in by their relations before Mr. Tollinton saying that they were unwilling and that they were forced to go and Mr. Tollinton on that application released them all ?

A. That came to my knowledge when I returned from camp. It did not concern my party. When I got back I heard that Mr. Tollinton had sent them back to their homes.

By the President—

Q. Is that because they were unwilling ?

A. Yes, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You were asked by Sir C. Setalvad about the co-operation of pleaders. I do not know whether it was taken down.

A. It was Mohan Lall, Pleader. He met me at the Railway Station and he took a constable with him in his tonga in order to protect the Railway Bridge.

Q. After hearing the news in the Tahsil you went to the bazar and found that everything was calm and quiet there ?

A. That is on the 11th.

Q. On the morning of the 12th again when you were going to the bazar the only thing that you saw was that there was a small crowd in the Lulliani Adda of dispersing when you passed ?

A. Yes.

Q. You saw nothing else ?

A. No, nothing else.

Q. When you reached the Railway Station were you alone or with anybody else ?

A. Two private gentlemen accompanied me.

Q. There were no constables or *chaprassis* ?

A. One *chaprassi* was with me and he informed me that such and such a building had been set on fire, and I asked the other *chaprassi* to bring my horse to the Station.

Q. You say a small crowd started towards the tahsil, on being threatened they turned towards the City Police Station. Your party was threatened at that time, how many people were in that party ? You were there. Who else ?

A. Sayed Ahmad Shah, Sardar Kishen Singh, Exoise Sub-Inspector, three *munshis* and I think three *chaprassis*.

Q. You had no arms with you ?

A. No we had no arms. I could get no opportunity to obtain arms.

Q. You took two *tum-tums* and you started in pursuit of the crowd ?

A. Yes.

Q. You again reached the mob near Idgah Bridge and you again stopped the mob ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And instead of listening to you they ran off again ?

A. Yes. After stopping for a minute or so.

Q. This mob according to you was gradually increasing ?

A. Yes.

Q. The mob did not listen to you and again proceeded further ?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore during all this time no attempt was made by the mob to assault you or any of your party or to show any threatening attitude ?

A. No, Sir.

Q. It was after according to you, two shots had been fired that the mob became dangerous ?

A. Yes.

Q. Will you please refer to your statement where you say "I myself and my party in front of the mob at the tahsil gate were in a very dangerous position. Hukam Chand, one of the tahsil *chaprassis* was accidentally wounded there." Having regard to the context it is not clear whether you were in a dangerous position when the mob was being fired on by the police who were on the tahsil roof. I take it that you were standing below and near you the people were being shot, and you were in danger of being hit ?

A. Yes.

Q. That is your meaning ?

A. Yes.

Q. That same evening you carried out a number of searches for the purpose of finding stolen property ?

A. Yes.

Q. Also the next morning you carried out many searches to find looted property ? And you were not molested by anyone ?

A. These were not rioters. They were only private people.

Q. You followed this crowd for at least some time, and you were present before the tahsil and at other places, and you saw this mob ; now, did you in this mob find any pleaders or any respectable shopkeepers of Kasur ?

A. No.

Q. Apart from this incident which you have mentioned about the breaking of *chattis* and other vessels I think it is to your personal knowledge that you were asked by the military authorities to return a certain amount of money to some of the arrested persons ; and this money was taken away from them by the soldiers and deposited by you ?

A. Yes, the money had been kept for the arrested persons, and it was being returned.

By Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate—

Q. With reference to this village, where you saw certain articles belonging to suspects damaged by soldiers. This is the village to which the people who were suspected

3 December 1919.]

LALA KHAN CHAND—continued—Khan Sahib AHMAD KHAN.

of having done mischief at Khem Karan Railway Station belonged. They were suspected of doing damage at Khem Karan, and on that night when you went with the raiding party about 14 persons of that village—suspects were arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. And this man in whose house this dacoity took place was one of those suspects?

A. Yes. The suspect had absconded.

Q. With regard to this incident at the Railway Station it was alleged that people who took part in that incident had taken away some property of the Railway staff and you therefore carried out searches in order to recover some of the stolen property?

A. Yes, it was found. Clothes and one *hooka*.

Q. With regard to that other point that you mention here about the end of your statement about a man being shot dead. I think he was shot dead on being challenged at night by a sentry. A military enquiry was made about this at Kasur and your evidence was taken? May I know what your evidence was with regard to this matter?

A. My evidence is the same as what I have stated.

Q. I will just remind you of it by reading your evidence out. This statement is being put before the committee. The following is your evidence:—

"On the morning of the 21st April 1919 about 3-30 or 3-45 A.M. a detachment of troops to whom I was attached as Civil Magistrate reached the village of Lakhna. The village was surrounded by troops for the purpose of preventing villagers leaving the village, while arrests were being made in the village. The party making arrests to whom I was attached started to enter the village when we heard the report of a rifle. Soon after when the arrests had been made, we came to the spot where the man was lying wounded. On enquiry he said

his name was Karn Chand, shopkeeper. He stated that he was going outside to ease himself, when a soldier called to him and then fired at him. The officer in charge of the troops enquired from the soldier what had happened and he stated that he asked the man to halt but he snatched his bayonet. The police and Lambardar took the man to Kasur to have him treated, but later learned that the man had died on the way. When we first found the wounded man the Officer Commanding troops ordered a soldier to dress his wound, which was immediately done." That is your statement?

A. Yes.

Q. And this village is one of those villages where you had suspected people who had taken part in the Kasur affair at the Railway Station?

A. Some suspects were arrested from that village.

Q. Now with regard to that part of Sir Michael O'Dwyer's speech to which reference has been made about removing the seat of Government from Lahore to Amritsar as recruiting was not up to the mark, was this remark as you understood it at the time, made as a serious threat to the people or was it made in a humorous way?

A. It was not a serious threat. He meant by it that the Lahore people should be ashamed for remaining behind in recruiting.

Q. Was that remark, as you understood, it, made as a serious threat to the people or in a humorous way?

A. It was not a serious threat. It was only mentioned by the way, that the Lahore people should feel ashamed or not helping Government in the matter of recruiting.

Q. Was it mentioned in a humorous way?

A. Yes, it was mentioned in a humorous way.

[At this stage at the suggestion of the President, Khan Sahib Ahmed Khan, District Superintendent of Police, Kasur, was again called and examined on certain points.]

#### Khan Sahib AHMAD KHAN.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You know that certain pleaders in Kasur were arrested?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Now the tahsildar told us that some of those pleaders had rendered assistance?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. These pleaders were arrested on what information?

A. On the evidence of certain railway officials.

Q. In arresting them you acted on the statements that were made to you by certain witnesses?

A. They were made to Mr. Marsden or to Mr. Mitter, they were recorded by the magistrate.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Were you present at the time the statements were made?

A. No.

Q. Therefore you don't know what statements were made by these witnesses?

A. I know, because they were sent on to me.

Q. From what you say that persons against whom only a single person made any statement were released, I take it that the evidence against these pleaders consisted of a single statement?

A. More than one.

Q. If more than one made statements, why were they not *chalaned*?

A. After considering the evidence, we came to the conclusion that the evidence was not reliable.

Q. How many days after the 16th were these pleaders arrested?

A. On the 19th.

Q. And before the 19th you were already in possession of the evidence that was given by the man who protected Mr. Sherbourn and his family?

A. Yes.

Q. And he had clearly stated that Mr. Mohi-ud-din was of great help to him and saved the lives of the Sherbourn family?

A. Quite so.

Q. Further you personally knew these pleaders from a long time?

A. Yes, since I have been in Kasur.

Q. Now take the case of the son of this pleader. Only a single pointsman with great difficulty identified him so he was arrested and kept for a long time in custody?

A. No.

Q. Take the case of Dhanpat Rai, so far as you are aware, there was no evidence against him?

A. No.

Q. What about the case of Mr. Abdul Kadir, the man whom you described as more than 60 years old, what was the evidence against him?

A. There was one railway official.

Q. Will you kindly give me his official designation, I can't follow if you merely say one railway official.

A. One Badir, shunting jamadar.

Q. What did he say?

A. He said that he saw the accused pursuing the murderers of Europeans.

Q. As a matter of fact Abdul Kadir was never identified by the Europeans?

A. No.

Q. As a matter of fact the approver in the case never mentioned that Abdul Kadir was one of the crowd?

A. No, the approver's statement was subsequent to this statement.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. What evidence had you against Ghulam Mohi-ud-din?

A. One hammer-man of Ferozepore said he heard him at the Railway station saying "kill, kill."

The President:—We really cannot go into all these cases. So far as I am personally concerned, all I want to know is whether the arrests were made on any information.

3 December 1919.]

Captain A. C. DOVETON.

Captain A. C. DOVETON, 1-30th Punjabis.

*By the President—*

Q. You administered Martial Law, I think, in the Kasur District ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. For how long ?

A. For over three months.

Q. Can you give me the date when you started ?

A. It was about the 22nd or 23rd of April. It commenced on the 23rd April.

Q. Till when ?

A. It continued until the end of August.

Q. I think you sent in a report in connection with your administration of Martial Law, which is to be found as Part IV of the report sent by Colonel Taylor to the Adjutant-General in India ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I do not propose to ask you about everything that is in that report, but in connection with the punishments administered by you under Martial Law, it has been alleged, in the course of this enquiry, that you invented certain punishments of your own ?

A. I did invent some minor punishments.

Q. What were those ?

A. Mostly working on the railway premises.

Q. In the case of what people did you mete out that punishment ?

A. In the case of people who had in any way resisted authority or law and order.

Q. When did you start to administer that punishment ?

A. I should say about the end of May.

Q. For how long did you continue it ?

A. Until Martial Law was removed from the railway lines.

Q. Was that inflicted as a severer or as a less severe punishment ?

A. As a less severe punishment.

Q. There has been a suggestion that you ordered a *sadhu* to be whitewashed ?

A. No, that is entirely wrong.

Q. Is there any foundation for that statement ?

A. I can understand how the rumour arose. There was a particular piece of work to be done in the Goods Yard, I mean the clearing of a siding. There was an undelivered consignment of lime, I mean the owner had not taken delivery of the consignment and the whole siding was blocked. I ordered that this should be removed. I was told that that was the only work on hand that day. It was the rainy season, and I think these people were covered from head to foot. They had shovels with them, and they were covered with lime from head to foot.

Q. Is that the origin of that rumour, so far as you know ?

A. As far as I know, that must be the origin of it.

Q. You never administered white-washing as a punishment ?

A. Not as a punishment.

Q. Had a *sadhu* been punished and made to do some labour ?

A. Not this particular work; they were put on to work; but they were not the only people at whom it was directed.

Q. There is a further allegation that you ordered some man as a punishment to draw figures with his nose on the ground ?

A. That is incorrect.

Q. Is there any foundation for that ?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. Can you account for such a rumour being in circulation ?

A. I cannot. The nearest possible thing to that was making a man put his forehead in the dust in the Indian fashion. The man who was brought up before me for punishment was asked before leaving my presence to put his forehead on the ground. I told him the words *matka tek*.

Q. What did it involve ?

A. It involved some humiliation.

Q. With what object did you ask that to be done ?

A. It was simply by way of making the people concerned acknowledge authority. That was the idea.

Q. It was rather as an acknowledgment of authority than as a punishment ?

A. It was not a punishment, Sir.

Q. Did you ever hear it made a ground of complaint against your administration of Martial Law ?

A. This is the first I have heard of it.

Q. This is also the first that you have heard about the white-washing affair ?

A. No, Sir, I heard of that before.

Q. Now as regards the general orders, was there any relaxation in the Martial Law orders made about the middle of May ?

A. They were relaxed by degrees.

Q. I suppose the public of Kasur suffered considerable inconvenience by some of the orders ?

A. Certainly, they did.

Q. It was particularly so in the case of travelling orders ?

A. But that was relaxed, I think, before any other order was relaxed.

Q. Did you yourself deliver some lectures to the public ?

A. I did.

Q. On what did you lecture ?

A. On the general situation. I talked to them pretty straight about the way they behaved, and I tried to make them see things in their proper perspective, in fact they were more in the nature of advice.

Q. May I ask in connection with these lectures if you had made yourself familiar with the provisions of the Rowlatt Act ?

A. I would not pose myself as an authority on the question, but the main object of my lectures was to show that there was really no great hardship in the passing of the Act, and that whatever hardship it involved did not justify the occurrences which took place.

Q. Did you explain to the audience that that Act did not, except in cases of anarchical or revolutionary movements, apply to the whole population at all ?

A. I pointed out that.

Q. So that generally you discussed the Rowlatt Act with a view to removing, as to its provisions, the suspicion that had arisen in the peoples' minds owing to rumours ?

A. That was the object of my lectures.

Q. I think in one of your lectures you had the assistance of one of the pleaders who had been detained ?

A. I had.

Q. Did he volunteer assistance or did you ask him to assist you ?

A. When I had finished my lecture, I asked him to make a few remarks.

Q. That was Ghulam Mohi-ud-din ?

A. Yes.

Q. I think he was released without any charge brought against him ?

A. So I understand.

Q. Did he deliver a speech ?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it quite satisfactory and according to your standard ?

A. In every way.

Q. Did you have in the course of your administration to try a number of prisoners ?

A. Quite a fair number. I do not know how it compared with the other places.

Q. I am asking you in particular about the Patti rioters ?

A. They were sent down for trial.

Q. Did you try them sitting alone ?

A. I was alone, but I had the assistance of the Court Inspector.

Q. I see you mention that that trial lasted for 12 days ?

A. Yes, Sir, there were a very large number of witnesses.

Q. Were the accused in that case represented ?

3 December 1919.]

Captain A. C. DOVETON.

[Continued.]

A. Yes, there were three counsel.

Q. I think altogether there were 46 accused?

A. I think so.

Q. And I think there were a large number of witnesses examined both for the prosecution and for the defence?

A. More for the defence than for the prosecution.

Q. Of the so many accused you convicted 4 juveniles, I think, and 27 adults, according to your statement?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. The juveniles were whipped I think, and the others received terms of imprisonment?

A. That is so.

Q. I want you to explain as regards certain reprisals that are said to have been made against the suspects who disappeared from the neighbourhood. What was done in those things?

A. They were not suspects as far as I remember, but they were people who had left the area in contravention of the Martial Law orders or who being absent at the time failed to return within the period prescribed. These reprisals consisted of visiting the houses and removing things like *chorpays* for the accommodation of the troops and earthen pots and things of that description.

Q. But on any of these occasions was property destroyed belonging to the people of the houses which were raided?

A. Yes.

Q. Under what circumstances was that done?

A. I don't know what you want.

Q. I mean the property of these people was destroyed, what were the grounds for destroying the property of the people who were absent?

A. A Martial Law order had been issued warning people that they must return to their homes within a certain period failing which reprisals would be made, and the relatives of absentees were also warned to communicate with the absentees with a view to their returning within the prescribed period, the point being that the police were then engaged in their investigations and were trying to round up people who had been implicated in the riots.

Q. In cases where property was destroyed, was notice given to the people who were absent or to their relatives that unless the absentees returned by a certain time their property would be destroyed?

A. That was embodied in the Martial Law orders.

Q. To what extent did such reprisals take place? How many houses were visited?

A. Six houses were visited on three different occasions. I have mentioned it in the statement.

Q. I see you say that everything of any value in the houses visited was cleared?

A. If there ever was anything in those houses.

Q. In one case were certain metal pots taken away from the house?

A. Yes, some metal pots.

Q. Whose house was that?

A. It was the house of a man named Jhandu.

Q. What was he?

A. He had the reputation of being a *badmash*.

Q. On the occasion of these searches were you also accompanied by a Municipal Commissioner and some Indian and British Infantry?

A. I had British and Indian troops with me.

Q. Was there a British Officer in addition to yourself?

A. There was.

Q. About the whippings that took place, did you order many to be whipped?

A. A good number, Sir.

Q. In connection with these whippings, was there a medical examination by a doctor before these whipping took place?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you present when the whippings took place?

A. On nearly all the occasions.

Q. Allegations have been made that in certain cases where whippings were administered, people practically succumbed to the injuries that were inflicted? Is there any foundation for that allegation?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. You saw no sign of collapse in the case of any one?

A. No, Sir.

Q. You say that the high number of lashes that were administered is accountable to the fact that there was nobody who had the knack of handling the "cat"?

A. That is a fact.

Q. With the result that the high number of lashes would not represent so severe a punishment as would otherwise have been the case?

A. That is what I mean.

Q. What sort of "cat" was used?

A. It was the regulation "cat o' nine tails."

Q. Is it ordinarily used in connection with these punishments?

A. It is part of the field service equipment, I believe.

Q. As regards the place where they were whipped, according to your statement only some juveniles were whipped in a public place?

A. No one was whipped in a public place.

Q. I thought some juveniles were whipped in a public place?

A. There is no mention of it in my report. It was entirely private, but there were two boys, quite children, who were sent down by the tribunal in Lahore to be punished by me. They must have been about 11 or 12 each. They had taken part in the riot, and I thought it sound to have the whole school present to witness the punishment.

Q. In one case I believe you administered a considerable number of lashes to a man and also you administered two years' rigorous imprisonment. You refer in your report to the case of a man who was caught for posing as a C. I. D. officer. Was that the maximum sentence you could enforce?

A. The maximum punishment was 30 lashes, 2 years' rigorous and a thousand rupees fine.

Q. Could you impose those three cumulatively?

A. Those were my orders.

Q. In the case of that man you imposed the maximum number of lashes and the maximum period of imprisonment?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I see you suggest that the people generally did not object to Martial Law, what is your foundation for that expression of opinion?

A. From the way in which people expressed themselves to me I gathered they did not object to it, in fact I was told that the women appreciated Martial Law more than any one else.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—*

Q. I think you took over charge on the 23rd of April?

A. That is so.

Q. Did Martial Law come to an end on the 12th of June apart from the railway lines?

A. It would be about that date.

Q. And Martial Law went on on the railway lines up till when?

A. Till the end of August.

Q. When Martial Law was withdrawn in June, it went on on the railway lines, but was that Martial Law on the railway lines the same Martial Law, the same proclamations and orders that had been in existence for everybody prior to that date, or was it a new proclamation of Martial Law?

A. It was a continuation of the old, there were no new proclamations.

Q. Were there any proclamations or orders made under Martial Law on the railway lines?

A. None were necessary.

Q. The old orders were in force, but they were only restricted to the railway area?

A. Exactly.

Q. As I understand it, up till the 12th June when you were administering Martial Law over the district as a whole, am I right in saying that you did not inflict on anybody any unauthorised punishment, that is to say, any punishment other than imprisonment, flogging or

3 December 1919.]

Captain A. C. DOWNTON.

[Continued.]

fine up to the 12th June when Martial Law was withdrawn in areas other than the railway?

A. I cannot say that definitely, but I think it is quite possible that I may have administered unauthorised punishment before that date.

Q. Did you report the fact of your having inflicted these unauthorised punishments to your superiors?

A. No.

Q. What made you suppose that you were authorised to inflict those unauthorised punishments when certain definite punishments were laid down in your orders?

A. It was up to me to keep order, and in case of offences when one did want to make use of severer punishments, I thought that these would just meet the case.

Q. Didn't you consider from your study of the proclamation of General Beynon that he laid down certain punishments which he thought would meet the situation, and that those and no others were under your powers? Didn't you consider that?

A. I should not have thought that applied to minor punishments, *i.e.*, punishments less than those.

Q. You thought you might inflict any form of punishment that was less than the prescribed punishment?

A. Yes.

Q. You will agree with me that in the ordinary way in the Army where you administer Military Law to persons subject to military discipline, there is one thing quite clear on the face of the King's Regulations, *viz.*, that no unauthorised punishments are ever to be administered at all?

A. I did not take it in that light at all. I thought I did what was correct at the time.

Q. We have had some talk about your having ordered people not only to do manual labour, but to perform certain exercises, to do skipping, climbing ladders and that sort of thing. What are the facts? Did you ever order persons to do these things?

A. There was one as regards skipping. It was suggested to me by a man whom I proposed to punish myself.

Q. He asked for it?

A. He said he would do it if he was excused from working in the goods yard.

Q. How much skipping did he propose to do?

A. 20 without a break.

Q. He made that offer and you took him at his word?

A. He was not the only one who offered.

Q. After that, you inflicted it on people who had not asked for it?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the age of people who did skipping? Were they young people or middle-aged people or what sort of people?

A. There was nobody who was aged.

Q. People of middle age?

A. I should say so.

Q. How much skipping did they have to do?

A. 20.

Q. To how many people do you suppose, apart from the man who volunteered to do it, did you give this punishment?

A. I should think at least 20.

Q. You will agree with me—I do not want to be too critical—that that rather tended to bring the proceedings into contempt? Didn't it, Captain? If a man could do 20 skips without exerting himself, it was not much of a punishment; but in either case it looked very silly. Didn't it?

A. I do not know that it brought the proceedings into contempt. It acted as a deterrent.

Q. Apart from skipping, was there any special form climbing ladders under your jurisdiction?

A. That is new to me. I do not know where that has crept in from.

Q. You never ordered it?

A. I did not.

Q. All right; we will have to accept that. Putting people to do manual labour is a thing that happens in the Army in various conditions. There is nothing

novel or new about making people do such things by way of punishment?

A. Yes.

Q. In the case of those people, civilians who had to do that while you were administering Martial Law, was it accompanied by any form of imprisonment, confinement in the barracks at the Railway station?

A. It had to be done on the railway premises.

Q. How long did you have to keep them on the railway premises in order that they might do manual labour?

A. A day; one or two remained for a couple of days.

Q. What happened in the night? Did they go back to their home or did you keep them imprisoned?

A. They were not imprisoned; they merely deposited some of their belongings by way of security so that they should return the next morning.

Q. You let them go so to speak on that?

A. Yes.

Q. In your statement that has been supplied to us, I want to take you to Appendix IV\*.

That is the official tabular statement of the different offences and the different punishments that were meted out. Is it not?

A. Yes.

Q. Does that apply simply to your area of Kasur?

A. Yes.

Q. You notice there is nothing whatever there in the returns about any of those sorts of punishments. In this return there is nothing except imprisonment, lashes and fines?

A. Yes; those are the three forms of punishment.

Q. There is no return that has ever been sent to headquarters as regards the various other forms of punishment?

A. No.

Q. Supposing you thought you were entitled to inflict those other forms of punishments and they were under your powers, why didn't you report what you had done in the other cases to your superior officers?

A. I thought it was a slight thing and it was unnecessary.

Q. Apart from punishments in these cases, some of the cases which came up before you were, I take it, sent up by the Police. Were they?

A. Yes.

Q. Then there would be other cases perhaps where men had been arrested by the Military authorities?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there any other persons except those two classes of authorities who sent up cases to you for trial?

A. I think there must have been people who were brought before me by the Railway.

Q. As regards the offences for which they were tried, first of all a certain number of them would be tried for offences against one or other of the Martial Law proclamations?

A. Yes.

Q. Apart from people who were put up for offences against Martial Law proclamations, you say some were put up by the Railway. Was there any other offence under the Railway Act and under any other Act which you undertook to correct?

A. I think all the cases that were brought before me came under the paragraph in the proclamation which refers to acts prejudicial to good order and public safety if they did not come under any specific heading.

Q. A good deal could be brought under that. Were they charged before you under that section of the proclamation?

A. Cases were brought to me that such and such a thing had happened. I decided whether the men were to be charged, and if so, what they were to be charged for.

Q. So far it was quite right. You had to decide whether it came under the proclamation or not. Were there any cases which obviously could not be brought under the proclamation which you tried, say, cases of cheating or

\* Will be found in Lt. Col. McRae's statement at page 381.

3 December 1919.]

Captain A. C. DOVETON.

[Continued.]

other offences under the Penal Code that could not be brought under the proclamation?

A. As regards cheating, the only case I remember was the case of a man who cheated two old women of their money who were trying to obtain passes at the station. I took into consideration the fact that Martial Law existed. I did not consider it in the interests of law and order and public safety. And that case was tried by me in preference to others.

Q. It was a case of cheating in connection with obtaining a Military pass and therefore you thought that would fairly come under the Military Code?

A. I sent the man to Brigade Head-quarters at Ferozepore with a view to his being court-martialled and the man was returned to me to deal with.

Q. I want to know the view you took at the time. Did you try yourself according to the best decision you could make and try to confine your activities as a Military Court to persons who had committed offences against these proclamations and not to persons who committed ordinary crimes that had nothing to do with the special condition of Martial Law?

A. I did not touch anything which to my mind had nothing to do whatever with Martial Law. Anything which in any way I considered to affect the administration of Martial Law, I tried.

Q. You did not regard yourself as a person who was entitled to try cases in connection with all offences, but only those kinds of offences that came directly or indirectly under the proclamation?

A. Exactly so.

Q. Apart from that, you said that there were some cases put up before you for trial by the Railway. Is that so?

A. I said so. I know that the Railway brought people before me from time to time, but I cannot remember any specific cases.

Q. Can you tell me whether they put up people before you for offences that had nothing to do with Martial Law proclamation or were they put up for offences that had nothing to do with the special condition of Martial Law?

A. To the best of my recollection if it had nothing to do with Martial Law, I had nothing to do with it. But if it in any way affected the keeping of law and order at the station, I took it up.

Q. Would you be good enough to look at paragraph 15 of your statement? I want to ask you something about what some people have said. There is a case where you state "the District Traffic Superintendent, Ferozepore, under orders from the North-Western Railway Head-quarters, requested the Railway Police to bring before me for trial the Guard and Driver of the Ferozepore train, which was attacked at the distant signal on the 12th April." Then you go on "The accused were charged under section 128 of the Railway Act." "The Driver was found not guilty of 'wilful negligence' and was acquitted, with a recommendation that he should be dismissed from the Railway;" I gather from that that section 128 of the Railway Act makes it an offence for a Driver to be guilty of wilful negligence?

A. Yes.

Q. The act for which he was charged was supposed to have been done on the 12th April?

A. It was in connection with the riot.

Q. Do you think that wilful negligence in connection with the riot of the 12th April made it a Military Court's matter?

A. There was a special order passed empowering Martial Law Magistrates to try such cases which had occurred before the proclamation of Martial Law on the 19th. But I cannot give you the reference between the 31st March and the date on which Martial Law was proclaimed.

Q. It was a special order which did not apply to area officers, but applied to some magistrates. Were you under that?

A. To the best of my knowledge, I was.

Q. Were you authorized to try cases prior to the introduction of Martial Law?

A. Subsequent to the 31st or 31st March.

Q. Subsequent to the 31st March?

A. Yes.

Q. Under that special order?

A. I cannot give you the reference, but that is what I understood.

Q. You understood that you were a person who had that authority?

A. Yes.

Q. At any rate you found him not guilty of wilful negligence, but you recommended that he should be dismissed from the railway. Why?

A. The man was not mentally fit to hold his own in a crisis.

Q. Did you try in your capacity as Military Court any cases, which were not criminal matters at all, but which were claims to property?

A. No.

Q. Or claims to money?

A. No.

Q. We have been told of a case. I will leave it to some other member to ask you about it. But in one case, the temple case, Rs. 1,500 was ordered to be handed over to somebody and the tenant's property was ordered to be returned. Was that order given?

A. No.

Q. Did you try the case?

A. I did not try it; I would have nothing to do with it.

Q. Who had to do with it? Do you know?

A. Nobody; they did it themselves and put the blame on me afterwards.

Q. Then you were asked about the Martial Law order about property. The reference is to Martial Law Order No. 9. It is an order by Lieutenant-Colonel McRae, dated the 25th April 1919. It runs "I hereby order that no person who was a resident of Kasur on the 10th April 1919, shall leave Kasur without a special pass or permit duly signed by me or on my behalf. And further all such residents who have left Kasur on or after the 10th April 1919, will return to Kasur within four days from this date failing which measures will be taken against their property."

A. Yes.

Q. Were you the officer in charge of the party which was accompanied by the last witness, the Tahsildar?

A. That refers to another matter. The case you are asking me about refers to Kasur itself. I think the last case named by the previous witness was in a village somewhere.

Q. That case has got to be distinguished from cases under Order No. 9?

A. Yes.

Q. Under this order No. 9 I think you say that altogether six houses were visited?

A. I think that is correct.

Q. In case of people who had not returned, the earthen vessels were destroyed, clothes burnt and *charpoyis* removed, etc., for the accommodation of the troops?

A. That is so.

Q. Now as regards the other case where the Tahsildar went, were you a member of that party?

A. I never left Kasur.

Q. I want to refer you to the last paragraph of your statement. "Shortly after the raising of Martial Law from the city, there was a noticeable influx of a type of individual whose attitude towards authority was not a good example for the people of Kasur, many of these being, not merely truculent, but openly defiant. One heard such expressions." Then you give some expressions. "Unless there was some tangible offence, it was unfortunately impossible to deal with such persons, but in cases where the railway had anything to recover from them they were sent to do work in the goods yards equivalent to the amount to be recovered from them in the event of their being unwilling or unable to pay."

A. That is correct.

3 December 1919.]

Captain A. C. DOVETON.

[Continued.]

Q. In the latter case of persons who committed no offence, but who owed the Railway some money, they were also made to work.

A. I can give you an example. If a ticket collector demands a ticket of a man, the man becomes openly abusive and threatening. He has got no ticket or anything and he is determined to push his way out of the station. The Railway officials are not able to deal with large crowds of people and they generally let such people go, unless they have some Military supporter at the back of them, because it is too complicated a business to recover money in such cases. And I thought it was up to me, in view of what had happened in April at Kasur station, to see that there was special order preserved at that station. And I made it my business to see to it.

Q. By reason of Martial Law being on the Railway, had you power to have the man before you for a debt due to the Railway and make him work it out by labour?

A. I did not deal with cases of debts to the Railway, but for behaviour at the station. As regards cases of debt, the business did not concern me at all. It was the man's general demeanour that concerned me.

Q. You had him before you for punishment for that conduct. You ordered him to do a certain amount of work and you measured the amount of work by the amount of the ticket or money or whatever it was that he owed?

A. Approximately so.

Q. I did not quite gather that from your statement. May I take this from you? This was not applied to people who had nothing to do with you, i.e., it was not applied to the ordinary civilian in the street. It was only applied to persons whose conduct to be insolent or not to be respectful?

A. It had nothing to do with people outside the Railway.

Q. It applied to people who were truculent and in connection with conduct of passengers while at the Railway station?

A. Yes.

Q. And you were letting them in for being visited by Martial Law because of their conduct in the Martial Law area, viz., on the Railway?

A. Exactly.

Q. In this case did you have them before you at once and try them as a Military court and sentence them to do this?

A. No; they were brought before me and I heard what had to be said all round and I decided whether it was a case for punishment or not. If not, I told them to let the man go. If I thought he deserved punishment, he went up to the goods shed to work it out.

Q. In some of these cases there have also been the ordinary punishments inflicted, viz., lashes?

A. I thought it was too much. My idea was to reduce punishments, because, on the whole, order had been restored and people were inclined to behave themselves as a whole better, and I was trying to cut down punishments.

Q. In Appendix IV\* of your statement there are one or two groups of offences. (The last line but one.) I see 4 persons got 20 stripes; they were Railway menials. What sort of offence did they commit?

A. The offences were insubordination, slackness and interfering with the smooth working of the railway.

Q. What sort of slackness was it. It is a little bit hard to be sentenced to be flogged for slackness?

A. It was a repeated and aggravated offence.

Q. What sort of slackness was that? Four persons got 20 stripes. You may remember something about the nature of the case?

A. I can remember one case. A man did not turn up for duty. It is a thing which happened frequently. The mail train was delayed 10 minutes owing to this man not turning up for duty. I understand that this is a serious offence on the railway.

Q. How many stripes did you order him?

A. Five.

Q. Then you say for offences against railway officials, one person got 5 stripes. Was that for insolence or assault?

A. Assault and things of that nature.

Q. There is one offence in that appendix, viz.; being abroad at unauthorised hours. One person was imprisoned for 24 months, one person got 30 stripes and one person was fined Rs. 10. Was that the same person who got a cumulated sentence or was it two different sentences?

A. Appendix VI\* makes it quite clear, I think. It is shown in Appendix VI, No. 22. But it is not clear from this appendix. I think I remember the case. The man was not merely abroad, but he was actually committing burglary at the time. He was removing grain, as far as I recollect, from somebody's godown.

Q. You gave him 2 years and 30 lashes?

A. Yea.

Q. Then five persons were sentenced to 120 months and 5 persons were sentenced to 150 stripes for assaulting a civil official. Was that one gang of 5 or were these 5 separate cases?

A. This is the case of a kumbardar who was assisting the Military in getting hold of some people who were implicated in the riot. The five accused got hold of this man and had it not been for the intervention of somebody, they would have beaten him to death. He was brought before me in a very bad state and the five men were tried by me.

Q. What did you sentence them to? Did they all get the maximum, 2 years and 30 lashes?

A. Yes.

Q. Just about this habit of genuflexions. Was that something that you did to people for special reasons or do you make everybody do that?

A. I inflicted that on people who were brought before me for any offences. There were no particular cases. It was not confined to special cases.

Q. When you sentenced them to this punishment was it at the close of the proceedings that you expected them to do this? Did you make everybody do that?

A. No, not in the cases of those who were acquitted.

Q. But in the case of people who were convicted, you ordered this before they left the Court?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you seen anything like that in your career as a Military Officer?

A. No.

Q. When did you invent this? Was it early in your career as a Military Officer or later?

A. I started it at Kasur.

Q. Did you start this practice about the 23rd of April?

A. I practised it subsequently.

Q. Did you go on with it for weeks or months, roughly?

A. I should say it went on for a month.

Q. Why did you drop it?

A. Because I thought people had come to a reasonable frame of mind.

Q. During the time, I take it that it was in force, when civilians met a Military Officer in the streets you expected them to salute the Military Officer?

A. In the Indian fashion.

Q. Did you have any cases arising out of failure to do that?

A. People failing to do so had instruction.

Q. Had you anything to do with persons who failed to salute?

A. They had to attend so many parades, and there was an officer who instructed them.

Q. You ordered them to attend a parade?

A. Yes.

Q. In some instances, cases of failure to salute were brought to your immediate notice. If it was reported what was the enquiry you held?

A. I never heard any cases unless they were brought by some reliable persons.

\* Will be found in Lt.-Col. McEac's statement at page 361.

\* Will be found in Lt.-Col. McEac's statement at page 362.

8 December 1919.]

Captain A. C. DOVETON.

[Continued.]

Q. Did any of these people say 'I did not see the officer' or anything of that sort?

A. I suppose he would have if he wanted to.

Q. You had a regular parade for the purpose?

A. Yes.

A. I understand that when Martial Law was in force in Kasur the custom was to make civilians salute the officers. There has never been such a custom of making civilians salute every soldier? Is that so?

A. No.

Q. Did you expect every Military officer to be saluted?

A. I did not. Because we were bringing to the notice of the civilian population that they had now got to deal with other officers, that they were to be under Military Officers, saluting might be a very useful practice just as in the army and make people recognise that they had got to look to different officers for the maintenance of order.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. I want to know a little more about this punishment that you inflicted, of making people work in the railway goods? People that were sent to the goods shed were escorted?

A. Well, there was an escort.

Q. They were sent under guard?

A. I do not think any one was sent under guard.

Q. How were they to be taken to the goods sheds? Somebody took them in custody and took them to the goods sheds?

A. Somebody took them.

Q. They were not free to go away?

A. Certainly not.

Q. After you pronounced the sentence, virtually, they were in custody?

A. Yes.

Q. And while working in the goods shed, they were also virtually in custody?

A. There was nothing to prevent them going away.

Q. They would then be running away surreptitiously?

A. It would be.

Q. For all particular purposes, they were in custody?

A. The man is expected to stay there until he has finished his job.

Q. What sort of work was expected from him?

A. Loading and unloading bales.

Q. It was heavy work that they were expected to do?

A. It need not be. It depends on the individual, whether it is heavy or light.

Q. To load and unload bales is certainly heavy work for ordinary people?

A. The man can take his time about it; he can take the maximum amount of time. There is nobody to ask how much he did.

Q. Was there somebody to look to that work being done?

A. Nobody, except the Railway employees.

Q. And the man could not go there and be idle?

A. He had to load and unload and do a certain minimum amount of work, I presume, Sir.

Q. Then does it not come to this, when the man was made to do the work for a whole day, he was for all practical purposes suffering rigorous imprisonment for that day?

A. I cannot say.

Q. That day he was practically in custody. He had to load and unload bales. Don't you think that amounts to rigorous imprisonment for that day?

A. I do not know the definition of rigorous imprisonment.

Q. You know people sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 5 days or a week; you know what work they are ordinarily made to do?

A. Yes. I do not know what work people are made to do in gaols; I have heard.

Q. You have not seen it yourself?

A. I believe they are made to work there.

Q. The work that these people were made to do was no easier than the work which prisoners in gaols under rigorous imprisonment have to do?

A. I did not intend it to be.

Q. You intended it to be a rigorous imprisonment for a day or two when they were put on that work? You meant it to be so?

A. When I meted it out I thought I met the case.

Q. You meant it to be hard work for them for that day or two?

A. I did not express anything as to the intensity of the work. I gave what work I thought suitable.

Q. You told me what the work was, that is, loading and unloading bales, a pretty heavy work; you have also told me that he was for all practical purposes in custody during that period. Does it not come to this: For that day or two days the man was for all practical purposes in imprisonment and doing hard labour?

A. I think you are the best judge of that. I ordered certain punishment; it is not for me to compare it with the punishment administered in jails. I intended the punishment to fit the crime.

Q. You intended the punishment in the case of the people whom you sent to work in the goods sheds to be of the character I have described. Is it so?

A. If I thought that a day's work in the goods sheds was a proper punishment for the offence I gave it.

Q. I quite see it; you considered it proper. In cases in which you did consider that punishment proper you meant that punishment to amount to what I have described?

A. I meant the punishment as a day's work. I saw what work was done in the goods sheds ordinarily and I meant it to be the same.

Q. Leave it there. Now turning to your report: "Shortly after the raising of Martial Law from the city, there was a noticeable influx of a type of individuals whose attitude towards the authorities was not a good example for the people of Kasur, many of these being not merely truculent, but openly defiant." "Unless there was some tangible offence it was unfortunately impossible to deal with such persons....."

People who were merely truculent or openly defiant you were unable to deal with as that by itself was not tangible offence?

A. What is implied is that was I felt myself unable to deal with them by means of ordinary punishments under Martial Law.

Q. In the cases in which people was truculent or openly defiant you found yourself unable to deal with them by the ordinary Martial Law punishment?

A. I felt I was not justified in applying the ordinary Martial Law punishments.

Q. In the cases of people that you have described here, as being truculent or openly defiant, you found yourself unable to deal with them by the ordinary Martial Law punishment. Is that so? Or you thought that the Martial Law punishments were not suited?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you go on to say "in cases where the railway had anything to recover from them they were sent to do work in the goods yard equivalent to the amount to be recovered from them in the event of their being unwilling or unable to pay." That means, if I understand it aright, that if any of these people who so behaved owed anything to the railway then you dealt with them by meting out this punishment in the railway goods shed.

A. These people were certainly made to work; not merely the people who owed money to the railway.

Q. I did not say that. Those people who were truculent or openly defiant and in addition to that owed money to the company; these you dealt with by meting out this punishment?

A. Yes; that is true.

Q. Then, does it not come to this that, if they had not owed anything to the railway then you would not have given them this punishment; or rather you could not have given them this punishment?

A. I think the last paragraph is clear.

Q. I am on this paragraph for the present.



3 December 1919.]

Captain A. C. DOVETON.

[Continued.]

A. It is not meant to imply that if they did not owe anything to the railway, they would have escaped that punishment; but if they showed any sort of defiance of authority they also were put on to this work.

Q. Take the case of a person who was truculent or defiant, but did not owe anything to the railway at all; you still punished him with work in the goods shed?

A. It depended on the degree of the offence.

Q. What did you do? I am merely taking your statement in that paragraph. After stating the case of people who were truculent or openly defiant you say "unless there was some tangible offence it was unfortunately impossible to deal with such persons." Does not that imply that you found it impossible to punish people who were truculent or openly defiant because that of itself was not a tangible offence? Is it not so? If that paragraph means anything it means that?

A. Yes; the fact of their remonstrance, of their owing something to the railway.

Q. Do I understand you there to say that persons who were truculent or openly defiant you found yourself unable to deal with because being truculent or openly defiant by itself was not a tangible offence?

A. That was what I meant.

Q. Then it was the circumstance of their owing something to the company that enabled you to punish them in the manner you did?

A. I thought so.

Q. You thought it was an offence, the circumstance that they owed money?

A. It aggravated the offence.

Q. I am not concerned whether it aggravated or not.

A. These are the reasons.

Q. I am not asking reasons. You have already told me that being merely truculent or openly defiant was not a tangible offence by itself. I put it to you: Does it not follow then that it was because of the circumstance that they owed something to the railway you were able to give them this punishment. Is it not so?

A. It did not enable me to give the punishment. I felt that I was justified in giving the punishment.

Q. The proposition that I put is: for being merely truculent or openly defiant you found it impossible to deal with them because it was not by itself a tangible offence?

A. That is what it means.

Q. If that is correct, then you were able to deal with these people and give them the punishment because of the circumstance that in addition they owed something to the railway? Is not that so?

A. That was the view I took.

Q. I wanted to get at your frame of mind at that time. Therefore you really caught hold of the circumstance of something being due to the railway to punish the truculent and the defiant with this punishment. Is it not that the real position?

A. It was to deter people of this frame of mind; that was my object.

Q. In order to punish the truculent and defiant attitude of the people which you could not do otherwise, you caught hold of the circumstance that they owed something to the railway and gave them this punishment?

A. It assisted me.

Q. The circumstance of their owing anything to the company assisted you in awarding this punishment.

A. Yes.

Q. Now these *sadhus*, were they sent to the goods shed where there was a store of lime?

A. You mean to imply they were only *sadhus*?

Q. I did not imply anything at all. We were told that some *sadhus* were ordered to be whitewashed as a special punishment?

A. That is not punishment.

Q. You explained how this rumour arose. You said that some *sadhus* were present?

A. Some persons.

Q. Some persons including the *sadhus*?

A. There were *sadhus* among the people were sent to work in the goods shed and there was lime there,

and that was how they got whitewashed. I do not know if these were the people referred to.

Q. Did you see them?

A. I saw some people covered from head to foot with lime.

Q. How did they cover themselves from head to foot?

A. Very simple experiment. If you go on a wet day to a pile of lime and shift one foot to the one side.....

Q. That was how it occurred?

A. I do not know of any specific case. I thought it might be the natural result.

Q. How many people did you see like that?

A. I do not know how many people I saw; as far as I can recollect there were 5 or 6 people there who were put on to this work.

Q. What were these people guilty of?

A. I cannot tell you for which offence they were punished. I am unable to tell you; I did not take notes.

Q. It must be what is mentioned in your statement being either truculent or defiant in addition to owing something to the railway?

A. Not necessarily owing something to the railway.

Q. Without owing anything to the railway?

A. Not necessarily owing to the railway.

Q. Merely being truculent was sufficient?

A. I did not say so.

Q. Have you awarded this punishment to others?

A. It is quite possible.

Q. You have awarded this punishment in the case of other offences not mentioned in paragraph 17?

A. It must have been something which is referred to in paragraph 17.

Q. All that is referred to in paragraph 17 is:—truculent in addition to owing something to the railway?

A. Will you look at the last five lines of my report?

Q. "In view of the fact that this particular station had been the scene of murder and unprecedented violence a short time previously, similar treatment was meted out to all persons who threatened railway officials or made a show of violence to them, by way of pointing out that the station was Government premises, and that they should be regarded as such."

So, people who were threatening railway officials were also awarded this punishment?

A. That is so. I have tried in this paragraph to include in general terms the type of offence that was so punished.

Q. What do you mean by "making a show of violence to"? A man was asked to show his railway ticket and he was evading that: is that what you mean?

A. If a man was brought before me by one of the railway officials or a Passenger Superintendent for threatening him or doing something of that sort; I enquired into the case and I decided what was to be done.

Q. All sorts of cases were dealt with under "made a show of violence"?

A. I have put it as clearly as I can.

Q. You cannot illustrate it further?

A. No.

Q. If a person used threatening language to a railway official you sent him to work for a day or two in the goods shed in the manner you have described.

A. Yes.

Q. Then, Captain, about your order making people rub their forehead on the ground. How many people were made to do this?

A. I did not make any notes of this.

Q. But have you told Mr. Justice Rankin that all those who were convicted were made to do this?

A. I cannot remember the number.

Q. There must be a large number?

A. Probably.

Q. The offences with which they were charged and for which they were convicted were all of varying degrees of gravity. They were not all offences of the same gravity?

A. No.

Q. A man may be convicted for a slight offence or for a very heinous offence, and they were all made to do this

3 December 1919.]

Captain A. C. DOVSTON.

[Continued.]

irrespective of the nature of the offence for which they were convicted?

A. Yes, at the beginning.

Q. Everyone was made to do this before he could leave?

A. Yes.

Q. I understand you to say that this you insisted upon in order to induce in them a reasonable frame of mind?

A. My words did not imply that.

Q. What was it intended to accomplish, this order about their putting their forehead on the ground?

A. To people in that place, there was no such thing as authority and everybody was his own master. The main object was to impress on the people that was not the case, that everybody was not his own master and they had got to conform to law and order.

Q. Was not that sufficiently brought home to them by the convictions and sentences that you inflicted on them? Why this addition?

A. I thought it was suitable.

Q. You convicted the man and sentenced him to six months' rigorous imprisonment. Would it not bring home to him very vividly the strong arm of law and authority?

A. It probably would.

Q. Why on the top of that did you inflict this punishment of putting his forehead on the ground?

A. I don't think it an infliction.

Q. Don't you think, Captain, it must have been felt by them as an humiliation?

A. Not necessarily.

Q. Not necessarily?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever observed in ordinary life any person putting his forehead on the ground in the manner in which you were insisting upon these people to do?

A. I have.

Q. To whom?

A. To a wealthy Indian.

Q. To a wealthy Indian?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that a very unusual thing or an ordinary thing in ordinary life?

A. It is not for me to say. My activities are confined to the regiment.

Q. Well I understand a person doing that to a religious saint, or a religious leader. Have you ever seen people in ordinary life doing this?

A. I have just said I have.

Q. Captain, how often have you seen this?

A. I am unable to say.

Q. Then you spoke of the lectures you gave at Kasur?

A. Yes.

Q. You said you talked straight to the people. What sort of talk was that?

A. It was all reported by the police. I have not got a copy myself.

Q. Can we get a copy to see?

A. I think it should be possible.

Q. Then with regard to whipping you say you inflicted 40 sentences of whipping?

A. I think that is correct.

Q. That excludes the six students?

A. I know nothing about the boys.

Q. You are not responsible for the boys that had been whipped?

A. If I had come before I should have been.

Q. It had been done before you came?

A. Yes.

Q. Then with regard to reprisals against property, you visited six houses, and in some cases you burnt clothes and destroyed vessels. Do you think you were justified in doing this by the Martial Law orders?

A. I do.

Q. You do think so?

A. Yes.

Q. These houses were the houses of poor people or of rich people?

A. They were certainly not rich people.

Q. Vessels and clothes were their only property?

A. Only clothes. I saw they were mere rags. They had removed everything of value.

Q. How did they appear to be poor?

A. Because there was nothing to be found there.

Q. They were poor, because they did not possess anything?

A. I did not say the men were poor. I did not know or find out their social position.

Q. Then you know, Captain, the gallows were put up at the Kasur Railway Station?

A. They were putting up the gallows.

Q. Was that done by your order or by the orders of the higher authorities?

A. Not by my orders.

Q. It was done by the orders of the General Officer Commanding?

A. I cannot tell you.

Q. You don't know, Captain. You must have received those orders as Administrator of Martial Law in Kasur?

A. I did not receive them.

Q. Who received those orders?

A. I cannot tell you.

Q. Who put up the gallows. Being the Martial Law Administrator at Kasur you must have known?

A. I was not an engineer, but an engineer was sent down from Lahore who put up the gallows.

Q. So no gallows were put up in Kasur in your presence. But it must have been done under your orders or the orders must have been passed on to you?

A. I received no orders. A man came from Lahore who brought the component parts from there.

Q. And without telling you at all or without asking your permission he put up the gallows?

A. I was perfectly aware of what was going on, but it was not my business to interfere.

Mr. Cocks, Deputy Inspector-General of Police:—  
The gallows were put up by the Commissioner's orders who was acting under the orders of the Government.

Q. The Commissioner may have passed those orders but Captain, you were the Martial Law Administrator at Kasur?

A. It was not my business to have anything to do with the erecting of the gallows.

Q. You had not been told about it?

A. Never. Nothing.

Q. A large number of people were arrested in Kasur?

A. A very large number.

Q. And where were they kept?

A. In the prisoners' cage.

Q. What is that?

A. An area that was wired in for the purpose.

Q. It was specially erected?

A. Yes; it was specially erected.

Q. Was it near the station?

A. Yes.

Q. How many prisoners were kept in that cage at a time?

A. I cannot tell you.

Q. Did you inspect the cage from time to time?

A. The figures had nothing to do with me.

Q. Then who erected this cage?

A. The Faridkot Sappers and Miners.

Q. They were the agency that did the erecting?

A. The cage was in existence when I arrived at Kasur. I arrived on the 23rd April.

Q. When you arrived it was already there?

A. Yes.

Q. You say that these arrested people were sent to Lahore?

A. I believe so.

Q. And they were so sent handcuffed and in ropes? What authority was doing that?

A. That was not my business. I cannot tell you.

Q. You were the Martial Law Administrator, Captain, at Kasur, you had authority for everything?

A. Colonel McRae.

Q. After you assumed charge on the 23rd April, the Courts at Kasur were doing their ordinary business?

3 December 1919.]

Captain A. C. DOVSTON.

[Continued.]

- A. The Civil Courts, you mean ?  
 Q. Yes, the Civil Courts ?  
 A. No, I never visited them.  
 Q. And the Criminal Courts ?  
 A. I presume they were.  
 Q. The police were doing their ordinary work ?  
 A. They must have been.  
 Q. And how soon after you assumed charge, Captain, did things come to a normal state in Kasur ?  
 A. What do you mean by normal state ?  
 Q. That there was no disturbance, that people were not defiant or anything of that sort. Normal means quiet state ?  
 A. It is rather difficult to answer. People settled down by degrees.  
 Q. When did they settle down to a very great extent ?  
 A. I should say before the middle of May.  
 Q. You say in your report, Captain, that Martial Law was liked by the people ?  
 A. I was given to understand so.  
 Q. So much so that you say that they would have liked Martial Law permanently, i.e., Martial Law would have been welcomed by the law-abiding people permanently in Kasur ?  
 A. I gathered that it was a form of justice which was appreciated.  
 Q. You gathered they preferred Martial Law to ordinary Civil Law and liked a permanent system of Martial Law Administration ?  
 A. It was the impression which was given to me.  
 Q. The people actually used to come and tell you that they would prefer Martial Law to ordinary civil administration ?  
 A. Summary Courts for certain offences was the point.  
 Q. They liked Summary Courts ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. They liked people being tried summarily without any appeal in preference to the ordinary law ?  
 A. They preferred that to spending money on appeals.  
 Q. People do not like appeals in this country. Is that your experience ?  
 A. It is not my experience.  
 Q. At Kasur people liked to give up their right to appeal and liked summary Martial Law Courts in preference to ordinary Civil Law, they were so much in love with these Military Courts ?  
 A. I am merely telling you the opinion that was expressed to me. I don't know what was at the bottom of it.  
 Q. Then you say that they were so pleased with the administration of Martial Law that they actually presented an address to you ?  
 A. Yes, they presented it to me.  
 Q. When was this ? On what date ?  
 A. I cannot give you the date, but I think it was in the beginning of June.  
 Q. Who had signed this address ? Was it signed by anyone ?  
 A. I cannot tell you off-hand.  
 Q. Was it signed by any leading man of Kasur ?  
 A. The leading men were present when the address was given to me.  
 Q. But they did not sign ?  
 A. I cannot tell you. I have not got it here to refer to it.  
 Q. What did the address say ? (It does not matter if you do not remember.)  
 A. It has been duly reported.  
 Q. What do you mean when you say "from this time onwards, there was a marked difference in the attitude of the people and sullen submissiveness was replaced by cheerful obedience, so much so that after the last detachment of troops had been removed, it was possible for an European to walk through the city and be treated with courtesy by the gentry, while the humbler people were willing slaves." Do you think, Captain, that people willingly wished to be slaves ?  
 A. The term is not used literally.  
 Q. What do you mean to convey by that ? How did they indicate that they were willing slaves ?  
 A. They were willing to help you in anything in any way you required.  
 Q. You think that indicated to you that they very much liked the Martial Law ?  
 A. I am sure they did.  
 Q. May it not be indicating the contrary, i.e., that they were so much afraid of the Martial Law ?  
 A. It was done in cheerful way when I was going in the city.  
 Q. They did it in a very cheerful manner ?  
 A. Yes.

4 December 1919.]

Captain A. C. DOVETON.

[Continued.]

**At Lahore, Thursday, the 4th December 1919.**

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.L.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., *Secretary.*

Captain A. C. DOVETON—*continued.*

*By Major-General Sir George Barrow—*

*Q.* Was it your experience that in the administration of Martial Law there were a great number of minor breaches of discipline and minor offences which could not be foreseen when the general proclamation bringing in Martial Law was issued, and in regard to which it was left to the officer administering the law on the spot to devise minor punishments? Did you not find that you had to devise minor punishments to meet these minor breaches of regulations?

*A.* I did, Sir, that was my experience.

*Q.* That if you had only applied the punishments laid down in the proclamation it would have been very hard on the people?

*A.* That was the view I took. There were offences which probably at the beginning of Martial Law might have been punished with the punishments laid down in Martial Law proclamations, but afterwards it was not necessary.

*Q.* And your sole desire was really to make it weigh as lightly on the people as circumstances would permit?

*A.* That was what I intended.

*Q.* These minor punishments are really only in the nature of what in the army you might consider as minor punishments awarded by minor officers, or even by Company officers?

*A.* That is the best equivalent to them.

*Q.* And these minor punishments would not in the ordinary course of events be reported to superior authority? It is not the custom in the army to report them?

*A.* No, Sir, it would not be necessary.

*Q.* Did the people ever express or show that they resented these minor punishments specially, or more than they would have other punishments?

*A.* No, Sir, I think I had the moral support of the people.

*Q.* They preferred them to being fined or flogged for some minor breach?

*A.* Infinitely. In one case a man elected one of these minor punishments in place of a fine.

*Q.* That punishment of loading and unloading bales that you gave, I suppose, whether that is heavy or not would depend on the number of bales lifted in the day and the number of men who worked at each bale?

*A.* Yes.

*Q.* In your experience soldiers have often been put to the labour of loading and unloading?

*A.* It is almost an every-day occurrence.

*Q.* Do soldiers look upon it as a very terrible or severe labour?

*A.* No, certainly not.

*Q.* I suppose I need hardly ask you to explain the expression 'willing slaves'?

*A.* I think it is a colloquial idiom.

*Q.* Is it not a fact that the experience of people as regards the application of Martial Law is this, that before they have any acquaintance with or experience of Martial Law they look upon it as something very

terrible, and when it is administered it is found to be terrible only to the people who are malefactors and evil-doers? I would put it this way. Is it not rather like people who have never been in an aeroplane, who think it is very dreadful and almost so dreadful as to be frightened off it, and when they go up in an aeroplane they find, if they only sit still, it is rather a pleasant experience than otherwise?

*A.* I should think so.

*Q.* I do not want an expression of your opinion, is that what you arrived at from the attitude of the people?

*A.* As soon as things were made clear to the people, they had no apprehensions at all about Martial Law. In the beginning it was something new to them and they naturally did not understand it.

*Q.* Of course Martial Law is not introduced as a pleasure?

*A.* Exactly.

*Q.* You did not find that the well-to-do people felt it very hard?

*A.* No, Sir. I went out of my way to remove any suspicion from the minds of the people as to whom it was directed against.

*Q.* I would like to know about this order of yours in regard to people who were truculent in their demeanour and who owed something to the railway. You mean that anybody in the city was asked if he owed anything to the railway and was immediately brought in, or was it for offences committed at the railway station?

*A.* It was for offences committed on the railway and at the railway station.

*Q.* Only in connection with the railway?

*A.* Only in connection with the railway.

*Q.* Did you ever see Ghulam Mohi-ud-din, after he was released?

*A.* The first time I saw him after his release was at one of my meetings and subsequently he came and called on me.

*Q.* What did he say to you when he called on you?

*A.* I cannot tell you what he said, Sir, but he came of his own free will and he conveyed to me that he did not resent the treatment that had been meted out to him; although he did not entirely agree with everything that had been done, he did not resent it. Under the circumstances he thought it was inevitable and he knew that as he was innocent he would come out top.

*Q.* What did he mean by that when he said he would come out top?

*A.* He meant to say that he would be cleared.

*Q.* Did you ever see that other man Dhanpat Rai after he was released?

*A.* He also came and called on me.

*Q.* Of his own free will?

*A.* Of his own free will.

*Q.* What did he say?

*A.* He thanked me as a local representative of the Government at Kasur for the treatment meted out to him. He also conveyed to me that he did not resent

4 December 1919.]

Captain A. C. DOVSTON.

[Continued.]

the treatment which he had received, and he said that as he was an innocent man it was owing to British justice that he was released.

Q. Therefore he was not bearing any resentment or thinking that he was treated with extraordinary harshness?

A. That is what he conveyed to me.

Q. Were you yourself able to go about in the city freely?

A. I did so daily. I went out of my way to mix with the people and get into touch with them.

Q. Did they treat you sullenly or as if they did not like you?

A. I always got a very cheery greeting wherever I went. I could go into any part of the city and I was welcome. I was on very good terms with the people altogether.

Q. Now, I do not think we have got quite to the bottom of this question of these prostitutes at the station. I should like you to give us in your own words what the story was.

A. As it has been presented it is rather a misrepresentation, though not deliberate. I can clear the thing up. There was a case which I had to deal with in which some men of loose character were involved and they were sentenced to whipping. I ordered the Sub-Inspector who was in charge of the arrangements to get hold of the local bad characters to witness this, because I knew that they were associates of these people. The last thing any sane man would think of would be to send for other people of the description referred to in the evidence. However I did not anticipate such a thing. I was only dealing with men. The whipping was fixed for the evening; I cannot tell you what time, but in the cool of the evening. That afternoon I went into the city to one of my meetings to talk to the people and I got back three-quarters of an hour late, and I was horrified to see all these people martialled there, and I remonstrated at once with the Sub-Inspector and he said, "but those were your orders, you said to bring all the loose characters." I did not want these people brought. It was late and I could not afford any police to escort them away from the vicinity of the station. I did not want them hanging about in the vicinity and there was nothing to do but to get on with the whipping, and that is how they happened to be there. It was not my wish or my intention that they should be there.

Q. There is one other point that I wish to ask you about. You made some men who were leaving you, touch the ground with their foreheads. When did that idea originate in your mind? Have you ever heard of its being done in the East before?

A. Yes, Sir, until quite recently I believed it was quite a general thing for people to do to those in authority, and I have reason to believe that it still exists in the districts in Sind.

Q. It is quite common in Sind; I have often had it done to myself voluntarily.

A. And I have also seen it done to Indians of position.

Q. So, though it might look like it at first sight to a European who had not been in the East, it would not be considered by the people as such an extraordinary act of debasement?

A. No.

Q. Therefore you did not look on it like that or meant it to be that when you ordered it? It might not have been a judicious order but you did not consider you were ordering them to do something debasing, simply because it has been done and is done even to this day?

A. Yes, Sir.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—*

Q. Have you ever had a ride in an aeroplane?

A. No, I have not.

Q. Therefore you cannot say as to what would be the feeling of a ride in one?

A. I merely know what other people have told me.

Q. About Mohi-ud-din and Dhanpat Rai, you considered that what they stated to you was genuine?

A. I had not any reason to believe to the contrary.

Q. According to you, a man who was innocent, who was arrested, who was handcuffed and roped, who was kept for more than three days in jail, against whom no charge was ever made, who was never informed of any charge against him, after he comes out of jail he comes to you and he praises you and British justice? Having regard to all these facts you thought what he stated to you was genuine and that he had no resentment?

A. I thought he had the good sense to see it was part of the general scheme.

Q. Was it not a fact that he came to kiss the hand of him who kicked him? It did not strike you like that? That the people were so much terrorised and they had lost so much of their self-respect that they went to you and made a profession of British justice and said they had no resentment? Was it not the case of a man who came to kiss the hand of the man who kicked him?

A. He certainly did not.

Q. Did any of these men who were very mercifully flogged by you in order that they might be saved other serious punishment, complain to you? Do you mean to say that they had such an appetite for another flogging that they should have complained to you and made matters worse?

A. I am afraid I do not understand you.

Q. You had recourse to the punishment of flogging, and certain persons were flogged. I want to know whether any of them showed any resentment or objected to it?

A. Nobody expressed any resentment at all.

Q. Do you think that they had appetite for another flogging? Would you expect any person to come up before the Martial Law authorities and say "we resent your sentence of flogging"?

A. They would probably tell their friends and acquaintances and it would eventually come to my ears.

Q. By way of a rumour?

A. I do not know whether you can call it a rumour. That is the general atmosphere.

Q. With regard to bringing prostitutes to witness the whipping was there any reason for assembling these bad characters?

A. Very much so.

Q. And if these prostitutes had gone without an escort there would have been some danger?

A. I could not say that definitely, but I understand that at the time they were responsible for a large amount of trouble at Kasur.

Q. Your paragraph 4 says "abuses on the part of well-to-do classes during this period were instantly checked, all foodstuffs bought in bulk from the retail dealers being immediately returned." Under which regulation did you exercise this power? There are about 12 to 19 regulations that were promulgated at Kasur; under which regulation was this exercised?

A. I exercised no power. They did it themselves. It had been brought to my notice that these people were gathering foodstuffs at the expense of the poor, and when they saw that order they returned it.

Q. As a matter of fact you never punished any persons for purchasing Rs. 4 or 5 worth of grain?

A. All the punishments are laid down in the appendix.

Q. I want to know whether any persons were punished for purchasing more than Rs. 4 or 5 worth of rice or wheat?

A. No one was punished by me. If they had been punished it would have been embodied in the appendix.

Q. Under which clause would it.....

A. I would have given the definition of the offence as I have done.

Q. Is it not a fact that when you asked Ghulam Mohi-ud-din to address the people on the Rowlatt Bill your idea was to put the man in a tight corner?

A. No, I wanted to clear him.

4 December 1919.]

Captain A. C. DOVSTON.

[Continued.]

Q. That he may in your presence prove himself to be a turn-coat?

A. That was not my object. I wanted to give the man a chance of clearing himself.

Q. Look at paragraph 6 where you say "called upon Ghulam Mohi-ud-din for a speech and which, if he is guilty of the things of which he is suspected, must have proved him a turn-coat before his audience, most of whom heard him speak on the day of martial."

A. That is perfectly true.

Q. Have you had any occasion to administer Martial Law before the 23rd April?

A. No, never.

Q. Was Martial Law administered in any area where you were as an officer during your service?

A. No. I have no personal experience.

Q. Now with reference to paragraph 9 as regards reprisals against property; these were taken as the result of non-compliance with a Martial Law proclamation, under which persons who had left Kasur on or after the 10th April were ordered to return to their homes within a certain number of days. Altogether six houses were visited on three different occasions, earthen vessels being destroyed, clothes in some cases being burnt and *charpoy*s being removed for the accommodation of the troops? Is that true?

A. Yes.

Q. Was this proclamation published in English or Urdu in any of the newspapers?

A. There is no newspaper in Kasur.

Q. Well, in Lahore and Amritsar or in any other journal either in English or Urdu?

A. It was published in vernacular newspapers in and round Kasur.

Q. That is all?

A. Yes.

Q. Was any evidence recorded by you before you took these steps? Was there evidence for taking the steps you did?

A. I am sorry, I do not follow.

Q. Your regulations was promulgated after a week—about a dozen persons were not found in their houses and instead of punishing them for their absence their property was destroyed. Was there any proper occasion for the exercise of this power?

A. It was sufficient for me that the people were not present. As regards one or two dozen. I would like to correct that figure by saying that it ran into hundreds.

Q. It was sufficient for you that these people were not in their houses?

A. I made enquiries as to whether they had returned or not and I was informed that they had not returned.

Q. And then these steps were taken?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you any evidence that these persons had any knowledge of your regulation?

A. Relatives were warned to communicate immediately with the absentees.

Q. No evidence was taken by you as to whether these persons were able to communicate with their relatives? I take it that these steps were taken without satisfying yourself as to whether or not these persons were aware of the regulation?

A. There was no time for making enquiries. That was the time for action. We were trying to round up the people.

Q. You considered it justifiable that without knowing whether a man was aware of your regulation to destroy his property and.....?

*Major-General Sir George Barrow.*—This is a young officer who was doing his duty under trying conditions and he is not a criminal in the dock.

*The Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan.*—My Lord, May I ask what was the relevancy for that remark?

*The President.*—You may continue.

*Witness.*—I did exactly what I considered to be right at the time. There was no time for thinking, there was no time for meals. One was working at

Martial Law from the time one got up in the morning till the time.....?

Q. Am I not allowed to probe the matter and to sift the evidence to justify his action? I do not think it is my duty to accept everything that has been stated in the statement. It is my duty to sift the evidence on which he justifies his action.

A. There is no time to consider things in a crisis.

Q. You say in paragraph 10 "Martial Law though not understood at first by the inhabitants, proved rather a blessing than otherwise, if one can judge by the repeated expressions of gratitude which were heard from the lips of people who had nothing to gain by thus expressing themselves." Can I get any names of the citizens of Kasur who said this?

A. If I had known that an enquiry was going to be held I would have gone about with a note-book. I do not remember any names. It was a general expression of opinion.

Q. You do not think that they were in abject terror and wanted to please you?

A. I did not see any signs of it.

Q. I think you will agree with me that so far as Indians are concerned they have a horror of being flogged?

A. I do not think it is confined to Indians.

Q. Notwithstanding the fact that the normal punishment was flogging you thought the people were feeling happy and they were expressing gratitude?

A. The law-abiding people had nothing to fear from flogging.

Q. Do you think that the Indians would be grateful to the British Government if flogging were substituted for fines and other punishments in the Indian Penal Code? Did they express their gratitude to you because a number of people were being flogged?

A. It was not the flogging that made them happy. It had the effect of establishing peace instantly and people were not led into wasting their money in lengthy litigation. The people were better on the whole. I am talking of the people as a whole, not individuals.

Q. You say "there is no doubt that the swift and stern punishment inflicted, especially whipping, had a very salutary effect, and persons contemplating any villiany would think more than twice before embarking on it." That is your opinion?

A. That is the impression I gained.

Q. You say again "that general relief was felt at the punishment and removal to Lahore Jail of certain persons with a bad record who had kept the police busy and the inhabitants on pins and needles for some time past." Who were these persons who were sent to Lahore and how many of them?

A. It is all on paper somewhere. I made a record of these cases. I do not think they were sent because there was a bad record against them but because they were rioters. It just happened that they were such people who could not keep out of mischief.

Q. And probably the people came and expressed their gratitude to you for sending these people away to Lahore?

A. That was the general belief?

Q. How did you come to know of that?

A. From expressions I heard on different occasions.

Q. When the people came in a body to thank you?

A. It was in general conversation that I heard these expressions.

Q. You consider that stern punishments were inflicted?

A. At the beginning they were stern.

Q. You refer to a case where you say thirty lashes were awarded to a *badmash* and two were sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment. Is there any record of that trial?

A. If you refer to Appendix IV,\* third line from the bottom, you will find it. Offences impersonating and assisting to impersonate a C. I. D. official with intent to obtain money.

\* Will be found in Lt.-Col. McEag's statement at page 81.

4 December 1919.]

Captain A. C. DOVETON.

[Continued.]

Q. Was there a separate trial or were they tried together?

A. Separate.

Q. What was the evidence against them?

A. I cannot tell you.

Q. There would be a record of it?

A. A statement of the case is put in. There is a form in which these cases are recorded and a statement of the offence against the accused. It is not taken down. The forms are supplied and in the different columns the particulars are filled in.

Q. May I know what was the offence with which this man was charged?

A. I cannot tell you without referring to the record.

Q. Is it not a fact that this man was punished simply because he was a friend of the other man? There was no evidence against him?

A. He was actively assisting this man.

Q. There would be evidence of active participation by this man?

A. Exactly.

Q. At least some persons came before you and deposed to the fact that he was impersonating a C. I. D. official and this man used to help him?

A. He used to be with him and possibly he would assist him.

Q. You have already stated that an address was presented to you in appreciation of the gratitude of the people? I would just like to know whether a copy of it was taken by the police and forwarded to headquarters.

A. The original was with me.

Q. The police were very anxious to get hold of this and to send it to headquarters?

A. I believe they had orders to report on all matters.

Q. The address was couched in the most penitent terms, combined with assurances that a repetition of the shameful events of the 11th and 12th April was impossible, and expressions of gratitude for the treatment they had received?

A. Exactly.

Q. Do you remember who read the address and by whom it was signed?

A. It was an elderly *maulvi* who read it as far as I remember.

Q. And there was a representative gathering of the gentry there?

A. Yes.

Q. On what date was this address presented to you?

A. It must have been about the end of May or the beginning of June.

A. It was a few days preceding the *Ramzan*.

Q. It appears to me that your fame as Martial Law administrator was not confined to Kasur alone, and you say that large numbers of people from outlying villages were in the habit of bringing their wrongs and grievances to be righted by the administrator of Martial Law?

A. It was in the Kasur area.

Q. You say "by the administrator of Martial Law, whether it was within his province or no. Though the majority went away disappointed, the fact did not deter others from coming, such was their faith in the justice of Martial Law." May I know whether they admired the man or the method?

A. I think you must ask somebody else that question.

Q. May I understand as to whether they were complainants who were enamoured of this or were they accused persons who also liked this?

A. I take it the accused people if they were innocent.

Q. If this is your impression about complainants and the persons accused the guilty man is not keen on receiving punishment. So far as the persons complained against are concerned they would not like it?

A. I did not say so.

Q. If I remember aright,—if I am wrong please correct me—in answer to a certain question that was put by

Mr. Justice Rankin in reference to the first paragraph of section 99 of your statement you have stated that you exercised this power thinking that such orders would be covered by the general power that rests in the administrator of Martial Law for maintaining order and avoiding a breach of the peace. If I am not wrong that is the correct version of your statement?

A. Yes.

Q. Will you kindly refer to sections 1 and 2 of paragraph 17. Is it not a fact that paragraph 17 has nothing to do with these cases which you dealt with for breaches of the peace, because you say in paragraph 2 "in view of the fact that this particular station had been the scene of murder and unprecedented violence a short time previously, similar treatment was meted out to all persons who threatened railway officials or made a show of violence to them, by way of pointing out that the station was Government premises and that they should be regarded as such," so similar treatment was awarded to those who were mentioned in paragraph 1.

A. I considered that there are different degrees of intensity in the same offence.

Q. So far as your paragraph 1 is concerned, having regard to the language used by you, were any persons threatened at the railway station?

A. I considered there were different degrees of intensity of the same offence.

Q. But you will agree with me that according to your expression of opinion the cases dealt with in paragraph 1 of section 17 were without your jurisdiction. You have admitted that?

A. I don't say so.

Q. Well now what is the meaning of these words "unless there was some tangible evidence it was unfortunately impossible to deal with such persons?" The natural meaning is that you could not deal with such cases under the Martial Law?

A. I considered that I was not justified in applying Martial Law punishments in those cases, I mean the regular punishments laid down.

Q. And you say that "shortly after the raising of Martial Law from the city there was a notable influx of a type of the individual whose attitude towards authority was not a good example for the people of Kasur, many of these being not merely truculent, but openly defiant. One heard such expressions as '*hukm kya chiz hai, ham ko hukm nahin jante.*' Unless there was some tangible offence it was unfortunately impossible to deal with such persons, but in cases where the railway had anything to recover from them they were sent to do work in the goods yard equivalent to the amount to be recovered from them in the event of their being unwilling or unable to pay." That is how you put the case?

A. Yes, that is how I have expressed it.

Q. Do I understand you rightly that as soon as the Martial Law was abrogated from the city of Kasur, these people came to the railway station and in your presence and in your hearing used these words "*hukm kya chiz hai*" or were these words reported to you by some other persons?

A. I actually heard myself such expressions.

Q. Therefore you thought that the state of affairs was such that notwithstanding the fact that you had administered Martial Law at the railway station from the 23rd April up to the beginning of June, as soon as Martial Law was abrogated, these people came to the railway station and in your presence and in your hearing they used these expressions?

A. As a rule they did not come to the railway station. They arrived from outside. They were travellers to Kasur, and I have said that there was an influx of people.

Q. Then you mean to say that these people were travellers either by mail trains or passenger trains, is it not so?

A. A very large majority of these men were travellers.

4 December 1919.]

Captain A. C. DOWSON.

[Continued.]

Q. And they had some squabbles either about purchasing something or about getting drinking water or having something to do with the railway officials and perhaps they said to the railway officials we don't understand this *Aukh*, and therefore you arrested these men; you detained them sometimes for two days, sometimes for one day and made them do this work at the railway station?

A. Would you repeat some of that question? I can't follow you.

Q. The persons who were using these expressions were passengers by mail or passenger trains?

A. Yes, a large majority of them.

Q. And, they were punished for expressing their feelings in these words?

A. Not necessarily for expressing these feelings, every one did not express himself in that way.

Q. So far as your statement in paragraph 1 goes, I don't find anything else, except that these words were spoken by passengers who have arrived by mail or passenger trains, and therefore, they were not allowed to proceed further and were detained and they were ordered to do work at the goods shed. Am I right?

A. Are you taking a particular case? If one were to record every single incident that occurred, it would run into a three-volume novel.

Q. I am asking a general question. You said that the majority of the persons, you refer to in paragraph 1 of your statement, were those persons who were travelling by mail or passenger trains, and that these persons were detained and made to work in the goods shed for a day and sometimes for two days?

A. If I considered that the man's conduct justified that, I ordered it.

Q. I want to make that clear. A large number of these persons who were ordered to work at the goods shed were passengers by mail or passenger trains.

A. They could not possibly be acquainted with the local conditions. The fact is that they did things which were so obviously wrong. It was not a question of their not being acquainted with the orders.

Q. My point is that a large number, or at least an appreciable number of these persons who were detained for two days and ordered to do work at the goods shed were passengers either by mail or passenger trains?

A. They were passengers by incoming trains. That is perfectly correct.

Q. Did you bring them under any regulation, or were any orders passed by you for breach of any regulation? I want to know under what regulation you were punishing them?

A. I used my prerogative.

Q. But still it should be under some regulation. You cannot use your prerogative like that.

A. It was up to me to preserve law and order, and I was exercising my will.

Q. Would they come under the regulation of maintaining law and order?

A. Exactly.

Q. Therefore, have you shown all those convictions under that heading "law and order"?

A. No, as I said yesterday, I did not show these. They were not convictions, they were minor punishments.

Q. Under the Martial law order that was issued by General Beynon, if these persons refused to obey your order, they would be liable to very serious penalties. After you passed an order if any persons disobeyed the order issued under Martial Law by General Beynon and proclaimed at Kasur on the 16th, they were liable to very serious consequences?

A. They would have probably been punished very severely at the beginning.

Q. You said that some of them were kept for two days and some for a day?

A. That is so.

Q. I would naturally expect that there would be some record somewhere putting down the name and saying that a particular man was ordered to do work

at the goods shed for one day or for two days as the case may be?

A. I did not consider it necessary.

Q. How would you be able to find out if your order was obeyed or not? If there was no record of the name or the number of days he was ordered to do work at the goods shed, how would you be able to find out if the man had obeyed your orders or not?

A. I could find out from the station authorities where the man had been working. If a man attempted to go away before his job was finished, the matter was reported to me.

Q. Supposing in two days about 12 or 15 persons had been ordered by you to work at the goods station. Out of these 15 persons, 5 were ordered to work one day and 10 for two days. If there was no record as to which of them was to work for one day and which of them for two days, how would you be able to find out whether your orders were obeyed or not and whether they were liable to any punishment?

A. There were never more than three at a time.

Q. Supposing the man turned up the next day, how would you be able to punish him?

A. The men were not put in custody.

Q. I want to find out how you would be able to satisfy yourself. Supposing a complaint is brought against him that he was ordered to work at the goods shed and he had not turned up. On the 2nd day supposing he turned up and said that he was ordered to work only on one day. How would you be able to punish that man if there was no record?

A. It was very easy to ensure a man coming back again. He merely deposited some of his property.

Q. Now about the threatening of railway officials, how many cases were there of this description?

A. Are you referring to regular punishments?

Q. I am referring to your statement in paragraph 2 of section 17?

A. I cannot possibly tell you. I have said that I did not keep a record of those things.

Q. There is no record even of persons who threatened the railway officials?

A. There is no record.

Q. By record I don't mean anything bulky. I simply want to know if the name of the person and his offence have been recorded? Is there any such thing?

A. No.

Q. With reference to certain persons who were sent for trial before you for what had happened previous to the 16th, in answer to Mr. Justice Rankin you said that you took cognisance of those cases because by a subsequent order or ordinance retrospective effect was given to the regulations. May I know to which regulation you refer? So far as I understand, there was no such regulation.

A. I cannot give the reference.

Mr. Justice Rankin:—I think he has referred to the power given by the General Officer Commanding to certain of the officials to try cases that happened prior to the declaration of Martial Law.

Witness:—That is so.

Mr. Justice Rankin to the President:—It is not an ordinance, it was a proclamation by the General Officer Commanding.

Witness:—Perhaps I can clear the matter up. I cannot give you the reference, but the case was sent to Lahore for trial, and it was returned to me, I believe on the advice of the Legal Remembrancer.

Q. Now with regard to the question put to you about a certain temple case where it was alleged that you ordered the restitution of certain money and you ordered certain tenants to pay their rent to some other person, you said that it is absolutely incorrect. I want to know what was the basis of that false rumour.

A. I could not tell you what the basis of that rumour was, but I can tell you this that a complaint was made while I was there. Some time afterwards, possibly a month or six weeks afterwards, Dhanpat Rai with another man came to me and remonstrated with me about this.



4 December 1919.]

Captain A. C. DOVERON.

[Continued.]

He was not too overawed and terrorised to come and remonstrate with me. I however pointed out to them that I had issued no such orders and they said "Well, so and so and so and so said that you did." I told them that it was absolutely incorrect. I told them at the time that I had nothing to do with this business and if they paid the money it was their own look out. They asked me if those people could be brought before me to confront me. I said, "Yes" They were brought, and I reiterated the orders that I had given at the time. There is however a point worth noting, and that is, when the case originally came up these people came armed with the money in notes ready to hand over. I refused to have anything to do with the case, and then outside my office they sat down and the money changed hands. I warned them twice while it was going on that it was their own look out.

Q. I think the regulation about circulating false rumours about the administration of Martial Law and about the Martial Law authority was in force from the very beginning at Kasur, especially about circulating false rumours about the method of administration of Martial Law and the Martial Law authorities?

A. Yes.

Q. It appears to me that a large number of these false allegations were in circulation in Kasur. May I know why none of these persons were hauled up and punished?

A. I had no evidence about these false rumours.

Q. At least Mr. Marsden informed you of some of those rumours?

A. Mr. Marsden spoke to me just before I left. He asked me about certain things that had happened.

Q. It is certainly a very serious matter. I want to know, if these false rumours were in circulation why no steps were taken against the people who were circulating them?

A. Martial Law had been removed from Kasur at the time. It was only in force on the railway line.

Q. You said 16 or 17 days before you left?

A. The people who circulated these rumours were residents of Kasur and not of Kasur Railway Station. Martial Law was only in force in the railway area. It was out of my jurisdiction.

Q. Therefore may I take it that these rumours were afloat after the 10th of June?

A. They were not brought to my notice till after then.

Q. Then did you try any kidnapping cases?

A. No. I know what you are referring to. At least I think I do.

Q. Was any kidnapping case tried by you?

A. No.

Q. There was a kidnapping case which was tried by you and in which the parties were represented by pleaders, and the trial was held at the Railway Station and some woman complained to you that her daughter had been kidnapped by three or four persons?

A. You are quite correct. I know the case.

Q. This thing did not happen at the Railway Station at all, it was in the interior?

A. This happened when Martial Law was in existence over the Kasur area.

Q. Therefore I want to know if you could try kidnapping cases under the Penal Code, under Martial Law Regulations?

A. I did not try them for kidnapping. I tried them for an offence prejudicial to good order and public safety, because in view of the fact that Martial Law was in operation, so long as these things happened, one wondered what else would not.

Q. Therefore according to you, you were authorized to try all offences punishable under the chapter "Offences against persons and property," that is practically the whole of the Indian Penal Code?

A. I answered that question yesterday. I said anything which in any way affected the administration of Martial Law, I tried. I had to use my discretion. I was the man on the spot.

Q. And was this complaint brought to you direct or did the case come to you through the police?

A. The case was brought to me. I handed it over to the police for investigation.

Q. It was investigated by the police?

A. Yes.

Q. There was another kidnapping case where the accused were discharged, but was there any other kidnapping case where the accused were punished?

A. No other case.

Q. Do you know that any station clerk was flogged under your orders?

A. At the beginning, yes.

Q. He was given 30 lashes?

A. Yes.

Q. May I know what his offence was?

A. As far as I recollect, he was the organizer of a meeting in contravention of a Martial Law order.

Q. Will there be any record of this case?

A. There is a record.

Q. You refer to that case where 9 persons were arrested in a room, and he was one of them?

A. Yes.

Q. And these 9 persons were arrested in the quarters of these clerks?

A. Yes.

Q. They were present at one place and in a compound?

A. Yes.

Q. There were 9 persons?

A. Yes.

Q. May I know under which regulation was the meeting together of 9 clerks in the railway compound prohibited?

A. It was an illegal gathering. I cannot give you the number of the regulation.

Q. In the Martial Law proclamation there is an order that not more than 10 persons can meet without a permit. That, I think, would not apply to 9 persons who lived in the same compound in small barracks, if all these persons met together, I don't think that order could apply to these people. The proclamation says that 'not more than 10 persons can meet without a permit,' but in this case there were only 9 persons whom you arrested and one of them was flogged?

A. There was a local order to the effect that not more than 5 persons could meet. I could not quote the order at the present moment. It was a local order at the beginning under which not more than 5 persons were allowed to meet.

Q. And you thought that that order would cover the case of clerks who were living in the same quarter?

A. They did not live in the same quarter. They were scattered over a wide area. There was a good interval between the quarters. The quarters are in pairs, and the information that was received was that a meeting was to be held in one of the quarters, and as the railway employees had been mixed up in the doings of the 11th or 12th, the case was brought under the Martial Law proclamation.

Q. And this very person was a prosecution witness in the Kasur Conspiracy and Riot case?

A. I don't know.

Q. This incident is described in this way: 'On the afternoon of the 28th April information having been received that the Kasur Railway Staff, practically all of whom were implicated in the riots and against whom there was but little useful evidence to hand, were about to hold a secret meeting that evening to decide their future policy. The house was surrounded and entered by the military, 9 persons were arrested. The police eventually obtained useful evidence from these persons.' Is that correct?

A. I know nothing about that.

Q. It was on the 28th under your administration?

A. I was administering on that date.

Q. Was Mustanohand, Assistant Station Master, at Kasur, arrested under your administration of Martial Law?

4 December 1919.]

Captain A. C. DOVETON.

[Continued.]

A. Not under my orders. I don't remember the man by name, I know the name, but I don't remember who the man is.

Q. Was any bull sent by you to the veterinary hospital during your stay there?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember the name of Lala Ratha Kishan in connection with this bull?

A. I remember his name very well.

Q. Did you pass any order against him that the bull in front of his house was not sufficiently fed, that he should take care of it in future and that he should see that the bull was properly fed. Sometimes afterwards you again went back and saw that the bull was not properly fed and you sent it to the veterinary hospital and asked Lala Ratha Kishan to pay all the expenses?

A. I think I told him that the animal should either be destroyed or properly cared for.

Q. Subsequently the bull was sent to the veterinary hospital and he was made to bear all the expenses?

A. He volunteered to pay the expenses, I believe.

Q. He volunteered to pay?

A. He told me he was quite prepared.

Q. He told you that he would gladly pay all the expenses. Before that bull was sent to the veterinary hospital, did you not ask him to feed that bull properly?

A. He said that it was in his compound and I told him that it must be looked after properly.

Q. Do you remember an old man named Sundar Das, aged about 62, a shop-keeper, who was sentenced to one month's imprisonment, and some stripes and a fine of Rs. 50?

A. I do not remember the case.

Q. Because he purchased wheat from somebody else?

A. I remember that case.

Q. You remember that case. After serving his sentence, he came out of the jail and died?

A. I know nothing about that. I think that is a mistake. I do not think I ordered any stripes at all.

Q. That man had no stripes?

A. Not in that case.

Q. He was only fined? Do you remember what happened to him?

A. I think he got a month's imprisonment and possibly a fine.

Q. What was his offence?

A. I think it relates to being abroad at unauthorised hours. I was asked about it yesterday. He received the stuff from the man I was questioned about yesterday.

Q. He received this stuff from that man?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the offence? He received it. What is the harm? I cannot see what crime he committed.

A. He also made a false statement in my court.

Q. As a witness?

A. Yes.

Q. That is he purchased wheat from certain persons whom you punished?

A. He made a false statement.

Q. Was he punished for perjury?

A. That is what it amounts to. He made a false statement in my presence. He had been conniving at the offence of this man who was outside at unauthorised hours and was removing wheat or some such thing.

Q. I do not understand. What do you mean by saying that he was conniving with this man? Is that in not observing the Curfew order?

A. Perhaps I expressed myself wrongly. He received the wheat which he knew to be stolen from this person.

Q. Was he punished for receiving stolen property or was he punished for perjury or for both?

A. He was punished for both. He made a false statement in my presence in connection with this case.

Q. Apart from the address that was given to you, was any ode composed in your praise?

A. Yes.

Q. That was composed by a person who was brought under arrest, by a Mahomedan, who happened to be a poet. And the punishment you inflicted on him was to compose a poem.

A. The man in question disobeyed an order of mine, and when he was brought before me he expressed his appreciation of my justice. Then I asked him if he was a poet, and he said he knew very well how to compose a poem.

Q. You therefore asked him to compose a poem in appreciation of you?

A. Exactly. It was a very good piece of work and he read it in the market place.

Q. About making a line on the ground by the nose, you have stated that it was not done?

A. That was not done.

Q. So the punishment about rubbing one's forehead on the ground was exaggerated to this?

A. Yes.

Q. I am questioning you only with a view to give you an opportunity of denying it. I will give you the name. May I know whether one Lala Kesav Das was ordered by you to draw lines? Do you remember it?

A. As regards the name, I do not know.

Q. As regards the punishment, it was never inflicted?

A. No.

Q. Was Lala Kesav Das punished by you for purchasing Ra. 4 of rice, as you thought it was a large quantity and he should have purchased only for one rupee? Because he purchased for Ra. 4, you punished him?

A. I do not know the name. I do not know Lala Kesav Das.

Q. Do you remember you punished a certain person for that offence?

A. I do not remember. If it is on record, he will have been punished.

Q. It is not on record at all. This is an allegation and I give you an opportunity of denying it.

A. I cannot have punished the man.

Q. Not for one minute do I say that all these allegations that I am putting to you are true. That is not my case. But I give you an opportunity of denying. Mention has been made of these things in certain statements and other places. Therefore I give you an opportunity of either admitting or denying them.

A. I have already stated that it is not true.

Q. Nor about the purchase of Ra. 4 worth of rice?

A. No. The man approached me for assistance and I ordered the stuff to be returned to him. That is the only case I remember.

Q. The name of that tenant was Durga Das. He was alleged to have been ordered to pay rent to Jagan Nath; upon his refusal, he was fined and punished. I only want to give you the name.

A. That is entirely wrong.

Q. Did you ask any Muhammadan to dance with a fool's cap on his head?

A. No. But I could tell you what that originated in. A man was endangering public safety by coming in a train with the door open and sitting on the foot-board. I made him stand in a less precarious position for a certain length of time by way of punishment.

Q. And he was not made to dance?

A. No.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. When you took over charge on the 23rd April were you given any written or verbal instructions as regards your authority?

A. Some instructions came to me by post. Some, I think, came direct from the Lahore Division and some came through the Ferozepore Brigade. There was a paper defining my powers.

Q. On the same day that you arrived in Kasur?

A. I was handed some telegraphic instructions before I proceeded to Kasur.

4 December 1919.]

Captain A. C. DOVETON.

[Continued.]

Q. Before you arrived at Kasur ?

A. Yes, simply stating the powers of an area officer.

Q. Have you any recollection what those powers were ?

A. The first thing that I got was the maximum punishments that could be inflicted. That was 30 lashes and Rs. 1,000 fine and 2 years' rigorous imprisonment.

Q. That is if anybody committed breaches of your orders. What I want to get at is what you were told as to what authority you had or what orders you could give ?

A. I am afraid I did not quite catch the question.

Q. I want to know whether you were given general authority to do what you thought best under the circumstances or whether a limitation was put only as regards punishments or whether you were also told as to what your authority was and what you could do and what you could not do ?

A. The orders that I received were very brief, and anything outside, the orders I did entirely on my own ; I used my discretion.

Q. You received certain orders ; and outside the orders, you used your discretion ?

Q. Were you told that you could use your discretion or did you do it of your own accord or were you told that you had authority to do what you thought was best ?

A. There was nothing in the order saying that I could use my discretion, but one is after all in the habit of using one's discretion in the Army, if a new situation arises.

Q. I see there is nothing in the orders, but because in the Army anyone has to use his discretion if a new situation arises, you thought you could use your discretion ?

A. That is so.

Q. When you were ordered to come to Kasur, you got a telegraphic order containing brief instructions ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you, after your arrival at Kasur, get any detailed instructions by post or otherwise ?

A. Yes, there was a sheet of foolscap paper printed, which gave instructions.

Q. Did you get a proclamation which was issued by General Beynon on the 19th April ?

A. That was received. I had several copies of that.

Q. After receiving that, may I take it, you considered that to be your authority, the scope within which you could work ?

A. I took it that anything in that proclamation might be modified by orders issued locally to suit the local situation.

Q. Orders issued by whom ? Issued by you ?

A. By the Officer Commanding, Kasur.

Q. I simply want to understand the position. General Beynon's proclamation applied to the whole area and of course there were certain local orders issued, I take it. It is the same in Kasur as elsewhere ?

A. Yes.

Q. Issued by you or Colonel McRae ?

A. Colonel McRae was commanding at the time. Those were the only orders. Nothing varied in essential particular from the general order.

Q. I want to be clear about it. Your authority was contained in the general proclamation issued by General Beynon and the local orders issued by Colonel McRae as regards Kasur. Is that correct ?

A. Yes ; so long as he was there.

Q. And when he was not there ?

A. It devolved upon me.

Q. Entirely ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you supposed to issue these local orders that you thought necessary for the preservation of law and order in Kasur ? Were they to be consistent with the general proclamation of General Beynon or could you go outside the scope of those general orders ?

A. I am trying to catch what you mean.

Q. My meaning is this. You said that General Beynon issued a proclamation which applied to the whole area under his command in Amritsar, Lahore and Kasur.

There were local conditions which required local orders. And therefore they were issued, first by Colonel McRae and afterwards it devolved upon you. Is that correct ?

A. Yes. None of the local orders, to my knowledge, went against the original proclamation of General Beynon.

Q. That is the question of going against the general order. My question is whether they were consistent with that order ?

A. I think so.

Q. That is what I want to know.

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore I take it that your authority was limited and confined by this general proclamation of General Beynon. Am I right in concluding that from what you said ?

A. Yes, generally speaking. But I want to know what you mean by limited.

Q. I mean that you could not go beyond this proclamation, your powers were confined or defined by the proclamation.

A. Are you referring to punishments out of the ordinary ?

Q. I am referring to the offences created and punishments provided for them. My question is whether your local orders, in your view, were to be consistent with these general instructions or could you give any orders which were not consistent with these general proclamations and orders of General Beynon ?

A. I would just like to know your conception of consistency.

Q. I want to know whether you thought you were bound by the orders of General Beynon or whether you thought that under certain local conditions you had authority, if necessary, to go outside his authority.

A. I believe that under certain local conditions, I could, to a certain degree, go outside this authority.

Q. What was that limitation ? You said ' to a certain degree.' To what degree ?

A. There again I had to use my discretion ; I had to do what I thought was right.

Q. Do I understand that whenever you thought it necessary in the interests of law and order of Kasur to give any orders which might be outside the authority given to you by the proclamation, you did so in the interests of law and order on your own discretion ?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore I do not see the object of this general proclamation of General Beynon at all Officers who gave certain orders had absolute discretion to do what they thought best in the interests of the preservation of law and order. It came to that ?

A. I take it from a soldier's point of view. He would not say that the general operation orders are absolutely of no use simply because the local Commanding Officer has to use his discretion in emergency or under certain conditions.

Q. I understand that a soldier generally has a sort of general instruction given to him, that if circumstances arise, he may use his own discretion outside the orders of the commander.

A. Circumstances not defined there are left to his discretion.

Q. There must be some sort of general rule somewhere. It must be somewhere in your book of instructions, that circumstances may arise in the course of the soldier performing his duties, and it is necessary for him to use entirely his own discretion.

A. Are you talking about the proclamation ?

Q. You said that you took it from the soldier's point of view. It must be laid down somewhere ?

A. It is laid down.

Q. What I want to get at is this. There was the general proclamation of General Beynon. Is it laid down in this proclamation that local officers who are in charge of the command of local areas might in the interests of law and order use their own discretion if circumstances require, whether it be consistent with these orders or not ? It does not say so anywhere.

4 December 1919.]

Captain A. C. DOVETON.

[Continued.]

A. I do not remember that this has been said anywhere in General Beynon's proclamation.

Q. In the Army somewhere it is generally laid down ?

A. I am afraid we are at cross purposes. I do not remember that this is mentioned in the proclamation. It is a rule in the Army that a man should use his discretion, but I think you are referring to General Beynon's proclamation. I do not see it is laid down in General Beynon's proclamation.

Q. It is not there. You, being a soldier, took it in that sense. What I do not quite understand is that in this proclamation it is nowhere laid down. This use of discretionary power is somewhere laid down in the Army Rules ?

A. Yes.

Q. Here it is not laid down, only in the Army Regulations it is laid down. Because it is laid down in the Army, you think you have been given this discretionary power. Here in General Beynon's proclamation, you have not been given any such discretion.

A. I look upon the proclamation as the orders of an Officer Commanding in the field. He does not say in his orders that the local commanders shall use their discretion, because it is taken for granted as it is one of the principles of a soldier.

Q. You take it in that sense ?

A. I look upon that proclamation as exactly the operation orders of a field commander.

Q. You thought it necessary in dealing with local conditions to use your discretion ?

A. Yes.

Q. As regards this order requiring people to rub their foreheads on the ground, according to your own discretion you thought it necessary ?

A. Yes.

Q. And you do not regard it as inconsistent with the instructions. You thought it was quite consistent ?

A. At that time I thought so.

Q. May I take it that you thought it necessary in the exercise of your own discretion ?

A. My view at the time was it was necessary to exact the last degree of respect, and it is a thing which I dropped as soon as I thought it was not required.

Q. It did not strike you as being very much like the order of General Dyer which made villagers crawl ?

A. I never associated the two.

Q. Supposing anybody had refused to obey that order, what punishment would you have inflicted ?

A. The occasion never arose.

Q. Supposing it had arisen, how would you enforce your order ?

A. I really do not know. I have no idea. Probably I would have acted on the spur of the moment.

Q. You would have ordered some punishment ?

A. I do not think I should have ordered a punishment. I think I should have got somebody to assist him to do it.

Q. To assist him to do it forcibly ?

A. Yes.

Q. You have spoken in your report, paragraph 6, about your delivering lectures and "straight speaking." What do you mean by "straight speaking?" Can you give us an example ?

A. In ordinary colloquial language I would call it "telling off." I explained to the people that false representations were made, that they had been misled and they had got themselves into trouble and those responsible had got off scotfree.

Q. Reading some of the paragraphs of your report one is led to believe that the administration of Martial Law in Kasur was such as to make Kasur a peaceful land flowing with milk and honey. The place had become a land of wail and sorrow, I think, when some of the restrictions were removed ? Do you think they would rather have it for all times ? I would not then call it Martial Law.

A. My opinion is that though it might not be welcome to individuals it was of great benefit to the community as a whole.

Q. They did not like probably law's delays, those long procedures and pleaders' heavy fees : they would get rid of these and have their cases decided immediately ?

A. They would not be induced to spend money on litigation and I think in a short time the benefits of summary courts would soon be apparent.

Q. Referring to your expression 'willingly done' of course you mean that people rendered willing obedience ?

A. I mean to say that the attitude of the people was friendly. They assisted you in anything to the best of their ability and cheerfully. For example, a bicycle breaks down ; half a dozen people rush forward and take it to the nearest military post. I mean to say, they are prepared to help you.

Q. Do you not see that if a person were placed entirely under another person and subordinated completely as regards his attitude, his postures and actions, to the will of another who can punish him as he liked, would he not be very obedient to the person who is the commander ?

A. If people realize that these punishments were not directed at individuals but were necessary for establishing law and order I do not think they will have anything to complain of.

Q. You do not think that sort of ready obedience and what is called cheerful helpfulness is rendered to every absolute despot in the world ?

A. No doubt. But I went out of my way to talk to the people. I became intimate with them. I went in among them and spoke to them.

Q. Despots also talk to them ; they do all sorts of things to them because they have fear of instant punishment. Is that not enough to make people render absolute obedience ?

A. I do not think they can do in the same spirit.

Q. Spirit is inside ; nobody knows, you can only see its outside action ?

A. I think one can make a good case by the general demeanour of the people.

Q. That is, you were a good despot personally.

A. When I went in amongst them I was received with cheerful greeting.

Q. But certainly you would not like to substitute despotism for the reign of law, apart from any benefit ?

A. I do not think I suggested that.

Q. Probably the people of Kasur liked it ; they were so fond of Martial Law ?

A. An Indian gentleman who was giving evidence expressed it this way :—

"Martial Law is right but it depends on who administers it."

Q. I can quite understand that. Men who administer it they may have personal influence with the people ; that is all right. Would you think it very ungrateful on the part of the Kasur people not to have petitioned the Government to restore to them the blessings of Martial Law ?

A. I do not think so.

Q. When you arrived at Kasur, was it in a condition of turmoil or was it perfectly quiet ?

A. It was hardly quiet. The attitude of the people was ugly.

Q. In what manner was it shown ?

A. One can feel but not describe its atmosphere.

Q. So there is nothing which you can tell us ?

A. I cannot give any specific instances.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. With regard to the question of *milauing*, you said that you knew of your own knowledge that this was done by Indians. Is it a fact when you say that when two Indians meet, one in order to show his respect will bend down and touch his feet ?

A. I believe so.

Q. All these cases that you tried or orders that you passed, offensive or otherwise, were they not in the honest *bona fide* belief that what you were doing was the right thing to do under the circumstances ?

A. That is so.

4 December 1919 ]

Lt-Col H. St. G. M. McRAE.

Lt-Col. H. St. G. M. McRAE, D.S.O., 2-15th Sikhs, Commanding Kasur Area.

*By the President—*

Q. Colonel McRae, when did you arrive at Kasur ?

A. At 2 o'clock on the afternoon of 12th.

Q. And from that time what was your position ?

A. I was commanding troops and administering Martial Law after the advent of Martial Law.

Q. I think you submitted to the Adjutant-General a report dealing with the situation in Kasur, and the action you took under Martial Law ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I have to ask you about two points. The first is in connection with those warrant officers; you state in your report that apparently the warrant officers then lost their heads, fired off their revolvers over the heads of the crowd or at too long a range and then fled for protection to the station building. Was that the conclusion you drew at the time from the evidence of the witnesses ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You think that if they had fired straight at them and not in the air it would have been effective ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In the last paragraph of your report you give the casualties that occurred at Kasur in consequence of the action of the mob. That list was made out from the information you had at the time ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I see there one warrant officer killed, one warrant officer died of wounds, one British officer severely wounded, two British non-commissioned officers severely wounded, one Indian official severely wounded one British officer slightly wounded and four Indian officials slightly wounded, eleven casualties.

In the second part of your report you deal with information after your arrival. There is a reference in paragraph 29 to an aeroplane. What action was taken by an aeroplane in Kasur ?

A. On several occasions aeroplanes circulated in the city. On one occasion they dropped propaganda leaflets.

Q. Was any bomb dropped on Kasur or any machine-gun used ?

A. No, Sir.

Q. When you arrived at Kasur, what was the attitude of the crowd ?

A. The people had broken off and gone to their houses, the attitude of the people seen in the streets was sullen.

Q. I think you did no firing that day ?

A. No, Sir.

Q. On your arrival at Kasur I do not think you did anything for a day or two ?

A. My hands were tied by the civil authorities.

Q. When did you receive authority to act independently ?

A. On the proclamation of the Martial Law. On the 16th.

Q. In connection with the arrests that were made, did the military assist the police ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When did you start assisting them ?

A. After the proclamation of Martial Law.

Q. Had they not assisted them previous to that ?

A. They assisted in picketing certain villages while the police searched—on the evening of the 12th.

Q. What village ?

A. One of the outlying villages, Khem Karan of Kasur.

Q. An armoured train arrived in the morning. You thought it was slow in coming into action ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you receive information from Khem Karan, which is the next station on the Amritsar line, that considerable damage had been done there ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you send any force there ?

A. I had no troops at my disposal at that time, Sir.

Q. Your first night was passed without incident at Kasur ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You suggested to Mr. Mitter to take advantage of the presence of the military and to search for stolen property, to make arrests ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Why did you make that suggestion ?

A. I thought it necessary to make some motion, otherwise there would be further outbreaks.

Q. What made you infer further outbreaks ?

A. From the nature of the people of Kasur.

Q. Did they seem to be of unsettled mood ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You made arrangements for certain bodies of troops to go from Kasur to neighbouring villages. When did you start that ?

A. After the proclamation of Martial Law.

Q. The Ferozepore column visited Kasur on the night of the 14th of April ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Then it went on to Khem Karan ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On the 15th did Mr. Mitter come to see you at the railway station ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. That was your headquarters ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did he appear uneasy ?

A. Very much so.

Q. What was causing him uneasiness ?

A. He feared further troubles.

Q. Was anything said as to attempts being made to tamper with the loyalty of the troops ?

A. We inferred that attempts were being made to tamper with the loyalty of my regiment.

Q. Did you discuss the matter with him ?

A. I discussed with him and came to the conclusion that attempts had been made but there was no fear of the loyalty of the Sikhs.

Q. Was it disturbing ? Had you any doubt of the loyalty of the troops ?

A. Not for a moment.

Q. Were there rumours as to the destruction of the Golden Temple at Amritsar ?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Were you anxious that the rioters who had done mischief to life and property in Kasur should be arrested ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you patrol the city day and night ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You sent detachments of Indian troops ?

A. Yes, Sir, with police.

Q. In what state was the city as regards business during this time.

A. A few shops only opened. Then shopkeepers came in conference and the shops were opened.

Q. On the 15th, the telegraph between Kasur and Amritsar was repaired ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And Mr. Marsden came and took over the duties from Mr. Mitter ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you drafted the proclamation of Martial Law on the 16th ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you on that day go to the town along with Mr. Marsden and there proclaim Martial Law ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you marched to the Town Hall was it very fully crowded ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. The surroundings were picketed ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You yourself read the proclamation in English and the Deputy Superintendent read the translation in the vernacular ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were some questions asked by the audience ?

A. Yes, Sir.

4 December 1919.]

Lt.-Col. H. St. G. M. McRae.

[Continued.]

Q. What sort of questions?

A. They were questions as to whether they would be right to hold religious meetings and about the curfew order.

Q. What did you say as regards the holding of religious meetings?

A. My orders were that no meetings should be held without permission.

Q. Did you indicate that they might apply for permission?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What was the attitude of the audience when they heard the proclamation?

A. Sullen and unrepentant.

Q. By unrepentant do you mean there was no open expression of regret?

A. I understood that they did not regret the occurrences.

Q. Before the end of the meeting, I think, the pleader, Mr. Dhanpat Rai, was arrested?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was he sent to Lahore Jail?

A. Yes, Sir; under the orders of the Commissioner of Lahore.

Q. Immediately after the Darbar did you despatch five parties each of 10 rifles to assist the police in making further arrests?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And with it 24 arrests were made?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In the following days a considerable number of further arrests were effected?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. How were the arrests in the outlying villages effected?

A. In the form of military operations. Villages were surrounded, the police then entered with military escorts and apprehended persons about whom they had reports.

Q. I think in Appendix I you give a detailed statement as to the different operations that took place?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Is that an accurate and full statement of those operations?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What effect had the execution of these raids on the outlying villages?

A. No offender felt safe.

Q. Had they in your opinion good or bad effect?

A. Excellent effect.

Q. On the 16th April, were the lady missionaries evacuated to Ferozepore?

A. Yes.

Q. Why was that step specially taken?

A. There was an embarrassing situation and I had to keep a British guard. I had not sufficient troops.

Q. Before the declaration of Martial Law were the lives of Europeans in danger?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What effect on the town had the declaration of Martial Law?

A. It had the immediate effect of quieting the town and restoring order.

Q. And I think you allowed the lady missionaries to return on the 22nd April?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. They left for the hills on the 6th May?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was your military force in Kasur on the 18th April?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. We have been told about the cases of seven school-boys or students who were flogged, you may explain how that occurred.

A. The school-boys had taken a considerable part in the rebellion. They had been seen leading and inciting the mob. The action taken by me was to order certain school-boys to be flogged.

Six were whipped with three to six strokes each. I considered that this is the form of punishment that a

boy received in an English public school for unruly conduct.

Q. I understand that you selected six more or less at random?

A. The schoolmasters were asked to select the boys, they picked out the smaller boys and boys of low caste.

Q. Did this whipping take place in public?

A. Outside the railway station.

Q. You suggested that similar whipping would be administered in an English public school. Was the whipping administered similar to that in an English public school?

A. We got it lower down. They had to have it on the back.

Q. Did any of the boys suffer any injury in consequence?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Was there a medical officer present when the whipping took place?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. The whipping was carried out with Cat o' nine tails?

A. Regulation sticks.

Q. I understand the other whippings did not take place in public?

A. At the station, Sir.

Q. Were such whippings imposed by you or by somebody else?

A. They were done by Captain Doveton.

Q. There were a considerable number?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. We have been told about the parading of the inhabitants of Kasur near the railway station for the purposes of identification. How many people paraded at one time? What was the largest number?

A. Under 1,000.

Q. Did you assist the police in assembling these people?

A. Yes. Also we assisted in closing the exits to the town to prevent robberies.

Q. How was the process of identification carried out?

A. The townspeople passed in single file before persons who had assembled for this purpose.

Q. Then did they pass before a number of different people who were identified or did they just pass before one or two on one occasion?

A. Both forms were adopted, Sir.

Q. How long were they kept out for the purposes of identification?

A. On one day they were probably kept out for six hours owing to the difficulty of collecting so many people and also of passing them in their presence.

Q. Were the military kept the whole day?

A. The military were kept the whole day and the public for a certain portion.

Q. On those occasions were the public addressed on the meaning of the Rowlett Act?

A. In one case in my presence. There were other cases.

Q. I think you took bicycles from people at Kasur and you paid for the repairs of those at certain local rates?

A. Yes.

Q. What were they used for?

A. They were used by the military for despatch riders and military patrols.

Q. Was it necessary?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they retained longer than it was necessary?

A. I cannot say. They were returned after I had left.

Q. Was there a large number of complaints about taking the bicycles?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Did an armoured motor battery from Kasur constantly patrol the road between Ferozepore and Kasur?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Had the armoured motor battery considerable moral effect on the people?

A. Great effect, Sir.

4 December 1919.]

Lt.-Col. H. St. G. M. McRAE.

[Continued.]

Q. Were the roads tampered with at all?  
 A. On two or three occasions.  
 Q. In what way?  
 A. Water was let off on the road from the canal.  
 Q. A good deal of water was let off which made a short delay in the passing of motors?  
 A. Country roads are not metalled. They become bad by being watered.  
 Q. You received information that a large number of Kasur people had migrated to Ferozepore and other places by road and rail?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. What steps did you take in this connection?  
 A. I had ferries guarded and watched them and also railway trains were stopped at the Kaiser-i-Hind bridge and searched by the police.  
 Q. Was there any Martial Law Order against trains at Kasur?  
 A. For a short time.  
 Q. Now, we have had some evidence as regards accommodation for the prisoners. Where were they accommodated?  
 A. Just outside the railway station.  
 Q. Where a cage was constructed, as accommodation for prisoners at Tahsil and police stations was inadequate?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. It was constructed by some Sappers?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. The material was requisitioned from the town and paid for?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. You say here "The enclosure was surrounded by an eight foot barbed wire fence, to which were attached some 50 cow bells, an open shelter was erected in the centre and covered latrines at one end."  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. How was the food for the prisoners arranged?  
 A. By the police or their relatives were allowed to bring food.  
 Q. I think the police looked after the cage during the day time and the military at night?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. How many had you, the largest number at one time?  
 A. I kept no record. That is a matter with which police were concerned. Probably up to 150; they were over 100 at one time.  
 Q. Was the cage inspected more than once?  
 A. Continually.  
 Q. By whom?  
 A. By various officers. My senior officers inspected continually.  
 Q. Was it found to be quite satisfactory as regards accommodation?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. Had you a medical officer in attendance?  
 A. Always.  
 Q. Did any cases of sickness occur?  
 A. Not one, Sir.  
 Q. I want to know whether during the time the cage was used health was fairly good?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. So far as the better class of prisoners was concerned, if accommodation was available, they were lodged in cells at the Tahsil or police station?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. The cage was finally closed on the 8th May?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. How did you send prisoners to Lahore?  
 A. The police actually took them and they were provided with military escorts. The men were handcuffed and roped together.  
 Q. Why were they roped together?  
 A. I know nothing about that.  
 Q. Were the police concerned with that?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. In an appendix you have given us information as to the number of arrests at Kasur?  
 A. Yes.

Q. As regards that, the special tribunal at Lahore seem to have tried 67 and of these 67 there were 13 death sentences, 21 transportation for life, 9 imprisonment and 24 acquitted.  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. And as regards Khem Karan, seven were imprisoned and 16 were acquitted?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. As regards arresting people, after the first trial had taken place at Lahore, did you make any arrest unless more than one witness identified?  
 A. He may have been identified but was not arrested.  
 Q. We have been told about reprisals that were taken against absentees. Can you give us any further information in the matter?  
 A. It was the only way of inflicting punishment upon those persons.  
 Q. Certain people had absented themselves against whom there was a good proof in the hands of the police of participation in the riots. Their furniture was destroyed. What was your policy? What sort of articles were destroyed?  
 A. I don't know. I was never present on any of those occasions. That is hearsay.  
 Q. Had you given any instructions as to what sort of property should be destroyed?  
 A. My proclamation was that their property was liable to be destroyed.  
 Q. Is your proclamation here?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. The proclamation is "No person, who was a resident of Kasur on the 10th April 1919, shall leave Kasur without a special pass or permit duly signed by me or on my behalf. And further all such residents who have left Kasur on or after the 10th April 1919, will return to Kasur within four days from this date, failing which measures will be taken against their property." Is that the only proclamation you issued in connection with this matter?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. But did you give any further instructions than that as to what property was to be destroyed or did you leave it in this general way?  
 A. I left it to them, Sir.  
 Q. On the 28th April a number of the railway staff, who were holding a meeting, were arrested?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. What was the explanation for those arrests?  
 A. I had information given to me that the railway staff were about to hold a secret meeting there. I ordered that the meeting should be arrested.  
 Q. Was that meeting contrary to your Regulation or orders?  
 A. Any meeting of ten persons was contrary to my orders.  
 Q. At this meeting how many people were present whom you arrested?  
 A. I understand nine. I arrested them because I could not count the meeting before I arrested them.  
 Q. Were these people charged with any offence?  
 A. That was dealt by the Administrator of Martial Law.  
 Q. I think Captain Doveton?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. The military force was reduced on the 6th of May?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. By that time was the town much quieter than it had been before?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. On the 9th of May were you relieved by Captain Jameson?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. In your general remarks at the conclusion of your report you refer to one or two unfortunate occurrences that took place during the administration of Martial Law?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. The first of these is a case of a native, who approached the British sentry on duty at the railway station during a dust-storm and was shot dead?

4 December 1919.]

Lt.-Col. H. St. G. M. McRAE.

[Continued.]

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was there an inquiry held at once?

A. There was.

Q. And you have given the record of the inquiry in one of your appendices?

A. Yes.

Q. That is the case of the man who has been referred to us as being brought to the advance Station Hospital?

A. Yes, Sir. I don't know that he was taken to the Station Hospital.

Q. Then on the 21st, was there any occurrence at the Lakhna village?

A. The village had been surrounded for the purposes of making certain arrests and apparently a certain man attempted to escape and was stopped by the sentry. Possibly he did not understand what the sentry meant and he seized his bayonet. On another British soldier coming this man struggled with him who unfortunately fired at him and he died.

Q. Was any inquiry held into this matter?

A. I held an inquiry on the very day.

Q. As a result of this inquiry the action of the sentry, although regrettable, was considered justified under the circumstances?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it a serious thing for a civilian or any one to seize a sword or an arm from a soldier?

A. Yes.

Q. Then on the 19th April there was a case where a sepoy plundered some bag and clothes in the Khara village?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you make an inquiry into it?

A. Yes. He was subsequently arrested and tried by Summary Court Martial. He was given six months' imprisonment and dismissed from service.

Q. And stolen property was handed over to the civil?

A. Yes.

Q. Did any cases of intimidation come under your notice?

A. Two cases. One case was of three Sikhs of village Lohgarh who had been arrested for participation in the riots and against whom there was only one witness who had been released. They returned to their village and attacked and beat the Lambardar of their village who had given evidence against them.

Q. I think they got the assistance of two others?

A. Yes.

Q. Then five of them were tried under Martial Law and sentenced to receive 30 lashes and also to undergo two years' rigorous imprisonment?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that a serious case?

A. The worst that came before me.

Q. I think they received the lashes straight away or at once?

A. Yes.

Q. Had that punishment a salutary effect upon the neighbourhood?

A. Excellent effect.

Q. One of the things you had to provide for in the case of Martial Law was that if offences were committed you had to get information about them from the people who knew about them. Did you find whether there was any reluctance on the part of the inhabitants to give accurate information of what had occurred?

A. Really that did not come under my sphere.

Q. There was another case of attempted blackmail or intimidation against a loyal railway official who had identified a number of rioters?

A. A certain man who had given evidence against several rioters was threatened by some unknown persons at night.

Q. These people used to go outside his house and shout out threats?

A. Yes. We tried to capture them but failed. The result was that it did not occur again.

Q. I think you did not capture them because your soldiers did not recognize them?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the matter of communications a difficult one?

A. It was that.

Q. How it was that?

A. The telegraph is entirely in the hands of Indians. Roads were bad and there were practically no motor cars available and no telephones in Kasur.

Q. Did that make your work more difficult than before?

A. Yes.

Q. You took steps to guarantee the safety of the railways?

A. The village headmen were made responsible for the Railway Line and telegraph in their neighbourhood.

Q. But I don't think you adopted the system of taking hostages for good behaviour?

A. No, Sir, I did not think it sound because the hostage had he been present on the spot might have been able to stop it.

Q. Was the behaviour of your troops, both Indian and British, satisfactory?

A. Excellent, Sir.

Q. Were any cases of insubordination brought to your notice?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Did you have any differences with the police?

A. No, Sir, we got on excellently.

Q. Do you express any opinion as to whether the police should have been better armed or should have better weapons than they had?

A. It is my opinion.

Q. We were told the kind of arms they had. They were inferior to soldiers' arms?

A. I would not rather give my opinion on this.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—*

Q. Colonel McRae, I think there is only one thing I want to ask you anything about. You arrived at Kasur on the 12th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And General Beynon's proclamation which introduced settled principles of Martial Law, is, as we know, dated the 19th of April.

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And between the 12th and the time when that proclamation was distributed, the position and powers of different officers as regards Martial Law had not been properly defined?

A. No.

Q. I mean Martial Law was in its initial stages and you were close up against the riots and trouble that had just occurred and you did not in the least know what was going to take place at the next moment.

A. Not at all.

Q. If I have followed your report, when you got to Kasur things looked as if anything might happen in the way of a recurrence of trouble?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you have put in paragraph 23 of your report the general instructions with which you were sent to Kasur?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. That in the absence of any magistrate you will take all measures to restore order at those places. A magistrate will probably proceed with your party if he arrives in time. You will carry out such measures as he recommends until he hands over direction of military operations to you. In the latter case you must do all in your power to protect life and property and at the same time deal strictly with the offenders.

A. Yes.

Q. Now the incident which we have heard about school-boys took place, I gather, on the 18th?

A. Yes.

Q. That is before there was an Area Officer administering Martial Law formally under General Beynon's proclamation?

A. That is so.

Q. And if I follow the position as it appeared to you at the time you got to Kasur you knew that there were



4 December 1919.]

Lt.-Col. H. ST. G. M. MORAE.

[Continued.]

a great number of rioters and disaffected people in Kasur, but you had not by that time been able to find out who came under that class and who did not ?

A. Quite so.

Q. And as I understand you discovered that the school-boys had been responsible to some extent for the trouble ?

A. Yes.

Q. I see you say in your report that at least two school-boys were identified as having taken leading parts in the riots ; were those two school-boys ever arrested ?

A. I cannot tell you who they were, I think they both were.

Q. I am told that two school-boys were arrested and afterwards sentenced. Did you satisfy yourself that the school-boys in Kasur as a whole had been taking part ?

A. I did.

Q. I rather gathered from evidence by other witnesses that you had representations made to you by at any rate one school master, that his boys had got out of hand ?

A. That is so.

Q. And I think the action you took did not have reference to one school only but to all the schools ?

A. To all the schools.

Q. I just want to follow what you did. Did you send round to all the headmasters and ask them to take disciplinary action, or what did you do first ?

A. Mr. Marsden actually arranged with the police I think for the presence of all the school boys. Beyond authorising that they should be collected, I actually took no personal part in it.

Q. So he sent for all the school masters ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you present at that meeting ?

A. No.

Q. When you had to do with the matter first, what had resulted from this action of Mr. Marsden in calling a meeting of school masters ?

A. You will see it in paragraph 62 of my report. Mr. Marsden reported practically as in sub-paragraph 2 of that.

Q. He sent for the school masters ?

A. I do not know how he arranged with the school masters ; that had nothing to do with me.

Q. What was the first thing you did in the matter ?

A. Mr. Marsden suggested that the schools should be paraded and he should see the school masters. I gave my sanction to that. Then the next proposal was that Mr. Marsden reported that certainly one school master if not more, had reported that his boys were defiant. We had evidence to show that they were in the riots and he suggested that certain boys should be picked out to bear punishment for the whole, and I sanctioned it.

Q. The original intention was that the headmasters should choose those boys who had been taking a leading part in the mischief ?

A. Yes.

Q. And as I understand they picked out some boys and you were satisfied from the look of the boys that they had not been properly chosen ?

A. Mr. Marsden reported that to me.

Q. Did Mr. Marsden consult you as to what he should do because they had made this obviously wrong selection ?

A. Yes, and we agreed that we should make our selection ourselves.

Q. You paraded the boys and how was the selection in fact made, the selection you made yourself ?

A. I did not personally make it.

Q. You were not there ?

A. I came out from the railway station which was my headquarters, sanctioned that Mr. Marsden should take this action, and went back to my work.

Q. Mr. Marsden or somebody in your absence picked out the boys, and you had sanctioned that the boys he should pick out should be thrashed ?

A. Yes.

Q. I see you say in your report that it was decided to select the six biggest boys aged about 17 years ; are you satisfied, Colonel, that the selection was made of the big boys ?

A. I left that to Mr. Marsden ; it was my suggestion that we should take the biggest.

Q. As far as you know, the particular lot of boys who were selected may have been entirely innocent ?

A. That was their misfortune if that was so.

Q. The individual hardship of such a policy as that is obvious, is it not ?

A. I know personally how one has been punished at school at home. A whole form has been punished for the sake of one who would not give himself up.

Q. And one has known cases where a whole form has been guilty and only some of them have been punished ?

A. Quite so.

Q. But it might be a matter for a difference of opinion. Have you ever known cases either of a public school or elsewhere of people selected as an example and flogged when they might have been innocent ?

A. No.

Q. As I understand you, you felt you had to do something to reduce the school boys as a whole to some sort of order ?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the effect of this action ? Did you have any further trouble with these boys ?

A. None at all.

Q. Do you attribute that to the action you took ?

A. Entirely.

Q. Did you ever get to know anything more ? Did you not have the boys' parents coming to you saying anything about it ?

A. No, never.

Q. I suppose at this time the order from superior authority directing that public whipping should not take place had not yet been sent ? You gave us the date, it was later on ?

A. No, that was on a later date, the 24th of April.

Q. Did it occur to you that disciplinary action in the face of the school might be one thing, that perhaps it was a little unnecessary to do it in public ?

A. No.

Q. Do you suppose that many members of the public did attend that function ?

A. Not a big percentage, if you take the population of Kasur. Of course there are always people crowding round a railway station.

Q. At any rate so far as you are concerned the matter ended there. You did not have any further facts brought to your knowledge either by way of complaint or otherwise ?

A. No.

Q. I do not think there is anything about it in your report, but I understand that certain columns, I think they have also been described as raiding parties, went out from Kasur to the surrounding district. Did that come under you ?

A. Yes.

Q. I understand that there were movable columns sent out round the country districts for the purpose of shewing that the power of the Government was still in existence ?

A. That was absolutely distinct. Those were sent out by orders of the Division.

Q. Can you tell me in a few sentences the policy and the effect of the other kind of raiding parties ?

A. Raiding parties as sent out by me. No party was sent out to make arrests without information handed to me by the police. I did not investigate what the information was. They informed me that certain persons in certain villages were suspected of participating in the riots. Then I issued my orders to assist the police to take those certain persons.

Q. So those raiding parties were really for the purpose of assisting the police to effect arrests of persons who were wanted by the police ?

A. Yes.

4 December 1919.]

Lt.-Col. H. St. G. M. McRAE

[Continued.]

Q. That being the object of them, who were in charge of these raiding parties, was it the same officer every time?

A. No, my Appendix I shows the officers in command. They were detailed by roster.

Q. Were there orders that they should confine themselves to searching for named persons and bringing them back under arrest or were they to do anything else?

A. You will find their orders in the Operation Orders I issued for every operation. They are in appendices to the War Diary.\*

Q. Looking them over were they orders to effect arrests or what were their other orders?

A. As a rule their orders were—take for instance my Order No. 6 on page 20, paragraph 2:—'The force as per margin will surround Athilpur by 4 A.M., on the 22nd instant, and give any necessary assistance to the police in searching the village and making arrests.'

Q. That was simply what they had to do, to give assistance in making arrests? Did you give them powers to do anything else, that is to hold enquiries for other persons?

A. That was entirely police arrangement. The officers got these orders to assist the police.

Q. As regards those parties do I understand from your report that they were not authorised in any case to adopt the system of taking hostages?

A. I took no hostage; I did not approve of it.

Q. You did not send raiding parties to any village simply because the village was known to be disaffected?

A. I sent no parties out without obtaining actual names of people.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Before you came to Kasur where were you?

A. Commanding my regiment at Ferozepore.

Q. Were you acquainted with Kasur before?

A. I had been through it on manoeuvres only.

Q. You passed through Kasur?

A. I have passed through it.

Q. You have never known Kasur before?

A. No.

Q. And at no period of your career were you stationed at Kasur?

A. No.

Q. If you look at your report, paragraph 1, you say 'this city has for many years been noted for sedition'?

A. I refer you to paragraph 1 on my first page in which I say that all I have said there is hearsay.

Q. You have no personal knowledge about this at all?

A. No.

Q. Who told you this, that this city was for many years noted for sedition?

A. With Your Lordship's consent I won't answer that.

Q. From whom did you get that information?

A. I do not propose to answer that question; it is hearsay.

Q. You make this statement in a responsible document to the authorities, surely we would like to know what is the basis for this statement.

A. I leave it as I have put it there.

Q. Why I am asking this question is that we have had other witnesses, officials, who have stated that in Kasur before the 10th of April, there was no political activity at all, nothing was doing so far as politics were concerned; and that is why I was surprised to find this statement made so assertively, that this city has for many years been noted for sedition. Do you still adhere to that statement?

A. I refuse to answer the question.

Q. I have stated to you the fact that officials who were stationed at Kasur for some length of time have told us that there was never any political activity in Kasur before these incidents; do you still adhere to the statement you make here that this city has for many years been noted for sedition?

A. I refer you to paragraph 1.

Q. That is a simple question to answer, whether you adhere to this opinion after what I have stated to you of the evidence of other officials?

A. What I have stated is here, Sir.

Q. That is not answering my question?

A. That is the only answer I can give you.

Q. Then, Colonel, you also go on to state here that the city harbours a large number of the pleader class who are well known to have anti-Government feelings. That is also on hearsay?

A. Yes.

Q. And stands on the same footing as the other statement that the city has been noted for sedition?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you aware that it has been stated to us, and you must have known it as Martial Law Administrator, that several pleaders assisted the authorities on the 12th and subsequent dates to maintain law and order, and that one of the pleaders was actually instrumental in saving the Sherbourns, are you aware of that?

A. Yes.

Q. Knowing that several pleaders assisted the authorities in the manner I have described, one of them actually saving the Sherbourns, do you still adhere to the statement that the pleader class is well known to have anti-Government feelings? Do you still adhere to the statement?

A. I adhere to my statement as put in the report as hearsay.

Q. Do you adhere to it now after knowledge of the facts that I have mentioned?

A. I acknowledge your facts as correct.

Q. If they are correct, do you still adhere to this sweeping statement that the pleaders were well known to have anti-Government feelings, or are you prepared to modify it?

A. I will read to you my statement—"This city has for many years been noted for sedition and harbours a large number of pleader class who are well known to have anti-Government feeling." In return I put it to you, did the pleaders play up and try and stop this as a whole or did they not?

Q. I am not here to answer questions.

A. Well I do not answer yours, unless His Lordship orders it.

Q. Are you aware that Kasur did not join the other places in the Punjab as regards the *hartal* on the 30th March or the 6th of April?

A. No.

Q. You still make the sweeping statement that the city has been known many years for sedition?

(The witness did not reply.)

Q. You adhere to that I take it, Colonel?

A. I adhere to what I have said before as hearsay.

Q. Then you refer to the Amritsar merchants having dishonoured Hundis of Kasur merchants. That is also, I take it, on hearsay, you have no evidence at all in support of that?

A. No, it is hearsay.

Q. Then on the 16th of April you held a Durbar at Kasur?

A. Yes.

Q. At which Durbar the pleader Dhanpat Rai was arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. Were other people arrested at this Durbar?

A. No.

Q. Only one man was arrested?

A. That is all.

Q. Other pleaders were arrested subsequently at a later date?

A. Yes.

Q. You are aware of that?

A. I am aware.

Q. Were they kept in custody for a considerable time?

A. Yes.

Q. And they were released without being brought to trial?

4 December 1919.]

Lt.-Col. H. St. G. M. McRAE.

[Continued.]

A. I know nothing of what happened to them.

Q. You ordered notices issued by you under Martial Law to be posted on certain houses. In paragraph 59 you refer to this. Who made a selection of the houses on which these notices were to be posted?

A. Either the S. D. O. or the police.

Q. The police made a selection?

A. I think so.

Q. You say here, Colonel, that these notices were to be posted on the houses of well known agitators? What do you mean by agitators?

A. What is put there. You will find the meaning of the word in the dictionary.

Q. Surely you can answer that question without referring me to a dictionary. You say in your report that the notices were to be posted on the houses of well-known agitators, and you have said that a selection was made by the police. I want to know when you used the word "agitator" whom you meant?

A. I left that to the police to select.

Q. That is not answering my question?

A. I cannot answer that question.

Q. When you frame a report you know what you mean by it?

A. I know: it is there before you.

Q. What do you mean by agitators—whom do you indicate by that?

A. I think it is good English.

Q. I never suggested it was bad English. I want to know what class of persons you meant to refer to thereby?

A. These were the orders I gave to the police and they carried them out.

Q. Surely you understand my question and I think you can answer me?

A. I do not want to answer it otherwise than by what I have said there.

Q. What class of people do you refer to when you use the word agitators? Surely you know who you meant to denote.

A. I think it is pretty clear there.

*By the President—*

Q. Have you any idea what you mean by agitators. People have different ideas when they use certain words. What did you have in your mind when you used that word?

A. A man who agitates against Government.

*By Sir C. H. Selvad—*

Q. I want to understand what you mean by agitating against Government?

A. Anyone who by expression or otherwise speaks against a Government measure.

Q. That is an agitator?

A. Yes.

Q. You gave direction to the police that all persons in Kasur who to their knowledge had expressed themselves against any Government measure should be the persons selected?

A. I do not say all. Some of them. I ordered that these notices wherever possible should be posted on the houses of well known agitators.

Q. Did you explain to them what you meant by agitators as you explained to us now—that people who had expressed themselves against any Government measure?

A. I gave orders then as I have told you now. I gave orders that they should post these notices on the houses where there were such persons.

Q. Did you describe the class of persons you meant?

A. I merely used the word agitators.

Q. To whom did you give these orders?

A. Either to Mr. Marsden or the Superintendent of Police.

Q. You also included what you call malcontents. What class do you mean to designate by malcontents? A man who is known to express dissatisfaction with the Government or any Government measure?

A. The same thing as far as I am concerned.

Q. Being against a government measure is the same thing as being against Government in your view?

A. Yes.

Q. Were the houses of all lawyers in Kasur selected for posting these notices?

A. I do not know. I did not post them. I gave the order; it was sufficient for me to see it was carried out.

Q. You say in the same paragraph "as a deterrent, orders were issued that reprisals would be taken against the property of the person on whose walls or gate posts any proclamation had been defaced." Was that order in writing?

A. I rather think it is one of the Martial Law orders.

Q. Will you refer me to it, please?

A. Quite likely not. Any way it is my order. What does it matter whether it was in writing or not?

Q. Surely you can answer my question without adopting this attitude? I want to know whether this order was in writing or oral? You can certainly answer that question?

A. It was certainly an order. I do not remember whether it was in writing.

Q. Why did not you then say you did not know or you did not remember?

A. You seem to forget that it is eight months ago.

Q. You could easily have said "I forget" or "I do not remember"; that would be a perfectly good answer instead of saying what does it matter whether it is in writing or oral. Surely that is not the attitude which you should adopt towards the committee or any member of the committee. You do not remember whether the order was in writing or orally?

(*Mr. Justice Rankin*:—See Martial Order No. 3.\*)

Q. "Failure to ensure the proper protection and continued exhibition of my orders will result in severe punishment." Is that the order you mean?

A. That is right.

Q. That is a bit different from what you say in paragraph 59—"Will result in severe punishment" but the punishment is not stated in Order No. 3?

A. Yes; there is a slight difference but the meaning is the same.

Q. What was to be done with that man's property? What was your actual order? When you gave that order about reprisals being taken did you indicate what would be done to that man's property?

A. It would come up for orders under Martial Law.

Q. You did not indicate what the reprisals would be?

A. It would depend on the damage done.

Q. That punishment regarding his property was to follow even though the notice may have been defaced by somebody else?

A. Quite so.

Q. You thought that was a reasonable order to make?

A. I did.

Q. Do you still think so?

A. Yes.

Q. Then on the 18th some school boys were flogged and you gave directions that the biggest six boys were to be selected for that purpose?

A. I said generally speaking take the six biggest. The misfortune was that they happened to be big.

Q. It was irrespective of whether they were innocent or guilty; because they were big they had to suffer?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think that is a reasonable thing to do?

A. Yes, I think so under certain conditions.

Q. It is a mere accident that a boy is big, should that invite punishment on him?

A. It was his misfortune.

Q. His misfortune was that he was big?

A. Yes.

Q. Now with regard to the parading of the inhabitants of Kasur for identification—that took place on several occasions?

A. Yes.

Q. On one occasion the whole town was drawn up?

A. Yes.

Q. I mean the whole male population?

4 December 1919.]

Lt.-Col. H. St. G. M. McRae

[Continued.]

- A. Yes.
- Q. For the purpose of identification they were kept out for six hours?
- A. A considerable time. It was unfortunate, it could not be helped.
- Q. Did the parading of the people result in anything?
- A. Yes. Several arrests were made.
- Q. There; on the spot?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Then in paragraph 71 you speak of prisoners having been despatched to Lahore handcuffed and roped together?
- A. Yes.
- Q. These were people who were under trial? They were not brought to trial?
- A. I really do not know. They were sent to Lahore by the police.
- Q. This was after you assumed charge as Martial Law Administrator and when you were really responsible for the whole administration. These people were sent handcuffed and roped together for their trial?
- A. I do not know whether they were going up for trial or not.
- Q. Do you think that was a right thing to do?
- A. They were dangerous prisoners. I considered everybody was a dangerous prisoner. They had been arrested for dangerous assaults.
- Q. A good number of them were ultimately released without any trial at all. Was it a reasonable thing to do to send people handcuffed and roped together when ultimately they were not brought to trial?
- A. I could not afford to take risks.
- Q. You thought that was a reasonable thing to do?
- A. Certainly.
- Q. Then on the 22nd April you searched the houses of eight pleaders? Why were these houses searched?
- A. At the request of the Deputy Superintendent of Police.
- Q. On his suggestion?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Was anything found at these searches?
- A. Certain documents were found.
- Q. Were they documents of an incriminating nature?
- A. I do not know at all. They were taken over by the police.
- Q. What happened to these eight pleaders?
- A. I do not know.
- Q. Surely you sanctioned the search of these houses and you must have acquainted yourself with the result of the search?
- A. No. I think the matter was still pending when I left. Some of the cases went on for some time.
- Q. You did not care to see what documents were found?
- A. I should not have known what was in them.
- Q. You know the circumstances under which gallows were erected at Kasur somewhere near the station. When were they erected?
- A. Look at my paragraph 80.
- Q. They were erected soon after....
- A. On the 3rd of May.
- Q. How long did they remain there?
- A. They were actually taken down on the 8th.
- Q. Under whose orders were these gallows erected?
- A. The Commissioner of Lahore.
- Q. He was the civil authority and you had the command after Martial Law was declared and as you were Martial Law Administrator, what authority had the Commissioner in Kasur?
- A. He was still Commissioner of Lahore.
- Q. And you thought that he could still give directions as to what was to be done in an area under your military charge?
- A. Certainly, provided I had no objection to it from a military point of view.
- Q. Did he consult you?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Was there any correspondence between you and the Commissioner?
- A. I had a written order to erect them.
- Q. You have told us that he consulted you. Were you consulted at all by the Commissioner whether these gallows should or should not be erected at Kasur?
- A. No.
- Q. He never consulted you about that?
- A. No. He consulted me as to the place.
- Q. And you selected the place?
- A. We did it together.
- Q. Did the Commissioner come down to Kasur?
- A. Yes.
- Q. When he came down to Kasur he must have had a talk to you about his intentions about the erection of the gallows?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Was that Mr. Kitchin?
- A. It was.
- Q. Did he indicate to you why he wanted the gallows to be so erected at Kasur?
- A. No.
- Q. Did you ask him why it was considered necessary?
- A. It had nothing to do with me. I had to give my orders.
- Q. You were not under the orders of Mr. Kitchin at all so far as....
- Witness. I think, Your Lordship, that this is outside the point.
- Q. Did you consider yourself to be under the Commissioner?
- A. No.
- Q. You were not bound to take orders from him?
- A. No; not bound to.
- Q. When the Commissioner came there did you ask him when he mentioned the proposal about erecting gallows why it was considered necessary to do it?
- A. No.
- Q. Did you gather what the idea underlying it was?
- A. Certainly.
- Q. Will you tell me?
- A. To hang the men convicted at Kasur.
- Q. Why erect gallows in a prominent place near the station and keep gallows there for some length of time? You say the people had not been convicted then?
- A. I do not know. That had nothing to do with me.
- Q. Surely you knew this fact that when the gallows were erected the people who had been charged with murder had not been convicted?
- A. Yes, they had been convicted.
- Q. What is the idea in having it in a public place and not in jail as ordinarily?
- A. It is usual under Martial Law for such things to happen.
- Q. It was really your suggestion that it should be done in a public place?
- A. As a matter of fact it was put to me by the Commissioner and I agreed.
- Q. Was the idea that the gallows should be kept for some days in order to strike terror in the public mind?
- A. No; it was not. The idea originally was to erect the gallows and as soon as they were ready to carry out the executions.
- Q. But orders for the execution were not received for some time?
- A. They were received.
- Q. These gallows were ultimately dismantled?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Under orders from Government?
- A. From Lahore.
- Q. Did the Punjab Government make the order?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did they have any correspondence with you in the matter?
- A. No.
- Q. Did they give an expression of opinion as to the erection of the gallows?
- A. No. As a matter of fact the Punjab Government really did the whole thing themselves. I was only consulted as to the place. The Punjab Government sent down their own mechanic or artisan.

4 December 1919.]

Lt.-Col. H. St. G. M. McRAE.

[Continued.]

Q. So the initial orders to erect the gallows were passed by the Punjab Government ?

A. Yes.

Q. The Commissioner was merely the mouth-piece of the Punjab Government ?

A. Yes.

Q. Though you were Administrator of Martial Law yet the Punjab Government still exercised authority in the Kasur area ?

A. Yes.

Q. So did the Commissioner ?

A. Yes.

Q. And the police under your general control were carrying out their ordinary duties ?

A. Yes.

Q. So were the magistrates in Kasur ?

A. That I do not know.

Q. And the other courts ?

A. I have no personal knowledge.

Q. How long after you assumed charge did Kasur return to normal conditions ?

A. About the end of the month.

Q. By that time everything was quiet ?

A. Yes.

Q. And the behaviour of the people had altered ?

A. Yes.

Q. You had no fault to find after that ?

A. No.

Q. Kindly refer to your paragraph 102 on page 18 where you say "the inhabitants of Kasur were thoroughly cowed by Martial Law and overawed by the military." What does that imply ?

A. When I took over the administration of Kasur on the 12th the people were sullen. There was very little in the way of business going on in the town. There were large numbers of men about and they were certainly unemployed. They used to stand about in little groups of three and four. Their appearance was very sullen on all occasions. When I happened to go through the town after Martial Law had been exercised for about fourteen days the state of the town may be said to be more or less normal and I put that down to the effect of Martial Law.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—*

Q. From the 12th up to the 15th, I gather from your report, the civil authorities at Kasur did not act up to your suggestions ?

A. That is so.

Q. I think any investigation that was carried on with regard to the happenings at this station was done on the evening of the 15th ?

A. That is so.

Q. Between the 12th and the 15th you did not examine any witnesses or was any statement of any witness placed before you ?

A. Not before me.

Q. Therefore whatever you have stated in your report as to what happened on the 12th is practically based upon what you subsequently learnt from Mr. Marsden and the civil authorities ?

A. That is so.

Q. You gathered that information from Mr. Marsden and the civil authorities after they had held their investigation ?

A. Yes.

Q. Between these dates Major Nicolas also arrived at Kasur ?

A. Yes.

Q. You also made certain suggestions to him ?

A. Yes.

Q. He also did not accept them ?

A. Yes.

Q. Kindly see paragraph 17. You were informed by the civil authorities that two warrant officers refused to get out of the train and refused the appeals of the two non-commissioned officers to assist them to save the Sherbournes. That was your information ?

A. Yes.

Q. Who is responsible for the War Diary\* at Kasur from the 12th ? Who supplied the information ?

A. That was information collected from the files.

Q. You have got a War Diary where you mention what happened at Kasur ?

A. My Staff Officer wrote up a diary day by day.

Q. On the 13th April it is stated in the War Diary at page 2, "early in the morning Mr. Mitter, S.D.O., stated that no further trouble was expected here but possibly in Amritsar," that was his opinion ?

A. Yes.

Q. Paragraph 17 of your statement. When you say that "apparently the warrant officers lost their heads, fired off their revolvers over the heads of the crowds".... That is practically what you gathered from the information given to you by the civil authorities ?

A. Yes.

Q. And therefore should there be any difference between this version and the version given to this Committee by the civil authorities, perhaps their statement would be more correct ?

A. Quite likely.

Q. Now you will find that so far as any danger to the lives of Christian ladies or European ladies was concerned, in your opinion that was over by the 22nd April ?

A. Yes.

Q. Now about the cage, I want to know the dimensions of the cage, how many yards long was it ?

A. You went to Kasur and saw it, did you not ?

Q. No, I have never in my life seen Kasur.

A. The enclosure, I should say, was not as big as this room, but very near it.

Q. Were there any latrine arrangements inside ?

A. Yes, there were arrangements inside.

Q. According to you there may be at one time 150 prisoners ?

A. Very likely.

Q. With regard to the identification parade that was held, all the witnesses were at one place, and then they were allowed to pass 11 or 12 times according to the number ?

A. All the witnesses were together.

Q. Practically up to the 15th till the arrival of Mr. Marsden you did nothing except on one or two occasions to help the police in arresting and searching houses ?

A. That is all.

Q. I gather from your report that on the 12th with Major Nicolas at about 4 o'clock you went inside the city ?

A. Yes.

Q. And then you came back and stopped at the station ?

A. That is so.

Q. And you describe there that the people appeared to be sullen as if they were afraid of reprisals ?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 13th when you had a visit from Mr. Mitter you had not gone to the city ?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore on the morning of the 13th, except what you had seen of the city on the 12th when you were driving in a motor car you had no knowledge of what was going on inside the city and what was the mood of the inhabitants there. On the 12th you went only for an hour and a half inside the city. Then you came back, and then up to the morning of the 13th you had no talk with Mr. Mitter and you knew nothing except what you saw on the evening of the 12th ?

A. The station is right on the top of the city. It looks up to the main street. You could see a good deal of the city. I did not go outside before Mr. Mitter came up.

Q. During the time of Martial Law a large number of municipal commissioners were ordered to attend daily at the railway station ?

A. Yes, I think so.

4 December 1919.]

Lt.-Col. H. St. G. M. McRAE.

[Continued.]

Q. And it was they who were made responsible for informing the people of the different orders that were passed by you?

A. I cannot say whether they were all municipal commissioners or not. Certain of them were.

Q. Please see page 8, line 2, you say "practically all were municipal commissioners." They may not be municipal commissioners, there was at least one person from each ward?

A. That is right.

Q. About the arrest of certain railway officials, you describe it in paragraph 81: "On the afternoon of the 28th April information having been received that the Kasur railway staff, practically all of whom were implicated in the riots and against whom there was but useful evidence on hand, were about to hold a secret meeting that evening to decide their policy. The house was surrounded and entered by the military. Nine persons were arrested. The police eventually obtained some useful evidence from these persons"?

A. Yes.

Q. Up to that time I believe these people were not prepared to give any useful evidence?

A. I don't know anything about it. I did not have anything to do with it.

Q. You obtained useful evidence?

A. I was told that there was evidence afterwards.

Q. Did you agree to any order being passed that no persons should buy more than a certain quantity of grain?

A. The order I gave is in the proclamations.

Q. It does not find a place in the proclamations but it appears to me that Captain Doveton has made that statement?

A. My order is in the proclamations.

Q. At paragraph 88, I want to know whether you were consulted about it or whether any steps were taken to return the food-stuffs bought from the retail dealers. Was there any oral order passed to that effect?

A. That I don't remember.

Q. Were you at Kasur at the time when the reprisals were taken against those 6 persons who had not returned within the prescribed period?

A. Yes.

Q. I only want to know whether you acted entirely upon the information supplied to you by the police or you yourself made any investigation?

A. It is not for me to make investigations.

Q. Certain information was supplied to you by the police?

A. Yes, they brought these persons to Captain Doveton.

Q. How did you satisfy yourself that these persons were informed of your Martial Law proclamations that they should return within the prescribed time for the purpose of identification or that they received your communications?

A. That is really a point for the Administrator of Martial Law. I told Captain Doveton to give them another two or three days which he acted upon. They were always given two or three days.

Q. Now you have used the word "hostages." I want to make myself clear. What do you mean by "hostages." You mean some officers go to a village and bring about 8 or 10 respectable persons under arrest in order that the rest of the inhabitants may be of good behaviour and may be prepared to supply sufficient evidence for the arrest of the concerned persons?

A. Yes.

Q. The word "hostages" does not mean those persons who were actually concerned in the riot?

A. No.

Q. Appendix I. Actually the names of 74 persons were given by the police for the purpose of being arrested to different officers, but the actual number of persons arrested was 155?

A. Yes.

Q. That is the names of the remainder were not given by the party?

A. Not when the parties went out.

Q. Please see Appendix III-R. You find in the statement of Private Nathan:—"A man came down the road soon after the search party had gone into the village and was challenged by the sentry on my right. When challenged he hid behind a wall. The sentry shouted out 'Idhar so.' On this the man moved behind a bush or some rubbish near by and hid behind it. The sentry advanced towards him and made signs to him to go round the village to where the prisoners were being collected. He did not appear to understand and when threatened with the bayonet he grasped the sentry's rifle and tried to pull it out of his hand. Suddenly he let go and bolted away from the village towards a haystack. The sentry endeavoured to catch him when he had gone about 20 yards. The man reached the haystack and stopped by the side of it; I then placed a round in the breech and fired at him. The bullet hit him in the body and he dropped."

A. Yes.

Q. And further you will find in Appendix III-B., the man had a bayonet wound in the chest?

A. Yes.

Q. Would you please see page 6 of the diary? Now on the 21st April it appears that information was given to you that about 12 villages were in a seditious state round about?

A. Yes.

Q. Page 7. The result of the search of these pleaders was that important conspiracy documents were seized? Practically you did not care to go through them? Probably they were not ready but you were informed by the police?

A. I think that is probably a wild statement of the young officer who wrote that report. At the time he wrote it they were not even translated.

Q. It would clear the question that was put to you by Sir Chimanlal Setalvad. It appears to me by the word 'agitator' you mean 'suspected disloyal subject.' At page 7, you say that Lieut.-Col. Money made a tour of the town and saw the proclamation was fixed to the houses of suspected disloyal subjects?

A. Yes.

Q. Page 8 of the diary. It appears to me that one of the informers who were giving you information about suspected persons was ultimately found to be demented?

A. Yes.

*By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmed Khan—*

Q. Excepting those two officers who fired revolvers at the crowd, no one else was hurt by the crowd?

A. No one else was armed. I was not present. That is what I heard.

Q. Those officers who were hurt, they were not armed?

A. Only the warrant officers were armed.

Q. You mean the two warrant officers who were killed?

A. Yes.

Q. When you arrived at Kasur in what condition did you find the railway station? Was it all destroyed or only a portion of it, because you say "having destroyed the railway station." So far as our information goes, it was only a part of the lamp room which was burnt by fire?

A. Would you look at document 19? Would you look at my original telegram?

Q. You wrote this report; this cannot be hearsay.

A. It is in Appendix II,\* it is in the Blue Book, Military Reports, Disturbances at Kasur. That is the answer to your question.

Q. You did come to Kasur on the afternoon of the 12th?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you inspect the railway station?

A. You get my answer there.

Q. Now in paragraph 8 of your statement, you say that "having destroyed the station. . . ." From this the impression produced is that the whole railway station was destroyed, but it was only a part of the lamp room

4 December 1919.]

Lt.-Col. H. St. G. M. McRAE—concluded—LALA MOHAN LAL SETH.

which was burnt. I want you to make it clear whether the whole station was destroyed or only a part?

A. Yes, I detail it there.

Q. That is your meaning?

A. Yes.

Q. Don't you think it could also be taken to mean that the whole station was destroyed? I simply ask your opinion about it.

A. I would say it is very difficult to destroy a station in the sense in which you take it, unless you level the whole buildings to the ground and tear up the buildings. I give my report\* in Appendix II.

Q. That is what I wanted to know. Well, now, you stated in answer to a question that certain people were arrested and kept in the lock-up because you could not take risks?

A. Yes.

Q. May I take it that you came to Kasur with the idea that the place was full of dangerous characters who required to be promptly dealt with?

A. Yes.

Q. How did you get that idea? What made you think so?

A. It was the orders that I received. I was told that the station of Kasur and Gandasinghwa had been wrecked by the mob and looted and the fate of the mail trains was uncertain. I was also told that two British warrant officers had been murdered.

Q. When you arrived at Kasur, did you enquire about the fate of those mail trains?

A. Certainly, that was the first thing I did. In fact that was one of the first things I was sent to do.

Q. You came to know that the trains were all right?

A. They were not. The Amritsar train had been looted, and the train from Ferozepore had been attacked by the mob and some people were murdered and maltreated in one of the trains.

\* Vide Annexure.

Q. Except in that one train nothing occurred?

A. That is so.

Q. Only one train was affected, and not the other two?

A. Two trains were affected. The Amritsar train was looted. There are three trains coming in there. The Amritsar train which comes in there had been looted, the Ferozepore train was also looted, but the Lahore train had managed to get back.

Q. I understood there was only one train which was looted?

A. No, I think you will find that two trains were looted.

Q. Had you ever before any experience of the administration of Martial Law?

A. I am glad to say I have never had and I hope I will never use it again.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. It was stated by a witness yesterday before this Committee that a party of British soldiers with two British officers had gone to a village called Pat o Kohra and had willingly done destruction to property. I want to show that this is a mistake. It was said by him that there were two British officers and the younger of the two had instigated the other British soldiers to do what they did. Will you kindly see your War Diary. I see that no British troops went in that expedition?

A. That is so.

Q. Who actually did accompany it?

A. As laid down in it, Mr. Marsden was there; I do not know what British officers went with that detachment.

Q. So far as this village is concerned, there were no British soldiers who went there?

A. No.

Q. Appendix No. I of your present statement shows that there was only one Officer Commanding. At any rate it shows that there were no British soldiers?

A. No, all were Indian troops.

## ANNEXURE.

### APPENDIX II.

Copy of report from Lieutenant-Colonel McRae, 2-15th Sikhs, Commanding Forces at Kasur, dated 12th April 1919.

15-20, 12th April 1919. Train arrived at Kasur at 3 P.M. without opposition. Station buildings, windows, furniture and signal instruments destroyed. Chains connecting signal broken lamp room burnt. Rioters about 1,000 of all castes, Muhamdians, Hindus and low castes. No visible organisation, leaders not known. Men from Amritsar known to be amongst rioters. Lieutenant-Colonel Atkins arrived at 2-45 P.M. with 4 cars. Mrs. Sherbourn and three children and all mission safe at their house Khan Sahib Ahmed Khan, Deputy Superintendent of Police, near mission. Telegraphic communication opened to Raewind. One Conductor, A. O. C. killed by mob now at Railway Station. Lance-Corporal Battson, 1-4th Queen's, wounded on head in Kasur civil dispensary. Name unknown no identification marks. Train from Lahore has returned. One European not identified passenger from Ferozepore wounded was sent on to Lahore. After destroying Railway Station the mob moved on to Post Office and set it on fire after looting and to the Treasury where the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Tahsildar, Sub-Divisional Officer and other officials were collected and fire was opened on the mob who were about to burn the gate and loot the Sub-Treasury Munsif Court was burnt. At 1-30 P.M. the mob dispersed leaving two dead and six wounded. The mob disappeared. City now quiet. Guards placed on Mission Treasury, Deputy Superintendent of Police's house and Police Station and Courts. Armoured cars now proceeding to patrol the City. Further action depends on their report. Keeping train with troops in station. Lance-Corporal Doveton now reported having skull fractured by car to Kaiser-i-Hind Bridge signed by Lieutenant-Colonel McRae at 3-30 P.M. Since 3-4 one aeroplane arrived over the City, Major Nicolas Judge arrived and two more cars.

LALA MOHAN LAL SETH, Vakil, High Court, Punjab, and Municipal Commissioner, Kasur.

By the President—

Q. Are you a High Court Vakil and municipal commissioner at Kasur?

A. Yes; I am a municipal commissioner and High Court Pleader.

Q. I think you have expressed the desire to give evidence before us in connection with these disorders?

A. Yes; as a Government municipal commissioner for the last 12 years, Mr. Marsden talked to me about it and said "the committee is coming here; you might give some evidence." I told him that I had seen such and such things and could give my opinion about certain things that I have heard and believed. So he said I might put in my statement. I gave the statement to

4 December 1919.]

LALA MORAN LAL SETHI.

(Continued.)

him, and perhaps he has sent that to you, and you have kindly asked me to give evidence.

Q. Just give me your view generally as to what were the causes of unrest in Kasur prior to the outbreak.

A. As I have said one was these high prices with no prospect of their going down. The war has been on for so long, 4 years, and so people were really tired, and they wished Government to take some action and control the situation. That is one thing which really upset the people.

Q. You think that is a very prominent factor in the situation?

A. Yes; when people become poor and have suffering, they make demands, just as we think that our King should look to all these things, and expect that the King should interfere and solve economic difficulties.

Q. Well, you suggest in your statement that the war loan had something to do with the unrest.

A. My Lord, there was collection of war loan in small sums of Rs. 10 through post office. People had to take scrips. Officers, tahsildars, and naib-tahsildars go to shops and beg people for Rs. 10.

Q. I cannot really quite understand you because that was very commonly done in England and Scotland. People paid small sums in the way of contributions to the war loan and they were entitled to get back the money subscribed after a time?

A. It is all right if people voluntarily give it and in the case of people who can afford it. Suppose a peon or a clerk with a family of 4 or 5 people who gets only Rs. 20 is asked to pay Rs. 10 or Rs. 20, he feels it.

Q. Everyone usually who is asked to subscribe wants to avoid it as far as he can. Do you know any cases in your own personal knowledge of undue pressure being brought to bear upon any individual to make him subscribe?

A. So far, I cannot give you any instance. Shopkeepers will probably tell you that, because the complaint is general. In war loan meetings, the officer will propose Rs. 200 and the man will begin with Rs. 10 or Rs. 20. It looks odd. Really that is the way in which pressure is put upon people.

Q. I really want to know what is within your own knowledge on a matter of this sort. Similarly you suggest that recruiting methods had something to do with it. So far as the town of Kasur was concerned, did people recruit there at all or to any extent?

A. Recruiting was done in Kasur. There were two or three agencies. There were other people who voluntarily helped Government. There were so many recruiting agencies.

Q. What is the population of Kasur?

A. According to the last census the population was about 24,000, and I think now-a-days it is about 27,000.

Q. How many recruits did Kasur provide for the army?

A. It must have provided something like 400 to 500.

Q. I mean the city proper.

A. I am talking of Kasur town. It supplied about 400 to 500 men.

Q. Are you sure about these figures?

A. One gentleman from Kasur, Guranditta Mall, I think, provided about 150 and another gentleman, Sher Nawab, who is an honorary magistrate, provided about 20 or more.

Q. Do you mean to say they were instrumental in getting these people? Did they belong to Kasur itself? They got 150 from Kasur, that is what you said. Where did they get them from?

A. Some from Kasur, and some from their village, which is about 4 miles from Kasur. So practically everybody came from Kasur.

Q. Were these gentlemen anxious to do their best in the way of assisting Government in the war crisis?

A. Yes, they were; they did actually help.

Q. Do you make any complaint about this getting men and the way they got them?

A. There was no trouble about that. I refer to certain cases. Lots of people from Raja Jang were brought by

a magistrate in Kasur. About 30 or 40 families were following and weeping. Then they were taken almost in custody to Lahore and Mr. Tollinton, the Deputy Commissioner, let them go.

Q. What do you mean by saying that they were brought in custody?

A. They were not allowed to go.

Q. Did they desire to be soldiers first and afterwards did not like to be so?

A. No. The case of Raja Jang is not within my direct knowledge, but I have heard they were asked to come, and some said that they would come. Others joined with their brothers only to accompany them up to Kasur.

Q. There is no specific ground of complaint if the moment it was clear that these men desired not to be soldiers the Deputy Commissioner let them go. They were under no compulsion. Is that really a serious ground of complaint?

A. They just related the whole thing to the Deputy Commissioner. They said that they were not willing, and that they had been forced. That was the reason why they were let off.

Q. There can be no ground of complaint, because the men were let go as soon as it was found that they were not willing?

A. But the fact remains that there were people who thought that this thing was objectionable.

Q. It appears that some people in connection with recruiting were over-zealous. As soon as the matter came before the higher official, it was put right?

A. Therefore I say it was a case of overdoing it.

Q. Again so far as this is concerned, have you any cases within your own knowledge? I understand that you heard these from somebody?

A. I am a pleader for the last 25 years. In this war recruiting there were cases under section 107, what they call security to keep the peace. Some cases were brought. There were other cases under section 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Those people were brought in and then as they agreed to be recruited they were let off. That is of course within my own knowledge. There was another case. A receiver was appointed by the District Judge and some rioters assaulted that receiver. There were some seven or eight people who assaulted him seriously. He was a respectable man. Some two or three of them suggested that they should agree to be recruited and then all the offenders were let off.

Q. Do you make that a serious ground of complaint? I think that happened in many places as well as here.

A. Those who have been aggrieved feel that this ought not to have been done.

Q. Why should they have a grievance if they were not tried and let off upon the footing that they became soldiers?

A. Not only those that were recruited, but others also were let off.

Q. You do not suggest there are any cases within your knowledge where a man was forced into the army against his will?

A. Not within my knowledge.

Q. Do you suggest any other causes of unrest?

A. I have suggested that where there is a sympathetic officer, who takes people into his confidence, people are all right. When there is a good Deputy Commissioner and a good Sub-Divisional Officer, people are all right. If, on the other hand, there is an officer who is annoying people unnecessarily, people become upset. With due deference, I may state that the régime of our late Lieutenant-Governor here was rather annoying in various ways to the leaders and others. That too of course caused a sort of irritation.

Q. That is unsympathetic attitude towards political agitation. Is that correct according to your view?

A. Towards legitimate political agitation.

Q. I put it to you that it refers to all agitation. There are some people here just as in England and Scotland who do not like any sort of political agitation. I am merely asking your view on this point whether there



4 December 1919.]

LALA MOHAN LAL SETH.

[Continued.]

was an unsympathetic attitude shown by the Government towards political agitation generally?

A. Generally the policy of the Government is all right. But when it comes to practice by some officers, then the thing becomes worse.

Q. So far as this is concerned, that would cause antagonism among the leaders, but I do not know if the general public will mind it at all?

A. Now-a-days it is the time of newspapers and presses and talk. Things go round in that way. A thing is talked about in the Legislative Council, just as the Rowlatt Act was. All the non-officials joined together and we thought this was very fortunate as regards the Hindu-Muhammadan union; but yet there was no result.

Q. I suppose you will agree that although newspapers are very useful, they sometimes confound. You will admit that while newspapers may be very useful, they are often very misleading?

A. There are two sides to a good thing. In that way we might put it. A good law punishes perjury. Of course people who are in the habit of telling lies will feel that the law is a bad thing for them. So one of course may take another view.

Q. About the Rowlatt Act, I suppose you have an intimate knowledge of the Act itself?

A. The Act is not yet ripe for our usual practice. I have read it cursorily once or twice in these days, but we do not exactly know everything about it until we have to use it.

Q. You are not afraid of my subjecting you to cross-examination?

A. No, My Lord.

Q. Do you know that among the people there were numbers of rumours as to what was going to be the effect of this Act?

A. Yes; people said that there is no appeal under it, there is no reason for it and there is no pleader allowed under it. That is true in some cases. In part II, we have no pleader. Sometimes even the accused are not allowed to appear. There were such talks and sayings. All were talking about them. The masses do not really go into details and see things for themselves. They just take some big things (*mota* things) and then they form their opinion. They do not go into the minutest details.

Q. Is it not within your knowledge that they formed a very considerable number of very wrong opinions about the Act? You may be quite entitled to disapprove of the Act if you like, and your own view may be against the Act. They said that the Act was very bad and they mentioned many things which the Act in reality was not going to deal with?

A. I think those people who, it is said, entertained wrong ideas about that Rowlatt Act had no clear ideas. The only thing they learnt was that it was opposed by all the non-officials and therefore they should not agree to it.

Q. Once they learnt that it was opposed by the non-officials, they very soon imagined that there was very good cause for its being opposed.

A. They cannot give you any reasons. If you ask an illiterate man, he will not give you any reasons. They would say some such things about which I have given you an idea. They would say that this Act does not allow us to have pleaders. Therefore we should not have that.

Q. Were all these the disturbing causes? A further disturbing cause among the people was the arrest or turning back of Mr. Gandhi on his way to Delhi?

A. All things combined. This was the last straw on the camel's back, as they say.

Q. I think you expressed the view that until the 10th or 12th of April Kasur had not been a politically-minded community at all?

A. My home is in Lahore; I have been in Kasur for the last 25 years, and up to this time, I have never seen any political meeting and no leader has ever kindly gone there and given us the advantage of his views.

Q. You just let the Government carry on without criticism?

A. Criticism is always healthy if it is *bonâ fide*. We should not grudge criticism if it is well meant.

Q. I was merely putting it from your point of view. Kasur was not a political centre. You had no political meetings where the action of Government was criticised?

A. There is not much education in that town. The literacy of the people according to the last census was very small, and I should not wonder if graduates from that place are not more than 20 at the outside. As there is not much education, there could be no political education. There is no political society there and there is no platform there.

Q. Is there much crime in Kasur?

A. Yes, there is a good deal of murders, etc. We get cases of robbery. The low class people joined the riots there. That is a matter of daily occurrence. Some Jats joined in the riot. They thought they could take some loot, etc., in the ordinary way along with their brothers and others. There was no special reason.

Q. Having been asked generally as to your views about the situation, what do you say was the immediate causes of the outburst that took place at Kasur?

A. There was no inducement offered. As I said the ball was set rolling in a way. Boys from school went round, just having a demonstration against the Rowlatt Act, and they came to the railway station.

Q. Was that the liberty funeral demonstration?

A. I heard they had a *charpoy* with them and they said that was the Rowlatt Act being carried on their shoulders with a black cloth over it. They were coming to the station. Had there been one single police constable staying at the gate at that time, who had not allowed those boys to go to the platform, they would have returned to their homes. They were only schoolboys and they would have returned had they been checked. There was one police constable. I was the first man to point out to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Mr. Marsden, that there was a police constable and he noted his name.

Q. Surely, in addition to the boys, there were a lot of men who were in an excited state?

A. Wherever there is a *tamasha*, a good number of people join. Whenever there is a gathering of boys, everybody wants to see that *tamasha*, and so those people joined. And then those *badmashes*, butchers, sweepers and people from the village of Bamini, and from different villages of Manjha and people from villages of bad character also joined. Those places are not very far from Kasur. They could come in half an hour. They thought there was a good occasion for joining that they might get something in the looting.

Q. How did the *badmashes* know that there was a golden opportunity? The procession started only in the morning.

A. There was a *hartal* the previous evening.

Q. They must have thought it was worth while to join, and they might get something. Their intention must have been to loot the station?

A. Those people who joined may have had that idea. But the boys had no such idea.

Q. Have you any doubt that in that crowd, there must have been many who were bent upon destruction of property when they started from the city?

A. When they started from the city, my idea is that it was an ordinary demonstration. The boys only wanted to make a show of "Rowlatt Act Hai Hai" and nothing else.

Q. You know that they did a great deal of damage at the station?

A. Yes; I saw it afterwards. When I reached there, I saw that the lamp room was burnt. At that time some pleaders were helping to quench the fire. They damaged some flower pots and glass panes. Your Lordship has seen those places.

Q. You also know that they made a very murderous and determined attack upon all Europeans in the train coming from Ferozepore.

A. That I have heard.

4 December 1919.]

LALA MOHAN LAL SETH.

[Continued.]

Q. How do you account for that ?

A. Of course I have no direct knowledge ; but I heard they were making a show. And wherever they saw Europeans they began to say ' hai hai ' in their presence ; those people were offended ; those people had pistols and they wanted to show them.

Q. Apart from the possibility of their showing pistols at all, the evidence we have got is to the effect that this crowd went deliberately up to this train and attempted to get hold of all the Europeans in it. How do you account for that ?

A. Not having direct knowledge, I cannot give you any opinion upon it.

Q. In fact, when some *badmashes* or some people at all events make attacks upon Europeans, were they not bent upon attacking Government and attacking the European population ? Is that not a reasonable inference to draw from the conduct of the mob in attacking the train in the way in which they did ?

A. The trains in Kasur reaching from any side all stop at the distant signals, on the three sides, from Lahore, Ferozapore and so on. There is no interlocking arrangement. Every train stops there. It seems to me that this crowd went there and seeing the Europeans, they showed that demonstration only to the Europeans. They did not show it to the Indians. They wanted to show that demonstration and shout *hai hai*. They perhaps got offended and therefore they insulted them.

Q. You are suggesting all that. It seems to me a difficult suggestion to accept. I want to see if there are any real grounds for making it.

A. I cannot give you any specific reason. This is my idea ; they must have been showing this to the Europeans only and therefore the thing commenced.

Q. How can you account for the mob making an attack not merely on the warrant officers who had got pistols, but also upon a woman and three young children ?

A. I think these were *badmashes*.

Q. The *badmashes* wanted to loot ?

A. There was one man who wanted to outrage the modesty of a woman. He was identified and was convicted. Such people seize such opportunities ; not that they have any idea. Just according to their evil propensities they go on.

Q. There is another point. The mob apparently were not satisfied with what they did at the station ; they made further destruction on other sides ?

A. Because by that time the *badmashes* joined them and seem to have said ' let us go to the treasury.'

Q. I think you yourself told us ' the mob.' You did not see the mob ?

A. I did not go there.

Q. In your statement you say that it was well that the police fired ?

A. After going and seeing the spot myself, the burning of the court, the shed of the petition-writers, the burning of the Tahsil, I formed that opinion. They had already done some mischief. I think they were justified in firing. If a robber comes to my house and does mischief, I shoot him if I can.

Q. Your view is that the educated people of Kasur had nothing to do with this ?

A. No.

Q. You say two pleaders Abdul Qadir and Mohi-ud-din did their best to quell the disturbances ?

A. Yes ; they got a reward.

Q. They were kept in imprisonment for certain time ?

A. I saw them being taken handcuffed, like ordinary criminals. I saw them in the Police *havalat*.

Q. On an occasion like that, mistakes can quite well be made ?

A. I learnt it from Abdul Qadir himself. He is an old man and cannot walk. They gave him a push with a bayonet and he was forced to walk quickly.

Q. In connection with a rising of that sort you admit, that if it occurred along with a number of other risings in the neighbourhood, it was natural enough that serious steps should be taken to prevent the recurrence of it ?

A. I think the authorities were really mistaken in thinking there was a general rising of the town ; after 2 o'clock it was just nothing. People were sitting in their houses, some in their shops. Nothing was heard after that ; and when the military also arrived, it was all quiet. No disturbance when Mr. Marsden came up. He was taking his escort ; I was called to the railway station at the time. I took him in my tonga and drove with him to my court room. I told him " you need not have that escort with you." He said, it was the order of the Commander. I said there was nothing here now-a-days ; it was only for a short time that these *badmashes* came in and there was nothing to fear.

Q. Don't you think that the authorities might reasonably be apprehensive that a similar rising would occur again ?

A. I say that true information did not reach them. If they saw the police all the people there would become quiet. There is no sentiment of disloyalty against Government. It is only when something happens that they make a cry.

Q. There was the consideration of protection of the railway property all round. We have been told that in many cases the railway lines were destroyed and railway buildings otherwise damaged ?

A. I heard something about it near Patti.

Q. If you have made yourself acquainted with these occurrences in addition to having a knowledge of the serious things that happened in Kasur, don't you think, with the information before us, it is reasonable to provide against a recurrence ?

A. If a small police were there, with the aid of the military, the situation would have been saved. Near the post office there is a police *thana* and there were many people there. Had they come near the people they would have saved the situation already ; but nobody came out at the time.

Q. I see you express opinions very adverse to the administration of Martial Law. I just want you to give your own views of these different occurrences so far as you have knowledge of them. I believe in connection with your own case, you had your house searched ?

A. Yes. That is right.

Q. Nothing was found ?

A. Of course nothing was found, and nothing was found in anybody else's house. I talked to Mr. Marsden. He said, " that Sanskrit document, was that some incriminating document or a seditious one ?" It was not a seditious document. Some student from Hardwar had come here and his friend had written a long essay like that, and they did not understand that and thought they were connecting Asia and Russia and all that. This was the incriminating document that was found ; nothing else.

Q. What are your principal grounds of complaint against the Martial Law administration ?

A. First it was not necessary. This goes to the root of the matter ; because there was no general rising, no revolution. In Kasur it lasted only for 2 or 3 hours. It does not indicate that you should have Martial Law in Kasur for so many months and administer it so severely. As regards acts done under Martial Law ; my house was very near the railway station. I had on several occasions been a Municipal Commissioner. There were elected Municipal Commissioners, and we all used to go to the railway station every day, sit there from early morning till evening. This is personal. There were 100 or 150 people there and afterwards they were released without trial. I think it caused a great deal of trouble to the people.

Q. Of course I suppose you can hardly have Martial Law without the people having to submit to considerable inconvenience ; that you would understand ?

A. Because the Martial Law was unnecessary the evils that came along with it were still more unnecessary.

Q. You are referring to your own case here ?

A. Not only pleaders' houses were searched, but every kind of people's house was searched. Brahmins were

4 December 1919.]

LALA MOHAN LAL SETH.

[Continued.]

not allowed, even ladies were not allowed, and people not allowed to go for their marriages.

Q. You complained about the Curfew order?

A. Yes, Sir. It is a trouble to people; though the rule was 8 o'clock really after 7 people were not allowed to go out. The real order was not to go out on the circular roads. But even in those days, when they were out in those shops, those roads which were not prohibited, yet the soldiers, Indian and European, molested them.

Q. I think I have had a good deal of experience of the Curfew order not very long ago, in other countries; perhaps you are referring to the Martial Law Administrator interfering with the Hindu temple. Have you been present all the time here?

A. Not all the time.

Q. Did you hear Captain Doveton giving his explanation as to what occurred?

A. I was not here then. The report outside is that the tenants of the temple property were threatened and insulted.

Q. You make it as though it was a ground of complaint against Martial Law that people were threatened and insulted. Where did you get this information on which to make this charge?

A. There is the judicial case I referred to. I was in court on that day when they were making the statement to the Court and they stated that the Martial Law Administrator was threatening and they were ordered to pay rents to the new landlord, as it were.

Q. You were making an accusation against something the Martial Law Administrator did. What is it you complain of here, that they actually did as regards the Hindu temple property?

A. There is a temple there; certain property belongs to it. There are certain shops, and those shopkeepers pay rent to the person who is in charge of that temple. The person in charge at the time was the President of the Hindu Sabha who used to collect the landlord's rents from the shopkeepers. There was a dispute between the Brahmin who was in charge of the temple and the Hindu Sabha. He said that the Hindu Sabha had nothing to do with that and that he was entitled to realise the rents. That Brahmin brought a complaint before the Martial Law Administrator. The fact was the clerk of the Martial Law Administrator was a relative of that Brahmin. Now this matter was brought to the Martial Law Administrator. He ordered "No, you must pay to the man just living in that temple." So, these people had to pay to the man living in that temple about Rs. 1,500. Now the real owner brought a suit against the tenants. They applied to the Martial Law Administrator saying that they paid the wrong man. The court ordered:—"You get that money from him. We cannot; you must pay the landlord."

Q. I do not see that Captain Doveton ever pronounced any order. I do not see how you really had any information contrary to that.

A. They said that in Court.

Q. People may have said that.

A. These people have made a statement, and that statement is on judicial record. There they stated that they were threatened. I heard it before that. I was not a direct witness of their threatening. I heard that these people had to pay rent to the Brahmin in the temple and not to the Hindu Sabha.

Q. You also make a statement: 'A deaf beggar was shot to death at the railway station for not replying to the call of the soldier on duty.' You have heard the explanation given?

A. That beggar was deaf; he came near the gate; they thought he was a man who wanted to go in against their orders. He was shot, because the soldier on duty called him and he did not reply.

Q. It is a very unfortunate incident. We have heard that this sort of incident that must occur when soldiers are on sentry duty. Is it not? Do you suggest that there was anything reckless about the act of the soldier in firing on that occasion?

A. I do not suggest that. He was called and he did not reply to that call.

Q. I see you are complimenting the Criminal Investigation Department and Police on their actions during the time?

A. As regards permits. I asked for a permit from Mr. Marsden and he gave me one. Again from Captain Doveton. He did not give me one and I lost my case; in Lahore many people had to return their fees.

Q. How long did that rule as regards not getting permits continue in force?

A. I cannot tell you definitely; I think it must have been for a month.

Q. Did it inconvenience you only on one occasion or did you lose more than one case by not getting permits?

A. I did not take many cases.

Q. Because you were annoyed?

A. I thought it was useless to get a case at Lahore, and so I did not take any case and I refused one case.

Q. In your statement, you say that the police and the C. I. D. did their work honestly and boldly. It is rather new to us, the complimenting of the action of the C. I. D. and the Police?

A. I can testify to it:—Some innocent persons were brought in. The C. I. D. and the Police inquired into the matter. My house being situated near the railway station, I saw them passing my house. They were released, because the C. I. D. and the Police did their work honestly. There are other cases within my knowledge in which they have done their work honestly and boldly.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You told us that there was no political activity in Kasur at all?

A. No, Sir.

Q. No political organisations, or political meetings?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Is there any truth in the suggestion that Kasur city was noted for many years for sedition?

A. No.

Q. Is there any truth in the suggestion that the pleaders of Kasur were well-known to have anti-British feelings?

A. Never up to this time. Lala Dhanpat Rai's name was mentioned in connection with politics. He had an orphan girl and then there was a political seditionist, Ajit Singh. He married this orphan girl. That is all the matter.

Q. We do not want all that. Is there any truth in the suggestion that the pleaders of Kasur were well-known to have anti-British feelings?

A. No.

Q. Even the Rowlatt Act in the beginning did not rouse Kasur at all?

A. No.

Q. You had no *hartal* on the 30th March or 6th April as in other places?

A. None at all.

Q. I want to know how do you account for the sudden awakening in Kasur on the 12th with regard to the Rowlatt Bill?

A. There was no political activity, no political organisation regarding the Rowlatt Act.

Q. You have just told us that the Rowlatt Bill did not rouse them to make any *hartal* on the 30th or 6th. What was the cause of this sudden awakening of this sudden demonstration?

A. On the 11th there was a meeting. I was that day in Lahore.

Q. Who started that meeting?

A. I shall say; I was here on the 11th. I returned from Kasur at 5-30. Just as I reached there I learnt that there was the *hartal* after all in Kasur.

Q. How do you account for that? Who started the *hartal* on 11th?

A. I think the people from Amritsar, those traders who have dealings in hides or other things; they as a joke said, 'you Kasuris did not join us on the 6th; you are such and such people; we therefore boycott you.'

4 December 1919.]

LALA MOHAN LAL SETHI.

[Continued.]

Q. You think the starting of the *hartal* on the 11th was in a certain measure due to the instigation of the Amritsar people ?

A. Due to the traders ; on the 11th, there was a rumour that the Kasur people were also going to observe the *hartal*, so that they might not be left behind Amritsar people.

Q. Do people from Amritsar come to Kasur ?

A. My idea is that Kasuris have to go to Amritsar for their business.

Q. There they got impregnated with their ideas about the *hartal* ?

A. Yes. They heard that Mr. Gandhi has been arrested and *hartal* was going to be declared, and they said they should also do the same.

Q. Have you come into contact with the Kasur merchants ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Have you heard firsthand that many Kasur merchants, who had gone to Amritsar, were so spoken to ?

A. I have heard that some people had gone there and some hide merchants were there and heard it.

Q. Is there any truth in the suggestion that Amritsar merchants said they were not going to cash *hundis* of Kasuris if they did not join them ?

A. There was a rumour to that effect.

Q. When did you hear that first ? Some days before the 11th or after ?

A. Some 2 or 3 days before the 11th.

Q. Were you in Kasur on the 10th ?

A. I think I was on the 10th.

Q. When did you hear at Kasur of the events that happened at Amritsar ?

A. I did not hear them. On the 11th morning I came ; we had to get news from newspapers.

Q. On the 11th you were in Lahore ?

A. On the 11th I came by 7 o'clock train to Lahore.

Q. That day you remained in Lahore ?

A. I remained in Lahore.

Q. Did you know there was going to be *hartal* at Kasur ?

A. No, it was news to me at the railway station.

Q. When you returned to Kasur in the evening ?

A. Yes. There I learnt.

Q. Before that you did not learn ?

A. No.

Q. Can you say why *anti*-European feeling burst forth at Kasur ?

A. I have already said.

Q. Was there any *anti*-British or *anti*-European feeling in Kasur before that ?

A. No. None at all.

Q. It suddenly burst forth ?

A. Yes, it suddenly came up.

Q. Now in the causes of disturbances you put the high prices, then you spoke of the War Loan, then you spoke of some meetings at which War Loan was collected. Were you present when the officials were pressing the people for it ?

A. There were many meetings for the collection of War Loan.

Q. There were many meetings at Kasur ?

A. Yes.

Q. You were present at most of them ?

A. At almost all the meetings.

Q. What was done at those meetings ?

A. People would pay in the presence of Sub-Divisional Officer. For instance, he asked a man "what would you give ?" The man replied "I would pay Rs. 2,000." The Sub-Divisional Officer said "No, you must give Rs. 4,000."

Q. You mean to say that people of limited means were also asked to subscribe ?

A. In the town officials or the Tahsildar asked even the clerks who were getting Rs. 20 a month to subscribe.

Q. They went from house to house ?

A. Yes, from shop to shop.

Q. And asked people to subscribe ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they subscribe on being so asked ?

A. They subscribed some small amounts and even that by force otherwise they would not have done so.

Q. They were so afraid of the officials pressing them that they could not refuse ?

A. Where an official goes, Tahsildar or the Naib-Tahsildar, he says "You must pay." The man says "I am poor, I cannot pay." When he presses again and again for payment, that man has to bow and he pays.

Q. Then you refer to the unsympathetic attitude of the Government and you specially mention the Lieutenant Governor. To what do you particularly refer ?

A. His speeches here and his speeches in the Council irritating the leaders of the Indians and thus annoying them.

Q. Unsympathetic attitude, was that against the educated classes ?

A. Yes.

Q. And as regards the political aspirations of the people ?

A. Because the other day he said the Punjab does not like the reforms and such like things.

Q. Then you refer to the fact of the whole non-official opinion in Council having been overruled by the official opinion. Was that considerably disappointing ?

A. That is really a farce in spite of our joining hands in such a way.

Q. Then you refer to the arrests of certain pleaders and you specially mention two of them, Maulvi Ghulam Mohi-ud-din and M. Abdul Kadir. Now these pleaders were assisting the authorities on the 12th in maintaining law and order ?

A. They went into the mob and were asking people to go away and were just helping the Government, but that it was construed otherwise.

Q. And one of them, Maulvi Ghulam Mohi-ud-din, was actually assisting in saving the Sherbourns, and these facts were well known to the Government and the police ?

A. Yes. Mr. Sherbourn mentioned this fact. The Sub-Divisional Officer went there and saw Ghulam Mohi-ud-din standing near Sherbourn, and he was standing like a constable and procting them.

Q. These two gentlemen are persons of great position and respectability ?

A. Maulvi Adul Kadir is a leader of the Kasur Bar and Maulvi Ghulam Mohi-ud-din is one of the best lawyers.

Q. Was it your feeling, or was it also the feeling generally in Kasur that their arrest, was very unjust ?

A. Yes.

Q. Now when you say that Martial Law was not necessary at Kasur, what do you mean by that ?

A. I mean, as I understand, Martial Law is only necessary where there is a general rebellion or general rising. There was none in Kasur and therefore there was no need of Martial Law in Kasur.

Q. What happened was of the same character as what had happened in various places in the Punjab in Amritsar, at Kasur, and in Lahore. The railway lines and the telegraphic communications were cut at various places ?

A. I think there was no connection between them if they were done at the same time at many places. Even if things happened at the same time no inference should be drawn that there was connection between them. There was no connection between things done at Delhi and at Amritsar.

Q. I understand you to say that there was no connection between what took place at various places in the Punjab at the same time ?

A. Yes, there was no connection.

Q. What I understand is, is it not somewhat strange that events of a similar character should happen at various places in the Province at the same time ?

A. The news of Mr. Gandhi reached at the same time.

Q. I understand you to say that there was a common cause at that time, and that cause had the same effect and resulted in cutting communications, etc. ?

A. By cutting of communications you mean telegraph and railway communications ?

A December 1919.]

LALA MOHAN LAL SETH.

[Continued.]

Q. That is what I want to understand, the cutting of telegraph and railway communications, attack upon public buildings and a sort of demonstration against Europeans, these results were very similar in many places at the same time?

A. Many wise people think in the same way, while many bad people think in the same way. The action of the mischievous people went in the same direction.

Q. That is the only way in which you account for this?

A. The Delhi people did not come to Kasur to cut telegraph wires and do mischief of the same sort just as was done at Amritsar.

Q. Do you think that the way of doing mischief was one that suggested itself naturally to *badmashes*? That is your opinion?

A. When they come near the railway station what should they do?

Q. They must cut the railway line?

A. That is the mischief they can do.

Q. Do I understand you to mean that in Kasur the position was such that the civil authorities could have carried on with the aid of the military?

A. Even with the aid of the police.

Q. Even without the aid of the military?

A. They could have.

Q. If so, the civil authorities could have carried on with the aid of the military?

A. Yes.

Q. Then there was no necessity for the declaration of Martial Law?

A. No.

Q. If that had been done the inconvenience of Martial Law could have been avoided?

A. Yes.

Q. In any event do you think that it was necessary to continue Martial Law for the period for which it was in fact continued.

A. It should not have been introduced, not to mention continuing it.

Q. But still I want your answer to my question. I quite see your view that it should never have been introduced. In opposition to your view it was introduced. Then after the introduction how long do you think, should it have been continued?

A. There was nothing happening. I should not fix any time. There was nothing after 2 P.M. on the 12th. My idea is that even the authorities knew that there was nothing after the 15th or say 18th. After that it should have been stopped.

Q. You know that these things happened on the 12th at Kasur and any reasonable people in charge of maintaining law and order must take precautions to prevent recurrence of these things. Martial Law as you know had been introduced, and it must have continued. I want to know for how long it should have been continued?

A. Say eight days.

Q. A week should have been quite sufficient according to you?

A. Yes, in order to ensure that this quiet was real and not unreal eight days were quite sufficient for this.

Q. After eight days you don't think there was any apprehension?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You know all those eight pleaders whose houses were searched?

A. There were not in all eight pleaders, but there were two others.

Q. I am taking you to that point.

A. Of course I know all pleaders.

Q. They were all respectable men?

A. Very good men.

Q. Could any Police officer have imagined that any stolen property would be found in their houses?

A. Not in the least.

Q. Therefore when all those eight houses were searched at one and the same time, what was your inference?

Was the action of the authorities justifiable or unjustifiable, or was there any other motive?

A. Most unjustifiable.

Q. Then about travelling, you have given us your own experience. Do you suggest that the pleaders closed their professional business altogether? They were disallowed permits to travel?

A. Not only pleaders closed their work, but others too.

Q. When, as a matter of fact, the pleaders were not allowed to mention others?

A. They were giving the names at Lahore and others also were in the District Judge's Court and they were not allowed.

Q. Then there were *sadhus* of all religions and creeds who were put to various indignities. Have you any personal knowledge or do you only rely upon what you heard about them?

A. Every day they used to go passing my house and I used to see them.

Q. What did you see with your own eyes?

A. They used to come early in the morning and sit for hours and hours on the ground without any food and then in the evening they were allowed to go away.

Q. The second day the same thing was repeated?

A. Yes, again the same thing happened on the second day, on the third day, on the fourth day, and so on.

Q. The same persons repeated the same thing?

A. A list of all the religious institutions and temples were prepared and all the *sadhus* and their occupants were called.

Q. Even those who were not *sadhus*, but belonged to these religious temples and institutions were called every day?

A. Yes.

Q. That you have seen with your own eyes?

A. Yes. Both Hindu and Muhammadan *sadhus* and *faqirs* used to come and sit there.

Q. Could they go away or leave that place if they liked after 8 or 9 P.M.?

A. If the authorities did not allow them to go, how could they go away.

Q. They were asked to perform certain duties?

A. Their duty was to sit and to sit quietly for hours and hours and they were not asked any question.

Q. They were asked no question and no investigation was made?

A. No.

Q. You were saying something about your experience at Kasur, but you were saying something else that in Kasur the Curfew order was confined to some particular parts of the town?

A. To the Circular Road outside the town.

Q. These soldiers, both Indian and British, looted some shops and they did not allow those persons to pass who were not living on those roads?

A. They were overdoing things. If they passed they would take action.

Q. You suggest here that the military people looted some shops and were not checked?

A. They went to visit the town and there looted the shops of Ali Muhammad and Ghulam Farid.

Q. Can you give the names of those shop-keepers whose shops were looted?

A. I have given you two of the names. I made inquiries.

[The President:—That was an unofficial inquiry into a rumour.

The Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan:—I do not see any difference. If the enquiry were made by the police, they could speak of it.

The President:—How can a non-official speak about this inquiry? The witnesses would have to be produced.

The Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan:—He says he had heard from those who had been looted. However, I have to obey Your Lordship's ruling.

The President:—I do not believe there is any necessity for this question. He is a non-official agency.

The Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan:—That is Your Lordship's ruling.]

4 December 1919.]

LALA MOHAM LAL SETHI.

(Continued.)

Q. You say that liquor shops were closed on account of trouble from these soldiers?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see that with your own eyes?

A. The Inspector of the Excise Department was there. He was at that time putting up in my house and those shop-keepers came and complained that the soldiers wished to go in and would not pay. Therefore after that they reported to the Martial Law Administrator and by his orders the shops were closed for some time, so that there might not be trouble again.

Q. You say the Martial Law Administrator began to interfere in all sorts of affairs and you had to obey his rulings?

A. Yes.

Q. Apart from the Hindu temple are you aware personally of any cases or matters in which the Martial Law Administrator interfered?

A. There was a case of abduction, a civil case, which was being tried at the time.

Q. Any other case?

A. There was a case of a person who was writing petitions (he was not a petition-writer) without license to the Martial Law Administrator. He used to charge a slightly higher rate, i.e., Re. 0-8-0 or Re. 0-12-0 instead of Re. 0-1-0 or Re. 0-2-0. He was punished with Rs. 10 fine for doing this.

Q. About this temple case you have made a certain statement. May I know whether it was only an excuse for the defendants in that case that they had already paid the amount that was due from them to other persons or was there also a case by the plaintiff whether these people under the Martial Law order had paid to Jagan Nath?

A. The plaintiff had no need to sue. It was for the defendant to plead "I have already paid such and such an amount." The Court said "It was not my business."

Q. Apart from what you really heard in Court were you aware of these facts before the case was fought out?

A. Yes.

Q. So far as you were concerned you did not consider that those statements were perjured statements?

A. They were not wrong.

Q. Then you say that flogging was done in the presence of prostitutes. Have you any knowledge of the prostitutes coming there?

A. I had only heard it. I have no personal knowledge.

Q. Now you say an innocent railway *babu* (Bhagat Ram) was given thirty stripes with a rest after every five stripes and was admonished to identify people. No case was brought against him and no charge was laid against him before being flogged?

A. No.

Q. I ask you as a Municipal Commissioner and a Member of the Bar were you present at the railway station when Bhagat Ram was flogged or did you only hear of it?

A. Yes, I only heard of it.

Q. Did you hear of any other complaint that just came to your notice?

A. Yes, a biggish banker by name Radha Kishen used to feed those lame bulls there and they used to be lean. They were of course old and when the Captain passed by them he used to say "Why are you keeping them in this way?" Once or twice he said this and then he summoned that man at the railway station and insulted him there.

Q. But so far as the part of insult is concerned you were not there?

A. No.

Q. What happened then?

A. That man said that he would pay expenses and the bulls should be sent to the hospital; so they were sent there.

Q. He thus saved himself from botheration and from being summoned, I can say?

A. Yes.

Q. Now about the Bar Room *chaprasi*. That is a case which was within your knowledge because you are yourself a Member of the Bar?

A. The *chaprasi* was engaged only two or three days before. He did not know the language of the place properly. On that fateful day he went out of the Bar Room and was standing along with the *Tahsil chaprasi* outside. Both he and the *Tahsil chaprasi* got a shot. He was sentenced to transportation for life and the *Tahsil chaprasi* got a reward of Rs. 50.

Q. I have not heard of details about the arrest and identification of Mohi-ud-din, son of Maulvi Abdul Kadir. Do I understand correctly that as a matter of fact an attempt was being made to get him identified falsely and the D. S. P. interfered? That is what you mean by saying boldly?

A. Yes.

Q. So far as Kasur is concerned was there any *hartal* after the 12th?

A. No. There was none.

Q. All the shops were opened from the 13th?

A. Yes, from the 13th and 14th. We were asked to go round the town and we went and asked the people not to have any *hartal*. There was none at all.

Q. What was the attitude of the Kasur people after the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th? Did they appear to be sullen or did they appear as usual?

A. Too terrified to stand on their legs.

Q. Was it possible for the general inhabitants of Kasur during those days, if there was any order passed against them of which they rightly or wrongly felt aggrieved, to go to the authorities? Do you think it was possible for them to go and complain to the Martial Law authorities and would they get redress?

A. No.

Q. I want to know whether in your opinion the Kasur people were happy with the Martial Law Orders that were passed?

A. How could it be?

Q. Do you think, you are a Pleader and a Municipal Commissioner, the Kasur people or people of the surrounding villages were very happy because they had no right of appeal, their cases were finished in one day, they had nothing to do with the long Penal Code or the Criminal Code, and there was no Evidence Act?

A. How could they be?

Q. Then were you present at any of the fancy punishments that were awarded to different persons at Kasur?

A. I saw that man with white lime over his body. I did not see him being whitewashed. I saw that *sadhu* whitewashed and mentioned him to Mr. Maraden.

Q. You actually saw the *sadhu* being whitewashed? He might be digging lime and therefore he might have got that lime on him?

A. So Mr. Maraden told me that while removing the bags from the railway goods shed his body might have become besmeared with it.

Q. What is your reason for not accepting this explanation and why do you call it fancy punishment?

A. If this was the punishment.

Q. Why do you say whitewashed? Was it done with a brush, or with a *luchi* or with anything else?

A. I was told that it was done in that way. I am not a witness to that, therefore I cannot say.

Q. There is one thing more. You are an Indian gentleman. I would like to have an answer to it from you. A boy is caned by his father or uncle. Would he mind it or would there be any disgrace to him in that?

A. No disgrace.

Q. If the boy is punished by his Schoolmaster?

A. No.

Q. Supposing a boy was brought to the railway station and if by the order of the Martial Law Administrator he was caned, would he not consider that to be very disgraceful?

A. Not simply caned but tied to something and caned.

Q. Tied to a triangle?

A. Yes. He would feel it for the whole of his life.

By Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Govt. Advocate—

Q. I think there is just a passage at the end of your statement which has not been brought out so far. You

4 December 1919.]

LALA MOHAN LAL SETH.

[Concluded.]

say "So I think very few innocent persons were *challaned* before the Commission. The result of the trials too was not disappointing. Very few innocent persons were convicted." So far as you are concerned very few innocent persons were convicted?

A. Many innocent persons were *challaned* but very few were convicted?

Q. What I want to know is, is that your opinion and do you adhere to it?

A. Yes.

Q. Now I take you to one other point which is not in your statement, i.e., I understand you were one of the several pleaders who attended the meeting on the 12th before these disturbances at Kasur took place?

A. The meeting was on the 11th. I attended that meeting just after I reached Kasur. Some friends of mine came and said that there had been *hartal* and I, being a Member of the Municipal Committee and a Director of the Bank, should go and pacify the people. So I went and tried to pacify them.

Q. Did you go and try to pacify the people?

A. I told them not to be violent and asked them to observe the rule of Mr. Gandhi in not being violent and obeying the Government respectfully.

Q. Anyhow you were one of those who made efforts to pacify people. They quite welcomed you and said they would not have a *hartal* that day?

A. We did not talk about it. We only just asked people not to be violent.

Q. You said that they should obey the dictates of Gandhi but they should not use violence?

A. *Hartal* is not violence.

Q. Were you among those who said they might have a *hartal*?

A. We did not say anything about a *hartal*. There was a *hartal* on already there when I reached Kasur. The mob was there and we talked about the Rowlatt Act.

Q. You have already told the Committee that on the 11th you were aware of what happened at Amritsar on the 10th?

A. No, I did not say that.

Q. In answer to Sir C. H. Setalvad you said at Lahore you heard of the events at Amritsar.

A. No, I heard of Gandhi's arrest.

Q. You did not hear on the 11th at Lahore what had happened at Amritsar on the previous day?

A. No, I came to court and did my work.

Q. That is what I understood you to say, this was public property on the evening of the 10th at Lahore?

A. That morning I did not read the papers at Kasur, I went to court.

Q. Anyhow you knew what had had happened at Lahore on the evening of the 10th, that is firing had had to be resorted to to disperse the Anarkali mobs. Were you aware of that on the 11th?

A. While I was returning from the court on the way I heard there had been some altercation on the Upper Mall, but I did not get the details of it.

Q. But you knew something of that? The point I want to put to you is whether it occurred to you or not, when making a speech at that meeting on the 11th, in the light of what had taken place at Lahore, which you say you knew something of, to tell the people it was not good under these circumstances to continue these *hartals*?

A. *Hartals* we did not speak of.

Q. You knew the *hartal* was going on, you went to speak to them, and you did not tell them that, in the light of what had happened in Lahore, you did not think it should continue?

A. I did not know that they would continue the *hartal* after that.

Q. You did not advise them to break up the *hartal* because it had led to bad consequences?

A. It was already evening, 5-30, by the time I reached there.

Q. I did not ask you the reason why you did not do so?

A. I did not refer to the *hartal* at all.

Q. Nor did any of the other pleaders advise them against the *hartal*?

A. Neither against nor for.

Q. By the time you were leaving, one Narendra Ali, who has been subsequently sentenced, spoke and said, 'now the flatterers are going away we must do what we like'?

A. I am told that Narendra Ali after that made a speech after I and Maulvi Abdul Kadir went away.

Q. With regard to one little point. In the beginning of your statement about 500 people being recruited from Kasur, you made it clear that you included in that recruits from neighbouring villages?

A. They are Kasuris.

Q. The point which was really put to you by the President was as to the number of people from the town. Are you aware or are you not that the number from the town itself was very much less than 100 even?

A. I do not know.

5 December 1919.]

Lieutenant H. MUNRO.

## At Lahore, Friday, the 5th December 1919.

## PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.  
 The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.  
 Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B.,  
 K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.  
 Sir C. H. SETALVAD, KT.  
 Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., Secretary.

Lieutenant H. MUNRO, 2-17th Infantry.

By the President—

Q. Were you a passenger by the train from Ferozepore to Lahore, leaving Ferozepore about 9 o'clock in the morning on the 12th of April last?

A. I was, Sir.

Q. Were you in a first class compartment along with Captain Limby of the Royal Engineers?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What other Europeans were in the train besides yourselves?

A. Mr. and Mrs. Sherbourn and their children, two N. C. O.'s of the 1/4th Queens, a Master Gunner of the Royal Garrison Artillery and a Conductor or Lieutenant in the Ordnance Depot.

Q. These people were in different compartments from the compartment in which you were?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did the train stop about 500 yards west of Kasur Station?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did it remain stopped for some time?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you think that unusual?

A. I did not at the time. I had no reason to think so. I was reading a paper at the time, and there was nothing unusual about it until we afterwards saw a good number of Indians alongside the train on a bank which ran parallel to the train. Captain Limby drew my attention to the fact that they seemed excited. He looked out and saw Mr. Sherbourn going along the bank. He then drew my attention to the fact that there had been disturbances in other parts of the Punjab, and that probably the same sort of thing was happening in Kasur, and he said he was going to get out and see what was the matter, and I said I would go too, so we got out.

Q. Did you see a large crowd when you got out?

A. There was not a large crowd on the bank at the time, there were a few, fifty to a hundred. But from the top of the bank I could see that something at the station was burning, and what seemed to be an enormous crowd were coming from the station towards the bank.

Q. What was the crowd doing?

A. They were in the distance at that time, three or four hundred yards away.

Q. Did you make out that they were gesticulating?

A. They were carrying flags of different descriptions, pieces of cloth, and were very noisy. It was quite easy to see that they were thoroughly excited.

Q. I think numbers of them had lathis?

A. Everybody seemed to be carrying something, if it was not a lathi it was a piece of iron or something.

Q. Were shouts thrown at you?

A. Oh, yes, as soon as we were spotted. I had hardly been on the bank two minutes when I was greeted with shouts of *Afsar Sahib hai, mar do, mar do*, "Here is an officer, kill him, kill him."

Q. You were in uniform?

A. I was.

Q. Was that cry shouted frequently by the crowd?

A. Oh, yes, we were objects of very much attention directly we appeared on the bank.

Q. Except that you had made your appearance on the bank had you done anything to excite the people?

A. Absolutely nothing.

Q. And had no one in the train done anything to excite the hostility of the crowd?

A. Nothing; Mr. Sherbourn was the only one who got out of the train previous to myself and Captain Limby. I afterwards saw the two Conductors who were afterwards killed; they were in their carriage.

Q. From the attitude of the crowd and these cries did you think the crowd intended to do violence?

A. I was perfectly certain of it.

Q. You were not armed?

A. I had nothing at all.

Q. And neither was Captain Limby?

A. No, Sir.

Q. What was the first step you took?

A. I did not realise the seriousness of the position at first. They were all thoroughly excited, but I thought nothing of it; I had seen excited natives before and it did not worry me a great deal. Mrs. Sherbourn was naturally very excited; she had her children with her. I knew her personally and she said to me "For God's sake do something." So I looked round rather in a quandary as to what to do. So there was a Gate-keeper's hut there, and I advised her to get down with the two Corporals of the Queens and get into the hut, which she afterwards did. I then tried to get towards the engine with the idea of shifting the train one way or the other. The first railway official I met was the guard of the train. I said "you must move this train either backwards or forwards." His reply was "I cannot, I have no line clear." My impression was he was directly concerned in the whole business; he was absolutely callous. He took absolutely no measures whatsoever to do anything. After that, Sir, I went along with Captain Limby towards the engine, and by that time I had a pretty rough time; I had been hit with lathis, and bricks were flying all over the place. It was perfectly impossible to get to the engine so we had to turn back.

Q. I think you managed to get clear of the main crowd?

A. Yes, Sir, we did.

Q. In the course of getting clear of the main crowd had you to defend yourself?

A. Yes, Sir. From memory I should say four or five times we had to stop and fight for it back to back.

Q. I think you used your fists as the only thing you had?

A. I used everything that was available, fists and feet.

Q. And you and Captain Limby did manage, I suppose, to inflict some injury on some of your assailants?



5 December 1919.]

Lieutenant H. MUNRO.

[Continued.]

A. I think so, Sir.

Q. Did it take you some time to get clear of this crowd?

A. Yes, Sir, it did.

Q. How long?

A. Well, Sir, I should think to the time that we were really safe it was a matter of at least an hour and a half to an hour and three quarters.

Q. Did you see what the crowd was doing during this time?

A. Part of the crowd, not all.

Q. What was the crowd, so far as you saw, doing?

A. There was a huge crowd round the Gate-keeper's hut in which the Sherbourn family were. It was perfectly impossible to get there. That was practically the safest place, one was more or less safe from stones at any rate, and I tried to get back to the hut, but it was absolutely impossible. So we got close to the train, working back down it so as to be safe on one side at any rate. The crowd round the hut were absolutely infuriated, madmen the whole of them. They were doing everything they possibly could to get in there.

Q. Did the crowd attack every European in the train or attempt to attack every European in the train?

A. Yes, Sir, every European in the train was either killed or wounded, except Mrs. Sherbourn, she and the children; I believe, she was not actually maltreated.

Q. Did you form any opinion at the time as to what the object of the crowd was in coming out towards the train in the way in which they did?

A. Well, Sir, I do not know of course. I should think they probably came out for loot, for what they could get; but directly they found there were Europeans on the train they did not seem to worry about loot very much. The train was hardly touched, but we were subjected to a good deal of attention from them.

Q. And did the circumstance that you were wearing the King-Emperor's uniform seem to goad the crowd on?

A. I think so, Sir. I have since spoken to Mr. Sherbourn very many times on the whole thing. Directly we appeared on that bank—I had only been out of the train a matter of half a minute—we heard them shout *Afsar Sahib hai, kill him, kill him.*

Q. I think when you reached a place of safety it was found that you had sustained considerable injuries?

A. Well, Sir, Captain Limby previously had a severe injury to his hip and I had some trouble in getting him away. He was not able to stand the strain. He had had a bad time of it as I had. I had my *topi* taken, it was late in April, and I was very wary of getting sun-stroke. My chief object was to get to a village and have a rest. At the time I was dubious about the villages, and so we went warily. We managed to find a Jat Sikh village and they treated us well, and we rested there for an hour or an hour and-a-half. Then I got a pony from the village, put Captain Limby on it and brought him to the Kaisar-i-Hind Bridge. It was a ten mile tramp and we had both had quite enough.

Q. You met Mr. Clarke, and he took Captain Limby to his bungalow and you were taken to hospital?

A. Yes, Sir, he had a guard there.

Q. I think from the certificate of the medical gentleman who attended you you were found to be suffering from a large scalp wound and multiple contusions and abrasions of body and upper extremities, and he adds the injuries were severe?

A. Yes, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. So far as you were concerned you saw and heard no firing?

A. I heard firing.

Q. Where from?

A. From the direction of the Station.

Q. But where you were you saw and heard none?

A. None at all, Sir.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Who was this guard that you have spoken about.

A. I have since recognised the guard.

Q. Was he an Indian?

A. He was an Indian guard.

Q. What caste was he, have you any idea whether he was a Sikh?

A. From memory I should think he was a Hindu.

Q. He refused to take any steps whatever?

A. He certainly gave me that impression. The train at the time I got out of it had been standing there three or four minutes.

Q. What was he doing all the time?

A. Nothing, he was walking up and down the train, and my opinion was that the driver or the guard or both could see the crowd coming long before I did.

Q. Who was the driver?

A. Also an Indian.

Q. A Hindu or a Muhammadan?

A. I could not say.

Q. The driver also did nothing?

A. The train was not moved until some time afterwards, 7 or 8 minutes afterwards.

Q. When all this was happening between you and the crowd both the driver and the guard were standing still doing nothing?

A. I believe the driver was on his engine, but the guard was off his train because I spoke to him on the bank.

Q. The driver never came out but stuck there?

A. Must have done.

Q. Now some days after this incident of the 12th were you asked to come to Kasur for identification?

A. As soon as I was well enough I went.

Q. When did you go?

A. I could not tell you the dates.

Q. Roughly how many days?

A. From memory 7 or 8 days, perhaps less.

Q. And was the whole town turned out on that occasion?

A. On one occasion, but that was some time afterwards.

Q. At what identification were you?

A. I went into Kasur daily. I think altogether I was in Kasur for at least 20 days.

Q. You went daily to Kasur?

A. Yes, we had a detachment there and for that reason I went there daily.

Q. You were at several identification parades?

A. Yes.

Q. And were you able to identify any one?

A. Yes.

Q. How many did you identify?

A. I think 7 or 8, may be more.

Q. Was any particular person pointed out to you by the police, and were you asked whether you could remember him?

A. I was very keen on identifying some of these people, and I was allowed always to go into the jail or wherever prisoners were collected to see if I could find any of my former friends. I did on several occasions.

Q. I have seen it alleged that with regard to one particular individual the police either brought him to you or he was shown to you, and you were pressed to identify him, and you said—no, you could not identify him at all?

A. No, not at all; I never had that experience. I certainly would not be pressed to identify anybody, even by the police.

Q. Did the police bring to you or show to you any particular person on more than one occasion and ask you whether you could identify him and you said you could not?

A. They may have done so. They may have shown me the same man three or four times in the crowd. A crowd of 50 or 60 men were sometimes brought to me. I cannot say whether any of these men had been previously brought before me.

Q. At the trial did you identify these people?

A. Yes. Originally if I identified a man the police put him into jail and he was brought up for trial at Lahore. After giving evidence at the trial I was asked to go round and pick the men out. On one occasion here in Lahore there were at least 40 prisoners, and of these I identified only two or three. I had to go round the whole 40 and identify my men again, and I have a

5 December 1919.]

Lieutenant H. MUNRO—concluded—Mr. SHERBOURN.

good memory, and I hope I did not make any mistakes; I think I didn't.

*By Major-General Sir George Barrow—*

Q. These people who were identified by you were subsequently tried?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You attended their trial?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were they convicted?

A. Some of them and some were acquitted.

Q. Of those you identified?

A. Yes.

Q. They were not all convicted?

A. No, it was impossible. As a matter of fact one whom I was absolutely certain of—I had fought with him personally on the railway embankment, but unfortunately no one else was there; Captain Limby was down and out; but I knew this man's face after fighting with him for three or four minutes on the bank, that man was acquitted.

Q. Why?

A. There was no second evidence, there was only one, myself.

Q. And those men convicted were men against whom there was more than one witness?

A. Yes, Sir, necessarily.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—*

Q. You gave evidence at two trials; twice you appeared as a witness at trials?

A. I was certainly at Lahore more than twice; it may have been for two trials, it may have been for more or less.

Q. And Captain Limby was also a witness with you?

A. Yes.

Q. It appears from the statements made in those cases that neither you nor Captain Limby mentioned that the crowd on seeing you said *Afsar Sahib hai, mar do, mar do*. May I take it you made that statement and it was not recorded?

A. I made that statement three or four days after that occurrence in a written statement.

Q. In these trials in your recorded evidence, on both occasions neither in your statement nor in Captain Limby's does this statement find a place. Therefore it is quite possible either that you made that statement and it was not recorded, or you forgot to make it?

A. I do not think, as a matter of fact, I did make that statement at the trial. I was not called upon to make a statement at the trial.

Q. What I say is, your evidence and Captain Limby's evidence was recorded at both the trials, and I have got the record of these trials before me, and from both those statements this expression is absent.

A. But evidence is not a statement surely.

Q. In the evidence that was recorded at those trials this expression is absent. There are only two possible explanations for that, either that you made that statement and it was not recorded or you forgot to make that statement?

A. I did not forget to make that statement; I was not asked to make a statement.

Q. When you gave your evidence you did not state that the crowd were calling out *Afsar Sahib hai, mar do, mar do*, nor do I find that expression in Captain Limby's evidence, therefore the explanation is either that you

forgot to mention this fact or you mentioned it and it was not recorded?

A. There is a third I may point out. At the trial a man was tried for maltreating me and attempting to murder me, that statement I had already recorded and that statement did not enter into the thing whatever at all, because the men who were charged with hurting me may have been a mile away, as it was done ten minutes afterwards. They may never have been near the Kasur Station.

Q. You will find that the whole thing is described, that on the 12th of April you were going by the train, the train stopped and both you and Captain Limby got out, and some one said Kasur Station was burning, and you saw the Sherbournes and the two soldiers carrying these children. All these facts are mentioned. The point is that in the natural sequence of events you did not mention that expression. Either you forgot to state the fact or you did make that statement and it was not recorded.

A. Yes.

Q. It comes to this that you said that you were not specifically asked to state what the crowd was saying?

A. That is what I mean.

Q. And you did not volunteer it?

A. No; I had no occasion to.

Q. Was it a usual thing to stop at that place every day?

A. I did not go with the train every day. My station is Ferozepore.

Q. The mere fact of the train stopping there at the distant signal did not indicate anything to you?

A. No, not at the time.

Q. Having regard to the usual practice I think it may be assumed that before the train starts from the distant signal and goes to the platform a line clear is required?

Mr. Herbert.—Evidence will be produced that it is not so.

Q. When did you hear the shots fired, after the Sherbournes had gone to the house?

A. A long time afterwards.

Q. Before that you heard no shots?

A. No.

Q. So far as the courage of the crowd is concerned I take it that when once you threw down one of the mob on the other side of the railing, it had a great moral effect?

A. The crowd had no moral courage ever. I held up 25 men with an ordinary smoking pipe.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—*

Q. From what you have just said I understand that your impression was that the crowd would have been only too pleased to murder you and Captain Limby if they had been able to?

A. First of all we had no arms. They made grimaces at us.

Q. Then if you had been unable to defend yourself as you did, do you think that they would probably have murdered you?

A. I am positively certain.

Q. You would not describe them as a lot of harmless school-boys whose intention was to make an innocent display of some kind to the passengers?

A. No.

**Mr. A. J. SHERBOURN, Signal and Interlocking Inspector, North Western Railway.**

*By the President—*

Q. Are you a Signal and Interlocking Inspector?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you in the train from Ferozepore to Kasur on the 12th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You, your wife and three of your children were in a second class compartment?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. The train stopped I think about 500 yards west of the station?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Is it usual for a train from Ferozepore to stop there?

A. No.

Q. Did you look out in consequence of the stoppage of the train?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What did you see?

A. While I was in the compartment I saw Indian passengers all leaving the train and running up on to the bank at the side?

5 December 1919.]

Mr. A. J. SHEERBOURN.

[Continued.]

Q. Do you know what forced the Indian passengers to leave the train?

A. From hearing of the Delhi and the Amritsar cases I concluded that there was going to be some trouble.

Q. Did you see anything in front of the train?

A. I saw a great mob.

Q. How many?

A. I estimated the number at about two thousand.

Q. How far were they from the front of the train?

A. About 300 or 400 yards.

Q. When you saw them were you alarmed?

A. I was.

Q. Particularly for the safety of your wife and children?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. From the distance could you see anything as to the attitude of the crowd as to whether they were a threatening crowd or a peaceful crowd?

A. I saw them running towards the train and shouting. They were making a terrible noise.

Q. Did you hear any definite shouts?

A. No, Sir.

Q. I think two soldiers Corporal Batsman and Lance-Corporal Grinham of the Queens helped you, your wife and your children to reach the gate-keeper's hut?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. At this point did you see Mr. Khair Din, Inspector of Coaching and Goods?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did he give you any advice as to what to do?

A. I saw the mob so I got out of the train on the left side and I entered the compartment adjoining ours where I knew there were two soldiers. I got in to ask them if they had any fire-arms. I saw Khair Din then and the soldiers and I took my wife and children down from the compartment.

Q. The soldiers were unfortunately unarmed?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Khair Din himself gave you a little assistance?

A. He did.

Q. When you reached the hut what did the crowd do?

A. They smashed the door and window in.

Q. What object had the crowd in going to the hut?

A. To attack us.

Q. Did they declare their intention? Was it manifest that they wanted to drag you out?

A. I think so after what happened.

Q. In the meantime did Corporal Batsman and Lance-Corporal Grinham defend the hut from the crowd?

A. As long as they could.

Q. What happened to them?

A. They were struck and knocked down. Corporal Batsman hardly got out of the hut when he was struck and dragged out.

Q. Did Corporal Grinham strike a man with an axe he had with him?

A. He struck at the man but I cannot say exactly whether he hit the man. He himself was immediately hit on the head.

Q. Had anyone of your party or anyone in the train done anything to instigate the crowd or to irritate the crowd so as to justify the action that was taken by them?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. What was the reason for the crowd making this attempt on you and your wife and children? What explanation did you give to yourself of this attack?

A. I thought they were up against all Europeans.

Q. Did you see the last two witnesses—Lieutenant Monro and Lieutenant Limby—did you notice that the crowd attacked them?

A. I got into the hut by the time the crowd came up. They were about three or four hundred yards in front of the train when we were advised to go into the hut, and we got into the hut before they came up to the train.

Q. How long did you remain in the hut?

A. A couple of hours.

Q. In the meantime did these two soldiers remain beside you in the hut?

A. No. I do not know what happened to them.

Q. Were they dragged away by the crowd?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And did they fight their way defending their lives against the crowd?

A. I could not say.

Q. Anyhow these men did all they could to help you?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did anyone of the crowd enter the hut and do anything to you?

A. Only two entered.

Q. Was anything done to you?

A. My hat was taken off and thrown out and he tried to drag me out.

Q. Did you form any opinion as to what was the object of dragging you out?

A. To hand me out to the crowd to murder me.

Q. From the attitude of the crowd had you any doubt in your mind that that was their intention—that they intended to murder you when they got you outside?

A. Not after seeing what they had done to those two soldiers.

Q. Was Khair Din with you at the time?

A. The whole time.

Q. Did he plead with the rioters not to molest you?

A. Yes.

Q. And a little later did one of the Kasur pleaders come up?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Who was that?

A. Ghulam Mohi-ud-din.

Q. He also pleaded with the crowd to save you?

A. I think after Khair Din spoke to him.

Q. Both Khair Din and this gentleman did what they could to allay the passions of the crowd?

A. Ghulam Mohi-ud-din went out and spoke to the mob and they quietened down immediately. The second time when he went and spoke to them they all went to the station.

Q. Then after the crowd went back to the station did you remain in the hut for a little while?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you were at the village the Deputy Superintendent of Police with about twenty others came to you?

A. We had been there an hour when they turned up.

Q. I think when you were there you got on a horse and took a telegram to Ferozepore?

A. No, Sir, it was after we were taken to the Deputy Superintendent of Police's bungalow that I got a horse. I asked the Deputy Superintendent of Police if any information had been sent to Ferozepore and he informed me that he had sent a man on horseback to Lahore, so I told him Ferozepore was nearer and that I would get on a horse and take any message to Ferozepore for help.

Q. Was that with a view to informing the Military?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was the situation one that the police could deal with themselves?

A. I could not say.

Q. Anyhow you thought the safety of your family and others made it advisable that the Military should be present?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think when going with your telegram you got on to a light engine at one point?

A. On arriving at Gandasinghwala I found a light engine ready to go to Kasur; I got on to it and I ordered the station master to return it to the bridge.

Q. There you met Colonel Atkins of the Queens?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And then you got him and a force to return with you to Kasur?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. At the time when you returned to Kasur did you find that the mob had been dispersed by the police fire?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You were taken back to Ferozepore by Colonel Atkins?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On your way to inform the Military as to what was occurring you met Lance-Corporal Grinham?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. He was one of the men who was protecting the hut when your wife and children were in it?

5 December 1919.]

Mr. A. J. SHERBOURN.

[Concluded.]

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In what condition did you find him?

A. I found that his head had been cut in several places and he was bleeding very badly.

Q. Was he staggering along as fast as he could?

A. Just before I got up to him he fell against the bank.

Q. Was he in a very exhausted condition?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You do not think he would have been able to go further?

A. No; I do not think he would have been able to get a step further.

Q. You were able to render him assistance?

A. I got my arm round his waist and helped him to the bridge, where Colonel Atkins left a man in charge with him before leaving for Kasur again.

Q. But for that assistance that you rendered him would he have had a bad chance with his life?

A. First of all he was without a hat in the hottest part of the day and it is quite likely he would have got heat-stroke.

Q. Did you see what occurred to the warrant officers who were murdered?

A. No; I did not see them. They were brought into Ferozapore. That was after their death when I was asked to identify the bodies.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. When your train stopped at the distant signal was the signal against the train?

A. Yes.

Q. If the signal was against the train the train could not in the ordinary course proceed?

A. No.

Q. When you were hiding in the hut and when the mob came there what was the number of the mob?

A. I could not say how many came up to the hut.

Q. Khair Din went out of the hut and persuaded them to go away and not to molest you?

A. Two men entered the hut and it was with them that Khair Din spoke.

Q. Did you hear the mob outside?

A. We heard a terrible noise.

Q. If the crowd had come to the hut determined to molest you how did Khair Din so easily succeed in sending them away?

A. He did not send them away.

Q. He certainly succeeded in persuading them not to molest you?

A. He spoke to their leaders.

Q. And they acceded to his suggestion?

A. Yes.

Q. How do you explain that they were so easily persuaded?

A. Khair Din told us that Kamal Din was his neighbour and knew him very well so perhaps Kamal Din thought Khair Din might give him away afterwards so he agreed to what Khair Din had to say.

Q. At what stage did the pleader come?

A. Sometime after.

Q. Had the crowd come back again when the pleader had come?

A. There were some men.

Q. What was the occasion for the pleader to come?

A. I could not tell you.

Q. How long was this pleader with you?

A. I do not think he remained for more than five minutes.

Q. He also succeeded in persuading the crowd to go away?

A. When he spoke to them they went away from the hut.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. How far was the hut from the train?

A. It was a few yards behind the brake-van of the train.

Q. Did you hear any shots when you were in the hut?

A. No.

Q. So long as you were in the hut the train was still there?

A. It had been taken into the station before we left the hut.

Q. How long after?

A. I could not tell you.

Q. Do you remember that one of the expressions used was: "Suar ka bachcha?" These were the words addressed to the crowd?

A. Yes.

Q. According to you they removed your hat and they were trying to molest you. Up to that time it was not given out that two men had been killed?

A. I cannot remember exactly in what order these things happened.

Q. I will read a passage to you from Mrs. Sherbourn's statement. "Some one said that two of their men had been killed; and the man who pulled off my husband's hat got enraged again, and caught me by the wrist."

A. That is true.

Q. How many minutes after you were taken to the hut did this man come and pull off your hat?

A. I could not say exactly. As soon as the door was broken open.

Q. Was this statement made when he was pulling off your hat or was it made by another man?

A. I do not know if it was exactly at that time.

Q. Before your wife's wrist was caught did not one of the men say that "you need not be afraid; you are my mother and your friends are my brothers."

A. I do not remember hearing that.

Q. Khair Din has made this statement before the court.

A. Possibly he may have, but I cannot say.

Mr. Herbert.—When Ghulam Mohi-ud-din addressed the crowd "Suar ka bachcha chale jao" did the crowd say anything?

A. Yes, they taunted him by saying "you yesterday told us something very different to what you are telling us to-day."

By the President—

Q. What I want to ask you is this. With reference to the first leader to whom Khair-ud-din spoke, who was he?

A. He was Chunilal, a contractor.

Q. He had influence over the crowd?

A. He seems to have had a great influence over the crowd.

Q. You have referred to him as a leader of the crowd. Was he leading the crowd towards that hut?

A. He was one of the first to enter the hut. I take it that he was leading the crowd.

Q. What I mean is, was he participating in the actions of the crowd?

A. I could not say that.

Q. Anyhow he had influence with the crowd, and after the conversation of Khair-ud-din, he persuaded the crowd not to continue the action they had started. Is that what you mean?

A. Not to harm us, that is what I mean.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Is it not a fact that the conversation just now detailed by you in answer to the Government Advocate was made by Chunilal who was already inside the hut, and not by any member of the mob outside?

A. I have stated before that it was Chunilal.

Q. After that it was Kamal Din who supplied you with chapatis, milk, water, etc.?

A. I do not know who supplied the food but they were brought into the hut by Kamal Din.

Q. It was Kamal Din who took you to his own village and remained with you for about two-hours?

A. He came along with us. He did not remain for two hours, as we were only there for about an hour.

5 December 1919.]

M. KHAIR-UD-DIN.

## M. KHAIR-UD-DIN, Travelling Inspector of Accounts, North Western Railway.

*By the President—*

Q. Were you in the train from Ferozepore to Kasur on the 12th when it was stopped about 500 yards away from the station?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You were in the 2nd class compartment along with the last witness with his family, and there were four other Indians besides yourself?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Of these four, one was Inspector of Works, North Western Railway, and the other was a Judge?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Besides these people, there were two soldiers in your compartment?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. As soon as Mr. Sherbourn got into the compartment after the train stopped, what happened?

A. I had secured a seat on the middle berth. I was busy reading my book. Mr. Sherbourn got into the compartment and whispered something to the two British soldiers and I could only hear the word "mob" from his conversation. Then I got up and asked Mr. Sherbourn what the matter was, and he said there were rioters outside and he was quite frightened. Then I asked the two soldiers if they had revolvers with them and to load them if they had, but unfortunately they had none with them at the time. So we got down from the compartment.

Q. Did you think there was a probability of your being attacked then?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Why did you think so?

A. Because the night before I was at Moga, and some people who had come to Moga by the night train were talking about the happenings at Amritsar. Then it struck me.

Q. Very well, you might continue the story.

A. Then I got down from the compartment with Mr. Sherbourn. I saw Mrs. Sherbourn and her three little children had already come out. I also saw two Military Officers who also must have come out of the very train. I asked them if they had any revolvers with them, but unfortunately they had none. They all asked me what they should do to protect themselves, and I suggested to them that they should get into the compartment and hide themselves in the bath room and I told them that I would do my very best to help them. There was no time to return to the compartment, because we had left the train and come a few paces away. As the rioters were overtaking us, we all ran to the rear side of the train. There was a gateman's hut there. I knew the gateman, he is considered to be a saint there, and he knew me. So I shouted out to him and told him to open the door of his hut. He very kindly complied with my request, and then I put all these people in the hut and I stood outside. The two military officers of course wanted to face the mob, but they could not.

Q. You said that the two officers wanted to fight the crowd but could not?

A. Yes, it was impossible, because they were stoned and I saw them running. I told the mob to keep back as they had revolvers so that the crowd might be afraid and go away. However, I do not know what happened to these officers. At that time some of the mob began to break open the window and door of the hut, and I was in the hut. I tried to pacify them and I appealed to them saying that I had my purdahwalla family inside and not to disturb us, but all my appeals were in vain. First the small window of the hut was broken, but of course they could not see their way to enter. Then one man came through the big door. He broke it open, but I managed to send him back. Then another man by name Chuni Lal came in. Then I told him 'look here, young boy, these are my friends, do not disturb them.' I patted him, and I did everything in my power to pacify him. In the meantime the two soldiers came out first, because they were in the hut, and they wanted to face the mob, but it was impossible for them to do so. I saw them running as they had received severe hurts because the mob was stoning them.

Q. Do you mean the Military Officers?

A. Yes, Sir, I saw also the two officers.

Q. They never were in the hut?

A. They were outside. I saw them running away and facing the mob, but they could not. Then the two soldiers came out. The first one received slight injuries, but the second soldier, a tall man, I well remember him, had a serious hurt and blood was spouting out of his wound like water from a fountain, and he fell senseless. I picked him up and again went inside. Then I did my level best to pacify Chuni Lal and told him 'look here, young boy, these are my friends, Mrs. Sherbourn is like my sister and Mr. Sherbourn is a great friend of mine, I am very anxious that they should be quite safe.' In fact I did everything to please him and pacify him because I looked upon the trouble as a rising against the British Government. I persuaded Chuni Lal not to hurt this family in any way as they were my great friends.

Q. Did you say that because you looked upon the rising as a rising against the British Government?

A. Naturally, one cannot deny that, because whatever the rioters were doing was simply to put the Europeans into trouble.

Q. It was an attack then upon all Europeans?

A. It was, of course. The two officers were stoned and they had to run for their lives, and although they tried to face the mob, it was impossible for them as they were not armed at the time and I saw with my own eyes the two soldiers who had come out were running as they have received serious injuries, and they were bleeding. I was sometimes inside the hut and sometime outside because I was watching the movements of the rioters, and the hut as well. Then I saw another boy, Kamal Din, whom I knew before, I mean the second boy. He came out of a village on the opposite side of the gateman's hut and then went straight to the mob because the first mob was very large, and later on they came in batches. He first went there, and after a while he returned and I thought I would get all the assistance from this boy. When he returned from the mob, I patted this boy and told him that the Sherbourns were my personal friends and they should not be disturbed or molested in any way. As I said before, I was sometimes going out to watch the hut, and every time I went outside, I was requested by Mrs. Sherbourn not to leave them alone, but I had to go out sometimes to watch the movements of the crowd. After some interval Mr. Ghulam Mohi-ud-din turned up, and as soon as I saw him I thought I would get help from him. So I shouted out and said that the Sherbourns were practically safe so far and we must see that they are not disturbed any more. Then he came up, I made him stand on the wall of the enclosure of the gateman's hut. He stood there and told the mob to go away and not to disturb us. After this the mob did not trouble us.

Then we tried to get some conveyance. I asked Mr. Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din to get a conveyance. In the meantime I had sent my own servant to bring my wife's veil so that I might take Mrs. Sherbourn in disguise. But we could not get any conveyance, so without waiting further we took this family to the village, because Kamal Din suggested to me that the Sherbourns would be quite safe there. The gatekeeper also told me that he had some influence in the village and that he would see that this family was not in any way disturbed there. So we started, but before doing so, I told Mr. and Mrs. Sherbourn 'don't you think that I will go alive to my own house leaving you in this state,' so that Mrs. Sherbourn, who was very much frightened at the time, might not lose all courage. Every time on the way I told her 'don't you think I will go away safely home leaving you in this state; you will see that my throat is out first, and then of course if anything happens I don't know' so that the lady might not lose heart. After reaching the village, I suggested to Kamal Din to bring some milk. I asked him to do this twice, first in the hut and again after reaching the village. He of course brought some milk, water and other things after reaching the village. Then Sheikh Din Muhammad, Judge, the

5 December 1919.]

M. KHAIR-UD-DIN.

[Continued.]

5th passenger, also arrived before we left the hut to go to the village, and he also rendered very valuable assistance to the lady, because she was feeling quite faint and he was pouring water on her head.

Then, of course, I was very much relieved of my anxieties and I felt myself that the family was quite safe.

Then after some time the Deputy Superintendent of Police, the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Sub-Inspector, City Police, came with other gentry and officers of the town.

Q. But for the assistance that you and the other gentlemen rendered, had you any doubt that Mr. Sberbourn and his family would be massacred on that occasion?

A. I believe so.

Q. After they had been for a while in the village, the Deputy Superintendent of Police arrived with a police force and took them to his bungalow where other Europeans and Christian ladies were brought for safety?

A. I accompanied them up to that bungalow myself.

Q. What had caused this outburst against the Government and against the Europeans to which you referred? Why had this large mob come out of Kasur and why did they want to destroy Government property and attack Europeans?

A. I have got a travelling life, and I get very little time to know all these things. I was travelling by the train. I cannot fully describe what this outburst was due to, however, my idea is it is a long thread.

Q. Could you give us your story?

A. Of course everybody knows it. It was only to trouble the Government. Something began some years ago, and I heard that European officers here in Lahore were stoned, it was all in the papers. Then some Muhammadans formed a meeting and passed a resolution condemning this assault by the Hindus. This happened some time ago but now of course some sort of influence has been at work and a few Muhammadans have joined Hindus, otherwise the majority, as far as I think, do not want to join such movements.

Q. Could you come nearer to the incident, itself. What would you say was the motive power behind the mob that did this violence? Did you form any opinion on that?

A. The only opinion I formed was that they wanted to put the Government into trouble.

Q. The destruction of the railway plant and trains and so on looks as though the mob wanted to get rid of the Government altogether?

A. It appears so.

Q. Did that appear to you to be their idea at the time?

A. Yes, Sir, because of the destruction of Government property, cutting of wires and so on.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. What are you doing, Mr. Khair-ud-din? Where are you employed?

A. I am employed in the Railway Department.

Q. As what?

A. Travelling Inspector of Accounts.

Q. What is your salary?

A. Rs. 240.

Q. You were for many years in the railway service?

A. Yes.

Q. You yourself take no part in public or political affairs?

A. No.

Q. And you don't follow and study what is happening?

A. Of course here and there I hear something, but personally I don't study.

Q. You don't take part in any public affairs?

A. No.

Q. You have said that you look upon this rising as a rising against the British Government? Why do you say so?

A. Because the damage that was done was all to Government property, cutting of wires, damaging stations, burning post offices, burning courts and other things.

Q. Stations are not the property of Government; they are the property of the Railway?

A. You may take it in any sense, but I take it as Government property.

Q. Because crowds damaged the railways and cut telegraph wires, you call it a rising against the British Government?

A. So I take it.

Q. Who do you think organized that rising?

A. I may say those who have not got sense, and those who do not know how to treat their rulers.

Q. Who do you think they were? I want to know who organized this rising against the British Government.

A. I can only say those people who have not got sense.

Q. What class of people, Hindus or Muhammadans, or both together, did it?

A. Both, I think.

Q. Both Hindus and Muhammadans?

A. Yes.

Q. You said that in your view they had planned to rise against the British Government?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. All these crowds in various places were not armed at all? What I mean is some bad characters may have been armed with lathis and things of that sort, but the crowds were not armed with weapons?

A. They had no arms.

Q. Do you conceive that those who organized what you call a rising against the British Government were so insane as to believe that they could turn out the British Government without arms at all?

A. That is why I said it was a foolish idea of foolish men.

Q. Do not you think that people who organize a rising against the British Government would think out the problem in some manner? They did not imagine that they could turn out the British Government by having a mob and going with lathis and destroying some property?

A. Only those whose heads are turned may think in that way.

Q. I don't understand you. Do you think that the heads of all Hindus and Muhammadans in the Punjab were turned on this occasion?

A. I never said all, but whosoever did it.

Q. Was there a very small number of insane people who thought this way?

A. I think so.

Q. It must be a very small number; because according to you anybody who organized a thing of that sort must be really insane, his head must have been turned; and you don't attribute that to any large section of the population in the Punjab?

A. Large or small, I can't say. But all that I can say is whosoever's head is turned may think like that.

Q. You gave your emphatic opinion that in your view this was a rising against the British Government. Surely you ought to be able to tell me to whom you attribute this; whether to any particular individuals or to a large section of the Punjab population or to whom?

A. I can only say that one who has become mad or insane, may imagine rising against the British Government.

Q. Are there many mad men in the Punjab or few?

A. I have replied to that, I think.

Q. You have not replied to that. Are there many or are there few?

A. A few.

Q. And the bulk of the population in the Punjab has approved of the action of the few mad men?

A. Yes.

Q. After you went to the hut you said the mob came up to the hut. What was the number of the mob that so came?

A. The first batch was a huge mass.

Q. Many hundreds, several hundreds?

A. Yes.

Q. And one or two came in?

A. Some were all round the hut, some were trying to break open the door and windows.

Q. You say that they came there with the intention of molesting the Europeans?

5 December 1919.]

M. KHAIR-UD-DIN.

[Continued.]

A. That is what I saw.

Q. You also say that the intention of the crowd was to kill the Europeans?

A. Yes, I saw the injured.

Q. If they came with that determined intention, how do you account for your being able to persuade them to go away without carrying out their intention?

A. Nobody can kill a man if his life is not to be shortened.

Q. Because it was so ordained that the Sherbourns were to live therefore somehow the crowd suddenly changed its mind. Is that what you suggest?

A. They tried, but of course on the persuasion of Chuni Lal they did not do anything.

Q. I want to know if the crowd was an organised crowd who had come with the determined intention of killing the family, how did you succeed so easily in persuading them to go away with carrying out their intention?

A. I controlled first the boy who was leading the mob.

Q. But how was Chuni Lal, who was leading the mob for an attack on the Europeans, so easily persuaded by you?

A. I tried to make him understand that these people were my friends.

Q. Had you known him before?

A. Up to this moment I did not know who he was.

Q. You had never seen him?

A. Never.

Q. You had no personal influence over him before?

A. He might have seen me, but I had no personal influence over him.

Q. I want to know how were you able to persuade Chuni Lal who was leading the mob which had come with the determined intention of harming the Europeans to give up that intention and go away?

A. I had some talk with him. I told him that this was no good, I gave him a small lecture and advised him that he should not do so and so on, and he accepted it at once. After that he pleaded on my behalf and assisted me.

Q. Similarly with regard to Kamal Din, he was also a person who was leading the crowd?

A. No; he was not leading the crowd. Of course you may understand that Mr. Sherbourn told me that when I went out the boy did some thing. I will not say that he beat him or did any such thing, but abused him. In my presence he did not do that.

Q. Was Kamal Din also one of the leaders of the mob?

A. I did not take him as a leader. Immediately he came, whatever intention he had, I told him to assist me.

Q. As soon as Kamal Din came to the hut you were able to persuade him to assist you in saving the Sherbourns and he acceded to your request?

A. Yes.

Q. How do you account for the fact that Kamal Din so suddenly changed his intention?

A. I do not know Kamal Din's intention. I came to know of it when I went out and came inside and Mr. Sherbourn told me that I should not go out, because this boy disturbed them in my absence. Whenever I used to go out, he disturbed Mr. and Mrs. Sherbourn in my absence.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Was Kamal Din in the mob or did he come from somewhere else?

A. He came from the village side, as I explained.

Q. He was not in the mob?

A. No, he was not. When he came from the village, he went towards the mob.

Q. All along he was not in the mob that was surrounding you when you came out of that hut?

A. No; he came from the village side.

Q. You were examined as a witness in this riot case, were you not?

A. Yes.

Q. I will read out to you one of the passages. "One Chuni Lal and another Kamal Din came into the hut

at different times but from the mob." Is that statement correct?

A. Please read my full statement. I explained just now that he came from the village and went towards the mob and from there he returned to my hut.

Q. I am reading from your statement as a witness.

A. I must have answered the question in that way there.

Q. You say one Chuni Lal and other Kamal Din came to the hut from the mob. Is that statement correct?

A. Yes; whatever is given there is correct.

Q. These two things are not consistent. I want an explanation. Here you say that he came from a different direction; he was not in the mob. And there you explicitly said that he came from the mob.

A. I have explained that.

Q. I do not say that you are not giving the truth. This is contrary to what you have said there.

A. Please hear me. He came from the opposite village and he went towards the mob. That is what I have explained. Then from that mob he returned towards the hut.

Q. Is it not true that the boy Chuni Lal addressed these remarks to Mrs. Sherbourn? Although he abused Mr. Sherbourn, he did address these remarks to Mrs. Sherbourn; "You are my mother and your children are my brothers."

A. I have said further, and have given full account.

Q. I only want this. I do not want your full account.

A. So far he said that. I remember.

Q. Although he abused Mr. Sherbourn, to Mrs. Sherbourn he said "You are my mother and your children are my brothers."

A. Yes; he also said 'Damn Sherbourn and Damn the English Government.' He also said that.

Q. My point is this. Although he abused Mr. Sherbourn, to Mrs. Sherbourn he said "You are my mother and your children are my brothers."

A. Yes.

Q. After some time, Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din came?

A. Yes.

Q. And you heard him addressing the crowd as "Suar log hat jao?"

A. We both went out.

Q. Yourself and Ghulam Mohi-ud-din went out?

A. Yes, outside near the hut.

Q. You thought, according to you, that this was a rebellious mob intent upon turning out the British Government from India and you were so bold as to go out of this hut and address the mob as "Suar log hat jao."

A. Yes.

Q. Is that consistent with your idea that this mob was a rebellious mob which was bent upon turning out the British Government and you thought that that was the proper way to address them?

A. It is like this. The first mob was unmanageable. Then they came out in batches. The mob which we, Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din and I, had to deal with was a small mob. There were a few people. It did not consist of so many. Properly speaking, I would withstand a few of them myself.

Q. How many were there in that mob?

A. That was the last batch I should say.

Q. What was the number of the last batch?

A. Say about 10.

Q. And you could withstand this mob of 10?

A. Of course, if they did nothing.

Q. You had nobody with you and you had no firearms?

A. No.

Q. You thought you would be able to withstand these 10 men.

A. That was the last batch. They were about 10, I do not know the exact number.

Q. How far away were the others from these 10 persons?

A. The others had gone away. I explained it to you. Please remember. They came in batches. The first was a very big batch, it was a very huge mass. Of course with the help of Chuni Lal I could disperse them. Then another batch came. Then again there

5 December 1919.]

M. KHAIR-UD-DIN.

[Continued.]

came another batch. We had about 3 or 4 batches. It was a small batch of a few men.

Q. In your opinion there was an organised conspiracy behind all these risings?

A. I think so.

Q. And when did you come to know of this? When did this idea cross your mind that there was a sort of organised conspiracy behind all these risings? Was it on that very day or some days previously?

A. When this attack on the Rowlatt Bill began to come, of course each and every soul was talking. Then the passive resistance business started.

Q. That would be in the month of February or March. Is it not so?

A. I cannot give you the exact date.

Q. I do not want the exact date. I want only the month.

A. Sometime before these occurrences.

Q. How many days or how many months before?

A. I cannot give you the exact date.

Q. Give me an approximate time.

A. I say I cannot.

Q. You cannot say whether it was a few weeks or a few months or many months before the occurrences at Kasur? From what time did you begin to think that there was an organised conspiracy to turn out the British Government?

A. At different times we heard different things. Sometime back there was some talk about the Fort being blown up and so on. These things were uttered. Similarly when the Rowlatt Bill question came up, of course there was much talk.

Q. There may be much talk. I want to know when for the first time it struck you that there was an organised conspiracy behind all these movements?

Q. At what time did that idea cross your mind?

A. I cannot say. But I think the Government fully knows it; they can give you the exact time.

Q. Your reply is "I cannot," and the Government knows it and they can supply me with that information?

A. Yes.

Q. Up to what time did you think that your province was absolutely loyal? I am talking of the Punjab. When did you begin to suspect the loyalty of some of the inhabitants of the province?

A. During this war we have done nicely.

Q. I do not say that you have not done nicely. I want to know from what time you began to suspect the loyalty of some of the inhabitants of the province of the Punjab.

A. From what time I cannot say.

Q. May I take it that this idea that there was a conspiracy behind this movement came to your mind when you were preparing this statement? Give me some idea. I do not want the exact date, or anything of that sort. I want some idea of time when for the first time it struck you that there was something wrong with some of the inhabitants of the Punjab and they were becoming or were being persuaded to become disloyal?

A. I have never said disloyal anywhere.

Q. Don't you think that those who intended to turn out the British Government from the province of the Punjab were disloyal?

A. Wicked persons will do wicked things any time they like.

Q. Till the time you saw these acts, I think the idea never crossed your mind. That is, till the time you saw these things done by some of the persons or by some of the crowds, this idea never struck you that there was any disloyalty among the people?

A. Of course it was putting Government into trouble.

Q. Would not putting Government into trouble be disloyalty to the Crown?

A. I do not quite follow you.

Q. Do you make any distinction between putting Government to trouble and disloyalty?

A. That is my answer.

Q. I want to know whether you make any distinction between disloyalty and putting Government to trouble?

A. I say they were putting Government to trouble. That is all.

Q. That is disloyalty?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore I want to know when for the first time you thought that some of the people of the province of the Punjab were becoming disloyal? When did the idea first cross your mind?

A. I can see it even now.

Q. Do you think that is the answer to my question, when for the first time this idea crossed your mind that the people of the Punjab were becoming disloyal or were being persuaded to become disloyal?

A. First as I remember it was sometime when Europeans were stoned in Lahore.

Q. Was it three years ago?

A. I cannot give you the exact time.

Q. Some years ago?

A. Yes.

Q. At that time you thought that some of the people of the Punjab were becoming disloyal?

A. Sometimes they were pacified and at other times they were not.

Q. The whole thing commenced some three years ago?

A. Yes.

Q. Where did this stoning of the Europeans happen?

A. It was in Lahore.

Q. What was the occurrence?

A. Some European officer was stoned and of course the Muhammadans did not like this action. I remember. At least I read about it some time ago.

Q. Some years ago a certain British officer was stoned in Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. By whom?

A. By some Indian, I think.

Q. One or two or only one?

A. I do not remember the number, but I read about it some time ago.

Q. Was it a riot? Did a crowd or one individual assault that British officer?

A. I do not remember.

Q. And then the Muhammadans did not like it?

A. Yes.

Q. What do you mean by saying that the Muhammadans did not like it? I do not quite understand that. Will you kindly explain it?

A. You can refer to the records. I do not remember fully.

Q. It is not my business to refer to the records. You have come here to give evidence perfectly. You have made that statement voluntarily that several years ago a European Government official was assaulted. I want to know whether you know any facts about that affair or not. It appears to me that either you have forgotten it or you do not want to speak out.

A. I remember that; I cannot give you the exact date and time.

Q. I am not asking you the exact date and time. My simple question is what you mean by saying that the Muhammadans did not like it. Was it an attack by one or more persons and the Muhammadans did not like it? I want an explanation.

A. They did not like that the Europeans should be troubled.

Q. The Muhammadans did not like the Europeans being put to trouble. Were there any meetings or do you refer to any newspaper articles or any resolutions passed? What do you mean?

A. I read in the papers: of course, some resolutions were also passed.

Q. You read in the papers to the effect that some resolutions were passed by the Muhammadans saying that it was a bad thing and they did not like it?

A. Yes.

Q. Very well, what happened next?

A. I do not know.

Q. You mentioned in your reply to the President something about the Hindus. You said that the



5 December 1919.]

M. KHAIK-UD-DIN.

[Continued.]

Muhammadans did not like it. This was the beginning of the threat?

A. The Muhammadans did not like it.

Q. That was the beginning of the threat of disloyalty and that is the reason for what you saw at Kasur. Do you know what happened within this period?

A. No.

Q. After that there was nothing else?

A. This is the end of the threat.

Q. After that, this is the end of the threat. I do not say what you state is not exactly what you believe. You have stated before this Committee that you thought this rising was a rebellious rising with the intention of turning out the British Government, and in reply to the President, you considered it a long threat. Therefore it is long threat upon which you have based your opinion?

A. It has come to this length.

Q. The beginning of the threat was that some European was assaulted by one or more persons at Lahore; then in the papers you saw certain resolutions passed by the Muhammadans that they did not like it; after that there was nothing else and this is the end of the threat?

A. There were some troubles from emigrants.

Q. You refer to a time three years ago?

A. I do not remember now.

Q. I take it that your opinion that there was a conspiracy to turn out the British Government from India is based first upon that long threat because one European was assaulted by one or more persons at Lahore, and you read in certain newspapers that the Muhammadans had passed a resolution saying that it was a very bad thing, then the second thing that you told this Committee was that there was some trouble by emigrants and the third is what you saw at Kasur?

A. Yes.

Q. And upon this fact you have based your opinion that there was a conspiracy to turn out the British Government. Is that not so?

A. Yes.

Q. There were two other officers in the train?

A. Yes.

Q. And they did not help you or Mr. Sherbourn?

A. They could hardly save themselves.

Q. There were two other warrant officers who had firearms. They did not come out of their compartment and help you?

A. I did not see any such officer. I saw the two officers, they had no revolver with them.

Q. There were two other officers who had firearms?

A. I did not see those officers with firearms.

Q. They never came out of the compartment?

A. I never saw any other officer with the exception of those I have described.

Q. You were not aware that any other Europeans were in that first class compartment? When you came out of your carriage, you did not see any other European officers except those whom you have mentioned in your statement?

A. I did not see anybody else.

Q. Neither did you see them before reaching Kasur?

A. No.

Q. How many minutes were you inside the hut before Kamal Din came?

A. I was there from the beginning to the end.

Q. How many minutes after you reached there did Kamal Din come there?

A. He came after some time.

Q. Was it a long time afterwards or was it after a few minutes? Some time may mean anything.

A. I cannot say the exact time.

Q. You cannot say whether it was 15 minutes or two hours?

A. I never noted down this.

Q. There is no question of noting down. I do not want the exact second and minute. Give me some idea.

A. It was after some time. That is what I can give you.

Q. Some time may mean one hour or 10 minutes or 5 minutes.

A. Say about an hour or so.

Q. According to your estimate of time Kamal Din came after one hour?

A. One hour or so.

Q. According to you as soon as you used to go out of the hut, these two boys used to molest the Sherbourns. Therefore you were requested not to leave hut, because, these boys, Chuni Lal and Kamal Din in your absence were molesting Mrs. Sherbourn and her children?

A. So Mr. Sherbourn told me.

Q. I do not understand this. Notwithstanding that you had a persuasive tongue and you persuaded these two leaders of that rabble mob not to molest the lady and not to molest children, how is it as soon as you went out of the hut, they again commenced molesting? I do not understand that.

A. I cannot answer why they were doing that in my absence.

Q. And you think that a crowd which had leaders like Chuni Lal and Kamal Din, who could be persuaded by you or dissuaded by you from having their own will without any firearms was bent upon turning out the British Government?

A. It was not this mob that I referred to.

Q. You do not mean that that particular mob of which Kamal Din and Chuni Lal were leaders had any idea of turning out the British Government. If you make that clear, I am satisfied.

A. Yes.

*By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—*

Q. Some questions were asked by one or two members. I want to make that clear. You said that there was an organized rebellion to turn out the British Government. Is that so?

A. I never said organized rebellion.

Q. There was some organization behind these disturbances, the object of which was to turn out the British Government. Is that what you said?

A. So it appeared to me.

Q. Was it confined only to the Punjab or was it in your opinion throughout India?

A. I cannot say much about this.

Q. You do not know much about the rest of India. You can say about the Punjab better? Your knowledge of the Punjab is better than the rest of India?

A. Yes. It was seen everywhere in India.

Q. It was seen everywhere. I take it that you are well acquainted as to what is taking place all over India?

A. No. I meant about passive resistance.

Q. I just want to get at the source of your knowledge. Why do you say that it was all over India? Are you personally acquainted with it, or is that your inference by reading newspapers?

A. That is what I saw on the day of the disturbance, and that is what we heard for some time about passive resistance and so on.

Q. Because you have heard about passive resistance, and you saw what happened at Kasur on the 12th April, you conclude that there was this rebellious movement all over India. Is that so?

A. Illiterate people take a wrong meaning of what the learned people have to say. Of course it is sufficient for them to think they should take these lines.

Q. You do not answer my point. My question is whether from reading about passive resistance in the newspapers and from what you saw on the 12th April at Kasur, you conclude that there was this kind of movement to turn out the British Government.

A. That is what I saw at Kasur and that was quite clear to me.

Q. Did you conclude that from what you saw at Kasur? From that it was clear to you that the movement was with the object of turning the British Government?

A. Of course I saw some injured and some being killed.

5 December 1919.]

M. KHAI-UD-DIN—concluded—Mr. V. O. RAYNOR.

Q. Is that what you saw in Kasur?  
 A. And heard about Amritsar?  
 Q. Upon what you saw at Kasur you have based the statement that the object was to turn out the British Government?  
 A. To trouble the Europeans.  
 Q. Not to turn out the British Government, but to trouble the Europeans?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. From what you heard about the happenings at Amritsar and from what you saw at Kasur, you conclude that the object was to trouble the Europeans and not to turn out the British Government?  
 A. I say that the object was to trouble the Europeans.  
 Q. And not to turn out the British Government?  
 A. I replied to both questions, that it was to trouble the Europeans.  
 Q. You did say "they wanted to turn out the Government?"  
 A. To trouble the Europeans; it means they wanted to turn the Europeans out.  
 Q. By troubling the Europeans, you mean to say that they wanted to turn the Europeans out?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. You said there were some mad men who organised this movement in the Punjab.  
 A. Whose head had been turned.  
 Q. Do you know any of these organisations, any one of them? Where were the headquarters of the organisations of these men whose object was to turn out the British Government?  
 A. I don't know.  
 Q. Are you acquainted with any branch of it anywhere?  
 A. No.  
 Q. Did you have any conversation with any of them?  
 A. No; from what I saw, I say that these were mad men.  
 Q. What you saw at Kasur?  
 A. What I saw and what I heard.

Q. What you have given out to this Committee is what you saw at Kasur and heard at Amritsar?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Nothing beyond that?  
 A. Nothing.  
 Q. Can you tell us why these people wanted to trouble and turn out the Europeans, and what was the cause of it?  
 A. Anybody who wishes to disobey his master can do anything he likes.  
 Q. I do not quite understand you. My question is why these men wanted to turn the Europeans out: what was the cause of it? You may say you do not know. Can you assign any cause?  
 A. Whatever they wanted to do should be done; their wishes should be carried out.  
 Q. What were their wishes?  
 A. They knew how to do these things.  
 Q. You have no idea as to what their wishes were?  
 A. They wanted the Rowlatt Bill to be cancelled.  
 Q. And the Rowlatt Bill could not be cancelled until the Europeans were turned out? Is that what you mean?  
 A. Not only that; there may be many other things. Evidently they thought so.  
 Q. You know their thoughts? Have they spoken to you?  
 A. Perhaps.  
 Q. Did you have any conversation with any one of them?  
 A. No.  
 Q. So you have read their thoughts, they have been telling all these things.  
 A. These were the things that were going on. So I understand from the disturbances that took place.  
 Q. And what you say is based on this disturbance and from this you have built up all this story in your imagination?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Nothing more than that?  
 A. Yes.

Mr. V. O. RAYNOR, District Traffic Superintendent, North Western Railway, Ferozepore.

Q. Mr. Raynor, you are the District Traffic Superintendent, North Western Railway, Ferozepore?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. Were you in the train on the 12th April?  
 A. No, Sir.  
 Q. You know that on the occasion of these occurrences, the Railway staff at Kasur seemed to have been indifferent?  
 A. They were most inactive.  
 Q. Would you explain how you account for that?  
 A. My information is in my statement. The fact was they took no trouble to wire to Ferozepore and inform of the occurrence before 12 o'clock, before the instruments were destroyed and they had come on to the station platform. At the time the 1st train came, the telegraph instruments were not interfered with.  
 Q. Had they time to send a message?  
 A. Lots of time. It would only take a few seconds to get to the instrument and send the message.  
 Q. Did you investigate as to how far the staff had been associated with the rising actively?  
 A. Some of my staff were identified, arrested and, I believe, sent up to Lahore.  
 Q. Had you seen some of your staff prior to the occurrence of the 12th?  
 A. I got to Ferozepore on the 3rd April; I took over the district only on the 3rd. I did not have an opportunity to see my staff at all. I knew the Station Master on a previous occasion. On the 11th, as I have said at the beginning of my statement, with the Executive Engineer, I motor trolled to Amritsar. It was then that I saw certain of the staff and returned. On our return journey, there was active *hartal* and the people had come to the station. The staff did not even give me any information about them.  
 Q. Did they give you wrong information?

A. They absolutely gave me no information what ever.  
 Q. Who is the acting Station Master at Kasur?  
 A. It was the permanent Assistant Station Master, Ghuni Lal.  
 Q. Is he still acting?  
 A. No, Sir. He was one of them that was given a month's pay and notice in terms of his agreement.  
 Q. Because his conduct was unsatisfactory? Were you aware, on the 12th, that they were contemplating a strike on the railway?  
 A. No, Sir.  
 Q. Were you informed that on the 16th Martial Law was to be declared?  
 A. I was not at Kasur at the time.  
 Q. You got a wire from the Traffic Manager stating that Martial Law was about to be declared on the North Western Railway in the Punjab?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. So far as the administration of railways is concerned, is Martial Law a benefit or the reverse?  
 A. I had no experience of it except at Kasur, and it was not my job to go into those things—whether it was of benefit or not.  
 Q. I suppose you thought it impossible to maintain a regular system of trains after the wires were cut and the rails were being lifted?  
 A. Absolutely impossible. Telegraph wires were being cut and trains derailed all over the place.  
 Q. Measures to prevent a recurrence of these things would be essential?  
 A. I think it would be a very good thing.  
 Q. Were you more than once at Kasur from the 12th April onwards?  
 A. Yes, Sir.

5 December 1919.]

Mr. V. O. RAYNOR.

[Continued.]

Q. And in connection with the riots and the murders that have taken place did you know that efforts were made to get the members of the Railway staff to identify them?

A. As I have said, Lieutenant-Colonel McRae asked the station staff to come and give evidence, but the station staff showed a very sullen attitude towards identifying people. Mr. Marsden approached them as well to volunteer and give evidence. I spoke to the permanent Station-master who had returned by then, and he endeavoured on more than one occasion to get the staff to come forward. He himself did. It was on that occasion that he informed me that the staff were absolutely unwilling. I could make no impression on the staff.

Q. After several efforts were made, you were successful in getting some of the staff to give evidence?

Q. A few of the staff.

A. What methods did you adopt?

A. I just spoke to them about it.

Q. You did use no threat or violence?

A. None whatever.

Q. In talking to them, did you form an opinion as to what was causing reluctance in their minds?

A. The opinion afterwards that I formed was, to start with, the people that did come forward and give evidence were some of the junior men. These had been coerced by their seniors or outside influence had been brought to bear on them.

Q. During the period of the disturbances, were you constantly getting reports as to cutting of wires?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. At what different points?

A. Frequently on the Amritsar-Kasur section and in the Hoshiarpur and Jullundur Districts.

Q. Did you endeavour to trace them?

A. The police made enquiries about these cases; they were in hands of the police.

Q. Did you make any attempts?

A. I was not able to get away from Ferozepore.

Q. As a result of the raids was the train service interfered with?

A. A great deal.

Q. How long was it before the train service resumed its normal course?

A. On the Amritsar-Kasur section I think the trains started running on the 1st May; there was only one train each way put on.

Q. Was it possible to run more trains?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Did the curtailment of traffic necessitate restrictions?

A. The main lines could not carry the traffic.

Q. During the period I see you say in your statement that certain rumours were circulated freely among the rural population. The rumours you refer to are:—(1) The Lieutenant-Governor had been murdered and Government House reduced to ashes; (2) the Fort had fallen and is in the hands of the mob, and (3) that the Golden Temple had been bombarded by our troops. How did you find out these rumours?

A. Everyone talked about them. One of my assistants, Sardar Teja Singh, was continually sending a man to repair telegraph wires, and he gave this information on more than one occasion, and I asked him to see if these rumours, especially about the Golden Temple, were true.

Q. As regards your staff, did these rumours have an unsettling effect on them?

A. At Ferozepore, I had a large staff of Sikhs, especially in the running staff.

Q. You found that they did unsettle them?

A. Very much.

Q. Did you try to trace these rumours to their sources?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Is it a fact that there was going to be a strike at Ambala during those very days?

A. I do not think there was a strike; there was no strike in Ferozepore District. The strikes that I heard of were at Jaisal and Bahawalpur.

Q. And you have not yet been informed as to whether or not a strike was there? How many clerks of the station staff are there at Kasur?

A. I cannot tell you off-hand.

Q. Half a dozen or more than a dozen?

A. The senior Indian staff there must be about 30.

Q. Whom did you include in the senior staff?

A. Station-masters, Assistant Station-masters, signallers, booking clerks and goods clerks.

Q. How many Station-masters?

A. One.

Q. How many assistants?

A. Three.

Q. Signallers.

A. 4 or 5.

Q. Was any one of them on leave on the 11th or 12th?

A. Yes; the Station-master was on leave.

Q. Was he not at the station?

A. No.

Q. Now, so far as the Station-master is concerned, he was a witness in the conspiracy case?

A. I do not know; I believe he was.

Q. Assistant Station-master Kehr Singh? He was a witness?

A. Yes.

Q. Then all the ticket collectors were witnesses against rioters in the case?

A. I cannot say.

Q. I will give you the names—

Hardeo Das, Amar Nath, Miran Bakhsh, Kohar Singh, Tulsi Das, Shiv Sewak Singh, Lachman Das, Nand Lal, Muhammad Shafi, Nathu Ram, Ghulam Muhammad, Nirotam Das and others. Therefore even after hearing the names of these witnesses you are prepared to say the Railway staff were not prepared to give evidence?

A. To start with, they were not prepared to give evidence. When I approached them, they were most reluctant, and it was only after my having spoken to them and advised them that there was no harm in coming forward and giving evidence, that they came forward.

Q. You advised them there was no harm in coming forward? Therefore the underlying idea of the reluctance was they believed that harm would come to them?

A. I know Indians fairly well, and I know what reluctance is based on. The reluctance was due to the fact that the other people, merchants and others, with whom they have to deal would look on them as scamps.

Q. They thought that if they appeared as witnesses, they would be inconvenienced by the merchants and others with whom they had dealings.

A. Yes; except that, nothing else.

Q. Now, that is your opinion?

A. It is my opinion.

Q. I want to know on what was that opinion based?

A. An opinion any one of us can form.

Q. Any more reasons for their being reluctant to give evidence?

A. This is another reason; they did not want to give themselves away.

Q. The reason why they did not in the first instance come forward to give information was they thought that they were in it. Therefore if they are in the wrong you would not expect them to come forward?

A. You cannot draw that inference.

Q. If I am in the wrong, I won't come before you and make a clean breast of it?

A. Certainly.

Q. From the very fact that in the first stages of investigation, they did not come forward, they were reluctant, and at another stage of the investigation, the whole lot of them have been examined as witnesses and have come forward, will it be unnatural to draw the inference that some sort of pressure was brought

5 December 1919.]

Mr. V. O. RATNOR.

[Continued.]

to bear upon them, either by the Railway authorities or by somebody else?

A. No; I know my staff fairly well. I know the Station-master; I thought him a very good man. I thought that if any undue pressure was brought to bear on them he would have brought it to my notice.

Q. Is it not a fact that this reluctance disappeared after one of the clerks was lashed?

A. No; they came forward before that.

Q. At what time were you in Kasur Station?

A. I cannot tell you exactly; I can tell you from my diary. It was either before or after the train that was mobbed on the 2nd day. I think it was before.

Q. At what time?

A. 10 o'clock I think.

Q. At what time did you return on the 11th?

A. About 5-30 or 6.

Q. We have been informed as a matter of fact that this meeting of which you make mention in your statement was being held at 5-30?

A. I could not say exactly.

Q. I give you that information; you may take it from me. We have been informed that a meeting was actually held at 5-30.

A. There was a *hartal*.

Q. That meeting was held at 5-30. We have been also informed that there was no *hartal* at 10 o'clock. Therefore when you were going to Amritsar, did your staff inform you that there was no trouble, and they were perfectly quiet?

A. Yes.

Q. After 5-30 your staff remained in the railway premises?

A. Just next door; actually on the borders of the station.

Q. And from what time to what time have they to be present there?

A. Not the whole lot. They are changed.

Q. May I know the names of the persons?

A. In the afternoon, Chuni Lal and Nandi Lal, Signaller in charge and 2 others.

Q. From what time to what time was it their duty to stay in the station? Nand Lal?

A. Nand Lal's duty hours end at that time. Chuni Lal was at the station the whole day. He was the Station-master, but was not required to be there the whole day.

Q. When you formed your opinion, had you any information that this man, Chuni Lal, and Nand Lal, who were your informers, had any occasion to go to the city?

A. No, certainly not.

Q. And if I mistake not the crowd which was supposed to have come to the Railway Station, it was some time after the meeting was stopped?

A. That may be so.

Q. And therefore I do not think that is a very strong ground, it will be at the most suspicious, that your informers did not inform you that there was any trouble in the city?

A. Merchants were coming and going because it was a public place. The people were continually coming and going. It was only reasonable to imagine that they would surely have informed the staff and given information to the Station-master.

Q. Merchants were coming and going?

A. They were the whole day there.

Q. In case there was a *hartal* these merchants won't come?

A. There was *hartal*.

Q. Then they would not come for business?

A. That was before 2 o'clock. Up to that time the merchants were there. I am positive that *hartal* was declared to commence at 2 P.M.

Q. You mean that up to 2 o'clock they would come, and there they would give this information?

A. Yes.

Q. You have given evidence before us that up to 2 o'clock there was no *hartal*. It was all of a sudden at 2. What are your reasons? It was a sudden *hartal* on receipt of the news of Mr. Gandhi?

A. It is only reasonable to accept that. The staff was there. If they went into Kasur, they were right in the middle of it. I don't know that they were right in the middle of it, but they are not very far away. In fact the Station vendors are all residents of Kasur. They have no place provided for them at the station. They could let them know. They kept the *hartal* as well.

Q. The story is this that somewhere about 2 or 2-30 the idea of *hartal* was started and some of the shops were closed. A few bands of young men went round to ask the people to close their shops. In the meantime they wanted to have a speech and they approached certain pleaders, and these pleaders consented, and then a meeting was held at about 5-30. There was nothing wrong at that time. After the meeting was dispersed a violent speech was delivered by somebody who got the people to close their shops throughout the city. The *hartal* was spontaneous, news having reached of what had happened at Amritsar and of Mr. Gandhi's arrest; and it was not universal; a few shops were closed. Therefore I again ask you whether you are not prepared to modify your opinion that when you went to Amritsar and came back from there it was quite possible that these two men, Chuni Lal and Nand Lal, might not have heard about it?

A. I don't think that those two men must have heard about it, but the other staff was there, and they must have heard about it. Some of the staff live in the city.

Q. Is it your opinion that the police were concerned in it or connived at it?

A. That is not a question for me to answer.

Q. You went there and investigated the matter?

A. I did not investigate. That is purely a police case.

Q. It was Railway Police?

A. It does not come under my jurisdiction.

Q. Then in your investigations on the subsequent days you never troubled yourself with what these Railway Police were talking at the time?

A. It was not my job.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Do you suggest that the trains were stopped at the distant signals?

A. That is incorrect. They stopped at the facing points. The station has not interlocking facing points. When the train was detained outside the signals the signals could not be pulled as they were damaged and cut. All the three trains remained hanging outside the signals.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. The trains cannot come into the station unless the signals are lowered. The signals were against the train?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Somebody had deliberately cut the wire?

A. Yes.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. The signals are close to the station?

A. They are quite near the station building.

Q. How did they cut them?

A. They were clipped. One or two cuts were given with a pick-axe or something like that.

Q. It might have been done by somebody who understood what they were meant for?

A. They were exposed wires.

Q. The cutting might have been done by somebody who knew about these wires?

A. These wires were just near the Gate-keeper's hut. The Gate was just near the Bridge, and the signals are pulled off from there on the Ferozepore side at the wheel signal.

Q. But were other wires also cut?

A. The telegraph wires were also cut.

Q. This is a ground wire?

A. Yes.

Q. They were only cut in that one place?

A. Yes.

5 December 1919.]

B. KEHAR SINGH.

## B. KEHAR SINGH, Assistant Station Master, Kasur.

By the President—

Q. Were you Assistant Station Master at Kasur?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Were you on duty on the 12th of April last?  
 A. I was on duty from 1 o'clock in the night to 9 in the morning.  
 Q. On your being relieved you had gone to your quarters?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. After taking your bath you heard a great noise coming from the Railway Station?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. You took a friend with you?  
 A. Yes, B. Mastan Chand whose quarters are just near mine.  
 Q. You reached the platform at about 10?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. What did you find there?  
 A. First of all I found a wagon which was standing on the island platform on fire.  
 Q. How had that wagon been set on fire?  
 A. The rioters had set that wagon on fire.  
 Q. What had put the wagon on fire?  
 A. It was a wooden wagon.  
 Q. Wooden wagons would not easily take fire. Had there been oil in it?  
 A. It was burning a little on one side.  
 Q. It was not all in flames?  
 A. At one corner.  
 Q. Had there been anything else in the wagon?  
 A. There were four tins of oil, hand lamps, signals and other lamps, baskets and other furniture. Signals were saved from that wagon.  
 Q. All these things you found in the wagon?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Where had these things come from?  
 A. These were the station stores for the station use.  
 Q. They were inside the wagon?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. And it was on fire?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Was there anything else on fire?  
 A. I saw the lamp-room on fire.  
 Q. Did you see any glasses of doors and windows broken?  
 A. Yes. I saw the glasses broken outside the station and the lamp-room was altogether on fire.  
 Q. Did you find out how this had occurred?  
 A. The rioters had destroyed the lamp-room.  
 Q. Were many people seen near the station?  
 A. About 2,000.  
 Q. What were they doing?  
 A. They were breaking glass and running towards the Gandasinghwala side.  
 Q. Did you see your staff there?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. What were they doing?  
 A. They were extinguishing the fire in the lamp-room.  
 Q. And did your staff make any attempt to prevent the crowd from doing what they were doing?  
 A. I came to know that they were shaking hands before the crowd not to do so.  
 Q. What do you mean by shaking hands?  
 A. Trying to disperse them.  
 Q. Your staff was trying to disperse them?  
 A. The staff was trying to disperse the mob. They were shaking hands "don't do so," "don't do so."  
 Q. They were really pressing the crowd not to do so?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Then you went to the Assistant Station Master's office to get the key of the fire bucket stand?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Did you then go to the Telegraph Office?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. What did you find there?  
 A. I found that the instruments had been taken from their proper position and wires had been cut.  
 Q. How was that done?

A. By some rioters.  
 Q. Did you make any effort to wire?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Were you able to do so?  
 A. The station wires had been cut. I then made up my mind to go to the Government Telegraph Office and I went out of the station. I was accompanied by B. Gurdas Ram, Pleader, and we went to the Government Telegraph Office and Mastan Chand, Assistant Station Master, and Chuni Lal and Jiwan Mall were returned again to the lamp-room and remained at the station. When I, with B. Gurdas Ram, arrived in the Government office, we found all the instruments out of order. I tested them but heard no beat.  
 Q. Had the wire been cut?  
 A. Not inside the office.  
 Q. Some damage must have been done outside?  
 A. Yes, on testing no beat was heard. Then we proceeded to find a *tumtum* but found none in the bazar. Then I requested a pleader to give us his tonga and we arrived at Ganda Singhwala.

By Sir G. H. Setalvad—

Q. How long were you at Kasur before these events?  
 A. I arrived on the 13th November.  
 Q. That was the first time you were posted at Kasur?  
 A. Before I had been at Kasur for four years and then after a lapse of time I was again posted there.  
 Q. But you have known Kasur before?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. You knew the station staff well?  
 A. Yes. Some were new hands and some were old hands in the staff.  
 Q. It has been suggested that the station staff was in league with the rioters in these disturbances? Is there any truth in that suggestion?  
 A. No.  
 Q. You were the Station Master in charge?  
 A. No, I was the Assistant Station Master.  
 Q. The permanent Station Master had gone on leave?  
 A. Babu Chuni Lal was in charge.  
 Q. You were not in charge?  
 A. No.  
 Q. You were one of the Assistants?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. And so far as you know is it true that the station staff was in league with the rioters?  
 A. I don't know, Sir.  
 Q. I want to know what you mean by saying that you don't know whether they were in it or not. You were on the station on that day; you were there for several months; you were in constant company with the other members of the staff and surely you must be in a position to tell me what you observed on that day. Was any member of the staff in league with the rioters?  
 A. I don't know.  
 Q. There was no member in league with them?  
 A. No.  
 Q. How many members of the staff were at the Station when the rioters came?  
 A. About 12 or 15 clerks and about 12 or 15 menials.  
 Q. And how many members of the police force were there?  
 A. About two or three constables.  
 Q. Had they arms or not.  
 A. They daily remain without arms.  
 Q. What did these station staff, i.e., 12 or 15 menials, do to prevent the rioters from destroying the property?  
 A. When I reached the platform they were putting the *gumlas* (flower-pots) in their places and they were extinguishing fire.  
 Q. What was the number of the crowd?  
 A. About 2,000.  
 Q. You think it was not possible for the Station staff to keep them back?  
 A. I think it was impossible to turn out the crowd of so many men.

5 December 1919.]

B. KEHAR SINGH.

[Continued.]

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

- Q. This Gurdas Ram, Pleader, who helped you, is the son of the Station-master?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. And you know Chuni Lal?  
 A. Assistant Station-master.  
 Q. He was arrested?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. He was kept under arrest for some days?  
 A. For about 15 days.  
 Q. There was one Bhagat Ram?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. What was he?  
 A. Chief Booking Clerk.  
 Q. He remained under arrest for some days?  
 A. No, Sir.  
 Q. He was flogged?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. There was another Assistant Station-master named Mastan Chand?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. He was also arrested?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. He was kept under custody for how many days?  
 A. Four men were arrested from the Station.  
 Q. This man Mastan Chand had 28 years' service?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. He was not present at the Station?  
 A. He was present at the Station. I have stated that he accompanied me to the Station. The Station-master, Kirpa Ram, was on leave.  
 Q. You were personally aware that Mastan Chand was not among the rioters?  
 A. Yes, he came from the quarters with me when I came.  
 Q. When you went to the Telegraph office he went with you?  
 A. He was again returned with Chuni Lal and Jewan Mal, Assistant Station-masters.  
 Q. Can you give me an idea why all these Station Staff were arrested?  
 A. Those four men? They were arrested on the evidence of some person called Darogha; he was at Ferozapore and he made an impression upon the authorities that these men were telling the mob "don't kill the Salibs inside the Station, but take them outside the Station and kill there," that is what I heard.  
 Q. Were they arrested after this statement or before this statement?  
 A. They were arrested on the 27th or the 28th.  
 Q. That is what I mean. You refer to the contractor of the 1/4th Queens, an outsider, who came and made that statement; were all these persons arrested before his statement or after his statement?  
 A. After his statement.  
 Q. This man Bhagat Ram, why was he flogged?  
 A. He was attending the meeting.  
 Q. Where was he attending the meeting?  
 A. At the Railway quarters at Hari Ram's house.  
 Q. What was wrong with that?  
 A. I was one of the members of that assembly. First of all I was called by Mr. Long, Station-master. After that, through Muhammad Shafi, some other clerks were called.  
 Q. Mr. Long called you and some other clerks?  
 A. Yes, through Muhammad Shafi.  
 Q. They were collected in that room?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Who was Mr. Long?  
 A. He was acting Station-master.  
 Q. And then the Military were informed. They came and arrested you?  
 A. They surrounded us.  
 Q. There was no conspiracy meeting or anything of that sort?  
 A. No, Sir.  
 Q. Now you were all along in service there and after the 12th you were there?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. And how many people were made to work at the Railway Station?  
 A. At the Kasur Railway Station?  
 Q. At the Kasur Railway Station those who were arrested and those who were ordered to be punished were 40 persons every day?  
 A. Altogether there were 30 clerks.  
 Q. How many members of the outside public were made to work at the Goods Shed during the Martial Law days?  
 A. There were some Sadhus.  
 Q. How many Sadhus did you see working there?  
 A. I did not see any. I only heard that some Sadhus were working.  
 Q. You only heard that some were working at the Station and you did not see?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Did you not see anybody?  
 A. No. My duties were from 1 to 9 hours.  
 Q. Were you present at any of the floggings or were you ordered to be present?  
 A. I saw Bhagat Ram being flogged.  
 Q. You saw him?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Who asked you to be present there?  
 A. Captain Doveton.  
 Q. Did the police help you in any way when the crowd came there on the 12th?  
 A. I was not at the Station at that time, Sir.  
 Q. I do not understand one thing. Is it not a fact that all the trials and all the enquiries by Captain Doveton were held at the Railway platform?  
 A. Which enquiries, Sir?  
 Q. Kasur Railway Station was the head-quarters of the Military Authorities in those days and persons were tried, convicted or let off, i.e., their cases were heard at the Railway Station. Is it not a fact?  
 A. Yes, Sir. At the Railway Station.  
 Q. You know some of the people who were ordered to work at the Goods Shed?  
 A. No. My duties were at night.  
 Q. Does not day duty come by turn?  
 A. During that period I was ordered to work altogether at night.  
 Q. Do you know one Sharn Das?  
 A. There is a train Clerk, Shams-ud-din.  
 Q. Do you know anything that occurred to him?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. What was that?  
 A. He was ordered to read an apology before the Military Authorities regarding a quarrel with the Manager of the Circus Company.  
 Q. There was a quarrel between him and the Manager of the Circus Company?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. What steps were taken against him?  
 A. He was taken before the Captain, and there he apologized.  
 Q. What was his crime?  
 A. I heard there was a quarrel between Shams-ud-din and the Manager of the Circus Company about a chair. The Company had given free passes, and the holders were told if they liked to see the Circus they must bring their own chairs. Shams-ud-din did not bring his own chair. He returned the pass. I don't know whether the Manager made a complaint to Captain Doveton or somebody at the Station. Shams-ud-din was told to read an apology.  
 Q. The apology was read because he was given a free pass by the Manager of this Company and the Manager had said that any one who wished to witness the Circus, should bring his own chair?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. This man went there without a chair, but wanted to sit on a chair?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. The chair was not given and he returned the pass?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. For this reason he was made to read an apology?  
 A. I heard that these were the circumstances.  
 Q. Did he go a second night to the Circus?

5 December 1919.]

B. KEHAR SINGH—concluded—LALA ANANT RAM.

A. He might have.

Q. Was he allowed to sit? What happened to him?

A. I heard he was returned.

Q. You don't know what happened to him the second day?

A. No.

## LALA ANANT RAM, Municipal Commissioner, Kasur.

By the President—

Q. You are a Municipal Commissioner at Kasur I think?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You were in Kasur on the 12th of April?

A. I was inside the tahsil at about 11 o'clock.

Q. Were you inside the tahsil at the time the mob came and made an attempt to burn down the gate of the tahsil?

A. I was there at about 12 or 1 when the mob came and attempted to break open the tahsil.

Q. What was the attitude of the mob?

A. They shouted out "Let us loot the treasury and release the prisoners."

Q. Were the mob under the control or were they a threatening and defiant mob?

A. They threatened to break the tahsil down and afterwards they put fire to the sheds outside and also to the Munsif's Court.

Q. Did the officials make attempts to get the mob to disperse?

A. The Sub-Inspector of Police with his staff and the Munsif with his staff were on the top of the tahsil and they asked the mob to disperse.

Q. Did the mob pay any attention to the request to disperse?

A. They did not pay any attention to it, and they threw brickbats.

Q. In your opinion was it necessary to fire upon the mob in order to disperse them?

A. Had they not been fired at they would have succeeded in looting the Kutcheri (Court-house) and putting fire to it and would have advanced to other parts of Kutcheri and burnt them.

Q. Was there any reason why the mob should have sought to destroy the Kutcheri and these places?

A. They were excited and they came to burn the Kutcheri and other parts.

Q. Was there any reason why they should select these places to burn them?

A. They said that there would be no English Raj.

Q. There would be no English Raj or there is no English Raj?

A. There would be no English Raj.

Q. And was it your view then that they were destroying all trace of English power or English influence?

A. Owing to the firing they were dispersed, and had they not been fired at they would have succeeded in burning this and other parts also.

Q. After they were dispersed and after the 12th, did a feeling of unrest continue in Kasur?

A. When at about 2-30 the troops arrived together with the motor cars, then the people sat quietly.

Q. I am referring to after the 12th, on the 13th and 14th was there a feeling of unrest and a dread lest an outbreak should occur again?

A. There was peace owing to the arrival of the troops.

Q. But for the arrival and presence of the troops would you have been afraid of a similar outburst occurring?

A. People were apprehensive and they could not imagine what might happen during the following night.

Q. What was the effect of the declaration of Martial Law on the 16th?

A. There was quiet and peace.

Q. In your view had the presence of the Military and the declaration of Martial Law any effect in keeping down disturbance?

A. There was peace owing to that.

Q. Do you attribute that peace and quiet to the presence of military and the declaration of Martial Law?

A. Yes, owing to the proclamation of Martial Law and the arrival of the military.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You are a permanent resident of Kasur?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you have been Municipal Commissioner for many years?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you are well acquainted with people in Kasur and their activities?

A. I am familiar with them.

Q. Before April 1919 was there any political activity in Kasur?

A. Not to my knowledge; I never heard of it.

Q. As far as you know was there, before that time, any anti-British or anti-Government feeling in Kasur?

A. There was none before this.

Q. As far as you know was there any conspiracy in Kasur against Government before this?

A. There was none previous to that.

Q. Can you tell me why there was this sudden manifestation of feeling against the British Raj?

A. After the 11th April, when they had begun the *hartal*, then something happened to their brains.

Q. Before the 11th Kasur was, according to you, perfectly loyal?

A. Yes.

Q. There was no political activity of any sort at all?

A. I did not hear of it.

Q. In a day what suddenly turned their heads and made them enemies of the British Raj?

A. God only knows.

Q. You cannot account for it?

A. On the 11th when they heard of the *hartal* of the 6th at other places and also when they heard that at Amritsar and Bombay their *hundis* were not honoured then they had the *hartal* on the 11th.Q. Because they heard of the *hartal* at other places and as you say their *hundis* were not honoured at Amritsar and Bombay, they decided on having the *hartal* on the 11th?

A. Yes.

Q. That is all right; they decided upon having a *hartal*. What I want to know is why did Kasur, which was according to you, perfectly loyal, suddenly in a day turn disloyal? People may have a *hartal*, it does not necessarily follow that they are disloyal?

A. On the evening of the 11th there was a meeting outside on the maidan of Ram Lila plain and there were certain speeches made by people in which they said they should run risks.

Q. Were you present at that meeting?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Do you attribute the events of the 12th solely to what happened at the meeting of the 11th?

A. It was heard that there was a meeting the previous evening.

Q. You think that brought about what happened on the 12th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. This crowd that was shouting that there would be no English Raj, who were these people?

A. The people who constituted the mob outside. I was in the tahsil.

Q. You did not see any of them?

A. I had some trouble with my foot so I could not go upstairs. Had I gone there I would have been able to see them. I saw the people who constituted the mob through the holes of the door.

Q. When you saw them what class of people were they who were shouting this?

A. There were some Chamars, some Jats, some Hindus and some Muhammadans, all mixed up.

Q. Were they the riff-raff and badmashes of the city?

A. All sorts of people were there and I could not make out any of them.

5 December 1919.]

LALA ANANT RAM.

[Continued.]

Q. Did they look like respectable people?  
 A. There were no respectable men there.  
 Q. Were there people from adjoining villages also in the crowd?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. And are those villages around Kasur known for crime?  
 A. Several people of those villages had committed crimes.  
 Q. They are notorious for thefts and dacoities?  
 A. For instance the people of Mana.  
 Q. Notorious for offences of the nature I have mentioned?  
 A. They might have been doing that, I do not know particularly.  
 Q. You have lived in Kasur all these years, surely you know what reputation Kasur and its adjoining villages have with regard to these offences? Are they not more numerous in that locality than in other parts of the Province?  
 A. I know the village of Mana and its people and I have told you what they have been doing, that they do commit thefts and burglaries.  
 Q. So also other villages?  
 A. And Khara.  
 Q. So there are several villages noted for offences of that character?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. And people from those villages had come to Kasur to take advantage of this occasion for loot?  
 A. Several had come.  
 Q. You say that the presence of the military restored order?  
 A. Certainly.  
 Q. That shows that the turbulent element were overawed by the presence of the military?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. Could not the same result have been effected if the military were quartered in the city or near the city and civil authority carried on the administration with the aid of the military if necessary?  
 A. Had the military not arrived at that particular hour it was probable that the night would have brought many more troubles.  
 Q. So it was the presence of the military that restored peace and order?  
 A. Undoubtedly.  
 Q. If the military had been kept there for some time in aid of civil power the result would have been the same without the actual declaration of Martial Law?  
 A. What authority could possibly be given to them?  
 Q. They would not have any direct authority but they would be always available there in aid of civil power to quell any disturbance if it did occur?  
 A. Martial Law was at that time essential; it is a different matter whether it should have lasted for more time or for a shorter time.  
 Q. Did Martial Law do more in the way of restoring order than the arrangement which I have suggested?  
 A. The people who were eye-witnesses can very well say that Martial Law was a necessity.  
 Q. What particular action under Martial Law was necessary for maintaining order?  
 A. Had the military not arrived they would not have been checked. But for Martial Law the military who had been picquetted there would have had no authority whatsoever.  
 Q. In your opinion how long was Martial Law necessary after the 12th?  
 A. The secrets of statesmanship are only known to Kings.  
 Q. As a leading man in Kasur and conversant with the circumstances of Kasur in your view how long was Martial Law necessary?  
 A. Ten or fifteen days would have been sufficient after the 12th of April.  
 Q. By that time every thing was perfectly quiet?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. There was no disorder or anything feared after that time?  
 A. There was nothing after that.

By the Hon'ble Pundit Jagat Narayan—

Q. At what time did you leave the *tahsil*?  
 A. About two o'clock.  
 Q. Where did you go?  
 A. I went to the Post Office and asked the Sanitary Inspector to quench the fire.  
 Q. At what time did you reach your house?  
 A. About 6 o'clock in the evening.  
 Q. Had you any occasion to converse with any members of the mob at any time?  
 A. I went to the station.  
 Q. From about 8 o'clock up to 6 o'clock you remained at the station?  
 A. I accompanied the troops to the Government houses.  
 Q. From the time that the military arrived at the station you went with the military and remained with the military till 6 o'clock and at 6 o'clock you went to your place?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. Did you send for any respectable shopkeepers of your city or did they come of their own accord to your place?  
 A. After that I went to the bazar.  
 Q. To different shopkeepers?  
 A. In the new bazar there are many shops.  
 Q. And you went there?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. The military arrived on the 12th?  
 A. Yes; at half-past two.  
 Q. There was no proclamation of Martial Law till the morning of the 16th?  
 A. No.  
 Q. Could the military who arrived on the evening of the 12th maintain peace and order till the morning of the 16th? The question is, if the military were able to maintain peace and order from the evening of the 12th to the morning of the 16th why was Martial Law necessary on the morning of the 16th?  
 A. Because Martial Law had been proclaimed in the Lahore District, therefore it was necessary in Kasur.  
 Q. My point is this; from the 12th up to the morning of the 16th the military with the help of the civil authorities were able to maintain peace and order, would it not have been able to maintain peace and order after the 16th?  
 A. I have already replied. Such secrets are known to Kings.  
 Q. In your opinion are there any pleaders in Kasur who are seditious?  
 A. I have never heard about that.  
 Q. Or any *munshis*?  
 A. No.  
 Q. Were the shopkeepers of Kasur seditious people?  
 A. There is not a single person in Kasur having those ideas.  
 Q. Were any respectable residents of Kasur assaulted during that day?  
 A. I have not heard.  
 Q. Were any respectable people or honorary magistrates or municipal commissioners abused by the mob?  
 A. We were told that one Gopi Das, Honorary Magistrate, was pulled down from his cart.  
 Q. Anything else?  
 A. And his turban was taken of.  
 Q. That was in order that he may observe *hartal*?  
 A. It was on the day of the *hartal*.  
 Q. He was made to come down from his cart so that he may also observe *hartal*?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. Except that you know nothing else?  
 A. No.  
 Q. At the time the mob were doing all this damage did the police or other officers who were going and coming out of the crowd persuade them not to commit this damage?  
 A. I was inside the *tahsil* so I am unable to tell you.  
 Q. Except what happened in the *tahsil* were you informed of any assault by the mob on police or civil officers?



5 December 1919.]

LALA ANANT RAM.

[Continued.]

- A. Sheikh Rahim Bukhsh, a member of the committee, was in the city *thana* and he prevented the people from attacking the *thana*.
- Q. Were any police or civil officers assaulted?
- A. I do not know.
- Q. Except those public buildings was any private property looted?
- A. No, Sir.
- Q. At 2-30 P.M. when you went in the city with the Military was not everything quiet and every person at his own place?
- A. We did not go towards the city. We went to the public buildings, i.e., the Mission House Hospital in the evening and the house of the Superintendent of Police and the Treasury.
- Q. Would you have to pass through the city?
- A. We passed outside the city.
- Q. Did the military on the 12th go inside the city?
- A. I accompanied them outside the city.
- Q. From 2-30 to 6 you were with the military and up to that time . . . ?
- A. We left them outside the city.
- Q. What are your grounds for saying that the city would have been looted in the night time?
- A. There was general talk in the city on the 12th that had the military not arrived there would have been trouble. They apprehended danger.
- Q. Therefore I take it that almost all the persons of Kasur who had any property had no sympathy with what occurred at the station or at the Tahsil?
- A. The Mahajans and others were nervous.
- Q. Therefore they had no sympathy with this mob?
- A. It could not be possible.
- Q. Did the pleaders or the respectable educated classes have any sympathy with this mob?
- A. They did not mix with it.
- Q. Had they any sympathy?
- A. They had no sympathy with those people.
- Q. Do you know anything of the Martial Law Administration? You used to be present at the Railway Station during the course of Martial Law?
- A. I used to be present there.
- Q. Did you know what was happening at the station?
- A. We used to go there at 6 and were allowed to come back at 5 P.M. We had to go to the city to distribute those proclamations.
- Q. Were you in favour of respectable persons being handcuffed and sent away? Did you approve of this procedure without any sufficient proof against these men?
- A. I considered it to be bad.
- Q. Did you know that a large number of persons who did not go to the goods shed were ordered to work at the goods shed?
- A. I was at the Octroi Office.
- Q. Were a number of persons ordered in your presence to do work at the goods shed?
- A. All the members of the committee used to sit in the octroi office from morning till evening waiting for orders.
- Q. Were any orders issued to you? Were you doing any work at all from 6 to 5?
- A. We had to be there all the day and we were given orders if they came in.
- Q. Do you know what sort of cases were tried at the station? You are a member of the committee of that temple and that temple was in possession of certain money—what was the amount of that money?
- A. About Rs. 1,500.
- Q. And on your behalf a suit was filed in respect of this money? You went to Captain Doveton and you considered that this matter was one of litigation and that he should not pass any orders in this matter?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Sharf-ud-din and Saiyid Rahim Bakhsh also made the same representation to Captain Doveton and Captain Doveton passed orders?
- A. He passed orders and he gave over the money.
- Q. Were you present at the station when this happened?
- A. I was present there and I went to him.
- Q. When you were present at the station and when you saw that this matter was going to be decided by him you went to Captain Doveton?
- A. Yes, Sir.
- Q. Were any tenants of your committee ordered to pay rent to Jagan Nath?
- A. They were asked to give the money over to Jagan Nath and accordingly they did.
- Q. Who passed this order?
- A. Captain Doveton.
- Q. What do you mean by an order?
- A. He said that he ordered this.
- Q. When he passed the order were you with him?
- A. I was in the octroi office and the tenants came and said they had paid their rent to Jagan Nath.
- Q. And on hearing this you went to Captain Doveton?
- A. Yes, Sir.
- Q. What did you say to Captain Doveton after hearing from the tenants?
- A. That we have made them pay this man.
- Q. Why did you go to Captain Doveton and inform him of this fact?
- A. Because I was a member of the temple committee.
- Q. You had gone there to inform him that his order has been obeyed?
- A. I went there to say that he ought to be allowed to pay the money.
- Q. The conversation you had with Captain Doveton previous to this, will you repeat it again?
- A. I submitted that Jagan Nath had filed a case in the Court of the District Judge and this would be better decided there, "so kindly don't take this matter in hand."
- Q. What reply did you get from Captain Doveton?
- A. He replied that he would send the matter to the Tahsildar.
- Q. What happened next?
- A. I was satisfied because Saiyid Rahim Bakhsh had also told me to that effect.
- Q. Did it go to the Tahsildar Sahib?
- A. No, Sir.
- Q. Do you know of any other case that was tried in your presence?
- A. Lala Keshav Ram had bought some rice, and he told Captain Doveton that he returned it.
- Q. He was sent for before Captain Doveton for purchasing rice?
- A. Yes, Sir.
- Q. What happened then after he said that he had returned that rice? Nothing happened?
- A. Nothing.
- Q. I am only asking you to tell me what you actually saw and what happened in your presence in every case.
- A. Durga Das Saighal who was a grain dealer in the city was fined Rs. 5 or Rs. 10.
- Q. Why?
- A. He was a tenant of the temple property. He had to pay the rent.
- Q. Pay the rent to whom?
- A. To the man to whom Captain Doveton wanted the money to be paid.
- Q. What is his name?
- A. Pandit Jagat Nath, Pujari.
- Q. Why was this Durga fined?
- A. Pandit Amar Nath Munshi, Reader to Captain Doveton, informed the Captain that he demanded rent from him and that this man hesitated.
- Q. And for this reason he was fined Rs. 10?
- A. Rs. 5 or Rs. 10.
- Q. And he was your tenant?
- A. I was there and also Saiyid Ahmad Shah.
- Q. Was there any other case?
- A. There was no other case. There was an allegation against Mukhan Singh and Nanak Singh that they had impersonated C. I. D. officers and wanted to exact money from the relations of those people who had been arrested.

5 December 1919.]

LALA ANANT RAM.

[Continued.]

Q. Are these all rumours, or do you state those from your knowledge?

A. I was present there.

Q. Anything else? I want you to give me only those cases which you know personally and when you were present at the station?

A. I have stated them.

Q. Therefore all the cases that you have stated happened in your presence when you were at the station.

A. When I was present.

Q. And you have spoken from your own personal knowledge?

A. I was present, there.

*By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—*

Q. What position do you hold in Kasur besides being a Municipal Commissioner?

A. I am a banker, I have got some property and some land. I am also an assessor.

Q. What is the present state of Kasur, is it in a disturbed condition or is it perfectly quiet?

A. It is quiet there now.

Q. How many police would be enough to keep order there, should there be any disturbances?

A. The police is insufficient now, and it should be increased.

Q. It should be increased to how many?

A. I don't know what force there is there now.

Q. Then how can you say that the force is insufficient?

A. Now we have appointed chowkidars and also we have Thikri Pahra in the city. If the number of the police force is increased then we would not be required to appoint these chowkidars.

Q. Would these chowkidars and the police that you now have, in your opinion, be quite sufficient to keep order in Kasur?

A. It is quiet there now.

Q. But should there be any disturbance, how much more police force do you think would be necessary to keep order?

A. I think that after Martial Law there will be no more disturbance. It is all quiet there now.

Q. You mean that after the Martial Law that was proclaimed last April, there is no likelihood of any disturbance taking place? Is that what you mean?

A. I hope there will be none.

Q. It is not a question of hope, but it is a question of what you think.

A. In my opinion there will be none.

Q. So that because you do not think there is any likelihood of any disturbance, there is no necessity for saying anything about the increased police force?

A. None.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—*

Q. I don't understand about this temple case. I want you to tell me what you saw and heard yourself, but nothing else. Did you usually sit in the octroi office in the railway station?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Where did Captain Doveton usually sit and hear cases or pass orders?

A. In a room of the station.

Q. Not the same room as the octroi office?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Now when you first heard of this temple case, was that from some body coming into the octroi office and telling you that Captain Doveton had passed an order or were you present in the other room with Captain Doveton when that case was brought before him for hearing?

A. This affair took two or three days, and during that time I went to Captain Doveton and told him all about this matter which was then being talked about. Then Lala Radhakishen and both Radha Kishen, Maghi Shankar, Durga Das and another man were called by Captain Doveton.

Q. Were you present with Captain Doveton and did you hear him pass any orders about the payment of Rs. 1,500?

A. I was not there at that time.

Q. Were you present with Captain Doveton and did you hear him pass any orders about the temple matter or temple rents, apart from the Rs. 1,500?

A. I was not present at the time when the orders were passed.

Q. If you are told now that Captain Doveton himself has told us that it is a mistake and that he never in fact passed any such order, are you prepared to say that that is untrue?

A. They were made to pay.

Q. If you are told that Captain Doveton has told this committee that he never in fact passed any such order in the temple matter, are you, who were not present, prepared to say that that is untrue?

A. I can say only about myself that what I say is true. I state the true facts known to me, that those four men came to me and informed me that by the order of Captain Doveton they had paid the money to the gentleman.

Q. (To the Interpreter.) Ask him if he understands the difference between four men coming to him and telling him something and his seeing and hearing something that happened.

A. Those people used to go to Captain Doveton for three days, and they only informed me.

Q. So that your information depends upon what those people told you?

A. After the money was paid to Jagannath he together with four other gentlemen Gokal Chand, Saiyid Aminuddin Sahib, Shaikh Rahim Bakhsh and I went to Captain Doveton and informed him that the money had been paid to that Jagannath by Amarnath, because Amarnath and Jagannath were relations, therefore the money was paid to Amarnath.

Q. When you went to Captain Doveton to tell this story, what did he say about it?

A. He sent for Jagannath.

Q. Did Jagannath come and speak to him in your presence?

A. He came in the presence of 5 men.

Q. What did he say?

A. He was asked if the money was with him and he confessed that the money was with him.

Q. What else took place?

A. Then he went away.

Q. Nothing else took place?

A. As far as I remember, there was nothing.

Q. Now just tell me, did you or did you not hear Captain Doveton say to any of these people that they should pay this money to Jagannath if they liked, but it was entirely their own choice?

A. It was not in my presence that he said those words.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—*

Q. When you went twice to Captain Doveton, once on a previous occasion and again at another time with regard to Durga Das' affair, you informed him that he shall not decide this matter or he should not pass any orders on this matter? Did he tell you that he had nothing to do with this matter and that he had not passed any such orders?

A. He said that he would send this matter to the Tahsildar.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—*

Q. When he said that he would send the matter to the Tahsildar, did he mean that this was not a Martial Law case but this was a case which should go before the ordinary courts?

A. Exactly.

*By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—*

Q. You have stated that you have been a considerable time in Kasur; can you say whether punitive police force was ever imposed on the town for misbehaviour?

A. It was stationed.

*By the President—*

Q. When was that?

A. About 15 years ago. In the time of Nizam, the great dacoit, there were punitive police stationed there.

5 December 1919.]

BAWA KHARAK SINGH.

## BAWA KHARAK SINGH, Sub-Inspector of Police, Kasur.

*By the President—*

Q. Bawa Kharak Singh, you are Sub-Inspector at Kasur?

A. Yes, in Sadar, in the suburbs, not in the city.

Q. Were you in Kasur on the 11th April last?

A. I reached Kasur in the evening from Lahore.

Q. On the 12th April where were you at about 11 or 12 o'clock?

A. I was in the police station of the head quarters.

Q. Did you hear then that the rioters had attacked some Europeans at the Kasur Railway Station?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you inside the tahsil?

A. I had gone inside the tahsil after closing the gate.

Q. Is the gate a large one?

A. It is a huge gate. I closed it and went upstairs.

Q. And had you got any arms?

A. Yes, Sir, I had rifles.

Q. I see you say in your statement "we piled bricks in four places in order to throw them at the rioters in the event of their attempting to damage the gate." What do you mean by that?

A. If the people had not returned peacefully and the police had any occasion to fire, then I wanted to use these bricks rather than fire arms.

Q. When did the rioters come in front of the tahsil?

A. Between 1 and 2.

Q. Were they shouting anything, and, if so, what?

A. They were shouting saying that the English Raj had come to an end and "Gandhi ki jai, Kitchlew ki jai" and "Satyapal ki jai."

Q. Were there several of you in the tahsil at this time? The Tahsildar was there?

A. He was outside the tahsil.

Q. Did you hear the Tahsildar or any one else trying to persuade the mob to disperse?

A. Sayad Ahmad Shah and the Tahsildar persuaded those people to disperse.

Q. Did the people disperse when they tried to persuade them?

A. No, Sir, they did not go.

Q. What did they do or say?

A. They tried to damage the tahsil gate, and I told them that it would entail serious consequences and they should go back.

Q. What did they say to that, did they say anything?

A. These people replied 'you also come down and join us.'

Q. Why did they want you to join them?

A. They said that they would break open the Treasury and release the prisoners.

Q. Why did they want you, a police officer, to join them?

A. Perhaps they thought that I would also join them being an Indian.

Q. Did they say anything about the British Raj being at an end?

A. They did.

Q. And was that one of the reasons why they asked you to join them?

A. Yes, that was one of the reasons.

Q. You said the crowd would not disperse, what did they do there?

A. They tried to damage the tahsil gate in order to break it open, and one of them had an implement in his hands. They advanced towards the tahsil gate.

Q. Did you do anything to stop it?

A. I threw those brickbats down in order to threaten them.

Q. Did they pay any attention to that?

A. They did not pay any heed to it, rather they also threw some brickbats at me.

Q. Did you fire at all?

A. In order to frighten them and also to inform the other officers, I fired my rifle in the air.

Q. In your opinion was it necessary to use force to prevent them from doing further destruction?

A. Yes.

Q. Why did you not fire at them instead of in the air?

A. So that none of them might lose his life, I fired in the air.

Q. Do you think that firing in the air has the effect of preventing the mob doing damage?

A. It is possible.

Q. Is it not very improbable that you can stop a mob that is bent on damage by firing in the air?

A. Sometimes this is the effect of that.

Q. On this occasion it had not that effect, I think?

A. Yes.

Q. The Deputy Superintendent of Police gave orders to fire on the crowd?

A. Yes.

Q. When they were fired on and some casualties occurred, did they disperse then?

A. They all dispersed.

Q. In this crowd of people, were there people from the outside villages?

A. The mob was composed of those people who deal in dyeing skins and also Jats, Muhammadans and Hindus and sweepers of the villages.

Q. How do you account for these people from the villages adjoining, joining in this riot and bloodshed that took place?

A. The incidents about Amritsar were known to them, about the looting of the banks, and therefore these villagers also joined the mob in order to have their own share of loot and also to be able to release the prisoners.

Q. What had excited them about Amritsar? Was it that the mob there had been successful in getting loot? Is that what you mean?

A. Yes.

Q. I think at about 3 o'clock, European soldiers arrived and guarded the treasury?

A. Yes, they took the treasury into their protection.

Q. I see that you say in your statement that the rioters left their axes, sticks and lathis at the scene of occurrence. Had some of the rioters' axes in their hands?

A. There were lathis, clubs and sticks in their hands, and also one or two crowbars, implements used in felling bricks.

Q. Did you see these crowbars used by the crowd at all on that day?

A. I had seen them working with these implements at the sheds provided for appeal writers.

Q. Did you search some houses that night?

A. No.

Q. Was a house-search made during the day, i.e., the next day?

A. No.

Q. Did you make any arrests that day?

A. We arrested three men that day.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—*

Q. On the 12th in front of the crowd, the first time you fired in the air, was it with a rifle or with a pistol?

A. At first I fired with my rifle and then the crowd shouted that it was empty and then I fired with my pistol.

Q. The first time you fired with a rifle. When you fired with the rifle, had the mob already set fire to the Munsif's office at that time?

A. They set fire afterwards.

Q. Had they set fire to the petition-writer's shed by that time?

A. After the rifle was fired, they set fire to the petition-writer's shed.

Q. In your statement, you put it the other way round. "They set on fire the Munsif's office by burning thatch grass taken from the petition-writer's shed. Thereupon I loaded my Government rifle with shot cartridges and fired in the air."

A. That is about the second time.

Q. The first time that you fired was with your rifle. Which is correct, did you fire in the air? Was that first time after or before they started burning the petition-writer's shed and the Munsif's office?

5 December 1919.]

BABA KHARAK SINGH—*continued*—MIRZA SHUJA BEG.

A. First I shot in the air when they were advancing towards the tahsil and then afterwards after they had set fire to the Munsif's court.

Q. After you fired with your rifle, then you thought that would not do, and fired in the air with your pistol?

A. Yes.

Q. And then you say "we also went on firing from the roof." Was that firing with rifles or showering brick-bats?

A. After the arrival of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, we began to fire at them.

Q. And before his arrival?

A. We shot in the air in order to give an alarm to the officers and also to frighten the mob.

Q. And then there was firing in the air twice. Then you say "we were again obliged to fire in the air but this had no effect." That was the third time you fired?

A. It was the third time. They then went to the western side of the thana in order to enter the tahsil.

Q. Then you say, after firing in the air for the third time, "thereupon I fired my pistol in the air." That was the 4th time?

A. Three times I fired with my rifle and three times with my pistol. When they had brought the thatch to the gate of the tahsil, then I fired for the third time.

Q. At any rate, you fired 4 times if not oftener into the air. Was that with the rifle or with pistol?

A. I fired 6 times.

Q. You seem to believe in fireworks, rather? Do you believe in fireworks? Have you not received instructions as a Sub-Inspector at Kasur that the one thing you should never do is to fire in the air or to fire blank cartridges?

A. I shot into the air because there was no senior officer there and I wanted that nobody should lose his life.

Q. Why did you want that nobody should lose his life? Why should not they lose their lives by dozens in those circumstances?

A. There was no responsible officer to give me orders.

Q. Do you distinctly remember hearing "Gandhi, Kitchlew, Satyapal ki Jai" being shouted that morning?

A. When they were advancing towards the tahsil; they were shouting these words.

Q. Do you know who Kitchlew and Satyapal, that they were referring to, were?

A. I knew that Kitchlew and Satyapal were leaders at Amritsar, and Gandhi was the leader of India.

Q. What had the Kasur mob to do with Kitchlew or with Satyapal? Had they ever heard of them before?

A. I am not in charge of the city and therefore I cannot say anything about the city people.

Q. Had you ever heard a Kasur mob before that day shouting about either Kitchlew or Satyapal?

A. I never received such information, because I have no connection with the city.

Q. When you did fire, can you tell me how many rifles fired?

A. More than 50.

Q. More than 50 rifles?

A. About 12 or 13 rifles, 50 rounds.

Q. Did you see other members of the police when they fired?

A. Yes, I saw them.

Q. In your opinion were they really and properly firing at the mob or were they firing over the head of the people?

A. They were aiming and firing at them, because they had been ordered.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. This mob that you saw shouting that the British Raj was at an end what people did it consist of? What sort of people were in that mob?

A. I have already said that this mob consisted of sweepers, skin dyers, low-class people, Jats and Hindus.

Q. Were these people of Kasur town or of the villages surrounding Kasur?

A. People belonging to Kasur city and also to the villages.

Q. Were the majority of them Kasur people?

A. Both Kasur and village people.

Q. Where was the larger portion from? From Kasur or which place?

A. Kasur people and village people were about equal in number.

Q. In that mob did you see any respectable person?

A. There was no respectable person there.

Q. Have the villages round Kasur been known for crimes?

A. Yes.

Q. They are always ready to seize an opportunity for looting?

A. They usually do these things; commit thefts and crimes.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. In the cases that were sent up from Kasur to the tribunals were those convicted mostly townspeople or villagers?

A. The majority of them were townsmen of Kasur.

#### MIRZA SHUJA BEG, Honorary Magistrate, Patti.

By the President—

Q. Are you a Magistrate at Patti?

A. Yes.

Q. We have been told that Patti is 28 miles from Kasur?

A. Yes.

Q. What size of place is Patti?

A. The population of Patti is about 8,000.

Q. Were you accustomed in Patti to have any political addresses? Were you taking any interest in politics?

A. Not before the 5th or 6th April.

Q. On the 5th or 6th April what occurred?

A. Durga Das who had arrived from Amritsar and Bal Sarup, a resident of Chimba delivered speeches.

Q. On what sort of subjects?

A. About the *hartal* and against the Rowlatt legislation.

Q. What effect had these speeches upon the population.

A. The speech of the 5th resulted in the *hartal* of the 6th.

Q. Was the *hartal* on the 6th a general one?

A. Yes, Sir. It was a general one.

Q. Did any disturbance take place that day?

A. Apart from people saying something against the Rowlatt Bill, there was no disorder there on the 6th.

Q. Is Patti in close touch with Amritsar?

A. It is situated at a distance of 28 miles and the railway train runs three times a day between these two towns.

Q. Did people hear of what occurred at Amritsar on the 10th April?

A. They came to know of these incidents on the 10th.

Q. What effect had the knowledge of the incidents on the population?

A. Their feelings were disturbed and they thought of having a loot.

Q. Was it the circumstance that crowds had looted property in Amritsar that interested the mob in Patti?

A. This thing had interested them very much.

Q. Did they start any loot of their own in Patti?

A. During the night between the 11th and 12th, they cut the telegraph wires and the night between the 12th and 13th, there was a crowd ready for loot.

Q. What did the crowd do?

A. This crowd came to the Post Office first to set fire to the Post Office.

5 December 1919.]

Mr. MIRZA SHUJA BEG.

[Continued.]

Q. Did they set fire to the Post Office?  
 A. They were made to flee.  
 Q. Did they set fire to any other buildings?  
 A. They did not set fire to any other building; they cut wires and broke gateways and smashed the other parts of the building.  
 Q. Did you hear anything said by the crowd when they were engaged in this work of destruction?  
 A. I heard various people crying that they have turned the Englishmen out of this place and burnt places and buildings.  
 Q. Did they make attempts at Government buildings?  
 A. There was an attempt; they came to set fire to them.  
 Q. How long did the disturbance in Patti last?  
 A. Up to the 14th.  
 Q. How did it show itself on the 13th?  
 A. On the 13th, they gathered together and said that the Lahore Fort had been taken and the Lieutenant-Governor had been killed.  
 Q. What effect had it on the party?  
 A. An armoured car arrived on the 14th and several *badmashes* went to loot it; but when they knew that it contained arms and troops, they fled away.  
 Q. Did the patrolling army reach Patti on the 16th?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. Did that do good work in restoring peace and order?  
 A. People were frightened by their arrival and peace was restored.  
 Q. Were a number of people arrested on the 28th April?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. I see you say that you are in possession of facts as regards the treatment by the authorities of the accused. What do you know of the treatment by the authorities?  
 A. From the 12th up to 28th, there were no arrests. On the 28th I went to Kasur and informed my Sub-Divisional Officer that there were no arrangements made for Patti as yet. Then he came to Patti himself. The accused people were recognised.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—*  
 Q. What were you in Kasur?  
 A. I am only an Honorary Magistrate.  
 Q. You said in Patti there are 8,000 people. Are there any Europeans among them?  
 A. There are European firms there.  
 Q. But there are no European people?  
 A. No, Sir.  
 Q. When the attempts were made upon Government buildings on the night of the 12th or 13th, which buildings were they that were attacked?  
 A. The post office, railway godown, and the railway lines.  
 Q. Were any of them in fact damaged?  
 A. The railway godown, the railway lines and the railway ways were smashed.  
 Q. The post office was not?  
 A. It was rescued.  
 Q. Not even the windows?  
 A. No.  
 Q. At the post office, how big was the crowd?  
 A. At first it was about 35; afterwards there were 150 men.  
 Q. On the 13th did people go about the road for their work?  
 A. No, Sir.  
 Q. Were any shops opened?  
 A. On the 13th some shops were opened, some were still closed.  
 Q. On the 14th, before the arrival of the armoured car, were people going about the roads?  
 A. The same state of affairs existed as on the 13th.  
 Q. How many policemen are there in Patti?  
 A. Some 20 men.  
 Q. What did they do on the night of the 12th?  
 A. The police did not help except by sending some men who came to disperse the mob on the 12th.  
 Q. Was the guard at the railway station in the godown when the lines were cut?

A. Nobody was there before this, but afterwards, 4 or 5 constables with Sub-Inspector arrived.

*By Sir C. H. Setalvad—*

Q. Were the telegraph wires cut on the 12th or the 11th?  
 A. On the night between the 11th and 12th.  
 Q. Telegraph wires were cut with the idea that they may loot without any disturbance?  
 A. Afterwards when I read the statement made by the accused I came to know that they cut wires so that the troops from Ferozepore may not be able to reach Amritsar.  
 Q. Who were the people who cut these wires?  
 A. They were apprentices of those shopkeepers.  
 Q. Did they compose the crowd that attacked the buildings?  
 A. These people and some *zamindars*.  
 Q. What do you mean by *zamindars*?  
 A. Farmers.  
 Q. You mean the cultivators?  
 A. Farmers.  
 Q. Did the riff-raff population of the town join this mob?  
 A. All these people were there.  
 Q. Did you see this crowd yourself?  
 A. I saw this mob with my own eyes, when it was advancing towards the post office to burn it and when I dispersed it with my own rifle.  
 Q. You stated that you with your brothers and 25 men dispersed the mob. Were they all armed?  
 A. We had seven rifles and others were equipped with *lathis*.  
 Q. What were the police doing at the time when you were dispersing the crowd on the 12th?  
 A. The police had not yet arrived.  
 Q. Was there not a police station in the town?  
 A. They did not reach the place.  
 Q. Did you inform the police?  
 A. I and the Sub-Inspector of Police were sitting, when a postman of the post office came and informed us that he had been threatened since 12 o'clock in the noon.  
 Q. At what time?  
 A. 6-30 in the evening.  
 Q. How soon afterwards did the crowd come to the post office?  
 A. About 8 o'clock.  
 Q. About 2 hours after?  
 A. About 1½ hours.  
 Q. Was the Police Inspector with you when you got this information?  
 A. We were together and I asked him to send some policemen for the protection of these people.  
 Q. Did he send any police people?  
 A. No.  
 Q. What did he do?  
 A. Afterwards he informed me that he had not got a sufficient number of policemen and therefore he had not despatched any.  
 Q. How many people had he?  
 A. The total number of policemen is 20, and I do not know how many he had at his disposal at that time.  
 Q. Were these 20 people armed or unarmed?  
 A. 12 of them have police revolvers and the rest have spears and swords.  
 Q. There are 12 rifles?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. On the 12th, the police did not turn up at all at any time?  
 A. The police did not arrive when the post office and the railway station were attacked, but when the mob reached the godown, then the Inspector with Sub-Inspector and some policemen arrived.  
 Q. What time of night was it?  
 A. 9 o'clock.  
 Q. What did they do, the police?  
 A. I was not present at that place.  
 Q. You left after dispersing the crowd? You went to the post office?  
 A. I met the crowd fleeing from the post office and from the railway station and then I stationed my

5 December 1919.]

Mr. MIRZA SHUJA BEG.

[Continued.]

men at this place in order to protect these places against a recurrence of disturbance.

Q. How far was the police station from the post office or the railway station?

A. About 200 yards.

Q. The police must have seen what was happening?

A. Certainly.

Q. And the police still never turned up at all?

A. After they were dispersed from those places, they gathered in an open space before the police station and even then nobody came to disperse them.

Q. They remained in front of the police station and even then the police did not turn up?

A. No.

Q. What did the crowd do in front of the police station?

A. They were consulting each other, and seeing that one man with his companions was obstructing their way and checking their progress they wanted to divide themselves into parties.

Q. Who was obstructing them?

A. I and my companions were checking their progress.

Q. When all this was happening were the police inside the police station?

A. Some of them were undoubtedly there.

Q. The Police Inspector who was with you when the information was brought at 6 o'clock: was he also at the police station?

A. He was at his house.

Q. How far away?

A. About 100 or 125 yards from the police station.

Q. Now on the night of the 12th nothing further happened?

A. Nothing.

Q. The crowd were not able to do anything with the godown or the police station?

A. Nothing.

Q. Nothing of this kind happened on the 18th. And thereafter what took place?

A. Nothing.

Q. You say there were no Europeans at all in this town?

A. None.

Q. You say that there were business premises of European firms?

A. Yes; there are European firms.

Q. European firms have branch firms there?

A. Under Indian assistants.

Q. Are there several of them?

A. Five.

Q. This mob never attacked any of those European firms?

A. They could have reached those firms after they had reached the post office but they were dispersed.

Q. From the post office, they could have gone there had they not been dispersed at the post office.

A. Yes.

Q. They could not have gone to those firms before they reached the post office?

A. That is the only way, by the post office. The post office is situated outside the market; these firms are situated inside the market.

Q. After they were dispersed at the post office, they went to the railway station and godown?

A. When they were dispersed, some of them proceeded towards the station and some took the other way which led them to the railway godown.

Q. That is, they went to the railway station, then to the godown, and could have gone and attacked the European firms if they were so minded?

A. They were frightened and I was pursuing them. They were flying before me and they could not do that.

Q. You say they were shouting they had turned Europeans out.

A. They were shouting. "We have turned the Europeans out and burnt their buildings."

Q. Who said this?

A. All the hooligans that were there.

Q. What did they mean by saying that they turned the Europeans out?

A. Just as I have stated in my statement, they meant that the Lahore Fort had been taken and the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab had been killed.

Q. Did they say that at the time?

A. This rumour was current. Because of this rumour they were saying these things.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Did you make any preparations to guard the post office before 8 o'clock?

A. Yes.

Q. That is after you received the information, you made arrangements to guard the post office?

A. Yes.

Q. And when the mob arrived before the post office, you and your men were already there?

A. No, Sir. I was at my place.

Q. How far is your place from the post office?

A. About 50 yards.

Q. Where are these firms situated?

A. These firms are situated inside the enclosure called Dany's market.

Q. Now these persons who composed this crowd, were some of them residents of the city or were they all outsiders?

A. All belonged to the town, with one or two exceptions.

Q. Therefore they could have gone to any other place and could have avoided the post office if they had chosen to do so?

A. They threatened the post office and the station.

Q. Therefore you know from the information available to you that their real intention was to loot the post office and then go to the station and loot it?

A. Yes.

Q. You were not informed that their intention was to go and loot shops inside the city?

A. It was afterwards that I came to know that they had that idea.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. What do you do at Patti? Are you a landlord?

A. I am a land-owner, and I have also some property there.

Q. You have stated that Durga Das, a lecturer of Amritsar, and Swami Bal Sarup of Chimba, District Lahore, came to Patti on the 4th and 5th April and delivered lectures which had a pernicious effect on the minds of the people. Were you present when they came and delivered lectures?

A. I was not present at those lectures.

Q. Then how did you know it had a pernicious effect on the minds of the people?

A. I had consulted the police about the measures to be taken in order to stop these lectures, but the police told me that there was no harm in these lectures. So they allowed them to have these lectures.

Q. Was any of the police present at those lectures?

A. The Sub-Inspector and the Inspector, both of them, were present and they told me.

Q. Did they report to you as to what was the subject matter of the lectures?

A. They told me that the trend of the lectures was against the Rowlatt Act and in sympathy with the hartal.

Q. And those lectures, you think, had the effect of causing hartal on the 6th of April?

A. Yes, Sir. It was due to them.

Q. There was nothing said or there was no talk about anything else in Patti before that?

A. There was never a talk before these lectures in Patti.

Q. Were the people of Patti seditious or in any way inclined to anything disloyal or were they loyal to Government?

A. The main population of Patti belonged to the Mughals. They are very loyal and they are mostly employed in His Majesty's forces.

Q. Have they also remained loyal in these disturbances?

A. Yes.

Q. There were no respectable persons who caused these disturbances?

5 December 1919.]

Mr. MIRZA SHUJA BEG.

[Concluded.]

A. Amongst the people who were arrested there were no respectable persons.

Q. But you saw those people who caused these disturbances; you went after them and dispersed them. Did you see any respectable person amongst them?

A. I saw the people who had been threatening the Post Office people since 12 o'clock. I had heard they were respectable. I saw three about whom I had heard that they were respectable. Three of them were present but when I saw them they were not respectable persons in my opinion.

Q. Who were those persons?

A. They were Mulakhrāj, Kidar Nath and Lal Chand.

Q. What are these people?

A. They are shopkeepers and commission agents.

Q. Were they arrested?

A. No.

Q. Were they saying anything seditious or disloyal?

A. I asked them to go away because I had received a report against them but they replied that they had been stationed there by the Inspector of Police for the protection of those places.

Q. What kind of report had you received about them?

A. The Sub-Inspector had reported to me that these three men had threatened and asked the Post Office official to remove himself and his family people because they had an intention to set fire to the Post Office.

Q. At what time you had got this information?

A. At about 6-30.

Q. It was on the 12th?

A. Yes.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. You stated that one Durga Das from Amritsar came and lectured at Patti. Is this the same Durga Das who was the Editor of the "Waqt" newspaper

and who was subsequently tried and convicted by the martial law commission at Lahore in the main conspiracy case?

A. Yes, he is the same man.

Q. You have stated that two European firms had business transactions at Patti and had their offices there. Did the buildings, in which they had their offices, belong to them or to some Indian people at Patti?

A. They are my own.

Q. In the shops had they much furniture?

A. There was furniture and money.

Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate.—I have one request to make before Your Lordship's Committee adjourn for to-morrow. There was this case of a Hindu temple discussed yesterday. I sent for information from Kasur about the civil records of the case in the Munsiff's Court about which Mr. Mohan Lal, Pleader, spoke yesterday. He said that he had heard some people making a statement on the 3rd of September. I wired for those records and I have got them to-day from the Record office of the District Court here. I want to tender these original records before Your Lordship. We propose to put in copies of these records. I also want to tender the translation of these records, for an allegation was made about a sum of Rs. 1,500 which seems to be unfounded, and also another allegation, which was made in connection with Captain Doveton trying some persons, seems to be unfounded. These were made in the Court of the Munsiff. It would shew the Committee everything.

The President.—Show these records to Pandit Jagat Narayan. He might see them.

Mr. Abdul Kadir.—Mr. Justice Rankin also wanted to know about something.

Mr. Justice Rankin.—Yes, I asked some question but I was not dissatisfied.

6 December 1919.]

SARDAR AMAR SINGH.

At Lahore, Saturday, the 6th December 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.  
 The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.  
 Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B.,  
 K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.  
 Sir C. H. STALVAD, Kt.  
 Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

H. WILLIAMSON, Esq., M.B.E., I.P., *Secretary*.

SARDAR AMAR SINGH, Pleader, Kasur.

*By the President—*

Q. Mr. Amar Singh, you are a pleader in Kasur?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you in Kasur on the date of the disturbances?

A. On the 12th.

Q. You have expressed a desire to make a statement to us?

A. Yes, Sir, I was asked by Mr. Marsden, so I did.

Q. Will you tell us what you saw?

A. On the 12th at about 10 most of the pleaders were assembled in the house of Maulvi Abdul Kadir. There was a *hartal* continuing from the previous evening and that morning also there was a *hartal*. Maulvi Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din came running to the house of Maulvi Abdul Kadir and wanted us to take some steps to stop the *hartal*.Q. Did you think a *hartal* might lead to riot?

A. We contemplated no riot.

Q. But did you think it was a dangerous thing to have a *hartal*?A. No, I had never experienced a *hartal* before and I was not there on the 11th, so I did not know the attitude of the mob there that evening. Of course Maulvi Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din might have seen the attitude of the mob on the evening of the 11th. He came there and said we should take some steps to stop the *hartal*. Maulvi Abdul Kadir said we should do all we can and it was about 10 o'clock when about 80 or 40 persons had collected at the house of Maulvi Abdul Kadir.

Q. When you were in deliberation did news reach you that something had occurred at the Station?

A. Yes, Sardar Ganda Singh came there and informed us that boys were committing mischief at the railway station.

Q. Was it not more than boys?

A. He used those words 'boys are committing mischief at the railway station, and you must hurry up.' That was the information he gave us.

Q. What did you do?

A. There were three tongas standing there because we were going to court as it was court time, and it was by chance that we had assembled there. In one tonga Maulvi Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din and Maulvi Abdul Kadir went straight to the railway station. On the second tonga I think Mr. Mohan Lal, Mr. Mathra Das, both pleaders, and another gentleman Lala Devi Dial went and on the third tonga was Sardar Ganda Singh himself with his family, and we could not get another tonga so I and Mr. Gokal Chand walked to the railway station. On the way we found an empty tonga and took that. When we reached the railway station the mob had almost left the place, but I saw the godown burning and some of the furniture of the waiting room also being burned outside the railway station. First of all I met Sardar Kebar Singh, Assistant Station Master, there. He was in great stress of mind, his turban was off and he told me he had been undone and I should help him in any way I could. Two trains

were standing there, one on the Ferozepore side and the other on the Lahore side. He said "my instruments have been taken away, help me in finding those instruments so that I can get those trains in." For a few minutes I tried to find the instruments, but we could not find them.

Q. They had been taken away?

A. They had been taken away, but we did not know who took them. I said to him 'do not mind the trains now, your station is being burnt.' There was a tin there and I took hold of that and began to fill it with water to try and extinguish the fire.

Q. Had the mob gone out towards one of the trains?

A. Towards the Ferozepore train side.

Q. Did you see what the mob did?

A. No, I saw the mob running towards that side; I saw their backs of course.

Q. You did not see what that mob did to that train?

A. No, Sir, I do not know what the mob did at the train.

Q. Did you see anything of the two warrant officers who were murdered?

A. No, My Lord, I had returned by that time, I had gone to Mr. Mitter's Court.

Q. So you know nothing about the murders?

A. No, Sir. Subsequently when the mob looted the city post office and were going towards the big post-office and towards Mr. Mitter's Court, then I came across that mob.

Q. I want to ask you what justification you have for this statement that you made to us that 'it (the mob) was further excited on account of the firing by some of the British soldiers travelling by the Ferozepore train, and then it committed the unfortunate excesses both at the railway station, in the town and *tahsil*.' What justification have you for that statement?

A. I base that statement upon the statement of the Deputy Superintendent of Police of Kasur, and on the statements of Maulvi Abdul Kadir and Maulvi Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din.

Q. I do not know if you know the information that has been put before us in connection with the Kasur incidents. I won't trouble you further than by asking you this simple question, do you adhere to this statement as to what occurred at the station in view of the evidence which has been put before us? Do you still adhere to that statement that the mob was further excited on account of the firing by some of the British soldiers travelling by the Ferozepore train, and then it committed the unfortunate excesses both at the railway station, in the town and *tahsil*?

A. Yes, Sir, I stick to it; it is quite true.

Q. You think that is a correct representation of the facts?

A. Absolutely correct.

Q. If it be the case that the crowd went out to that train and attempted to murder several Europeans and attempted to murder, among others, these two warrant officers, do you still adhere to that statement?



6 December 1919.

SARDAR AMAR SINGH.

Continued.

A. I have not followed Your Lordship.

Q. If it be the case that the crowd went out to that train, and without any provocation, attempted to murder several Europeans and attempted, among others, to murder those two European officers, would you still adhere to that statement?

A. My Lord, I stick to that portion of the statement that before the murders took place and before the post office and *tahsils* were attacked the mob was fired at by these Warrant Officers and to this Sardar Kishan Singh was an eye-witness. Of course the mob had done mischief before; they had burned the godown and gone to the bridge side, but as to these murders I submit only those European gentlemen were murdered who had used their revolvers.

Q. Were you not informed that they had attempted to murder other Europeans in the train before the train came up to the station?

A. I did not know any other European was murdered.

Q. Are you in entire ignorance of this circumstance that the mob had gone out to the train and attempted to murder first two officers in uniform and afterwards attempted to get Mr. and Mrs. Sherbourne and their children?

A. I was told by Sardar Kehar Singh that the mob had gone to burn the railway bridge and not to murder any Europeans there, and I was not present at that place myself.

Q. If you were not present don't you think it would be much safer, much more prudent and much fairer if you did not volunteer to give any explanation of the occurrence? I ask you that as a gentleman who is in the habit of appearing before courts and who knows the elements of justice and fairness. Don't you think it would be fairer on your part if you did not express an opinion?

A. Mr. Marsden had asked me for my evidence.

Q. About this particular part of your evidence I am asking you.

A. This part of my evidence I had verified; it was quite true and I thought it my duty to put it down. I verified it from the Excise Sub-Inspector and from both the Maulvis and then I put down all these things.

Q. There is one other question I wish to ask you. In connection with the administration of Martial Law you say that you saw a *sadhu* white-washed, when was that?

A. I think most probably it was the month of June.

Q. Where was it?

A. I came from the Patti train at about 4 and when I passed by the 2nd class exit, just by the side of the exit was sitting a *sadhu* white-washed and shivering. When I handed over my ticket to the ticket collector I asked him about it and he told me he had fallen a victim to Captain Doveton. I asked what was his fault and he said "Captain Doveton knows it." In the next room was Captain Doveton and I could not ask him. I saw him white-washed, sitting and shivering there.

Q. In your statement when you say 'I saw a *sadhu* white-washed,' the meaning of that statement I would take to be that you saw a *sadhu* being white-washed?

A. No. I purposely avoided the use of the words being white-washed. He was not white-washed in my presence.

Q. Do you know how he came to be white-washed?

A. I myself saw him, a white coating from head to foot sufficiently thick on his whole person.

Q. What was his name?

A. I did not enquire. I had no business to enquire.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Do I understand you to say that when the mob attacked these Warrant Officers and they fired a revolver, that in your opinion is some justification for the mob thereupon to beat them to death?

A. There is absolutely no justification for beating anybody to death but when a mob is already excited and irresponsible and low class people are fired at, including *samindars* and *Jats*, they do not realise their responsibility, and only those Warrant Officers were

killed who used revolvers. I do not say this was any justification to do any mischief or do any crime.

Q. Do you think they realised their responsibility before the Warrant Officers discharged their revolvers?

A. Did the mob realise it? The mob was already doing mischief. What responsibility did they realise?

Q. If you were attacked by a mob and had a revolver in your hand what would you do?

A. They were in the train, they were not attacked.

Q. You say they discharged their revolvers when nobody was molesting them at all?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You were not there.

A. No. Sardar Kishan Singh, Excise Sub-Inspector, was there and he told me. And I may point out here one thing that one of the rioters was also injured by the revolver shots of these Warrant Officers, and I am told by the Deputy Superintendent of Police that he was convicted.

Q. He was only hit in the foot, wasn't he?

A. Yes, Sir, he was hit in the foot.

Q. Do you think he would have had any ground to complain if he had been shot through the heart?

A. I do not think so when he was already one of the rioters.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You are a pleader?

A. Yes.

Q. For how many years?

A. I am completing my 8th year.

Q. And you have been practising all this time at Kasur?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You know the other pleaders intimately I suppose?

A. At Kasur? I know every one of them.

Q. Now before April was there any seditious movement in Kasur?

A. I do not think there was any seditious movement anywhere.

Q. We are now concerned with Kasur for the moment.

A. I do not think there was any seditious movement going on, at least not to my knowledge, in the Punjab. At Kasur we never held any political meetings even. One of us used to take an interest in political matters, Maulvi Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din. He used to come here and to Delhi and deliver lectures on political platforms. The other pleaders I do not think even talked of politics there.

Q. There was no political activity in Kasur?

A. Absolutely not.

Q. Was there any anti-Government or anti-British feeling in Kasur before April?

A. You see, when this Rowlatt Act was passed in the face of all opposition and when His Honour the late Lieutenant-Governor had delivered a speech on the 7th of April that there should be no *hartal* and that if any one did such things he would be punished severely; the people resented the policy of His Honour. Otherwise as against Government itself or as against the British there was no feeling. There was resentment no doubt but *anti-feeling* against Government itself or against the British there was absolutely none.

Q. About the Rowlatt Act were there any meetings at Kasur before the 11th of April?

A. No, Sir, absolutely not.

Q. Kasur did not take part in the Rowlatt Act agitation?

A. We used to read everything in the papers.

Q. You did not hold a protest meeting?

A. Nothing, Sir.

Q. How do you account for this sudden outburst on the 12th?

A. You see, the people of Kasur wanted to observe the *hartal* on the 6th in common with the whole country in obedience to the message of Mahatma Gandhi. This was first brought before the members of the Bar and we refused and said we could not take any lead in the matter.

Q. When was that?

A. It was, I think, on the 1st or 2nd of April.

6 December 1919.

SARDAR AMAR SINGH.

(Continued)

Q. There was a meeting?

A. No, no meeting.

Q. There was a meeting of the members of the Bar?

A. No, in the Bar room there was a talk about it.

Q. There was no regular meeting? There was a talk about the *hartal*?

A. About the *hartal*, that Gandhi's message had been received and were we to do anything or not. Most of us refused to take any part.

Q. Some of the pleaders were in favour of the *hartal*?

A. To my knowledge in the Bar room no one was in favour of it.

Q. Who started the thing if there was no one in favour of it?

A. It was started in this way. Maulvi Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din and Mr. Devi Dial proposed that we should pass a protest resolution on the 6th and wire that to the Secretary of State and Mr. Lloyd George. As to a *hartal* it was clearly decided against.

Q. Was everybody agreed that there was to be no *hartal*?

A. This was agreed among the members of the Bar.

Q. And in fact there was no *hartal* on the 6th?

A. No. These two gentlemen wished that we should hold a meeting if possible and send telegrams to England that this Rowlatt Act should be repealed. Nearly all the members of the Bar showed their inactivity about this; and then they consulted some of the principal traders of the town and all refused and said "we won't take part in the *hartal*."

Q. There was no meeting on the 6th?

A. A meeting was talked of.

Q. Then what happened?

A. They came to Lahore on the 6th to attend the meeting at the Bradlaugh Hall and I went to a relative of mine at Ferozepore; so no meeting or no *hartal* took place at Kasur on the 6th.

Q. My question was, if there was no political activity against the Rowlatt Act, how do you account for these events on the 12th taking place?

A. There was no *hartal* on the 6th and we people were put to great shame by other men from Amritsar, from Lahore and Amritsar, who told us that we had not joined in the protest of the country.

Q. When you had no *hartal* and no meeting, you were taunted by people from other places?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you say you were taunted, were the members of the Bar taunted?

A. I was also taunted and most of us were taunted.

Q. By whom?

A. At Ferozepore also some people asked me whether there was *hartal* at Kasur and I said no.

Q. Did people from other places come to Kasur and speak to you about this?

A. So much I do not know, but I know that some tradesmen received their *hundis* back and their bills of exchange were returned to them. In the case of one shop-keeper Sundar, his *hundi* or his railway receipt was returned from Amritsar.

Q. Have you any personal knowledge about that or is it what you have heard?

A. That transpired during the investigation.

Q. You did not know about it yourself?

A. Personally I did not know.

Q. You have heard about it in the same manner as you have heard about the *sadhu* being white-washed?

A. I only know so much that when the investigations were going on.

Q. That is what you heard during the investigations?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you say you were taunted, were you personally taunted, and where, at Ferozepore?

A. At Ferozepore people asked me if there was a *hartal* at Kasur and I said no, and they said 'why have you people of Kasur not done so,' I said we had not and they said we had done a very bad thing.

Q. Were you convinced that you had done a wrong thing?

A. It was neither wrong nor right; we did not join the voice of the country.

Q. I want to know what the effect on you was of that rebuke you got from your friends at Ferozepore?

A. Personally at the moment of course I can say that which I heard the whole country had held a *hartal* and nothing had taken place, I thought it would have been better if Kasur had joined with the voice of the country.

Q. So you felt you had done wrong in lagging behind?

A. I felt so at the moment, but I never contemplated that this mischief would take place.

Q. You felt like that when you returned to Kasur?

A. I had nothing to do with Kasur. I am not a resident of Kasur. I am only a practitioner.

Q. You have been there eight years?

A. I only do my practice there.

Q. Who were the other people who were similarly taunted?

A. There is one Honorary Magistrate Sheikh Nawab Khan. He told me that some people taunted him.

Q. This gentleman returned from Lahore and said they taunted him because he had not taken part in the common protest of the country and did you say that you also felt the same?

A. When it was the cause of the country every one must have felt that he was doing wrong in abstaining from the *hartal*.

Q. When you were rebuked by people from other parts what did you resolve to do? Did you try to make up lost ground?

A. I have already submitted that there was absolutely no talk of a *hartal* after the 1st or 2nd of April. I forgot the thing. It was a momentary feeling which I felt when I was going through the bazar.

Q. And you shook off that feeling?

A. It was only momentary.

Q. You came back to your original frame of mind that you were quite right in abstaining?

A. I came back to that idea.

Q. When you were rebuked at Ferozepore did the feeling that you had done wrong in abstaining remain with you?

A. The real fact of the matter was we were afraid of the officials and so we decided not to take part.

Q. You wanted to have a *hartal* and to have a meeting but you were afraid of the officials?

A. We wanted to join in the common protest of the country but we were afraid of the officials.

Q. Throughout you wanted to join the other people in the country in agitating against the Rowlatt Act?

A. Not throughout. There was a talk about it on the 1st and 2nd of April; before that there was no talk. It was only mentioned in the papers.

Q. You wanted to join the public?

A. About the 6th we wanted to join but because we were afraid.

Q. Then was it on the 6th that you and other members were willing to join the other people in the country in protesting against the Rowlatt Act? At what stage did you desire to demonstrate about the Rowlatt Act?

A. I have already submitted that there was a talk about it on the 1st and 2nd of April in the Bar room when Maulvi Ghulam Mohi-ud-din and Devi Dial said "what are we to do first on the 6th" and it was then decided that we were not going to join.

Q. Do I understand that your determination on the 1st and 2nd not to have a *hartal* on the 6th was taken because of your fear of the officials?

A. I think so.

Q. But for that fear of the officials you would have decided to have a *hartal*?

A. Because we considered it to be an innocent thing.

Q. In your heart of hearts you wanted to have a *hartal* because the whole country was having it?

A. Yes, Sir, we wanted to join with the country.

Q. But you did not have the courage to do so?

A. No, Sir.

Q. You were afraid of the officials?

A. Very much afraid; even now.

Q. What particular official were you afraid of in Kasur?

6 December 1919.]

SARDAR AMAR SINGH.

[Continued.]

A. I think all the officials were against it. There was no official who was in favour of having a *hartal*.

Q. Nobody would suggest that the officials would be in favour of a *hartal*. The officials everywhere were naturally against it. What was there in Kasur that you were afraid of?

A. Because there was absolutely no political life in the place.

Q. There was no force of public opinion in Kasur?

A. No.

Q. That is what made you very much afraid of the officials?

A. Yes, Sir. From a conversation I had with Mr. Fyson I gathered at Lahore on the 30th March that a *hartal* would not be popular. I had gone to see Mr. Fyson on some private business and in course of conversation he mentioned that there was going to be a *hartal* on the 30th March. And from his frame of mind I gathered that he was going to take some steps against those who were organising this. As a result of this conversation I knew that he was against it and as he had been recently transferred to Lahore from Kasur I decided to keep quiet.

Q. I take it from this that your inclination was to have a *hartal* on the 30th?

A. As a matter of fact I never knew that they were going to have a *hartal* on the 30th. This I gathered from my conversation with Mr. Fyson.

Q. Have you anything more to say about accounting for this outburst on the 12th?

A. For various reasons there was a feeling of discontent amongst the people.

Q. What reasons?

A. Economic, political, recruitment, war loan—several people had a number of grievances against the Government.

Q. What was the reason connected with recruitment?

A. Recruiting people against their wishes.

Q. Were any people in Kasur recruited against their wishes?

A. Attempts were made . . . . .

Q. I want to know whether you have any personal knowledge of people in Kasur being recruited against their own wishes?

A. I know nothing of Kasur proper. I know something about the neighbouring villages. In Kasur no one came forward although we did our best to persuade them.

Q. So you took part in the recruiting campaign and you were persuading people to join?

A. I was helping Mr. Fyson.

Q. You were co-operating with the authorities in getting recruits in Kasur?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you compelling people against their wishes to join?

A. I personally did not compel anybody.

Q. Did you see any of your co-operators doing so, either officials or non-officials? I want to know whether any of your co-workers resorted to compulsion?

A. I can answer this question but I would ask to be excused.

Q. But did you not volunteer to give evidence?

A. Perhaps your Honour is under a misapprehension. This statement was called for from me by Mr. Marsden.

Q. Did you offer to give evidence?

A. I am giving evidence at the request of Mr. Marsden.

Q. You were asked by Mr. Marsden to give evidence? When did he ask you?

A. I can show you his letter if you like. (Witness hands letter to Sir C. H. Setalvad.)

Sir C. H. Setalvad.—This letter says: "Dear Sir, I should be glad if you could see me to-day sometime between 12 and 2." This letter does not say anything about your making a statement. What date was this?

Witness.—Kindly do not confuse me. This is the first time that I have come into the witness box.

Sir C. H. Setalvad.—You realise now that it is one thing to be in a witness-box to be examined and another thing to cross-examine one in the witness-box.

Witness.—If you see the letter you will find the date. I think it was in October.

Q. When you went and saw him what did he tell you?

A. He told me that he wanted my evidence about the disturbances at Kasur and Martial Law administration.

Q. Did you tell him that you were willing to give evidence?

A. I told him that I had refused the Congress Committee to give evidence but as he was my officer and as he had asked me to give evidence I could not venture to refuse. I told him that I would think over the matter and then send him my evidence.

Q. Did you express to him your unwillingness?

A. At that moment it was neither refusal nor acceptance.

Q. You said you would think over it?

A. Yes. I had a talk with him and then he told me that I could write down my evidence.

Q. The result was that you decided to give evidence?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you inform him of your decision?

A. I never met him for some days. Then on the 1st or 2nd November in court he told me that there will be no cross-examination or anything. I was not very anxious to give evidence. He told me that there would be no cross-examination. After some time I heard that His Lordship had arrived and that there would be cross-examination and that counsel would be permitted and therefore I was unwilling to come forward and give evidence. I asked to be excused.

Q. You put it on the ground of cross-examination?

A. I put it on the ground that I might say something which might be unpalatable to any side. I knew I might have to speak the truth and say something which might not be palatable to one or the other side.

Q. What sides do you suggest?

A. There are two sides—the official and the congress. Q. And therefore you wanted to be excused. Did Mr. Marsden press you to send in your evidence?

A. He persuaded me. He is my Sub-Divisional Officer and I could not very well refuse him.

Q. You assented much against your wish?

A. I have submitted that I was not very anxious to come into the witness-box but because I was asked by my officer I have come.

Q. You suggested—that you were compelled to give evidence.

A. No; I was not very anxious to give evidence. I was requested to give evidence; no one compelled me.

Q. But have you not come to give evidence voluntarily?

A. Whatever I will submit it will be voluntary and it will not be at the instigation of any party. But I would rather not say things which would go against me.

Q. What are the matters that you do not wish to disclose?

A. You asked me about recruitment and whether any one was compelled to join and who was it that compelled them, and whether they were officials or non-officials.

Q. Do you know whether some were compelled?

A. Some were compelled. I do not say they were not. I would like to speak out.

Q. Certainly, speak out. Tell us the whole thing, whatever you want to say. You made a remark that compulsory recruitment was one of the causes of discontent at Kasur. I want to test this statement. I want to know who did the compulsion.

A. May I ask one thing from you; can you assure me that if I disclose anything no harm or trouble will come to me.

Q. What trouble do you mean?

A. The trouble is Your Lordships will be going away in a few days and then I have to remain here as a subject of His Majesty's Government and I do not wish to say anything against officials. I will speak the truth and my statement can be verified from records.

Q. If your statement is to be the truth why need you be afraid?

6 December 1919.]

SARDAR AMAR SINGH

[Continued.]

A. I would request you, Sir, to clear this point on recruitment from some other witness.

Q. You made a statement that recruitment against the wishes of the people was one of the causes of discontent and you say that you know the things that happened—you know a good deal, surely then don't you think it is your duty to tell us?

A. It is my duty. I submit that I will be displeasing somebody.

Q. You cannot please everybody?

A. Sir, I do not want to create trouble for myself. I have to live. If you can give me an assurance that my statement about recruitment will not bring me into trouble then I am prepared to make everything clear to you. I have got personal knowledge on this subject—I have seen it with my own eyes. I have got certain papers and I have been working with Mr. Fyson in connection with recruitment.

Q. Why not tell us the whole truth about it? It is best to be frank. Some undesirable methods were employed by whom?

A. By all the recruiting parties.

Q. What was the method adopted?

A. The method adopted was to ask the Sub-Inspector to send up young Jats under sections 107 and 110.

Q. The Police Sub-Inspector was asked to send up Jats in the villages under sections 107 and 110 asking them to give security for good behaviour. Who asked the Sub-Inspector?

A. That is the whole thing I want to avoid.

Q. Surely you ought to tell us who gave those instructions?

A. It was after the visit of His Honour to Kasur.

Q. You say the instructions were given to the Police Inspector. Did you see who gave those instructions?

A. I saw them assembling together in a private room and then action was taken.

Q. Who assembled?

A. Officials.

Q. What officials?

A. The Police and Kasur civil authorities. And after they came out of the room we saw a number of *chalans* coming up and those people who were never *chalaned* before were brought up.

Q. Sometime after the meeting you saw a number of young Jats brought up before the Magistrate under sections 107 and 110. You say all these people were brought up. Did you see the *chalan* forms? How many were they roughly?

A. There were about 100 *chalans*.

Q. What Magistrate's court was this?

A. In those days the Sub-Divisional Officer was Khan Bahadur Sultan Ahmed Khan.

Q. He was Sub-Divisional Officer in those days at Kasur?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. These 100 were brought up from villages?

A. They were from various *thanas*.

Q. What happened to those people who were brought up under those *chalans*?

A. Sometimes they were persuaded and sometimes influence was brought to bear upon them. Every method was used that they should volunteer.

Q. You saw the *chalans*?

A. Yes, Sir, I appeared for some of these people.

Q. What happened to these people who were brought up under these *chalans*?

A. They were sometimes persuaded, sometimes some sort of influence was brought to bear upon them, in fact every method was used to make them volunteer. In some cases when these Jats used to hear that the sole purpose was recruitment, they used to decamp and they did not care to appear even under these *chalans*, and then they were brought in handcuffs.

Q. They were hand-cuffed under these *chalans*?

A. Some of them were. The police used to present the *chalans*, but some one used to tell them that the people to whom these *chalans* were issued were away from the village, and so on.

Q. But what was done to those people who were brought up under section 107 or 110?

A. In our Manjha you can have any number of witnesses for the prosecution, some *sarkars* and others.

Q. What was done to those people?

A. People would come forward and say that a certain man is a thief, he is a dacoit and so forth. Then that person was advised that it was better for him to join the service of Government, he would bring a good name to his country and to his parents; he would get some squares, and such like inducements were given to him. Well, since this canal irrigation was introduced, the people of Manjha *stags* are rich enough. They did not like to go on Rs. 11. That was the thing. Those who were poor said 'All right, we will join the army, or I will send my son or I will send my brother.'

Q. Then they were let off?

A. Then, Sir, he had to fulfil his promise by joining the army if he had undertaken to join himself or give his brother or son if he had agreed to do so, and then he was generally let off.

Q. Then the proceedings under section 107 or 110 were withdrawn?

A. If he was obstinate he was put in the lock-up for some days, or if he was a man worth Rs. 5,000 he was asked to deposit security to the extent of Rs. 4,000 or Rs. 5,000, and even after some security was given, some technical objection was raised and the security was refused, and then he was sent to jail for some time.

Q. They were harassed in that manner till they agreed to serve as recruits?

A. Till they agreed to serve or underwent their imprisonment.

Q. They had the choice of going as recruits or going to prison?

A. Before they were convicted or sent to jail they were generally given two or three chances so that they may consider over the matter and consult their people.

Q. Now you spoke of 100 *chalans*, did this happen also with regard to the other villages and other people?

A. I am not talking of one village only. These 100 *chalans* were almost for the whole of the sub-division in the beginning. Then also suppose there was a case under section 326 or 325, the magistrates used to keep a record in their court showing the war services the people were rendering to the Government. They used to ask the people whether they were willing, and they used to advise the people that it was better for them to join the army, or if they themselves could not they should give somebody.

Q. Was this done after His Honour came to the Kasur District?

A. Yes, before his visit there were no recruits.

Q. What was the date of his visit that you are referring to?

A. It was the month of August 1917.

Q. After that, this was done?

A. We were brisk in recruiting after that.

Q. What I want to know is, was recruitment carried on by these methods?

A. By persuasion, by these methods, and in every possible way. Some people were given squares for *kachcha* cultivation if they supplied some recruits. I have also supplied some.

Q. Nothing wrong in giving inducements to people to join the army?

A. Supposing there is a second class Magistrate who has the power of sending a man to jail for only six months. Then he would threaten the man that he would send him to jail for 7 years unless he joined the army.

Q. You mean the magistrates, with regard to the people put before them, were openly threatening these persons with higher punishments than they were authorised to inflict unless they joined the army?

A. Yes, they were.

Q. Did you hear that yourself?

A. Yes.

Q. This happened in your presence?

A. At that time he also told the accused that it was better for him to join the army.

Q. On any occasion did it happen in your presence?

A. On several occasions. He was told that he would be severely punished.

6 December 1919.]

SARDAR AMAR SINGH.

[Continued.]

Q. But that happened in your presence?

A. Yes, in my presence as a counsel, sometime as a chance visitor.

Q. In whose court did these things happen, let us have one or two instances?

A. In the court of almost every magistrate.

Q. On how many occasions did you yourself hear a magistrate telling the accused that unless he joined the army he would be severely punished, on how many occasions did you yourself hear this either as a counsel appearing for somebody or being in court for some other purpose?

A. It must be on about 20 or 30 occasions in different courts.

Q. In Kasur itself or in the district?

A. I have my practice at Kasur, sometimes we were in camp.

Q. On 20 or 30 occasions you yourself heard the magistrates telling the accused that unless they joined the army they would be severely punished?

A. Well, there is a judicial file existing, and in that you will find the statements of the accused. I submit there is a file existing, the statements of the accused are there. The accused was asked if he was willing to join the army. Well, he said "I will give you my brother or my son or my servants or I myself will go."

Q. Is that recorded in the file of any case?

A. Certainly, in cases in which he was *chalaned*.

Q. Can you give us the names of one or two cases where you say this was recorded in the records of the cases? Can we get the file?

A. I think, Sir, if you will kindly go through all the files of first class Magistrates, at least in 80 per cent. of the cases you will be able to get these things.

Q. We cannot go through the files of all first class Magistrates, but you say you appeared in some of the cases, and so if you give us the names of the accused who were so told by the Magistrate in your presence, we can send for the files of the particular cases and look at them to see whether what you say is recorded in the files or not?

A. I don't remember the names now, but if you will ask the pleaders of Kasur they might be able to give them to you.

Q. You are a pleader of Kasur?

A. I have not brought my diary with me.

Q. But you must have some record from where you can find these things hereafter? You can go home and send us a list of the cases in which the Magistrates told the accused that they would be severely punished if they did not join the army?

A. So much I have not got in my record. I can only show that such and such accused joined the army.

Q. What you say is that in the records of some of the cases you will find it recorded that the person concerned was asked if he was willing to go, and he said yes or that he would give his brother or son, is that so?

A. That file was sent to the S. D. O. for approval.

Q. You find it recorded in the file?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. If you can give us the names of the accused in whose cases the record was made to that effect, we can send for those files?

A. I will have to find out.

Q. You can find out hereafter and send us a list?

A. I will try my best, but I am not the senior counsel of that place, Moulvi Ghulam Mohi-ud-din and others are the senior pleaders.

Q. You have put materials before us, and you are making a statement?

A. Any threat is not on the file. Only the statement of the accused, his willingness and the approval or disapproval of the S. D. O.

Q. If you can give us the names of these cases, we can send for the files?

A. I will find them out.

Q. Now about the war loan, you said that was also one of the causes?

A. I can give you one instance that I myself saw. I remember it.

Q. Will you kindly tell us?

A. This *chalan* business and sending for people under sections 107 and 110, this was in the beginning in the time of Khan Sahib. Mr. Fyson did not follow this procedure. He used to go to the villages and preach to the people.

Q. Mr. Fyson did not use any compulsion or any of the methods that you have described?

A. He did not use any of these methods. Of course if a file was sent to him by some subordinate magistrate or even if in his court anybody was willing to join, he was quite ready to have him, he did not call for any of these *chalans*.

Q. *Chalans* were not made in this manner in his time?

A. But of course he was also recruiting.

Q. So were all?

A. But he adopted different methods.

Q. Not of compulsion?

A. You may take it as compulsion, but I am going to submit that method.

Q. What was that method?

A. Subsequent to the War Conference or Durbar which was held in Delhi some two years ago, there was a public meeting held here by His Honour, and the Punjab was asked to supply about 2 lakhs of recruits. They were distributed in every district. Our sub-division had also to supply about 800 or 900 of them. The thing is I do not wish to say all this nor have I got the courage to refuse you.

Q. You are going to describe the methods of Mr. Fyson. Let us have them.

A. Yes, Sir. He had got a census prepared from every village, and he ordered that such and such a village should supply so many recruits, and they were distributed. Suppose the Kasur Tahsil had to supply 400, they were distributed. But when after preaching for 6, 7 or 8 months he found this method was not successful, then he decided to follow the method that was in force in the Ferozepore District.

Q. He decided to follow the old methods?

A. He decided to follow the method which was followed in the Ferozepore District.

Q. What was that?

A. He sent his Naib-Tahsildar. That was rather an inducement to the people also. Suppose a man was a debtor to some *sowcar*. The *sowcar* was asked to forego his interest or some portion of his principal.

Q. Do you consider that illegitimate, a wrong method, to offer such monetary inducement to persons to join the army? Is there anything wrong in it?

A. Have I said that? You asked me to describe the method. I don't say whether it is right or wrong.

Q. The creditor was asked to forego interest or to show some concession to the debtor?

A. Yes, he was told that he would get some *sanad* and the man would go, and so on. Suppose he is to be betrothed to somebody and he cannot get himself married to that girl. Then influence was brought to bear upon the parents of the girl that they should give their daughter to this man and then the man would join the army. Or if some land was mortgaged, half the land would be redeemed.

Q. Those are what you call the Ferozepore methods?

A. We learnt it from Ferozepore.

Q. These are the methods?

A. Some of them.

Q. Did Mr. Fyson do anything else?

A. He appointed two *panchayats*. The head of one *panchayat* was our Tahsildar Sahib, and of another was our Honorary Magistrate, a Khan Bahadur. Their function was this—Suppose from a certain village a certain number of recruits were required, and that village had supplied only half or one-fourth the number instead of the number which was allotted to them, then the *panchayat* would go there and hold their sitting until the necessary number of recruits were secured. I have got experience of these things in the village of Rajajang.

Q. Would you give us your personal knowledge of that village? What happened?

6 December 1919.]

SARDAR AMAR SINGH.

(Continued.)

A. Khan Bahadur Sherbaz Khan was our Honorary Magistrate. He took a *panchayat* of about 100 persons to Rajajang. They had to supply about 25 or 30 recruits, I don't know the exact number, but the balance against them was about 19. Then they held a meeting in that village. The *zaidar* of that village was also present at that meeting.

Q. You were present at this meeting?

A. I was present in the meeting of Mr. Fyson when these two *panchayats* were formed, it was of *zaidars*, *lambardars*, honorary magistrates and such like persons.

Q. Were you present at this meeting in the Rajajang village?

A. I was not present, but I was present when these men were brought under custody.

Q. Well, tell us exactly what happened.

A. That *panchayat* went to the Rajajang village and picked up some people. One of them was a Jat and the others were Kurmis or some such people, about 19 in number.

Q. Nineteen people that were still due from that village were picked up from that village?

A. They picked up 19 people. Some *tahsil chaprassis*, some *zaidars* and *lambardars* with bayonets on brought these 19 people to Mr. Fyson at Kasur.

Q. They were about 19 people, and they were brought to Kasur by soldiers?

A. Not soldiers; but by *chaprassis* and *saidars*.

Q. You said with bayonets on?

A. Some had rifles, because they were in charge of these recruits, and it was their duty to see that they were safely brought.

Q. They were brought there in custody?

A. It was just like custody.

Q. Were you present when they were brought there?

A. I sent them to Lahore. When they were sent, I was present.

Q. Where were you when they were brought?

A. First they were brought to Mr. Fyson. At that time I was not present. In the evening I was present at the railway station. The Naib-Tahsildar was also present. All those 19 persons were brought to the station. Some of them were weeping, and the parents of some of them who were also at the railway station were crying. I told them there was no harm in their going as they would be serving their King and country.

Q. They were crying, were they unwilling to go?

A. Most of them.

Q. Did they say so?

A. When they were weeping one could understand it.

Q. It may not be going to the war, but it may be owing to their people going to a distant place?

A. They were crying saying that their men were being taken away by force.

Q. They themselves were saying so?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You were at the railway station?

A. Yes.

Q. Was Mr. Fyson there?

A. No, they were first presented before him.

Q. When they told you that they were brought by force, what did they tell you?

A. Those people told me that they were quite unwilling. Then they were made to sit in a third class compartment, which was made empty, and then some *saidars* and *chaprassis* sat along with them with bayonets in hand. They were sent to Lahore. The next morning their relatives came crying to Mr. Tollinton, the Deputy Commissioner in Lahore.

Q. They were released?

A. When Mr. Tollinton came to know that these people were taken by force and against their wishes, I was told by the *zaidar* of that village that those people were released and sent back to their homes.

Q. That shows that when the matter was brought to the notice of the higher authorities and when they came to know that these people were unwilling to go, they were let off?

A. I submit the method adopted.

Q. You say that though superior officers disliked these things, still the subordinate officers in fact resorted to these methods?

A. Then Mr. Tollinton also issued instructions that there should be no compulsion.

Q. After this incident, were instructions issued to the subordinate officers not to resort to these methods hereafter?

A. Mr. Tollinton wrote to Mr. Fyson and then he issued further instructions.

Q. Now let us leave it there. You were suggesting that the war loan operation had something to do with this trouble. What happened there?

A. Officers used to ask people to contribute to the war loan. Suppose a man was willing to give only Rs. 500, he was asked to pay Rs. 2,000 or Rs. 1,500.

Q. They were persuading people to give more than they were willing to give?

A. Well, some used to give, some refused.

Q. Is it not the case all the world over that if you want subscriptions people are not always willing to give their money, and they have to be persuaded?

A. I did not say that any force was used.

Q. Do you suggest that there was anything improperly done or compulsion used or undue pressure brought to bear upon people with regard to the war loan?

A. Well, undue pressure, I won't say anything about it. In our country even to win the good opinion of an officer, is a sufficient incentive. When an officer wants us to do anything, people generally do it. Suppose you are the head of my district, and you want me to do a certain thing, I would do that to please you.

Q. And still you harbour a grievance against him. You express your willingness to do something before him in order to please him, and still you harbour a grievance over giving the money?

A. If I voluntarily give you something and if you accept it, well and good; but if you want to double or treble it, then of course people think that it is a sort of pressure.

Q. Some people refused to enhance their quota?

A. Some people refused.

Q. Was anything done to them or were they left alone when they refused?

A. What was to be done?

Q. Were they maltreated in any manner or was there any undue interference with them if they refused or were they let alone?

A. One cannot say. Sometimes an officer increased the income-tax.

Q. Was anything of that sort done to your knowledge? What is the use of making these suggestions unless you are prepared to support them by facts which you know?

A. I remember one instance, Sir. There was a meeting held in Kasur at which an officer told the people that they had not done anything for the war loan, and they should do more.

Q. It was merely exhorting the people to give more?

A. Exhorting in a threatening tone.

Q. What did the officer threaten them with? What did he say would happen to them?

A. I think the frown of an officer is quite sufficient.

Q. He did not say anything as to what he would visit them with if they did not subscribe?

A. He said that if Germans had been our rulers, we would have been very badly treated; but now under British rule we were being well treated; we had made so much out of the war and such like things.

Q. That is all? Anything else improper that you saw with regard to the war loan?

A. I don't say whether it is proper or improper. In certain cases some people were made to subscribe some amount. Suppose he was a poor man and had not got the money, but simply to please the officer, he had to get money somehow from somewhere and pay it.

Q. Do you say that the people who were made to subscribe to the war loan were discontented? Were they?

A. They felt, of course; because there was a register kept showing the amounts subscribed by the various people and the recruits given by the different people. So, as is the habit of our people, to win the good will of the officers, they used to do something specially. I

6 December 1919.]

SARDAR AMAR SINGH.

[Continued.]

don't mean to say that any one was actually beaten or sent to jail for not subscribing to the war loan.

Q. You said something about the enhancement of income-tax in connection with the war loan?

A. Regarding income-tax, I can only give you bare facts. It is for your Lordships to judge. I cannot give you more.

Q. You can give us facts of which you have knowledge?

A. You say what is proper and improper?

Q. What is the connection between income-tax and war loan? What facts have you got as to what was done in connection with the income-tax?

A. An Extra Assistant Commissioner at Kasur was in charge of this war loan work. He raised the war loan subscriptions as much as he could by persuasion and by influence. Some obeyed him, some displeased him. Soon after he became the Income-tax Collector, the income-tax of some of those traders who had not obeyed him fully when he was Extra Assistant Commissioner was very much enhanced, and they attribute this to their not having subscribed to his satisfaction.

Q. Do you know of any cases personally?

A. Some people have complained that their income-tax has been put too high. Suppose one man was liable to pay only Rs. 200, and was made to pay Rs. 800.

Q. They attributed that to their not having subscribed to the war loan to the satisfaction of that officer?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Now on the 11th you had a meeting at Kasur, had you?

A. Kindly give me two minutes; I am confused. If my statement is displeasing to Your Lordship, excuse me.

Q. There is no question of displeasing. We are trying to gather facts; that is all. There was a meeting on the 11th?

A. I was not there.

Q. You were not in Kasur on the 11th?

A. No; I was there on the 12th. Subsequently I was there on the 16th. I was at Kasur up to the 23rd.

Q. Several pleaders in Kasur were arrested?

A. Yes; not several, three pleaders were arrested.

Q. And the houses of 8 or 9 were searched?

A. The houses of 5 pleaders were searched.

Q. Were these pleaders who were arrested handcuffed and taken through the streets?

A. They said they had been handcuffed.

Q. You did not see them?

A. No.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. About the white-washing of the *Sadhu*, you did not see him being whitewashed?

A. I did not see.

Q. Did you speak to anybody who had seen him being whitewashed?

A. The station staff might have seen him.

Q. You did not see anybody who said to you that he saw him being whitewashed?

A. My submission in answer to Your Lordship was that the station staff might have seen him being white-washed.

Q. You did not see it and you did not speak to anybody who saw that?

A. I did not.

Q. Was he coated with white dust or lime?

A. He was coated with lime; it was of a different colour, it was a white coating, just as there is on the wall.

Q. Was it pasted all over or coated with a brush?

A. Not with a brush. It was from top to feet. It was all over the body.

Q. Was it a thick paste?

A. It was sufficiently thick.

Q. How thick? Was it like *sowah*?

A. It was like *sowah*, i.e., dust.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You said that the *Sadhu* was shivering?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it dry dust? Or when you saw the *Sadhu*, was he wet?

A. It was half dry at that time.

Q. The whitewashing that you saw was not ashes, it was not dust?

A. I think it was of lime.

Q. Was it mixed with water or was it dusty?

A. It was wet; so it must have been mixed with water; or he might have perspired; I do not know. It was a regular coating, a mixture of water and lime.

Q. It was a regular coating?

A. Yes.

Q. Then I will ask only one more question. You state "On the arrival of the Patti and Ferozepore trains, the mob grew in number." Then you say "it was further excited on account of the firing by some of the British soldiers travelling by the Ferozepore train."

A. Yes.

Q. You have no personal knowledge of these facts? I mean that you learnt it from somebody else?

A. I understand it. My submission is after extinguishing the fire at the railway station, I and some of the gentlemen went towards the Patti side. The Tahsildar told me that the fire had been extinguished and asked me to run up towards that side. Then we three or four went there. There we saw that the Patti train had emptied out away from the station and the Sub-Inspector of the Railway Police and some of his constables were coming from that train. The whole train was passed by us and we saw that some of the zamindars also like spectators wanted to know what was the matter. They also were running towards that side where the mob was going, i.e., towards the bridge. That I saw myself. So I said they grew in number.

Q. What I want to make clear is that you have no personal knowledge that there was firing?

A. I did not see it myself.

Q. Therefore that leaves a wrong impression. It is not clear from your statement, as to whether this firing did take place according to your information at the station or whether it took place where the train was. As regards the firing to which you refer, you have no personal knowledge. Still you persisted in answer to the question put by the President that you were right. I want to know as to whether you mean to convey by this that your information was that this firing did take place when the train was near the distant signal or whether it did take place at the station.

A. I think it refers to the railway station.

Q. Therefore you do not mean to insinuate that any firing did take place at the time when the train was stationary near the distant signal?

A. I am not certain about that.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. I have a few questions to ask. I am sorry to trouble you. You said that you were afraid of giving evidence, because you might be compelled to tell the truth under cross-examination. Do you mean to imply by this that if you are not cross-examined, you will not be telling the truth?

A. No, what you refer to is the ordinary thing. I talked to Mr. Marsden about it.

Q. You said you were afraid of giving evidence, because you might have to speak the truth when being cross-examined?

A. That I did not say. Of course I shall have to speak the truth. Such questions as Your Lordship just wanted to know about might be unpalatable to somebody.

Q. You mean to say that in cross-examination you might be asked about certain facts which you do not wish to disclose, because they may not be liked by somebody?

A. Yes. But I do not mean that in my examination in chief I will tell a lie. I will have to speak the truth always.

Q. Why should you be afraid of telling the truth in any case when you are asked about facts? Why should you not state them?

A. I have stated them. I have not done any harm to Your Lordship by giving out my mind to you. You have not got any experience of this province. I do not

6 December 1919.]

SARDAR AMAR SINGH.

[Continued.]

know what is the matter with your province, but here we cannot displease our officers, excuse me.

Q. You cannot, because you are afraid some harm might come to you and that is why you do not wish to displease your officers?

A. If the things are unpalatable to them.

Q. So may I take it that this is because there is some sort of fear at the back of your mind that the officials will use their power in an irresponsible manner towards you? Is that the idea?

A. Yes, Sir; because I had experience of that also with Mr. Fyson.

Q. I want to know what this is.

A. What I am submitting is based on my personal knowledge. Once a meeting was held here on the 9th March to request the Government of India to postpone the passing of the Rowlatt Bill. That was presided over by the Hon'ble Fazl-i-Hussain. I was a chance visitor there. Mr. Duni Chand and Mr. Ghulam Mohi-ud-din asked me to second the resolution. The resolution was that we should request His Excellency to postpone the passing of that Act for some months, because we had been rendering war services and when the people do not like a bill, it should not be thrust upon them. That was my maiden attendance at a political meeting and my maiden speech. I made the speech; I do not deny that. I saw Mr. Fyson on the 29th March here. When he came to know of that, he expressed his displeasure about that meeting and about my speech at that meeting.

Q. Very well, perhaps he did not like it, perhaps he thought you were not very wise in doing it? Why should that be a reason for not stating the truth?

A. I have submitted that I am speaking the truth. I simply suggest, just as I told Mr. Marsden, that I should be excused. He wanted my statement and in obedience to his wishes, I have sent my statement. Your Lordship wanted to ask some questions about recruiting. I did not want to say anything as some gentleman might not like that. That was the only thing.

Q. What I do not understand is, because a certain thing is unpleasant to the officials, why should that be a reason for you to desist from speaking the truth? Are you afraid of their using their power against you?

A. They might; I cannot say.

Q. They might use it improperly. Is that your idea?

A. The thing is very plain. I think it is a common psychology of mind. Suppose Your Lordship is displeased with me for anything which you do not like and you are a man in authority and I am a subordinate, you can, if you like, make use of your authority in that way.

Q. I shall be influenced by my displeasure in the use of my authority?

A. You might be influenced. I do not say they would certainly use the powers in that way. Now I have not displeased Your Lordships. I have obeyed you and I have given you the true facts that I know and believe.

Q. According to you officers are dreaded because they might use their powers improperly?

A. It is human nature. I do not mean that all officers are like that.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. You have told us that you people of Kasur at first abstained from the *hartal* and the general movement, because you knew that the officials disapprove of the *hartal*?

A. Yes.

Q. When you look back now on the riot, murder and incendiarism which the Kasur mob committed on the 12th April, do you now think that perhaps the officials were right in deprecating the *hartal*?

A. That is accidental: it was not contemplated by anybody. These murders and all these things were accidental: by chance they were unfortunate things. They were not deliberate things. Of course if the officials thought that such things might happen, then of course they were justified.

Q. You have told us at that time that the people had many grievances, economic and political, against the Government. Is that not right?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think that when the people were in that discontented condition it was prudent of you, the educated classes of Kasur, to indulge in political agitation and excitement further?

A. We did not indulge in fact. We stopped from indulging; realising this thing, we did not indulge.

By Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate—

Q. I understood you to say in connection with that matter of people being sent up under sections 107 and 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code, that all you had to go upon was that some officials—the local civil officials and the police officials—held a consultation and after that you saw a large number of persons being sent up under those sections?

A. That is my experience.

Q. That is all that you had to go upon when you made this statement this morning to the Committee that some Sub-Inspectors were asked to send Jats up under section 107. What I ask you is that that was all you had to go upon, that a consultation had been held after which you began to see a large number of Jats being sent up. There was nothing more direct than that?

A. Not only that; when the *chalan*s were placed . . .

Q. Please answer my question whether there was anything more direct than that so far as your information is concerned. For instance, have you ever seen any written order to that effect to any Sub-Inspector?

A. I did not see any written order. I have heard about that.

Q. There was no written order that you ever saw to that effect. Did you ever hear of any verbal order by any officer superior to a Sub-Inspector to the effect that he may send up young Jats under section 107, simply because they are young Jats fit for recruiting and not *badmashes*?

A. My submission is that when the *chalan* was . . .

Q. I will come to *chalan*s. I have got something to ask about your personal experience of the *chalan*s. My question is a very simple and straight one. . . .

A. I have seen that. I was present at the time. But I have not seen any order. It is not my business. I have told you my experience.

Q. You stated this morning that Sub-Inspectors were asked to send Jats. If you can modify that statement, then some of these questions will disappear and there will be no necessity to bother you. Do you say that they were actually asked?

A. They were not asked in my presence. That I have never said.

Q. Then that is what you infer?

A. From their practice.

Q. Now you also said by way of illustration that second class Magistrates whose powers are only to sentence up to six months' imprisonment, when any cases were brought before them, said that they would punish them heavily up to seven years or so. Can you name any Magistrate of the second class who did so or did any such thing in your presence—That is what you said by way of illustration. Please note "by a Magistrate of the second class" and not by a first class Magistrate. Did any Magistrate of the second class say within your hearing that he would inflict any such punishment?

A. Not exactly seven years.

Q. Anything more than his powers?

A. Yes: nearly all our Bench of Honorary Magistrates also sometimes said so and also our Tahsildar.

Q. In your hearing?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you name the Tahsildar? After all we know who the Tahsildar is. Will you name him?

A. Tala Khan Chand is the Tahsildar.

Q. Did any second class Magistrate say within your hearing that he would punish more severely than he was empowered?

A. They said that it was better for them to join the army; otherwise they would be severely punished. What was the good for them in going to jail for two years. It was better to go to the army. Honorary Magistrates also said that.



6 December 1919.]

SARDAR AMAR SINGH.

[Concluded.]

Q. You said something further which I do not think was made note of and that is that sometimes pleaders also said to the accused persons "better accept this; it is better to join the army." Did you do that at any time to any accused you were dealing with?

A. I asked a number of my clients to join the army.

Q. You advised them that it was better to elect to go to the army rather than suffer imprisonment or be bound down for some term of security?

A. I told them there was no harm and they would be serving our King and country.

Q. You persuaded them?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you think you were helping them and doing your duty towards your client when you were saying so or was it simply to please any particular official that you did that?

A. The Magistrates asked them to go to the army and I told them it was better.

Q. Were you doing your duty?

A. I had my duty towards the Government, not only to my client. So I used to do that.

Q. I am just confining myself to what you considered to be the best for your client under those circumstances. I want to know whether you gave him that advice as you thought it was best for him under the circum-

stances, or simply were you mindful of your duty to Government?

A. I think if all of us volunteered our services willingly, there was no harm.

Q. That is a different matter. You are a lawyer and you know what my question is?

A. But I do not understand the force of your question.

Q. It does not matter about the force. You understand the question; give me the answer.

A. I have given you the answer already that we pleaders used to tell our clients that it was better for them to join the army and serve the Government.

Q. Now, when you did that, you did not think you were doing anything wrong?

A. When it was wished by Government, I was right.

*By the President—*

Q. Apart from the wish of the Government, did you, as a pleader, consider that there was anything wrong in advising the client to offer his services to the country by recruiting himself rather than undergo the sentence?

A. My Lord, there was nothing wrong in my asking them.

*By Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate—*

Q. You think there was nothing wrong.

A. Yes; I never took the lead.

## PART II

# Written Statements of Witnesses, Lahore

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON, D.S.O., Royal Sussex Regiment, late Commanding, Lahore (Civil) Area.

*Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Johnson, D.S.O., Royal Sussex Regiment, late Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Simla, 30th July 1919.*

In accordance with your verbal orders of 15th instant, I have the honour to submit a report on the recent disturbances in Lahore and more particularly on the administration of Martial Law in the area under my command from the 15th April 1919, when Martial Law was proclaimed, until 29th May when I was relieved on being ordered on service. Martial Law was withdrawn on 12th June, and between that date and 29th May nothing occurred and no action was taken calling for comment.

2. I have divided the report into three sections, viz. :—

*1st Section.*—The events that led up to the introduction of Martial Law.

*2nd Section.*—The period under Martial Law.

*3rd Section.*—General.

3. The area covered by this report is known as the "Lahore (Civil) Area" and may be described as that lying between the Ravi River and the Bari Doab Canal, within a radius of 3 miles from the Central Telegraph Office and includes the City, the Fort, the Civil Station, Moghulpura Railway Works, or in a word, the whole of Lahore less only the Military Cantonments east of the canal.

4. The population of this area is estimated at 230,000 divided approximately as under :—

Europeans, exclusive of Troops	5,800
Muhammadans	129,500
Hindus	78,000
Sikhs	13,000
Indian Christians, etc.	9,500
TOTAL INDIANS	230,000

5. At the outbreak of the disturbances the forces available for the maintenance of order were approximately as follows, viz. :—

Punjab Police (armed)	230	
Railway Police (armed)	160	
		440
British Infantry in Fort	120	
Royal Garrison Artillery	25	
		145
		585

There were in addition about 800 unarmed police and possibly 300 Indian Defence Force, while 4 miles away at Lahore Cantonment were stationed most of the 43rd Infantry Brigade and some Divisional troops.

*Section I.—Events leading up to the Introduction of Martial Law.*

6. Although the state of affairs in the Lahore (Civil) Area at any time between 6th and 15th April was such as to justify the introduction of Martial Law, the overwhelming necessity for its proclamation is only apparent when the disturbed condition of India in general and the Punjab in particular is considered.

7. In Appendix I\* will be found a brief chronological summary of the signs of unrest, acts of violence and outrages, ever growing in number and gravity, which lead me to feel confident we were up against not a mere local agitation or ever general political unrest based on an unpopular measure, such as the "Rowlatt Acts," but that we had to face a widespread, carefully organized National and therefore *anti-British* rising.

8. This summary, although possibly not complete, discloses the striking fact that these outbreaks and outrages increased with intensity throughout the first half of April, till they assumed the form of an undisguised rebellion and the waging of war and then, *on the introduction of Martial Law*, rapidly died away. This fact will be more clearly realized by a study of the "graph" given in Appendix II†

9. It may be noted here that in the Lahore (Civil) Area the only bloodshed that took place occurred *before* Martial Law was proclaimed and that thereafter not a shot was fired nor any violence used. I believe that this is typical of the experience of other districts placed under Martial Law.

10. In the Lahore (Civil) Area conditions had been more or less normal until Sunday, 6th April, a day that had been set apart for demonstration throughout India against the "Rowlatt Acts." On this occasion additional troops had been drafted into the Fort and some cavalry sent in from the Cantonments to assist the Police. No actual collisions took place between the mobs and the Police—at any rate no shots were fired.

11. At 10-00 hours on 10th April, Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal, leaders of the seditionist movement at Amritsar, were arrested and deported, an event that at once led to a crowd, five or six thousand strong, emerging from the City of Amritsar, armed with *lathis* and stones, to attack the Civil Station. In anticipation of trouble, the few troops available had been placed as picquets to protect the Civil Station and Railway. Although denied entrance into the Civil Station and Railway Station the crowd reached the goods sheds, which they burnt to the ground, killing a European guard.

The principal European Banks were pillaged and their Managers brutally murdered. In all five Europeans were murdered, two injured (including one lady who was nearly beaten to death), the Telegraph office was destroyed and damage by fire and looting estimated to exceed 36 lakhs carried out. Detachments of the Royal Sussex and an Indian Regiment arrived at Amritsar from Lahore during the evening and order was temporarily restored.

12. Information as to these events in Amritsar was received in Lahore at about 15-00 hours and orders reached troops in Cantonment at 17-15 hours.

The first 150 men available of the 2-6th Battalion, Royal Sussex, at Lahore Cantonment having been despatched to Amritsar, other detachments, as fast as they could be collected, were sent into Lahore (Civil) Station by Royal Air Force lorries. The Central Telegraph office was occupied by a strong detachment at 18-35 hours, another detachment reaching the Montgomery Hall (Gymkhana Club) at 18-55. European hotels and Government House were all under protection of British troops by 19-30 hours and a detachment of 17th Cavalry reached the Mall about 19-15 hours.

13. At about 16-00 apparently the news of the Amritsar proceedings reached Lahore City. Crowds immediately gathered and concentrated near Lahori Gate, whence a mob of about 6,000 or 7,000 emerged at about

Continued.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

18-40 hours and passing down the Anarkali Bazar, gathering strength as they proceeded, made for the Central Telegraph office.

14. The sight of 40 British soldiers with fixed bayonets in possession of the Telegraph office appears to have caused the crowd to change its plan, as, after a little hesitation, it passed on down the Mall with the declared intention of getting to Government House. I have recently learned on the authority of one of the leaders of this mob, who escaped conviction at a Special Tribunal, that the object of that crowd was "only to insult, not murder Europeans." For such a mob of Indians to insult a Briton is but the equivalent for his murder, as such action must obviously lead to forcible resentment, which in turn would mean the beating to death of the European. The small detachment of Police collected to bar their way was pressed back and it was at this critical point that the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Fyson, and the Deputy Inspector-General, Criminal Investigation Department, Mr. G. A. Cocks, came on the scene and, realizing that less than half-a-mile further on over 100 ladies and children would be at the Gymkhana Club, ordered the Police to open fire.

This action inflicted casualties amounting to one killed and five wounded, checked the mob and enabled the Police, now reinforced, to drive it back towards the City.

15. I think there can be no two opinions that the action of Messrs. Fyson and Cocks saved Lahore that night from scenes of outrage and murder, compared to which those at Amritsar would almost have paled into insignificance.

16. Later on that night at about 22-00 hours the Police in the Anarkali Bazar, after being heavily stoned, were compelled to fire on the crowd whose casualties on that occasion amounted to one killed and five wounded. During this night owing to the seething excitement and hostile attitude of the population in the city it was thought desirable to withdraw all police from their numerous stations within the city—which was thus left in the hands of uncontrolled mobs. Personally I consider this action entirely justified by the situation.

17. In the meantime, during the night of 10th-11th April, strong detachments of Indian troops had been posted at the Pumping Station, Reservoir, Power Station, Central Jail, Ravi Railway Bridge and the Headquarters of 43rd Brigade moved into Lahore.

18. It was doubtless owing to these precautions that no outbreaks occurred in Lahore on the next day, 11th, although in the City, still uncontrolled by the Police, many meetings were held besides those in the great Badshahi Masjid, at which Muhammadans and Hindus fraternized. These meetings of the two races in the mosque, at which sedition and rebellion were openly preached, were, I think rightly, regarded as one of the most serious factors in the situation and as adding largely to the gravity of the military situation.

19. On 12th April it was decided at all costs to re-establish control of the City. Accordingly at 09-30 hours I arrived at Delhi Gate in command of a column of Cavalry, British and Indian Troops and Police—about 800 all ranks.

That we succeeded in forcing a passage through angry and excited crowds with such little bloodshed I believe to be due to the excellent co-operation of the Royal Air Force with four aeroplanes, which, as arranged, were to bomb the route in advance of the column on a given signal being made. I informed the leaders of the crowd at the entrance of the city that should a bomb be thrown or a shot fired at the troops, the aeroplanes would clear the route for the column by bombs. I then halted for some minutes to enable this fact to be made known to the crowd.

20. During the march through the city and excited crowd emerging from the Badshahi Masjid managed to surround the rear guard which was attacked by sticks

and stones, whilst bricks were thrown from the roofs of houses. To reduce the pressure and clear the mob I had to order the Police to fire a few rounds, less than 20, which resulted in the death of 1 and the wounding of 3 or 4 men among the crowd, which at once fell back. Posts were established at 3 points in the city, garrisoned by detachments of British and Indian Troops and armed Police.

21. On 13th April a very large meeting was held in Amritsar in defiance of orders, issued, I believe, under the Defence of India Regulations. A small party of Indian troops broke up this meeting by fire, inflicting severe casualties among the crowd. It is only fair to record my opinion that this incident had a far-reaching effect on the seditionists and agitators in Lahore and was probably no small factor in enabling me, as subsequently shown, to re-establish and maintain order in the area under my command without further bloodshed.

22. On the 13th and 14th April no further actual disturbances took place, but the leaders of the people apparently devoted their attention to perfecting the *hartal* or strike, which was paralyzing life and industry in Lahore, holding up all means of locomotion and threatening to close down the all important railway workshops at Moghulpura.

23. This was the position in Lahore on the night of 14th-15th April, when the Government of India authorized the introduction of Martial Law, but the military situation in Lahore itself can only be properly appreciated by a study of the events that were taking place in other parts of the Punjab, a *resumé* of which, as previously stated, is given in Appendix No. I.

#### Section 2.—The Period under Martial Law.

24. At 06-00 hours on Tuesday, 15th April, the Headquarters of 43rd Brigade and all Cavalry were withdrawn to Lahore Cantonment, and the separate military area referred to in paragraph 3 was created and placed under my command.

25. The troops and the police at my disposal at that time consisted of the following:—

	All ranks.
Armoured Cars . . . . .	3
Royal Garrison Artillery (in the Fort) . . . . .	19
British Infantry . . . . .	387
Indian Infantry . . . . .	381
Indian Defence Force, approximately . . . . .	250
Armed Police . . . . .	460
	— 1,497
Unarmed Police . . . . .	800
	—
TOTAL . . . . .	2,297

In Appendix XI, will be seen the bi-monthly strength of the garrison of the area.

26. On the declaration of Martial Law becoming known about 10 A.M. on 15th April, the following officers, then in Lahore on leave or duty, at once reported themselves for duty, *viz.*:—

Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Lindsay Smith	Supply and Transport Corps.
Major Barnes, XIX-Punjabis	Divisional Recruiting Officer.
Major D. Vanrenen	Army Remount Department.
Captain Rigby	3rd Punjab Light Horse.
Captain DeBrath	Indian Cavalry.

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

Lieutenant Steward . . . 22nd Punjabis.  
 Lieutenant E. Dunn . . . Ditto.  
 2nd-Lieutenant Burroughs . . . 2-35th Sikhs.  
 2nd-Lieutenant Stanley . . . late 76th Punjabis.

These officers, with Captain C. F. Johnson, Adjutant, 2-6th Battalion, Royal Sussex Regiment, and several civilians who volunteered most valuable assistance, formed my staff during the administration of Martial Law. Subsequently Lieutenants W. Groom and D. Bacon, 42nd Deolis, were also attached to the staff of the Area.

It is impossible to over-estimate my indebtedness to these officers for the tact, energy and initiative which they displayed under circumstances that were as difficult as they were novel.

27. At 11-00 hours, I issued the first notice to the public announcing, *inter alia*, the introduction of Martial Law, the boundaries of the new military area, and my appointment to command troops and administer Martial Law in that area. This notice—which was issued hurriedly and might have been better drawn up—contained Martial Law Orders—

- (a) prohibiting all persons, other than Europeans or persons in possession of a permit, from being in the streets between 20-00 and 05-00 hours;
- (b) prohibiting processions or gatherings of more than 10 persons;
- (c) a warning that drastic reprisals would be taken in the event of a bomb being thrown or a shot fired at either troops or police;
- (d) prohibiting any interference with persons desirous of opening shops or proceeding to work;
- (e) requisitioning all tongas and tum-tums;
- (f) requisitioning all motor vehicles.

28. All Martial Law Orders and Notices issued by me are shown in Appendix IV,\* and it will probably be convenient if I now refer to them in the order issued giving reasons for their imposition and a brief statement as to their effect.

29. The order referred to in paragraph 27 (a) was, I think, one of the most important ones made. I had two objects in issuing it, *viz.* :—

- (a) By keeping the Indian population indoors during the night to reduce the strain in the matter of patrols and picquets on troops and police and to better insure the protection of the European population in the Civil Station.
- (b) To give the Indian population a lesson in discipline, and to bring home to them the meaning and power of Martial Law—action that I thought only fair in view of my determination to put a stop to the strike at an early date.

The effect of this order was excellent and so well was it obeyed that during the 7 weeks it remained in force out of a population of nearly a quarter of a million, only 95 persons were charged with disobeying it. Of these, 29 were acquitted, either because the offence had been committed within say 20 minutes of the prohibited hour or because the accused had arrived from a distant place and was clearly ignorant of the order.

Not only did this order effect its intended purposes but it had a result I had not foreseen, and one which gave no little satisfaction to the people, *viz.*, it automatically put a stop to all house-breaking and thefts, formerly of frequent occurrence.

During these prohibited hours the streets were constantly patrolled by troops and police stationed in the city and I was thus assured of receiving ample notice should any illegal gathering be attempted during the nights.

Some 2 weeks later, a certain excitement was caused by agitators spreading the report that, as a consequence of this order, women unable to procure doctor or nurse, were dying in child birth. Although I had invariably

issued "night passes" for those purposes when they were applied for, I immediately took steps to make public the fact that any person in whose house a birth was anticipated in the immediate future, could, on application, obtain the 3 necessary passes for himself, doctor and nurse. Subsequently I found it necessary to let it be known that I should require explanations from any person who, obtaining passes on this ground, failed to register a birth within 14 days—a hint which effectually reduced the rush for these passes.

30. The order referred to in paragraph 27 (b) was obviously necessary and was well obeyed by the people, only 31 persons being charged with its contravention. Permits allowing funeral processions, but limited in numbers, were granted from the first, and, as soon as the situation showed itself to be within hand, permits both for these and wedding processions were freely issued. To prevent an authorized funeral procession of say 100 persons, being swollen to perhaps 1,000 I declined to allow hands to accompany any such processions in the streets, although towards the end of the period they were permitted to play in compounds.

31. I venture to lay considerable stress on the importance of the warning referred to in paragraph 27 (c). Later on during that day—15th April—at a meeting I had with some 80 of the leading inhabitants of the City, I explained with great care and earnestness the nature of the reprisal I had decided on in the event of bombs being thrown or troops fired on in the narrow streets of the City. I told them that the spot, where a bomb exploded or a soldier or policeman fell as a result of a shot, would become the centre of a circle having a diameter of 100 yards; that one hour would be allowed in which to remove all living things—but no goods, jewellery, clothing, etc., from the buildings involved within such circle, and that, at the end of the hour, I should proceed with, and continue until I had completed, the total demolition of every building—other than mosques or temples within the circle. I added that I hoped the Government would have the open spaces thus created preserved for ever as a warning against offering violence to His Majesty's troops or police. I may add that I had made all arrangements for, and had every intention of, carrying out such a reprisal. I instructed those present at the meeting in question to announce my intention immediately to all house-holders in their respective wards of the City.

I have referred to this matter in some detail because I have every reason to believe that its deterrent effect cannot be over-estimated and that it was at least one of the principal factors in preventing bloodshed and maintaining peace in the area. A house-holder may contemplate, unmoved, the presence of a bomb-throwing fanatic on the roof of his own or an adjacent house, knowing full well that the authorities have first to catch the criminal before the latter can be hanged or shot. The situation, however, becomes entirely changed when he realizes that his house and all he possesses in it will inevitably become a heap of rubbish and dust if any outrage takes place within 50 yards of it. From being a mere disinterested spectator, rather hoping for the excitement of a *tamasha* in his vicinity, he is converted into an active policeman as regards his own house and a keen detective in respect of the doings of his neighbours within a radius of 50 yards.

I commend to officers, who may be called on to administer Martial Law, this cold-blooded determination to destroy all property within a given distance from the scene of an outrage as being as effective as it is humane—much more so indeed than the threat to bombard a town by artillery or aeroplane, when the house-holder thinks that, after all, the chances are that his house will be missed.

32. The prohibition of interference with persons desirous of opening their shops, or proceeding to their work—*vide* paragraph 27 (d)—was not, at the time, very effective. The people had not then grasped the protection afforded them under Martial Law nor had it

Continued.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

been made an offence under Martial Law to refuse to trade or work. "Picquets" from the class of men referred to in paragraph 36 threatened immediate violence to those anxious to back out of the *hartal* and that was generally sufficient to gain their end.

33. Under Martial Law Order No. 2 I commandeered all tongas and tum-tums, the owners and drivers of which were taking part in the *hartal* or strike, rendering transport a matter of great difficulty. My objects in taking this action were as follows:—

- (a) It was a first step towards carrying out my intention of breaking up the *hartal* as soon as possible.
- (b) It provided me with sufficient vehicles with which to organize the collection and removal to rallying posts of women and children in the Civil station in case they were again in danger. At that time there were about 2,000 European women and children in the area.
- (c) It provided the necessary military transport besides ensuring transit facilities for residents and travellers in Lahore.

For the purposes of a "park" for these vehicles I took possession of the Punjab Light Horse drill ground.

The order to report was obeyed with alacrity—over 800 tongas and tum-tums being registered. 300, subsequently reduced to 200, tongas were retained for military service; horses and drivers receiving free rations and the latter being paid eight annas per diem.

All tum-tums and the balance of the tongas were then given a certificate of "exemption from military service" and released on condition that they plied for hire as before the *hartal*, reporting to the Police twice daily.

The combination of fear of the consequences of disobeying any order under Martial Law together with a desire to break away from the strike leaders and earn money, were so strong that no single instance occurred of a driver or owner taking his vehicle off the road during the continuance of Martial Law.

34. Under Martial Law Order No. 3 all motor cars had to be surrendered for military service, but in cases in which I was satisfied that cars were essential to the business or profession of a European they were at once released and an "exemption certificate" issued. I refrained from granting exemption in the case of Indians resident in Lahore as I thought it desirable to bring home to them all—loyal and disloyal alike—some of the inconveniences of Martial Law, in the hope and belief that in the future, the weight of their influence will be whole-heartedly thrown against seditious movements likely to lead to the introduction of Martial Law.

My object in taking possession of all available motor cars were as follows:—

- (a) To prevent agitators either escaping from Lahore or getting into the country to spread sedition or from communicating with leaders in other districts.
- (b) To provide means of rapid conveyance for military and police officers, civilians in charge of women and children in different wards, telephone and telegraph employees engaged in repairing out wires, etc. For these purposes 23 cars were retained in the Civil Area for varying periods.
- (c) To provide the Divisional Commander with a means of rapidly moving small bodies of troops to scenes of disorder in outlying parts of the Divisional Area. For this purpose 87 cars were sent to Lahore Cantonment.

All motor vehicles were finally returned to their owners, subsequent to my relief, but I regret to learn that no little dissatisfaction is expressed by some owners as to the insufficiency of the compensation received.

I would suggest that the principles involved in the "commandeering" of "returnable" as distinct from "expendable" goods should receive early considera-

tion and that those decided on be clearly laid down for the guidance of officers in the future.

35. On the afternoon of 15th April, after consultation with the Civil Railway and Government authorities, I issued Martial Law Order No. 4 prohibiting, with certain exceptions, the issue of 3rd class tickets from railway stations within the Civil Area. The objects of this order were as follows:—

- (a) To place every difficulty in the way of agitators leaving Lahore for outside districts. With the practical cessation of 3rd class traffic, the Railway Police and the Criminal Investigation Department, were able to maintain an effective surveillance over Indians travelling by superior classes.
- (b) To relieve the difficulty of working the Railways which was becoming serious owing to the numerous outrages—destruction of bridges, stations, telegraph lines, etc.—necessitating a reduction of the train service and the stoppage for some time of all night running.

A certain number of suspicious characters succeeded in evading this order and defeating (a) by walking to stations outside the area. This, however, was speedily remedied by the General Officer Commanding the surrounding districts applying the same order to his area.

36. Martial Law Order No. 5 was also issued on the 15th April. The *hartal* or strike had led to the complete closing of shops, causing a serious rise in prices particularly of foodstuffs, whilst the cessation of work naturally affected the earning power of the poorer classes. The wealthy sympathisers of the strike—and therefore with the seditious agitation—had hit on a rather ingenious way of turning this situation to account. Under the guise of charity, they provided funds for the opening of special shops known as *langars* for the free distribution of cooked food to the poor. The results were obvious: the recipients of this bounty naturally considered that a state of things in which they received free food was preferable to the old order under which they had to work for it, and so became whole-hearted supporters of the strike, forming a body of men always at the disposal of the "political leaders" for the purpose of threatening or committing violence against those who desired to end the strike and resume their work or business.

On satisfying myself of this state of things I at once took steps to close these *langars* with the result that, though in certain quarters capital was attempted to be made out of my action as interfering with "charitable" efforts to relieve the suffering poor, it produced a state of mind—and possibly stomach—among the masses of the poorer and most easily misled people, that greatly facilitated the complete breaking up of the *hartal*, which I had determined to effect a few days later at all costs.

37. Martial Order No. 6 issued on 16th April, prohibited the underlings of legal practitioners from leaving Lahore. Information was laid before me that this class of person—the jackal of the *vakil* or pleader—was particularly active in assisting the spread of sedition and I thought it desirable to prevent his travel by rail as a second or intermediate class passenger. The names of about 300 of these people were submitted to me by their employers in accordance with the order. To make sure none had been omitted I threw the onus on a committee of leading legal practitioners to check the list, work which was most conscientiously carried out by the gentlemen whom I selected.

As to results, it is obviously not possible to produce direct evidence in the case of this and several orders, which will be referred to later, but I submit that it is justifiable to conclude that the preservation of peace and order in Lahore itself and the rapidly improving condition of other districts in the Punjab may be directly connected with these orders, which undoubtedly limited the activities of the persons against whom they were directed.

38. Martial Law Order No. 7 promulgated on 16th April, was the first of several which I deemed it

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

necessary to issue with a view to restricting the seditious activities of the students of some of the colleges of which there were no less than 11 in Lahore with a *personnel*, including teaching staff, of about 5,030.

I may here state frankly that although the military situation that might, at any moment have been created by these Colleges, caused me but little worry, I viewed with grave anxiety the ultimate effect on Northern India if its educated youth, the future leaders of the people, are to be allowed to spend the most receptive period of their lives in such a seditious and *anti-European* atmosphere as undoubtedly existed in most of these Colleges. I came across some particularly sad instances in which were involved sons, whose fathers had fought for the Empire, were pensioners of the State and whose loyalty was beyond question; but for the evil influence found in these Colleges these boys would doubtless have grown up retaining untarnished the loyalty they had inherited from their fathers.

If I had any reason to doubt the volume of evidence laid before me by all sorts of people as to the state of affairs in some of these Colleges, it was removed by the number of threatening letters addressed to me daily by declared, but anonymous students, most of them couched in terms of disgusting obscenity.

The constant attendance at roll calls involved in the Martial Law Orders referred to, whilst restricting the seditious activities of the *personnel* of the Colleges concerned, was adversely affecting the work of the students for approaching University examinations. At the request of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, therefore, I convened a meeting of all Principals of Colleges—at which were also present the Hon'ble Mr. H. J. Maynard, C.S.I., Vice-Chancellor of the University and the Hon'ble Mr. J. A. Richey, Director of Public Instruction. I informed the Principals that I regarded the system of roll calls as a temporary measure designed to keep the students out of mischief and not as a punishment for their past conduct, which latter I considered should be undertaken by them. I added that failing the infliction of suitable punishments within seven days I should close the Colleges and order each student to proceed to his home and remain there. Schedules of proposed penalties were duly submitted to me, but some were so totally inadequate and displayed such a complete lack of appreciation by Principals of the seriousness of the conduct of their students that I had to send them back for revision.

Martial Law Order No. 36 of 5th May, No. 44 of 12th May, and No. 46 of 13th May, show in detail the penalties agreed to by me as, being while very merciful, sufficiently serious to restrain future generations of students from being misled into disloyal actions.

The punishments inflicted on 1,011 students by the Principals of the various Colleges are shown in detail in Appendix No. III.

On the publication of the orders setting forth these penalties I cancelled all restrictions imposed on the Colleges under previous Martial Law Orders.

It is difficult to suggest a remedy for a state of affairs that seemed to me to outweigh in gravity anything else I noticed during the period under review, but I submit the following points for consideration—

- (1) The formation of smaller classes.
- (2) An increase in the European teaching staff.
- (3) A notification that any College in which seditious or *anti-European* propaganda is allowed or is found to exist, shall be debarred from entering its students for University examinations for a term of years.

As regards the disciplinary action taken against the students of the D. A.-V College and referred to Martial Law Order No. 7 and to some similar measures subsequently taken in connection with other Colleges, I adopted the method of compulsory attendances at roll calls in preference to either (a) closing the College, or

(b) prosecuting individual students. In the case of (a) the students would either have hung about Lahore, with the risk usually associated with idleness, or have scattered to their homes, posing as martyrs and spreading sedition, besides which they would have been deprived of the benefit of a few weeks' experience of such discipline as I hoped to be able to give them under Martial Law. My difficulty as to adopting (b) was that the limited amount of corporal punishment I could inflict would be totally inadequate for conviction on a charge of spreading sedition, whilst I naturally hesitated to attach the life-long stigma of gaol to misguided youths. The plan of frequent attendance at roll-calls put an effectual stop to any attempt by students to create trouble in adjacent villages or to leave Lahore without permission.

39. Martial Law Orders Nos. 8 and 9 issued on 16th April, were intended to deal with a trouble that became apparent during the night of 15th-16th April, *viz.*, the impossibility, with the limited force at my command, of protecting Martial Law Notices posted in public places in the City. They had been torn down or defaced in numbers. A reference to second part of paragraph 1 of Martial Law Notice No. 1 will show that my first intention was to make known to the people verbally through their representatives (whom the Police had selected from each ward) what orders had to be obeyed by them. In twenty-four hours I found this scheme would not work, as, whilst the representatives swore they had told every person in their ward of an order, persons, when charged with a breach of such order, denied all knowledge of it and could not be convicted. By throwing the onus of displaying and maintaining Martial Law Orders on the owners of houses, the troops and police were saved much work, while the publication in Martial Law Order No. 9 of a selected list of persons residing in various parts of the area who would display these orders, denied a person charged with a breach of orders the excuse that he was unable to ascertain their nature. The persons whose names appear in Martial Law Order No. 9 were not necessarily selected on account of their known loyalty.

The effect of these arrangements was entirely satisfactory, so much so, in fact, that, with the exception of the Sanatan Dharam College, referred to in Martial Law Order No. 13, only 5 persons were subsequently charged with tearing down orders, whilst no accused person pleaded ignorance of the order under which he was charged.

40. On evening of 16th April I felt sufficiently sure of the situation to take the next step in breaking up the *hartal*, the continuance of which was obviously a constant menace to peace and order. Martial Law Order No. 10 was therefore issued designed to crush the strike in the limited area of the Anarkali Bazar, for which purpose I considered I had sufficient troops available to ensure the order being obeyed. It will be noticed that the order in question goes much further than the mere opening of shops, and by insisting on every individual carrying on his normal work, struck at the root of passive resistance, with which I had been openly threatened.

In order to be perfectly fair and to prevent any possibility of misunderstanding I took steps to let the people living in Anarkali Bazar know precisely how I proposed to deal with the situation should they fail to obey the order, *viz.*, that I should occupy every street in the area mentioned with a strong force of troops and police and proceed to burst open each shop, placing British soldiers in them to protect the owners and to prevent looting or theft. If, however, the owner was not present, or being present, refused to sell goods required by legitimate customers, the soldiers would be empowered to supply the articles required but not to accept money on behalf of the disobedient owner.

The effect of this order was seen early on the morning of the 17th April when all shops reopened work and business was resumed in the Anarkali Bazar and in addition a good many shops in the City itself reopened.

Continued.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

In view of the successful application of this order in the Anarkali district I felt justified in the afternoon of 17th April in issuing Martial Law Order No. 14 requiring by 10-00 hours on the following day the complete cessation of the *kartal* and the resumption of business and work throughout the entire area under my command. This order was universally carried out soon after daylight without waiting for the appointed hour.

The effect of this action was strikingly illustrated at the Moghulpura Railway Works, as the following figures will show:—

Approximate total number of workmen on rolls	11,892
Approximate average total number of work men employed under normal conditions	10,089
Approximate number to which workers were reduced on 16th April	3,920
Approximate number of workers on duty on 19th April	10,484

41. On 16th April I issued Martial Law Order No. 11 prohibiting the carrying of *lathis*.

I was aware that large numbers of these weapons were possessed by men in the City, and, whilst I did not feel justified in ordering a house-to-house search for them, I considered the refusal to allow them to be carried in the streets not only removed the temptation to use them, but added to the chance of preserving peace and preventing any regrettable incident.

The effect of the order was excellent and there was but one case of a man being charged with its contravention.

Representations were, however, made to me by several influential Indians who commented respectfully on the fact that, while in Lahore no one was allowed to carry a stick, in Delhi apparently, mobs numbering thousands were permitted to demonstrate with *lathis* before or in the vicinity of the Chief Commissioner.

42. Martial Law Order No. 12, was also issued on 17th April. Many students and truculent persons had a habit, I found, of so walking abreast as to monopolize the entire side walk or pavement, a course of action, that, when persisted in on meeting a European, was certain to lead to a breach of the peace, hence the issue of the order, which was readily obeyed.

43. The partial destruction of a Martial Law Order exhibited on the walls of the Sanatan Dharam College, during the night of 16th-17th April, gave me an opportunity of bringing home to all concerned the power of Martial Law. Instead of conducting an enquiry and endeavouring to trace the individual offender, I adopted the course of sending troops and police to arrest all male persons found in the premises belonging to the College and interning them in the Fort. On the following day having received a personal undertaking from the Principal of the College that no further breach of Martial Law Orders should occur at the Sanatan Dharam College, I released the interned *personnel* of the College, after payment of the cost of the rations they had consumed. Martial Law Order No. 13, was issued in this connection and I feel confident that the action taken had a beneficial effect on the situation.

44. Martial Law order No. 15 was issued on 18th April, and was necessary owing to the mass of false, inaccurate and exaggerated reports or rumours that I found in circulation, all doubtless started by the seditious leaders with a view of stirring up the people against Martial Law instead of welcoming it—as they were already showing signs of doing. Owing to the respect which Martial Law had by this time acquired, I think this order was effective in checking the spread of these dangerous rumours. Only one person was charged with breach of this order—viz., the writer of an account in a vernacular paper of the presence of a large Turkish force with the Afghans at Landi Kotal.

45. Martial Law Order No. 17 was issued on 19th April commandeering motor cycles and also the pedal

driven cycles of students in certain colleges. The motor-cycles were urgently required for despatch riding work and, owing to the increasing heat, I thought it desirable to supply all British Infantry with bicycles in order to increase their mobility and to lessen the fatigue in carrying out the necessary reliefs of posts in the area.

Under Martial Law Order Nos. 21, 22, 23 and 25—vide Appendix IV, I subsequently took possession of more bicycles—in all 1,291—with a view to their being required by other British troops in the Divisional Area.

46. In addition to the firearms owned by Europeans—who are exempted from gun licences, I found that some 1,700 guns, rifles and revolvers were in the possession of Indians in the area. At first I intended to secure the surrender of all these firearms in order to prevent them being stolen and used against the troops. However, to avoid hurting the feelings of many of these licence-holders, who were men of untarnished loyalty, I decided only to call in the arms of men of whom there might be doubt as to their ability to take proper care of such weapons. The necessity for care in the control of arms in possession of licence-holders (Indians) is illustrated by the following extracts from the evidence given on 9th June last in the trial of the Amritsar Conspiracy Case:—

“The people present said, if only they had arms they would teach the British a lesson”—and again:—“Ghulam Nabi said, we should get arms from the licence-holders.”

In issuing Martial Law Order No. 18,—I was also mindful of the undesirability of denying prominent Indian Loyalists the means of self-protection against the violence openly threatened them by seditious agitators.

Subsequently, acting on the advice of the Police and the Civil authorities, I took into safe-keeping some 400 firearms, all of which have been subsequently returned to their owners.

47. A number of the motor-cars commandeered were without drivers, and, as a sufficient number of these did not come forward and offer their services voluntarily I obtained the number required without difficulty by issuing Martial Law Order No. 19 on 20th April.

48. So completely had the introduction of Martial Law not only put a stop to disturbances, but created an obvious atmosphere of contentment among the masses of the population, that on 21st April I made the first of a series of relaxations regarding hours during which Indians were confined to their houses. Martial Law Order No. 20, extended the use of the streets from 20-00 to 21-00 hours.

On 12th May by Martial Law Order No. 45, the hour was altered from 21-00 to 22-00, and on 24th May in view of the religious observances due to the approaching *Ramzan*, Martial Law Order No. 57, reduced the hours during which the streets were closed to 2, viz., from midnight to 02-00 hours.

49. The quarters in which both British and Indian troops were quartered in the Area, particularly in the city, were naturally of a make-shift and therefore unsatisfactory character. I was specially concerned as to the health of British troops living under these trying conditions in increasing heat, and as no supply of electric fans was obtainable from the Military authorities, on 23rd April I issued Martial Law Order No. 24, empowering the commandeering of such number of electric fans as were required for the use of troops.

I think the provision of this ample supply of electric fans was largely responsible for the satisfactory health of the troops in the Area.

50. Partly in order that I might procure a more complete register of public vehicles and their drivers and partly to bring home to owners and drivers the undesirability in future of indulging in strikes at the instigation of political or seditious agitators, I issued Martial Law Order No. 26 on 24th April, Under this order no vehicle was allowed to ply for hire and no

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

driver to drive such vehicle unless in possession of a Military permit, for which the Municipal annual charges for such licences were adopted.

I think that in future Lahore tonga drivers are not likely to be easily induced to become the tools of the "political" agitator.

51. By the issue of Martial Law Order No. 29 on 25th April, I took the first steps in reducing the prices of the necessaries of life.

The order in question referred to "Atta" and the following orders subsequently dealt with various other articles, viz.:-

No. 31 on 27th April	.	Milk, see page 297.
" 32 " 29th "	.	Salt and wheat, see page 298.
" 35 " 5th May	.	Vegetables, see page 298.
" 37 " 7th "	.	Mutton, see page 299.
" 41 " 9th "	.	Vegetables, see page 301.
" 52 " 17th "	.	Do. see page 305.
" 58 " 28th "	.	Atta, see page 306.

Encouraged by the spirit of lawlessness engendered by the strike and assisted by increased difficulties in obtaining supplies—due partly to the hesitation of country producers to venture with their carts into disturbed areas and partly to the reduced railway facilities, prices had been raised by the *bunias* beyond all warrant.

It has been suggested that in thus taking action to control economic matters I was going beyond the necessities of Martial Law. I venture, however, to differ from this view.

The first essential of Martial Law I take to be the preservation of peace and order, and the supply or otherwise of the necessaries of life at reasonable rates have a most direct bearing on the contentment of the people (particularly when living in a crowded city) and therefore on the military situation.

As soon as my action was realised by the people, I think it is not too much to say, that their attitude towards Martial Law changed from passive acquiescence into that of active approval—which found expression in the frequently heard cry of "*Martial Law is jai!*"

The fixing of maximum rates for any article, particularly when its source of production is not under the same control, is a matter requiring the most careful consideration, or the restriction of price may easily result in the total disappearance of the article from the market, in which case the remedy is liable to be worse than the cure.

I received large numbers of applications from Indians praying that I would reduce the prices of many articles, but, with the exceptions already mentioned and for reasons given, I had to decline.

The control of prices, so far as I established it, worked very satisfactorily and caused no falling off of supplies; in the case of mutton and goat flesh, indeed, the reduction of 25 per cent. in its price increased its average daily consumption by nearly 40 per cent.

When dealing with the price of milk I discovered that practically the entire supply was seriously "watered." The mean of a large number of samples that I caused to be analysed showed the added water to be between 10—15 per cent., and this, based on a conservative calculation of the daily consumption of milk in the area, means that the people of Lahore are content to pay over six lakhs a year for water, with which their milk is adulterated.

I at once took drastic steps to put a stop of this typical example of the prevailing low standard of business morality, and by means of heavy fines (up to Rs. 250) backed by the ever present dread of the possibility of the addition of corporal punishment, succeeded getting the public supplied with more or less pure milk.

I am, however, conscious that of all the measures taken by me to protect the people from robbery—possibly "profiteering" is a more modern and less

offensive word—this was the least popular. Apparently it is taken for granted that both the owner of the cow and the actual vendor of the milk will naturally add, each his own quota of water, and this course of conduct having by time, become hallowed into "*dustoor*," I am afraid that my action was appreciated neither by buyer nor seller, the latter, I think over doubting the justice under which I heavily punished such conduct. However, I understand that from the last day of Martial Law, the milk vendors reverted to custom and by increasing the added water, quickly recovered the amounts they had been fined.

For the collection of all necessary information to enable me to decide as to the possibility or otherwise of controlling the prices of various articles, I am greatly indebted to Mr. C. H. Townsend, Controller, Civil Supplies, Lieutenant-Colonel Farmer, Chief Civil Veterinary Surgeon and to Diwan Karam Chand, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Assistant to the Controller of Civil Supplies.

52. On 25th April I received from the Library of one of the principal Colleges in Lahore, a number of illustrated papers, in which pictures of well known British Officers had been defaced or made the subject of insulting remarks and obscene suggestions, the latter in some instances being extended to the portraits of European ladies. A search in the library of another College disclosed a similar state of things. I thereupon issued Martial Law Order No. 30 which would seem to have had the desired effect, as subsequent inspection of College libraries, disclosed no further instances of this *anti-British* propaganda.

53. I need not dwell on the unsatisfactory standard of honour and morality among the majority of Indian officials especially in the lower grades. The acceptance of "*bakhshish*" and bribes is a custom so hallowed by time and "*dustoor*," that I do not believe that 99 per cent. of those indulging in the practice realize that there is any harm in it. A consideration of the pay received by the Police and minor officials would almost lead one to assume that they were expected to increase their official salary to that of a living wage by the methods to which I am referring.

I was uncomfortably conscious that the Martial Law Orders which I was issuing from day to day was opening up a largely extended and fruitful field of operations for those minor officials who are apparently constitutionally incapable of understanding the British view of honour and official morality. On 2nd May, therefore, I issued Martial Law Order No. 33 as an attempt to check practices that must naturally conduce to resentment amongst the people against Martial Law.

A reference to the summary of convictions and punishments given in Appendix V will show that eight persons were subsequently convicted with contravention of this order and heavily punished.

54. On 5th May, I issued Martial Law No. 34 calling for a return of stocks of wheat.

The reasons for this action are set forth in the order itself. On 8th May, by Martial Law No. 39, I took similar action in the case of gram.

At this time a falling off in the arrivals of gram and wheat was noticeable and it became necessary to ascertain whether these lesser deliveries were due to a genuine shortage of supply or to the refusal of the local merchants to purchase on account of secret stocks of wheat with which they intended to make large profits after the abolition of Martial Law. The returns published in Orders No. 38 of 7th May Nos. 47 and 48 of 14th May give the results obtained by these orders.

55. Besides food, the only other "expendable" necessary of life to the poorer people is that of cloth. Owing to the—to them—prohibitive price at which *bunias* were selling cloth, I decided to take advantage of the "Cotton Cloth Act of 1918," and obtained from the Mills a supply of standard cloth at cost price, making the cloth merchants retail it at a rate fixed by me to allow them a reasonable profit.



Continued.]

LT.-COL. FRANK JOHNSON.

I was again indebted to Mr. C. H. Townsend, the Director of Industries and Controller of Civil Supplies, for making all necessary arrangements to give effect to Martial Law Order No. 40.

It will be noticed that in providing the people with cheap cloth and food I did not adopt the usual method of opening special Government shops for this purpose but insisted on those traders who normally dealt in such articles, stocking and selling them at prices fixed by me. I commend this method of using all the ordinary channels of distribution in preference to that of opening one or two special shops. It saves much worry and offers greater facilities to the masses of the people to take advantage of the controlled prices. The system worked in Lahore without the slightest trouble.

56. On 10th May, on account of the hostile action of the Amir of Afghanistan, I deemed it wise to take steps to ascertain what Afghan subjects might be in Lahore and to prevent others arriving to cause unrest among the people. I therefore issued Martial Law Order No. 42, and arranged for the registration of all Afghans in the area and the internment of such of them as might be potential enemy soldiers.

Great assistance was rendered to my staff in carrying out this work by Mir Muhammad Ali, Assistant Political Afghan Agent to the Punjab Government.

57. Owing to the crop of alarmist rumours spreading in connection with Afghan outbreak, on 10th May I issued Martial Law No. 43, repeating the warning given on 18th April against the spreading of false reports and also stating that the facts would be published from time to time in the vernacular paper the *Haq*.

58. Owing to the excellent behaviour of the people on 15th May, I issued Martial Law Order No. 49, making further relaxations of Martial Law restrictions—Orders Nos. 6 and 12 were cancelled and 1 (4) so modified as to require no permits for processions or gatherings in connection with *bona fide* religious services.

59. The 15th May, being the anniversary of the Muhammadan festival known as *Shabrat*, I issued Martial Law Order No. 50, cancelling for that night, as far as Muhammadans were concerned, all restrictions on being out of their houses at night.

60. Martial Law No. 51, was issued on 17th May at the request of the Civil authority who wished to take advantage of the power under Martial Law to ensure the compilation of a complete list of the owners and occupiers of all buildings in the area.

61. By the publication on 20th May of Martial Law Order No. 53, an end was made of the protracted negotiations which had been in progress for nearly 6 weeks for the reopening of the Badshahi Masjid, which was closed on 12th April in consequence of its misuse, for a joint seditious meeting of 25,000 Muhammadans and Hindus.

Three weeks earlier I had handed to the leading Muhammadans a written statement of the guarantees I required before allowing the reopening of the Mosque. No little outside pressure was brought to bear on me to modify the terms laid down, but as these were the minimum, I deemed it necessary to exact in the interests of future peace, I stood firm and ultimately secured their complete acceptance, including the acknowledgment of the rights conferred on 10th June 1856 on the Officer Commanding, Lahore Fort, to deny access to the Mosque under certain conditions.

Martial Law Order No. 54 of 23rd May, was at once effective in checking a waste of water which was seriously increasing.

63. Several cases having been reported of the drivers of *tongas* in Military employ, being compelled to accept public "fares" I issued Martial Law No. 55, on 23rd May to put a stop to the practice.

64. The only other Martial Law Order to which reference is necessary is No. 56, issued on 24th May. Under this order, owing to the Hindu festival known as *Bhadrakali* taking place on the following day the 'Curfew' gun was deferred from 22-00 to 23-00 hours.

65. In appendices V, VI and VII\* will be found full details of all convictions and punishments that took place in Summary Minor Courts for contravention of Martial Law Orders.

Charges were laid against 277 persons of whom 89 were acquitted and 208 convicted. Of these cases 140 were dealt with by Major Barnes and myself, and 137 by Civil Magistrates specially appointed for that purpose.

The total punishments awarded amounted to 74 months' imprisonment, 832 stripes and Rs. 6,813 fines.

Twenty persons received 74 months' imprisonment—or an average of 3.7 months each. The 832 stripes were distributed among 66 persons, an average of 12.6 each and 136 persons were fined an average of Rs. 50-1 each.

The sentences of imprisonment varied from 6 months to 1 month, corporal punishment from 20 to 5 stripes whilst the fines ranged from a maximum of Rs. 500 to a minimum of Rs. 1.

As regards corporal punishment, this was never inflicted on any but able bodied young men, and I do not hesitate to attribute the remarkably small number of contraventions of Martial Law Orders to the knowledge that the power to use it existed. That so little difficulty was experienced in keeping the peace and avoiding riotous scenes that lead to bloodshed was, I am convinced, due mainly to knowledge that corporal punishment would take the place of the usual civil punishment of say 30 days' imprisonment, which possesses little, if any, terror to the average Indian. Of the total number of stripes given, 55 persons received 716 stripes in the confines of the Central Jail, Lahore and only 11 persons received their punishments of 116 stripes in *quasi-public*—that is the floggings were administered in the compounds of either the Telegraph Office, the old Kotwali or the Reservoir *chaokas*. Although not entirely enclosed none of these places can be deemed "public" within the ordinary meaning.

The punishment was invariably inflicted on the buttocks with an ordinary cane and it is as ridiculous as it is untrue to suggest that persons died as a result of this punishment.

On the other hand, responsible for the maintenance of peace and order amongst a crowded Indian population of nearly a quarter of a million, I would sooner have been deprived of the services of 1,000 rifles than the power of inflicting corporal punishment.

I have recently heard it said that some political leaders (who are apparently very hurt at the stamping out, or the methods of stamping out, of this rebellious outbreak), claim to have discovered that 5 or 6 men were shot at night, besides a number of Kashmiris shot at the Ravi Bridge during the period of Martial Law. The actual truth is that the only shots fired after the introduction of Martial Law were from a rifle accidentally discharged whilst being cleaned in camp in the Lawrence Gardens, and 3 at a motor car driven by Europeans who failed to stop when challenged by a picket of Indian troops. As the total result of these 4 shots one tyre was slightly damaged.

The story referred to above could only have been invented, repeated and believed by Indians who, like those referred to in paragraph 53 are woefully ignorant of the ordinary standard of honour and morality and who merely regard a deliberate lie as a perfectly legitimate and natural weapon.

Before leaving this question of punishments inflicted under Martial Law, I would direct particular attention to Appendix IX on page 313 which contain an "instruction" to all Military and Police officers and Magistrates administering Martial Law under me. This document contains, I think, very clear orders as to the principles to be adopted in (a) enforcing obedience to Martial Law Regulations and (b) inflicting punishments.

The spirit of this order was, I know, invariably acted up to most loyally.

66. During the period covered by this report I carried out at a cost of a little over Rs. 40,000 certain permanent

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

defensive works in connection with the vital services of Lahore, viz., light, power, and water and telegraphs. Full details of these works together with my reasons for undertaking them will be found in Appendix VIII\* in the form of an extract from a report addressed by me to the General Officer Commanding, 16th (Indian) Division, on 19th June 1919.

67. Under arrangements made before the introduction of Martial Law, by the Divisional Commander, Major-General Sir William Beynon, K.C.I.E., C.B., D.S.O., 311 women and 307 children were evacuated to Hill Stations during April and May, the majority going between 16th and 19th April.

Even after this exodus I found nearly 1,300 women and children in the area mostly without the financial power to get away; widely scattered throughout the area, their presence was a constant source of anxiety and must have seriously hampered military operations had any further outbreaks taken place.

In the cold weather women and children can be evacuated to the Defensive Post in Lahore Cantonment but the question of their prompt disposal in the event of outbreaks in the hot weather calls, I think, for early consideration.

#### Section 3.—General.

68. The preceding sections of this report have dealt with the position in general immediately prior to the introduction of Martial Law, and also, in some detail, with the application and administration of that "Law" in Lahore. It only now remains to consider briefly the results of its introduction.

69. In Lahore itself, the facts would seem to be non-contentious, viz., that the cessation of grave disturbances and of a strike which its leaders boasted would be continued indefinitely, followed immediately after the introduction of Martial Law.

It is in the deductions from these facts that there are two schools of thought.

The great majority, representing, I think it is not too much to say, all honest and impartial men of both races, see in these facts but a simple illustration of cause and effect.

The other school of thought, representing a minority, and the apologists of those "political leaders" who were clearly engaged in organizing war against the Government, dispute the fact, alleging that no serious disturbances or acts of rebellion ever took place—or were even contemplated and that the strike was but the simple, peaceful and spontaneous method of individual protest against an unpopular Act.

A study of Appendix I with its list of outrages, ever growing in number and gravity, until they culminate in deliberate murder and looting in at least two cases, besides attempts in others, and showing clearly how this state of affairs suddenly ceases on the introduction of Martial Law, will enable any impartial person to judge between these schools of thought.

As instancing the organization proceeding at this time to create a state of war and rebellion as distinct from mere political excitement, attention is invited to the proclamation given in Appendix X,† calling on Hindus, Muhammadans and Sikhs to "get ready for the war" and enlist in the "Landa Army."

70. With a full knowledge of all the facts and the advantage of having been in close touch with all classes of people in the Punjab during April and May, it is my considered opinion that when the Government of India decided to allow Martial Law to be introduced into some districts, they saved the Punjab and possibly a large part of India from the horrors of another mutiny.

71. Some people point to the fact that after the 15th April peace was maintained in Delhi and many other large cities without Martial Law and argue therefrom that its introduction was unnecessary in Lahore, Amritsar, etc. Such people would appear to forget, or shut their eyes to another fact, viz., that just as a bomb dropped into a lake sends its ripples over a wide area, so the

promulgation of Martial Law in portions of the Punjab must have made its influence felt far beyond, say Delhi.

72. To me, the two-outstanding lessons derived from the Martial Law period were these:—

(a) The merciful character of Martial Law in its power of, and effectiveness in, maintaining order, and so preventing bloodshed and loss of life. So far, therefore, from its application to a District threatened by disturbances, being cruel, it is in reality the most merciful course of action to take, the degree of kindness increasing with the promptitude with which it is applied, and

(b) The adaptability of the majority of the masses of the people to the form of Government involved under Martial Law, i.e., a one-man, autocratic Government or "Government by *Hukm*."

I was very struck with the fact in Lahore that the people not only acquiesced in the situation produced by the introduction of Martial Law, but that they settled down to it with unmistakable signs of relief and contentment.

73. That there was no loss of life amongst the Troops and Police engaged, and so little amongst the rioters themselves, is, in my opinion, due in no small measure to the strictness with which the Arms Act regulations have been enforced.

I should view with grave concern any weakening of the provisions of this measure, for, although the possession of, say, 20 firearms in a crowd attacking troops would make no difference to the tactical situation or the result of the attack, it would inevitably involve an amount of bloodshed out of all proportion to the number of firearms in the hands of the mob, or to the increased power derived by the mob from their possession.

74. It is impossible to close this report without referring to the co-operation extended to me by all ranks of the Civil Government.

Under the present ill-defined relations which exist between the Civil and Military Powers, when what is known in India as "Statutory Martial Law," comes into force, no small amount of tact on both sides may be required to prevent friction. In Lahore, however, thanks to this spirit of co-operation displayed by the Civil Government, individually or collectively, not the slightest sign of friction occurred and I was never called upon to exercise tact.

But for this support, particularly from His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor Sir Michael O'Dwyer, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., the Hon'ble The Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court, from the Chief Secretary of the Punjab, the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner, and the Officers of the Punjab Police and Criminal Investigation Department, my anxiety and work would have been greatly increased.

Judging from my experience of what might have happened, I consider the whole question of the incidence of Martial Law in India calls for re-consideration.

75. The conduct of all ranks of British and Indian troops and Police in the Area stands out as a bright feature in the dismal record of this period of disturbance and outrage. The patience and discipline exhibited, under great provocation, particularly during the stone throwing on 12th April, was not, I am sure, without its good effect on the general situation. No single case of a breach of discipline or a "regrettable incident" took place.

The people in the city were particularly surprised at the bearing of the British troops quartered in their midst, drawn from 2nd Battalion Duke of Wellingtons' Regiment, 2-6th Battalion The Royal Sussex Regiment, 1st Garrison (F. S.) Battalion Somerset Light Infantry. They had an idea, I understand, that under Martial Law troops were licenced to loot or take what they required without paying for it, and I am sure that the impression made by the conduct of the British troops concerned will not be a negligible factor in permanently improving the relations between the two races in Lahore.

\* Page 312.

† Page 313.

Continued.]

Lt. COL. FRANK JOHNSON.

## APPENDIX I.

*List of Acts of Violence and Outrages in India—March—April 1919.*

No.	Date.	Place.	Outrage.	REMARKS.
	1919.			
1	30th March . . .	Delhi . . . .	Riot . . . .	Mob attacked Railway Station, beat the staff and Police. Mob was fired on.
2	6th April . . . .	Calcutta . . . .	Do. . . . .	Mob threw stones at Bristol Hotel and later rescued two men from arrest, assaulting police.
3	10th April . . . .	Amritsar . . . .	Do. . . . .	Mob attacked and burnt banks, telegraph office and railway goods shed, murdered five Europeans. All telegraph wires cut.
4	10th April . . . .	Chhoharta . . . .	Looting . . . .	Mob looted goods train and cut telegraph wires.
5	10th April . . . .	Lahore . . . . .	Riot . . . . .	Mob advanced from City to Civil Station, dispersed by Police and Military.
6	11th April . . . .	Bombay . . . . .	Riots . . . . .	Police and Cavalry stoned, trains and motors held up, fire engine stoned, mob charged.
7	11th April . . . .	Ahmedabad . . . .	Do. . . . .	Flour mills burnt down. Telegraph office damaged. European Sergeant and native policeman killed, several rioters killed and wounded.
8	12th April . . . .	Virangaum . . . .	Do. . . . .	Station and Government buildings burnt. Telegraph wires cut. Treasury looted.
9	12th April . . . .	Kasur . . . . .	Riot, murder . . . .	Two trains held up and looted, two British soldiers killed, two injured. Railway Station burnt down, all wires cut.
10	12th April . . . .	Khem Karn . . . .	Looting . . . . .	Railway station looted.
11	12th April . . . .	Gandasinghwa . . . .	Riot. . . . .	
12	12th April . . . .	Patti . . . . .	Do. . . . .	Railway station and signals damaged.
13	12th April . . . .	Surat . . . . .	Do. . . . .	Railway line pulled up.
14	12th April . . . .	Calcutta . . . . .	Do. . . . .	Large mobs attacked police, who fired.
15	12th April . . . .	Ahmedabad . . . . .	Do. . . . .	Two Government buildings burnt, wires, cut. Police fired on mob.
16	12th April . . . .	Lahore . . . . .	Do. . . . .	Stones thrown at troops marching through City. Mob fired on by police.
17	12th April . . . .	Do. . . . .	Wire cutting . . . .	All wires to Simla cut.
18	13th April . . . .	Patti . . . . .	Do. . . . .	Railway telegraph wires cut.
19	13th April . . . .	Tarn Taran . . . . .	Do. . . . .	Ditto ditto
20	13th April . . . .	Gohlwar Varpal . . . .	Do. . . . .	Ditto ditto.
21	13th April . . . .	Jaloo . . . . .	Do. . . . .	All wires cut between Lahore and Amritsar.
22	13th April . . . .	Chheharta . . . . .	Derailment . . . . .	Goods train derailed and looted.
23	13th April . . . .	Amritsar . . . . .	Riot . . . . .	Mob dispersed by fire. Heavy casualties.
24	13th April . . . .	Kot Radha Kishen . . . .	Stone throwing . . . .	1st Class passenger injured by stone thrown at the train.
25	13th April . . . .	Wagah . . . . .	Riot . . . . .	Mob looted and damaged Railway Station, signals, etc.
26	13th April . . . .	Do. . . . .	Derailment . . . . .	Armoured train derailed.
27	14th April . . . .	Gujranwala . . . . .	Riot . . . . .	Mob attacked and burnt Civil Station, Church and other public buildings. All telegraph wires cut and instruments burnt.
28	14th April . . . .	Bahawalnagar . . . . .	Wire cutting . . . . .	All wires were cut and trains held up by mob.
29	14th April . . . .	Sheikhupura . . . . .	Wire cutting . . . . .	Telegraph wires cut and offices and instruments burnt at several small stations between Sheikhupura and Sangla Hill.
30	14th April . . . .	Sangla Hill . . . . .	Do. . . . .	
31	14th April . . . .	Shakurpur . . . . .	Do. . . . .	Damage done by Station Staff.
32	14th April . . . .	Lahore . . . . .	Do. . . . .	Wires cut between Lahore and Delhi.
33	14th April . . . .	Bahadurgarh . . . . .	Attempted derailment. . . . .	Attempt led by Station Master to tamper with line and railway bridge.
34	14th April . . . .	Okara . . . . .	Damages committed. . . . .	Minor damage and destruction took place.
35	14th April . . . .	Hafizabad . . . . .	Do. . . . .	Ditto. ditto.
36	14th April . . . .	Akalgarh . . . . .	Do. . . . .	Ditto ditto.
37	14th April . . . .	Mansurwali . . . . .	Do. . . . .	Ditto ditto.
38	14th April . . . .	Hafizabad . . . . .	Stone throwing . . . . .	European passengers in train attacked.

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

APPENDIX I—contd.

List of Acts of Violence and Outrages in India—March—April 1919—contd.

No.	Date.	Place.	Outrage.	REMARKS.
	1919—contd.			
39	14th April . . .	Wazirabad . . .	Riot . . .	Mob attacked Railway station, broke signals.
40	15th April . . .	Gujrat . . .	Do. . .	Railway Station damaged.
41	15th April . . .	Wazirabad . . .	Do. . .	Mob damaged Railway Station, removed rails, burnt sleepers on bridge.
42	15th April . . .	Kundian . . .	Minor riots . . .	Minor disturbances took place.
43	15th April . . .	Lala Musa . . .	Do. . .	Ditto ditto.
44	15th April . . .	Qila Sheikhupura . . .	Do. . .	Ditto ditto
45	15th April . . .	Bahalike . . .	Do. . .	Ditto ditto.
46	15th April . . .	Siakot . . .	Arson . . .	Railway carriage burnt.
47	15th April . . .	Chuharkana . . .	Riot . . .	Mob burnt Railway Station, looted and attempted to burn train. Rail removed and bridge timbers burnt.
48	15th April . . .	Kala . . .	Derailment . . .	Passenger train derailed.
49	15th April . . .	Rohtak . . .	Wire cutting . . .	Telegraph wire cut at mile 357.
50	15th April . . .	Gohana . . .	Do. . .	Postal wire cut.
51	16th April . . .	Changa Manga . . .	Do. . .	All lines were cut.
52	16th April . . .	Chuharkana . . .	Arson . . .	Mob burnt Dhaban Railway Station and canal bridge. Collision between police and mob.
53	17th April . . .	Lyalpur . . .	Do. . .	Bhoosa burnt.
54	17th April . . .	Malakwal . . .	Derailment . . .	Two killed and two injured.
55	17th April . . .	Delhi . . .	Riots . . .	Mobs come into collision with police and troops. Several injured.
56	17th April . . .	Railways . . .	Wire cutting . . .	Wires were cut at many places on this date.
57	18th April . . .	Sidhwan . . .	Arson . . .	Railway Station burnt down
58	18th April . . .	Kaithal . . .	Riot . . .	Mob rushed and damaged Railway Station.
59	18th April . . .	Makhu . . .	Attempted wrecking . . .	Iron gradient post found on railway line.
60	18th April . . .	Ladhuka . . .	Do. . .	Obstructions placed on line.
61	18th April . . .	Railway . . .	Wire cutting . . .	Wires cut at various places on this date.
62	19th April . . .	Do. . .	Do. . .	One or two cases of wire cutting occurred.
63	20th April . . .	Rohtak . . .	Do. . .	Wire cut on canal.
64	20th April . . .	Chakki . . .	Do. . .	Telegraph wire cut.

Continued.]


Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

APPENDIX II

Diagram showing acts of violence before and after the introduction of Martial Law.

No. of Acts of Violence.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14



\*Outrages cease.

Martial Law

64 3 6 8 4 5 9 10 11 13

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

APPENDIX III.

Return of penalties inflicted on students of various Colleges by the Principals for taking part in seditious agitations.

Name of College.	Expelled permanently.	Forfeiture of concessions.	Loss of one year's seniority.	Forfeiture of scholarships.	Scholarships suspended for 3 months.	Rusticated for 1 year.	Suspended for 3 months.	Fined.	To find security for future behaviour.	TOTAL.
King Edward Medical	10	...	9	6	16	...	...	...	...	41
Dayal Singh	7	...	14	...	2	5	4	7	245	284
Sanatan Dharm	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	78	78
Norman Christian	1	...	3	...	...	2	...	5*	...	11
Dayanand Anglo-Vedic	16	...	15	10	...	5	...	270	112	428
Government	12	5	...	15	...	6	...	...	...	38
Law	...	...	7	...	...	...	...	124	...	131
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>406</b>	<b>435</b>	<b>1,011</b>

\* Does not include fines of Rs. 5 inflicted on every resident of the hostel of the College who did not attend the College on the 11th and 12th April without due reason.

APPENDIX IV.

Martial Law Notices, Lahore Civil Area.

No. 1.

WHEREAS the Government of India has for good reasons proclaimed Martial Law in the districts of Lahore and Amritsar; and

WHEREAS superior military authority has appointed me to command troops and administer Martial Law in a portion of the Lahore District, now known as the "Lahore Civil" command whose boundaries may be described as follows:—

The Civil Lines;  
The Municipality and City of Lahore;  
The Fort;  
The Mogulpura Works;  
and any other area not included in the above between the Ravi River and Lahore Branch of the Bari Doab Canal inclusive within three miles of the Central Telegraph Office, Lahore,

and WHEREAS Martial Law may be briefly described as the will of the Military Commander in enforcing law, order and public safety:

I make known to all concerned that until further orders by me the following will be strictly carried out:—

1. At 20-00 hours each evening a gun will be fired from the Fort, and from that signal till 05-00 hours on the following morning no person other than a European or a person in possession of a military permit signed by me or on my behalf will be permitted to leave his or her house or compound or the building in which he or she may be at 20 hours. During these prohibited hours no person other than those excepted above will be permitted to use the streets or roads, and any person found disobeying this order will be arrested, and if any attempt is made to evade or resist arrest that person will be liable to be shot.

This and all other orders which from time to time I may deem necessary to make will be issued on my behalf from the Water-works station in the City, whither every Ward will keep at least four representatives from 6 A.M. till 17-00 hours daily to learn what orders, if any, are issued and to convey such orders to the inhabitants of their respective Wards. The onus of ascertaining the orders issued by me will rest on the people through their representatives.

2. Loyal and law-abiding persons have nothing to fear from the exercise of Martial Law.

3. In order to protect the lives of His Majesty's Soldiers and Police under my command, I make known that if any firearm is discharged or bombs thrown at them the most drastic reprisals will instantly be made against property surrounding the scene of the outrage. Therefore it behoves all loyal inhabitants to see to it that no evil-disposed agitator is allowed on his premises.

4. During the period of Martial Law I prohibit all processions, meetings or other gatherings of more than 10 persons without my written authority, and any such meetings, gatherings or processions held in disobedience of this order will be broken up by force without warning.

5. I forbid any person to offer violence or cause obstruction to any person desirous of opening his shop or conducting his business or proceeding to his work or business. Any person contravening this order will be arrested, tried by a Summary Court and be liable to be shot.

6. At present the City of Lahore enjoys the advantage of electric lights and a water-supply; but the continuance of these supplies will depend on the good behaviour of the inhabitants and their prompt obedience to my orders.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,

2/6 Battalion, Royal Sussex Regiment,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB;

Lahore, 15th April 1919.

No. 2.

ALL tongas and tum-tums whether licensed for hire or otherwise be delivered up to the Military Officer appointed for that purpose at the Punjab Light Horse ground by 17-00 to-day—Tuesday, 15th April. Drivers will receive pay and horses be rationed.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

No. 3.

ALL motor cars or vehicles of any description will be delivered to the Military Officer appointed for that purpose at the Punjab Club by 17-00 this day.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

*Continued.]*

LA.-COL. FRANK JOHNSON.

## No. 4.

By virtue of the powers vested in me, I have prohibited the issue of Third or Intermediate Class tickets at all Railway Stations in the Lahore Civil Command, except only in the case of servants travelling with their European masters, or servants or others in the employ of the Government.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

Time—22-00 hours.

Lahore, 15th April 1919.

## No. 5.

WHEREAS, from information received by me, it would appear that shops, generally known as *Langars*, for the sale of cooked food are used for the purpose of illegal meetings and/or the dissemination of seditious propaganda, and whereas I notice that all other shops (particularly in Lahore City) have been closed as part of an organized demonstration against His Majesty's Government, now therefore, by virtue of the powers vested in me under Martial Law, I order that all such *Langars* or shops for the sale of cooked food in the Lahore Civil Area, except such as may be granted an exemption in writing by me, shall close and cease to trade by 10-00 hours to-morrow, Wednesday, 16th April 1919.

Disobedience to this order will result in the confiscation of the contents of such shop, and the arrest and trial by summary procedure of the owner or owners.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

Time—28-00 hours.

Lahore, 15th April 1919.

## No. 6.

WHEREAS I have reason to believe that certain munshis, agents, dalal and/or chuprassis employed by legal practitioners in Lahore are engaged in disseminating seditious propaganda, therefore by virtue of the powers vested in me under Martial Law I make the following Order :—

- (1) No such munshi, agent, dalal or chuprassee shall leave the Lahore Civil Command without a permit signed by me or on my behalf.
- (2) Every legal practitioner resident in this Command will submit to me, through the Deputy Commissioner of Lahore, by 16-00 hours to-day a complete list of every munshi, agent, dalal or chuprassee directly or indirectly employed by him.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

Time—08-00 hours.

Lahore, 16th April 1919.

## No. 7.

WHEREAS I have reason to believe that certain students of the D. A.-V. College in Lahore are engaged in spreading seditious propaganda directed against His Majesty's Government and whereas I deem it expedient in the interests of the preservation of law and order to restrict the activities of such students, I make the following Order :—

All students of the said College now in this Command area will report themselves to the Officer Commanding

Troops at the BRADLAUGH HALL daily at the hours specified below and remain there until the roll of such students has been called by the Principal or some other Officer approved by me acting on his behalf, and until they have been dismissed by the Officer Commanding Troops at BRADLAUGH HALL :—

07-00 hours.  
11-00 hours.  
15-00 hours.  
19-30 hours.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

Time—08-00 hours.

Lahore, 16th April 1919.

## No. 8.

WHEREAS some evilly disposed persons have torn down or defaced Notices and Orders which I have caused to be exhibited for the information and good government of the people in the Lahore (Civil) Command,

I issue this warning,

In future all Orders that I have to issue under Martial Law will be handed to such owners of property as I may select and it will be the duty of such owners of property to exhibit and keep exhibited and undamaged in the position on their property selected by me all such orders.

The duty of protecting such orders will therefore devolve on the owners of property, and failure to ensure the proper protection and continued exhibition of my Orders will result in severe punishment.

Similarly I hold responsible the owner of any property on which seditious or any other Notices, proclamations or writings not authorized by me are exhibited.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

Time—10-15 hours.

Lahore, 16th April 1919.

## No. 9.

WHEREAS it has been found expedient to revise Martial Law Order No. 8.

NOW THEREFORE I give notice that copies of all Orders and Notices issued by me under Martial Law will be exhibited at the following places :—

*Inside the City.*

1. House of Mehta Amin Chand, Pleader, Gali Bhadda Kali, Wachowali.
2. House of Dr. Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din, Bar.-at-Law, Kucha Tirgaran, inside Mochi Gate.
3. Baitak of Suba, Contractor, Wazir Khan's Chauk.
4. House of Dr. Nihal Chand, Sikri, Wachowali.
5. House of Jai Gopal Tandon, Manager, Punjabi Press, inside Shahalmi Gate.
6. Shop of Fazal Din, book-seller, Kashmiri Bazar.
7. House of Lala Kanshi Ram, Kapur, near Water Works Reservoir.
8. House of Lala Sardari Lal, Vaid, Gumti Bazar.
9. House of Lala Kidar Nath, Contractor, Niween Gali Sathan.
10. House of Badshah, son of Nur Din, Lakkar Mandi.
11. Shop of B. Hira Singh, Turiwala, Hira Mandi.
12. House of Mohna, Saraf, Bus Bazar.
13. House of Lala Sundar Das, Bar.-at-Law, inside Shahalmi Gate, Paper Mandi.
14. House of Thakur Sukh Ram Das, Editor, *Rajput Gazette*, Mohalla Purbiya, Mochi Gate.
15. House of Lala Kanshi Ram, Kholra, Editor, *Bulletin Chuni Mandi*.

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

16. House of Pandit Chuni Lal, Vaid, near Bhairo Asthan.
17. House of Pandit Jewan Lal, Pensioner, Chauk Matti.
18. Shop of Bhagat Ram, Puri, Sudesh Vastu Stores, Sutar Mandi.
19. Shop of Jaggan Nath, son of Govind Ram, Attar, Rang Mahal.
20. Shop of Dayalu, Halwai, Neewan Katra, Akbari Mandi.

*Outside the City.*

1. House of Dr. G. C. Naurang, Bar.-at-Law, McLeod Road.
2. House of Lala Dharam Das, Suri, Pleader, Maclagan Road.
3. House of Lala Rattan Chand, Gowalmandi.
4. House of the Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Mian Fazal-i-Hussain, Bar.-at-Law, Lytton Road.
5. House of Pir Taj-ud-Din, Bar.-at-Law, Empress Road.
6. House of Lala Govardhan Das, Agent, Insurance Company, Gowalmandi.
7. House of Lala Durga Das, Pleader, Circular Road, outside Lohari Gate.
8. Office of Mr. Nanak Chand, Bar.-at-Law, Anarkali.
9. Shop of Lala Dhani Ram, Bhalla, Hindu Boot House, Anarkali.
10. Shop of Lala Durga Das, Cheap John, Anarkali.
11. Junction of Mall and McLeod Road.
12. Charing Cross.
13. Chauk New Kotwali.
14. House of S. K. Mukerji, Pleader, near Nila Gumbaz, Chauk Anarkali.
15. Shop of Amolak Ram, the Swadeshi Stores, Anarkali.
16. House of Mr. H. Beechey, Bar.-at-Law, Fane Road.
17. House of Balhshi Tek Chand, Pleader, Fane Road.
18. House of Lala Piari Mohan, B.A., Pleader, Bans Mandi.
19. D. A.-V. College Boarding Houses (Superintendent).
20. Law College Boarding Houses and Hostels (Superintendent).
21. Government College Boarding Houses (Superintendent).
22. Medical College Boarding Houses (Superintendent).
23. Dayal Singh College Boarding Houses (Superintendent).
24. Khalsa Boarding House, near Veterinary Hospital (Superintendent).
25. Forman Christian College Boarding Houses (Superintendent).
26. Vedio Ashram Boarding House (Superintendent).
27. Viram Ashram Brahma-Samaj Boarding House (Superintendent).
28. Islamia College Boarding Houses (Superintendent).
29. Veterinary College Boarding House (Superintendent).
30. Rajput Boarding House (Superintendent).
31. Central Training College Boarding Houses (Superintendent).
32. Central Model School Boarding House (Superintendent).
33. Sardar Partap Singh Boarding House (Superintendent).
34. Sanatan Dharm Boarding House (Superintendent).
35. D. A.-V. School Boarding House (Superintendent).
36. Agarwal Ashram Boarding House (Superintendent).
37. Arts School Boarding House (Superintendent).

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB;  
Lahore, 20th April 1919.

No. 10.

WHEREAS practically every shop and business establishment in the area under my Command has been closed

in accordance with the *hartal* or organized closure of business directed against His Majesty's Government, and WHEREAS the continuance of such *hartal* is detrimental to good order and governance of the said area and WHEREAS I deem it desirable from time to time to limit the effect of such *hartal*: Now therefore by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law I make the following Orders, viz.:-

By 14 hours to-morrow, Thursday, the 17th day of April, every shop and business establishment in the quarter generally known as Anarkali Bazaar will open and carry on its business and each occupier of such shop or business premises will exercise his skilled trade or calling in exactly the same manner as they or he did before the creation of the said *hartal*; and I warn all concerned that disobedience of this Order will result in the opening by me of such shop or business, and that any resultant loss arising out of such forcible opening will rest on the owners or occupiers of such shop or business, and further that refusal or neglect to carry on business or to exercise such skilled trade or calling above referred to will render the person guilty liable to such summary punishment as by virtue of Martial Law I am authorized to inflict such punishment including imprisonment, fine and whipping.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB;  
Time—20-00 hours.  
Lahore, 16th April 1919.

No. 11.

WHEREAS I think it advisable to take such steps as I think necessary for the prevention of violence and the preservation of good order, more particularly for the prevention of injury to His Majesty's Soldiers and Police, as well as to all law-abiding citizens in the Area under my Command, I make the following Order:—

From and after the promulgation of this Order it shall be illegal for any male person to carry or be found in possession of an instrument known as a *lathi*.

All persons disobeying this Order will be arrested, tried by summary proceedings and punished under the powers conferred on me by Martial Law.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB;  
Time—22-00 hours.  
Lahore, 16th April 1919.

No. 12.

WHEREAS I deem it expedient to take further steps for the prevention of violence and intimidation and for the maintenance of good order in the Area under my Command, I make the following Order:—

From and after the promulgation of this Order it shall be unlawful for more than two persons to walk abreast on any constructed or clearly defined pavement or sidewalk in such Area, and disobedience of this Order will be punished by all such special powers as are conferred on me by Martial Law.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB;  
Time—02-00 hours.  
Lahore, 16th April 1919.

No. 13.

WHEREAS information laid before me shows that a Martial Law Notice issued by me and posted by my



Continued.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

orders on a property known as the *Sanatan Dharam College Hostel on Bahawalpore Road*, has been torn or otherwise defaced, in contravention of my Martial Law Notice No. 8.

NOW THEREFORE by virtue of the powers vested in me under Martial Law, I order the immediate arrest of all male persons domiciled in the said Hostel and their internment in the *Lahore Fort* pending my further Orders as to their trial or other disposal.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

Time—15.25 hours.  
Lahore, 17th April 1919.

No. 14.

WHEREAS practically every shop and business establishment in the Area under my Command has been closed in accordance with the *hartal* or organized closure of business directed against His Majesty's Government,

AND WHEREAS the continuance or resumption of such *hartal* is detrimental to the good order and governance of the said Area,

AND WHEREAS I deem it expedient to cause the said *hartal* to entirely cease :

NOW THEREFORE by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law I make the following order, namely :—

By 10.00 hours to-morrow (Friday), the 18th day of April 1919, every shop and business establishment (except only *langars* referred to in Martial Law Notice No. 5, dated 15th April 1919) in the Area under my Command shall open and carry on its business, and thereafter daily shall continue to keep open and carry on its business during the usual hours, up to 20.00 hours, in exactly the same manner as before the creation of the said *hartal*.

AND LIKEWISE I order that every skilled or other worker will, from 10.00 hours to-morrow, resume and continue during the usual hours his ordinary trade, work or calling

AND I WARN all concerned that if at 10.00 hours to-morrow, or at any subsequent time, I find this Order has been, without good and valid reason, disobeyed, the persons concerned will be arrested and tried under the summary procedure of Martial Law, and shops so closed will be opened and kept open by force, and any resultant loss arising from such forcible openings will rest on the owners and/or occupiers concerned.

AND I FURTHER WARN all concerned that this order must be strictly obeyed in spirit as well as in letter, that is to say, that to open a shop and then refuse to sell goods and to charge an exorbitant and prohibitive rate, will be deemed a contravention of this Order.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

Time—17.10 hours.  
Lahore, 17th April 1919.

No. 15.

WHEREAS it has come to my knowledge that the present state of unrest is being added to and encouraged by the spreading of false, inaccurate and exaggerated reports or rumours,

NOW THEREFORE by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I give notice that ANY PERSON found guilty of publishing, spreading or repeating false, inaccurate or exaggerated reports in connection with the Military

or Political situation will be arrested and summarily dealt with under Martial Law.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

Time—10.20 hours.  
Lahore, 18th April 1919.

No. 16.

WHEREAS I have reason to believe that certain students of the DYAL SINGH COLLEGE in Lahore are engaged in spreading seditious propaganda directed against His Majesty's Government, and whereas I deem it expedient in the interests of the preservation of law and order to restrict the activities of such students, I make the following Order :—

All students of the said College now in this Command Area will report themselves to the Officer Commanding Troops at the TELEGRAPH OFFICE daily at the hours specified below and remain there until the roll of such students has been called by the Principal or some other Officer approved by me acting on his behalf, and until they have been dismissed by the Officer Commanding Troops at TELEGRAPH OFFICE :—

07.00 hours.	15.00 hours.
11.00 hours.	19.00 hours.

First parade at 11.00 hours on 18th April 1919.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

Time—16.00 hours.  
Lahore, 18th April 1919.

No. 17.

WHEREAS it is deemed desirable to provide for the better mobility of His Majesty's Troops in the area under my command (and in those adjacent thereto).

NOW THEREFORE by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I make the following orders :—

- (1) From and after this date no motor nor pedal-driven cycle shall leave the area under my command without a permit signed by me or on my behalf.
- (2) All owners of motor and other cycles shall when ordered to do so by me, whether by notice addressed to them personally, or as residents in certain district or areas, or as members of certain institutions, trades, or callings, deliver all cycles, owned or possessed by them to the Officer appointed to receive them on my behalf, at the places and by the hour stated in such Notices, which will be published from day to day in (amongst other places) the *Civil and Military Gazette*.
- (3) AND I FURTHER ORDER that every motor-cycle in the area under my command, other than those the *bona fide* property of Government or of a Gazetted Officer, be delivered to me or the Officers appointed by me at the Cinema in McLeod Road between 08.00 and 13.00 hours on Monday, 21st April 1919, and thereafter it will be a contravention of Martial Law for any person, other than those excepted in this paragraph, or holding exemption certificates signed on my behalf, to be found in possession of a motor-cycle whether in running order or otherwise.
- (4) AND I FURTHER ORDER that all pedal-driven cycles in possession of students on the rolls of the D.A.-V., Sanatan Dharm and Dyal Singh

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

*Continued.*

Colleges be delivered to the Officer appointed by me at the Bradlaugh Hall between 02-00 and 13-00 hours on Monday, 21st April 1919, and thereafter it will be a contravention of Martial Law for any student of the said Colleges to ride or be in possession of a cycle.

AND I WARN all concerned that failure to comply with this Order, or tampering with any cycle to impair its immediate usefulness, will result in severe penalties under Martial Law.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

*Time—22-15 hours.*  
*Lahore, 19th April 1919.*

No. 18.

*Surrender of firearms and ammunition.*

WHEREAS it has come to my knowledge that a number of persons in the Area under my Command are in possession of firearms and ammunition, by virtue of exemption, license or otherwise,

AND WHEREAS I deem it desirable, in the interests of the safety of His Majesty's Troops and Police and for the prevention of disorder and violence, to take steps to ensure that such arms should not pass, by theft or otherwise, into the possession of those who might use them unlawfully,

NOW THEREFORE by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law I do make the following Order, that is to say,

Any person in possession of any arms or ammunition, ordered by me or by any Officer, Magistrate, Soldier or Policeman acting on my behalf, to surrender for safe custody such arms and ammunition shall deliver them to me at the place and by the hour mentioned in such Order.

And for the purpose of this Order, every Military or Police Officer, Magistrate, Soldier and Policeman shall be deemed to be acting on my behalf.

AND I WARN ALL CONCERNED that disobedience of this Order will be summarily dealt by me under Martial Law.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

*Time—12-30 hours.*  
*Lahore, 20th April 1919.*

No. 19.

*Motor Drivers.*

WHEREAS the services of motor drivers are immediately needed,

NOW THEREFORE by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law I make the following Order, that is to say :

By 14-00 hours to-morrow, the 21st day of April 1919, every person skilled in driving a motor vehicle, not now driving commandeered or exempted cars, will report himself to MAJOR LINDSAY SMITH at the TRANSPORT PARK, PUNJAB LIGHT HORSE GROUND.

All drivers so reporting will either be registered or engaged. The latter will receive current rates of pay.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

*Time—14-15 hours.*  
*Lahore, 20th April 1919.*

No. 20.

WHEREAS on the 15th day of April 1919, in order to minimise the work of the Troops and Police and the better to maintain public order and safety in the Area under my Command, by Martial Law Notice No. 1 I forbade certain classes of the inhabitants of the said Area to leave their houses or be in the public streets or roads between 20-00 hours and 05-00 hours daily,

AND WHEREAS this and other Orders issued by me have been carried out to my satisfaction, I am desirous of removing as far as possible restrictions which interfere with the religious exercises of certain classes of the inhabitants :

NOW THEREFORE I Order and direct that so long as the inhabitants of the Area under my Command continue faithfully to obey all Orders issued by me in the cause of public order and safety, the hours during which the streets, etc., are closed shall be between 21-00 hours and 05-00 hours, and this alteration shall come into operation at 21-00 hours to-morrow, the 22nd day of April 1919.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

*Time—10-55 hours.*  
*Lahore, 21st April 1919.*

No. 21.

*To owners of cycles*

IN CONTINUATION of paragraph 2 of Martial Law Notice No. 17, dated 19th April 1919, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I ORDER THAT—

All pedal-driven cycles (save and except such as are the *bonâ fide* property of Government) owned or possessed by persons, other than Europeans, residing in the district hereinafter described, shall be delivered to the officer appointed by me at the Cinema, McLeod Road, between the hours of 09-00 and 16-00 to-morrow (Tuesday) the 22nd day of April 1919.

AND THEREFORE it will be a contravention of Martial Law for any such person to be in possession of a cycle, unless accompanied by a certificate of exemption from military service signed on my behalf.

*District affected.*

That portion of the Area under my Command that lies SOUTH of the City Boundaries and the RAVI RIVER exclusive, and NORTH or WEST of the following roads, inclusive :—

CHAMBERLAIN ROAD from the MOCHI GATE, thence by THORTON ROAD, NABHA ROAD and EDWARD ROAD to the junction of CUST and MULTAN ROADS.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

*Time— hours.*  
*Lahore, 21st April 1919.*

No. 22.

*To owners of cycles.*

IN further continuation of paragraph 2 of Martial Law Order No. 17, dated 19th April 1919, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I ORDER THAT—

All pedal-driven cycles (save and except such as are the *bonâ fide* property of Government) owned or possessed by persons, other than Europeans, residing in the district hereinafter described, shall be delivered to the Officer appointed by me at the Fort between the hours of 09-00

*Continued.]*

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

and 16-00 to-morrow (Wednesday), the 23rd day of April 1919.

AND THEREAFTER it will be a contravention of Martial Law for any such person to be in possession of a cycle unless accompanied by a Certificate of Exemption from military service signed on my behalf.

For the purposes of this Order, all cycles owned or ridden in the course of duty by Officers or servants of the Government shall be deemed to be the property of Government and therefore exempt from this order.

*District affected.*

That portion of the Area under my command known as the "City."

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

*Time—08-55 hours.*

*Lahore, 22nd April 1919.*

## No. 23.

WHEREAS it was not possible to receive, inspect and issue receipts for all pedal-driven cycles surrendered in accordance with Martial Law Order No. 21 of 21st April 1919, during the hours specified in the said Order,

NOW THEREFORE, I ORDER that all persons residing in the Area defined in the said Order will deliver cycles in their possession to the Officer appointed by me at the Cinema at McLeod Road between 09-00 and 16-00 hours to-morrow (Thursday), the 24th day of April 1919.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

*Time—07-25 hours.*

*Lahore, 23rd April 1919.*

## No. 24.

WHEREAS I deem it expedient to make provision for the preservation of health and the greater comfort of British Troops stationed in the area under my Command,

AND WHEREAS a number of electric fans and lights are required in the buildings in which some of such troops are quartered,

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I authorize any Officer appointed by me for that purpose to enter any college, public building, hostel, hotel, private or other residence or building and remove such number of electric lights and fans required for the purpose aforesaid.

AND any attempt to obstruct such removal, or to hide, or to damage or to impair the immediate efficiency of any such fans or lights, will be summarily dealt with under Martial Law;

BUT nothing in this Order shall authorize the removal of any fan or light from a room usually inhabited by a woman.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

*Time—07-25 hours.*

*Lahore, 23rd April 1919.*

## No. 25.

WHEREAS it was not possible to receive, inspect and issue receipts for all pedal-driven cycles surrendered in accordance with Martial Law Order No. 22 of 22nd April 1919, during the hours specified in the said Order,

NOW THEREFORE, I ORDER that all persons residing in the Area defined in the said Order, that is to say, "The

CITY," will deliver cycles in their possession to the Officer appointed by me at the Fort between 09-00 and 16-00 hours to-morrow (Friday), the 25th day of April 1919.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

*Time—07-40 hours.*

*Lahore, 24th April 1919.*

## No. 26.

WHEREAS I deem it necessary to take steps for the more complete control of all horse-drawn vehicles licensed to ply for hire in the area under my Command, and in order to lessen the chance of further loss and inconvenience to the public by reason of any *hartal* or refusal to ply for hire,

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I order that on and after Monday, the 28th day of April 1919, no landau, gharry, tonga or tum-tum shall ply for hire in the Area under my Command unless in possession of a permit signed by me or by an Officer acting on my behalf, which permits will be issued on payments shown in the schedule published below.

AND I FURTHER ORDER that the driver of every such licensed vehicle shall also be in possession of a military permit to drive such vehicle, for which a charge of Re. 1-4-0 will be made.

All vehicles and drivers must obtain the necessary licenses and permits from *Major Lindsay Smith*, at the *Transport Park, Punjab Light Horse Ground*, between 09-00 and 17-00 hours on the 25th, 26th and 27th days of April 1919 and failure to obtain such licenses and permits will be dealt with as a breach of Martial Law.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

*Time— hours.*

*Lahore, 24th April 1919.*

*Scale of Charges for Military Permits to ply for hire and drive licensed vehicles.*

Class.	Fee.		
	Rs.	A.	P.
1st (Landaus) . . . . .	6	0	0
2nd (Gharries) . . . . .	5	0	0
3rd (Tongas) A . . . . .	3	8	0
3rd (Tongas) B . . . . .	3	0	0
4th (Tum-tums) . . . . .	2	0	0

## No. 27.

WHEREAS, from information laid before me, I have reason to believe that a large number of students at the KING EDWARD MEDICAL COLLEGE, Lahore, have openly given expression to seditious sentiments and cries,

AND WHEREAS I deem it expedient to limit the mischievous activities of such students,

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I make the following orders :—

1. No student on the rolls of the said College at present residing in the area under my command shall leave such area without a permit signed by me or on my behalf.

2. All students of 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th years of the M.B.S. Class of the said College, now residing in the area under my command, save and except those as to whose loyalty I am satisfied and to whom, on the recommendation of the Principal, I may grant exemption, will from the promulgation of this Order, report themselves to the Officer Commanding Troops at PATIALA HOUSE daily at the hours specified below, and remain there until the roll of such students has been called by an Officer appoint-

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

ed by the Principal and approved by me and until they have been dismissed by the Officer Commanding Troops at PATIALA HOUSE :—

07-00 hours.	15-00 hours.
11-00 hours.	19-00 hours.

*Note.*—4th year students are exempted from attendance at the 07-00 hours roll-call.

3. At 11-00 hours to-morrow (Saturday), the 26th day of April 1919, in lieu of the roll-call at PATIALA HOUSE, such roll-call will take place at the FORT, LAHORE, and every such student in possession of a cycle will there and at that hour deliver it to the Officer appointed by me, and thereafter during the continuance of Martial Law or until such time as I may rescind or modify this order, any such student in possession of a cycle shall be deemed to have contravened Martial Law.

AND I WARN all such students that absence from any roll-call without reasonable excuse will be severely punished.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

*Time*—07-40 hours.  
Lahore, 25th April 1919.

No. 28.

WHEREAS on the 23rd instant some evilly disposed person set fire to the contents of a pillar letter-box, causing loss and inconvenience to the public,

AND WHEREAS such offence can at present only be dealt with under process of Civil Law,

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in me under Martial Law, I hereby order that damage or attempted damage to or theft of any postal matter or Post Office property in the Area under my command, shall be deemed to be an offence under Martial Law, punishable with all the certainty, celerity and severity of such Law.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

*Time*—08-50 hours.  
Lahore, 25th April 1919.

No. 29.

WHEREAS by Martial Law Order No. 14 of 17th April 1919, I warned dealers in the Area under my Command against charging exorbitant prices for their goods,

AND WHEREAS I find that the current retail price for *Atta* is as much as 5½ seers per rupee, whilst *Atta* can be purchased by retail shopkeepers at Rs. 5-13-0 per maund, so that such shopkeepers are making a profit of about Re. 1-7-4 per maund which is approximately equivalent to 25 per cent. *per diem*,

AND WHEREAS, I deem such profit to be exorbitant and unlawful, and further that it is necessary to protect the people from the hardship and injustice of such exorbitant price :

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I shall from time to time fix and determine the prices at which the necessaries of life shall be sold.

AND I NOW ORDER THAT—

From and after 17-00 hours this day and until further notice, it shall be a contravention of Martial Law for any dealer in *Atta* to—

- (1) refuse to sell *Atta* when requested to do so, and
- (2) supply less than 6½ (six and-a-half) seers per rupee which will allow such retail dealer the excellent profit of annas 5/5½ per maund or say 5 per cent. *per diem* on his capital involved.

And so that no retail dealer in *Atta* shall be able to plead, as an excuse for contravention of his Order, his inability to purchase *Atta* at the wholesale price named above, I give notice that on application being made to the officer appointed by me for that purpose, *viz.*, the Director of Civil Supplies, whose office is with that of the Director of Agriculture near the Civil Secretariat, he will give all necessary information and facilities to enable such retail shopkeepers to supply themselves with *Atta* at the said wholesale price, *viz.*, Rs. 5-13-0 per maund.

AND I WARN ALL CONCERNED that any disobedience of this Order will result in prompt and severe punishment under Martial Law.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

*Time*—10-50 hours.  
The 25th April 1919.

No. 30.

WHEREAS it has been proved to me that certain students in Lahore Colleges are in the habit of defacing with obscene and filthy comments, pictures appearing in illustrated papers of members of his Majesty's Naval and Military Forces, Civil or other services,

AND WHEREAS such obscene and filthy comments are calculated to promote disaffection and bad feeling, and to be prejudicial to good order,

NOW THEREFORE I warn all concerned that it shall be deemed to be a contravention of Martial Law for any person to deface or mark any picture or letter-press purporting to represent or refer to British subjects, by signs, drawings or words calculated to bring contempt, ridicule or dislike on such British subjects,

AND such prohibition is also extended to the use of words, signs or gestures directed at, addressed or referring to, any such British subjects,

AND I SHALL HOLD RESPONSIBLE for such outrages on illustrations all who are inmates, owners and occupiers, students and teachers, of the premises in which such damaged or defaced picture or literature is discovered.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

*Time*—17-50 hours.  
Lahore, 25th April 1919.

No. 31.

WHEREAS by Martial Law Order No. 14 of 17th April 1919, I warned Dealers in the Area under my Command against charging exorbitant prices for their goods,

AND WHEREAS I deem the present prices charged of MILK, *viz.*—

- 3 Annas per seer for cows' milk, and
- 4 Annas per seer for buffaloes' milk.

to be unjustifiable, exorbitant, and to press heavily on the poorer people,

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law,

I ORDER THAT, from and after 17-00 hours this day and until further notice, it shall be a contravention of Martial Law for any person who yesterday was a dealer in milk—

- (1) to refuse to sell milk when in possession of milk and requested to do so,
- (2) to adulterate milk, or
- (3) to charge more than Annas 2½ per seer for cows' milk and Annas 3 per seer for buffaloes' milk.

Continued.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

AND I WARN ALL CONCERNED that any disobedience of this Order will result in prompt and severe punishment under Martial Law.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

*Time—06-40 hours.*  
*Lahore, 27th April 1919.*

No. 32.

WHEREAS by Martial Law Order No. 14 of 17th April 1919, I warned dealers in the Area under my Command against charging exorbitant prices for their goods,

AND WHEREAS I find that KHEWRA SALT can be laid down in this Area at an inclusive cost of Rs. 1-12-0 per maund whilst the people are made to pay Annas 1/8 per seer or Rs. 3-12-0 per maund producing a profit which is exorbitant and unlawful,

NOW THEREFORE by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law I ORDER THAT from 14-00 hours to-morrow, Wednesday, 30th April, salt, other than imported table salt, shall be supplied at a price not exceeding Anna One (A. 1) per seer, a price which I shall shortly further reduce after I consider sufficient time has been allowed to enable small dealers holding stocks purchased at high rates to dispose of or reduce such stocks.

AND I FURTHER ORDER that from and after 14-00 hours to-morrow, not less than 7½ seers of WHEAT shall be supplied for a rupee.

AND I WARN ALL CONCERNED THAT

- (a) all those who to-day are selling salt or wheat must continue to do so but at the new prices.
- (b) adulteration or short measure of all articles, whether a "controlled" article, like Atta, Milk, Salt and Wheat, or otherwise, will be deemed an offence against Martial Law and dealt with by me accordingly.

AND I FINALLY WARN ALL CONCERNED that unless the present unjustifiable prices, particularly of the necessaries of life, are at once materially reduced, I shall gradually fix the price of every article.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

*Time—17-50 hours.*  
*Lahore, 29th April 1919.*

No. 33.

WHEREAS it has come to my knowledge that attempts are frequently made to extort money from persons with a view to either saving them from penalties for intentional or other breaches of Martial Law, or for the purpose of removing them from the restrictive incidence of such Martial or other Laws,

AND WHEREAS I deem such conduct gravely detrimental to the good order and governance of the Area under my Command,

I THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in me under Martial Law, declare that it is an offence under Martial Law Regulation No. 15 for any person in the said Area to offer or receive money or other valuable consideration, or to act as agent or "go-between" in any transaction or proposed transaction by virtue of which the person paying such money or giving such consideration expects, or is promised, to evade any penalties or proceedings, or to obtain any benefit of any kind whatsoever under Martial or other Laws or Orders.

AND I WARN ALL CONCERNED that any person convicted of any breach of this Order in the said Area is

liable to 2 years' imprisonment, with or without a fine, and shall also be liable to a whipping.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

*Time—17-15 hours.*  
*Lahore, 2nd May 1919.*

No. 34.

WHEREAS I have trustworthy information that certain dealers in wheat in the Area under my Command are evading Martial Law No. 32, dated 29th April 1919, and refusing to sell wheat at the price fixed by me on the ground that their supply of wheat is exhausted ;

AND WHEREAS I have reason to believe that certain of the said dealers, on the contrary, have secret stores of wheat ;

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law I make the following Order :—

Every trader, banker, bunnia, or other person in the said Area who owns or possesses, directly, or indirectly, wheat exceeding 5 maunds in weight, shall render to me in writing (enclosed in an envelope marked "Wheat") by 09-00 hours on the 7th day of May 1919, a return showing the total quantity of wheat owned or possessed by him.

And so that no person intending to evade this Order may subsequently, when faced with the consequences of such evasion, complain that he was unaware of the procedure to be adopted by me,

I WARN ALL CONCERNED that as soon as possible after the hour named for the rendering of the said Returns, I shall cause them to be published, and at the same time offer substantial rewards for information that will lead to the conviction of any person failing to submit or submitting an inaccurate Return.

And such reward will be paid by the person disobeying this Order, in addition to such other punishment as, by virtue of Martial Law, I am empowered to impose.

And I further warn would-be informers of the consequences of wilfully giving me false information.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

*Time—12-00 hours.*  
*Lahore, 5th May 1919.*

No. 35.

WHEREAS by Martial Law Order No. 14 of 17th April 1919, I warned dealers in the Area under my Command against charging exorbitant prices for their goods ;

AND WHEREAS on the 1st May I met at the Town Hall, Lahore, a large number of growers of, and wholesale and retail dealers in, vegetables, discussed the costs of production, transport and selling, pointed out the present unjustifiable prices of many vegetables, particularly those that form part of the necessaries of life of the poorer classes, and finally gave the said producers and dealer three days in which to reduce their prices ;

AND WHEREAS I find that no notice has been taken of my request for a reduction in the said prices ;

NOW THEREFORE by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law I make the following Order, that is to say,

From 04-00 hours on Wednesday, the 7th day of May 1919, it shall be a contravention of Martial Law for any dealer or other person in the Area under my Command

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

to charge or attempt to charge more than the prices shown below:—

And any person found guilty of contravening this order will be severly punished.

Name of Vegetable.	Maximum retail price:		
	Rs.	A.	P.
Baingan . . . . .	0	1	6 per seer.
Tinde . . . . .	0	3	0 " "
Bhindi tori . . . . .	0	4	6 " "
Karele . . . . .	0	6	0 " "
Tori (green) . . . . .	0	2	6 " "
Tomatoes . . . . .	0	3	0 " "
Kadu (ghia) . . . . .	0	0	6 each.
Cabbages . . . . .	0	0	9 " "
Onions (dry) . . . . .	0	0	9 per seer.
" (green) . . . . .	0	0	6 " "
Potatoes . . . . .	0	1	3 " "
Peas . . . . .	0	5	0 " "
Sag . . . . .	0	1	3 " "
Kadu (Pahari) . . . . .	0	0	9 each.
Khera . . . . .	0	0	3 " "
Kakri . . . . .	0	0	3 " "

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB:

Time—15-20 hours.

Lahore, 5th May 1919.

No. 36.

WHEREAS by Martial Law Order No. 27 of the 25th April 1919, I ordered certain action to be taken against all students on the roll of the KING EDWARD MEDICAL COLLEGE, LAHORE, on account of the seditious conduct of certain of them;

AND WHEREAS the Principal of the said College has now reported to me that he has inflicted the following punishments, that is to say—

(1) To be forthwith expelled from and permanently removed from the roll of the College:—

1. Qasuri Lal . . . . .	First year student.
2. Nanak Chand Kapur . . . . .	Second year student.
3. Hans Raj Madan . . . . .	Third year student.
4. Jagat Ram Bhatia . . . . .	" " "
5. Giyan Chand Bhatia . . . . .	Fourth year student.
6. Gopal Singh Chowla . . . . .	" " "
7. Lal Singh Sahotra . . . . .	" " "
8. Pran Nath . . . . .	" " "
9. Parma Nand . . . . .	" " "
10. Hans Raj Chhibar . . . . .	" " "

(2) To suffer the loss of one (1) year's seniority:—

1. Kulwant Rai . . . . .	First year student.
2. Jagrinda Singh . . . . .	" " "
3. Kanhya L.J. Bhambri . . . . .	Second year student.
4. Lakshmi Narain . . . . .	" " "
5. Gurbakhsh Rai Dhamrait . . . . .	" " "
6. Shamsheer Singh . . . . .	Third year student.
7. Kishori Lal . . . . .	Fourth year student.
8. Amolak Ram Mehta . . . . .	" " "
9. Hira Lal Sachdeva . . . . .	" " "

(3) To forfeit their scholarships:—

1. Qasuri Lal . . . . .	First year student.
2. Kulwant Rai . . . . .	" " "
3. Jagat Ram Bhatia . . . . .	Third year student.
4. Shamsheer Singh . . . . .	" " "
5. Kishori Lal . . . . .	Fourth year student.
6. Amolak Ram Mehta . . . . .	" " "

(4) To have their scholarships suspended for three months:—

1. Mohan Lal . . . . .	First year student.
2. Parma Nand Bhatia . . . . .	" " "

VOL. IV

3. Fakhur-ud-din . . . . .	First year student.
4. Ram Lal Ubroi . . . . .	" " "
5. Ch. Hakim Din . . . . .	Second year student.
6. Jagat Ram Sahai . . . . .	" " "
7. Amar Nath Chopra . . . . .	" " "
8. Jhangi Ram . . . . .	" " "
9. Mokham Chand . . . . .	Third year student.
10. Sh. Muhammad Yusaf . . . . .	" " "
11. Hukam Chand Gupta . . . . .	" " "
12. Bhagwant Kishori Sikand . . . . .	" " "
13. Vaishnu Das Kashyap . . . . .	Fourth year student.
14. Jagan Nath Chopra . . . . .	" " "
15. Daulat Ram Mehta . . . . .	" " "
16. Harbhajan Singh . . . . .	" " "

AND WHEREAS I consider the aforesaid punishments, although very merciful, to be sufficient to restrain the remaining and future students from being misled into disloyal and seditious action:

I DIRECT that adequate disciplinary action having thus been taken against the College from the promulgation of this Order the students shall be relieved of all restrictions and liabilities imposed by Martial Law Order No. 27.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB:

Time—22-50 hours.

Lahore, 5th May 1919.

No. 37.

WHEREAS by Martial Law Order No. 14 of the 17th April 1919, I warned all dealers in the Area under my Command against charging exorbitant prices for their goods;

AND WHEREAS many complaints having been made to me concerning the present price of Mutton and Goat-flesh, I made and caused to be made exhaustive enquiries into the working of the meat trade in this Area;

AND WHEREAS as a result of such enquiries I find that a profit of about Rs. 3½ is being made on an outlay of Rs. 8½, which I deem to be unjustifiable;

NOW THEREFORE by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I make the following Order:

From 05-00 hours on Friday, the 9th day of May 1919, it shall be deemed a contravention of Martial Law for any Butcher or dealer in meat to charge or attempt to charge more than the following prices:—

MUTTON . . . . .	per seer 6 annas.
GOAT-FLESH . . . . .	" " 5 "

And being confident that a sufficiency of live animals can be obtained at a price to yield the butcher a reasonable profit on the basis of the above prices,

I WARN ALL CONCERNED that it will be an offence against Martial Law for any person who, during the past week has generally dealt in Meat, to refuse, without valid reason, to sell meat at the prices now fixed when called upon to do so.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB:

Time—13-10 hours.

Lahore, 7th May 1919.

No. 38.

IN accordance with the notice contained in Martial Law Order No. 34 of 5th May 1919, I published below the returns rendered to me as to stocks of wheat held in the Area under my Command:

AND I FURTHER give notice that a reward, varying in accordance with the magnitude of the mis-statements proved, but in no case less than Rs. 50, nor more than

Continued.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

Rs. 500, will be paid to any person giving information which leads to the conviction of a person who has failed to render a return (or rendered one containing materially inaccurate figures) in response to Martial Law Order No. 34 :—

Name.	Maunds.
Sham Lal . . . . .	7
Khan Sahib Abdul Aziz . . . . .	16
Balkishen, Traffic Inspector . . . . .	8
K. B. Thapar, Rai Bahadur . . . . .	9
Umar Daraz and Umar Hayat . . . . .	17
Kanshi Ram, Khosla . . . . .	28
Khan Sahib Mian Chiragh Din . . . . .	8
Chokha Nand . . . . .	15
Mullick Girdhari Lal . . . . .	9
Agent, North-Western Railway . . . . .	19,940
Rai Bahadur Dr. Hira Lal . . . . .	12
Laehmi Sahai . . . . .	10
Shiv Ditta Mall . . . . .	11
Dina Nath, Hem Raj . . . . .	9
Durga Das Sondhi . . . . .	13
Ram Nath Tandan . . . . .	8
F. D. Warris, Esq. . . . .	10
Karam Chand Puri . . . . .	70
R. B. Ganga Ram, C.I.E., M.V.O. . . . .	12
Suraj Bhan . . . . .	9
Chaudhri Ghulam Rasool and Sons . . . . .	13
M. Bahadur Chand, M.A., LL.B. . . . .	38
Indar Singh . . . . .	10
Het Ram Agarwal, M.B.B.S. . . . .	7
Pandit Amir Chand . . . . .	8
Dr. Beli Ram . . . . .	7
Kartar Singh Khosla . . . . .	25
Chaudhri Shahab-ud-din . . . . .	37
Gulzari Mal, Ram Chand . . . . .	380
Jagan Nath, Wakil . . . . .	15
The Hon'ble Rai Bahadur Ram Saran Das . . . . .	20
Nanak Chand Reis . . . . .	24
Ata Ullah . . . . .	7
Kishen Parshad Spni . . . . .	12
Nand Lal, Ahrtia . . . . .	1,530
Mokand Lal . . . . .	10
Balkishan, Deputy Examiner, Military Accounts . . . . .	10
Gandu Mall, Harji Ram . . . . .	10
Khan Bahadur Mian Siraj-ud-Din . . . . .	38
Ganga Ram, shopkeeper . . . . .	22
Salig Ram, shopkeeper . . . . .	43
Fazal Din, Kharasi . . . . .	100
Ramji Dass . . . . .	7
Sadar Din, Lambardar . . . . .	40
M. N. Mukerjee, Esq. . . . .	12
Kishen Lal . . . . .	18
Rai Bahadur Mul Raj . . . . .	11
Khan Sahib Sardar Shah . . . . .	10
Lala Jaswant Rai . . . . .	17
Khan Bahadur Dr. Amir Shah . . . . .	30
Pandit Rikhi Ram . . . . .	10
Malik Mobarik Ali . . . . .	10
Mian Pir Muhammad-Mohammad Amin . . . . .	10
Abdul Halim . . . . .	12
Syed Wajid Ali Shah . . . . .	20
Nizam-ud-Din . . . . .	50
Malik Din Muhammad . . . . .	15
Zahur Din . . . . .	10
S. Ali Muhammad . . . . .	9
Parma Nand . . . . .	16
Amir and Alla Dad . . . . .	25
Ramzan Ali . . . . .	10
Messrs. Banka Mal, Mool Chand . . . . .	105
Amar Nath, Chopra . . . . .	15
Lala Kashi Ram . . . . .	8
Babu Mathra Das, Gian Chand . . . . .	18
Khan Sahib Muhammad Daim Khan . . . . .	10
Taj-ud-Din . . . . .	8
Radha Lal . . . . .	33
Hidayat Ullah . . . . .	8

Name.	Maunds.
Ram Chandra . . . . .	8
Pandit Thakar Parshad . . . . .	6
M. Fazal Din . . . . .	8
Rai Bahadur Milkhi Ram . . . . .	16
Chaudhri Niamat Khan . . . . .	9
M. Miran Bakhsh . . . . .	8
Tulai Das . . . . .	35
Chaudhri Imam Din . . . . .	10
Nand Lal . . . . .	20
Pandit Nanak Chand . . . . .	16
Bawa Baij Nath . . . . .	22
Pandit Jawaia Parshad . . . . .	6
Messrs. Ishar Das and Brothers . . . . .	35
S. Niaz Ali . . . . .	7
Lalji Das Khannah . . . . .	8
Mahant Hira Singh . . . . .	8
G. R. Kohli . . . . .	10
Kanshi Ram Kapur . . . . .	12
Kake Shah, Jawande Shah . . . . .	32
Pandit Shiv Raj Nath Kaul . . . . .	8
Jawahir Singh, Kalyan Singh . . . . .	13
Brij Lal . . . . .	7
Girdhari Lal . . . . .	7
Devi Ditta Mal . . . . .	12
Wahab Din . . . . .	28
Daulat Ram . . . . .	10

FRANK JOHNSON, Lieut.-Col.,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

## HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

Time—12-00 hours.

Lahore, 7th May 1919.

## No. 39.

WHEREAS my attention has been drawn to the rising price of GRAM,

AND WHEREAS I have reason to believe that certain dealers in the Area under my command are holding secret stores of GRAM, the price of which is thereby artificially inflated;

NOW THEREFORE by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I make the following Order :—

Every trader, banker, bunnia, or other person in the said Area who owns or possesses, directly or indirectly, Gram exceeding 5 maunds in weight, shall render to me in writing (enclosed in an envelope marked "GRAM") by 09-00 hours on the 11th day of May 1919, a Return showing the total quantity of Gram owned or possessed by him.

And so that no person intending to evade this Order may subsequently, when faced with the consequences of such evasion, complain that he was unaware of the procedure to be adopted by me,

I WARN ALL CONCERNED that as soon as possible after the hour named for the rendering of the said Returns, I shall cause them to be published, and at the same time offer substantial rewards for information that will lead to the conviction of any person failing to submit a Return or submitting an inaccurate Return.

And such reward will be paid by the person disobeying this Order, in addition to such other punishment as by virtue of Martial Law, I am empowered to impose.

And I further warn would-be informers of the consequences of giving me false information.

FRANK JOHNSON, Lieut.-Col.,

Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

## HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

Time—13-40 hours.

Lahore, 8th May 1919.

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

No. 40.

WHEREAS representations have been made to me regarding the hardship suffered by the poorer classes of the people owing to the present high prices of cotton cloth;

AND WHEREAS I find that the Cloth Merchants in the Area under my Command with the hope and intention of enriching themselves, have purchased large stocks of cotton goods at high prices, and are now faced with a loss owing to the fall in the price of such goods in the markets of the world;

AND WHEREAS I find such Merchants are naturally opposed to the introduction of cheaper cloths until such time as their present stocks are exhausted;

AND WHEREAS the Government of India, studying the interests of the poorer people, did by the Cotton Cloth Act of 1918, secure a certain percentage of the output of all Cotton Mills in India at a low rate;

AND WHEREAS I find that such cheap cotton cloth known as "Standard" cloth, is not at present available to the people of Lahore;

AND WHEREAS the Director of Civil Supplies, acting for me, has obtained a sufficient quantity of such Standard cloth, and I deem it preferable to persuade the ordinary Cloth Merchants to deal in such cloth rather than open Government shops for that purpose;

Now THEREFORE by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I order the Cloth Merchants named below to stock and sell Standard cloth from 10-00 hours on Tuesday, 13th day of May 1919, at the price of Annas six (6) ~~is~~ nine (9) per yard, a rate which I have satisfied myself will leave a reasonable profit to the seller;

AND, FURTHER, that it shall be deemed a contravention of Martial Law if more than 12 yards are sold to any one purchaser, or if any person, having purchased such cloth from one of the Merchants referred to, resells it.

I FURTHER ORDER each of the said Merchants to report himself, either personally or by representative, to the Textile Assistant to the Director of Industries at the Government Central Weavery, Old Police Lines, Sheranwala Gate, Lahore, between 07-00 and 14-00 hours on Monday, 12th May 1919, with Rs. 493-6-6 in cash with which to purchase and take delivery of one bale containing about 1,368 yards of the said cloth.

*Names and addresses of Merchants selected for the sale of cheap cloth.*

1. Abdul Karim and Sons, Gumti Bazar.
2. Karam Chand and Sons, Gumti Bazar.
3. Shankar Das Ganesh Das, Rang Mahal.
4. Duni Chand Khanna, Rang Mahal.
5. Ram Mal Nika Mal, Kinari Bazar.
6. Dhanpat Rai, son of Gobind Ram, Chouk Tripolia.
7. Shev Dyal and Sons, Bazaz Hatta.
8. Jagan Nath Dawarka Das, Bazaz Hatta.
9. Bashi Ram, Anarkali.
10. Sohawa Mal Gopal Das, Anarkali.
11. Ramji Das and Bros., Anarkali.
12. Ram Dhan Diwan Chand, Anarkali.
13. Middo Mal Durga Das, Commercial Buildings.
14. Brij Lal, son of Borri Mal, Anarkali.
15. Duni Chand and Sons, Commercial Buildings.
16. Bhima Mul and Sons, Commercial Buildings.
17. Sh. Mahboob Ali, The Mall.
18. Sh. Rahmat Ullah, The Mall.
19. Gurdas Mul Panna Lal, Gumti Bazar.
20. Ahmad Bakhsh and Sons, Gumti Bazar.
21. Ballo Mul Behari Lal, Shalmi Bazar.
22. Rattan Chand, son of Ganpat Mal, Kinari Bazar.
23. Narain Das Ram Krishen, Bazaz Hatta.
24. Ram Rakha Tirath Ram, Bazaz Hatta.
25. Thakar Das, son of Kirpa Pam, Kashmiri Bazar.
26. K. P. Thukral & Co., Anarkali.
27. Malava Mal & Co., Anarkali.
28. Shankar Das, son of Bhima Mal, Market.
29. Dakhni Mal, Uttam Chand.

30. General Cloth Stores, Anarkali.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB:

Time—11-10 hours.

Lahore, 9th May 1919.

No. 41.

WHEREAS by Martial Law Order No. 35 of the 5th May 1919, I fixed the maximum retail prices of certain vegetables,

AND WHEREAS I now find that certain of such prices can be still further reduced in the interests of the consumer without being unjust to the producer or seller,

Now, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I Order that after 05-00 hours on Saturday, 10th May 1919, it shall be a contravention of Martial Law to charge or attempt to charge more than the prices set forth below for the following vegetables, viz.:-

	Rs.	A.	P.	
BAINGAN . . . . .	0	1	0	per seer.
BHINDI TORI . . . . .	0	4	0	" "
KARELE . . . . .	0	4	0	" "
ONIONS, dry (other than Karachi) . . . . .	0	0	9	" "
SAG . . . . .	0	0	9	" "
KADU (Pahari) . . . . .	0	0	6	each.

AND WITH THESE EXCEPTIONS all the prices fixed in my said Martial Law Order No. 35 of 5th May 1919 remain in force until further orders.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB:

Time—12-45 hours.

Lahore, 9th May 1919.

No. 42.

WHEREAS THE AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN has seen fit to take certain hostile action against the Government of His Majesty the King-Emperor;

AND WHEREAS I deem it desirable to take steps to ascertain the names and business of all subjects of the said Amir who may be in the Area under my Command:

Now THEREFORE by virtue of the powers vested in me under Martial Law, I make the following Orders:—

- (1) No Afghan subject shall leave the Area under my Command without my written permission.
- (2) Every Afghan subject (except women and children accompanying husbands or parents) now in the Area under my Command shall present himself for registration at the HEAD-QUARTERS of this Area between 09-00 hours to-morrow (Sunday), the 11th day of May 1919, and 17-00 hours on Monday, the 12th day of May 1919.
- (3) From and including Tuesday, the 13th day of May 1919, it shall be an offence against Martial Law for any person to assist in any way an Afghan subject not in possession of a Certificate of Registration signed by me or on my behalf.

AND I FURTHER DECLARE THAT should any person know of the existence of any unregistered Afghan subject in the Area under my Command, and fail to report such knowledge to me immediately, such person shall be deemed



Continued.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

to have contravened Martial Law and be dealt with accordingly.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB:  
Lahore, 10th May 1919.

No. 43.

WHEREAS by Martial Law Order No. 15 of 18th April 1919, I warned all people in the Area under my Command to refrain from spreading false, inaccurate or exaggerated reports or rumours in connection with the military or political situation;

AND WHEREAS I find rumours as false as they are stupid being circulated in the said Area in connection with events now taking place in or on the borders of AFGHANISTAN, I deem it desirable to repeat my warning of 18th April as to the severity of punishment that will be inflicted on any person inventing, repeating or giving currency to false, inaccurate or stupid rumours, particularly in connection with Afghanistan,

AND so that no person shall be able to plead that he must listen to such rumours or remain in ignorance of passing events, I GIVE NOTICE that all *communiqués* issued by the Government contain true and authentic news and all such *communiqués* may be seen in the *Haq*.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB:

Time—16.45 hours.

Lahore, 10th May 1919.

No. 44.

WHEREAS by various Martial Law Orders I ordered certain action to be taken with a view to restraining the seditious activities of the students of certain Colleges:

AND WHEREAS the Principals of some of the Colleges of Lahore have now reported to me that they have inflicted the following punishments, that is to say:—

1.—*Dyal Singh College.*

(a) Expulsion from the College:—

- (i) Kundan Lal . . . Fourth year student.
- (ii) Basti Ram . . . Third year student.
- (iii) Bua Datt . . . Second year student.
- (iv) Sukha Ram . . . Ditto.
- (v) Ram Rattan . . . First year student.
- (vi) Dewan Chand . . . Ditto.
- (vii) Hazari Lal . . . Second year student.

(b) To rusticate for one year:—

- (i) Bansi Lal . . . Fourth year student.
- (ii) Khazan Chand . . . Ditto.
- (iii) Chiragh Din . . . Second year student.
- (iv) Asa Nand . . . Ditto.
- (v) Dharam Singh . . . First year student.

(c) To be put back by one year:—

- (i) Daulat Rai . . . Fourth year student.
- (ii) Gokal Chand . . . Ditto.
- (iii) Mohar Chand . . . First year student.
- (iv) Dina Nath . . . Ditto.
- (v) Purshottam Lal . . . Ditto.
- (vi) Piare Lal . . . Ditto.
- (vii) Balishan . . . Ditto.
- (viii) Guli Chand . . . Ditto.
- (ix) Durga Parshad . . . Ditto.
- (x) Sant Ram . . . Ditto.
- (xi) Salig Ram . . . Ditto.
- (xii) Bhagwan Das . . . Ditto.
- (xiii) Ishar Das . . . Ditto.
- (xiv) Pralhad Chand . . . Ditto.

(d) To be suspended for three months:—

- (i) Shinghar Singh . . . First year student
- (ii) Kidar Ishwar . . . Ditto.
- (iii) Harnam Lal . . . Ditto.
- (iv) Roop Chand . . . Ditto.

(e) To be deprived of their scholarships for three months:—

- (i) Dina Nath . . . First year student.
- (ii) Guli Chand . . . Ditto.

(f) Fined Ra. 20 each:—

- (i) Baij Nath . . . Fourth year student.
- (ii) Kishan Lal . . . Ditto.
- (iii) Ishar Das . . . Ditto.
- (iv) Kishan Chand . . . Ditto.
- (v) Ram Nath Sathi . . . Ditto.
- (vi) Dina Nath . . . Ditto.

(g) Fined Ra. 10 each . . . 210 students.

(h) To find security of Ra. 25 each . . . 245 students.

(i) All students who failed to appear for examination on the 11th April 1919 to be declared to have failed in the subjects of such examination.

2.—*Sanatan Dharma College.*

- (a) To find security of Ra. 20 each . . . 18 students.
- (b) " " " " Ra. 40 each . . . 53 students.
- (c) " " " " Ra. 5 each . . . 7 students.

NOTE.—The students of this College were also interned for a period in the Fort.

3.—*Forman Christian College.*

(a) Expelled:—

- (i) D. D. Chopra . . . Sixth year student.

(b) Rusticated for one year:—

- (i) Manzur Hassan Khan . . . Third year student.
- (ii) Muhammad Hashim Khan . . . Ditto.

(c) Detained for one year and not allowed to live in any hostel belonging to the College:—

- (i) Sher Singh . . . Sixth year student.

(d) Detained for one year:—

- (i) Karam Singh . . . Third year student.
- (ii) Rallia Ram . . . Fourth year student.

(e) Fined Ra. 25 each:—

- (i) Gujjar Mall . . . Fourth year student
- (ii) Balbir Singh . . . Ditto.

(f) Fined Ra. 10 each:—

- (i) Hari Singh . . . Third year student.
- (ii) Munir-ud-Din . . . Ditto.
- (iii) H. R. K. Dogra . . . Ditto.

(g) Every resident of a hostel of the College who did not attend the College on the 11th and 12th April without due reason . . . Fined Ra. 5 each.

4.—*Dayanand Anglo-Vedic College.*

(a) Expulsion (not in future to enter any College of the University):—

- (i) Sita Ram Agarwal . . . Third year student.
- (ii) Gian Chand Sangari . . . Ditto.
- (iii) J. S. Talwar . . . Ditto.
- (iv) Sada Nand . . . Ditto.
- (v) Gurdas Ram Anand . . . Ditto.
- (vi) Som Dutt . . . Ditto.
- (vii) Mela Ram Sehgal . . . Ditto.
- (viii) Ram Nath . . . Ditto.
- (ix) Durga Dutt . . . Ditto.
- (x) Ram Rakha Bawa . . . Ditto.

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

(b) Rustication for one year:—

- (i) Vidya Sagar . . . Third year student.
- (ii) Kundan Lal . . . First year student.
- (iii) Sarv Mittra . . . Third year student.
- (iv) Achint Ram . . . Ditto.
- (v) Chaman Lal . . . First year student.

(c) To be put back one year:—

- (i) Kishori Lal . . . Third year student.
- (ii) Dukh Bhajan Lal . . . Ditto.
- (iii) Hari Kishen . . . Ditto.
- (iv) Jagan Nath Deora . . . Ditto.
- (v) Indar Singh . . . Ditto.
- (vi) Jamna Das . . . Ditto.
- (vii) Bhashambar Nath Basin . . . Ditto.
- (viii) Haveli Ram . . . First year student.
- (ix) Bhagat Ram . . . Ditto.
- (x) Dhunda Mal . . . Ditto.
- (xi) Ganesh Das Dhawan . . . Ditto.
- (xii) Basheshar Nath . . . Ditto.
- (xiii) Munshi Ram . . . Ditto.
- (xiv) Som Dutt Sharma . . . Third year student.
- (xv) Jamna Das . . . Ditto.

(d) Will not be permitted to rejoin the College to prepare for any subsequent examination:—

- (i) Bhim Sen Prashar . . . Second year student.
- (ii) Ram Prashad . . . Ditto.
- (iii) Charan Das . . . Fourth year student.
- (iv) Pindi Das . . . Second year student.
- (v) Abnashi Ram . . . Ditto.
- (vi) Bishan Das, Chopra . . . Fourth year student.

(e) Forfeiture of scholarships and stipends:—

- (i) Gian Chand, Sangari . . . Third year student.
- (ii) Sita Ram, Agarwal . . . Ditto.
- (iii) Haveli Ram . . . First year student.
- (iv) Ram Rakha . . . Ditto.
- (v) Din Dyal . . . Ditto.
- (vi) Ram Chand . . . Third year student.
- (vii) Shiv Prashad . . . Ditto.
- (viii) Ram Karan . . . First year student.
- (ix) Nehari Lal . . . Ditto.
- (x) Khushi Ram . . . Ditto.

(f) To deposit security of Rs. 50 each, 112 students.

(g) To pay fine of Rs. 10 each, 270 students.

AND WHEREAS, considering the aforesaid punishments, although very lenient and merciful, to be sufficient to restrain students in the future from being misled into disloyal and seditious action, I direct that, adequate disciplinary action having thus been taken, all restrictions imposed on certain students by Martial Law Orders No. 7 of 16th April 1919 and No. 16 of 18th April 1919, are cancelled from this date.

But in order, however, to minimise the chances of students being led or leading others astray, I ORDER THAT every student on the roll of a College in Lahore shall not reside, without my written permission, in any other place than in the Area under my Command or his registered home.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB:

Time—06.40 hours.

Lahore, 12th May 1919.

No. 45.

WHEREAS on the 15th day of April 1919, in order to minimise the work of the Troops and Police, and the better to maintain public order and safety in the Area under my Command, by Martial Law Notice No. -1, I forbade certain classes of the inhabitants of the said Area to leave their houses or be in the public streets or roads between 20.00 hours and 05.00 hours daily,

AND WHEREAS by Martial Law Order No. 20 of 21st April, I substituted 21.00 hours for 20.00 hours as laid down in said Martial Law Order No. 1,

AND WHEREAS orders issued by me under Martial Law having been generally obeyed to my satisfaction I am desirous of still further limiting the restrictions I deemed it necessary to impose on the movements of the people during the hours of darkness;

Now, THEREFORE, I order and direct that, subject to the continued good conduct of the people, the hours during which the streets, etc., are closed shall be between 22.00 hours and 05.00 hours, and this alteration shall come into force at 22.00 hours on 13th day of May 1919.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB:

Time—06.40 hours.

Lahore, 12th May 1919.

No. 46.

WHEREAS by Martial Law Orders No. 36 of 5th May 1919 and No. 44 of 12th May 1919, I have caused to be made known the punishments inflicted by the Principals of various Colleges on certain of their students:

Now, THEREFORE, I set forth below details of the punishments which have been inflicted by the Principals of certain other Colleges in the Area under my Command, in order that present and future students may be warned thereby of the certainty with which punishment, imposed in these cases with the utmost mercy, follows participation in disloyal and seditious occurrences:—

1.—Government College.

Expulsion—Not in future to enter any College of the University:—

- (i) Jiwan Lal Gauba . . . First year student.
- (ii) Nand Lal Saighal . . . Second year student.
- (iii) Nand Lal Dhal . . . Ditto.
- (iv) Kartar Singh Bhalla . . . Ditto.
- (v) Jagat Ram Sethi . . . Third year student.
- (vi) Ghazanfar Ali Khan . . . Fourth year student.

(b) Having completed their courses for the examinations will not be taken back afterwards, either for the same examination if they fail, or for a higher one if they pass:—

- (i) Balwant Rai . . . Second year student.
- (ii) Amrit Lal . . . Ditto.
- (iii) Hari Datt . . . Fourth year student.
- (iv) Parkash Chandra . . . Ditto.
- (v) Chuni Lal Nayar . . . Ditto.
- (vi) Kishen Dayal Kapur . . . Ditto.

(c) Rustication for one year:—

- (i) Brahma Vallabh . . . First year student.
- (ii) Jawahir Singh . . . Ditto.
- (iii) Sant Singh . . . Ditto.
- (iv) Kishen Chand . . . Ditto.
- (v) Prahlad Varma . . . Ditto.
- (vi) Mehdi Hassan . . . Ditto.

(d) Forfeiture of scholarship:—

- (i) Bans Raj . . . First year student.
- (ii) Sardari Lal Malhotra . . . Ditto.
- (iii) Viyas Dev . . . Ditto.
- (iv) Rajendar Nath . . . Ditto.
- (v) Muhammad Musa Khan . . . Ditto.
- (vi) Jagat Singh . . . Ditto.
- (vii) Ajodhya Lal . . . Ditto.
- (viii) Arjan Dev . . . Ditto.
- (ix) Des Raj . . . Ditto.
- (x) Nazir Ahmad . . . Ditto.
- (xi) Mohammad Sharif . . . Ditto.
- (xii) Hari Chand . . . Ditto.
- (xiii) Abdul Khaliq . . . Ditto.
- (xiv) Kishen Chand . . . Ditto.
- (xv) Sardari Lal Jain . . . Ditto.

Continued.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

## (e) Forfeiture of half-fee concessions:—

(i) Gopal Das . . . . .	First year student.
(ii) Sardari Lal . . . . .	Ditto.
(iii) Devi Singh Lohre . . . . .	Ditto.
(iv) Hari Chand . . . . .	Ditto.
(v) Bishen Das . . . . .	Ditto.

## 2.—Law College.

## (a) To be put back for one year:—

(i) Guru Das Soni . . . . .	LL.B. Class.
(ii) Ram Rang Trikha . . . . .	Ditto.
(iii) Sada Lal . . . . .	Ditto.
(iv) Brij Lal Syal . . . . .	F. E. L. Class.
(v) Bal Dev . . . . .	Ditto.
(vi) Kanad Dev Sondhi . . . . .	Ditto.
(vii) Ram Saran Sharma . . . . .	Ditto.

(b) Fined Rs. 10 each—38 students, nearly all of the LL.B. Class.

(c) Fined Rs. 5 each—58 students of the LL.B. and F.E.L. Classes.

(d) Fined Rs. 3 each—28 students of the F.E.L. Class.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

## HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB:

Time—11-35 hours.

Lahore, 13th May 1919.

## No. 47.

WHEREAS I published in Martial Law Order No. 38 the Returns rendered to me as to stocks of WHEAT held in the Area under my Command on the morning of the 7th May 1919;

AND WHEREAS certain persons, against whom action has been taken, failed to render their Return by the hour named,

Now, THEREFORE, I publish below the Returns received from those persons:—

Name.	Maunds.
1. Pt. Amar Nath . . . . .	38
2. Ch. Barkat Khan . . . . .	7
3. Lal Singh . . . . .	20
4. M. Rohmat Elahi . . . . .	8
5. Messrs. Mool Chand & Co. . . . .	93
6. Mohan Lal . . . . .	18
7. Mehar Muhammad Din . . . . .	30
8. Kh. Br. Mir Sulaman Shah . . . . .	14
9. Pritam Das . . . . .	7
10. Faiz Ullah . . . . .	7
11. Khurshaid-ud-Din . . . . .	7
12. L. Shiv Dyal . . . . .	20
13. Brij Lal . . . . .	6
14. K. N. Agnihotri and Ch. Pakhar Das . . . . .	25
15. Devi Dyal . . . . .	13
16. Meraj Din . . . . .	25

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

## HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB:

Time—14-30 hours.

Lahore, 14th May 1919.

## No. 48.

In accordance with the notice contained in Martial Law Order No. 39 of 8th May 1919, I publish below the Returns rendered to me as to stocks of Gram held in the Area under my Command:—

Name.	Maunds.
Diwan Ram Lal . . . . .	40
Fazal Ahmad . . . . .	75

Name.	Maunds.
Pt. Jawala Parshad . . . . .	9
Nand Lal . . . . .	9
Baij Nath Bhalla . . . . .	28
Mehta Bahadur Chand . . . . .	48
Brij Lal . . . . .	10
K. S. Chiragh Din . . . . .	16
L. Jaewant Rai . . . . .	6
The Hon'ble R. B. Ram Saran Das . . . . .	12
Gullu Ram . . . . .	9
Nand Lal Puri . . . . .	1,825
Amar Chand and Bros. . . . .	14
Mohan Lal Soth . . . . .	9
Harkishen Das, Tulsi Ram . . . . .	12,506
Ch. Shahab-ud-din . . . . .	41
Kanshi Ram, Khoela . . . . .	11
Shankar Das . . . . .	350
Kesar Mal, Amir Chand . . . . .	30
Nagendra Nath, Mitra . . . . .	64
Khuda Bakhsh Sayan . . . . .	17
R. B. Ganga Ram . . . . .	45
Amar Nath Chopra . . . . .	35
Ghulam Qadir . . . . .	10
C. J. Sahni . . . . .	13
Mehr Chand . . . . .	13
Bawa Baij Nath . . . . .	20
Uttam Chand Kapur . . . . .	145
Ram Sukh Das . . . . .	45
M. Pir Muhammad . . . . .	16
Balkishen . . . . .	8
Dr. A. B. Arora . . . . .	61
Phiraya Mall Manna Mall . . . . .	240
Viroo Mall . . . . .	20
Girdhari Lal . . . . .	6
Raja Narendra Nath . . . . .	6
Damodar Dass Bhajat Ram . . . . .	62
Salo Mal Dhani Ram . . . . .	50
Parma Nand Diwan Chand . . . . .	27
Ram Kishen . . . . .	50
Mullick Girdhari Lal . . . . .	8
Jeeven Lall . . . . .	15
Kaka Mall Ram Narain . . . . .	30
Muhammad Abdulla . . . . .	60
Baluk Ram . . . . .	6
Abdul Halim Khan . . . . .	9
Gurditta Mall . . . . .	1,382
Nikoo Singh, Sunder Singh . . . . .	1,450
Budh Ram, Balmukand . . . . .	1,171
Gulzari Mall, Ram Chand . . . . .	2,102
Ram Lal, Behari Lal . . . . .	50
Kanhya Lal, Gopal Dass . . . . .	10
R. B. L. Milki Ram . . . . .	8
Bishen Das . . . . .	17
Daulat Ram, Har Dyal . . . . .	5,201

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

## HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB:

Time—16-10 hours.

Lahore, 14th May 1919.

## No. 49.

WHEREAS the behaviour of the people in the Area under my Command renders it possible to modify and or annul various Martial Law Orders which from time to time I deemed necessary to issue and impose in the interests of order and public safety;

Now THEREFORE I make the following Orders:—

- (1) Martial Law Orders Nos. 6 and 12 of 16th April 1919 are cancelled from this hour.
- (2) Martial Law Order No. 1 (1) of 15th April 1919 and No. 45 of 12th May 1919 are still further modified so that after 22-00 hours on the 16th May 1919 it shall be lawful to be in the streets and roads at all hours except only those between 22-00 hours and 04-00 hours inclusive.

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

- (3) Martial Law Order No. 1 (4) of 15th April 1919 and Section 9 of proclamation dated 19th April 1919 are so modified that processions and gatherings in connection with *bona fide* religious services, weddings, funerals or circumcision of children, shall be lawful without my written permission, provided always that such processions or gatherings do not exceed 100 persons in all and are not accompanied by any band or music.

IN ANNOUNCING these first relaxations of Martial Law Orders I WARN ALL CONCERNED that this concession must not be misinterpreted as a sign of the weakening of Martial Law, which will still be applied with all swiftness and severity against those engaged in seditious propoganda or in attempting to aid the King's enemies.

AND IN PARTICULAR I WARN TRADERS AND BUNMIAS that I am determined with all the power vested in me under Martial Law, to protect the people in the Area under my Command in the matter of adulteration of foods, or refusing to sell the necessaries of life at the reasonable prices I have fixed or may hereafter fix.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

*Time—11-15 hours.*

*Lahore, 15th May 1919.*

No. 50.

WHEREAS this is the Muhammadan Festival known as SHABRAT when those of that Faith usually visit their Mosques during the hours of the night,

AND BEING DESIROUS that the necessities of Martial Law should inferere as little as possible with the religious exercises of the people in the Area under my Command ;

NOW THEREFORE I give Notice that during to-night, i.e., the night of 15-16th May, Muhammadans wishing to visit their Mosques may do so at any hour without let or hindrance, notwithstanding any Martial Law Orders to the contrary.

BUT NOTHING IN THIS ORDER shall be construed as permitting the opening of the BADSHAHI MASJID (which remains closed pending the receipt of guarantees against its future misuse), nor the use of fireworks, nor does it refer to any other period than the night specified.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

*Time—11-15 hours.*

*Lahore, 15th May 1919.*

No. 51.

WHEREAS a complete list of occupiers or owners of all buildings in the Area under my Command is to be prepared :

Now, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I issue the following orders:—

- (1) The entire Area has been divided into 24 blocks.
- (2) Each block has been put in charge of a separate Patwari to prepare the required list.
- (3) It will be the duty of the Patwari to give 24 hours' previous general notice to the occupiers and owners of the particular part or locality of his block which he proposes to do each day.
- (4) It will be the duty of each occupier or owner of the house or area in the locality about which a general notice has been issued, to be present in person or by proxy at his place, and furnish or cause to be furnished to the

Patwari on his arrival the following information, i.e.,

- (i) His name; occupation and full address.
- (ii) Annual rent of the house or part of the house or of the area occupied by him.
- (iii) If a house or a part of a house or area is occupied by the owner or is occupied free of rent, he will state the annual rental value of the same, having regard to the cost of the building and the rents prevailing in the locality.
- (iv) Furnish any other information necessary for the correct preparation of the required list.

AND I WARN ALL CONCERNED that failure to comply with this Order or to furnish wrong information will result in severe punishment under Martial Law.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

*Time—10-20 hours.*

*Lahore, 17th May 1919.*

No. 52.

WHEREAS by Martial Law Orders No. 35 of 5th May 1919 and No. 41 of 9th May 1919, I fixed the maximum retail prices of certain VEGETABLES,

AND WHEREAS I now find that certain of such prices can be still further reduced in the interests of the consumer without injustice to either producer or seller :

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I order that after 05-00 hours on Monday, 19th 1919, it shall be a contravention of Martial Law to charge or attempt to charge more than the prices set forth below for following Vegetables, viz. :—

Name of Vegetable.	Maximum retail price.	
	Rs.	A. P.
Baingan . . . . .	0 0 6	per seer.
Bhindi Tori . . . . .	0 3 0	" "
Karele . . . . .	0 2 6	" "
Tori (green) . . . . .	0 1 6	" "
Kadu (Ghia) . . . . .	0 0 3	each.
Kadhu (Pahari) . . . . .	0 0 3	" "

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

*Time—12-25 hours.*

*Lahore, 17th May 1919.*

No. 53.

WHEREAS, owing to the misuse of the BADSHAHI MOSQUE by Muhammadans and Hindus as a meeting place for the furtherance of seditious agitation—a misuse which constituted a danger to the peace—I, by virtue not only of the powers conferred on me by Martial Law, but also by the right to deny access to the said mosque vested for ever in the Commandant of Lahore on the 10th day of June 1856 when the said Mosque was, on certain conditions, given back to the Muhammadan community, deemed it necessary to close and did so close and deny access to the said Mosque;

AND WHEREAS I have now received from a Committee of leading Muhammadans satisfactory guarantees and assurances against the future misuse of the said Mosque ;

NOW THEREFORE I ORDER THAT from the date hereof, all Muhammadans shall have access to the said BADSHAHI MASJID without let or hindrance and shall continue

*Continued.]*

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

to have the free and undisturbed use of the said Mosque on the original conditions.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.,*  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB :

*Time—13.45 hours.*  
*Lahore, 20th May 1919.*

No. 54.

WHEREAS it has been brought to my notice that excessive waste of water is taking place, both in the City and Civil Station of Lahore, where owing to the recent disturbances, the Government of the Punjab and many troops have to reside;

AND WHEREAS I have satisfied myself (a) that the four million gallons of water per diem being supplied are more than sufficient for the needs of all, and (b) that the present supply cannot be increased at present;

NOW THEREFORE by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I ORDER THAT after 12.00 hours to-morrow, the 24th day of May 1919; it shall be deemed a contravention of Martial Law for any person or persons to waste or misuse the pipe supply of water.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.,*  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, FALETTI'S HOTEL :

*Time—13.10 hours.*  
*Lahore, 23rd May 1919.*

No. 55.

WHEREAS I have received information that certain persons have insisted in being driven in Tongas retained for Military Service, and in some cases have actually assaulted the drivers who rightly refused to accept such person as "fares,"

AND WHEREAS all such Tongas in Military Service can be readily distinguished by the letter and number painted on the dash-board:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in me under Martial Law, I declare that it shall be a contravention of such Law for any person to induce, by threats, bribes or otherwise, any driver of a Tonga in Military employ to ply for hire or neglect the work which he may be ordered to perform.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.,*  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, FALETTI'S HOTEL :

*Time—14.45 hours.*  
*Lahore, 23rd May 1919.*

No. 56.

WHEREAS the Hindu Festival known as BHADRAKALI takes place on Sunday next, the 25th day of May 1919, when people of the Hindu faith usually gather together for the purpose of worship at the BHADRAKALI TEMPLE in Lahore City:

AND BEING DESIROUS that the necessities of Martial Law should interfere as little as possible with the religious exercises of the people in the Area under my Command;

NOW, THEREFORE, I give Notice that during the night of Sunday next, i.e., the night of the 25th-26th May 1919, the inhabitants of this Area may be out in the streets until 23.00 hours,

BUT NOTHING IN THIS ORDER shall be construed as permitting the use of fireworks, nor does it refer to any other period than the night specified.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.,*  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, FALETTI'S HOTEL :

*Time—07.15 hours.*  
*Lahore 24th May 1919.*

No. 57.

WHEREAS His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor Sir Michael O'Dwyer, K.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., has been pleased to express his wish that any restrictions imposed by the necessities of Martial Law, which might interfere with the religious observances of the people in the Area under my Command, may be reduced to the minimum demanded by the Military situation;

AND WHEREAS the representatives of the Muhammadan community have petitioned me that from the commencement of the RAMZAN the "Curfew" hours may be reduced to from 23.00 hours to 02.30 hours:

NOW THEREFORE, seeing the excellent manner in which all Martial Law Orders have been obeyed in the Area under my Command, I make the following Order, that is to say:—

With effect from 23.00 hours on Tuesday, the 27th day of May 1919, until further Notice, Martial Law Order No. 1 (1) of the 15th April 1919, and all subsequent modifications of such Order, are cancelled, and it shall only be unlawful for the persons referred to in such Orders to be outside their houses or compounds between 23.59 hours (midnight) and 02.00 hours.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.,*  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, FALETTI'S HOTEL :

*Time—07.30 hours.*  
*Lahore, 24th May 1919.*

No. 58.

WHEREAS by Martial Law Order No. 29, dated 25th April 1919, I fixed the maximum retail price of ATTA at 6½ seers per rupee, and by Martial Law Order No. 32, dated 29th April 1919, the maximum retail price of WHEAT at 7½ seers per rupee;

AND WHEREAS the prices of the said commodities have risen since the above mentioned Orders were issued

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I ORDER THAT from and after 14.00 hours on the 30th day of May 1919—

- (a) not less than 6½ (six-and-a-quarter) seers of ATTA shall be supplied for a rupee and
- (b) not less than 7 (seven) seers of WHEAT shall be supplied for a rupee.

AND I WARN ALL CONCERNED that the other provisions of Martial Law Orders Nos. 29 and 32 are still applicable and in force and that any contravention thereof or of this Order will be dealt with summarily under Martial Law.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Col.,*  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, FALETTI'S HOTEL :

*Time—11.51 hours.*  
*Lahore, 28th May 1919.*

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

APPENDIX V.

Lahore (Civil) Area.—Summary of convictions for offences against Martial Law Orders.

No. of Order.	Nature of offence.	No. of convictions.	Imprisonment (Months).	Stripes (Number).	Fines.	Cases dismissed.	REMARKS.
1 (1)	Being in the streets, without permit, during prohibited hours.	66*	5*	334	Rs. 396	29	*Includes one female.
1 (4)	Without a permit, taking part in a procession or gathering of more than 10 persons.	31	...	155	285	...	
1 (5)	Offering violence to a person desirous of opening his business or working.	1	...	6	...	11	
3	Failing to deliver up Motor Cars.	4	...	...	500	2	
4	Travelling on railway in prohibited class without a permit.	1	...	10	...	...	
7	Being a student of the D. A.-V. College, absent from roll call.	2	...	...	75	...	
8	Tearing down or defacing Martial Law Orders.	5	12	60	250	5†	†Includes one girl.
10	Neglecting or refusing to carry on business in Anarkali.	1	...	...	500	...	
11	Found in possession of a lathi.	...	...	...	...	2	
14	Neglecting or refusing to carry on business or work in Civil Area.	8	1	20	145	1	
24	Obstructing the removal of an electric fan	...	...	...	...	1	
26	Being the driver of a public tonga and neglecting to take out a military permit.	3	...	10	10	4	
27	Being a student of the Medical College, absent from roll call.	..	...	...	...	1	
29	Refusing to sell atta	2	...	...	550	...	
30	Referring to British subjects in words calculated to bring contempt, ridicule or dislike on such subjects.	1	3	10	...	...	
31	Refusing to sell, adulterating or over-charging for milk.	51	5	50	2,682	2	
32	Charging more than the authorised price for salt.	...	...	...	...	1	
33	Bribery	8	42	135	10	...	
34	Neglecting to report stocks of wheat.	8	...	...	460	1	
35	Charging more than the authorised price for vegetables.	1	...	...	200	...	
39	Neglecting to report stocks of gram.	1	...	...	500	...	
43	Spreading false reports or rumours	1	3	...	...	1	
55	Inducing or compelling the driver of a tonga in military service to accept a fare.	...	...	...	...	2	
Divisional Commander's No. 5.	Raising or fomenting dissatisfaction amongst His Majesty's subjects.	1	3	10	...	3	
Divisional Commander's No. 11.	Obstructing or impeding a Military or Civil officer in the execution of his duty.	2	...	10	20	...	
Divisional Commander's No. 15. Sialkot's No. 36	Acts to the prejudice of good order or of the public safety.	8	...	6	130	1	
	Travelling to Lyallpur without permission	1	..	..	100	..	
Miscellaneous civil offences.	Travelling by train without a ticket and boarding a train in motion, etc.	1	...	6	...	2	
	TOTAL	208	74	832	6,813	69	

Continued.]

LT.-COL. FRANK JOHNSON.

APPENDIX VI.

Detailed list of convictions and punishments for infringements of Martial Law Orders.

Case No.	Imprisonment (Months).	Lashes (Number).	Fines.	Case No.	Imprisonment (Months).	Lashes (Number).	Fines.
<i>Order No. 1(1)—Being in streets during prohibited hours.</i>				<i>Order No. 1 (1)—Being in streets during prohibited hours—contd.</i>			
			Ra.				Ra.
22	..	..	5	199	...	6	...
40	..	..	2	200	...	6	...
71	..	..	10	203	2	...	...
72	..	15	..	66	5	334	396
73	..	15	..				
74	..	..	10				
75	..	15	..				
76	..	15	..				
77	..	15	..				
78	..	15	..				
79	..	15	..				
80	..	15	..				
81	..	..	10				
82	..	..	10				
83	..	..	10				
84	..	15	..				
85	..	15	..				
86	..	..	10				
87	1	..	..				
88	..	..	200				
89	..	8	..				
90	..	10	..				
91	..	10	..				
92	..	10	..				
93	..	10	..				
94	..	..	5				
96	..	10	..				
97	..	..	15				
98	..	6	..				
101	..	6	..				
103	..	8	..				
104	..	8	..				
105	..	8	..				
109	..	..	15				
110	..	..	5				
111	..	..	5				
118	..	..	3				
120	..	..	2				
121	..	6	..				
122	..	6	..				
123	..	..	5				
124	..	..	10				
125	..	..	5				
126	..	..	1				
127	1	..	..				
151	..	..	5				
152	..	..	5				
154	..	..	5				
182	..	18	..				
183	..	..	10				
184	..	8	..				
185	..	..	5				
186	..	8	..				
187	..	..	10				
188	..	8	..				
189	..	8	..				
190	..	..	5				
191	..	8	..				
192	..	8	..				
193	..	..	5				
194	..	..	5				
197	1	..	..				
198	..	..	3				
				31	...	155	285
				<i>Order No. 1 (4)—Taking part in processions or gatherings.</i>			
				8	...	...	5
				9	...	...	5
				10	...	...	5
				11	...	...	5
				12	...	...	5
				13	...	...	50
				14	...	...	5
				15	...	...	5
				16	...	...	5
				129	...	20	...
				130	...	...	15
				131	...	...	15
				132	...	15	...
				133	...	15	...
				134	...	15	...
				135	...	15	...
				136	...	15	...
				137	...	15	...
				138	...	15	...
				139	...	...	15
				140	...	...	15
				141	...	...	15
				142	...	...	15
				143	...	...	15
				144	...	20	...
				145	...	...	15
				146	...	...	15
				147	...	10	...
				148	...	...	15
				149	...	...	15
				150	...	...	30
				31	...	155	285
				<i>Order No. 1 (5)—Offering violence to persons desirous of working during "Hartal."</i>			
				202	...	6	...
				1	...	6	...
				<i>Order No. 3—Failing to deliver up motor-cars.</i>			
				1	...	...	100
				2	...	...	200
				3	...	...	100
				4	...	...	100
				4	...	...	500

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued,

APPENDIX VI—concluded.

Detailed list of convictions and punishments for infringements of Martial Law Orders—continued.

Case No.	Imprisonment (Months).	Lashes (Number).	Fines.	Case No.	Imprisonment (Months).	Lashes (Number).	Fines.
<i>Order No. 4—Travelling without a pass.</i>				<i>Order No. 30.—Referring to British subjects in words of contempt.</i>			
			Rs.				Rs.
207	...	10	...	208	3	10	..
1	...	10	...	1	3	10	..
<i>Order No. 7—Students absent from Roll Call.</i>				<i>Order No. 31.—Adulterating or refusing to sell milk.</i>			
7	...	...	25	30	..	..	250
29	...	...	50	31	..	..	200
2	...	...	75	32	..	..	250
<i>Order No. 8—Tearing down or defacing Martial Law Orders.</i>				37	..	..	50
6	...	...	250	41	1	20	..
113	...	5	...	42	..	..	25
114	...	5	...	43	..	..	50
195	6	20	...	44	..	..	25
196	6	20	...	45	..	..	25
5	12	50	250	46	..	..	25
<i>Order No. 10—Refusing to carry on business in Anarkali.</i>				47	..	..	50
117	...	...	500	48	..	..	25
1	...	...	500	49	..	..	50
<i>Order No. 14—Refusing to carry on business.</i>				50	..	..	50
5	...	...	5	51	..	..	100
20	...	10	...	52	..	..	50
166	...	...	5	53	..	..	50
167	...	...	30	54	..	..	250
175	...	...	5	55	3	20	..
38	...	10	...	56	..	..	25
115	...	...	100	57	..	..	50
153	1	...	...	58	..	..	25
8	1	20	145	59	..	..	25
<i>Order No. 16—Driving "tonga" without Military License.</i>				60	..	10	100
106	...	...	5	61	..	..	20
107	...	...	5	62	..	..	20
128	...	10	...	63	..	..	20
3	...	10	10	64	..	..	20
<i>Order No. 29—Refusing to sell "Atta."</i>				95	..	..	200
17	..	..	500	102	..	..	100
112	..	..	50	108	..	..	100
2	..	..	550	159	..	..	25
				160	..	..	5
				161	..	..	15
				162	..	..	5
				163	..	..	25
				164	..	..	15
				165	..	..	5
				168	..	..	15
				169	..	..	15
				170	..	..	20
				174	..	..	30
				176	..	..	50
				177	..	..	50
				178	1	..	..
				179	..	..	25
				180	..	..	25
				201	..	..	25
				204	..	..	34
				205	..	..	34
				206	..	..	34
				51	5	50	2,682



Continued.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

## APPENDIX VI—concluded.

Detailed list of convictions and punishments for infringements of Martial Law Orders—concluded.

Case No.	Imprisonment (Months).	Lashes (Number).	Fines.	Case No.	Imprisonment (Months).	Lashes (Number).	Fines.
<i>Order No. 33.—Bribery.</i>				<i>Order No. 5 (1).—Divisional Commander's Proclamation.—Raising dissatisfaction amongst His Majesty's subjects.</i>			
			Rs.				Rs.
39	6	20	..	116	3	10	..
65	6	20	..	1	3	10	..
66	6	20	..	<i>Order No. 11.—Divisional Commander's Proclamation.—Obstructing officer in execution of his duty.</i>			
67	6	20	..	156	..	20	..
68	..	15	..	181	..	..	20
69	6	20	..	2	..	20	20
70	6	20	..	<i>Order No. 15.—Divisional Commander's Proclamation.—Acts to the prejudice of good order.</i>			
155	6	20	10	35	..	..	50
8	42	135	10	36	..	..	25
<i>Order No. 34.—Neglecting to report stocks of wheat.</i>				99	..	..	15
18	..	..	20	100	..	..	10
19	..	..	20	156	..	6	..
21	..	..	60	171	..	..	10
23	..	..	50	172	..	..	10
24	..	..	20	173	..	..	10
25	..	..	20	8	..	6	130
26	..	..	20	<i>Order No. 36.—Sialkot Brigade.—Travelling to Lyallpur without permission.</i>			
27	..	..	250	160	..	..	100
8	..	..	460	1	..	..	100
<i>Order No. 35.—Charging more than authorized price for vegetables.</i>				<i>Miscellaneous Civil Offences.—Travelling by train without ticket.</i>			
28	..	..	200	158	..	6	..
1	..	..	200	1	..	6	..
<i>Order No. 39.—Neglecting to report stocks of gram.</i>				<i>Order No. 43.—Spreading false rumours.</i>			
34	..	..	500	33	3	..	..
1	..	..	500	1	3	..	..

NOTE.—Details of each case in this appendix are filed with the Punjab Government.

## APPENDIX VII.

Details and Averages of Punishments.

Martial Law Order under which charged.	Nature of offence.	IMPRISONMENT.		LASHES.		FINES.		AVERAGE.			REMARKS.
		Persons.	Months.	Persons.	Stripes.	Persons.	Rupees.	Imprisonment.	Stripes.	Fine.	
1 (1)	Being in the streets, without permit, during prohibited hours.	4	5	32	334	30	308	1-2	10-4	Rs. 12-2	
1 (4)	Without a permit, taking part in a procession or gathering of more than 10 persons.	..	..	10	155	21	285	..	15-5	13-6	

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

APPENDIX VII—contd.

Details and Averages of Punishments—contd.

Martial Law Order under which charged.	Nature of offence.	IMPRISONMENT.		LASHES.		FINES.		AVERAGE.			REMARKS.
		Persons.	Months.	Persons.	Stripes.	Persons.	Rupees.	Imprisonment.	Stripes.	Fine.	
1 (5)	Offering violence to a person desirous of opening his business or working.	..	..	1	6	..	..	..	6-0	..	
3	Failing to deliver up Motor-Cars.	..	..	..	..	4	500	..	..	125-0	
4	Travelling on Railway in prohibited class without a permit.	..	..	1	10	..	..	..	10-0	..	
7	Being a student of D. A. V. College absent from Roll-Call.	..	..	..	..	2	75	..	..	37-5	
8	Tearing down or defacing Martial Law Orders.	2	12	4	60	1	250	6-0	15-0	250-0	Two persons received both imprisonment and stripes.
10	Neglecting or refusing to carry on business in Anarkali.	..	..	..	..	1	500	..	..	500	
14	Neglecting or refusing to carry on business or work in Civil Area.	1	1	2	20	5	145	1-0	10-0	29-0	
26	Being the driver of a public tonga and neglecting to take out a Military permit.	..	..	1	10	2	10	..	10-0	5-0	
29	Refusing to sell attas	..	..	..	..	2	550	..	..	275-0	
30	Referring to British subjects in words calculated to bring contempt, ridicule or dislike on such subjects.	1	3	1	10	..	..	3-0	10-0	..	Same person.
31	Refusing to sell, adulterating or overcharging for milk.	3	5	3	50	43	2,682	1-06	16-66	55-8	2 persons received both imprisonment and stripes. 1 person received both stripes and fine.
31	Bribery	7	42	7	135	1	10	6-0	19-8	10-0	6 persons received both imprisonment and stripes. 1 person received stripes, imprisonment and fine.
34	Neglecting to report stocks of wheat	..	..	..	..	8	460	..	..	57-5	
35	Charging more than the authorized price for vegetables.	..	..	..	..	1	200	..	..	200	
39	Neglecting to report stocks of gram.	..	..	..	..	1	500	..	..	500	
43	Spreading false reports or rumours.	1	3	..	..	..	..	3-0	..	..	
Divisional Commander's No. 5.	Raising or fomenting dissatisfaction amongst His Majesty's subjects.	1	3	1	10	..	..	3-0	10-0	..	Same person.
Divisional Commander's No. 11.	Obstructing or impeding a military or civil officer in the execution of his duties.	..	..	1	20	1	20	..	20	20	
Divisional Commander's No. 15.	Acts to the prejudice of good order or of the public safety.	..	..	1	6	7	130	..	6	18-5	
Slalkot No. 34	Travelling to Lyallpur without permission	..	..	..	..	1	100	..	..	100	
Miscellaneous	Travelling by train without a ticket and boarding a train in motion, etc.	..	..	1	6	..	..	..	6	..	
TOTAL		20	74	66	832	136	6,813	3-7	12-6	50-1	

NOTE.—The above gives a total of 222 convictions, but in 14 cases two or more forms of punishments were awarded—leaving the number of persons convicted—308.

Continued.]

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON

## APPENDIX VIII.

Extract from Report on certain permanent defensive works in Lahore (Civil) Area.

Confidential, dated Nowshera, 19th June 1919, from Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Johnson, D.S.O., Royal Sussex Regiment, late Commanding, Lahore Civil Area, to Head-Quarters, 16th (Indian) Division, Nowshera.

18. I continued to command this area and administer Martial Law within it from 15th April until relieved on 29th May on being ordered on service. A report on this period, however, is not specifically called for, so it need not be referred to beyond saying that as a result of being in very close touch with all classes of the community and having a detailed knowledge of all the events during and immediately preceding this period, I was forced to certain conclusions, an appreciation which decided me to immediately undertake certain defensive measures, to reduce in future the dangers run by the European community between say, 6th and 13th April.

19. The conclusions at which I arrived were briefly these:—

- (1) That the root trouble of the rising was not political but frankly national and anti-British, a condition not likely to be permanently remedied by any political "reforms" no matter of how wide reaching a nature they may be.
- (2) That these anti-British outbreaks are fanned into flame and made possible by (a) reckless and unblushing lies, misrepresentations and false suggestions spread broadcast by what, I fear, must be admitted to be the majority of the educated classes of leaders of Indian opinion, and (b) the colossal ignorance and unbelievable credulity of the uneducated masses of the people, who are but the tools of the educated seditious agitator and the still more dangerous, influential but unseen men behind these risings.
- (3) That but for the accident of the Telegraph Office being occupied by troops in the nick of time, and for the firmness and initiative of the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Fyson, at a very critical moment, in ordering the police to fire, Lahore on the 10th of April would have witnessed scenes much more reminiscent of the worst of those of 1857 than of those which took place earlier in the day in Amritsar.
- (4) That other outbreaks are bound to take place in the future, are likely to be at shorter intervals and are certain to be better organized, to represent an improved *bandobast* and so are sure of being of an even more serious nature.
- (5) That, as secrecy may be looked upon as the factor most likely to be relied on for success of such anti-British risings, the time at the disposal of the authorities in which to make defensive arrangements is likely to be even less in future than it was on the recent occasion.

20. In the face of these conclusions and in view of the Afghan menace and the possibility of more trouble in connection with the peace terms with Turkey, I deemed it only wise to take in hand preparations of a more permanent nature for the defence of the vital public services in the area then under my command, viz., the water-supply, lighting and power, and communications.

21. The water-supply consists of two parts:—

- (a) The source of origin—a number of tube-wells with a pumping station at Badami Bagh to the north-east of the city; with

- (b) high-level reservoir tanks, almost in the heart of the City. It must be remembered that whereas the Civil Station is entirely dependent on this source of supply, the mass of the Indian population in the City is much less on account of the number of old wells still in use.

In common with all the buildings at these vital points the pumping station has been erected without any regard to its defensive qualities, the delicate machinery being sited so close to the public thoroughfare that a passerby could easily throw a bomb amongst it and put it out of action indefinitely.

By the reconstruction and loopholing of some existing walls, the erection of others, and the provision of wire entanglements, the pumping station could now be held by say, 40 men against a very large and determined mob, even if it included a percentage of modern rifles, a contingency which, I think, must be faced, sooner or later.

The reservoir or "tanks" in the city is important, not only in connection with the water-supply but as a tactical point very nearly in the heart of the city. Its occupation in times of trouble by British troops prevents the city from passing completely into the hands of the mob and is the one suitable *pied à terre* in the city where troops can be stationed in comparative comfort and whence patrols can be despatched.

The building forms a square of about 80 yards with thick brick walls surrounding four large steel tanks, surmounted by a flat roof about 30 feet above the ground level.

The roof is commanded by higher buildings on three sides and would be untenable against rioters possessing even a few rifles.

I have had permanent stages fitted at all four corners seven feet below the roof and loopholes,—sited as alternately to cover both the roofs of houses opposite and the streets below. Permanent flank defences, and steel doors and windows, where necessary, have rendered this reservoir building impregnable if held by a minimum of 30 men with 1 M. and L. gun and a good stock of hand grenades, against any enemy without artillery.

22. The Electric Power Station in Macleod Road was another "vital" point that, commanded from all directions, was extremely difficult to defend, if attacked by a determined mob, even without rifles, and untenable immediately an attack was supported by rifle fire from adjacent roofs.

In order to protect fire positions from reverse and enfilade fire a good deal of brick work was necessary in the form of *parados* and traverses.

Flank defences have been arranged for and the station is now practically surrounded by unscalable walls.

I would rather undertake its defence now with 30 men and 1 M. and L. gun than with 200 troops before these works were carried out.

23. The Telegraph Office buildings are arranged roughly on the outsides of three sides of the large parallelogram which forms its compound. It would seem to be almost impossible to have devised a "lay out" more difficult to defend under any circumstances. Three sides, including the "danger" or city side, are now surrounded by a 12 foot wall suitably loopholed, to ensure a maximum fire power at the points most likely to be attacked with the necessary *cajoniers* fitted with M. and L. gun positions for enfilade fire.

The fourth side, that facing the Civil Station, has no continuous wall, but with steel doors on the battery and power house, a protected fire position on the roof of its verandah, provision for heavy flanking fire, and an entanglement to keep any attackers outside bombing distance, is, I think, rendered quite secure without the necessity of shutting out the prevailing breeze from the compound.

Owing to the height of the Bank of Bengal and other commanding buildings, very high *parados* have been necessitated on the southern side.

Lt.-Col. FRANK JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

To deny cover to an attacking force the walls around the Convent Chapel at the north-east corner of the Telegraph compound, and at the west side of Patiala House old compound, should be replaced by a post and wire fence; a short piece of wall around a private bungalow between these two properties should be similarly treated.

24. The above completes the report on the actual defensive measures undertaken by me. But for my sudden departure I should have submitted detailed plans and drawings of all these works with the suggestions that they should be reproduced in order that in an emergency an officer being sent to the defence of one of these vital points—perhaps in the dark—might have some idea of how best to distribute his force for the defence of the position. Plans of the Telegraph Office work could be furnished by Mr. Cargill of the Public Works Department; of the Electric Power Station by its General Manager; and of the pumping station and reservoir by Mr. Henderson, the Municipal Engineer. To all these officers I should like to place on record my acknowledgments for the zeal, skill and initiative they displayed in carrying out my designs, and for some improvements suggested by them.

25. At the request of Major General Sir William Beynon, K.C.I.E., C.B., D.S.O., and of His Honour Sir Michael O'Dwyer, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., etc., I gave careful consideration to the defence of Government House, which it is now clear is automatically looked upon by civil population as their rallying post on the outbreak of danger. I have already submitted to the Hon'ble the Chief Secretary of the Punjab my reports and detailed plans, involving an expenditure of some Rs. 40,000.

In my opinion, until this work is carried out at Government House, the lives of the European inhabitants of the Civil Station cannot be considered as adequately protected.

26. I think that a study of the ground shows the following to be the natural "line of resistance" that would be held by any Commander responsible for the defence of Lahore against trouble from the city, viz., from Railway Junction Station on the right, along McLeod Road to Telegraph Office, thence *via* Bank of Bengal, the Market, Town Hall, Roberts Club (all inclusive) to the Secretariat.

By a limited amount of work much could be done to permanently strengthen such a line by improving the cover and field of fire to the defenders and at the same time denying these things as far as possible to forces approaching the Civil Station from the city.

Had time permitted I proposed to have undertaken this work; assuming its completion I would suggest that, just as there is a "Fort Area" on which no buildings can be erected without the approval of the military authorities, so this line should be regarded as of military importance and the erection of buildings, etc., forbidden which might either weaken its defence or lend assistance to an attacking force.

APPENDIX IX.

Lahore (Civil) Command—Martial Law Instruction No. 2.

Memorandum to Officers Commanding Units and Detachments, Police Officers and Magistrates.

(1) In order to prevent the occurrence of regrettable incidents, it must be clearly understood that the existence of Martial Law neither necessitates nor justifies the committal of excesses either in—

- (a) the maintenance of order;
- (b) in enforcing obedience to Martial Law Regulations, nor
- (c) in the infliction of punishment.

(2) The guiding principle to be borne in mind is that the force required in (a) and (b) and the ensuing punishment should never exceed the necessities of the case.

(3) The punishment of whipping in particular, whilst probably the most efficacious and convenient method of summarily dealing with most minor breaches of Martial Law Regulations, requires tact and commonsense in its infliction. Under no circumstances should old or feeble men be flogged, and the social status of the offender also needs consideration.

(4) It cannot be too clearly impressed on all ranks that the temporary supersession of the ordinary process of Civil Law by the introduction of Martial Law, does not mean that justice ceases to be administered; on the contrary, the suspension of the usual safeguards makes it doubly imperative that all concerned should bear in mind that it is "up to them" to see that Justice, and not irresponsible violence, is administered.

(5) When in any case Officers or Magistrates acting on my behalf are doubtful as to the suitable punishment to be inflicted, the case can always be remanded and the question referred to me. In nearly all cases this can be done by telephone, obviating any delay.

(6) Nothing in the above is to be read as weakening the hands of those responsible for strictly maintaining good order and enforcing Martial Law Regulations.

FRANK JOHNSON, *Lieut.-Colonel,*  
*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, PUNJAB CLUB:

Time—08 00 hours.

Lahore, 18th April 1919.

APPENDIX X.

Notice.

"Mr. Shaukat Ali ki jai."

"Mahatma Gandhi ki jai."

"DANDA ARHAR."

*First event.*—When Mahatma Gandhi arrived at Palwal, the English monkey informed him that his entry into the Punjab was forbidden, and that he should please go back. He replied that he would never go back; then that pig monkey arrested him. Reports of his arrest reached here at once.

*Second event.*—When the news reached Amritsar, the *Danda Fauj* (army) of the brave Sikhs set fire to the Bank, the Railway Station and Electric Power House. They cut the telegraph wires and removed the railway line. The *Danda Fauj* (army) of Amritsar bravely killed a number of European monkeys and their Sikh Regiments have revolted and deserted. O Hindu, Muhammadan and Sikh brethren, enlist at once in the *Danda Army*, and fight with bravery against the English monkeys. God will grant you Victory. Do not apprehend that God does not help us. Cast away such a notion out of your heart. God helps us at all times and hours. Conquer the English monkeys with bravery. God will grant Victory. Leave off dealings with the Englishmen, close offices and workshops. Fight on! This is the command of Mahatma Gandhi.

*Third event.*—O Hindu, Muhammadan and Sikh brethren, do you know of the incident that took place at the Mall Road on the night of the 10th April? The Hindus and Muhammadans who were martyred that day were your own and they sacrificed their lives. Does not this incident excite you? What is the reason? Were not those who were made martyrs in Hira Mandi on the 12th April your own brethren, and died at the hands of the tyrants? Does the Prophet of God command you not to fight against the tyrant? No, never,

LT.-COL. FRANK JOHNSON—concluded—Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

the Prophet himself fought, and has commanded us too to destroy the tyrants as he did. Should we not be ashamed of ourselves that while the tyrant is up to all sorts of cruelty, we are sitting quiet? O Hindu, Muhammadan and Sikh brethren, raise the cry of *Allah-u Akbar* and kill the *Kafra*. Get ready soon for the war and God will grant Victory to India very soon.

Fight with enthusiasm and enlist yourselves in the Danda Army.

Signatures to the notice:—

Servants of the Nation,

DANDA ARJUN.

Hindus, Muhammadans and Sikhs.

#### APPENDIX XI.

##### Strength of Troops and Police in Lahore (Civil) Area.

Date.	British Troops.	Indian Troops.	Armed Police.	Armoured Cars.	Unarmed Police.	Indian Defence Force.	Total all ranks.*	REMARKS.
15th April 1919	406	381	460	3	800	250	2,297	* Excludes personnel of armoured car.
30th April 1919	1,085	339	445	3	800	250	2,919	
15th May 1919	733	125	280	2	800	250	2,188	
29th May 1919	209	517	280	3	800	250	2,056	

#### Mr. E. P. BROADWAY, Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore.

Towards the close of March last in connection with the agitation concerning the "Rowlatt" Act a general "hartal" was organized here for Sunday, 30th March, but was postponed at the last moment to Sunday the 6th April.

The idea was that the people should fast from Saturday night till Sunday night, close all shops and suspend all business of every kind. On Sunday evening there was to be a mass meeting in the Bradlaugh Hall to protest against the Act. Trouble having occurred at Delhi on the 30th March, it was necessary to make special arrangements to prevent similar trouble here.

On the 3rd April, I issued notices (copy attached)\* under section 30 of the Police Act indicating that no meetings or processions should be held in the Public streets without a proper license, and requiring intending promoters of any such meeting or procession to apply to me for licenses not later than 10 A.M. on the day previous to that for which the license was required. These notices were prepared and issued in consultation with the Deputy Commissioner and Deputy Inspector-General. They were sent to all the newspapers, English and Vernacular, to the organizers of the meeting and their known sympathizers by name posted at the City gates, in fact made as widely known as possible.

No applications for licenses were however received at all. At 10 A.M. on Friday morning, the 4th April 1919, the Deputy Commissioner held a meeting of all the Municipal Commissioners of Lahore in his office. I was present at the meeting and the Municipal Commissioners were reminded of their responsibilities and duties and asked to look after their wards, and see that no coercion was used to compel people to suspend business and close shops. I may as well dispose of them here by mentioning that their efforts were unsuccessful and the "hartal" was complete and general throughout the City and Anarkali.

To return to Friday, at 11-30 A.M. I accompanied the Deputy Commissioner, Deputy Inspector-General, Lahore, Deputy Inspector-General, Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab, Lahore, to Cantonments where a meeting had been arranged and was held in the Divisional Office with the General and Brigadier-General and their Staff Officers. A route march of troops through Lahore was arranged by the General for Saturday

morning. It was further arranged that a hundred British Infantry should march through Lahore via Gol Bagh to the Fort on Saturday evening, and should remain in the Fort till Monday morning. Lorries were provided for this detachment in order to convey them quickly from the Fort to any threatened point, should they be required. I may mention here, that this force was never called out. We asked for a squadron of cavalry to be posted at the Gol Bagh and two armoured cars at the Kacheri for use in case of need. It was also suggested that the Indian Defence Force units be warned to look after their armouries.

Eventually the arrangements actually ordered by the General were as follows, excluding the arrangements at the Fort above-mentioned which of course took effect from Saturday night—

One squadron, 114 strong, of lancers to be at the Gol Bagh at 6-30 A.M. on Sunday and bivouac there all day ready to assist if required.

Two armoured cars to be at the High Court and two at the Deputy Commissioner's Kacheri at 6-30 A.M. on Sunday and to remain all day to assist if required.

These were the only armed military forces that I am aware of, but signal and medical units were also sent in the ordinary course.

In addition the P. L. Horse were asked to have 20 troopers on duty to look after their Headquarters and Punjab Rifles were asked to have 50 men to look after their armoury at their Headquarters, and the North-Western Railway were similarly ordered to mount a guard of 50 men at the Railway Station to guard their armoury, etc. I may note here that these Indian Defence Force Units were not moved from their posts throughout the day.

About 4 P.M. the Deputy Commissioner held a meeting to which the leading agitators and organizers of the proposed "hartal" had been summoned. I attended the meeting and both Deputy Commissioner and I pointed out to the gentlemen present the danger of exciting the people, throwing them out on the streets by "hartal" and collecting them at the Bradlaugh Hall to hear fiery speeches. We repeatedly pointed out that they were stirring up forces they might not be able to control and that their responsibility was very great. We asked them not to provoke a "hartal" but if they must do so, at least to see that it was purely voluntary and that

\* Vide Annexure A, page 317.

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

no sort of pressure was put on any one who did not wish to observe "hartal." We also asked them to keep in touch with us, explaining that we should be found all day at Deputy Commissioner's office. That the situation on Sunday would be one of great danger to the public peace was obvious, and most careful police arrangements were made to meet it.

A statement showing my orders and dispositions in detail is attached.\* The idea was to hold a line roughly dividing the town from the civil station, i.e., from the railway station, down McLeod road to the Telegraph Office, along the Mall, to the District Courts.

Armed pickets and reserves were all commanded by carefully selected officers to whom I personally explained their duties and responsibilities.

With my remaining officers, I made my headquarters with the Deputy Commissioner at his office. This was the nearest point to the Bradlaugh Hall and here I had my largest armed reserve.

All detachments, Police and Military, were in their places by 6-30 A.M. I remained in the closest touch with the Deputy Commissioner throughout the day and maintained touch with my pickets and reserves by means of the telephone, mounted and foot messengers, and personal visits by motor car. Up to about 11 A.M. all was reported quiet. I heard that there had been a gathering of students by the river but that it was breaking up and parties dispersing and returning to town peacefully and quietly. It appears that these parties entered the City and environs by different gates and roads, and swelled to large mobs as they proceeded towards the Circular road which passes along by the Mochi, Shalmi, Lohari, etc., gates. The City Inspector patrolling along the Circular road entered the Mochi gate to find a large mob coming down and was indeed at once engulfed in it as people were pouring in to join the mob from all side streets, houses, etc. He came along with the mob out of Mochi gate on to the Circular road exhorting them to disperse. Here they made as though to turn to the east towards the railway station, but the City Inspector begged them to turn back, pointing out that the Bradlaugh Hall was in the other direction. Whether they seriously intended going eastward or not it is impossible to say, but they then turned westwards. Crowds were pouring out of all the city gates to join this procession, and from Anarkali and all other directions so that it was growing every moment. The Inspector was involved in the crowd and had difficulty in getting clear of it.

Eventually he got clear and turning down a side street galloped to the Kacheri where he reported the state of affairs about 11-30 A.M., stating that the crowd had hitherto been quite orderly as far as abstaining from any form of mischief was concerned, but was greatly excited and would be difficult to stop. He was sent back and Deputy Commissioner and I at once prepared to meet them. As we rode through Market Chouk we saw the road clear to Nila Gumbaz Chouk where the crowd was pouring eastward toward King Edward's Square. We therefore rode hurriedly on to the Y. M. C. A. Chouk where we saw the huge procession coming down towards the Mall. The crowd was then nearly opposite Mool Chand's shop. Mr. Clarke, Deputy Superintendent of Police and Inspector Khan Sahib Abdul Ghani Khan had been swept along with them and were endeavouring to induce them to go back. Deputy Commissioner and I immediately came up the road to the head of the mob with our few police sowars. There we parleyed with them for some time urging them to go back. Meanwhile, the Cavalry and armoured cars had moved up and blocked the mouth of the road into the Mall behind us. This excellent and timely move was I am sure of great value to Deputy Commissioner and myself, and enabled us to keep the mob at least stationary until Dr. Gokal Chand Naurang arrived. He was on foot however and could not be seen by more than a few in the front ranks. He then appealed to

me for a horse and I put him on a Police sowar's animal. Thus mounted, he was able eventually to turn the whole crowd back and head them for the Gol Bagh and Bradlaugh Hall. The street was soon clear and what had looked an ugly situation was saved. The Deputy Commissioner and I then returned to the Mall and proceeded to Market Chouk where we found another mob being held and turned back in the bit of Anarkali Bazaar between the Market Chouk and Nila Gumbaz by Mr. Donald, Mr. Cocks, Mr. Stead and other officers and some constables. Deputy Commissioner and I at once joined them. A few of the Cavalry were lined up behind the police by the way of support. Dr. Gokal Chand Naurang again appeared and led this mob off also to Bradlaugh Hall. This affair had lasted about 2 hours.

After these incidents there was no more trouble. A huge crowd collected in and around Bradlaugh Hall from 2 P.M. and lecturers were put up to speak to keep them quiet there. Dr. Gokal Chand and Lala Duni Chand came to see me at the Kacheri after 2 P.M. and I arranged with them to see that the crowd were not further excited by heated speeches at the meeting, fixed certain limits beyond which any impromptuous procession of students returning from the meeting must not go, arranged for the reception, accommodation and proper treatment of the C. I. D. Officers who were to attend the meeting, and last but by no means least obtained an undertaking from them that the meeting would close by 6 P.M. to allow of the crowds dispersing and returning to their homes well before dark.

Fresh dispositions were made to meet eventualities after the Bradlaugh Hall meeting but no processions were attempted and no trouble occurred. The people dispersed to the City but I heard next day that mobs had paraded the streets till a late hour uttering their cries of "hai, hai," etc., abusing Municipal Commissioners and Honorary Magistrates who had stood out on the Government side and burning copies of the Rowlatt Act. On the 7th instant shops opened as usual and normal conditions appeared to have been re-established for the next three days though I heard of ill-feeling continuing against those of the local gentry who had acted with us.

On the 9th the usual license was given for the *Ram Naumi* celebration and police arrangements were made.

During the day I was informed that as there was much ill-feeling against some Honorary Magistrates it would be better if they did not attend and I asked Deputy Commissioner to put on certain Extra Assistant Commissioners which he did.

I was informed next day that the celebration took on more of the character of a political demonstration than the purely religious procession it had always been.

A great show of Hindu-Muslim unity was made and shouts of *Jai* for leaders and for unity were frequent.

On the 10th afternoon I went out with the Inspector-General to Cantonments as news of trouble at Amritsar had come in, to arrange for military assistance, which was promised by 6-30 P.M.

On my return I made certain Police arrangements.

At about 5-30 P.M. I received information that the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest and of the trouble at Amritsar having got known a "hartal" was commencing. I issued supplementary orders telephoning them to my lines and Police Stations. I then proceeded to my house where I found Mr. Fyson, Deputy Commissioner, who informed me that His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor desired to see me. We proceeded to Government House where His Honour enquired what Police and Military arrangements had been made to guard against trouble. Mr. Cocks, Deputy Inspector-General, C. I. D., Punjab, was also present. A telephone message came in that a big crowd had formed. Mr. Fyson and Mr. Cocks proceeded by car down the Mall. I motored to my lines to turn out my reserve, which I had ordered to be kept in readiness there. I found them ready,

\* File Annexures B and C, pages 317 et seq.

Continued.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

fallen in, and despatched armed parties down the McLeod road and Montgomery road to the Mall to rendezvous at the Telegraph Office.

I mounted one of my sowar's horses and with the remaining dozen mounted men proceeded quickly down Montgomery road on to the Mall. We heard firing on the Mall on leaving the lines. At Charing Cross we ran into the Cavalry who were just arriving from Cantonments. I joined the officer in command and we hastened on. Opposite the Telegraph Office, I found Mr. Cocks who informed me that they had had to fire to drive back the mob and that Mr. Clarke, Deputy Superintendent of Police, had gone on, pushing them back to the City. I was told that he had very few men and fearing he might get into difficulties immediately proceeded with my sowars, a few cavalry troopers under a British Officer (Lieutenant Wilson, I believe) and an armed party of foot-police to his assistance.

Before we got about half-way, however, hearing an uproar, I left the foot police and pushed forward rapidly with the mounted force. We found Mr. Clarke in Anarkali Bazar just beyond Nila Gumbaz Chauk, with a handful of Police Constables trying to push back the mob.

Eventually we succeeded in pushing them back nearly to the end of Anarkali Bazar, but there we were stopped the crowd having swelled to huge proportions and formed into a compact mass. They would not give way or disperse and began stoning us. I sent a mounted man back with a note to Mr. Fyson to come up at once with reinforcements. For about three-quarters of an hour we remained there being stoned from in front and from the roofs to our left and right front, being occasionally pushed back a few yards and again pushing forward. We were all hit with brick bats, etc., including the Cavalry Officer. I was hit five or six times—once rather severely on my right shoulder blade, apparently by a brick from one of the house tops. My left hand and thigh were also out—people on some low roofs to our left front in particular were so troublesome that two or three rounds of buck-shot were fired in their direction which eased the situation. Some crackers were thrown by the crowd and for a moment we thought they had secured firearms. A torch on a long pole was put up to the electric supply wires apparently with the object of cutting off the electric light.

A few persons in the crowd seemed to be endeavouring to get them to disperse. Among them was Chaudhri Ram Bhaj Dutt, who asked for a horse which I gave him but which he found unmanageable owing to the uproar. I repeatedly warned the crowd that they must disperse or they would be fired on but they kept up a deafening clamour, shouting and jumping and would listen neither to us nor to Chaudhri Ram Bhaj Dutt. A few more armed foot constables had come up.

Eventually Mr. Fyson arrived with reinforcements. He went forward and ordered the mob to disperse, warning them that we should have to fire. He was stoned. Chaudhri Ram Bhaj Dutt asked for time and Mr. Fyson gave him a few minutes, but the crowd would listen to no one and defied all orders. Mr. Fyson then gave me instructions to fire. I ordered my men to fire with buck-shot. Five or six shots were fired and the crowd broke. I immediately ordered cease fire.

We then moved up on to Circular road. I posted a picket of foot police there and proceeded with the mounted force along the Circular road eastwards. There was some desultory stone throwing as we started eastward. We cleared the street and adjoining gardens, the crowd dispersing rapidly into the City. We went almost up to the Akbari Gate. From there I sent Mr. Clarke on with the mounted police to patrol up to Delhi Gate, down the Landa Bazar and McLeod road and report to me at the Telegraph Office. Mr. Fyson and I turned back the way we had come with the Cavalry, and arrived at the Telegraph Office without incident.

Mr. Clarke on his arrival there reported having assisted to disperse a mob in Landa Bazar which had attacked Mr. de Gale, Assistant Superintendent of Police. This

mob did some slight damage to municipal property—broke a lamp or two. The Deputy Commissioner and I took our quarters in the Telegraph Office (where we remained some weeks).

The next day, the 11th April, I was receiving reports all day from my officers and others indicating that the City was in a state of rebellion. The "hartal" continued. It was stated that a committee had been appointed to manage the City, to decide as to "hartal" and whether Government servants should attend their offices, and so forth.

A "Danda Fauj" had been formed by one Channan Din, which went about the City creating great enthusiasm. A mass meeting was held in the Badshahi Mosque in which Hindus joined and there was much excitement and display of the unity. Ram Bhaj Dutt and others addressed the crowd and advised them to stand firm. One Balwant Singh came there and gave out that the Indian troops had mutinied in Cantonments and killed two hundred of the British—that they were coming to their help—that he had himself killed six soldiers. He was carried round in triumph.

In the evening it was decided to march a column of troops and police through the City next morning, and establish pickets to regain control and restore law and order. General Clarke visited me late at night and marked on the map the places where I advised police pickets should be posted. There were to be five police pickets of 28 rank and file each, viz., at Old Kotwali at Bazaz Hatta, at Lakar Mandi, at Lohari Mandi and at Haveli Nawab Sahib. Military pickets were also to be established and a few police men posted with each. The column was formed at the Railway Chauk next morning 12th April at 9-30 A.M. and marched via the Landa Bazar, Delhi Gate, Water Works, Hira Mandi Lakar Mandi and out at Bhati Gate.

The people were sullen and hostile. Remarks were heard that they would not open shops till the Act was cancelled. I saw a man at the Water Works raise his hand threateningly against a British Officer. I heard of the attack on a Criminal Investigation Department Inspector in the Badshahi Mosque that morning. At Hira Mandi, there were large crowds—many armed with sticks—people armed with sticks were coming to or from the mosque. It was said that the mosque was full of people, and it was apparent that it was the centre of disaffection. The Criminal Investigation Department Inspector had been assaulted there. There were crowds between the Hira Mandi and the mosque—attempts were made to disperse the crowds and many warnings were given. They would not disperse but formed elsewhere as soon as they were moved on from one place. It was decided to clear the Badshahi Mosque. This was done by a Muhammadan Magistrate and the gates picketed to prevent re-entry. Crowds came out and joined those already outside. Hira Mandi was packed with people, hostile and angry, many armed with sticks. Such a crowd could not be left between the troops and the pickets just established. It was decided to disperse them. They tried to stampede the horses of the Cavalry. The troops turned and formed up. Mr. Fyson, Deputy Commissioner, ordered the crowd to disperse, warning them they would be dispersed by musketry if they remained. They began stoning—I ordered up armed police. Mr. Fyson with some troopers went forward to the mob and tried to disperse them, but this effort was useless—stoning continued and the mob tried to cut him off. He returned. The foot police came up. I particularly requested the Officer Commanding Troops to let the police do any firing that was necessary, as my men had buck-shot, and I was anxious to avoid rifle fire by the military. I lined up the police in front of the troops and Deputy Commissioner warned the crowd the police were going to fire. I ordered four files on the right to load with buckshot. The Deputy Commissioner instructed me to fire and I ordered the men to fire low. In all 8 shots were fired. The crowd then broke and I ordered "cease-fire." Immediately we moved forward and the crowd dispersed

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Continued.]

in all directions. I saw only one man fall to the firing. He was carried off by his friends. When we saw all was clear we reformed and moved on. From the first all along our march the Deputy Commissioner had continually announced that no meetings or processions would be allowed in the City. I got back to the Telegraph Office about 12-30 or 1 P.M. The "hartal" continued. I organized patrols of 40 or 50 armed men under Gazetted Officers to move in and about the City by night and day to visit posts and pickets and maintain order.

The funeral of one Kushi Ram, killed at Hira Mandi, was taken out in a huge procession through the City in defiance of the orders prohibiting procession.

This day a "hartal" was observed in Kasur and serious trouble occurred, two Europeans being killed, the station burnt, the train looted, and public buildings attacked. The police there had to fire. Troops from Ferozapore arrived later. At Jallo Telegraph wires were cut; at Patti wires were cut, and goods shed damaged; at Khem Karan the station was damaged.

On the 13th April the "hartal" continued. Wagah Station was sacked and burnt wires were cut and line damaged. An armoured train was derailed. I was informed that the attack on Wagah was the result of seditious meetings at Maniala and Narwar that day.

On the 14th the "hartal" continued. I assisted in the arrangements for the deportation of Messrs. Ram Bhaj Dutt, Harkishen Lal and Duni Chand. There was some disturbance at the Mogulpura workshops and stones were thrown. On this day a train was stoned at Kot Radha Kishen and wires were cut at Wagah, Jallo and Attari. A seditious assembly was reported in Padhana and other villages were said to be restive and preparing to loot.

On the 15th April Martial Law was proclaimed and the great strain of the last four or five days was relieved. It was a very great relief to the Police. The "hartal" continued, but the situation seemed to be improving. Stones were again thrown at a train at Kot Radha Kishen. The stocks on the Government Grass Farm land near Cantonments were set on fire and the villagers of Bangali, Padri, Barki, etc., were suspected.

On the 16th April stones were again thrown at a train at Kot Radha Kishen and a lady and four sepoy were hurt. Martial Law was proclaimed at Kasur. Wires were cut in the Changa Manga jurisdiction. On this day Martial Law Notice No. 10, was issued ordering the ending of the "hartal" in Anarkali from the next afternoon, but shops opened long before the time specified.

Similarly, Martial Law Notice No. 14, ordered the opening of shops in the City on the 18th, but all shops began opening on the 17th. Thus by the 17th evening the "hartal" was over.

Before Martial Law was declared seditious posters were constantly being put up all over the City. I also received reports of picketing and preventing people going to work and conveyances from plying for hire. Reports were frequent also that the people were saying that the police and military were only waiting to turn to their side, that little firing had been done by the police and none by the military, owing to reluctance of both to obey orders. The actual casualties were as follows:—

	Killed or died of wounds.	Wounded.
At Upper Mall . . . . .	1	7
Lohari Gate . . . . .	3	12
Hira Mandi . . . . .	3	26

One man was arrested and convicted for inciting the police to rebel. After Martial Law was declared notices put up were defaced and measures had to be taken to protect them.

On the 18th April (Friday) the Badshahi Mosque was kept closed to avoid chances of trouble should a crowd collect there.

Cases against persons concerned in these disturbances were sent up and tried by Summary Courts and Special Tribunals.

Police pickets and posts were modified or abolished as things settled down and normal conditions gradually returned, until by the 12th June, Martial Law was removed and special arrangements were considered no longer necessary.

ANNEXURE A.

Notice.

Being satisfied that it is intended shortly to convene or collect an assembly or form in public streets, roads or thoroughfares near the Bradlaugh Hall or elsewhere a procession which would in the judgment of the District Magistrate of Lahore, if uncontrolled be likely to cause a breach of the peace, I hereby, under section 30 of the Police Act (V of 1861), require the persons convening or collecting such assembly or directing or promoting such procession to apply for a license not later than 10 A.M. on the day previous to that for which the license is required.

This order will remain in force one month from this date.

E. P. BROADWAY,

Senior Superintendent of Police.

LAHORE;  
The 2nd April 1919. }

ANNEXURE B.

Note and Disposition Statement by Mr. E. P. Broadway.

I have held a meeting of all Inspectors and Officers who are commanding armed pickets to-morrow, have carefully explained to them their duties and responsibilities, the orders regarding use of firearms by police, etc., and places where they can look for support and to which they can report.

They have been ordered to carefully inform and control their men. They have been instructed to see that no compulsion or coercion is used by demonstrators to force shopkeepers or others to close their shops or stop their business in any way.

They will see that all ordinary beat constables are on duty as usual. No beats are to be abandoned or reduced anywhere. On the contrary, where necessary, extra men may be placed on duty at discretion of Inspectors. No posts or chaukis are to be left empty.

All standing and personal guards are to remain at their posts. No one is to be allowed to go away to get food or any other such pretexts.

Officers to carry revolvers in holsters. Arrangements for arming have been carefully explained.

Most particularly I have warned officers present and asked them to instruct their men that there must be no interference by any policeman with shopkeepers and others. They must remain strictly neutral and in no way try to persuade or induce anyone who wishes to close his shop or suspend business to do otherwise. The great importance of self-control, forbearance, patience and good humour has been impressed on all.

Mr. Clarke, Deputy Superintendent of Police and Inspector Mr. Gray, will arm and despatch to their respective posts all the men who will assemble in Lines at 5 A.M.

E. P. BROADWAY,

Senior Superintendent of Police.

The 5th April 1919.



Continued.]

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

## STATEMENT A.

## Distribution of Police for duty on 6th April 1919.

1	2	3										
		STREETS.										
Serial No.	Distribution.	Assistant Superintendent of Police.	Deputy Superintendent of Police.	Inspectors.	Sergeants.	Sub-Inspectors.	Head Constables.	Constables.	Defudars.	Sowars.	Cycle Sowars.	
1	Telegraph Office (armed)	1	..	..	..	..	2	6	60	..	..	..
2	Accountant-General's Office (armed)		..	..	..	..	2	6	60	..	..	..
3	Albert Victor Hospital (armed)		..	..	1	1	1	3	30	..	..	..
4	Jail and Ferozapore Road Chauk (armed).		..	..	..	..	1	3	30	..	..	..
5	Mugalpura { Armed .	..	..	..	..	1	2	20	..	..	..	
	{ Ordinary	..	..	..	..	..	2	20	..	..	..	
6	* District Courts { Armed .	..	2	1	2	3	20	100	2	14	2	
	{ Unarmed	..	..	..	..	..	10	50	..	..	..	
7	† Reserves at Police Stations (armed).	..	..	..	..	3	7	35	..	..	..	
8	‡ Reserve in Lines (armed) .	..	..	1	..	1	6	55	..	..	..	
9	§ Guard in Lines for magazine stores, etc.	..	..	..	..	1	2	25	..	..	..	
10	Guarding the Civil Station. { Armed .	..	..	3	..	3	14	140	..	..	..	
	{ Ordinary	..	..	..	..	..	9	36	..	..	1	
	TOTAL (ARMED) .	1	2	6	3	15	79	653	2	14	..	
	TOTAL (ORDINARY) .	..	..	..	..	..	11	65	..	..	3	
	GRAND TOTAL .	1	2	6	3	15	90	711	2	14	3	

\* Ordinary.

† Detail of No. 7—

	Sub-Inspectors.	Head Constables.	Foot Constables.	
Police Station, City . . . . .	1	2	25	Sub-Inspector Charanjit Singh in command
Police Station, Anarkali . . . . .	1	2	25	Muratab Ali Shah.
Police Station, Naulakha . . . . .	1	2	25	Feroze Chand.
Police Station, Mozang . . . . .	..	1	10	Senior Head Constable.
TOTAL . . . . .	3	7	85	

‡ Inspector Gray.

§ Sub-Inspector Gurnam Singh.

## Detail of No. 10.

	Inspectors.	Sergeants.	Sub-Inspectors.	Head Constables.	Foot Constables.	Mounted Head Constables.	Sowars.	Cycle Sowars.	REMARKS.
Railway Chauk { Armed .	1	..	1	3	30	}	..	1	Inspector Feroze Din Ahmad.
{ Ordinary	..	..	..	1	4				
Brandreth-McLeod Crossing (ordinary).	..	..	..	1	4	..	..	..	
Killa Gujar Singh { Armed .	..	..	1	3	30	}	..	..	Sub-Inspector Ghulam Hamid.
{ Ordinary	..	..	..	1	4				
Nisbet Road { Armed .	..	..	1	2	20	}	..	..	Sub-Inspector Tota Singh.
{ Ordinary	..	..	..	1	4				
Mission Road (armed)	..	..	..	1	4	..	..	..	
Jind Road (ordinary)	..	..	..	1	4	..	..	..	
Church (ordinary)	..	..	..	1	4	..	..	..	
NMa Gumbaz { Armed .	1	..	..	3	30	}	..	..	Inspector Mr. Bings.
{ Ordinary	..	..	..	1	4				
Market Chauk (ordinary)	..	..	..	1	4	..	..	..	
Durand Road Convent (armed).	1	..	..	3	30	..	..	..	Inspector Mr. Douglas.
TOTAL (ARMED) .	3	..	3	14	140	..	..	..	
TOTAL (ORDINARY) .	..	..	..	9	36	..	..	1	
GRAND TOTAL .	3	..	3	23	176	..	..	1	

Mr. E. P. BROADWAY.

[Concluded.]

ANNEXURE C.

ORDER.

With reference to standing orders on the subject of occurrence of any outbreak in Lahore City directed against law and order, the following supplementary orders are now issued for information and guidance.

2. The standing orders mentioned in paragraph 1 above, apply to an outbreak in any part of Lahore and not only Lahore City proper.

3. Attached with these orders are the following statements which will be in force on Sunday 6th April 1919 :—

Statements A, B, and C.

*Notes.*—I only attach statement A,\* as B, and C, are merely statements showing where men were to be drawn from to form the pickets and are of no interest.

E. P. BROADWAY,

4. *Time.*—All the details will fall in at 5 A.M. and be at their respective positions not later than 6 A.M. on 6th April 1919.

5. *Food.*—As officers and men will remain on duty throughout the day and until a late hour in the night, all should make proper food arrangements as no leave will be given for this purpose once postings are made.

6. *Duties and responsibility.*—Officers in charge of details are personally responsible for seeing that their men know their duties which are :—

“To maintain law and order, prevent destruction of private and Government property, to hold up and force back any parties of rioters who may attempt to make their way towards the Civil Station, and to communicate news to the Superintendent of Police.”

7. *Use of arms.*—In this connection attention is invited to the instructions regarding use of arms by the Police against a crowd contained in Appendix No. 21-16, Police Rules, Volume II, pages 54-55, with which all officers on duty in charge of armed details must make themselves thoroughly acquainted and for any infringement of which they will be held personally responsible.

8. *Armed picquets.*—The armed picquets noted in statement will be armed with muskets and 20 rounds ball and 10 rounds buck-shot for rifle. This ammunition to be carried in pouches.

In the event of the picquet being considered insufficient to control the crowd the officer in charge should despatch messengers of the unarmed picquet to the Police officer in charge at the District Courts and to Assistant Superintendent of Police in charge at Telegraph from which place reinforcements will be immediately despatched.

9. *Unarmed picquets.*—Unarmed picquets as noted in statement will be armed only with batons. Their duties will be as shown in paragraph above. In addition to these duties, they are to keep in touch and communication with the nearest armed picquet and will act as patrols to obtain messengers and to convey information and messages between officers in charge the armed picquets and the officer in charge at the District Courts and Telegraph Office.

(Sd.) W. G. CLARKE,

for Senior Superintendent of Police.

5th April 1919.

ORDER.

UNTIL further orders the following guards will be kept in readiness at the places noted below :—

*City.*—One sub-inspector, 2 head constables and 25 constables, under command of the Inspector, City, and Sub-inspector Nasir Shah.

*Anarkali.*—One sub-inspector, 2 head constables and 25 foot constables, under command of Inspector, Anarkali, and sub-inspector Maratab Ali.

*Naulakha.*—One sub-inspector, 2 head constables, and 25 constables under command of Inspector, Naulakha, and sub-inspector Feroze Chand.

*Mozang.*—One head constable and 10 foot constables, under command of the sub-inspector in charge of the Thana or senior head constable present.

The following guards will also be strengthened :—

Currency Office Guard by 1 head constable and 8 foot constables.

Bank of Bengal Guard by 8 foot constables.

Reserve Guard of 2 head constables and 25 constables will be kept at Lines and in the event of this or the Police Station Guards being called out, a new guard of the same strength will immediately be formed to replace the guard sent out. Details required to keep up this guard will be obtained from men available or free at Headquarters Police Stations and Posts. Headquarters and Police Stations Inspectors will see to this and arrange accordingly.

W. G. CLARKE,

Deputy Superintendent,

for Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore.

LAHORE :

Dated 10th April 1919. }

ORDER.

In continuation of order of date just issued, the following further arrangements are ordered :—

(1) In addition to 1 Sub-inspector, 2 head constables and 25 foot constables to be maintained in readiness all night and till further orders as an armed reserve at Police Stations City, Anarkali and Naulakha, and 1 head constable and 10 foot constables at Police Station Mozang, all other officers and men are to be warned to remain present in thanas and posts so as to be ready to turn out quickly if and when required.

(2) The first armed reserve to proceed at once from Lines to Telegraph Office and remain there, posting two sentries until relieved by British Infantry—when relieved they will return to Lines as armed reserve and remain ready to turn out at short notice. In addition a second armed reserve must be formed at once in Lines of similar strength. This will make a standing armed reserve of 2 sub-inspectors, 4 head constables and 50 constables, under Inspector Mr. Gray when the 1st reserve returns from the Telegraph Office. Further every officer and man attached to Lines must be warned to remain in Lines all night, ready to turn out if and when required. Double the magazine guard from the above reserves (armed) and have strict watch kept in Lines. Send out mounted patrols of 1 sowar each on following roads :—(1) Circular Road to Bhati Gate to Delhi Gate. (2) Lohari Gate through Anarkali to Police Station Anarkali and back by Gol Bagh. (3) Naulakha Police Station to Post Office *via* McLeod Road and back. These patrols to be relieved every two hours. Police Station, Moghalpura, to keep 10 men as armed reserve under a head constable as a guard and to send out extra men to look out and obtain information and report. All officers and men to sleep in Lines. One head constables and 4 foot constables to be posted at Badami Bagh Pumping Station by Naulakha Police Station.

E. P. BROADWAY,

Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore.

LAHORE :

The 10th April 1919.

Major-General Sir W. BEYNON.

Major-General Sir W. G. L. BEYNON, K.C.I.E., C.B., D.A.O., Commanding, 16th (Indian) Division.

*Letter from Major-General Sir W. Bynon, Commanding, 16th (Indian) Division, to the Adjutant General in India, Army Headquarters, Simla, No. A-2051, dated the 5th September 1919.*

In accordance with your No. 026375-1 (A. G.-10), dated 19th July 1919, I have the honour to forward a comprehensive narrative of the recent disturbances in the Lahore Divisional Area under my Command during the period 1st April to my departure on field service on the 29th May 1919.

(2) *Events leading to the introduction of Martial Law, 30th March 1919.*—At 21-30 hours on the 30th March a telephone message was received from the Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, informing me of the riots which had occurred at Delhi on that day, and further that the *Hartal* which had been arranged for Lahore on the 30th had been postponed until the 6th April 1919.

(3) *1st April.*—As the opening of the High Court was to take place on the 1st April, I deemed it advisable to provide a Guard of Honour of British troops for His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, and a Squadron of Cavalry as escort. I further ordered up No. 10 Armoured Motor Battery from Ferozepore. The function passed off quietly and No. 10 Armoured Motor Battery was returned to Ferozepore.

(4) *4th April, Appendix I.*—I, and my Staff, had frequent interviews with the Local Government, and arrangements were made to dispose troops in Lahore on the 6th so as to prevent the possibility of occurrences such as happened at Delhi on the 30th. On the 4th April I warned Brigadier-General R. E. Dyer, C. B., Commanding, Jullundur Brigade, to take special precautions against untoward incidents especially at Amritsar, in consultation with the civil authorities and that he was to despatch 20 Indian ranks under an Indian officer, for the protection of the railway station there. These arrived that evening.

(5) *6th April.*—The 6th passed off without disturbances, *Hartal* was observed in all the cities. In Lahore a procession had to be dispersed by police and cavalry, a few arrests being made by the former. There was no firing.

All troops except guards on Telegraph offices and railway station, returned to cantonments that evening and things appeared normal except for some shops remaining closed.

(6) *9th April.*—On the 9th, there was a ball at Government House, Lahore, and I was there informed that Mr. Gandhi had been arrested and that it was quite possible that disturbances would occur at Amritsar on the following Sunday, the 13th.

(7) *10th April.*—I accordingly instructed General Dyer on the 10th to send 100 Muhammadan troops to arrive in Amritsar on Saturday morning, 12th April.

(8) Soon after despatching this, a mutilated message was received from the Officer Commanding at Amritsar (Captain Massey), saying that trouble was expected there, and asking for half company of British Infantry, an aeroplane and some gunners. As the Local Government here did not appear to anticipate immediate trouble, this telegram was considered somewhat alarmist. However, this information was immediately repeated to General Dyer at Jullundur, for any action he considered necessary. He was told that the Gunners would be sent from Lahore, but that I had no aeroplanes available at the moment.

(9) At 15-30 hours on the 10th, the Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, came to see me, and informed me that there had been serious riots in Amritsar that morning, and that he anticipated trouble in Lahore in the evening.

(10) *10th April.*—At 16-45 hours a telegram was received from Captain Massey, at Amritsar, reporting serious rioting and the murder of the Manager of the National Bank, and shortly after a short statement was received from the Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar, by

hand to the same effect. Telegraphic communication beyond Amritsar was interrupted, but we were still able to communicate with the railway station at that place.

(11) *Despatch of Troops to Amritsar.*—127 Royal Sussex and 170, 1-124th Baluchis, under the command of Major Macdonald, 1-124th Baluchis, who was to take over command at Amritsar, were ordered from Lahore Cantonment. They arrived at Amritsar at 21-30 hours that night.

(12) *Precautionary measures in Lahore Civil Station Area, Appendix I.*—After seeing the Inspector-General of Police, I issued verbal orders to Brigadier-General Clarke to despatch troops to Lahore. Most of the troops were attending the 43rd Brigade Sports in Cantonments on the afternoon of this day so that there was a certain amount of delay in collecting them and getting them ready.

However, by 18-35 hours, a detachment of 30 men, 2-6th Royal Sussex, occupied the telegraph office in time to save it from the mob, who turned back when they found the guard in position. The main body arrived in Lahore by 10-00 hours in time to prevent the mob getting into the Civil Station. This mob had collected in the City and all shops were shut as soon as the news of the riots arrived from Amritsar. The mob were stopped in the Mall by the police, who fired inflicting four casualties. This occurred just as troops were arriving and a detachment, 17th Cavalry, assisted in driving the mob back to the City.

(13) *Precautionary measures at Ferozepore and Jullundur.*—The General Officers Commanding, Ferozepore and Jullundur Brigades, had been ordered to place guard on the telegraph offices and all important points in their areas, immediately on receipt by me of the news of the Amritsar riots.

(14) *Amritsar.*—The story of what happened at Amritsar on the 10th is, (as far as can be ascertained), as follows:—

*Appendix II.*—About 00-45 hours, Drs. Kitchlow and Satyapal having been told to report, arrived at the Deputy Commissioner's House. They were accompanied by two attendants, Hans Raj, Joint Secretary of the *Satyagraha Sabha*, and a certain Sikh agitator. After an interview of about half an hour, Kitchlow and Satya Pal were deported in motors, and the two attendants, with as little delay as possible, proceeded to the city and proclaimed this fact, and called a meeting at the Jallianwala Bagh. The result was "*Hartal*" in the City.

(15) It now appears (12 noon) that one crowd proceeded towards the Jallianwala Bagh in accordance with the proclamation, while another made out in the direction of the Civil Station. The latter was fired on in the vicinity of the railway station by picquets of the Somersets and ammunition column personnel, which had been posted at 10-00 hours. The mob suffered some eight killed and about twenty-two wounded. Before being dispersed from the vicinity, however, this crowd set fire to an outstanding goods shed, and killed Sergeant Rowlands and a North Western Guard named Robinson. They also attacked the telegraph office and smashed the telephone switch board and battery material, and wrecked the contents of the telegraph master's quarters. The telegraph office was undoubtedly saved by the plucky action of Subedar Sardar Khan, and Lance Naik No. 2067 Mouman Shah of the 54th Sikhs, F. F. The former bayoneted the man who had seized the telegraph master by the neck and then both dispersed the crowd.

(16) When this news reached the City, the mob who were on their way to the meeting, turned and went towards the sound of the firing, breaking open and wrecking the post office *en route*. On reaching the Town Hall, the mob proceeded to wreck it. The mob were here joined by Drs. Bashir and Meer Makhbul Hassan. These two persons now led the crowd to the National Bank and incited them to loot. The feelings

Major-General Sir W. BEYNON.

[Continued.]

of the mob were considerably enhanced at this moment by the arrival of a casualty from the scene of the Railway Bridge affair, and the result was that the National Bank was set on fire, and Messrs. Stewart and Scott foully murdered.

(17) *Appendix II.*—The mob, having completed this work of destruction, then proceeded to the Chartered Bank, wrecked it, and murdered Mr. Thompson. A party of 260 of the 1-9th Gurkhas, en route to Peshawar, arrived at 15-00 hours and were detained. 100 of them were armed from the Fort and used to reinforce the picquets. These picquets held the mob until it dispersed about 17-00 hours when all was quiet. These picquets were relieved by the reinforcements from Lahore consisting of a detachment under Major Macdonald 1-124th Baluchis, of Royal Sussex and Baluchis who arrived at Amritsar at 21-00 hours on the 10th April, and proceeded immediately to the City, to relieve four Europeans who were in the Kotwali, and also brought in the remains of the three murdered Bank officials. An armoured train was ordered down from Lahore at 18-30 hours, but this did not arrive until 09-00 hours the next morning.

(18) *Appendix II.*—Mr. A. J. W. Kitchin, C.I.E., Commissioner of Lahore, was present and informed the Officer Commanding, Major Macdonald, 1-124th Baluchis, that he (Major Macdonald) was in charge and could take any military action considered necessary.

(19) The station at Chhcharta, about 5 miles from Amritsar, was also attacked by *badmashes* who tried to loot the goods shed but a party on a light engine from Amritsar dispersed them.

(20) *11th April.*—On the next day, 11th April, reinforcements arrived at Amritsar from Jullundur, consisting of 100, 1-25th Londons, 130 of the 151st Infantry, and 100 of the 59th Rifles. Owing to the arrival of the aeroplanes from Risalpur I was able to send two to Amritsar. These proved afterwards of great value in carrying despatches when no other safe means of communication was available. Two armoured cars were also despatched, and a detachment of Royal Garrison Artillery to reinforce the Fort.

(21) *Movement of troops.*—It was only on this morning, 11th April, that I received a letter from the Punjab Government, dated 9th April, enclosing an extract from a letter from the Deputy Commissioner, dated the 8th, urging that the garrison there be increased.

(22) The British troops in Lahore were now very weak, should trouble occur at Moghulpura, which was probable. General Dyer had been ordered on the 10th to send as many British troops as he could spare from Jullundur to Amritsar, replacing them at Jullundur by 1-4th Queens from Ferozepore.

(23) Orders were sent again to-day to expedite the move of the Queens, as General Dyer considered that further depletion of British troops in Jullundur was very inadvisable.

(24) The Officer Commanding, Amritsar, was ordered to return the detachment, 2-6th Royal Sussex to Lahore, as soon as they could be relieved. Orders were also sent to-day (11th April) for the 40th Divisional Signal Company to leave Dalhousie, which they did on the same day.

(25) Owing to the importance of the Command at Amritsar, I deemed it advisable to send a more senior officer, and accordingly Major Morgan, D.S.O., Commanding, 1-124th Baluchis, proceeded to Amritsar on the night of the 11th April to take over command there.

(26) *Arrival of Brigadier-General Dyer, C.B., at Amritsar, Appendices III and IV, Proclamation forbidding assemblies or meetings.*—General Dyer, had, however, arrived at Amritsar at 21-00 hours and assumed personal command, in addition to establishing his Brigade Headquarters there. On arrival, he was handed a copy of orders issued by the Deputy Commissioner that morning to several citizens. They were to the effect that the troops had orders to restore order in Amritsar, and to use all force necessary, that no gatherings of persons

or processions of any sort would be allowed, that all gatherings would be dispersed, and that any persons leaving the City in groups of more than four would be fired on.

(27) *March of troops through Amritsar, 12th April.*—On the next day (12th April) he marched through the City in force, in order to impress the inhabitants with the fact that he had sufficient force to enforce law and order. A dozen important arrests were made without opposition. 50 sabres arrived at Amritsar from Jullundur, so that General Dyer was able to work further afield, and sent out an armoured car and some cavalry to Chhcharta, and an armoured train to Tarn Taran where trouble was expected on that night.

(28) *March of troops through Lahore City, Appendix I and Police open fire to disperse mob.*—A strong force marched through Lahore City with the object of establishing picquets at important points to effect its occupation. The crowd was overawed chiefly by aeroplanes hovering over it, as the people had been warned that bombs would be dropped if necessary. During the procession a troop of cavalry acting as rearguard was cut off and surrounded by a mob which was dispersed by police who fired killing two and wounding two. Cavalry are unsuitable for work in narrow streets and their use in cities was discontinued after this.

(29) *Outrages and murder at Kasur.*—At 12-45 hours His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor told me over the telephone that a train had had to put back to Kasur and that communication was cut off. This was the first intimation I received, and orders were issued immediately for the despatch of an armoured train from Lahore. On the morning of the 12th April a mob of about 1,000 rioters of all castes attacked the railway station, partially burning it and looting the Station Master's office. While this was going on, the 61 up passenger arrived about 10-15 from Ferozepore and stopped in the cutting about  $\frac{1}{4}$  mile south of the station. The mob attacked the train, killing two European warrant officers and seriously injuring two non-commissioned officers of the Queens. A Railway Engineer, after getting his wife and child, with the help of some natives, to the Mission, got hold of a pony and galloped back to the Kaiser-i-Hind Bridge to warn Ferozepore. Captain Limby, R.E., and 2nd-Lieutenant Munro, 2-17th Infantry, were attacked by 100 men armed with sticks and stones, and ran for about a mile towards Ganda Singh Walla. Being then exhausted they stopped and fought their assailants, who by that time numbered about 20, and beat them off with their fists. They then made their way across country to the Kaiser-i-Hind Bridge about 10 miles which they reached about 2 P.M. Meanwhile the mob attacked the Treasury, whence they were beaten off by the police, and dispersed about 13-30 hours, just before the arrival of Colonel Atkins, 1-4th Queens, with 16 British ranks and three Lewis guns in private motor cars from Ferozepore. At 14-00 hours, 50 of the 1-4th Queens and 100 of the 2-15th Sikhs under command of Lieutenant-Colonel McRae, D.S.O., left Ferozepore, arriving Kasur at 15-00 hours. All was then quiet.

The armoured train ordered from Lahore at 13-00 hours, arrived late that night.

(30) I ascertained at 16-55 hours by aeroplane that all was quiet at Kasur and I sent two aeroplanes to be at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding, 44th Brigade.

(31) *British troops asked to be held in readiness to reinforce Lahore Garrison.*—His Honour suggested that I should ask for another British regiment from the north but as all was quiet at that time in the Rawalpindi area, I did not consider this necessary on the information at my disposal, as I hoped to get the detachment of the 2-6th Sussex back from Amritsar that evening and some details from Dalhousie. Owing to want of accommodation, I was anxious not to get more British troops into Lahore than necessary. Accordingly I asked the Northern Command for one British

Continued ]

Major-General Sir W. BRYSON.

battalion to be held in readiness and said that a serviceable armoured motor battery would be useful. No. 9 Battery had only lately been reported as unserviceable, both on account of personnel and equipment.

(32) *Railway security, 12th April.*—I attended a conference at Government House the evening of the 12th April at which Railway security were discussed. It was arranged to protect all important stations and bridges on the main lines. The Railway Security scheme could not be applied as the police were unable to find the necessary guards. We therefore arranged mutually for which stations the military and police should be responsible. The civil authorities did not consider it necessary to furnish guards in the Multan district or on the Pathankot and Kasur-Amritsar lines.

(33) *13th April, Railway outrages, Kasur-Patti line, Wireless and Recall of British detachments in hills.*—On the morning of the 13th April all telephonic communication with Amritsar and beyond was severed and reports were received that three stations on the Kasur-Patti line had been destroyed or looted and telegraphic communication was cut there. I therefore asked for five sets of wireless (which arrived by 06-00 hours the next morning), and a Cavalry regiment. All available fit British Infantry and Royal Artillery details recalled from Dalhousie and Pathankot and 40th Divisional Signal Company ordered to despatch its sections to their several Brigade Headquarters. Owing to shortage of Government Transport, I had also to ask for lorries to be sent down for distribution to all stations. These were also necessary should it be required to move troops rapidly to threatened points.

(34) *Mobile columns.*—General Southey was ordered to collect transport to equip a mobile column to march through the Manjha country to Amritsar.

(35) *Armoured motor Battery.*—No. 2 Armoured Battery, which had only been asked for on the 12th April, detrained at Lahore Cantonment by 14-00 hours on the 13th April and was sent on by road to Ferozepore.

(36) *Orders for aeroplane action against raiding gangs.*—Orders were also issued to the Royal Air Force that pilots were to keep a lookout, when carrying messages or reconnoitring, for any gangs damaging the railway, and they were to fire on them immediately.

(37) *Moghulpura Railway Workshop strike.*—About 21-00 hours I received information from the C. I. D. that attempts were being made to induce men to strike in the Moghulpura Railway Workshops and destroy the shops, and that strike piquets would be out next day. Only one picquet was seen on the morning of the 14th April, and were dealt with so summarily by a detachment of the 17th Cavalry, that there has been no trouble in Moghulpura, the most dangerous spot here, during the whole of the disturbances.

(38) Instructions were issued also for military guards to travel on all trains between Lahore, Amritsar, and Ferozepore.

(39) *17th April.*—At 22-45 hours I heard from Government House that 200 people had been killed at Amritsar. What happened was this:—

(i) *Appendices III and V.*—General Dyer issued a proclamation in the morning by beat of drum in the main streets warning the inhabitants that unlawful acts, including the holding of meetings, would be punished by Military Force. Later on he heard that some disaffected characters had ordered a meeting in the Jallianwala Bagh at 16-30 hours, but he did not think it would take place in the face of his orders. At 16-00 hours the police reported that a gathering was beginning. Piquets were therefore immediately sent to hold the various gates of the City, and with 25 rifles of the 9th Gurkhas and 25 rifles of the 54th and 59th Rifles, F. F. and 40 Gurkhas armed with kukries only, and two armoured cars, he entered the City. The narrowness of the lane by which

he entered, necessitated his leaving the armoured cars behind.

(ii) On entering the Jallianwala Bagh he saw a dense crowd which he estimated at 8,000 being addressed by a man on a raised platform.

(iii) As his force was very small, he realised that any hesitation might mean attack, so he ordered fire to be opened immediately, and disperse the crowd. The exact number of casualties has never been ascertained.

(iv) The wisdom of General Dyer's action has been fully proved by the fact that there has been no further trouble of any sort in Amritsar. The news had a decidedly sobering effect on the surrounding villages when it spread to them.

(v) His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor agreed with me that General Dyer acted in a correct manner.

(40) *Burning of Wagah, Appendix X.*—It was on the night of the 13-14th April that Wagah station was destroyed, and an armoured train which has been sent up from Amritsar to pilot the Bombay Mail from Lahore to Amritsar was derailed near Wagah.

(41) *14th April.*—The next morning news was received of the wrecking of Gujranwala.

(42) I had also just received a mutilated telegram from General Altham from Bina, from which I gathered that railway strike on a large scale was impending.

(43) *Railways.*—(i) It was now clear that I should have to disperse considerably in order to guard railways from the particular form of damage which appeared to be most popular at the moment. The Railway Security and Railway Strike schemes did not meet the situation. The raiders did not attempt to destroy bridges except for burning sleepers on unprotected small ones. Nor did they ever appear where there was any force sufficient to do them any material damage. The object of the leaders was undoubtedly damage to Government property and murder Europeans, but the mob wanted their "quid pro quo" in the shape of loot. Their easiest way to get this was to smash up a small wayside station and hold up a train going through and loot it.

(ii) To meet this, it was necessary to have small guards at all stations in the disturbed areas, at which there were cross-over lines or points, in addition to large guards at Junctions and the usual bridges. Blockhouses were built for these guards by the 53rd Company, and the Faridkot Sappers and Miners, and were completed by the 17th April.

(iii) The Local Government asked the Durhams to arrange for the protection of the railways in their states and this was done most promptly. It relieved me of a great deal of responsibility, and set free a large number of troops, which I could not in fact have found. I should therefore have been compelled to leave a number of railways which were not of strategical importance to their fate. This I had to do in the case of the Kasur-Patti-Amritsar line.

(iv) I should here like to mention the admirable work done by the Faridkot Sappers and Miners. They arrived at Ferozepore within 2½ hours of receiving orders. In the construction of blockhouses, on which they were employed, the rapidity and excellence of the work was marked. Great credit reflects on Lieutenant-Colonel Nand Singh and the officers and men under his command.

(v) *Villages to be responsible.*—Arrangements were also made by the Local Government for villages to find five men per mile for the protection of railways in their area. It should be noted that there were no more cases of damage to railways in this area after these measures had been put into force. These measures were completed by the 18th April.

(44) *Reinforcements.*—Several moveable columns would also have to operate in the areas away from the railways. I therefore considered it necessary to ask Northern Command for a half battalion of British troops.

Major-General Sir W. BEYNON.

[Continued.]

These were sent me next day (15th April) from Sialkot, and at the same time I received information that the 1st battalion, West Riding Regiment, had been ordered here from Quetta, by the Chief of the General Staff.

(45) *14th April, Gujranwala.*—As soon as news was received here of the trouble at Gujranwala station on the 14th April, an armed train was immediately sent from Lahore and later in the day at the request of the Lieutenant-Governor an aeroplane was sent out with verbal orders to disperse any gathering engaged in the work of destruction. This machine bombed and machine-gunned the crowds which were burning the civil lines. This had a very salutary effect for on subsequent occasions the mere sight of an aeroplane was sufficient to disperse any crowd.

For report of aeroplane pilot, see Appendix VI.

(46) *Lahore Civil Area.* Vide *Lieutenant-Colonel F. Johnson's report.*—It had now become necessary to establish a separate Command in the Lahore civil area, which is 5 miles from Lahore Cantonment. From a military as well as a civil point of view, Lahore is in some respects more important than the Cantonment, containing as it does the Central Telegraph and Telephone system, main railway station, railway offices, several Banks, the Government offices and last but not least Government House itself. The Railway and Telegraph offices alone are both of primary military importance, and in my opinion any scheme which does not contemplate a defence of the area containing these places, is militarily unsound. The Fort is useless being on the wrong side of the City, and the sooner it is given up the better, as its retention involves locking up troops which could be better employed elsewhere.

(47) Brigadier-General Clarke, C.M.G., who had removed his Headquarters to the Punjab Club on the 10th, now handed over immediate command of the troops in the Lahore Civil Area to Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Johnson, D.S.O., and returned to Cantonments, whence he could better administer his Brigade Area as a whole.

(48) *Bahawalnagar, 15th April, Appendix VII.*—On the 15th April at 08-15 hours I received news that communications with Bahawalnagar had been severed since 15-00 hours on the 14th, and that there was some anxiety as to the fate of the Europeans. I surmised that this might be the beginning of the general strike of which General Altham's telegram had warned me. Brigadier-General Southey was ordered to send troops from Ferozepore to deal with the situation. A detachment under Captain Maud, 1-4th Queens, left at 12-30 hours, arriving at Bahawalnagar at 17-00 hours. The disturbance was soon quelled, thanks to the efficient way in which Captain Maud handled the situation. Communication was soon re-established with Samasata and Bhatinda and three trains which were held up at Bahawalnagar were despatched to their destinations. After arranging for the security of the place and of the Europeans left there, the party returned to Ferozepore on the 16th with prisoners and some Europeans, women and children.

(49) *15th April, Armoured trains, Appendix VIII.*—It had become evident on the 15th April that a large number of armed trains would be required so Brigadier-General Cartwright, C.M.G., D.S.O., was placed in command of all armoured trains. The permanent armoured trains were too unwieldy and heavy for the work required, and were very difficult to re-rail. It was realised that a large number of armed trains would be required which could be sent out in different directions at short notice and from which small mobile columns could operate in the villages in the neighbourhood of where damage had been done. In addition to the two regular armoured trains, Nos. 1 and 3 at Lahore, and No. 2 which had been sent from Karachi to Multan, three improvised trains were immediately assembled and two others kept in reserve at Lahore. Two companies, Railway Sappers and Miners, were obtained from Sialkot who found both escorts and repair gangs, and six machine guns and personnel were taken from No. 288 Machine Gun Company. On the

18th April, the system was reorganised, the heavy trains being returned to their own stations at Lahore and Karachi and six light trains improvised in their place. These were stationed at Ludhiana, Bhatinda, Multan, Lyallpur and Lahore, each with a definite area of operations, and one in reserve at Lahore.

(50) *Armoured trains, Appendix IX.*—Some very good work was done by Captain Flowerdew, 1-24th North Western Railway Battalion, Indian Defence Force, who took out a train on the 17th April to Chuharkana to assist in rounding up rioters, and by Sergeant Davis, Durham Light Infantry. Captain Flowerdew with a few men chased a party of the rioters to a village 5 miles from the railway from which he captured 8 prisoners, who had been concerned in the wrecking of Chuharkana. Sergeant Davis, while following up a party which had separated from the one Captain Flowerdew and his men were chasing, came upon an armed party some of which were mounted. Two were armed with rifles and two with guns. Sergeant Davis, single-handed, shot three of these men, but their servants got away with their arms. He also killed another man who was following them and took four prisoners.

(51) *Railway Strike.*—All active opposition was now over as far as the Lahore Divisional Area was concerned, only a very few minor cases of wire cutting occurring in the Gurdaspur and Jullundur districts. A Railway strike which started at Samasata and Khanewal on the 15th April was over on the 16th April, thanks to the prompt arrival of troops. The strike scheme was put in force in the Multan district on the 16th April. The disturbances had spread westward into the Lyallpur district, in the 2nd Divisional Area. Prompt assistance was rendered from this area by sending an armoured train and 250 troops from Multan to Lyallpur, and three armoured trains were sent on the 16th and 17th to Chuharkana.

(52) *Punitive Columns, Appendices XI, XII, XIII, XVII and XVIII.*—Punitive columns were by this time moving in all directions, and there were no villages that were in anyway implicated which were not visited. Besides imposing and levying fines, arresting prisoners, the columns were more particularly useful in reassuring the people and in giving the lie to seditionist propaganda. In some of the districts, troops had never been seen, and their presence had a most salutary effect in raising the *izzat* of the pensioned Indian officers and men. Durbars were held at all large villages at which free discussions took place and the truth explained to the people. The services of retired Indian officers were enlisted for propaganda work to counteract lying rumours which were being spread broadcast. This system of personal contact proved far more satisfactory than the issue of notices.

(53) It was ascertained by these columns that the real population was not in sympathy with the rebellion, and this was particularly the case in the Manjha country, which was suspected by the civil authorities as probably being at the bottom of the disturbances. All agreed that the damage was done by the local *badmashes*, who were incited by the *Arya Samajists*, most of whom came from the large towns. (Civil officers were attached to columns as advisers to assist and interpret. Military Commanders were instructed that they could not delegate their powers to the civil officers attached. This order was found necessary in order that responsibility should not be divided.)

(54) *Martial Law, Appendices XIV, XV and XVI.*—(i) On the proclamation of Martial Law I asked for and obtained the services of Lieutenant-Colonel E. D. Money, C.I.E., as Administrator of Martial Law, who took up his duties on the 17th April.

I found this appointment of a very useful nature as Colonel Money acted in addition to his other duties as "Alliance Officer" between myself and the Punjab Government and other Civil Departments.

(ii) His duties also consisted of drafting and issuing Proclamations and orders under Martial Law which

*Continued.]*

Major-General Sir W. BRYNOR.

were distributed to the officers concerned for information and action.

(55) After Colonel Money left me to take command of a brigade, he was succeeded by Major Ferrars who continued to act till after I proceeded to Kohat.

(56) Martial Law came into force at midnight on the 15th-16th April.

(57) At the conferences which were held almost daily at this time at Government House the question of the institution of officers both civil and military to try offences under Martial Law was discussed and it was decided to appoint specified officers to try offences on the spot so as to prevent the overcrowding of jails with prisoners awaiting trial by the ordinary courts.

(58) *Proclamation of Martial Law.*—(i) The result of these conferences was embodied in a Proclamation by me, dated the 19th April which notified the Regulations to be enforced within the limits of the 16th Division in all places under Martial Law.

(ii) *Martial Law Areas. Officers appointed to try offences under Martial Law.*—This Proclamation also laid down that the district would be divided into areas within the limits of which certain authorised officers would dispose of offences. In addition to these officers, all Officers Commanding Stations or Regiment, Field Officers or others specially designated were also authorised to dispose of offences. (*Vide Appendix XIV.*)

(iii) These officers were given the powers of a First Class Magistrate.

(iv) Printed Instructions were issued for the guidance of these officers. (*Vide Appendix XV.*)

(v) Instructions were also issued by the Punjab Government for the trial of persons charged with offences committed before the 19th April. (*Vide Appendix XVI.*)

(vi) The result of the institution of these courts was that offences of a minor nature were tried without delay and the lesson that immediate punishment following on the commission of a crime was inculcated on the turbulent members of the population.

(59) *Railways; General report on action taken. Restrictions on travelling. 19th April.*—The attack on railway stations goods sheds and destruction of the permanent-way led to the disorganisation of railway timings and the necessity for restricting the running of trains to daylight only. This again led to the overcrowding of the few trains available for public travel and evidence that agitators travelled from place to place by Mail led to the question of the restrictions of travel by Indians and after discussing the matter at the daily conference, orders were issued abolishing all 3rd class and Intermediate passenger traffic within the area governed by Martial Law.

(ii) *Inspection stations.*—The difficulty of enforcing this rule upon passengers arriving from without the area necessitated the selection of certain stations where all travellers were inspected.

(iii) *Railway Permits.*—These restrictions undoubtedly caused great inconvenience to the public but it also enabled the C. I. D. to control the passage of undesirable persons. Any one wishing to travel had now to obtain a permit which could only be obtained at certain specified stations and from officers specially nominated to supply them. These permits were necessary to enable natives, such as soldiers going or returning from leave or natives who had to travel on legitimate business to obtain tickets as no ticket could be sold by any Station Master without the previous production of the permit. The finger imprints of those furnished with permits were taken on the permit to prevent transference of permits.

(iv) As the safety of the railways became assured these restrictions were gradually relaxed until only natives travelling by Mail trains were subject to examination.

(v) *Food Supplies.*—Orders were also issued regarding the portage by rail of certain goods, those necessary for the supply of food for daily consumption obtaining priority passes.

(vi) All these orders and restrictions had a salutary effect and enabled day and night running of trains to be resumed before many days as the populace found the

game of destroying the railway re-acted with swiftness and precision to their own disadvantages.

(60) *Fairs and Melas.*—At this time the movement of an unusual number of Sedhus along the main roads became noticeable and it was considered advisable to stop all fairs or melas where these characters were in the habit of collecting and where the opportunity might be taken of disseminating seditious rumours or of inciting disaffection to Government. Action was accordingly taken to forbid all such gatherings.

(61) *Use of Motors and bicycles for seditious propaganda.*—I had received proof that youths apparently of the student class arrived on bicycles at the Cantonment Sudder Bazaar and there, by threats of violence, caused the shopkeepers to close. This was reported to the Cantonment Magistrate who at once proceeded to the Bazaar where he enforced the opening of the shops, the students having fled on hearing of his arrival.

(62) The commandeering of methods of progression such as motor-cycles and bicycles was therefore considered at the daily conference and orders were given to Area Commanders to take action in their respective areas. The result was very effective, especially in the Lahore Civil Area where the commandeering of motors enabled a supply to be put aside for the purpose of conveying troops rapidly to any threatened point and enabled motor patrols to proceed daily halfway to Ferozepore and Amritsar where they were met and exchanged reports with similar patrols from those places.

(63) *Motor cars.*—Motor cars were particularly valuable in sparing troops during the hot weather. With commandeered cars, it was possible to organise a column of nearly 100 rifles with Lewis guns which could be sent out rapidly to almost any point required, and be got back the same day.

As an example, news was received one afternoon that an attack was expected in a small station that night; a platoon was despatched by road to villages from which the attackers were most likely to collect. It arrived there before dark, and prevented any trouble arising.

(64) *Bicycles for troops.*—In the Lahore Area the British troops were also equipped with bicycles for patrol work and for the relief of guards and detachments, thereby saving the men from marching in the hot sun.

(65) *Tongas and Ekkas.*—The Officer Commanding the Lahore Civil Area also commandeered the tongas and ekkas plying for public hire with excellent results.

(66) *Publicity Work.*—Throughout this period the Publicity Committee were making every endeavour to counteract the lies and libel spread throughout the country by agitators. The Administrator of Martial Law worked in conjunction with the Commissioner and with the Publicity Committee and use was made of the passage of moveable columns and of aeroplanes to issue leaflets denying the rumours against Government.

(67) *Kasur.*—At Kasur Lieutenant-Colonel H. S. McRae, D.S.O., and the troops under his command did excellent work in effecting the arrest of 150 persons implicated in the riots at Kasur, Khem Karan and Patti, and in assisting the police in arresting 100 others. This necessitated operations covering twenty-eight days, which entailed considerable hardship and long marches. When news was received that rioters were in certain villages, a column was despatched when possible by rail to the nearest station, and the village concerned was surrounded by dawn. These raids were in every case successful.

(68) *Ferozepore.*—Great credit is due to Brigadier-General Southey, C.M.G., for the fact that the Ferozepore district remained quiet throughout the critical period under review. The Local Government were themselves agreeably surprised that nothing untoward occurred there. The excellence of General Southey's preparations in peace time for the security of the area under his command, the cordial and close relations with the civil authorities enabled him to act promptly on the first news of unrest in Lahore. A prompt show of force, and his firm and tactful handling of the situation frustrated any plans that were maturing, and cowed the population.

Major-General Sir W. BEYNON.

[Continued.]

(69) *Amritsar*.—The strong measures taken by General Dyer at Amritsar had a far reaching effect and prevented any further trouble in the Lahore Divisional Area. His knowledge of the Indian and his popularity with the Sikhs did much to restore confidence and loyalty in the surrounding districts.

(70) *Lahore Civil Station*.—The measures taken by Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Johnson, D.S.O., in the security and administration of Martial Law were most effective; the justness of his orders and the personal touch which he established with Indians of all classes caused the administration of the Martial Law to become a blessing which the poorer classes especially appreciated.

(71) *Multan*.—In the Multan district there was never much cause for anxiety, due, no doubt, to the adequate arrangements taken by Brigadier-General Miles, C.B. It was thanks to these arrangements that the Railway strike mentioned above was nipped in the bud. The troops, however, both British and Indian, had a trying time, throughout which they were always cheerful. General Miles gave valuable assistance to the Deputy Commissioner, Lyallpur, by acceding promptly to all calls for troops.

(72) *Assistance from the Civil Administration*.—I wish to record my thanks to all ranks of the Civil Administration of the Punjab, who cordially assisted me on all occasions, and whose personal knowledge and experience of the customs and laws of the native population were always placed at the service of myself and the Military officers. I would specially thank the European officers of the Police and Railway Departments whose heavy work was considerably increased by the calls made upon them for information and assistance by the military.

(73) It is understood the report from Brigadier-General R. E. Dyer, C.B., is being sent to you direct.

(74) The reports from Lieutenant-Colonels MacRae and Smithers will be forwarded immediately on receipt but as they will not be ready for some days this report is submitted now to save further delay.

APPENDIX I.

*Memorandum by the Headquarters, 43rd Infantry Brigade, No. R. M. 103, dated Lahore Cantonment, the 2nd May 1919.*

In compliance with verbal instructions from G. S. O.-11, I forward briefly a resumé of events at Lahore between 30th March and 4th May 1919.

*April 4th*.—Conference held at Divisional Headquarters at which Deputy Commissioner, Lahore, Superintendent of Police and other officials were present beside the General Officer Commanding, 16th (Indian) Division, General Officer Commanding, 43rd Brigade and their staff and various precautionary measures were decided on.

*April 5th*.—Route march through civil lines in part of city by one squadron, cavalry, one battery, and four armoured cars.

*April 6th*.—Following dispositions were made by 06-30 :—

Lahore Fort	100 Sussex.
Ferozepore Road	5th Punjab Light Horse.
Roberts Club	3rd Punjab Rifles.
Chief Court	2 Armoured Cars.
Gol Bagh	1 Squadron, 17th Cavalry.
The Katcheri	2 Armoured Cars.
Lahore Junction	50 Rifles 1-124th N.W.R. Battalion, I.D.F.

Dressing stations were established and system of visual signalling. Guard posted on all Indian Defence Force Armouries and Brigade Headquarters at Lahore Fort.

All remained quiet until 11-45 hours when Deputy Commissioner asked for squadron of Cavalry and 2 armoured cars to proceed to Anarkali Bazar to turn back a procession.

Arrests made.

18-00 Squadron of Cavalry and armoured cars sent to stop a procession entering the Mall.

*April 10th*.—Twenty Gunners sent from Fort to Amritsar. Moveable column left for Amritsar 20-30 hours. Troops sent into Lahore.

Mob fired on by police near Telegraph office. Brigade Headquarters at Punjab Club.

*April 11th*.—Guard sent to Badanti Bagh pumping station.

Cavalry sent to Moghalpura to disperse mob who was interfering with the workers.

Guards put at various points.

Crowd appeared at different places during the day but retired on arrival of troops. Lieutenant-Colonel W. K. Bourne appointed to command Lahore Cantonment in absence of General Officer Commanding.

*April 12th*.—Procession marched through the city leaving standing picquets. Police fired once when mob surrounded rearguard consisting of 17th Cavalry.

20-30—Owing to lack of police and report from Deputy Commissioner that natives would try and loot bungalows and assault European women, bungalows in civil station were picqueted by 100 men and patrolled by armoured cars.

*April 14th*.—Wagah railway station burnt. Armoured train sent out and derailed.

Arrests made by Deputy Commissioner.

Armoured cars sent to Atari to rescue missionary ladies.

*April 15th*.—Punitive Flying column under Lieutenant-Colonel W. K. Bourne sent out.

*April 16th*.—Attempt made to derail train between Harbanspura and Jallo.

*April 18th*.—Flying column in cars sent to Kana. Two students arrested. Officers' motor car patrols started.

*April 19th*.—1st Duke of Wellingtons arrived.

*April 20th*.—Cavalry sent to Padhana to bring in Sardar Jewan Singh.

Flying column in motor cars to Kamoke.

*April 21st*.—Troops relieved of armoured train duty and escorts found from Sappers and Miners. Village of Wagah fined Rs. 950.

*April 23rd*.—Cavalry sent to Padhana. Nine arrests made.

*April 27th*.—Column in motor cars sent to Wagah to collect their fine which was overdue. Fine was paid.

*April 30th*.—Nothing to report.

The guard of one non-commissioned officer and six men of the 1st South Lanc. Regiment on Royal Air Force was discontinued.

Officers' daily motor car patrols discontinued.

Martial Law order No. 32 was issued by Officer Commanding, Lahore Civil, fixing the prices of wheat and salt. General Officer Commanding, 16th (Indian) Division, accompanied by Officer Commanding, Lahore Civil, visited posts in the city. Arrangements are being made for the strengthening of these posts with sandbag defences, etc.

18-00 hours.—All quiet in Area.

*May 1st*.—Nothing to report.

Daily location statement discontinued, but orders have been sent to units concerned to submit same on 10th, 20th and 30th of each month.

Detachment of 20 Rifles of Indian Defence Force at Lahore Junction Railway Station was relieved by 2-10th Jats. Detachment of Jats at Pumping Station commanded by an Indian officer and not by British officer, as formerly.

2-35th Sikhs guard at Lahore Junction Railway Station relieved. The policing of the station to be done by the 2-10th Jats. Two cars sent to Officer Commanding, Kasur, for use there.

Orders issued to Officer Commanding, 1-124th Baluchistan Infantry, to relieve the 2-10th Jats of all detachments in the Lahore Civil Area, Lahore Junction Station and Mughalpura, beginning on 5th May 1919.

*May 2nd, 06-00 hours*.—All quiet.

Martial Law No. 4 was issued by General Officer Commanding, 43rd Infantry Brigade, fixing prices of atta, wheat, cow's milk, buffalo's milk and ghee.



Continued.]

Major-General Sir W. BAYBOK.

Martial Law No. 5 was issued by General Officer Commanding, 43rd Infantry Brigade, ordering no shopkeepers, dealers or retailers from refusing to sell goods, the price of which was laid down in Martial Law No. 3.

British officers of 2-12th Pioneers and 2-35th Sikhs commanding Cantonment, East and West Station, withdrawn, and placed by reliable Indian officers.

18-00 hours.—All quiet.

May 3rd.—All quiet.

Guards on canal bridges discontinued from to-day.

2-35th Sikhs ordered to take over aeroplane shed guard on the 5th to relieve 2-10th Jats.

A Flying column under Major Braide for propaganda work left Lahore Cantonment in cars 15-00 hours.

Strength of column was one British officer and 50 other ranks, 1st South Lanc. Regiment two British Officers, one Indian officer, 50 Indian other ranks, 2-35th Sikhs, one Civil officer Shanker Dass and Honorary Captain Tammega Singh. Column proceeded to rendezvous at Luliani arriving at 17-00 hours.

Durbar held at Public Works Department Rest House at 18-00 hours. Shankar Das and Honorary Captain Jamneja Singh talked at considerable length and had an obvious effect on Durbar. On being asked for grievances, the following were forthcoming. Existence of wine shop which attracted *badmashes*, who under influence of drink, spread rumours. Requested removal of wine shop. High prices complained of.

Column bivouacked the night 3-4 at Public Works Department Rest House compound. Column left Luliani early the 4th for Raja Jang.

Durbars being held in village of Duftu Satoke Mir Muhammad. The addresses made by Shankar Das and Honorary Captain Jamneja Singh had great effect. These two men have done good work. Attitude of all villages respectful and loyal. Entrained column at Raja Jang at 11-30 hours, and arrived Cantonment about 12-30 hours, 4th instant.

Arrangements are being made with Deputy Commissioner for pensioned Indian officers and Civil Officers of good local standing to tour round the Brigade Area to distribute propaganda and explain Rowlatt Bill, etc.

A Martial Law order has been published in Lahore Brigade Area to the effect that any shopkeepers who sold those goods for which nerrick rates have been fixed before the fixing of the rates shall now continue to do so.

The men of the 1st Duke of Wellingtons that were accommodated in the Forman College moved to Patiala and Research blocks of Medical College yesterday.

Aeroplane guard, Indian Station Hospital, Water-Works picquet, E., of aerodrome, of 1-124th Baluchis relieved by the 2-10th Jats.

18-00 hours.—All quiet.

May 4th.—06-00 hours.—All quiet.

A Sadhu arrested on 3rd instant for travelling without a ticket from Cantonment West to Montgomery was arrested at Montgomery.

The Officer Commanding, Montgomery, has been ordered to send the Sadhu to Area Officer, Lahore, under escort.

18-00 hours.—All quiet.

## APPENDIX II.

*Copy of a message received by aeroplane from the Officer Commanding, Amritsar, to the General Officer Commanding, 16th Division, Lahore, dated the 11th April 1919.*

Two Seditious, Dr. Kitchlew and Dr. Satyapal, were arrested by the civil authorities at 10-00 hours on 10th April 1919.

The Military were warned and asked to give necessary protection in case of trouble. Picquets were immediately sent out and posted to command approaches to railway station, civil lines and cantonment. Trouble started at about 11-30 hours by the mob endeavouring to break

through to the civil lines, this was stopped by the mob having to be fired on and driven back at 12-10 hours and held in check. Casualties among mob as reported by C. I. D. about eight killed, number wounded unknown at present. Mob then returned to city and there looted and burnt the National and Alliance Banks and set the Town Hall on fire and I regret to have to report murdered Messrs. Stewart, Scott and Thomson of the above Banks, also acting Sergeant Rowlands of the Military Works and Guard Robinson of the North-Western Railway. Before leaving the vicinity of the railway station the mob set fire to an outstanding goods shed where the last two mentioned Europeans were killed. At about 15-00 hours a troop special containing 280 Gurkhas on its way to Peshawar was detained and 100 of the Gurkhas armed from the Fort and utilised to reinforce the existing picquets who were thus enabled to hold the Mob till the arrival of reinforcements from Lahore at 21-30 under my command. On my arrival I found all quiet and immediately proceeded to patrol city with my detachment from Lahore and brought in the remains of the three Bank officials murdered during the day and also released four other civilians held up in the City. Relieved picquets of Gurkhas, Somersets and Ammunition column. Found all quiet in City. Night remained quiet. At 05-15 hours troop special under command of Major Clarke arrived from Jullundur with 1 British officer, and 100 ranks—Londons—2 British officers and 130 ranks, 151st and 1 British officer and 100 ranks, 59th together with military officer and staff. Parties from these latter details were sent out on arrival to relieve picquets and remainder posted at exits to City. Two aeroplanes flew over City at 7 A.M. Armoured train with 2 British officers and 34 men arrived from Lahore at 09-00 hours. Party of 1 British officer and 20 Gunners arrived at 10-30.

## APPENDIX III.

*Copy of the Secret Report by Brigadier-General R. E. Dyer, Commanding 45th Infantry Brigade, on the operations from the 11th April 1919 to 14th April 1919.*

I arrived here on night of 11th April, and the same night went through the City to bring the Inspector of Police in charge of the city to personally hear what he had to say. After consultation with the Deputy Commissioner and Police officials, I determined, with a view to showing the inhabitants that I had a sufficient military force to force them to law and order, and also to arrest certain ring-leaders.

I marched through the City in force next day. This was carried out between 12-00 hours and 15-00 hours on 12th April.

I was aware that the inhabitants had been warned that they were not to hold meetings or gatherings and that if they did so they would be fired on. To further enforce my wishes, a Proclamation was proclaimed on morning 13th by beat of drum in many of the main streets of the city, warning the inhabitants that unlawful acts would be punished by Military force. On my way back from the city I was informed that the disaffected characters in the City had ordered a meeting in the Jallianwala Bagh at 16-30 hours. I did not think this meeting would take place in the face of what I had done.

At 16-00 hours I received a report from police that a gathering was beginning in the place mentioned above.

I immediately sent picquets to hold various gates of City, and with 25 Rifles, 9th Gurkhas and 25 Rifles from detachments of 54th Sikhs, F. F., and 59th Rifles, F. F., making a total of 50 rifles and also 40 Gurkhas armed with kukris. Two armoured cars also accompanied this party. I entered the Jallianwala Bagh by a very narrow lane which necessitated leaving my armoured cars behind.

On entering I saw a dense crowd estimated at about 5,000, a man on a raised platform addressing the audience and making gesticulations with his hands.

Major-General Sir W. BRYNOR.

[Continued.]

I realised that my force was small and to hesitate might induce attack. I immediately opened fire and dispersed the crowd. I estimate that between 200 and 300 of the crowd were killed; my party fired 1,650 rounds.

I returned to my Headquarters about 18-00.

At 22-00 I, accompanied by a Force, visited all my piquets and marched through the city in order to make sure that my orders as to inhabitants not being out of their houses after 20-00, had been obeyed. The city was absolutely quiet and not a soul to be seen. I returned to Headquarters at midnights. The inhabitants have asked permission to bury the dead in accordance with my orders. This I am allowing.

APPENDIX IV.

*Given out Morning Eleventh to several citizens. Handed over to the General Officer Commanding, 45th Brigade, and signed by the Deputy Commissioner, midnight 11th-12th April 1919.*

The troops have orders to restore order in Amritsar and to use all force necessary.

No gathering of persons nor processions of any sort will be allowed.

All gatherings will be fired on.

Any persons leaving the city in groups of more than four will be fired on.

Respectable persons should keep indoors.

(Sd.) MILES IRVING,  
D. C.

AMRITSAR :

*The 11th April 1919.*

APPENDIX V.

*Proclamation copy.*

The inhabitants of Amritsar are hereby warned that if any property is destroyed or other outrages committed in the vicinity of Amritsar it will be taken that excitement to perform these acts originates from Amritsar City and such measures will be taken by me to punish the inhabitants of Amritsar according to Military Law.

All meetings and gatherings are hereby prohibited and I mean to take action in accordance with Military Law to forthwith disperse all such assemblies.

(Sd.) R. E. DYER, C.B., Bdr.-Genl.,  
Commanding Jullundur Brigade.

*Dated 13th April 1919.*

APPENDIX VI.

*Copy of aerial reconnaissance report from 15-10 hours. 14th April 1919 to 15-40 hours 14th April 1919.*

Time.	Place.	Observation.
15-10	Gujranwala	Railway Station on fire bales of goods on platform burning. Passenger train in station, Up Line, on fire. English Church and four houses in the Civil Lines on the East of Railway burning. All these were still burning at 15-30 hours.

Time.	Place.	Observation.
15-20	Gujranwala	Dropped three bombs on party of natives, 150 strong outside village about two miles north-west of Gujranwala. One bomb failed to explode. The others fell near party which scattered. 3 casualties seen, 50 rounds machine gun fired into village.
15-30	"	Party of 50 natives outside village about 1 mile south of above village, 2 bombs dropped, only one exploded within 10 yards of party. No casualties were seen, 25 rounds machine gun fired into village. Party dispersed into village.
15-36	"	About 200 natives in the fields near a large red building on north-west outskirts of town. One bomb dropped which burst in courtyard of house; several people appeared to be wounded, 30 rounds machine gun fired into party who took cover in house.
15-40	"	2 bombs, which failed to burst, dropped on large crowd of natives in centre of town. 100 rounds machine gun fired into parties of natives in the streets. At 15-40 when machine left for Lahore no natives could be seen in streets. At 15-40 Station occupied by police.

(Sd.) D. H. M. CARBERY, Captain,  
Observer.

APPENDIX VII.

*Report of Captain W. M. Maud, 1-4th Queens (R. W. S. Regiment), on strike at Bahawalnagar, dated 17th April 1919.*

Under orders received from the General Officer Commanding, 44th Brigade, at 10-00 hours on the 15th instant, I proceeded to Ferozepore Cantonment station to take charge of troops, who were to proceed to Bahawalnagar by special train to rescue families at that place and endeavour to release trains that had been held up by strikers between Bhatinda and Bahawalnagar.

I arrived at Ferozepore station at about 10-30 hours and the troops consisting of 25 Rifles, 1 Lewis gun, 1-4th

*Continued.]*

Major-General Sir W. BRYNOR.

Queens and 25 Rifles, 1 Lewis gun, 2-15th Sikhs, arrived soon afterwards. A train was waiting for me consisting of 2 third class carriages and a brake van. I did not consider this sufficient for me to accomplish my object. I ordered material for repairing the permanent-way to be collected and accommodation to be provided for any families which I might find it necessary to bring back to Ferozepore. I also ordered gangs of platelayers, which I was informed would join me at various stations along the line. Owing to the delay in the collecting of the material for the repairs for the permanent-way, I did not leave Ferozepore Cantonment until 12-30 hours.

At Ferozepore City a gang of 10 platelayers joined the train. I was informed that two further gangs of platelayers would join the train at Guru Har Sahai and a permanent-way Inspector at Fazilka. I reached Guru Har Sahai at 13-10 hours, where I had to wait some time to get a clear line to Jallalabad. A gang of 9 platelayers joined the train here, the second gang not being available. I left Guru Har Sahai at 13-26 hours and arrived at Jallalabad at 13-55 hours. I again had a stop at this station as the Station Master had allowed a train to Macleod Ganj to precede my troop special contrary to orders. I left Jallalabad at 14-11 hours and arrived at Fazilka 14-53 hours; reported to General Officer Commanding, 44th Brigade, that all was quiet up to this point. At Macleod Ganj which I reached at 15-50 hours all was quiet, and I was informed that the missing trains were between that station and Bahawalnagar; probably at Bahawalnagar. At Macleod Ganj I put an armed guard on to the engine, and rode on it myself as I had been informed that it was likely that permanent-way had been damaged.

I arrived at Bahawalnagar 17-00 hours without further incident. I noticed that the Telegraph wires had been cut at a short distance from the station and were being repaired. At Bahawalnagar I found Captain Watson in charge of the station and took over from him. Almost all the staff were on strike. After taking military precautions to safeguard the station, I interviewed the running staff and gave them one hour to resume work, and warned them that if they did not do so they would be dismissed. The running staff gathered in a crowd on the northern side of the station. On the southern side of the station by the engine shed, I found the Loco. staff and a large number of citizens from Bahawalnagar City. These I dispersed without trouble. I gave the Loco. staff one hour to return to work under penalty of dismissal, and a good many of them returned within the time specified. The Europeans, women and children, who were in a bungalow, near the station under a guard of Indian Defence Force, I brought to the station as soon as possible. At 21-15 hours communication with Bhatinda was restored. In the meantime, I had been making preparations to send the three passenger trains to their destinations at Samasata and Bhatinda respectively, sufficient drivers of the Loco. staff having agreed to resume work to enable me to get them away. About this time, I received a report that the State people intended to shoot at any train leaving for Samasata and Bhatinda at the distant signal. On receipt of this report the drivers who promised to take the trains to their destinations refused to do so. I compelled a driver to take an engine to the distant signal on the Samasata side under an armed guard. On the way a number of the permanent-way staff left their quarters which were alongside the line and came towards the train. I dispersed these without trouble. I was able to go past the distant signal and return to the station without further interference. I then despatched the 2 trains to Samasata as one train, Captain Watson and Sergeant Major Eah, who were armed with revolvers riding on the engine, and guard being armed with a rifle belonging to the Indian Defence Force.

As communication with Samasata had not been restored, I handed a message to Captain Watson to the Political Agent of Bahawalpur, informing him of the report of the attitude of the State people and asking him to come as soon as possible.

Captain Watson promised to despatch this as soon as possible. Later on, I took the same precaution of proceeding to the distant signal on the Bhatinda side of Bahawalnagar before despatching the Bahawalnagar train. All was quiet. On my return by different line to the one I had gone out on, I found that two sleepers had been laid across the line. I despatched the train at Bhatinda with a guard of 1 non-commissioned officer and 6 men of the 30th P. I. who had been sent from Bhatinda the day before with orders to return as soon as possible.

The Station Master informed me that he had received a report that the detachment of the 30th P. F. had said that they would not fire if they were ordered to do so. I could not verify this, but give it for what it is worth.

On the 16th instant about 9-00 hours, the permanent-way staff arrived at the station, and asked to resume work. I told them that they were no longer servants of the Railway Company, and that they would not be permitted to do so and would be turned out of their quarters within one hour, but that any striker who would give me the names of those who had cut the wires within that hour would be permitted to resume work. I gave the same promise to the Loco. staff. At 10-00 hours the permanent-way staff refused to give me the names of those who had damaged the wires, and I therefore turned out all who had taken part in the strike. They left quietly. The tehsildar of Bahawalnagar came to see me about 09-00 hours, and after some difficulty I induced him to promise that a guard of responsible citizens should be sent over to the station by 15-00 hours that day, who would guarantee the safety of lives and property there. I endeavoured to secure evidence as to who had been responsible for the cutting of the telegraph wires, but was unable to obtain any definite information. The Station Master reported that he could identify the following three men as having put a trolley on the line with the object of derailing any outgoing train:—

1. Abdul Hakim, Booking Clerk.
2. Ram Lal, Train Cleaner.
3. Ganga Ram, Guard.

I had these men arrested and put them under an armed guard. At 16-40 the Tehsildar brought the following citizens in compliance with his promise to me:—

1. Mohamed Khan, Zamindar (Landlord).
2. Ulwar Khan, Zamindar (Landlord).
3. Ahmed Khan, Zaildar.
4. Chaudari Iman Din, Municipal Commissioner.
5. Mukhti Atma Ram, Municipal Commissioner.
6. Seth Dev Karam, Municipal Commissioner.

I ordered Sergeant Linton to take charge of those who were left at the station, as I decided that it was then safe to return to Ferozepore. Sergeant Linton had the following under his command:—

- 1 Police Havildar and 10 men armed.
- 5 State policemen, unarmed.
- 1 Sub-Inspector and five men Railway Police unarmed.
- 16 men of the Indian Defence Force with 20 rifles and 4,000 rounds of ammunition.

These together with the citizens of Bahawalnagar I consider will be sufficient to safeguard the property and lives of those who remained behind.

Just before I left, a train from Samasata arrived bringing the President of the Council of Regency, Bahawalpur, who promised to go to the city and take steps to keep the inhabitants quiet. Just before he arrived I received a telegram with reference to the Proclamation of Martial Law over the North Western Railway. The Tehsildar had already explained this to the citizens and station staff, and the President promised to give publicity to it in the City. I left Bahawalnagar at about 18-30 hours and arrived at Ferozepore without further incident, bringing with me as prisoners the above mentioned men who were identified in connection with the trolley incident, also seven women and sixteen children, the remainder had elected to remain behind.

Major-General Sir W. BRYNON.

*[Continued.]*

## APPENDIX VIII.

*Brief resumé of operations of Armoured Trains from the 30th March to 4th May 1919.*

Between the 10th and 15th April, at which date armoured trains were taken over by the C. B. A., Nos. 1 and 8 Armoured trains appear to have been engaged in the neighbourhood of Amritsar and Kasur under the orders of the Officer Commanding, Amritsar. Several wires appear to have been cut between Amritsar and Kasur and a special goods train was derailed at Chheharta on the main line between Amritsar and Lahore on the night of the 12th-13th, where a complete section of both lines had been removed bodily from the track.

On the following night No. 1 Armoured train was derailed near Wagah Station from a similar cause.

Night running of trains in the affected areas was then discontinued until early in May.

The C. B. A., 16th (Indian) Division, took over control of the Armoured trains on 15th and opened an office at Lahore Junction Railway Station.

No. 2 Armoured train was sent up from Karachi to Multan.

Three improvised trains were also assembled and two others kept in reserve at Lahore with engines in steam facing in either direction.

Two companies of Railways Sappers and Miners were obtained from Sialkot for escorts and repair work, and six machine guns and personnel from 288th Machine Gun Company.

On the 16th a passenger train was stopped and looted at Chuharkana and some stations and portions of the permanent-way damaged in this locality.

Chuharkana village was entered and the rioters fired upon by the escorts of Nos. 1 and 3 trains, causing some casualties and bringing in 22 prisoners.

An improvised train was also despatched next day to arrest one of the leaders of the riots but failed to do so, but a mob was fired on in the village of Padiawala through which the man they were seeking escaped and four were killed, some injured and eight prisoners taken.

Other prisoners and hostages were taken on the 18th there.

Trouble was also experienced at this time at Changa Manga.

The two heavily armoured trains, Nos. 1 and 3, were returned to the workshops and No. 2 returned to Karachi, and the Armoured train service was reorganized on 18th. Six lighter trains were improvised and stationed—No. 1, Ludhiana, No. 2, Bhatinda, No. 3, Multan, No. 4, Lyallpure, No. 5, Lahore, No. 6 in reserve at Lahore. These were manned by Sappers and Miners and in some cases machine guns according to the needs of the moment, and each train, except No. 6, given a definite area of operations.

From this date the trouble had largely abated and occasional outbreaks were dealt with as they occurred, and in each case the adjoining villages were made to find patrols and held responsible for the safety of sections of the line.

Two additional trains were organized by the Officer Commanding, Jullundur, which on discovering were placed under General Officer Commanding, Armoured trains, and one of these took over the area of No. 1 train which went to Multan and relieved the Multan train which was brought in and dispersed on 26th.

On the 28th Nos. 2 and 3 were brought in to Lahore and dispersed and No. 1 again placed under orders of Officer Commanding, Jullundur.

From this time onwards two armoured trains were held in readiness to move at one hour at Lahore and had not been required up to the date of this report.

G. E. BARFORD, *Captain, R. F. A.;*  
for *Brigadier-General,*  
*Commanding Armoured Trains, Lahore,*

LAHORE CANTT.  
10th May 1919.

## APPENDIX IX.

*Copy of Memorandum No. 172-C., dated 18th April 1919, from the Officer Commanding, 1-24th North-Western Railway Battalion, Indian Defence Force, to Headquarters, 16th Indian Division.*

I forward herewith a copy of a report by Captain S. P. Flowerdew, 1-24th North-Western Railway Battalion, Indian Defence Force, for your information.

H. G. NORMAN WHITE, *Lieut.-Col.*  
*Commanding, 1-24th North-Western Railway Battalion,*  
*Indian Defence Force.*

As ordered I proceeded with 1 non-commissioned officer and 14 men by special train leaving Lahore at 11-42 hours on 17th April 1919 and arriving at Chuharkana at about 13-00 hours. I found no civil authorities at the railway station so pushed on about a mile to Chuharkana village where I met Armoured Train No. 1 (Captain Joscelyne) and the Sub-Divisional Officer (Magistrate) who had with him a Sub-Inspector and few details of civil police.

I was told the man to be arrested had fled from his village (Chuharkana) the day before and was camping at a well about 2 miles further on. We set out with the Sub-Inspector in the direction of the well but were seen by the fugitive from about half a mile and could not overtake the party.

Fire was opened and one of the party was killed in a wheat field. The main body was chased into a village named Padiawala about 3 miles further on and we entered this village from the south, posting four men to stop exit from the north. We took eight men from the village who were all concealed in houses locked from outside and were said by an informant to have been in the mob that burnt Chuharkana station. Among the prisoners was Fauza Singh, Sepoy of 3rd Guides, on leave from Mardan.

Ram Singh had passed through Padiawala and fled, probably on horseback, before we arrived. He is an ex-sepoy.

On returning to the line I found Sergeant Davies, D. L. I., who had gone off after another party. He reported that in following up a party of the group from the well he had run into an armed party some of whom were mounted. It seems that two men were armed with rifles and two with guns. Sergeant Davies killed three of this party but their arms were taken away by their servants. He also killed one other man in following them.

Sergeant Davies had taken four prisoners, two of whom were strongly suspected by the police and the other two were released.

The number of others hit is not known but several were seen with wounds.

The Magistrate did not require any further assistance and as there was a party of 100 Gurkhas from Abbottabad at Chuharkana I returned to Lahore with 8 prisoners taken by my party and also 3 handed over by Captain Joscelyne.

The Magistrate informed me that Ram Singh was in the front of the rioters but the most important ringleaders are—

1. Teja Singh, son of Pertab Singh, Chuharkana.
2. Kartar Singh of Jabba, Manager, Khalsa High School, Chuharkana.
3. Sohon Singh, son of Bagwan Singh of Kaloki.
4. Mehar Din, Blacksmith of Kaloki.
5. Syed Nahal Shah, Fakir.

S. P. FLOWERDEW, *Captain,*  
*1-24th North-Western Railway Battalion,*  
*Indian Defence Force.*

The 17th April 1919.

Continued.]

Major-General Sir W. BAYTON.

## APPENDIX X.

*Copy of a Memorandum No. 171-A.-Confidential, dated 15th April 1919, from the Officer Commanding, North-Western Railway Battalion, Indian Defence Force, Lahore, forwards report in triplicate from the Officer Commanding, No. 1 Armoured Train, for the period the train operated in the Amritsar Area, viz., from 11th April 1919 to 14th April 1919, received 17th April 1919.*

*Begins.*—Copy of the wire, dated 14th April 1919, from Captain A. H. Joscelyne, Officer Commanding, No. 1 Armoured Train (at Wagah), to the Brigade Major, Amritsar, copy to Officer Commanding, 1-24th Battalion, North-Western Railway Rifles, Lahore.

As directed, Armoured Train No. 1 was taken out from Amritsar to patrol the line to Atari and pilot the down mail through. It left Amritsar at 22-20 hours. All was well up to Atari, the report showing that nothing unusual had occurred or was expected. On arrival at Atari the Station Master and Inspector of Police reported that nothing had so far occurred but that they were expecting a raid by a mob of villagers and that they had reason to believe that this mob was already near the line not far above Atari, between there and the next station Wagah, as they had heard shouting from that direction. All being quiet at Atari, the armoured train therefore proceeded to Wagah and on from there to Jallo, the next station. Nothing unusual was seen, heard or ascertained. Consequently I wired from Jallo to Lahore, about midnight to start the mail, intending to patrol line back to Atari in front of it and then pilot it through to Amritsar one section ahead. When this wire had been sent we tried to get line clear back to Wagah, but failed. I therefore got permission to proceed without line clear. Just as we were starting 17 Up Passenger train entered Jallo and the driver stopped us. He reported that Wagah Station had just been fired and that the mob, about 250 strong, had tried to rush his train but he has slipped through. I therefore wire back to Lahore Cantonment to stop the mail there or at Lahore and proceeded at once to Wagah; it was found to be burning but nothing more was seen and no one was visible even by the careful use of the search light. I therefore proceeded to Atari to see whether all was well there. Finding all was well there, and we were running short of water in the Engine, I decided to go back as far as Lahore Cantonment to definitely detain the mail as it was not safe for it to proceed, take water and then return to Atari to pilot 41 Up Passenger then on the road and other goods trains from Atari to Jallo. Unfortunately just before reaching Wagah the armoured train was derailed although proceeding with all caution due to a complete rail length of permanent-way having been lifted bodily out of the track. This was between 1 and 2 hours and was the third time we had passed over this section within an hour. The three leading vehicles, viz., the mine exploding unit, the machine gun unit and the 12-pounder gun were badly derailed but no one was injured. I took steps to protect the train and on examination found that a start had been made to cut the other line also but that the job had evidently been interrupted. I tried to get communication with Lahore or Amritsar by tapping the wire but failed, between 2 and 3 hours an engine and brake van arrived from Lahore with two British officers and forty rank and file, news of the burning of Wagah having been given by the driver, 17 Up in Lahore. I reported the facts to them and they decided to return to Lahore leaving one officer and forty rank and file at Jallo, the other officer going through to Lahore to report the facts. About 6-0 hours the S. W. I. arrived and restored through running on the other (the up line), about 3-30 hours another train arrived from Lahore with a crane, break-down staff, a section of Cooly Corps and some Indian Infantry to assist in clearing the line. This work is now in progress and I hope that the line will be cleared by this evening. I propose then to proceed to Lahore with the damaged vehicles to get them repaired. The repairs to them will take a week. Through running

on the down line should be restored this evening. The telegraph wires were also badly cut in several places between Jallo and Wagah and Atari. The S. W. I. reported on his arrival that the down line had been cut in a second place, about a mile and half away from where the armoured train had derailed towards Atari. This was done after the armoured train had passed the spot and derailed. The mob evidently hid in the crops on either side of the line as the armoured train passed and then got to work as soon as all was clear. It was all done within about an hour during which the armoured train had passed three times over the section. Wagah was not badly burnt, the mob evidently having been interrupted by the armoured train. The mob was apparently trying to get to the mail which was prevented and also possibly the burning of Atari was prevented by the arrival of the armoured train.

## APPENDIX XI.

*Copy of Memorandum No. B. M.-116, dated 19th April 1919, from General Officer Commanding, 43rd Infantry Brigade, to Headquarters, 16th (Indian) Division.*

I forward herewith copy of Lieutenant-Colonel Bourne's report on the flying column.

F. BROADHEAD, Captain,  
for Brigadier-General,  
Commanding 43rd Infantry Brigade.

*Copy of a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel W. K. Bourne, Commanding 2-35th Sikhs, to Headquarters, 43rd Infantry Brigade, No. B. C.-6, dated Lahore Cantonment, the 19th April 1919.*

In accordance with the instructions received, the flying column, 50 Cavalry under Major Stuart, 17th Cavalry, I Section, Howitzer R. F. A., 200 men, 2-35th Sikhs, 12 men, 2-12th Pioneers, moved on the 16th and investigated villages as below:—

1. *Sahajpal*.—No direct evidence, but it is near the places where Grass Farm stacks were burnt. One lambardar and 3 pattadars were sent in to 43rd Brigade Office for enquiry.

2. *Bhangali*.—Nine men were arrested on the evidence of a Grass Farm Inspector, and a Grass Farm Chowkidar. One of these, Nawab, is a Grass Farm Chowkidar himself, but is strongly suspected of participation. At any rate he knows a great deal but will not give it away. One Bur Singh, Jat Sikh, a big powerful man, is supposed to be the chief. He and one son, Mian Singh, were arrested. Orders for the arrest of another son, Wadhawa Singh, were given to the Police Sub-Inspector of Barki. The lambardar, Jaggat Singh, was also arrested.

3. *Ghavindi, close to Bhangali*.—There are about 15 or 16 men living in the village, 6 of them were identified by the Grass Farm Chowkidar and arrested.

4. *Barki*.—Four men were identified and arrested. The evidence in the case of all these men, except Nawab and the Lambardar, Jaggat Singh, is the same, viz., Uderaj Singh, Grass Farm Chowkidar, certified that he recognised these men as having trespassed on the Grass Farm, having diverted Government water and prevented Government coolies from working. They had stated that the Grass Farm no longer belonged to the Sarkar. There is no direct evidence against the Lambardars, but Ram Chand, Grass Farm Inspector, stated that on the evening of the 13th he saw a large number of men moving from the direction of Bhangali and Barki towards the Grass Farm where the fire took place.

5. *Hudiana*.—The lambardars would give no evidence for some time. Two were kept for the night and were brought to Atari on the 17th. The others then arrived there and gave names of 7 men who had been seen moving on the evening of the 13th in the direction of Barki. The name of the man who gave this evidence is Jhand Singh.

Major-General Sir W. BAYNON.

[Continued.]

Orders were given to the Sub-Inspector Ghulam Hussain of Barki to arrest these 7 men and send them into Lahore.

6. *Padhana*.—Was visited on the morning of the 17th. Of the 14 lambardars there, only two appeared. There is a Municipal Council there, but only two of these were found. The chief man in the village is Sardar Bahadur Jiwan Singh, Honorary Magistrate. He had been in Lahore and arrived while I was there. His manner on arrival was casual, but I put it down to fatigue at the time. As my enquiry proceeded his manner became more and more off-hand and was almost insolent. I had to speak to him of this. He expressed his intention of making an enquiry, but said he could not produce any evidence at the moment. I therefore left instructions with him that he was to make enquiries at once and to send the results of such enquiry with all the lambardars in charge of his son to me at Atari that evening. This was done, and evidence was given on the evening of the 13th, a drum was beaten in Padhana, orders given for the meeting of an unlawful assembly and the closing of shops on the 14th. Nine men were therefore arrested and sent in, including a lambardar who was a ringleader and two others in whose patts these occurrences took place. Orders have been given for the arrest of two others against whom there was evidence.

The whole tone of Padhana was bad. I only learnt afterwards that some schoolboys jeered when the officers and troops were passing. Sardar Bahadur Jiwan Singh, his son, and the Municipal Commissioners professed ignorance of what was happening in their own village and showed little anxiety to assist. I consider Jiwan Singh is unfit for his position and his honours, and should be deprived of both.

7. *Atari*.—Only one of the chief men was present in the place. He expressed himself as thoroughly loyal and anxious to help, and it seemed impossible to obtain any evidence. He stated, I believe truly, that no outrage has taken place in that Thana. They had all been sent for by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police and the Commissioner at Amritsar, and had attended. No charge was made against them.

8. *Wagah*.—One lambardar and one candidate for Safed Posh were present. No evidence was forthcoming. The Safed Posh candidate was just going in to the Commissioner at Lahore and was therefore left free. The lambardar, Ras Singh, was arrested and brought in. The village is within a few hundred yards of the station, and the burning of the station must have been known.

9. *Wagah Station*.—The gangmen who work there come from several villages round Wagah, Sahnke and Narwar, and were in these villages on the night of the 13th, as it was a holiday. The crowd who burnt the station came from the direction of Narwar, and Sahnke is close by. This is the evidence of the Assistant Station Master, Fazal Haq, who comes from Kasur.

10. *Narwar*.—The Zaildar and lambardars were present as they were told the evidence was strong, and they denied all knowledge, they were given 10 minutes to produce evidence. Failing that I told them I would have them beaten. They refused to give evidence and two lambardars and 4 others were beaten by a sowar by my order. I then gave them 10 minutes again and as they still refused, I arrested the Zaildar, two lambardars and five others and brought them in.

11. *Jallo*.—All the Zaildars and lambardars of the neighbouring villages, including Manawan, Harbanspura, Tera, etc., were present waiting for a magistrate from Lahore, who was going to arrange for the responsibility of the various villages for the line for patrolling, and so on. These again denied all knowledge. As the magistrate was just coming, I told them I would not arrest any of them, but I said what I had done at Narwar, and that if they did not give the evidence to the magistrate I should probably return and deal more strictly.

12. The names of the individuals arrested and the charges against them have been given by Mr. Penhearow to the Cantonment Inspector of Police, to whom the prisoners were sent.

13. The column did three long marches, more than 20 miles on the first two days and 18 on the third. As the infantry had been doing no regular marching, this was a very high test, but the marching was very good throughout. There were a certain number of cases of blisters, but on the third morning there were only 7 men unfit to march.

14. Local supplies were obtained, but only with some delay. The non-commissioned officer in charge of supplies told me he could have obtained supplies more quickly, though perhaps at a higher rate, if he could have bought himself, in the open market, but his orders on starting were to spend as little money as possible. As men and horses had long hard days, I consider efficiency would have been better maintained by prompt supplies even though the cost were enhanced.

15. The whole district was absolutely quiet and there was no question of resistance, but I think the display of force had a very decided effect, except perhaps at Padhana which would be all the better for another visit, and some severity.

W. K. BOURNE, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding, *Flying Column*.

APPENDIX XII.

*Copy of report by Officer Commanding Ferozepore moveable column, dated Ferozepore, the 13th April 1919 to the 1st May 1919.*

(A) STRENGTH OF FORCE.

1 troop Cavalry (23rd and 17th Cavalry).  
1 section, 1094th Battery, Royal Field Artillery.  
1 company, 1-1st Kents.  
2 companies, 2-17th Infantry.  
1 company, 1-30th Punjabis.  
1 set Pack Wireless.

	B. O.'s	I.O.'s	B.O.R.'s	I.O.R.'s	
Combatants	24	12	170	490	} Approximate
Non-combatants	1	..	2	238	

(B) ROUTE TAKEN, WITH DIARY.

*Ferozepore, 13th April 1919.*

Column left 13th April 1919.

*Kasur, 14th April 1919.*

Column arrived 14th April 1919.

Two British officers and forty-nine British other ranks joined Column, also one pack Wireless Set.

*Staff*.—Major T. Pilditch, 1-1st Kent Battalion, took over duties of Brigade Major, and Captain W. Taylor, 2-17th Infantry, duties of Staff Captain to Column.

Mr. C. H. Malan, I.C.S., joined Column as Civil Officer. Instructions from Brigade notifying Martial Law proclaimed and defining policy to be adopted received.

*Khem Karan, 15th April 1919.*

Consultation between Officer Commanding Mobile Column and Officer Commanding Kasur.

Message received from the 44th Brigade to the effect that Martial Law had been proclaimed in Lahore and Amritsar on the 13th April 1919.

23rd Cavalry arrive from Kasur.

Message received from Division stating that 17th Cavalry arrive at Patti on 16th April 1919.

*16th April 1919.*

Martial Law proclaimed at Kasur and Khemkaran.

Three men suspected of seditious propaganda arrested and sent to Kasur. The principles of Martial Law and the Rowlatt Bill were explained to the leading inhabitants of the town.

One squadron 23rd Cavalry arrived, one troop Cavalry left to patrol railway from Kasur to Waltha.

Continued.]

Major-General Sir W. BETHON.

*Gharyala, 17th April 1919.*

All villages en route from Khem Karan visited and warned.

No arrests were made. A number of retired Indian officers were organised as a non-official intelligence corps, each officer being given an area.

One squadron of 23rd Cavalry and 100 rifles of the 2-17th Infantry sent to Kasur.

All precautions have been taken with regard to the health of the troops. The district appears quiet.

*18th April 1919.*

All villages concerned warned as to their responsibility for the safeguarding of the railway line.

Similar orders issued for putting and keeping in repair the *kucha* road between Khem Karan and Tarn Taran.

Written orders issued for the internment of seven bad characters of village Bhuranau.

*Patti, 18th April 1919.*

En route at mile 234-6, I inspected gate keeper's hut which had been broken into on the night 15th-16th April. Telegraph wires had also been cut in several places during the same night. Suspicion rests on Bishan Das, Aryasamajists of Chima and villages Chima, Thakar Kaura and Ghuslewar.

Orders have been issued for the arrests of Bishan Das and the Lambardars of these villages. I interrogated the principal inhabitants of Patti, regarding the occurrences of the 12th April. It appears that Durga Das, proprietor of "Waqt" (an Amritsar paper) lectured on the Rowlett Bill on the 5th and 6th April at the invitation of the local Aryasamajists. On the 6th *hartal* was observed for one day.

On the 12th instant a crowd of about 600 collected in the railway station, broke the gates of two level crossings, and cut telegraph wires. The inspector and sub-inspector, with two constables and twenty citizens, dispersed the mob.

Unsuccessful attempts were made to damage the line and goods shed. No other Government property was damaged. There no further incidents until the night 15th-16th April when telegraph wires were cut at the same place. Steps are being taken to deal with those implicated. At 16-30 hours a wire was received from Officer Commanding, Kasur, suggesting the arrest of certain people, and the search of a number of villages for bombs and arms.

*Kucha Pucca, 19th April 1919.*

At 6-00 hours I moved to Kucha Pucca, and arrested Bhagwan Singh and Bahadar Singh (under instructions from Kasur).

A detachment had been sent to Sundra for the arrest of Lal Singh, Bahadur Singh and Tara Singh. A complete search of the village was made.

I visited Mukhi Khur. The village was searched but nothing incriminating found. No arrests made.

*Patti, 19th April 1919.*

I then went to Kukhi Kilam where I warned the lambardars and returned to Patti.

There were no incidents at any of the villages.

The local sub-overseer, canals, informed me that the canal telegraph had been cut on the night 18th-19th April, within the limits of Mukhi Khur.

The lambardars were ordered to produce the offenders by the evening of the 20th. During the day's tour I seized the following articles at Kucha Pucca:—One tin trunk containing books and papers from Bhagwan Singh's house; papers and medicine powders from Bahadar Singh's house; one old regulation sword in another house.

On my return to Patti I wired Officer Commanding, Kasur, to send necessary information and witnesses in substantiation of arrests made at his suggestion.

Further investigations inclined me to believe that the evidence was groundless. If, however, there is any foundation for it, I consider that the papers seized should be examined by a competent officer of the C. I. D.

*20th, 21st April 1919.*

Arrests were made of men stated to be present at the riot and others concerned in it. At present there is no satisfactory evidence.

There would appear to be two factions in the town, one consisting of Mirza Beg, Honorary Magistrate, Mahmed Beg and three members of the notified arpa committee; the other of Rhamat Beg, Tulal Ram, Nathe and Mulk Raj.

Suspicion also seems to rest on the local Aryasamajists for initiating the riots. The minds of the ignorant classes had evidently been strongly influenced by the lectures of Durga Das on the 5th and 6th instant.

The following hostages were taken to Amritsar:—

1. Arura Ram.
2. Amir Chand.
3. Munshi Ram.
4. Pandit Devraj.
5. Nund Lal.
6. Bishin Das.
7. Bhagwan Singh.
8. Wadawar Singh.
9. Tara Singh.

1—5 were from Patti.

1, 3, 4 and 5 invited Durga Das.

2 was manager of the local Aryasamaj school.

6 spoke at one of the lectures and is suspected of participating in the damage done to railway at Thakar Khaura on 15th and 16th April.

7 was arrested on information received from Officer Commanding, Kasur.

8 was Bhagwan Singh's host at Kucha Pucca.

9 was arrested on information received from Officer Commanding, Kasur.

Durbar was held in Patti on morning of 21st April.

*Tarn Taran, 22nd April 1919.*

All quiet here.

Necessary arrests had been made by Civil authorities. Staff Captain R. A. Stubbings, 1-30th Punjab, took over duties of Staff Captain vice Captain W. Taylor, 2-17th Infantry, evacuated to Ferozepore sick.

*Amritsar, 23rd April 1919.*

Column arrived Amritsar and encamped in Ram Bagh gardens.

Took over part of Station guards. Message received from Division stating that Officers Commanding Columns are not to delegate their powers to Civil Officers.

*24th April 1919.*

Took over all train guards at Amritsar railway station. Nothing of importance to report.

*25th April 1919.*

Despatched by ration train one prisoner and documents under British escort to Kasur, and surplus ammunition to Ferozepore, under verbal instructions of the General Officer Commanding, 16th Division.

Despatched to Headquarters, 16th Division, registered list of retired Indian officers who had given the column their assistance between Waltoha and Tarn Taran.

*26th April 1919.*

Proclamation of the General Officer Commanding, 16th Division in vernacular read out to all Indian ranks. Mr. S. M. Jacob, I.C.S., reported for duty as Civil Officer to Column, vice Mr. Malan, I.C.S., sick in Lahore.

The latter was wired requesting that all notes in his possession relating to the work of the Column should be forwarded at once.

Major-General Sir W. BRYNOR.

[Continued.]

*Situation at Amritsar.*

General situation at Amritsar appeared to be as follows:—

The populace seemed overawed by recent military operations, and consequently were very respectful to all Europeans. This respect, however, which had been enforced, was given by a few very reluctantly; students especially still shewed signs of insolence. The general attitude of the people seemed to be sullen.

*Mianpur, 27th April 1919.*

All quiet in Mianpur.

17th Cavalry left with orders to have all exits to village of Sursingh closed by 05-30 hours. They were followed by fifty Infantry in bamboo carts.

*Sursingh, 28th April 1919.*

Two arrests made at Sursingh and one at Darajke.

Interviewed everybody possible, but could not find any connection between Sursingh and recent disturbances. General Officer Commanding, 45th Brigade, arrived by motor from Amritsar and held a durbar.

Orders received from 16th Division re despatch of 17th Cavalry to Lahore.

*Algun, 29th April 1919.*

All quiet here.

Instructions received from 44th Brigade that all animals should proceed by road from Khem Karan to Ferozepore, in addition to units detailed.

Column marched in two parties—(a) rail party, (b) road party from Algun.

*Khem Karan, 30th April 1919.*

Column arrived Khem Karan.

(a) party proceeding to railway station.

(b), party pitching camp.

Train party arrived Ferozepore.

*Ferozepore, 1st May 1919.*

Road party arrived Ferozepore.

(C) ORDERS ISSUED *en route* AND SCHEDULE OF PUNISHMENT INFLICTED.

(1) *Orders Issued.*

(a) Orders for seven bad characters of village Bhuranau to report to the Tahsildar at Khem Karan before leaving their village.

*18th April 1919.*

(b) Orders to all villages in the vicinity of the railway line, giving their responsibilities for the safety of the line and Government property.

(c) Orders to Gharyala to clean and mend the road in the vicinity of that place

(2) *Schedule of Punishments Inflicted.*

(a) No sentences of whipping were inflicted under my orders, and no cases were tried.

The disturbances which I investigated occurred before Martial Law was proclaimed, and further investigations of these cases were handed over to the Civil authorities.

(b) There were two fines of Rs. 1 each inflicted at Khem Karan on bullock drivers who took their bullocks away after being impressed.

(c) Altogether thirteen arrests as hostages were made and handed over with their papers to the Civil authorities. Twelve as leaders and seditionists.

One as being in possession of loot from Amritsar.

(D) MY OPINIONS WITH REGARD TO THE FOLLOWING ARE GIVEN BELOW.

(1) Loyalty of the District.

(2) Source from which seditionist propaganda spread.

(3) Value of *Anti-Seditionist Propaganda.*

(4) Use of Retired Indian Officers in Propaganda work.

(1) *Loyalty of the District.*

My impression as regards the loyalty of the district was that outside the larger towns, the country folk seemed contented. They were at the time busy cutting their crops, and did not appear interested in anything else. Most outlying villages had not even heard of the Rowlatt Bill.

I was impressed by the number of ex-soldiers in the villages who all assured me, as did all the retired Indian Officers, whom I called in from as many villages as possible that the villages were not at all unsettled. Some had heard of certain pernicious rumours, but those whom I interviewed were inclined to laugh at them.

On the other hand, the larger towns contained seditious elements, and my impression was that the education and seditious few had got hold of the lowest classes in the place, and it was the latter who were called on to create disturbances.

(2) *Source from which seditionist Propaganda spread.*

In my opinion the source of the propaganda was chiefly from Amritsar, and, in a lesser degree, and only in adjacent places, from Kasur, such as Khem Karan, where the damage done to the railway was apparently the work of men from Kasur. Propaganda was spread by emissaries sent out to lecture and by agents in the town itself, who keep in touch with leaders at Amritsar. I never heard Lahore mentioned in the district I traversed, except that they had heard of riots there. I also think that rumours only filter out to the agricultural classes through people who have heard them when visiting towns on business.

I suspected mendicants and fakirs, but I was assured that this was the exception rather than the rule, and I only came across one case of this description.

(3) *Value of anti-seditionist propaganda.*

I consider that most of the trouble was caused through lack of *anti-seditionist* propaganda and publicity. The populace seemed quite content at my explanations of affairs. I do not think I met a single case where the contents of the Rowlatt Bill were known. All that was known about it was that it was tyrannical. Platform speakers (seditionist) do not translate it when speaking, even when asked to. The local Indian civil authorities seem to be rather afraid or too apathetic to raise a voice in protest and, with a very few exceptions, were seditious themselves.

(4) *Use of retired Indian Officers in propaganda work*

In my opinion a great deal of good could be done by the judicious use of retired Indian Officers in propaganda work. Those I saw were very keen on it, and many asked for copies of the Rowlatt Act to start at once. They have been a great deal more in touch with Europeans in the shape of daily contact with their British Officers, and know their ways and sense of justice, better than the Civil Indian officials, who only see their British superiors when on tour at long intervals.

The old soldier sees through these rumours, and in some cases they had already refuted them in their villages. Their great complaint was, that the police would not allow them to have any standing or authority for fear that their (the police) "power" should be undermined.

APPENDIX XIII.

*Copy of a report of Moveable Column, Gurdaspur, Dhariwal, and Batala, from Brigadier-General, 45th Brigade, Amritsar, No. G.-16, dated 23rd April 1919, to Headquarters, 16th (Indian) Division, Lahore Cantonment.*

Report of Moveable Column, Gurdaspur, Dhariwal, and Batala—

\* \* \* \* \*



Continued.]

Major-General Sir W. BYRON.

The moveable column ordered in my No. 39, dated 19th April 1919, proceeded by train to Gurdaspur 09-00 hours on the 21st instant arriving at Gurdaspur at 11-15 hours.

They were met by the Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police, Gurdaspur district, at 12-00 hours, the column marched to the School where the Heads of Communities were collected and the General Officer Commanding addressed the meeting.

A list of pleaders and barristers, who had taken an active part in the *hartal*, Gurdaspur, was obtained from the Superintendent of Police; this was forwarded you under my No. P.-2, dated the 22nd April 1919, with a request that the licenses be suspended.

The column returned to the train and the General Officer Commanding and the Brigade-Major proceeded with a suitable escort by train to Pathankot to inspect the Gurkha detachment there. They returned 18-30 hours.

22nd April 1919.—Column proceeded by train to Dhariwal, and marched through the Bazaar at 09-00 hours, a meeting of Heads of Communities was held and the General Officer Commanding addressed the meeting. Five arrests of men who caused shops to be shut on the evidence of Mr. Armstrong, I. D. F., were made.

Also a Government servant who acted in an insolent manner was arrested.

These men are now confined in Fort Govindgarh.

Column left by train and arrived Batala 13-00 hours. Heads of Communities of Batala City were collected and addressed by the General Officer Commanding at 15-00 hours directly after the meeting another meeting was held of Lambardars and villagers, the column entrained at 16-00 hours and arrived Amritsar 17-15 hours.

(Sd.) H. C. BRIGGS, *Captain,*  
for *Brigadier-General, Commanding 15th*  
*Brigade.*

## APPENDIX XIV.

*Proclamation.*

Whereas Martial Law has been proclaimed and is in force in the districts of Lahore, Amritsar and Gujranwala, it is hereby notified that until further intimation, the following Regulations will be enforced within the limits of the 16th Indian Division in all places to which Martial Law has been or may be extended.

*No. 1.—Law and Tribunals.*

Martial Law has been declared subject to—

- (a) the maintenance of ordinary courts for ordinary offences, and
- (b) the establishment under the Martial Law Ordinance, 1919, of Special Tribunals for offences specified in section 2 of the Bengal State Offences Regulation, 1804.

The result of the establishment of Martial Law is that subject to the said Ordinance, plenary power is vested in the General Officer Commanding the Division of prescribing offences, penalties, courts and procedure in regard to all matters connected with or arising out of the present disturbances and of taking all measures and issuing all orders that he may deem necessary for the suppression of these disturbances. In the exercise of these powers the General Officer Commanding the Division is pleased to declare that a breach of any of the Regulations, Nos. 2-15 below, shall be deemed to be an offence.

*No. 2.—Offences. Rebellion, Aiding rebels and Endangering public safety.*

No person shall—

- (a) be actively in arms against His Majesty, or
- (b) directly incite others to take up arms against His Majesty, or

- (c) actively aid or assist the rebels, or
- (d) commit any overt act by which the safety of His Majesty's Forces or subjects is endangered.

*No. 3.—Assisting or harbouring rebels.*

No person shall assist or harbour rebels by giving them information, or by supplying them with shelter, food, drink, money, clothes, arms, ammunition, stores, luggage, or means of conveyance, or by assisting them in any way to evade apprehension.

*No. 4.—Failing to report rebels.*

Every person—

- (a) who receives information of gatherings or intended gatherings of rebels, or
- (b) who knows or has reason to believe that any of his relatives or dependents have joined or are about to join the rebels,

shall without delay give full information thereof to the nearest Military or Civil authority.

*No. 5.—Seditious language and publications.*

1. No person shall make use of any language with the intention either—

- (a) of raising or fomenting disaffection among His Majesty's subjects, or
- (b) of promoting hostility between different classes of such subjects.

2. No person shall print, publish, circulate or have in his possession any publications containing seditious articles or articles likely to promote disaffection or bad feeling.

*No. 6.—Protection of Railways, Canals and Telegraphs.*

No person shall (a) in any way interfere with the working of the railways or canals, (b) damage or tamper with any material or property connected with railways and canals, (c) damage or interfere with telegraph or telephone lines or apparatus or wireless telegraph installation, (d) tap with the intention of reading off messages any telegraph or telephone lines.

The attempt to commit or the abetment of any breach of this regulation shall be punished as a breach of the regulation.

*No. 7.—Control of Transport.*

1. No person shall, save under a proper permit, have in his possession any motor vehicle.

2. Every person using any such vehicle shall pass any guard or sentry at a speed not exceeding 6 miles an hour and shall stop the car if so ordered by any guard or sentry, and shall carry on such a vehicle a suitable light between the hours of sunset and sunrise.

These Regulations do not apply to Civil Officers of Government or to members of His Majesty's forces (Naval, Military or Air Force, Indian Defence Force or Police) in respect of any vehicles lawfully issued to them as such officers or members.

*No. 8.—Control of travelling and movements.*

No person shall, save under such conditions as may be prescribed, enter or leave this area or move to and fro within it.

*No. 9.—Control of meetings.*

No person shall, save under a proper permit, convene or attend any meeting of more than five persons, except in the case of—

- (a) a meeting *bond fide* held for religious purposes in an authorised place of worship;
- (b) a meeting of a Municipal Committee or any other similar public body;
- (c) a meeting of persons residing in one house and gathering in such house.

Major-General Sir W. BEYNON.

[Continued.]

*No. 10—Escaping.*

No person shall—

- (a) escape or attempt to escape from any prison or other custody in which he is for the time being confined or restrained under Martial Law, or
- (b) abet any other person in escaping or attempting to escape from any such prison or custody.

*No. 11—Disobeying and obstructing officers.*

No person shall—

- (a) disobey or neglect to obey any order given by any Military or Civil officer in the execution of his duty when administering Martial Law, or
- (b) obstruct, impede, or interfere in any manner with any Military or Civil officer or other person who is carrying out the orders of any authority administering Martial Law, or who is otherwise acting in the execution of his duty under Martial Law.

*No. 12—False news and reports.*

No person shall disseminate false intelligence which he knows to be false, or spread reports calculated to create alarm or despondency.

*No. 13—Defacing Martial Law notices.*

No person shall destroy, deface, or in any way tamper with any notice exhibited under Martial Law while such notice is in force.

*No. 14—Production of permits.*

Every person shall, when required to do so, give his correct name and address, and produce his permit or pass to any Military or Civil officer acting under the authority of these Regulations, or to any soldier, volunteer, or policeman in uniform.

*No. 15—Miscellaneous Offences.*

No person shall commit any act, or be guilty of any omission—

- (a) which is to the prejudice of good order of the public safety, or
- (b) which is calculated to mislead, or hamper the movements of, or imperil the success of His Majesty's Forces.

*No. 16—Penalties.*

Any person who contravenes any of the foregoing Regulations 2-15 (inclusive) shall be liable to trial by an officer authorised to dispose of an offence summarily under Martial Law. Such an officer may sentence an offender to imprisonment, rigorous or simple, which may extend to two years, or to fine not exceeding Rs. 1,000 or to both, and to six months' imprisonment in default of payment of fine, and may also inflict whipping in addition to, or in lieu of, any other punishment which he is empowered to inflict.

*No. 17—Arrest and Trials.*

(a) For every offence against these Regulations the offender may be arrested with or without warrant from any officer authorised to dispose of offences. For minor offences against these Regulations the offender will not necessarily be arrested, but may be summoned to appear before such officer.

(b) Whenever a person is summoned to appear or is arrested under Martial Law, the charge against him shall without unnecessary delay be investigated by an officer authorised to dispose of an offence summarily under Martial Law or by some officer deputed by him and not under the rank of Captain or, at his request, by a Civil Magistrate or by the police.

(c) The investigating officer will dismiss a charge brought before him if in his opinion the evidence does

not show that some offence under Martial Law has been committed, or if in his discretion he thinks the charge ought not to be proceeded with.

(d) At the conclusion of the hearing, if the investigating officer is of opinion that the charge ought to be proceeded with, he shall without unnecessary delay, either—

- (i) dispose of the case summarily, or
- (ii) in cases where he considers that the offence calls for a more severe punishment than he is empowered to inflict, refer the case to the Legal Remembrancer to the Punjab Government who, after considering the evidence, will decide whether to convene a Commission under the Martial Law Ordinance, 1919, for the disposal of the case or whether it should be remanded to the officer referring it for disposal or to any other officer exercising powers under these Regulations, or
- (iii) remand the accused in custody while further enquiries are being made.

In case (iii), if within reasonable time sufficient evidence is not forthcoming, the accused person shall be discharged.

*No. 18—Officers authorised to dispose of offences summarily under Martial Law.*

The districts in which Martial Law has been declared shall be divided up into areas and for each such area an officer or officers will be authorised to dispose of offences summarily under Martial Law. Such officers shall be known as Area Officers.

In addition to the Area Officers, every officer commanding a station or regiment, every Field Officer and every officer nominated by a General Officer Commanding a Brigade, by the Officer Commanding Lahore Civil Area or by the Local Government, is hereby authorised to dispose of offences summarily under Martial Law.

W. G. L. BEYNON, K.C.L.E., C.B., D.S.O.,  
Major-General,  
Commanding the 16th Indian Division.

The 19th April 1919.

## APPENDIX XV.

*Instructions for guidance of Officers administering Martial Law.*

The Form 5 Martial Law issued to all concerned is to be adhered to and a return to be sent in at 19 hours daily of offences tried during 24 hours ending 16 hours to each Area Headquarters, for submission to Administrator, Martial Law, 16th Division. In connection with the column in Martial Law Form 5, the statements of witnesses and statements of accused need not be filled up.

All persons arrested must be dealt with as follows:—

- (1) By Summary Court, Form 5, for offences not deserving of death.

The punishments to be inflicted are—

- (a) Rigorous imprisonment up to 2 years.
- (b) Fine not exceeding Rs. 1,000.
- (c) Whipping not exceeding 30 lashes, to be carried out in the presence of joint offenders only and responsible witnesses—not in public.

Any sentence may be combined.

In all cases immediate action should be taken and punishment inflicted on the spot.

In case of imprisonment the offender or offenders are to be handed over to the nearest jail or lock-up with the prescribed order of committal, Form 3 or Form 4.

Officers will exercise restraint over their feelings. They will not allow resentment to obscure their judgment in the proper administration of justice. In the measures undertaken under Martial Law there should never be any suspicion of resentful retaliation.

*Continued.]*

Major-General Sir W. BRYSON.

(2) By Commissions, Special Tribunal Courts, for offences deserving of greater punishment than those empowered by Summary Court, Form 5.

All offences committed before 19th April must be sent before these Commissions—*vide* Instructions by Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, in regard to trial of persons charged with offences committed before 19th April. The Courts Martial therein referred to are the Summary Court, Form 5, which the Commission also have power to try by for all offences committed before the 19th April.

(3) Attention is directed to Martial Law Instruction No. 2, dated 18th April 1919, as published in *Civil and Military Gazette* and to be procured from Superintendent, Government Printing, Punjab, Lahore, on demand.

(4) It should be noted that the Martial Law Regulations referred to in Blue Book, page 21, are all embodied in the Proclamation by General Officer Commanding, 16th Division. Area Commanders issue Martial Law Orders and also notices if necessary.

5. All concerned should be instructed. Rail permit must be issued with the greatest discretion.

E. D. MONEY, C.I.E., D.S.O., *Lieut.-Col.,  
Administrator, Martial Law, 16th Division.*

## APPENDIX XVI.

*Instructions in regard to the trial of persons charged with offences in connection with the present disturbances committed before the 19th April 1919.*

Under the Martial Law (Further Extension) Ordinance, 1919 (Ordinance IV of 1919), the Local Government "may by general or special order direct that any Commission appointed under the said Ordinance shall try any person charged with any offence committed on or after the 30th March 1919, and thereupon the provisions of said Ordinance shall apply to such trials accordingly and a Commission may pass in respect of any such offence any sentence authorised by law." The necessary general order is being issued.

2. It will be observed that this power is extremely wide. The Local Government has been instructed by the Government of India that the Commissions are to be used only for the trial of offences arising out of the recent disturbances.

3. All offences connected with the disturbances which were committed before the date of the Martial Law proclamations (i.e., before April 19th in the case of districts or portions of districts within the limits of the 16th Indian Division, and the 20th April in the case of districts or portions of districts within the limits of the 2nd Rawalpindi Division) will therefore be tried by the Commissions appointed under the Martial Law Ordinance, 1919. The Courts Martial appointed under the proclamations have no power to try any of these offences. Should any such cases have been dealt with by Courts Martial before the issue of these orders, a list of them should be prepared, as it will be necessary to regularise them later on.

4. The Commissions will sit in Lahore. The officers in charge of investigations should send prisoners in to Lahore. The preliminary investigation will be conducted by the Police who will make a report and submit it with a précis of the statements of witnesses to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Lahore. If he considers that there is a *prima facie* case, he will submit the précis for orders to the Legal Remembrancer. If the Legal Remembrancer considers that there is no case for trial by a Commission, he will direct the release of the accused. If he considers that there is a case for trial, he will frame a charge and convene a Commission, giving to the Commission a special direction, if he finds the case is one which should be tried according to the procedure prescribed for Summary General Court Martial.

5. When the précis of the statements of witnesses, charge and the order of the Legal Remembrancer are received by the Commission, the accused person will be at once brought before it and the charge will be read to him. The prisoner will be then granted sufficient time to enable reasonable steps to be taken for procuring the attendance of any witnesses he wishes to call and for allowing him to communicate with his witnesses and any friend or legal adviser whom he may wish to consult.

Police officers are reminded that expedition is essential, and that a case which is complete against a number of accused, should not be delayed merely because it is not complete against all. The remaining accused can be sent up later.

6. It has been arranged that counsel for the defence shall be provided by Government for any accused person who is unable to procure counsel for himself.

7. The Deputy Inspector-General, Criminal Investigation Department, will depute a competent police officer to attend the preliminary hearing at which the charges will be read to the accused and his list of witnesses taken in order to acquaint himself with the list of witnesses for the defence whom the Commission has decided to call. He will be able to inform the Commission of the earliest date on which it will be possible to produce the prosecution as well as the defence witnesses.

If special arrangements are made by the police for procuring the attendance of witnesses the time which is to elapse between the preliminary hearing and the date of the trial should ordinarily not exceed three days.

J. P. THOMPSON,  
*Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.*

## APPENDIX XVII.

*Copy of a report from Captain E. A. Stead, 3-23rd Sikh Infantry (Officer Commanding, Special Movable Column) to the Officer Commanding, Jullundur.*

I have the honour to report that according to instructions contained in 45th Brigade letter, dated 22nd April 1919, I left Jullundur at 13-00 hours on the same day in command of a column consisting of one troop, Guides Cavalry, F. F., and 150 Indian Infantry supplied by the following Depôts, 62nd Sikhs, F. F., 1-54th Sikhs, F. F. and the 59th Rifles, Field Force; Mr. Abdul Haq, Assistant Magistrate, also accompanied the column.

The itinerary was carried out as follows:—

*Shankor, 22nd April 1919.*—Arrived at 15 hours and marched to the village with all the Infantry. There were no detaining facilities for Cavalry. A Durbar was held in the centre of the village at which all the returned emigrants were present. The Durbar was addressed by Mr. Abdul Haq, who explained the Rowlett Bill and attempted to dispel any misapprehension that might exist in the minds of the villagers. A free interchange of ideas followed, by which it appeared that the Durbar was productive of much good. Undoubtedly the presence of the Military had an excellent effect.

*Nakodar, 23rd April 1919.*—The whole column marched to the town after having spent the night in Nakodar Station. A complete tour was made through the streets and on arriving at the Tehsil a Durbar was held, the proceedings were carried out in the same manner as on the preceding day. The majority of the inhabitants are shopkeepers and it was difficult to prevail on these to leave their shops. The Durbar was moderately attended and those who were present did not enter into the proceedings with any great interest. On being asked why they shut their shops, the only answer they could give was because the Jullundur City people had done so on the previous day.

*Sidhwan, 23rd April 1919.*—Arrived here at 9 hours after a march of five miles from Nakodar. The Durbar was only attended by about 30 persons. The reason being probably the fear of the consequences of Sidhwan Station having been burnt. The villagers denied all knowledge of the event and ascribe it to the work of

Major General Sir W. BEYNON.

[Continued.]

"badmashes" from some other villages. To enhance the effect of the presence of the Military a Sikh Subedar (Pertab Singh), 59th Rifles, F. F., also addressed the villagers and emphasised the fact that he and his men are servants of the "Sarkar" and would obey any command even to firing on their own brothers.

This feature was considered by Mr. Abdul Haq to be so effective that it was introduced into all subsequent Durbars. Subedar Pertab Singh (Sikh), 59th Rifles, F. F., Subedar Bhikam Singh (Dogra), 1-54th Sikhs, and two Jemadars being Punjabi Mussalman and Dogra all speaking. After the Durbar the march was continued to Normahal.

*Bilga, 23rd April 1919.*—In the afternoon the Infantry went by train to Bilga, the Cavalry were not taken owing to there being no detaining facilities. The characteristics of the Durbar here were much the same as in the previous villages, with the exception that out of a village containing 66 returned emigrants only about 6 attended. The presence of the Military appeared to awe the villagers here even more than in other places.

*Jandiala, 24th April 1919.*—This is a large village containing over 160 returned emigrants and is understood to have the worst reputation of any village in the Jullundur district.

Owing to two villages having to be visited this day necessitating march of 13 miles, Mr. Abdul Haq and myself and the troop, Guides Cavalry, went on in advance to have a Durbar ready by the time the Infantry arrived.

The villagers appeared to resent very much the punitive Police post quartered on them and were becoming somewhat noisy and truculent. With a view to impressing them I despatched Lieutenant Ellery to meet the Infantry and to march them through the street in which the Durbar was being held with fixed bayonets. They arrived just at the moment when the spokesman of the Durbar was becoming insolent. This had an immediate sedative effect and the Durbar continued quietly and orderly, without any trace of the former disquiet. At 9 hours the column marched on to:—

*Bandala, 24th April 1919.*—All arrangements appeared to have been made for the arrival of the column by the Tahsildar and the Durbar was held in the School. The inhabitants appeared contented and loyal and provided a meal for all the troops. There seemed to be an apparent fear of a visit from the Military, and a strong desire for better understanding.

*Nurzahel, 24th April 1919.*—Owing to the column already having marched through the streets *en route* for Jandiala in the morning, it was not considered necessary for them to be present at the Durbar, which was attended by Mr. Abdul Haq, myself and two other officers. The inhabitants of this town are nearly all shopkeepers and despite the efforts of the Tehsildar there was a very poor attendance, they appeared to disbelieve the rumours about the Rowlatt Bill when explained to them thoroughly by Mr. Abdul Haq.

*Phillour, 24th April 1919.*—At the request of Mr. Abdul Haq the column stopped at Phillour on the journey back to Jullundur. A feature of the Durbar held here was the speech made by a prominent local pleader who, it is understood, was largely instrumental in causing the *Hartal* in this town. He spoke strongly in favour of the Government and stated that the leaders of the *Satyagraha* movement had no idea that the ignorant masses would commit excesses and had no wish that they should. The column then entrained and arrived at Jullundur at 12 hours. The infantry were marched to the Moveable Column camp and the Guides Cavalry to their own lines.

The unfounded rumours which have arisen during the recent disturbances were all current in all villages and the free interchange of ideas, such as took place,

undoubtedly dispelled these rumours and gave the people a clearer and truer idea of the aim and scope of the Rowlatt Bill, this is the opinion of Mr. Abdul Haq who accompanied the column and who has an intimate knowledge of the Jullundur district, which he has toured for the last three years. The presence of the Military identifying itself with a civil officer left no doubt in the minds of the people that force could and would be applied if occasion should demand.

The Tahsildars and Police officials whom the column came in touch with were impressed by the value of the work accomplished and the possibilities it offered for calming the unrest arising out of the recent disturbances.

E. A. STEAD, Captain,  
3-23rd Sikh Infantry.

#### JULLUNDUR:

*The 25th April 1919.*

#### APPENDIX XVIII.

*Copy of Memorandum from Headquarters, 45th Brigade, Amritsar, No. A. C.-10, dated (and received) the 26th April 1919.*

Diary of Amritsar Moveable Column operating in the Bhugga Atari Area, 24th April 1919, to 26th April 1919.

*24th April 1919.*—The column, as detailed in my No. B.M.-39 of 18th April 1919, accompanied by the Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar district, and the Mahunt (a big Sikh Priest living at Gura Sat Sultan), moved out to Bhugga *via* Raja Sansee. Here a large Durbar was held at which all the influential men of the district attended.

The General Officer Commanding and Mahunt addressed the meeting which passed off satisfactorily.

At 13-00 hours the column resumed the march to Bhugga and arrived there 15-00 hours. Camped round Canal Bungalow, an ideal camp for the size of the Force.

All quiet during day and night.

*25th April 1919.*—Column moved to Atari at 09-00 hours. The General Officer Commanding with Cavalry and Armoured Car proceeded to Asraphur (near Berowal) Mission Hospital.

All was well. This Hospital had been threatened on the night of the 12th instant, and the two ladies including Miss Burnell were then sent into Lahore on that night.

News was received here that a certain amount of railway material was in possession of certain villagers of Dalake. The Cavalry was sent to search the village but only a few sleepers which had been in the village for some years were found. The village of Shuhoor was also visited by the Cavalry.

The column arrived at Atari 13-00 hours and camped round the Public Works Department Rest House.

At 16-00 hours a very large and influential Durbar assembled.

The General Officer Commanding, Deputy Commissioner and Mahunt addressed the meeting. It was heard here that the effect of the Durbar at Raja Sansee the day before had been very good.

In the evening a witness was brought up who gave the names of eleven men who had been implicated in the burning of Wagah Station.

Their names and villages are given on the attached appendix.

Five persons of Atari in possession of looted property from the National Bank, Amritsar, were also noted.

All these names have been handed over to the Deputy Commissioner who is having the men arrested to-day.

All quiet during night and day.

*26th April 1919.*—Column marched to Amritsar at 08-00 hours. The General Officer Commanding visited Chheharta Police Post on the way and found that 30 arrests from the villages of Basurkee and Choomanpoor had been made in connection with the cutting of the Railway line near Chheharta on the night 12-13th April.

Major General Sir W. BRYDON.—*concluded*—Mr. ALAN MITCHELL.—Mr. H. FYSON.

Column arrived A. S. R. 13-00 hours.

The following men were seen on the Dalek Wagah Road on the night of the 13th-14th April moving towards Wagah and giving out that they were going to burn Wagah Station:—

Chanda Singh, Dhanwa Khurd.  
Sanat Singh, Dhanwa Khurd.  
Lachman Singh, Dhanwa Khurd.

Seram Singh, Dhanwa Khurd.  
Gurda Singh, Khapta.  
Allah Ditta, Shuhoor.  
Hussaina, Shuhoor.  
Mangal Singh, Dalaka.  
Amar Singh, Dalaka.  
Ujagar Singh, Dalaka.  
Ganda Singh, Bopura.

**Mr. ALAN MITCHELL, I.C.S., late additional Deputy Commissioner, Lahore.**

At the beginning of April 1919 I was in Simla as Assistant Commissioner. I was under orders of transfer to Mianwali and had handed over charge at Simla on the 14th April. On the 16th I received a telegram from Government cancelling my orders for Mianwali and instructing me to proceed immediately to Lahore.

I arrived at Lahore about noon on the 17th and hearing that Mr. Fyson, the Deputy Commissioner, had his headquarters at that time at the Telegraph Office, I reported myself to Mr. Fyson there. I found everything quiet in Lahore as the Military authorities had by that time got complete control of the situation, and I found, in fact, that there was very little for me to do. I was invested with the powers of a summary court, and tried a few cases of petty offences against Martial Orders. The curfew order was already in force when I arrived in Lahore, and I had to deal with a few cases of persons found out of doors in prohibited hours. I was exceedingly impressed with the fact that out of a city of about 250,000 inhabitants there should be only each morning 5 or 6 persons brought up for being found out of doors in the prohibited hours. In addition to the 5 or 6 brought up to be dealt with at the Telegraph Office, I understand there were a similar number taken up daily to be dealt with by the Magistrate at the water works.

After about a week I took up the ordinary work of the Personal Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Lahore. Meanwhile Major Ferrar had arrived and taken over the duties of Deputy Commissioner, Lahore. On May 19th Major Ferrar reverted to military duty, Mr. Fyson, who had in the meantime been Joint Deputy Commissioner, became again Senior Deputy Commissioner, and I was appointed Joint Deputy Commissioner. From this time on I saw more of the actual administration, especially as Mr. Fyson was suffering from continual fever and had to take 15 days casual leave. But by this time the civil administration had practically resumed its normal course, although Martial Law was nominally

in force. The chief matters dealt with under Martial Law at this time were connected with the prices that had been fixed for wheat and flour and for other commodities. I was in constant communication with Colonel Johnson and Mr. Townsend, Director of Civil Supplies, over this question of prices. Eventually the orders regulating prices were rescinded at the end of May as they were having the effect of keeping supplies from coming freely into Lahore. That the prices fixed by the Military authorities were reasonable is, I think, proved by the fact that they only rose very slightly indeed when the control was removed altogether.

Mr. Fyson returned from casual leave about the 10th June and immediately concentrated his attention on preparing the report required by Government on the disturbances. He very soon again began to suffer from fever, and was granted six months leave on medical certificate. He endeavoured to finish off the report before going on leave and to assist him in this we called into headquarters Mr. Marsden, Sub-Divisional Officer, Kasur, who had first hand knowledge of events subsequent to the actual outbreak in the Kasur portion of the district. Before the report was finished, however, the Civil Surgeon insisted that Mr. Fyson should give up all work and proceed immediately on leave. Mr. Fyson left on the 23rd June, and as Mr. Marsden had been collaborating with Mr. Fyson in the preparation of the report and as he had in fact more personal knowledge of affairs in the district as a whole than I had, I arranged for him to finish the report. As officiating Deputy Commissioner at the time it was submitted to Government, I was of course responsible for it, and it went in over my signature after I had scrutinised and, where necessary, revised it.

On the 7th July I handed over charge of the Lahore District to Mr. M. S. D. Butler, on my transfer to Gujranwala.

**Statement of Mr. H. FYSON, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Lahore (now in England).**

*Chronological Narrative of Events.*

**March 9.**—After agitation in the press had been going on against the Rowlatt Bills for several months, a meeting was held at the Bradlaugh Hall, presided over by Hon'ble Mian Fazl-i-Hussain at which a pleader M. Ghulam Muhayud Din from Kasur and others used intemperate language and when the chairman called a speaker to order he was booed.

In the latter days of March a notice was published that the 30th had been fixed for a meeting, *hartal* and fast and the signatories were warned by me of the consequences of intemperate language used on March 9th and of probable disorders on 30th. This day was not, however, so observed in Lahore, proceedings being deferred to April 6th.

**April 2.**—The Superintendent of Police forbade public processions in streets for one month under Police Act.

**April 4.**—The Municipal Members and Honorary Magistrates and well disposed traders were urged in the morning to do their best to prevent *hartal* and disorders on 6th. In the afternoon signatories of the notice for 6th were called by the Deputy Commissioner in the

presence of Mr. Broadway, Senior Superintendent of Police, and the events of March 30th at Delhi were recalled as proving that previous warning had been very necessary. Orders were given that the organisers of the programme set for April 6th would be held responsible for any untoward events that might take place on that day. The "leaders" attempted to obtain full control of the city by offering to take responsibility if the police were withdrawn. They succeeded in obtaining a promise that no force would be used by Government to compel shopkeepers to open or close shops if they were unwilling to do so. They took advantage of this on April 5th and 6th when terrorism was employed. The police force was insufficient to prevent this. Arrangements were made to parade military forces round the Fort Road and elsewhere.

**April 6.**—Cavalry and armoured cars occupied the District Courts and "Gol-Bagh." Mr. Broadway and Mr. Fyson took up their quarters at the Courts. All the morning news came in of crowds at the Ravi, and these subsequently filtered back to the town in small parties which at 11-45 formed a procession down Anarkali

Mr. H. Fyson.

[Continued.]

Bazar, carrying a black flag with Gandhi's picture on it. The crowd forked at the Nila Gumbaz Chawk after pushing aside a police post, and one part carrying the flag was stopped by Mul Chand's shop by Mr. Broadway and Mr. Fyson accompanied by some Police Sawars with cavalry in rear. The mob were led apparently by pleaders or other educated persons and the nucleus consisted of youths. This crowd was led away to the Bradlaugh Hall by Dr. Gokal Chand Naurang who was furnished with a police mount for the purpose. The other part of the crowd went to Market Chawk and were stopped there by cavalry and cars. Some men were arrested for violence but released almost at once. The bulk of this crowd too was led away by Dr. Gokal Chand who appeared twice for that purpose: the cavalry were then employed to clear the Anarkali Bazar up to Nila Gumbaz by advancing in line. The Gol Bagh was cleared of loafers subsequently by Dr. Gokal Chand who was asked to lead them off. He was prepared throughout the day to help the authorities. The meeting at Bradlaugh Hall was packed: it was attended by C. I. D. officers in uniform. After it the crowd returned in parties and there were no more processions till later at night when the military had been withdrawn. A crowd then went round to various Municipal Commissioners and Honorary Magistrates' houses and shouted abuse and threw stones. There was a complete closure of shops all day and force was used by the mobs against people who were unwilling to close. The procession of this day was illegal but the Deputy Commissioner did not use firearms to disperse it as the crowd did not seem disposed to violence.

*April 9.*—The Ram Naumi procession at night in Lahore was allowed on religious grounds. It was utilised by the popular leaders for the display of seditious sentiment and fraternisation between Hindus and Musalmans. Lala Duni Chand led it on horseback. Honorary Magistrates told off to watch it were deterred by the populace, and the Deputy Commissioner had to employ Stipendiary Magistrates.

*April 10.*—At 3-30 the news of Gandhi's arrest came to Lahore and at 4-30 the news of the outbreak at Amritsar, regarding the deportation of two agitators there. Military preparations were being made at Lahore for a possible outbreak on Sunday when the orders had to be changed for the same evening. Mr. Broadway spent most of the day over this and the Deputy Commissioner (Mr. Fyson) did not see him till 5 p.m. nor hear the full news of the outbreak till then. The Senior Superintendent of Police and Deputy Commissioners were called to Government House at 6 p.m. and shortly after heard by phone of a crowd coming up the Mall. Mr. Broadway went off at once to fetch his reserves of police and the Deputy Commissioner drove with Mr. Cocks, Deputy Inspector-General, Criminal Investigation Department, to meet the crowd. The crowd were pushing back a dozen Police Constables who had been hurried to the Mall largely, through the prompt action of Lala Gopal Das, Head Clerk of the Senior Superintendent of Police, who went to Anarkali thana to see that orders were being carried out. The Deputy Commissioner attempted (after he and Mr. Cocks had left the car) to induce the crowd to return by pushing back the flag bearer, but they pushed on and as the Police were being surrounded the Deputy Commissioner asked Mr. Cocks to draw them off and open fire. This was done and the crowd at once disappeared mostly behind the Soldiers' Club. The casualties were 1 killed and 7 wounded. The crowd when coming up the Mall numbered several thousands and was composed chiefly of youths. It was difficult to distinguish what they were shouting or to ascertain their object. They had no weapons and had done no damage beyond breaking young trees. But it was the third day on which illegal processions had taken place and there was no saying when the temper of the mob would change or what the effect of their reaching Government House would be.

Later in the same evening the Cavalry arrived and in the Anarkali Bazar a large mob assembled which stoned the Senior Superintendent of Police and the Crown

forces while the Deputy Commissioner was engaged at the Telegraph Office awaiting developments after informing Government of what had occurred. The Deputy Commissioner then rode to the Senior Superintendent of Police and as the stoning continued he gave two minutes time for the crowd to clear, intimating his intentions to Ram Bhaj Datt who seemed to be leading the mob; and as it was disregarded, he again ordered fire and three men were wounded and died later and 12 were wounded. The crowd at this place were carrying on a sort of Muharram and the nucleus sat down in the Chawk near Lohari Gate apparently refusing to budge. They disappeared very quickly when fire was opened by the Police. The stoning came mostly from the sides of the street where bricks were available. The Circular Road was cleared by Cavalry, and a small force of police under Mr. de Gale, Assistant Superintendent of Police, encountered rioters with sticks in the Dabbi Bazar: these found themselves in danger of capture and dispersed. Police pickets were left on the Circular Road and the Cavalry retired to the Mall.

*April 11.*—At Lahore the city was under control of the mob all day and night but outside that area Government forces were in possession. Closures of shops had begun at 4 p.m. on the day before and continued for several days. Aeroplane reconnaissances reported large crowds in the Badshahi Mosque near the Fort and it was learnt that Hindus were allowed to address political gatherings there. There was no corresponding admission of Musalmans into Hindu or Sikh temples. A band of club men was also allowed to enter the mosque: this was a half drilled body called the *Danda Fauj*. Demonstrations of hostility to Government were very violent and included destruction of the King's picture. The Deputy Commissioner called a meeting of leading men to the Telegraph Office, including both parties for and against Government and warned them that Martial Law would be brought in if the *hartal* were not stopped.

At the Railway workshops, during the breakfast hour, two Sikh students distributed pink leaflets on the subject of passive resistance, with a portrait of Subramania Iyer. Shortly after there was an attack on the time office, and stones thrown in by boys. The Police were called up and dispersed the crowd, but Mr. Gregson, Loco. Superintendent, was stoned. The assistance of Cavalry was also procured. The men returned to work to the extent of about 30 per cent. of the usual numbers.

*April 12.*—At 9-30 a military force under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Johnson, D.S.O., Royal Sussex, and consisting of British Infantry and machine guns, with Indian Infantry and Cavalry, and accompanied by Police and the Civil authorities marched through the city from the Dabbi Bazar to Hira Mandi *via* the Waterworks, and on to the Lakkar Bazar and Mōri Gate and Bradlaugh Hall, and Police posts at other points. The demeanour of the crowd was hostile and they called out for the cancellation of the laws. Shopmen at Delhi Gate seemed inclined to open. Magistrates were left with all the pickets. At the west end of Hira Mandi the space in front of the Fort and Mosque was crowded, and this area was cleared by Cavalry moving in line. It was learnt that some Criminal Investigation Department Officers had just been assaulted by the large crowd in the Badshahi Mosque and one officer had been nearly killed. After consulting General Clarke (who had arrived by car) and Colonel Johnson, the Deputy Commissioner, sent S. Rahim Bakhsh, Extra Assistant Commissioner, to enter the Mosque and order the crowd to disperse. This was done and the entrances picketed by Cavalry. The crowd streamed across the open space to Hira Mandi in the form of a Muharram procession and they were carrying sticks. On reaching the bazar they began stoning the Cavalry there and the Deputy Commissioner attempted to clear the street by pushing forward the Cavalry but on Senior Superintendent's advice armed police were brought up and eventually as the stoning and excitement increased 4 Constables were ordered to fire. Two persons were killed and 27 wounded, but no prisoners were taken. The crowd then dispersed. In all 6 killed

*Continued.]*

Mr. H. FYSON.

and 46 wounded were, as far as is known for certain, the total casualty list throughout the disturbances in Lahore. The troops were never called upon to fire.

At about noon a meeting of various parties was held in the Town Hall to discuss matters, with no result, though it sat for some 3 hours. The Deputy Commissioner informed the gathering that Martial Law would be brought in if the shops were not opened, and was asked to have the military and police taken away, otherwise the shops would remain closed. Free food shops were opened by the organisers of the unrest, contributions of large sums being made by several persons. Offensive notices were put up and Government clerks and Railway men deterred from going to their work. The shops in the city, Anarkali and Gwalmandi areas remained closed, a constant stream of people passing up and down the streets all day. This continued for days and provided a striking spectacle of unrest, the people's mind being apparently completely on edge.

Order was kept at the Railway workshops by Military detachments. The loco-shops had very few men working but there was a good attendance at the carriage shops. On the morning of this day occurred riots at Kasur, Patti and Khem Karan (see Kasur separate report).\*

April 13.—At Lahore the *hartial* continued and a meeting of leaders of people called to get them to stop it. The district was proclaimed under the Seditious Meetings Act and notice given forbidding all assemblies of more than ten persons. All wholesale retail liquor shops were closed (except hotels and restaurants in the Civil Station. There was an attempt made to get the Railway guards to strike. The organisation of *Thikri Pahra* on the Railways was begun by Khan Bahadur Khan Zafar Khan, Extra Assistant Commissioner. Night patrols in the Civil Station were also begun. The Station of Wagah on the Amritsar line was sacked and burnt, mostly by people from Manihala and Narwar where seditious meetings were held. The armoured train was derailed.

April 14.—Three agitators were deported from Lahore, Pandit Ram Bhaj Datt, Lala Har Kishan Lal, and Lala Duni Chand. Precautions were taken against a possible outbreak but the city remained quiet. Filth was thrown into the street which had been newly cleaned, on a rumour that the Lieutenant-Governor was to pass through the town, and the municipal staff deterred from cleaning it away. At Kot Radha Kishan stones were thrown at the 17 up train and telegraph wires cut at Wagah, Jallo and Attari. An assembly met by beat of drum at Padhana, and there was a general feeling of unrest in villages along the Amritsar line.

The Lahore Civil Area was separated from the rest of the district and put under the command of Colonel Johnson, Brigadier-General Clarke withdrawing his staff back to cantonments.

There were persistent attempts made to prevent the workmen going to the Railway shops and these were only frustrated by employing police with fixed bayonets to disperse the crowd at the workmen's train. Some two-thirds of the carriage and wagon men attended their work.

Telegraph traffic with Amritsar was again interrupted, in such a way as to preclude the use of the phonophone. Simla was reached *via* Karachi and Agra. Two lines of wire were also cut near Delhi.

Control of petrol in Lahore and requisitioning of motor cars for military purposes was begun.

April 15.—At Lahore proclamations were issued—(1) declaring the City area to be in a perturbed state under section 15, Police Act, (2) declaring Martial Law throughout the district. The *hartial* continued, save in suburbs. A train was stoned at Kot Radha Kishan: wires cut and timber obstructions placed on the line beyond Chhanga Manga. Two grass farm stacks were burnt at Banghali and Padri. Two ladies were brought in by armoured cars from a village near Amritsar boundary.

A series of Martial Law Proclamations was commenced to-day issued by Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Johnson,

D.S.O., Officer Commanding, Lahore Civil Area. A curfew gun was proclaimed and nobody other than a European was allowed in the streets from 8 P.M. to 3 A.M. without a permit. All tongas and *tamtams* were ordered to report at a fixed place. All motor vehicles were also called in. Langars used for assisting the *hartial* were suppressed.

April 16.—Arrests by Police began in Lahore and Kasur and Martial Law proclaimed at Kasur. A train was stoned at Kot Radha Kishan and several people injured, a gatekeeper's hut was broken into near Patti. A flying column with Magistrate left Lahore for villages in Parki Thana and took prisoners in four villages. Third and inter-class bookings were stopped at Lahore Station.

Registration of agents, *touts*, etc., of pleaders at Lahore was begun and they were forbidden to leave Lahore without permit. Roll calls of the D. A.-V. College were begun four times a day at the Bradlaugh Hall. Owing to the defacing of notices steps were taken for their protection by owners of the property where they were put. The list of such owners consisted of persons known to be inimical to Government. The carrying of *lathis* in Lahore Civil Area was forbidden.

April 17.—An attempt was made to derail trains between Jallo and Harbanaspura. Some shops began to open in Lahore in the evening.

Martial Law orders were issued for shops to open in Lahore but they began to open before the orders were distributed. The unrest now began to subside.

(N. B.—The narrative so far was written by Mr. Fyson, Deputy Commissioner, himself before going to England on leave.)

Tribunals were appointed under the Martial Law Ordinance. Several Martial Law offences were dealt with summarily.

April 20.—Several prominent rioters and rebels were arrested.

### SECTION III.—CLASSES PROMINENT IN PROMOTING DISTURBANCES.

Artisans and menials make up 40 per cent. of the convictions by the Special Tribunals. It was not a rural movement in any way: 77.7 per cent. of persons convicted of rioting were urban, and less than 15 per cent. zemindars. Only one returned emigrant was convicted. Over 50 per cent. of the convicts were literate; this however does not mean that over 50 per cent. of the mobs were literate, but that the literate, who it is true, were quite a considerable proportion were the more prominent and easily recognised. The rural 20 per cent. was confined to a small group of villages near Lahore, e.g., Wagah, etc. Hardly any students were convicted, for boys, having less developed features, are naturally not easily identified by lookers on. But very large numbers were punished departmentally at Lahore and Kasur, because they were known to have been concerned in the disturbances.

Of Government servants 9 were convicted in connection with the Lahore disturbances. Twelve in all are shown but two of these were in the Kasur cases; and one was a Police Sub-Inspector convicted for extorting a bribe, and not for taking part in the disturbances. Of these nine none occupied a high position. It may be noted that one is an engine driver, one a railway office clerk and one an employee of the Telegraph Department. The palpable treachery of the railway staff at Kasur is dealt with separately.

The police and the military show up very well as regards the disturbances. The only case of a policeman shown convicted was not (see above) one of sedition.

The one entry under 'soldier' in Statement F\* refers only to a *khalasi* attached to a regiment. One soldier was convicted by a Summary Court (at Kasur), but this case too had nothing to do with sedition. Seeing that a large number of demobilised soldiers especially of those recruited towards the end of the war, were in the towns and the few villages disaffected, this is not only a sign

Mr. H. FYSON.

[Continued.]

of the loyalty of the military but a further disproof of the allegation that recent recruiting methods were among the causes of disaffection.

SECTION IV.—NATURE OF MOVEMENT, HOW FAR DISLOYAL *anti-EUROPEAN*, OR *anti-CHRISTIAN*.

The movement at Lahore was primarily *anti-Government*. The idea was to stop Government work, paralyse communications, and inconvenience Europeans to such an extent that the Government would be forced to capitulate over the Rowlatt Act. Any other motives were secondary, and due to the fact that an Indian crowd is too excitable to be passive merely. Thus the movement incidentally revealed the real feelings of the urban population towards Britain. It may be said that they have no real feelings of loyalty or gratitude for favours past or to come. In their excitement they were willing to burn photographs of the King and Queen, and so to show that it is not merely the 'bureaucracy' in India that they hate but England.

In Lahore District as a whole (*cf.* the Kasur report)\* the movement was not *anti-Christian*, as it was in Gujranwala and Amritsar. The churches and missionary buildings and schools of Lahore, and the missionaries scattered through the district, were not attacked, nor were Indian Christians singled out for maltreatment.

The Gandhi movement, as it appeared in Lahore, was directed against the Government, and therefore against all its officers; and as the Government was identified with the British, the latter were viewed collectively as foes. In opposing the Government the first aim was to hold up communications. Therefore telegraph wires were cut extensively in Lahore and the district; successful attempts were made to derail trains; and the Railway staff were tampered with. A partial strike was engineered at the Railway station, and in the carriage and wagon and the Loco shops for several days in the middle of April only a small proportion of the men were at work. This was also due to picketing, whereby not only railway employees but Government clerks of all descriptions were hindered from going to work. The Railway employees had to be protected by Police with drawn bayonets. Efforts were also made to attack the Lahore Railway Station, and the time office was at one time in danger. Railway Stations all over the district were attacked and looted, and rails tampered with. Near Lahore also some large grass farm stocks were burned.

The second method of opposing Government, or rather of displaying hatred of it, was to insult or attack officials. Repeated efforts were made by the mob to reach Government House. Their intention of course was to make a demonstration, but there is no shadow of doubt that had they reached there they would have lost their heads and run riot, and acted as their brethren at Amritsar did. In the city filth was on one occasion thrown out on roads which had been cleaned in anticipation of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor passing that way.

The Police were constantly hooted and abused and stoned by the mob. On March 9th English Police officers entering the Bradlaugh Hall meeting were hooted. Many Police sustained slight injuries during the riots and in one case a C. I. D. (Indian) officer was nearly killed by the crowd at the Badshahi Mosque.

The people also displayed their anger with all creatures or supporters of the Government. At the Ram Navami procession on April 9th in which Hindus and Muhammadans fraternized supporters of Government were threatened and warned to keep away. On the 6th April crowds visited the dwellings of Honorary Magistrates and Municipal Commissioners (other than those who were disloyal) and threw stones and shouted out abuse.

It was said above that the *anti-Government* feeling when translated into action became *anti-British*. This was witnessed at Kasur. At Lahore the forces of law and

order were too strong. But officers who were in the midst of events say that the people's faces were disfigured with fury, and that they used to shout out expressions of hatred of the English. Many instances were found of illustrated papers and of pictures being disfigured by filthy and obscene allusions to Europeans. And the very fact that the news of the foul murders at Amritsar, instead of inducing the people to drop the movement, inspired them to redouble their efforts shows what their sentiments were.

SECTION V.—METHODS OF RIOTERS.

In order to demonstrate to the outside world the feelings of India, the leaders organised passive resistance and *hartal* and in order to force the hands of the Indian Government an effort was made to hold up communications and stop work in Government offices, and for the same reason to cause the maximum of inconvenience to Britishers.

Passive resistance and *hartal* have been described above. All the people voluntarily or by compulsion assumed the demeanour of mourners, and all shops were shut for days on end.

Telegraph wires were cut in every direction. A partial strike was organised at the Lahore Railway Station and Workshops, and the men were picketed. Students went to the station and workshops and distributed pamphlets. A general strike on the railway would have occurred had not Martial Law intervened. *Arya Samaj* has a strong hold on the upper grades of the Railway staff. The Kasur account shows how shamefully the staff behaved there. There and elsewhere telegraph messages were intercepted showing the existence of a conspiracy to strike.

The *hartal* was regarded not only as a good form of demonstration, but also as a useful lever on Europeans. Provisions became very scarce and dear. There is no doubt that such action was likely to bear most hardly on Europeans; for Indians could make some arrangements among themselves, and as the Indians also were inconvenienced, a movement was set on foot at Lahore and Kasur to establish *langars*, *i.e.*, messes, where Hindus and Muhammadans could eat together (servants of Europeans of course being not admitted).

The mobs at Lahore were not given much opportunity of attacking Government buildings. The Kasur mob, however, was able to work its will, and after damaging the Station went on and attacked the Main and a Branch Post Office, both of which they looted, gutted and burned and then hurried down to the Munsif's Court. They made desperate efforts to break into and burn the Tashil, and loot the Treasury, but were fired on at this point by the Police, and dispersed.

There is no trace of an effort to form an army. The *Danda Fauj* or gang of clubmen formed at Lahore was the only thing of the sort, and it was insignificant. The people probably expected that the Police and native troops would take their side. In Lahore the crowd used to call out to the Police to take their side. At Kasur it was once or twice suspected that people were approaching the soldiers, and the crowd attacking the Tashil called to the Police to come out and join them.

SECTION VI.—PUNITIVE AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES.

(1) *Administrative.*

1. *Military occupation of the City.*—It appeared early on that the Police forces would be insufficient to cope with the troubles threatening and on April 6 Military forces were called in. They occupied the District Courts and the "Gol Bagh" near by, and paraded along near the Fort Road and other places. Cavalry dispersed crowds at Market Bazar and Anarkali. At night the military was withdrawn, whereupon the crowds again gave trouble. On April 10th it at once became apparent that military aid would be needed. Military forces therefore entered the City and garrisoned various points



Continued.]

Mr. H. Fysox.

in the City and the Civil Lines. Firing was necessary that day but then, as also on subsequent occasions, only the Police fired and not the Military at all. On the 11th things were so bad, and demonstrations of hostility to Government, (e.g., the King's picture was publicly burned) were so violent that the Deputy Commissioner warned the leading men of Lahore at a meeting that Martial Law would have to be introduced if *hartal* was not stopped. This however, had no effect. Again that day some cavalry assisted in the City. It was by now obvious that the military would have practically to take over Lahore until matters improved. And on April 12th it was arranged for a procession to march through the City starting at Lahore Junction Station. It consisted of mounted police, 160 sabres of cavalry (17th) and 100 infantry (2-6th Royal Sussex and 2-10th Jats), with 75 dismounted police. This force marched *via* Delhi Gate, the Water-works the Gaiety Theatre, the Bhati Gate and Kutchery Road, and during this time aeroplanes flew over the City. At the same time permanent posts were arranged for ensuring the security of the City, each being self supporting and possessed of visual signallers. These posts were at Delhi Gate (40 infantry, Indian and British), Water-works (50 infantry, Native and British, and 25 police), Bhati Gate (50 infantry, Indian and British) and Bradlaugh Hall (20 Indian). During the procession picquets were posted at points commanding the City. It was arranged that there should be various permanent posts in the City and Civil Lines and that they should be in communication with each other. Henceforward the military arrangements prevented any anxiety. The detailed movements of troops after this need not be described. It will suffice to say that the Military authorities constantly altered their dispositions as occasion demanded and that all important points were secured throughout the City and Civil Lines. At the same time alarm orders were elaborated; and it was arranged that officers in charge of sections should collect inhabitants at the following rallying posts:—

- (1) Lahore Junction.
- (2) Masonic Hall.
- (3) Faletti's Hotel.
- (4) Nedou's Hotel.

Armoured cars were also in readiness at various points in case of alarm. Throughout the troubles in the City, 6 persons were killed and 46 wounded and the Police alone fired. No more casualties occurred after April 12th. The people were cowed by the news that aeroplanes would drop bombs in case of trouble, and by the presence of the military. But crowds continued to parade the streets, and the *hartal* in spite of repeated warnings was continued. So on April 16th Martial Law was proclaimed, containing various measures for enforcing law and order. The City and Civil Lines continued to be held in force, but henceforward the chief pre-occupation of the military was with places outside Lahore proper.

2. *Military arrangements in the district.*—Military guards were found necessary for railway stations as telegraph lines were being cut and many stations had been attacked. Troops were therefore despatched to guard various stations along the three sections, Lahore to Amritsar, Lahore to Raiwind and Lahore to Gujranwala, and blockhouses were erected. These arrangements began from the 15th April.

Flying columns were sent out into the district. On the 16th one, known as "Bourne Column," moved through the villages Sahajral, Bhagali, Gravindi, Barki and Hudiara, and on the 17th reached Khaira (Police Station in Kasur Sub-Division). It consisted of one Section Howitzer, R. F. A., 212 Indian troops and 50 cavalry. Various men were arrested and sent to Lahore. After that the column moved on to Padhana, Atari and Wagha, arriving there on the 18th. A Padhana *lambardar* and various other suspected persons were arrested. As it was found that those who had burned Wagah Station (on 13th) were chiefly men from Narwar and Sahuke, the column moved on to Narwar. Two *lambardars* and 4 villagers there were beaten. Jallo was

then visited, and the column on the 18th returned to Lahore.

Another flying column on the 20th April went to Muridke and Kamoke, as the telegraph line had been cut between those places. Mr. Jacob, I.C.K., accompanied it. The behaviour of a *lambardar* of Kamoke was not satisfactory and he was sentenced by the above officer acting as a Summary Court to a fine of Rs. 200 and a whipping. At the same time hostages were taken in case of future mischief.

On the 28th April another flying column went out to Wagah to realize the fine of Rs. 950 imposed on that village which had not been paid on the due date. Regarding the district also, as in the case of the city, details of the military arrangements need not be gone into. It must suffice to say that security and communications were duly arranged for, by constant marches and by motor patrols on the chief roads, and that dispositions were made for countering any trouble.

3. *Fines under Martial Law* were imposed and collected by the Military at the following places:—

	Ra.
Padhana . . . . .	3,500
Jallo . . . . .	400
Narwar . . . . .	1,500
Wagah . . . . .	950
Sahuke . . . . .	300

These sums are in each case equivalent to half the land revenue, and were sent to the Civil Treasury.

4. *Students and school boys*, were ordered to be punished departmentally, and this resulted in large numbers being expelled, degraded or fined at Lahore and Kasur.

5. *Tikri Pahra* was established in the villages near the railway and kept in force till the middle of June.

6. *Various agitators* were deported and several subsequently brought back for trial.

7. On 10th April 1919 the Commissioner directed the Deputy Commissioner, Lahore, to form standing committees of leading zamindars for assistance in keeping law and order and giving information.

#### (2) *Trials by the Commission.*

There were 20 cases in all and 188 persons accused, of whom 108 were convicted and 80 acquitted. But at the time of writing one more case, in which 11 persons, who are chiefly legal practitioners, are being tried, is still pending. The Kasur Report deals with the cases relating to Kasur and neighbouring cases. This statement\* includes all the places of the district. The great majority of cases were under section 121, Indian Penal Code (Waging war against the King). Akin to these were a few under section 124-A (Sedition). Apart from these there were five cases dealing with offences incidental to the rebellion. Thus in two cases there were seven persons convicted of dacoity as it was considered that these persons merely took advantage of the disturbances to loot, without any rebellious intentions. In one case three persons were convicted of rioting. In these cases also it was held on various grounds, e.g., the youth of the offenders, rebellion was not established. Two persons were convicted of extortion (under Indian Penal Code, 161, 384 and 109, Indian Penal Code, *viz.*, a Sub-Inspector of Police and an accomplice. And one man, a newspaper proprietor, was convicted under rule 25 of the Defence of India Act. The sentences were practically all of death and transportation, accompanied in the great majority of cases by forfeiture of property.

The sentences were considerably modified on revision by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor; the capital sentences were reduced, from 26 to 13 and transportations from 64 to 31. There were no whipping sentences and only three fines. Nearly 70 per cent. of the convicts were men of between 20 and 30 years of age, only 14 were boys of under 20.

\* *Note.*—Statements have not been reproduced.

Mr. H. FYSON—concluded—Mr. W. G. CLARKE.

(3) *Trials before Summary Courts.*

\*Statements C (2) shows that there were 8 cases under the Indian Penal Code, and one each under the Telegraph Act and Defence of India Act. These cases all "arose out of the disturbances." The Telegraph Act case was concerned with Telegraph wire-cutting, an act calculated to hinder communications; the case under section 411, Indian Penal Code, dealt with property stolen during riots; and the 6 cases under section 147, Indian Penal Code, as also that under section 426 concerned persons taking part in the riots but for various reasons (for example the youth of the accused) not considered to have intended rebellion. Four of these section 147 cases were in the Kasur Summary Court.

Statement C (1) shows the number of offences against Martial Law (as defined in the Proclamation of April 19th). Out of 345 persons accused 240 were convicted. These figures include the Kasur cases, which have been analysed in detail in the Kasur report. The vast majority of convicts in all cases both those before the Commission and the Summary Courts are of the urban populations. In the riot cases Hindus and Muhammadans were equally divided; and it is noticeable that over 50 per cent. of the convicts before Tribunals were literate. To some extent this is because they would be in the forefront and so more easily identified. No special reason can be given for the Muhammadans convicted by the Summary Courts being

\* *Note.*—Statements have not been reproduced.

so much in excess of the Hindus. It may be because Hindus are more submissive and were more easily cowed by Martial Law than the Muhammadans.

(4) *Punishments.*

Out of the 81 sentences of imprisonment 13 were for 2 years, the maximum; 27 were for 1 year and 25 were for 6 months and 16 for less than 6 months.

Out of 178 fines only 26 were for sums of Rs. 100 to Rs. 200.

(5) *Whipping.*

There were 87 whipping sentences. These figures include those of Kasur where the whipping cases are discussed. But the 6 school boys beaten with a cane mentioned there are not included in these figures.\* Of these sentences, 24 were of 30 stripes, 5 of 20, 44 of 10 or over and 21 of 5 or over. The average number of stripes per sentence is about 16, and as one-third of the cases are from Kasur, where the average was 18 stripes, the average for Lahore was about 15. No one died or was seriously injured by whipping. At Lahore all whipping was done in private after the first few days and at Kasur all whipping was in private except in the case of 6 school boys, whose whipping was semi-public.

\* The only other case of whipping carried out as a disciplinary measure by the military, so far as is known, was that of the 2 Lamberdars and 4 villagers of Narwar by the Bourne column on the 18th of April.

P. MARDER.

Mr. W. G. CLARKE, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lahore.

Information having been received about 29th March that a *hartal* in Lahore was being arranged for the 30th March, Mr. Broadway, Senior Superintendent, Police, issued orders showing the distribution to be made of Police at Headquarters in the event of it being necessary to call out the Police, but later information being received that the *hartal* was postponed the orders in question were not carried out. Between the 30th March and 1st April information was received that a complete *hartal* would take place and having received notice of a meeting to be held in the Bradlaugh Hall on the 6th April, to protest against the Rowlatt Act, Mr. Broadway on the 2nd or 3rd April issued a notice under the Police Act forbidding, without license, meetings, public processions in the streets for one month. As far as I remember this notice was ordered to be served on all the signatories to the Bradlaugh Hall Meeting Committee and published in the papers and posted throughout the City and other places. On the 4th April Mr. Broadway attended a meeting convened by the Deputy Commissioner (Mr. Fyson) to urge Honorary Magistrates, Municipal Commissioners and others to do their best to prevent *hartal* and disorders on the 6th April. On the 5th April Mr. Broadway issued orders for the posting on 6th April of Police pickets and guards at selected points and fixed the District Courts as the Police headquarters for that day. Accordingly in the early morning of 6th April the orders were complied with, after which I patrolled and visited the pickets. During such duty I noticed that all shops were closed, young men, who appeared to be students, were going about bare-headed and bare-footed and quite a number were wearing a black mourning band on their arm and some had the picture of Gandhi suspended round their neck. Tongas and other horse conveyances were not to be seen on the roads and it seemed quite clear that a complete *hartal* was being observed. Later in the morning information was received that students and people of the city, who had gone to the Ravi river in the early morning, were returning in procession but inquiries showed this information to be incorrect. Towards 12 noon, however, information was received at headquarters (District Courts) that a large procession had formed in the city and was making towards Lohari Gate and Anarkali *via* Circular Road,

and Mr. Broadway ordered me to gallop to Nila Gumbaz and try and hold up the procession if it came that way. I met the head of the procession at the entrance to Nila Gumbaz Chauk and raised my hand as a signal for it to stop, but no notice was taken; my horse was struck causing it to rear and plunge and the reins pulled, and I was driven forward by the crowd as far as Mool Chand's shop. The crowd was very excited and shouting *Rowlatt Bill hai hai, Mahatama Gandhi ki jai, Hindu-Musliman ki jai*. All in the crowd were bare-headed, a large number were wearing black *kurtas* and beating their breasts as is done by people taking part in the Muharram processions. A black banner with the picture of Gandhi was being carried in the middle of the procession.

While being driven forward and also at Mool Chand's shop, I asked the people what they wanted and they said they wanted to go on to the Mall and on my telling them they could not go they said they would. Shortly after this, Mr. Fyson and Mr. Broadway came up from the direction of the Young Men's Christian Association with some sowars and held up the crowd. Dr. Gokal Chand Naurang, then came on the scene and on being given a sowar's horse mounted it and managed to get the crowd to return with him towards Nila Gumbaz Chauk and I believe took it to the Bradlaugh Hall. I followed and from the Chauk got on to Market Road where I saw another crowd being pressed back by Police Officers and some cavalry towards Nila Gumbaz Chauk. While this was going on Dr. Gokal Chand Naurang returned and got this crowd also to follow him to Bradlaugh Hall, after which I returned *via* Gel Bagh to the District Courts and was shortly afterwards followed there, by Dr. Gokal Chand Naurang and Mr. Duni Chand who agreed, after some discussion, with Mr. Broadway to finish the Bradlaugh Hall meeting by 6 p.m. and avoid, if possible, any trouble and further processions. After this, I was sent out by Mr. Broadway to make Police arrangements to close the roads at Nila Gumbaz Chauk and Market Chauk leading down the Mall towards the Civil Station. The meeting having dispersed in good time, when all was clear Police pickets were formed up and returned to their respective stations. I heard the following morning (7th April) that after the Bradlaugh Hall meeting crowds went round the City, visited the

Continued.]

Mr. W. G. CLARKE.

streets in which certain Honorary Magistrates and Municipal Commissioners resided and abused them for having tried to prevent the *hartal*.

The next day, 7th April, shops opened and all business was resumed. Normal conditions prevailed also on the 8th and 9th, but as it was feared on the night of the latter date that the presence of certain Honorary Magistrates who usually attended the Ram Naumi festival and who had tried to stop the *hartal* on the 6th would cause trouble, application was made to the Deputy Commissioner to put Extra Assistant Commissioners on duty.

On the 10th April morning information was received that the Ram Naumi celebration held in the City on the night previous was more of a political demonstration than anything else and that L. Duni Chand had headed the procession mounted on a horse and that Chaudhri Ram Bhaj Dutt and others had also taken part. There was marked fraternising of the Hindus and Muhammadans taking part in the ceremonies, such as drinking out of the same vessel and shouting of "*Lila Duni Chand ki jai*" "*Hindu-Musulman ki jai*" and abuse was used against certain Honorary Magistrates who had tried to prevent the *hartal*. In the afternoon news was received of the arrest of Gandhi and later news of the outbreak at Amritsar and Mr. Broadway immediately issued orders for Police arrangements to be made to deal with any outbreak in Lahore. These orders were first communicated to police stations and lines from office by telephone and later the written orders issued.

Between 6.30 and 6.45 that evening, I received information at my bungalow that a large crowd was marching down the Mall. I immediately got on to my bicycle and reached the Mall in about 5 minutes and saw the head of the crowd opposite the English Warehouse and O'Dwyer Club gate. I got off my bicycle and advancing saw Police trying to hold up the crowd and shouting out orders to get back, but the mob continued to press forward, I then saw the Police step back and heard Mr. Fyson give the order to fire. By this time I had reached the line of Police. After the firing the crowd backed but some of the mob rushed through the gate leading to the O'Dwyer Club; seeing this, I took 3 or 4 men and entered by the opposite gate and turned them back on to the Mall. I then joined the remainder of the Police and followed the mob back down the Mall. On nearing the Bank of Bengal and Young Men's Christian Association Chauk a part of the crowd went towards the Market Chauk and part towards Nila Gumbaz. I followed the latter accompanied by a Sub-Inspector and about 6 armed constables and on reaching the Bank of Bengal gate I was suddenly seized and thrown to the ground by a man who had detached himself from the crowd, Sub-Inspector Moratab Ali and his men immediately rushed forward and the former freed me by striking the man on the back with the butt of his revolver. The man then ran and joined the crowd. A constable was in the act of shooting at the man but I prevented him from firing. We then followed on to Nila Gumbaz Chauk and I halted my men and closed the road leading out of Anarkali Bazar. I had hoped that the crowd, having been warned, would disperse here and go away quietly, but instead the numbers began to increase and fearing another rush through, which meant the crowd getting on to the Mall again, I advanced and blew the alarm whistle for reinforcements and then pushed on. The mob continued to increase and seemed to have been joined by another mob from the direction of Lohari Gate. While warning the mob that firing would be resorted to if it did not disperse, Mr. Broadway, armed with a dozen or so sowars and some Cavalry in the charge of a British Officer followed by some 6 or 8 foot Police, arrived. Later Inspector Grey arrived with another force of 12 or 14 men. Chaudhri Ram Bhaj Datt came out of the mob and asked for time to try and disperse the people. His request being acceded to he was given a sowar's horse, but could not control it, so dismounted and went on foot and eventually mounted an electric switch box on the pave-

ment. I saw him waving what looked like a white *chادر* about, but could not hear what he was saying owing to the noise of the mob. By this time stones and mud were thrown and continued to be thrown in spite of warnings and Mr. Broadway gave the order to fire a few rounds in the direction of some low shop roofs to the left from which stones were particularly bad. Two or three rounds were fired but stoning continued from other directions. A sowar had been despatched to bring the Deputy Commissioner, who on arrival finding the stoning still going on and being himself stoned on going forward, ordered further firing after which the crowd was dispersed by the Police and Cavalry advancing and patrolling the Circular Road as far as the road leading to Akhari Gate. At this place Mr. Broadway ordered me to proceed to the City Kotwali and ascertain the state of affairs there. Accompanied by the sowars I reached the Kotwali and while there, heard shouting as of another mob in the Naulakha direction. I took a guard of a Sub-Inspector and about 20 armed men and marched down Landa Bazar. When about the middle of the bazaar I saw a number of men armed with sticks coming towards us so halted the guard. The men, however, dispersed and the guard proceeded. A little further on I met Mr. de'Gale, Assistant Superintendent of Police, who informed me that he had been attacked at the entrance to the bazaar by the men whom I had met with my guard in the bazaar and who had then dispersed. Finding all clear on arriving at Railway Chauk I sent the City guard back to the Kotwali and returned to the Telegraph Office (which had been made District Police headquarters) and McLeod Road and reported events to Mr. Broadway.

Later on that night I was again sent out by Mr. Broadway on patrol on McLeod Road to see to pickets on that road and reserves in Police Lines according to the orders Mr. Broadway had issued that evening.

On the 11th April I remained at the Telegraph Office. During the day I heard the City was in the control of the mob since the previous night and that the Danda Fauj was much in evidence, also that a large gathering has assembled in the Badshahi Mosque and that Hindus were present and that political speeches were being made.

Under orders of Mr. Broadway I made arrangements that evening for Police to accompany the Military through the City on the morning of 12th April.

On the 12th April I accompanied Colonel Johnson, Mr. Fyson and Mr. Broadway with Military and Police forces and marched through the City entering by Delhi Gate leaving by Bhati Gate and finishing up at Bradlaugh Hall. During the march Police and Military pickets were detached and posted at selected places. Throughout this procession the attitude of the mob was both hostile and defiant.

On arriving at Puri's Cinema (Tibbi Gateway) a crowd was seen in the grounds between the Fort and Mosque and by order of General Clarke was dispersed by Cavalry. Information was received about this time that a Criminal Investigation Department officer had been assaulted in the Mosque and the latter place was ordered to be cleared and closed. The crowd came out from the Mosque and formed up in Hira Mandi. The majority of them were carrying sticks. They were warned to disperse but took no notice and on a line of Cavalry advancing with the Deputy Commissioner to disperse it the mob surrounded them and began using their sticks and throwing stones. Seeing this I galloped back towards Puri's Cinema and sent forward some Police and brought Colonel Johnson who was at the head of the column. After the Deputy Commissioner and Cavalry had extricated themselves from the mob about 4 files of Police were ordered to fire as the stoning got worse. The crowd dispersed after the firing and after an armed Police guard had been posted there the Military and Civil forces went on towards Bhati Gate and Bradlaugh Hall and had no further trouble. Officers finally dispersed at the Telegraph office.

Mr. W. G. CLARKE—concluded—Mr. J. E. KROUGH—Lt Col. the Hon'ble W. F. NORTH.

From this date onwards I was at Headquarters (the Telegraph office) carrying out the orders of Mr. Broadway regarding Police pickets, escorts, arrests and searches.

During the period 12th to 15th April, on which latter date Martial Law was proclaimed, I heard that the Deputy Commissioner had held meetings to try and end the *hartal* but without success. I also heard of the disturbances and murders in Kasur and the outbreak at Gujranwala and other places the opening of free food shops (*Langars*) that efforts were being made to

try and prevent Government servants returning to work, and the cutting of telegraph wires and removal of Railway lines at various places. After the proclamation of Martial Law on the 15th April and order to open shops on 17th April the situation became easier. Between the 17th April and 12th June, on which latter date Martial Law was withdrawn, Police and Military pickets were either reduced or withdrawn as the situation permitted, under the orders of Mr. Broadway after consultation with the Military authorities.

Mr. J. E. KROUGH, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Lahore.

I was on duty as Magistrate in charge at the Railway Station on the 6th April, the day of the first *hartal*, and again from the evening of the 10th till the afternoon of the 13th April, when I was called to the Telegraph Office to assist Mr. Fyson, Deputy Commissioner, in the disposal of current work. I can depose to the general condition of affairs at the Lahore Railway Station and its immediate vicinity during the period that I was on duty there.

The Station was visited all day long by large groups of students and others, many of whom were wearing black bands or other distinguishing badges, thus prominently identifying themselves with the *hartal* movement and the general feeling of unrest.

The Station was visited all day long by large groups of students and others, many of whom were wearing black bands or other distinguishing badges, thus prominently identifying themselves with the *hartal* movement and the general feeling of unrest.

The Station was visited all day long by large groups of students and others, many of whom were wearing black bands or other distinguishing badges, thus prominently identifying themselves with the *hartal* movement and the general feeling of unrest.

The Station was visited all day long by large groups of students and others, many of whom were wearing black bands or other distinguishing badges, thus prominently identifying themselves with the *hartal* movement and the general feeling of unrest.

and preventing them from going to work and threatening them with violence. One of the offenders turned out to be a clerk in the office of the Chief Examiner of Accounts North-Western Railway.

Mischievous groups were seen trespassing on the Railway lines in the Lahore yard on the Shahdara side of the Railway Station, while a gang of hooligans and boys held up the road near the Railway Station having stretched a rope across.

I was informed that groups of men were going about the roads making people get out of tongas and walk. In one case the Deputy Superintendent, Railway Police, was held up by a gang and made to get out and walk. This same gang then broke the large street lamp near the underway across the Railway lines on the Shahdara side of the Lahore Railway Station. This gang was led by an ex-head constable of the Railway Police. I tried and sentenced him under Martial Law.

I heard of the various wild rumours circulated regarding the provisions of the Rowlatt Act.

As special Martial Law Magistrate I tried several cases of minor offences. As Martial Law Magistrate acting under orders from headquarters, I supervised the public floggings which were carried out under my orders at the Market Square and outside Delhi Gate.

Under the orders of Mr. Fyson, Deputy Commissioner, and the instructions of Mr. Cocks, Deputy Inspector-General, C. I. D., I arranged for the train for the deportation of Messrs. Harkishen Lal, Duni Chand and Ram Bhaj Datt whose arrest at the Telegraph Office I witnessed.

Lt.-Col. the Hon'ble W. F. NORTH, Officer Commanding Fort, Lahore.

Quite early on the morning of April 11th, a large crowd had collected outside the iron rails at the main gate of the Fort. The Sergeant of the guard telephoned up to me that the leaders of the mob were trying to pull down the rails. I went down at once, and found an extremely violent crowd hooting and yelling, and although I do not understand Urdu at all well, I could hear continual shouts of "kill the white pigs." There was much shaking of fists and spitting at us (myself personally) through the rails, and threatening with *lathis*, and small axes on long bamboos, also considerable throwing of broken bricks and stones.

I reinforced my guard, and gave orders that the crowd were to be kept back from the rails at all costs, as it appeared possible that the great crowd *might* pull down the rails.

About 2-30 P.M., Lieutenant Tapp of the clothing department had to pass out on his motor bicycle, and great difficulty was experienced in getting him away. He was hooted and stoned by a considerably larger crowd, but no damage done. After he had got out of range, the crowd began to stone the gate again, and became very increasingly hostile. Later in the afternoon the crowd apparently got tired of the game and gradually dispersed.

I with others of my officers were on the fort walls overlooking the Badshahi Mosque when a great meeting was held, and I think it was during the time the Criminal Investigation Department man was assaulted, that the

crowd, seeing us on the walls, began to shake their fists and yell at us, pointing their fingers and putting out their tongues. This I could see quite clearly with my glasses.

Later on again (I think it was) a crowd trying to get out of the city towards the Taksali Gate, immediately south of the Fort, were fired on by the police. On that occasion, through my glasses, I saw two policemen deliberately fire in the air, their rifles being at an angle of at least 45°.

Again later on, I had a telephone message to be ready to handle a large hostile crowd moving through the city in direction of the Fort.

This was found to be a big procession taking the bodies of some people killed by the firing to be buried. The demeanour of the crowd on emerging from the city was so threatening, great shouting and shaking of fists, that, owing to orders I had received to keep the space opposite to the south gate of the Badshahi Mosque clear, I rushed 100 men on to the south wall of Fort to support the cavalry picquet down below us. I also had some Lewis guns on the wall. I was quite certain at the time, that if we have not had the men quickly on to the wall, the crowd would have tried to rush the Badshahi Mosque gate. From the wall to the road on which the crowd were, is not more than 300 yards at the most.

But for some time before April 10th I noticed that people were, for some reason I did not then understand, outwardly hostile. On more than one occasion, when

LL.-Col. the Hon'ble W. F. NORTE—concluded—SAYAD MUHAMMAD SHAH—SHEIKH RAHIM BAKHSI.

starting or returning from my morning ride I was hooted at by parties of boys, and twice I was spat at by old men, returning from a ceremonial bath, close under the mosqu walls. At the time I probably put them down as fanatics, until the same thing happened again.

Also several times, I and one or other of my officers riding home by the Circular Road, were hooted at by the boys of a school near the Cotton Mills. This at the

time they were assembling outside the school about 9—9.30 A.M. Not expecting any trouble then, we took no great notice.

On several occasions also, we had insolent remarks made at, or about us by students, while riding down the Mall. The demeanour of those who were handed over to me as prisoners, once they were caught was extremely humble.

#### SAYAD MUHAMMAD SHAH, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Lahore.

I was posted on the 6th April 1919 in the Kutchery by the District Magistrate to issue orders on behalf of the Civil authority. At about 11.30 A.M. on 6th April 1919, Khan Sahib Abdul Ghani Khan, City Kotwal, came to the Kutchery and informed the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police that a mob of over 60,000 men, after passing through city, has reached the Mochi Gate, and threatens to pass through Anarkali Bazar intending evidently to go to the Upper Mall. The District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police both ordered me to accompany the City Inspector to the spot and report all about the situation at once. I reached Kesri's shop in the Anarkali Bazar where I found that the mob had already extended up to Nila Gumbaz. Information was at once sent to both officers to reach somewhere near Nila Gumbaz, because the mob was absolutely uncontrollable and could not be checked. The City Inspector with me tried to persuade the mob to return, but they refused and threatened to assault. The City Inspector afterwards left the procession in my hands and went straight *via* Takia Imli street to the direction of Nila Gumbaz. I accompanied the mob till we reached Nila Gumbaz near Mul Chand's shop and there I found the Deputy Commissioner, Superintendent of Police and all other Police Officers present and there we managed to disperse the mob and sent them back to the direction of Bradlaugh Hall where the mob was in reality going to assemble in response to an invitation by certain persons to attend a meeting in connection with the Rowlatt Bill.

2. On the night of 9th April I was put in charge of the Ram Naumi procession along with Lala Ram Lal and City Kotwal. The procession started at about 7 P.M. and reached Dabbi Bazar at about 1 P.M. During the route the procession made halts at various places where certain persons made speeches, etc., with regard to the Hindu-Muhammadan unity, and some of them uttered violent words against the Government and openly defied their authority. It lasted till about 1 A.M. The details of the speeches and the names of the gentlemen making speeches have already been reported. I believe, to the proper authorities so these need not be mentioned here. The only noteworthy point is that this the Ram Naumi gathering was turned into a political procession that night. In spite of several requests the people behaved improperly. This whole thing was reported to the Deputy Commissioner early next morning.

3. Just after the stone throwing affair at Anarkali which occurred on the evening of 10th in connection with the *hartal* of the bazar, I was immediately put in charge of the Anarkali Civil Area to look after the affair which duty I did till 25th April. Reports on various points were from time to time made to the officers concerned. The details of all these things I could give if called for.

4. Conversation with Lala Duni Chand with regard to the release of one Moti, the details of which I had already given in my statement before the Martial Law Commission.

#### SHEIKH RAHIM BAKHSI, Senior Sub-Judge, Lahore.

On the 8th April at about 4 P.M. I went to see the District Magistrate at the Katcheri. The main crowd had passed on to the Bradlaugh Hall. A number of students and others, who were still in the Municipal gardens, constantly hissed and hooted the military sowars posted there. On the 10th April at about 4 P.M. news of Gandhi's arrest was received. In the evening the District Magistrate sent for me and deputed me to have a notice written by him translated, printed and published through night, which I did.

At about 11 A.M. on the 11th April, it was reported that a big crowd had collected behind the High Court. I was sent to disperse it. I found that the clerks of the Accountant-General's Office had struck and refused to work. Some of the clerks would not resume work on the ground that it was a national mourning day, but the majority alleged that they were anxious to go back to their homes as they were afraid of the same being looted. With the consent of the Accountant-General almost all the clerks, except those of the Currency Office, were given leave for the day, after some heated discussions. The crowd dispersed after that. Outside the compound a few students told me that I should have encouraged the clerks to hold out. Such was their spirit at the time. Some of the clerks of the Deputy Commissioner's office, some of the Railway Department complained to me that the mob very often prevented them from attending to duty.

On the 12th April I rode with the District Magistrate and the military through the city. Every one complained against the Rowlatt Bill. At Hira Mandi it was reported that a C. I. D. Inspector had been assaulted

inside the Badshahi mosque where there was a big gathering. I was deputed by the District Magistrate to clear the mosque, which I did with little difficulty. When the mob, however, came out in the open maidan it would not move away. Some of them were rather insolent. They went to the Hira Mandi side after all, no sooner I went inside the Hazuri Bagh I heard some firing.

A seditious poster was removed by me from the Hazuri Bagh and handed over to the police. In the afternoon thousands of people went with the dead body of a student who had died at Hira Mandi. We watched the procession but did not interfere with it. For two or three days I was on duty at the Badshahi mosque and watched the crowds passing on to the Ravi river to hold meetings as the district had been proclaimed under the Seditious Meetings Act.

On the 15th April or so, I was sent to Shahdara to arrest Hem Raj who had arranged *hartal* there, in consequence of the arrest of Lala Harkishan Lal. I met with no opposition.

I had a number of miscellaneous duties to perform, the chief thing being to have the Martial Law Orders duly published and posted.

In my opinion some sort of administrative measure was necessary to check the lawlessness and intentional disregard for authority.

I have been trying to trace the seditious posters, etc. I had handed over to the police, but in vain. Probably they are now placed on some judicial records. Hence the delay in submitting the report.

Rai Sahib SETH DWARKA NATH—Mr. G. A. COCKS.

Rai Sahib SETH DWARKA NATH, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lahore.

I am posted to Lahore and was in charge of the Lahore Tehsil (not including the Headquarters Police Stations). On the 6th April I was on duty with the Police force kept in reserve in the District Kutchery. At about 12 noon Mr. Broadway, Senior Superintendent, Police, received information that an unlawful procession had come through Anarkali and was going towards the Civil Station *via* the Mall Road. Mr. Broadway sent me with 50 armed Constables to go to Chauk Nila Gumbaz and await orders there, and he himself with some sowars galloped to the Mall Road *via* Market Chauk. Deputy Commissioner was with him. When I reached Nila Gumbaz the crowd, which was very big, had passed the Chauk. The crowd consisted of all sorts of people majority of whom were beating their breasts. Whilst I was stopping with my guard in the Chauk a young man who was bare-headed intentionally collided with my men. I asked him not to do so, but he stared at me in return and entered and passed through the ranks of my men twice. I thought this was his way to show passive resistance. So I made a sign to two of my Indian officers who led him away and left him in the crowd.

After some time the head of the procession returned from the side of Young Men's Christian Association. Lala Duni Chand was with it. He was just near the young men probably students who were carrying a black flag. Lala Gokal Chand Naurang was also with them, but he was riding a Police horse. The attitude of the crowd was excited. Lala Gokal Chand had led the mob towards the Gol Bagh and had returned. He was going towards the Market Chauk shouting to the people to come away, when a man in the mob thinking him to be a Policeman and alone hit him with a stick which struck him on the leg. He turned round and abused that man and the people also abused him and told him he was "Doctor Sahib and their own man." When the majority of the mob had gone away towards the Bradlaugh Hall I left half my men at the Nila Gumbaz and marched the others to the District Courts. We were jeered at and abused on the way by people standing on the sides. I have shown the above instances as an example of the attitude of the people as they happened in my presence.

On the 10th evening at about 5 P.M. I was going in my trap in the Lohari Chauk when I saw a small group of young men coming from the opposite side shouting "*Mahatma Gandhi ki jai.*" They passed me and then perhaps noticing my cap turned round and shouted at me asking me to take off my cap. I refused and drove on. I found people were collecting and the shops were being shut. I went out of Taxali Gate and drove to the Police Office. There I found Senior Superintendent, Police, sitting in the office and reported the facts to him verbally. He asked me to get men and post guards at District Kutchery and Civil Secretariat and arrange about the safety of the National Bank of India. I got men from Anarkali and Mozang Police Stations and after posting the guards at District Kutchery and Civil Secretariat Offices, etc., I went to Police Station Anarkali. I heard that a big mob had gone on the Mall and a small guard of Policemen had doubled to intercept them. I galloped in my trap. At the Telegraph Office I met with the tail of the mob. As the crowd got thicker I drove on the tan ride. Near Lord Lawrence's statue I saw the head of the mob. They had a black flag. The Police guard was at a distance of few paces in open order with their muskets at the

ready position. The mob was advancing in small rushes. I jumped down from my trap and ran to the front of the mob. I argued, ordered, entreated and advised people to disperse. They would not listen. I was not in uniform and had my back towards the Police. Two young men rushed past me. I looked round and found that they had each seized the musket of a Policeman. Just after that shots were fired and I ran back behind the Policemen firing the shots. This happened opposite the Soldiers' Home on the Mall Road. I saw that Mr. Cocks, Deputy Inspector-General and Mr. Fyson, were with the Policemen who in all were about a dozen men. Mr. Clarke, Deputy Superintendent, Police, had also come up. One man dropped and some must have been wounded. Majority of the people fled away. The remainder were pushed back by Policemen advancing. Some other Police arrived and I was ordered to stop at the Chauk near Lord Lawrence's Statue with some men where I remained till 2 A.M.

I accompanied Mr. Slesser, Additional Superintendent, Police, and marched in the afternoon of the 12th April with an armed force of two Sowars and 50 Foot Constables through the Lahore City. We visited the Police guards put in the City in the morning. A big procession following the dead body of one Khushi Ram (against the orders of Deputy Commissioner) met us in the Bazaz Hatta. There was a very big crowd following. The people were very excited and were shouting and beating their breasts. They were shouting "*Hindu-Musliman ki jai,*" "*Punjab ke Shahidon ki jai,*" "*Mahatma Gandhi ki jai.*" As the attitude of the people was very excited we thought it prudent to follow them at a distance and did so up to Tibbi.

On the 13th April 1919 the Railway Station Wagah was burnt. Meeting took place at Manhiala where speeches were given that the Hindus and Muhammadans should unite and help their brethren who had risen against the Government in Amritsar and Lahore City. According to the agreement arrived at, people met at Narwar on the same night and then burnt Railway Station Wagah, cut off Telegraph wires, etc.

Offensive notices abusing Government and some of the *raizes* who were thought to be Government partisans were put up on the Gates of Lahore City and I saw and removed some myself. I heard many complaints from Government servants that they were forcibly stopped away from their duty. Some told me that they had come wearing dhotis and bare-headed, as then the strikers allowed them to pass, thinking them to be one of themselves. People were not allowed to drive in tongas and were made to get down.

Two grass farm sticks were burnt in Rakh Bhangali and people of villages Bhangali, Barki and Ghawindi began to forcibly graze their cattle upon Government fodder saying that these things belonged to themselves and that there was no Government. Some men of the abovenamed villages were arrested and sent up for trial the majority of whom were convicted by the Area Officer.

On the 15th April the Martial Law was proclaimed and the things calmed down a great deal in the Lahore City after that.

The *hartal* continued up till 17th morning when in the morning all the shops were opened up. A Martial Law order was issued on the same day disallowing *hartal* but I think it had ended before people knew about the order.

Mr. G. A. COCKS, Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab.

I was in office till 6 P.M. on the 10th, news of the outbreak and of the murders in Amritsar being received same afternoon. Soon after reaching home I received a telephone message saying that a crowd had gathered in the City, and it was feared it might make for the

Civil Station. I rang up Senior Superintendent of Police and learnt he was at Government House. I motored to Government House and found Mr. Fyson, Deputy Commissioner, and Mr. Broadway, Senior Superintendent of Police, with His Honour. While discussing arrange-

Mr. G. A. COCKS—concluded—Mr. I. W. BOWRING—Khan Sahib SHEIKH ABDUL AZIZ.

ments there a telephone message from the Kotwali came through on Private Secretary's telephone which I received. It was from one of our Indian subordinates saying a crowd had left the City and was making its way down Anarkali Bazar to the Mall. Reserves had not then been posted and Mr. Broadway went straight to the lines to turn them out and post them so as to block the roads from the City to the Civil Station. I drove Mr. Fyson down the Mall. It was beginning to get dusk when we saw the mob advancing up the Mall, it being then perhaps 50 yards west of the Soldiers' Club—the old Punjab Bank. We left my car at the Soldiers' Club and went to meet the mob, finding a handful of police armed with muskets, perhaps some 12 or so in number, mixed up with the front ranks of the crowd and being pushed steadily and rapidly back up the Mall. Mr. Fyson and I harangued the mob, warned them of the consequences of disobedience and endeavoured to turn them back. There were a couple of soldiers from the Club who joined us and a Sub-Inspector in charge of the small police guard. After being hustled about, jeered and abused, Mr. Fyson told me that we should have to fire in order to disperse the crowd as the police were being overpowered and portions of the crowd were getting

round through the compound of the Soldiers' Club. The difficulty was to withdraw the men so that they should not fire into one another. Incidentally it was impossible to make one's orders heard. Mr. Fyson repeated his decision and a few of the men were eventually withdrawn some distance and fired. In all probability some 20 rounds were fired, but it was then too dark to enable me to say what casualties occurred. The front ranks of the mob broke and the firing was stopped. Inspector Gopal Singh, Rai Sahib Dwarka Nath and Mr. Clarke, Deputy Superintendent of Police, arrived and I told Mr. Clarke to make the men continue to drive the crowd back with the butts of their muskets. At the Lawrence Statue a *rum-jum* was obtained and three wounded men were sent in it to the Charing Cross Police Post. These were the only wounded men I saw. We then drove back the mob slowly, but steadily as far as the Telegraph Office. There Mr. Broadway arrived with his mounted police and a detachment of the 17th Cavalry and I handed the control over to him. The remainder of the Cavalry followed and some reserve police, and I did not follow up the crowd. I stayed at the Telegraph Office for some time and eventually drove back up the Mall.

Mr. I. W. BOWRING, Superintendent of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab.

I was not actually present in Lahore on the 10th of April when the disturbances took on a serious form as I had left on the evening of the 9th of April for Bombay on special duty. I returned from Bombay with great difficulty owing to strikes on the Railway on the early morning of the 15th April. Our train was hung up at Delhi for several hours and surrounded by crowds shouting "*Gandhi ki Jai*." It was very difficult to obtain food as all the staffs of the Refreshment Rooms had run away.

Before reaching Delhi our train was stopped at night on information being received that a large gang of men were hiding under a bridge prepared to wreck the train. We had to divert from the main line at Rajpura and come right across the Punjab to Bhatinda where we were told that riots and strikes were in progress. A very great feeling of tension and apprehension appeared to be prevalent throughout the country. My only personal experience of the mobs in Lahore was on the 6th April, when I was myself a witness of the attitude of the crowds who attempted to come down the Mall on the morning of that day. In the afternoon I attended an enormous meeting at the Bradlaugh Hall accompanied

by two other officers of the Criminal Investigation Department, by the orders of the Punjab Government. We were in uniform and received a most disgraceful reception, being greeted with hisses, jeers, shouts of shame and other signs of antagonism. On our way to the Hall we met an English lady accompanied by her Hindu husband leaving the place, and I learnt subsequently that she also had been treated with great disrespect, hissed and refused a chair.

Though we had previously given intimation of our intention to attend the meeting to Mr. Duni Chand, no preparations were made for our accommodation in a position where we could hear well what was going on, and after being inveigled inside the Hall, we were forced to leave it and took seats in a gallery which was approached from the staircase outside. On my return to Lahore on April 15th I was deputed to investigate all the cases which had taken place there in connection with the outbreaks which included a number of cases of individual persons arrested, for stirring up trouble in the city and suburbs, besides a number of important cases including the Main Lahore Case which were sent for trial by the Court Martial Tribunals.

Khan Sahib SHEIKH ABDUL AZIZ, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Political Branch, Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab.

The public agitation in Punjab against the Rowlatt Bills dates from February 1919 and before anything was generally known as to the unprecedented scale the agitation was to shape itself, we received information that preparations were in progress for stirring agitation on a scale unheard of before. Lahore and Amritsar took the lead in Punjab. Meetings were held to run the campaign, violent speeches were openly delivered, and writings and cartoons calculated to inflame public feelings appeared in press which went to create a very unpleasant situation for the Government.

At the same time that this agitation was at work, Mr. Gandhi's *Satyagraha* propaganda, defined by Mr. Gandhi as a movement of mere soul force, began to show distinct signs of developing into an active resistance movement and we received reports that a growing anti-British feeling was being fostered among the people, that the best *Satyagraha* would be to assault Europeans and go to jail. This was reported to us before any actual assaults on Europeans took place. About this stage a campaign of misrepresentation and calumny

began as a result of which mischievous rumours like the following became prevalent:—

- (a) The Government did not want to grant Reforms to the extent they have been announced and the Rowlatt Bills were really intended as a *Pesh Bandi* to cope with the situation likely to arise later on in the disappointed India.
- (b) The Rowlatt Bills were intended to deprive Indians of their elementary rights of liberty and to chain them down to eternal slavery.
- (c) The Government aimed at the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire and the Bills were meant to meet the resulting Muhammadan situation.
- (d) The Bills were intended by Government to check national advancement of Indians and to act as substitute to the Defence Act to arm Government with powers of arrests and internments without trials.

Khan Sahib SHEIKH ABDUL AZIZ—concluded—Mr. A. DALE-GREEN.

- (e) The Bills empowered police to arrest four or more persons found together.
- (f) The marriage parties would be liable to prosecution if found without permits from police.
- (g) Permits from police would be necessary for journeys from one place to other.

While such was the state of misrepresentations prevailing in Punjab, there came the unfortunate news of the happenings of Delhi on 30th March the day when Delhi went into complete *hartal* in observance of it as a day of national humiliation and protest against the Rowlatt Bills. The attitude of Delhi emboldened the people here. A complete *hartal* also took place on that date at Amritsar and this also encouraged the people at Lahore and other places. This was followed by seditious posters appearing in Lahore with effect from 3rd April 1919. At last 6th April, which had been fixed as a day of National Protest for Lahore, etc., dawned and in the morning large number of seditious posters were found posted at various parts of the Lahore City some of which were removed by our staff. More posters of this nature were discovered from day to day and continued up to several days later till the enforcement of Martial Law. I submit herewith English translation\* of posters in print which were produced before the Martial Law Commission in the Lahore Main Case.

The 6th April was a day of complete *hartal* in Lahore and was marked for unlawful processions going about the bazars when Hindus and Muhammadans fraternised and drank water from the same tumblers and *anti*-Government as well as *anti*-British feelings manifested itself openly as follows:—

- (a) A youth wearing an English hat with his face blackened and wearing a garland of old shoes round his neck was reported to have paraded through the bazar inside Delhi Gate followed by a mob who struck the youth on his hat with shoes.
- (b) Another mob, while passing at noon by the Circular Road to Anarkali, came across a dummy figure with an English hat on, kept at the balcony of the "Chandar Parkash" hotel. The hat was removed and kicked and trampled by the mob.
- (c) At the Bradlaugh Hall meeting, three European Officers, Messrs. Bowring, Beaver and Askwith, were hissed at. I happened to be

\* Attached to oral evidence, pages 106 to 112.

present there and was an eye-witness to the affair.

- (d) After the Bradlaugh meeting, a mob proceeded towards Lohari Gate. It came across two Europeans in tongas on the road outside Rai Bahadur Mohan Lal's house. Some persons out of the mob picked up stones to pelt them, but the Europeans realising the situation moved off.
- (e) A part of the audience of the Bradlaugh Hall meeting went about till late in the night in the city using foulest epithets on Europeans and using abusive language against those who were known to be helpers of Government.

Subsequent to the 6th April, our reports received dealt with various incidents into the details of which I need not enter, because they have all come before the Martial Law Commission in the Lahore Main Case, I mean the extraordinary scenes of political fraternisation between Hindus and Muhammadans at the Ram Naumi procession on 9th April, the general *hartal* and the happenings of 10th April, the appearance of *Danda Fauj*, the parading of streets by excited mobs using foul language towards His Majesty the King-Emperor, meetings in the Shahi Mosque on the 11th and 12th April and attempt on the life of an Inspector of Criminal Investigation Department, who went on duty to the Shahi Mosque. It may be mentioned, however, that the mob which came out of the Shahi Mosque on 11th April destroyed the pictures of Their Majesties the King and Queen in the balcony of the house of Lala Raghu Nath, Pleader, situated near the water Reservoir and disfigured the portraits of Their Majesties on the sign board of Faqir Chand, contractor's house, situated close to the former place. This fact was reported to me the same evening and the scenes of the occurrences were inspected by me personally later on. It was on the same day that a mob also appeared armed with *lathis* at the Golden Mosque Sub-Post Office and Railway Booking Office and forced the Government employees to close the offices and smashed the sign board. This spot was also inspected by me personally and removed the broken board which was produced before the Martial Law Commission.

Such was, I may point out, the situation in Lahore after 10th April. The lawless element was spreading rapidly to outstations when Martial Law was introduced on 15th April 1919.

Mr. A. DALE-GREEN, District Traffic Superintendent, North-Western Railway, Lahore.

I was at Lahore on the 10th of April and proceeded to Amritsar by No. 6 Down Passenger about 15-55 hours on the evening of the 10th when I heard that there had been trouble there, and that the Government and Railway telegraph wires had been cut. I remained there till the 12th afternoon when I proceeded to Lahore and left Mr. Binns, my Assistant, in charge at Amritsar.

I will not attempt to give an account of all that occurred, i.e., cutting of wires, breaking of railway lines, etc., as no doubt the Government is already in possession of these facts, and as I was continually engaged in dealing with the situation as far as working of the Railway, controlling of trains, rationing of staff, supply of repair trains, etc., and it would be hopeless for me to try and trust to my memory to describe anything in detail, particularly as I presume the Engineers are better able to give details of damage to the Railway track, and the Telegraph Department to Railway wires, etc.

*Train Service.*—It was soon found that it would be very dangerous to attempt to run passenger trains through certain areas during the night, due to the tampering with the line and the Telegraph wires and the attacks made on European passengers wherever opportunity occurred. The train service was, therefore, curtailed

to certain day trains only, principally Mails. The booking of passengers had, therefore, to be curtailed to suit the accommodation available.

*Railway Staff.*—I had information about 15 to 20 days before the 10th of April of disaffection amongst the staff and my news was that a strike had been fixed for the 13th of April, but believed at the time that the trouble was due to certain Railway agitators who considered a strike a better method to obtain their ends, i.e., enhanced rates of pay, than the usual appeals, etc., but during the disturbances I found that whenever there was trouble with the staff it was distinctly *anti*-British and *anti*-Government. A strike was averted by special steps at Lahore, and I believe the fact that Lahore staff did not strike prevented strikes spreading all over this Railway.

That trouble when it did occur was distinctly *anti*-British and *anti*-Government is clearly proved by the trouble on the control phones between Shahdara and Eminabad. I mention this case in particular as I personally heard what occurred on the phone.

In very many places where the staff stuck to their work they could buy no food from the usual places of sale and special steps had to be taken to ration staff in these areas.



Major J. C. HUNTER—Mr. O. W. WATKINS.

Major J. C. HUNTER, R. E. (Temp.), Carriage and Wagon Superintendent, North-Western Railway.

I assumed command of Moghulpura Area about 9 o'clock on the night of the 10th April last and proceeded to Moghulpura Armoury to complete arrangement for the safety of women and children. Members of the Indian Defence Force had been called out and Armoured Trains Nos. 1 and 3 (stabled in Moghulpura Shops) had been ordered out in response to a telephonic message from the Adjutant of the 1-24th Indian Defence Force, who was at Lahore. After crews for these trains had been told off the available strength for the defence of Moghulpura was about 75 Indian Defence Force and Volunteers, 50 2-10th Jats and about 50 armed police. Patrols were then detailed for duty in Moghulpura area and Workshops, and the reserve was retained at Moghulpura Armoury with 3 Motor Cars for any emergency and also one Motor Car patrolled the roads every 2½ hours.

2. There was no disorder reported in any part of Moghulpura Colony, no doubt, because it is entirely occupied by Government employees (a large number of Government quarters for Indian workmen is situated about quarter of a mile to the north of the European Colony).

3. The behaviour of the Railway workmen at Moghulpura was very satisfactory, and there was no organized attempt amongst them at striking work, but judging from the number of pickets stopping men at different points of the roads leading to Moghulpura it appears as if it had been controlled by some outside organization presumably in Lahore City, and the attendance of Railway workmen at duty gradually decreased from the 8th to the 16th of April (inclusive).

4. Between the 11th and 16th April the Works Superintendent, who is a most important witness and is unfortunately absent on leave in England, stated to me on several occasions that workmen had complained through their Foremen and in many cases direct to him about gangs of men at different points on the roads attempting to prevent them from attending work.

5. On the morning of the 16th of April shortly after 7 o'clock I received a phone message at Moghulpura Time Office from Mr. Gantzer, Superintendent, Printing

Press, Moghulpura, stating that two gangs of men were in the vicinity of his bungalow preventing workmen from attending work. I at once proceeded down the Bhagwanpura Road in my car with four ranks of the 6th Royal Sussex, and when within about 500 yards of the gang, consisting of about 40 to 50 men on the road they evidently noticed the car approaching and immediately dispersed and ran across the fields towards Shalamar and Bhagwanpura, and as it was then hopeless trying to capture any of them, I then ordered two rounds to be fired over them. One man seemingly got scared and hid among the corn of one of the fields. He was taken in charge and handed over to the Special Tribunal for disposal, but I believe he was shortly afterwards released. After this date no further complaints were made from any of the workmen and the attendance improved from the following morning, which actually was higher than normal.

6. Workmen residing in Bhogiwal and Bhagwanpura complained to the Works Superintendent that *hartal* was kept up to the 15th of April in the bazar of these villages which lie about a mile-and-a-half to the north of Moghulpura, and the Administrator of Martial Law ordered me to visit these villages on the afternoon of the 16th April to see that all shops in the bazar were opened. I sent for the Lambardar Mian Taj-ud-din to conduct me through the villages, and I then found every shop opened, although in some cases there were very few commodities on view. I feel certain that had the Lambardar not been absent from the village up to the 15th his influence would have prevented *hartal*. I paid further visits to these villages and found all shops opened and well stocked with commodities, and in some cases food stuffs were being sold at lower rates than those fixed by Martial Law order.

7. There was no further trouble in Moghulpura area; and I am convinced that it was due to the action taken under Martial Law. I may say that I had a petition about two months ago from workmen residing in Bhogiwal requesting for Martial Law to be reinstated, which they wished to be forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner. I, however, handed it back to them and informed them that their request could not be considered.

Mr. O. W. WATKINS, Works Manager, Loco., North-Western Railway, Moghulpura, Punjab.

After being on Indian Defence Force duty throughout the night of April 10th, 1919, I paid a hurried visit to the Loco. Works at 6-30 A.M. on the 11th.

Everything was apparently quiet, and the number of absentees, 9 per cent., i.e., slightly below the average (10 per cent.). The good attendance was no doubt due to it being pay day and to the rule that absentees are not paid till a later day.

A commotion took place outside the Works during the breakfast hour when the men found that the Audit office clerks were absent, and that they could not get their pay. They therefore refused to return to work for the second period and threw mud and stones at all who tried to get them in. No police were in evidence. Special arrangements were then made for the disbursement of pay, but the absentees were 20 per cent.

On being relieved of Indian Defence Force duty on 12th, I immediately asked for a military guard to be posted near the Works during the meal hour. There was no attempt at unruly conduct after 11th.

On the 12th, 40 per cent. of the staff were absent. All complained that it was with the greatest difficulty that they had attended work as in every direction, on all main roads and even on the Railway line, they encountered bands of men with sticks who prevented

them going to their work. Rumours were afloat that those who went to work would have their houses looted and their families molested. They therefore asked that the Works be closed instead of working the usual Saturday afternoon overtime. Had this request been granted it is obvious that the construction put upon it would have been that the men had been locked out. Overtime was therefore worked by those who wanted to. They numbered 250 out of a total of 4,560, or 5½ per cent.

On the 14th, 85 per cent. of the staff were absent in the forenoon. About a hundred more men attended work in the afternoon. Large numbers were prevented from attending by bands of men encountered between the Signal Shops and the Running Shed, while others, who walked, waited outside the Works to see how many came by the Workmen's train. When they saw how few they were, they returned to their homes and persuaded others to do so also.

Many of the clerical staff either attended duty many hours late, owing to the necessity of going miles out of their way, or were compelled to disguise themselves as students in order to avoid molestation.

The attendance gradually improved till it became normal on the 21st.

Mr. C. C. RYAN—Mr. C. B. HARDING.

Mr. C. C. RYAN, Station and Assistant Traffic Superintendent, North-Western Railway, Lahore Junction.

At about 1 P.M. on the 10th April I heard that there was some trouble at Amritsar. About 1-45 P.M. an Indian Police Officer came to me to arrange accommodation for a party of Police to go by the Down Calcutta Mail to Amritsar as it was feared rioting was occurring. This was done. At about 2 P.M. I tried to get into touch with Amritsar on the Railway phonophone, but was unable to obtain a response. Between 2 and 3 P.M. I made two more attempts with the same result. At about 3-15 P.M., Mr. Bennet, Station Superintendent, Amritsar, called me on the phonophone and told me that serious rioting had occurred, and that Guard Robinson had been murdered. The Deputy Commissioner then spoke to me and gave me a message for His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, which was repeated over the telephone. I then learnt that telegraph communication was interrupted. I passed some more messages on the phonophone.

I had no previous indication of any disturbance brewing, though I did hear that another *hartal* had been arranged for the 13th April. This was commonly spoken about by the staff.

About 15 days or so prior to the 10th April, very strong rumours reached me of the Railway signallers and running staff intended strike which was to take place at 2 P.M. on 13th April. This strike was being engineered by the Indian guards who were financing the whole thing. I did not then connect this movement with any political move, but thought it was one in connection with pay. The matter was reported to the District Traffic Superintendent, Lahore, with whom I discussed the situation and planned to meet the situation should the strike mature. Confirmation of the intended strike was hard to obtain, till the disturbances at Kasur on the 12th (twelfth) April when at about 9 P.M. I got Mr. C. B. Harding, Deputy Superintendent, Railway Telegraphs, to call up Kasur and enquire how things were progressing there. The Indian signaller first asked Mr. Harding his name. He was given the name of one of his Indian signallers on which the man began to give a brief account of the situation. He then began to say that they were all ready to strike at 2 P.M. on the 13th instant and depended on Lahore for the lead and would wait for their signal to stop work at 2 P.M. on 13th April. This showed that arrangements had been made to strike and the selection of 2 P.M., the hour at which the staff at Lahore changed duties in the Telegraph office went to prove all I had heard. Prior to this, but after the 10th

April I had on two occasions seen the signallers in a group having confidential discussions, but put it down to the riots. I at once discussed the matter with Mr. Harding and decided on speaking to the men and did so soon after and warned them of the consequences of such action. Later on I reported the matter to the District Traffic Superintendent. I also arranged to place a Military Guard over the Telegraph office to prevent men from being interfered with. On the 13th this was done. No strike occurred. Later on, 14th and 15th bogus telegrams were being received of strikes occurring and telegrams supposed to have been issued by Lahore were reported to have been received by other stations.

On the 13th it was brought to my notice that the mob in the city were forcibly stopping the staff from coming on duty. The majority of the Station Staff managed to come to work by using various disguises and excuses, but a fair number of Indian Guards remained away from work under the excuse of being prevented from coming. I, however, felt that they could have come to work had they too tried. I sent a verbal message to them through one of the Indian guards warning them of the risk then ran by keeping away from work. About half the number immediately returned to work. The District Traffic Superintendent also spoke to one of the senior Indian guards and conveyed a similar warning when nearly all the others turned up after being promised a pardon. The same morning about 300 workmen of the shops tried to stop the others from going to work. An armed guard had to be sent to the local entraining station to keep order. This had the desired effect and the men were allowed to go away in peace. The 300 returning to the city without any further trouble. These same disaffected men tried to intimidate my Yard staff by threatening to rob and molest their houses and wives at night and had to be given protection. They stoned and abused the cabinmen for remaining on duty.

All foodstuff was stopped from coming out of the city, in consequence of which the staff and passengers, both European and Indian, were put to considerable inconvenience and entailed special arrangements having to be made. Owing to the railway tracks and stations being interfered with the night running of trains had to be discontinued resulting in several trains being held up at Lahore with large numbers of passengers who had to be fed. This curtailment of trains had the effect of placing the strain of the entire traffic on the sections during the day causing trains to be cut down, etc.

Mr. C. B. HARDING, Deputy Superintendent, Railway Telegraphs.

On the 11th and 12th of April 1919, I noticed something wrong with my staff. There was extensive whispering going on and a certain amount of passive resistance. I called the staff together and lectured them on the seriousness of the political disturbances taking place. In fact I told the men that if occasion arose I was prepared to flood the office with Military and Postal Signallers and that all work except "Train Running" would be shut down. I had no further trouble with the staff after this.

The first inkling I received of the strike idea being widespread was from Kasur at 10 P.M. on the 12th. I gave my name as "Bandara" (Mulkraj Bandara) and Kasur enlightened me in many things. It struck me as if everything was prepared throughout the line for 14 hours on the 13th for a general strike. Even on the 13th I was quite certain that my staff would stick to me and I was not wrong in my belief.

On the 13th while moving about from instrument to instrument I observed that nearly all the stations were giving the code name of my office (LHR) and informing each other that LHR had struck work. I did all I

could to contradict this and on one occasion I was told by Sahadra that I was the only man in office as the staff under me had struck.

In the meantime several offices did strike and the staffs at Ambala and Bhatinda resumed duty after a telegram was sent from Lahore assuring them that Lahore was still loyal.

On the same date (13th) I observed certain Sikh gentlemen at the Public counter making diligent enquiries and jotting down notes. The booking table was then removed outside to the platform and the entrance closed and a guard was promptly placed before the office.

During these disturbed days my wires were being cut in all directions, nearly all my important lines, Ambala, Sukkur, Amritsar, Rawalpindi, etc., were interrupted for some days and most urgent traffic was delayed.

I may here casually mention the difficulties experienced by my staff during these disturbances:—

- (1) Abusive language towards them by the Indian public.
- (2) Some men were told to vacate their buildings by landlords unless they struck work.

Mr. C. B. HARDING—~~concluded~~—Rev. E. D. LUCAS.

- (3) Muhammad Sadiq was beaten by shoes when on his way to office.
- (4) Men attended office with dhotis, so that the Indian Public would not take them for Baboos.
- (5) Nearly every man came to office by circuitous routes.
- (6) Some left their homes with *lotas* of water under the pretence of going to answer the calls of nature.
- (7) Men were told that their homes would be looted while they were away.
- (8) They were even told that their wives and daughters would be molested.
- (9) Food stuffs were not procurable in the city and I issued several chits to the shop opened by Government in the new Masonic Hall on the Mall.

Four of my staff were away on leave, viz., Balwant Singh and Abdul Rahim, on sick leave, Roshan Din and Ramiah on privilege leave.

A Criminal Investigation Department Officer told me that although Abdul Rahim was on the sick list he was observed frequently in the Badshahi Masjid.

I was very displeased with these four men for not joining up immediately the disturbances began. The men on the sick list probably kept away awaiting events.

On making enquiries lately I have come to know that certain Signallers did try to canvass for a strike. In fact, they took certain oaths such as eating of pigs and cows flesh to create a strike, but finding the majority of men were for work they were disappointed in their object. I actually do not blame these men, they were either misguided or pressure was brought to bear on them outside.

Conditions at Lahore and in fact in the Punjab, were serious enough, and it is my firm conviction that had this office struck, the conditions would have been far worse, as nearly all the Telegraph Offices on the North-Western Railway Telegraph system would have followed suit, and this would have involved all other branches.

Rev. E. D. LUCAS, Principal, Forman Christian College, Lahore.

At 3 p.m. on the 10th April, I went over to Anarkali Police Station to secure the release of one of our students who was suspected unjustly of theft. While there I saw about a dozen policemen drawn up in line with muskets, and asked the Police Superintendent what this meant. He replied that there had been trouble in Amritsar, and that they were expecting trouble in Lahore. Word had just reached Lahore that Gandhi had been arrested the previous day. From what he said I gathered that there had been serious rioting in Amritsar. At 5 o'clock, the Indian Christian Association was giving a Badminton party on the lawn in front of my house. There were about fifty or sixty people present, mostly Indians. While we were playing, my partner, Mr. Joseph Thakur Dass, Secretary to the Punjab Publicity Committee, said "do you hear that noise?" On listening I heard a sound resembling a big swarm of bees. Within a few minutes we could hear the roar of a crowd coming down the road from the Anarkali Bazar. The ladies all went either into our house or into the Verandah, and the men went to the gate. I was standing in front of the gate, and saw the procession coming. In the front line was a black banner with some inscriptions about Gandhi. It was attached to two poles, and was carried by at least two men. This first crowd, I would estimate, contained from 800 to 1,000 people. Realizing that this crowd was likely to be fired upon, I called to one of our students whom I saw near the front of it. With the greatest difficulty I attracted his attention, and he came over near where I was standing. I ordered him to return to his hostel, but he refused to obey me. I repeated the order and told him that he would be in danger of expulsion if he did not obey me instantly. He still refused, and the crowd thinking that I was trying to interfere with the procession, grew very angry and cries of "shame" and other abusive terms were addressed to me. My companions then urged me to withdraw behind the gates as they were afraid I might be attacked. While the crowd had no weapons in their hands except a few sticks, yet stones and sticks could have easily been picked up in the neighbourhood. I then went behind the gate which we shut, and watched the crowd pass by. I had seen the crowd on the previous Sunday, April 6th, turned back from in front of Ewing Hall, and my impression was that this crowd was far more excited and dangerous. I would not say that they were bent on violence at the time, but they were determined upon having their own way, and were not ready to be stopped by any opposition. So far as I could gather the object of the crowd was to go to Government House, and demand the immediate release of Gandhi. I should say that the number who passed our front gates within ten to fifteen minutes,

was as high as from three to four thousand. Most of them were young men and boys, and the uproar was constantly increasing. Ten minutes after the crowd passed or possibly fifteen, we heard the firing on the Mall distinctly, and in a few minutes the crowd commenced to return streaming past our compound. It was then getting dark. I was still afraid that some of our students would be injured, and remained on the street, and tried to get our students to go back to their hostels. At the gate farthest away from the Post Office, I noticed a group of about fifty gathered there evidently seeking shelter. As I made my way through them, I almost ran into the arms of a small line of policemen with an English Officer at their head. I called to him, and he replied "you take care of these people, we are out after other game." I then went around to the hostels and saw that all our students were safe. In Ewing Hall in the evening one of our Muhammadan students turned up with his clothes covered with blood. He boasted that he had been in the front line, and had carried away from under the nose of the police one of the victims. He was regarded as a great hero by most of the students.

So much for the events of the evening of the 10th. As to the state of feeling of the students, I will need to give a brief statement of the conditions of student life in the previous months. When I returned from furlough in America in September 1917, I found a great deal of political discussion going on among the students and their attitude rather hostile towards the Government. Newspapers such as the "Tribune" were eagerly devoured and quoted by the majority of the students. However, during that year 1917-1918, owing to the pressure of the war, there was no great excitement. The year 1918-1919 started unpropitiously with the epidemic of influenza in October and November. The armistice came when the Lahore Colleges were closed on account of this epidemic. When the students re-gathered on the 19th, a few weeks were occupied in victory celebrations. One felt that the students were not very enthusiastic about the victory, in fact their whole attitude towards the war was one of extreme indifference. In December the National Congress met at Delhi, and some of our students attended it. Then came the debate in the Legislative Council over the Rowlatt Bill. The students regarded this Bill as an attempt to destroy the political liberties of India. They believed all that was said about the tyrannical nature of the Bill, and from January on much political excitement prevailed amongst the students of Lahore. In March came Mr. Gandhi's *Satyagraha* movement and the *hartals* or strikes. The disturbances in Delhi on March 30th were regarded by

Rev. E. D. LUCAS—concluded—Mr. A. S. HEMMY—Rai Bahadur AMAR NATH.

the students as an initial attempt of the Government to check political activities, and those who were killed were regarded as martyrs. April 6th was observed as a *hartal* in Lahore. Students were used as propagandists in the campaign to promote it, and went around among shop-keepers, tonga drivers and servants urging them to do no work on Sunday. In conversation with students I found that none of them had read the Rowlatt Act, but they believed it to be a very direct threat to all forms of political action. I remember one conversation with a senior student in which I said that this law was directed against revolutionists, and that when the trouble broke out as it did in Delhi instead of the real agitators being killed or wounded, innocent spectators or those who were in the mob from curiosity were often the ones to suffer. He replied that if he had a small son in such a crowd he would gladly have him martyred for the sake of his country. I could give many instances to show the

excited and unnatural state of mind of the students. After the firing on the 10th the students did not attend their classes, looked upon those who had been injured and killed as martyrs, and induced all students to regard those days as set aside for mourning. There was a great deal of talk about Hindu and Muhammadan unity, and Hindus and Muhammadans ate and drank together freely for a few days. On Friday evening, the 11th, in Newton Hall I tried to reason with the students living there pointing out to them that they had disobeyed the orders of the Government, and must expect to suffer, but they refused to listen to me. On the same day students insulted European ladies on the streets, and racial feeling was very strong. I think this covers the ground which I have been asked to report upon, but I would close with this remark. I believe that the diffculties of the students have perhaps not been fully appreciated.

**Mr. A. S. HEMMY, Principal, Government College, Lahore.**

I am prepared to speak of the feelings and actions of Government College students only.

The interest in politics began to rise rapidly during the debates upon the Rowlatt Act in the Imperial Legislative Council. When Mr. Gandhi proposed the holding of a *hartal*, the majority of the students were prepared to fast, but they obeyed without demur the order that their kitchens should not be closed, though very few students took food on the 6th April.

They were in no way hostile towards the College authorities, nor did they show any bitterness towards Government. With the exception of a few politically-minded students, they looked upon the proceedings in a light-hearted sort of way, expecting that with sufficient clamour, Government would give way.

The wounding of a Government College student of the first year on the Mall on April 10th roused great excitement and anger, particularly amongst the first year.

At the time, lectures were not going on, the 2nd and 4th years had been given study leave for the forthcoming University examinations, the 1st and 3rd years were having college examinations, the 3rd year having commenced on the 10th, the 1st about to commence on the 11th.

On the 11th, the 3rd year were present at their examination, the 1st, with the exception of about a dozen, were absent. The Principal, Colonel Stephenson, called them to a meeting, which they attended.

They were warned as to the consequences if they did not attend the next day. It is a rule of the college that

students absent without leave from examinations are liable to be struck off the rolls.

On the 12th, the first year again absented themselves. They were ordered to go home. The 3rd year also were mostly absent. The Principal called the latter together and spoke to them. They repented of their disobedience and offered to take their examination on the spot. It was, however, convenient to take only the Botany examination at that time and all except one appeared. The attitude of the 3rd year was not hostile and they were much perturbed over their disobedience. The same could be said of a large proportion of the 1st year.

Only a small proportion of the students could be said to hold actively hostile opinions, the majority had no strong feelings either way, and on reflection sincerely regretted the outbreak.

The Principal deemed it desirable to get the students out of the over-charged atmosphere of Lahore and on the 12th closed the college.

The 2nd and 4th years returned in May for the University examinations, and a number of them immediately asked for an opportunity to prove their loyalty. Without prompting on the part of any of the staff, they asked if some organization could be made in which they could show their loyalty actively and a "League of Order" was started. This was joined immediately, without any pressure, by the great majority of the students in residence as well as many others, and it did useful work during the vacation.

Since the reopening of the college the attitude of the students has been normal and perfectly friendly relations have existed between the students and the staff.

**Rai Bahadur AMAR NATH, M.B.E., Joint Registrar, Lahore.**

*I.—The War Loan.*—As Honorary Joint Secretary of the Provincial War Loan Committee and Honorary Secretary, Lahore District and Town Committee, I am in a position to state that within my knowledge no pressure has been exercised upon anybody in order to make him subscribe to the loan. Our Committee received no complaints worth consideration on this score either direct or indirect, and if there had been any undue influence exercised in any quarter, surely it would have got into the papers, which are always eager to magnify such matters. On the other hand, the entire Indian Press, both English and Vernacular, gave us every help, and one journalist among others subscribed to the extent of Rs. 40,000. Not only have the subscriptions been voluntary, but in many cases they were offered and sent to the banks, without the knowledge of the Committee and in amounts larger than we had expected. This circumstance is explained by the fact that some people are unwilling to have it known to the public that they

have much money with them. The loan carried its own recommendation because of the handsome rate of interest it carried and the convenient terms of repayment.

Besides the Provincial Committee at Lahore, District Committees and Sub-Committees were constituted in all important cities and towns consisting of both officials and non-officials. The Provincial Committee distributed circulars and letters of appeal through the district officers to all the Sub-Committees in the Province. Lahore set a good example by announcing in its first list a handsome subscription of Rs. 17,09,200. The members of the Sub-Committee, who were in a position to know the well-to-do people first subscribed themselves and then induced others to subscribe according to their means. All classes subscribed, the trading and business classes most largely. In Amritsar two prominent lawyers subscribed in the 2nd War Loan Rs. 1,13,000 and Rs. 1,00,000, respectively. Punjabi business men, who are in Calcutta and elsewhere, sent large amounts. One

Rai Bahadur AMAR NATH—concluded—Rai Sahib BADHAWA MAL—Nawab FATEH ALI KHAN.

gentleman subscribed 10 lakhs himself and 1 lakh for his wife. Hissar District, considering its population, did the best; the Indian Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Latifi, and his wife taking great interest in the matter, the latter herself subscribed Rs. 50,000. I will submit lists which give a comparative statement of different districts which will show that the disturbances and riots had absolutely nothing to do with War Loan.

In accordance with Sir Michael O'Dwyer's wishes the agricultural classes were left very much to themselves, but a few subscribed handsomely. In Lyallpur District the zamindars offered in lieu of War Loan subscriptions one harvest of the wheat grown in one acre (*killa*) for every 28 acres (*a murrabba*). The Government of India, while thanking the agriculturists for their patriotic and spontaneous offer, declined to accept the gratuitous offer, but advised them to invest the price of Wheat in the War Loan and use the interest for village purposes such as assistance to families of men on military service.

Comparing the figure of population and Income Tax of the different districts and towns with the amount subscribed by each, it will be found that only a very small portion of the available income of the people has been invested in the Loan. For instance, in Lahore town, with a population of 210,271, only 269 gentlemen to our knowledge subscribed Rs. 1,000 and upwards to the 2nd War Loan. In Amritsar town, out of a population of 151,339, only 230 gentlemen subscribed Rs. 1,000 and upwards. Kasur town, with a population of 24,783, only 13 subscribed Rs. 46,900. In Gujranwala District, with a population of 923,419, only 185 subscribed Rs. 1,000 and upwards.

The above facts clearly show that the Punjab, with its comparatively small population and resources, secured 3rd position in both the War Loans by entirely voluntary subscriptions, and that the insinuation that it did so under official pressure is entirely baseless and malicious.

*II.—Application of Martial Law in Lahore.*—I cannot speak with first-hand knowledge of other places, but so far as Lahore is concerned I know for a fact that Martial Law was introduced by the authorities under compulsion and after much hesitation. I took an active part in all the negotiations and movements to restore peace and

order, and so I can confidently say that people did not listen to reason—rather pook-pooked the idea of resuming business. The *hartal* kept up by the shopkeepers from the 10th to the 15th following upon the alleged arrest of Mr. Gandhi was causing tremendous inconvenience to the public at large and could not be ignored. The authorities tried every means of persuasion and conciliation through the local leaders to induce the people to resume business, and when all these negotiations failed there was no other alternative but Martial Law. Besides the populace had become unruly. They would not allow anybody to resume business and even interfered with men going to office. The plying of *taw-taws* and *longas* was stopped, and if any one dared to depart from this rule he was treated with violence. I can honestly and confidently say that if this unruly spirit had been allowed to continue longer, *badmashes* of the city would have been encouraged to commit loot and other outrages upon the weaker citizens. I have information that in villages such a spirit manifested itself and there worse results would have followed as the *badmashes* wanted only an opportunity.

I may note that on the day of first *hartal* (6th April) crowds at night went to the doors of persons who were understood to be loyal to Government and did not approve of the *hartal* and abused them in the most vulgar and threatening terms. Some of them received anonymous letters of threat.

When the troops were first brought to the City I accompanied with others the Deputy Commissioner and the Officer Commanding and found that the attitude of the people was menacing and insulting.

*III.—Recruiting.*—I did some recruiting work in Lahore, personally giving about 40 recruits and some others followed my example. None of my recruits belong to Lahore town, and I believe nobody else obtained any recruits from the city. In Lahore District, although a good portion of it consists of Manjha, the home of the fighting classes, recruitment was not done on a scale proportionate to its population and importance. The Deputy Commissioner left things much to themselves, and I can safely say that nobody can come forward to make allegations of pressure of any kind.

Rai Sahib BADHAWA MAL, Head Accountant, Moghalpura Workshops, North-Western Railway, Lahore.

11th April was the fixed date of payment to the shop workmen of Moghalpura. I started from my house at about 9 A.M., to be here in time and to see that the necessary arrangements were made and in time for the above.

From Lahori Gate I took my route to the station *via* Amritdhara Road, and when I was nearing the Islamia College a crowd of people advanced and intercepted my passage. I explained to them that my work was urgent and asked them to let me go on, but they did not mind it as none of them was of my acquaintances, and I had therefore to leave that road and went to Kila Gujar Singh, *via* Sufdarmali and reached office about 20 minutes late.

On the 12th I did come by the road passing by the Fort, and when I was between the Kashmiri and Sheranwala Gates two men came to me running and said that

the passage was not clear. I was therefore advised to return and took my way to the Badami Bagh station by the new road made for the Goods Shed and reached office without any further obstruction.

On the 13th night, Sunday, my house was set on fire between 11 and 12 P.M., the outside door was chained, my boy was at his work studying, and when he saw the flames he made noise and the neighbouring people came running to subdue the flames before they reached the second storey.

The matter was reported through the Loco. Superintendent to the Police who made enquiries, but no clue of the culprit was found. This seems to me to be the work of some one who did not like my devotion to duty and attending office at such disordered times.

Nawab FATEH ALI KHAN Qazilbash, C.I.E., Lahore.

*I.—Rumours regarding Rowlatt Act before the hartal of 6th April and also afterwards.*

The most unfounded rumours, calculated to incite ignorant masses against Government, were rife, e.g., that police has been given powers to arrest any four persons sitting or standing together, that people will have to obtain the sanction of Government before marrying their children, that Government will in future take half of the produce of land as revenue, etc., etc. The political leaders made no attempt of any kind to contradict these baseless ru-

mours. I contradicted some of these rumours in a letter published by me in the Press.

*II.—Hartal of the 6th April 1919.*

Gandhi's message was printed with mournful headings and circulated broadcast amongst people before *hartal* of 6th April. Political leaders like Harkishen Lal and Duni Chand visited city and induced people to close shops. Notice of meeting of 6th April was issued over the signatures of several persons. The organisation which cir-

Nawab FATEH ALI KHAN.

[Continued.]

ulated these notices, etc., and the members of which visited the city is responsible for the complete *hartal* of 6th April, for which people had also been prepared by false rumours. Other contributory causes of this *hartal* were—

- (a) The news of complete *hartal* at Amritsar on 30th March and a local feeling that Lahore should not lag behind.
- (b) Economic distress due to high prices.
- (c) Gandhi's name and the sedulously spread report that he was a saint also operated on the Hindu section of the population, though it is my definite opinion that without local organisation to support Gandhi's propaganda, the *hartal* could not possibly be the complete one it was. Attention is drawn in this connection to the weak manner in which Khalifate day was observed, although Gandhi had put himself at the head of it. The Khalifate day was not observed, because no local organisation took it up.
- (d) The natural power of the educated classes to influence their uneducated countrymen who look up to them for guidance.

It was common talk that the institution of *hartal* would not be confined merely to the shop-keepers, but that its further development would be the complete boycott of the European community by their Indian servants, *khidmatgars* and bearers. The *hartal* in the eyes of the common people had thus an *anti*-British aspect from the very start. They had little knowledge of the provisions of the Rowlatt Act to protest consciously against it.

### III.—Procession of 6th April 1919.

Although prohibited by the authorities, yet it came out and marched triumphantly through the city. Most seditious cries formed its motto, e.g., *Has George Mar Gaya* (King George is dead). Loyal citizens, who had the reputation of co-operating with Government, were openly abused. I was abused when the procession passed my house in the city.

The very fact that this prohibited and seditious procession was allowed to march through the city unobstructed shows how forbearing the authorities were.

### IV.—Hartal of 10th April and subsequent days.

A state of excitement, artificially kept up by the fraternisation on the occasion of the *Ram Naumi* procession, brought about another *hartal* on the 10th as soon as the news of Gandhi's arrest came. The excitement also resulted in two collisions with the Police in Anarkali and Lohari Gate. I was not present on these occasions and therefore cannot describe the actual situation.

With this *hartal*, the disorderly element practically took control and in the city civil authority was made powerless. The city gates were guarded by groups of ruffians and Indian officials were not allowed to proceed to their offices. Actually cordons were drawn across the city gates. Tonga-drivers were forcibly stopped, and in some cases the entire tonga gear was cut into pieces. Civil authority could render no help. *Hartal* became openly *anti*-British. Municipal property, e.g., lighting lamps in the city were broken and destroyed.

The excitement was kept up by the meetings in the Badahahi Mosque, organised by the political leaders on 11th and 12th April, resulting in another collision between the authorities and the people near Lohari Mandi. A Criminal Investigation Department official was attacked in the mosque for being the informer of an alien Government which was now, as it were the enemy. A *Danda Fauj* (army of persons with sticks) had come into existence and was parading in the city. Loyal citizens were in great peril of their lives and property and authority was helpless in the city. Two of my servants were actually attacked and the tutor to my sons was threatened, because he taught my sons, the sons of a friend of the enemy. A strong rumour was set afloat in the city that my city house would be burnt. Upon this, I sent its intimates

away to my estate at Ali Razabad, nearly 12 miles outside the city. Intimation of this was sent to the Chief Secretary of the Punjab Government and other executive officials. Copy of my letter is enclosed as an Appendix. After the Amritsar news, the danger became greater, especially to the European community. Europeans were rarely seen on the public roads which were deserted. Meanwhile most alarming news began pouring in from the outlying districts of Railway lines dismantled, of telegraph wires being cut, of Government offices being burnt and of Europeans being killed. These news were welcomed by the insurgents in the city. Add to these rumours like the following, that the Gurkha soldiers had refused to fire at Amritsar; that the Sikhs had likewise followed, etc., rumours which were most gustily received.

In spite of the extreme gravity of the situation, political leaders continued with their game. Donations were announced for the continuance of the *hartal* which was the emblem of hostility to Government. Open sedition was talked in the city. Abuses were levelled at the King-Emperor. Loyal citizens lived in a state of indescribable anxiety, in hourly peril of their lives and property. The people had been worked into a state of frenzy, and for the time religious distinctions were obliterated. Hindus and Muhammadans drank from the same cups.

Great efforts were made to somehow end the *hartal* which was the heart and centre of the whole trouble. Loyal citizens waited upon the political leaders, begged them to end the strike, but they were in the pose of victors and imposed almost impossible conditions like the removal of the military, the release of the Amritsar arrested, etc. The condition of the removal of the Military was the most mischievous, as it is my opinion that it was the presence of the Military in sufficient strength of Lahore which prevented the Amritsar developments taking place at Lahore and operated as a powerful force upon the insurgents in charge of the city to deter them from openly attacking the lives and properties of loyal citizens.

So great was the excitement of the people that even at a later stage when some of the political leaders themselves advised the people to open their shops, the people did not listen to them and accused them of having been won over and as traitors. This was inevitable. The mob, when once inflamed, is apt to get out of control, and this was the case here.

It became known in the city towards the 14th that Martial Law would be proclaimed, but this had no effect, although some of the excitement had subsided on account of the deportation of the prominent political leaders in the morning of the 14th. People were obdurate still. Meanwhile the situation was going from bad to worse in the outlying districts of the province. Martial Law was the only alternative, and it did not come a day too soon. The *hartal* was immediately ended. The anxieties of loyal citizens were removed. The European people came out of their hiding. The roads became frequented. Prices were forced down and the poor people had great relief.

All fear of recrudescence was removed by the prolongation of Martial Law. Though there was no visible disorder some time after the proclamation of Martial Law, yet its continuance was absolutely necessary to disabuse the public of the absurd notions that had entered their heads regarding the powerlessness of authority.

### APPENDIX.

Now that the situation created by the pernicious passive resistance movement has calmed down, and order and authority has been rehabilitated, may I take the liberty of informing you of my personal experiences at Lahore on the 12th, 13th and 14th instant. By the way it may be noted that immediately previous to these dates my letter on the passive resistance movement published in the *Civil and Military Gazette* of 6th April had been subjected to abusive criticism by the vernacular and the Indian-edited English Press of the country. I did not communicate these incidents at the time they took place for the only reason that I did not wish to add to the anxieties of the Government, but now, thanks to Colonel

**Nawab FATEH ALI KHAN—concluded—The Hon'ble Rai Bahadur BAKSHI SOHAN LAL—The Hon'ble Rai Bahadur LALA RAM SARAN DAS.**

F. Johnson's prompt and effective measures the darkness of the horizon has disappeared and peaceful subjects can now open the tongue of their grievances. Here is the description:—

- (1) My servant, Bishen Das, was on the 12th instant caught hold of by the mob near Rang Mahal and thrashed severely on the ground that he was my servant, and I had written to the papers against Mr. Gandhi and the *Satyagraha*. Bishen Das was injured in his wrists and fingers, and extricated himself with the greatest difficulty out of a situation that might have otherwise proved fatal.
- (2) On 13th April, I in the company of Mr. Shafi, the Raja of Sheikhpura and others, went to Mr. Duni Chand's house to admonish him and his coadjutors not to incite the illiterate and ignorant people to acts of disorder and lawlessness. The persons present there, particularly Mr. Harkishen Lal, insulted me for having written in the columns of the *Civil and Military Gazette* against the passive resistance movement. Subsequently I was informed by Mr. Shafi that people were very furious at my having written to the *Civil and Military Gazette* against the passive resistance movement, so much so, he said, that they were not prepared to meet me on any terms.

- (3) On the 14th April, my Dhobi, Karam Din, was caught hold of in Kila Gujar Singh, and going to be beaten on the ground that he was my employee and I was the enemy of the people, but he escaped by telling them that he had resigned my service and was engaged elsewhere.
- (4) On the 14th April, a rumour got afloat in the city that my house inside Akbari Gate known as Mubarik Haveli would be sacked and set on fire. My dependents accordingly removed their families to my estate at Ali Razabad, and themselves stayed at the Haveli to protect it. They have now brought back their families to Mubarik Haveli.
- (5) The tutor of my son and grandsons, Maulvi Kaim Din, was repeatedly threatened by the people inside the Bhati Gate, where he lives, that if he did not resign my service, he would be badly beaten and his property and houses burnt to ashes. The said master was so much terrified that he had to be removed to my estate at Ali Razabad on the 15th instant.

In conclusion, I must record my gratefulness to Colonel F. Johnson who very graciously took measures to protect and picket my house at the Empress Road.

With my kindest regards.

FATEH ALI KHAN,

Quasibach.

**The Hon'ble Rai Bahadur BAKSHI SOHAN LAL, Vakil, High Court, Lahore.**

My impression is—

(1) That the *hartal* observed in Lahore on 6th April 1919, though attended with some disturbances, did not cause much anxiety and did not continue longer than 24 hours.

(2) That the *hartal* commenced on 10th April 1919 having resulted in more serious disturbances did cause great anxiety to every peace-loving citizen of Lahore and the anxiety continued to increase as the *hartal* prolonged, and all efforts to break it practically failed.

(3) That the shop-keepers who had closed shops when approached for resuming their business seemed to be panic-stricken and afraid of being looted and beaten by the unruly mobs passing in processions in the bazars, and I was also in a state of anxiety on the eve of the outbreak of the disturbances and before their suppression, as the mobs included uncontrollable rowdy element of the city, and I apprehended that the rowdy element would go on increasing and multiplying as the *hartal* prolonged.

(4) I felt a relief after the disturbances and *hartal* were completely suppressed by means of Martial Law.

The *hartals* of 6th and 10th April continued onward having caused much anxieties and complaints having

come to be heard that groups of the mobs passing in the bazars, streets and roads intercepted the students going to schools and colleges, the clerks going to offices, and other gentlemen driving in tongas and carriages and persuaded them or even forced them to give up all work. I engaged myself with some other leading gentlemen of the city to persuade the shop-keepers to break the *hartal* as early as possible. In our efforts in Anarkali, Nila Gumbaz and Commercial Buildings, etc., from 11th to 15th April we met groups of persons marching in the bazars. They appeared to be young men of very low position for whom it would not be strange to indulge in looting and rowdyism whenever an opportunity occurred. The leading shop-keepers stated that they were afraid of being looted if they resumed business and opened shops and we gave them assurance of police guard to protect their property. Our efforts met little success, only a few of the shop-keepers having opened their shops even under police guard before the announcement of the Martial Law, but as soon as the Martial Law was announced the shops began to open at once and without any fear of loot, etc., and the groups of the mob passing in procession throughout all the bazars disappeared immediately that the Martial Law was proclaimed.

**The Hon'ble Rai Bahadur LALA RAM SARAN DAS, C.I.E., Lahore.**

I learnt that there was going to be a *hartal* at Lahore on the 30th March, but as the organisers of the *hartal* felt doubtful as to its success on that date, it was announced later on that there will be a *hartal* on the 6th April. I went about in the city on the 4th April advising some shopkeepers not to join the *hartal*, as by throwing a large number of people out of work there was danger of breach of peace. On the 5th April some persons came to me and informed me that a large number of shops will keep open on the 6th. In the afternoon the same day some of the same persons came to me again and told me that two parties, one from Amritsar and the other from Delhi side, joined by local men, had come and spoiled our work. I mentioned this fact to Sir Michael O'Dwyer at a Garden Party the same evening. On the night of the 5th these parties were reported to have gone round the city bazars

abusing Government officials, Municipal Commissioners and title holders. On the 6th there was a complete *hartal* and the mobs in the streets were rowdy, fearless and unruly. A respectable guest of mine, Seth Dongersey of Bombay, went out in my motor-car in the morning. When the car returned some time after that it came without him, and the chauffeur, on enquiry, told me that a mob had forced him to get out of the car, and that he was told to walk on foot. After that when Sethji met me he told me of the incident that had happened to him, and added that he had begged the mob to allow him to proceed in the car, as he was a stranger to Lahore and did not know his way. The mob insisted on his getting out and walking on foot, which he complied. On the morning of the 11th, I was present at an informal conference held at Government House at which a number of

The Hon'ble Rai Bahadur LALA RAM SARAN DAS—concluded—LALA JIWAN LAL.

leading local and mofussil gentlemen were present. Most of them represented that the situation had become very serious, and called for repressive measures. It was suggested at that conference that efforts should again be made to put an end to the continuance of *hartal* through the co-operation of popular leaders of the moment. This suggestion was made by some of the Indian gentlemen present. We had a meeting with this object on the night of the 11th at the house of Sheikh Muhammad Naqi, Rais, where some leading shop-keepers were also invited; they suggested that the *hartal* could only be stopped if we could induce their leader to co-operate. They mentioned on being asked certain names of their leaders. A motor-car was sent to fetch one of the persons named, but he could not come. As it was getting very late we dispersed with the understanding to assemble again the next day to negotiate with the leaders. This was done

at the bungalow of the Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Mian Muhammad Shafi, C.I.E., where some of the leaders were present and in the meeting some conditions were suggested, which were put before Government. There was another meeting with the leaders at the Town Hall on the 13th April at which I was also present. In this meeting some violent speeches were made by men put forward on the popular side. Thereafter Raja Narendra Nath, The Hon'ble Mian Muhammad Shafi and myself went through the city to try and get the shops opened, but we were jeered, hooted and abused. The prolonged continuance of the *hartal* was causing great distress in the city paralysing its life and was a source of danger to the people. Persons of substance and property were in great fear. This state of things could not have ended without repressive measures, which relieved anxiety.

LALA JIWAN LAL, Inspector, Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab.

I belong to the Political Branch of the Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab. In this province the public agitation against the Rowlatt Bills started through local newspapers and by holding protest meetings in the beginning of February 1919. In the third week of February I was ordered by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Political Branch, to report about the activities of the Amritsar public with regard to this agitation.

I went to the meeting of February 28th at Amritsar held in Bande Mataram Hall to protest against the Rowlatt Bills. I took notes of the meeting and made a report.

On 9th March 1919, I was ordered to attend the meeting held in Lahore in the Bradlaugh Hall to protest against the Rowlatt Acts. In this meeting among others Dr. Saif-ud-Din Kitchlew of Amritsar also delivered a speech. There were other Criminal Investigation Department Officers along with me taking notes in shorthand. I also helped the report.

On March 23rd, I attended another protest meeting against the Rowlatt Acts held in Bande Mataram Hall at Amritsar. Prepared report from Urdu notes, which I made at the time and then destroyed. I noticed that there was much more excitement among the masses after the dispersal of this meeting than it was after the meeting of the 28th February held in the same hall. The result of the speeches was that some of the audience actually abused and cursed the Government also passed remarks that the Government was simply robbing them of their wealth and every little comfort.

The second Bill was probably passed on 18th of March in the Imperial Legislative Council and on the 26th March Mr. Gandhi's message of the 23rd March advocating fasting and suspension of business on the 30th of March. I attended this meeting with Asghar Ali, Shorthand Reporter. I took brief notes and Asghar Ali took notes in shorthand and prepared the report under my supervision.

On 30th March there was a complete *hartal* in Amritsar and a protest meeting was held in the evening at the Jallianwala Bagh. The meeting was a very enthusiastic one. Asghar Ali, shorthand writer, prepared the report of this meeting too under my supervision and I also took brief notes. These two meetings of the 29th and 30th March excited the feelings of the public very much and their behaviour at the meetings and after their dispersals, showed that they were all full of hatred and contempt towards the Government.

The day of national humiliation was observed at Amritsar on the 30th March but its postponement to 6th April was also published the same day.

At Lahore a meeting was arranged on the 6th April and I was ordered by my Deputy Superintendent to report the proceedings of the meeting and also to report about the behaviour of the people in the city in connection with the observation of the day of national humiliation. There was a complete *hartal* in the city and there

was only one shop (Delhi House) in Anarkali which was not closed and sold things. Different mobs were seen parading through the city, shouting *Gandhi ki jai, Shohidan Delhi ki jai, Luni Chand ki jai, Satyapal ki jai*, etc., etc. The mob forced the passers-by to take off their caps and head dresses. Also I noticed that a motor carrying certain friends of the Hon'ble Rai Bahadur Ram Saran Das was stopped by a mob on the Mall Road. At about 9 a.m. I saw thousands of men collected in front of the Islamia School inside Sheranwala Gate forcing the school authorities to close the school and did not disperse until the school was actually closed. At about 10-20 a.m. I saw huge disorderly crowds emerging from Mochi, Shahalmi, Lohari Gates, with a view to go to the Mall road. I reported all about these demonstrations, etc., to my Deputy Superintendent orally. At about 2 p.m. I went to the Bradlaugh Hall and found it totally packed. The proceedings started before time. Owing to a very heavy rush of people meetings were also held outside the hall. I took notes inside the Bradlaugh Hall. After the proceedings had started Messrs. Bowring and Beaver, Superintendents and Mr. Askwith, Assistant Superintendent of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, came to the Bradlaugh Hall. They were all in uniform and as soon as the officers entered the hall rose at them, shouted and hissed. They were taken into the hall but not given chairs to sit. Afterwards they were seated in the balcony. Cries of shame were also shouted by the audience. I and Asghar Ali took notes of the proceedings and prepared a report. After the meeting was over there was a minor hostile demonstration outside the hall when the officers left it. Hindus and Muhammadans took water in the same glasses outside the hall.

After this meeting ended a large crowd marched through the city in form of procession and disorderly scenes took place, such as burning of the Rowlatt Bill copies and cursing the Municipal Commissioners, etc.

On 9th April I went to Amritsar, saw the *Ram Naumi* procession and submitted a report about it.

On 10th April while I was at Amritsar at about 11-30 a.m. the news of Kitchlew and Satyapal's deportation were received in the city and spread like wild fire. All the shops were closed in no time. I was in the Hall Bazaar at about 12 noon where a large mob collected and moved towards the civil station. The mob went over the foot bridge and the road bridge to cross the railway lines. The appearance of the crowd was extremely hostile. People were saying "They have taken away our leaders." "Where is the Deputy Commissioner?" "We will tear him to pieces." I understood that the common object of the mob was to secure the immediate release of Kitchlew and Satyapal and to kill the Deputy Commissioner if they could not succeed. A Military picquet (mounted) which was posted on the road bridge stopped this furious mob from crossing the railway lines and entering the civil station. At this the crowd picked up stones from the road and railway lines and pelted the picquet very heavily



LALA JIWAN LAL—concluded—SARDAR AYA SINGH.

with the result that the mounted picquet had to retreat. At that time I was at the tail of the mob watching these disorderly events. Soon after I heard firing and I ran to the telegraph office where I telephoned to Lahore that situation at Amritsar was very unhealthy. Crowd then came with *dandas*, etc., and smashed the Telegraph office. I went home as it was not safe to move among most disorderly mobs full of murderous elements. At the telegraph office I heard the rioters shouting. "They have killed our brothers and we will kill them." "Come on, let us wreck their offices and bank." At about 5 p.m. I came out of the house and saw that British Church, Mission Room, National Bank of India, the Municipal Hall, Hall Gate Clock and the Post Office near the Municipal office were in flames, Chartered Bank was also smashed. Also heard that Europeans were murdered. People were openly abusing the Government and the Europeans. Municipal pipes, telephone wires, electric wires were also smashed. I saw the National Bank go down looting. Saw Hindu and Muhammadan corpses about 8 or 9 in number in Khair Din's mosque in the Hall Gate Bazar where a Sikh and a Muhammadan openly preached murder of Europeans and told the people that the British *Raj* had almost ended. From their appearance they did not look to be responsible people but were rowdies. Rioters were seen patrolling the city with *lathis* in hands. There was complete lawlessness in the city. I came out of the city and saw picquets of British soldiers and Gurkhas outside the city near the railway station. There I was met by my Deputy Superintendent Khan Sahib Abdul Aziz Khan who had come from Lahore on a motor. He heard from me the news of this outbreak and I returned to Lahore along with him in motor the same evening.

Next morning while going to the office at Lahore, I saw that all the shops were closed and *chhablis* were noticed in different bazaars where Hindus and Muhammadans were served water in the same glasses. In office I was ordered to attend the Badshahi Mosque meeting. At about 1 p.m. I arrived at the Badshahi Mosque. There were many Hindus and Mussalmans. Inside the door there was a piece of draped cloth with a motto in Persian meaning "The King who practises tyranny cuts his own root underneath." At about 1-30 p.m. I saw Ram Bhaj Dutt, Mohsin Shah, Taj Din and Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din together in the mosque. There were then Muslim prayers. At 2 p.m. Shuja-ud-Din made a speech from the pulpit. He said that the Deputy Commissioner had desired speeches to be made to dissuade people from the *hartal*, but that he told the Deputy Commissioner that neither police nor military should come. Then Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din read out Gandhi's message from a newspaper. Ram Bhaj Dutt then spoke from the pulpit. He said that he himself had been present at the disturbance on the 10th and that the police had fired at the crowd after they had actually retreated and he characterised this action as perverse and tyrannical and said that the king should depend not on arms but on management. He said that Germany had fallen through internal revolution. Then he referred again to the 10th and said that the people only retired when they were fired upon. This was cowardly and what they should have done was to stand and die. People in the mosque put questions written on paper pieces to Ram Bhaj Dutt. Then he said he was tired of speaking. Mohsin Shah then got on the pulpit to read the *chits* but could not make himself heard and got down. Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din then read out the *chits*. The questions were, shall we open the shops or not? Shall we go to the office or not? And should we follow the instructions of Gandhi that orders contrary to conscience should be disobeyed?

Ram Bhaj Dutt said that he alone could not answer these questions and that a committee should be formed for the purpose of preparing answers. He said that every one would have to abide by the decision of the committee even if it involved death for them. An aeroplane then passed over the mosque; Ram Bhaj Dutt then pointed and said "How could we fight this? God will have to decide." He said that for five days no one should go to the Mall Road, and that no students should attend the schools or colleges. He advised them to tell their parents that he (Ram Bhaj Dutt) had given them this order.

Then Allah Din, speaking from the pulpit, approved what had been done in the city, except that no single leader had been appointed. Therefore he advised the appointment of a dictator. He said that we should strive to recover the corpses of the dead. While he was speaking Balwant Singh, a Khilasi of the Railway Volunteers Corps, came in shouting about the mutiny, and saying that he had killed a number of soldiers. People shouted "we are delighted" and said "our own armies are coming." I then went and telephoned to the Deputy Inspector-General and returned about 15 minutes after. When I returned Mota Singh of Patiala was speaking from the pulpit. Before Allah Din had finished speaking Harkishan Lal, Dharam Das Suri, Duni Chand and Piyari Mohan Dattatriya arrived at the scene. It was after 4 p.m. They were greeted with the same shouts of *Gandhi ki jai*, etc. Mota Singh said that the people ought to have stood the shots for the sake of the country instead of running away. He said he did not believe in the Bible saying about turning the other cheek, also said that to bear tyranny was to encourage it. Duni Chand then got on the pulpit and called upon the people to elect the committee which Ram Bhaj Dutt had proposed. The people began to shout out names of Harkishan Lal, Ram Bhaj Dutt, Duni Chand, Dharam Das Suri, Doctor Gopi Chand, Sardar Habibullah, Bar-at-Law, Mohsin Shah, Pleader, Doctor Nihal Chand and Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din. The election of members of the committee was done by one man proposing a name, which was acclaimed by the audience. Then another name was proposed and acclaimed and so on. Duni Chand said that the *hartal* made it necessary to arrange for food and drink for the poor people. He also said that if those of the members who were then elected refused to serve, their names should be struck off and the committee should have power to elect new members. Harkishan Lal then announced a subscription of Rs. 10,000 towards the Committee for the *Langar Khana*s. By that time it was evening prayer time and the mob left the mosque, after arranging that there should be another meeting in the mosque at 8 a.m. next morning and that the *hartal* should continue the following day. Duni Chand announced it. There were the usual shouts "*Delhi ke Shahidon ki jai*," "*Amritsar ke Shahidon ki jai*," etc. The procession in which men armed with *lathis* and *dandas* were leading passed through the Hira Mandi to the Gumti Bazar. On the way pictures of Their Majesties the King and Queen on the house of Raghu Nath Sahai were destroyed by the mob. The mob then pulled down, kicked and defaced a sign board of one Fakir Chand, contractor, bearing pictures of Their Majesties the King and the Queen. There were then shouts "*Hai hai George Mar Gaya*." I gave my account orally to Deputy Superintendent of Police, Political, the same evening. I took no written notes at the meeting as it was not safe to do so.

I investigated the *Danda Fauj* case in which *Danda Fauj* was formed by one Chanan Din which went about the city on the 11th and 12th April carrying sticks and delivering most seditious speeches.

SARDAR AYA SINGH, Head Booking Clerk, Golden Mosque Booking Office, Lahore.

At 7 p.m. on 11th April about 200 men armed with *dungs* began to hammer on the doors of the Booking Office and ordered the office to be closed. I said I could not close a Government office, but they got into the

office through another door, and cried "crush him" in English. Yielding to force my assistant and I closed the office. My notice board was pulled down and damaged and the notices torn off.

Mr. J. A. FERGUSON—Mr. GULSHAN RAI—Pandit K. N. AGNIHOTRI.

Mr. J. A. FERGUSON, Registrar, High Court, Lahore.

On the 11th of April the day on which the Accountant-General's office clerks were allowed to stop work and go home I was in my office at about 11 o'clock. I went out and found about 100 of the clerks of the High Court outside my office. They appeared excited and frightened. I spoke to them. Then Mr. Justice leRossignol, whose chamber is next to my office, came and spoke to them. They said they had great difficulty in reaching the Court, that many people in the city had tried to stop them, that some of them who were to go through were to take solemn affirmation that they were not to go to office. One man said he had been chained into his house from the outside. We told them that they had nothing to fear. On the next day I went round the office at 10 A.M. I found the clerks there but they told me that they had had the same difficulty. They also said that they had been told by the people that special arrangements would be made on the following working day, i.e., the 14th, to ensure that they should not go to office. Some of them said they had to come round by the back of the city.

The High Court went on working as usual, though some of the clerks were absent. I took strong measures

by putting a man on leave without pay. I believe that Mr. Prenter's court was open, but I do not know about the others. I enquired from Mr. Montgomery and other officers who told me that their clerks also complained. The clerks of the High Court were far too much frightened to be merely trying to get a holiday. I made no enquiry in the city. I did not send for the city people. There are 165 clerks in the High Court. Only one or two of the Lahore clerks were absent on the 11th and 12th. There were never more than three or four absent. Those absent were absent without leave. One of the men absent was ill on the 10th and we accepted his word that he was ill on the 11th. I called for the explanations of the others. I considered them unsatisfactory, but I cannot remember exactly what they were. I asked some of the clerks individually on the 11th. They said they were afraid of their houses being looted by the people who had stopped them. I asked them for the names of those who had stopped them, but they hesitated and did not give any. Mr. Justice leRossignol told them that if they would name any one, steps would be taken to deal with them in accordance with the ordinary course of law.

Mr. GULSHAN RAI, Vice-Principal of the Sanatan Dharma College, Lahore.

There has been in my opinion during recent years a growth of undesirable political views among our student population. This is due to the fact that the student body as a whole is hopelessly ignorant in matters political. They are given no instruction in civics either in schools or at college. They know nothing about the administration of their country, the way in which it works and the construction of its machinery. Being ignorant impressionable youths, they are easily excited and led away by things happening around them. When to such events are added irresponsible speeches and writings, of both Europeans as well as Indians, and when under such circumstances students are handled not tactfully, it is not a matter of surprise if students become very much prejudiced against officials. During recent years students have been led to believe that the professions of Government have very often been at variance with the actual acts of officials. They are made to think that Europeans, at least in India, are opposed to all constitutional reforms in the country. They have seen it illustrated many times that Indians are absolutely powerless when pitted against bureaucracy. The result is they have lost faith in British justice, British ideas of impartiality, in the *bond fides*

of officials, and in the intellectual and moral superiority of Europeans. Under these circumstances when students are persuaded to think that they are not fairly and justly treated by Europeans, they resent this treatment. Being after all boys, they do not realize the full consequences of their actions, and are sometimes rash, inconsiderate and careless. This has exactly been the case with Punjab students. In their political views they have been at one with politicians of advanced type. They have been eager to attend political meetings and take part in all political demonstrations.

This undesirable political attitude of students was sought to be removed and its growth checked by repressive methods. The Martial Law authorities tried by employing coercive measures to terrorise students, and to curb independent spirit among them. These measures have greatly embittered the feelings of students against Government, and the situation has now become worse. The youthful buoyant spirits of boys could never be curbed by coercive methods. The authorities have, in my humble opinion, committed a very serious blunder in doing all they did against students in April and May last.

Pandit K. N. AGNIHOTRI, Proprietor, "The Capital Sports Works," Lahore.

*Real situation in Lahore before the advent of Martial Law.*

Lahore is a place where a very large portion of the population is educated (as compared with other cities in the Punjab). A very large number of weekly and daily papers are issued from here and are read by a large portion of the people who keep themselves in touch with up-to-date information with regard to the affairs that particularly affect their country. The educated people as a whole and a fairly large portion of the half-educated feel greatly interested in matters political and consequently subscribe very largely to these daily and weekly papers. The rigours of recruiting may not have been experienced personally by the Lahore people but there is no doubt that they knew how the campaign of recruiting and raising war funds was carried on by the officials in the towns and villages of the Punjab. A zamindar friend of mine came to me for my help and related to me how his relatives were forced to become recruits.

The methods adopted for raising the war loan and obtaining contributions to the various war funds were

not only highly objectionable but created great tension of feelings between the officials of Government and the people. We in Lahore had unfortunately personal experience of some of the methods by which various war funds were raised. A typical instance of my own experience will go to show how the things were done even under the eye of the Local Government. From this one could imagine how the people must have fared in other towns and villages far off from the Capital:—

A group of 6 or 7 men came to me and asked me to contribute to the War Relief Fund. The group consisted of one Khan Sahib, one or two merchants, one Kanungo who was working in the Income-tax Department and one Tahsildar's peon. As I had already contributed my mite to this fund through another source I expressed my inability to do so again. On hearing this I was insulted and threatened that I would be forced to pay by the Tahsildar and that my income-tax would be raised (this latter step was of course taken and I had to pay 2½ times the amount of tax I used to pay before). My name was noted down and after a couple of days I was sent for

Pandit K. N. AGNIBOTRI—concluded—Mr. RAHMAT ILAHI.

by the Tahsildar but I did not go. My neighbours and others informed me of the similar treatment meted out to them. The incidents connected with the raising of recruits and various war funds had shaken the public confidence in the administration of justice by the Government. Now came the Rowlatt Act which deprived the people of their legitimate right of counsel and appeal. This and similar other defects in the body of the Act were laid bare in its entirety before the people of Lahore. The passing of the Act in the face of strong and united opposition of all the non-official members of the Viceroy's Council and very strong public opinion roused the people and made them try their last weapon of passive resistance in opposing the Bill. There was a spontaneous response of the whole city to the appeal of Mr. Gandhi and other leaders. Consequently there was a complete *hartal* on the 6th April. The day passed off quite peacefully and the business was resumed in full vigour as usual on the 7th April thus proving conclusively that the agitation was purely and entirely restricted to Rowlatt Act. Thus ended the 1st *hartal*.

*The causes that led to the 2nd Hartal.*

Nobody in Lahore ever dreamt that there would be a 2nd *hartal* until the evening of 10th April when all of a sudden there came the news of the most unfortunate arrest of Mr. Gandhi. The news spread like wildfire and the people got shocked to such an extent that there was a 2nd *hartal* complete and spontaneous as the 1st. But for the arrest of Mr. Gandhi there would have been no 2nd *hartal*, and if the Government had not taken to firing near the Mall and in the Anarkali Bazar the *hartal* would not have continued. Although there was continuous *hartal* in Lahore after the 10th April there was no act of violence, no looting or setting fire to any property. So much so that no man was even molested. I had been to the city in those days and to my utter surprise and astonishment I found that the people were perfectly peaceful. No doubt the whole city presented the scene of mourning but the people were perfectly orderly. The *hartal* was complete and consequently the people had no work to do except walking to and fro in groups. The poor people who could not earn wages were supplied with food free of cost. This step was most judicious and kept the people perfectly at peace.

*The Martial Law.*

To the great surprise and astonishment of the people of Lahore all of a sudden the Martial Law was proclaimed and the people were warned not to be out of doors after 8 P.M. As far as I know it was the ignorant and illiterate people who were arrested being out of doors after 8 P.M. as they could not properly understand the orders and realize the risk they were running. I saw with my eyes a batch of these people brought by the police to the public square near Market, made to take off their clothes and put on a muslin *langoti* and were tied with a *tikkiki* and flogged most cruelly in the gaze of the public. The scene was ghastly and struck terror in the

hearts of the people and brought tears of blood into their eyes while I saw one or two Europeans were laughing and enjoying this hellish scene. The people flogged in my presence were all innocent people who did not even understand what 8 P.M. meant. They invoked the help of God but nobody came to their rescue.

*Imposition of fines on respectable people.*

A Martial Law notification was issued to the effect that whereas it had come to the knowledge that certain dealers were withholding their stocks of wheat and not selling the same to the people it was hereby ordered that the people who held more than 5 maunds wheat report their stock to the Officer Commanding, Civil Area, before—date and time. From this it appeared that the notification was meant only for grain dealers and not for individual gentlemen. I had about 12½ maunds of wheat with me and as I understood that I was not to report I did not do it. But the next day I came to know from certain friends of mine that the individuals were also required to report. I at once wrote a letter to the Officer Commanding, Civil Area, stating the reasons of the delay and reporting the quantity of wheat I held. I could have easily distributed the wheat among my friends who were my neighbours and evaded the law, but I did not do it and trusted my innocence and sincerity. I was sent for by the Officer Commanding, put under guard of two European soldiers with their bayonets fixed as if I was a great criminal and placed for my trial before some officer. Although I explained the whole matter and gave my reasons for delay in reporting I was fined Rs. 60 or in default 1 month's imprisonment. I paid the fine. The indignity to which I was subjected and the anxiety of my friends who accompanied me there tore my heart into pieces. Lala Mool Chand's son and a pleader of Lahore were made to suffer the same indignity for reporting a couple of hours late.

*Imposition of punishment on College Students.*

I cannot forget the scene I saw when about 60 students of the Sanatan Dharm College were being marched to the Fort with their heavy beddings on their heads or shoulders and guarded by police on all sides. This punishment was inflicted on them simply because a notice or two of Martial Law notification was removed by some one from the gate pillars on the roadside, although I am told by a most reliable authority that the notification to hold the people responsible for the removal or tearing of Martial Law circulars, who reside inside the building where such notices are put up, came out after these poor students were arrested and marched off to the Fort.

There are so many other scenes that I saw which were simply heart-rending. In short the introduction and administration of the Martial Law was absolutely unjust and uncalled for. The results of its introduction and administration have been simply disastrous to the Government and the people.

Mr. RAHMAT ILAHI, B.A., LL.B., Pleader, Lahore.

During the Martial Law days an order was issued that everybody in possession of more than 5 maunds of wheat should inform the Officer Commanding, Lahore Civil Area, before such and such time on such and such date. My information reached the said officer some 4 hours late but on the same day. I was ordered to

appear before the officer on some date at 9 A.M. I had to wait outside the office in heavy rain until 4 P.M., when I was called before the officer and fined Rs. 20 for speaking truth.

I am ready to depose as to the above fact.

# Written Statements of Witnesses, Kasur

Mr. P. MARSDEN, I.C.S., Sub-Divisional Officer, Kasur.

1. I took charge of Kasur Sub-division on 15th April 1919, Martial Law being proclaimed on 16th April 1919. The subsequent investigations were under my supervision, and I was associated with the Officer Commanding, Kasur Civil, in the maintenance of order and in administering Martial Law, the latter work being taken over by a Martial Law Officer from April 23rd. In June I wrote a report on the disturbances and subsequent proceedings—the substance of which is before the Commission as written evidence. In addition to attesting that report\* I am prepared to give oral evidence as follows.

2. There is no doubt that Martial Law was necessary at Kasur, and that its maintenance for a considerable period was necessary. In various parts of the Sub-division telegraph wires were cut subsequently to the riots, and the sympathy of the people with the rioters was shown by the paucity of evidence forthcoming against them. Investigations necessarily lasted a long time: trials continued for some weeks, as a result of which there were, among others, eleven capital sentences which were actually carried into effect. Many villages had to be visited in the district, some of bad repute, when evidence pointed to some of the residents having participated in the riots. Considering these points, and the fact that the civil authorities on the 12th of April were unable to prevent the crowds from working their will on almost all Government buildings and on the railway, and there was no reason to suppose that unless over-awed they might at any time act similarly—my feeling, as the civil officer, was that military rule was essential. It is true that no more trouble was given by the crowds: but that might not have been the case, had not the people felt themselves powerless against the forces present.

3. The military and civil were in close co-operation, and the Officer Commanding was always careful to see that civil advisers were present with the military—and the advice of civil officials was always taken in any question of administration. In fact, the military forces acted purely as guards and as supporters of the civil authorities when necessary. The city was patrolled; people were free to move about the city at nights, only being forbidden to cross a certain boundary on one side of the city at defined hours of the night. Prisoners were escorted by military guards: soldiers accompanied civil officials to assist at searches. In short, the life of the city proceeded as usual: and investigations were made by the civil authorities: and the military enabled them to do so without danger. I do not think that a single actual instance can be given by any one of any violence or outrage committed by a single soldier.

4. During Martial Law, the people were at first sullen but submissive. They soon, however, became cheerful in demeanour, seeing that no vengeance was being taken, and no one sent up for trial unless on very good evidence. Finally it seemed to me that the military were extremely popular: and when officers stopped in the city crowds used to collect and talk to them. It is correct that officers insisted on the people salaaming when they passed. From my own observation I should say that the people did not resent this at all: often they thought it rather a joke. Since Martial Law the people have been peaceful and content and very polite. Missionary ladies who go into the houses assure me that no bitter feelings are left—the people seem even more friendly to them than before. So I have no hesitation in saying that the military did nothing to embitter feelings. From what scores of inhabitants have said to me, I gather that people were very surprised at the military being so gentle in their methods.

5. The cases of rioters were investigated by the police and myself in close collaboration. I have never felt so convinced in any criminal case that all persons arrested and convicted were guilty, as in this case, and pleaders have told me that great satisfaction was caused by the fact that all punished were undoubtedly guilty—only one possible exception has ever been suggested to me.

The investigation was practically all public—from the simple fact that it consisted mainly of identifications. All suspected persons and prisoners were drawn up on the various occasions and witnesses walked past and stated when they recognised any one. And on May 1st, in order to shorten the case and prevent the public being troubled by people being constantly called up, I managed to collect all possible witnesses from Kasur and from various parts of India at the same time—and all the men of Kasur were as far as possible gathered together, for identification. The people were not forced to sit without headgear as has been suggested; they merely had to remove it for a few seconds when passing the witnesses; because witnesses said all or most of the people at riots had been bare-headed: and they found it easier to recognize people bare-headed; nor were they without water for which provision was made. It is thus apparent that it was a matter of some moral courage for witnesses to come forward and identify: and there is little doubt that many possible witnesses—especially Railway menials—were afraid to do so. Not only were the identifications in public, and in the presence of all accused and suspected persons—but practically all the statements of such witnesses were also at once taken down in public.

In order to ensure that possible guilty persons should be present in Kasur for identification, efforts were made to prevent people leaving—and also to bring absconders back. All Sadhus were retained under supervision in Kasur: partly because they were known to be harbingers of sedition: partly because they were required for identification, as it was known that many had been in the riot. Only two were identified: and I was convinced from my enquiries that many Sadhus from outside Kasur had joined in the riot and subsequently decamped.

Persons were only arrested either on very strong suspicion or on definite evidence. Persons merely suspected were kept under supervision, but not arrested: as also persons against whom evidence given appeared to be false. There were far too many prisoners to be kept in the two thanas, so a special erection was made for the majority: viz., a space enclosed by wire, and roofed over, and provided with sanitary arrangements, just near the station. Others especially the more respectable persons, were confined in the thanas. There one or two (notably two pleaders) were allowed to have their own bedding and books: and all prisoners who desired it were permitted to receive food from their relatives. When identifications by possible witnesses had been completed, and when I was convinced that any evidence was false, prisoners were released.

The only persons sent up for trial were those proved to have been concerned in the actual riot. It was a question whether certain leading people, mainly pleaders, had not been guilty of instigating and fomenting rebellion by speeches. But after careful sifting of the evidence against them, and after consultation, it was decided to give them the benefit of the doubt.

Finally it may be said that accused persons had everything in their favour: as (1) identifications were public, (2) the evidence of a single witness, however reliable, was not considered sufficient, (3) cases were not dealt with by subordinates, but evidence was closely scrutinised at once by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and myself: so that there was no possibility of evidence being faked or cases concocted; and no accused or witness could be coerced or maltreated; nor was there any

\* Vide page 363 et seq.

Continued.]

Mr. P. MARSDEN.

possibility of bribing; whereas once the accused had seen all that there was against them, they or their friends had plenty of time for licit or illicit defence.

6. *The causes of the disturbance* at Kasur were naturally unfolded to me during my investigation and daily contact with and questioning of people and accused. They were as follows:—

- (1) Baseless rumours about the Rowlatt Act and the methods of the authorities at other places.
- (2) The action, or more especially the inaction, of the Bar. That is to say, that though the people took them for leaders and heard their speeches, they showed utter irresponsibility in their rôle of leaders. Many admitted to me that they had not actually perused the Act. They allowed the people to suppose that their liberties were threatened, and made such statements as that "our only hope is in God"—which of course the people interpreted according to the saying "God helps those who help themselves." No Pleader, as far as I could ascertain, ever warned the people that many rumours about the Act were baseless, or informed them of its safeguards.

I admit here that a publicity campaign by officials would have done good. But the fact remains that the Pleaders at least allowed themselves to be accepted as spokesmen and leaders (in written statements to me several of them admitted this) and in that capacity did not allay, but stimulated the excitement of the people.

- (3) Outside pressure: all people admitted to me the prevalence of a rumour that if Kasur did not fall into line with other places on the *hartal* question, traders would be boycotted. Some documentary proof of this was also obtained. It was also known that leaders from outside were present on April 12th.
- (4) The *hartal* on the 11th and 12th, and the consequent idleness of the people: combined with the fact that the civil authorities were very anxious not to molest or annoy the gathering crowds.

I also found that certain alleged causes were imaginary, e.g.—

- (1) *Recruiting methods of the past.*—There was no hint of this throughout. The classes concerned were not those drawn upon for the army. Recruiting was never mentioned in the agitation or in the speeches of leaders, or heard among the cries of the mob; nor was the case of any accused or suspect connected in the remotest way with this cause. The military, active and retired, were loyal throughout.
- (2) *Emigrants' grievances.*—No disaffection was traced to this cause.
- (3) *Provocation by the authorities.*—There was none such: if anything the authorities were too kid-gloved. The Europeans and soldiers at the station were attacked at sight. Those attacked where the train stopped had no means of defending themselves. The two murdered warrant officers fired revolvers (ineffectually) after they had been stoned by the mob.

7. *The need for firing* by the police is obvious from the facts. In my investigations I found that the only error was that firing was not resorted to before. When I questioned several police officials, and demanded an explanation, their reply was that they were afraid to fire—and that they expected that such an action might lead to subsequent punishment. The fear of subsequent enquiries seems to have paralysed their actions. Firing was only resorted to when Government building

after building had been gutted, and when the crowd had signified their contempt of two shots in the air by the Tahsil police. I also found that the inadequacy of their arms had deterred the police (e.g. in the City Thana) from issuing forth and threatening the mob.

8. There were two cases of persons being shot by sentries, one was at Kasur Railway Station. I reached the spot just as the man expired—and heard the statement of the (British) sentry at the time. He was entirely justified in firing. A dust storm was raging, and the man was seen moving towards the sentry—and would not answer when challenged again and again. Some time after it transpired that he was dumb. His presence there was inexplicable. It was unfortunate that he was dumb, but this very fact proved the truth of the sentinel's statement.

The other was the case of the shooting of a Bania by a sentinel at a village (Khara). As I was not present I will not mention it further. A military enquiry was held at the time.

9. Certain actions of the Martial Law officer have been adversely commented on. Some were mentioned to me while he was still at Kasur. They referred to certain practical punishments which he inflicted on people, such as putting them to do manual labour, to perform exercises, climb ladders, etc. I questioned him when it was brought to my notice. He said that he had done such things to avoid inflicting a term of imprisonment for petty offences. He specifically denied having ever had any one whitewashed, as has been alleged. In any case it is to be noted that these acts were only after Martial Law had been withdrawn from Kasur, and confined to the Railway Area only. So the question does not really concern Martial Law administration at Kasur, but that on the Railway.

#### I.—Survey of Predisposing Causes.

There is a large Pleader element at Kasur, a bad crowd of menials and low-paid labourers, in connection with the leather industry and butcher trade; and some large schools. These elements supplied all the material for trouble, as in other places. There is also a very large bazar; and outside influences were at work upon the shop-keepers, in the shape of big firms at Delhi, Karachi and Bombay ultimately, but more particularly at Amritsar proximately, and the latter, under the influence of the former, brought pressure to bear on the shop-keepers of Kasur by dishonouring *kundis*. Further, Kasur is an important railway junction, and the whole staff were disaffected. As Kasur (a town of some 25,000 population) is in close contact with Lahore and Amritsar it was natural that trouble should ensue. In the actual riots several strangers were noticed among the leaders, who have not been identified, but were probably from Amritsar. In other words, Kasur was a good centre for disorder, and a little pressure from outside, and the instigation of a few outside emissaries were enough to kindle the flame.

#### II.—Immediate causes of outbreak.

The news from Lahore and Amritsar brought matters to a crisis. There had not been, as elsewhere, a *hartal* on April 6th. But on April 7th the idea began to be mooted. On the 10th a rumour spread through the bazar that outside firms were boycotting Kasur and on the 11th crowds began to collect. As seen retrospectively the situation was now imminently dangerous; unless some sharp check were applied, it was clear that the crowds would continue getting more excited till they had given full vent to their feelings.

#### III.—Chronological narrative.

On the 11th *hartal* was started. A crowd, led by Nadir Ali Shah, a shop-keeper of Kasur (since hanged) and a master of the M. B. High School and a *darzi* and a few strangers, went all round the city insisting on the closure of shops and places of business. Some

Mr. P. MARSDEN.

[Continued.]

people obeyed reluctantly, but for the most part all promptly complied.

On the 12th morning *hartal* was again observed. Two or three crowds paraded the city, closing places of business and schools. The school-boys played a conspicuous part, led by Kamal Din (since sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment) of the M. B. School, a nephew of an Honorary Magistrate. There were again strangers among the leaders; and at the head of the crowd, which was an immense one of several thousands after the various bodies met together, a *charpoy* on which was spread a black flag was carried, as an emblem of the death of liberty, and at about 9-45 A.M. the crowd made its way to the railway station. Just before arriving there, Nadir Shah (mentioned above) made a violent speech. The crowd was in a state of great excitement, every one weeping and beating their breasts as at Muharram time. Having done considerable damage to the station, by breaking pots and doors and throwing stones at windows, the crowd was about to leave, but the boy Kamal Din got up and urged them to do more damage. The constant cries of him and the other leaders were "Rowlatt Bill *na manzur hai*; Mahatma Gandhi *Ji ki Jai*; Muhammad Ali, Shaukat Ali *Ji ki Jai*." Then the crowd surged back into the station, and just then three trains came up to the distant signals from Lahore, Patti and Ferozepore. The trains drew up to the signals as crowds and a quantity of smoke were seen at the station. Having burned a small oil shed and damaged the signal and telegraph wires and smashed the furniture and looted some property and a large number of tickets in the station rooms, the crowd ran towards the Ferozepore train, some 400 yards off. During these occurrences the Railway staff are proved to have made no remonstrances and in some cases to have instigated the rioters.

In the Ferozepore train were several Europeans; viz., Mr. Sherbourn, a Railway official, with his wife and three small children in one compartment; two officers, Captain Limby and Lieutenant Munro, in another; two warrant officers, Conductor Selby and Sergeant Mallett, in another; and in a 2nd class carriage were Corporal Battson and Lance-Corporal Gringham of the Queen's Regiment, along with Mr. Khair Din, Travelling Inspector of Railway Accounts, Mr. Gupta, Inspector of Works, North Western Railway, Sheikh Din Muhammad, Extra Assistant Commissioner, and one or two other Indian gentlemen. Seeing the crowd Mr. Khair-ud-din advised the Sherbourn family to seek shelter in a gate-man's hut and he and the two Corporals helped them along inside it. The two Military officers failed to induce the driver to back the train out; instead of that he drove on into the station. The two officers then ran down the line towards Ferozepore, being pursued and struck several times, Lieutenant Munro sustaining a severe injury on the head. The two warrant officers refused to get out of their carriage and stand by the European party at the hut, where they might have kept off the crowd with their revolvers, they being the only armed persons present. After a while the two Corporals were overpowered, dragged out of the hut, and felled to the ground, but in some marvellous way managed to rise and run off, Gringham reaching the Ferozepore Road, and Battson ultimately mounting the Lahore train, nearly a mile off, with the help of one Gurdit Singh of Palmerabad village. Mr. Khair-ud-din was hustled and pulled into the doorway of the hut. One Ram Chand of Khem Karan also stood by and helped the party. Finally, the crowd were persuaded to leave the hut, largely through the efforts of M. Ghulam Mohi-ud-din, Pleader, mentioned above, who showed great energy and personal courage in dissuading and even abusing the crowd. Then he and Mr. Khair-ud-din took the family across to a house in Kot Halim Khan, a hamlet on the other side of the line. After some time Mr. Mitter, officiating Sub-Divisional Officer, and Khan Sahib Ahmed Khan, Deputy Superintendent of Police, and other officials found them here and took them for safety to the Deputy Superintendent of Police's bungalow, about

half a mile off. The presence of this European party somewhat embarrassed the officials, and unfortunately proper arrangements had not been made to watch the crowds or to concentrate any police force where necessary. So the movements of the officials at every stage were too late, and the mob was able to work its will. Nor did any of the influential people of Kasur make any serious effort to stop or to dissuade the crowd. The most active official was the Tahsildar, Lala Khan Chand, who was the first to reach the station, with Sayad Ahmed Shah, Sub-Registrar, having already early in the morning gone to report to Mr. Mitter (officiating Sub-Divisional Officer) that *hartal* was being observed. From the station, finding the mob had moved towards the train, he went to call Mr. Mitter, and came back with him and Sayad Ahmed Shah and Mr. Muhammad Abdulla, who met them, and then they were joined by the Nair-Tahsildar Chaudhri Muhammad Khan who lives just by the line and it was then after that, that the Deputy Superintendent of Police with a Sub-Inspector (Hamid Ullah) and two armed constables met them, and they all then went on to the platform. And by this time some tragic events had occurred.

It has been mentioned that the Ferozepore train moved on towards the platform. The crowd followed it and inside it, as I have mentioned, were the two warrant officers. They got out and stood at the door of their carriage. The crowd were by some railings about 60 yards off, and throwing stones at the two men. One fell on one of them. Then they lost their heads and fired off all their rounds towards the crowd, without doing any damage. The crowd then closed in on them; and they ran up and down the platform, and went up to a group of Railway officials and asked them if there was no Railway staff or Police who would assist them. The Railway men said nothing and gave no encouragement. Two Railway constables who had been on the platform had run away. So the two warrant officers ran out of the station entrance and turned towards the Waiting Shed, were hemmed in by some railings and, there beaten to death with *lathis*, the final blows being dealt by some Jats.

When the Deputy Superintendent of Police and party, as above described, arrived they found one man dead and one still living. They left Mr. Tara Singh Narula, Pleader, who had come up to see if he could help, to look after the wounded man, and went off, as narrated, to see where were the European party. It was about 11-30 A.M. when they found them at Kot Halim Khan and soon afterwards they took them to the Deputy Superintendent of Police's bungalow, and the Deputy Superintendent of Police here left them and some Missionary ladies next door, with his own family.

Meanwhile the crowd had cut the telegraph wires just outside the station, climbing on to the walls of a *serai* to do so, looted and gutted the Wheat Mandi Post Office, ran past the City Thana, which the Head Constable besought them not to attack, and then concentrated on the main Post Office, only a few yards off the Thana, and quickly set it on fire. At the *thana* were six constables and two head constables with six rifles between them. The Sub-Inspector had gone off to the Deputy Superintendent of Police as noted above. The Deputy Superintendent of Police thinks that it would have been useless for this force to have tried to stop the mob. From the Post Office the crowd set off towards the Munsif's Court and the Tahsil, which are side by side. The Tahsildar had meanwhile come up with the crowd. There is no doubt that he did his utmost to restrain it constantly stopping to address them, and keeping up with them, as they moved towards the Tahsil, in his tonga. With him were Sayad Ahmed Shah, Sub-Registrar, and some of the Tahsil subordinates and chaprassis. After a little hesitation the mob moved on to the Munsif's court, and soon set it on fire, the Munsif having gone across into the Tahsil, where there was a Sub-Inspector (B. Kharak Singh), three head constables and 14 constables, with nine rifles between them. These police fired two shots, a constable his rifle, and the Sub-

Mr. P. MARSDEN.

[Continued.]

Inspector his pistol, both into the air, and the mob thought that they only had blank ammunition. Then at last the Deputy Superintendent of Police and his party arrived on the spot. His bungalow is near to the Tahsil and the violent occurrences there could be heard. The party consisted of himself and four armed constables, these five being armed, and a Sub-Inspector of Police (Gobind Sahai) by chance present; also Khan Sahib Shahbaz Khan, Honorary Magistrate, and Fateh Baz Khan, his brother, these two having come to the Deputy Superintendent of Police's bungalow. Mr. Tara Singh, who had come on from the station, and Mr. Mitter, Extra Assistant Commissioner, and the Naib-Tahsildar. The latter two had gone from Kot Halim Khan, where the European party were, into the city, Mr. Mitter intending to send a telegram for military help from Lahore. Meanwhile, however, the Deputy Superintendent of Police sent one to Ferozepore 18 miles nearer. But the actual news was first given there to the Police by Khan Bahadur Rabb Nawaz Khan, Sub-Registrar of Ferozepore, who had come into Kasur by the Ferozepore train and at once got a tonga to drive back to Ferozepore and tell the news, telephoning from Kaiser-i-Hind Bridge on the way.

When the Deputy Superintendent of Police's party reached the Tahsil the Munsif's court and many documents inside had been burned, and the crowd were threatening to burn the Tahsil door with the lighted reed roof of a *chappar*. The Deputy Superintendent of Police asked Mr. Mitter if he had no objection to his firing and then he and the four constables opened fire below, and the constables on the Tahsil wall followed suit, the Tahsildar and Tahsil subordinates above mentioned sheltering themselves from the fire, though one chaprassi standing near the Tahsildar was wounded. One man was killed, and several wounded, which is a small number of casualties, considering that 57 rounds in all were fired—25 by the police in the Tahsil and 32 by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and four constables. The crowd at once fled helter skelter and the constables came out of the Tahsil and pursued them. On that day eight persons were apprehended, viz., two persons seized while running away (by Din Muhammad, Jamadar of Chaprassis, in one case, and by Khan Sahib Shahbaz Khan and Siraj Din, Chaprassi, in the other); two wounded men who went to hospital; three lying badly wounded on the ground; a young man Chuni Lal who had at first assisted the rioters but afterwards befriended the Sherbourn family, and another man arrested near the Tahsil.

On the afternoon of the 12th a Military force arrived under Colonel McRae of the 2-15th Sikhs, and all was then (3 P.M.) quiet. From the 13th to 15th no arrests were made. This was a pity. The Extra Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Superintendent of Police explained the fact as follows. They found that few or no arrests were being made in other places, e.g., Amritsar, and did not know if they were expected to make arrests. The Extra Assistant Commissioner wired to Deputy Commissioner, Lahore, on the 13th asking if arrests were made and his reply received on the 14th was to the effect that arrested persons, if their cases were proved, should be sent to Lahore. While the Extra Assistant Commissioner was considering whether this meant that further arrests were to be made, a movable column arrived with an I. C. S. Officer, Mr. Malan, and he also was doubtful about making arrests. Therefore on the 15th the Extra Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Superintendent of Police went to Lahore to consult the Deputy Commissioner. That afternoon the new Sub-Divisional Officer Mr. Marsden arrived. On the 16th morning a Darbar was held at the Town Hall, and Colonel McRae proclaimed Martial Law. At this meeting Lala Dhanpat Rai, a notorious agitator of past days, who had presided at the Rowlatt Act meeting on the 11th, was arrested. Twenty-one arrests in all were made that day; on the 17th there were three arrests, on the 18th four, and on the 19th 40. Most of the arrests on these three days were on

the identification of the Europeans and of the officials of Kasur; a large crowd of suspected persons, chiefly Sadhus, butchers, leather-workers, schoolboys and menials from the Kote near the station being assembled for identification. On the 20th 23 arrests were made. After that a few arrests were made daily as more witnesses were called up, e.g., passengers and workmen from the Ferozepore train. The only really prominent men arrested were M. Ghulam Mohi-ud-din and M. Abdul Kadir, Pleaders. They had been prominent at the Rowlatt Act meeting on the 11th and had been at a meeting held with the object of establishing leagues for Hindus and Muhammadans on the 12th morning; and furthermore were said by certain witnesses to have joined in the riot. But these witnesses were proved to be false, as it was proved that the two men did their very best to stop the riot at the station and hurried there before any official arrived. After some deliberation it was decided not to prosecute them and other persons prominent at the Rowlatt Act meeting, as their speeches could hardly be called inflammatory.

On the same day, April 12th, there were troubles at Khem Karan Station and at Pattu. Khem Karan Station is six miles off and some damage to it was done by about 20 men, mainly sweepers from Pattu village near by. They were driven off with the help of some Khem Karan zamindars. This occurrence was immediately after the trouble at Kasur, from where a sweeper had run off to Pattu, his village, and told the others that all railway stations were being looted, and that there was a good chance of looting Khem Karan Station.

Pattu is 28 miles off. The news of Kasur excited the townfolk who had previously been stirred up by the lectures of one Durga Das of Amritsar at meetings convened by local *Arya Samajists*, and by Amritsar people in trains passing through, one of which had been delayed several hours, during which time Amritsar people went into the bazar. A riot lasted from about 8 to 11 P.M., the rioters being the riffraff of the town. Some damage was done to the station, but the people were restrained from doing any great harm by a few of the officials and chief inhabitants and the police.

#### IV.—Classes prominent in promoting disturbances.

The main responsibility lies on the pleaders. The masses regarded them as leaders, and at every turn sought them out to make speeches. It is quite clear that the Bar had gone in for violent and indiscriminate, as well as uninformed, criticism of the Rowlatt Act.

The most inflammable material kindled by the above was the students. Young men of 16 and 17 from the schools were in the forefront, and even tiny boys were as violent as any one.

The mass of the crowd was composed of the lowest classes, viz., sweepers and artisans and leather-workers and butchers. Kasur swarms with these, especially the "Kote" near the station, and to this fact may be attributed the despicable nature of the mob. The men had a Dutch courage, which led them to throw stones at a distance and attack *en masse* but not to grapple individually with Europeans, who were thus able to escape through the scattered portions of the mob; and there was no attempt made to attack the very small band of police who fired on the large crowd from outside the Tahsil.

The shop-keepers also were prominent (several were convicted) and the *hartal* was universal and mainly voluntary in the bazars. So it may be said that the unrest was universal, extending as it did through the professional, trading, labouring, menial and student classes.

#### V.—Punitive and protective measures.

After the riot at Kasur on the 12th of April a Military force of 300 men arrived at Kasur from Ferozepore under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel MacRae (2-15th Sikhs), including 50 British troops (Queen's Regiment). Shortly afterwards the force was reduced to 150 rifles, viz., 50 of the Queen's and 100 native troops (2-15th Sikhs). On the 8th of May a further reduction

Mr. P. MARSDEN—concluded—Mr. TARA SINGH NARULA.

was made to 100 men of the 2-17th (Indian) Infantry, and on the 11th May this force was further reduced to 50 men, and on the 21st June only 15 rifles were retained. The Military intend shortly to withdraw these also, and leave the work of protection to the Police. Had the Afghan War not intervened, these reductions would have been made more slowly. But the Martial Law and the various punitive measures had a good effect, and it soon became apparent that the people were not likely again to give trouble. Military headquarters were at the railway station, where the Sub-Divisional Officer also stayed till the end of April. The chief work done by the Military was the guarding of the railway station and of the chief Government buildings; patrolling the city; and accompanying the Civil authorities to villages where arrests had to be made. And of course the force was able to insure that the restrictive orders under Martial Law were duly obeyed.

A movable column (commanded by Colonel Smithers of the 17th (Loyal) Regiment) and accompanied by an I.C.S. Officer went along the Railway line from Kasur *via* Patti to Amritsar soon after the riots, and then returned the same way. Its duty was to arrest ringleaders and suspected persons and if necessary, to inflict fines and generally to take any measures required by the situation. Various people were arrested, *e.g.*, some Arya Samajists and others at Patti, who had fostered agitation; and some men were taken as 'hostages' from bad villages; and its movement certainly helped to keep the people quiet. But a column of the sort cannot take the place of the police, and the latter are apt to lose a sense of responsibility if affairs seem to be in the hands of the Military. This happened at Patti, where the Inspector was very dilatory in making arrests, because he thought that nothing more was to be done beyond the steps taken by the Military. It should be noted that during the operations of this column no persons were flogged.

*Thikri pahra* was established in the villages along the railway line the arrangement being made by Khan Bahadur Khan Zafar Khan, who was deputed to this work by the Government. The arrangements were successful; for after the first few days, during which several telegraph wires were out, no more such incidents occurred.

#### Judicial proceedings.

Persons accused in connection with the Kasur and Khem Karan riots were tried by the Special Tribunals at Lahore; and also one man accused of abetting rebellion and of spreading false reports from Khaira in Kasur Sub-Division. The Sub-Divisional Officer on April 20th and Captain Doveton, Martial Law Officer on April 23rd, were appointed as Summary Courts. The latter heard all cases that arose, as they were not numerous.

Concerning the personnel of the convicts, the following points are worth noting. Twelve were shop-keepers; three were Government servants, *viz.*, an octroi *muharrir* and an employee in the Excise Department and a Chaprassi employed in the Bar Room, Kasur; two were students (*N.B.*—Two other students, small boys, were tried by the Summary Courts). No pleaders were accused. Only two Sadhus were accused, and one convicted, though a large number were known to have been concerned. Except for 7 men all the convicts were of Kasur. No particular caste or religion preponderated among the accused; they were representatives of all sections of the community. As regards occupation, the shop-keeper and the labourer and artisan were the most prominent.

*The Summary Court.*—In the Summary Court of the Martial Law Officer (Captain Doveton) there were in all 79 persons convicted. The chief case was that rela-

ting to the riot at Patti, in which 31 accused were convicted and 15 acquitted. Of these, 24 persons were sentenced to imprisonment and 4 to whipping. The convicts were chiefly petty shop-keepers and menials.

*Whipping.*—Of the 48 other cases of conviction 30 sentences were whipping (2 of these concern one man on different occasions). As there were also 4 whipping sentences in the Patti case, and as 6 school boys were whipped by order of the Officer Commanding (before the arrival of the Martial Law Officer) there were 40 cases of whipping in all at Kasur, and these may be considered together. The total amount of stripes was 710, and the average number of stripes per person was therefore 18. The persons whipped were all of the lower classes, the only exception being a ticket collector of Kasur Railway Station. All were of mature age, except in the case of 8 school boys; and they were whipped with a cane, and the number of stripes in their case in no case exceeded 6. Of these boys 2 were those above mentioned, sent for trial in connection with the Kasur riot, and the other 6 were whipped by the order of the Officer Commanding as an administrative measure, because the Head Master reported that they were still giving trouble and that he could not keep order among them. The offences for which the whipping was given were all very serious: in a few cases because of their probable effects, *e.g.*, an attempt to spread false rumours and the holding of an illegal assembly; but in the great majority of cases because they were in themselves brutal or dangerous actions. For example, 4 were cases of a riot at the station, when a Non-Commissioned Officer was assaulted; 2 were cases of efforts to escape from custody by persons accused in the Kasur riot case; 5 were cases of persons who when drunk trespassed in a woman's apartments; and 5 were cases of a brutal assault involving severe injuries on a *lambardar* for giving information to the authorities about rioters. Other cases again were those of persons who committed despicable offences such as making false accusations against alleged rioters, and one was that of a Sepoy of the Malay States Guides, who cheated two poor old women of the amount of their railway fares, by impersonating an official. A very bad case of impersonation similarly punished was that of two Jats, one of whom pretended to be a C. I. D. official, and thereby extorted large sums of money. This cozening rogue actually managed to be seen about with the Officer Commanding, Lahore Civil Area, by which means he increased his own earning powers. Many of these punishments, inflicted on cheats, on Government servants who misbehaved, and on dangerous *badmashes*, were very popular with the community at large. It was extremely effective for example, when a *lambardar* from a distant village came before the Sub-Divisional Officer in the morning complaining of an assault by *badmashes*, and troops forthwith went out and secured the offenders, and produced them before the Martial Law Officer, and before the day was out the five *badmashes*, scoundrels of the worst type, had all received 30 lashes, and started on a course of 2 years' rigorous imprisonment. Such things made the people relish Martial Law.

The whippings were carried out on the Railway platform just near the room where the military had their headquarters. The public had no access here; and all the whippings were therefore in private. But the 6 school boys mentioned above were whipped just outside the station entrance in the presence of their school fellows and of some of the railway staff, that is to say in public.

As regards other classes of sentences 26 accused in all were fined, the fines averaging Rs. 51 per person; and 13 persons were sentenced to imprisonment, the terms varying from one month to two years.

Mr. TARA SINGH NARULA, Bar-at-Law, Kasur.

I have already sent my application through the Sub-Divisional Officer, Kasur.

Briefly my evidence is as follows:—

Up to the 11th instant Kasur was absolutely quiet. On 11th instant, at or about 2 P.M., *hartal* was declared

on receiving the news of the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi. A meeting in the evening was called. Speeches by Messrs. Oms Dat, Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din, Seth Mohan Lal were delivered. No speech was inflammatory. At the end of the meeting, some of the people asked whether there will



Mr. TARA SINGH NARULA—concluded—Khan Sahib AHMAD KHAN.

be a *hartal* to-morrow. Maulvi Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din replied that there can be no compulsion. Everybody is free to do just as he likes and this meeting is not meant for that purpose. While leaving the meeting, I saw one Nadir Shah got on the table and I heard him say now the flatterers have left and let us decide the matter among ourselves. The people were certainly excited but no disorder of any kind took place.

On 12th instant, at or about 1.30 P.M., I was told that the Railway station has been burnt. I at once went to the Railway station. A wounded man met me on the way. At the Railway station, Mr. Mitter, Sub-Divisional Officer, placed me in charge of the wounded English gentleman. Ten or 12 persons armed with *danga* came to attack the English gentleman but on my threatening them they went back.

In the meantime Post Office was put on fire and after arranging for water, I got my tonga ready and took the Sub-Divisional Officer with me and went to the District Superintendent of Police's house for the purpose of saving the mission house. There I learnt that all the ladies and girls of the mission house have come to the District Superintendent of Police's house. Sub-Divisional Officer gave me order to go and try to disperse the mob. Naib Tahsildar and myself went towards the Munsif's Court and tried our best to persuade the people to go

away but in vain. We reported the matter to the Sub-Divisional Officer. Sub-Divisional Officer and District Superintendent of Police went with us to the Tahsil. Munsif's Court was on fire and the people were trying to put the Tahsil Gate on fire. Sub-Divisional Officer gave orders for fire. The mob dispersed. Some arrests were made at the spot and one was by me. After that there was absolute quietness at Kasur. During the Martial Law days Mr. Marsden, Sub-Divisional Officer, was very kind to me. He sent me passes at my house. All the members of the Legal Profession of Kasur were called to the Railway station twice for identification. On one of these two occasions Sub-Divisional Officer remarked that he is very sorry for our trouble, but there is a rumour that there were one or two pleaders among the rioters, therefore he was forced to do it.

On 1st May whole male population was called at the Railway station. Whatever the reasons may be for such an action, I certainly felt for the wife of my ayoo.

I was also present at the search of Maulvi Abdul Kadir's house. It was fairly done.

Captain Doveton was so kind to me as to allow me to appear for the prosecution in a case. Causes of disturbance was the excitement of people and there was rumour that Amritsar has boycotted Kasur.

Khan Sahib AHMAD KHAN, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Kasur.

*Position of things before the riot.*

1. Kasur has commercial relations with Lahore, Amritsar, Karachi and Bombay and other places. But it observed no *hartal* on the 30th March 1919 or 6th of April as suggested by Mahatma Gandhi.

*Hartal on 11th April.*

2. After the 6th April one Sunder Lal of Kasur went to Amritsar to arrange disposal of his goods, but they were not accepted there and he was told that no article of Kasur would be sold in Amritsar. Similarly Shikh Ghulam Farid of Kasur despatched his articles from Kasur and sent Railway Receipt to Abdul Rahim and Karam Ilahi of Lahore who refused to accept it. These two instances are in evidence, but there are also others, which the Kasur people brought verbally from Amritsar, when they went there on the 9th April to witness *Ram Naumi* day, and before the 11th April it was rumoured that Kasur had been boycotted by other cities on account of non-observance of *hartal* on the 6th April. It brought a great pressure on the Kasur people.

3. Consequently on the 11th April, when trains from Amritsar and Lahore reached Kasur at 10 A.M. and brought news of incidents which took place there and of the arrest of Mahatma Ghandi, the Kasur people started *hartal* and in no time all shops were closed and a mob formed. The acute cause of *hartal* was pressure of boycott by other cities, but the chronic causes were economic conditions and excitement over Rowlatt Act.

4. At this time I was at Ganda Singhwala in connection with the investigation of a dakaity case, and on receipt of news of *hartal* at Ganda Singhwala I returned to Kasur at about 4.30 P.M.

5. The mob moved about and urged others to close shops. They visited Railway Station and other Kots. Same evening they collected at Hari Har tank and a meeting was held with B. Omadat (President of the local Arya Samaj), president, and Seth Mohan Lal, M. Ghulam Mohi-ud-din, M. Abdul Kadir and Gokal Chand, all pleaders, spoke against the Rowlatt Act and passed resolutions against it. Though some of these speeches were moderate in words, but they were certainly exciting. After this meeting Nadar Ali Shah addressed the audience in exciting words and told them that the leaders had done what they were expected to do, but it was for the people themselves not to rest till the Rowlatt Act was cancelled, and he suggested *hartal* on the following day.

6. I took precautions to guard the Mission compound, Sub-Divisional Officer's house, Judicial lock-up, Police Stations, Courts and Deputy Superintendent of Police's office. It may be noted that there were only 49 Constables in the City Police at that time, excluding the Sadar Police Station, Tahsil, Judicial lock-up, Sub-Divisional Officer guard and office hands. Out of these 49 Constables, 13 were untrained, having been enlisted as special constables on account of the formation of the Police Battalions and 12 men were fixed duties, thus leaving only 25 trained Constables to guard the City Police Station, Courts, Mission Compound, Deputy Superintendent's office and three Police Posts in the City, and we had to employ the 13 untrained men with the trained Constables on the various places.

*Outrages on the 12th April.*

7. On the 12th April all shops were closed and a mob was formed, which visited the various Kots, Factories and schools and brought a complete *hartal* to all business. At the same time gentlemen mentioned in paragraph 5 as well as other leading men of the City held a meeting at Maulvi Abdul Kadir's house, and according to their own version they discussed the *hartal* and arranged to hold formal meeting in the evening and cook rice and distribute it to the mob. But there they heard of the attack by the mob at the Railway Station and some of them ran towards it.

8. It may be mentioned that after visiting various places detailed above, the mob collected in the Main Kots and brought a *charpoy*, over which a black sheet was spread. This they declared liberty funeral, and carried it on their shoulders. They made out that they had lost their liberty over the Rowlatt Act, and that they wanted to show their grief to the passengers at the Railway Station, as it was the arrival time of three trains from Ferozepore, Patti and Lahore. They made the cries of "*Rowlatt Bill hai, hai*," "*Mahatma Gandhi ki Jai*" "*and Hindu-Muslim ki Jai*." On arrival at the Railway Station they started mischief by breaking flower pots, windows, etc. It appears that they were encouraged by some of the Railway officials, they broke the telegraph wires and set fire to the lamp room. The mob moved towards Ferozepore along the Railway line, as the train had come in sight. They held up the train and attacked the European passengers and started a regular loot. The Indian passengers all left the train, and after a few minutes the train moved to the Railway Station, when a European

Khan Sahib AHMAD KHAN.

[Continued.]

passenger was seen inside the train and the mob followed the train. At the Railway Station the two Sergeant Majors got out of the train as well as Corporal Battson. The former two had revolvers in their hands, but as soon as they came out they received showers of stones. They fired their revolvers, but it had no effect on the crowd, only one man was hit in the foot. Seeing the overwhelming crowd they got terrified and ran to the Railway building for protection, but were followed by the mob and received injuries. Corporal Battson was ahead of them and managed his escape, and got into the train which had arrived from Lahore and was in sight stopping at the distant signal. The other two received severe injuries and succumbed to them same day.

9. The first report to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Mr. Mitter) and myself was to the effect that the Railway Station was attacked by the mob and lamp room burnt. On receipt of which we at once came to the Railway Station, but before our arrival in the meantime the above incident had taken place and both Sergeants were in a serious state. Medical assistance was secured at once. There were some rioters at the Railway Goods shed, who were dispersed, and when we were attending the wounded Sergeants news came that in a hut on Ferozepore line some European lady and her children were in danger of their lives, and that the rioters might have killed them. We went to that direction at once, eventually found Mr. Sherbourn, Mrs. Sherbourn and their three children at Kote Halim Khan. Mrs. Sherbourn was in a very terrified state and with great difficulty I pacified her and brought them to my house, where Mission ladies and Christian girls were also located, as the mob had intended to attack them also.

10. On arrival at my house I learnt that the mob had attacked the Post Office and had gone to the Treasury to loot. I wrote a telegram to the Officer Commanding Ferozepore, Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police, Ferozepore, for military assistance, which Mr. Sherbourn volunteered to take. He was given a horse and Indian Head dress, and revolver. After leaving my house in charge of my reader and other men, I, with four armed Constables and other persons (unarmed), went to the treasury. The Munsif Court and Petition Writer's sheds were on fire and a big *Chhappar* was being placed in front of Tahsil Gate to set fire to it to effect entry. Before my arrival Sub-Inspector Kharak Singh had tried to push back the crowd with stones and had also fired some shots on the mob in vain. I warned the crowd which consisted of all classes from 1,000 to 2,000 men, but it had no effect on them, and there was no alternative then, but to fire on the mob, which was done. The mob was scattered about in all directions, and the firing had had a good effect on them and they all dispersed, leaving one man killed and three wounded. The firing took place between 1 and 2 P.M. and there remained no signs of any mob and everything became in order and quiet then. At 3 P.M. Colonel McRae with his men arrived at Kasur.

11. It may be explained here that my house is about a mile from Railway Station. That after the mob attacked the Railway Station a Head Constable of the Railway Police sent information in writing to the Sub-Inspector of City Kasur, who brought the news to me, and after arrival at the Railway Station news of attack on European lady and her children diverted our attentions to them. We had to walk to Kot Halim Khan, more than a mile from the Railway Station. I could not leave the Sherbourns there, as the people were hostile and brought them to my house from Kote Halim Khan, which is  $1\frac{1}{2}$  mile distant. These facts are given to explain how we were kept engaged till the time of our firing on the mob at the Tahsil.

#### *Enquiry and searches.*

12. Investigation was at once started by me in co-operation with Mr. Mitter and Mr. Marsden, who arrived there on the 15th April. On the 1st day, i.e., 12th April, eight men arrested and other arrests followed them. Nothing was left to the subordinate staff, except compliance with

orders given to them. Result of firing on the mob was that one person was found dead on the spot, and three other succumbed to the injuries and fourteen were found wounded. In all 167 arrests were made, out of these 75, including one approver were tried, 69 by Special Tribunal and 5 by Summary Court Martial, 25 of them were discharged and the remaining were given various punishments. Against 92 persons there was not sufficient evidence to warrant their conviction and they were released. No person was arrested unless there was some information or evidence against him. House searches were made lawfully in the presence of the owners of the houses or their representatives. They were carried out by Magistrates or Sub-Inspectors in the presence of respectable persons of the locality.

#### *Co-operation of the Military with the Police.*

13. Co-operation of the Military with the Police in keeping order was excellent. The Military also at the request of Sub-Divisional Officer and myself helped us in rounding up certain villages, where the rioters were suspected. At each occasion a Magistrate and a Police officer accompanied them, and the Magistrate, was held responsible that everything was done in proper way and in accordance with the law.

#### *Attitude of the general public.*

14. The general public did not afford any assistance in supplying information against the offenders and they kept back all evidence within their knowledge. From the brief summary of the case given above it will appear how the rioters committed atrocities at the Railway Station, Post Office and the Tahsil, but no one came forward to give any evidence or information against the offenders.

15. Postal officials have been prominent in keeping back all their information as they did not identify a single rioter. In the same way the Railway officials were reluctant to give evidence until they were told by their own officials.

16. It is in evidence that strangers were seen amongst the rioters who led the mob to the Railway Station on ostensible pretence of showing the liberty funeral to the passengers, and there they started the mischief, which once commenced by the unruly mob, could not be stopped, there being no provocation of any kind to the mob to commit these outrages.

17. This disturbance can safely be described as mainly a town riot, as out of 167 persons arrested, there were only forty villagers and 127 townsmen and out of 40 villagers there were 30 zamindars who happened to be in Kasur on the 12th April and seeing the outbreak they joined the rioters. Amongst the 127 townsmen there were 110 shop-keepers and workmen, leaving a balance of 17 persons, mostly belonging to the educated classes, etc.

18. On the 13th April bazars were opened and work was resumed as usual in Kasur.

#### *Khem Karan Case.*

On the 12th April 1919, when rioters were dispersed at the Kasur Tahsil, some of them went to Pattu village and collected about 25 men there and then attacked the Khem Karan Railway Station where they broke telegraph apparatus. The Station staff fled and the rioters stole everything they could lay hands on. An outcry was raised and men from the neighbouring fields came and rioters made off.

#### *Patti Case.*

1. Patti is nearly half way between Amritsar and Kasur and the events of the former place could not fail to effect Patti. Certain political minded persons of Patti invited Satyapal and Dr. Kitchlew to Patti to address a meeting, as they were restricted under the Defence of India Act, Durga Das, Proprietor of the *Waqt*, Amritsar, came in their stead and addressed the meeting on the 5th April

Khan Sahib Ahmad Khan—concluded—Mr. R. F. MITTER—LALA KHAN CHAND.

and urged for *hartal* on the 6th April, which was observed, and on the 6th April another meeting was held at which Durga Das made an exciting speech.

2. News of the events of the 10th April at Amritsar reached Patti and created a stir, and certain persons cut telegraph wire between Patti and Kasur. On the 12th April, when news of Kasur riot arrived there, a large

crowd assembled and they attacked the Goods shed and Goods trucks, cut telegraph wire and damaged Railway level crossing gate, but before the mob could do much damage the Inspector of Police and other respectable persons went there and dispersed the mob.

3. No occasion was found by the Police to fire at the mob.

**Mr. R. F. MITTER, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Kasur.**

1. I was Sub-Divisional Officer, Kasur, from 5th to 15th April, i.e., for 11 days.

2. The Kasur people would probably have had no *hartal* or demonstrations if left alone; but business relations enabled Amritsar traders to coerce the Kasur traders to fall in line and so there was a *hartal* on the 11th April but that passed off quietly.

On the night of the 11th April it was told me (subsequently) that some men from Amritsar came into Kasur and took charge of the *hartal* on the 12th. They began by getting the schools closed and induced the boys to follow and improvised bier. The shouts of the boys "*Rowlatt Bill hai, hai*" attracted others and grown up men also of the hooligan class gradually joined the procession as it made its way through the various streets. When the procession had become quite large the leaders suddenly directed it towards the Railway Station. Here it seems the leaders began the work of destruction and the others followed suit in earnest, youth class probably in spirit of pure mischief.

From the station the mob moved towards the Ferozepore side along the Railway line and as a train from that side was coming in they held it up, started a loot and attacked the European passengers. The Indian passengers were not molested. After a few minutes the train moved on to the station and 3 Military non-commissioned officers got out of the train. The mob stoned them and 2 of them who had revolvers fired at the mob but hit only one man on the foot. Two of them were severely injured and died the same day, one escaped.

3. It was after all this had been done that I received information at my house that the mob had become violent and after sending word to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, I started for the Railway Station with the Tahsildar and 2 or 3 other gentlemen who had just then come to my house with news. While nearing the Railway Station I saw that men with nippers were cutting the Telegraph line and that some men were carrying away

packages from the station. At this stage the Deputy Superintendent of Police joined me with 2 rifles. We dispersed the mob at the Railway Station, attended to the two military men lying at the Station—one dead and one seriously wounded. Sent word to the Assistant Surgeon to come at once and moved on to the rescue of Mr. and Mrs. Sherbourn and their children who were reported to be in danger in Kot Hakim Khan. From there I returned to my house to send a message by a messenger (the wire being out) to Lahore for military aid and the Deputy Superintendent of Police took the Sherbourns to his house.

After despatching the messenger to Lahore I went to the Deputy Superintendent of Police's house and as just then the Naib-Tahsildar and others brought word that the mob was bent on plundering the Treasury and would not disperse. The Deputy Superintendent of Police and I went with a few armed constables to the spot, and finding that the situation was as reported by the Naib-Tahsildar and quite desperate I sanctioned firing on the mob. The firing dispersed the mob and everything was quiet after that. My order was quite justified, for in my opinion there was no alternative if further arson and murders were to be prevented. I was relieved on the afternoon of the 15th April and had practically nothing to do with the investigation.

The causes of the riot in my opinion were—

- (a) High prices.
- (b) The passing of the Rowlatt Act at a time when the people expected rewards and praise for their efforts in the war.
- (c) Excess of zeal on part of some officials of the tahsildar class and zaidars, etc., in obtaining recruits and war loans.
- (d) Misrepresentations as to the scope and effect of the Rowlatt Act in the newspapers and in public lectures.

**LALA KHAN CHAND, Tahsildar, Kasur.**

I have been at Kasur as follows :—

- (1) As a Settlement Tahsildar from 1st March 1913 to December 1914.
- (2) As a Mahal Tahsildar from 24th March 1916 up to this time.

In my opinion the causes of disturbance are as below :—

- (1) News of Mr. Gandhi's alleged arrest.
- (2) Rumours that several cheques and *hundis* of Kasur were dishonoured by Amritsar, Lahore and Delhi bankers and traders, and that they had boycotted Kasur people for not joining the universal *hartals*.
- (3) False rumours about the disturbances and events at Amritsar.
- (4) The alleged arrival of certain persons from Amritsar side, whose stories had a bad effect on the people.
- (5) False rumours about the intentions of the Rowlatt Act, for which no responsible educated person took the trouble to satisfy the public discontent.
- (6) The *hartal* or disturbances have no connection whatsoever with recruitment or war-loans.

There was absolutely no pressure in this Tahsil either for recruitment or for loans.

The actual facts which I saw or I became aware of, I beg to give below. Late in the afternoon of 11th April, suddenly I heard in the Tahsil that on reaching the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest people were closing their shops and *hartal* was made in Kasur. There was all calm and quiet in the bazars and no interference was made by police or other authorities. In the evening a public meeting took place at the Ram Lila ground and a few pleaders and others addressed the audience. I was not present in the meeting, but it is said that the speeches were not of a serious nature. On the close of the meeting one Nadir Ali Shah is said to have spoken to the remaining persons that the public has every right to do what they liked. The persons were retiring and very few stayed there to hear his remarks. On the morning of 12th April, I walked through the bazars and was told that there was still *hartal*. I informed the Sub-Divisional Officer accordingly. On my way back to my house I saw a small crowd in the Lulliani *Adda* of *turn-tums* dispersing when I passed. It was nearly 9 A.M., when Mahant Gopi Das (deceased) came to my house and was talking about *hartal*. Imme-

## LALA KHAN CHAND—concluded.

diately after this Sayad Ahmad Shah, Sub-Registrar, arrived there to consult me on a certain Municipal affair. Soon afterwards I was informed by my chaprasi that the Railway Station has been set on fire. We hastened to the Railway Station. On reaching near the Railway Octroi Post, I saw some furniture of the Railway Department on fire. On going inside the Railway Station, I saw lamp room burning and 3rd class booking office was in great disorder. Everything was upset, and I was told that rioters had taken away some money and tickets. In the station I only saw some three clerks and one constable and four coolies. Here I was told that the station accident was over and something should be done now to save the Railway bridge where the rioters had gone to pull it down. I asked Lala Gokal Chand and M. Amar Singh, Pleaders, to kindly stay at the station and to do something to extinguish the fire. I told the constable to report the occurrence to the Deputy Superintendent of Police as I was myself going to the Sub-Divisional Officer. He expressed his inability on account of his being alone. Some other man was sent to the Deputy Superintendent of Police. Coming outside the station I saw another constable. Seth Mohan Lal, Pleader, met me there and I asked him to take the constable with him in his tonga down to the Railway bridge. I myself and S. Ahmad Shah rode to inform the Sub-Divisional Officer (Mr. Mitter). The Sub-Divisional Officer at once accompanied us and by a short cut route we saw at a distance that there was nothing wrong with the Railway bridge and there were no rioters there. We all walked down to the Railway station side. Near the Kot Murad Khan Rohi bridge Chaudhri Muhammad Khan, Naib-Tahsildar, joined us. Here we saw and dispersed some people who were pulling down the railway wires and poles of telegraph. A few paces further before going near the platform the Deputy Superintendent of Police joined us with a Sub-Inspector and some constables. Here we saw many persons carrying away bundles from the brake whom we dispersed and they ran away leaving a good many bundles at the spot. On going a few paces further S. Kishan Singh, Excise Sub-Inspector, met us and informed us that two European Military Officers have been killed by the rioters and one was slightly wounded whom the Excise Sub-Inspector had hidden in a waggon of a goods train. We went there, but the officer had left the waggon and had fled towards the Lahore train which was standing at the distant signal. The Sub-Divisional Officer ordered me and the Naib-Tahsildar to go and see the officer safe. We went towards the train and satisfied ourselves that the gentleman had got into the train safely which had moved back to Lahore. We joined the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Deputy Superintendent of Police soon and went to the spot where the bodies of officers killed were lying, one had just died and the other was senseless besmeared in blood. Arrangements were immediately made for medical help and guard. Here we heard that a European officer, his lady and children were being assaulted by the rioters. We started towards the distant signal near Dingarh. We reached near the pointsman's hut and were informed that Mr. Khair Din, Inspector, Coaching and Goods, and Maulvi Ghulam Mohi-ud-din, Pleader, had taken them safely to Kot Halim Khan. On reaching Kot Halim Khan we saw Mr. and Mrs. Sherbourn and their children safe, but in a very perplexed state under a small *chappar* in a *Tagia*. They were taken to an open room and necessary was done to console them. Thence they were taken to the Mission compound by myself and the Deputy Superintendent of Police and few others, while the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Naib-Tahsildar went to the town to report the occurrence. We had not yet reached the Mission compound when a big smoke was seen in the town, some one told us that post office was on fire, some were doubting about the locality. On our reaching near the Mission compound a Missionary lady came out saying that they themselves could not be safe there. The Deputy Superintendent of Police then took Mr. and Mrs. Sherbourn to his own house just near by and was attending to comfort them. I took permission to see to the post office. Reaching there I found the

post office burning and the municipal staff and some others were trying to put down the fire and many persons were standing by. Necessary was done. Here I was informed that the rioters are collecting to go to the judicial lock-up to set the prisoners free and to rob the treasury. A small crowd started towards Tahsil, on threatening they turned towards the City Police Station close by where police was on guard, some above the roof and some on the door. After discussing a few minutes with the police the crowd at once proceeded towards Tahsil, I took two *tum tums* and started in their pursuit with S. Ahmad Shah, S. Kishan Singh, Excise Sub-Inspector, three Tahsil Munshis, Tahsil jemadar and some three chaprasis who were already with me. We got the mob between the Idgah bridge and Ghulam Hassan Khan's house, stopped the mob which again ran off. We pierced the mob through which was gradually increasing in the way, stopping them thrice in the way but the mob again proceeded on. On reaching the tank near the Tahsil the mob was greatly increased in number and stood for a while intending to go towards the Judicial lock-up. But on the persuading of one of the rioters all of them turned to the Tahsil to loot the Treasury. Here I and my company in front of the door of the Tahsil and the Police, some others including Munsif and his staff on the roof of the Tahsil door stopped the mob for some time from doing anything wrong. They were trying to set fire to the Tahsil door but were stopped now and then. One of the petition-writers' huts, on the back of the mob, was seen on fire and some 4 or 5 persons of the mob were seen ready to set fire to the Tahsil gate. While resisting the Munsif's Court, behind the mob was seen at blaze. Bawa Kharak Singh, Police Sub-Inspector, gave out two unloaded shots to threaten the mob. The mob again became more furious. Immediately the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Naib-Tahsildar and Khan Sahib Shahbaz Khan were heard coming at a short distance. The Sub-Divisional Officer ordered fire to be opened on the rioters who were just going to fire the Tahsil gate, and the Deputy Superintendent of Police fired at the mob and at once the police at Tahsil roof also commenced firing. I myself and my party in front of the mob at the Tahsil gate were in a very dangerous position. Hukam Chand, one of the Tahsil chaprasis was accidentally wounded there. One of the rioters was shot dead and several were wounded. Some of the wounded were arrested there, the rest ran away. This all happened before 1-30 or 1-45 p.m. After this all was calm and quiet again. At about 4 p.m. Military help arrived first by motors and afterwards in a special train from Ferozepore. By evening a good many searches were conducted in my presence in the surrounding *abadis* to recover the stolen property, others were conducted next morning. At night another armoured military train reached from Lahore with a search light. The Naib-Tahsildar went with this train on patrol duty to guard the railway lines. On the morning of 16th April, Martial Law was proclaimed and some arrests were made. Some raids were made with military guard in several villages to arrest the suspects and search their houses. Enquiries started and identification proceedings carried on till 1st May. Identifications were made in public, and in many cases I was present. Over two hundred searches in Kot Murad Khan and surrounding *abadis* of Kasur and several searches at Patto Kohna and Lakhna were made in my presence. The only harshness of the military people which came to my notice was at Patto Kohna where some ordinary things of a suspect were damaged by the soldiers under the directions of a Junior Military Officer. At village Lakhna a *bania* was shot dead after being challenged at night by a European soldier. Military enquiry was made about this at Kasur in which my evidence was also taken down. In connection with some searches at village Khara, the Commanding Officer handed over to me some money belonging to some suspects which was afterwards returned to the proper persons. The search of a leading pleader, Maulvi Abdul Kadir's house was also conducted by me. No interference was made by the military people.

Captain A. C. DOVETON.

[Continued.]

## Captain A. C. DOVETON, 1-30th Punjab.

*The Administration of Martial Law.*

On taking over the administration of Martial Law on the 23rd April, one of the most difficult tasks was to deal with the daily increasing number of applications for travelling permits. This was all the more difficult as the local police were acquainted with only a very small percentage of the applicants. And as the Military and the police were still rounding up persons implicated in the riots, and as a number of such persons had not only absconded but there was good reason to suspect that others would endeavour to do so as they found things getting too hot for them, I therefore granted permits very sparingly. No doubt this entailed hardship for a small number of business men as Kasur is essentially a commercial town, but under the circumstances this was unavoidable.

The number of applications rapidly rose from thirty to about seventy daily. These were submitted in writing, the applicant having to give good reasons for his wanting to travel. About ten or twelve permits were granted daily. A man was brought before me and duly punished who set himself up as "the official petition writer for travelling permits."

2. It was soon brought to notice that persons who were disappointed in their attempts to obtain permits to travel by rail were in the habit of engaging tumtums and going by road. A Martial Law Order was promptly issued making it an offence for the driver of any vehicle leaving Kasur to accept as his fare a person not provided with a road pass. The result of this was a large number of applications for "road permits" which I was unable to deal with alone. In this matter, Sayad Ahmed Shah, Sub-Registrar, was of great assistance in investigating claims, filling in the forms and bringing them to me for signature.

The restrictions on travelling were removed under orders from Lahore.

3. As regards economic restrictions, certain local gentlemen drew attention to the high cost of foodstuff in the City and requested that a scale of rates should be drawn up for Kasur as had already been done in Lahore.

A small group of commercial gentlemen came forward and volunteered to open two "cheap shops" for the poor, pending the publication of the proposed "nirikh" rates.

Permission was given and the shops were stocked with a plentiful supply of foodstuffs of a good quality.

A "nirikh-nama" was drawn up in consultation with the Naib-Tehsildar and some local business men. It was decided that the articles under discussion could be sold for slightly cheaper rate than in Lahore, and the rates were fixed accordingly. The result of this was that the steady influx of grain into Kasur ceased, and owners diverted their supplies to markets where they could obtain a better price. Action was about to be taken with a view to regulating the supply of grain when orders were received from Lahore to cancel the "nirikh-nama" which had been in force about ten days.

4. Abuses on the part of "well-to-do classes" during this period were instantly checked, all foodstuffs bought in bulk from the retail dealers being immediately returned.

5. About the middle of May, orders were received to gradually relax Martial Law restrictions. This was carried out in various ways, notably by returning to their owners the greater number of bicycles commandeered, decreasing the number of hours that people had to remain indoors at night and so on till by the time the month of "Ramzan" commenced the hours of restriction were only one-and-a-half.

6. Constant patrolling on the part of the troops and the ever present fear of breaking a Martial Law Order had made the inhabitants very "jumpy;" and about a fortnight before the commencement of the month of "Ramzan," noting that the attitude of the people had changed for the better, and considering that

they had received a good lesson, I decided at the request of certain Indian gentlemen to deliver lectures to the inhabitants taking the city quarter at a time. My lectures consisted of a general review of the disturbances in the various parts of the Punjab, some straight speaking and the discussion of the Rowlett Act, copies of which and a history of which were distributed in the vernacular to those who were able to read and understand.

At the last of my lectures, Maulvi Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din, Pleader, who had just been released from arrest and who was suspected of anti-British agitation, was present. After my lecture and when one or two leading gentlemen had spoken, I called upon Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din for a speech and which, if he is guilty of the things of which he is suspected, must have proved him a turn-coat before his audience; most of whom heard him speak on the day of "Martial."

It is worth noting, that at none of these meetings was there anyone with the exception of Maulvi Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din, who could say a word about the Rowlett Act, though invited to do so. Another point which has not been noted up to the present is that this Act is known among the masses as the "Raula Act."

7. After the 8th May, the question of proclamations was not referred to the Officer Commanding, Kasur, Captain Jameson, being junior to the administrator of martial law.

8. Towards the end of May the case of the Patti rioters was sent to Kasur to be tried summarily by the Administrator of martial law. There were 46 accused, 4 of whom were juveniles, and 30 witnesses for the prosecution and no less than 96 witnesses for the defence. The case took twelve days to hear. The four juveniles were whipped and 27 others were given terms of imprisonment varying from six to eighteen months. The remainder were acquitted.

9. As regards reprisals against property, these were taken as the result of non-compliance with a Martial Law Proclamation, which persons who had left Kasur on or after the 10th April were ordered to return to their homes within a certain number of days. Indeed a few days grace was given before reprisals were actually taken. Altogether six houses were visited on three different occasions, earthen vessels being destroyed, clothes in some cases being burnt and *charpays* being removed for the accommodation of the troops.

10. The people whose houses were visited appear to have removed everything that was of value, and locked their houses before departure, with the exception of one "badmash" named Jhandu whose home was occupied and from which a few metal pots and pans were taken. During these searches I was accompanied by a British officer, a party of British and Indian troops, and a Municipal Commissioner. The news of these reprisals evidently-reached the ears of those who were absent from their homes as they resulted in either the return of those concerned or letters announcing their whereabouts and explaining their disability.

11. Whippings were inflicted with the regulation "cat" in strict privacy and with due regard to decency. For this purpose one end of the Station platform was reserved to which no one except authorised persons were allowed access.

Those about to be whipped were first examined medically by a doctor who remained present throughout the whipping.

No one collapsed under punishment. The comparatively high number of lashes is explained by the fact that there was nobody who had the knack of handling the "cat" and the punishment compared with the number of lashes ordered was correspondingly light. The punishment inflicted is not that usually expected of the "cat"; for example, in the case of thirty lashes, there was nothing more than a chipping of the outer skin and there was actually no such thing as "drawing blood."

Captain A. C. DOVETON—concluded—Lt.-Col. H. St. G. M. McRAE, D.S.O., A.

The social status of offenders was taken into consideration before ordering the punishment of whipping.

12. Martial law though not understood at first by the inhabitants, proved rather a blessing than otherwise, if one can judge by the repeated expressions of gratitude which were heard from the lips of people who had nothing to gain by thus expressing themselves.

The people during the first few weeks of martial law were decidedly nervous, owing no doubt to a guilty conscience, and the fear of reprisals for the crimes which they had countenanced. After some time as they realised that the law-abiding public had nothing to fear from martial law, they began to appreciate the comparative security in which they in the city lived. To use the words, of a local gentleman, "Doors which before martial law came into operation, had to be bolted and barricaded for fear of burglary at night, can now be left with only the "catch" on or even open as no one dares to stir at night, let alone to go out to commit burglary."

There is no doubt that the swift and stern punishments inflicted, especially whipping, had a very salutary effect, and persons contemplating any villany would think more than twice before embarking on it. General relief was felt at the punishment and removal to Lahore Jail of certain persons with a bad record who had kept the police busy and the inhabitant on pins and needles for some time past.

A notable case was that of a man called Makhan Singh, a plausible person, who, though not a inhabitant of Kasur, managed to draw attention to himself during the war by his recruiting efforts and his literature on "loyalty."

Evidently he thought that Kasur would be a good field for his activities as he came to the Sub-Divisional Officer armed with a "chit" from an Official in Lahore, to the effect that the bearer could give information leading to the arrest of persons implicated in the recent riots. Not only did his information prove false, but he was caught red handed posing as a Criminal Investigation Department Official, attempting to get money, from relatives of suspects with a view to securing their release. He received 30 lashes and was awarded two years' rigorous imprisonment. A confederate of his, a well known gambler in Kasur, was similarly dealt with. It was cases of this description, which brought home to the inhabitants the justice of Martial Law, which when stripped of the restrictions on the freedom of the individual was a form of justice, which if it had come to stay, would have been welcomed by the law-abiding public.

13. Evidence of the gratitude of the people is given by the fact that after a series of lectures in different parts of the city by the Administrator of Martial Law, his permission was asked to hold a meeting at the "Purani Mandi" to present him with an address. Permission was duly accorded, the meeting held and a written address presented, a copy of which was taken by the police and forwarded to their Headquarters at Lahore. The address was couched in the most penitent terms, combined with assurances that a repetition of the shameful events of the 11th and 12th April was impossible, and expressions of gratitude for the treatment they had received.

From this time onwards, there was a marked difference in the attitude of the people and sullen submissiveness

was replaced by cheerful obedience, so much so that after the last detachment of troops had been removed, it was possible for an European to walk through the city and be treated with courtesy by the gentry, while the humbler people were willing slaves.

If further evidence is necessary, to show the attitude of the people towards Martial Law, it is sufficient to say that large numbers of people from outlying villages were in the habit of bringing their wrongs and grievances to be righted by the Administrator of Martial Law, whether it was within his province or no. Though the majority went away disappointed, the fact did not deter others from coming, such was their faith in the justice of martial law.

14. Instructions were received from Lahore, that Martial Law would be raised from the City of Kasur from the 20th June, but that it would remain in force on the Railway.

15. On the 1st July, Captain Jameson left Kasur with the last detachment of the 2-17th Infantry.

16. About this time the District Traffic Superintendent, Ferozepore, under orders from the North-Western Railway Headquarters, requested the Railway Police to bring me for trial the Guard and Driver of the Ferozepore, train, which was attacked at the distant signal on the 12th April.

Accordingly the services of the Public Prosecutor were secured and the 14th July was fixed for the hearing. The accused were charged under Section 128 of the Railway Act.

The case of the Driver only was disposed of on this date, as Lieutenant Munro, the chief witness in the case of the Guard, was unable to attend.

The Driver was found not guilty of "wilful negligence" and was acquitted, with a recommendation that he should be dismissed from the Railway. A copy of this was forwarded to the District Loco. Superintendent, Lahore.

The case of the Guard was fixed for the 9th August when owing to the Public Prosecutor meeting with an accident the case was postponed and finally made over to the Sub-Divisional Officer for disposal as for various reasons including the illness of Lieutenant Munro it was found impossible to secure the attendance of all the witnesses.

17. Shortly after the raising of martial law from the City there was a noticeable influx of a type of individual whose attitude towards authority was not a good example for the people of Kasur, many of these being, not merely truculent, but openly defiant. One heard such expressions as "Hukm kya chiz hai" "Ham 'koi hukm nahin jante." Unless there was some tangible offence it was unfortunately impossible to deal with such persons, but in cases where the railway had anything to recover from them, they were sent to do work in the goods yard equivalent to the amount to be recovered from them in the event of their being unwilling or unable to pay.

In view of the fact that this particular station had been the scene of murder and unprecedented violence a short time previously, similar treatment was meted out to all persons who threatened railway officials or made a show of violence to them, by way of pointing out that the station was Government premises and that they should be regarded as such.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. St. G. M. McRAE, D.S.O., 2-15th Sikhs.

*Report on the Administration of the Kasur Civil Area during the Punjab Riots, April 12th to May 8th, 1919.*

1. As it is understood that detailed reports on the origin of and concerning the Riots at Kasur have already been submitted by the Civil Authorities and as this report on the same would only be in the nature of "hearsay," I will only refer to these matters briefly.

2. The Report is divided as follows:—

*Part I.*—The events before the arrival of the Military.

*Part II.*—The events after the arrival of the Military, before the Proclamation of Martial Law.

*Part III.*—The events after the Proclamation of Martial Law.

*Paragraph 62.*—The whipping of school boys.

*Paragraph 70.*—The prisoners' cage.

*Paragraph 72.*—The Martial Law Officer and Summary Court at Kasur.

*Paragraph 80.*—The gallows.

Continued.]

Lt.-Col. H. St. G. M. MacRAE.

Part IV.—The administration of Martial Law by Captain Doveton, 1-30th Punjabis.

Part V.—General.

## APPENDICES.

- I.—Statement showing the number of men suspected of participating in the Kasur and other Riots, taken by Military Operations.
- II.—Graphic showing the number of arrests at Kasur by dates.
- III.—Proceedings of the Courts of Inquiry on the shooting by two British sentries of two natives on the 17th and 21st April 1919, respectively.
- IV.—Summary of convictions against Martial Law Orders.
- V.—Detailed List of convictions and punishments for infringements of Martial Law Orders.
- VI.—Details and averages of punishments.
- VII.—Chronological Narrative of Events.
- VIII.—Copy of a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel MacRae to the 44th Brigade on handing over Command of the Kasur Force.

## PART I.

*Events before the arrival of the Military.*

3. Kasur City has a population of some 25 thousand inhabitants, it is also a busy railway junction.

This City has for many years been noted for sedition and harbours a large number of the pleader class, who were well-known to have *anti*-Government feelings. There was no military garrison at Kasur. Ferozepore City, which is about 16 miles distant, is about the same size as Kasur and is overawed by the presence of the military garrison.

Kasur City has a big business connection with Amritsar, Lahore and Karachi and it is natural that the feeling of unrest in the two first mentioned cities should spread quickly to Kasur. However Kasur was apparently inclined to keep apart from the projected disturbances and refused to join the "*hartal*" which was generally kept in the big cities of the Punjab on the 6th April 1919.

This aloofness displeased the *anti*-Government leaders of Amritsar, who caused the Amritsar City merchants to combine against the Kasur merchants with the result that Kasur "*Hundis*" were dishonoured by the Amritsar merchants and a general boycott declared.

4. On the 10th April, the riots and murders occurred at Amritsar. That same evening and next morning boycotted Kasur merchants returned to their homes in Kasur with the news. There is but little doubt that they were accompanied by certain malcontents from Amritsar, who came with the express intention of raising trouble against the Government in Kasur.

5. On the 11th April Kasur was in a ferment. Meetings were held and the agitators insisted on a "*hartal*" for the following day. It is reported that shops were even closed by force.

6. On the morning of the 12th April the agitators had so worked up the feelings of the crowd that something more than words was necessary to appease the feelings of the mob. The schools were closed and the boys were only too glad to join in any excitement. In fact some of the elder boys are directly responsible for the bloodshed and destruction that followed (e.g., Kamal Din, nephew of an honorary magistrate, who was afterwards sentenced to seven years' imprisonment). On the whole, the influence of the elder schoolboys was most dangerous and lawless.

7. A procession was formed headed by a bier, representing the funeral of India's freedom. At about 10-00 hours, the mob proceeded to the railway station and destroyed the waiting rooms, ticket office, lamp room, telegraph wires, etc. The two or three railway police on duty deserted their posts. The railway officials passively encouraged the rioters and in consequence no

damage was done to the station master's office, telegraph office, and station staff's quarters. The third class booking office, a very strong building, was looted. On examination it would appear that this had been opened from the inside as no damage to the doors or building was done. It was afterwards proved that the railway staff were *anti*-Government almost to a man, but being utter cowards took but little part in the riots.

8. Having destroyed the station the mob was moving off, but at that moment the three trains from Lahore, Ferozepore, and Amritsar, which meet at this junction, were seen to be approaching and at the instigation of Kamal Din (*vide* paragraph 6 above) now proceeded to attack and loot the trains. The Lahore train, however, was able to back and reach Raewind in safety.

9. The Amritsar and Lahore trains were then looted. The loot was immediately carried away and hidden, which helped to break up the crowd.

10. However, a large mob then proceeded to the "Kacheri" Post Office, which was looted and burnt, then the Munsif's Court was burnt. The mob then proceeded to the Tehsil with the intention of releasing the prisoners and looting the Treasury. Here they were fired on by the police and suffered a few casualties. The *moral* of the mob was not up to standing casualties and immediately dispersed. There was no more rioting at Kasur.

11. Had the mob made any determined effort to capture the Tehsil they would probably have succeeded as the police garrison was too small and practically without ammunition. It is reported that certain of the mob endeavoured to bribe the police to open the gates but they refused.

The loot of the Tehsil would have emboldened the mob to attack the Mission, close by, where several English ladies were residing. Their probable fate is too horrible to contemplate.

12. After the rebuff at the Tehsil, some bodies of rioters proceeded to Ganda Singhwala, and Khem Karan. The latter station was looted. Practically the entire gang of twenty persons of the menial class who looted Khem Karan were subsequently arrested, of whom 16 were brought to trial but only seven were convicted.

13. To return to the attack on the Ferozepore train. This train had halted at the distant signal. (The signal cabin at Kasur had not been completed and all trains were hand-signalled into the junction.)

On the train were several Europeans—

Captain Limby, R.E.	}	in 1 first class carriage.
Lieutenant Munro, 2-17th Infantry.		
Conductor Selby, I.O.D.	}	in 1 second class carriage.
Sergeant-Major Mallet, R.G.A.		
Corporal Battson, 1-4th Queen's.	}	in 1 second class carriage.
L. Corporal Grinham, 1-4th Queen's.		
Also Mr. Khair Din, Traveling Inspector, Railway Accounts and one or two Indian gentlemen.	}	in 1 second class carriage.
Mr. and Mrs. Sherbourn, a railway official and three small children.		

14. The train had halted, as usual, at the distant signal, which was in the small cutting, where a gate-keeper's hut was situated at the level crossing. There are villages close to the line on both sides of the railway.

15. Passengers looking out of the train saw a large mob surging noisily towards the train and saw smoke ascending from the station. Most of the native passengers at once deserted the train.

Friendly natives warned the Europeans of the approach of the mob and advised flight.

16. Captain Limby and Lieutenant Munro walked to the engine to urge the engine driver to back the train. He refused. The officers were then attacked by the

Lt.-Col. H. St. G. M. McRAE.

[Continued.]

mob and forced to run for their lives, they eventually escaped after a rough handling. Lieutenant Munro sustained severe head wounds.

17. The two warrant officers refused to get out of the train and refused the appeals of the two non-commissioned officers to assist them to save the Sherbourns. It is not clear what next happened to them, for the train shortly afterwards proceeded to the station. Apparently, they were not seen by the mob until the train arrived at the station, when the two warrant officers came out on to the platform and stood by their carriage. It is said that these warrant officers had heard of the Delhi and Amritsar riots and fearing trouble had carried loaded revolvers with them. The other Europeans were unarmed.

The appearance of the warrant officers on the platform was greeted with a roar from the crowd who commenced throwing stones, but were kept at a distance of some sixty yards by the fear of the revolvers. Apparently the warrant officers then lost their heads, fired off their revolvers over the heads of the crowd or at too long a range and then fled for protection to the station building. Finding the station staff hostile, they rushed outside towards the native passenger enclosure, where they were cut off by the mob and attacked with sticks and stones. Conductor Solby was killed and Sergeant-Major Mallet left for dead. He was eventually rescued by the D. S. P. and carried to the civil hospital where he died during the afternoon.

18. Meanwhile the two non-commissioned officers of the Queen's devoted themselves to saving the Sherbourn family, whom they brought to refuge in the gatekeeper's hut at the level crossing, where the two non-commissioned officers stood on guard at the door.

The hut was at once besieged and the two non-commissioned officers fighting gallantly with their fists were dragged out and eventually knocked down. However, they escaped marvellously being helped by natives, Grinham making his way to the Ferozepore road and Battson was carried to the Lahore train by a Sikh zamindar, by name of Gurditt Singh of Palmerabad.

19. The Railway Accounts Inspector Mr. Khair Din, together with one Mr. Ghulam Muhi-ud-Din, pleader, then were able to intervene and persuaded the mob to release the Sherbourn family which they did. They brought the Sherbourns to the shelter of a friendly hut in the village but the neighbours became hostile, so they removed them safely to the house of the D. S. P. Khan Sahib Ahmad Khan, who took them to the Mission next door, where several European ladies resided.

20. As soon as Mr. Sherbourn saw his family in safety he borrowed a horse and rode to the military post at the Sutlej Bridge where he telephoned the news to the Ferozepore Bridge and then rode back to his family.

21. There is no doubt that if the Europeans had remained together, instead of separating especially with the two revolvers of the warrant officers, they would have kept the mob at bay and possibly might have diverted them from doing further damage.

22. The following casualties were caused by the murderous assaults of the mob at Kasur :—

Warrant officer killed . . . . .	1
Warrant officer died of wounds . . . . .	1
British officer severely wounded . . . . .	1
2 British non-commissioned officers severely wounded . . . . .	2
Indian official severely wounded . . . . .	1
British officer slightly wounded . . . . .	1
Indian officials slightly wounded . . . . .	4
<b>TOTAL . . . . .</b>	<b>11</b>

PART II.

*The events after the arrival of the Military, before the proclamation of Martial Law.*

12th April.

23. 13-00 hours on the 12th April 1919, the Brigade Major, Ferozepore, 44th Brigade, handed the following

written orders to Lieutenant-Colonel H. St. G. M. McRae, D.S.O., 2-15th Sikhs at Ferozepore :—

"You will proceed at once in command of 100 men, 2-15th Sikhs and 50 men, 1-4th Queen's by train to Ganda Singhwala and Kasur, both of which stations are said to have been wrecked and looted. In the absence of any magistrate you will take all measures to restore order at those places. A magistrate will probably proceed with your party if he arrives in time. You will carry out such measures as he recommends until he hands over direction of Military operations to you. In the latter case, you must do all in your power to protect life and property and at the same time deal strictly with the offenders. Information should be sent back to me by motor car, 7 of which are now proceeding to Kasur by road. If further reinforcements are required, I propose to despatch a portion of the Moveable Column and a section of Field Artillery.

There is telephonic communication between the Kaisar-i-Hind Bridge, General Officer Commanding's bungalow and Brigade office."

24. The Brigade Major further stated that the fate of three passenger trains, which were due to arrive at Kasur about 10-00 hours in the morning, was not known.

25. A special train had been arranged and the force as ordered left the Cantonment station at 14-10 hours. The detachment, 2-15th Sikhs, were ready to embark at 45 minutes after the call for help had been received.

26. Ganda Singhwala was reached at 14-45 hours. All quiet. The train then proceeded carefully, in case the line had been tampered with, and arrived safely at Kasur without any opposition at 15-00 hours.

The Ferozepore telegraph near Kasur had been destroyed but the Lahore wires were intact.

27. On arrival at Kasur, Lieutenant-Colonel Atkins, 1-4th Queen's, Mr. Mitter, Sub-Divisional Officer, and Khan Sahib Ahmed Khan, District Superintendent of Police, met the train and explained the situation. (Vide part 1).

Lieutenant-Colonel Atkins had arrived a quarter of an hour previously by road with four touring cars armed with Lewis gun teams from the 1-4th Queen's.

28. The following guards were at once posted :—

- 1 non-commissioned officer and 6 men, 1-4th Queen's, to the Mission.
- 1 non-commissioned officer and 6 men, 1-4th Queen's, to Deputy Superintendent of Police's house.
- 1 non-commissioned officer and 3 men, 2-15th Sikhs, to Civil Hospital.
- 1 non-commissioned officer and 10 men, 2-15th Sikhs, to the Tehsil (Treasury).
- 1 non-commissioned officer and 10 men, 2-15th Sikhs, to the Police Station and Courts.

29. An aeroplane arrived at 15-45 hours from Lahore and circled round the City.

30. Major Nicolas, the Judge from Ferozepore, arrived by car at 15-45 hours and proceeded with Lieutenant-Colonels McRae and Atkins, the Sub-Divisional Officer and Deputy Superintendent of Police with 5 armoured motor cars to make a tour of the City. All the shops were closed and the inhabitants were standing in silent groups at every corner and crowded the roof tops and windows to see the cars go by. They appeared silent and as if they were afraid of reprisals.

31. The Mission was then visited and the Sherbourns sent back to Ferozepore by car.

32. Hearing that a Missionary lady, Miss Green, was still out at Valtaha, a branch Mission, on the Amritsar road, a car with two armed men of the Queen's was sent out and she was brought back to the Kasur Mission.



Continued.]

Lt.-Col. H. St. G. M. McRae.

The Mission ladies were requested to make plans for an early departure for a safer abode of residence.

33. The party then returned to the Railway Station.

All being quiet, Lieutenant-Colonel Atkins and the armed cars returned to Ferozepore at 19-20 hours.

34. At this stage the Military were waiting on the Civil. I repeatedly suggested to Major Nicolas, the Sub-Divisional Officer and Deputy Superintendent of Police that the troops should be at once utilised to assist the police in making a search for stolen property before it had been hidden or disposed of; but the Civil seemed either too busy, or their staff disorganised or unwilling to do so. So nothing was done except at 18-10 hours, a small search party of one British officer and 29 men of the 2-15th Sikhs were sent out to assist the police to search a hamlet near the scene of the looting of the Ferozepore train. But this party was too small and started too late. It recovered nothing by dark, but to prevent the stolen property from being removed this party stayed out all night, picqueting the exits of the hamlet. The search was continued on the 13th April and a little property recaptured but no arrests made.

35. At 19-35 hours, No. 3 armoured train, under the command of Captain Scott, Indian Defence Force, arrived at the distant signal from Lahore and wasted 35 valuable minutes playing with his search-light on the town before he could be induced to come into the station, in spite of direct orders to do so by officers sent by me. I had received information from the Station Master at Rukham Wala that he feared a riot and I was also anxious to patrol the line towards Amritsar as trouble was expected and I was of opinion that a show of force would prevent further outrages. At 20-10 hours I ordered Captain Scott to patrol towards Amritsar but he stated his crew required rest and time to cook. I gave him one hour, but it was with the greatest difficulty I got him to start by 22-48 hours.

36. Meanwhile at 21-20 hours information was received that Khem Karam, the next station on the Amritsar line six miles distant, had been looted and considerable damage done at about 18-00 hours. The rioters were about twenty in number and went about their work of destruction as if the operation had been carefully planned. They, however, fled on the approach of some villagers who ran in from the fields at the request of the Station Master.

37. The night passed without incident at Kasur.

13th April

38. The armoured train only patrolled as far as two stations beyond Khem Karam and returned about 04-00 hours. Captain Scott did not report his return and his arrival was not reported to me until 07-50 hours. It was unfortunate that he did not proceed further towards Amritsar as riots occurred at Gharyala and Patti during the early hours of the morning. It was also reported that there was trouble at Tarn Taran.

39. At 07-55 hours I ordered Captain Scott to patrol with his armoured train to Amritsar and back. It took him just half an hour to start. No. 3 Armoured train reached Amritsar about 17-00 hours and reported that the telegraph wires had been cut between nearly all stations on the line.

No trains were then running on this branch line.

The armoured train was retained at Amritsar to replace No. 2 Armoured train that had been derailed in that neighbourhood.

40. At 08-29 hours an aeroplane from Lahore flew over Kasur.

41. At 07-45 hours Mr. Mitter, Sub-Divisional Officer, came to the Railway Station and discussed the situation with me. He was of opinion that no further trouble was to be expected in Kasur.

42. I urged Mr. Mitter to take advantage of the presence of the Military to take immediate steps to search for stolen property and to make arrests, but he refused to come to any decision on this matter.

43. Major Nicolas returned to Ferozepore by car at 09-15 hours.

44. Arrangements were made with the Sub-Divisional Officer for ten tum-tums or ekkas and five bullock carts to be placed at the disposal of the Military by 10-00 hours to-day. This transport to remain permanently under Military charge at the Railway station, for urgent patrolling and moving stores, especially in connection with the troops encamped at the Tehsil. Subsequently about sixty tum-tums were made available for Military purposes, e.g., flying columns, at very short notice. The above was paid for by the Civil at local rates and recovered in due course from the Military.

45. I had stopped all railway passenger booking at Kasur, until the police had made their arrests but to-day at the request of the Sub-Divisional Officer I opened passenger booking to persons with police passes. This restriction was removed, except in the case of passengers travelling by Mail train on the 5th May.

46. During the day the telegraph lines to Ferozepore and Khem Karam were repaired.

47. During the day and night of the 13th, 14th April the Ferozepore Moveable Column, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Smithers, 2-17th Infantry, assembled at the Tehsil camping ground.

15th April.

The column left for Khem Karam on the morning of the 15th April and returned to Ferozepore on the 30th April.

48. At 09-10 hours Mr. Mitter, Sub-Divisional Officer, came to see me at the Railway station. He appeared to be rather uneasy. He said that he feared further troubles in Kasur and stated that attempts were being made to tamper with the loyalty of the 2-15th Sikhs. I discussed this with my Subedar, who stoutly defended the loyalty of his men and said there was nothing to fear, the Sikhs would see the Government through this trouble. Throughout the disturbances I never had a moment's doubt of their loyalty, even when the lies about the destruction of the Golden Temple were being promulgated. The Sikhs seemed to take the greatest pleasure in hustling the few Sikhs prisoners taken later at the request of the Civil. Most of the whipping was also carried out by a Sikh drummer. There was also considerable competition at Battalion Headquarters Ferozepore to be allowed to join the Kasur Force.

49. I again urged Mr. Mitter and the Deputy Superintendent of Police to ask for Military assistance in searching for loot and apprehending known rioters. It was now three days since the riots occurred and practically nothing had been done. However, they would decide on nothing. Martial Law had not yet been declared and the Military were still only looking on.

50. The City was patrolled at all hours day and night by mixed detachments of British and Indian troops. A few shops were opened but business seemed at a standstill. The appearance of the townsmen was sullen and apprehensive. There is no doubt that this inaction was fomenting the feeling of unrest.

51. The telegraph was repaired between Kasur and Amritsar to-day.

52. At 19-30 hours, P. Marsden, Esq., L.C.S., arrived and took over the duties of Sub-Divisional Officer from Mr. Mitter. Mr. Marsden had recently returned from Field Service in Persia and was, therefore, in touch with Military ways. From the moment he took over charge as Sub-Divisional Officer the outlook at Kasur began to improve. He at once agreed to the co-operation of the Military to assist the police in making arrests.

53. To-day the Sub-Divisional Officer and Deputy Superintendent of Police visited Lahore by car and brought back copies of the Martial Law proclamation issued there.

Orders were received this evening to declare Martial Law, and on the arrival of Mr. Marsden we drafted proclamations for Kasur.

A Durbar was summoned for eleven hours to-morrow at the Town Hall.

Lt.-Col. H. St. G. M. McRAE.

[Continued.]

## PART III.

*The events after the Proclamation of Martial Law.*

16th April.

54. At 10-45 hours on the 16th April together with Mr. Marsden, I marched in state with the following escort to the Town Hall:—

- 2 cars, No. 2 Armoured Motor Battery. (Arrived from Ferozepore for the occasion);
- 1 troop, 23rd Cavalry, F. F. (*En route* to join the Ferozepore Moveable Column);
- 2 Sections, 1-4th Queen's;
- 1 Company, 2-15th Sikhs;
- 1 Lewis Gun Section, 1-61st Pioneers;

large crowds had assembled in the streets, they were orderly but sullen. Some shops were open.

We arrived at 11-00 hours. The small Hall was packed with the representatives of the Town. The surroundings were piquetted with the troops, the escort being drawn up in the "compound." British sentries were placed inside at each door of the Hall.

On arrival I read the Proclamation in English and the Deputy Superintendent of Police read a translation in the vernacular. (Copies of all the Kasur Proclamations have already been forwarded to the 16th Division, no further copies are available.)

NOTE.—No copy traceable in the 16th Divisional Office.

A few questions were asked and answered. The assembly seemed submissive but not repentant. No speeches were made or regrets expressed as to the recent occurrences.

55. Before closing the Durbar and in accordance with instructions received from the Commissioner of Lahore Mr. Dhanpat Rai, a pleader, was arrested. It created some sensation but no opposition. The prisoner was despatched to Lahore Jail under escort by the 14-00 hours train.

56. Immediately after the Durbar I despatched five parties each of ten rifles, mixed British and Indian, to assist the police in making further arrests. Total arrests by the evening 24.

57. From this time onward, the Military were in constant co-operation with the police in making arrests.

Arrests of persons wanted by the police in outlying villages were carried out in the form of Military operations.

Small columns were sent out with police guides, often with a Civil Officer in attendance by march, tumtums, or by special trains. The villagers concerned were surrounded before dawn and all exits stopped. The police search parties with Military escorts then entered the villages with their informers and with the assistance of the village Headmen made the necessary arrests and searches.

A statement showing the number of Military operations of this kind is attached (Appendix I). The raiding of villages, in some cases 12 to 14 miles from the base at Kasur, had a very good moral effect on the villagers. No culprit felt safe. In consequence, some more cunning offenders constantly changed their places of abode to avoid the search parties. During some of these long distant raids the troops covered over twenty miles during the night.

58. The lady Missionaries were evacuated to Ferozepore on the 16th April. Their presence in an outlying house necessitated an extra guard and an embarrassment under the circumstances. But as the town became so subservient under Martial law they were permitted to return on the 22nd April. However, on instructions from the Divisional Commander, they were persuaded to leave Kasur on the 6th May.

59. For the purposes of administration, each of the ten wards of Kasur were ordered to detail one representative to be present at the Railway station during certain hours of the day to receive orders and communications from the Officer Commanding for their respective wards. Each of the wardens was issued with copies

of the proclamations in English and Urdu, which were posted on certain houses selected by the police. Usually these notices were posted on the houses of well known agitators or malcontents. During the administration of Martial law no such proclamation was removed or defaced. As a deterrent, orders were issued that reprisals would be taken against the property of the person on whose walls or gate posts any proclamation had been defaced.

17th April.

60. Since the arrival of Mr. Marsden he had been living at the Military Headquarters at the Railway station. On the 17th April he opened his Court in the Sub-Divisional Officer's house near the Tehsil. A guard was placed over the bungalow.

18th April.

61. The Military Force, Kasur, was increased on the 18th April and for the rest of the month consisted of—

- 1 Squadron (less 1 troop), 23rd Cavalry, F. F.
- 2 Sections, 1-1st Kents.
- 1 Company, 2-15th Sikhs.
- 1 Company, 2-17th Infantry.
- 2 Lewis Gun teams, 1-61st Pioneers.

The Cavalry and one Company, 2-17th Infantry, were encamped near the Tehsil and the remainder of the troops were accommodated at the Railway station where there were excellent quarters for the British troops.

62. At 16-00 hours on the 18th April, all the local school boys with their masters were ordered to assemble in the open space opposite the Railway station for purposes of identification, also for disciplinary action.

The school boys and young educated lads had taken considerable part in the leading and fermentation of the riot and in several cases were reported by their school masters as being quite out of hand and unruly. At least two school boys were identified as having taken leading parts in the riots.

So, in consultation with Mr. Marsden, it was decided to select the six biggest boys, aged about 17 years, from the schools to bear punishment for the whole. These having been medically examined received six strokes each with an ordinary cane on the bare shoulders, administered by a Sikh drummer in the presence of the remainder of the school.

This was the only form of public whipping that took place at Kasur. Subsequent whippings being carried out at one end of the Railway station platform, access to which was closed to the public. Details of these whippings are shown in part IV.

The boys underwent their whipping without undue exhaustion. A medical officer being present at this and all subsequent whippings.

In all other cases of whipping the regulation "cat o' nine tails" was used.

It was considered that to deal with offenders convicted of brutal assaults and rioting the best form of punishment was whipping, especially if carried out without undue delay. The moral effect is very great and far-reaching.

19th April.

63. At 16-00 hours on the 19th instant a telegram was received from the 44th Brigade, Ferozepore, to the effect that the powers of a first class Magistrate were delegated to officers of the rank of Field officer, that is to award two years' rigorous imprisonment, fine of Rs. 1,000, and flogging.

This being only applicable to districts in which martial law had been proclaimed.

20th April.

64. Every few days certain sections or classes of the inhabitants of Kasur were paraded near the Railway station for purposes of identification. The Military

*Continued.]*

Lt.-Col. H. St. G. M. McRAE.

assisted the police in assembling these people and closing the exits to the town and keeping order generally. In this way a large number of persons implicated in the riots were identified and arrested.

On two occasions, practically the whole male population of Kasur was thus assembled. Mr. Marsden took this opportunity of addressing the people, explaining the Rowlett Bill and the meaning of Martial law.

65. Acting on instructions from the 16th Division all bicycles in Kasur were ordered to be handed over to the Military authorities on the 20th April. Only 48 bicycles were produced, of these 15 only were in a serviceable condition. Two local mistris were therefore procured to mend and keep these cycles in a state of repair. They were paid for the work done, at local rates.

The bicycles were used for patrols and despatch riders; they were eventually handed back to their owners probably on the whole in a better state of repair than when received.

66. There were no motor cars or motor cycles in Kasur.

67. No. 2 Armoured Motor Battery from Kasur constantly patrolled the road between Ferozepore and Kasur to meet an Armoured Motor Battery Patrol from Lahore. This former battery on several occasions patrolled Kasur City.

There is no doubt that the moral effect of these cars is very great. Roads, however, are easily temporarily destroyed, especially near canal banks, and on several occasions roads were flooded by malcontents to try and wreck motor cars.

68. On the 26th of April two commandeered cars from Lahore were received from the 16th Division for use in Kasur, to expedite arrests and identifications of prisoners. These cars were of great value.

69. Information having been received that a large number of the residents of Kasur had migrated to Ferozepore and other places by road and rail, steps were taken to watch the ferries over the Sutlej and passenger trains were occasionally stopped on the Kaisir-i-Hind Bridge and searched by the police. In this way a few persons wanted by the police were arrested.

70. The accommodation for prisoners at the Tehsil and police stations being inadequate, a prisoners' cage was constructed in the open space in front of the Railway station by Lieutenant-Colonel Bishen Singh and the Fardikot Sappers and Miners, material being requisitioned from the town and paid for. The enclosure was surrounded by an eight foot barbed wire fence, to which were attached some 50 cow bells, an open shelter was erected in the centre and covered latrines at one end.

Police arranged for the prisoners' food and controlled the enclosure during the hours of daylight. The cage being handed over to the Military for safe keeping at night. Kitson lamps were arranged round the cage and sentries were posted.

At one time there was as many as 150 prisoners in this cage, but only for a few days.

There was always a medical officer in attendance but no case of illness occurred during the time that prisoners were confined here.

The weather, with the exception of one day when there was a short thunder storm, was clement, and no uncalled for hardships were experienced by prisoners in this respect.

The better class of prisoners were, when accommodation was available, lodged in cells at the Tehsil or police station.

The cage was closed on the 8th May.

71. Prisoners were despatched to Lahore Jail by passenger train, in batches as was convenient as soon as the evidence against them was completed, under a mixed British and Indian Infantry and police guard. Prisoners travelling to Lahore were handcuffed and roped together.

72. The work of administration of this City of 25,000 inhabitants and surrounding area soon became too much to be centred on the Officer Commanding, so on

the 23rd April Captain Devoton, 1-30th Punjab, was appointed Martial Law officer in the Kasur Civil Area.

He administered Martial Law under the orders of the Officer Commanding, Kasur, all sentences, Proclamations and other proposals being referred to him before being carried into execution.

A report by Captain Devoton on his administration is embodied as part IV of this report.

In brief, 79 persons from Kasur and 4 from Patti were convicted by Captain Devoton's summary court; they included—

Kasur	40 sentences of whipping.
	(Excluding the 6 school boys beaten with a cane by order of the Officer Commanding, Kasur) (vide paragraph 62).
Patti	4 sentences of whipping.
	Average 19 stripes. (Including the 6 boys).
Kasur	26 fines.
	13 sentences of imprisonment from 1 to 2 years.

73. Attached [appendix II] is a statement showing the number of arrests at Kasur by dates. Of these, the following were tried by the Special Tribunal at Lahore and sentenced as follows:—

Kasur	13 death sentences.
	21 transportation for life.
	9 imprisonment.
	24 acquitted.
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>67</b>
Khan Karan	7 imprisonment.
	16 acquitted.
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>23</b>

74. After the trial of the Special Tribunal at Lahore of the first batch of prisoners from Kasur was completed, it was evident that the Tribunal would not convict persons on the evidence of only one witness for the prosecution, no matter how good the evidence. Therefore, no prisoners were sent up for trial with less than two witnesses for the prosecution. The remainder were released.

75. Kasur was continually being visited by superior officers who inspected the Martial Law arrangements, prisoners' cage, quarters of the British and Indian troops, etc., and on all occasions expressed satisfaction with the arrangements made. These included—

- The General Officer Commanding, 16th Division.
- The Commissioner of Lahore.
- The General Officer Commanding, 44th Brigade.
- Brigadier-General in-charge Administration, Northern Army.
- Brigadier-General Chief Administrator of Martial Law, Lahore.
- Deputy Director of Medical Services, Northern Army.
- The Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Lahore.

22nd April.

76. In accordance with the request of the District Superintendent of Police, eight Pleaders' houses in Kasur were searched on the 22nd April. Soldiers were utilised to piquet the houses during the search but not actually in searching. Certain documents were confiscated.

77. In order to minimise the danger in any future rioting it was made unlawful by martial law to be in possession of a metal bound stick or "Lathi." All such were ordered to be handed over to the Military. Although it was believed that there were hundreds in concealment very few were handed in or seized by search parties.

Lt.-Col. H. St. G. M. McRae.

[Continued.]

24th April.

78. Telegraphic orders were received from the 16th Division on the 24th April that flogging must not be carried out in public but in the presence of joint offenders and responsible witnesses. A later wire from the 16th Division added that flogging should not be indiscriminate. The social status of offenders must be taken into consideration.

79. On the 24th April owing to the fact that several persons wanted by the police had evaded arrest by migrating to other towns, a proclamation was issued calling on all inhabitants of Kasur to return to their houses within four days or reprisals would be taken on their property.

Reprisals were taken in a few cases against absentees against whom there was good proof in the hands of the police of participation in the recent riots. These reprisals consisted of the visitation to the houses by a mixed police and Military party. Earthen water pots, charpoys and furniture were destroyed. Houses were not knocked down. (See Part IV.)

25th April.

80. On the 25th April a set of gallows to hang three persons simultaneously arrived from Lahore Jail. In accordance with instructions received from the Commissioner, Lahore, this gallows was erected on the 3rd May under the supervision of a staff sent from Lahore Jail, in the open space outside the Railway station, that is for a public execution.

On the 4th May information having been received that eight persons were to be hung simultaneously, an extension of the gallows to fulfil this condition was erected and completed on the 7th May. The labour for this work was requisitioned from the inhabitants of Kasur (not by prisoners) and paid for under Civil arrangements.

However on the 8th May, instructions were received that the executions would take place in Lahore Jail. The gallows was therefore dismantled and despatched to Lahore.

This led to many curious rumours. One of which was that the Kasur mob, furious at the idea of the executions, had attacked the Military at the station, destroyed the gallows and freed the prisoners.

28th April.

81. On the afternoon of the 28th April, information having been received that the Kasur Railway staff, practically all of whom were implicated in the riots and against whom there was but little useful evidence to hand, were about to hold a secret meeting that evening to decide their future policy. The house was surrounded and entered by the Military. Nine persons were arrested. The police eventually obtained some useful evidence from these persons.

6th May.

82. The Military Force at Kasur was reduced by the departure of the squadron (less one troop), 23rd Cavalry F. F. on the 6th May.

The Force was further reduced to 100 rifles, 2-17th Infantry, on the 8th May and again reduced 50 rifles on the 10th May.

On the 21st June this Force was reduced to a mere guard of 15 rifles.

This reduction was precipitated by the commencement of the Afghan War.

7th May.

83. An aeroplane flew over the city on the 7th May and dropped propaganda leaflets.

The moral effect of aeroplanes over cities is very great. The inhabitant of the smallest house feels overlooked and exposed to attack.

9th May.

84. On the 9th May Lieutenant-Colonel McRae, 2-15th Sikhs, was recalled to take his battalion on service and

was relieved in Command at Kasur by Captain Jameson, 2-17th Infantry.

## PART IV.

*The Administration of Martial Law by Captain Doveton, 1-30th Punjabis.*

## SECTIONS 85 TO 99.

[This Part consisted of Capt. Doveton's report on his administration and has been printed as his written statement on page 370.]

## PART V.

*General.*

100. The riots were anti-Government that is anti-British. The rioters were of all castes, led by discontented educated persons, pleaders and school boys. The mob consisted of butchers, leather and cotton and factory hands and menials, the very scum of the City. They were reported to have called out to the Railway staff at Kasur that Indians had nothing to fear from the mob, they only warred against Europeans.

The railway employees, with the exception of Eurasians, were implicated practically to a man. Railway officials have so much power in their hands as regards the working of the Railway that this factor will be a constant danger to the Government for time to come.

There were no soldiers, ex-soldiers or "Komagatu Maru" emigrants amongst the rioters.

It would appear that the riot was not anti-Christian, but had the rioters not been checked at the Tehsil, the Mission would have probably been attacked and it is impossible to tell to what excesses the mob would have endeavoured. There are no churches in Kasur. It is a notable fact that Mr. Mitter the Sub-Divisional Officer is a Christian.

Throughout these riots no fire-arms were used by the mob. Luckily there were few fire-arms in the district and these only held by persons guaranteed by the Civil. Had the mob been in possession of and used a few fire-arms or bombs the morale of the mob would have certainly been raised to cause the rioters to commit further excesses.

One of the first acts under martial law was to call in all fire arms in possession of Indians, not being Government servants. They were retained by the police.

Had the mobs at Amritsar, Lahore and Kasur been more successful and not immediately suppressed and cowed by the arrival of troops, these riots would have spread to the smaller towns and possibly villages.

The recent recruiting methods in the Punjab have been mentioned by ignorant persons as one of the causes of the riots. There is however, absolutely no truth in this. The proof being, that soldiers remained quite loyal and no ex-soldiers were amongst the rioters. Moreover, the soldiers evinced the greatest pleasure in the suppression of the riots.

Agitators held out the loot of Ferozepore Arsenal as a bait to the crowd.

101. Rioting and wire cutting ceased with the arrival of the Military and the proclamation of martial law; after which there was never any attempt to oppose the soldiers and police in carrying out their duties in connection with these disturbances.

It is probable that the proclamation of martial law in disaffected areas saved the Punjab and possibly India from a rebellion, that might have reached the extent of that of 1857.

102. The inhabitants of Kasur were thoroughly cowed by martial law and overawed by the Military. Well-wishers of the Government welcomed the change and felt secure. Malcontents feared instant reprisals of wrongs committed and sullenly submitted to the orders. Whether the fire of rebellion still smoulders and will

*Continued.]*

IA-Col. H. St. G. M. McRAE.

break out again, remains to be seen. But the people have learnt a lesson and will, if they again contemplate rebellion, be more cunning and probably their plans will be carried out with greater secrecy and daring than heretofore, as otherwise they know they have no chance of success.

103. On the days following my arrival at Kasur, I was bombarded with requests for interviews by numbers of the local Honorary Magistrates, pensioned Indian Officers, etc. I refused to see anyone without an introduction from the Sub-Divisional Officer or the District Superintendent of Police. I gave out that after what had occurred I did not know who was a friend or foe. Those that I did see usually produced books of "chits" letters from Viceroys, Commanders-in-Chief, Lieutenant-Governors, Commissioners, etc., to say what fine work they had done for the Government. I refused to see those "chits." I made it known that all pre-riot "chits" were now useless. What only was now of value was a "chit" to say what support to the Government had been rendered in the recent disturbances.

From what I gathered the Local Honorary Magistrates and Sardars, with very few exceptions, had done absolutely nothing to stop the inflammatory speeches against the Government or to check the riots, as was done by certain law-abiding citizens at Tarn Taran. Of course most of these men were old men and not up to great physical exertions, but at least they could have condemned the anti-Government speeches at the meetings.

104. I cannot speak too highly of the spirit of co-operation between the Civil and Military after the proclamation of Martial Law. Consultations were of daily occurrence and neither party was ever left in the dark as to the proposals of action of the other.

105. During the occupation of Kasur by the Military the following incidents occurred:—

(a) On the 17th April at 23-50 hours, a native (subsequently identified as a lunatic), who approached the British sentry on duty at the Railway Station during a dust storm in a suspicious manner common to rifle thieves, and who ran away when challenged, was shot dead. The action of the sentry under the circumstances was considered justified. Attached is a copy of proceedings of the Court of Inquiry (Appendix III).

(b) On the 21st April at about 04-30 hours, when Lakhna village was surrounded before dawn by a Military Force to assist the police in making certain arrests, a native attempted to escape and in doing so closed with the sentry, seizing his bayonet, was shot at and mortally wounded by another British sentry. The sentry's action under the circumstances, although regretted, is considered justified. A copy of the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry is attached (Appendix III B.).

(c) On the 19th April at about 04-30 hours, when the village of Khara was surrounded before dawn by a Military Force to assist the police in making arrests, a sepoy plundered a bag of rupees; he was subsequently arrested, tried by a Summary Court Martial and sentenced to dismissal from the service and to six months' rigorous imprisonment in a civil jail. The stolen property was handed over to the Civil.

106. Two cases of intimidation came to notice:—

(a) Three Sikhs from the village of Lohgarh, who had been arrested for participation in the riots and against whom there was only one witness, had been released. They returned to their village and in conjunction with two other Sikhs attacked and nearly killed their village Lambardar for giving evidence against them. The wounded Lambardar reached the Sub-Divisional Officer's house on the afternoon of the 4th May. He was sent

back and told to let people in the village know that he had lodged a complaint and that he expected that the Government would act on his behalf in the course of a few days, but that the officials at Kasur were very busy at present. This was suggested to ensure that the miscreants would not take flight prematurely. The same evening as soon as it was dark a mixed force of Cavalry, Infantry and Police marched out and surrounded the village. The five Sikhs were captured without difficulty. Next morning they were tried under Martial Law, sentenced to receive thirty lashes and to undergo two years' imprisonment each. They received the lashes forthwith and were despatched under escort to Lahore Jail the same afternoon. This speedy retaliation had a very salutary effect on the neighbourhood and the facts of the case soon spread abroad.

(b) The only other case of attempted blackmail or intimidation was against a loyal Railway official, who had identified several rioters. He complained that unseen individuals used to come outside his house at night and shout out threats. An ambush was laid for these men by Sikh soldiers in disguise. Unfortunately the disguise was discovered but the annoyance ceased forthwith.

107. Communications in the Punjab are on the whole bad. The Telegraph is entirely in the hands of natives. Telegrams, especially on railway lines, are subject to uncalled-for delays. There are no telephones at Kasur. The Sub-Divisional Officer's house and office are about two miles from the Railway Station. Application for telephones to be installed was made but refused as there were none available. Yet telephones are to be found in most of the private European houses in Lahore.

The Ferozepore Movable Column was practically out of touch when it left Kasur, although provided with a pack Wireless Set as the latter proved unsatisfactory.

108. To guarantee the safety of the Railway and to prevent further damage to telegraphs, all village headmen of villages on both sides of the railway and telegraph lines in the Kasur area were warned that the villages would be held responsible for any damage done in their vicinity.

109. The system of taking hostages for good behaviour was not adopted as it was considered unsound. The hostage could not really be held responsible for damage and could always retort, if damage was done, that had he been free he could have restrained his fellow-villagers.

110. The behaviour of the troops, British and Indian, under my command during these trying times was all that could be desired. The British troops were splendid, their behaviour and self-control admirable. The squadron, 23rd Cavalry, attached to the Kasur Force had one troop of Manjha Sikhs, but this troop was left at Ferozepore for duty, so as to avoid any risk of trying the men too highly, as most of the rioting was in the Manjha country. This was a very sound move, but I do not think there would have been any cause for uneasiness had they been sent to Kasur.

111. The men of the 2-15th Sikhs are Malwais, although they were employed in the Manjha country, many of the persons arrested by them were Sikhs, mostly of low castes, there was never any hesitation in obeying orders for arresting these persons. Virulent lies concerning the Golden Temple at Amritsar, etc., were circulated, but the Sikh soldiers trusted their British officers and scoffed at the rumours. However, I took the opportunity of sending detachments of Sikh officer and men to visit Amritsar to see for themselves that the stories were false.

112. Many of the 2-17th Infantry were recruited from village in the neighbourhood, yet they did their duty very satisfactorily.

113. I would like to take this opportunity to state that the police throughout these troubles behaved very

LT.-COL. H. ST. G. M. McRAE.

[Continued.]

well, and are deserving of greater confidence. It is suggested that if they had been better armed and adequately provided with ammunition, and if they had been instructed to use force at the beginning of these disturbances, it is almost certain that no riot would have eventuated.

114. In Appendix VIII I attach a copy of a letter submitted by me to the 44th Brigade on the completion of my duty at Kasur, bringing to the notice of the General Officer Commanding, the good work done by certain individuals.

APPENDIX I.

Statement showing the number of men suspected of participating in the Kasur and other Riots, taken by means of Military operations.

Strial No.	Village.	Distance from Kasur Railway Station.	Number of suspects as reported by police.	Date searched 1919.	Prisoners taken.	Officer Commanding Party.
		Miles.				
1	Kara . . . . .	3	?	19th April	6	Major Paske, 23rd Cavalry.
2	Patho Kohna . . . . .	3½	12	20th April	14	Lieutenant Onraet, 23rd Cavalry.
3	Nizampura . . . . .	2½	To search for loot.	20th April	9	Lieutenant Burgess, 2-15th Sikhs.
4	Lakhna . . . . .	15½	3	21st April	5	Major Paske, 23rd Cavalry.
5	Thatti Jaimal Singh . . . . .	13½	7	21st April	7	
6	Sankhatra . . . . .	12	4	21st April	4	
7	Athilpura . . . . .	4½	1	22nd April	5	
8	Man . . . . .	4	wounded 3	25th April	19	Lieutenant Noel, 2-17th Infantry.
9	Lohgarh . . . . .	5½	} 2	25th April	6	Lieutenant Holcroft, 23rd Cavalry.
10	Sehari Hathai . . . . .	5½				
11	Sangat Singhwala . . . . .	8 from Rukanwala Station.	} 15	23rd April	15	Captain Walker, 2-15th Sikhs.
12	Boher Singhwala . . . . .	8 from Rukanwala Station.				
13	Amarpura . . . . .	6 from Rukanwala Station.				
14	Patti . . . . .	30	22	28th and 29th April	60	Lieutenant Burgess, 2-15th Sikhs.
15	Lohgarh . . . . .	5½	5	4th May . .	5	Lieutenant Onraet, 23rd Cavalry.
	TOTAL . . . . .	.....	74	...	155	

APPENDIX II.

[The graph is not reproduced: figures are given instead.]

Number of arrests (sic.) at Kasur by dates.

April 12 . . . . . 8	April 19 . . . . . 75	April 25 . . . . . 139	May 4 . . . . . 209
16 . . . . . 28	20 . . . . . 97	28 . . . . . 188	5 . . . . . 247
17 . . . . . 31	21 . . . . . 113	28 . . . . . 254	6 . . . . . 201
18 . . . . . 35	22 . . . . . 122	May 1 . . . . . 264	

[The figures are progressive totals and represent the numbers under arrest on the dates specified.]

Continued.]

Lt.-Col. H. St. G. M. McRAE.

## APPENDIX III-A.

*Proceedings of a Court of Enquiry assembled at Kasur on the 18th April 1919 by order of Lieutenant-Colonel H. St. G. M. McRae, D.S.O., for the purpose of enquiring into the shooting of a native by the sentry on duty at Kasur Station on the night of the 17th and 18th April 1919.*

President—

Captain A. R. Walker, 2-15th Sikha.

Members—

Lieutenant P. H. Cutler, 1-4th Queen's Regiment.  
2nd-Lieutenant F. F. Guest, 1-61st King George's Own Pioneers.

The Court having assembled pursuant to order proceed to take evidence.

*First Witness.*

No. 202876 Private Sturgeon, L. A., 1-4th Queen's Regiment. Witness having been duly sworn states:—

On the night of the 17th April 1919 I was sentry between the hours 11 and 12 p.m. About 11-50 a heavy sand storm came up and I found difficulty in distinguishing objects. During the storm a man appeared about ten yards away. I immediately challenged him. I received no answer to my challenge. He evidently heard it as he hesitated, and he continued to approach. I then challenged again, and he then made a jump for cover in front of my post. He being a native and I thinking he might not understand "Halt" I shouted "Bus." He still took no notice but tried to dodge out of the other side of the cover. I then tried to meet him with my bayonet and he jumped back behind the cover and ran out the other side. He was then running up the road from where he had approached. I then fired and hit him. He fell about thirty yards away. By this time the storm had cleared a bit. Witness withdraws.

*Second Witness.*

No. 200783 Private Nathan, 1-4th Queen's Regiment, states:—

On the night of the 17th instant I was awakened by the challenging of one of my sentries. I being the Commander of the Guard on the entrance of Kasur Station, I distinctly heard the man challenged three times followed by the Hindustani word "Bus." This was followed up by a round fired by the sentry, the time being 11-55 p.m. The Guard fell in and I went to see the reason, and I found a native had been shot. Witness withdraws.

*Third Witness.*

No. 200300 Sergeant Organ, E. H., 1-4th Queen's Regiment. Witness having been duly sworn in states:—

On the night of the 17th instant about 12 midnight I was awakened by the challenge of a sentry. I heard him challenge twice more and shout "Bus." I then heard a shot fired. I was sleeping about fifty yards from the sentry post. Witness withdraws.

*Fourth Witness.*

Sub-Assistant Surgeon Arjan states:—

About 12 midnight on 17th I went to see a man who had been shot by a sentry. When I went there I found the man dead, shot in the head. I then brought him to my advanced station hospital. Witness withdraws.

Having carefully considered the above evidence and also taking into consideration the fact that Martial Law has been proclaimed and that the native was shot in one of the streets closed to the public during the hours of 20-00 to 05-00 hours by the proclamation, I am of opinion that the sentry took all due precautions and that his act was justified.

(Sd.) H. G. McRAE, Lieut.-Colonel,  
Commanding Kasur.

## APPENDIX III-B.

*Proceedings of a Court of Enquiry assembled at Kasur on the 22nd April 1919, by order of Lieutenant-Colonel H. St. G. M. McRae, D.S.O., Commanding, 2-15th Sikha, for the purpose of enquiring into the circumstances of the wounding of an inhabitant of the village of Lakna on the morning of 21st April 1919.*

President—

Captain A. R. Walker, 2-15th Sikha.

Members—

2nd-Lieutenant C. S. Cole, 2-15th Sikha.  
2nd-Lieutenant E. A. Macfarlane, 2-15th Sikha.

The Court having assembled pursuant to order, proceed to take evidence:—

*First Witness.*

No. 200783 Private Nathan, S., 1-4th Queen's Regiment, having been duly sworn states:—

On the morning of the 21st of April 1919 I was on a piquet post on a road leading to a village to stop all inhabitants of the village coming out while arrests were being made by the Civil Authorities. A man came down the road soon after the search party had gone into the village and was challenged by the sentry on my right. When challenged he hid behind a wall. The sentry shouted out "Idler so." On this the man moved behind a bush or some rubbish near by and hid behind it. The sentry advanced towards him and made signs to him to go round the village to where the prisoners were being collected. He did not appear to understand and when threatened with the bayonet he grasped the sentry's rifle and tried to pull it out of his hand. Suddenly he let go and bolted away from the village towards a haystack. The sentry endeavoured to catch him when he had gone about 20 yards. The man reached the haystack and stopped by the side of it; I then placed a round in the breach and fired at him. The bullet hit him in the body and he dropped. He was not dead. Some time after at the end of the raid I saw him go back unaided to the village.

The above evidence has been read over to the witness, who acknowledges it to be correct.

(Sd.) S. NATHAN, (200783 Private).

*Second Witness.*

No. 205772 Private Stallwood, E. J., 1-4th Queen's Regiment, having been duly sworn states:—

On the morning of the 21st April 1919 I was on piquet duty outside a village for the purpose of keeping inhabitants from leaving the village. I saw a man looking round the corner of a wall and he came right out in the open and saw me, whereat he went behind a heap of rubbish and appeared to be hiding from me. I shouted to him "Idler so." but he did not move, so I went after him and I signed to him to go in front of me. He went a very short way in front of me and then suddenly turned round and grasped my bayonet. I tried to get it away and in the struggle he got wounded in the stomach. He then bolted for a haystack away from the village and I followed him but he was leaving me behind and I could not have fired because of the other sentry, Private Nathan, who was nearly in the line of fire. Nathan shouted to him to stop but he didn't, so the sentry (Nathan) fired at him and dropped him by the side of the haystack.

The above evidence has been read over to the witness, who acknowledges it to be correct.

(Sd.) E. J. STALLWOOD, (205772 Private).

The above evidence was taken down by us at Kasur on the 22nd of April 1919.

(Sd.) A. R. WALKER, Captain, 2-15th Sikha, President.  
" C. STANLEY COLE, 2nd-Lieutenant, 2-15th Sikha, Member.  
" E. A. MACFARLANE, 2nd-Lieutenant, 2-15th Sikha, Member.

Lt. Col. H. St. G. M. McRAE.

[Continued.]

*Third Witness.*

Tehsildar Sahib Khan Chand having made a statement of affirmation states:—

On the morning of the 21st April 1919, about 3-30 or 3-45 A.M., a detachment of troops to whom I was attached as Civil Magistrate reached the village of Lakhna. The village was surrounded by troops for the purpose of preventing villagers leaving the village while arrests were being made in the village. The party making arrests to whom I was attached started to enter the village when we heard the report of a rifle.

Soon after, when the arrests had been made, we came to the spot where the man was lying wounded; on enquiry he said his name was Karn Chand, shopkeeper. He stated that he was going outside to ease himself, when a soldier called to him and then fired at him. The Officer in charge of the troops enquired from the soldier what had happened and he stated that he asked the man to halt but he snatched his bayonet. The police and Lambardar took the man to Kasur to have him treated but later learnt that the man had died on the way.

When we first found the wounded man the Officer Commanding troops ordered a soldier to dress his wound which was immediately done.

As far as I am aware, on enquiry there was no one in the immediate vicinity except the man wounded and the sentry who wounded him.

The wounded man had a slight wound low in the chest, stated by him to be a bayonet wound.

The above evidence has been read over to the witness, who acknowledges it to be correct.

(Sd.) KHAN CHAND, Tehsildar, Kasur.

The 23rd April 1919.

Taken down by us at Kasur on the 23rd April 1919.

(Sd.) A. R. WALKER, Captain,  
2-15th Sikhs, President.

„ C. STANLEY COLE, 2nd-Lieutenant,  
2-15th Sikhs, Member.

„ E. A. MACFARLANE, 2nd-Lieutenant,  
2-15th Sikhs, Member.

The incident is regretted.

After carefully considering the above evidence, and taking into consideration that Martial Law had been declared, and that the troops were rounding up men in a village who were reported to have taken part in the murderous assault on non-commissioned officers of the witnesses' regiment during the riot on the 12th April 1919 I am of opinion that Private Nathan was justified in his act.

(Sd.) H. G. McRAE, Lieut.-Colonel,  
Commanding Kasur.

KASUR:

The 24th April 1919.

No. 14-10-24, from Lieutenant-Colonel H. G. McRae, Commanding Kasur, to the Headquarters, 44th Brigade, Ferozepore.

Forwarded.

Confirmed.

(Sd.) W. M. SOUTHEY, Brig.-General,  
Commanding, 44th Brigade.

FEROZEPORE:

The 25th April 1919.

—APPENDIX IV.

*Details of averages of punishments.*

Nature of offence.	IMPRISONMENT.		LASHES.		FINES.		AVERAGE.		
	Persons.	Months.	Persons.	Stripes.	Persons.	Rupees.	Imprisonment.	Stripes.	Fine.
Attempting to escape from custody.	...	...	2	20	...	Rs. ...	...	10	Rs. A. P. ...
Unlawful gathering . . .	...	...	1	30	1	10	...	30	10 0 0
Offence relating to passes .	1	4	2	40	4	250	4	20	62 5 0
Being abroad at unauthorised hours.	1	24	1	30	1	10	24	30	10 0 0
Assaulting a Civil Official .	5	120	5	150	...	...	24	30	...
Riotous conduct, breach of peace and causing a breach of peace.	...	...	6	90	8	240	...	15	30 0 0
Impeding the work of the Military.	1	12	1	10	2	70	12	10	35 0 0
Impeding the work of the Civil Police.	1	6	3	90	3	175	6	30	58 3 0
Failing to return to place of residence when ordered to do so.	1	1	1	30	3	250	1	30	83 3 0
Intimidating a witness . . .	1	12	1	30	...	...	12	30	...
Intimidating a clerk of the A. M. L.	...	...	...	...	1	10	...	...	10 0 0
Conspiring to minimise the Patti riots.*	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Offences relating to Summary Courts.	1	1	...	...	2	100	1	...	50 0 0
Impersonating and assisting to impersonate a C. I. D. Official.	2	48	2	60	...	...	24	30	...
Offences of railway menials	...	...	4	20	...	...	...	5	...
Offences against Railway Officials.	...	...	1	5	1	50	...	5	50 0 0

\* Dismissed.



Continued.]

Lt.-Col. H. St. G. M. McRAE.

## APPENDIX V.

*Lahore (Civil) Area—Summary of convictions for offences against Martial Law Orders.*

Nature of offence.	No. of convictions.	Imprisonment (months).	Stripes (number).	Fines.	Cases dismissed.
Attempting to escape from custody . . . . .	2	Nil	20	Rs. Nil	Nil
Unlawful gatherings . . . . .	2	Nil	30	10	Nil
Offences relating to passes . . . . .	6	4	40	250	1
Being abroad at unauthorised hours . . . . .	2	24	30	10	...
Assaulting a Civil Officer . . . . .	5	120	150	...	...
Riotous conduct and breach of peace and causing breach of peace. . . . .	8	...	90	240	...
Impeding the work of the Military . . . . .	3	12	10	70	...
Impeding the work of the Civil Police . . . . .	6	6	90	175	...
Failing to return to place of residence when ordered to do so. . . . .	3	1	30	250	...
Intimidating a witness . . . . .	1	12	30	...	...
Intimidating language to the clerk of the A. M. L. . . . .	1	...	...	10	...
Conspiring to minimise the Patti riots . . . . .	...	...	...	...	1
Offences relating to Summary Courts . . . . .	2	1	...	100	...
Impersonating and assisting to impersonate a C. I. D. Official with intent to obtain money. . . . .	2	48	60	...	...
Offences of railway menials* . . . . .	4	...	20	...	...
Offences against Railway Officials . . . . .	2	...	5	50	...

\* 7 Reprimanded.

## APPENDIX VI.

*Detailed list of convictions and punishments for infringements of Martial Law Orders.*

Case No.	Imprisonment (months).	Lashes (No.).	Fines.	REMARKS.
	ORDER NO.	<i>Attempting to escape from custody.</i>	Rs.	
1	..	5 . . . . .	..	
2	..	15 . . . . .	..	
	ORDER NO.	<i>Unlawful gatherings.</i>		
3	..	30 . . . . .	..	
4	..	.. . . . .	10	
	ORDER NO.	<i>Offences relating to passes.</i>		
5	..	10 . . . . .	..	
6	..	.. . . . .	200	
7	..	.. . . . .	..	Acquitted.
10	..	.. . . . .	10	
11	..	.. . . . .	30	
12	..	.. . . . .	10	
21	4	30 . . . . .	..	
	ORDER NO.	<i>Being abroad at unauthorised hours.</i>		
9	..	.. . . . .	10	
22	24	30 . . . . .	..	
	ORDER NO.	<i>Assaulting Civil Official.</i>		
8 (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e).	24	30 . . . . .	..	Punishment of each accused.
	ORDER NO.	<i>Riotous conduct, breach of peace and causing breach of peace.</i>		
29 (a), (c), (d) & (e) & 32.	..	15 . . . . .	25	Punishment of each accused.
29 (b)	..	.. . . . .	25	
29 (f)	..	15 . . . . .	50	
30	..	.. . . . .	40	
	ORDER NO.	<i>Impeding the work of the Military.</i>		
15	..	.. . . . .	50	
28	..	.. . . . .	20	
33	12	10 . . . . .	..	
	ORDER NO.	<i>Impeding the work of the Civil Police.</i>		
23	6	30 . . . . .	..	
26 (a), (b)	..	30 . . . . .	..	Punishment of each accused.
26 (c)	..	.. . . . .	100	
31 (a)	..	.. . . . .	50	
31 (b)	..	.. . . . .	25	

Lt.-Col. H. St. G. M. McRAE.

[Continued.]

*Detailed list of convictions and punishments for infringements of Martial Law Orders—concl'd.*

Case No.	Imprisonment (months).	Lashes (No.).	Fines.	REMARKS.
	ORDER No.	<i>Failing to return to place of residence when ordered to do so.</i>	Rs.	
14	..	.....	100	
24	1	.....	100	
27	..	30	50	
	ORDER No.	<i>Intimidating a witness.</i>		
13	12	30	..	
	ORDER No.	<i>Intimidating language to clerk of A. M. L.</i>		
19	..	.....	10	
	ORDER No.	<i>Conspiring to minimise the Patti riots.</i>		
17	..	.....	..	Acquitted.
	ORDER No.	<i>Offences relating to Summary Courts.</i>		
16	..	.....	50	
25	1	.....	50	
	ORDER No.	<i>Impersonating and assisting to impersonate a C. I. D. Official.</i>		
18 & 20	24	30	..	Punishment of each accused.
	ORDER No.	<i>Offences of Railway menials.</i>		
34 (a), (d), (f) & (j).	..	5	..	Punishment of each accused.
34 (b), (c), (e), (g), (h), (i) & (k).	..	.....	..	Reprimanded.
	ORDER No.	<i>Offences against Railway officials.</i>		
35	..	5	..	
36	..	.....	50	

(Sd.) A. C. DOVETON, Captain,  
1-30th Punjabis.

APPENDIX VII.

*Chronological narrative and list of acts of violence and outrages in the Kasur neighbourhood, April 1919.*

Date.	Place.	Outrage.	REMARKS.
6th April	Lahore, Amritsar, Ludhiana, etc.	"Hartal"	Kasur did not join.
10th April	Amritsar	Riot and murder	Mob attacked and burnt Banks, Telegraph Offices, Railway Goods Shed, wounded five Europeans. All telegraph wires cut.
Do.	Lahore	Riot	Mob advanced from City to Civil Station, dispersed by police and military. Agitators arrived at Kasur from Amritsar.
11th April			
12th April	Kasur	Riot and murder	Two trains held up and looted, two British soldiers killed, two injured. Railway Station burnt down. Telephone wires cut. Lieutenant-Colonel McRae's Force arrived to restore order.
Do.	Khem Karan	Looting	Railway Station looted.
Do.	Ganda Singhwala	Riot.	
Do.	Patti	Do.	Railway Station and signals destroyed.
Do.	Lahore	Do.	Stones thrown at troops marching through City. Mob fired on by Police. Telegraph wires cut.
13th April	Patti	Wire-cutting	Railway telegraph lines cut.
Do	Tarn Taran	Do.	Do.
Do	Gohlwar Varpul	Do.	Do.
Do	Auritsar	Riot	Mob dispersed by fire.
....	Kot Radha Kishan	Stone-throwing	First class passengers injured by stone thrown at the train.
16th April	Kasur	....	Martial Law declared.

Lt. Col. H. St. G. M. McRae—concluded—LALA MOHAN LAL SETH.

### APPENDIX VIII.

#### Disturbances, 1919.

*From the Officer Commanding, 2-15th Sikhs, to the Headquarters, 4th Brigade.*

1. In handing over the command of the Kasur Force on the 9th May 1919, I have the honour to request that you will bring to the notice of the General Officer Commanding, the good work done by the detachments placed under my command at various periods:—

1-4th Queen's.	2-15th Sikhs.
1-1st Kents.	2-17th Infantry.
1-61st Pioneers.	

2. The operations lasted 28 days, during which period the troops arrested over 150 persons concerned in the riots at Kasur, Khem Karan and Patti, and another hundred were arrested by the police.

The persons arrested by the troops were taken in night operations against 15 villages and entailed considerable hardship and long marches. The morale, keenness and leading of the troops was excellent throughout the operations.

3. I especially wish to bring to notice the good work done by—

Major C. A. M. Paske, 23rd Cavalry (Frontier Force).  
Lieutenant P. T. Onraet, 23rd Cavalry (Frontier Force).  
Captain A. R. Walker, 2-15th Sikhs.

Captain A. C. Doveton, 1-30th Punjab.  
Subedar Bir Singh, M.C., I.D.S.M., 2-15th Sikhs.

4. The closest co-operation in these operations was maintained with the Civil and I would especially like to bring to notice the good work done by P. Marsden, Esq., I.C.S., Sub-Divisional Officer, Kasur, and Mr. Ahmed Khan, Khan Bahadur, Superintendent of Police.

Mr. Marsden has recently returned from service overseas and being used to military ways was of the greatest assistance.

5. The health and comfort of the troops quartered at Kasur was all that could be desired, and for this they are chiefly indebted to the exertions of the staff of the North-Western Railway, who speedily repaired the damages done by the rioters to the buildings and produced new furniture, chairs, etc. In this connection I bring to notice the following officials:—

V. Raynor, Esq., District Traffic Superintendent, Ferozepore.

McQuillon, Esq., Executive Engineer, Ferozepore.

Collins, Esq., Traffic Department.

Mr. H. H. Long, the new Station Master, Kasur.

Mr. E. Garrison, the new Assistant Station Master, Kasur.

Teja Singh, Railway Telegraph Department.

6. I forward herewith the War Diary of the Kasur Force from 19th April 1919 to 9th May 1919.

(Sd.) H. G. McRAE, *Lieut. Colonel,*  
*Commanding, 2-15th Sikhs*

#### LALA MOHAN LAL, SETH, Vakil, High Court, and Municipal Commissioner, Kasur.

I am ready to appear as a witness before the Disorders Enquiry Committee and my evidence in brief will be as follows:—

##### I.—Causes of disturbance:—

- (a) Famine prices of necessaries of life since the commencement of war with no prospect of their going down.
- (b) Collection of war loan even from people who could not afford to advance it. Overdoing in recruiting.
- (c) Unsympathetic attitude of the Government as exhibited by officers like the late Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. (Compare the result of the sympathetic attitude of the present Lieutenant-Governor.)
- (d) People have realised that the representation of the people in the Legislative Council is a farce. The Rowlatt Act has not so much exasperated the people as the conviction that however sound and solid the non-official vote would be, the official representation is too overwhelming to be influenced and they can pass any proposition ignoring the non-official representation.
- (e) At such a time the forced return of Mahatma Gandhi from the Punjab.

##### II.—Causes of disturbance in Kasur:—

- (a) Kasur not a political centre. No political society here—not even any religious society worth the name. Seldom any leader of Congress or any society came here and gave any lecture.
- (b) Kasur a trading town. It did not join in the Universal *Hartal* of 6th April. Accordingly Amritsar and Lahore trading people were crying shame for Kasur and were threatening to injure them in their business. Kasuris were, therefore, afraid. The forced return of M. Gandhi and consequent rumour of *Hartal* on that occasion, was a good opportunity for Kasur traders to make amend for their past omission to go into *Hartal*.

III.—The mischief done on morning of the 12th was due to some silly boys going to the station and breaking flower pots and panes of glasses. The police authorities there showed utter indifference otherwise the mischief would have been nipped in the bud there. *Badmashes* from neighbouring villages and some sweepers and low-class people thought it was a golden opportunity for looting and so they joined it. Nobody checked them at the main post office near the Town Thana. The Thana police did not come out to stop the mob. When the mob reached the Tahsil it was well that the Tahsil police fired and quelled the mob. The bubble burst and was seen no more. No respectable or any known person was seen in the mob. Though the Sub-Divisional Officer, District Superintendent of Police and others reached the Tahsil. After that it was all quiet. The disturbance was not an organised one and there was no conspiracy. The educated people had no hand in it, but rather tried to quell the mob. M. Abdul Kadir and M. Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din, Pleaders, reaching the mob tried to quell it, but they were given a very good reward for their laudable act and were in jail for a month or so, and were then discharged without any trial.

##### IV.—Necessity of Martial Law:—

As stated above there was no rebellion, no conspiracy. The mischief here was for a few hours and no more. The general public had not joined it. Everything was quiet from 12th April to the day when all of a sudden the bomb of Martial Law was thrown on the people. There was no reason or occasion for it.

##### V.—Administration of Martial Law:—

Had this been in the hand of civil authorities it would have been better. But the Military authorities had neither the tact nor the experience to govern people. So their rule was very strict and put people to great trouble and inconvenience. It is impossible and impracticable to relate all the erratic acts done by the military in the town but some may be mentioned by way of sample (e.g.)—

- (1) Sweeping arrest of hundreds of people, though subsequently discharged after some days without any trial.

LALA MOHAN LAL SETH—concluded—Lieutenant H. MUNRO.

- (2) Arrest of respectable people and their harassment like ordinary criminals and then discharge without any trial and blame.
- (3) Searching the houses of respectable people unnecessarily. My house and the house of several pleaders and others were searched. Of course nothing incriminating was found there.
- (4) Disallowing people to travel even for their urgent affairs. I was once given a permit by Mr. Marsden, the Sub-Divisional Officer, but was second time refused by the Martial Law Administrator by which I lost my case. Several pleaders had to return their fees for their cases in Lahore.
- (5) Sadhus of all religions or creeds were put to various indignities as the military suspected that they were the spies. The suspicion was, however, wrong and nothing was brought out.
- (6) Curfew order was itself a great nuisance to the people.
- (7) Military soldiers looted some shops and nobody checked them and people were afraid to complain against them.
- (8) Liquor shops were closed on account of this trouble of the soldiers.
- (9) Martial Law Administrator began to interfere in all sorts of affairs, even the tenants of a Hindu temple property were threatened and forced to pay hundreds of rupees to people having no right to them. This was related to a Bhawn, (Temple in Mandi). Lala Durga Dass, Radha Kishan, Maghi Mal, &c., were insulted and threatened. Now there has been a Judicial case about it in the Court of Munsif of Kasur decided on the 3rd November.
- (10) Every male resident of Kasur who could walk on his legs, was brought out near the railway station on the 1st May. Military was sent in the town for driving out those who had been somehow left behind and were brought under arrest. All the town was made to pass bare-headed in front of the identifiers—irrespective

of age or dignity, and were made to sit in the sun from morning to about 2 P.M. without meals. One can imagine innocent persons being put to such indignities and anxieties for such a long period.

- (11) Students were flogged without proof and were expelled from the school for ever.
- (12) I understand some flogging was done in the presence of prostitutes.
- (13) An innocent Railway Babu (e.g., Bhagat Ram) was given thirty stripes with a rest after every five stripes and was admonished to identify people. No case was brought against him and no charge was laid against him before being flogged.
- (14) A deaf beggar was shot to death at the Railway Station for not replying to the call of the soldier on duty.  
These and numerous others—too numerous to be remembered and put in this synopsis.

VI.—It may be added that the Civil and Police including the C. I. D. were doing things very fairly and mitigated great deal of the sting of Martial Law. The Martial Law administration was done in the spirit of vindictiveness, and had it not been for the civil and the police authorities greater atrocities might have been committed. So I think very few innocent persons were challoaned before the commission. The result of the trials too was not disappointing. Very few innocent persons were convicted.

A bar-room chaprasi who was newly engaged and did not properly know the language of the *siaga* was convicted merely because he was standing outside the bar-room and got a shot along with a Tehsil chaprasi—the latter was rewarded Rs. 50. As ill luck would have it the first batch before the commission fared the worst and when time passed on the sentences became lighter.

The Police and C. I. D. did their work honestly and boldly. Some Railway Officer was, I understand, going to interfere in the investigation unfairly and was boldly checked by the Deputy Superintendent of Police in charge for which he deserves every credit.

Lieutenant H. MUNRO, 2-17th Infantry.

On April 12th last I was a passenger by the train leaving Ferozepore at about 9 A.M. for Lahore.

I travelled in a first class compartment with one other occupant, Captain Limby of the Royal Engineers.

Nothing unusual occurred until the train reached a point about five hundred yards west of Kasur Station. Here the train stopped. At the time I was reading a paper. After two or three minutes had passed Captain Limby drew my attention to the fact that we were not at Kasur Station, and to the abnormal number of natives that were hanging about round the train.

He intimated his intention of alighting from the train to see what was the matter. This he did and I followed him. Almost as soon as we appeared upon a bank, which ran parallel to the line, I noticed an air of suppressed excitement which seemed prevalent among the natives. Captain Limby informed me that he suspected the riots had broken out in Kasur and that we were not going to have a pleasant time.

From the direction of Kasur we could see a crowd of at least one thousand thoroughly excited natives approaching. They were armed with *lathies*, pieces of iron and other implements. Their vanguard greeted us with cries of "Afsar Sahib hain mar do mar do." (We were both in uniform).

From the bank I perceived that the station or part of it was burning.

After directing Mrs. Sherbourn and her children to get into a gate-keeper's hut with two Corporals of the 1-4th Queen's who were with her, I made an attempt to work

up the train towards the engine, with the intention of forcing the driver to move the train one way or other.

I found the guard of the train wandering about and told him to get the train on the move. He replied "I have no line clear." By this time I had been hit with sticks and stones, and had retaliated many times with my fists. I was absolutely unarmed.

My attempt to reach the engine was frustrated. I came back towards the hut in which the Sherbourn family were and the two soldiers. I could not get near it, owing to the crowd. Finding Captain Limby again, we decided that the only thing to do was to attempt to get back towards Ganda Singhwala.

We managed to get clear of the main crowd, but had several pitched battles with parties of twenty and twenty-five on the railway line. During one of these fights I knocked one assailant over the embankment. He must have been severely injured. This happening had considerable moral effect on the rest. We managed to beat them all off eventually.

After resting in a village (the inhabitants of which were not hostile) for about an hour, I procured a horse for Captain Limby and brought him back to the Kaiser-i-Hind bridge. Here we were picked up by Mr. R. T. Clarke, the Deputy Commissioner, Ferozepore, who took Captain Limby to his bungalow and me to hospital.

I append a medical certificate.

I have since identified several of my assailants, and attended their trials in Lahore.

Lieutenant H. MUNRO—concluded—Mr. A. J. SHERBOURN—M. KHAIR-UD-DIN.

The Station Hospital, Ferozepore, the 12th April 1919.

This is to certify that I examined Lieutenant Munro, 2-17th Infantry.

He was suffering from a large scalp wound and multiple

contusions and abrasions of body and upper extremities. The injuries were severe.

C. L. HORWOOD, Captain,  
Royal Army Medical Corps.

Mr. A. J. SHERBOURN, Signal and Interlocking Inspector, North-Western Railway.

I give below the correct account of the Kasur outrage.

That on arriving within a mile of Kasur the train stopped. I looked out and noticed the Indian passengers leaving the train and getting on to a high bank. I noticed a mob of about 2,000 men about 200 yards in front of the train making towards the train. Two soldiers, Corporals Battson and Lance-Corporal Grinham of the Queen's helped us (my wife, three children and myself) to carry our children to a gate keeper's hut, where we were advised by Khair Din, Inspector of Coaching and Goods, to hide. The mob came up and smashed in the door and window. Corporal Battson tried to keep them from entering, he was struck several times and pulled outside. Lance-Corporal Grinham struck a man with a pick-axe which he found in the hut, he himself was hit on the head and fell and was also dragged out. Lance-Corporal Battson managed to escape to 14-Down which had just come in and was afterwards backed to Rukhanwala. Lance-Corporal Grinham also managed to escape to the bridge with the help of a *gharrywala*. Then one of the mob, who I afterwards caught between Ganda Singhwala and Kasur entered the hut and pulled my hat off, threw it outside and tried to drag me out whereupon Khair-ud-Din pleaded with the rioters not to harm us. This leader of the mob went out and spoke to the men who quietened down. A few minutes later, some one came and informed the leader that two of his men had been killed. This upset him, he then caught my wife and tried to drag her out, again Khair-ud-Din pleaded with them. A little later a Pleader, who is now a prisoner, came and Khair-ud-Din pleaded with him also to save us. He jumped up on the courtyard wall and said something to the mob and they almost immediately went away. Khair-ud-Din then proposed taking us to a village about  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile from the hut where we

went and remained till about 13 hours. Then the Deputy Superintendent of Police, with about twenty others, came to our help and removed us to the Deputy Superintendent of Police's bungalow, where the Deputy Superintendent of Police told me that my family was quite safe with an armed guard of about twenty-five men. I got a horse and rode to Ganda Singhwala where I handed in a telegram for Ferozepore. On my way a few hundred yards from the Deputy Superintendent of Police's bungalow I saw the mob again making towards the Mission building. On arriving at Ganda Singhwala I found a light engine ready to go to Kasur. I ordered the Station Master to return it to the bridge, I got on to the engine and went to the bridge to inform the Military. I met Colonel Atkins of the Queen's at the bridge, after explaining things to him, Colonel Atkins, about twenty men and myself returned to Kasur at about 3 P.M. When we got there, we found that the Police have dispersed the mob by firing on them. The city was very quiet at 8 P.M. Colonel Atkins took us back to Ferozepore in his car. On my way to the bridge I met Lance-Corporal Grinham staggering down the road, he was badly hurt and bleeding. I got off the engine and helped him up to the bridge. Captain Limby and Lieutenant Munro, who were also passengers by the same train, managed to escape to the bridge after being severely handled. The two Warrant Officers, who it was reported we owed our preservation to, were not the two who helped us, they, Conductor Selby and Master Gunner Mallait, never got out of their compartment, they went on to the station in the train which was after a few minutes taken into Kasur Station, it was on the platform that these two unfortunate men were beaten to death. All that was done for us was done by Khair ud Din. There were two killed and four badly injured, the names I have already mentioned.

M. KHAIR-UD-DIN, Travelling Inspector of Accounts, North-Western Railway.

I came from Moga Tahsil and took No. 61-Up train from Ferozepore Cantonment on the 12th instant for Kasur. When the Moga train arrived at Ferozepore Cantonment 61-Up was standing at the station.

I entered a II Class compartment and could secure a seat on the middle berth as there were the following other passengers also:

- (1) Two European soldiers.
- (2) One Indian gentleman.
- (3) Mr. Gupta, Block Inspector, North-Western Railway.
- (4) M. Ghulam Rasul, Inspector of Works, North-Western Railway.
- (5) Sheikh Din Muhammad, Judge, who joined and entered our compartment at Ferozepore City.

When the train was nearing Kasur Station it stopped dead near the distant signal. I thought there is crossing of three trains at that time, it may be on account of that. But shortly we all in the compartment heard that passengers from carriages of the train were getting out and running away.

Before any of us got out of the compartment Mr. Sherbourn jumped in and mentioned to the two soldiers something regarding a mob. At the very moment I told Mr. Sherbourn and the soldiers that I was quite at their services. I also told the soldiers to take care of their rifles and load those up, but to our misfortune they said they had none.

When I got down from my compartment, I saw Mrs. Sherbourn with her three children had already come out from her compartment. I saw also two Military Officers who evidently also must have come out from the very train. I requested them to load their revolvers, but unfortunately they had also none of the kind. They all asked me what should they do for safety and I told them to hide themselves in bath room and I would stand outside for watch and guard.

There was no time to do so and we all ran towards the rear side of the train. But the rioters were overcoming us. I was behind all the Europeans, could not run properly and swiftly as I was lifting one of the children of Mr. Sherbourn. I heard one of the Europeans saying "Khair-ud-Din where we should go now, rioters have quite overcome us." I shouted out and told the gateman to open the hut close by. This was done and all the Europeans entered in it. The boy, whom I was carrying was given to one of the soldiers and I stood out. Hardly the door and window of the hut were bolted, the rioters were on our heads. They began to break the window and door and my cries telling them that there is my *pardahwala* family had no effect, rather slaps and blows were the replies from rioters for me. When the window and door were broken opened the two Officers came out and ran away. Some rioters followed stoning and abusing them. Then the two soldiers followed and met with the same luck.

M. KHAIR-UD-DIN—concluded—Mr. V. O. RAYNOR.

Mr. Sherbourn and his family and myself remained behind. I had some time to wrestle, sometime to appeal for mercy for sparing this European family. One young Hindu boy, whose name I now learn is Chuni Lal, promised to assist me, though I heard him abusing Mr. Sherbourn, when I checked the boy he became quite quiet and remained with us and did his best to move the mob. I saw another boy coming from the opposite side and going towards the mob and again returning towards me. I know this boy, his name is Kamal Din, relative to Sher Nawab Khan, Honorary Magistrate. I told this boy that these Europeans are my friends and asked him to assist me in saving their lives. This boy also helped me in moving the mob and when I wanted to feed this family, he brought bread and milk. I provided a little fruit also. In a word the two boys helped me all around and so far so I saw them fanning to this family. I then thought to remove them to my house as they were quite exposed and not yet free from danger. I sent my own servant (useful servant in this affair) to my house to bring my wife's *Burka* (veil) as I wanted to take Mrs. Sherbourn in disguise and gave my Indian cap to Mr. Sherbourn.

M. Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din Khan, Pleader, turned up, he and I used force also to move the rioters and we succeeded after having lot of abuses. Another gentleman, Shaikh Din Muhammad, Judge, the 5th passenger, mentioned in the 1st page, also came up and was a helping hand to me and useful for the services of the European family.

I deputed M. Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din, Pleader, to arrange for conveyance. But having failed to secure one, I, on the proposal of boy Kamal Din, took the European family to the boy's aunt's house, a place in the Kote (village) close by. This I did as I had reliance on the boy. All this was done with the necessary precautions, i.e., covered Mrs. Sherbourn with a sheet of cloth I got from the gate-man, who was also very obliging, and useful and gave my own Indian cap to Mr. Sherbourn. When we reached the place in the Kot (village), we passed the time very smoothly and calmly and Kamal Din managed to supply chairs, water and milk for the family. In a word nobody disturbed the family there.

Then the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Sub-Divisional Officer, and Sub-Inspector, City Police, Kasur, (named below\*) arrived with Police force and other gentry and officers. The appearance of the Police Officers gave really a fresh life to the European family. Deputy Superintendent of Police took this family to his bungalow where other European and Christian ladies were also brought for safety.

I having thus secured the lives of five Europeans whom I did utmost and at all risks to save. I left the place with the permission and consent of Mr. Sherbourn and Deputy Superintendent of Police.

\* Khan Sahib Ahmad Khan, Deputy Superintendent of Police.  
Mr. Mitra, Sub-Divisional Officer.  
Sheikh Hamid Ullah Khan, Sub-Inspector of Police.

#### Mr. V. O. RAYNOR, District Traffic Superintendent, North-Western Railway.

On the evening of the 10th April last I received a wire from the Station Superintendent, Lahore, asking me to stop 42-Down at Kasur and not to run her to Amritsar, as the District Traffic Superintendent, Lahore, wished it. Shortly after a second wire was received from the District Traffic Superintendent, Lahore, in confirmation. The train had, however, left and orders were given to terminate it at Patti. Later that day news came in that the Amritsar Banks had been looted, and that Bhagtanwala Station had been burnt. I did not, however, realise the seriousness of the situation which is borne out by the following facts :—]

- (1) At about 8 P.M. I proposed to the Executive Engineer, who had a motor trolley at his disposal, that we motor through to Amritsar, as Bhagtanwala was in our jurisdiction. On permission being asked, however, from the General Officer Commanding, Ferozepore, it was refused. The night of the 10th was spent in suspense; very little news came through from Amritsar. The Ferozepore Cantonment station was visited by the Deputy Commissioner and the General Officer Commanding. The latter informed me that troops were on their way to the station and would I help the Officer Commanding to place pickets at the most important points. This I did. I was given no reasons for these precautions.
- (2) Next morning I again approached the Executive Engineer, who obtained the required permission, and we motor trolled through to Amritsar.
- (3) We took no precautions to arm ourselves. It was not till we arrived at Amritsar, and we were able to put questions to several officers there that we realised the seriousness of the situation. We then took precautions for the return journey.

In the light of subsequent events at Kasur, the next day, the 12th April, I now come to one of my reasons for forming my opinion that the Railway Staff at Kasur, if not active participants in the movement, were in sympathy with it. The second will be dealt with later. On our journey to Amritsar we stopped at Kasur and I asked for the Station Master. I was informed he was on leave and

issued orders to wire and recall him. Assistant Station Master Chuni Lal was officiating as Station Master. He along with others of the staff, met us on both the outward and return journeys. On both occasions we questioned them and particularly asked whether there were any signs of trouble at Kasur. The reply was an emphatic "No." After the occurrence of the 12th, however, enquiries showed that a mass meeting of the citizens of Kasur had taken place on the 11th at which Hindus and Muhammadans had fraternised freely and a general *hartal* was ordered to commence at 2 P.M. This *hartal* was actually on at the time we passed through on our way back to Ferozepore, and I consider it was the duty of my staff to inform me. Had they done so I could have brought it to the notice of the authorities at Ferozepore, and it is probable that measures would have been adopted to avert a repetition of the events at Lahore and Amritsar.

During the period 10th to 17th I was on several occasions questioned by both the Deputy Commissioner and the General Officer Commanding, Ferozepore, whether a strike was contemplated on my district. I had conversations with several of my Indian subordinates, and was assured that on the Ferozepore District no such thing was intended in spite of the fact that it was common knowledge at the time that strikes or attempts at strikes had taken place on other districts.

On the 16th I received a telegram from the Traffic Manager informing me that Martial Law was about to be declared on the North-Western Railway in the Punjab, and I repeated this to all my Station Masters, besides sending out reliable Indian subordinates to explain (with one of my Assistants, Sardar Sahib Sardar Teja Singh) to them that so long as they continued to work they had nothing to fear. They visited practically all stations of my district. I was subsequently informed by both the Station Masters, Ludhiana (Mr. James), and Jullundur, City (Bahadur Chand), that this telegram had had far-reaching effects at their stations as without a doubt a strike was intended. The first rumour conveyed to me regarding a general railway strike was on the 12th April. None to my knowledge was previously contemplated.

I was regularly in Kasur from the 12th April onwards. The Officer Commanding, Kasur, Lieutenant-Colonel McRae, had, on more than one occasion, approached the station staff present at the time of the riot to volunteer and come forward to give evidence as well as to identify

Mr. V. O. RAYNOR—concluded—B. KEHAR SINGH—LALA ANANT RAM.

prisoners. They had, however, been sullen and by their attitude had shown that they had no intention of doing so. I spoke to them on several occasions myself, and it was not till about my sixth effort that only certain members came forward, a remarkable fact being that the junior hands were the first to show willingness. Their lead was followed by others of their seniors, and as a result a large number of rioters were identified including, I believe, some of the principals. The conclusion drawn by me from this was two-fold, first that the junior members had in some way been coerced by their seniors or some outside influence, and second that at least certain members were, as I have previously stated, if not active participants in the riot at least in sympathy with the mob.

I was continually receiving reports during this period, practically a daily occurrence, that train telegraph wires were being cut, especially on the Amritsar-Kasur Section and isolated cases in the Hoshiarpur and Jullundur districts. These were not, I feel sure, the acts of Railway officials or of organised gangs. The village population firmly believed at the time that law and order was at an end and were all out for devilment. My Assistant, Sardar Sahib Sardar Teja Singh, rendered valuable assistance in accompanying telegraph repair gangs between Amritsar

and Kasur, and this opinion was expressed by him more than once.

As a result of the Amritsar and Kasur riots and the subsequent frequent cutting of wires on this section the running of trains was stopped up to the 1st May 1919, and it was not till after the Mobile Column had gone through the district, led by the Amritsar Patti-Kasur Railway, that one train each way was put on. Similar restrictions were likewise imposed on other branch lines.

During the period of the disturbances the following strong rumours were current in Ferozepore which had a most disquieting effect on the Railway staff besides on the minds of the rural village population:—(1) That the Lieutenant-Governor had been murdered and Government House reduced to ashes; (2) the Fort at Lahore had fallen and was in the hands of the mob, and (3) the last but by no means the least, that the Golden Temple at Amritsar had been bombed by our troops. On hearing this last I took active measures to refute it by sending out my Assistant, Sardar Sahib Sardar Teja Singh, to visit Amritsar, and after satisfying himself as to the incorrectness of the rumour, to give his knowledge widespread circulation amongst my subordinates as well as to the travelling public.

#### B. KEHAR SINGH, Assistant Station Master, Kasur.

On the 12th April I was working as Assistant Station Master, Kasur, from 1 to 9 hours. On my being relieved I went to my quarters. No sooner I had finished bathing and I was going to take my food when I heard a great noise on the station. I dressed myself and ran to the station taking B. Mastan Chand with me. On my reaching the platform at about 10 hours I saw the lamp-room on fire and glasses of doors and windows broken and some rioters running towards Gandasinghwala side. Some men of my menial staff were standing in line; I called them and ordered them to extinguish the fire of one wagon lying at the end of island platform, and some tins of oil and other furniture were saved, and then I went to the Assistant Station Master's office and taking the key of the fire bucket stand distributed iron dolls to goods coolies who were found on the platform, and then I went to the Telegraph office, found instruments taken off. I returned to get a trolley and try to wire about the case, but, seeing the mob gathered on the Gandasinghwala side bridge, I went out with a view to go to Government Telegraph office. Just on reaching the front of the station I met B. Gurdas Ram, Pleader, and some other men. I being accompanied by B. Gurdas Ram left for the Government

Telegraph office and Mastan Chand, Assistant Station Master and Chuni Lal and Jewan Mal were returned again to the lamproom and remained at the station. When I, with B. Gurdas Ram, arrived in the Government office we found all the instruments out of order. On testing no beat heard, then we proceeded to find out any tumtum but found none in the bazar and shops being closed. Then I and B. Gurdas Ram requested one pleader to give us his tonga and arrived at Gandasinghwala. We both wired accident class wire from Gandasinghwala and returned back to Kasur reaching there at about 13-40. On hearing that some men had looted the wagon and brake of 61-up standing at station line, I told the jamadars to shunt the wagons in front of Goods office and had them watched by chowkidars. On going to the station I saw the corpse of one European gentleman and one being dressed in waiting room, and I heard that Chuni Lal had wired about these occurrences, and then at about 15 hours troop-special arrived from Ferozepore and I was accompanied with my superior officer while seeing all state of affairs, and after that I was obeying orders of all Military Officers as required.

#### LALA ANANT RAM, Municipal Commissioner, Kasur.

1. On the 11th April, I was at home down with fever on account of the hurt I had received in the foot. I heard that there was a *hartal* in the City, and that it was rumoured that the Bombay and Amritsar people had objected to have *hundi* transactions.

2. On the 12th April, I was present inside the Kasur tahsil and helped in saving the files of the Sub-Divisional Officer's Court and in getting them kept inside the Tahsil. The Tahsil door was locked. The rioters came. The Munsif and the Sub-Inspector of Police with their staffs got on the Tahsil building roof and told people to go away and do no mischief.

3. On account of pain in my feet I could not go up the roof of the Tahsil building and lay down in front of the Sub-Inspector's room.

4. The mob made noise saying that they would get the prisoners released and loot the treasury. On hearing this noise I went towards the locked door and looked outside from the holes in the doors. I loudly told the people to desist from their designs, but no one cared for my cries. The rioters set fire to the Petition-writers' shed. Then they set fire to the Munsif's Court and the Chaukidar's

*kotha*. After this they brought the burning shed to the Tahsil door for firing it.

5. Notwithstanding the pain in my feet I went at once to the Treasury to save it and taking out my revolver from the pocket I stood opposite to it. From the roof the Police fired at the mob to save the Tahsil treasury. I then came to the door and saw that the rioters were running away.

6. Had the Police not fired on the rioters, the latter would have burnt the Tahsil buildings and looted the treasury, and this would have meant ruin.

7. The tahsil door was opened, and I saw present there Mr. R. Mitter, Sub-Divisional Officer, Deputy Superintendent of Police, the Tahsildar, Khan Sahib Muhammad Shahbaz Khan, and several other officers.

8. Reaching at the Post Office I impressed on the Sanitary staff the necessity of speedy extinguishing of the fire.

9. At 2-30 P.M. a special train containing soldiers came and at that time armoured motor cars also arrived. I went to the station. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, also came there. The Colonel asked as to who I was. He was told that I was a Municipal Commissioner. On this the Colonel said that I should be sent with the

LALA ANANT RAM—concluded—BAWA KHARAK SINGH.

Military guards to take them to the Government buildings. Accordingly I took them to the various Government buildings, e.g., Deputy Superintendent of Police's house, the Mission House, the Police Station, Treasury, Hospital, etc.

10. On the 15th April, Mr. P. Marsden, Sub-Divisional Officer, arrived and made the necessary arrangements with the result that peace reigned once again.

11. On the 16th April the Colonel announced the declaration of Martial Law at the Municipal Office. All the townpeople, rich and others (who were always under great apprehension lest some calamity should overtake them at night) felt great relief on the arrival of the Military guards. Whenever a suspect had to be arrested, the Military Guard used always to go as an escort, but no one was molested in the way.

12. After 8 P.M. no one could go on the Railway Hospital and Tahsil roads.

13. As to Martial Law people said that on account of Military Guards on the roads there was peace. No theft of cattle, etc., took place.

14. On the 1st May when all men were called to the Railway station for purposes of identification, Military guards were sent through the city for protection. One Municipal Commissioner accompanied each guard. I was with the guard which went to Ket Usman. Generally the Martial Law Officers gave no trouble.

15. As things became normal, the Military guards were reduced.

16. The members of the Kasur Municipality put in an application that they took the responsibility for peace. On the 9th June Martial Law was removed.

Statement of BAWA KHARAK SINGH, Sub-Inspector of Police, Kasur.

On the 11th April 1919, because of the *hartal* the Kasur Police Station issued an order that the Treasury and the Police Station should be protected. This order was complied with. Between 8 and 9 I went to the Kasur Police Station to report that everything was alright. A report reached there that the *hartal* was to be repeated in the city on that date. On this Khan Sahib Ahmad Khan, Deputy Superintendent of Police, ordered that the judicial lock-up, the treasury, the tahsil and the Police Station should be safe-guarded. He also gave the necessary instructions. Accordingly the Police Station and the tahsil with the subordinate staff were placed under the protection of a (Police) guard and the tahsil entrance closed. Between 11 and 12 I brought the Munsif, Kasur, with the latter's office records to the Police Station and the Tahsil. It was apprehended that the office would be burnt because Babu Uma Datt, Commission Agent, and Lala Chet Ram, Municipal Commissioner, Kasur, who had visited the Munsif's office, said that the rioters had attacked certain Europeans at the Kasur Railway Station, had damaged the Railway Station and burnt the Kasur Post Office. The gate being closed we could not see things outside the Tahsil. So I with the employees of the Police Station, Sundar Das, Head Constable, in charge of the Tahsil Guard, Fazal Din and Kanbaya Lal, Head Constables, and a few other constables got up on to the roof of the gate armed with rifles. We piled bricks at four places in order to throw them at the rioters in the event of their attempting to damage the gate. The rioters came in front of the Tahsil at about 1. They proclaimed loudly that the English *regime* had ceased to exist and shouted out "*Gandhi, Kitchlew, Satyapal ki jai.*" Sayyid Ahmad Shah, Sub-Registrar, and the Tahsildar of Kasur, had, in the meantime, come to the Tahsil office with their respective staffs. They dissuaded the mob from advancing towards the Tahsil office, but without result. The rioters continued to shout that nobody could do them any harm because the English *raj* had come to an end. Accordingly, when the mob advanced towards the Tahsil I dissuaded them from doing so in very polite words, but my warning had no effect on them who asked me to join them, because the British *raj* had ceased to exist. I again warned them, but some of the members of the mob reached near the gate and wanted to damage it. I, with my comrades, showered brick-bats on them. Thereupon the mob withdrew, and one of them—a Muhammadan—began to pull down thatched roof of the Tahsil building by means of a mason's axe. Some of them began to throw brick-bats at us. We paid them in their own coin with the result that they stopped short of advancing towards the Tahsil. They set on fire the Munsif's office by burning thatch grass taken from the petition-writer's shed. Thereupon I loaded my Government rifle with shot cartridges and fired in the air in order to frighten the mob, but the latter remarked that the fires were blank and began to advance towards the Tahsil gate. Whereupon I fired my pistol in the air. This put back the mob, but they continued to throw brick-bats at us. We also went on firing from the roof. At this time certain

members of the mob dragged the thatch in front of the Tahsil gate and did not listen to us when we prevented them from doing so. We were again obliged to fire in the air, but this had no effect on them. Thereupon I fired my pistol in the air. In the meantime there arrived at the spot Khan Sahib Ahmad Khan, Deputy Superintendent of Police, accompanied by Khan Shahbaz Khan, Honorary Magistrate, Kasur, and Chaudhuri Muhammad Khan, Naib-Tahsildar, Kasur. The mob, however, paid no heed to their warning. Accordingly all of us fired at the mob with the result that they fled away. The rioters were 2 or 3 thousand in number. One of them died of firing near the Munsif's Court and three wounded. The latter were caught. A majority of rioters belonged to the *Kamin* people (menials) of Kasur. The Muhammadans, Hindus and Jat Sikhs of the adjoining villages had also joined with them. At 3 P.M. European soldiers arrived who were deputed to guard the Treasury. The rioters left their axes and *lathis* at the scene of occurrence. Several of them were seen armed with sticks and staffs. On the night between the 18th and 19th April I, in attendance on the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Kasur, Cavalry Officer (Major) and certain other Military Officers reached the village of Khara, Police Station Lalvani. The troops and the cavalry duly besieged the village and we proceeded to the houses of Ajaib Singh, Teja Singh, Baghel Singh and others, caste Jat, who were suspected of having taken away the watch belonging to a murdered European from the Railway Station, Kasur. On being called out Teja Singh and others did not open the inner door. At last we entered the house by climbing over the compound wall. The said Ajaib Singh, who was attempting a flight, was found with a *chhavi*, which was seized. House search was made at day time, but no watch was found. Bhakar Singh, Teja Singh, Ajaib Singh and Baghel Singh, all the four persons, were arrested and placed in the lock-up at Headquarters Police Station, Kasur. On the night between the 19th and 20th of April I, in attendance on the said Military Officers and the Tahsildar of Kasur, reached Pannun Kalan and after besieging the village, the houses of 16 persons including sweepers, Jat Sikhs and Muhammadans were locked up in connection with the incident at the Railway Station Khem Karan and were searched at day time, but nothing incriminating was found in possession of any of them. Fourteen persons were arrested and brought to the Headquarters Police Station, Kasur, and placed in the lock-up there. Maulvi Ghulam Muhi-ud-Din, Pleader, was also arrested the same day and placed in the same lock-up, because this lock-up is more spacious and better ventilated than the one at the Police Station. He was put in a separate room, and under the orders of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Kasur, was allowed to have bedding and food supplied by his family. This concession was continued on subsequent days. There were 53 persons in the lock-up on that day, all of whom were taken away by the Military Guard for being placed in the fenced lock-up at the Railway Station, Kasur. But Maulvi Ghulam Muhi-ud-Din, Maulvi Abdul Kadir, Pleaders, Muhi-ud-



BAWA KHARAK SINGH—concluded—MIRZA SHUJA BEG—SARDAR AMAR SINGH.

Din, son of Maulvi Abdul Qadir, and 7 other respectable persons were kept in the lock-up at the said Police Station and the Sub-Divisional Officer, Kasur, gave them permission to use their own bedding and food, which they continued to use. They also recited the *Qur'an* daily which was supplied to them at the instance of the Sub-Divisional Officer. On the night of the 20th April 1919, I, in attendance on the Military Officers and the Tahsildar of Kasur, reached the village Lakhna near Valtoba, which was besieged as usual. The houses of some of the persons

were locked-up and searched. But nothing incriminating was found. Since the information against them was unfounded, none of them was arrested.

On the 23rd April 1919, Maulvi, Mirza, an accused in the case of the Railway Station, Khem Karan, on being asked delivered up to me stolen property, which consisted of clothes, an Indian smoking pipe (*shukla*), belonging to the station clerks. The house of Kashi Ram, Pleader, Kasur, was searched by me personally in a polite manner.

MIRZA SHUJA BEG, Magistrate, Patti.

As I wish to make a statement regarding the disturbance which took place at Patti, District Lahore, in April last, I pray that I may be allowed to give evidence. My evidence will be regarding the following points:—

- (1) Durga Das, lecturer of Amritsar, and Swami Bal Sarup of Chimba, District Lahore, came to Patti on the 4th and 5th April 1919 and delivered lectures, which had a pernicious effect on the minds of the people.
- (2) The people of Amritsar and Patti used to exchange their views no less than three times a day and the disturbance at Amritsar had a seditious effect on the minds of the people residing in Patti.

Owing to these seditious ideas telegraph wires were cut between the night of 11th April 1919 and 12th April 1919 in order that Englishmen and the troops, etc., might remain ignorant of events at Amritsar.

- (4) The rioters attacked the Government buildings between the night of the 12th and 13th April in order to loot them and set fire to them.
- (5) When I remonstrated with them they gave expression to seditious views.
- (6) At the time of attack they were shouting in intemperate language that they would expel the English.
- (7) The disturbance lasted till 14th April 1919 and the arrival of the armoured car had a good effect on the minds of the people.
- (8) Patrolling army reached on the 16th April and it did work in connection with the restoration of peace.
- (9) The accused were arrested on 28th April 1919. I will also make a statement regarding the treatment accorded by the authorities to the people.

SARDAR AMAR SINGH, B.A., LL.B., Pleader, Kasur.

I wish to appear as a witness before the Committee and the following is the synopsis of my evidence as regards disturbances at Kasur (Lahore District).

I.—*Causes of the disturbances.*—(a) A large majority of the Kasur people were at one with the rest of the country as regards the attitude of the Government towards the Rowlatt Bill. The people had contributed their humble share towards the successful termination of the war and they expected better treatment at the hands of the Government. When the Government of India passed the Rowlatt Bill in the Indian Legislature with the aid of official majority in the teeth of opposition by the whole country through their non-official representatives, the people felt it a great insult. Already the people had become sick of the present system of administration for various reasons, especially the repressive policy of our late Lieutenant-Governor so they took the passing of the Rowlatt Act as a grievous injury to their aspirations and wanted its repeal by all legitimate means. Hence when the message of Mahatma Gandhi reached their ears to observe 6th April as a day of fasting and prayers by suspension of business, the people of Kasur also wanted to observe that day as desired by the Great Soul. But as the principal traders and members of the Kasur Bar on account of the attitude of the bureaucracy towards the measure refused to lead the people in the matter, there could be no *hartal* here on 6th so the anger of the people towards this measure remained pent up.

This town is a great trading centre, and has business connections with the principal towns of the country. So when the outside traders heard that the Kasur people did not join in the common protest of the country they boycotted the market and some of the Bills of Exchange, etc., of the traders here were dishonoured.

(b) Then on 11th came the unhappy news of the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi and the deportations of Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal and the consequent *hartal* at Amritsar and Lahore, the people of the place could now no more afford to remain aloof from their Amritsar and Lahore brethren. Consequently in the afternoon of 11th there was a spon-

taneous *hartal* in the city. As I was not here that day I don't know the movements of the mob that evening.

As every moment news arrived from Amritsar and Lahore of the firing of the people there and the casualties caused to the British at Amritsar and the Indians at both the places and the continuation of the *hartal* there, the people here too continued *hartal* on 12th and consequently there was a mob passing through the town expressing indignation at the action of the Government.

At 10 A.M. a meeting of the respectable citizens of the town happened to be held at the residence of Mahammad Abdul Kadir, President of the Kasur Bar, and an esteemed member of the Muhammadan community here to devise means to pacify the people and to put an end to the *hartal*. The deliberations had only half proceeded when all of a sudden Sardar Sahib Sardar Ganda Singh, retired Inspector of Police, now resident of V. Khem Karan, came with the painful news that the mob had committed mischief at the Railway Station. At once the meeting was dissolved and all ran in various directions to stop the mob. It consisted mostly of the low class people of the town, some of the school boys and outsiders. I took to extinguishing fire at the Railway Station by personally carrying tinfuls of water in the company of L. Gokalchand, Pleader, and S. Kishan Singh, Excise Sub-Inspector. Moulvi Abdul Kadir and Ghulam Mohi-ud-din, Pleaders, went to the Railway Bridge to see that the mob did not injure the Bridge or the incoming trains. On the arrival of Patti and Ferozepore trains the mob grew in number by some of the passengers joining it. It was further excited on account of the firing by some of the British soldiers travelling by the Ferozepore train, and then it committed the unfortunate excesses both at the Railway Station, in the town and tahsil. The mob had really become uncontrollable and the firing at the tahsil was quite justified. It would have done greater mischief if it had not been so dispersed. The military arrived at about 4 P.M., and before its arrival all was quiet. There were no disturbances again and the civil authorities could well cope with the situation. All this was a spontaneous outburst of the

SARDAE AMAR SINGH.

[Concluded.]

feelings of the people as a protest against the policy of the Government and there was no twinge of conspiracy or rebellion against His Majesty's Government in India.

II.—The subsequent declaration of martial law here on 16th was quite unjustified. By the declaration of this negation of all laws, the Government perhaps wanted to terrify the people. They were no doubt so terrified in the beginning but its re-action has been very bad more especially because it was administered in a very vindictive spirit and the respect for Government has rather decreased in the minds of the people by this measure. The demand of *salams* (saluting) by British soldiers and officers from every Indian was most demoralizing. It rather created hatred in the minds of the people for the British.

The flogging of the school boys and other individuals at the Railway Station (Platform) was also seriously criticised by the people. The restrictions on travelling was a source of great annoyance to the people. Some members of the Bar were refused permission by the military authorities to attend to their cases at Lahore although I had the good luck of being permitted twice.

III.—*As regards the police investigation and searches.*—Although in the beginning on account of panic in the minds of the officials some undesirable arrests were made and unnecessary searches done, they were on the whole satisfactory, and there was no complaint as to the attitude of the civil authorities to the people. There was profuse praise for Mr. P. Marsden, Sub-Divisional Officer and K. S. Ahmad Khan, Deputy Superintendent of Police, for the good conduct of the police, there being no complaint of extortion or corruption against the police. But still the general belief is that some innocent persons have either been executed or awarded heavy terms of imprisonment and this shows the hasty nature of the proceedings.

IV.—*Administration of martial law.*—I have been absent from Kasur during the early days of martial law and so I don't know much as to its administration here during that time. But from the experience that I have got during May and June and the complaints that have reached me, I can't but conclude that it was very irksome to the people. At the Railway Station, the Headquarters of the Officer Commanding Kasur, martial law was in full force. Several inhuman punishments were inflicted. I myself saw a *sadhu* white-washed. I am told that for a trifling matter the son of our Revenue Assistant (Q. Allaud-din) was made to jump for sufficient time over the rope.

In the early days of martial law I also came to know that at about midnight a deaf and dumb poor man was shot dead for his being out-doors during the *curfew* hours and for his not replying to the call of the sentinel at the Railway Station. I am also told that although to the town proper *curfew*-restrictions did not apply, some men were still arrested in the night and punished for being out-doors during the so-called forbidden hours.

V.—*1st May, identification.*—I was not present here that day. But I am told by a number of gentlemen here that the whole adult male population of the town was summoned at the Railway Station early in the morning and had to wait there up to 3 P.M., in sunshine in the sultry hot weather without food or drink and had to undergo identification bare-headed. This bare-headed identification was seriously resented by the whole population—*pagri* (turban) being regarded as a sign of respect amongst the Indians. The Sikhs who have shed their very life-blood for the Empire resented the most as they are forbidden by their religion to walk bare-headed. The woman folk at home were in great anxiety as to the probable luck of their husbands and sons.

The above is the short story of the martial law period at Kasur. The people repented very much for the mischief done by irresponsible persons and I am sure we shall not have a repetition of the unfortunate incident for any time in future.

In the end I can't help submitting a few more impressions of my mind and I hope I shall be excused for this little bit of plain speaking.

Some 15 years back the British Government in India was regarded as a Divine blessing and the Britons as champions of justice, equality and liberty, but the repressive policy of the Government of India and disregard for the legitimate aspirations of the people has created great discontent during the last 15 years and there is a feeling of growing hatred for the Britons. May the Great English nation realize it so that there be again in India feelings of cordiality, friendship and brotherhood between the two nations so that the sacred tie between England and India be everlasting. Give equal rights and privileges to Indians in every walk of life and they shall love the Britons more than they are loving their own kith and kin.

## PART III

# Martial Law Notices issued in the Lahore Civil Area, Lahore Brigade Area, and Kasur.

### Lahore Civil Area.

*For Martial Law Orders 1 to 58, vide Appendix IV to Lt.-Col. Frank Johnson's Statement on pages 291—306.*

#### No. 59.

WHEREAS the Muhammadan Mela known as PAR KA MELA takes place on the 14th and 15th June 1919, when certain Muhammadans gather together at the Tomb of JAHANGIR at Shahdara, near Lahore:

AND BEING DESIROUS that the necessities of Martial Law should interfere as little as possible with such Melas;

NOW, THEREFORE, I give notice that for the period of the two days mentioned above, persons may gather together at the said JAHANGIR'S TOMB according to custom, and such persons attending the said Mela are permitted to be out of their houses during prohibited hours of the two nights in question, i.e., the nights of the 14-15th and 15-16th June 1919.

W. J. W. BRACKENBURY, *Lieut.-Col.*,

*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, FALETTI'S HOTEL:

*Time—12.30 hours.*

*Lahore, 31st May 1919.*

#### No. 60.

WHEREAS Martial Law Orders No. 29 of 25th April 1919, No. 32 of 29th April 1919, and No. 58 of 28th May 1919 were issued with a view to protect the public from the hardship and injustice of the exorbitant prices of WHEAT and ATTA;

AND WHEREAS it has now been represented to me that the necessity for fixing the prices of these two articles no longer exists;

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I deem it advisable to suspend Martial Law Order No. 58, which fixed the prices of WHEAT and ATTA.

BUT I WARN all dealers in these articles that the refusal to sell either WHEAT or ATTA shall continue to be a contravention of Martial Law, and will be dealt with as heretofore.

In order to further encourage dealers to import WHEAT, ATTA and GRAM into Lahore I direct the Municipality to refrain, for a period of ten days from this date, from levying octroi on WHEAT, ATTA or GRAM.

W. J. W. BRACKENBURY, *Lieut.-Col.*,

*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, FALETTI'S HOTEL:

*Time—16.15 hours.*

*Lahore, 2nd June 1919.*

#### No. 61.

WHEREAS by Martial Law Orders No. 35, dated 5th May 1919, and No. 52, dated 17th May 1919, the maximum retail prices of certain vegetables were fixed under Martial Law;

AND WHEREAS, I now deem it expedient to further amend such prices;

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in me under Martial Law, and notwithstanding anything contained in the aforesaid Martial Law Orders to the

contrary, I ORDER THAT from 05.00 hours on the 5th June 1919 it shall be a contravention of Martial Law to charge or attempt to charge more than the prices set forth below for the following vegetables, viz:—

	Rs.	A.	P.	
Bhindi Tori . . . . .	0	2	3	per seer.
Karele . . . . .	0	1	0	” ”
Tomatoes . . . . .	0	1	0	” ”
Potatoes . . . . .	0	1	6	” ”

W. J. W. BRACKENBURY, *Lieut.-Col.*,

*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, FALETTI'S HOTEL:

*Time—15.30 hours.*

*Lahore, 3rd June 1919.*

#### No. 62.

WHEREAS it has been represented to me that the wholesale price charged for KHEWRA SALT is exorbitant and unjustifiable;

AND WHEREAS I find that, as set out in Martial Law Order No. 32, dated 29th April 1919, KHEWRA SALT can be laid down in this Area at an inclusive cost of Rs. 1-12-0 per maund,

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I ORDER THAT from 18.00 hours to-morrow, Wednesday, 4th June 1919, salt, other than imported table salt, shall be supplied to any purchaser of ten maunds or over at any one time and under any one transaction, at a price not exceeding Rs. 2-4-0 per maund.

AND I WARN ALL CONCERNED that all those who are to-day selling SALT wholesale shall continue to do so at the new price and under the new conditions;

AND I FURTHER WARN ALL CONCERNED that Martial Law Order No. 32, dated 29th April 1919, in so far as it refers to SALT, remains unaffected by this Order except in regard to the purchase price of quantities of salt ten maunds or more in weight.

W. J. W. BRACKENBURY, *Lt.-Col.*,

*Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, FALETTI'S HOTEL:

*Time—16.15 hours.*

*Lahore, 3rd June 1919.*

#### No. 63.

#### RETURN OF ELECTRIC LIGHTS AND FANS.

WHEREAS by Martial Law Order No. 24, dated 23rd April 1919, I took over a number of electric fans and lights;

AND WHEREAS I now deem it expedient to return them (or their value) to their owners;

NOW THEREFORE by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I ORDER all such owners to present themselves at FALETTI'S HOTEL, Lahore, between the hours of 09.00 and 11.00 on Monday, the 9th June 1919, to receive back their electric lights and fans (or their value);

AND I WARN ALL OWNERS that should they fail, without sufficient reason, to so present themselves at the place and time mentioned in this Order, the electric lights and

*Continued.]*

## LAHORE CIVIL AREA AND LAHORE BRIGADE AREA.

fans will remain in my charge at owner's risk, and I will not be further responsible for the same.

W. J. W. BRACKENBURY, Lt.-Col.,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, FALETTI'S HOTEL :

Time—12.10 hours.

Lahore, 6th June 1919.

## No. 64.

WHEREAS by Martial Law Orders Nos. 17, 21, 22 and 23 I ordered all pedal-driven bicycles to be delivered over to me ;

AND WHEREAS I now deem it expedient to return all bicycles to their owners ;

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law I ORDER all owners to present themselves at the CINEMA, McLeod Road, on any day between the hours of 07.00 and 19.00 but before NOON on the 9th June 1919, to receive their bicycles.

AND I WARN ALL OWNERS that bicycles not claimed before NOON on the 9th June 1919 will remain in my charge but at owner's risk, and I will not be further responsible for the same.

Unless claimed within a further period of 48 hours, i.e., before NOON on the 11th June 1919, the bicycles will be handed over to the Superintendent of Police.

W. J. W. BRACKENBURY, Lt.-Col.,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, FALETTI'S HOTEL :

Time—12.20 hours.

Lahore, 6th June 1919.

## No. 65.

By virtue of the powers vested in me under Martial Law, I HEREBY ORDER all persons having claims against the Military Authorities for work done since the institution of Martial Law, to present the same at FALETTI'S HOTEL, Lahore, before NOON on the 10th June 1919.

AND I WARN ALL CONCERNED that no claims will be considered after that time and date.

W. J. W. BRACKENBURY, Lt.-Col.,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, FALETTI'S HOTEL :

Time—11.05 hours.

Lahore, 7th June 1919.

## No. 66.

WHEREAS by Martial Law Order No. 3, dated 15th April 1919, I ordered all motor-cars to be delivered over to me ;

AND WHEREAS I now deem it expedient to return all motor-cars to their owners ;

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I ORDER all owners to present themselves at, or to send a representative to, the CAR POOL, NAJIB BARRACKS, LAHORE CANTONMENT, on Thursday, 12th June 1919, at 08.00 hours, to receive their cars.

AND I WARN ALL OWNERS that cars not claimed before 10.00 hours on 12th June 1919, without sufficient reason being given, will remain in my charge, but at owner's risk, and I will not be further responsible for the same.

W. J. W. BRACKENBURY, Lt.-Col.,  
Commanding Lahore (Civil) Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, FALETTI'S HOTEL :

Time—14.45 hours.

Lahore, 9th June 1919.

## Lahore Brigade Area.

## No. 1.

WHEREAS the Government of India has for good reasons proclaimed Martial Law in the Districts of Lahore and Amritsar and whereas I am appointed to command the troops and to administer the said Martial Law in that portion of the said Districts known as the Lahore Brigade Area which is defined as the Lahore Civil Districts (less Lahore Civil Area), I make known to the inhabitants of the Lahore Brigade Area—

- (1) That I am so appointed to enforce law and order and to guard the public safety.
- (2) That loyal and law abiding persons have nothing to fear from the exercise of the aforesaid Martial Law,
- (3) That certain restrictions have been placed upon the inhabitants of Lahore City and Civil Lines by the officer appointed by me to command the troops and administer Martial Law therein,
- (4) That as the inhabitants of the Lahore Cantonment have been law-abiding and of good behaviour, similar restrictions have not yet been laid on Lahore Cantonment, but such concession is dependent on the future good behaviour of the inhabitants,
- (5) That I forbid any meetings or processions or unlawful assemblies to be held in Lahore Brigade Area without my permission. Any meetings, procession or unlawful assembly held in contravention of this order will be dispersed by force, without warning.
- (6) That any person contravening the Martial Law Regulations or any of the above orders or any further orders I may issue from time to time shall be arrested and tried by a Summary Court and be liable to be punished with fine, whipping, imprisonment or death according to the circumstances of the case.

J. L. J. CLARKE, Brigadier-Genl.,  
Commanding Lahore Brigade Area.

LAHORE CANTONMENT :

The 17th April 1919.

## No. 2.

WHEREAS certain evilly-disposed persons have circulated a lying report that the GOLDEN TEMPLE at AMRITSAR has been damaged, I HEREBY deny the said report and declare it to be false and untrue,

AND I HEREBY ORDER that no person or persons shall disseminate false intelligence which he or they know to be false, or spread reports calculated to create alarm and despondency among the inhabitants of this district,

AND I FURTHER ORDER that any person or persons so creating alarm and despondency shall be arrested and dealt with summarily under the powers vested in me by Martial Law.

J. L. J. CLARKE, Brigadier-Genl.,  
Commanding Lahore Brigade Area.

LAHORE CANTONMENT :

The 18th April 1919.

## No. 3.

WHEREAS I am informed that at certain places in the district under my command, that is to say, the Lahore Civil District outside the boundaries of Lahore Civil Area, certain dealers and retailers have charged and are charging excessive prices for their goods, whereby the poorer classes in the said District are suffering hardship and injustice,

I HEREBY ORDER that such dealers and retailers shall not sell their goods in excess of certain rates, which I from

## LAHORE BRIGADE AREA AND KASUR.

[Continued.]

time to time shall fix and publish, and I warn all concerned that any dealer or retailer who disobeys or attempts to disobey this order will be punished by me under Martial Law.

J. L. J. CLARKE, *Brigadier-Genl.*,  
Commanding Lahore Brigade Area.

LAHORE CANTONMENT:  
29th April 1919.

No. 4.

WITH reference to Martial Law Order No. 3 of the Lahore Brigade Area, dated April 29, 1919.

I hereby direct that the prices of the following articles of consumption shall not exceed those mentioned herein until further notice:—

Atta . . . . .	6½ seers to the rupee.
Wheat . . . . .	7½ " " "
Milk, Cows . . . . .	2½ annas per seer.
" " Buffaloes . . . . .	3 " " "
Ghi . . . . .	9 chittacks to the rupee.

J. L. J. CLARKE, *Brigadier-Genl.*,  
Commanding Lahore Brigade Area.

LAHORE CANTONMENT:  
The 1st May 1919.

No. 5.

I HEREBY ORDER that no shopkeeper, dealer, or retailer who was selling goods, the price of which I may deem it expedient to fix in accordance with my Order No. 3 before the publication of the said Order, shall now refuse to sell the said goods in consequence of the said Order.

AND I WARN all concerned that any such refusal to sell the said goods will be an offence against Martial Law, and will be dealt with as such.

J. L. J. CLARKE, *Brigadier-Genl.*,  
Commanding Lahore Brigade Area.

LAHORE CANTONMENT:  
2nd May 1919.

No. 6.

I HEREBY ORDER THAT no fresh vegetables whatsoever, potatoes or otherwise, shall be consigned by rail from any Station under my Command to any Station whatsoever save to LAHORE JUNCTION STATION, LAHORE CANTONMENT EAST STATION and LAHORE CANTONMENT WEST STATION:

AND I WARN ALL CONCERNED that any person who consigns, or any Railway official or other person who permits any such person to consign, any fresh vegetables, including potatoes, to any Station other than those above mentioned, shall be guilty of an offence under Martial Law, and shall be dealt with under the said Law.

J. L. J. CLARKE, *Brigadeir-Genl.*,  
Commanding Lahore Brigade Area.

LAHORE CANTONMENT:  
6th May 1919.

No. 7.

I HEREBY GIVE NOTICE that my Martial Law Order No. 3, and my Notices Nos. 4 and 5, and any subsequent order or notice I may issue regulating the prices of food-stuffs and necessaries apply only to the Area known as the Lahore Cantonment and to nowhere else in the Lahore Brigade Area under my Command, save to the said Cantonment.

VOL. IV

And that such orders as the officer known as the Officer Commanding, Lahore Civil Area, may deem fit to issue, regulating the prices of the said articles, do not apply to the said Lahore Cantonment, nor to any other place in the Area under my Command other than the Area known as the Lahore Civil Area.

J. L. J. CLARKE, *Brigadier-Genl.*,  
Commanding Lahore Brigade Area.

LAHORE CANTONMENT:  
6th May 1919.

No. 8.

WHEREAS it has been brought to my notice that certain wilful damage has recently been done to acrial telephone lines in the vicinity of Lahore Cantonment.

Now, therefore, I HEREBY ORDER that any person discovered committing any damage to, or tampering with, any telegraph or telephone line in the area under my command, will be severely dealt with under Martial Law, and I FURTHER DIRECT that the inhabitants of any village or house in the vicinity of such damage will be held responsible for it and liable to be fined or to suffer such other punishment as I may direct.

J. L. J. CLARKE, *Brigadier-Genl.*,  
Commanding Lahore Brigade Area.

LAHORE CANTONMENT:  
16th May 1919.

Kasur Area.

No. 1.

WHEREAS the Government of India has for good reasons proclaimed Martial Law in the districts of LAHORE and AMRITSAR, and

WHEREAS superior Military authority has appointed me to command troops and administer Martial Law in a portion of the LAHORE District, now known as the "KASUR CIVIL" Command, whose boundaries are the Municipal boundaries, and WHEREAS Martial Law may be briefly described as the will of the Military Commander in enforcing law, order and public safety:

I make known to all concerned that until further orders by me the following will be strictly carried out:—

From 20.00 hours evening till 05.00 hours on the following morning no person other than a European or a person in possession of a permit signed by me or on my behalf will be permitted to use the streets or roads, south and east of the town and the road passing the Civil Hospital to the Tahsil, and any person found disobeying this order will be arrested, and if any attempt is made to evade or resist arrest that person will be liable to be shot.

This and all other orders which from time to time I may deem necessary to make will be issued on my behalf from the Railway Station, whether every Ward will keep at least one representative from 06.00 till 17.00 hours daily to learn what orders, if any, are issued and to convey such orders to the inhabitants of their respective Wards. The onus of ascertaining the orders issued by me will rest on the people through their representatives.

Loyal and law-abiding persons have nothing to fear from the exercise of Martial Law.

In order to protect the lives of His Majesty's Soldiers, Police and property under my command, I make known that if any firearm is discharged or bombs thrown at them, or property damaged, the most drastic reprisals will instantly be made against property surrounding the scene of the outrage. Therefore it behoves all loyal inhabitants to see to it that no evil-disposed agitator is allowed on his premises.

3 E

Continued.]

KASUR.

During the period of Martial Law I prohibit all processions, meetings or other gatherings of more than 10 persons, except authorised schools, factories and meeting for worship in authorised buildings at authorised times, without my written authority, and any such meetings, gatherings or processions held in disobedience of this order will be broken up by force without warning.

I forbid any person to offer violence or cause obstruction to any person desirous of opening his shop or conducting business or proceeding to his work or business. Any person contravening this order will be arrested, tried by a Summary Court, and be liable to be shot.

## No. 2.

All tongas and tum-tums, whether licensed for hire or otherwise, will be delivered up to the Military Officer appointed for that purpose at the Railway Station as required. Drivers will receive pay.

## No. 3.

I give notice that all orders I have to issue under Martial Law will be delivered to such owners of property as I may select, and it will be their own duty to exhibit and keep exhibited and undamaged in a conspicuous place on their residence all such orders.

Failure to ensure the proper protection and continued exhibition of my orders will result in severe punishment.

Similarly I hold responsible the owner of any property on which the seditious notices are exhibited.

## No. 4.

WHEREAS I have reason to believe that certain Munshis, Dalals and Chaprasis employed by legal practitioners in KASUR are engaged in fostering sedition, therefore by virtue of the power vested in me under Martial Law I hereby order that:—

No such Munshi, Agent, Dalal or Chaprasi shall leave the KASUR CIVIL COMMAND without a permit signed by me or on my behalf.

Every legal practitioner resident in this COMMAND will submit to me by 14 hours to-day a complete list of every Munshi, Agent, Dalal or Chaprasi employed by him.

## No. 5.

WHEREAS it is necessary for preserving law and order that my forces should be adequately equipped with bicycles I hereby order that every person, other than a Government employee, owning a bicycle should produce it before 16 hours to-day and hand it over to my Staff Officer, Lieutenant B. Burgess.

Anyone found disobeying this order will be severely dealt with.

## No. 6.

WHEREAS it has been ordered that in future *hartal* will be regarded as a seditious act,

I hereby forbid any person to close his shop or to refuse to do business or to utilise his skill.

Anyone contravening this order will be severely dealt with, and his shop, or the residence in which he was accustomed to do his business, will be forcibly opened.

## No. 7.

WHEREAS I deem it expedient to take further steps for the prevention of violence and intimidation and for the maintenance of good order in the Area under my command, I make the following order:—

From and after the promulgation of this order it shall be illegal for any person, other than a Government employee, to carry or to be found in possession of an instrument known as a *lathi* or *dang* without my permission.

All persons in possession of such *lathis* or *dangs* will hand over the same to my Staff Officer Lieutenant B. Burgess at the KASUR RAILWAY STATION at 16.00 to-day.

H. ST. G. M. McRAE, *Lieut.-Col.*,

Commanding Kasur Area.

KASUR RAILWAY STATION:

21st April 1919.

## No. 8.

WHEREAS certain evilly-disposed persons have circulated a lying report that the Golden Temple at Amritsar has been damaged, I HEREBY deny the said report and declare it to be false and untrue.

AND I HEREBY ORDER that no person or persons shall disseminate false intelligence which he or they know to be false, or spread reports calculated to create alarm and despondency among the inhabitants of this district.

AND I FURTHER ORDER that any person or persons so creating despondency shall be arrested and dealt with summarily under the powers vested in me under Martial Law.

H. ST. G. M. McRAE, *Lieut.-Col.*,

Commanding Kasur Area.

KASUR RAILWAY STATION:

The 23rd April 1919.

## No. 9.

WHEREAS I deem it expedient in the interests of Law and order that all residents of KASUR should remain at KASUR until further orders, therefore by virtue of the powers vested in me under Martial Law, I HEREBY ORDER THAT:—

1. No person, who was a resident of KASUR on the 10th April 1919, shall leave KASUR without a special pass or permit duly signed by me or on my behalf. And further all such residents who have left KASUR on or after the 10th April 1919, will return to KASUR within four days from this date, failing which measures will be taken against their property.

2. Ward Members will furnish me by 7.00 hours to-morrow, the 26th April 1919, a list of all residents absent from KASUR, stating their present address and the dates on which they left KASUR.

In the case of inaccurate or otherwise misleading information being given concerning a resident's whereabouts the Ward Member or family of person concerned will be severely punished.

H. ST. G. M. McRAE, *Lieut.-Col.*,

Commanding Kasur Area.

KASUR RAILWAY STATION:

The 25th April 1919.

## No. 10.

WHEREAS I have reason to believe that certain "Sadhus" or persons dressed as such, have left KASUR with the intention of escaping detection and arrest for the crimes of which they are guilty, therefore by virtue of the powers vested in me under Martial Law, I HEREBY ORDER THAT:—

No religious mendicants or persons disguised as such shall on any account be permitted to leave KASUR.

Anyone who is cognisant of the departure or intention to leave on the part of such person, and who fails to give timely warning that would lead to his arrest, will be deemed guilty of an offence under Martial Law and will be severely dealt with.

Further, if it comes to the knowledge of any person that a religious mendicant or person describing himself

KASUR.

[Continued.]

as such has entered the KASUR area, it shall be his duty to report the fact without delay to the Officer Administering Martial Law, KASUR, failing which he will be deemed guilty of an offence under Martial Law.

2. Ward Members will furnish by 7.00 hours to-morrow, the 28th April 1919, a nominal roll of all *bona fide* religious mendicants at present in the areas for which they are responsible. These mendicants will report daily at the Railway Station at 8.00 hours and 16.00 hours where they will remain until the roll of such mendicants has been called by an officer approved by me, acting on my behalf, and until they are dismissed by such officer.

H. ST. G. M. McRAE, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Kasur Area.

KASUR RAILWAY STATION:  
The 27th April 1919.

No. 11.

WHEREAS it has come to my notice that certain drivers of tum-tums and other vehicles have been assisting unauthorised persons to leave KASUR, I HEREBY ORDER THAT:—

No driver of any vehicle shall leave KASUR without a written Pass signed by me or on my behalf, nor shall he carry out of KASUR limits any passenger who is not in possession of such a Pass, nor shall he carry any passenger on a date other than that for which the Pass he holds was issued.

If a driver of any licensed vehicle refuses to take any permit-holder or exempted person in his vehicle, he will be severely dealt with.

All drivers of vehicles outside KASUR municipal area without passes are at liberty to come into KASUR with or without passengers, but must obtain passes before again proceeding.

This Order applies to all vehicles from towns and villages outside KASUR which are within the limits of the KASUR COMMAND.

All vehicles within the municipal area when not engaged will be drawn up in line on the stand known as the Luliani Tonga Stand. Vehicles when at KHEM KARAN, GANDA SINGHWALA and other places within the limits of the KASUR COMMAND will be drawn up outside the Thanas of these places whence they may be engaged. Chowdhris will be held responsible that this Order is enforced.

Infringement of this Order will result in the commandeering of all vehicles.

H. ST. G. M. McRAE, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Kasur Area.

KASUR RAILWAY STATION:  
The 29th April 1919.

No. 12.

WHEREAS it has been brought to my notice that certain persons are making false statements for the purpose of obtaining travelling permits, note, therefore, that any person found on inquiry to be making such false statements will be deemed to have committed an offence under Martial Law, and will be punished.

H. ST. G. M. McRAE, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Kasur Area.

KASUR RAILWAY STATION:  
The 6th May 1919.

No. 13.

WHEREAS it has been brought to my notice that shopkeepers are charging exorbitant prices for foodstuffs,

AND WHEREAS the continuance of such charges is calculated to cause unnecessary suffering and privation to the inhabitants,

AND WHEREAS it would be a gross injustice to all concerned, if such charges were allowed to continue,

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I shall from time to time fix and determine the (sic.)

AND NOW, THEREFORE, I ORDER THAT from and after 17.00 hours this day and until further notice, it shall be a contravention of Martial Law for any dealer to sell any of the commodities in the following list at a price higher than that which is therein stated:—

	Per rupee.
Atta . . . . .	7 seers.
Wheat . . . . .	8 "
Gram, whole . . . . .	9½ "
„ crushed . . . . .	9 "
<b>Dal—</b>	
(a) Chana . . . . .	7 "
(b) Mash . . . . .	4 "
(c) Masur . . . . .	6 "
(d) Mung . . . . .	3 "
(e) Moth . . . . .	4 "
<b>Milk—</b>	
	Per seer.
(a) Cow's . . . . .	As. 2-6
(b) Buffalo's . . . . .	„ 3-0
Curds . . . . .	„ 3-6
	Per rupee.
Butter . . . . .	12 chataks.
Ghi . . . . .	10 "
Oil, cooking . . . . .	1½ seers.
	Per seer.
Sugar, white . . . . .	As. 7
„ (native shakar) . . . . .	„ 5
Gur . . . . .	„ 4
<b>Meat—</b>	
	Per seer.
Goat or sheep . . . . .	As. 5-6
Beef . . . . .	„ 4-0
	Each.
Brain . . . . .	As. 1-0
Head . . . . .	„ 2-0
	Per dozen.
Eggs . . . . .	As. 6-0

AND FURTHER no dealer shall sell any of the above-mentioned articles adulterated or of an inferior quality, nor shall he refuse to sell to any customer.

AND FURTHER this order shall apply to the whole of the KASUR TAHSIL.

AND I warn all that any disobedience of this order will result in prompt and severe punishment.

H. ST. G. M. McRAE, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Kasur Area.

KASUR RAILWAY STATION:  
The 7th May 1919.

No. 14.

WHEREAS on the 16th day of April 1919, in order to minimise the work of the Troops and Police and the better to maintain order and public safety in the Area under my Command, by Martial Law Notice No. 1, I forbade certain classes of the inhabitants of the said Area to use certain streets and roads between 20.00 hours and 05.00 hours daily.

AND WHEREAS this and other Orders issued by me have been carried out to my satisfaction, I am desirous as far as possible of removing restrictions which interfere with the religious exercises of certain classes of the inhabitants:

NOW, THEREFORE, I order and direct that so long as the inhabitants of the Area under my Command continue

Concluded.]

KASUR.

faithfully to obey all orders issued by me in the cause of public order and safety, the hours during which the said streets, etc., are closed shall be between 22.00 hours and 05.00 hours and this alteration shall come into operation at 22-00 hours to-day, the 7th day of May, 1919.

H. ST. G. M. McRAE, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Kasur Area.*

KASUR RAILWAY STATION:

*Dated 7th May 1919.*

—  
 No. 15.

WHEREAS the restriction on travelling referred to in the General Martial Law Proclamations, dated 10th April

1919, and subsequent Amendment, dated 21st April 1919, have been removed in certain Areas.

AND WHEREAS, in the interests of law and order, the removal of such restrictions in the Area under my Command is at present neither desirable nor advisable,

THEREFORE, in order to prevent any misunderstanding on this point, I HEREBY GIVE NOTICE, for information of all concerned, that all persons desirous of leaving KASUR shall continue to obtain passes or permits duly signed by me or on my behalf before attempting to leave.

H. ST. G. M. McRAE, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Kasur Area.*

KASUR RAILWAY STATION:

*The 7th May 1919.*



THE DISORDERS INQUIRY COMMITTEE

---

# EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

## Disorders Inquiry Committee

---

VOLUME

V

2

GUJRANWALA, GUJRAT, LYALLPUR AND PUNJAB PROVINCIAL



CALCUTTA  
SUPERINTENDENT GOVERNMENT PRINTING, INDIA  
1920

**VOLUME V.**

**GUJRANWALA, GUJRAT, LYALLPUR AND PUNJAB PROVINCIAL.**

	<u>Pages.</u>
<b>Part I.—Oral Evidence . . . . .</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Part II.—Written statements accepted without oral examination . . . . .</b>	<b>185</b>
<b>Part III.—Written statements of witnesses subsequently examined orally . . . . .</b>	<b>189</b>
<b>Part IV.—Martial Law notices and Instructions . . . . .</b>	<b>249</b>

## WITNESSES.

### GUJRANWALA.

Serial No.	Name.	Oral evidence.	Written Statement.
		PAGE.	PAGE.
1	ABDUL KADIR, MUNSHI, Permanent Way Inspector, North Western Railway, Lyallpur.	128	222
2	ABDUR RAHIM KHAN of Zaida, Lieut. Khan, Cadet, Indian Army . . . . .	120	217
3	AMAR SINGH, Sardar Sahib, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Sheikhpura . . . . .	120	216
4	ARMSTRONG, Mr. A. R. B., Executive Engineer, Wazirabad . . . . .	75	205
5	BOSWORTH-SMITH, Mr. B. N., I.C.S., Joint Deputy Commissioner, Sheikhpura, Gujranwala District.	88	209
6	BUDH SINGH, BAWA, Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, Provincial Division, Lyallpur.	125	219
7	CARBERRY, Captain D. H. M., Flight Commander, No. 31 Squadron, Royal Air Force.	38	194
8	CHATTERJEE, Mr. B. C., Head Master, Mission High School, and Member Municipal Committee, Gujranwala.	53	199
9	CHOPRA, Mr. R. C., Hafizabad . . . . .	128	222
10	DEWAN CHAND, Babu, Sub-Permanent Way Inspector, North Western Railway, Lyallpur	126	221
11	DODKINS, Lieutenant L., Observer, Royal Air Force . . . . .	41	195
12	DURAN KHAN, Khan, Honorary Civil Judge and Vice-President, Notified Area Committee, Sangla Hill, Sheikhpura.	126	221
13	EWING, Captain J. A. S., 19th Lancers . . . . .	56	200
14	FLOWERDEW, Captain S. P., 1-24th North Western Railway Battalion, Indian Defence Force, Lahore.	118	216
15	GHULAM MOHI-UD-DIN, Munshi, Retired Military Sub-Assistant Surgeon, Wazirabad	79	206
16	GHULAM RASUL, CHAUDHRI, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala . . . . .	49	197
17	GHULAM HUSSAN, AGHA, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Gujranwala . . . . .	46	196
18	GODFREY, Captain W. E., I. A. R. O., Gujranwala . . . . .	42	196
19	HARWOOD, Captain A., 1st Durham Light Infantry . . . . .	56	201
20	IQBAL NARAIN, PANDIT, Secretary, Municipal Committee, Gujranwala . . . . .	67	203
21	JACOB, Mr. S. M., I.C.S., Director of Agriculture . . . . .	71	204
22	KIRPA SINGH, MUNSHI, Tahsildar, Wazirabad . . . . .	76	205
23	NEVILL, Mr. J. B., Assistant Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala . . . . .	61	202
24	NORRIS, Mr. T. H., Station Master, Wazirabad . . . . .	88	208
25	O'BRIEN, Lieutenant-Colonel A. J., C.I.E., C.B.E., Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala.	1	189
26	PICKEN, Reverend S. C., of the American Mission, Sangla Hill, Sheikhpura	123	218
27	SHAW, Mr. E. K., District Engineer, Gujranwala . . . . .	53	199
28	SRI RAM SUD, Rai Sahib, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Sub-Divisional Officer, Sheikhpura.	100	213
29	SMITH, Mr. V. W., Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala . . . . .	52	198

## GUJRANWALA—contd

Serial No.	Name	Oral evidence.	Written Statement.
		PAGE.	PAGE.
30	SMITH, Major C. W. J., 2-54th Sikhs, F. F. Administrator, Martial Law, in Gujranwala, Gujrat and Lyallpur.	82	207
31	SULTAN AHMAD, Khan Bahadur, Mirza, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Gujranwala	33	193
32	SUNDAR SINGH, SARDAR, Honorary Secretary, Central Co-operative Bank, Gujranwala.	69	204
33	TATAM, Lieutenant, Military Grass Farm, 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division . . . .	117	215

## GUJRAT.

1	ABAD JAN, SARDAR, Senior Sub-Judge, Gujrat . . . . .	149	229
2	FAIZUL HASSAN SHAH, Sayad, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Gujrat . . . .	151	230
3	WILLIAMSON, Mr. H. S., I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Gujrat . . . . .	143	225

## LYALLPUR.

1	AVATAR KISHEN KAUL, Pandit, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Lyallpur . . . .	141	225
2	SMITH, Mr. V. W., Superintendent of Police, Lyallpur ] . . . . .	133	224

## GURGAON.

	TREVASKIS, Mr. H. K., I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon . . . . .	170	242
--	--	-----	-----

## ROHTAK.

	BOLSTER, Mr. R. C., I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Rohtak . . . . .	171	243
--	---	-----	-----

## AMBALA.

	WHITEHEAD, Mr. R. B., I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Ambala . . . . .	172	244
--	---	-----	-----

## PROVINCIAL.

1	BOALTH, Mr. V. H., Traffic Manager, North Western Railway, Lahore . . . .	163	231
2	BURLINGHAM, Mr. G., Superintendent, Railway Telegraphs, North Western Railway and Oudh and Rohilkhand Railway.	...	186
3	COODE, Mr. J. M., Director, Telegraph Engineering, Northern Circle . . . .	...	185
4	FAZL-I-HUSSAIN, the Hon'ble Khan Bahadur, Mian Member, Punjab Legislative Council, Lahore.	157	241
5	TOMKINS, Mr. L. L., C.I.E., Deputy Inspector General of Police . . . . .	174	245
6	TOWNSEND, the Hon'ble Mr. C. A. H., I.C.S., Director of Civil Supplies in the Punjab.	179	246

NOTE.—The witnesses are shown under the districts to which their evidence primarily relates, but in several cases witnesses deposed to facts concerning other districts also. And of the Gujranwala witnesses, some relate to the district, some to the city, and others to both. An endeavour has been made in the page headings to indicate the tracts with which each witness dealt.

# Volume V

## PART I

### Minutes of Evidence

At Lahore, Saturday, the 6th December 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.J., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., *Secretary*.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN, C.I.E., C.B.E., Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala.

*By the President—*

Q. You were the Deputy Commissioner of Gujranwala during the period of the disturbances?

A. I went there on the 14th April. I was under orders of transfer to Ambala and I left on the evening of the 12th and was sent back by motor car on the 14th itself, and I got back.

Q. Where had you been previously?

A. I was in Gujranwala.

Q. How long had you been at Gujranwala?

A. I was there for nearly two years.

Q. In your statement here you give us a survey of the predisposing causes for the riots. What do you think was the principal cause that unsettled the people and caused disquiet?

A. I do not know; I think it was organized from outside.

Q. Was there a certain amount of unrest in Gujranwala because of the economic conditions?

A. Not at all; Gujranwala is a very rich place and growing in prosperity. It has got two big canals, of which the Upper Chenab is only just beginning to take full effect.

Q. So far as recruiting was concerned, was there any unrest caused by the methods of recruiting?

A. No. Recruiting was almost confined to the agricultural classes and the townspeople did nothing; and it was the townspeople who joined in these riots.

Q. Were the people in Gujranwala affected by the previous outbreaks in Delhi and Amritsar?

A. Yes; I understand that the occurrences of the 14th were entirely due to a meeting of the leaders in which it was decided to repeat the incidents of Amritsar and Lahore in order to discredit the Government. That is in the approver's statement.

Q. But so far as the leaders were concerned—and by the leaders I mean those who were politically minded—was not their idea the holding of *hartal*? Or are you referring to anything more than the holding of a *hartal* so far as the leaders are concerned?

A. I understand that it was intended to create mischief on the 14th.

Q. Were there not in Gujranwala some politically minded persons who wished to have a *hartal* as a demonstration against the Government measures in introducing the Rowlatt legislation?

A. They had a *hartal* on the 6th.

Q. Subsequently was there a *hartal* in connection with Mr. Gandhi's arrest or after his arrest?

A. It was on the 14th, after the Amritsar riots.

Q. What I really want to get at is this: you do not suggest, but you indicate as though the leaders were organizing; and by that I suppose you mean the members of the pleader class?

A. Certain pleaders were arrested.

Q. They intended that Delhi and Amritsar should be copied in the sense that riots should take place in Gujranwala?

A. Yes.

Q. On what evidence did you come to that conclusion?

A. I was told so by Mr. Heron, that he understood on the night of the 13th that there would be trouble the next morning.

Q. Who did you understand were causing the trouble?

A. Certain of the pleaders who were arrested and convicted.

Q. In your statement you say that it had been resolved on the night of the 13th "to repeat the incidents of Lahore and Amritsar in order to discredit the Government and to show sympathy with the people of these places." What information did you receive?

A. This is the evidence of one Bhagat in the Gujranwala Leaders' Case. He was a Barrister-at-Law.

Q. It was upon his information that you based your conclusion?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you any other ground?

A. Yes, one of the barristers met two or three of the leading conspirators and was telling them that they intended to create trouble.

Q. Who was it that told you?

A. Abbas Ali.

Q. Was he the man who was sentenced?

A. No, he went at once and told Mr. Heron about it. (Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate:—He is a witness.)

Q. Who was the man that told him?

A. Mr. Lal Singh and Mr. Amar Nath.

Q. Were these men tried then?

A. They were tried and convicted.

Q. Of what?

A. Waging war.

6 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

Q. Before the previous *hartal*, that is, the *hartal* of the 6th, a local meeting of the pleaders was held?

A. Yes, there was a meeting on the 5th. There was a notice of the meeting printed and circulated all over the town calling the public to meet together and a number of pleaders and traders put their signatures to it.

Q. I think you saw the leaders?

A. I called them and warned them that if any disorder took place I should hold them personally responsible.

Q. What did you mean by that intimation? Did you mean that if the *hartal* took place and any violence resulted you would hold them responsible?

A. That I should arrest them.

Q. Were you going to do that, apart from the question whether they had advocated violence or not?

A. I made it clear to them that if violence followed it would be due to their preachings.

Q. Of course, it is one thing that violence should follow upon misunderstood advice and another thing that violence should follow without being encouraged; is there any reason to suppose that in the meeting of the 5th April, the leaders incited them to violence?

A. Not on that day.

Q. I think the resolutions that were passed at the meeting are the ones you set forth:—

(i) "That this meeting expresses its strong protest against the Rowlatt Bill and views with consternation and disapproval the manner in which it has been passed in the teeth of unanimous opposition and the considered judgment of the country as a whole.

(ii) This meeting expects that the 6th of April be observed as a national protest day and a fast of 24 hours be kept by all, and that all business in the town be suspended for the day.

(iii) That this meeting views with alarm the action of the Delhi authorities in firing upon the people of the city, which resulted in the deaths of so many citizens; and urges on the Government the need of enquiring into responsibility for the said occurrence.

(iv) That a cable be despatched to the Secretary of State, etc., etc., conveying the purport of the resolutions."

The third resolution deals with matters I won't trouble you with. As regards the first two, was there anything wrong in either of these resolutions?

A. Nothing in themselves.

Q. Then unless a speech was made in furtherance of the *hartal* or there was something said that incited them to violence, you have no necessity to condemn any meeting?

A. I warned them to see that there was no trouble, and I took no further action.

Q. You suggest a reason in your statement for advocating trouble?

A. I did suggest that it was possibly a trial of strength.

Q. What justification had you to suggest that?

A. It is a matter of opinion.

Q. During this period, from the end of March to the 13th of April, were there rumours in Gujranwala as to the effect of the Rowlatt legislation?

A. Rumours that Government were going to do this and do that were afloat.

Q. Were the rumours that were in circulation, within your knowledge, false rumours?

A. Yes.

Q. Had the circulation of these rumours had a bad effect on the people, or a disquieting effect?

A. I did not notice anything.

Q. Had people, in consequence of these rumours, not worked themselves up to excitement against the Rowlatt legislation?

A. I did not notice any particular excitement before I left the district on the evening of the 12th.

Q. Then you left on the evening of the 12th? When did you return?

A. I returned by motor car on the 14th.

Q. At what time did you return?

A. I just got to the edge of the civil station at quarter past 2. The motor car broke down and I had to walk. I had got to see where the ladies and children were.

Q. By the time the aeroplanes arrived, did you discover what took place that day?

A. I saw the place burning and I met Mr. Heron, Mr. Nevill and other officers.

Q. What traces of damage did you see on your inspection?

A. At that time, the buildings were all burning.

Q. Nobody extinguished the fire?

A. It burnt all night.

Q. What other buildings?

A. The station was burning the next morning.

Q. Did you ascertain that the earliest incident that had occurred in the course of the day was that of the calf being killed and hung up by the neck to the Katchi railway bridge?

A. That was the first thing.

Q. Did you find rumours circulated as to who did it?

A. Yes, that the police had done it. No true rumours.

Q. Were such rumours as that calculated to excite the feelings against the Hindus?

A. Yes.

Q. So far as I know, no useful object was served by the circulation of such rumours?

A. That is the one object.

Q. Then you mentioned about the station burning. Did you really see the bridge burning?

A. I did not see at that time.

Q. Did you see it after?

A. I did not.

Q. That bridge is not far from the station, I think?

A. One bridge was on the west of the station and the other on the east.

Q. I think the first one that was burnt was the one on the west. This is described in your statement as a small bridge. That is inaccurate?

A. Yes, it is the bridge of the railway.

Q. The sleepers of the bridge were all set on fire?

A. Yes.

Q. All these sleepers were burnt by merely putting a match to them?

A. No, by pouring kerosene oil and setting fire to it.

Q. After the kerosene oil burnt out, the sleepers caught fire?

A. Yes.

Q. Had several of the sleepers been put on fire?

A. I did not take notice.

Q. You went there the next day?

A. I was doing many things next day.

Q. Had anything occurred to telegraph wires?

A. They were all down.

Q. I think the telephone to Lahore was still open?

A. It was open for a short time after the telegraph lines were cut.

Q. Communication was sent by telephone to Lahore as to the occurrences?

A. One message was sent soon after the train started, then the next message had to be sent to the railway station at Eminabad which was sent off by mid-day.

Q. What was the attitude of the railway staff?

A. They were hostile to Government.

Q. You mean that they did not assist?

A. I was not there, a witness said they would in no way assist in keeping the station clear.

Q. You mean the report of Mr. Nevill?

A. Yes.

Q. Was railway traffic interfered with in consequence of what had taken place?

A. Yes.

Q. When was traffic over the bridge that was burnt running that side?

A. I think it went on almost at once, but there was not sufficient damage done to the railway line to stop running of trains, for military purposes.

6 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

Q. The other bridge that was attempted to be set on fire was the Kachi bridge; that was the bridge on which the corpse was hung. Was serious damage done to that bridge?

A. No, it was checked.

Q. Is that bridge easy to set on fire?

A. It can easily be done.

Q. You did not see any actual attacks by the mob?

A. No.

Q. From what you saw at the time, what would have been the object of the mob in destroying the property in the way it was destroyed?

A. It was hostility to British Government.

Q. Was large looting done in Gujranwala at the railway station?

A. Yes. Once the goods shed was fired, a lot of the people who were working as porters ran away and the mob came and carried off the sacks that were lying there.

Q. Would the firing of the station or the destroying of the telephone wires in any way have aided them in merely looting?

A. That was to interfere with the railway traffic.

Q. You think it was a different object and looting was subsidiary?

A. The looting happened when they saw the goods shed was burning. They availed themselves of the opportunity.

Q. You referred to the arrival of the aeroplane. When did the aeroplane arrive?

A. I got into the Treasury to see that the women and children were alright. At that time the aeroplane was hovering above head, just about 3 o'clock.

Q. Did any bomb fall where you were? How many bombs were dropped?

A. I understand six were dropped of which two took effect, just outside the goods sheds, opposite the two level crossings.

Q. What casualties were caused by it?

A. I believe 11 deaths, all told, including those shot by the police, and 27 wounded, I think.

Q. I just want to know if you have got it from any witness?

A. I understand that one bomb killed five men and wounded four and that another bomb killed one and wounded one; what the others did I do not know.

Q. We were informed that two bombs were dropped on two villages in the neighbourhood of Gujranwala. What were the casualties caused by these bombs?

A. One was caused.

Q. Did you include these casualties? That includes the total number of casualties caused by aeroplanes and firing by the police in Gujranwala?

A. Yes.

Q. On the morning of the 15th, you went round the city making a certain number of arrests?

A. Yes.

Q. Whom did you arrest on that occasion? You arrested 23 persons altogether?

A. Yes. Probably all people who were said to be leaders and some others who were comprised in the mob.

Q. As regards the mob, I presume you arrested them because there was evidence connecting them with the actual acts of violence and destruction. Why did you arrest the leaders?

A. Because all through the previous day, there had been meetings in the town at which mobs were excited by these leaders.

Q. By "excited" you mean "encouraged to do acts of violence?"

A. Not exactly. One or two of the speakers spoke violently, but the majority confined themselves to preaching Hindu-Moslem unity and matters of that kind.

Q. Did you arrest those leaders who had confined themselves to preaching Hindu-Moslem unity?

A. I arrested all those who I had reason to believe were stimulating an outbreak.

Q. Do you think any one had stimulated the outbreak who had spoken at the meeting?

A. I do certainly.

Q. In making the arrests you proceeded on the assumption that everybody who had spoken had spoken at a previous meeting?

A. On the 14th, there was a meeting, after meeting the mob would turn out and demonstrate outside the railway station and then would retire to the city again. And then another disorder, as a result of listening to the speeches of these leaders.

Q. Do you mean to say that it is after the listening to the discourses that they did violence in different parts of the city?

A. It was after Mr. Heron was attacked on the railway lines and he fired and the police with him had fired, two wounded were taken to the assembly where a talk was going on, after that the people broke out and began to burn.

Q. In connection with the people you arrested, how many leaders did you arrest actually?

A. I have not got the details here, I think about a dozen.

Q. Were all these men afterwards prosecuted?

A. Yes.

Q. Were any of them convicted?

A. One or two.

(Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate:—Four.)

Q. And those who were convicted, what were they convicted of?

A. Two to sentence of death and two to transportation for life.

Q. What happened afterwards?

A. Some of the sentences were reduced to two years and some to three years.

Q. As regards the two other prisoners, was the sentence carried out?

A. The biggest sentence that remained in the end was three years, that is after the revision by the present Committee.

Q. How many Europeans are there in Gujranwala, many Europeans?

A. No, it is a small station, and the American missionaries had gone away the night before in consequence of information given to them by the Indian Christians. They went away at midnight.

Q. Were there practically any Europeans?

A. We had the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner, the Superintendent of Police and the Assistant Superintendent of Police, the District Engineer with wife and four children—Captain Godfrey had gone away on the 13th, the night before—and there was an European Permanent Way Inspector, with, I think, two ladies of his household.

Q. On the day of the outbreak, confining yourself to that day, were there many Europeans in Gujranwala?

A. Yes.

Q. How many were there?

A. I think in the Treasury there were eight men and nine women and children.

Q. Did they actually take refuge on that day?

A. No.

Q. Where did they remain the whole day?

A. Mr. Wace was away at Eminabad to superintend the annual Cattle Fair there. Mr. Nevill and Mr. Heron were taken up all the day in dealing with the riots. Mr. Shaw had been asked by Mr. Heron to watch his family and take refuge in the Treasury when things looked dangerous and he actually got into the Treasury ten minutes before the rioters attacked the Court House. Captain Godfrey had gone away and I was away too.

Q. Martial Law was proclaimed over your district, I think, on the 16th?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you consider it was necessary?

A. Yes. We had outbreaks in 14 different places in the Gujranwala district as it was.

Q. About those places you have made a mention in your statement?

A. Yes.

Q. What are they? The first was Wazirabad?

6 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BAIKEN.

[Continued.]

A. Yes, Wazirabad, Hafizabad, Ramnagar, Akalgarh, Chuharkana, Daman Singh, Moman, Sangla and Aulakh. I have not dealt in my report about Chuharkana because Mr. Bosworth-Smith was made responsible for that area.

Q. In your statement you are dealing with the area for which you were responsible and the first of these is Wazirabad?

A. Yes.

Q. Just give shortly what occurred at Wazirabad. An attempt was made to force a *hartal* on the 6th but that there was no *hartal*?

A. No.

Q. It was frustrated by the efforts of the Muhammadans?

A. Yes, they were all pleased to do this.

Q. How did you come to know that. Did you make an investigation?

A. They said there will be no *hartal* at Wazirabad, while there was a *hartal* at Gujranwala.

Q. Then on the 12th, it was decided to have a *hartal* on the 13th?

A. Yes.

Q. That was postponed to the 15th?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you suggest it was postponed because some of the traders might not lose their profits from the *Baisakhi* Fair?

A. Yes, the 13th and 14th were the *Baisakhi* days and they postponed it so that they might not lose their profits.

Q. Then on the 14th, did they know of what had occurred at Gujranwala?

A. Some of the people went from Gujranwala to Wazirabad that afternoon.

Q. How far is Wazirabad from Gujranwala?

A. Twenty miles.

Q. Was there an agitation in favour of the *hartal* on the following day?

A. Yes, they met in the mosque.

Q. During the afternoon a meeting was convened. Did groups march through the streets?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you say they were singing inflammatory songs?

A. Well, among other things they were saying that nobody was to give girls to the Wazirabad men because they had not had *hartal* so far.

Q. That sort of thing was said?

A. Yes, unless Wazirabad took action they would be treated with contempt by the people.

Q. The people who said those things must have come from outside?

A. Yes, from Gujranwala.

Q. Then on the 15th a *hartal* was held?

A. Yes.

Q. What happened in the schools on the 15th at Wazirabad?

A. Well, they first of all attacked the telegraph wires on both sides of the station and destroyed them. They attacked the distant signals and set fire to the bridge over the Palku close to the Chenab. Then there was a force of cavalry round the station so they could not do much. They went away to the Gujranwala side and burnt the house of Reverend Grahame Bailey, a Scotch missionary, living there for years and years.

Q. Unfortunately the Reverend Mr. Bailey was not in the house?

A. No. All the Europeans had been away to Wazirabad itself.

Q. They burnt his house and looted all valuable things?

A. Very valuable.

Q. Had the crowd any grievance against Reverend Bailey?

A. No, it was purely because he had a white face. There were those who said that he ought to be let off because he was Irish but that was overruled.

Q. That is because he was a European?

A. Yes.

Q. Where is the place called Ghakhar?

A. It is a station half-way between Gujranwala and Wazirabad.

Q. Was any attempt made there?

A. Yes. Some *brimachars* of villages near by came and asked the people of Ghakhar to attack the line but the people of Ghakhar refused.

Q. I think on the 16th of April you with the Superintendent of Police visited Wazirabad and superintended the arrests of certain of the leaders?

A. Yes.

Q. Were troops also sent to Wazirabad?

A. Troops were already there and afterwards the General of the Sialkot Brigade moved his headquarters there.

Q. As regards Hafizabad what happened there?

A. Well, there they damaged the signals and damaged the telegraph wire and the most serious thing they did was that they made an attack on Lieutenant Tatam who was travelling with a small boy. A large mob, as the train steamed in, rushed towards the station and he seeing the trouble shut up all the windows and shutters, the gauges and the frames of every opening and locked the doors and hoped that the crowd would not notice him. However they broke right through with bolts and stones and did their best to kill him but fortunately a Sikh wedding party was in the train and mainly with their aid the guard was informed and the train was taken away. Ordinarily the stopping time of this train at Hafizabad was 20 minutes.

Q. That is how he and the small child with him were saved?

A. Yes, and owing to one young Muhammadan.

Q. At that place there had been *hartal* for several days?

A. Yes.

Q. Now coming to Akalgarh and Ramnagar, what happened there?

A. Nothing very much serious happened at Akalgarh beyond speeches and small damage to telegraph wires but at Ramnagar they burnt the effigy of the King-Emperor on the banks of the Chenab and then proceeded to have a bath afterwards.

Q. On what date was that?

A. That was on the 15th.

Q. Was a report as to what had occurred sent to you and did you investigate it?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, after the bath did they return in triumph to the town?

A. After having the bath they returned to the town shouting "George *mar gaya* (George is dead), George *ka siyapa*." (*Siyapa* is a funeral).

Q. Where is Ramnagar? How far is it from Wazirabad?

A. Six miles from Akalgarh between it and Wazirabad, going through Hafizabad and Sangla.

Q. How are these different places situated from Gujranwala?

A. Akalgarh is 16 miles from Wazirabad.

Q. How far is Wazirabad from Gujranwala?

A. Twenty miles. It is difficult to get direct to Akalgarh. Ramnagar is six miles on the *pakia* road from Akalgarh.

Q. Did any incident take place at Aulakh?

A. Yes, one incident that took place at Aulakh was that the zamindars burnt the *patwari's* papers at village Aulakh.

Q. On what date did that occur?

A. On the 16th April. That was the only case in which zamindars took any action on my half of the district. On Mr. Bosworth-Smith's half there was trouble at Chuharkana.

Q. Would it have been much more serious if the zamindars had joined in the riots.

A. Much. I sent at once the Assistant Superintendent of Police and a British officer and a force of both soldiers and police was sent out in tum-tums.

Q. Do they constitute a warlike portion of the population?

A. Yes.



6 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

Q. I think those who had been guilty of the act of burning these papers were arrested?

A. Yes, eight of them were convicted.

Q. In connection with the measures adopted under martial law were troops despatched to different affected areas?

A. All over the district very quickly.

Q. And I think the headquarters of the Sialkot Brigade were removed to Wazirabad?

A. Yes.

Q. And detachments were sent to Gujranwala, Hafizabad and Wazirabad?

A. Yes.

Q. How many troops were altogether utilized in your area for maintaining order?

A. I can give the figures. We had 90 men in Gujranwala. Later on they were reduced to 50. There were small detachments.

Q. Could you have carried on, in your opinion, and maintained law and order without the assistance of the military?

A. No.

Q. I do not know whether we have gone through the Martial Law Orders of the Gujranwala District. Had you issued Martial Law Orders in the similar way just as they had at Lahore or were they different?

A. I do not think they were on anything like such a scale. We enforced the Curfew Law to keep people indoors at night but we had to ease that off quickly because it interfered with the movements of carts and pack animals to market.

Q. Because you felt that it interfered with their movements?

A. Yes, once we felt, there was no serious danger or more restrictions were not necessary.

Q. I think you had proclaimed an order as regards saluting the British Flag. That is Order No. 11, Gujranwala District.

A. Yes. It was found that agitation was going up and down the railway line.

Q. Were there many cases of flogging?

A. I think 16. All spread over three or four places.

Q. Flogging sentence was pronounced by the Special Tribunals or by the Summary Courts?

A. Four, I think, were pronounced by the Commissions in Lahore and the rest by Summary Courts and by the Area Officers.

Q. Did you try any of these cases yourself?

A. No. Mr. Wace tried some and the others were dealt with by the Area Officers.

Q. Did flogging in any case take place in public?

A. I think one took place in public, though I am not quite sure.

Q. Then after that one case, you stopped public flogging?

A. Yes.

Q. Were instructions sent to you that flogging should not take place in public?

A. Yes.

Q. These might have come from Local Government?

A. I think so. They might have been issued by the General.

Q. As regards those who were flogged, were they youths or men? Were there any old or feeble men that were flogged?

A. I don't think so.

Q. In connection with the damage that was done, a very considerable number of claims had been made?

A. Yes. They were as follows:—

	Rs.
Gujranwala . . . . .	5,37,000
Wazirabad . . . . .	69,000
Hafizabad . . . . .	6,000
Akalgarh . . . . .	1,000

But I think they were somewhat reduced. Gujranwala was reduced.

Q. Was any claim also put in by the North-Western Railway?

A. They put it in first and then withdrew it.

Q. The damage to Railway as put in the claims was considerable?

A. It was about eight lakhs damage. The damage to the railway buildings is included in the five lakhs. Rs. 8,20,000 gives the damage done by the mob but I think it was decided under section 82 that the claims of the damages done by the enemies of the King should not be recovered. I think that has been adhered to.

Q. In dealing with the question as to methods pursued by the mob you say here in your statement that "In Hafizabad on the 15th of April the cry of the leaders was 'See how, although the main line is stopped, troops are able to go round through Hafizabad towards Lahore, Amritsar and Delhi to fight against our brothers.' We should stop this line also."

A. Yes.

Q. Did you get information that such was the matter?

A. I was told at Hafizabad.

Q. You were told at Hafizabad itself?

A. Yes.

Q. When you were making an inquiry there?

A. Yes. The main line was stopped but the mails went round *via* Sangla for a day or two. It was the passage of the mails that led Hafizabad people speaking in that way.

Q. In connection with the mobs, were there any violence or damages done by many students or school-boys?

A. There was a very large proportion of youths and boys.

Q. Did you form any opinion as to how that came about?

A. It struck me that they must have been taught before but that is only an opinion.

Q. You do not attribute to school-boys the plan of spoiling the railway or burning the railway bridges but it was the action of some of the older people?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. I want to see if I have outlines of the Gujranwala story rightly. After the *hartal* on the 6th and until the 13th there was no actual trouble in Gujranwala?

A. No.

Q. Before the meeting which had been called for the 5th you warned the leaders?

A. Yes, on the 5th itself.

Q. Of course at that time you did not know what the resolutions would be, but you thought it wise to give them a general warning?

A. Yes, that if talk led to trouble they would be responsible.

Q. Now on the 13th itself as I understand, whatever meetings there had been before that, there were further meetings, as you have reason to believe, of all the people we will call for the present the leaders?

A. Yes, the inner circle.

Q. Now your information with regard to that depends, first of all, I think, upon the evidence in the main Gujranwala conspiracy case?

A. Yes.

Q. Secondly, upon the fact that on that evening the American missionaries received warning from the Indian Christians; and thirdly, I think from another source, what was that?

A. Yes, a Barrister, who was not in that circle met two of the inner circle who told him that the people were so excited that they were ready to kill Europeans and to elect their own Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police. That was what he said.

Q. Is this gentleman to whom that was said going to be called before us?

A. Yes.

Q. As regards what you told us about this meeting of the 13th, those are the three sources of information or inference which we have to go upon, so far as you know?

6 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

A. That there was going to be trouble next day. I should perhaps say that Mr. Heron went round to the missionaries at 9 o'clock at night, I think, and asked them to go, and they took counsel together and said no, they thought it would be all right, and it was later than that, about 10 or 11, that the Indian Christians came to them and said that they would be all right provided the white people went.

Q. Of course you had left on the 12th?

A. I had left on the 12th.

Q. Now you yourself arrived on the 14th at Gujranwala just after the aeroplanes had arrived?

A. When I was inside the Treasury asking people whether they were all right aeroplanes were overhead. I had not noticed them as I came along.

Q. I see from the War Diary that about 10 minutes past three in the afternoon the aeroplanes seemed to have sighted Gujranwala, and apart from what they did on surrounding villages, they seem to have dropped two bombs at 20 minutes to 4 according to the War Diary?

A. Yes.

Q. And at that time you were in Gujranwala yourself?

A. I was in Gujranwala myself.

Q. Now it is a little difficult to collect on how many occasions the police had to fire at Gujranwala. Could you from your information just summarise for me the occasions of firing on the 14th?

A. There was no firing at all until the attack on Mr. Heron, which was at about 11 o'clock in the day. Till then there had been a lot of throwing of stones and marching and counter-marching and shouting, but Mr. Heron was himself very anxious and was persuaded by the magistrate with him to take no strong measures, that it was expected that the mob would settle down.

Q. That was at about 11 o'clock; what was the next occasion of firing that you know of?

A. Then there was no other firing until the news came that the mob had broken across the railway line and gone up to the courts and set them alight. On that Mr. Heron left the railway station with two parties, one going to one side and one to the other, and they fired long distance shots at people wherever they could see them.

Q. What time would this firing be, can you give it to me roughly according to your information and belief?

A. I suppose it must have been about 2 o'clock, but Mr. Nevill would be able to tell you better.

Q. I just want to get a grasp of the sequence of events. After that firing, was there any other firing which you can mention to me?

A. I believe the guard at the station fired. From that point Mr. Heron notes that wherever a mob was found it was fired on.

Q. Was there any occasion of outstanding importance that you can mention to me, giving me that time, or was it a question of what I may call scraps in the street after that?

A. It was scraps up and down the civil station which is the other side of the railway.

Q. Apart from the fact that the thing had got to such a pass that the crowd was fired at whenever seen, those are the two occasions of firing, about 11 o'clock and 2 o'clock, that you know of?

A. Yes.

Q. Now before 11 o'clock a good deal of damage had been done at the railway station, had it not?

A. The first incident was the attack on the train, and then the cutting of the telegraph wires near the distant signal and the setting fire to the railway bridge west of the station.

Q. And before 11 o'clock what else had happened?

A. After that telegraph wires on the Lahore side of the station were also cut.

Q. Apparently the railway station had been set on fire before 11 o'clock.

A. What Mr. Heron says is that at about 10-30 news was received that a mob had set fire to the *kutchka* railway bridge, that is on the east of the station, some 4 or 500 yards from the city on the Lahore side. A posse of

police was sent to the spot and there dispersed the mob; but the wooden planks of the bridge had been seriously damaged by fire, and it was later reported by the railway authorities that the bridge was rendered unsafe for the passage of trains. Several black flags were seen at various places. The crowd, however, kept moving in and out of the city. Some 20 or 30 minutes later he says he received information that the mob was damaging the railway line on the Lahore side of the station near the *kutchka* bridge, and taking a small force of constables he proceeded to the spot.

Q. I shall get all that from Mr. Heron; I want you to summarise it for me quite roughly. Apart from this, the mob had attacked the railway near the distant signal before 11 o'clock?

A. Yes.

Q. And the *kutchka* bridge was burning before that time?

A. Yes.

Q. And can you tell me whether the Superintendent of Police had to use his revolver before 11 o'clock, or whether this 11 o'clock incident is the same incident as that in which he had to take part?

A. When he came back from driving off the mob from breaking up the railway line, the men in that party went on to the Grand Trunk Road on the other side of the railway fencing and they were joined by others. After this the mob re-crossed on to the railway line and attacked Mr. Heron. They were armed with lathis, heavy iron hammers, crow-bars, etc., and the remainder were armed with stones which they continued throwing. Having been struck by three stones, one on the face and one on the shoulder, Mr. Heron gave his men orders to fire, and himself drew his revolver and fired a couple of shots. He says the man who attacked him was nearest to him and his hands were within a couple of inches of his neck.

Q. That was the firing at about 11 o'clock?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the exact site of that firing?

A. It was a couple of hundred yards down on the east side of the railway station.

Q. Then the firing at 2 o'clock, what was the spot at which that took place?

A. Up and down the civil station.

Q. And after 2 o'clock the crowds had been dispersed in the civil station from time to time by being fired at whenever seen?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you give me an idea of how long this state of affairs lasted during that day?

A. I could not tell you.

Q. I do not think in Gujranwala itself there were in fact, as it happened, any cases of Europeans other than the officials on duty dealing with the mobs being attacked?

A. No.

Q. Can you tell me at about what time of day on the 14th according to your information, these people were collected into the Treasury or Tahsil?

A. It was only Mr. Shaw and his family who actually went into the Treasury just before the mob arrived to burn it; it must have been about 1.

Q. As regards the other people you have mentioned, the half-a-dozen European officials who had their families, I presume, in the civil station, were there any incidents throughout that day of particular houses being selected for attention by the mob?

A. No. Mr. Buckley, the Permanent-Way Inspector, took refuge with an Indian Guard.

Q. About the buildings, which were attacked, first of all there was the railway station including the signals, shed, the goods shed, and other places; there was the wire-cutting in connection with the railway station and the bridges that were attacked?

A. Yes.

Q. Apart from that were the telegraph wires cut?

A. The telegraph wires were cut on both sides.

Q. Is there any telephone in Gujranwala?

A. There was a railway telephone.

6 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

Q. Was that cut ?

A. Yes.

Q. As I understand the District Court was set on fire ?

A. The central building of the District Court was burnt.

Q. And that is near the Tahsil ?

A. No, it is near the Treasury.

Q. Was the Post Office attacked ?

A. The Post Office was attacked and burnt.

Q. Was there any other public building burnt other than what I have mentioned ?

A. The Tahsil, and there was the Industrial School and the Church.

Q. Now this Industrial School, what sort of a school was that, was it a public institution ?

A. It was a District Board School.

Q. A public institution maintained by Government funds ?

A. I think Government may have subscribed something, but it was the District Board School.

Q. Is it a European Institution in any sense ?

A. No. And they burned the Dāk Bungalow.

Q. So that, looking broadly at the buildings that were attacked, they appear to have been, with the possible exception of the Church, public buildings, and in the case of the Church a more or less distinctively European building ?

A. Yes.

Q. Was any private property attacked at all ?

A. None, except the looting in the goods shed.

Q. Now the railway in this part of the world, is that a Government affair ?

A. Yes, the railway is Government.

Q. Is it the case that aeroplanes were over Gujranwala and taking action both on the 14th and the 15th ?

A. I understand that a bomb was dropped on the 15th, why it was done I do not know.

Q. I understand that on the 15th at about 8-55 in the morning a gathering of about 20 in a field, one mile west of the town, was scattered with a Lewis Gun ?

A. It is the first time I have heard of it.

Q. That was a similar gathering outside a house in a village, half a mile to the west of the town, and a bomb was dropped which hit the adjoining house and blew the side in, in the morning just before 9 o'clock ?

A. I did not even know of that. I was thinking of the aeroplane which came out in the afternoon.

Q. On the 14th can you tell me whether, before 20 minutes to 4, any aeroplanes had taken action in Gujranwala itself ?

A. I do not know the exact course of events ; there was some machine gun firing and bombs were dropped, but which bomb was dropped on what spot I do not know.

Q. After the event I suppose you would have a look and see the places where the bombs had dropped. Did you examine the craters of these bombs ?

A. Personally I did not. All the first few days after that I was engaged in running round other parts of the district.

Q. I rather gather, as regards Gujranwala itself, from the War Diaries that the only bombs dropped in Gujranwala were two bombs which failed to explode, and that they were dropped at about 20 minutes to 4 on the afternoon of the 14th ?

A. No, there were six bombs dropped on the 14th.

Q. I am not speaking of the villages outside Gujranwala ?

A. There were two very good bombs from the point of view of my personal safety ; one bomb got on to the crowd by one level crossing and killed five and wounded four, and another only killed one man, a well known ruffian, and wounded another, close to the other level crossing. Those were the two bombs that really were of practical value.

Q. What about the other four ?

A. Well two or three were duds and practically all the four were dropped rather haphazardly. (Witness here showed the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin a map showing where bombs had been dropped.)

Q. You have in front of you two reports of aeroplane reconnaissances, one on the 14th and one on the 15th. If you will be good enough take the one of the 14th first. The one on the 14th gives an account of certain bombs dropped upon outlying villages and then towards the end it gives an account of what was done in Gujranwala itself. According to that report on the 14th there is mention of only two bombs all told as dropped in Gujranwala itself, is that so according to that report ?

A. No, it is not so ; it is known that bombs were dropped just opposite the level crossing and did go off.

Q. According to that report is there any mention of more than two bombs dropped in Gujranwala itself on the 14th ?

A. No.

Q. In fact you tell me there were six ?

A. I have always understood so.

Q. And you say that of those six, two of them which were very effectively dropped at places you have already told me, and there was a third, as I understand, almost in line with the other two on the same day ?

A. That is our information.

Q. Then at the same time there were three others, one of which was dropped on an outlying spot called the Khalsa Boarding House. Then there were two others which were dropped a little north-west of the first three you have spoken of ?

A. Yes, in the city.

Q. Can you give me any information about those two others, what they did, what their effect was, whether they exploded or not ?

A. The two bombs in the centre of the town failed to explode.

Q. Did they do any damage as duds ?

A. They did no damage.

Q. Can you give me any information as regards the occasions, the places and the effects of the fire from aeroplanes with machine guns ?

A. A sweet seller was hit with a machine gun bullet near the Khalsa School.

Q. Anything else ?

A. Some individuals were wounded by what seems to be machine gun bullets, but of course they themselves were extremely reticent.

Q. Did you find out in what part of the city they were when they were hit ?

A. I have got a list of the persons who were wounded and the places where they are said to be wounded.

Q. Where shall I find that ?

A. I have this list here.

Q. Is it a very long document ? Perhaps you could put it in ?

A. The majority of our wounded are noted as being wounded outside Chetty Singh's which is close to the main level crossing, west of the station. (Witness shows document to Mr. Justice Rankin.)

Q. I am speaking now only of people who were wounded with machine gun bullets.

A. There is no distinction drawn in this list.

Q. Then the information in your possession does not enable you to locate the spot upon which the machine gun fire from aeroplanes actually took place ?

A. No.

Q. Can you tell me whether there were any military in Gujranwala at this time ?

A. None.

Q. Can you give me any idea as to the number of inhabitants in Gujranwala proper ?

A. Of the town about thirty thousand.

Q. Can you give me any idea as to the number of police ?

A. Mr. Smith, Superintendent of Police, will appear before the Committee and he will be able to give you the numbers. On the 14th April the total strength of Gujranwala including the city and the office staff was one Inspector, six sub-inspectors, 22 head constables and 119 constables. This force was split up into three main guards, the line, the line reserve and the city reserve. At the most critical time the total number of men

6 December 1919]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

available for the protection of the railway station and the civil station was only 3 sub-inspectors, 10 head constables and 61 constables.

Q. Can you tell me whether the railway station itself was policed by railway police in addition to those?

A. No.

Q. Are the figures you have just given me of armed police?

A. A good number of these must have been armed.

Q. From what you had been able to see had you any fault to find with the fidelity or loyalty of the police?

A. Not on the whole. The situation appears to have been that they played up when they were with British officers and where they were not with a British officer they hesitated and waited for orders.

Q. Well, that is a different thing from lack of fidelity or loyalty—that would be a lack of initiative?

A. On the whole they did very well. There were one or two who were dealt with for inaction.

Q. So broadly speaking the position was not complicated by any real trouble as regards the fidelity of the police?

A. No; one sub-inspector was in a difficult position because one of the leaders of the mob was his brother.

Q. What was the number of military that arrived at night about 9 o'clock on the 14th?

A. About 50.

Q. Martial Law was proclaimed on the 16th?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was the Area Officer to begin with?

A. Major Wheatly.

Q. And was he the Area Officer for long?

A. Yes; quite a considerable time. He went away before Martial Law was ended.

Q. This would be the gentleman who had to dispose of the summary cases?

A. Yes.

Q. The actual orders under Martial Law were of course issued by a superior officer, and he would be the gentleman who would try the offences?

A. He disposed of a number of them. Mr. West, Assistant Commissioner, tried some of them.

Q. As regards the actual number of punishments of whipping, there seems to have been very few in Gujranwala?

A. Yes.

Q. And you tell us that the majority of those persons were whipped for being caught out of their houses during Curfew hours?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you have at the time any opportunity of judging how the Area Officer administered Martial Law punishments? Whether they were administered beyond necessity or otherwise?

A. I did not actually supervise any of his orders.

Q. I see there were five sentences of whipping passed by the Commissions and four by Summary Courts for minor offences between the 30th March and the date of the proclamation—so the sentences were passed after the proclamation of Martial Law?

A. Yes. The first notification enforced Martial Law from a certain date, though after that date there were very few offences except petty ones and later on by another proclamation the courts were empowered to try offences that had taken place between the 30th March and 16th April.

Q. Did you have any reason to notice any special difficulty in connection with the saluting order in Gujranwala?

A. No; I think it was generally accepted.

Q. The saluting order is No. 7 of that list. I think therefore by that order when an inhabitant met an officer he was required not merely to give him the ordinary salute, but, I think the salutation usually accorded to Indian gentlemen of high social position in accordance with the customs of India. That is to say persons riding on animals or on or in a wheeled conveyance will alight,

persons carrying opened and raised umbrellas shall lower them and all persons shall salute or salaam with the hand. I would like to know whether that particular kind of salute, so far as you know, caused any particular difficulty or burden upon the inhabitants?

A. No; I do not think so. It was generally accepted.

Q. I take it that any particular orders that were felt to be oppressive would be the subject of remarks of some of the inhabitants to you?

A. I think the only order that the people came to complain about was the Curfew. They came to me and pointed out that on account of this order traffic was being impeded and that trade was being held up; so we relaxed this order as quickly as possible.

Q. In your statement I see you have pointed out the necessity for punishing a few individuals to remind people unaccustomed to discipline and the introduction of Martial Law enabled that necessity to be brought home to the people very much effectively than could have been done without it?

A. Yes, that is so.

Q. Do you agree that the enforcement of the saluting order was a very good way to bring home to the civil population put under Martial Law that they now had a new master?

A. Yes.

Q. With regard to arrests—speaking of Gujranwala itself—could you tell me how many people were arrested and never brought to trial?

A. I do not think the figures are here. After the cases had gone to the Commissions, and petty cases of people looting at the railway station and so on had been dealt with there was a residue of persons against whom sufficient evidence had not been collected. One or two were not produced for trial, because I found that they had already been wounded and I thought that there was no good sending them up as I considered they had already suffered. There was one young pleader also, who I thought had undoubtedly been concerned, but as there was not sufficient evidence against him to take it too seriously I thought it would be sufficient to warn him. On the whole I think there were very few of that kind.

Q. Can you give me any figures? I can quite follow what you say about people being released on compassionate grounds and those being released because there was no actual charge against them, but I would like to have some figures? Do you think there would be as many as fifty or twenty?

A. I think sixteen would be nearer the mark.

Q. Can you tell me from your experience what was the longest time a man was kept in suspense without ever being brought to trial and ultimately released?

A. The longest would have been from the date of his arrest which might have been anywhere in the first two weeks after the 14th of April up to the 9th June. On the 9th June Martial Law was taken off and all the summary cases ended and anybody who was left undecided with was released.

Q. Then I take it—correct me if I am wrong—that some of these sixteen may have been kept as long as about six weeks?

A. Yes.

Q. During this time who was doing the investigation of cases? Was it the Criminal Investigation Department or the police or.....

A. The ordinary police but strengthened by special officers sent from Lahore.

Q. Can you tell me whether during this time the ordinary system of remanding was being followed?

A. No.

Q. People were not brought before Magistrates from time to time and remands taken?

A. No. There were some who were arrested who were obviously going before the Lahore tribunals, and so we did not pay very strict attention to them.

Q. The system that was adopted was in fact this, that the investigation of each case was complete, and then the man was either sent up for trial or released, and in the

6 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

meantime until the investigation was complete he was not brought up and remands taken, as would have happened in the ordinary course under civil law ?

A. There was no time.

Q. Was there any case brought to your notice of real gross hardship in connection with that, were respectable persons kept as much as six weeks and then released ?

A. No, I think that those who got off were lucky to get off.

Q. Where did they spend those six weeks ?

A. Some were in Lahore and some in the jail at Gujranwala.

Q. Was there any provision made whereby these people could offer bail and were they informed that they had the right to ask for bail ?

A. So many were charged with non-bailable offences.

Q. Apart from the fact that many were lucky to get off and assuming that they were innocent, do you remember any cases of respectable persons being kept six weeks in jail and then let off and nothing said ?

A. No.

Q. What sort of persons were these sixteen ?

A. There was a retired lawyer who was sent to Lahore in the big conspiracy case. I do not know exactly how long he was kept when he was actually let go.

Q. If that is so, he would do more or less six weeks ?

A. It would have been a month or shorter. There was then another pleader who was let go about the same time.

Q. Was that the man who was hit ? Why was he let go ?

A. Because there was no case against him. He was a minor leader, and it did not seem worth while sending him for a case which might result in his death or transportation for life.

Q. Were there any other pleaders beside those you have mentioned who were arrested and then not sent up for trial ?

A. No.

Q. Were there any people who were arrested on the basis of their previous conduct, previous to the 13th, and who were not brought up ? People against whom there was evidence of participation in the riot ?

A. Those are the only two.

Q. Did you order the arrests yourself ?

A. Yes, the arrests of the first batch.

Q. When you ordered the arrests was there any information before you ?

A. I met Mr. Heron and all the various magistrates who had seen what was going on and listened to a number of different stories and the police put up a long list, out of whom we made a selection as to the persons who were almost certainly guilty and whose arrests would likely to have a good effect on quieting the people.

Q. Was this simply a list or was it in the nature of a deposition ?

A. No ; it was a list and I was assured that the case against them was bound to be sufficiently strong.

Q. I take it this was the combined knowledge of the officials present exchanged verbally between themselves and verbal information from the police and your knowledge of the people and other non-official witnesses ?

A. Yes.

Q. In what form was their evidence before you ?

A. It was verbal. I only had time to make a number of verbal enquiries, and on that I had to take action.

Q. About the attacks upon communications. As I gather from your diary of the district these attacks upon communications were very widespread and persistent ?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell me broadly speaking then what time these attacks all took place ? Were there a great many of them on the 13th and 14th alone ?

A. Practically everything was on the 14th and 15th.

Q. So far as Gujranwala itself is concerned am I right in thinking that these attacks upon communications and telegraphs were one of the earliest manifestations of the trouble ?

A. Yes. That was the first thing that was thought of,

Q. Apart from any question of inference that there was a system behind all this, did you prosecute any enquiries to try and trace any organising hand in Gujranwala ?

A. No ; that would belong to the Central Government.

Q. Did you ever succeed in getting any information of individuals who might be behind the scenes in that matter ?

A. No.

Q. Then at Wazirabad as I understand it the rioting took a distinctly anti-European turn so much so that they burnt the house of Revd. Grahame Bailey. And the same kind of thing happened at Hafizabad when Lieutenant Tatam was attacked by the mob at the station ?

A. Yes, that is so.

Q. With regard to the incident of Ramnagar in connection with the burning of the effigy of the King-Emperor is the information in your statement based upon the trials that were held ?

A. Yes ; I tried the case myself.

Q. Can you, according to the best of your information, give me the approximate number of persons who were engaged in that insult to the King-Emperor ?

A. I think there were 28 tried, but of course there were a good many looking on and more people marched down the town shouting afterwards, but 28 were tried as being in the centre.

Q. Can you tell me what was the defence in that case—was it simply that they had not taken part in it ?

A. Almost all of them pleaded *alibis*. One man raised this point and said that nothing had happened.

Q. But I understand from what you say that you were satisfied that the incident had occurred ?

A. It was a natural thing to do for people of that type ?

Q. And you have no doubt that it occurred ?

A. I tried it judicially and found it so.

Q. I think you have said that you do not believe that the war loan and recruitment had very much to do with this excitement ?

A. No.

Q. Do you agree that the main excitement that led to these measures was the Rowlatt Act ?

A. Yes.

Q. And that excitement was heightened by the *hartal* ?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you also attribute the heightening of the excitement to the news of what had happened at Amritsar and Lahore ?

A. Yes, that is what led to action in Gujranwala and Wazirabad.

Q. Apart from any question whether there was an organised rebellion on the 14th, do you agree with the view that the explanation of all the trouble was due to the Rowlatt Act, heightened by the *hartal* and heightened by the example of what had happened at Amritsar and Lahore and other places ?

A. Yes.

Q. But in either case those are the three pre-disposing causes in your view ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the people in Gujranwala care much one way or the other about Amritsar persons like Kitchlew and Satyapal ?

A. Well, Satyapal came originally from Wazirabad. One of his relations was arrested in Wazirabad.

Q. In Gujranwala, do you think, whether he was deported or not on the 10th, they cared much for him ?

A. I would not put it that way. It is really certain things that had happened in Amritsar which they liked to copy.

Q. As far as you could tell from the cries of the mob, have you any reason to suppose that the mob at Gujranwala at any time went about crying out the names of Kitchlew and Satyapal, or making any other Amritsar cries ?

A. I am not sure on that point. I was not there.

Q. Well, let us keep to what you heard yourself. You were not there ?

A. I was not there.

6 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

Q. Martial Law in Gujranwala area, I rather gather, was relaxed much earlier than at any other place as regards Curfew orders?

A. I think so.

Q. When did the relaxation come into operation apart from railways?

A. The only point that we were interested in as far as Martial Law was concerned was in being able to get the cases tried by the summary courts, otherwise the actual Martial Law restrictions went off very quickly?

Q. How long were the actual Martial Law restrictions in force?

A. I could not say that, but they had to get passes, and that was because the railways could not carry them after a time.

Q. When do you say that Martial Law began to be relaxed apart from the Curfew in Gujranwala itself? It started on the 16th April and it was finished for good on the 10th June. What is the date between those times that you would put as the watershed. When do you think Martial Law began to go downhill again?

A. The restrictions as to railway traffic and orders for saluting went on till the end, but I take it that the most severe portion of it was the Curfew order.

Q. And that was relaxed when? Can you give me the date?

A. I could not give the dates. They were by separate notifications. There was correspondence with the General about it. I think we relaxed it in Gujranwala quicker than it was relaxed in Wazirabad.

Q. Well, I will get that from the proclamation. In your view was Martial Law in Gujranwala continued beyond what it was necessary?

A. No, I don't think so.

Q. You think that if on the 16th April you were furnished with the same number of troops to assist the civil authorities, the district could have been reduced to peace and order without the declaration of Martial Law?

A. And the judicial arrangements.

Q. You think that Martial Law would have been necessary for the judicial arrangements?

A. The courts were established under Martial Law.

Q. You think that Martial Law would have been necessary for that reason?

A. Very necessary.

Q. Apart from that reason, do you think that simply the presence of the military in Gujranwala district without the declaration of Martial Law would have been sufficient not only to restore law and order, but to make a certainty of restoring law and order.

A. I think it was necessary. I think the effect was very great. If we merely had troops behind the civil authorities, I don't think the effect would have been the same.

Q. What is the earliest date you think it safe for a single European unarmed to have gone with complete safety to the bazar? What is the earliest date that you can say of it after the 15th April?

A. I should not like to give an opinion.

Q. Can you give me any idea at all? If you cannot yourself give it, we will get it from somebody else.

A. I think he could have gone in the early part.

Q. And if Martial Law had not been proclaimed, do you think that state of things might have lasted longer than it did?

A. Yes.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. In your view the unrest in Gujranwala district was entirely political?

A. Yes.

Q. You don't think that war weariness, high prices, income-tax enhancement and other things affected it?

A. I don't think it affected Gujranwala in any way, as Gujranwala has done extremely well out of the war. I know there are different opinions, but I cannot agree that as far as Gujranwala is concerned these things affected it,

Q. We have been told with regard to every other place that war weariness, high prices, income-tax operations, and all those things had a great deal to do with the unrest. You do not agree with that so far as Gujranwala district is concerned?

A. I do not agree with that.

Q. You think that none of these things had anything to do with the unrest in Gujranwala?

A. Gujranwala town had very little to do with war work, therefore there cannot be any war weariness.

Q. You say that the people of Gujranwala were not tired of the war? They would have liked it if the war had continued?

A. I don't say so, but they had not very much to do with the war activities.

Q. They were not tired of the war, were they?

A. They were glad to have the war over.

Q. Were they not affected by the high prices consequent on the war?

A. Not the trading classes of whom many were concerned in the riots. They had made large profits out of the conditions arising out of the war.

Q. They might have made large profits, but they might not like to pay high prices?

A. As long as the profits remained in their pockets, they were all right.

Q. You don't think that the people were dissatisfied with the high prices in Gujranwala?

A. I don't think so. I think the only people affected by the high prices were Government servants and other officials on fixed wages.

Q. Of course the fixed pay people were more hit but the whole population was certainly affected?

A. The labouring classes in Gujranwala obtained high wages which entirely compensated for the high prices.

Q. You do not mean to suggest that the rise in wages was in any way proportionate to the rise in prices?

A. Oh, yes, I have always understood so.

Q. What was the rise in wages, 300 or 400 per cent?

A. I could not give exact figures, but I have always understood that the Kashmiri coolies and others obtained very large wages as compared to the pre-war wages.

Q. The wages increased everywhere, but the increase in prices was much more than the increase in wages; in many places the prices of various necessities of life went up 300 to 400 per cent?

A. No doubt they did.

Q. The rise in wages was certainly nothing proportionate?

A. But certainly in proportion to the rise in the prices of commodities.

Q. If the rise in prices was much more than the rise in wages, it would certainly affect the labouring population. Would it not?

A. Yes, if that is so.

Q. Now this unrest which, in your view, was entirely political, when did it first start in Gujranwala?

A. The only manifestation we had of it was the *hartal* of the 6th and the troubles of the 14th.

Q. There was nothing there that came under your observation before the 6th April?

A. No.

Q. Everything was quiet before that?

A. Yes.

Q. And you had nothing to complain of in the behaviour of the people before the 6th April?

A. No.

Q. Everything was quiet and the people looked perfectly loyal?

A. Yes.

Q. And before the 6th April had you ever noticed in Gujranwala any *anti-Government* or *anti-British* feeling?

A. There were always a certain number of people who enjoyed reading about reverses to the British. That went on during the war. There was always a certain class which enjoyed reading stories that were unfavourable to the British.

Q. Did this come under your personal observation?

A. I was told that there were people of that kind.

6 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

- Q. You did not take any serious notice of it, did you ?  
A. No.
- Q. It must be a very small number of people who took that view, I mean it was not so marked as to attract attention ?  
A. Certain newspapers especially from outside were very much enjoyed by certain classes.
- Q. You think that was an indication of anti-British feeling ?  
A. Well, if the papers were anti-British.
- Q. Those papers were anti-British ?  
A. Yes.
- Q. In what sense ?  
A. I did not read them myself, but this was the information I received.
- Q. Had you ever read those newspapers that you refer to ?  
A. I read copies of one paper which was sent up with a recommendation that it should be excluded. That I remember.
- Q. That paper was anti-British ?  
A. Yes.
- Q. What did it say ? That the British Government should be turned out of India ?  
A. I don't remember exactly what the words were.
- Q. When was this ?  
A. It was in 1918, I think.
- Q. A good number of newspapers were prohibited entry in the Punjab by the Punjab Government ?  
A. Yes.
- Q. While other Governments had not taken any such action with regard to those newspapers ?  
A. That is so.
- Q. The Punjab Government was very singular in that way ?  
A. Well, I suppose they thought that the Punjab was more inflammable.
- Q. I thought, Colonel, that the Punjab was always represented to be and the Lieutenant-Governor had on many occasions said that it was, the most loyal province in India ?  
A. That is true, certain classes at any rate.
- Q. Not only the most loyal, but as possessing much more strong common-sense than any other province in India ?  
A. Yes, I am quite prepared to agree to that.
- Q. Surely people who possess sturdy common-sense are not generally inflammable ?  
A. No.
- Q. You say this unrest was organized from outside. Where do you think this organization was ; was it outside the Punjab ?  
A. I have no information on that point.
- Q. Then on what do you base your statement ? You say here it was organized from outside. On what material do you base that statement ?  
A. It is only a private opinion, it is my own opinion.
- Q. Surely, Colonel when you arrive at an opinion you base that opinion on some foundation, on some material ?  
A. Yes, I don't quite know what exactly to say. One reason I would suggest for arguing in that direction is the outbreaks on the railway at Kundian and Malakwal, both railway junctions of importance on the road to the frontier, whereas other places in the neighbourhood did not break out.
- Q. What is the meaning of, it was organized from outside ? Do you mean outside Gujranwala or outside the Punjab province ?  
A. I don't know what the organization was, but I don't think that Gujranwala by itself would have started off in that way. That is my point.
- Q. That is not my question. My question is here you say, it was organized from outside. What do you mean by outside ? Do you mean outside Gujranwala or outside the Punjab province ?  
A. I do not know. There were manifestations in Delhi and on the Bombay side.
- Q. Surely, Colonel, you know what you mean by what you say here "it was organized from outside." I want to know when you framed that sentence what did you mean, whether outside Gujranwala or outside the Punjab ?  
A. I certainly meant outside Gujranwala.
- Q. So according to that the organization that you refer to was in the Punjab but outside Gujranwala ?  
A. I don't say that. I say that it was certainly outside Gujranwala.
- Q. Was it outside the Punjab or inside ?  
A. That I cannot tell you.
- Q. You cannot say where the organization was ?  
A. No, I have no information.
- Q. You do not know whether there was any organization at all ?  
A. No.
- Q. And then why do you say here "it was organized ..." when you never knew whether there was an organization at all or not ?  
A. As I said, it was only my assumption. I don't think that the Gujranwala people would have started it off of their own accord, therefore I assumed that it must have come from outside.
- Q. You assumed the existence of an organization without any evidence at all ? You never made any enquiries ?  
A. It is not for me to take into consideration every individual thing outside my own district.
- Q. Colonel, you have made a statement, and surely you must base that statement on some material ?  
A. I am like our friend this morning. I did not expect to be cross-examined.
- Q. Therefore you thought it did not matter if you made that statement and that it would not be challenged ?  
A. I was asked to give my opinion by the Punjab Government and I gave it.
- Q. Now the meeting of the 5th April that you refer to, that was openly called by a notice signed by various people and there was no secrecy about that meeting at all ?  
A. No.
- Q. And the resolutions that were passed at that meeting are those that you set out in Section III of your statement ?  
A. Yes.
- Q. There is nothing objectionable in them ?  
A. No.
- Q. Then the *hartal* that took place the next day, the 6th April, that you say in Section II was intended by the organizers to be peaceful ?  
A. Yes, it was peaceful all over the province.
- Q. But the point that I am now on is, you say that the organizers intended it to be peaceful ?  
A. I think so.
- Q. And it passed off also smoothly ?  
A. Yes.
- Q. So till the 6th April when the *hartal* was carried out, the intention of the people who were taking this action was that it was to be entirely peaceful ?  
A. I take it so, yes.
- Q. And that they never intended that any violence should be committed by any one ?  
A. No.
- Q. Therefore, I take it, Colonel that you do not impute any incitement to violence to them ?  
A. Not on that day.
- Q. You impute that after that day they changed their peaceful intentions and entertained the idea of inciting violence ?  
A. That I do think, and that has been accepted by the tribunals.
- Q. When did that change come over them, according to you ? On the 6th, 7th or later ?  
A. I gathered that it took place on the 13th, but of course I was not in the counsels of those people.
- Q. True, but you were the Deputy Commissioner of Gujranwala, and holding that position you must have made enquiries ?  
A. Actually I went away, I was not there on the 13th.
- Q. Up to the 12th when you were there, had they changed their peaceful intentions and was there any visible sign of incitement to violence ?

6 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

A. There was no sign of anything at Gujranwala, or I should not have left and the Punjab Government would not have let me go.

Q. I take it, then, that till you left on the 12th, there were no visible signs of any intention on the part of these people to go from their peaceful intentions to incitement to violence?

A. No visible signs.

Q. You attribute their change of intention to the events that took place actually on the 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. You had no other tangible evidence?

A. Yes, we have already had. There was sufficient in the air on the 13th to suggest that on the next day there would be trouble.

Q. True, I quite see that on the 13th there was sufficient unrest and something in the air, but was there anything to show on the 13th that these leaders who had called a meeting and carried out the peaceful *hartal* and intended to do so, had changed their intentions and that they meant to resort to violence?

A. Well, you can gather something from the evidence of the informer, and the Indian Christians of whom I spoke.

Q. That is to be gathered from the evidence of the informer and from the Indian Christians who were going up and down the town, they must have gathered it from somewhere? Did they suggest that these leaders organized a meeting.....?

A. They did not mention leaders.

Q. Nobody disputes that there was violence on the 14th, no doubt Gujranwala people took part in it. But what I am now on is that the leaders had no intention.....?

A. I think you may fairly assume that the crowd does not do things without being led.

Q. You attribute that intention to them because the crowd in fact committed violence and you assumed that they would not do it otherwise? That is what it comes to?

A. I think that is a reasonable assumption.

Q. Then you said that, you arrested the leaders on the 15th.

A. On the afternoon of the 15th.

Q. You have said that there were 11 leaders who were arrested, because they had held meetings, is that the fact?

A. Yes. I would not say only because they had held meetings, but there were meetings in the town first at Amarnath's house, but then when the crowds became too big for the compound outside his house they moved off to a place outside called the Niyan. That was on the 14th.

Q. In the morning?

A. The first meetings were held at Amarnath's house in the morning and they must have been at the Niyan when the wounded man reached there at half-past eleven.

Q. You say that the majority of the leaders at this meeting had merely confined themselves to Hindu-Muhammadan unity. Is that a fact? That is what you say?

A. I was trying to find a report of the meetings. I have not got the reports of the meetings here.

Q. You say that the majority of the leaders at this meeting had merely confined themselves to Hindu-Muhammadan unity?

A. No; I would not say so.

Q. That is what you have said?

A. I am trying to find the report of the meetings. I have not got the reports of the meetings here.

Q. You said in answer to Mr. Justice Rankin, I think (I have got a note of it) that the majority had merely confined themselves to Hindu-Muhammadan unity?

A. Yes; what exactly was said I cannot say. But I do not think any person in this crowd actually said 'Go and kill Europeans.'

Q. There was no incitement to violence preached at that meeting?

A. Not directly. I do not think so. I wish to speak subject to correction.

Q. If by referring to any document, you want to correct it, you can correct it later. But so far as you remember

now, at that meeting they did not preach incitement to violence, but they confined themselves merely to Hindu-Muhammadan unity?

A. As far as I remember there were no definite speeches saying 'you must go and do this and that.'

Q. In the speeches, there was no incitement to violence?

A. I think it will be best to see the decision of the tribunal.

Q. What we are concerned with for the moment is the information that you had on the 15th, what you had before you on the 15th when you made arrests. You had no information that anything was said or done at that meeting inciting violence?

A. I do not exactly know what had been said at these meetings.

Q. Then when you arrested them, you did not know what they had said?

A. I merely knew that there had been a great deal of talk by the leaders and that in consequence there had been these riots.

Q. All that you knew at the time you arrested them was that there were meetings at which leaders had talked a good deal and you had the further fact that violence had been committed by the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore you concluded that what the mob did must be the effect of those speeches. Is that what you mean?

A. We had other information.

Q. I will come to the other information later. But so far as what happened at the meetings was concerned, this was your frame of mind?

A. I think so; I think that can be assumed.

Q. Then you say, Colonel, that one of the reasons why you made the arrests of those people was that such arrests are likely to have a very good moral effect. That also entered into your calculation?

A. That is true.

Q. You thought that if the leaders were arrested, it would have a very great moral effect on the populace?

A. Yes.

Q. And would to a certain extent terrorise them?

A. Not so much that, but I thought it was the kindest thing to do.

Q. Kindest to whom? to the populace?

A. To the populace.

Q. Kindest in this way, I take it, that if the leaders were arrested, then the public would feel that big people have been arrested and they were very small people comparatively and unless they kept quiet, they would also be dealt with similarly?

A. That is not the point at all.

Q. How was it then? What effect was your action intended to have on the people?

A. I understood that the populace did these various acts on the stimulus of the leaders and if the leaders were taken away, then the populace would not be likely to take any further action and further action by the people would only end in their being shot and killed.

Q. Then you decided upon the arrest of the leaders because you thought thereby the populace would be prevented from doing any further mischief?

A. And suffering thereby. We know what they suffered elsewhere.

Q. Now, when you decided upon the arrests of these people, you yourself proceeded to make the arrests?

A. Yes.

Q. You had with you a considerable police force and also soldiers?

A. Yes.

Q. How many people had you?

A. I do not know the exact number. We had about 35 soldiers and constables to make the arrests and guard prisoners.

Q. The soldiers moved with you. Were they armed with drawn bayonets?

A. The soldiers were to prevent any opposition.

Q. True, that may be the object. Were they armed with bayonets and rifles?



6 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued

A. They certainly were armed with rifles and had bayonets, and they certainly had their ball ammunition with them, and also a Lewis gun. There was much discussion as to whether we were sufficiently strong.

Q. What is a Lewis gun ?

A. It is a portable machine-gun which can be worked by one man.

Q. Had you also an aeroplane helping you ?

A. An aeroplane came out at the same time.

Q. The aeroplane co-operated with you in these arrests ?

A. No.

Q. It was merely a coincidence ?

A. It was not. There was much discussion as to whether the force that we had there was sufficient to make the arrests, if the town turned out to oppose them.

Q. I forget the number of soldiers that were with you. How many did you say were with you ?

A. Thirty or 35, 50 all told ; a guard remained at the Treasury and I think there was another guard at the station.

Q. And you had a machine-gun ?

A. Yes, a machine-gun.

Q. That was not considered sufficient to make the arrests ?

A. It was considered sufficient.

Q. What about the aeroplane ?

A. My great object was not to have more slaughter, no more deaths, and the effect of the aeroplane on the previous day had been so great that I telephoned to the Chief Secretary and said that I was going to make the arrests between 3 and 4-30 and that it would be a good thing if an aeroplane happened to be going round at the same time.

Q. You telephoned to Lahore ?

A. I did and the aeroplane came at about 3-30.

Q. And the aeroplane preceded ?

A. It just went round. It was instructed not to do anything, unless it saw that there was any conflict going on.

Q. Then you went to one Hakim Rai ?

A. I did not go to Hakim Rai or Mela Ram. The civil station men were arrested while we were getting the police force ready.

Q. Anyway Hakim Rai was first arrested ?

A. Yes.

Q. And then Mela Ram was arrested ?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it true that Mela Ram was undressed at that time ? He was in his house ?

A. I was not there ; I do not know.

Q. When you first saw him he was not dressed ?

A. I really do not know, he may or may not have been fully dressed.

Q. Was he bareheaded ?

A. I think he was.

Q. You know when Indians go out, they do not go bareheaded ? They have their turbans ?

A. People in those days were going about bareheaded.

Q. You do not mean to suggest that people in the position of barristers and pleaders were going out of their houses bareheaded ?

A. I think they were bareheaded on the 14th.

Q. I can perfectly understand that. The 14th or whatever the date was, was observed by them as a day of mourning.

A. Mela Ram might have gone on mourning.

Q. You know, Col. O'Brien, that the Indian custom is when one goes in a mourning procession one goes bareheaded ?

A. Yes.

Q. His going bareheaded on the 14th was it on that basis ?

A. Yes.

Q. Unless there is a mourning procession, ordinarily you are aware that nobody goes bareheaded ?

A. Yes.

Q. And you found Mela Ram was bareheaded ?

A. I noticed him bareheaded.

Q. Did it ever come to your knowledge that when he was arrested he was not dressed and when he was taken out of his house he was not allowed to put on his dress or his turban ?

A. I do not know anything about that. My great object at the time was to make the arrests as quickly as possible.

Q. Not to allow anyone a second to put on his turban ?

A. It was not the question at the time. It was a question of going a considerable distance to the town and getting the men off to Lahore that day. It was also arranged for sending prisoners to Lahore. It was arranged by me for fear that there might be an attempt at rescue from the jail, if I had all the local leaders in the local jail. Not having very strong guards everywhere, I thought there might be attempts at rescue. Therefore it was arranged to send them to Lahore, where the strength was greater.

Q. I quite agree that it had to be done quickly ; but would there have been any appreciable delay if they had been allowed to put on their turbans ?

A. I daresay not. I was not there at the moment.

Q. Then the next man that was arrested was Labh Singh ?

A. That is quite correct.

Q. He is a Barrister-at-Law and Municipal Commissioner ?

A. Yes.

Q. At that time you had three men, you had Hakim Rai, Mela Ram and Labh Singh. Were they all handcuffed and chained to each other ?

A. Yes, they were handcuffed.

Q. And chained ?

A. Yes.

Q. Having handcuffed and chained those three people you proceeded to arrest Diwan Mangal Sen ?

A. Yes.

Q. Diwan Mangal Sen is a man of considerable position in Gujranwala ?

A. No ; I should not say so.

Q. You would not say so ?

A. He is an entirely self-made man.

Q. Is that a reproach ?

A. No. The way in which he obtained his money is not perhaps creditable to him.

Q. Are you, Col. O'Brien, making a charge against that man that he got his wealth by improper means ?

A. Perhaps I had better drop that, but I would not put him as a man of great status.

Q. He is a man of no status at all ?

A. He is a man of no great status.

Q. Is he not a very prominent man in Gujranwala and other places for his religious and social activities ? Is he not a well-known figure among the leaders of social activity ? Are you aware of that ?

A. No.

Q. Are you aware that he is the person who founded the King George Hindu School and endowed for that nearly a lakh of rupees ?

A. I know he started the Hindu School, but I do not know where he got the funds for that.

Q. We are not concerned about the way in which he got the money. You are very anxious to bring a charge against him ?

A. I do not know how the institution was endowed.

Q. I am simply asking you whether you are aware of the fact that he started the school called King George Hindu School and endowed it, in honour of the visit of the King. Don't you know that he founded that school in memory of the visit of the King ? Are you not aware of that ?

A. I believe so.

Q. You are also aware that he was Secretary of what is called the District Imperial War Relief Fund ?

A. I do not know that.

Q. And that he also considerably helped the authorities in obtaining recruits in your district ?

A. Certainly not. He did nothing to my knowledge.

6 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

Q. Are you aware that his own relations are serving in the army and with regard to recruiting he has been awarded a special certificate of merit? You are not aware of that?

A. Not in my time; I was there for two years.

Q. When you arrested this man, Mangal Sen, was he also bareheaded and undressed?

A. As I said, I was not there.

Q. When you saw him, he was undressed?

A. I understand he was.

Q. He was also handcuffed and chained?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you arrested Hakim Rai?

A. Hakim Rai was not arrested in the civil station. Hakim Rai and Amar Nath were actually discussing at Mangal Sen's house.

Q. Hakim Rai and Amar Nath were in the house of Mangal Sen?

A. Yes.

Q. They were all arrested there?

A. Yes.

Q. Handcuffed and chained?

A. Yes.

Q. Were all of them taken to the railway station?

A. Yes.

Q. How many were taken to the railway station like that?

A. I think there were five that reached the railway station.

Q. How many people did you take to the railway station like that? Were they five or six?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. I understood you to say that 21 or 18 persons were arrested?

A. Twenty-three or 24.

Q. You had other people like Hussain Bakhsh?

A. Yes. When we went down from the railway station we went round the town proper and then these arrests were made in the civil station.

Q. Five or six were first taken to the station?

A. These arrests were made at the civil station and then we went round the town proper.

Q. You first took five or six people to the railway station?

A. Yes.

Q. They were made to sit at the railway station?

A. I do not know what happened to them. I went to the city to see the Municipal Commissioners, who were, by previous arrangement, waiting outside the main gate of the town. And I arranged for two of them to go in front and warn the people that there should be no opposition, because if there was opposition, they might come to grief.

Q. When you reached the station, one Ralla Ram alighted there?

A. He was there. We tried to arrest him opposite the Gurukul, but we did not find him there.

Q. And you found him at the station? He arrived by some train?

A. He was at the station; he was sitting there, I understand, with the Municipal Commissioners.

Q. He was at the station?

A. He was at or near the station.

Q. His son was there who is a railway official?

A. Yes.

Q. His son is the Assistant Traffic Superintendent?

A. Yes.

Q. This Ralla Ram is a man of about 65 years?

A. No; I think he calls himself 54. I have had various petitions from him and his relations stating that he was 54, but I am not sure. He is an elderly man.

Q. And he was arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. Then he and the other people who had already been arrested were taken through the city?

A. Yes.

Q. They were brought from their homes to the railway station handcuffed and chained?

A. Yes.

Q. Then Ralla Ram was added to the party?

A. As a matter of fact, I do not know. I only heard of his arrest when I got back to the station.

Q. Those that were arrested including him were all marched through the city handcuffed and chained?

A. Yes; that is correct.

Q. And they were so marched for a distance of about two miles?

A. It was a long distance; we all had to walk on foot.

Q. That may be. What I want to know is, is it a fact that they were marched, handcuffed and chained for about two miles?

A. I would not say it is two miles.

Q. Less than two miles?

A. Yes.

Q. Then they were marched back again like that to the railway station by the same route?

A. By another route.

Q. They were marched like that through the city first by one route and then by another?

A. We made the arrests as we went along.

Q. Then when you arrived back at the railway station, by that time the other people had also been arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. And the whole party when you returned to the station came to about 20 or 21?

A. Twenty-three is the figure here.

Q. About that number?

A. Yes.

Q. Why were these people so marched through the city twice? Is it true that the manner in which they were chained was that a Hindu and a Muhammadan were chained together?

A. No. They remained in the positions in which they were.

Q. It is not true that Hindus and Muhammadans were chained together?

A. No. First of all I do not think we had 12 Muhammadans to chain to 12 Hindus.

Q. You may not have the full number, but as far as you could, was it done?

A. No; it was not so. We went on arresting and therefore Hussain Bukhsh might have been handcuffed to a Hindu, because there was a Hindu who had not a pair.

Q. Then there is no truth in the suggestion that Hindus and Muhammadans were so chained in order to show that this was the result of Hindu-Muhammadan unity?

A. There was nothing of that kind.

Q. Then after they were brought to the station like that, they were all put in a coal truck?

A. It is called a coal truck. I do not know why. It was an open truck; I do not think it was a coal truck.

Q. Open goods truck, not a passenger carriage?

A. I had asked for something to fetch them to Lahore; when I got there I found they had sent such trucks from Lahore.

Q. What did you ask them to send?

A. I had asked them to send something to fetch them.

Q. They sent a truck?

A. Yes, with some British soldiers on it.

Q. And how long were they kept in that truck? The whole night?

A. They went off at once, because I had arranged to complete the arrests by 4-30 and it was 4-45 before we got back to the station; as the traffic was very much impeded, they naturally wanted to get them back into Lahore by dark.

Q. So they were taken away almost at once?

A. Yes.

Q. Then they were brought to Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. When they were brought to Lahore, were they put in solitary cells?

A. I do not know what happened after that.

Q. Some authority in Lahore will be able to tell us about that?

A. Yes.

6 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

Q. They were so kept in Lahore for a period of a fortnight?

A. They then went to the central jail in Lahore.

Q. They remained in Lahore for about a fortnight and then they were taken back to Gujranwala. Were they taken again in a coal truck?

A. I do not know.

Q. When they were so taken back to Gujranwala, they were marched through Lahore city?

A. I do not at all know what happened in Lahore.

Q. Handcuffed and chained?

A. Probably.

Q. And how far distant by rail is Gujranwala from here? About 40 miles?

A. Forty-two miles.

Q. Ordinarily what time does it take for the railway journey?

A. It depends upon whether it is a mail train or a slow train.

Q. Ordinary mail train?

A. One hour and 20 minutes.

Q. Slow train takes a little longer?

A. About two hours.

Q. Is it true that when they were brought from Lahore, the journey took 15 hours?

A. I cannot tell you that. I never heard of that.

Q. You do not think it can be correct?

A. I do not know about it. They might have found difficulty in getting the train made up at the Lahore station. But I do not know anything about it.

Q. Possibly they might have been detained at the station?

A. I think so. I do not know anything about it.

Q. Then when they were so brought back to Gujranwala, they were kept there for about a fortnight, and then again brought back to Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. Why were they brought to Gujranwala like that?

A. We got them back to aid in the investigation. They went away as I told you originally because we feared that their presence in the local jail might lead to rescue and further bloodshed. I was very anxious to avoid that.

Q. After these two or three journeys backwards and forwards from Lahore, they were kept in jail handcuffed?

A. Yes.

Q. When they were sent back to Lahore again, they reached Lahore sometime during the night?

A. I do not know.

Q. Are you aware that they were kept at the station lock-up in a very small room without any food at all?

A. I do not know anything about it.

Q. Somebody in charge of them will be able to tell us?

A. I do not know myself.

Q. What officer was in charge on that day? Can you tell us?

A. I suppose the police arranged for the escort to take the men.

Q. They were taken in the morning to Lahore to the Martial Law Commissioners?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you on the 19th April make certain arrests at Sheikhpura?

A. Yes.

Q. How far is that from Gujranwala?

A. I came to Lahore on the night of the 18th and telegraphed to the railway to prepare a train, and I went out with the same train next morning, 42 miles into Lahore and then 21 miles out again next morning.

Q. At Sheikhpura you arrested about 10 persons?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Four pleaders and one retired Inspector of Police were arrested?

A. I do not think so. I do not remember. The arrests were very few.

Q. Among them was one Gohur Singh?

A. Yes.

Q. A man of 60 years?

A. Yes.

Q. Gohur Singh was arrested as a hostage for his 2 or 3 sons who were wanted?

A. That is right.

Q. And he himself had committed no offence?

A. No.

Q. As the sons were wanted by the police and they were not forthcoming, that was why the father, Gohur Singh, was arrested, though he had committed no offence? There was no charge against him?

A. He would not tell us where the sons had gone to. My information was that he had seen us coming and had sent them off.

Q. He said that he did not do that. I suppose he did not know where they were?

A. Yes.

Q. However, you arrested him and you also passed an order confiscating his property?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you produce that order?

A. I have not got it here.

Q. It must be available somewhere in the records?

A. I daresay it can be produced.

Q. Kindly have it produced. In the meantime, I will read to you from a copy I have got; you passed this order?\*

A. Yes.

Q. You thought you had authority to pass that order against this man, arresting him and confiscating his property, saying that any one touching his property or cutting the produce will be shot. On what authority did you pass that order?

A. I do not know that I passed the last sentence. I won't guarantee that.

Q. I want to know on what authority you passed that order?

A. I assumed that under Martial Law one can take strong action, more strong action than one can otherwise do. Under Martial Law the courts assist us to defend the right of the people as quickly as possible.

Q. When Martial Law was proclaimed, were you given any instructions as to what things you could do under it?

A. No.

Q. Did the General Officer Commanding issue any general instructions?

A. I was not acting in communication with the General at that time.

Q. Martial Law was proclaimed on the 16th?

A. Yes.

Q. And this order was passed on the 19th?

A. Yes.

Q. Till then you had received no instructions either verbally or in writing as to your powers under the Martial Law?

A. No, I had conversation with the Chief Secretary from which I was given to understand that probably if I have to take certain action hurriedly, it will be legalised afterwards, if it is proved to be in good faith.

Q. You saw Mr. Thompson, the Chief Secretary?

A. I telephoned.

Q. You telephoned to Mr. Thompson, the Chief Secretary, on the 15th; that was before declaration of Martial Law, and you telephoned to him to say that you have to take various means, and that he should see to its being legalised afterwards?

A. Yes; provided it was in good faith.

Q. And he gave you a blank cheque?

A. Of course I should be using my discretion.

Q. That was before the declaration of Martial Law. Martial Law was declared on the 16th. After that did you receive any instruction from any authority?

A. No. Not with reference to this particular point.

Q. When you passed this order on the 19th did you think that you were covered by this assurance of Mr. Thompson?

\* Neither order nor copy were available at the time of printing.

6 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

A. I thought if I achieved my object, that is, the arrest of these two men, nobody would seriously suffer, and I got the men arrested.

Q. You thought under Martial Law you had authority to make this order or any other order to secure the arrests of these people. That is what you thought?

A. Yes.

Q. Then, during the administration of Martial Law, you issued various notifications?

A. I did not.

Q. The notifications in the book?

A. They are issued by the Brigadier-General.

Q. You are not responsible for these notifications?

A. No.

Q. Were they issued on your recommendation?

A. Some at my suggestion.

Q. This No. 7? Was this your suggestion?

A. I do not know; I am not sure. I certainly remember discussing it with the General; but whether it was my suggestion or on agreement with his suggestion I cannot remember. I am quite prepared to identify myself with that order.

Q. You quite approved of it or more likely you made that suggestion to the General. If you did discuss it with him he must have expressed his personal opinion on your suggested order. Under this order persons meeting any European gazetted or commissioned, civil and military officer were to alight from wheeled conveyances, etc.?

A. I do not remember discussing that at all.

Q. You do not remember discussing that part of your order?

A. I do not remember. My general impression is that people in authority should be saluted.

Q. Did you approve of that order, that people riding in wheeled conveyances, if they met a gazetted European officer, must alight and salute him?

A. I think it is hardly in accordance with the customs of India at the present time, but still it was your custom.

Q. Did you approve of it or not?

A. I am prepared to say I approved of it.

Q. You admit that it is not in accordance with the existing Indian custom?

A. I think that the Indian custom is.....

Q. The Indian custom is not that. It is not the existing Indian custom for people when they meet any person of high social position to alight from their conveyance and *salaam* him?

A. Well, I do not know; I have noticed several friends of mine who have alighted from their conveyance and shaken hands.

Q. That is different. If you meet a friend who is walking you sometimes alight and shake hands with him. You are here dealing with mark of respect to a person without either knowing the man previously or even being on speaking terms with him. Have you ever seen any Indian doing that merely because the person he meets is in a high position?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Do you approve of it still?

A. It was to accentuate the saluting order.

Q. Is it not enforcing humiliation on Indian people, to make them alight from their carriages to *salaam* an European officer? Does it not savour of that?

A. You perhaps put the other way. It is rather this way. I go to the other extreme in insisting on the ordinary salutations being paid.

Q. It was necessary to go to the other extreme?

A. Perhaps so.

Q. For what purpose? What was the necessity for going to the other extreme and making this order?

A. The tendency of the present day is to abolish respectfulness. An Indian father will tell you that sons are not respectful even to their parents.

Q. The Indian young men are not following the ways of respectfulness, and you therefore thought you would improve them by going to the other extreme and enforcing this order?

A. I say I did not pass this order. I generally agreed.

Q. That is the ground on which you defend it? I put it to you: if an order of this sort is in force would it not create considerable resentment and bitterness among the people, and would not they feel humiliated?

A. I do not know. The feeling of bitterness already existed.

Q. You thought there was bitterness sufficient, and therefore any order of humiliation could not add to the bitterness?

A. I did not think its effect would be much.

Q. You think that bitterness was quite enough and nothing that you did, however unreasonable, would add to it?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Then about umbrellas? Is that an Indian custom at present? Have you met men paying respects in that way?

A. Umbrellas are now used by the million and are not the insignia of royalty.

Q. Then it is not the Indian custom to shut an umbrella when they meet one in a high social position?

A. I think it is going out.

Q. Have you ever seen it?

A. I think I have; I have seen men closing umbrellas, when they meet.

Q. When they meet you or meet whom?

A. When they meet me.

Q. When was that? Was that during Martial Law?

A. No, I have seen it. I think it is going out; practically gone out.

Q. Why was that selected, that umbrellas should be closed?

A. It is a sort of showing respect; it is a relic of the old ideas.

Q. Oh! You are reviving the old customs of India?

A. I was not doing anything.

Q. This order you did enforce, did you not, in Gujranwala?

A. I found it acted upon.

Q. There was only one alternative; if they had not obeyed they would have been flogged?

A. I never personally hauled up anybody or ordered him to be flogged.

Q. The order was in force?

A. I found it in force. I myself was busy with more important things.

Q. You observed it?

A. I observed it as I went along.

Q. May I know, Colonel, why this particular form of saluting was in force only in the case of European officers?

A. It is shown that they have already accorded the same salutation to Indian gentlemen of high social position.

Q. So far as the Indian officers are concerned, it was thought they would in the ordinary course *salaam* them by getting out of their conveyances or closing their umbrellas. It was necessary to enforce it in the case of European officers. Was that the idea?

A. I say it is not my order at all.

Q. You are standing by it Colonel and defending it?

A. You ask me why it was confined to Europeans. Because the same people would be according similar salutation to Indian gentlemen of high position.

Q. That is exactly what I am saying?

A. Therefore it was not necessary to pass an order saying that people must salute Indian Commissioners, and others if you like.

Q. It was not necessary in the case of Indian officers because they would be *salaamed* and respected in this peculiar manner in the ordinary course? Only a few minutes back you told me that these forms are dying out?

A. Yes.

Q. Then every one will not ordinarily show this mark of respect to Indian officers?

6 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

A. Yes.

Q. Then why was it necessary to make that order in the case of European officers? You say in that order...

A. For the wording of it I am not responsible. It is assumed that such respect mentioned therein would ordinarily be paid to Indian gentlemen of position.

Q. You admit on your own showing that it is a wrong assumption?

A. I am not responsible for the order; I am only responsible for the general agreement.

Q. Now as to the aeroplanes that were brought on the 14th and 15th, how many were there?

A. Three aeroplanes; on the 14th only one dropped bombs.

Q. On the 15th, how many?

A. On the 15th, one dropped one bomb.

Q. You asked for these aeroplanes to be sent?

A. No; I was on the road coming from Lahore in a motor-car. Mr. Heron himself was attacked. As the state of affairs was serious, he despatched two telegrams, one from Eminabad station to Lahore and one from the Rahwali station to Sialkot. These went off about 12. I do not know when they got to Lahore and when to Sialkot.

Q. Did they by telegram ask for aeroplanes?

A. They said 'Send military; police force not sufficient' or something of that kind.

Q. And I understand that this officer realising that no military could arrive in the very short notice hit upon the idea of asking for aeroplanes. The military in fact arrived at 9 o'clock at night?

A. They could not get a train, and they did not turn up till night; and the aeroplanes arrived at 3 or 3-30.

Q. When the aeroplanes arrived, where was the bomb dropped? Was that on the concourse of people there?

A. All I know is that two bombs took effect on two known rioters.

Q. I want to know who directed the aeroplanes, where the bombs were to be dropped.

A. Nobody directed. We have no means of communicating with aeroplanes.

Q. Did they drop the bombs at random?

A. They dropped on where they saw mobs outside the station.

Q. Outside the station?

A. Yes.

Q. Merely they saw people assembled and they dropped bombs. How long did aeroplanes hover over Gujranwala?

A. They circled round and round at 3-50. The people of course all scattered. When the machines left Gujranwala no Indians could be seen in the streets.

Q. The aeroplane that came next day, was that also sent by the Punjab Government?

A. One that hovered over while we were making arrests was asked for by me. As to the one that arrived at 8-55, I know nothing about it.

Q. You have no connection with that?

A. No. I asked for aeroplane only as a matter of protection.

8 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

**At Lahore, Monday, the 8th December 1919.**

**PRESENT:**

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.L., C.L.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARBOW, K.C.B., K. C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

MR. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., *Secretary*.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN—*continued*.

*By Major-General Sir George Barrow—*

Q. You said that when the mob was going to attack Mr. Shaw's house they discussed for about ten minutes whether they should attack it or not because he was an Irishman?

A. That was when they went to attack Rev. Bailey's house at Wazirabad.

Q. I want to know whether you had some reliable evidence in connection with this or whether it was merely a rumour?

A. No; I don't think so. It was told me as a good story.

Q. What I ask you is this: Was it a fact and would it show a certain amount of deliberation and method in the proceedings of the crowd or was it nothing more than a rumour?

A. I think it was quite a definite thing. It did happen, but I do not know whether it is in evidence anywhere.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—*

Q. Leaving aside the consideration that it was an organized thing or that it happened owing to outside influence, would you or would you not agree with me that taken by itself what happened at Gujranwala and in the surrounding villages, and taking into consideration also the fact that no arms were used and none of the crowds was armed, was it not clearly to you a ridiculous sort of rebellion?

A. Well, it was in a way ridiculous.

Q. You left Gujranwala on the 12th. Now, had you known that any such serious things would happen, you would not have left Gujranwala?

A. No.

Q. Therefore at the time you left Gujranwala there was no information in your possession that any serious thing was under contemplation?

A. No.

Q. Then you arrived in Gujranwala on the 14th and from your statement I gather it was at about 3 o'clock?

A. I arrived in the outskirts at about 2-20 and reached the Treasury at about 3.

Q. Before reaching the Treasury am I right in saying that either by chance or intentionally you met Iqbal Narain, the Municipal Secretary?

A. I do not remember. On my way I passed his house.

Q. Now on the outskirts did you see anything or did you meet any crowds of rioters?

A. No, I saw them dispersing from the Dāk Bungalow. I came up by the side road.

Q. And you were all alone?

A. No, we were four in our party in a motor. I picked up half of the guard that I found at the Sadar *thana*.

Q. Up to the Sadar *thana* you were only four?

A. Yes, we were four in the motor.

Q. Was any assault or demonstration made on the motor?

A. There was nobody but ordinary wayfarers on the road.

Q. Then the Sadar *thana* is inside the civil lines?

A. No, it is on the other side of the railway near the Government High School.

Q. That is, you don't cross the railway at all but come first to the *thana*?

A. Yes.

Q. When you reached the Sadar *thana*, so far as the civil station is concerned, there were no crowds?

A. When I reached the civil station there was no crowd till I was there. I met Mr. Nevill near the *Kutchery* while passing; he had been dispersing the mob in the public gardens.

Q. Now in answer to a certain question put to you on the last occasion you said that your justification for arresting the 22 or 23 persons, whom you arrested on the 15th, was based firstly on the statement of the approver, secondly on the statement of Abbas Ali, Barrister-at-Law, and thirdly on the statement of certain Christians?

A. No, I did not say that I arrested them for those reasons.

Q. There was information in your possession when you arrested them?

A. I arrested them under section 12 of the Defence of India Act and not for any definite offences but as a protective measure.

Q. Therefore up to that time you did not arrest them for having committed any offences in connection with these riots?

A. Well, I thought that the probability was that they would be charged under offences in connection with the riots and I also did it as a protective measure.

Q. Up to that time there was no information in your possession?

A. There was plenty.

Q. On the 15th?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore I ask you what information was in your possession.

A. I do not quite know how to put it. I had a great deal of information in my possession that they were the leaders of the mob. I had made various inquiries from various persons and I had previous knowledge also.

Q. You had previous knowledge before the 12th?

A. Yes.

Q. Then I would like to know the source of that information. Who gave you further information about the 13th and 14th?

A. I cannot tell you that. There were various people who spoke to me. I did not record the statements then as there was no time.

Q. Those various people did verify. They were either at the railway station or before the post office or near the Court or they were there at the time when the railway bridge was burnt. I am talking of these places and I want to know whether any of them made any statement before you that these pleaders were either at the railway station or that they were with the mob?

8 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

A. In some instances they were of course definitely with the mob.

Q. At the railway station when all these things were happening?

A. Yes.

Q. These pleaders?

A. Yes.

Q. You mean B. B. Bhagat?

A. B. B. Bhagat was one and Abdur Rahman was another.

Q. Only two were named, B. B. Bhagat and Abdur Rahman?

A. I think Hussain Bakhsh was also there. I really can't remember the details.

Q. This man B. B. Bhagat was pardoned with your permission?

A. Yes.

Q. And you must have seen his statement or confession?

A. I did not record it. I asked Mr. Wace to record it.

Q. Though it was recorded by Mr. Wace, you must have seen it?

A. I don't remember what he actually deposed to.

Q. In your statement on the last occasion and also in your report you based certain conclusions on the statement of the approver?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore I take it that you made yourself familiar with that statement and that you must have seen it?

A. I must have seen it some time, but I do not remember it now.

Q. I want to ask you one question. Did the statement of the approver in any way indicate or support your conclusions that it was a premeditated thing or that it was engineered by some outside agency? Am I right in thinking that, so far as the statement of the approver was concerned, upon whose evidence they were convicted, it did not show that it was an organized thing or that some outside influence was brought to bear upon those pleaders to commit such offences?

A. I am not sure on that point.

Q. If you kindly make yourself sure, I will just give you a brief skeleton. He says that after the 6th he went to Lahore, that he was conducted there through the city and that he could come back again up to the 12th, that no meeting was held on the 12th, that there was a meeting of the District Congress Committee, annual meeting, at the house of Lala Amar Nath, pleader. Somebody suggested that there should be a *hartal*. This proposition was opposed; nothing was decided on the 13th. No meeting was held between him and Din Muhammad. A meeting was held and in the evening it was decided that a *hartal* should be held on the 14th. Therefore what I want to know is this; is it or is it not true that so far as the statement of this approver was concerned, upon whose evidence these pleaders were convicted, he might be wrong or right, it did not give any indication that there was any previous conspiracy or that any outside influence was brought to bear upon the people of Gujranwala or on these leaders?

A. Well, take the statement about Chuni Lal, Manchanda, who came from Delhi. He said that he had intended to set fire to the Kangniwala railway bridge, so that the trains would not be able to pass with troops for some time to shoot down "our brothers." Another passage says that some persons cut the telegraph wires.

Q. This is the talk which took place on the 13th. So far as the statement of the approver is concerned, am I right in thinking that there was no conspiracy in fact either in Gujranwala or outside the Punjab that influenced the people of Gujranwala? I know those passages; they do not help us. They say that this was suggested and I am not taking it in that light. Am I right, so far as the information given by Mr. Bhagat was concerned, that it was not a premeditated thing or that there was not any conspiracy outside the Punjab, which could have influenced these people to commit all these acts?

A. Well it depends on how this opinion reads. We also discussed the Amritsar incidents that happened there on the 10th, and thought if the same incidents happened here it would be a fine thing.

Q. It was on the morning of the 13th at 11 o'clock. How do you answer my question?

A. I have already said in my statement that it was an organized thing. It is only an opinion. I gather when one opinion is built up it has effect for a number of days. If you take each thing separately and say that it is justified for this and it is justified for that, it is difficult.

Q. I want to know so far as Bhagat's statement is concerned, whether it did not support that opinion of yours. If it did, you might have good reasons?

A. I did not state that, but I said that this was my opinion.

Q. So far as your knowledge goes it did not lead you to the inference that any outside influence was brought to bear upon these people?

A. I am not prepared to say that.

Q. His statement does contain those facts?

A. There are facts but it is not that statement alone which helped me to form that opinion.

Q. Did he not state that nothing was settled up to the 13th, that nothing was decided on the 14th or on the evening of the 12th?

A. I understand they had a *hartal* on the 15th originally.

Q. Is there even the least indication in the whole statement of Mr. Bhagat that they were going to hold a *hartal* on the 15th?

A. I don't know.

Q. So far as his statement is concerned, there is not the remotest indication that the *hartal* was going to be held on the 15th?

A. Well, I have not studied this.

Q. According to his statement, the suggested *hartal* was going to be held on the 13th and it was suggested that this being the Fair day, the pleaders would not have to suffer anything while the shop-keepers would have to suffer a loss, and therefore it was postponed for a day?

A. I do not see that anywhere.

Q. So far as your memory goes, was there anything in the statement of B. B. Bhagat which would show that the *hartal* was going to be held on the 15th?

A. I do not remember his statement.

Q. Is it not correct, according to B. B. Bhagat's statement, that the *hartal* was not decided on the night of the 12th?

A. I do not know about that.

Q. You can look at it; you remember he said that a District Congress Committee meeting was held casually and this matter was brought before the committee; that two or three persons opposed it and subsequently the matter was not decided?

A. 'Someone suggested a *hartal* but nothing was decided that day.' It does not say someone suggested a *hartal* on any particular date. 'Someone suggested a *hartal* but nothing was decided that day, it being arranged that a meeting should be held at the house of Diwan Mangal Sen on the evening of the 13th of April.' And further on we have 'we too decided there should be a *hartal* on the 14th of April.'

Q. See page 5 of his printed statement. He clearly says there, beginning at the bottom of page 4,—'Diwan Sarab Dial and Mr. Labh Singh told me that there would be a meeting of the District Congress Committee that night at the house of Lala Amar Nath, pleader. In the Bar-room pleaders asked me what I had seen at Lahore, and I gave them a brief account of what I had seen. That evening we met at Lala Amar Nath's house,' and he gives the names of those who were present, and says that Mr. Mati Ullah and Mr. Labh Singh were elected as joint secretaries. Then he says: 'There was discussion about subscription which lasted a long time, and after discussing other matters the meeting came to a close. An informal discussion was introduced by Lala Amar Nath, pleader, as regards the arrest of the leaders, and

8 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

someone suggested a *hartal*. Diwan Lakh Chand opposed it, saying that this was opposed to Mr. Gandhi's views, moreover, his message was that we should not protest against his arrest. He was supported by a few others. On this Sarab Dyal said that by protest we do not express the feelings of our leaders, but our own feelings in regard to our leaders. The three men from the *Mandi* said the *hartal* should not be on a holiday, as the Pleaders then lost nothing; all should have like treatment. Nothing was decided, and the meeting came to a close.

A. I have not got it here.

Q. Therefore my point is, you agree with me that, so far as the meeting of the 12th was concerned, nothing was decided about a *hartal*?

A. I did not study the thing. He came and said he would make a statement.

Q. You have made three statements before this committee based on the statement of this approver. First of all you said it was decided to hold a *hartal* on the 15th and there was a design or something else to give a surprise?

A. I did not say I got that from the approver.

Q. When you made that statement, the evidence you had was the evidence of the approver, on the basis of whose evidence everybody was convicted?

A. Oh, no.

Q. And your second statement was that at that meeting they plotted and it was decided that they should have recourse to the same things as happened at Amritsar?

A. That I have read out.

Q. And there is a third statement; this man was the witness upon whose evidence all the leaders have been convicted; therefore I want to know, so far as your statement was based on the evidence of the approver, whether these conclusions were supported by his evidence or not?

A. Some of the conclusions may have been. I am perfectly sure that I never stated that I obtained the information only from him, or from him.

Q. Except this witness, has there been produced by you any witness in the conspiracy case to depose to the facts as to what happened on the 12th and 13th?

A. I did not produce witnesses in the conspiracy case.

Q. You were in charge of the case?

A. Not at all; the police were in charge of the case.

Q. The investigation was made by the police and the police were under you?

A. Yes.

Q. The investigation of this case was not made by the Martial Law authorities; it was made by the police who are under you?

A. They were not under me for that purpose.

Q. When this man made his deposition on the 21st it must have been produced before you in order that you might judge whether a pardon should be granted to him or not?

A. I had a general idea of what he said; I do not remember every detail of it.

Q. You had a general idea of what he said and after you have refreshed your memory from the document that was before you when you suggested the grant of a pardon to the approver, I want to know whether, so far as his statement was concerned, it did not suggest that any *hartal* was going to be held on the 15th?

A. I don't remember where I obtained that particular information from.

Q. My only question is whether you did not obtain that information from his statement?

A. It is not in the written statement; he may have said it verbally.

Q. This information is not contained in the statement of the approvers?

A. So I gather.

Q. What other information did you have to the effect that it was decided to hold a meeting on the 15th?

A. Various people told me so.

Q. Can you give us the names of any of the persons?

A. I cannot remember now.

Q. And these people must have attended these meetings of the 12th and 13th?

A. Possibly; possibly they may have heard of it; news goes round very rapidly.

Q. And would you believe those rumours against this statement of the approver?

A. I do not see the point.

Q. Here is the approver who has been granted a pardon in the conspiracy case itself. When he does not make that statement would you be prepared to believe those rumours?

A. Because a person does not make a statement; it does not prove that that statement is non-existent.

Q. When you stated that it was decided that the Amritsar incidents would be repeated on the 14th, did you mean by that that they intended to kill Europeans?

A. The Commission can come to its own conclusion surely. I think it suggests that they did intend to kill Europeans.

Q. You will find in the confession of the approver upon which you based that conclusion it is clearly stated that the incidents at Amritsar should be repeated, "that is, the cutting of wires, damaging of railways in order to annoy the authorities."

A. It is not in here.

Q. It is in here on page 5; I am referring to the confession that was recorded before you.

A. This report that I made up was written after I had had all the information; it was written after the decision of the cases.

Q. And you can take it from me that, except this witness, no one else could have given any information, or did give any information to the court that it was plotted that the Amritsar incidents be repeated on the 14th. He himself makes that statement, "the cutting of wires and damaging of railways in order to annoy the authorities."

A. That is in the original confession.

Q. And therefore will I be right in supposing that when this statement was made by the approver, the killing of Europeans was not contemplated?

A. I do not know; it depends on how you read the words "to repeat the incidents."

Q. There it is followed by the sentence, "that is, the cutting of wires, damaging of railways in order to annoy the authorities."

A. That goes on, "the plan is decided on where to do so and so;" that may be my expression.

Q. These are the words of the approver himself, that the Amritsar incidents be repeated on the 14th, and he says "that is, the cutting of wires, damaging of railways in order to annoy the authorities."

A. I have not got that before me; I don't remember it any way.

Q. Will you kindly see page 5; this document was before you when you suggested the pardon.

A. I do not remember it at all. He came to me and said he was ready to make a confession. Mr. Wace recorded the confession and I gathered the general impression of what he was going to depose about, but I do not remember the details of what he deposed.

Q. You could refresh your memory?

A. I have not got it. I do not in any case see what the point is.

Q. In your statement you say it was plotted on the night of the 13th that the incidents of Amritsar be repeated. I say this statement is based on the statement of the approver, but the statement of the approver is not only this much that the incidents of Amritsar be repeated, but it is followed by the words, "that is, the cutting of wires, damaging of railways in order to annoy the authorities."

A. The statement is a general statement; I do not remember the details of it. Before the judicial tribunal he was definitely asked and he said he knew then that Europeans had been killed in Amritsar in return for Indians who had been shot.

Q. That is a different matter; that has nothing to do with what was decided on the night of the 13th?



8 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

- A. Yes, in this statement it is so.
- Q. No European was assaulted up to about 11 A.M. on that day?
- A. There were only two there.
- Q. No one was assaulted?
- A. No.
- Q. And if the intention of the mob was to assault Europeans would it have been very difficult for them to go to the civil station and to destroy their property and to assault them?
- A. There was a strong guard of police out.
- Q. Is it not a fact that up to 11 A.M. Mr. Heron was in the midst of this crowd very often?
- A. He had his police with him.
- Q. The police he had with him were very few?
- A. I do not know, I was not there.
- Q. You do not know what was their number?
- A. No.
- Q. Therefore supposing that Mr. Heron had very few police with him and that up to 11 o'clock there were many opportunities for the crowd to commit a murderous assault upon him, if that assault was not committed, how do you account for it?
- A. I can give no opinion on that.
- Q. You also referred to one Abbas Ali, a barrister; was he a witness in the conspiracy case?
- A. No, he was acting as Public Prosecutor in Sheikhpura.
- Q. Would he not have been a very important witness in the conspiracy case if he were in possession of those facts?
- A. Well we thought of putting him in but then we thought the evidence was sufficient, and he was engaged in other work and was himself not anxious to go in.
- Q. He was appointed Public Prosecutor by you?
- A. No, Mr. Bosworth-Smith appointed him during the Martial Law period to prosecute Martial Law cases.
- Q. Before that he was not a Public Prosecutor?
- A. No, we never had one.
- Q. And after the Martial Law period he ceased to be a Public Prosecutor?
- A. Yes, when the work was over.
- Q. You know subsequently he was summoned as a defence witness in the conspiracy case?
- A. I did not know that.
- Q. The statement you have made about people saying they would have their own Deputy Commissioner and other statements similar to that, are based on information given by him?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Are you aware that those statements were not made by him when he was examined as a witness?
- A. No, I do not know what he said then.
- Q. You arrested certain persons on the 15th, and you said there were the magistrate and the police there. Was Abbas Ali there also?
- A. No.
- Q. Did he or did he not see you between your arrival and your arresting these men?
- A. Yes, I think I saw him either on the 14th evening or 15th morning.
- Q. And did he give you any list of names of persons to be arrested?
- A. No, he did not give me any names. He made a statement of what he knew.
- Q. Did he make a statement that he saw with his own eyes any people exciting the crowd?
- A. I do not remember at all what he said.
- Q. Was any list of persons placed before you by the police on the morning of the 15th?
- A. I think so, I think a long list was produced.
- Q. How many names were there in that list?
- A. I do not remember; we made a selection, a reduced number.
- Q. And the police suggested that all those persons were in the mob?
- A. Some down for one thing and some for another—I do not remember.
- Q. Would that list be in existence or is it destroyed?
- A. That I do not know.
- Q. Was it a casual sort of list or was it a document which was produced before you as a superior officer?
- A. I do not remember. I asked Mr. Heron to make up a list and I do not know what happened to it afterwards.
- Q. Did any of these police authorities, who produced that list before you, go before the conspiracy trial and identify any of these pleaders?
- A. I do not know what witnesses were produced before the tribunal.
- Q. Did they inform you that that list was prepared by them from their own personal knowledge?
- A. Some got the information from one place and some from another. I do not know how they got their information.
- Q. Do I understand that between 3-30 P. M. on the 14th and the morning of the 15th any statements were recorded by the police?
- A. No, I should think probably not.
- Q. About this information given by the Indian Christians, is it not a fact that, even before you left Gujranwala, you and Mr. Heron persuaded these missionaries to leave the station?
- A. No, I think that is not correct. I remember asking Mr. Wace to go round and ask the missionaries whether they thought it would be advisable to send their women-folk away after the Amritsar affairs. I did not go round to the missionaries myself.
- Q. Am I right in supposing that before the 14th the talk that did take place between you and Mr. Heron and Mr. Wace about removing the missionaries was due to what had taken place at Amritsar?
- A. Yes, I think that is fairly reasonable, up to the 12th.
- Q. Am I right in saying that some missionaries were reluctant to leave because they were anxious about their flock? They did not want to leave the Indian Christians alone?
- A. I believe that is what they said to Mr. Heron in the first instance.
- Q. Did they tell you or Mr. Heron that "you all do not care for us, we will be all right"?
- A. Oh no, I think a missionary is coming to give evidence on this point.
- Q. You do not know exactly what was the answer given to this question?
- A. The fact remains that they all left in the middle of the night.
- Q. Was that information referred to by you about Indian Christians, written information or oral?
- A. It was an explanation for their departure.
- Q. The statement of the approver did not come into existence up to the 26th of April?
- A. Possibly.
- Q. The statement of the Indian Christians referred to by you comes to this, that when you wanted an explanation as to why the missionaries left something was told you?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You do not remember what that something was?
- A. I have already stated it.
- Q. What was the information?
- A. I said the missionaries had gone because the Indian Christians warned them to go.
- Q. The information was that they left the place because the Indian Christians wanted them to go and the next thing was that you and Ashraf Ali had some conversation, either on the evening of the 14th or morning of the 15th, the purport of which you do not remember?
- A. No.
- Q. Did you go to Sheikhpura on the 19th?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You also went to Wazirabad on the 16th?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And you also went to Akalgarh?
- A. I did not go then till much later.

8 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

Q. When you went to Wazirabad on the 16th and Sheikhpura on the 19th you arrested certain persons there?

A. Yes.

Q. In none of these cases were warrants issued for the arrests?

A. No; I sent them direct to Lahore.

Q. And probably they were all arrested under the Defence of India Act and not for any particular offence?

A. Yes; that is right.

Q. It appears to me from your statement and also from seeing the list of the persons against whom suits were filed that you were against Arya Samajists and the pleader class?

A. I was not against them.

Q. Did you consider the Arya Samajists and the pleaders a bad lot?

A. No, it so happened that they were concerned. Our information was that those particular people that I arrested were concerned. I did not make arrests because they were pleaders or Arya Samajists.

Q. Is it not a fact that the arrests that you made at Wazirabad and Sheikhpura were made on the ground that those men had taken part in the *hartal* and at that time there was no other definite information before you?

A. The arrests at Sheikhpura were all made at the request of an Indian magistrate.

Q. On the ground that they had taken part in the *hartal*?

A. Oh no; there were other grounds also.

Q. And at Wazirabad?

A. At Wazirabad I examined large number of people before I made arrests.

Q. You examined a large number of persons?

A. At least I enquired from them.

Q. And their statements were that they had actually taken part in the commission of the offences?

A. Some were accused of one thing and some of another.

Q. The only information that was in your possession at Wazirabad was that these persons joined in the *hartal* or that they had attended meetings?

A. There were various reasons. I cannot give them now.

Q. Can you give me any other facts against them? I take it that on the 16th, when you arrested a large number of persons at Wazirabad, the only information upon which you arrested them was that they either joined in the *hartal* or attended meetings.

A. As I have said before there were several reasons.

Q. What were those reasons?

A. I cannot remember details of each of them. I found sufficient ground for making arrests and I made them.

Q. Therefore there is no information now available which would show on what information you arrested them. It was only on certain things said to you by those people. Do you remember the names of those persons?

A. Some were officials, some non-officials, some were Hindus and some Muhammadans.

Q. You don't remember their names?

A. No.

Q. Do you think any of those persons with whom you had a talk were produced as witnesses when the case was tried?

A. I expect some of them were. I am not sure. I do not remember who were produced as witnesses—that was done by the police.

Q. Did you consider the Arya Samajists taken by themselves seditionists?

A. People have different opinions.

Q. What is your opinion?

A. Well, the majority of the persons who were prominent belonged to the Arya Samaj class.

Q. Apart from the result of the trials, what is your opinion? Did you consider them as a class by themselves to be seditionists?

A. Well, I do not wish to answer this question.

Q. I will now take one or two passages from your statement. In paragraph 1 you say "as it is known, a very intensive campaign took place in a district not previously accustomed to recruiting from November 1917 to the end of the war;" is that true?

A. Yes.

Q. You admit that at least in one of the places in the neighbourhood of Chuharkana the people showed great reluctance to recruit?

A. The reluctance was due to the fact that a number of them belonged to regiments which had suffered very severely.

Q. As far as Chuharkana was concerned there was great reluctance?

A. Yes.

Q. Talking of the meeting which was held on the 6th, you say no attempt was made to explain the Bill? A particularly objectionable speech was delivered by one Mangal Sen. I hope the proceedings of those meetings were placed before you by the police?

A. I was informed of them.

Q. We have got a copy of the proceedings before us. This man is not coming as a witness so I will read out one or two passages. These are the proceedings that must have been submitted to you as a District Magistrate as to what happened in that meeting. "Lala Mea Ram after reading the above resolution explained in brief the procedure of the Rowlatt Act, saying that the Viceroy will first announce the application of the Act to the Punjab. The C. I. D. will bring a complaint against an accused to the Chief Justice stating the blame upon him and the evidence that will support the blame. The officer's deposition will thus be recorded and notice issued to the accused. A jury of 3 judges will then hear the case, the accused will be asked as to whether he will give his statement on oath or without oath. The accused will then be given 14 days to produce his defence after which the case will be decided. The accused will have no chance of appeal. He termed the Act with the words herein there is no *dalit* (grounds), no *vakil* and no appeal. He further said that the time, state of the country and the maintenance of peace in the country did not necessitate the passing of the Bill." This is the speech that was made at the meeting. You do not think that was explaining very fairly the procedure adopted?

A. I have not that paper before me.

Q. I am reading out of a document which has been supplied to us; you can take it as true. I want to know whether this fact was before you or not?

A. I suppose it must have been.

Q. What was the worst thing that was delivered at that meeting?

A. I am afraid I do not remember.

Q. Do you know that the following is the well-known couplet of Sheikh Sadi? "The King-Emperor is like the branches of a tree and the subjects are like the roots, and if the roots are rotten the tree is bound to fall down"?

A. Yes.

Q. I will now read out to you another speech which you say was the most objectionable? It is this: "We have been helping the Government throughout and expected that our status will now be raised, and we shall be given a place and the result has come to light that this Black Bill is passed. We are not disloyal, Vedas, Shastras and Kuran Sharif all teach us to be Loyal." Is that the speech which you describe as the most objectionable in your statement?

A. Yes.

Q. The most objectionable speech was made by one Mangal Sen which I have read out?

A. Yes.

Q. Now with regard to the calf affair. Was any investigation made as to who did this?

A. Yes; but it was never found out.

Q. Now as far as this calf affair is concerned has it not come to your notice as a district officer that this is not a very solitary instance, and that incidents like this have happened ere now in many places in India, and

8 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

these incidents usually lead to rioting between Hindus and Muhammadans ?

A. Yes, I have heard about this, and the trouble it caused.

Q. I do not think that you believe that this calf was killed by the Hindus and Muhammadans there ?

A. I have no information on this point.

Q. Who do you think would do it ? Either some Hindu has done it or some Muhammadan has done it, or it was done by someone who was against Hindu and Muhammadan unity ?

A. As I have said before I have no information.

Q. Don't you think that an act like this would bring about a breach in the Hindu and Muhammadan unity ?

A. It does not quite follow.

Q. If it was done by a Muhammadan what would be his object ?

A. I cannot give an opinion on this subject.

Q. Do you think that a Hindu would do it ?

A. I think it would be very difficult for him to do it with his own hand.

Q. Therefore I suggest to you that the object of this calf affair was to bring about disunion between Muhammadans and Hindus ?

A. I do not agree.

Q. What was the object in your opinion ?

A. I can give no opinion.

Q. You have read the statement of the approver ?

A. Yes.

Q. By the evidence of the approver and by the speeches that were made it was at once said that this calf incident had been the work of the police, and that an attempt was made to bring about a rupture between the Hindus and Muhammadans ?

A. It is quite likely that the calf was killed for that purpose.

Q. So far as that meeting, held on the morning of the 14th, is concerned according to the evidence of the approver, the impression created was that the object of this was to bring about disunion between Muhammadans and Hindus, and therefore speeches were made preaching Hindu and Muhammadan unity ?

A. I do not follow that.

Q. I will read it out to you. This is the version given by the approver, he says : "When I went there, Lala Amar Nath was speaking, addressing the meeting ; he was reading from a paper Mr. Ghandi's message, and was exhorting the public not to commit any acts of vandalism ; that Mr. Ghandi's mission was *Satyagraha*, that they should sit at home and remain inactive. Lala Amar Nath was followed by Mati Ullah who started with the word '*ham*,' as far as I could hear spoke on the unity of Hindus and Muhammadans. He was followed by M. Lal Khan. I couldn't hear much of his speech, as I was at a distance and people were coming in and out, but he also spoke on the unity of Hindus and Muhammadans. The next speaker was M. Din Mohammad who before going in, spoke to me to try to turn the people to the meeting, and not let them go out of the town as there had been trouble near the station. I was collecting people for the meeting, and therefore could not hear what he said in his speech." Was it not mentioned by them that this is the work of the police, we should not mind it ?

A. That might have been arranged.

Q. Your second suggestion is that this might have been arranged ?

A. Yes.

Q. On the bare chance that the matter will be attributed to the police and that there will be no disunion ?

A. The suggestion is that it was intended to excite the crowd against the police.

Q. Anyhow from what I have read out to you so far as that meeting was concerned it did not take it in that light ?

A. The meeting seems to have taken it very calmly.

Q. Because of the speeches that were made ?

A. They would not have taken it so calmly in the ordinary way.

Q. Now please refer to paragraph 4 of your statement where it says "it was afterwards found that they were led away to listen to further inflammatory speeches." Have you any record of those speeches ?

A. No.

Q. May I know on whose evidence you came to the conclusion that the speeches that were made were inflammatory ?

A. I cannot give that.

Q. Can you give me any other names of witnesses that were produced before the tribunals or anything in the statement of the approver where it is said an inflammatory speech was made ?

A. I cannot remember the grounds on which these people were convicted by the tribunals.

Q. Therefore you base your opinion upon the statement of the approver and on those persons who were produced before the tribunals ?

A. No. On general information that I received.

Q. And the witnesses who informed you that inflammatory speeches were made were not produced before the Commission ?

A. That I cannot say.

Q. Has it come to your knowledge that before all these public buildings were burnt and after the mob was fired upon by Mr. Heron after the assault, it was brought to the notice of the authorities that the liquor shops should be closed because the mob was getting out of hand ?

A. I think Din Muhammad spoke to that effect to Mr. Heron.

Q. About Wazirabad, you mention in your statement that some secret meetings were held. Is there any record of these meetings or is it only your hearsay knowledge ?

A. I have not got the information here on which I wrote that sentence.

Q. Was it based on some oral information that was given to you or is there any record of that meeting or any such thing ? Will that be forthcoming ?

A. I do not know whether it was put in evidence at all before the tribunal.

Q. That is not the point. The point is whether your statement of fact that certain secret meetings were held at Wazirabad is based on any report ?

A. My information is only general knowledge.

Q. With regard to Hafizabad you say "a secret meeting of the leading local agitators was held at the house of Ram Sahai, soda-water manufacturer, to discuss the measures of passive resistance." Is that also based on general information ? You cannot give any record of evidence ?

A. I cannot say whether it was put in evidence.

Q. It may not have been put in evidence, but it can be produced now. When you say that a secret meeting of the local agitators was held at the house of Ram Sahai, soda-water manufacturer, to discuss measures of passive resistance, is that information based on any verbal or written report ?

A. I cannot say where that information came from.

Q. You do not remember. You cannot say whether it was based on any police report or any police diary or anything of that sort ?

A. If it is a secret meeting, probably the police were not there ; they may have got it from somebody else.

Q. You do not remember what is the source of your information ?

A. No.

Q. Therefore practically you have no record, not even shorthand notes or anything of that sort as to what happened there ?

A. I have no record of that kind.

Q. You informed this committee on the last occasion that certain anti-Government papers were being read by citizens of Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know who the subscribers were and how many papers were there ?

8 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

A. No. I cannot tell you.

Q. You do not know who were the subscribers?

A. I did not make any lists of subscribers.

Q. You do not know as to how many such papers came to Gujranwala?

A. I had certainly information about that.

Q. You say one paper was not allowed to come inside, and you recommended that one should not be allowed. What are the names of these papers which you call objectionable papers, except the one that was proscribed on your recommendation?

A. I cannot remember the names at present.

Q. You can't remember the names of even one or two?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. What was the name of the paper that was proscribed?

A. I think that was *Nagqash*, and its successor *Rahbar*. I am not sure. There were two. *Nagqash* was proscribed first and then it appeared in the form of *Rahbar*.

Q. That would be an Urdu paper?

A. Yes.

Q. I understood that you meant to say that they were English papers?

A. I do not think they were English papers. I said papers.

Q. Therefore you cannot give me any other names, except *Nagqash* and its successor *Rahbar*?

A. No.

Q. They were one and the same thing?

A. Yes.

Q. Further on you say that some of these people were inflamed by the speeches delivered by the mob orators. I think you refer to what was happening before the house of Amar Nath. You are referring to that same meeting?

A. At Niyain, the second meeting.

Q. What I read to you was about the second meeting at Niyain.

A. Yes.

Q. The description of the meeting by the approver is this. The overflow of the meeting which went from the front of Amar Nath's held a meeting in the open air. You refer to this Niyain meeting?

A. It is referred to by the approver.

Q. And you have no record of this Niyain meeting? No police record?

A. I am not sure.

Q. I will ask one or two questions about recruiting. Are you aware that for the previous 3½ years during the war the number of recruits from Gujranwala was about 4,000, and that during the course of the last six months or 4 months you raised 5,000?

A. Yes.

Q. The previous record of 3½ years was 4,000 and during the last 4 months of this recruiting you raised 5,000?

A. Not the last four months.

Q. During the period, and about 4 or 5 months before the armistice?

A. That is not right.

Q. What is the period during which you recruited 5,000?

A. December 1917, January, February and March 1918.

Q. During the last four months, December to April?

A. To the end of March.

Q. And *quota* system was enforced in Gujranwala?

A. It tended to achieve it.

Q. During the period 1917-18, were any prosecutions under the Defence of India Act instituted by you with reference to recruitment?

A. Yes; there were one or two people who definitely took action to discourage recruiting.

Q. And you prosecuted them under the Defence of India Act?

A. Yes; I think so.

Q. Is it not a fact that a large number of *zaildars*, *lambardars*, etc., were fined, dismissed and suspended for failure to supply the requisite quota?

A. A good number was fined and punished in that way for failing to act up to their duties.

Q. So far as licensing of arms was concerned, were any orders issued that only those applicants who furnished two recruits in the case of licenses for sport and one recruit in the case of licenses for protection would be given licenses and no others?

A. Some such order of that kind was passed.

Q. Were you informed that the price of recruits in your district went up from Ra. 800 to Ra. 1,000?

A. No.

Q. What was the price of recruits under your jurisdiction?

A. The inducements for which recruits went were different.

Q. I am referring to the practice of purchasing. There may be other methods of inducement, but I now refer to the practice of purchasing. What was the price of recruits, if supposing I, living in Gujranwala, wanted to purchase a recruit?

A. I cannot tell; I remember one *lambardar* was murdered because he did not pay Ra. 200 that he promised. I remember that, but I cannot tell the exact sum.

Q. Was any *zaildar* in Shahpur, Imam Din, murdered within your jurisdiction on account of his methods of recruiting?

A. He was murdered, but I do not think it was because of his methods of recruiting. He was murdered by a fanatic who gave out that nobody should assist Government in recruiting; it was not because he had done anything special.

Q. You know that you arrested one Bugga at Wazirabad?

A. Yes.

Q. And you know that articles and letters have appeared in the papers against you in reference to that matter?

A. I never had them sent to me.

Q. He was arrested by you on the 16th?

A. No; he absconded.

Q. Is it true that you, accompanied by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and some men, went to the town and there arrested a number of respectable men on the 16th?

A. We arrested in the same way as we did in Gujranwala.

Q. Then you went to the shop of this man to arrest him?

A. Yes.

Q. The city sub-inspector of police, one Bahadur Shah, was with you?

A. He must have been there also; I do not know his name.

Q. You were informed by his son that Jamiat Singh was not in the house?

A. That is what he said.

Q. This man's name is Purushotham Singh?

A. That may be; I do not know.

Q. Then you were informed that he had gone to Jammu State?

A. No; I was not informed; he was in the town at the time.

Q. So far as his son was concerned, did he not tell you that he went to Jammu State?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Then you did not believe that he was not there and the house was searched?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you went again on the 21st April to Wazirabad?

A. Possibly; I do not know.

Q. And then you went there and ordered that the whole property of Bugga be confiscated?

A. Yes.

Q. And after pronouncing this order, you deputed two men to turn out the men of the house in the Jallianwala Lane and to take possession of the inmates' property?

A. Yes; arrangements were made.

8 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

Q. You know that in that house there were 4 females and 6 infants ?

A. I do not know that.

Q. Did you not know that the wife of this man and the mother of these men were there ?

A. I presume they would be able to make arrangements for them ; they have lots of friends.

Q. And all these females and children were turned out from the house and the house was taken possession of under your orders ?

A. Yes ; that is right.

Q. And further even these women were not allowed to wear shoes ?

A. I know nothing about it.

Q. Except the dress that was on their shoulders, these 4 females and children were not allowed to take anything from inside the house ?

A. I was not there personally.

Q. Was that your order ?

A. No.

Q. Were they allowed to take anything ? Did you give any order of that kind ?

A. I did not give any orders to take any such action.

Q. You ordered these two men to go and take possession of the property ?

A. That is right.

Q. Did you give any instructions to the two men whom you deputed that the people should be allowed to take some property with them from the house ?

A. I did not give any special order.

Q. Your order was to take possession of the property of Jamiat Singh ?

A. Yes.

Q. You know that one of the buffaloes was also locked up with the property and died in the house ?

A. I do not know that.

Q. Apart from what you did, Colonel, during these riots it is quite possible that he was a guilty person and that he was properly punished ; I am not questioning that ; being the head of the district, before what happened on the 6th or 14th, you knew that he was a respectable and prominent citizen of Wazirabad ?

A. He was.

Q. He was paying Rs. 2,000 in the shape of income-tax ?

A. He paid a good deal of income-tax.

Q. He was the President of the local *Singh Sabha* ?

A. I do not know that.

Q. He subscribed Rs. 7,000 to the war loan, the largest amount that was received by you from Wazirabad ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then he also subscribed to the Red Cross Society started by you ?

A. The subscriptions to the Red Cross Society were before my time.

Q. He was also helping you in recruiting, and on your recommendation he was given a *Sanad* ?

A. I do not think he did any recruiting.

Q. Was it not that on your recommendation a silver mounted cane was given to him ?

A. Yes ; that is right.

Q. When you started a District War League, he was a member of the District War League ?

A. He was.

Q. Then hearing of this confiscation order, after a few days, Jamiat Singh surrendered himself to you ?

A. That was the object of the order.

Q. Then he was handcuffed and sent to jail ?

A. Yes.

Q. Although this Jamiat Singh surrendered himself to you on the 26th April, his property was not released up to the 4th May 1919 ?

A. That I cannot tell you.

Q. Was not a petition put before you by his son praying that the property which had been confiscated should be released, and nothing was done for some time ?

A. I do not think so. Directly I got the man I ordered the release of his property. That is my recollection. There might have been a delay of a day or two.

Q. The property was not released until his son put in an application ?

A. No.

Q. Did you release the property on the date the application was put before you ?

A. I do not know. That may be correct.

Q. He says " till the time I put my application before the District Magistrate, my property was not released."

A. It may have been due to oversight.

Q. Quite possible. You do not say from your memory that it is false ?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. Then from the 26th April up to the 1st June, this man remained in jail, and he was neither brought to trial nor sent anywhere else ?

A. It is probably true.

Q. What is your explanation ?

A. The question was whether he should be sent before the tribunal on the bigger charge or be dealt with by the local summary court. He was sent to Lahore, as the Legal Remembrancer sent the case back.

Q. On the 1st of June with 8 others he was sent to Lahore to be tried under section 121 of the Indian Penal Code ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the Legal Remembrancer say that he could not go on, and did he send back the case ?

A. He said that it was not sufficiently serious to be tried by one of the big tribunals. We disagreed very strongly with that opinion.

Q. Then on the 4th June, he was brought back to Gujranwala ?

A. That is right.

Q. He was again sent to jail ?

A. I suppose so.

Q. And when going and coming he was always handcuffed ?

A. I know nothing about it ; I suppose he was.

Q. And this man again came before you on the 5th June ?

A. I cannot tell dates.

Q. The point is this. Was it not on the 5th June for the first time that Jamiat Singh was informed about giving the list of witnesses, and that he was going to be tried before you ?

A. It would have been about that date after he got back to Lahore.

Q. Even then he was not informed as to what was the charge against him ? Is it true that even up to the 5th June he was not informed as to what was the charge against him, and that for the first time on the 5th June he was asked under your orders to give a list of defence witnesses ?

A. He must have been told with what he was charged.

Q. He must have been ? Was there any such record ?

A. Surely as you find in the other Martial Law trials, he must have been informed.

Q. I want to know whether you ever informed Jamiat Singh as to what was the charge against him or not ?

A. Presumably he must have been informed.

Q. On what date ?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. Probably on the 5th June ; that was the day on which he was brought before you.

A. Because he had been to Lahore ?

Q. Then on the day he was brought for the charge to be framed, Mr. Anant Ram, B.A., LL.B., pleader, who wanted to appear with him, was not allowed. He wanted to see the file and the file was not given to him, although an application was put before you ?

A. No ; there were various pleaders in these cases ; I do not remember Anant Ram.

Q. So far as Jamiat Singh is concerned, was any application put before you with a request that he may be allowed to see the file of Jamiat Singh and was that application refused ?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. His son makes that allegation. May I understand that you say it is a false allegation ?

8 December 1910.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

A. No. I cannot tell you.

Q. You do not know who were the subscribers?

A. I did not make any lists of subscribers.

Q. You do not know as to how many such papers came to Gujranwala?

A. I had certainly information about that.

Q. You say one paper was not allowed to come inside, and you recommended that one should not be allowed. What are the names of these papers which you call objectionable papers, except the one that was proscribed on your recommendation?

A. I cannot remember the names at present.

Q. You can't remember the names of even one or two?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. What was the name of the paper that was proscribed?

A. I think that was *Nagqash*, and its successor *Rahbar*. I am not sure. There were two. *Nagqash* was proscribed first and then it appeared in the form of *Rahbar*.

Q. That would be an Urdu paper?

A. Yes.

Q. I understood that you meant to say that they were English papers?

A. I do not think they were English papers. I said papers.

Q. Therefore you cannot give me any other names, except *Nagqash* and its successor *Rahbar*?

A. No.

Q. They were one and the same thing?

A. Yes.

Q. Further on you say that some of these people were inflamed by the speeches delivered by the mob orators. I think you refer to what was happening before the house of Amar Nath. You are referring to that same meeting?

A. At Niyain, the second meeting.

Q. What I read to you was about the second meeting at Niyain.

A. Yes.

Q. The description of the meeting by the approver is this. The overflow of the meeting which went from the front of Amar Nath's held a meeting in the open air. You refer to this Niyain meeting?

A. It is referred to by the approver.

Q. And you have no record of this Niyain meeting? No police record?

A. I am not sure.

Q. I will ask one or two questions about recruiting. Are you aware that for the previous 3½ years during the war the number of recruits from Gujranwala was about 4,000, and that during the course of the last six months or 4 months you raised 5,000?

A. Yes.

Q. The previous record of 3½ years was 4,000 and during the last 4 months of this recruiting you raised 5,000?

A. Not the last four months.

Q. During the period, and about 4 or 5 months before the armistice?

A. That is not right.

Q. What is the period during which you recruited 5,000?

A. December 1917, January, February, and March 1918.

Q. During the last four months, December to April?

A. To the end of March.

Q. And *quota* system was enforced in Gujranwala?

A. It tended to achieve it.

Q. During the period 1917-18, were any prosecutions under the Defence of India Act instituted by you with reference to recruitment?

A. Yes; there were one or two people who definitely took action to discourage recruiting.

Q. And you prosecuted them under the Defence of India Act?

A. Yes; I think so.

Q. Is it not a fact that a large number of *zaildars*, *lambardars*, etc., were fined, dismissed and suspended for failure to supply the requisite quota?

A. A good number was fined and punished in that way for failing to act up to their duties.

Q. So far as licensing of arms was concerned, were any orders issued that only those applicants who furnished two recruits in the case of licenses for sport and one recruit in the case of licenses for protection would be given licenses and no others?

A. Some such order of that kind was passed.

Q. Were you informed that the price of recruits in your district went up from Rs. 800 to Rs. 1,000?

A. No.

Q. What was the price of recruits under your jurisdiction?

A. The inducements for which recruits went were different.

Q. I am referring to the practice of purchasing. There may be other methods of inducement, but I now refer to the practice of purchasing. What was the price of recruits, if supposing I, living in Gujranwala, wanted to purchase a recruit?

A. I cannot tell; I remember one *lambardar* was murdered because he did not pay Rs. 200 that he promised. I remember that, but I cannot tell the exact sum.

Q. Was any *zaildar* in Shalpur, Imam Din, murdered within your jurisdiction on account of his methods of recruiting?

A. He was murdered, but I do not think it was because of his methods of recruiting. He was murdered by a fanatic who gave out that nobody should assist Government in recruiting; it was not because he had done anything special.

Q. You know that you arrested one Bugga at Wazirabad?

A. Yes.

Q. And you know that articles and letters have appeared in the papers against you in reference to that matter?

A. I never had them sent to me.

Q. He was arrested by you on the 16th?

A. No; he absconded.

Q. Is it true that you, accompanied by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and some men, went to the town and there arrested a number of respectable men on the 16th?

A. We arrested in the same way as we did in Gujranwala.

Q. Then you went to the shop of this man to arrest him?

A. Yes.

Q. The city sub-inspector of police, one Bahadur Shah, was with you?

A. He must have been there also; I do not know his name.

Q. You were informed by his son that Jamiat Singh was not in the house?

A. That is what he said.

Q. This man's name is Purushotham Singh?

A. That may be; I do not know.

Q. Then you were informed that he had gone to Jammu State?

A. No; I was not informed; he was in the town at the time.

Q. So far as his son was concerned, did he not tell you that he went to Jammu State?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Then you did not believe that he was not there and the house was searched?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you went again on the 21st April to Wazirabad?

A. Possibly; I do not know.

Q. And then you went there and ordered that the whole property of Bugga be confiscated?

A. Yes.

Q. And after pronouncing this order, you deputed two men to turn out the men of the house in the Jallianwala Lane and to take possession of the inmates' property?

A. Yes; arrangements were made.

8 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

Q. You know that in that house there were 4 females and 6 infants ?

A. I do not know that.

Q. Did you not know that the wife of this man and the mother of these men were there ?

A. I presume they would be able to make arrangements for them ; they have lots of friends.

Q. And all these females and children were turned out from the house and the house was taken possession of under your orders ?

A. Yes ; that is right.

Q. And further even these women were not allowed to wear shoes ?

A. I know nothing about it.

Q. Except the dress that was on their shoulders, these 4 females and children were not allowed to take anything from inside the house ?

A. I was not there personally.

Q. Was that your order ?

A. No.

Q. Were they allowed to take anything ? Did you give any order of that kind ?

A. I did not give any orders to take any such action.

Q. You ordered these two men to go and take possession of the property ?

A. That is right.

Q. Did you give any instructions to the two men whom you deputed that the people should be allowed to take some property with them from the house ?

A. I did not give any special order.

Q. Your order was to take possession of the property of Jamiat Singh ?

A. Yes.

Q. You know that one of the buffaloes was also locked up with the property and died in the house ?

A. I do not know that.

Q. Apart from what you did, Colonel, during these riots it is quite possible that he was a guilty person and that he was properly punished ; I am not questioning that ; being the head of the district, before what happened on the 6th or 14th, you knew that he was a respectable and prominent citizen of Wazirabad ?

A. He was.

Q. He was paying Rs. 2,000 in the shape of income-tax ?

A. He paid a good deal of income-tax.

Q. He was the President of the local *Singh Sabha* ?

A. I do not know that.

Q. He subscribed Rs. 7,000 to the war loan, the largest amount that was received by you from Wazirabad ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then he also subscribed to the Red Cross Society started by you ?

A. The subscriptions to the Red Cross Society were before my time.

Q. He was also helping you in recruiting, and on your recommendation he was given a *Sanad* ?

A. I do not think he did any recruiting.

Q. Was it not that on your recommendation a silver mounted cane was given to him ?

A. Yes ; that is right.

Q. When you started a District War League, he was a member of the District War League ?

A. He was.

Q. Then hearing of this confiscation order, after a few days, Jamiat Singh surrendered himself to you ?

A. That was the object of the order.

Q. Then he was handcuffed and sent to jail ?

A. Yes.

Q. Although this Jamiat Singh surrendered himself to you on the 26th April, his property was not released up to the 4th May 1919 ?

A. That I cannot tell you.

Q. Was not a petition put before you by his son praying that the property which had been confiscated should be released, and nothing was done for some time ?

A. I do not think so. Directly I got the man I ordered the release of his property. That is my recollection. There might have been a delay of a day or two.

Q. The property was not released until his son put in an application ?

A. No.

Q. Did you release the property on the date the application was put before you ?

A. I do not know. That may be correct.

Q. He says " till the time I put my application before the District Magistrate, my property was not released."

A. It may have been due to oversight.

Q. Quite possible. You do not say from your memory that it is false ?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. Then from the 26th April up to the 1st June, this man remained in jail, and he was neither brought to trial nor sent anywhere else ?

A. It is probably true.

Q. What is your explanation ?

A. The question was whether he should be sent before the tribunal on the bigger charge or be dealt with by the local summary court. He was sent to Lahore, as the Legal Remembrancer sent the case back.

Q. On the 1st of June with 8 others he was sent to Lahore to be tried under section 121 of the Indian Penal Code ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the Legal Remembrancer say that he could not go on, and did he send back the case ?

A. He said that it was not sufficiently serious to be tried by one of the big tribunals. We disagreed very strongly with that opinion.

Q. Then on the 4th June, he was brought back to Gujranwala ?

A. That is right.

Q. He was again sent to jail ?

A. I suppose so.

Q. And when going and coming he was always handcuffed ?

A. I know nothing about it ; I suppose he was.

Q. And this man again came before you on the 5th June ?

A. I cannot tell dates.

Q. The point is this. Was it not on the 5th June for the first time that Jamiat Singh was informed about giving the list of witnesses, and that he was going to be tried before you ?

A. It would have been about that date after he got back to Lahore.

Q. Even then he was not informed as to what was the charge against him ? Is it true that even up to the 5th June he was not informed as to what was the charge against him, and that for the first time on the 5th June he was asked under your orders to give a list of defence witnesses ?

A. He must have been told with what he was charged.

Q. He must have been ? Was there any such record ?

A. Surely as you find in the other Martial Law trials, he must have been informed.

Q. I want to know whether you ever informed Jamiat Singh as to what was the charge against him or not ?

A. Presumably he must have been informed.

Q. On what date ?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. Probably on the 5th June ; that was the day on which he was brought before you.

A. Because he had been to Lahore ?

Q. Then on the day he was brought for the charge to be framed, Mr. Anant Ram, B.A., LL.B., pleader, who wanted to appear with him, was not allowed. He wanted to see the file and the file was not given to him, although an application was put before you ?

A. No ; there were various pleaders in these cases ; I do not remember Anant Ram.

Q. So far as Jamiat Singh is concerned, was any application put before you with a request that he may be allowed to see the file of Jamiat Singh and was that application refused ?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. His son makes that allegation. May I understand that you say it is a false allegation ?

8 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

A. Presumably pleaders did appear in these cases. I do not remember every particular case.

Q. This is the allegation: "Our counsel, Mr. Anant Ram, pleader of Sheikhpura, was not allowed to appear along with him, nor he was given the file to see, although he had put in application for the purpose."

A. I should think it is wrong, but I cannot remember.

Q. 19th June was fixed for the hearing of this case?

A. Yes.

Q. And the case was tried at Wazirabad?

A. Yes.

Q. Were all the witnesses named by him summoned? Was it not a general practice that whenever a list of witnesses was placed before you, you ordered all the local witnesses to be summoned, but if any witnesses were living outside, their names were cut out?

A. No.

Q. Therefore were all these witnesses summoned by you?

A. That I cannot say. Those cases were conducted before the military tribunals and summary courts, and the defence were responsible for the production of their witnesses.

Q. Was there an allegation that not a single witness from outside the station was summoned?

A. I do not know. In many cases people put up appeal proceedings and such witnesses were in many cases cut down.

Q. On the 9th, this case was finished in one hour?

A. I do not know.

Q. What time did you take?

A. I think Mr. Wace tried it.

Q. And then he (accused) was given 18 months' rigorous imprisonment and fined Rs. 1,000?

A. That may be so.

Q. And this sum was realised from the son?

A. I do not know; I am sure I did not try it.

Q. Then you remember that you have realised about Rs. 1,300 from this man as his share of the amount of damage done to railway property?

A. I do not know that. Rs. 16,000 have to be collected.

Q. Rs. 30 for the maintenance of the military force quartered in Wazirabad?

A. I do not know anything about it.

Q. Now, about this Curfew order and *alaaming* order, was it brought to your notice that within your district any persons were shot. Is there any truth in the allegation that 2 or 3 persons were shot, I do not say deliberately? Were the facts brought to your notice of any persons being shot accidentally on account of the breach of Curfew order?

A. No persons were shot. There was a report that one man was found dead in the street in Gujranwala at night. He was examined and he was found out to have no marks of injury on him; probably he had gone out of his house and fallen in a fit; that is the only foundation to that rumour at all.

Q. Any case in any of the surrounding villages?

A. No.

Q. I will take up the Ramnagar case where the effigy of the King-Emperor was burnt. Is it not a fact that in the first report that was submitted by the police there was no allegation of the burning of the effigy of the King Emperor and the only report was that there was a *hartal*?

A. Yes; that was the report.

Q. There was no allegation of the burning of the effigy?

A. The head constable did not report that.

Q. Subsequently, do you remember that any representation was made to you that the effigy was burnt and about 5 maunds of firewood were used in the burning?

A. No; I have not heard of it.

Q. You tried this case?

A. Yes.

Q. May I know what time you put in to try this case?

A. I began in the morning and went on all day, and

I think, to part of the next day. At any rate I pronounced the judgment the next day.

Q. It was finished in one day?

A. I think I worked from 6 A.M. to 6 P.M. I cannot remember.

Q. So it was finished in about one day?

A. Yes.

Q. Then, in this case, you examined about 105 defence witnesses?

A. I cannot say how many there were.

Q. Were not they more than 100?

A. There were a great many.

Q. I want to know whether, to the best of your recollection, there were more than 100?

A. I cannot remember that.

Q. But there were about 10 or 11 prosecution witnesses?

A. May be correct.

Q. And every one of these accused got the full sentences which you can award?

A. They were all convicted.

Q. Was it not the case that a sergeant of police, one of your subordinates, was produced as a defence witness, and he said that he never heard any such thing on the day of *hartal*?

A. He said he was in the town. He has, I understand, been punished.

Q. Subsequently, for giving that evidence?

A. For his trying to hush up the affair.

Q. Certainly you gave some time to these men to take their food during the day while you yourself went and took your lunch?

A. I worked very hard and took very little time off.

Q. If I say that the case was commenced after 9 and finished about 5 with an interval for lunch will it be wrong?

A. I cannot remember details.

Q. And having regard to the number of witnesses, you think you gave them a fair trial?

A. Yes.

Q. Ordinarily, from what time to what time would you take up these cases?

A. Whenever possibly I could find time. I worked in the morning, in the middle of the day, and I worked in the night.

Q. Up to what time did you try your cases on the 9th June?

A. Up to 6-30.

Q. You did not try any case at night?

A. Up to the time when the lamps were beginning to be lit.

Q. Not till 12 o'clock?

A. No.

Q. When were you informed that Martial Law was going to be taken off?

A. On the 8th. Not before that.

Q. Were all the cases that were tried by you on the 9th originally fixed for the 9th?

A. I think they were all fixed for the 9th. I cannot remember.

Q. There were no such cases tried by you on the 9th on the ground that the Martial Law was going to be taken off in the night? You made no hurry because the Martial Law was going to be taken off between 9 and 10 o'clock that night?

A. I worked hard to finish as many cases as possible.

Q. Where were the people who were arrested at Ramnagar? Were they arrested and warrants issued afterwards or were warrants issued and then they were arrested?

A. I cannot tell you. They might have been issued by the Magistrate.

Q. Had not four persons from Ramnagar sent you a wire saying that the case had been fabricated against them?

A. I do not remember. It is a common practice.

Q. You know, after they had sent this wire, they were arrested, and after 4 or 5 days they were let off.

A. No persons were let off that I know of.



8 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

Q. These 4 persons who sent the wire ?  
 A. I do not know.  
 Q. You remember one Fazl Din, a *lambardar* ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Did you dismiss him because he appeared as a defence witness in the Martial Law case ?  
 A. He was dismissed.  
 Q. His fault was that he appeared as a defence witness in this Martial Law case ?  
 A. Yes. It was on the ground that he had given false evidence.  
 Q. You thought that he gave false evidence ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Will you be surprised to learn from me that the whole of his evidence was that "I know this accused, and he has lived for 2 years in such and such place" and nothing more ?  
 A. I do not know.  
 Q. Was similarly another man dismissed by you because he stood surety for one of these accused persons ?  
 A. I do not know. They were all convicted.  
 Q. Were you ever informed by Captain Denning that the police were fabricating and making persons give false evidence ? Was this matter reported to you by Captain Denning ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. There was a well-to-do man who was mentioned by some of the witnesses as concerned in a case. The two witnesses were Atar Singh and Soab Sal whose depositions were sent to you with their thumb impressions, namely, that the police were forcing them to implicate one Jagannatham, and this matter was brought to your notice by Captain Denning ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. And these are the two witnesses on whose evidence a number of the leaders were convicted ?  
 A. I do not remember. It was a question whether Jagannatham should be included or not. He went and made himself useful to the military.  
 Q. Have you got that report, sent to you by Captain Denning, with the statement of these 2 witnesses ?  
 A. I do not know where it is. I am not Deputy Commissioner of Gujranwala now.  
 Q. I should like to get hold of it.  
 A. Jagannatham did complain to him and Captain Denning sent it to me with his opinion.  
 Q. Now, questions were asked of you and you answered them about one Gohar Singh ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Is it a fact that he was taken as a hostage for his 2 sons, that his property was confiscated, and during the time of confiscation his family was turned out ?  
 A. I think he had no house.  
 Q. Are you quite sure ?  
 A. I think so.  
 Q. His family was turned out of the house in which they were living ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Then subsequently you dismissed him from the *lambardarship* and he forfeited his pension ?  
 A. He had no pension.  
 Q. Was he dismissed from the *lambardarship* ?  
 A. If he was a *lambardar*, he probably was.  
 Q. Simply because his sons were not forthcoming on the day that you wanted them to appear ; knowing that ought not to be the reason ; they were already convicted of dacoity or robbery and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment ?  
 A. They were alleged to be concerned in the trouble at Sheikhpura.  
 Q. Now, has it ever come to your knowledge that one Shain Singh was wanted by you, and because he was not forthcoming his wife was arrested by the police ?  
 A. No ; I have never heard of that.  
 Q. It was in Sheikhpura.  
 A. I had been never there except one day.  
 Q. Then you do not know how many days after he was arrested and how many days he was in the lock-up ?

A. I do not know anything.  
 Q. I presume you tried this case, if I mistake not ?  
 A. Tried whom ?  
 Q. Did you order the arrest ?  
 A. No ; I cannot remember. Where was it : in Sheikhpura ?  
 Q. You were in Sheikhpura on the 19th April ?  
 A. On the 19th April I passed through ; I was there for a very short time.  
 Q. I will just read the order to you and refresh your memory—

"I reached Sheikhpura where I met . . . . .  
 . . . . . who were organisers and participators in the *hartal* or connected with the cutting of wires. I arrested 4 pleaders, 1 petition-writer . . . . ."

This was on the 19th April 1919. Was no such order known to you ? These were the very words of your order ?

A. I think so.  
 Q. And these are the reasons for your making the arrest at Sheikhpura of these 6 or 7 persons ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. You remained there for not more than 50 minutes or an hour ?  
 A. For a very short time.  
 Q. And you thought that what you have put down here was a sufficient justification for arresting these men ?  
 A. There was the senior Magistrate ; I could not make the arrests without his motion.

Q. Is it a fact that all these men, all these four pleaders, after a detention of 40 days in solitary cells, were released without being put on trial ?

A. I did hear they got off without trial.  
 Q. You made 20 arrests at Sheikhpura. What was the total number of arrests that you made in passing through ?  
 A. I do not remember. Many arrests were made at different places.

Q. Now, up to that date, as District Magistrate, from the 30th March or 6th April, did you hear any complaints against these pleaders made by any of your subordinates ?

A. I knew very little about Sheikhpura. It is a subdivision, another senior magistrate is in charge, and I knew very little about it. Gujranwala is an enormous district, and it has been divided since I left.

Q. Were any persons flogged for not *salaaming* ?  
 A. I know nothing about that.

Q. As District Magistrate, you must have heard about that ?

A. No ; I heard nothing. There were 16 cases ; I do not know what the details are.

Q. Do you know one Ram Singh, son of Lal Ram, an iron merchant ?

A. I do not.  
 Q. Do you know of any Government College student being flogged ?

A. No ; I do not.  
 Q. Do you remember Luxman Das, servant and shopkeeper ? Was he found dead in front of the shop ?

A. He was an old Hindu, I think. I can't remember.  
 Q. You went during this court martial to Akalgarh ?  
 A. Yes.

Q. On the day you went, did you order the people of Akalgarh to metal the road, and was not a subscription of Rs. 2,000 made for the metalling of the road ?

A. The road was made up. There was a path from the canal bank ; we had to go about at a quick pace in motor cars, and I ordered that road to be levelled.

Q. But was it paid from Municipal funds or Government funds, or were the people ordered to raise a subscription ?

A. I do not know how it was met.  
 Q. You have not yourself paid a single pie for it ?  
 A. I have not.

8 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

- Q. Is it not a fact that the inhabitants of Akalgarh were made to make that road ?
- A. Very often zamindars are turned out to level a piece of road. It has been done before.
- Q. You have fined certain villages and towns during the Martial Law period. May I know on what basis ?
- A. These fines were imposed under a different law.
- Q. Apart from that, any other fines ?
- A. I do not know ; what are they ? Can you remind me ?
- Q. Take the Rs. 1,000. Was it not levied because a complaint was made by some department ?
- A. No, the Telegraph department put in a bill.
- Q. So far as these places were concerned, was there any other damage than the breaking of one telegraph wire ?
- A. The Telegraph department sent me a bill for so many thousands, and I sent it back telling them to break it up.
- Q. May I take it that Rs. 1,000 was the compensation for damage done to that wire ?
- A. I cannot say what it was. It was on the application of some department.
- Q. Surely you know what damage was caused ?
- A. It was on the application of some department.
- Q. It is quite possible that it may be something more ?
- A. For the Government Telegraph department it was Rs. 1,000 and for the Railway it was Re. 1.
- Q. Was there any cost for the Telegraph Department ?
- A. They sent me a consolidated bill, and I said that they should break it up.
- Q. What was the cost of the telegraph wire there ?
- A. This I can't remember at this moment. There was a lot of trouble.
- Q. Take for instance, another thing. Unfortunately the Rev. Bailey's bungalow was burnt and compensation had been ordered to be levied for that. Is it not a fact that in that case the people of Viroke and Nizamabad were convicted for burning down Rev. Bailey's bungalow ?
- A. Some of them were convicted for looting.
- Q. People of Viroke and Nizamabad ? I may be wrong it may be Viroke or Bairoke ?
- A. I understand there were people of Viroke and Nizamabad who were convicted.
- Q. This compensation was levied from Wazirabad ?
- A. I think from Wazirabad and Nizamabad.
- Q. Were they combined ? I think it was Wazirabad alone.
- A. In any case Wazirabad because they went to the Rev. Bailey's house. These Viroke and other people simply joined in the riots. It was distributed between Wazirabad and Nizamabad.
- Q. What is the amount for Wazirabad and for Nizamabad ?
- A. It is not there.
- Q. Then I want to know why no compensation was given to those persons whose goods were burnt in the goods sheds ?
- A. That is a case in which the Railway department said that they were not liable under the Railway Act.
- Q. I thought you stated that any damage that was done by the King's enemies could not be recovered ?
- A. It is like this. A claim was put in by the Railway department to me for Rs. 8,20,000 which was their estimate of the goods that had been damaged. It was a rough estimate because they could not make up the accounts. The accounts had been burnt and a rough estimate was made. Then the individuals put in claims of only Rs. 60,000 odd. Well as regards all the remainder the Railway said that they were not responsible for it. Therefore there was no claim against the locality.
- Q. That is, the Railway department said that there was no claim under section 82 of the Railway Act ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Because the damage was done by the King's enemies ?
- A. Yes, because it was the act of the King's enemies.
- Q. Was not the other damage done by the King's enemies ?
- A. The Act is a special thing. There is a protective clause in the Railway Act for that purpose.
- Q. That may be a very technical ground, but I do not see a difficulty about it.
- A. No.
- Q. You know that all the boys of the schools at Wazirabad were ordered to go out and salute the Flag ?
- A. It was ordered by the military.
- Q. Were all the boys in Wazirabad ordered ?
- A. I don't know whether all the boys were ordered, but the bigger boys were so ordered.
- Q. Was it brought to your notice or not that in the months of May and June when these boys were parading in the sun for the purpose, some of them fainted ?
- A. One day when I was there I found that the officer made a delay in coming and the mass was detained and one boy fainted. I told them to dismiss the parade.
- Q. Do you know that from the next day the parade was held thrice a day, though before it used to be held twice a day ?
- A. I don't.
- Q. Don't you think if it were done three times a day instead of twice a day as before, it was very hard for the boys to come out and parade in the months of May and June ?
- A. I don't think so. It was hard if they were kept too long in the sun, otherwise not. On my suggestion the midday parade was given up.
- Q. And in your opinion a large number of boys and young men were in the front in all these disturbances because it was deliberately so planned ?
- A. I think I said that is an opinion.
- Q. The leaders had said that they should take part ?
- A. Yes, that is my opinion.
- Q. You must have been informed that during the second week of April a strike was contemplated, and it was only by chance that the strike did not come off ?
- A. That, I understand, is so.
- Q. Then during Martial Law after these disturbances you deprived the Gujranwala Municipality of their election ?
- A. Yes, I reported to Government.
- Q. Do you think it was necessary ?
- A. I think so.
- Q. Apart from the property that was damaged at Gujranwala there were many other Government buildings in Gujranwala which had not been burnt ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Apart from any other reason, don't you think it would not be a good reason if you say that the bridge was not burnt because the calf was hanging there ? Were you aware whether there was an allegation in the approver's statement that two calves were hanging on the two bridges ?
- A. That is in the approver's statement.
- Q. When the allegation was that somebody came and informed the crowd that a calf was hanging on the bridge, don't you think that the natural explanation was that because the calves were hanging on these bridges they were not burnt ?
- A. No. I cannot give that opinion.
- Q. Then that question again ; there were other buildings at Gujranwala which were not damaged, or was every one of the Government buildings burnt ?
- A. Several Government buildings were not burnt.
- Q. There were several Government buildings in which Europeans lived. For instance, Mr. Shaw's family lived in a Government building ?
- A. No, they lived in a private house.
- Q. There was no building inside the Court compound where any Europeans lived ?
- A. No.
- Q. Were you informed that bombs were thrown in the compound of the Khalsa High School ?
- A. Yes. It was regrettable.
- Q. The number of these persons who were mentioned as having been affected by these bombs was 62 ?
- A. I don't know.

8 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

Q. A large number of students lived there ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. It was a residential school ?  
 A. A boarding house.  
 Q. Similarly a bomb was thrown in the *mandi* inside the city ?  
 A. I believe it was thrown in the *mandi* opposite the Town Hall.  
 Q. You received no report about any persons being shot during the Martial Law time at Nizamabad for breach of any Martial Law orders ?  
 A. No.  
 Q. Am I right in supposing that on the night of the 15th or on the morning of the 16th or 17th you informed the military authorities that you thought that the 50 soldiers that had been supplied to you were quite sufficient for the purposes of Gujranwala ?  
 A. For Gujranwala city, you mean ?  
 Q. Yes.  
 A. I may have, I don't know.  
 Q. You also know Muhammad Hussain and Arur Chand of Wazirabad ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. When you reached Wazirabad, you sent for these men at the Dak bungalow and arrested them ?  
 A. I sent for all the municipal commissioners.  
 Q. Is Arur Chand a municipal commissioner ? You arrested them there ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. You arrested them because there was evidence against them ?  
 A. Very likely.  
 Q. Had you held any investigation about the casualties ? Was there anything on paper or was any investigation made about the bombs ?  
 A. A list of the persons killed and wounded was made up. An attempt was also made to calculate whether they were wounded by the police or the bombs.  
 Q. What about the outlying villages ? How many bombs were thrown on the 15th ?  
 A. We have got a record of it.  
 Q. Also of the number of bombs that was thrown on the 15th ?  
 A. I don't know whether it was on the 14th or the 15th. I have not got a separate record.  
 Q. Bombs were thrown on two days and the casualties were on the 15th ?  
 A. I learnt first on the 15th.  
 Q. Therefore you could not possibly have ordered an inquiry ?  
 A. All those who were injured were injured at one time.  
 Q. You further say in your statement that this mob had also an intention to loot wealthy merchants of the town. That is your opinion ?  
 A. I was informed so.  
 Q. Your superior officer was Mr. Kitchin ?  
 A. Yes, he is Commissioner.  
 Q. Gujranwala was within his jurisdiction ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Therefore his evidence would cover Gujranwala, Lahore and Amritsar ; all these three places ?  
 A. Yes, if he gave evidence about Gujranwala.  
 Q. I thought I could give you that name. His name was Ram Saran Das, Sarbarah Lambardar, who furnished bail and was dismissed. Do you remember him ?  
 A. No.  
 Q. Do you remember the case of one Doctor Daulat Singh at Wazirabad ?  
 A. No.  
 Q. Is it not a fact that he was arrested because he was the Secretary of the Arya Samaj ?  
 A. Nobody could have arrested him for that reason. The Secretary of the Arya Samaj might have been concerned.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. How long have you been connected with the Punjab Commission ?

A. Since 1896.  
 Q. And you have been probably in the course of that long period in many districts in the Punjab ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. So I may take it that you are fairly acquainted with the conditions in the province ?  
 A. Especially on the western side.  
 Q. During all this period what is your experience about the attitude of the people ? Were they loyal to Government or disaffected ?  
 A. The people on the whole were distinctly loyal.  
 Q. You mean to say that they remained thoroughly loyal during the Great War ?  
 A. Speaking as a whole.  
 Q. They made great efforts for the cause of the Empire ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Then to what do you attribute the sudden outburst in these various places ?  
 A. I can understand it. I cannot give any opinion.  
 Q. Surely there was no organized movement with the object of overthrowing the Government, in the Punjab or, in your opinion, anywhere else ?  
 A. I cannot give an opinion.  
 Q. Still you are an experienced officer who has been so long in the Punjab and you must know it ?  
 A. In my statement I have put that there was some organized movement somewhere.  
 Q. Somewhere in the Punjab or outside it ?  
 A. There were manifestations and it looked as if it were a premeditated thing.  
 Q. I want to know, in the Punjab or outside it ?  
 A. That I cannot say.  
 Q. From these occurrences there you thought that there must be some organized movement ?  
 A. Yes, from the way it went up along the railway.  
 Q. May I take it that if there was anything of that sort behind it in the western districts of the Punjab, it would have come to your notice ?  
 A. No, I don't think it would. We would have been taken by surprise. It came to us as a great shock.  
 Q. As a District officer would you not know it ?  
 A. I don't think so.  
 Q. Is it not a fact that it is the district officer to whom Government looks for such information ?  
 A. There were many district officers who were taken by surprise.  
 Q. The explanation is simple. Is it not that you did not know because there was nothing ?  
 A. It is possible.  
 Q. Do you think it was likely ?  
 A. I have committed myself to my opinion.  
 Q. I know that opinion, but what I want to know is whether in the opinion of an officer of your standing it was likely ?  
 A. I don't think it was likely.  
 Q. Then what you mean to say is that it was not likely that there should be such a thing ?  
 A. No. I say it could be done without our knowledge.  
 Q. Was it likely that officers of all grades, from top to bottom, should be ignorant of the movement which was of not less a character than to overthrow the Government, a movement of that magnitude, yet everybody, police, C.I.D., and district officers, should be absolutely ignorant of this everywhere ?  
 A. I really cannot speak on this.  
 Q. Don't you think it was very unlikely ?  
 A. The whole thing was so surprising.  
 Q. You call it a rebellion ?  
 A. It has been held so judicially.  
 Q. I am not concerned with those judicial proceedings but here I want to know from you, as an experienced district officer of long standing, whether there was anything like a rebellion meant to overthrow Government or if there was anything behind the movement of no less a character than to overthrow the British Government in India, and you were absolutely ignorant of that movement. May I suppose that officers were so ignorant in their various districts that they did not take a note of what was going on ?

8 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

A. I am prepared to admit that.

Q. Then it seems to be true that either the officers were ignorant of what was going on or the thing did not really exist. My own conclusion is that the thing really did not exist. Would you not agree with me?

A. I am not prepared to give an opinion in that way.

Q. Do you not think that the causes of these disturbances lie in the fact that *hartal* was proclaimed by Mr. Gandhi and that when these *hartals* took place in the Punjab, the disturbances in Amritsar, the arrest of Mr. Gandhi, and the arrest of Amritsar and other people caused disturbances in Gujranwala. Don't you think it was so?

A. I don't think so. Why did they cause disturbances in Kundian and Malakwal? When they caused disturbances in these places why did they cause them in places all of which were not railway junctions?

Q. If the organizers of the movement, as you seem to think, wanted to have a rebellion in the Punjab or in parts of the Punjab, would they not try to get hold of more warlike people, i.e., villagers and cultivators throughout the province, in order to effect their object?

A. Yes, they could.

Q. Don't you think it likely, supposing you are of opinion that there was an organized movement?

A. I cannot give any advice on the subject.

Q. I am just putting it to you as a matter of ordinary common sense whether anybody, who started with that object in his view, would not have attempted to have on his side or whether that organization have attempted to have on their side the more warlike population of the Punjab villages to carry out their object. This seems to be a very obvious thing?

A. I don't think they were available if it was organised.

Q. You think it was not very well organised because the village people were not on their side?

A. I don't want to say any more about that.

Q. But you have expressed an opinion that it was a rebellion?

A. Because that is a judicial decision.

Q. My question is whether it was a rebellion or not. I just want to know the grounds on which you formed that opinion?

A. For that purpose I consider that the judicial decision is sufficient.

Q. Because a certain Court has given a decision. That is your only reason. You have no independent knowledge outside that decision?

A. Apart from that it is merely a question of opinion.

Q. But have you any opinion outside that decision or is your opinion immediately founded on that decision?

A. I have got my own opinion.

Q. That is, you are of opinion, independently of that decision, that there was a rebellion?

A. Yes.

Q. May I know the grounds on which you base that opinion?

A. I do not think I could express them.

Q. You cannot express them because you have not got any grounds?

A. Partly I do not wish to do it and partly there is a difficulty about it.

Q. Difficulty in what way?

A. Difficulty to form reasons.

Q. Of course you had them. You had reasons already in your mind and it is not a question of finding them and of afterwards forming an opinion.

A. The main reason for my opinion is the judicial decision.

Q. Then there is something which you don't wish to express and something which you find it difficult to express?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, so I take it that, broadly speaking, you have not got anything beyond the judicial decision to go upon?

A. Not very much.

Q. Well, you say in your statement relating to the immediate causes of the outbreak that "In Delhi, when the mob came into conflict with the police, no action was

taken against the organisers. Consequently it was decided to push a *hartal* in as many places in the Punjab as possible."

A. Yes.

Q. What kind of action do you think should have been taken against these leaders of Delhi?

A. I don't think I am called upon to give my opinion on what occurred in other places. I said certain consequences followed because no action was taken.

Q. What action did you think should be taken?

A. I am not prepared to tell you what should have been done in another province.

Q. Here you have stated that no action was taken. You must have had some sort of idea in your mind?

A. Everybody has some sort of idea as to how they would deal with an emergency of this kind.

Q. You think it would have been better if Martial Law had been proclaimed in Delhi and similar procedure adopted?

A. I do not like to express an opinion of that sort.

Q. But you have expressed an opinion?

A. I made a statement but it is merely my opinion.

Q. And certain consequences followed, because no action was taken?

A. It is not for a mere Deputy Commissioner to criticise another government.

Q. But you have criticised another Government?

A. As I said before, I was not prepared to be cross-examined.

Q. It is not cross-examination, I simply want to understand.

A. This was my opinion given to the Punjab Government, but I am not prepared to say what should have been done in Delhi and what should have been done in Bombay and other places.

Q. May I take it you gave your opinion to the Punjab Government without deliberating on what you were saying?

A. No. I cannot admit that.

Q. You have some ground for what you have said here?

A. I took certain action in Gujranwala; other people took different action in Amritsar, but which is right and which is wrong and what should have been done is another thing.

Q. In your opinion if similar action had been taken elsewhere against organisers as you took against organisers in Gujranwala, that would have been appropriate action to take?

A. No, I cannot say what I would have done if I had been in Delhi.

Q. Very well, you do not wish to say?

A. No.

Q. You said in regard to the notices that were printed for the meeting of the 5th, that no Gujranwala press would undertake the work; why?

A. They disapproved of it.

Q. They disapproved of the meeting?

A. They were not going to commit themselves to it.

Q. In this statement you have said that one Chuni Lal, Manchanda, spoke as an eye-witness of the incidents in Delhi and alleged that the official account was incorrect?

A. Yes.

Q. You mention it as if to say that the official account was alleged to be something bad. Is it not possible for official accounts to be incorrect?

A. I understand that he gave a garbled version of the same affair.

Q. You say that Chuni Lal, Manchanda, spoke as an eye-witness and alleged that the official account was incorrect. You do not say that the account he gave was incorrect, but you say he alleged that the official account was incorrect? Is it adduced in such a manner as to suggest it was something very serious for him to have said that?

A. I suppose there is something in that.

Q. Is it an offence or something very bad to say that a certain official statement is not quite accurate?

A. I understand it misled the public.

8 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

Q. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the official report is not very accurate, if anybody says that would it be far wrong?

A. It is not taken like that.

Q. It would not be wrong?

A. It is not taken like that.

Q. Further on you say about the *hartal* of the 6th, that it passed off peacefully as its organisers intended. So I take it that the people in the town were entirely in the hands of these organisers. They simply followed their advice.

A. The organisers did not stimulate trouble for that particular day, and people just had a holiday.

Q. Because it was not their intention that there should be any trouble, they must have told the people that there must be no trouble and the people abstained from causing any trouble?

A. No; I take it the other way; there would have been trouble if the organisers had stimulated trouble.

Q. That is what I am suggesting. It was in their hands to cause trouble or not?

A. I do not think it is surprising that townspeople did break down as they did; I do not think they would have done anything without stimulation.

Q. This indicates that it depended upon the intentions of the organisers. There may have been stimulus and they were excited and in that excitement committed disturbances. I can see that. Here you say that it depended upon the intention whether there should be trouble or not?

A. That is my suggestion.

Q. Then the mob in the town was entirely in the hands of these organisers. They can make them do as they like?

A. I think without stimulus the mob would not cause or make trouble. That is my point.

Q. Then in Section II you say "This description has been introduced to show how unreal the first demonstration was; and it was this very unreality which had the effect of obscuring the real danger which lay behind it." Which demonstration do you refer to? Was it the one on the 6th of April?

A. Yes.

Q. What do you mean by saying that it was unreal? In what sense?

A. I mean that the *hartal* passed off so peacefully that officials were lulled into the idea that trouble was not likely to occur.

Q. In what sense was it unreal? Why should it be unreal?

A. Perhaps the wording is not very good, but that is my meaning.

Q. Do you mean to imply that if subsequent to the 6th April nothing had happened on the 10th at Amritsar or Lahore or if Mr. Gandhi had not been arrested, there was not going to be some trouble in Gujranwala after the 6th? Is that what you mean?

A. On that point, I cannot give an opinion.

Q. Because here you say "and it was this very unreality which had the effect of obscuring the real danger which lay behind it."

A. Yes.

Q. Behind the demonstration?

A. Yes, behind the demonstration.

Q. What was that danger which you are suggesting here?

A. I take it this way, that it was so surprising that the organisers of the *hartal* were able to enforce the *hartal*. I was assured on the 5th by a number of the better people in the town that there would be no *hartal* and yet, to my surprise, the next morning it had been sprung upon the people. That is my point.

Q. I do not quite follow you, because you said you are referring to some danger which you say lay behind it?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the danger?

A. The danger that lay behind it was that certain people who were able to organise the *hartal* were able to organise worse things later.

Q. Is that all?

A. That is my suggestion.

Q. Was there possibility of organising something worse later? Was that the danger?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it not a fact that everybody has that potentiality of doing wrong, everybody in the world, if he wishes to do so?

A. But not necessarily of stirring up a mob of people to do wrong.

Q. Here I understand you are referring to some definite danger that you thought was behind, and not to a mere possibility of anybody organising something wrong; that everybody is likely to do?

A. I think my meaning is fairly clear.

Q. I do not understand you. That is why I put you that question that if on the 10th April no disturbance had taken place either at Amritsar or Lahore, or if Mr. Gandhi had not been arrested, do you think that nothing was going to happen in Gujranwala?

A. I do not know what would have happened on any other day. There were a lot of movements which might have tended to make trouble.

Q. What were they?

A. You say that Mr. Gandhi's arrest and turning back to Bombay stirred up things. Possibly if he had stayed for some time in the Punjab that might have stirred up trouble. There are many possibilities that might have happened. I am only suggesting it.

Q. That is all?

A. I think so.

Q. Nothing outside that? Your reference is merely to a possibility?

A. I suggested that there were possibilities of danger.

Q. Danger of what sort? Danger of riot or rebellion? What is the kind of danger? That is my point.

A. It is very difficult to give an opinion on what may happen.

Q. What sort of danger were you thinking of?

A. Certain things did follow and from that we made certain deductions.

Q. Did that not follow on account of what happened in Lahore and Amritsar on the 10th? When you are referring to the question of *hartal* on the 6th, it is quite possible that it might have happened on the 10th?

A. Yes.

Q. It could not be said as regards the 6th, that there was some real danger lying behind the unreal demonstration?

A. From the results there appeared to have been some organization that arranged the first *hartal* and stimulated further trouble.

Q. What was the object of the organization?

A. That I cannot tell you.

Q. You have said that "the American missionaries received a warning late at night from the Indian Christians that it would be as well for them to leave." That was on the night of the 13th?

A. Yes, I understand it was at about 11 o'clock in the night.

Q. Did I understand you correctly to say that they had been warned before you left Gujranwala?

A. They were warned on account of what happened at Amritsar. Simply we thought that the men would be better without womenfolk.

Q. Do you not think that their going away on the night of the 13th was due to that warning?

A. It was not, because I told you Mr. Heron went and tried to persuade them to go previously before the warning of the Indian Christians and they would not go.

Q. They might have thought better of it afterwards?

A. I think you will get evidence on that point.

Q. If they received any information through some Indian Christians on the night of the 13th, that something was growing in Gujranwala, would they not inform the authorities before leaving Gujranwala?

A. That is an unfortunate thing that we cannot quite explain. They went off and sent a verbal message to Mr. Heron and that verbal message never reached.

8 December 1919.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

Q. Was that a verbal message to Mr. Heron ?  
 A. Yes ; it was a verbal message to Mr. Heron to be told the next morning. Mr. Heron must have been out before the messenger came to him and he never got the message. It was one of his great troubles. He thought that these men, women and young girls were still in the station.

Q. How far is the mission house from Mr. Heron's bungalow in Gujranwala ?  
 A. It is about a quarter or one-third of a mile. They ought to have told him.

Q. It would have been the easiest thing if they apprehended such a serious thing ?  
 A. They ought to have done it and put it in writing.

Q. What information had you to enable you to say that most people who were leaders were legal practitioners ?  
 A. It was merely because the legal practitioners were mostly concerned.

Q. What sort of relations are there between the executive officers and the legal practitioners in the Punjab in your experience ? Are they very cordial or not ?  
 A. As far as I am concerned, they have always been very cordial.

Q. And they are generally a law-abiding and loyal class of people in your experience ?  
 A. A great number of them are.

Q. And the same may be said of the members of the bar in Gujranwala ?  
 A. A large number of the members were not in the least concerned in this affair.

Q. At Wazirabad the mob also set fire to a gang hut ?  
 A. Yes ; I think in that they went about burning anything they could come across.

Q. Relating to the events of the 14th April at Hafizabad, you refer to a crowd being addressed by some people. "Speeches were made in the neighbourhood of the goods shed, openly advising rebellion."  
 A. Yes.

Q. What was said in the speeches ?  
 A. I do not know what was said at the time. This is an abstract of my information.

Q. That is merely a conclusion drawn by somebody that it was open rebellion ?  
 A. Yes.

Q. He did not say what was said in the speeches ?  
 A. I have not got the report. I do not know whether it is available.

Q. Don't you think it is a serious allegation to make against anybody ?  
 A. I think it has got to be accepted as true.

Q. There must have been an account somewhere ?  
 A. Yes.

Q. Had you before you the speeches ?  
 A. No.

Q. You did not have the speeches before you ?  
 A. I have had reports of the speeches.

Q. Have you any recollection as to what sort of thing was preached ? Could you constitute that as open rebellion ?  
 A. On the morning of the 14th one or two meetings were held near the railway station and after the leaders had incited the crowd to take immediate steps to overthrow the Government by raising as much opposition to it as possible, some of the leading participants called attention to the fact that the train was coming in.

Q. This is found by the tribunal ?  
 A. Yes.

Q. You had no information about it ?  
 A. I must have had similar information too.

Q. Did you have it ?  
 A. Yes.

Q. I want to know according to your information, what was stated in the speeches ?  
 A. I have not got the statement.

Q. Nor can you give us anything from your recollection ?  
 A. No ; I cannot remember.

Q. Then under the heading "Methods adopted by rebels and disturbers of the peace" you say "As directed by Mr. Gandhi, the rebels organized a *train Aerial* on the 6th of April." Who are these people whom you call rebels ?  
 A. People who were convicted as such. Certainly some of them escaped notice.

Q. That is founded upon the conviction of the tribunals ?  
 A. I think it is.

Q. And not on your information ?  
 A. I had very much the same information as that which was put before the tribunals.

Q. You also had the same information ?  
 A. Most of the information that was placed before the tribunal was also the information that I received.

Q. What was that information on which you founded the conviction ?  
 A. I cannot give every bit of that. I think it is sufficient to say that the tribunal held that they were rebels.

Q. I think it is not sufficient evidence.  
 A. But for the purpose of my writing this report, it might have been sufficient.

Q. Then may I take it that the tribunal said that ?  
 A. Yes.

Q. And nothing beyond that ?  
 A. I do not want to be too precise in that way. I do not say that I had no information that was not other than that which was put before the tribunals.

Q. You have ?  
 A. I may have. I am not prepared to be as precise in that way.

Q. My difficulty is this: here so many people are called rebels ?  
 A. Yes. It is sufficient that the tribunal held them to be so.

Q. I simply wanted to know whether you have found this merely upon the fact that the tribunals have called these rebels and convicted them as such or whether you had some information before you concluded that they were rebels ?  
 A. I do not know ; it is very difficult to answer.

Q. It is a very simple question. Either you have founded your opinion upon that or on something else. You must know on what you founded your opinion.  
 A. I was there all that time and received all kinds of information and from that I formed my opinion.

Q. You had some information to go upon independent of the conclusion arrived at by the tribunals ?  
 A. I had information which was also put before the tribunals.

Q. I want to know what that information was ?  
 A. I cannot remember it all now.

Q. You have no recollection of that at all ?  
 A. I cannot remember.

Q. I do not want you to remember everything absolutely ; but don't you remember it at all ?  
 A. I had a very hard time of it. My memory is very vague, distinctly vague. I had a lot of work to do.

Q. Was the passing of the Rowlatt Act causing a disturbance or excitement in Gujranwala District ?  
 A. I did not notice anything very definite.

Q. You have said that the crowd does not do anything unless they are led. Do you mean by that that the leaders were all there on the scene leading them to all that destruction or were the leaders inciting them to cause destruction ?  
 A. I meant 'stimulated.' Some stimulated them in one way and some in another way ; some actually went with them and some did not.

Q. I simply want to know which sort of leaders were they who were just leading them to destroy them, or who incited them by speeches to commit action ? Which leaders are you referring to ?  
 A. May be those leading on the spur of the moment ; it might be both.

Q. You also referred to bitterness of feeling existing I think on the 21st the feeling existed already ?

8 December 1919.] Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN—concluded—Khan Bahadur MIRZA SULTAN AHMAD.

A. It was natural that there must be some bitterness of feeling or they would not have gone and caused so much damage.

Q. Bitterness of feeling between whom and whom?

A. Between a certain portion of the public and the Government.

Q. Government or Government officials?

A. I saw bitterness of feeling in the hearts of certain people; that is what I am referring to.

Q. Certain members of the public and the Government. Can you assign any reason for it?

A. I simply say there was bitterness; else they would not have done so much damage.

Q. Why was there bitterness at all?

A. I do not know. It came quite as a surprise to me. It was a shock to me.

Q. About the arrest of some people, I think you said that you arrested them under the Defence of India Act. Are you empowered to do that?

A. Yes; all District Magistrates were empowered.

Q. Without reference to the Local Government?

A. Any way, I am empowered, I know.

Q. Does it not require the previous sanction of the Local Government?

A. I do not know; I am not sure. In any case, I have made arrests whether I was empowered or not.

Q. That is better.

A. I was made to do certain things to suppress the trouble.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. You were asked certain questions regarding the temper of the mob at Gujranwala on the 14th April as against Europeans. Why did you form the opinion from your enquiries that it was against Europeans?

A. It was distinctly the desire of the mob to murder Mr. Heron.

Q. I understand that Mr. Heron was knocked down on one occasion?

A. He was not knocked down. He was just reached by an attacking mob when he drew his pistol and fired; and the men with him fired too.

Q. Did they display murderous intentions by words or signs?

A. They had already stoned him and they had in their hands hammers and crowbars.

Q. Did they use any actual threats against him?

A. Yes. They called out 'Kill him' and words of that kind. I forget the exact words.

Q. Then as regards the missionaries, do you agree that the Indian Christians, on the night of the 13th, not only knew that there would be an outbreak next morning but knew also that they being Indians were not in danger, the threat being against Europeans?

A. Yes.

Q. That being known to the Indian Christians, can you tell me, was any similar warning given during the night of the 13th to any officer of Government by any of the so-called leaders of Gujranwala?

A. No.

Q. Then whatever may have been the reason, Government and its officers did not in fact receive from the leaders the assistance which the missionaries got from their Indian comrades.

A. Yes.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. You were questioned about the pleaders and Arya Samajists. Can you tell me of the 16 persons sent up for trial, how many were released?

A. About eight.

Q. How many Arya Samajists?

A. I do not remember; some of them leading Arya Samajists; half a dozen or so.

Q. You were questioned about Mangal Sen; it was said that he was a prominent official and a philanthropist and that they acted very improperly in arresting this man and handcuffing him. Is it not a fact that this man was sent for trial before a Judge of the High Court and was sentenced to transportation for life?

A. Yes.

Q. You were questioned about Gohur Singh, Lambar-dar, and it was suggested that he committed no offence whatever, and that you improperly arrested him for helping his sons to escape. Is it not a fact that he was liable to be punished under the sections of the Indian Penal Code for so helping his sons, who were wanted by the police?

A. Yes.

Q. About certain compensation from villages and individuals, that is a compensation under the bye-laws of the Act and not under Martial Law?

A. Yes.

Khan Bahadur MIRZA SULTAN AHMAD, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Gujranwala.

By the President—

Q. Did you act as Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala, for a few days?

A. Only for a day and half.

Q. On the 13th you heard that there would be a *hartal* in Gujranwala?

A. I was informed by the Superintendent of Police on the evening of the 13th that there would be a *hartal* in Gujranwala and it would last as long as the *hartal* at Lahore lasted.

Q. About 7 o'clock on the 14th, did you go towards the city?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you, on your way, hear that certain occurrences were happening at the station?

A. I heard that the railway train which had reached Gujranwala from the Lahore side was attacked by the people and the people were stopping those who wanted to go to attend the *Baisakhi* Fair.

Q. Then did you go personally to the railway station?

A. I proceeded at once to the railway station and I found several of the passengers standing there and I also saw the train at the station.

Q. Did you know that the railway bridge had been burnt?

A. I came to know at the railway station that the Gurukul bridge had been burnt.

Q. I think the Superintendent of Police proceeded in that direction and you went towards the city?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you went towards the city, did you find that the shops were all closed and people were going to and fro?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they shouting?

A. Yes, Sir. They were shouting and they were crying "we won't accept the Rowlatt Bill" and some were crying "Hai hai Rowlatt Bill."

Q. Were they hurrying to the place where they were being addressed by the leaders?

A. Some were sitting there and others were proceeding to the place which was appointed for the meeting.

Q. And did you yourself return to the railway station?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you hear reports of shots being fired?

A. When I reached the railway station, I heard shots and also came to know that Mr. Heron was assaulted by a man who flew at his throat and then he gave orders to shoot at the mob.

Q. Then the shots were fired by Mr. Heron and some who were with him, I suppose?

A. The constables who accompanied him.

Q. Had the firing the effect of quietening the people or what effect had it?

8 December 1919.]

Khan Bahadur MIRZA SULTAN AHMAD.

[Continued.]

A. People were all the more excited by this firing.

Q. What casualties were caused by this firing?

A. Two were wounded by this firing; nobody died.

Q. Were the wounded carried away by the mob?

A. One of the wounded was carried to the place of the meeting and there they made an exaggerated statement "here is one of the wounded and there are many others who have been wounded."

Q. Was the mob in a very enraged condition?

A. They were very enraged and they said they would kill Mr. Heron and avenge themselves.

Q. Did you dread their doing destruction to property, as well as killing Mr. Heron?

A. I was not very apprehensive about property, but I did fear that Mr. Heron would come to grief.

Q. Did you think it necessary to have assistance?

A. There were only 70 constables in all and they were all scattered. There were 25 at the railway station. At that time we considered help necessary and wired to Lahore for military assistance.

Q. Were you able to send off the telegram from the station?

A. There was great difficulty, because the telegraph wire was cut at two places, so the Superintendent of Police despatched two men, one to Rahwali and the other to Eminadad, and the telegram was despatched from those two places.

Q. Meantime did the mob repair to the railway station again?

A. They advanced to the railway station.

Q. Did they collect in front of the gates?

A. At the back of the station.

Q. Were there many boys among this crowd?

A. About 40 or 35 per cent. of the crowd was composed of boys.

Q. Was the crowd using fiery language?

A. They abused in Punjabee and used very fiery language.

Q. Where were the Superintendent of Police and his constables at this time?

A. They were standing in front of the station on one side of the city.

Q. Did the mob address any language to the Superintendent of Police?

A. They were addressing all these things to him.

Q. What are "these things"?

A. Some asked him to put off his hat; some asked him to go away.

Q. Did you go towards the mob and endeavour to get them to go away?

A. Yes, Sir. I tried and about 300 or 400 men went with me towards the city; we went for a distance of 400 paces and then I came back and then they also returned.

Q. When you returned to the city did you see that the Post Office was ablaze?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were the mob, at the time you left, attempting to burn the railway station?

A. The crowd was divided into two parts; one was on the side of the city and the other nearing the railway station. It was the party that was near the railway station that tried to burn the station.

Q. You saw the mob in the city?

A. Outside the city.

Q. Had you to consider the question whether it was essential to fire upon them in order to disperse them or not?

A. The point was considered at that time, but because the front portion of the crowd was mainly composed of boys, neither my conscience allowed me nor was it the opinion of the Superintendent of Police that we should fire at that time.

Q. Had you ultimately to fire on the mob?

A. In my presence I never saw any firing but I have already mentioned about the firing at the Kachi bridge by the Superintendent of Police, Mr. Heron, and then I saw another mob while I was proceeding to the *kutcheri* and it was composed of boys mainly. I asked them to

go away and said that if they did not disperse we would have to fire. They then moved away, so there was no occasion for firing.

Q. Some time after this did you find other places in the city which they had set fire to?

A. The places that had been burnt are situated outside the city. At 1 o'clock I came to know that the *kutcheri*, dak bungalow and the tahsil had been burnt.

Q. Well, don't you think that if the crowd had been fired on sooner they would have dispersed without doing the damage that was done?

A. But I think that if those boys had been fired upon they would not have dispersed.

Q. I don't quite follow what you mean.

A. I mean that the crowd at the railway station was a mixed crowd and the majority of that crowd consisted of boys. Had those boys been shot at people would have been enraged and excited. Then there had been more trouble.

Q. How do you account for the mob setting fire to all these different places all these times?

A. The main reasons of this excitement, which I give, are three: firstly, that they had heard some true or untrue facts about the Rowlatt Act, secondly, about the arrest of Mr. Gandhi, and thirdly, they had heard strange rumours from people coming from Amritsar.

Q. Is it true that they had gone out that morning bent upon destroying all these places?

A. Before the police or the authorities were informed or had gathered at that spot the people had already done two things; first, they had burnt the Gurukul bridge and the other thing they had done was that they had stopped the train. They might have come to these conclusions on the previous night or at the spur of the moment they had thought of it and done it.

Q. Before they started on their acts of incendiarism had there been anything which might have provoked them?

A. Nothing, Sir.

Q. Well, I think at 3 o'clock in the afternoon Colonel O'Brien arrived and took over from you?

A. Yes.

Q. Was not there some firing in the city and was it not by the police?

A. No.

Q. Did not Mr. Nevill order firing in the city?

A. I had not heard of it.

Q. Did you not know that Mr. Nevill had authorised the police constables to fire?

A. I am not aware of that.

By the Honble Mr. Justice Bankin—

Q. Khan Bahadur Sahib, can you tell me as nearly as you know at what time in the morning the Gurukul bridge was set on fire?

A. As far as I can surmise it must be about 6 or 6-30 in the morning.

Q. So that the mob, who did that act, must have got up early in the morning and must have determined to make an attack on the Government property?

A. I cannot say anything about their intentions.

Q. Would you just tell me if in order to get that bridge burnt they had to fetch oil and put it on the sleepers?

A. I was informed that they got this oil from the railway station and some straw from there.

Q. You know the places where the bombs were dropped?

A. I don't know them as I had left.

Q. Have you not since seen the places upon which the bombs were dropped?

A. I never went to Gujranwala again. I went to Muridke.

Q. Were you anywhere near the spots where the bombs were thrown?

A. When the bombs dropped I was in the District Court.

Q. Where is that?

A. It is about half a mile distant from the places where the bombs were thrown.



8 December 1919.]

Khan Bahadur MIRZA SULTAN AHMAD.

[Continued.]

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Khan Bahadur, for how many years have you been in Gujranwala ?

A. From the 28th July 1917.

Q. Before that were you in some other district or were you formerly also in that district ?

A. I was at Jhelum.

Q. During your tenure of office in Gujranwala did you find the people law-abiding or disloyal ?

A. I was not stationed at Gujranwala. I was at Sharakpur, 20 or 25 miles away ; but as far as I know about the people of Gujranwala nothing against them was reported to me.

Q. Do you hold the same opinion about the Sharakpur people ?

A. Exactly the same.

Q. Was there any anti-Government feeling before April 1919 brought to your notice ?

A. I never heard of anything against Government but there were many meetings in favour of Government.

Q. Was that when the war broke out ?

A. Since my arrival in 1917 up to the end of 1918 these meetings were held.

Q. Meetings by the public to assist Government in recruiting and in War Loan ?

A. Some were concerned with recruitment and some with the War Loan and some with the War League.

Q. And so far as recruiting was concerned Gujranwala made a very good response ?

A. You mean Gujranwala proper or villages in the Gujranwala District ?

Q. I mean the villages in that district.

A. Agriculturist classes in the Gujranwala District provided a great number of recruits. Gujranwala itself did not do anything except giving 8 or 9 recruits.

Q. And were the events in April 1919 surprising to you ?

A. We had no idea of these things till the 13th. When these things happened on the 14th, we were absolutely surprised.

Q. The meeting that was held on the 14th, was mainly to oppose the Rowlatt Bill ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When was the news of the arrest of Mr. Gandhi received in Gujranwala ?

A. As far as I remember the news reached Gujranwala on the 12th or 13th.

Q. In your view was that news the cause of what took place on the 14th ?

A. This news had also its share in those incidents.

Q. On the 14th the crowd before they came to the railway station they passed through the city ?

A. I was not in the city and am not aware of that.

Q. They must have passed through the city ?

A. They have to pass through the city.

Q. On their way to the railway station they did not destroy any property ?

A. There is no other Government building or property on the way before the railway station and the Post Office.

Q. But the Courts, Tahsil and other offices were burnt subsequently. Where are they situated ?

A. They have to pass the railway station and the Post Office to reach *kutchery*.

Q. They are outside the city ?

A. Yes.

Q. At the railway station when Girdhari Lal, you say, attacked the Superintendent of Police, firing had to be resorted to ?

A. There is a bridge called *Kachchi* bridge at a distance of about 200 or 250 paces from the railway station. There this Girdhari Lal caught the Superintendent of Police by the throat ; therefore he had to resort to firing.

Q. What I want to know is was the railway station attacked after this firing and not before that ?

A. It was after this firing incident took place there that the railway station was attacked, and in my opinion these things would not have happened had firing at the

railway station not taken place, and had Girdhari Lal not attacked the Superintendent of Police there would have been no firing.

Q. The railway bridge near Gurukul was set on fire before this firing ?

A. That was put on fire before even I or the Superintendent of Police or any constable or any other person reached the bridge.

Q. Then you cannot say that the destruction of property followed the firing by the Superintendent of Police ?

A. The bridge near Gurukul was put on fire and the train was stopped from moving in order to make the railway people or passengers in the train share in the *hartal* because they were themselves in *hartal*. When the bridge was put on fire then they let the train move onward.

Q. In your view, was the bridge attacked for the purposes of making the railway people join in the *hartal* ?

A. That is what I think.

Q. Had the mob come to the railway station for the purposes of making the railway people join in the *hartal* ?

A. The people who stopped the train were those who were proceeding towards Amritsar for the *Baisakhi* Fair. Several of them had got into the train while others came out and said that as at Amritsar certain incidents had taken place it did not behove them to proceed to Amritsar for this fair.

Q. Had they then come to prevent the people who were going by that train to Amritsar ?

A. These people went to the station to catch the train for Wazirabad. When they reached the station they heard from the passengers of that train that at Amritsar certain incidents had taken place. They said all this to the people who were proceeding to Wazirabad.

Q. People had gone to the station to go to Wazirabad ?

A. Yes, the first part of the mob.

Q. You mean to say that people who came to the station, had come for the purposes of proceeding to Wazirabad by train ?

A. Yes.

Q. They heard from the passengers that events had happened at Amritsar ?

A. Yes.

Q. Upon that they made up their minds not to go to Wazirabad ?

A. Yes.

Q. Having made up their minds not to go, they stopped the train ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then further people came from the town ?

A. Yes.

Q. And then after that when they were joined by the further crowd, did they then proceed to attack the station ?

A. They were seen standing outside the railway fencing and they were only crying and shouting "*Hai hai Rowlatt Bill*." The Superintendent of Police preceded me and then those people tried to assault in our absence but they were dispersed. We did not resort to firing because there were many boys there.

Q. Till the Superintendent of Police arrived they had not begun to attack the station ?

A. The bridge had already been burnt. When we went there they only used bad language and were only crying.

Q. Then you asked them to disperse ?

A. I proceeded to the city.

Q. What did you do when this crowd, which was at the railway station, was threatening or crying ?

A. I took about 300 or 400 people along with me from the railway station. After making the things known to them I told them to give in writing whatever complaint they had to make.

Q. You talked with them and you took away with you 400 or 500 people ?

A. After having talked with them I told them that if they had any complaint they should make it in writing.

8 December 1919.]

Khan Bahadur MISRA SULTAN AHMAD.

[Continued.]

I also told them that if Girdhari Lal had not made an attack upon the Superintendent of Police then this firing would not have taken place.

Q. They were excited over this firing? You tried to persuade them to go away because it was owing to Girdhari Lal?

A. Yes, the same thing was told.

Q. And when you tried to persuade them like this, were they pacified?

A. We were talking with them and giving this as an argument that now everything had happened. If they were opposed to the Rowlatt Bill they must give it in writing and then we would submit it to Government. I was there for one day. There were some other people with me, therefore I persuaded about 400 or 500 people who came along with me.

Q. Did you take them with you. Where did you take them?

A. I took them towards the city to a place called Chah Beriwalla.

Q. What did you do there?

A. We asked them to go towards their homes and not to return because it was not the proper thing.

Q. Did they accept your suggestion?

A. Some of them really departed homewards and some other mischief-mongers came back.

Q. Where did you go?

A. I returned to the railway station.

Q. When you returned to the railway station, was it on fire?

A. When I returned to the railway station, I noticed that the Post Office was on fire.

Q. Was there a crowd in front of the Post Office?

A. There was a crowd there.

Q. What measures did you take?

A. We tried to persuade them again. Some began to move to and fro, and some of them who were bent upon mischief came to the railway station and some of them entered the railway station.

Q. What measures did you then take to deal with the mob that had already set fire to the Post Office? You saw the post office burning and they were threatening at the railway station. What measures did you then take at the time?

A. It was 1 o'clock when I noticed the Post Office on fire. But at the same time exactly a constable came running and informed us that the mob had set fire to the district court and tahsil. So instantly we went to the district court.

Q. When you went there what measures did you take?

A. When we went there, we saw that the district courts, the honorary magistrates' courts and the dak bungalow were all on fire. There was no man to be found there.

Q. The mob was not there at all? Where did they disappear?

A. Some went to that side and some to this side.

Q. When you came to the Post Office which was burning, there was a large crowd in front of it?

A. Yes.

Q. There was also a large crowd in front of the railway station?

A. Yes.

Q. What measures did you take then under those circumstances to disperse them?

A. When I went there and saw the mob, exactly at that time a constable came and informed me, and because it was the question of *kutcheri* and other places more important, I went straight to that place and left Lala Amar Nath here.

Q. When you went to the *kutcheri* you found nobody there?

A. None.

Q. Then did you come back to the railway station and the Post Office or what did you do?

A. I was there at the *kutcheri* up to 3 o'clock.

Q. You remained at the *kutcheri* from 1 o'clock to 3 o'clock when there was no crowd there at all, and there were no people doing anything there at all?

A. We went to the *kutcheri* on foot and we reached the *kutcheri* at about 1-30 and there we were trying to save the Government papers, etc.

Q. What measures did you take to see that no further mischief was done by the mob either at the railway station or anywhere else?

A. I was met by a mob of about 200 persons in the Company gardens which are situated on the way to the district court. When I met that mob there, I asked them to disperse, because I had not known to what degree the district courts had already been burnt and if they did not disperse, I told them they would be fired upon. I ordered my constables to be prepared, and when they raised the guns they dispersed.

Q. At what time did the aeroplanes arrive?

A. At about 3 o'clock.

Q. And dropped bombs?

A. I only heard the noise; I do not know whether they were dropping bombs.

Q. Where were you at the time?

A. I was at the district court.

Q. Was the mob still there at the railway station or near the *kutcheri* when aeroplanes came there?

A. I was not present near the Post Office or the station, but I heard that crowds were moving there in groups.

Q. There was no crowd near the *kutcheri*?

A. No.

Q. After the aeroplanes had dropped bombs, did you see what happened, in what places bombs were dropped, and did you make any enquiries?

A. I had already given over charge.

Q. You had nothing further to do then?

A. Nothing.

Q. You were not concerned with the arrest made on the 15th at Gujranwala?

A. I do not know anything further about those arrests, because I went to Muridka.

Q. Nor had you anything to do with the arrests at Sheikhpura?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. On the 14th, you left your house at 7 A.M.?

A. Yes.

Q. And you went to the city. How far were you away?

A. I was going to the city, but hearing the incidents at the railway station, I took my route to the railway station outside the city.

Q. How far were you from the railway station when this news reached you?

A. I was living outside the city at a distance of about half a mile or a bit less.

Q. The news that was received by you was that the train had already arrived at the station?

A. That the train had been stopped at the railway station.

Q. That train was one hour late that day? According to your statement it had arrived at the station at about 8 A.M.?

A. It was due at Gujranwala at 7 in the evening and it arrived at 8 A.M. I might say that it was late by one full night and one hour.

Q. At the time of its arrival it was 8 A.M.?

A. It was 7 o'clock.

Q. In paragraph 7 of your statement you say "I was told that Sialkot train which was late that day reached here at 8 A.M." Is that incorrect?

A. There is no mention of 8 o'clock in the vernacular statement which I submitted.

Q. However, you reached the station at about 8 A.M.?

A. Yes.

Q. Then at the railway station you found that passengers were on the platform?

A. Some of the passengers were in the train; others were on the platform and some had already departed.

Q. And the train was standing?

A. It was standing without an engine.

8 December 1919.]

Khan Bahadur MIRZA SULTAN AHMAD.

[Concluded.]

Q. And the Superintendent of Police with some constables was standing there?

A. Yes.

Q. How many constables were with the Superintendent of Police there?

A. About 25 or 26.

Q. At this stage you received information that the Gurukul bridge had been burnt?

A. I was informed by the Superintendent of Police about the Gurukul bridge.

Q. As soon as you received this news, the Superintendent went towards the bridge?

A. I cannot say if he went as soon as he received the news, but he went in my presence.

Q. Why do you say that the Gurukul bridge was burnt at 6-30?

A. I only heard so.

Q. Were you informed that a calf was hanging on any of these bridges?

A. I was not informed during that period, but after 14 days when I arrived back on private business, I was informed about this.

Q. Supposing a calf was hanging from that bridge, would that be any cause of provocation to burn that bridge?

A. Evidently it is quite sufficient.

Q. Therefore when you said in answer to the President that there was no cause for provocation, you were not aware of this fact; you did not take this fact into consideration?

A. No.

Q. From the gala dress of the first crowd that was at the station, could you or could you not make out that they were going towards Wazirabad and Gujranwala?

A. Crowds had already mixed before I reached the railway station.

Q. You were present on the morning of the 15th at Gujranwala?

A. Yes.

Q. And you gave over charge to Colonel O'Brien at about 4 P.M. on the 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you give to Colonel O'Brien any list of respectable persons as having taken part in these disturbances?

A. I was not familiar with Gujranwala before this, because I had only come there for one day and my knowledge was limited.

Q. Was any list given to Colonel O'Brien in your presence by anybody else?

A. No.

Q. Neither was a list given by your Extra Assistant Commissioner or by any police officer so far as your knowledge goes?

A. I have not heard of any list being given, not to my knowledge.

Q. You left in the evening of the 15th?

A. I was ordered at about 1 by the Deputy Commissioner to proceed to Muridke and I proceeded towards Muridke on the morning of the 16th.

*By Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate—*

Q. Khan Bahadur, have you ever had any experience of any disturbances before?

A. Disturbances with me or with Government?

Q. In your official capacity had you experience of any riot before?

A. I have only heard that such a thing happened in Multan in 1884. I have not had to deal with any riot.

Q. So far as acting as Deputy Commissioner is concerned, you have told us that you acted as Deputy Commissioner for one day and a half. Have you ever had an opportunity of officiating as a Deputy Commissioner before?

A. I even repent this one opportunity.

Q. Are you now in service or have you retired?

A. I should have retired on the 28th September, but I was given an extension.

Q. You have suggested that so far as the stopping of the train or the burning of the bridge was concerned, the reason why people did so might be that they wanted to include the railway in the strike. May I know what was the reason of the cutting of the wires which you have mentioned?

A. Evidently it was done in order to stop communications.

11 December 1919.]

Captain D. H. M. CARBERRY.

**At Lahore, Thursday, the 11th December 1919.**

**P R E S E N T :**

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.L., C.L.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

Sir C. H. SENTALVAD, Kt.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., L.P., *Secretary.*

Captain D. H. M. CARBERRY, M.C., D.F.C., Flight Commander, No. 31 Squadron, Royal Air Force.

*By the President—*

Q. Are you the Flight Commander of No. 31 Squadron ?

A. I was the Commander of No. 31 Squadron.

Q. On the afternoon of the 14th April 1919 did you receive verbal instructions from Lieutenant-Colonel Minchin ?

A. Yes.

Q. As to proceeding to Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. I see that Lieutenant-Colonel Minchin's orders were :—

- (1) That the native city was not to be bombed.
- (2) That crowds were to be bombed if in the open.
- (3) That gatherings near the local villages were to be dispersed if coming or going from Gujranwala.

Were those the instructions you received ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you carry out those instructions ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you arrived at Gujranwala at 3-10 P.M. ?

A. Yes, about 3 o'clock.

Q. When you arrived at Gujranwala what did you observe ?

A. When I arrived there I found that the railway station was burning and that all the goods in the goods shed were also burning. The station was crowded with people. There was a train on the Up line which appeared to be on fire as well.

Q. Did you notice the English church and four houses in civil lines burning ?

A. The English church and four houses in civil lines on the east of the railway were also burning.

Q. At what height were you flying from the ground ?

A. About 500 feet.

Q. Did you reconnoitre the situation before you took any action ?

A. I flew over Gujranwala and the neighbouring villages. I satisfied myself before I did anything.

Q. Was the course of your flight over the neighbouring villages also ?

A. I flew over the town and the neighbouring villages within an area of three miles from Gujranwala.

Q. Then after that did you take action ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you consider that the situation was such as justified you to take action in accordance with the instructions you had received ?

A. Yes.

Q. I think the action you took appears from the report annexed to your statement ?

A. Yes.

Q. From that report I see that the first bombs you dropped were the three bombs that you dropped on a party of natives 150 strong outside a village about two miles north-west of Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were these natives apparently making for Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. In your report I see that you say one bomb failed to explode and that the others fell near the party which scattered ?

A. Yes.

Q. You also add that three casualties were seen. Were you able to satisfy yourself as to the number of casualties ?

A. I saw three men dropping.

Q. When you say so do you mean they were wounded or killed ?

A. I could not say that.

Q. You fired a number of machine-gun rounds into these villages ?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whether they caused any casualties ?

A. I could not say.

Q. Then do you know which of the villages it was where you dropped three bombs ?

A. I don't know the name of the village. I had not the map which could show the village.

Q. You give it as about two miles north-west of Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then a few minutes later did you drop two bombs on a group of 50 natives outside a village a mile south of Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did both these bombs explode or only one ?

A. Only one exploded.

Q. That bomb burst within ten yards of a party ?

A. Yes, it burst quite near the party. It did not cause any casualties as far as I could see.

Q. Did you fire some rounds from the machine gun near the village ?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you say if that firing caused any casualties ?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Then a few minutes later did you fire again upon a number of natives in a field near a large red building on the north-west outskirts of the town ?

A. Yes.

Q. About 200 natives were there ?

A. Yes, I should think about 200.

Q. Was it on a building or upon a group of natives that you fired ?

A. I fired at a group of natives.

Q. What was the group of natives doing ?

A. There was a crowd of natives.

Q. They appeared to be making for the city of Gujranwala ?

A. I could not form an opinion.

Q. I think one of the bombs dropped burst in the court-yard of the building ?

A. Yes.

Q. And several people appeared to be wounded ?

A. Yes.

11 December 1919.]

Captain D. H. M. CARBERRY.

[Continued.]

Q. And did you fire some rounds from your machine gun into a party who took shelter in the house ?

A. Yes.

Q. A few minutes later did you drop two bombs in the centre of the town ?

A. They were dropped on a large crowd of natives near the centre of the town. I cannot tell you the exact place.

Q. But they dropped in the town ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they explode ?

A. No, Sir. Neither of the bombs burst. I did not see them hit the ground.

Q. So that they could not have caused any casualties ?

A. That is so, Sir.

Q. Did you fire your machine gun ?

A. I fired 150 rounds machine gun into parties of natives in the streets. These parties were coming from the railway station and going to the civil lines.

Q. About ten minutes to four did you leave for Lahore ?

A. Yes.

Q. Altogether you were something under an hour, between half an hour and three-quarters of an hour in Gujranwala ?

A. I was there for about three-quarters of an hour.

Q. At the time when you left for Lahore would you see whether the police held the station and no crowd was moving in the city ?

A. Yes, I reported that.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—*

Q. Just one thing I would like you to explain to me about the first incident at the village two miles north-west of Gujranwala. Was it the first time you dropped any bombs ?

A. Yes.

Q. You dropped them on a party of natives 150 strong ?

A. Yes.

Q. It is very difficult to estimate from the aeroplane the number of people in the crowd on the ground ?

A. You can estimate from the size of the crowd that were there.

Q. Then one bomb failed to explode and the others that fell near the party scattered it. After that I understand you fired 50 rounds of machine gun into the village. Was that simply fired at the houses or at the people in the streets or how did you fire into the village ?

A. I fired at the crowd that ran into the village.

Q. You followed up the crowd with the machine gun into the village ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then in Gujranwala itself you fired a hundred rounds at the people in the streets and those people were coming in crowd from the railway station. Did you see them going towards the Civil Lines ?

A. They were running away. As soon as I started firing, they began to disperse near the railway station and people also started to come away from the Civil Lines.

Q. When you fired near the railway station the people stopped from collecting round the station ?

A. Yes, Sir.

*By Sir C. H. Selvad—*

Q. I understand that you first went to Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. But you did not do anything at first there ?

A. No.

Q. Then you went to neighbouring villages ?

A. That is right.

Q. You went to one village two miles from Gujranwala and you first dropped two bombs ?

A. No, three.

Q. Those bombs you dropped on particular crowds that you saw there ?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was this crowd, in the streets or outside the village ?

A. They were on the road outside the village.

Q. That crowd consisted of how many people ?

A. I reported 150. I cannot tell you exactly.

Q. How many miles was this village from Gujranwala ?

A. About two miles north-west of Gujranwala.

Q. What was this crowd doing ?

A. They were going towards Gujranwala.

Q. How were you able to ascertain that they were going to Gujranwala ?

A. They were walking in the direction of Gujranwala.

Q. And you dropped three bombs on them ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you say in your report that you fired your machine gun into the village itself ?

A. Yes.

Q. That firing was not at any particular crowd ?

A. It was at the people on whom I dropped the bombs and who ran back to the village.

Q. When you first dropped bombs on a party of 150 strong they began to run away into the village ?

A. Yes.

Q. And you fired the machine gun into the village also ?

A. Yes.

Q. That was over the houses in the village ?

A. I suppose some of the shots hit the houses.

Q. You say that the people when they were fired at began to run away, i.e., after you dropped the bombs they began to disperse and got into some of the houses; that is what they attempted to do ?

A. Yes.

Q. You fired machine gun rounds into the village and threw bombs on those people who took shelter in the houses but there were other innocent people in those houses ?

A. I could not discriminate between innocent and other people who were, I think, doing damage or were going to do damage.

Q. You say that on 150 people, that were seen there, you dropped three bombs with the result that they dispersed and ran into the village. Was not your object accomplished ? Was there any further need of firing the machine gun ?

A. The machine gun was not fired indiscriminately. It was fired on the people who were running away.

Q. You fired the machine gun into the village ?

A. I said the crowd scattered and ran back into the village and I have said that 50 rounds machine gun were fired into the village. I fired at the men.

Q. When the crowd split up they must be running away and entering the houses; then you fired machine gun rounds into the village which hit the houses in which there were perfectly innocent people ?

A. I was at a height of 200 feet. I could see perfectly well and I did not see anybody in the village at all who was innocent.

Q. What I mean is this. When you threw the bombs on them they began to run away. Was not your object really accomplished ?

A. No.

Q. What was the further need of machine-gunning them and killing them. Your object was to disperse the crowds that had assembled and that were attempting to proceed to Gujranwala. The throwing of bombs must have resulted in some casualties. Was there any further need of machine gun fire ?

A. Yes, to do more damage.

Q. But then the object seemed to be to hit or kill more people in that crowd, although they had begun to disperse and were running away after the bombs had been thrown on them ?

A. I was trying to do this in their own interests. If I killed a few people, they would not gather and come to Gujranwala to do damage.

Q. Do I take it then, although by the first throwing of the bombs they began to disperse and run away, you still machine-gunned them in order to prevent the possibility of their re-assembling, the idea being to produce a sort of moral effect upon them ?

A. Yes. Quite right.

11 December 1919.]

Captain D. H. M. CARRERY.

(Continued.)

Q. Then you went to another village after that ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. And you fired your machine gun into that village ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Not on any particular crowd ?  
 A. Oh yes ; a party of 50 natives outside the village. About 50 people were seen returning to this village, having come from Gujranwala.  
 Q. How did you know they had come from Gujranwala ?  
 A. They were coming on the road from Gujranwala. There is no other place between this village and Gujranwala.  
 Q. They might be coming from places beyond that ?  
 A. But they had come through Gujranwala.  
 Q. And you saw these 50 people going into this village or on the way to this village ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. And you machine-gunned them ?  
 A. That is right.  
 Q. How many people were killed ?  
 A. I did not see any casualties.  
 Q. It did not take effect ?  
 A. No.  
 Q. Then you came back to Gujranwala ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. On the first occasion you went over Gujranwala you took no action at all, but when you went to these villages you did take action ?  
 A. I was doing reconnaissance first.  
 Q. For that purpose you had to go over other villages also ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. You generally tried to sum up the situation as to what was happening all round the district ?  
 A. Yes. I went round to find out the situation in Gujranwala and the neighbouring villages.  
 Q. Then when you came back to Gujranwala you found about 200 Indians in a field ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Where was this field ?  
 A. It was on the north-west outskirts of the town.  
 Q. Outside the town ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. What were these 200 people doing ?  
 A. I could not tell you what they were doing.  
 Q. Then why did you conclude that they were the rioters ?  
 A. It was a large crowd of people who should not have been there.  
 Q. You could not make out what they were doing ?  
 A. I have told you I could not make out.  
 Q. You dropped two bombs on them ?  
 A. I think I dropped only one.  
 Q. Then after that you fired 150 rounds with a machine gun into the town itself ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. That was aimed at no particular crowd ?  
 A. It was aimed at the whole place. There was a crowd.  
 Q. That is true. But as you threw one bomb at 200 people that had assembled, was it not sufficient ? Then I understand you fired about 150 rounds machine gun, were they not aimed at them ? Was a particular congregation fired at or the whole town itself ?  
 A. At people who were collecting round the station and who were running away from the station when I started firing. When they heard my firing the crowds were trying to get away.  
 Q. You fired the rounds into the town and not at any particular congregation ?  
 A. Not at the town, but at the people who were in the streets and were trying to run away.  
 Q. There might be peaceful people in the streets ?  
 A. No, they should not be in the streets.  
 Q. They should not be in the streets ?  
 A. No.  
 Q. You thought that anybody, who was in the streets of Gujranwala, had no business to be there at all the whole day ?

A. I saw these people. I could discriminate between people who had come out on business and the people who were trying to get shelter in the city.

Q. I don't follow you. Did you aim at any particular crowd ?

A. I can give you answer by reading out my report.

Q. The words there are " I fired about 150 rounds machine gun, into the native city, causing casualties." You say " coming back to Gujranwala I noticed a party of about 200 natives in a field near a large red building on the north-west outskirts of town " . . . . " I fired about 150 rounds machine gun into the native city."

After dropping one bomb you dropped two more bombs on the crowd of people who were moving into the city ?

A. Yes.

Q. You dealt with that crowd which was running away from the station into the city ?

A. Yes.

Q. In addition to that you say in your report " I fired about 150 rounds machine gun into the native city" ?

A. You must understand that it was no good my firing at the houses in the native city.

Q. At first you fired one bomb and then you dropped two bombs which you fired at particular crowds, then in the third place you fired about 150 rounds into the native city ?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 15th did you go with the aeroplane ?

A. No, I did not go to Gujranwala.

By Major General Sir George Barrow—

Q. How many bombs did you drop ?

A. Only eight.

Q. How many failed to explode ?

A. I did not see. Four, I think, exploded. Two I saw did not explode. The others I did not see.

Q. They were dud bombs ?

A. Yes.

Q. What was their weight ?

A. 20 lbs.

Q. In your statement I see that you did exactly what you were ordered to do. You were ordered that the native city was not to be bombed ; that crowds were to be bombed if in the open ; and that gatherings near the local villages were to be dispersed if coming or going from Gujranwala. Those were the orders for you ?

A. Yes.

Q. Well then you could not possibly tell whether the people at whom you threw the bombs were the innocent people or the guilty people ? It was quite impossible for you to say ?

A. Yes.

Q. You could only carry out your instructions ?

A. Yes.

Q. One bomb failed, but your object was to disperse the people. I take it that you had to carry out your orders. You had no occasion to fail in your duty ?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. It took you only 20 minutes to do all this firing. You mention from 15-20 to 15-40 in the report ?

A. I don't know the exact time.

Q. It is given in your first report of the 14th April that on your return you submitted the bombing report ?

A. Yes.

Q. I think your memory was then more fresh than it is now ?

A. Yes.

Q. It took you only 20 minutes to do all this ?

A. Yes.

Q. No orders were given to you that the native city or the local villages should be bombed.

A. No.

Q. With regard to the fact as to whether the crowd was going from Gujranwala or coming to Gujranwala,

11 December 1919.] Captain D. H. M. CARBERRY—concluded—Lieutenant L. DODKINS.

you decided all that within those 20 minutes. You had to do it, I mean to say, practically in those 20 minutes?

A. Yes.

Q. You mean the fact as to whether they were going from Gujranwala or coming to Gujranwala?

A. Yes.

Q. And whatever may be the reason, the fact that the crowd was going from Gujranwala or coming to Gujranwala does not find place in your bombing report. Was it not necessary for you to mention this fact in your report?

A. Yes.

Q. Am I right in saying that that fact should have found place in your bombing report?

A. I have not got my bombing report here.

Q. Will you kindly see it in General Beynon's report. There may be good reasons but I want to know why this fact is not mentioned in your bombing report?

A. It is not mentioned there.

Q. And you were flying at a height of from 100 to 700 feet over Gujranwala and neighbouring villages?

A. That is right.

Q. Then how many aeroplanes were there besides yours?

A. There were two others.

Q. And in one of them was Lieutenant Kirby?

A. Lieutenant Kirby was flying in a machine from Lahore to Risalpur. He flew over Gujranwala on his way to Risalpur.

Q. He also fired at the crowd?

A. I do not know.

Q. Had you been to Gujranwala before that date?

A. No, I had never been there.

Q. Have you ever been there since?

A. I have flown over Gujranwala several times since.

Q. I take it then that your object was to disperse the crowd?

A. My object was to stop the crowd from doing damage.

Q. That crowd was doing no damage but you thought the crowd in the villages was going to do so?

A. I stopped them from going to do any damage.

Q. Therefore your object was to stop them from going to Gujranwala?

A. Yes.

Q. When they were dispersed they would go to their own village?

A. Yes.

Q. And when that object was achieved, i.e., when you dispersed the crowd, instead of going to Gujranwala they went inside the village. What was the need of machine-gunning them? Practically you fired on all that were inside the village. Was there any need of machine-gunning them?

A. I have answered that question before.

Q. Then are you sure that there was only one road which led from that village to Gujranwala and that they could not have gone to any other place?

A. They could not have gone anywhere else across the fields.

Q. Where were these fields? Was there any well defined road there?

A. There was a well defined road between these villages and Gujranwala. From memory I can tell you that there were straight roads between these two villages and Gujranwala and the people were on the road between the villages and Gujranwala, outside the village.

Q. And if a bomb explodes within ten yards of a crowd of 200 persons, ordinarily how many casualties would it cause?

A. It might not cause any at all.

Lieutenant L. DODKINS, Observer, Royal Air Force.

By the President—

Q. Did you receive instructions on the morning of the 15th April last to make an aeroplane reconnaissance in the region of Gujranwala?

A. My orders were to make a route reconnaissance over the railway between Lahore and Gujranwala and to ascertain if the railway had been destroyed or the route cut in any way and also to make a reconnaissance of Gujranwala and report on the general situation and take offensive action on any large gathering of people.

Q. Who had given you those instructions?

A. I had received them in the usual way from the Adjutant.

Q. And then I gather from the War Diary\* of the 16th (Indian) Division, last entry (P. 4), that you must have received the instructions at about 8-15, if these instructions referred to you?

A. My reconnaissance started at 7-50.

Q. Then you must have received your instructions earlier?

A. Yes.

Q. Then I see you arrived in Gujranwala at 8-30?

A. Yes.

Q. You state there you found the main line railway culvert about 300 yards south of the main station partly demolished but under repair?

A. As far as I could ascertain the railway was distinctly broken and the culvert was blown in but I could not say how it was destroyed. Certainly there was a party of about ten or a dozen men there who were to all intents and purposes repairing the culvert.

Q. Is the culvert the same thing as the bridge?

A. The culvert is the bridge itself and on this side of Gujranwala.

Q. There are bridges on both sides of Gujranwala and then there is the Gurukul bridge?

A. This was a little culvert over a *nala* about ten feet wide.

Q. You refer to the bridge. It is a culvert over which the railway is carried over the sleepers. I now understand that. It was still burning?

A. There was no suggestion of setting fire to it, as far as I could see.

Q. You go on to say that no other damage to the railway permanent way was noticed between Lahore and three miles north of Gujranwala.

A. That is right. On the other side of Gujranwala there is a large bridge.

Q. That bridge is the Kachchi bridge?

A. I took my reconnaissance as far as that bridge.

Q. "Much rolling stock in station but no activity. Two trucks of goods train in station detached, one burning house on main road opposite station almost burnt out, still burning slightly." Was that the Post Office?

A. Yes.

Q. "No large congregations of people." Did you after 8-30 circle round Gujranwala?

A. Gujranwala and the country on all sides to a depth of 2 or 3 miles.

Q. "At 8-55 a gathering of about 20 noticed in field about 1 mile west of town, scattered with Lewis Gun." How many rounds did you fire?

A. One belt containing 148 rounds were fired.

Q. Were any casualties caused?

A. Whether it caused any casualties or not, I did not definitely aim my gun at the crowd. My instructions were to disperse the crowd.

Q. At 9-5 you report "Truck still burning strongly and deadstock on adjoining platform. Main station building demolished. Church and large house near demolished, but no fire. Station occupied by armed native police and a few British ranks. Working parties busy on permanent way"?

\* Not reproduced.

11 December 1919.]

Lieutenant L. DODKINS—concluded—Captain W. S. GODFREY.

A. Yes.

Q. There was an entry previous to this. You report at 8-58 "Similar gathering outside house in village  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile west of town; on approaching them they entered house. One bomb dropped which hit adjoining house and blew side in." Was that the only bomb you dropped?

A. Yes, that was the only bomb.

Q. In dropping the bomb you carried out the instructions you had received?

A. Yes.

Q. You dropped that bomb on the crowd or at the house?

A. There was a crowd as given in my report of 8-55 hours. To make a rough estimate it was between 30 and 50 men and had made a semi-circle at the door of a house. One man was standing at the door who was obviously addressing the crowd and when the bomb dropped everybody went inside the house.

Q. So far as you were able to ascertain that bomb caused no damage to any individual?

A. That I could not say, Sir.

Q. Then you left Gujranwala about 9-30?

A. At 9-30, Sir.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—*

Q. I take it as regards the second crowd, after they went into the house, to drop the bomb was the only effective way to break up the crowd?

A. My object was to disperse the crowd that was still inside the house.

Q. Then it was no good firing a machine gun?

A. No.

*By Sir C. H. Setalvad—*

Q. This gathering that you saw of about 20 people in a field near Gujranwala, did you observe what were they doing?

A. That was a difficult matter to do. It was certainly not a normal agricultural party of people.

Q. How did you conclude that?

A. Personally I have never seen any agricultural party gathered in this way in a few yards. As far as I could ascertain from the aeroplane it was an abnormal crowd.

Q. Was not March and April the crop gathering season in this part of the country?

A. That I could not say.

Q. These people were not on any road?

A. They were in a field.

Q. That field was not abutting on any road at all?

A. My memory is not sufficiently reliable to say, but some of them may have been within 200 or 300 yards of the road.

Q. Were they armed with sticks?

A. No.

Q. Or you could not observe anything?

A. No.

Q. They might have been engaged ordinarily in gathering crops in those fields?

A. They were obviously an abnormal crowd. They had gathered together in a very small space indeed. They were doing no work, standing and talking to one another.

Q. Do you think any people in a field, who were talking to each other, were doing anything unlawful?

A. My orders were to disperse any crowd and that gathering of 20 people was a crowd, and so I dispersed them.

Q. Then you say you saw a similar gathering outside a house in the village?

A. Yes.

Q. They had assembled in front of a house?

A. Yes.

Q. You could not well observe what they were doing?

A. I could well observe.

Q. What were they doing then?

A. They were listening to the man who was speaking at the door of the house. I have absolutely no doubt as to what they were doing. My idea was it was a meeting.

Q. The man who was speaking was standing at the door of the house?

A. In front of the house at the door step.

Q. And the other people were also on the steps?

A. On the road assembled to listen.

Q. They might have gathered there for any other purpose, on a marriage occasion or for a funeral purpose?

A. Do these ceremonies take place at 8-30 in the morning?

Q. Zamindars might have come to the person living in that house for business?

A. As 20 or 30 people had gathered outside the house in my mind at that moment there was no doubt as to why they were there or as to what they were doing.

Captain W. E. GODFREY, I.A.B.O., Gujranwala.

*By the President—*

Q. I think you were at Gujranwala on the 11th, 12th and 13th of April?

A. Yes, my Lord.

Q. What was your position?

A. At that time I was demobilised from the Army and was hoping to move to Gojra in the following week to take up my work as a Missionary of the Church Missionary Society there.

Q. On the evening of Friday, the 11th April, did anything occur to you at the railway station?

A. Not on the evening of Friday.

Q. On Friday you went to the railway station?

A. I went to the railway station to make arrangements for sending off my furniture to Gojra.

Q. What happened there?

A. When I reached the station platform, I noticed a small group of young men standing talking, and this of course was nothing unusual. But as I went, on my turning the corner straight towards the station master's office, they all turned and looked at me and one of them said something and made an action of throat cutting or of the slipping on of a nose at which the others all laughed. It was a deliberate action.

Q. By his action was it obvious to you that he either meant to cut your throat or nose?

A. One or the other was certainly meant.

Q. Was the action deliberate?

A. A very deliberate action.

Q. Did you say anything to them?

A. No, my Lord. I took a step or two towards him as if to ask him what he meant, but I immediately changed my mind and continued my way straight to the station master's office.

Q. Had you to go to the station again on Saturday about your furniture?

A. Yes, I had again to go to the railway station to complete arrangements about my furniture on Saturday, the 12th.

Q. In what condition did you find the railway staff?

A. I found them very rude. First of all they would not answer my question. There was a man speaking at the telephone and they did not greet me in the usual manner on that day; I noticed this particularly as during my six months' recruiting duty when I had much to do with them they were always on good terms with me and I always found them polite and obliging. I had to meet these people almost every day in connection with my sending recruits to the depot and they were always ready to meet me cheerfully and used to chat with me very nicely, but on that morning I noticed a distinct change in them.



11 December 1919.]

Captain W. E. GODFREY.

[Continued.]

Q. Had you conversation with the goods clerks about sending off the children's donkey to Gojra?

A. Yes, I went down to the goods office which is further down the line a little way. I was just merely asking a question. I meant to send away the donkey and I asked the price, as if it was heavy I would not make up my mind to find it worth while to send it. When this talk was going on one of them said "Sir, I would not send the donkey by rail if I were you." I asked him why. He replied it would be too hot. I did not pay any great attention to it at the moment and thought it was a joke about the donkey, but afterwards remembered the others laughed at the remark.

Q. Later on the same day what happened?

A. Having fixed up for bullock carts to convey this furniture to the station, I went again myself to see it loaded. I left the yard and went to the passenger platform, and was talking to some of the railway staff outside the parcel office when I just chatted to one of them who said to me "Sir, do you think you will see your furniture again?" I replied, "Yes, of course. Why do you ask?" He said "Oh there is going to be a very big railway strike." I was beginning to wonder at what they said, but did not wish to appear alarmed before them so I said laughingly, "Achchha, kismet" at which they all laughed. Then I went home.

Q. Later in the day did you see Dr. Charles of Gujranwala?

A. Later in the day he came to me and he said that all sorts of things were happening in the city. He came to me and asked me as a missionary officer to ascertain what arrangements would be made for the safety of the Indian Christians in the event of anything happening.

Q. Did he say anything particular as regards the Indian Christians?

A. No. He took me to Mr. Heron, and Mr. Heron heard what he had to say, asked certain questions as to whether he had any definite information, and said 'I advise you all, if you do hear anything further, to gather in the Treasury.'

Q. On Sunday morning, did Mr. Heron call to see you and advise you as to the safety of your wife and children?

A. On Sunday, Mr. Heron called very early; he asked me to come out to the verandah. I went and there we discussed the situation. Eventually he said he did not want to hear what my wife had got to say.

Q. He strongly advised you to make arrangements for going away?

A. Yes: I said, "these rumours are going about; but I am going on Tuesday or Wednesday." I was thinking then that these rumours were about the *hartal* which was to be on Tuesday. It is the custom there for American missionaries to have classes out in the open, and we were all there; while we were talking the Sabbath school broke up. I called Rev. Dr. MacConnelee and another and they all came and sat on my verandah and my wife also came, and we all discussed the situation. While we were discussing, Dr. Charles passed on his bicycle. He was going to the missionaries. We called Dr. Charles again and we continued to discuss the situation. The question arose whether it would be necessary for the ladies to go away. Dr. MacConnelee said 'ladies won't take my advice in the matter.' I went with Dr. MacConnelee to his house and all the missionaries were then present. The custom was for the missionaries to open their talk with a prayer. We had a prayer first. At that time, the single ladies said: "We cannot desert the Indian Christians." One of them said she would rather die with them rather than have it said that she went away leaving them.

Q. I think later they were assured by the Indian Christians they would be safe if the European Christians left?

A. I believe that was so. I should like to say here that Colonel O'Brien has rather misunderstood the situation as far as missionaries were concerned; the missionaries had no definite information at all. Nobody knew at that time whether it was merely a *hartal* or

whether there was the possibility of something happening after the *Baisakhi* fair at Eminabad. That was the situation at the time.

Q. Anyhow, after discussing the situation with Mr. Heron, did you resolve to leave?

A. Not at that time. Mr. Heron came back later on that day, somewhere between 1 and 2 o'clock, and called me again and said: "Mr. Godfrey, I have heard something which compels me to urge you to leave by the Bombay mail to-night" and we scrambled about and got ready. The ayah went away and it struck me extraordinary at the time; I have come to know of its significance only in the light of the subsequent events. Mr. Heron practically insisted that I should take my family away by the Bombay mail. So we hurried with the packing. Then I sent my servants after tongas. The servants came back saying that the tonga-walas would not come to a *sahib*. They were getting more money from the bazar people. I am quite prepared to say that I sent a note to Mr. Heron and he sent two constables with tongas and we went to the station preparatory to departure.

Q. I think when you left the station you intended to return to Gujranwala the next day?

A. It was like this; I did not know whether he was beginning to feel somewhat nervous. He said "Mr. Godfrey. Come back to-morrow. One white man with a revolver would be very useful." I promised I would come back.

Q. Next morning, did you endeavour to get there?

A. I went to Lahore station and heard that the line was cut.

Q. So you could not get back?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. You left Gujranwala by 4-30 P.M. on Sunday, the 13th?

A. By the Bombay mail; it was to leave at 6 but it actually left at 7-15.

Q. Do you know whether later that evening the Indian Christians approached the European Christians, and discussed the situation with them?

A. Not from my personal knowledge; I know they did.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Captain Godfrey, you said you were also a Missionary before?

A. I was a Missionary before. I felt it my duty early in the War to offer my services and accept a Commission in the Indian Army and I stayed in the Army until I made an application for demobilisation early this year. I was actually demobilised on February 28th and I stayed in Gujranwala where I left my family. I had not received my orders from the Church Missionary Society then. I received definite orders on the 1st April. So I was making arrangements for going to Gojra to take up Missionary work. I have re-started my work.

Q. Are you still in the army?

A. I am in the army again. I was recalled afterwards.

Q. Before you joined the army you were in Missionary work?

A. I was doing missionary work.

Q. For how many years?

A. Three years.

Q. When did you come to Gujranwala?

A. I came in June 1918.

Q. With regard to your army duties, in June 1918, you were posted there?

A. I was sent in command of the recruiting depot.

Q. Since then you remained in Gujranwala?

A. Yes.

Q. From June 1918?

A. Yes.

11 December 1919.]

Captain W. E. GODFREY.

[Continued.]

Q. From June 1918 when you came to Gujranwala up to April 1919 what was the state of Gujranwala? Did you observe anything unusual?

A. Nothing unusual until the Rowlatt Act began to be talked about.

Q. After the Rowlatt Act was passed or rather, after the Bill was introduced, there appeared to be unrest in Gujranwala?

A. Personally I was not prepared to say 'unrest.' I tried to see the best side of these people.

Q. As a missionary, you were mixing more freely with the population than other Europeans?

A. People would come to me more often.

Q. They were talking to you more in confidence?

A. Yes.

Q. You talked more familiarly with them than did the officials?

A. Yes, may be.

Q. Did you find the people of Gujranwala on the whole loyal and law-abiding?

A. Yes. They were quiet at any rate.

Q. Before April 1919, did you observe any anti-British feeling?

A. No.

Q. Or anti-Government feeling in the sense that they wanted to turn out the British Government from India?

A. No.

Q. Did the subsequent happenings come upon you as a surprise?

A. Not altogether as a surprise, I told you. I did not object to a certain amount of political agitation myself. I did not see any harm at the time. At the same time we had been discussing the thing with other officials but I never saw eye to eye with them. I suppose they were sometimes keen on proving their point. Mr. Heron told me things which I had to admit with a certain amount of reservation.

Q. How do you account for the sudden change in the attitude of the Gujranwala people generally?

A. I believe it was due to the rumours about the Rowlatt Act. The rumours of course were followed by happenings in other places.

Q. You attribute that to rumours about the Rowlatt Act?

A. Primarily; and then to what happened at Amritsar and other places. That is my personal opinion.

Q. Then you think that threw the people into a state of excitement?

A. I think so. They practically lost their heads. I think some of the people would not have done those things in ordinary times.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. It appears to me that the Deputy Commissioner, Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien was aware of the fears entertained by you and the Missionaries on the 11th?

A. About the coming *hartal*?

Q. Yes.

A. Colonel O'Brien had not my experience.

Q. That it was possible that something serious might happen?

A. Possibly, no.

Q. There was no definite knowledge in the possession of anybody?

A. I do not think so.

Q. So much so, in order to avoid that possibility, it was considered necessary that some of the Europeans should go armed to attend the meetings of that *darbat*?

A. We decided to go armed.

Q. Possibly in view of what happened at Amritsar?

A. I do not think that Colonel O'Brien went armed. But I was armed.

Q. It appears from your statement that you thought that the *hartal* would come off on the 15th?

A. Yes; I thought so.

Q. You had constant conversation with Dr. Charles on the 11th and 12th?

A. Yes.

Q. I will just read to you what he says. There was one *hartal* on the 6th and there was going to be a subsequent *hartal*. He says:—"The second *hartal* was intended to be held on the 13th, but the *halemis* petitioned for a day's delay to enable them to sell off the stocks of sweets they had got ready for the *Baisakhi* fair day. In the evening of the 13th, sweets were selling at 2½ to 3 annas per rupee instead of the usual one anna per rupee." According to my information, the second *hartal* was going to be held on the 13th, but as the sweet sellers said that they had a lot of *mithai* which they would not be able to sell, it was postponed?

A. I was not told these things; I clearly remember many other things I heard.

Q. Here is one point. It was said that the *hartal* was already arranged for the 15th and, on the 14th, it was deliberately held either to surprise the authorities or for some other purpose. Therefore I placed before you the statement by Dr. Charles.

A. Don't make me responsible for it.

Q. I thought you had a conversation with him?

A. I cannot say; I do not remember that.

Q. I take it that when you heard that the *hartal* was being held on the 15th, you depended on the information given by Mr. Heron?

A. No; it was commonly said that it was going to be on the 15th; probably my servant told me.

Q. Is it a fact that sweet-meats were being sold off on the 13th?

A. I do not know. I did not buy any.

Q. If that be a fact, then certainly the *hartal* should have been held on the 14th?

A. I do not know.

Q. The Deputy Commissioner was himself cognisant of this fact and was aware of this danger, because, as a matter of fact, he had sent you to Rev. McConneece to be prepared for any emergency, should anything happen on the day of *hartal*?

A. I never said so; he never saw me at all.

Q. Did you see Rev. McConneece on behalf of the Deputy Commissioner?

A. No. I might have probably said "Dr. McConneece might have spoken to Mr. Heron and the Assistant Commissioner" I might have used the words.

Q. I read from Rev. Dr. McConneece's statement. He says:....."when Captain Godfrey came to my bungalow, having been sent by the Deputy Commissioner to tell us to be ready with food and clothing to go to the Treasury on short notice in case of a riot".

A. I did not say that Colonel O'Brien gave me any instructions. No. There must be a mistake.

Q. The arrangements which he was trying to make, to have food and clothing ready so that there might not be any inconvenience at the time of the *hartal*....?

A. No, not on account of the *hartal* at all.

Q. Here is my point: in case the *hartal* was held?

A. In either case, we had to fly to the Treasury.

Q. That is quite a different thing altogether. It appears to me that at least it was understood that the *hartal* might be on Tuesday or Wednesday, 14th or the 15th?

A. I do not remember about the 14th. I remember about the 15th. Somebody did suggest that they might do anything after the *Baisakhi* fair.

Q. Then it was intended to have the provisions ready in the Treasury 2 or 3 days before, and Mr. Heron said that it might arouse suspicions?

A. I believe so. I personally thought of it. I said it would be quite a good idea. I advised the ladies to get the provisions collected together.

Q. Now, with regard to the railway staff, you know that a strike was contemplated and did come into effect in certain stations and it subsided because the military were there. At least, on one occasion, one of the staff had clearly informed you of the strike as when he asked you "Are you sure you would get your furniture again?" That clearly shows that had there been any conspiracy he would not have mentioned the fact at all?

11 December 1910.]

Captain W. E. GODFREY

[Continued.]

A. I am not sure. I thought he was particularly impolite to me. That might be due to the fact that he was a member of the conspiracy.

Q. What I am saying is: You cannot say he was a member of the conspiracy and he was divulging to you the secrets of that conspiracy. I am saying all along that the strike was going to be held and probably he was giving you that information?

A. Yes; he must have known it.

Q. I want to know, whether by your statement you conceived that the strike was a sort of conspiracy or was openly contemplated. He gave you that information?

A. I rather fancy so.

Q. So far as the information given by the Indian Christians is concerned, I find that the only evidence that is before the committee is this, that the European missionaries were not prepared to leave the Indian Christians; they wanted to share their fate?

A. The ladies were more kind than the men.

Q. It was only one person Lakuram Lab Ram who came to you?

A. He never came to me.

Q. Not to you? You said that native Christians gave certain information?

A. I never said they gave any information; they came and asked the missionaries to go away.

Q. That is my point. They did not say anything else?

A. The missionaries received no definite information whatever.

Q. No information was received by them that any attempt was being made to kill or loot or anything of that sort?

A. No such information.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. Just referring to the incident that you have related, you said that when you went there some people were standing there?

A. Yes.

Q. How many people were there?

A. About 6 or 7; no more.

Q. What class of people?

A. Rather respectable people, judging from their appearance.

Q. And they were on the platform?

A. Yes.

Q. In a group or line?

A. In a group, talking together.

Q. You went past them?

A. I went past them eventually.

Q. When did you notice the lads?

A. As I was approaching them.

Q. And in front of you one made that sign?

A. It was deliberately done.

Q. How far were you from the man?

A. 4 or 5 yards.

Q. In front of him?

A. On one side.

Q. You cannot say whether he made signs like this or that, whether he passed his fingers round his whole neck or only a portion of it?

A. No, I cannot say; they all meant the cutting of my throat.

Q. That is your inference?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he refer to any portion of your neck?

A. I cannot say exactly what part of my neck he wanted to cut.

Q. If you had seen properly, would you not have been able to say? Your attention was not arrested?

A. I did not look for it.

Q. Supposing he had scratched his neck?

A. Oh, no. He was moving his fingers round his neck.

Q. How many fingers?

A. I do not know whether he used one or two fingers.

Q. I want you to let me know how far you saw him properly. That was my object.

A. I noticed it because his laugh drew my attention.

Q. We will come to the laugh afterwards. You cannot say whether he moved one finger or two? You could not say that?

A. No.

Q. And then afterwards, did they laugh?

A. They laughed again.

Q. What do you mean by 'again'?

A. They laughed; they said something first and then they laughed; and then this particular man made an action like that and I saw it and took a step. I was going to ask him what he meant; they laughed again.

Q. Anything else to make him laugh, except this?

A. Somebody said something.

Q. You thought they were against you?

A. I was singled out for this particular purpose.

Q. How?

A. Because, as I came through the door, first of all, they were in a group; only one or two facing me saw me. One of the persons said something to the group; then they all laughed; and one of the number did that.

Q. You cannot say exactly that they made a gesture of finishing you off?

A. No.

Q. You did not hear anything of what they uttered?

A. I do not remember.

Q. Nor your name mentioned?

A. They did not know me.

Q. They did not know you?

A. I do not know these particular people.

Q. Nor was any reference to a *sahib* made? You heard nothing?

A. Nothing at all.

Q. You say "my change of mind made them laugh again." Did they read your thoughts?

A. I was walking in that direction and saw their action. I just took one or two steps and stopped.

Q. You were making this statement "My change of mind made them laugh again."

A. The laugh coincided with my action.

Q. Exactly. You took it as their intention?

A. Yes.

Q. They might have meant something else? Evidently they were talking of a very serious matter.

A. May be.

Q. Did you make mention of this to anybody, because you thought that some trouble was brewing, something in the air?

A. I was looking for the cause of the trouble.

Q. And so you went armed to the garden party?

A. I probably got information of the Amritsar incident later in the day.

Q. Then this incident would have been recalled to your mind at the station?

A. Yes; the accumulation of these incidents.

Q. Did you mention this to the Deputy Commissioner or any of the officials?

A. I have talked about this to the Deputy Commissioner, Colonel O'Brien. I thought I mentioned this to the Deputy Commissioner. He distinctly says: "I did not say," I must leave it at that.

Q. Here it is in your statement?

A. He distinctly says "You never mentioned it." I am prepared to leave it to him.

Q. Did you mention it to Mr. Heron?

A. Yes. That day or next day. I should think that day. I am not sure. I was not gathering facts.

Q. I am asking you what you did. Did you mention it to any of the missionaries in Gujranwala?

A. No.

Q. You didn't. It seems you had some sort of conference with the missionaries in Gujranwala about these rumours. Did they tell you of any incidents that happened to any of them from which they thought trouble was coming on?

A. I cannot remember them saying anything.

Q. Their duties took them every day to the town?

11 December 1919.]

Captain W. E. GODFREY—concluded—AGHA GHULAM HASSAN.

A. Yes; at the workshops and at a place 2 miles out of the town.

Q. The missionary ladies?

A. I should say they go most days.

Q. They did continue to go to the town as usual?

A. I do not know; ladies do not come reporting to me.

Q. Did you enquire whether the ladies were going to the town?

A. I did not.

Q. Was it not best to enquire from them whether they met anything unusual?

A. No, they probably discussed it among themselves. They probably heard things which they never told me.

Q. What I wish to know is this: You were discussing with the missionaries the situation in Gujranwala, about the rumours and certain incidents that occurred. The natural thing would be to enquire whether the missionary ladies had been visiting Gujranwala as usual and whether they had noticed anything unusual. Would it not?

A. Yes, it would be the natural thing.

Q. Did you do it?

A. I do not remember it.

Q. If you did, you would remember it?

A. If I am asked for a definite purpose, I would.

Q. Because you do not remember it, you are ready in your inference? Neither any of these missionaries told you that the missionary ladies had been visiting the town and had noticed anything unusual?

A. The ladies told me nothing.

Q. This Dr. Charles is also a missionary in Gujranwala?

A. Dr. Charles is not a missionary.

Q. Is he a surgeon or what?

A. He is a private practitioner in Gujranwala.

Q. He came to you and told you of these rumours, about the *hartal* and about the things that were being talked about. He never distinctly said what these things were? He generally said that all sorts of things were happening in the town?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you inquire about them?

A. I probably asked him. We thought it might lead to unpleasant results.

Q. Here you say: "Dr. Charles of Gujranwala came to me and said all sorts of things happening." That relates to the events of the 12th; so it was nothing beyond the *hartal* that you are referring to?

A. We were thinking of the *hartal* on Saturday; we knew what it was, and people in the town knew what had happened in Amritsar. We all knew and we all thought of the possibilities.

Q. Here you say: "He came to me and said all sorts of things were happening in the city of Gujranwala." What sort of happenings?

A. I think he referred to meetings and the people saying all sorts of things?

Q. What things?

A. I do not know distinctly.

Q. What sort of things? Were they saying "we are going to have our meal; we are going to drink water" and things of that sort?

A. For instance there was one of the servants; she was going about and singing 'we will all become rajas' she was humming and singing all the while. But I did not hear it; it was hearsay.

Q. Dr. Charles said that?

A. No; my wife heard it.

Q. He simply referred to the meetings in the city and the talk about the *hartal*?

A. Yes.

Q. He told you nothing more?

A. He said "I do not like the attitude of the people."

Q. Do you know of any specific instances of rumours? He gave no specific instances of rumours from which you inferred there was a change of attitude?

A. I cannot remember anything.

Q. He merely made a statement?

A. Yes; that all sorts of things are happening. I could have kept a diary if I had known those things were coming on. I did not know before about it. I am giving you a summary as it came to me.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. Captain Godfrey, you referred just now to rumours connected with the Rowlatt Act. Can you kindly give us a little more information about these rumours, as far as you can, in your own experience? Have you heard them yourself?

A. They came to me and asked me "Is it a fact that we cannot go in a party? Is it true that if there is a funeral we cannot mourn together? Is it true that if 5 men were talking together they would be immediately arrested?" and so on.

Q. Did you make the acquaintance in Gujranwala of any other people who have been described as political leaders?

A. Quite a few.

Q. Did you talk with them about the Rowlatt Act?

A. I asked them why they did not try to put those things before the people in a clear light and remove their misapprehensions.

Q. What did they say?

A. Many of them said: "We were trying to do that; these poor ignorant people won't listen to us" On the other hand, it all depends on the state of their mind at the time.

Q. What is your own belief about their attitude? Were they spreading contradictory rumours?

A. I think some did; some have not been credited with them.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Did you contemplate taking that *ayah* with you or leaving her behind?

A. The *ayah* would not come.

Q. You went away and she remained at Gujranwala?

A. Yes; she would not come.

AGHA GHULAM HASSAN, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Gujranwala.

By the President—

Q. On the 14th April, about 6 o'clock in the morning, did the officiating Deputy Commissioner's *chaprasi* come to your house?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did he give you a note asking that you should go to the house of the officiating Deputy Commissioner?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you accordingly proceed to his house?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On your way did you see some one riding a horse?

A. Yes; Mohan Lal.

Q. In what condition was he?

A. He was bare-headed.

Q. Was he talking with the people?

A. Yes.

Q. A number of people were around him?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they doing anything?

A. They were just talking.

Q. Had your presence any effect on them?

A. When I reached them, they became silent and they passed on.

Q. On reaching the house of the officiating Deputy Commissioner, what report did you receive as to what was occurring and what you were to do?

A. He ordered me to go and stay at the city *thana*.

Q. Did he inform you that all the municipal commis-

11 December 1919.]

AGHA GHULAM HASSAN

[Continued.]

sioners had been called out by him the previous night and asked to use their influence in stopping the *hartal*?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. As you went towards the *thana*, did you find that all the shops were shut in the bazaar?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you notice any people near the railway station?

A. Yes, Sir. I was going by the telegraph office and found the people there in the railway station. The mob was coming from the railway station towards the city. There were some boys and they were shouting "*Hindu Musalman ki jai, hai Rowlatt Act.*"

Q. What time was this?

A. I believe it was 7-30 or about that.

Q. At that time was any damage done to the station?

A. Not at all, at that time.

Q. At that time was damage done to a bridge near the station?

A. Yes.; Kahechi bridge. At the city police *thana* we were informed that a mob had gone to the distant signal and they wanted to damage it.

Q. You went with Mr. Heron?

A. I went with Chaudhri Ghulam Rasul and some constables from the city *thana* to that place. Before our arrival Mr. Heron and Rai Bahadur Ganga Ram and Lala Amar Nath were there.

Q. What had happened to the bridge?

A. From where we stood, the bridge was about 2 furlongs off.....

Q. From the Kahechi bridge?

A. Kahechi bridge is six furlongs from the railway station and the place where we stood is four furlongs from the railway station.

Q. When you stood there what did you see?

A. I saw the mob standing outside the wire fencing and I asked them to disperse; but they did not. They eventually came over to us and one of the men assaulted Mr. Heron.

Q. In what way did he do that?

A. He came forward and wanted to seize him.

Q. Was he on horseback or on foot?

A. No; all were standing on the railway line.

Q. What happened to this man when he wanted to assault Mr. Heron?

A. He was repulsed and afterwards Mr. Heron ordered firing.

Q. Before firing was ordered, had stones been thrown by the mob?

A. Yes, Sir. I was also hit on the right shoulder.

Q. What is your opinion at the time as to the intention of the assault on Mr. Heron? Did the man intend to do serious bodily damage to Mr. Heron?

A. I think so.

Q. What was the attitude of the mob?

A. They were in great excitement.

Q. At this time, did you know whether damage was done to the station or any other building in the town?

A. Before this time, when this assault was made, two bridges were burnt, one on the Gurukul side and the other on the Lahore side, the Kahechi bridge.

Q. When the firing took place, what happened? Did the mob disperse?

A. The mob dispersed. They went away from the railway line.

Q. Were there many casualties?

A. No. Only one man, Kishan Chand, was seriously injured and 2 or 3 slightly injured. I was told afterwards that buck-shot was used by the constables.

Q. Was the officiating Deputy Commissioner there?

A. He came after the firing.

Q. When he came, was there a question of continuing firing on the mob or of further firing?

A. No. There was only one firing, and the mob dispersed.

Q. Then were people sent to extinguish the fire at the railway bridge?

A. I remember that we sent some persons to extinguish the fire.

Q. Did one of the pleaders ask at the time that the liquor shops in the city should be closed?

A. Messrs. Din Muhammad, Bhagat and Narain came to the spot and Din Muhammad told us that these mob people came after taking liquor and so were excited, and therefore all the liquor shops should be closed.

Q. Did one of the pleaders you mentioned ask the mob to disperse?

A. Yes.

Q. The mob followed his advice?

A. No.

Q. When the mob dispersed in consequence of the firing, did you go then towards the post office or the railway station?

A. Railway station.

Q. That is near the post office?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you arrived at the railway station, what did you find?

A. We were informed that the post office was set on fire.

Q. Did you see the fire?

A. The post office was behind the railway station.

Q. What happened at the railway station itself? Was it set on fire?

A. It was not set fire to at that time.

Q. Did you want the municipal water engine to extinguish the flames?

A. Yes; they cried for help. I was told that people would not let the fire engine come.

Q. Did you yourself go into the room of the postmaster and take out some of the furniture?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You set one of the constables to work at the adjoining well?

A. Yes; there is a well adjoining the post office. I put him on the work. He was bringing the water and I was pouring it on the postmaster's room.

Q. Did you yourself pour water with a bucket?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Could you get sufficient water to extinguish the flames?

A. Certainly.

Q. With what materials had the post office been set on fire?

A. I did not notice it, because I was in a great hurry.

Q. After extinguishing the fire at the post office, did you go back to the railway station?

A. Yes; it is only 2 or 3 steps from the post office to the railway station; we all went there; we were guarding the railway station there.

Q. At this stage, did Mr. Din Muhammad, a pleader, come and assist you in dispersing the crowd?

A. Yes, Sir. He was asking the people to disperse. There were other pleaders too.

Q. Were a number of the mob taken away from the station?

A. Yes, he took a number of them to the city.

Q. About this time, did you receive any information?

A. I received information that the *tahsil* was set on fire and also the honorary magistrates' office.

Q. When you received that information, did you leave the station and go to it?

A. Yes; I was ordered by Mr. Heron to go and he sent with me Chaudhri Ghulam Rasul and some constables and we went there.

Q. On your way did you find the *daik* bungalow on fire?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think the doors of the bungalow were closed?

A. Yes, all the doors were closed. Nobody was there.

Q. Nobody was inside?

A. No.

Q. You broke open the door and saved some furniture?

A. Yes; saved some of the furniture and the luggage of the junior Sub-Judge who was putting up there.

Q. Meantime did Mr. Chaudhri Ghulam Rasul return?

A. He returned from the *tahsil* and said 'let us go to the railway station.'

Q. Had a big mob again gathered at the railway station?

11 December 1919.]

ADNA GHULAN HASSAN.

[Concluded.]

A. Yes.

Q. About what time was this?

A. I believe it was 12 o'clock.

Q. So, you went towards the railway station?

A. Yes, Sir; and there I was informed that the mob had gone to the treasury.

Q. What did you find at the railway station?

A. A mob was there; and I heard that another mob had gone to the treasury. As I was in charge of the treasury I hastened to that place. I went alone.

Q. After having been at the railway station, you went back to the treasury?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was there a rumour that the treasury would be set fire to?

A. Somebody informed me that the mob had gone to the treasury.

Q. You did not find the mob there?

A. No, Sir. The report was that the kotwali was set on fire.

Q. There you saw the District Engineer, Mr. Shaw?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you give any orders for dispersing any crowd that might be coming to the treasury?

A. Yes; I told the head constable that if anybody came that side he might fire on them.

Q. Did you go then to the *kutcheri* buildings?A. The treasury and the *kutcheri* buildings are adjoining each other.

Q. Had it been set on fire?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What did you do?

A. I broke open the door of the Superintendent's room and brought out one confidential almirah and certain other things and after that I went to the treasury office. Since the entrance door was set fire to from the window I went into the room and removed the books, balance sheets, cash accounts and those things, and then afterwards from the back window a man, Fazil Ilahi, was sent in and he removed some books from the treasury office.

Q. Was the treasury office also set fire to?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Had it been on fire when you had gone to the *kutcheri* buildings?

A. No, Sir.

Q. At the same time?

A. The buildings are adjoining each other. The building at the treasury office was also set on fire.

Q. Was that also done before you went?

A. Yes, Sir. As far as I enquired fire was set to the additional district magistrate's room and from there the fire spread to the other room; they are adjoining each other.

Q. Did you take any steps to extinguish it?

A. There was no use; the wind was blowing very heavily. We removed some records from the office.

Q. Did Mr. Heron come up to the buildings when you were there?

A. Yes, Sir, when we were getting out. He said that he received a report that the mob had gone to the police lines.

Q. When you reached the police lines, did you find a large mob?

A. A large mob was standing outside the police lines. The police lines are adjoining the jail. The mob proposed after setting fire to the police lines to go to the jail.

Q. To let the prisoners out?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you to fire on that mob?

A. Yes.

Q. Who gave the orders to fire?

A. Mr. Heron. He was on a horse and I was on foot. He ordered it from a distance.

Q. Was it necessary to fire at the time?

A. Yes, Sir; otherwise the mob would have gone to the police lines.

Q. When did you notice that the railway station had been set on fire?

A. This was after we dispersed the mob; it was perhaps 3 o'clock.

Q. Cases of incendiarism had been going on from the early morning until 3 o'clock in the afternoon?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were all these buildings that were set on fire Government property?

A. Yes; the district court, railway station, *tahsil dak* and bungalow are the property of Government.

Q. How do you account for the mob having burnt Government property situated in different places of the town?

A. The mobs were in different places.

Q. How do you account for their having selected Government property?

A. Because they are used by Government.

Q. You take it that the action of the mob was against Government?

A. Yes.

By Sir C. H. Scatchard—

Q. How many years have you been at Gujranwala as Extra Assistant Commissioner?

A. Since September 1918. Before that I was Munsif there for two years.

Q. You knew Gujranwala for a considerable time?

A. Yes.

Q. Before you came to April 1919 was there anti-Government or anti-British feeling observable?

A. No.

Q. Was the behaviour of the people to April 1919 perfectly loyal?

A. I think so.

Q. What was the reason in your view of this sudden outburst in April?

A. I think the Rowlett Act, Mr. Gandhi's arrest and the news which people brought from Lahore and Amritsar caused this outburst.

Q. That created this outburst?

A. Yes.

Q. And before the 14th had you any information or any apprehension that these things were going to happen?

A. I am afraid I knew nothing of those things because I was in charge of the *kutcheri*.

Q. When you first went to the station, was there a large crowd there?

A. Yes; the mob was going from the railway station to the city; it consisted of more than a hundred people.

Q. Then the crowd first went from the city to the railway station?

A. I saw them returning from the railway station to the city.

Q. It was perhaps early in the morning when they came to the station?

A. That I do not know.

Q. The fire that had taken place took place after that?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. Is Mr. Heron a big strong man?

A. Yes.

Q. If the man had succeeded in throwing Mr. Heron down, would Mr. Heron's life have been in danger?

A. Yes.

Q. Then the mob was fired at?

A. Yes.

Q. Who ordered it?

A. Mr. Heron.

Q. Did you order it?

A. No, but he can order that under section 129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Q. Did Mr. Heron on that day get any authority from any magistrate to fire on the mob?

A. He spoke with the Deputy Commissioner on the railway platform but whether he was given orders or not I cannot say.

11 December 1919.]

CHAUDHRI GHULAM RASUL.

## CHAUDHRI GHULAM RASUL, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala.

*By the President—*

Q. Are you Deputy Superintendent of Police at Gujranwala?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You have been in charge of Gujranwala since January 1918?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I don't think I need trouble you about rumours and so on. I will come at once to what occurred on the 14th. You were informed I think that there was to be a *hartal* on the 13th?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you put on duty in the city of Gujranwala for the 14th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you reach the police station about 7 in the morning?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On your way to the police station did you notice anything?

A. A man was coming riding in a khaki uniform. He was Mohan Lal.

Q. How was he in khaki?

A. He was wearing a hockey shirt, and knickers and stockings.

Q. You do not mean he had uniform on?

A. No. He had nothing on his head.

Q. Were there any people accompanying him?

A. He was alone.

Q. Did you hear about this time that a calf was hanging from a bridge?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Can you give us the exact time that you heard that?

A. It was about 7 A.M.

Q. Did you instruct sub-inspector Ghulam Rasul to go to the spot and ascertain if the rumour was correct?

A. He told me that it was there and that he had taken it down.

Q. Did you go to the spot yourself?

Q. I rode there and had the calf buried at about two hundred yards from that place.

Q. At what time did you have the calf buried?

A. I think it was 7.30 or a bit after that.

Q. Do you know who had hung up the calf on this bridge?

A. I could not say.

Q. Was the suggestion made that it was done by the police?

A. That was later on.

Q. Up to that time there was no such suggestion?

A. No.

Q. Was there any truth in the suggestion that the police had anything to do with the hanging of the calf?

A. Not in the least.

Q. And as soon as you ascertained that the calf was there you had it buried at once?

A. Yes, I had it buried at once.

Q. Did you realise that a thing like that would cause trouble?

A. Yes, that is why I had it buried and after having it buried I went to report the matter to the Superintendent of Police.

Q. What time did you reach his bungalow?

A. At about 8 A.M.

Q. Did you see any crowd at that time?

A. I saw a crowd of men collected and a railway train standing near the Gurukul railway bridge.

Q. Did you know why the train was stationary?

A. I was ordered by the Superintendent of Police to proceed to where the train was standing with a police guard which I did.

Q. When you went to the railway bridge what did you find?

A. I did not go as far as the bridge. I went as far as the train. When I arrived there the people were collecting but when they saw me with the guard they dispersed.

Q. Had anything happened to the bridge?

A. The bridge was burning and the people were running from that direction to the city.

Q. That is a bridge over a *nullah* on the top of which the railway runs—is it composed of heavy sleepers?

A. Yes.

Q. Are not these difficult things to set on fire?

A. Yes.

Q. I don't suppose you could set the sleepers on fire with matches? Did you find that the wood and the sleepers were soaked in oil before the firing took place?

A. I do not know about that.

Q. Did you form any opinion as to why the bridge had been set on fire?

A. To follow the example of Amritsar and Lahore. The telegraph wires were also cut. After that the other bridge was also set on fire.

Q. Were you told then to go to the police station?

A. Mr. Heron came up then. I was bringing back the train to the railway station because it could not go further on account of the burning of the bridge. There were no passengers in the train. He took charge of the train and told me to go to the city police station with half the men.

Q. When you were at the town did you see a mob coming from the Sialkot gate?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What were they doing?

A. They only passed by us.

Q. Did information reach you that the mob had gone towards the Kachchi bridge side?

A. Yes, after that.

Q. You sent information to the Superintendent of Police?

A. Yes, Sir, the people began to disperse when they saw the guard coming and when I arrived the bridge was already on fire.

Q. Did that bridge have iron girders?

A. Yes, Sir, and there was also timber above.

Q. Did you extinguish the fire?

A. I sent a man to the police station to bring the fire engine, but it could not come. I put a guard there of one head constable and eight constables and told them that if any man came there, they would have to fire on him.

Q. Just as you reached the bridge sub-inspector Ghulam Rasul arrived. He was going to Kachchi bridge. Did you post a guard at the bridge?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you notice that the sub-inspector was surrounded by a mob?

A. Further on about four hundred yards from me I saw him and hurried to the spot and the mob on seeing me dispersed.

Q. What time would that be?

A. It was before 9.

Q. Did you proceed after that to the city police station?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did news reach you that a mob of rioters were going to dismantle the distant signal on the Lahore side?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you proceed to that spot?

A. I proceeded to the spot with Agha Ghulam Hassan.

Q. I think you met the Superintendent of Police and the other people?

A. They were there already.

Q. Just explain in your own words what occurred when you got there.

A. It was a big mob which was on the Grand Trunk Road and I was with Mr. Heron, Ghulam Hassan and Lala Amar Nath and the police guard of about twenty men. We were on the railway line proper and the crowd were apparently discussing the uprooting of the rails before I reached them. They came near the railway

11 December 1919.]

CHAUDHRI GHULAM RASUL

[Continued.]

fencing and some of the crowd asked Mr. Heron to take off his hat—at least we received a message from Bhagat to the effect that they wanted Mr. Heron to take off his hat and salute them. Of course he did not do that. We asked them to disperse and there was a military officer who also tried to disperse them but they would not. We remonstrated with them to go away and one of them actually rushed at the Superintendent of Police. I then heard some firing and I saw the man who had assaulted Mr. Heron running. On the firing the crowd went out of the fencing.

Q. Before Mr. Heron had fired he had been assaulted—at any rate were stones thrown?

A. The stones were thrown and the assault was made at the same time.

Q. Where were you hit?

A. I received them in the back.

Q. Then after the firing did the mob disperse?

A. The mob only dispersed in so far as they went outside the railway fencing. We returned to the railway station and some of the mob began to throw stones at us again.

Q. What casualties had you caused by that first fire?

A. One man was seriously injured and about two or three were wounded.

Q. So far as you could judge the firing had very little effect?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You say the mob came up again at the railway station?

A. We were going on the railway line and the mob was also going there. They were parallel to us and they were throwing stones at the police guard and Mr. Heron. I was asked by Mr. Heron to stop there with a few men and he himself proceeded to the railway station.

Q. Did you hear the people threatening to do anything to Mr. Heron?

A. When we were at the platform many people came and on being asked to disperse they refused to do so. One of them said that he would kill Mr. Heron. So we turned him out and more men came in. I told Mr. Heron that we might have to fire on these people. Just as we were falling in we heard that the post office was on fire.

Q. Did you remain long at the post office?

A. I think it was more than an hour.

Q. Did the crowd in the meantime go to some other place?

A. There were many crowds.

Q. Did you hear that the *tahsil* was on fire?

A. We heard that the *dak* bungalow and *tahsil* were on fire. I was ordered to proceed there with a police force but when I reached the *tahsil* it was ablaze. I went there at about 1 P.M.

Q. Did you make arrangements to put the fire out?

A. We could not make arrangements as we could not get water and the engine could not come as the mob would not allow it.

In my opinion had we fired at the post office the position would have been in hand.

Q. Why didn't you fire at the post office?

A. I suggested this to Mr. Heron but he gave no orders.

Q. Do you know why he was averse to firing?

A. Some pleaders came and told us that they would try to persuade the people to go away. They tried to do this but the mob paid no attention to them.

Q. Did the Deputy Commissioner refuse to give liberty to fire?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was he in charge of the situation?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. After being at the *tahsil* and *dak* bungalow which were ablaze did you go back again to the railway station?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you came back to the railway station what did you find there?

A. We were all there—Mr. Heron and Mr. Nevill—and while there we heard that the treasury and the jail were threatened.

Q. Then did you leave for those places?

A. Mr. Nevill and I left for those places with a body of men.

Q. When you went to the jail did you find that it was safe?

A. The jail was safe but the *katcheri* was burning.

Q. A little after this Mr. Heron arrived at the treasury?

A. Yes, he sent me as he heard that the treasury had been threatened.

Q. Were you afraid yourself that the mob would commit violence there?

A. I went there but no mob turned up.

Q. Meantime did aeroplanes come?

A. Yes, Sir. After this Mr. Heron and I came back into the city.

Q. Did you see any bombs being thrown from the aeroplanes or shots from the machine gun of an aeroplane?

A. We could not see but we heard them.

Q. What was the effect of the aeroplane's action?

A. The people ran into the city to take shelter. After this all was quiet.

Q. But for that aeroplane's action would violence have gone on?

A. The violence would not have gone on if we had fired at the post office and I think we would have saved the situation.

Q. You suggest that if you killed about twenty people you might have saved the situation?

A. The aeroplane firing did not kill nearly as many as twenty.

Q. So that in fact the aeroplane just did what you think the police should have done earlier?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And if that previous action had been taken resulting in practically the same loss of life there would not have been the same amount of destruction to property?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you form any opinion as to whether the attitude of the crowd was anti-British?

A. It was anti-British and anti-Government, because they attacked Mr. Heron particularly. I was in the mob myself at about 9.30 when they assaulted him, but they did nothing to me or my men.

Q. You found that the property that was set on fire was Government property?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. From that you gathered that the mob was against the Government?

A. Yes, it was against the Government.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. How many years have you been in Gujranwala?

A. Two years.

Q. As Deputy Superintendent of Police?

A. Yes.

Q. Before April 1919 did you observe any anti-Government or anti-British feeling in Gujranwala?

A. No.

Q. You found that the people were very quiet and loyal?

A. Yes.

Q. Then this sudden outburst, which took place on the 14th April, was caused by what happened at Amritsar and other places?

A. First the Rowlatt Act was the cause of it, as the people were under the impression that it was a very bad legislation; that it did not allow two or three persons to sit together; and that the police had unlimited powers, etc.

Q. Owing to various rumours regarding the provisions of the Rowlatt Act, and the disturbances from Amritsar and Lahore and the arrests of Gandhi, Kitchlow and Satyapal the people were thrown into a turmoil?

A. Yes, and the local pleaders arranged a meeting

Q. Then a meeting was held on the 5th April, and at that meeting a resolution was passed, and that resolution has been placed before the committee by Colonel O'Brien?

A. Yes.



11 December 1919.]

CHAUDHRI GHULAM RASUL.

[Continued.]

Q. On the 15th April after these events various arrests were made in Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you take part in them ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you with Colonel O'Brien ?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. About twenty people or more were arrested ?

A. Yes.

Q. And prominent pleaders were arrested ?

A. Yes. Lal Singh was the only barrister.

Q. When the British troops and Colonel O'Brien and you went to each individual, you first went to one man and arrested him, you went to the second and third man, and so on. When you arrested these pleaders you marched them off as you found them in the house; you did not allow them to dress; they were taken bare-headed and undressed ?

A. All of them were not bare-headed; one or two may have been bare-headed.

Q. Did you allow them to put on their clothes and get dressed ?

A. Only in one or two cases were the people undressed.

Q. Were the others dressed awaiting your arrival ?

A. They were generally all dressed.

Q. What time of the day was this ?

A. After 2 P.M.

Q. And those you found undressed were marched off like that ?

A. Yes.

Q. You arrested them and handcuffed them and chained them together ?

A. Yes.

Q. As you arrested further persons they were also treated in the same way, handcuffed and chained and taken through the city ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you took them to the railway station ?

A. Yes.

Q. And they were put in a goods truck ?

A. Yes.

Q. How many did you put in that truck ?

A. All of them; about twenty-two.

Q. What was this truck ?

A. It was an open truck.

Q. Was this a coal truck ?

A. No, it was not exactly a coal truck as the sides were very low. The sides of a coal truck are usually high.

Q. They were all chained together and put in that truck ?

A. Yes.

Q. What hour of the day was that when you put them in that truck ?

A. It was about 5 o'clock. It may be earlier, between 4 and 5.

Q. How long were they kept in the truck before the train started ?

A. For a few minutes.

Q. What arrangements were made about their getting food or going to attend the call of nature ?

A. I do not know.

Q. You say that they were all chained together. Then how would those who wanted to attend the call of nature do so ?

A. I know nothing about that.

Q. When you put them in the truck, did you provide any food for them ?

A. I know nothing about those arrangements, as I was not in charge.

Q. You were with Colonel O'Brien when you arrested all these men, and you took them to the railway station and put them in the truck, chained and handcuffed. Was there any provision made for them ?

A. I saw no provision made.

Q. Did the train take them to Lahore ?

A. Yes.

Q. After about a fortnight they were brought back to Gujranwala. Probably you are aware of that ?

A. I think they were brought back, but I did not see them.

Q. When they were brought back were you in charge of them ?

A. No, they were taken to jail.

Q. Did you have anything further to do with them ?

A. We held identification parades.

Q. Did you go to the station to meet them ?

A. No.

Q. And when they arrived, what did you do with them afterwards ?

A. They were taken to the jail.

Q. What part did you take in it ?

A. I took no part. All we did was to hold identification parades, as the investigation was going on.

Q. They were kept about a fortnight in Gujranwala ?

A. I do not know.

Q. Did you know that they were taken again to Lahore ?

A. I did not know.

Q. On the first occasion, when you put them in the truck you personally had nothing further to do with them ?

A. No.

Q. You did not go personally and take any part in dealing with them ?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Was a meeting held on the 6th ?

A. A meeting was held on the 5th.

Q. And in consequence of that meeting, was there a *hartal* on the 6th ?

A. Yes.

Q. Is Bela Ram your subordinate ?

A. Yes.

Q. And did he submit the report of that meeting ?

A. Yes.

Q. Kindly look at Exhibit 7\* where the proceedings of that meeting are given. It is signed by Pars Ram sub-inspector and also by Mr. Heron. The President of that meeting was Lala Hakim Rai and speeches were given by Lala Mela Ram, Lala Amar Nath and Diwan Sarb Dayal and those proceedings contain the substance of the speeches that were given ?

A. Yes.

Q. Beyond this you have no other definite knowledge as to what were the speeches given ?

A. Yes.

Q. I take it that you rely mainly upon this ?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the distance between the city police station and the Kachchi bridge ?

A. About a mile.

Q. And what is the distance between the Kachchi bridge and the bungalow of Mr. Heron ?

A. One mile.

Q. Was this information about the calf given to you when you were on the way to the city police station ?

A. Yes. It was about 7 A.M. when I got the information.

Q. Up to the time you reached the Kachchi bridge and up to the time when you gave this information to Mr. Heron was the other bridge burning ?

A. At the time when I went to him, the bridge was burning.

Q. At the time you took down the calf, did you see the bridge burning ?

A. I could not see from that distance, as it was more than a mile.

Q. At what time was the Gurukula bridge burning ?

A. It was burning before I reached there.

Q. It was at about 8—at the time when the calf was taken down by you was the Gurukula bridge burning or not ?

A. I cannot say.

Q. Do you know that there was a meeting going on that day in front of Amar Nath's house ?

\* This refers to the Gujranwala Leader's case (Crown vs. Amarnath, etc.) The exhibit is not reproduced.

11 December 1919.]

CHAUDHRI GHULAM RASUL—concluded—Mr. V. W. SMITH.

A. I heard about this later on.

Q. Were you informed that the matter about the calf was mentioned there?

A. No.

Q. Did you or did you not inform the Deputy Superintendent of Police that this matter was mentioned at that meeting?

A. It was not mentioned.

Q. Probably you know something of the statement of the approver?

A. Yes.

Q. You did not find anything about this calf being mentioned at that meeting?

A. It was not mentioned at the meeting but in the procession.

Q. In the statement of the approver, there is no mention that the question of the calf was being discussed?

A. It was not mentioned at the meeting.

Q. Then where was it mentioned?

A. When the procession was going in the streets.

Q. Therefore I take it that your knowledge is that this fact about the calf was mentioned either in the procession or at the meeting?

A. I think it was mentioned in the procession.

Q. And do you know that it was then and there said that this was the work of the C. I. D.?

A. Yes, it was said so.

Q. Therefore you are probably incorrect in your impression when you investigated the matter that this allegation was made on the 14th?

A. No, this allegation was made on the 14th.

Q. As Deputy Superintendent of Police do you know that on the 13th pork was found and this matter was brought to your notice.

A. It was not pork.

Q. In your investigation have you been able to ascertain who was responsible for the hanging of this calf?

A. No.

Q. At the time when Mr. Heron was assaulted I think there were about 25 constables with him with fixed bayonets?

A. Yes, they were standing on the line.

Q. Were they behind him?

A. Yes.

Q. The man who assaulted Mr. Heron was Behari Lal and he had no arms with him—not even a stick and as a matter of fact he was not able to touch the body of Mr. Heron?

A. I think he did touch his body.

Q. You have said that some persons were saying that they would kill Mr. Heron, and the person who said this stated that as Mr. Heron has killed his brother, he would kill him?

A. That is so.

Q. At the Kaochehi bridge, what was the number of the crowd?

A. About four or five hundred.

Q. How many police were there?

A. Twenty.

Q. I am not talking of the railway station, I am talking of the Kaochehi bridge.

A. It was about 200 yards from there.

Q. Mr. Heron also went to the Gurukula bridge?

A. Yes, he did, but I was not there at the time.

Q. Do I understand that from 8 o'clock up to 12 o'clock there were always 20 policemen with him?

A. I do not know as I was not with Mr. Heron from 8 o'clock to 12 o'clock.

Q. At the time that the aeroplanes arrived it was raining in Gujranwala?

A. It was a small shower of rain.

Q. How long did it last?

A. About three or four minutes.

Q. Were you present at the meeting of the 5th which was convened by the Deputy Commissioner?

A. No, I was not.

Q. Did you see any respectable people of the city in the crowd on that day anywhere, either at the post office or kutcheri?

A. Yes, Lala Singh, Meela Ram, Abdul Azis and Khan Chand were there.

Q. Where?

A. Near the post office after it was set on fire.

Q. Were any of them with the crowd when the post office was burnt or did they come subsequently?

A. We did not see the post office being set on fire.

Q. So far as your knowledge goes were any of them burning the post office or did they come afterwards?

A. I think they came afterwards. We were there when they came.

Q. And you asked them to persuade the crowd to disperse but whether it was a genuine attempt on their part to do so you cannot say?

A. I do not know whether they made any attempt. They said to us do not fire—we will try to get the people to go away.

Q. Did they make an attempt to persuade them?

A. I do not know.

Q. What is your conclusion?

A. They might have told them the contrary.

Q. Have you any reason to believe that they did not ask the crowd to disperse?

A. I have no reason.

Q. I am talking of the crowd before the post office—how far was this crowd from you all?

A. About 30 or 40 yards.

Q. Therefore you could not hear what was being said from within 30 or 40 yards?

A. No.

Q. Can you tell me where the bombs were thrown inside the city?

A. I know nothing about this.

Q. Not even up to this time?

A. Yes.

Q. You are a Deputy Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala, and you know nothing about this?

A. This matter did not concern me and I had nothing to do with the investigation.

Q. And do you know where the other bombs fell?

A. No, I never cared to find out.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. About this truck—I understand it was on the 15th April at about sunset when these people were sent to Lahore from Gujranwala?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any special hardship in making a short railway journey in the hot weather at about sunset?

A. I do not think so.

Mr. V. W. SMITH, Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Smith, you are a Superintendent of Police?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. At the outbreak of these riots, what was the general condition of the police force throughout Gujranwala and the neighbouring parts of the Punjab? Was the police force depleted?

A. It suffered from under-recruitment, partly due to economic conditions and also on account of having

supplied nearly 2,000 men for the two police battalions, and all those vacancies had not been filled up.

Q. You have handed in a detailed statement to us as to the strength of the police force in Gujranwala?

A. Yes.

Q. And I take it that that statement you have handed to us is accurate?

A. There is only one point in which I should make a correction. In the first paragraph it is stated that 23

11 December 1919.] Mr. V. W. SMITH—concluded—Mr. E. K. SHAW—Mr. B. C. CHATTERJEE.

constables were brought in from punitive posts. The actual number should be 17.

Q. In your statement, I think, you also state as to the strength of the police in the neighbouring places in Gujranwala?

A. This only refers to the district of Gujranwala itself.

Q. Can you say with reference to the neighbouring districts of the Punjab as to the strength of the police force?

A. I was in Lyallpur myself, which is a neighbouring district; and there we were slightly under strength, almost normal.

Q. Do you know anything about other districts?

A. No, Sir. I cannot say.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Were you in the first week of May at Gujranwala?

A. I was at Lyallpur.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Of the 119 constables at Gujranwala, how many were armed?

A. All with the exception of 30 or 40.

Q. What about Wazirabad, Hafizabad and Sheikhpura?

A. At Wazirabad, the total number of muskets was six at the city police station, six at the Sadar police station and five at the Treasury guard.

Q. At Hafizabad?

A. There were only six at the police station and five at the Treasury guard.

Q. At Sheikhpura?

A. Eleven.

Q. Chuharkana?

A. There was none.

Q. At Sangla?

A. Six.

Mr. E. K. SHAW, District Engineer, Gujranwala.

By the President—

Q. Are you District Engineer at Gujranwala?

A. Yes.

Q. On the morning of the 14th April last, Mr. Heron, Superintendent of Police, came to you?

A. He came to my bungalow.

Q. Did he give you some warning?

A. He warned me to be prepared for all emergencies, as the riot had started.

Q. Did he say whether anything had been done at that hour?

A. They were burning the bridge north of the station.

Q. Did he leave some policemen as a guard at your bungalow?

A. Yes, four men and a sergeant, five all told.

Q. Was any arrangement made as to what you should do with your wife and children?

A. He told me, should matters become dangerous he would send word and I was then to take them to the Treasury.

Q. Did you receive word?

A. Yes, I received word at about 12 noon.

Q. And in consequence of that word, did you take your wife and children to the Treasury?

A. Yes.

Q. I think it is a square walled enclosure rising about 25 feet from the plain?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you on entering the enclosure mount the bastion to the north-east?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it a position that enabled you to see anyone approaching?

A. Yes, not from a long distance though.

Q. What was the distance you could see?

A. About 150 yards.

Q. Could you also obtain a good view of the road leading to the railway station?

A. Yes.

Q. Was riot going on there?

A. From the noise I could imagine there was riot.

Q. I think the Treasury is about 250 yards from your bungalow, and the court-house about 50 yards closer?

A. Yes.

Q. Shortly after your arrival did some of the rioters come from the direction of the railway station?

A. Yes, about 20 or 25.

Q. Did they do anything?

A. They broke into the interior of the court-house and set it on fire.

Q. That was 50 yards away from you?

A. The end they started on was much closer.

Q. How many men were there in that mob?

A. There were six men, and the remainder boys, about 20 or 25 all told.

Q. What material did they use for the purpose?

A. Some were carrying canes and some had what I took to be sticks, but from the rapidity with which flames reached the clerestory windows, I was forced to the conclusion that the canes had some inflammable liquid and possibly their sticks were squirts.

Q. Was the crowd entirely out of hand?

A. I do not know that they were out of hand, but they seemed to be working on a method, as if they had been previously trained.

Q. You know all the other acts of the incendiarism that were committed during the course of that day?

A. I heard of them afterwards, not at that time.

Q. Did you know of the arrival of an aeroplane?

A. Yes; it came when the court-house was burning.

Q. What was the effect of the action taken?

A. My firm belief is that if the aeroplane had not taken action, probably the whole of the civil lines would have been destroyed. The arrival of the aeroplane was the saving of the place.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. The age of those boys was from 12 to 14 years?

A. About that.

Q. The warning that was received by you was at about 12 noon?

A. Yes, about 12 noon.

Q. Up to 12 noon, you had not seen any portion of the crowd?

A. No.

Q. Up to 12 noon, there was no demonstration against or about your bungalow?

A. I did not see any.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. How far is your bungalow from the city?

A. About half a mile from the front of the city.

Q. How far is it from the station?

A. It is less than half a mile from the station.

Mr. B. C. CHATTERJEE, Head Master, Mission High School, Gujranwala.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Chatterjee, you are the Headmaster of the Mission High School and a member of the Municipal Committee, Gujranwala?

A. Yes, My Lord.

Q. On the morning of the 14th April, did you go to the school at about 7 o'clock?

A. Yes, I did.

11 December 1919.]

Mr. B. C. CHATTERJEE

[Continued.]

Q. I think that was a holiday, but you had gone to see about something?

A. Yes.

Q. Where is your school?

A. The school is outside the city, not very far off from it, just opposite to the *tahsil*.

Q. Were you told anything as to the occurrences in the city?

A. I was told by one of the *chaprasis* of the school that there was some noise and uproar in the city.

Q. As you were going home, did you hear the same thing from your friends?

A. Yes, I met them on the road.

Q. Was your wife very nervous as to what had occurred?

A. Yes, she was, because she was very sick at the time.

Q. I think you heard about the railway bridges being set on fire?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Did the Reverend Jiwan Mal come to your house?

A. Yes.

Q. Did it appear to you that things were assuming a dangerous aspect?

A. Yes, when I heard of these things, it did so appear to me.

Q. Did you hear people shouting?

A. I heard a noise.

Q. Could you distinguish what the shouts were?

A. It was a general kind of noise, I could not distinguish very much.

Q. You say you heard that people were shouting *Hindu-Musliman ki jai* and *Hai Hai George mar gaya hai*?

A. That is what I heard from the Reverend Jiwan Mal. I did not hear it myself.

Q. Did you advise the Reverend Jiwan Mal to bring his wife and children to your boarding house?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Was that in order that you might be together?

A. Yes and to be safe in the boarding house.

Q. By the time he reached his house, the crowd had greatly increased?

A. He did not come to the boarding house.

Q. Did he find that the crowd was so great that he could not come?

A. Yes.

Q. Is his house on the other side of the city?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the noise increasing from 9 to 11 A.M.?

A. Yes, it went on increasing.

Q. Could you hear it distinctly?

A. Yes.

Q. At about 11, did the crowd march towards the post office?

A. It did.

Q. And, I think, the post office was set on fire?

A. Yes.

Q. Coming to the civil lines, did the crowd burn the Casson Industrial School, and then the *dak* bungalow and then the *tahsil*?

A. Yes.

Q. Going into the city and then coming back again to the civil lines?

A. Yes.

Q. Then did they set fire to the district court?

A. Yes, when they came back.

Q. Was the station church then set on fire?

A. After the district court was set on fire, the crowd went towards the station church and that was set fire too.

Q. After that, was the goods shed set on fire?

A. Yes.

Q. Just about the time that the goods shed was set on fire, did you hear aeroplanes overhead?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the crowd still setting fire to buildings?

A. No they had just set on fire the goods shed.

Q. Did you hear bombs dropped by the aeroplane?

A. I heard a noise, I did not know what it was.

Q. What was the effect of the presence of the aeroplanes and the dropping of bombs?

A. The aeroplanes dispersed the crowd and of course people were in a dreadful suspense for fear of the crowd previous to that. They were to a certain extent relieved of that fear. That was the effect.

Q. Had you before this occurrence heard any rumour of action being taken against Christians?

A. No, My Lord.

Q. In your statement, you say "Hearing a rumour in the evening that the houses of Christians would be burnt during the night, I with my wife, who could hardly move on account of sickness, took shelter for the night in the Treasury." Was that on the night of the 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. So that even after the aeroplanes had appeared and relieved the situation, you were in dread of a recurrence?

A. Yes, there was the fear of houses being burnt in the night.

Q. Were you sent the next day to Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that for the purpose of safety?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you remain there for some days?

A. Yes.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Mr. Chatterjee, how many years have you been in Gujranwala?

A. For 30 years now.

Q. And therefore you are intimately acquainted with the people?

A. Yes, very intimately.

Q. During all this time that you were with them, what did you find the people to be? Were they quiet and loyal people?

A. Quiet, loyal and peace-loving.

Q. Did you notice all these years any anti-British or anti-English feeling among them?

A. Only of late to a certain extent, but not during those years.

Q. Before April 1919, was there any anti-British feeling?

A. I did not know of any.

Q. What do you attribute the sudden outburst in Gujranwala to?

A. The immediate cause was the Rowlatt Act, I think.

Q. In what manner?

A. People got excited over this Act, as I mentioned in my statement. There were misrepresentations made of the provisions of the Act, and on account of these misrepresentations people got excited, and their feelings underwent a change.

Q. When did these misrepresentations first come to your notice in Gujranwala?

A. I could not give the exact date, but about the end of March I think.

Q. Who spread these misrepresentations, so far as you know?

A. I could not tell.

Q. Did you attend any of the meetings about the Rowlatt Act?

A. No.

Q. One of the causes according to you is that the misrepresentations regarding the provisions of the Rowlatt Act had excited the people? Was there anything else?

A. There might have been, but none came to my knowledge in a definite way.

Q. Was there general unrest owing to economic causes, high prices and things of that kind?

A. There might have been.

Q. What was your observation?

A. I did not investigate these things. I am not in a position to say anything very definitely.

Q. Did the outburst of the 14th April come upon you as a great surprise?

A. Yes, it did.

11 December 1919.]

Mr. B. C. CHATTERJEE.

[Concluded.]

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—*

Q. Did you come back in the month of May?

A. No.

Q. You were in Gujranwala in the month of May?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. You know that some railway restrictions were placed on the travelling public of Gujranwala and they were removed before the 9th of May?

A. Restrictions were put on.

Q. And they were removed before the 9th of May?

A. I do not remember the exact date.

Q. Subsequently these restrictions were reimposed again?

A. Very likely; I had not much travelling to do, so I do not know.

Q. Was there a large exodus of women from Gujranwala in the first week of May?

A. I do not quite understand.

Q. Did a large number of women leave Gujranwala after the railway restrictions were removed?

A. I have no knowledge of it.

*By Sahibzada Sardar Sultan Ahmad Khan—*

Q. Do I understand that the first manifestation of any unrest made itself clear in Gujranwala in the month of March or before that?

A. I do not know about the previous happenings. But I heard certain things. There might have been causes; I only heard certain things.

Q. I am not asking about causes; I want to know facts about unrest. There was no show of unrest previous to that?

A. The only thing I know definitely about is the misrepresentations of the provisions of the Rowlatt Act.

Q. I want to know whether you came to know of any feelings of resentment or unrest or protest against the authorities at all?

A. Not before the 5th or 6th April, when some meetings were held.

Q. Do I understand that the object of those meetings was to protest against the Rowlatt legislation, as a sort of expression of annoyance at the authorities having passed that?

A. That is what I understood, because I have not attended meetings.

Q. There was no anti-British feeling?

A. There was anti-British feeling.

Q. In what way? What makes you say that?

A. From what the mob tried to do.

Q. You deduce that from the action of the mob, but I am asking you whether there was anything before these protest meetings on the 14th April?

A. Nothing came to my knowledge.

Q. So far as you are aware, you know of no anti-British feeling before the 14th April?

A. None whatever.

Q. Among either the better or lower class of people?

A. No.

Q. Then your statement that there was anti-British feeling is merely based upon the facts of the 14th, the burning of the railway station, of the court house, and so on?

A. Certain rumours came to my knowledge, but there was nothing definite.

Q. What was the source of your rumours?

A. Common people saying things.

Q. Common people came to you about it?

A. I heard from different persons.

Q. You must have heard from somebody?

A. From common people in the villages and towns.

Q. Did they come to see you on the 14th?

A. No, not on the 14th.

Q. I understood from you that before the 14th there was no manifestation to your knowledge?

A. I said except the rumours that came to my notice.

Q. How long before the 14th did you hear?

A. I could not definitely say.

Q. I do not want the exact date. Was it 10 days, or 15 days, or one or two weeks?

A. It may be about two weeks.

Q. What were the rumours that you heard? Was it that the Rowlatt legislation was harsh?

A. It was harsh as they understood the provisions. The provisions were understood to be that there would be a levy of fees on marriages, on the birth of children, Government taking half the produce, and so on.

Q. Is that all you heard?

A. Yes.

Q. From that you conclude that there was anti-British feeling?

A. Yes.

Q. Your conclusion is based on that?

A. Yes.

Q. On that you have based your conclusion that there was anti-British feeling?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there anything beyond that?

A. No.

12 December 1919.]

Captain J. A. S. EWING.—Captain A. HARWOOD.

At Lahore, Friday, the 12th December 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pundit JAGAT NARAYAN.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., L.P., *Secretary.*

Captain J. A. S. EWING, 19th Lancers.

*By the President—*

Q. Captain Ewing, you were in charge of the movable column in the Sialkot Area during the Punjab disturbances?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you submitted to us a statement as to your movements on the different dates. May I take it that that statement is accurate?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think we may accept that then as part of your evidence. What were the instructions you received before you started on your tour?

A. I was originally told to march through a certain area of country doing what they call "showing the flag."

Q. What exactly is that?

A. It was to show the villagers in the outlying parts of the country who had never seen troops, that we could move troops quickly about in the area and that sort of thing.

Q. And you visited a number of places as shown in your report?

A. Yes, in company with the Deputy Commissioner practically always.

Q. During the course of your tour did you do any propaganda work?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What sort of work was that?

A. We had a written statement to read out to the people and at one particular place, Sheikhpura, we gave a demonstration of motor machine gun firing and Lewis

gun firing at a range there, and Raja Fateh Singh of Sheikhpura arranged that there should be a large number of people called there to see the demonstration.

Q. In addition to that were there lectures delivered?

A. Yes, Sir, at these places we generally got some Indian to read out the lecture in the vernacular, both in Urdu and in Gurmukhi.

Q. And what was the lecture about?

A. It was partially describing the Rowlett Act, telling them that they were wrong about lots of things they had heard. It was chiefly trying to alter the opinion they had got about various things, contradicting statements that had got about among the Indians.

Q. At different places in your report I see you assisted in connection with the arrests of suspected people; will you just explain how assistance was given?

A. The Deputy Commissioner, Mr. deMontmorency, of Lyallpur, had certain names of villagers. How he got the names I do not know, but he had those names and I went out with the cavalry by night and completely surrounded the village, and then he called out the lambaradar and told him to produce the men that were required; in practically all cases they were produced.

Q. And I take it in your statement there is an accurate account of the different arrests that were made?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. So far as you are concerned, I suppose you were not in any way responsible for the selection of the people arrested?

A. Not in any way.

Captain A. HARWOOD, 1st Durham Light Infantry.

*By the President—*

Q. Captain Harwood, were you, on 15th April, detailed to command a detachment of 25 non-commissioned officers and men?

A. There is a mistake there; it should be 14th April.

Q. That was early on the morning of the 14th?

A. No, Sir, I was detailed at about a quarter past twelve in the afternoon.

Q. And were you instructed to proceed to Gujranwala?

A. Those were the instructions I was given, Sir.

Q. Where were you stationed at the time you received these instructions?

A. Rawalpindi, Sir.

Q. I think you entrained your party by the Bombay Mail at about 1 o'clock?

A. About 1 o'clock. The train was detained for a few minutes to allow the troops to get down there.

Q. What is the distance from Rawalpindi to Gujranwala?

A. About 140 miles roughly.

Q. And you proceeded by the Bombay Mail?

A. As far as Wazirabad.

Q. At Wazirabad you transferred your party to another train?

A. To a special train, Sir.

Q. Were you reinforced there?

A. Yes, Sir, by 50 men of the South Lancashire Regiment.

Q. I think there was also a railway breakdown gang?

A. A railway breakdown gang under Mr. Sims.

Q. You proceeded in your special train to Gujranwala?

A. We proceeded to Rahwali. The station master there stopped us and said we could not go further, but my instructions were to go to Gujranwala, so we proceeded along dead slow till we came to the bridge reported as being burnt.

Q. What time did you arrive?

A. At about 8-30 P.M.

Q. Had the bridge been repaired by the time you arrived?

A. No, Sir. The Railway Engineer examined the bridge and the damage was very slight and he thought it could stand the train running over it.

12 December 1919.]

Captain A. HARWOOD.

[Continued.]

Q. The damage had been in the nature of burning the sleepers ?

A. Burning the sleepers, and they had interfered with the brickwork underneath.

Q. When you arrived were any buildings still blazing ?

A. Yes, everything was blazing, the station, the goods yard, post office and the church. That was as far as I could see at that time. They were absolutely gutted ; it was quite impossible to save them as they had been burning for a number of hours.

Q. You sent to obtain information about the civil population and I think learnt that they were in the Treasury ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you then go to investigate the damage that had been done to the telegraph lines ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You walked about two miles back along the line till you came to the end of the break ? What did you find had occurred as regards the telegraph system ?

A. Practically all the wires along the railway right in front of the native city were out, the wires were flat on the ground and absolutely destroyed. We got the telephone wire which had just been installed and I tapped in on the telephone and obtained communication with Rawalpindi.

Q. I think you asked that troops should be sent to Wazirabad ?

A. Yes, Sir. On coming through Wazirabad, when picked up the detachment of South Lancashires, there was the Railway Transport Officer there who had only about a dozen rifles, and whether it was instinct or something, but I did not like the state of affairs at Wazirabad so I warned the Division.

Q. I think you sent your communication to Rawalpindi because you would not communicate with Sialkot ?

A. I could not communicate with Sialkot ; the telephone wire only runs between Rawalpindi and Lahore.

Q. I think you sent back the engine with orders ?

A. As soon as I got the information from the General Staff Officer to order the General Officer Commanding, Sialkot, to send down 50 ranks, that was my only means of communication with Wazirabad, so I took the engine off the train.

Q. I think you asked for a special train ?

A. I asked Rawalpindi as well for that, but I knew there were rolling stock and engines at Wazirabad, so I sent to the Railway Transport Officer, Wazirabad, to send them down.

Q. And that train arrived early next morning ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were the women and children evacuated ?

A. They were evacuated next morning.

Q. I think about half past eight next morning certain repairs were done on the telegraph lines ?

A. I had a brigade signal section with me and we bridged the gap by means of a heavy cable laid on the ground. There were two important wires joined up.

Q. That is a temporary repair ?

A. A temporary repair.

Q. Over what length ?

A. I should say over three or four miles there was a break altogether.

Q. Repairs were done to the railway bridge on the Lahore side of Gujranwala ?

A. Yes, Sir. That had been more seriously damaged than the other one, and the breakdown gang went out early that morning and commenced repairs and two or three new sleepers were put in.

Q. Did you investigate the damage done to the town ?

A. I went round the civil part of the town. I went across to the post office first. It was absolutely gutted ; there was nothing left of it. And I went as to the Church and from there into the town to interview the Deputy Commissioner, and saw the damage done to the law courts.

Q. And was the damage very extensive ?

A. Yes, Sir, everything was completely gutted.

Q. I think in addition to the places you have mentioned, the *dak* bungalow and the goods shed and the Church were also damaged ?

A. Absolutely gutted.

Q. About half past ten that morning did you try to get into communication by telephone with Rawalpindi ?

A. With Rawalpindi again. I went back to the instrument that had been put on the wire. It had been brought closer to the station. Mr. Langdon had been speaking to Rawalpindi previously, but I could not get into communication when I got there.

Q. Mr. Langdon, as you mentioned in a previous part of your statement, is the Superintendent of Telegraphs ?

A. He is the Engineering Superintendent.

Q. Work was commenced, I think, early in the morning on these telegraph lines and temporary repairs completed next day ? Was that the 16th ?

A. The 16th.

Q. Then on the 15th Colonel O'Brien had decided to make certain arrests in Gujranwala city ?

A. That is right, Sir.

Q. Was he escorted by a force that you gave him ?

A. He was escorted by a force under the command of Lieutenant Burghope who took about 25 men into the city.

Q. Did you post pickets on the railway line ?

A. I was instructed to post pickets on the railway line.

Q. That line divides the native part of the city from the civil lines ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you give the picket instructions to prevent any person leaving the city ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In all 22 arrests were made by Colonel O'Brien ?

A. About 22.

Q. And these people were sent to Lahore by special train the same afternoon ?

A. There was a special train sent to Lahore with a detachment of 25 men of the 2-6th Sussex Regiment.

Q. Did you see the accommodation provided for them ?

A. Yes, Sir, the accommodation was, I think, an open truck.

Q. Is that quite a usual way in such an emergency ?

A. I think they were very short of rolling stock at the time. I had the utmost difficulty. My men were all in 3rd class carriages. It was with the utmost difficulty that I managed to get 3rd class carriages for them.

Q. The journey from Gujranwala to Lahore did not take very long, did it ?

A. It is only about 40 miles and takes a little over an hour usually.

Q. I am told on this occasion the journey took a great deal longer, can you say whether this was so or not ?

A. I cannot say. After they left Gujranwala I never heard anything more of them.

Q. Then I think you provided, as you said, a number of British troops ; was that in connection with the trains which took the prisoners ?

A. No, Sir. The railway service from Gujranwala had started and passenger trains were passing through. One train, I remember, had a number of ladies on board and had absolutely no protection, so I supplied a guard for that train to go to Lahore.

Q. And I think Mr. Langdon proceeded to Lahore to get telegraphic stores and rations for the men of the detachment ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you receive any communication early on the 16th as to the state of the permanent way near Wazirabad ?

12 December 1919.]

Captain A. HARWOOD.

[Continued.

A. I received a message sent in by runner from the station master of one of the stations on the Wazirabad side of the line saying the whole permanent way was ablaze. I immediately detached the engine and one truck from my train and sent Mr. Sims with the railway breakdown gang and a non-commissioned officer and 10 rifles to find out what had been done. They reported late that evening that a determined attempt had been made to burn through the sleepers and to wreck a bridge on the line just by a village called Nizamabad.

Q. Can you tell me whether burning the sleepers of a bridge is an easy operation?

A. It is not.

Q. What is required?

A. They must have oil or petrol to set them alight first.

Q. It is not a thing which can be done by a man taking it into his head to put a match to the wood?

A. Absolutely impossible, Sir.

Q. Then you yourself went to Wazirabad?

A. Next day, Sir. When we finished the repairs at Gujranwala Mr. Langdon decided to supervise all repairs and I proceeded to Wazirabad.

Q. What time did you arrive at Wazirabad?

A. I left Gujranwala at about 1 o'clock and arrived there between 2 and half past, or perhaps a little bit later.

Q. That was on the afternoon of the 16th?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you informed by your repair parties as to the reception they got when they were affecting their repairs from a passing train?

A. Before I left Gujranwala, as the Government Telegraph men were out on the wires, I had to post pickets to protect them in case they were rushed. A train came through from Lahore and two of my men came back with one of the sub-inspectors of the Telegraph Department and reported that they had been jeered at and there were shouts of "Gandhi ki jai" from this train as they passed. They located the carriage as the rear carriage of the train. I spoke to Mr. Langdon and I decided to investigate it, so I detained the train at the station and it contained a number of young sepoys, and for precaution I took them from the train and detained them in Lahore jail. I reported the matter to Colonel O'Brien, and I believe he investigated the case a few days later.

Q. Were these sepoys who jeered at the party and whom you arrested armed?

A. No, Sir, they were returning from leave.

Q. When you arrived at Wazirabad what damage did you find had been done?

A. First of all when we came to Wazirabad (there is a village called Nizamabad there) where there was a break which extended roughly over a mile to a mile and-a-half.

Q. Will you explain what the nature of the break was?

A. Practically all the wires were down on the ground. The whole lot were cut and they were down on the ground. At Wazirabad it was particularly bad, the poles had been broken down there.

Q. Then how far did the break extend at Wazirabad?

A. At Wazirabad it extended altogether to about three miles. It crossed right over the river on the other side of Wazirabad.

Q. Speaking generally, was the damage very extensive?

A. It was very extensive. It took two days to repair before any special could pass.

Q. I think in consequence of the extent of the damage done Mr. Langdon decided to push on towards Lala Musa?

A. That is right.

Q. What was the advantage of that step?

A. If there were any small breaks, he could join up and prevent them from being cut off.

Q. Then were there a number of minor breaks?

A. Single wires were cut, I think.

Q. How far is Lala Musa from Wazirabad?

A. Roughly speaking about 40 or 50 miles.

Q. Then is Gujrat on the way?

A. Gujrat is between, half way.

Q. Did you find any damage done at Gujrat?

A. I found at Gujrat a very big crowd at the platform waiting for the train. The telegraph instruments in the railway station had been damaged. I cleared the crowd out of the railway station and inquired from the station master what damage had been done. The Deputy Commissioner of Gujrat was himself on the platform, and he told me that he had managed to collect a few police, but the instrument was out of order.

Q. Then I think the Deputy Commissioner of Gujrat accompanied you and Mr. Langdon to Lala Musa?

A. Yes, to Lala Musa.

Q. You left Mr. Langdon at Lala Musa and returned to Wazirabad?

A. Yes, I left Mr. Langdon at Lala Musa.

Q. And temporary repairs were commenced on the lines there that night?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you leave an escort with the working party and then return to Lala Musa?

A. I left for Lala Musa that night.

Q. You arrived there at 11-30 in the night?

A. It was quite late in the night.

Q. Was anything done to the telephone line to Rawalpindi?

A. It was tapped. The telephone line is on the same poles as the telegraph lines. They are the two bottom wires. When I got back I reported the damage again.

Q. I think on the 17th April, early in the morning, you received a report from the telegraphist on duty that interruptions were occurring on the line?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you make a test?

A. The tests were made and the fault was located at Gujrat Khan.

Q. Where is Gujrat Khan?

A. It is well up the line half way between Lala Musa and Rawalpindi.

Q. Did Mr. Langdon decide to make further investigation?

A. Yes.

Q. I think the train left Lala Musa at 6-45?

A. Yes.

Q. On arrival at Gujrat Khan you found that a detachment of troops under a British officer had arrived?

A. Yes.

Q. They arrived a little earlier?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the station master make any report?

A. He made a report that there had been an interruption. He gave me no definite statement.

Q. Then did you run the train to Rawalpindi?

A. Yes, to Rawalpindi.

Q. Why was that done?

A. I left in such a hurry that I had no kits and rations for the men of my detachment. I also required telegraphic stores.

Q. I think you made a personal report at Divisional headquarters?

A. Yes, I made a report.

Q. On the 17th April about 3-30 did you return to Lala Musa?

A. Yes, the same day.

Q. And you picked up your reinforcements there?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you get two Lewis guns there?

A. Two Lewis guns and 15 men.

Q. During the journey were you detained anywhere?

A. After crossing the bridge at Serai Alam Gir station. After waiting for about quarter of an hour I ordered the train to draw into the station. There was absolutely no necessity to stop. I immediately made an inquiry there from the station master, but did not get a satisfactory reply. When I asked him why had he detained the train outside, he gave no clear answer to me. I



12 December 1919.]

Captain A. HARWOOD.

[Continued.]

then asked him for a line clear, and he then went to his table and wrote out a line clear to the next station. The driver of my train at once pointed out to me that the line clear was not correct as the duplicate in the book had not been filled in and the station master had not wired to the next station for the line clear. He then wired to the next station and was given a reply that the line was clear. He then had to fill in the counter-foil of the line clear. I verified this with one of the Government telegraphists with me.

Q. He had not done that before?

A. No.

Q. And that caused you to suspect him?

A. Yes. If the line was not clear, the station master at the other end of the line would have distinctly wired this. It was a single line and such action on his part was liable to cause a collision.

Q. Did you take any action then?

A. I arrested the station master and took him to Lala Musa.

Q. You handed him over to the Officer Commanding troops at Lala Musa?

A. Yes, I took him with me in the train.

Q. Was that case reported to the Traffic Manager, Railway?

A. It was reported, Sir.

Q. On the morning of the 18th April were temporary repairs commenced near the village of Nizamabad?

A. Yes.

Q. During the effecting of these repairs did you place pickets round the village in order to prevent anybody from leaving the village?

A. Yes.

Q. What was your reason for taking that step?

A. Nizamabad is famous for iron-works where cutting tools, hammers, chisels, etc., are manufactured. This led us to suspect that some of the bad characters might be harbouring there, and that same evening again an attempt was made to burn the bridge. Mr. Langdon wanted to get information as to who had wrecked the telegraph line. I posted pickets round the village.

Q. Did you see the *lambardar* of the village?

A. I saw the *lambardar* of the village. I was taken to his house.

Q. You had some difficulty in getting information from him?

A. I had some difficulty in getting information from him. We knocked at his door and remained there for quarter of an hour.

Q. What prevented him from giving information?

A. I don't know.

Q. Did you question him as to whether he had informed the authorities at Wazirabad?

A. I questioned him first of all as to whether he knew who had cut the telegraph wires and burnt the bridge. At first he made no statement, but eventually I spoke to him in Hindustani, as I could speak a little myself and the Sub-Inspector of Telegraphs was acting as an interpreter—he said that he knew who was responsible for the damage done. I then inquired if he had reported the matter at Wazirabad, and he said "No." I then arrested him on suspicion.

Q. I think the damage, that ought to have been reported, was done four days previously?

A. Yes.

Q. Was a student from Gujranwala also arrested?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What had he been doing there?

A. I came out to the village and I saw Mr. Langdon talking to this man and found that he had been asking him who he was. He was insolently staring and looking at Mr. Langdon and was leaning up against a wall. I asked him where he had come from and what was he doing in the village, but he could give no satisfactory reply. The people were standing beside him, and I asked them if they knew anything about him. He said he had come to visit his brother-in-law. Then I asked the village people if that was true, but they said they

knew absolutely nothing about him and nobody could recognise him as an inhabitant of the village. I then decided to arrest him as well.

Q. Did you consider that you were justified in a critical state to take such an action?

A. Yes.

Q. Just before leaving the village you received a report that one of the pickets had been compelled to fire at a man who was attempting to leave the village?

A. I was actually myself in the village when one of these pickets was compelled to fire. When I came I could not find the man.

Q. Could you get any information regarding him?

A. I could get no information. I inquired again two or three days later, but could get no information whatsoever regarding him.

Q. You reported the case to the Officer Commanding troops at Wazirabad?

A. Yes.

Q. And also by telephone to 2nd Divisional Headquarters, Rawalpindi?

A. Yes, I also reported that case to Colonel O'Brien at Sangla Hill that afternoon.

Q. On the afternoon of the 18th were temporary repairs carried out on the Wazirabad-Sialkot telegraph lines?

A. Yes, for about a mile the damage was done in a sort of triangle there.

Q. You completed your temporary repairs at Wazirabad early on the morning of the 19th?

A. Yes.

Q. Then repairs were commenced on the Wazirabad Sangla Hill and Lahore lines?

A. On the Sangla Hill branch extensive damage was done and a couple of stations were burnt down there. An attempt was also made to burn the bridge over the canal near Chuharkana and two sleepers were burnt right through.

Q. That action was a matter which required considerable preparation?

A. Yes.

Q. How long did those repairs occupy?

A. The preparation for burning the bridge must have taken time. We carried out the repairs, and we worked till dark that night. We finished well after dark about 8 o'clock, and I then ran towards Lahore and the remaining repairs were carried out by the two Telegraph Specials.

Q. On arrival at Wazirabad on the 21st you returned the Brigade Signal Section to Rawalpindi?

A. As we found them of no further use.

Q. From the 21st to the 27th April were permanent repairs carried out on certain lines? You might mention them?

A. Yes, Wazirabad to Shorkot Road, then Wazirabad to Sialkot and Wazirabad to Gujranwala and on the Pindi side.

Q. And breaks round Wazirabad were also permanently repaired?

A. It took us a week to complete permanent repairs.

Q. Did you assist the Deputy Commissioner of Lyallpur District to make a number of arrests at the village of Gojra about the 23rd April?

A. I was coming from Shorkot. I had to wait at Gojra, and I found that the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. deMontmorency, had come to make certain arrests at Gojra, and he asked me for ten men as a guard.

Q. I think in connection with the working parties on the line military escorts were provided?

A. Always, Sir.

Q. Was that essential in the circumstances?

A. As a precautionary measure.

Q. And your detachment returned to Rawalpindi at 1 o'clock on the 28th April?

A. That is right, Sir.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Captain Harwood, you assisted in the arrests made on the 15th at Gujranwala?

12 December 1919.]

Captain A. HARWOOD.

[Continued]

- A. Yes, I assisted. I was simply putting pickets along the railway line.
- Q. You did not go in the city?
- A. Naturally I did not go in the city.
- Q. You did not carry out arrests yourself?
- A. No.
- Q. You were at the railway station?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You saw them brought to the railway station?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You saw some men brought to the railway station and then taken again to the town?
- A. I saw one arrest made at the railway station.
- Q. Along with the other people he was taken into the town?
- A. Some of them were taken into the town and they were brought back with further arrested people.
- Q. What time of the day were the arrests finished?
- A. I should say about 3-30, but I cannot say for certain; it was in the afternoon.
- Q. Was the whole lot brought there?
- A. Yes.
- Q. They were all handcuffed and chained together?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And at what time did the train taking them leave?
- A. The train left practically immediately after the arrests were completed. The train was ready waiting for them.
- Q. The train consisted of goods trucks and an engine?
- A. Yes.
- Q. There were several trucks?
- A. Two trucks; I cannot say for certain.
- Q. In one truck there were only the troops?
- A. The troops were with the arrested people. They split up in two parts; some of the arrested people and some troops were in one truck and some of the troops and some arrested people in the other truck.
- Q. They were at once taken away?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How long did the journey take?
- A. I cannot say.
- Q. After that how long did you remain there?
- A. Next day till 1 P.M.
- Q. You don't know what subsequently happened at Gujranwala?
- A. No.
- Q. Now about that incident you spoke of, that there were some Sikh soldiers jeering at some of the telegraph repairing parties. Where was this?
- A. This was at Gujranwala.
- Q. On what date?
- A. On the morning of the 16th.
- Q. At that time you were at the station?
- A. My train was at the station.
- Q. You were leaving that day?
- A. I was just preparing to leave Gujranwala.
- Q. You got into the train?
- A. I was standing on the platform and waiting for that train to leave first. I had to get in to the train behind.
- Q. Your train was yet to arrive?
- A. My train was on the platform.
- Q. The train they were in was a passenger train going towards Wazirabad. Were both the trains in the station?
- A. Yes. I was in the centre one. There is a centre line.
- Q. Both the trains were going in the same direction?
- A. Yes.
- Q. The passenger train was to start first?
- A. Yes. I was waiting for my repairing party.
- Q. Your train was a special train?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Where had these Sikhs come from?
- A. From Amritsar.
- Q. Were there any other passengers?
- A. The majority were of Sikhs.
- Q. How many were they in one compartment?
- A. About 30; it was a bogie carriage.
- Q. Were you near their carriage when they jeered?
- A. I was a mile away.
- Q. Some body reported to you?
- A. Two of my own men came back.
- Q. Who were they?
- A. Two private soldiers.
- Q. Were they British soldiers?
- A. Yes.
- Q. They came and reported to you?
- A. They came and reported to me along with the sub-inspector of Telegraphs.
- Q. You went and investigated the case?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What were they doing then?
- A. They were all sitting very quietly.
- Q. They did nothing in your presence?
- A. No.
- Q. Did you question them?
- A. Yes, they made some reply that they were singing.
- Q. That is possible?
- A. Yes, that was possible.
- Q. You had no reason to disbelieve them?
- A. They were shouting *Gandhi ki jai* and were jeering at the soldiers. I think the soldiers could understand when they were jeering at them.
- Q. In what language were they shouting?
- A. In Hindustani.
- Q. Did your men understand Hindustani?
- A. They can understand *Gandhi ki jai*. The Telegraph sub-inspector, who came along with them, could understand Hindustani.
- Q. They said they were singing?
- A. They told me that they were singing.
- Q. What did you do then?
- A. I immediately emptied the carriage and detained them at Gujranwala and reported the matter.
- Q. You arrested them there?
- A. Yes, I arrested them.
- Q. Where did you send them?
- A. I sent them to the local jail.
- Q. All of them?
- A. The whole lot.
- Q. What ultimately happened to them?
- A. I do not know. About three days later I saw Colonel O'Brien. He tried the case and dismissed it.
- Q. He allowed them to proceed?
- A. Yes.
- Q. He did not inflict any punishment whatsoever?
- A. No, he did not.
- Q. They were allowed to proceed as there was nothing against them?
- A. Yes.
- By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—*
- Q. What is the distance between Wazirabad and Gujranwala?
- A. I should say 20 or 25 miles.
- Q. What was the train composed of, railway breakdown gang trucks?
- A. An engine, a long open truck containing breakdown material and Mr. Sims had his own private carriage.
- Q. You gave them an escort?
- A. Yes, in the truck.
- Q. You gave them the same accommodation as you gave to the prisoners?
- A. Yes.
- Q. I don't think you were committing an improper act.
- A. It was a matter of emergency.

12 December 1919.]

Mr. J. B. NEVILL

Mr. J. B. NEVILL, Assistant Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala.

By the President—

Q. Are you Assistant Superintendent of Police at Gujranwala ?

A. I was, Sir.

Q. During the period of disturbances you were there ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you hear a *hartal* was proposed for the 15th April ?

A. Yes.

Q. I think there had been one on the 5th previously ?

A. I think it was on the 6th.

Q. This was a second *hartal* ?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the date suddenly changed ?

A. We only heard on the night of the 13th.

Q. It was changed from the 15th to the 14th ?

A. Yes.

Q. I think the Deputy Commissioner, Colonel O'Brien had left Gujranwala on the 13th.

A. Yes.

Q. On the evening of the 13th did you apprehend that you would have serious trouble on the 14th ?

A. No, we did not think very much would happen.

Q. Because the previous *hartal* had not led to an serious result ?

A. Not at all.

Q. But as a precautionary measure, all available police were called into headquarters ?

A. Yes.

Q. The changing of the date somewhat dislocated the police arrangements ?

A. Yes.

Q. With the result that the number of police available as a striking force was small ?

A. Yes.

Q. How many were they ?

A. They were about 50.

Q. I think we have got your statement as to the complete figures ?

A. Yes.

Q. In your statement you say that "this changing of the date was deliberate on the part of the leaders in order to foil the arrangements of the authorities for preserving order ?"

A. Yes.

Q. On what do you base that statement ?

A. It was well known that we had very few police. It was also on that day that lots of the local people had gone to attend a *darbar* held by the Lieutenant-Governor at Lahore. We were all told that this was deliberately done by the leaders.

Q. Coming now to the 14th, would you tell me what was the first incident that came under your notice on that date ?

A. I was living with the Superintendent of Police, Mr. Heron, in his bungalow. We saw a crowd collected near the Gurukul bridge. We sent down our servant. The train was standing by the bridge.

Q. Was that at the Gurukul bridge ?

A. Yes, right in front of the bungalow.

Q. What time was this ?

A. I am not quite clear as to the time, but it must have been about 7 in the morning.

Q. Well, then, when you got that information what did you do ?

A. I was ordered to disperse the mob because the servant told me that the crowd was doing damage to the railway line and the bridge. I had a guard with me to do that.

Q. As I understand the crowd had started to destroy the line before the police appeared on the scene at all ?

A. When I got there, there were two great heaps of wood burning on the line and the bridge was blazing.

Q. I think you say the train was stopped at the distant signal and damaged. Was that the early morning train ?

A. Yes, that was the early morning train going to Wazirabad.

Q. Had that train to pass over the bridge ?

A. Yes.

Q. What damage had been done to the Gurukul bridge ?

A. It was blazing at the time.

Q. In your statement here you say "Early on the morning of the 14th a calf was found hanging to a railway bridge." Was not that the Gurukul bridge ?

A. That was the Kachchi bridge.

Q. Was there any calf seen hanging on the Gurukul bridge ?

A. I had not heard of any.

Q. You had with you a guard of one head constable and six foot constables ?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you manage at that time to disperse the crowd ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you put out the fire with small damage to the bridge ?

A. Yes, we put down the fire.

Q. In setting fire to that bridge had they used any inflammable material ?

A. The wood they used was dry and they also got petroleum.

Q. Were the sleepers of the bridge themselves burning as well as the wood that had been brought from outside ?

A. There was a pile of wood and we poured water on it from the top.

Q. Were you not in a position to see whether the sleepers were charred ?

A. They were certainly charred.

Q. Were they actually blazing at the time at all ?

A. They were.

Q. Can you tell me that you could not set fire to these sleepers unless you used oil or petroleum ?

A. They had a great pile of wood blazing about 4 feet high.

Q. Could you say of your own knowledge whether there was oil on the sleepers or not ?

A. No. I was told that they had used oil.

Q. Well then, the train was taken back to the station ?

A. Yes.

Q. I think that instructions had been given to all the guards at the Treasury, etc., to be alert ?

A. Yes, that was done by the Superintendent of Police.

Q. Then the reserve was taken to the station ?

A. Yes.

Q. Here the railway premises and the line were cleared of the crowd ?

A. The Superintendent of Police cleared them off.

Q. What time ?

A. It must have been 7-30 or 8.

Q. In connection with that work of clearing the station and the line was any assistance rendered by the railway staff ?

A. I was not at the spot myself.

Q. Then why do you say in your statement "It may be mentioned here that the railway officials gave no assistance at all, showing passive, if not active, sympathy with the crowd" ?

A. That refers to later events. I mean to say that the railway staff gave me no help when I was putting out the fire at the bridge.

Q. Is that a matter where they might easily give help ?

A. Certainly they knew that the bridge was burning.

Q. A considerable part of the crowd that had collected was induced to go back from the station by Din Muhammad, pleader ?

A. Yes.

Q. And the police consolidated their position along the railway line ?

A. Yes, we held the railway line.

12 December 1919.]

Mr. J. B. NEVILL.

[Continued.]

- Q. Did you stay beside the Gurukul bridge ?  
A. Yes.
- Q. As you remained there, portions of the crowd kept coming there ?  
A. Yes.
- Q. Then did you form any opinion as to their intent ?  
A. They were obviously bent on mischief. Directly they saw me with a guard, they turned back.
- Q. How long did you remain so with your guard ?  
A. Probably for an hour.
- Q. Then you went back to the railway station ?  
A. After I heard firing.
- Q. When you got to the railway station what did you find there ?  
A. I found the post office just burnt up.
- Q. Was there a large crowd there ?  
A. A huge crowd which had just gone back to the city because the bazar is quite near the post office.
- Q. But did you see that they rushed in the direction of the city ?  
A. I saw them all scattering.
- Q. Were they waving anything ?  
A. Then they came back after that.
- Q. They were waving black flags ?  
A. Yes.
- Q. Were they throwing anything ?  
A. They were hurling bricks.
- Q. On any one ?  
A. Chiefly on the Superintendent of Police and on any body they came across.
- Q. The police were generally endeavouring to keep the crowd in check ?  
A. Yes.
- Q. Was Mr. Heron struck several times ?  
A. Yes, very often.
- Q. Was it a trying experience for the police force ?  
A. Yes, very trying.
- Q. Why was the mob not fired at the post office when they set ablaze the post office or showed utter defiance to the police ?  
A. Well, the Superintendent of Police did not order to fire. He was advised by the Deputy Commissioner not to do this. He was there and he could give the orders to fire but he did not.
- Q. Did you form any opinion as to whether it would have been better in the interests of the maintenance of order to fire at the mob at this stage ?  
A. Well, it was very difficult to form an opinion at the time. Afterwards it might appear to have been better but it was difficult to form an opinion at that time.
- Q. Did you at that time notice smoke coming out from the civil lines ?  
A. Yes, while we were in front of the station.
- Q. Did you send some police there ?  
A. Yes, I was sent round.
- Q. Were you soon followed by the Superintendent of Police ?  
A. Yes, he came. He had stayed to post a guard at the railway station.
- Q. When you reached the civil lines what did you find ?  
A. We came through the public gardens. There the mob had scattered all over the place. They were burning down any buildings they came across. The police then fired at the mob but most of the Government buildings had been burnt. The mob had made preparations and within ten minutes they finished the firing of buildings. We fired and drove them beyond the railway line.
- Q. What damage had they done before you fired ?  
A. They had practically burnt everything, Civil Magistrates' Courts, Church, etc.
- Q. And were they attempting to set the jail on fire also ?  
A. Yes, of course, they attempted to set fire to the Jail and the police lines.
- Q. When the mob fled did they collect again ?  
A. They were all round, many thousand people, and there were very few police.
- Q. Had the firing the effect of frightening them off ?  
A. Yes.
- Q. Was the mob in a very dangerous mood ?  
A. Yes, they were in a most dangerous mood.
- Q. Did you hear them making any shouts ?  
A. Yes, they were calling out that they would certainly kill Mr. Heron and all British Officers and they were talking all sorts of nonsense.
- Q. Did they say anything about burning buildings ?  
A. No, I did not hear them personally.
- Q. Well in your statement you say "They were calling out that they would kill all British officers and burn all Government buildings." What is the foundation for that part of your statement ?  
A. This happened later, while we were chasing them. They said they would burn down all the Government buildings and that is why we chased them in the public gardens.
- Q. Did they say all buildings or Government buildings ?  
A. Government buildings only.
- Q. About what time did they begin to shout ?  
A. At about the time when we caught them in the public gardens and drove them across the railway line. Then they began to shout that they had finished the business.
- Q. They were coming back and shouting that they had finished the business ?  
A. Yes.
- Q. You refer to the firing by the police ?  
A. As far as I was concerned by the Superintendent of Police.
- Q. Who had instructed to fire ?  
A. Mr. Heron.
- Q. Mr. Heron had instructed ?  
A. Yes.
- Q. How many shots were fired ?  
A. A very few. The total number of rounds fired during the whole day was, I believe, 20 or 30.
- Q. And the casualties were caused by this firing ?  
A. I don't think they ever caused any casualties. We never found out that any of the firing had caused any casualties. Casualties were shown to be due to the aeroplanes.
- Q. So there were no casualties ?  
A. Some were wounded.
- Q. The police was at this time pretty well exhausted ?  
A. They were very much exhausted by the end of the day.
- Q. When did the aeroplanes arrive ?  
A. As far as I remember they arrived at about 3.
- Q. A little after 3 ?  
A. Yes.
- Q. At the time the aeroplanes arrived what was the condition ?  
A. We just pushed them across the railway line.
- Q. Still the buildings were blazing at the time ?  
A. They were blazing.
- Q. What was the last building that had been set on fire ?  
A. The church.
- Q. When it was set fire to, it was just before the aeroplanes arrived ?  
A. It must have been within ten minutes or quarter of an hour of their arrival.
- Q. What was the effect of the action taken by the aeroplanes ?  
A. After that the crowd all dispersed and they went to their homes and there was no more trouble.
- Q. Could the police have dispersed the crowd ?  
A. I should not think so.
- Q. And at the time when the aeroplanes arrived ?  
A. Certainly they could have done it.
- Q. If the police could have done it, then in your opinion, they would have dispersed the people without doing more casualties than the aeroplanes did ?  
A. In my opinion it is very doubtful if they could have done it.
- Q. Then the action taken by the aeroplanes was a relief to the police ?  
A. Most decidedly.

12 December 1919.]

Mr. J. B. NEVILL.

[Continued.]

- Q. It was also a sort of relief to the peaceful citizens ?
- A. The men that were with us were very much pleased when the aeroplanes arrived.
- Q. Then Colonel O'Brien arrived the same time as the aeroplanes ?
- A. Yes, a little while after.
- Q. Next day certain arrests were made. Were you present when those arrests were made ?
- A. I was with the police.
- Q. Then Martial Law was proclaimed on the 16th ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Prior to the proclamation of the Martial Law was the disorder spreading ?
- A. We were getting reports from all over the district that various outbreaks had occurred. In Aulakh a *Patwarkhana* was burnt.
- Q. What is a *Patwarkhana* ?
- (Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate):—It is the official residence of the village *Patwari*.
- Q. On the 18th you and a party of British troops under Captain Wheatly went there and arrested the culprits ?
- A. Captain Wheatly and the party came with me.
- Q. What was the effect of Martial Law ?
- A. Directly we got Martial Law everything came to its normal condition, as far as I think.
- Q. On the 21st were you sent down to Chuharkana to supervise the investigations in the Sheikhpura Sub-Division ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What were the centres of agitation there ?
- A. Sheikhpura, Chuharkana and Sangla.
- Q. *Hartal* had been held at all these places ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. There was not much violence at Sheikhpura ?
- A. Yes, not at Sheikhpura.
- Q. What had occurred at other places ?
- A. At Chuharkana there was a tremendous upset. They had broken the railway line and cut telegraph wires and all over the line they had burnt all the stations except one. They had also burnt the bridges.
- Q. At Sangla what had happened ?
- A. There they had not burnt anything but wires were all round cut and they stoned the train. They also rescued a military deserter who was being taken to Rawalpindi. They also attacked the telegraph inspector.
- Q. Did they burn the station next to Sangla ?
- A. Yes, they burnt the station next to Sangla.
- Q. Who were active in the rising at Sangla ?
- A. At Sangla there were four or five Kuka Sikhs and the rest were the people of the town.
- Q. Were they openly saying anything as to British power ?
- A. Yes, their cry was that the British *Raj* was finished and they would have their own *Raj* in a few days and even if the British *Raj* returned, the Sikhs ruled that day. That was the common cry when I got there.
- Q. You are speaking with reference to your own station ?
- A. I am speaking about the time when I went down there on the 21st.
- Q. Were the population still very truculent and stubborn ?
- A. Yes, especially at Dhaban Singh.
- Q. And it was even after the declaration of Martial Law ?
- A. Yes, when I got down there, i.e., on the 21st.
- Q. Do you think you could have taken action but for the existence of the Martial Law ?
- A. I don't think so; we would have been in very difficult situation without the Martial Law.
- Q. Was investigation a difficult matter in these Sub-Divisions ?
- A. It was to begin with.
- Q. What rendered it difficult ?
- A. The people would not come forward; they were very truculent with the subordinates and it was very difficult to get information to begin with.
- Q. What was the effect of setting up Summary Courts and the rapid trials by them ?
- A. At the trials people saw that they would be immediately punished if they did anything. So they stopped and nothing further occurred.
- By Sir C. H. Setalvad—
- Q. Mr. Nevill, you say that the *hartal* which was arranged for the 15th was suddenly altered to the 14th ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now what is there to show that the 15th was originally fixed at all ?
- A. Because of the information that I had. It was chiefly given to me by the Superintendent of Police.
- Q. Wherefrom did you get that information ?
- A. I was given it by the Superintendent of Police.
- Q. When ?
- A. Probably on the 11th or 12th.
- Q. You were told on the 11th or 12th that the 15th had been fixed ?
- A. Yes; I cannot tell you definitely that I knew that the 15th had been fixed; but this was the general impression that 15th was the day.
- Q. You were told before the 14th in any event ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. That was probably on the 11th or the 12th ?
- A. I could not tell you.
- Q. Now were you surprised to find that the approver, who gave evidence about this, did not say that the 15th was ever fixed ?
- A. Well, I am afraid I was not deeply interested in that. That would not affect my opinion at all.
- Q. What I mean to ask is, was there any tangible evidence before you to show that the 15th was originally fixed at all and then altered to 14th ?
- A. I was told this by the Superintendent of Police.
- Q. That is all the material you had ?
- A. That was sufficient at the time. I had my own ideas too.
- Q. Now you say that one pleader, Din Muhammad, took the crowd back to the city ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. When was this ?
- A. That was when the crowd was in front of the post office, i.e., before the post office was burnt.
- Q. Before they set fire to the post office ?
- A. Practically at the same time.
- Q. You say he took the crowd to the city ?
- A. Not all the crowd but he took a portion of the crowd. There were many thousands of people there.
- Q. The portion that remained, set fire to the post office ?
- A. I don't know about that.
- Q. Were you there at the time when the pleader took the crowd to the city ?
- A. I was just coming up about that time.
- Q. Did other pleaders also assist in driving the crowd away ?
- A. There were a couple of pleaders with the Superintendent of Police.
- Q. Were they assisting the authorities ?
- A. I am not quite sure as to what were they doing but they were talking with the Superintendent of Police.
- Q. That is what you believed at the time ?
- A. That is the impression they gave me at the time.
- Q. This pleader, Din Muhammad, was arrested ?
- A. I believe so.
- Q. Ultimately, he was let off ?
- A. I have no personal knowledge about it. I heard of it.
- Q. He was kept under arrest for a considerable time ?
- A. I do not know anything about it because I have no personal knowledge.
- Q. You say that the aeroplanes arrived when they were with you; you mean the townspeople ?
- A. Yes; non-official people; there were a few magistrates and municipal commissioners.
- Q. They were with you ?
- A. Yes.

12 December 1919.]

Mr. J. B. NEVILL.

[Continued.]

Q. They throughout assisted the authorities or did their best to assist?

A. They were going and coming. There were a lot of people going and coming.

Q. I want to know whether there were a lot of people who assisted you?

A. Certainly.

Q. And they were the respectable class of people?

A. I cannot say.

Q. I mean people of some position in the town, were assisting you?

A. Yes.

Q. The mob consisted of the lower classes of people?

A. It would be very hard to say. There were thousands of people. Some were of the lower classes; some of them hooligans.

Q. Did this crowd loot any property in Gujranwala?

A. Possibly they looted at the station.

Q. In the town was there any loot?

A. It never came to my notice.

Q. You can speak of certain things about the villages of Sheikhpura, Sangla and Chuharkana?

A. Yes.

Q. You went to these villages, on the 21st?

A. Yes.

Q. When you speak about the cries regarding the British Raj, etc., did you hear them yourself or were you told of them when you went there?

A. That was what I found out. They were told by the people.

Q. And all this happened before you arrived?

A. Certainly.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. If those aeroplanes had not arrived just at that time do you think there would have been killing by the mob?

A. Yes; I think so.

Q. You consider that it was Martial Law which prevented the spreading of disorder to certain other parts of the district? You say here "up to the time of proclaiming Martial Law the disorder was rapidly spreading to the villages...."?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. It is your opinion that Martial Law did stop the spreading of disorder?

A. I think so.

Q. Further on you say "it was obviously only the fear of Martial Law that kept them (those in Sangla and its neighbourhood) from resisting"?

A. Yes.

Q. And the application of Martial Law and trial by Summary Courts enabled the authorities to get the malcontents in hand?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you asked the military to assist the civil authorities, would the results be the same as the introduction of the Martial Law?

A. I cannot offer an opinion on that.

Q. You have expressed an opinion here?

A. What I meant by that was that certain steps were taken by the authorities to suppress disorder and without those steps it would be difficult to carry on. As regards those steps, I have no opinion to offer.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Have you or your subordinates any record of any private meeting being held between the 6th and 16th?

A. I believe there is one.

Q. There is a report that a private meeting was held between the 11th and 12th at Gujranwala?

A. I understand so; I was told so, at any rate.

Q. Have you seen it?

A. I have not seen it.

Q. Were you informed as to where this meeting was held?

A. No.

Q. Were you informed as to who were the persons that held it?

A. No.

Q. You have never seen any report of what was said at these meetings?

A. It did not concern me at all.

Q. You said 'no very great apprehension was felt on the evening of the 13th.' Do you know that the authorities knew on the 11th and 12th that a *hartal* was going to take place? Are you aware that all Europeans at Gujranwala and all the officers knew that a *hartal* was going to take place and this information was in their possession on the 11th and 12th?

A. I do not know quite about the date; I think that is the date.

Q. On what date was the farewell *darbar* of Colonel O'Brien?

A. 11th.

Q. Are you aware that the Europeans were so apprehensive that they went with revolvers in their pockets?

A. I was not aware of it. I also attended.

Q. Are you aware that on the 11th and 12th arrangements were made to remove the missionary and European ladies from Gujranwala?

A. I do not think there were any.

Q. No meetings about it?

A. I was not present there.

Q. Supposing these things happened, still you would say there was no apprehension on the 11th, 12th or 13th as to what would happen?

A. There was a possibility that there would be no violence at all.

Q. On the 11th and 12th, were any special arrangements made by the police?

A. I do not know.

Q. What effort would you have made if you had known on the 12th that the meeting was going to take place?

A. I was the Assistant Superintendent of Police; I simply carried out orders.

Q. Therefore you could suggest what the Superintendent would not have done?

A. No.

Q. You are aware that the train which arrived at Gujranwala on the morning of the 14th was 14 hours late?

A. I was aware of it.

Q. You are aware that this was the first train which arrived from Amritsar between the 13th and 14th?

A. I found it out afterwards.

Q. That was the first train after what happened at Amritsar?

A. I was told so.

Q. You are also aware that 13th and 14th are *Baisakhi* fair days?

A. Yes.

Q. And this train was proceeding to Wazirabad?

A. Yes.

Q. And you know, apart from what happened on the 14th, normally a very large number of people would go by the morning train?

A. I understand so.

Q. Was booking stopped on the 14th morning at Gujranwala, for Wazirabad?

A. I do not know anything about it.

Q. Were you informed that a very large number of the crowd were either on the foot-boards of the train, or running with the train?

A. I heard there was an excited crowd round the train.

Q. The real point is whether or not a large crowd was standing on the foot-boards?

A. I have not heard anything.

Q. How long did you remain at the Gurukul bridge?

A. It was probably an hour. I had no watch.

Q. You know that this Gurukul bridge was surrounded by 5 or 6 temples, 2 Jain temples, 2 Sikh temples and 2 Hindu temples?

A. I do not know.

12 December 1919.]

Mr. J. B. NEVILL.

[Continued.]

Q. I want to know whether I am right in supposing that at least 5 or 6 temples are within an easy radius of this bridge.

A. It depends on what idea one has of the place.

Q. Is it 6 furlongs off, 3 furlongs off or what?

A. There is nothing near it, except a Gurukul.

Q. I want to know whether there are 5 or 6 temples within easy reach?

A. I do not know.

Q. You do not know?

A. There is a temple behind it.

Q. This is the nearest bridge to the railway station, this Gurukul bridge? The Kachchi bridge is far off?

A. Yes; on the other side.

Q. The Gurukul bridge is nearer to the station than the Kachchi bridge?

A. I could not tell without referring to the map. They are both quite near the station.

Q. And from the Gurukul bridge, could you see what was happening at the railway station?

A. I should not think so.

Q. You did not go to the Kachchi bridge at all?

A. No; not till after the fire.

Q. You were not there when Mr. Heron was assaulted?

A. No.

Q. Were you informed that on that very day, the C. I. D. and the Police were accused of having some connection with the calf affair.

A. No; certainly not.

Q. Subsequently?

A. I heard it a very long time afterwards.

Q. An investigation was started?

A. Not so far as I know.

Q. Were you informed that certain pleaders who wanted to take away the mob and who were very zealous that no injury should be done, informed the authorities that the liquor shops should be closed?

A. I have no personal knowledge. I heard it afterwards.

Q. You heard afterwards that such a representation was made to Mr. Heron?

A. Yes.

Q. Even in ordinary times, I think as a superior officer of Police you would know, hanging a calf in a public place or throwing it inside a mosque would lead to a very big riot?

A. Yes; I think so. It depends on circumstances.

Q. You were there at that bridge with 2 or 3 constables for one hour?

A. With 6 constables and 1 head constable.

Q. And except yourself and Mr. Heron, there were no Europeans inside the civil lines that day?

A. Mr. Shaw was there guarding the Treasury.

Q. Except you and Mr. Heron and Mr. Shaw, there were no other Europeans.

A. There was also a railway official.

Q. The first thing that was burnt was the Gurukul bridge?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was about 8 A.M.?

A. I should say before that.

Q. Practically sometime between 7-45 and 8?

A. Yes.

Q. And the Kachchi bridge? It was about 9?

A. It was afterwards.

Q. I cannot understand from what you say whether the things that were done were done by this mob or whether they were done by portions of the same mob, different groups doing different things, independently?

A. The mob was a huge one of tremendous size.

Q. People were on one side; some of them went to the Kachchi bridge and some went to post office. That is your impression?

A. Yes; that is my impression.

Q. Now, about these British officers, am I not right in supposing that instead of the mob saying it there was a particular man who was actually there saying that "Mr. Heron has killed my brother and I would kill him?"

A. It was a general cry.

Q. It was after some persons of the mob had been wounded, this cry was heard by you? After certain persons had been killed and some wounded?

A. They had been wounded at the Kachchi bridge before.

Q. It was after the shooting that some of the mob raised this cry?

A. Yes.

Q. Were not certain Government buildings inside the city also?

A. I do not quite know about it. There are certain Government buildings; there are certain Municipal buildings.

Q. So far as the Gurukul bridge is concerned, I think it was burnt up by placing 2 or 3 pieces of wood, binding them together by a wire and placing them on the bridge and lighting it?

A. No; there was a heap of 20 logs, one on the top of another.

Q. It was placed on the bridge and the pile was set on fire?

A. It was put on the top of the line.

Q. That is on the top of the wooden sleepers of the line? The wood was collected and placed there and fired.

A. The big logs were there.

Q. Practically this wood that was placed on the sleepers was also part of the bridge?

A. Yes; it was fixed.

Q. Have you seen this *Patwarkhana*, which is described in your statement?

A. Yes; I made investigations there.

Q. Was it a private house or a Government house?

A. I think it is a Government house.

Q. Had these people any grudge against the *Patwari*?

A. I think not.

Q. What was the object of burning the *Patwarkhana*?

A. To burn the land records kept there.

Q. They are kept there?

A. The current one is kept there.

Q. The current one is personally with the *Patwari* as in the case of *Jamabandi* and other accounts? It was kept in the house; and they wanted to burn it?

A. Yes.

Q. There were two small books which were with the *Patwari*?

A. There were lots of other papers.

Q. Is it a fact that Colonel O'Brien arrived before the arrival of the aeroplanes?

A. No; my information is that the aeroplanes arrived about quarter of an hour before Colonel O'Brien arrived.

Q. Is it not a fact that when Colonel O'Brien arrived, he started through the civil lines and went to the Treasury, and there were no crowds when he arrived? Are you aware that when Colonel O'Brien passed through the civil lines there was no crowd then?

A. There was no crowd then.

Q. Did he see any persons when he was going to the Treasury, any of the persons of Gujranwala? The Municipal Secretary, Pandit Iqbal Narain or any other? Did he speak to the Pandit?

A. He did speak at one place; I do not know whose house it is.

Q. One of your witnesses, Barrister Abbas Ali, did he go on a visit to the Deputy Commissioner?

A. I could not tell.

Q. Did you take any steps to inform the authorities as to what you knew about Din Muhammad? He was practically all the time there. Did you take steps to inform the authorities as to the part he took at that time?

A. Certainly, I informed the authorities.

Q. And notwithstanding that he was kept in jail?

A. I am not sure about that point.

Q. You have said (I have taken down your words; if you want to modify them, you may do so.) "That these villagers would not come forward and it was very difficult to get information from them, but that when the Martial Law was introduced the task was rendered easier."

12 December 1919.]

Mr. J. B. NEVILL.

[Continued.]

May I understand that you meant to convey the idea that the introduction of Martial Law helped you in getting evidence?

A. It made our work of investigation much easier and I considered that without Martial Law it would have been impossible.

Q. Your normal and usual investigation is much more difficult than the investigation you were holding during Martial Law times?

A. No; about the same.

Q. The difficulties you meet with in your ordinary police investigation were absent in the investigations held during the Martial Law days?

A. No; after the first few days, I found them practically the same.

Q. Martial Law had no effect?

A. Afterwards.

Q. In the first week?

A. It made it possible to investigate.

Q. These are your words. 'People are not coming forward to give evidence; it is difficult to get information.' How did the Martial Law help you to get information?

A. There was no attempt to oppose authority or do anything of that sort after Martial Law had been imposed. We were able to get in touch with the people.

Q. You did not mean to say that in any way Martial Law made them come forward?

A. Certainly not. It enabled them to come forward.

Q. So far as these villages were concerned, how did Martial Law help you to investigate these matters except that it allowed you to arrest anybody and everybody on the faintest breath of suspicion?

A. I do not agree with that at all. I never arrested anybody unless I had very convincing evidence that he was guilty.

Q. How did it help you?

A. Under Martial Law, they made no attempts to resist us, they helped us. There was a change in their demeanour.

Q. Martial Law brought them to their senses?

A. That is my meaning.

Q. Do you mean to say that these landlords, these *lambardars*, every one of them was in the know?

A. What is the meaning.

Q. You sent for the *lambardars*; they refused to give information saying 'we know nothing.' Did you suppose that they were in the know as to who committed all these offences?

A. Yes, some of them knew?

Q. Were any of these *lambardars* *challaned* or convicted?

A. I could not tell you offhand. I can tell you from the records. I believe one *lambardar* was convicted.

Q. What difference would you make between Martial Law and Military aid? You were in charge of a sub-division of the district as a superior police officer. What I say is: You take away the Martial Law regulations and you get all the help from the Military; what difference would it make to you?

A. I could not tell you; I have no experience.

Q. You had no previous experience of any Martial Law?

A. No.

Q. Therefore my point is: Supposing these regulations that people should *salaam* the officers, attend the parades and all that

A. That hardly concerns me. I have no opinion to offer.

Q. So far as you were concerned, I quite understand that military aid was necessary; but when you say that Martial Law instead of military aid is necessary, my difficulty comes in. You were not concerned with any of these regulations that were passed by the Martial Law authorities: you were only concerned with the help that you received from the mobile columns and the military escorts.

A. I am concerned with the actual points. Martial Law has practically enabled me to investigate.

Q. I want to know whether you are prepared to say that in your investigation you were practically helped by the Martial Law regulation that was passed by the Martial Law authorities?

A. I am not concerned with those things. I can tell you about the result.

Q. There are different parts of Martial Law; the first is passing certain regulations; the second is giving you military help and the third trying certain persons in a different way. There are 3 parts of the Martial Law so far as I understand. There were certain regulations passed, there was certain military help given to the civil authorities, and there were some distinct tribunals. So far as Part I was concerned, did it give you any help in your investigations and getting your cases easily and rapidly finished?

A. Yes.

Q. I am talking of the first portion. I can concede that the military help you got for arresting people certainly helped you in your investigations. You may contend there were established summary courts, and that the accused people were quickly punished before these courts and that there was no appeal or pleader or anything of that sort, and that people liked it. I want to know whether in the first statement, in your opinion, all these regulations helped you in carrying on your investigation?

A. I have no very intimate knowledge of what was done.

Q. If you have no very intimate knowledge of what was done, you could not possibly speak about the effect?

A. It was Martial Law that enabled me to carry out my investigation. I have no information about details.

Q. Martial Law on the whole brought about this result. I say Martial Law concerns the 2nd and 3rd parts. I want to know what result the other part of the Martial Law has brought about?

A. I cannot tell you.

Q. So far as your sub-division was concerned and so far as your jurisdiction extended, you never heard of any cases where this mob was armed with fire-arms or swords or anything of that sort and nothing was recovered from them?

A. *Lathis* were recovered.

Q. Did I speak of *lathis*?

A. *Lathi* is a distinct arm.

Q. Except *lathis*, nothing else?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Am I not right in supposing that the post office was burnt after the return of Mr. Heron from the Kachi bridge?

A. Yes, it is so.

Q. You say: aeroplanes came and dropped bombs and machine-gunned the crowd, first of all they came, went back and then came again?

A. I did not pay much attention to the aeroplanes. There was a great crowd. My impression is that they circled round for a considerable time first.

Q. And even their circling round over the station and over that road did not have the effect of dispersing the crowd until they began to bomb and fire upon the mob?

A. I think so.

Q. That is, before the actual bombing had taken place, the mob must have been aware of the fact that 3 aeroplanes were hovering over their heads?

A. Yes.

Q. And there were 3 aeroplanes, and you saw the 3 aeroplanes?

A. I think 3; I could verify from my note.

Q. Did you, as the head of the Gujranwala district Police Department make any order to investigate as to whether any houses were hit or not?

A. I was Assistant there. I had nothing to do with that.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. You said in your statement that the firing at the Kachchi bridge was the result of an assault on the



12 December 1919.]

Mr. J. B. NEVILL—concluded—PANDIT IQBAL NARAIN.

Superintendent of Police. What is your authority for saying that Mr. Heron was badly hurt?

A. I saw him; his face was very bad with bruises.

Q. Do you mean to say that the mob assaulted him before they were fired on?

A. Certainly.

Q. You said in reply to a question that the cries you heard of the mob intending to kill the British officers

were all after the mob had been fired on at Kachchi bridge. Do you mean to infer that this violent intention was the result of their having been fired at?

A. No; I was not at the Kachchi bridge. I was at the Gurukul bridge, and there was the Superintendent of police who said that all this took place before they fired on the mob.

PANDIT IQBAL NARAIN, Secretary, Municipal Committee, Gujranwala.

By the President—

Q. Are you the Secretary, Municipal Committee, Gujranwala?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On the 14th April last, did you go to the railway station early in the morning?

A. Yes.

Q. At what time did you arrive there?

A. It was 6-30 or 7.

Q. At that time, did the train come in from Amritsar?

A. No.

Q. Were you there when it arrived?

A. No, Sir.

Q. What did you see at the station?

A. There was a crowd of about 1,000 people, most of them bareheaded.

Q. What were they doing?

A. They were telling the people not to go to Wazirabad.

Q. Did the mob do anything to the property of the station at that time?

A. No.

Q. How long were you at the station?

A. For about 15 minutes. I then went back to my house.

Q. On your way back to the house did you see anything?

A. I did not notice anything.

Q. When did you first see anything of the incendiarism that took place that day?

A. I saw the Kachchi bridge burning.

Q. At what time did you see it burning?

A. That was about 8-30 or so.

Q. Where were you when you saw the burning bridge?

A. I was on the railway line.

Q. Had you gone from your house again?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. How far from the Kachchi bridge is it?

A. About 100 yards.

Q. You were there when Mr. Heron, the Superintendent of Police, was there?

A. I was not there.

Q. Did you see Mr. Heron that morning?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Where was he?

A. I saw him first at the railway station. I saw him afterwards near the Kachchi bridge, near the railway quarters.

Q. That is the place I wanted to ask you about. When you saw him there were a number of people surrounding him?

A. About 500.

Q. What was happening?

A. They were all armed and they were all threatening.

Q. What were they armed with?

A. With crowbars, hammers, lathis and railway implements.

Q. Did you notice whether Mr. Heron was attacked by any one?

A. Not in my presence.

Q. Were you there when the mob was fired on?

A. I went there five minutes after that.

Q. When you went there, was the mob dispersing in consequence of the firing?

A. There were still 5 or 6 hundred there.

Q. They were still threatening?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the position a critical one?

A. Very critical.

Q. Were the people in mob throwing anything?

A. Yes; they were throwing stones.

Q. At whom?

A. At where Mr. Heron was standing.

Q. Did you see any of the stones strike him?

A. Not in my presence.

Q. Then a large number of the mob collected at the railway station?

A. Yes; afterwards.

Q. Did you see it?

A. I was there.

Q. What occurred in your presence there?

A. The post office was burnt; afterwards the *dat* bungalow was burnt, the *tahsil* was burnt and other buildings.

Q. What led to the burning of these buildings?

A. People burnt the buildings, that is all I know.

Q. With what material did they burn the buildings?

A. I did not notice any materials.

Q. Did you form any opinion as to what the intention of the mob was in burning these public buildings?

A. Just to damage Government property.

Q. The mob also attempted to set the jail on fire. Did you see that?

A. I saw them going there and heard them saying so.

Q. What did you hear them saying?

A. "Now, we shall get to the jail, break it open and burn it."

Q. Were they saying anything as to who were in power that day?

A. They thought themselves to be in power.

Q. And were acting in complete defiance of the authorities?

A. Certainly.

Q. You remember when the aeroplanes arrived?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What was happening about the time they came?

A. They were burning the Industrial School at that time.

Q. But for the arrival of the aeroplanes, would more damage have been done than was done?

A. I think so.

Q. I think some bombs were dropped and shots were fired?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What in your opinion was the effect of the action taken by the aeroplane?

A. The mob dispersed.

Q. But for the presence of the aeroplanes would the mob in your opinion have dispersed?

A. Not at the time.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice G. C. Rankin—

Q. Were you in the street when the aeroplanes arrived or in some building?

A. I was outside on the road.

Q. Did you see 3 aeroplanes?

A. I saw more than one. May be 2 or 3.

Q. Were you near the people at any time when they were fired upon by the machine gun from the aeroplane?

A. No.

Q. You did not see?

A. No.

Q. Can you locate where any bombs have been dropped?

A. I know all the places.

12 December 1919.]

PANDIT IQBAL NARAYAN.

[Concluded.]

Q. Just tell me on what places? There were 3 in a line. Do you remember that?

A. On the Grand Trunk road.

Q. One of them was not effective and did not explode?

A. No.

Q. The other two did?

A. Yes.

Q. You cannot say whether that road was full of people or not at that time?

A. I did not see.

Q. You saw the mob.

A. Yes, Sir.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—*

Q. Have you seen the places where these bombs fell inside the *mandi*?

A. Yes.

Q. It is a very populated portion of the city surrounded by houses?

A. Yes.

Q. One of the bombs fell in the courtyard of the school?

A. Yes.

Q. How far is the *mandi* from the railway line? More than 2 miles?

A. It is about a mile.

Q. I believe that Colonel O'Brien arrived before the aeroplanes?

A. Just by that time.

Q. He has told us that he heard of the arrival of the aeroplanes when he was in the Treasury.

A. Yes.

Q. And he came and first saw you?

A. No.

Q. Did he not see you?

A. I saw him afterwards.

Q. Before going to the Treasury or after?

A. He came to Gujranwala; he went to my place; I was not there.

Q. Because he had gone to your place, so you went and saw him?

A. I do not know. I was there outside in the civil station; he called me and I joined him.

Q. At the time there were no crowds?

A. Not in the civil station.

Q. You know Mr. Abbas Ali?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he go to see him that evening?

A. I saw him there.

Q. Where the Deputy Commissioner was?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you been able to find out whether any of the houses in Gujranwala were damaged by any of these bombs? A three-storeyed building or any other building?

A. I do not know.

Q. This map which was placed before you was made with your assistance?

A. On my orders.

*By the President—*

Q. The map showing the places where the bombs had fallen?

A. No; I prepared a map of the town showing the civil station and not the places where the bombs fell.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—*

Q. I am only asking you about those places. You know Mr. Din Muhammad?

A. I know him very well.

Q. He and you were together 3 or 4 times on that day?

A. Yes.

Q. On every occasion you saw him, as a matter of fact, helping the authorities, by pacifying the crowd, by going to the places of meeting, and so on?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know how many days he was under arrest?

A. It was more than a month.

Q. You also know that on one or two occasions he did this at the request of Mr. Heron himself? When

you and he were together he asked him to remove the crowd and pacify them, and the crowd was taken away?

A. I do not know. I was not at that time with Mr. Din Muhammad.

Q. This train was one hour late that day?

A. It was 13 hours late.

Q. No morning train comes from Amritsar to Wazirabad?

A. This train was due at Gujranwala at 7.30, but it came on the 14th morning.

Q. And the first time you went there to the station, this train was being boarded by a large number of persons bound for Wazirabad?

A. There was no train when I went there.

Q. What time did you go to the station?

A. I went the second time at about 8 o'clock.

Q. You went at 7 A.M.

A. First time.

Q. Then the train was an hour late?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you seen the damage done to the Gurukul bridge with your own eyes?

A. Long afterwards.

Q. What was the damage done? Only one sleeper damaged?

A. Something like that.

Q. There is a black circular mark in one sleeper; that is the only damage done?

A. That is all I could say.

*By the President—*

Q. You saw it after repair?

A. Yes, Sir.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—*

Q. Did you see what damage was done to the Kachchi bridge?

A. I saw that bridge afterwards, Sir.

Q. You did not see the Kachchi bridge that day? How long afterwards?

A. I cannot say; may be a month afterwards.

Q. And Gurukul?

A. Same time.

Q. After a month?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see Mr. B. B. Bhagat there?

A. I saw him once.

Q. At the time when any of the bridges was burning, did you see Din Muhammad putting out the fire, or any of the pleaders?

A. I was not there when the bridge was set on fire.

Q. Were you informed by Din Muhammad?

A. Yes; he told me.

Q. On the 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. He was extinguishing the fire?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Do you remember that in your presence a representation was made by Din Muhammad that the people are getting out of hand because the liquor shops were open?

A. He and I both made it.

*By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—*

Q. How long have you been at Gujranwala?

A. For the last 3 years.

Q. Do you know the legal practitioners there very well?

A. I know all of them practically.

Q. Prior to the 14th, what was their attitude towards Government?

A. Defiant attitude.

Q. Were you present at any of the meetings they held?

A. I was hearing what they were talking.

Q. Were you present on the meeting of the 5th?

A. Yes.

Q. What attitude did they display there?

A. Some of them talked about the Rowlatt Act and others about the Delhi incidents. In my opinion they misrepresented the Rowlatt Act.

12 December 1919.]

SARDAR SUNDAR SINGH.

SARDAR SUNDAR SINGH, B.A., LL.B., M.B.E., Honorary Secretary, Central Co-operative Bank, Gujranwala.

By the President—

Q. Were you at Gujranwala on the 14th April last ?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. You heard of the trouble in the morning, I think ?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. Did you proceed to the railway station and put your services at the disposal of Mr. Heron, Superintendent of Police ?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. You saw the situation was a serious one, I suppose ?  
 A. Yes ; I thought so.  
 Q. After certain consultation with the Superintendent of Police, did you make a round of the civil lines ?  
 A. Yes, I made a round in the civil lines and passing by the Court and other Government buildings, I went to the Government High School.  
 Q. At that time, these buildings were quite safe ?  
 A. Yes, quite safe.  
 Q. On the way, did you see crowds in the street ?  
 A. Yes, Sir. Outside the Sardar Mahon Singh's garden I met the crowd.  
 Q. Were they excited ?  
 A. They were quite excited.  
 Q. And shouting ?  
 A. They shouted 'Rowlatt Bill hai hai.'  
 Q. In what direction were they proceeding ?  
 A. To the railway station.  
 Q. What time ?  
 A. It was about 10 o'clock.  
 Q. Did you see anything happening to the telegraph wires ?  
 A. I saw near the distant signal on the Lahore side, men climbing up the posts and cutting the wires.  
 Q. What were they cutting the wires with ?  
 A. Iron instruments.  
 Q. Were these the members of the mob that were doing that ?  
 A. Certainly.  
 Q. Did that cutting of the wires stop communication to Lahore ?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. At that time was the situation very grave ?  
 A. I think it passed out of the control of the civil authorities there.  
 Q. We heard from a large number of the other witnesses of the firing of the different buildings. I do not think I need trouble you with details. Of course you saw the different buildings that were burnt ?  
 A. Yes, Sir. I saw the post office.  
 Q. And you remember the aeroplanes came about 3 o'clock in the afternoon ?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. What was the result of the action taken by the aeroplanes ? Was it beneficial in the sense that it restored order ?  
 A. That is my view.  
 Q. But for that action (I think it unfortunately resulted in considerable casualties) what would have happened ?  
 A. I think the rest of the buildings would have been burnt. The Treasury might have been looted possibly.  
 Q. I think you are the Honorary Secretary of the Central Co-operative Bank in Gujranwala ? Where are your premises ?  
 A. In the heart of the town.  
 Q. Was any attempt made to set your premises on fire ?  
 A. I was told so.  
 Q. Did you succeed in trying to persuade the mob not to destroy the building ? What persuaded the mob not to burn the building ?  
 A. Because it was not a Government building.  
 Q. Was the mob at that time out to destroy everything that belonged to Government ?  
 A. That is my idea.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You are a prominent resident of Gujranwala ?  
 A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You practise there as a pleader ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. You also take interest in the co-operative movement ?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. Now, before April 1919, were the people of Gujranwala as far as you know them, loyal and law abiding ?  
 A. I think they were.  
 Q. Before you come to April 1919, was there any anti-Government or anti-British feeling visible among the people ?  
 A. I do not know anything about it.  
 Q. You never saw that ?  
 A. No.  
 Q. What do you think is the reason for this sudden change that came over them in April 1919 ?  
 A. My view is it was due to the agitation about the Rowlatt Act and then the agitation on account of grievances at Lahore and Amritsar.  
 Q. The Rowlatt Act agitation threw them into excitement ?  
 A. Yes, Sir. That excitement was heightened by *hartal*, because people were thrown out of business.  
 Q. The excitement was caused by the Rowlatt Act agitation followed by the *hartal* and by people remaining idle. Then came the news of the happenings at Amritsar and Lahore ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. That had the effect of making the unruly elements in society prominent ?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Was there a considerable portion of the population of Gujranwala who did not sympathize with the hooligans ?  
 A. Yes ; I think so. I suppose they were terrorised by what the hooligans were doing. Most of the people who were terrorised remained in their houses.  
 Q. It was really the hooligans and the unruly element in Gujranwala that took hold of the situation and did what they did ?  
 A. Yes, but I cannot say whether there was any organization behind. I think all the rowdy people were doing the mischief.  
 Q. Have you any personal knowledge of any organization behind ?  
 A. No ; I have no personal knowledge.  
 Q. Was not dissatisfaction also caused by the high prices that were obtaining ?  
 A. To some extent, yes, but in Gujranwala it was due to political agitation. The element of high prices was not very important.  
 Q. Why do you say so ?  
 A. High prices were only a minor cause.  
 Q. Now with regard to recruiting I understand that in the beginning Gujranwala was not very successful ?  
 A. Recruiting was very slack in the beginning.  
 Q. Did the recruiting campaign become very intensified after Colonel O'Brien took charge as Deputy Commissioner ?  
 A. The recruiting campaign was more properly organized.  
 Q. It was after Colonel O'Brien came that recruiting went on briskly ?  
 A. That is because he adopted some systematic means.  
 Q. Did it happen that there was considerable pressure exercised upon people to recruit ?  
 A. I am afraid I cannot say about that. No pressure was brought to bear in my presence.  
 Q. Do you know of cases where pressure was brought to bear, where people were brought up from villages and.....  
 A. When they were brought to the recruiting office they asked whether they were willing to join and if they were not they used to be sent back.  
 Q. But were not unwilling people brought up from villages ?  
 A. They might have been.

12 December 1919.]

SARDAR SUNDAR SINGH.

[Concluded.]

Q. They were brought up to Gujranwala from various villages ?

A. They were possibly brought up by some zealous individuals.

Q. Some over-zealous individuals did impress people who were unwilling ?

A. It was not the policy of the authorities.

Q. In some cases in fact it did happen and would this not cause discontent ? Will you agree that if in fact this did take place it would cause some dissatisfaction ?

A. You must also take into consideration that when they were let off this caused satisfaction to their friends.

Q. The very fact of people from various villages being so impressed and brought to Gujranwala, though ultimately let off, would to a certain extent cause discontent ?

A. I have no personal knowledge about this.

Q. Do you admit the fact that this happened ?

A. I saw only two cases where they were allowed to go back.

Q. You saw two cases where people were unwilling and were allowed to go back—if you were connected with the recruiting committee you must have come to know of other cases though you may not have seen them yourself. I understand that certain over-zealous officials had impressed unwilling people ?

A. I never said over-zealous officials. I said individuals.

Q. Individuals had so impressed people against their will ?

A. Yes, individuals impressed some for their individual benefit.

Q. There may have been various motives for doing so but in fact they did it ?

A. Yes ; I think so.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—*

Q. Were you staying in Gujranwala during the month of May ?

A. I think so.

Q. Are you aware that during the last week of April an order was issued restricting the right to travel to and from Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. And that this restriction was taken away in the first week of May ?

A. I cannot give the exact date.

Q. Are you aware that after a few weeks this restriction was removed ?

A. Yes ; I think so.

Q. Is it not a fact that two or three days after removing this restriction, this restriction was re-imposed again as a punishment on the citizens of Gujranwala ?

A. I will not say as a punishment but I think it was again imposed.

Q. Can you give me any reason why it was imposed ?

A. Because the railway authorities could not supply accommodation to the other people. There were very few trains running.

Q. If I inform you that the military authorities who were responsible for this order imposed it as a punishment will you be prepared to modify your statement ?

A. I cannot say much about this. I have given you my own reason.

Q. Was there any large exodus of women in the second week of May in Gujranwala ?

A. I do not know.

Q. Was this matter brought to the notice of the military authorities ?

A. I do not know.

Q. At what time did you reach the railway station ?

A. I reached the railway station at half-past eight.

Q. I think the Kachchi bridge affair was over by that time. I want to know as to whether what happened at Kachchi bridge happened after you and your party arrived there or did it happen before your arrival ?

A. I heard about this at the railway station.

Q. It must have happened before your arrival ?

A. Certainly. I heard about this affair after I arrived at the railway station, therefore, it must have happened before my arrival at the railway station.

Q. I want to know whether this happened before you reached the station.

A. It might have.

Q. When you reached the station you say in your statement that you met the Superintendent of Police and so long as you were able to see, Mr. Heron was not assaulted ?

A. He was assaulted afterwards at about 11 o'clock.

Q. I am referring to the assault made upon him at the Kachchi bridge ?

A. I know nothing of the assault at Kachchi bridge.

Q. Did you hear about it ?

A. I heard later on.

Q. You never came to know about it till the 14th ?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it not a fact that sweetmeat sellers sold their sweets very cheap on the evening of the 13th ?

A. I never came to the town on the 13th.

Q. May I take it that you know only what happened at the railway station ?

A. I never came to the town on the 13th.

Q. Were you there on the 11th and 12th ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you informed that after the 6th a second *hartal* was going to take place ?

A. No, I never knew about it.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—*

Q. About those cases where you said over-zealous individuals went too far in their method of getting recruits, were these cases numerous ?

A. There were very few.

Q. Whenever a man was brought in, was he allowed to go back again ?

A. There were two cases where they were allowed to go back.

Q. Did you suppose that as a result of such methods any individual was ever actually enrolled in the army against his will ?

A. I do not know of any such cases.

12 December 1919.]

Mr. S. M. JACOB.

Mr. S. M. JACOB, I.C.S., Director of Agriculture.

*By the President—*

Q. Mr. Jacob did you get instructions from the Punjab Government to leave Lahore with a mobile column at 3 A.M. on the 20th April?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What was the object of your going with the mobile column?

A. I have put all that down in my statement. I went to investigate and punish offenders for cutting the telegraph wires at mile 254 at Kamoke.

Q. On your arrival there did you call for the *lambardar*?

A. I told some villagers to fetch the *lambardar*.

Q. Did you get him?

A. Well I had to wait a long time and eventually one or two *lambardars* rolled up. One man Bhagwan Singh refused for a long time to come so I went to his house and got him myself.

Q. What happened when you saw him?

A. I found him at his house. He was standing there with folded arms and he was very indifferent to any instruction that I gave him. I told him to get the other *lambardars* and the villagers together. He practically paid no attention to what I said and eventually I told him that if he did not do what I wanted he would have to be punished; but he still continued to be very indifferent to what I asked him to do, so I held a summary court-martial on him and sentenced him to fifteen strokes of whipping and a fine of Rs. 200.

Q. Under what authority were you acting when you took that course?

A. Under the authority given to me under Martial Law.

Q. What was your position under Martial Law?

A. I was given power to try offences summarily.

Q. I see that in an other place you took some hostages—what exactly did you do in connection with the taking of hostages?

A. I had collected a number of villagers together and we had several men of respectability there and after discussing the situation with them they could not or would not tell me what they knew about the cutting of the wire, so I simply selected six men.

Q. What did you do with them?

A. Put them under arrest and sent them to the nearest *thana*.

Q. What happened to them after that?

A. I do not know as I was only temporarily employed on this duty.

Q. Were you also with a mobile column under the command of Colonel Smithers?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What object had that mobile column in view?

A. I think it was partly by way of demonstration and also if we found any organised resistance to deal with it. I could not tell you what Colonel Smithers' orders were.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—*

Q. On the 20th April were your instructions from the Punjab Government given to you in writing?

A. Yes; they were instructions in writing. I think my instructions were to report myself at 2 A.M. at cantonments to accompany the mobile column. The detailed instructions were given to Major Brade who was commanding the column.

Q. Was it the act of the military commander or was it your act when you took those hostages?

A. We both discussed it together. I do not know what the technical position would be.

Q. Can you tell me whether it was a part of his orders to take hostages?

A. The idea of taking hostages did not originate with me or with him.

Q. Your nomination to exercise power under General Beynon's proclamation—is that in writing?

A. I was gazetted as a Magistrate with summary powers by the Local Government.

Q. So you were entitled under Martial Law as constituted to hold a summary court?

A. I am not sure about the dates. I certainly was empowered but I am not certain as to whether the authorisation was subsequent to the date of this—20th April.

Q. It may have been retrospective?

A. I rather think it was before that.

Q. Can you tell me seeing that the general proclamation regularising the procedure afterwards adopted for Martial Law was dated the 19th April. Had you a copy of that with you at the time?

A. Probably not.

*By Sir C. H. Setalvad—*

Q. What position were you occupying in April?

A. I was Director of Agriculture.

Q. And when were you put on to duties relating to the disturbances?

A. I happened to be at Amritsar on the 13th and I was asked to take in a despatch to Lahore from the Deputy Commissioner which I did. But that was purely a private matter.

Q. When were you put on regular duty in connection with these disturbances?

A. I think it was about the 15th or 16th. I then took a despatch to the General Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade.

Q. Did the local Government take you away from your ordinary duties as Director of Agriculture and clothe you with some other function?

A. They gave me powers under Martial Law but I still had to carry on my duties as Director of Agriculture.

Q. Was that appointment made by the local Government or by the military authorities?

A. I believe by the local Government.

Q. Your appointment as you describe it in your statement was to punish offenders for cutting telegraph wires—was that by the local Government or by the military authorities?

A. As I have said just now the actual detailed instructions were given to Major Brade who was commanding the column.

Q. Who gave those orders to Major Brade?

A. Those as far as I remember were Brigade orders.

Q. Then what did the Punjab Government do? You say that under instructions from the Punjab Government you left Lahore to investigate and punish offenders for....

A. The Punjab Government gave me instructions to accompany the column.

Q. Who was to investigate and punish offenders—Major Brade or you?

A. I imagine it was myself. That is how I interpreted my orders.

Q. Were these orders given to you by the Punjab Government or by the military authorities?

A. By the Punjab Government.

Q. Have you that order in writing?

A. I have not got that with me.

Q. Where can it be had?

A. I could not say. It was delivered to me at about 11-30 P.M. and I had to leave at 3 A.M. in the morning.

Q. There must be a copy of it?

A. Yes, there must be.

Mr. Herbert.—General Beynon appointed certain military officers to try cases summarily and he asked the Punjab Government to depute civil officers similarly.

Sir C. H. Setalvad.—Have you that letter of General Beynon to the Punjab Government?

Mr. Herbert.—Yes.

12 December 1919.]

Mr. S. M. JACOB.

[Continued.]

*Sir C. H. Setalood.*—The orders to Major Brade as to what was to be done—they must also be in writing?

*Witness.*—Those were typewritten instructions.

*Q.* There must be some office copy available?

*A.* Yes.

*Q.* Were your orders merely to report yourself to the military authorities and take instructions from them or were you definitely given instructions by the local Government to investigate and punish offenders for cutting the wires?

*A.* I could not tell you. I cannot remember whether the words to investigate and punish were instructions to me. They were certainly Major Brade's instructions.

*Q.* Then when you went to this village and found the *lambardar* as you say obstructive what did you actually do? Did you hold an investigation or did you summarily proceed to punish him?

*A.* Well I warned him that I wanted him to understand that he had to listen to me.

*Q.* Was Major Brade with you?

*A.* Major Brade was with me.

*Q.* When the *lambardar* did not come you went to his house?

*A.* We both went with four or five soldiers and they were there with fixed bayonets but the *lambardar* was absolutely indifferent to the presence of those armed men, and I was rather surprised at that.

*Q.* Was he not terrified?

*A.* No, I was rather surprised at this. When these armed men came round he seemed to be rather more inclined to be insolent than before.

*Q.* What did he actually do when you asked him to go with you?

*A.* I first of all asked him why he did not come. Then as I have said he only smirked.

*Q.* Then when the soldiers came what did he do?

*A.* He stayed where he was and I told him to pull himself together and get the villagers.

*Q.* In what language did you speak to him?

*A.* Punjabi.

*Q.* Could he understand you?

*A.* Yes.

*Q.* And did he move at all?

*A.* No, he did not move at all. So I told him that he must come with me and the soldiers formed a guard round him. They did not lay hands on him and he began to move and they followed behind.

*Q.* When did you inflict this punishment?

*A.* After reaching my camp. We were on the main road holding an enquiry; and he continued to adopt his same attitude of insolence and obstruction.

*Q.* How did he show his insolence?

*A.* When I got to the main road where I was holding an enquiry I asked him to get the villagers together and to give me some information about the cutting of the wires.

*Q.* What did he say?

*A.* Eventually I found out that he had no information.

*Q.* He had information as to the fact of the cutting of the wires—the same information that you had?

*A.* Yes, but that was of no use. We wanted the details as to the cutting of the wire.

*Q.* What do you mean by details?

*A.* Who cut, how it was cut and when it was cut.

*Q.* About this you ultimately found out that he had no information?

*A.* I could not say that he had information. I daresay he had little or no information.

*Q.* If that was so—that he had no information—he could not give you any?

*A.* Yes.

*Q.* Then you proceeded to inflict this punishment on him and you gave him 15 strokes?

*A.* Yes.

*Q.* Who actually gave the strokes?

*A.* I think it was an officer of the West Sussex or West Kent. I forget the regiment.

*Q.* Was he stripped naked for this purpose?

*A.* He had his loin-cloth on and he was bound to a tree.

*Q.* Was the village collected there?

*A.* There were villagers there.

*Q.* Were they in large numbers?

*A.* I should think there were about thirty or forty.

*Q.* What was the number of inhabitants of the village?

*A.* About two to three thousand.

*Q.* Was he able to sustain this flogging?

*A.* Yes.

*Q.* And then you fined him Rs. 200?

*A.* Yes.

*Q.* And did you recover that amount?

*A.* Yes.

*Q.* How did you do it?

*A.* I think he told some of his friends to go and get it.

*Q.* Was he kept in custody till he was able to pay it?

*A.* Well he was not kept in custody. He made no attempt to go away so I accordingly made no attempt to guard him.

*Q.* Then after that did you take him further in your investigation?

*A.* No.

*Q.* Then did you do anything further?

*A.* I questioned various people as to what they knew about it. Eventually I got the information that the cutting of the wire had taken place at mile 364.

*Q.* You merely got the information that the wires had been cut at some other place?

*A.* Yes; that is correct.

*Q.* It was at that village that you took hostages?

*A.* Yes.

*Q.* When you reached that village what did you do?

*A.* I collected all the headmen of the village and leading men and there were a great many retired Indian officers there and we had a discussion.

*Q.* What was the population of this village?

*A.* It was a smallish village. There were about fifty collected for this discussion.

*Q.* Did you ask them to give information as to who was responsible for the cutting of the wire?

*A.* Yes.

*Q.* They could not give you any information.

*A.* They could not tell me. They said they had no information.

*Q.* Did you believe them or not?

*A.* On the whole I thought they probably might have something to say about it.

*Q.* At the moment did you believe them?

*A.* At the moment I was quite convinced that they knew something about it.

*Q.* You say the people consisted of retired army officers and you would expect them to be truthful about it and there was no particular reason why they should not help?

*A.* My impression of the men was that if they had known they would have told me.

*Q.* Did you know at that time that they were Indian officers?

*A.* Yes.

*Q.* And therefore you must have thought that if they had information they would not keep it back from you?

*A.* I thought that if they had information they would have probably told me.

*Q.* All these people who had collected including the retired Indian officers told you that they had no information?

*A.* They all told me.

*Q.* Then why did you take these hostages? What was the object?

12 December 1919.]

Mr. S. M. JACOB.

[Continued.]

A. It was more or less protective, to prevent a recurrence of the cutting. I think that was the idea underlying the orders which directed the taking of hostages.

Q. How was that prevented by taking hostages? Supposing there was cutting of wires after you took hostages, what was intended to be done to the hostages?

A. I suppose it was only more or less to impress the villagers that there was such a thing as Government after all and they had some power. I imagine that was the idea.

Q. In order to show to the villagers that there was power with the Government?

A. I imagine so; it is pure guess work.

Q. You took part in these operations. I want to know what the idea was behind the taking of hostages. You say it was to prevent the cutting of wires. How would that prevent cutting of wires, I want to know. Supposing wires were cut—what would you do with the hostages?

A. I do not know that I ever thought what the subsequent proceedings would be. In cases of that kind, one is dealing with emergencies as they arise.

Q. When you were dealing with an emergency?

A. You are talking of the subsequent emergency of wires being out a second time. That did not arise.

Q. Yes, when you decided upon doing this, it must have been done with some intelligent object. In what way would that have any effect on the villagers, or what was impressed upon the villagers thereby? Were they told what would happen to the hostages?

A. I did not consider what further action should be taken against hostages.

Q. When you took hostages, did you tell the villagers why you were taking them?

A. I told them that they were taken in order to prevent a recurrence of the cutting.

Q. What impression did you think you conveyed by that? If recurrence happened, what would happen to these people?

A. That was left to their imagination.

Q. How did you select these 6 people from among the 40 or 50 that were before you? Did you select the biggest six?

A. I think I had a good deal of help in selecting from the Indian officers who were present.

Q. They helped you in making a selection?

A. Yes.

Q. On what principle was this selection made by them?

A. I told them that they might tell me whom I should take. They pointed out some men. There was an Extra Assistant Commissioner; I forget his name. I asked him also. They named about 4 persons. I asked him to select two more and he picked out two more. As far as I remember, I did not personally select anybody.

Q. Then you took those six people with you?

A. Yes.

Q. Where did you take them?

A. I took them to the police station near by. I forget its name; I think it is at a distance of about a mile.

Q. You left them at the police station?

A. I left them with the *thanadar*.

Q. And you proceeded to other villages, I suppose?

A. I proceeded back to Lahore after this.

Q. After this how many villages did you visit? Was it two only, Kamoke and Nangal Sadan? Then you came back to Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. These hostages were left at the *thana*?

A. Yes.

Q. You did not bring them?

A. No.

Q. What happened to them afterwards?

A. I do not know.

Q. How long were they kept?

A. I do not know at all.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Before the 20th April were any other cases tried by you as a summary court?

A. I think these are the only two cases I have tried.

Q. Before that you never tried cases as a summary court?

A. Not as a summary court.

Q. I believe there will be no record of these two cases anywhere?

A. There ought to be; I sent in records.

Q. There is a record; you did make a record?

A. Yes.

Q. Then did you adopt the same method that was adopted in other places? *i.e.*, you left your place in the night time and surrounded the village in the early morning and you made investigations? When did you reach the first village?

A. Kamoke?

Q. The place where you punished Bhagwan Singh.

A. I think it was at about 5 or 6 in the morning.

Q. The general procedure was adopted, *viz.*, that before waking up the villagers, the village was surrounded by soldiers and the police? Nobody was allowed to leave?

A. Yes.

Q. Similarly, I take it, the village of Mari Megha was surrounded?

A. No; it was not surrounded because I had only about half a dozen mounted men with me. We simply went straight into the village.

Q. Did you punish Bhagwan Singh for any breach of Martial Law or under General Beynon's proclamation or under the Indian Penal Code? For what did you punish him? What was the charge read out to him?

A. I do not remember.

Q. If there is anything in that record, there must be the name of the accused, names of persons who were examined as witnesses and the offence for which he was charged. I do not want any more detail. But according to the form which has been given, you will have to put down the name of the accused, names of the witnesses that you examine, the charge that was read out to him and the punishment, guilty or not guilty. May I know whether you punished him for any breach of Martial Law, or for breach made in connection with the proclamation of General Beynon, or whether you punished him under the Indian Penal Code?

A. I merely punished him for refusing to help me.

Q. You have seen General Beynon's proclamation. Does it make that an offence?

A. I do not think I have seen General Beynon's proclamation.

Q. Certainly it was no breach of any Martial Law. There was no Martial Law that anybody who does not follow a civil officer proceeding with a moveable column to find out people cutting wires, etc., will be punished. There was no such Martial Law promulgated and you will agree with me that his case does not come under any of the sections of the Indian Penal Code?

A. I cannot remember whether I put down in the record any particular section.

Q. You will agree with me that it was no offence under the Indian Penal Code?

A. I do not know. I should like to have a look at the Penal Code. I had not the Penal Code with me at the time.

Q. It was not for breach of any Martial Law?

A. I have never said so.

Q. Why was he not arrested and subsequently taken and tried? It appears to me that your only reason for

12 December 1919.]

Mr. S. M. JACOB.

[Continued.]

punishing him then and there was to enable you to get on with your work. Why was he not arrested as others were?

A. For one thing, we were in motors; I do not know that we had very much room to spare, even if I had wanted to take him along.

Q. You subsequently arrested men and brought them?

A. Then we walked. Nangal Sadan is quite close to the main road.

Q. In the same way as others were arrested and brought by the police or somebody, why was he not arrested and brought by the police or somebody?

A. Nangal Sadan is off the main road; as I told you we walked.

Q. But when you brought them after arrest, you must have made some arrangement?

A. We walked.

Q. Up to Lahore?

A. To the *thana*.

Q. How far is this village where this Bhagwan Singh was living from the *thana*?

A. I could not tell you.

Q. Certainly not more than three-quarters of a mile?

A. I am trying to remember where the police station is.

Q. You just now informed me that it was within two miles of Nangal Sandan?

A. That police station is, I think, about 10 miles away.

Q. If you surround a village at 4 or 5 o'clock in the morning all of a sudden and say that nobody should go out, and if a man stands before you with folded arms and says that he has done nothing, do you call it obstruction? Don't you think he will be surprised?

A. He was called up by other people before I went there.

Q. When he came before you, was he not standing with folded arms before you?

A. Yes. I did not go and wake him up.

Q. Don't you think he will be terribly afraid? Will he not say 'I do not know what I have done, the police have surrounded the village and there are civil and military officers'? He is called all at once. He stands before you with folded arms. Is there no other explanation except that he was very insolent or obstructive?

A. You suggested that he was afraid.

Q. I do not say he was. I say that if at 5 A.M. in the morning the village was surrounded by the police and the Military and if he was all of a sudden called before a military officer, will that not be an explanation that his conduct might be due to his being afraid during those days?

A. His conduct was anything but that of a man who is afraid. You said that the village was surrounded at 5 in the morning. I said 5 or 6. It was certainly after day break: when I went to his house, it was some time after the preliminary arrangements.

Q. Did you give any instructions to the *thanadar* so far as these hostages were concerned as to what should be done with them? Were they to take them to the jail or to the Sub-Divisional officer? What instructions did you give?

A. I left them in his charge; they were under the orders of the Extra Assistant Commissioner.

Q. What instructions did you give? Were they to be taken to some Magistrate after 24 hours, or were they to keep them till something happened? Did you give any orders when you handed over these six men?

A. I think I merely told them to keep them until they got order from the Extra Assistant Commissioner to release them. As far as I remember, he was there; I left them in his charge.

Q. Did you tell him as to what to do?

A. He knew it.

Q. Was he to make any investigation to find out whether they were guilty, and then if they were not guilty, were they to be released?

A. He was making investigation at the time.

Q. They had not committed any offences. Were they to be kept in custody until the real offenders were discovered? There must be some instructions. I can understand an accused being kept in custody pending investigation. But here they had not committed any offence. They were hostages. What were the instructions given to the *thanadar* as to what should be done with them?

A. As far as I remember they were kept there in order to exert pressure on the village to give information.

Q. Am I right in supposing that the criterion of selection of these six men was that they were the most respectable and influential people of the village? Am I right in supposing that whenever hostages were taken, they were taken to be the most respectable and influential men of the village?

A. If it was the criterion, I think the Indian officers would probably come under that. I did not take any Indian officer.

Q. That is your idea. Indian officers do not have that position at all here. My point is, in taking hostages, the underlying idea is in order to bring pressure to bear upon the village, you take the influential and respectable men of the village?

A. Men of some position, at any rate.

Q. Not *badmashes*?

A. Not *badmashes* in the ordinary sense.

Q. Here is a man who received 15 strokes. So far as he is concerned, I do not think you said, even if the will of the military officer was supreme, that he refused to do anything that he was asked to do. You saw him at the time you reached there. You saw him going to the roof of his hut or house, and after that he was flogged?

A. I did not see that myself. A man came to me as I was searching one house. The man said that a man on the roof of his house was shouting to other people to make away with their loot and I said "Bring him down." Then they brought him down and I punished him.

Q. The military officer did not ask you to flog him or take any steps?

A. No, he did not.

Q. It was your own work?

A. Yes.

Q. For what offence did you punish him?

A. I punished him under the authority I understood I had under Martial Law.

Q. Then you were quite aware that the military were there? Have you any information that anybody was seen leaving, or subsequently was anybody seen leaving that village? It must have been day time, because it was 6 A.M.?

A. That was another day.

Q. Then at what time was this?

A. I think we reached Mari Megha at about 10 or 11.

Q. In the day or night time?

A. Day time.

Q. So far as your recollection goes, you or any constables or the body of soldiers did not see any persons leaving the village with property?

A. Subsequently to our searching, you mean?

Q. When you entered the village, somebody came and told you that this man was standing on the top of the roof saying something to his neighbour. After that, did you, as a matter of fact, find that any number of persons left the village after your arrival with any loot or with any property?

A. I did not catch any one leaving the village.

Q. Did you see any persons?

A. If I had seen, I would have stopped them.

Q. But nobody was enabled to leave the village with the loot?



12 December 1916.]

Mr. S. M. JACOB—concluded—Mr. A. R. B. ARMSTRONG.

A. I saw no one.

Q. Who was that man who gave you that information ?

A. He was some villager there.

Q. What was the defence of that man ? Did he admit that he was about to go away ?

A. He did not attempt any defence, as far as I know. He was caught on the roof.

Q. My difficulty is this. It may not be true, but it is possible that when he saw a large body of police and soldiers and British officers coming to the village from the roof of the house, he would shout that soldiers, British officers, etc., were coming to the village ?

A. This was after we had been in the village for some-time. When we were searching houses in the village, he did this.

Q. He was also tried by you as a summary court-martial ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then why were the others not convicted then and there ? Probably there was no evidence ?

A. It was rather doubtful.

Q. There, of course, you could not punish them without identification of property ?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. Is there any statutory obligation on *lambardars* of the Punjab to give assistance to Government officers in matters connected with the administration ?

A. There is.

Q. Does the law provide any penalty for breach of the obligation ?

A. Yes, under the Penal Code.

Q. Apart altogether from Martial Law, a *lambardar* who refuses to assist a Government officer in making the investigation when called on to do so, would be punished under the ordinary law ?

A. Yes.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. You stated that you had received written instructions from Major Brade regarding persons refusing to give information ?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember whether persons refusing to assist could be whipped or punished in some other way ?

A. Yes.

Mr. A. R. B. ARMSTRONG, Executive Engineer, Wazirabad.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Armstrong, are you Executive Engineer, Wazirabad, in the Gujranwala District ?

A. Yes.

Q. In April last how many European residents were there in Wazirabad ?

A. About 8 or 10.

Q. Rev. Mr. Bailey and his wife and two children lived a little away from the station, Mr. and Mrs. Ward and children, about one mile south of the station. Then you mention some other people. Your wife and yourself were living about one and a half miles from the station and your Assistant Engineer was about three miles away from the station ?

A. Yes.

Q. Does the railway station at Wazirabad lie between the city and the railway lines ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you notice anything on the 12th or 13th as regards the demeanour of the inhabitants ?

A. I noticed that they were rather insolent in demeanour.

Q. In what way.

A. My house is very close to the road which leads from Wazirabad, where crowds of people go to attend *Baisakhi*; they were passing very close to my house; they frequently came up to the windows and when they were turned off by the servants, they went away, but their general demeanour was insolent.

Q. The news of what had occurred at Amritsar and Lahore reached Wazirabad on the 13th ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the Officer Commanding warn all Europeans residing outside Wazirabad to be prepared to rendezvous in the railway lines at short notice ?

A. Yes.

Q. At about 2 o'clock on the 15th, were you all called in to the railway lines ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you instructed to reside in the railway rest-house ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did all the people I have mentioned come into those lines ?

A. Yes, during that afternoon.

Q. Did you also receive instructions from the Deputy Commissioner at Gujrat to take steps to safeguard your European staff at Kathala ?

A. Yes.

Q. You also called Mr. Anderton to Wazirabad ?

A. Yes.

Q. And all the people arrived at about 4 p.m. ?

A. Yes.

Q. I think you were a company of about 24 people ?

A. Yes.

Q. And you lived in the four-roomed house ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the British troops camp close to the house ?

A. Yes, quite close.

Q. Did you see an aeroplane that afternoon ?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you see ?

A. It hovered overhead for a few minutes and then it went north and landed in some field about a mile away.

Q. That night did you post armed sentries round the house ?

A. Yes, as instructed.

Q. Why was that done ?

A. We were instructed by the Officer Commanding

Q. Were there no troops available ?

A. No.

Q. The night passed off quietly ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did more troops come in ?

A. Yes. More came and joined in the night.

Q. During the 15th, were attacks made from the city on the station and civilians ?

A. Yes.

Q. At the station ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were civilians other than railway officials confined to the railway lines ?

12 December 1919.]

Mr. A. R. B. ARMSTRONG—concluded—MUNSHI KIRPA SINGH.

A. Yes.

Q. What sort of attacks were made ?

A. I was told that stones were thrown from the street into the station and attempts were made to seduce the railway staff (locomotive) from working, and set fire to some of the locomotive oil tanks.

Q. Were these oil tanks actually set fire to ?

A. They were not set fire to.

Q. Were the telegraph wires cut ?

A. Yes.

Q. At several places ?

A. Yes.

Q. Was anything done to the signal ?

A. Yes. It was pulled down.

Q. What happened to Mr. Bailey's house ?

A. It was burnt.

Q. Is his house about two miles south of the railway station ?

A. Yes.

Q. Fortunately he and his family had removed from that house ?

A. They came at 3 in the afternoon.

Q. Was the house burnt with all its furniture, clothes and everything it contained ?

A. Practically everything in the house was burnt.

Q. Among other things was there very valuable manuscripts ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were attempts made to burn the railway bridges and permanent way ?

A. Yes.

Q. Where were they ?

A. One was close to Mr. Bailey's house. I heard about it at the time and saw it after some days. Another attempt was made close to Wazirabad, which I happened to see from the railway quarters, a mile away.

Q. Did you actually see the burning of Mr. Bailey's house ?

A. No ; I did not.

Q. Did you actually see the cutting of wires ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see sleepers burnt ?

A. Yes.

Q. Where were they ?

A. Just north of Wazirabad station.

Q. Did you see the mob at close quarters ?

A. Not at close quarters.

Q. Could you judge as to their mood ?

A. I could not, except their actual cutting of telegraph wires, and trying to burn.

Q. You civilians were in an apprehensive state ?

A. For some days previously.

Q. Could you get supplies in the bazar ?

A. No ; we could not get supplies for some days.

Q. Why was that ?

A. Our servants told us that shop-keepers refused to supply any Europeans with things.

Q. I think you did get some flour from one of your contractors ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he procure it from villages in the neighbourhood ?

A. Yes, from 4 or 5 miles away.

Q. Is that gentleman Rai Bahadur Ram Rattan ?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whether he was instrumental in preventing the mob from what they did ?

A. He told me that the Officer Commanding asked him to try and dissuade the mob from burning oil tanks and that he spoke to the mob at the time.

By Sir C. H. Seelwood—

Q. How many years have you been at Wazirabad ?

A. One year.

Q. You say that on the 13th news from Amritsar and Lahore arrived ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did news of the Jallianwala firing at Amritsar arrive on the 13th ?

A. That I cannot remember now.

Q. Was the news of the firing at Jallianwala Bagh by General Dyer received at Wazirabad ?

A. I cannot remember exactly what the news was definitely except that there had been trouble at Amritsar and that Europeans had been murdered.

Q. Was that all ?

A. That is all I can remember at the present time. Most of it was in the form of rumours.

Q. On the 13th and 14th you had no definite information as to what had happened at Amritsar ?

A. We had no newspapers.

Q. News may have arrived without newspapers ?

A. That is why I call it rumour. I cannot recollect at the present moment exactly how we got the news.

Q. How far is Wazirabad from Amritsar ?

A. About a hundred miles.

Q. Is there constant communication ?

A. In ordinary times we have constant communication.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. The railway station at Wazirabad lies between the town and the railway lines ?

A. Yes.

Q. For some time past two British officers and a dozen British soldiers were living at the railway station ?

A. They were living in the railway lines.

Q. Then you say that attacks were made on the 15th. Except that one act of cutting wires, you did not yourself see other things. You were told by somebody.

A. The only things I really saw were the cutting of telegraph wires and the attempts made to burn on the 15th.

Q. Where were you ?

A. I was in front of the railway rest-house, hardly a quarter of a mile from the scene of occurrence.

Q. Nothing else happened on the night of the 15th and 16th ?

A. Nothing at Wazirabad.

Q. As regards the house of Mr. Bailey also, you have no personal knowledge ?

A. Except that I saw the house afterwards.

Q. Do you know who the leader of the mob was ? The name of the man who is actually responsible for it ? Was he Seshan Lal ?

A. No.

Q. Did you hear subsequently that he was a lunatic ?

A. No.

Q. For how many days was there difficulty in obtaining provisions from the city ?

A. Actually our servants were refused food for about two days, and then supplies were got through Rai Bahadur Ram Ratan. That kept us going for about 10 days. So we did not require any thing from the city for 10 days.

Q. There was *hartal* on the 15th ?

A. Yes, I believe so.

Q. So far as information given to you by your servants goes, it was difficult to get provisions on the 15th and 16th ?

A. Yes, we did not stand in need.

MUNSHI KIRPA SINGH, Tahsildar, Wazirabad.

By the President—

Q. Are you Tahsildar at Wazirabad ?

A. I have been there as Tahsildar since the 5th of April.

Q. On the evening of the 14th April was a meeting convened in the Jumma Masjid ?

A. Yes, there was a meeting.

12 December 1919.]

MUNSHI KIRPA SINGH.

[Continued.]

Q. Was the question of holding of a *hartal* discussed there? Were you present at that meeting?

A. I was not present at that meeting.

Q. On the night of the 14th were the sub-inspectors of the city and all the *thanadars* summoned to a meeting?

A. As I had received orders from the Deputy Commissioner, I had summoned them at my own house in order to discuss the arrangements to be made in the event of a *hartal* the next day.

Q. Did that meeting take place?

A. Yes, on the night of the 14th.

Q. Did you resolve to call the leaders who had advised a *hartal*?

A. This formed part of the order and we resolved to do it.

Q. At this time was a large crowd collected outside the *tahsil*?

A. When I collected the leaders of the city accordingly, there was a great crowd of people outside the *tahsil* at about 9-30 P.M.

Q. Who were the leaders that were brought in consequence of this summons?

A. Sultan Ahmad, *Zaidar*, Qazi Baki Shah, Baili Ram, coal merchant, Diwan Sikandar Lal.

Q. Were you present at this meeting yourself?

A. I had convened it?

Q. And you heard the discussion that took place?

A. Yes.

Q. What attitude was taken up by the leaders as to the holding of a *hartal*?

A. Pritham Das, President of the Arya Samaj Society, said that there should be *hartal* and he was not responsible for the peace and order.

Q. Were there any of them who thought it was advisable not to hold the *hartal*?

A. Diwan Sikandar Lal said that this was inadvisable.

Q. At this time was what happened at Amritsar known there?

A. I cannot say anything about Amritsar, but we had received information about the incidents at Gujranwala at the time when I received orders from the Deputy Commissioner on the evening of the 14th.

Q. Personally were you not aware that on the 13th there had been very serious occurrences in Amritsar?

A. No.

Q. Did you not even know what had occurred at Amritsar on the 10th April?

A. I had a general idea of the general incidents at every place but had no special information about Amritsar.

Q. Was anything said that if the mob was out of hand, they might have to be fired upon, at this meeting?

A. Yes, Sir. It was mentioned.

Q. At 9 o'clock on the next morning, i.e., the 15th, were all the gentlemen summoned to meet you?

A. They were summoned at 7-30 but the meeting dispersed.

Q. Was that meeting you were referring to in the night or in the morning?

A. In the morning.

Q. At 9 o'clock the gentlemen who had been summoned to meet you were allowed to depart?

A. Yes.

Q. And the mob you said had collected outside dispersed?

A. Yes.

Q. What did the mob then proceed to do?

A. I had already heard shouts and cries of the crowd previous to that. But when they were near the gates of the *tahsil*, I apprehended that there was some danger for the treasury, in which I had a good lot of money. As the majority of people who were with me had arms, people thought it was advisable for them to disperse, and went away.

Q. Was it about this time that the crowd burnt down the bungalow of the Rev. Mr. Bailey?

A. I did not move away from the treasury, but when these things had subsided, I heard the news about Mr. Bailey's house.

Q. You heard that at 1 o'clock?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you also hear of the destruction of telegraph wires and railway signals?

A. Yes, at about 2 o'clock.

Q. Was there a meeting in the afternoon at about 2 o'clock?

A. A meeting had been arranged to meet at the *mandi*, but because there were many people, they proceeded towards the post office. At about 3 or 4 o'clock, I received information that people had gathered near the post office and they were ready making preparations to attack the post office. I went there with two inspectors of police and a *zaidar*. I saw a crowd of about 500 or 600 men.

Q. Had you your police force in addition with you?

A. There was a military picket there.

Q. Then were arrangements made to guard certain public buildings?

A. I have already stated that on the evening of the 14th, I had asked all the sub-inspectors to appoint guards to protect Government buildings.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. At Wazirabad are there any officers superior to you or you are the person in charge of Wazirabad?

A. Officially I am the superior person.

Q. Who is your immediate superior?

A. The Deputy Commissioner.

Q. Is he at Wazirabad?

A. At Gujranwala.

Q. Wazirabad is under the jurisdiction of Gujranwala?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the population of Wazirabad?

A. About 15,000.

Q. When did the *hartal* first start in Wazirabad?

A. Some people had come from Gujranwala on the 12th; they, with certain men of Wazirabad, preached this *hartal* in the bazars and streets of Wazirabad. First of all they decided upon having the *hartal* on the 13th. The sweetmeat sellers had a lot of sweets, therefore they wanted them to postpone the *hartal* to the 15th.

Q. Actually the *hartal* took place on the 14th?

A. On the 15th.

Q. Why did it not take place on the 14th?

A. On the 13th and 14th, there was the *Baisakhi* fair.

Q. In your statement, you say that the leaders of the movement postponed it to the 14th?

A. It was postponed to the 14th, but the sweetmeat sellers insisted for a further postponement and it was again postponed to the 15th.

Q. Did it take place actually on the 15th?

A. Yes.

Q. How long did it last?

A. For one full day.

Q. Only on the 15th?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 16th, there was no *hartal*?

A. No.

Q. There was no *hartal* afterwards at all?

A. No.

Q. When you called the leaders of the town, they barring Pritham Das were not in favour of the *hartal*? Is that so?

A. They were silent. Pritham Das was the person who said that there should be *hartal* and the others were silent; Sikandar Lal was against the *hartal*.

Q. The others were silent?

A. Yes.

Q. In your statement, you say that in this meeting it was advocated that since the leaders of the town had not participated in the movement, the *hartal* should be ended the next day. Is that so?

A. The people whom I had called did not participate in it.

Q. Those were the people whom you call the leaders?

A. Barring Pritham Das and Jamiat Singh Bagga, nobody else out of those whom I had summoned participated in the *hartal* movement.

12 December 1919.]

MUNSHI KIRPA SINGH.

[Continued.]

Q. The statement that you make is that the leaders of the town had not participated in the movement?

A. I do not know whether they participated in the previous meetings or not.

Q. I am not asking about meetings in which they did not participate. I am asking you about the *hartal* movement.

A. Only these two participated, others didn't.

Q. Will you refer me to the paragraph in which you say that?

A. I have not stated it like that.

Q. The leaders did not participate?

A. That is correct.

Q. And it was because the leaders did not participate that the *hartal* ended the next day?

A. That is what I have been told.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Was Jamiat Singh Bagga among those who were present at your place at 9 A.M. on the morning of the 15th?

A. Certainly.

Q. You first of all made an enquiry as to who had attended the first meeting in the mosque?

A. Yes, I enquired and nobody admitted this fact.

Q. Did Jamiat Singh inform you that as it was a mosque he considered it to be an ordinary meeting and was present there?

A. Exactly.

Q. Jamiat Singh was not one of those who, like Pitan Singh, made any demonstration and said there must be a *hartal*?

A. No, Sir.

Q. You have described how the mob dispersed and with which leaders, and according to that statement Jamiat Singh did not head any mob or guide any party? In your statement you say:—

“At 9 o'clock A.M. all the gentlemen who were summoned to meet me were allowed to depart, and the mob that had collected outside Lohari Gate was also dispersed. A part of the mob went towards the Railway Station and a part towards Nizamabad by the Grand Trunk road. The mob which went towards Nizamabad included Muhammad Hussain, *alias* Bakra, son of Hafiz Abdul Manan, B sheshar Nath, Abdul Rashid and others. They took with them men from Nizamabad, Viroke, etc., and looted and set fire to the bungalow of Rev. Bailey. The mob that went towards the railway station was accompanied by Master Muhammad Jan, Jowanda Mal, Jagan Nath Saluga and others.” You have not mentioned the name of this man Jamiat Singh Bagga as leading any part of the mob?

A. No, Sir.

Q. And you have mentioned others?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it not said by Pritham Das that as the *hartal* had already been proclaimed and arranged it could not be prevented from taking place on the 15th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And Pritham Das also said that there was no intention of taking any steps?

A. He said that, but in addition to that he also said that in the event of any disturbance he was not to be responsible.

Q. So far as your statement is concerned, this clause does not find a place, that he said he would not be responsible?

A. No, it is not there. I distinctly remember it, but I have not written it in my statement.

Q. You have named Bisheshar Nath?

A. I did not know him then, but I know him since.

Q. Do you know that he is in the lunatic asylum?

A. I have been told by respectable people of Wazirabad and also I have come to know from a medical certificate that he was a lunatic in 1917.

Q. Do you know whether he is now in the lunatic asylum or in jail?

A. It is said that he is in the lunatic asylum, or he may be in jail, but he is a lunatic.

Q. Do you know that the Rev. Bailey's house was burned down by the people of Nizamabad and Viroke?

A. I did not see it with my own eyes, but the Nizamabad people accused the Viroke people and the Viroke people accused the Nizamabad people.

Q. Do you know that, so far as the burning of the Rev. Bailey's house is concerned, the people, both of Nizamabad and Viroke, have been convicted?

A. I do not think Viroke people have been convicted, but Nizamabad and Wazirabad people participated in it.

Q. And this Bisheshar Nath is an inhabitant of Wazirabad?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were your courts open on the 15th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And they remained open always and were never closed?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And when you went with your two sub-inspectors and one *zaidar* you were able to disperse that mob of 500 about whom you were informed that they intended to attack the post office?

A. I succeeded in dispersing them by policy.

Q. The military picket that you referred to were the soldiers that were living in the railway lines?

A. They were not those who were living in the railway lines.

Q. When did they come?

A. They reached probably on the 14th.

Q. These were already there from the 14th?

A. I saw them on the 15th.

Q. At what place?

A. By the post office.

Q. And they were there without your being informed as to what place they came from?

A. I had no information to that effect.

Q. After the 16th, did you remain all along at Wazirabad?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. During those days was every family taxed a rupee four or five weeks after the declaration of Martial Law?

A. The Malik Sahib was in charge of the place and he had ordered this, and this money was collected.

Q. One rupee per family or per house?

A. Per house.

Q. And how was this money spent?

A. The soldiers were supplied with things which they required because they had not got ready money with them.

Q. In which week after the 16th of April and on how many days was this money collected?

A. I do not remember the date.

Q. Was it in the month of April or May?

A. It was in April. And it was collected in a day or two. No, it took 10 or 12 days.

Q. What was the total amount?

A. Rs. 3,500 about.

Q. Through which agency was this collected?

A. Members of the municipal committee.

Q. During these days was a Martial Law order passed that the boys reading in every school should come at about 9 and 12 o'clock to salute the Flag?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was the Flag?

A. Just near a bungalow which is situated in the city.

Q. How far from the railway station?

A. A sixth part of a mile from the station.

Q. Were you informed that two Muhammadans were shot at Nizamabad and did you make any investigations and make a report?

A. I heard the police had taken some measures to investigate the matter.

12 December 1919.]      MUNSHI KIRPA SINGH—concluded—MUNSHI GHULAM MOHI-UD-DIN.

Q. You were there in charge, what was the report you heard?

A. Malik Sahib Khan was in charge.

Q. You were there as a subordinate officer, what did you hear?

A. There was one person supposed to be breaking the railway line and there I heard he was shot.

Q. Do you know the result of that enquiry?

A. I do not know.

Q. Do you know Diwan Chand of your place, of Wazirabad, a contractor?

A. I know a wine contractor named Diwan Chand.

Q. Was he fined Rs. 100 for not leaving his cart when an officer passed in a motor?

A. He was fined, but I do not know for what offence.

Q. There was no disturbance in Wazirabad after the 15th?

A. The people did remain quiet after Martial Law was introduced.

Q. And the last thing that was done by the crowd was between 1 and 2 P.M. on the 15th, after that nothing happened?

A. The last incident was wire-cutting.

Q. I am talking about Wazirabad city, not about the line.

A. I received intimation in the evening that they were making preparations to burn the court of the Munsiff, but I arranged to have pickets there and so it was saved.

Q. But did you see any crowds there?

A. I was informed.

Q. There is Municipal and Government property inside the city at Wazirabad?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was any attacked?

A. No, Sir, none. They had come near the *tahsil* with a view to damaging it as already described.

Q. You have mentioned in your statement what happened before 9 A.M. on the 15th. Have you in your statement described that there was any intention on the part of the crowd to attack the *tahsil*?

A. I have not mentioned it in the statement.

Q. Have you any connection with the municipality of Wazirabad?

A. I am the President of the municipality.

Q. Has any resolution been passed about the Rev. Bailey's house by the municipality?

A. Not particularly about Rev. Bailey's house.

Q. I may be wrong, but I want to know whether any resolution has been passed by the municipal committee of Wazirabad saying that the Rev. Bailey's house has been burned by the Nizamabad and Viroke people?

A. One member proposed that as the damage done to the Rev. Bailey's house was done by the people of Nizamabad they should not stand the punitive police.

Q. Has this resolution been passed by the municipality?

A. I did not wish it to be passed, but because the other members wished it it has been passed.

Q. But it has been passed?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Is your protest down there in the proceedings that it should not be passed?

A. I shall enter my protest when it is submitted to the Government but I have entered there that such and such a man has proposed this and it has been passed.

Q. Did you record your protest?

A. No, Sir.

Q. The Rev. Bailey's house is not within the limits of Wazirabad, is it not so?

A. It is not within the limits of Wazirabad.

Q. And how far away is it from Wazirabad?

A. About two miles.

Q. Do you know Diwan Badri Das of your place?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was his house searched and broken up?

A. It was not done in my presence.

Q. Do you know that Captain Denning was your Martial Law Officer?

A. Yes, towards the end.

Q. And within your knowledge did he or did he not complain to Colonel O'Brien that in some cases policemen were fabricating false evidence?

A. Not in my presence.

Q. Are you aware of it?

A. I did not know of it.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. You mentioned just now that some particular member of your municipality proposed something which was eventually carried. How long ago was that?

A. It was on the 6th of December.

MUNSHI GHULAM MOHI-UD-DIN, Retired Military Sub-Assistant Surgeon, Wazirabad.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Mohi-ud-Din, I think you are a retired Military Sub-Assistant Surgeon?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you have expressed a desire to make a statement before us?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What do you know about what occurred on the 14th and 15th of your own knowledge? You might explain.

A. On the 14th at about sunset outside the Lahori Gate I was sitting in the *mandi* of Munshi Allajoya about 300 yards away from the Lahori Gate. I performed my evening prayer there along with Master Muhammad Hussain Jo'ly and when I had done so I heard a loud shout by boys who were crying "Rowlatt Bill, Rowlatt Bill." On hearing this I myself and Master Muhammad Hussain Jo'ly left the place lest these people should come there and we might be taken as partners of the rioters.

Q. Was there any riot that night?

A. No, Sir; I heard only this.

Q. Did you hear it rumoured that night that there was going to be a riot?

A. No, no riot but a *hartal*.

Q. I wanted to know what you meant by saying you left there in order that you might not be implicated in the riot?

A. The disturbance, the *hartal*.

Q. Is a *hartal* necessarily a disturbance? Does a *hartal* necessarily lead to a disturbance taking place in your opinion? Do you think it is very likely that if you have a *hartal* you will have a riot?

A. A *hartal* is not a riot. There is a great difference between a *hartal* and a riot.

Q. Anyhow you told us you went away and you saw nothing else occur on the 14th?

A. No, Sir. I came to my house by the Trunk Road along with Muhammad Hussain and there were crowds of people walking about in the bazar as there was the *Paisahi's mela* on the 13th.

Q. On the 15th did you see anything of what occurred? That was the day on which the house of Mr. Bailey was burned down?

A. I heard that Mr. Bailey's house had been burned at about 2 o'clock. I did not see it myself.

Q. Did you see anything occurring in the station that day?

A. No, Sir, I was afraid.

Q. What were you afraid of?

12 December 1919.]

MUNSHI GHULAM MOHI-UD-DIN.

[Continued.]

A. I was afraid that as there was great disturbance in Wazirabad city perhaps they would attribute these things to me.

Q. You were afraid that you would get implicated in the riot?

A. Yes.

Q. You were then very wise in staying away?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. The only point I think that you say anything about so far as we are concerned is, I understand, that you think one gentleman who was convicted was wrongly convicted? So far as we are concerned we are not a court reviewing particular sentences so I do not think I need trouble you about all you can say in favour of that gentleman. But you have some complaint to make in connection with Martial Law?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What is your complaint?

A. One rupee *tawan* was levied.

Q. When was that?

A. In the month of April from nearly everybody in Wazirabad city.

Q. What is your complaint in connection with that levy which was made? It is a complaint that you had to pay one rupee?

A. Yes, Sir. I myself had to pay one rupee and many people of my place were compelled to contribute tea and butter and that sort of thing. Ali Ahmad was the leading man and he used to come and collect milk, mutton, beds and things like that.

Q. What had you to pay the one rupee for?

A. They said "we are collecting for the comforts for the military officers and soldiers."

Q. Was it levied as a tax or were you asked to subscribe that amount?

A. Those who came to collect the things said they were collecting it for the military.

Q. Who collected it from you?

A. For my ward Sheikh Inaitulla who is the member of my ward used to come along with Ali Ahmad.

Q. What right had they to collect from you?

A. They said they had received orders from the officers to collect that. I told them that I had been a military man of 20 years' service in the military department, and I had never heard of it, but I was afraid. I knew the principles of Martial Law and that a slight disobedience would entangle one; therefore I was compelled to pay it.

Q. Have you any other complaint you would like to bring before us?

A. Yes, I had to pay Rs. 44.

Q. What was that for?

A. *Tawan*.

Q. What was the ground on which you were asked to pay that?

A. For the damage done to Mr. Bailey's house and for wire-cutting.

Q. That would be levied under municipal law, would it not?

A. I do not know why it was done and who did it, but I had to pay that.

Q. Does that exhaust your complaints so far as you are concerned personally?

A. Yes. I am a military man with a very small pension and have had to pay so much. I did not take any part in the disturbances and still I have had to pay.

Q. You think the expense connected with these disturbances weighed pretty heavily upon you?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Have you any other point?

A. On the 13th I heard a meeting was held in the house of Shamas Din on the 11th or 12th of April and some men were sent for.

Q. You have not any knowledge yourself about this?

A. No, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Can you tell me the date on which you were compelled to pay this one rupee?

A. No, Sir, not exactly.

By Sir C. H. Selvad—

Q. Who is Chaudhri Ali Ahmad who levied the one rupee?

A. He is sub-registrar and at the same time municipal commissioner and landholder.

Q. What authority was he exercising in Wazirabad at the time when he levied the one rupee?

A. My idea is that he was solely in charge of Martial Law.

Q. Was he Martial Law Administrator in Wazirabad?

A. No, certainly not.

Q. How did he come to administer Martial Law?

A. That is my complaint; he behaved in such a way as if he was Martial Law Administrator.

Q. That is what you object to?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you question him when he came to recover the one rupee as to what authority he had for that purpose?

A. If I had made any objection I would have been handcuffed in a moment.

Q. But you knew he was not Martial Law Administrator?

A. In reality I knew he was not, but he was exercising the power by force.

Q. Who allowed him to exercise that power?

A. He was doing that, I don't know who allowed him, or whether he was allowed by any one.

Q. You are an experienced Army man; true, you paid the one rupee, but did you afterwards make enquiries about it?

A. Martial Law was in operation and I was afraid.

Q. You were afraid even of making enquiries?

A. Yes.

Q. Martial Law was removed somewhere in June, was it not?

A. Yes, on the 9th June.

Q. After that did you make enquiries as to the authority under which this was levied?

A. Yes, and I came to know that it was under the Deputy Commissioner's orders.

Q. You satisfied yourself that it was under the orders of the Deputy Commissioner?

A. Yes, then I was satisfied.

Q. Did you see the order?

A. No.

Q. Did you obtain a copy of it?

A. Certainly not.

Q. How did you satisfy yourself it was under the Deputy Commissioner's orders?

A. Every one was saying so.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You have given us a very long story about Master Muhammad Hussain and what he did, but unfortunately the Committee cannot ask you any questions about that because we have no right to judge his case. There is only one sentence I wish to ask you about. You say the public was subjected to indescribable suffering, misery and disgrace. What was the disgrace you mention here? I do not want your hearsay knowledge, have you any personal knowledge of it?

A. I saw the school boys standing in the sun. One day six or seven boys were exhausted and one of them was brought to me for treatment quite senseless and I applied ice and did what I could and after three or four hours he came to his senses.

Q. How did he get sunstroke? Why was he suffering?

A. He was standing in the sun along with other boys. The boys were sent for to make *salaam*.

Q. To make *salaam* to what?

12 December 1919.]

MUNSHI GHULAM MOHI-UD-DIN.

[Concluded.]

- A. There was some officer there.  
Q. How did that boy get sunstroke?  
A. While standing in the sun.  
Q. Who ordered him to stand in the sun?  
A. All the boys were ordered to stand.  
Q. By whom?  
A. I do not know.  
Q. Where did they use to stand?  
A. In the dāk bungalow.  
Q. At the time they were made to stand in the dāk bungalow were there any officers there?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Where was the headquarters of the military authorities there in those days?  
A. In the dāk bungalow close to the railway station.
- Q. Do you know of any other suffering or disgrace or misery?  
A. I do not remember.  
Q. You said *ghi* and butter were taken, how were they taken?  
A. Do you mean in what was it taken?  
Q. Supposing half a pie worth of *ghi* was taken, would you complain?  
A. It was collected from nearly all the streets, wherever they could find it.  
Q. Why should it not be collected? What is your complaint?  
A. Without price.  
Q. You say it was collected without price, and for whom?  
A. It was said for the military comforts.

17 December 1919.]

Major C. W. J. SMITH.

At Lahore, Wednesday, the 17th December 1919.

## PRESENT.

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B.,  
K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., *Secretary*.

Major C. W. J. SMITH, 2-54th Sikhs, F. F. Administrator, Martial Law, in Gujranwala, Gujrat and Lyallpur.

*By the President—*

Q. I think you were Administrator of Martial Law in Gujranwala and Gujrat from the 17th April to the 18th May 1919?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. At the commencement of the riots you were serving with the Area Unit for Gujranwala?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 17th April you proceeded to Wazirabad under the orders of the General Officer Commanding, 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division, and you there entered on your duties as Administrator of Martial Law?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you then under the late Col. Burbury? Were you present when Martial Law was proclaimed at Gujranwala?

A. Yes. On the afternoon of the 18th. I left Rawalpindi on the 17th and arrived at Wazirabad on the 18th.

Q. And a similar proclamation was made in Wazirabad on the 19th?

A. Yes.

Q. Were copies of the general proclamation of Martial Law circulated throughout the district?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you send them by officers and also through the civil authorities?

A. Yes, they were sent by me to all officers in charge of the detachments. I also handed over copies to the civil authorities and I believe the civil authorities applied for copies direct from the Punjab Press.

Q. Did you also circulate a proclamation as to the protection of railways?

A. Yes.

Q. What was that?

A. It was the carrying out of the orders which had already been instituted by the Deputy Commissioner at Gujranwala and Gujrat and also Lyallpur. Regarding the protection of railways by village patrols, a warning was issued in that proclamation against any damage being done under threat of punishment.

Q. I think you busied yourself, then, with the machinery for the administration of Martial Law?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were Area Officers appointed, and certain other special officers?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You mentioned two officers—Captain Cole and Captain Wheatly—in addition to the Area Officers?

A. Yes, there was also a third whom I remember—Captain Ewing. I sent him in charge of the Movable Column.

Q. Did you issue Martial Law instructions and furnish every British officer in the disturbed area with a copy?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they lay down the powers of officers?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What do you mean by "lay down powers of officers"?

A. Well, it was repeating the powers laid down by Colonel Burbury in his proclamation and arming all officers, i.e., those officers concerned only, with power to inflict punishments, but the power was not given to any junior officer.

Q. Were further instructions issued by you from time to time?

A. Yes, Sir, in a similar manner: in fact under Martial Law Instructions.

Q. Gujrat I think came under Martial Law on the 23rd April?

A. I see the Martial Law order was dated 24th.

Q. And then Lyallpur came under Martial Law a little later?

A. On the 25th—the date of the order.

Q. As these districts came under Martial Law, did you appoint your officers and issue such proclamations as you had already issued in the Gujranwala district?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were they the same, or with some modifications suitable to the districts?

A. There were slight alterations in certain cases. All were not applied, some were applied according to local circumstances.

Q. What means did you take to ensure that the Martial Law instructions and orders would be generally known to the public?

A. As Administrator of Martial Law I sent out instructions to Martial Law Area Officers to have the orders posted in suitable places in the towns where they were acting as Area Officers. Their headquarters as Area Officers was Wazirabad. I had them posted up I think in central places, including the railway station, *tahsil*, Indian Troops Camp, and certain places in the city, and I think on the Arya Samaj building.

Q. In the course of your administration of Martial Law, did you from time to time, consult the civil powers?

A. Yes. There were no European civil officers at Wazirabad which was the headquarters of the military district where I had to remain at headquarters. But I have at times visited Colonel O'Brien and the Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala district. I went on the outskirts of Gujrat and once to Lyallpur during my tenure of office and consulted the civil authorities there.

Q. Was any action taken by you taken exception to?

A. Not that I know of. I had no complaints or even suggestions from the civil authorities that my actions were giving trouble in any way.

Q. I see you indicate that you were handicapped by an insufficient office establishment?

A. Yes, Sir. The demobilisation of British troops was in full swing and it was exceedingly hard to manage. I asked the Divisional Officer for help from his establishment. For example, I could not get a clerk at all and finally I got one instead of the two I hoped to get.



17 December 1919.]

Major C. W. J. SMITH.

[Continued.]

Q. For this reason you had to remain pretty well all the while at headquarters?

A. Yes; Martial Law was a new institution and innumerable questions were being asked by officers of standing and others had to be settled immediately.

Q. I think you stopped your work on the 8th of May?

A. I now think I remember the date to be the 7th of May.

Q. Were your proclamations similar to the proclamations administered in Lahore under the Martial Law. Do you know?

A. Some of them were similar. The general proclamation was almost word for word. There were slight modifications. But there were a lot of local conditions which of course for geographical reasons or otherwise were not the same.

Q. I do not remember any special order issued by you that has never been under consideration before us in connection with some other area. During your administration were there any disturbances in your district?

A. None.

Q. To what do you attribute that?

A. I think it was due to the fact that Martial Law had been proclaimed. I think the troops overawed the people in the towns.

Q. What attitude did the people in Wazirabad and Gujranwala adopt?

A. When I first arrived at Wazirabad there was a sullen atmosphere amongst the populace, but this improved. In Gujranwala from start to finish I thought there was a sullen atmosphere, that is from what I saw of Gujranwala; I was not there very much. But during my opportunities of skirting the towns it struck me that there was a sullen atmosphere.

Q. Did it improve much?

A. No, I think not.

Q. Were not complaints made to you against the hardships of Martial Law?

A. No, except general complaints from the travelling classes—in towns and in zamindaris as regards railway travelling.

Q. I suppose restrictions on travelling would cause inconvenience to a number of people in the district?

A. Undoubtedly.

Q. Was that felt as a hardship?

A. I should think so.

Q. So that restrictions were relaxed as soon as it was possible in your opinion to do so?

A. I cannot say what the conditions were as regards the railway authorities who were chiefly responsible for the stopping of traffic of 3rd class booking. It was relaxed there shortly before I left.

Q. Now, was any person in your administration of Martial Law dealt with for any offence committed prior to the establishment of Martial Law?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Were the offences dealt with in your area of a serious character or not?

A. In the Wazirabad area I dealt with only one serious case.

Q. That was in connection with setting fire to Delhi House?

A. No, it was before Martial Law was proclaimed. It was in connection with the tampering with telegraphic instruments in the telegraph office.

Q. So far as Gujranwala and Gujrat districts were concerned, were the cases there trivial?

A. As far as I remember they were trivial, with the exception of one at Malakwal.

Q. In that case were heavy sentences pronounced?

A. Yes; there was a term, I think, of a year's imprisonment.

Q. I think you dealt with one case in which you pronounced a sentence of two years' imprisonment?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that the only case where you pronounced any sentence at all?

A. I think that is the only case in which I gave imprisonment at all.

Q. What was the offence there?

A. It was tampering with telegraphic instruments in the telegraph office at Wazirabad, thereby disconnecting the Sialkot-Malakwal-Gujrat line.

Q. As regards the majority of the cases, they were dealt with by the Area Officers and not by you?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Major Smith, I see from your proclamation that as early as April 21st Form V—Martial Law was used. I rather gather from your proclamation, which seems to be very carefully worded, that the intention was that Form V was to be used for every trial, whether it resulted in conviction or not, and under your orders I understand that you saw no reason to suppose that was not carried out correctly. Had you?

A. I have no reason to believe to the contrary.

Q. So that you should have a record exactly of everything that was done, whether by Area Officers or persons nominated by you?

A. If he conformed to that order, yes.

Q. Have you any reason to suppose that in your jurisdiction punishments other than those laid down in the Proclamation were ever instituted or applied?

A. I believe none that I know of.

Q. As regards the restrictions upon railway travelling, I think you said that that was largely required by the civil authorities. Is that so?

A. No, the only thing the civil authorities had to do with the railway was the guarding of it before Martial Law was proclaimed. I dealt with restrictions on railway travelling. As far as the third class was concerned, the restrictions were instituted by the railway authorities.

Q. As a matter of fact the difficulty of providing the necessary accommodation was due to the interruption of communications?

A. I believe so.

Q. Then from the military point of view, was it a part of your duty to prevent the spread of what I might call disaffection or agitation into the surrounding districts?

A. Yes, certainly.

Q. And I think with that object you were rather careful in giving passes to people and to the educated classes who may be disposed to agitate or carry agitation any further?

A. Yes.

Q. I think some of my colleagues will be interested to see that pleaders were to be regarded as suspicious characters unless they can prove that they were travelling to attend cases in court the dates of which were actually fixed. Please see Martial Law Instruction No. 6.\* What was the object?

A. The object of that: it was believed that some pleaders were interested in the spread of disaffection and the system of issuing passes enabled the authorities to know who were travelling and therefore made it easier to watch the movements of a few who did travel.

Q. Was a Proclamation in force throughout the area proscribing meetings?

A. It was proscribed in the general Proclamation by General Burbury in his original proclamation prohibiting a meeting of more than 10 persons.

Q. A large part of your time, especially at first I understand, was occupied in giving advice on problems that officers who were actually in command of particular spots had to deal with?

A. Yes.

Q. Now did you lay down regulations as regards investigation of cases before they were brought to trial?

A. No, it would be the duty of all officers to investigate any cases.

Q. May I take this one case regarding the telegraph man who put out of action these two lines. Before that man was tried was his case investigated in the usual course by the police or the Criminal Investigation Department?

A. The case was investigated by the Assistant Provost Marshal, Wazirabad.

17 December 1919.]

Major C. W. J. SMITH.

[Continued.]

Q. Before being brought up, it was not dealt with by the police at all?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that exceptional procedure or was that the usual course?

A. That was the usual course. The Assistant Provost Marshal used to bring all the cases to me as Area Officer, and that was the only serious one that was brought up at all.

Q. Then in addition to your work as Administrator of Martial Law, you supervised other areas?

A. Yes, by general instructions, and they submitted Form V to my office.

Q. Did you have information at the time as to how long persons were kept under arrest before being put up for trial?

A. In the case of my own area normally a man was never more than two or three hours under arrest. I used to hold my court every afternoon, I think at about 4 o'clock and that finished the cases for that day. The only case that lasted longer was one in which a telegraph operator was brought up and that was under investigation for not more than three days—I think.

Q. Did you find that the immediate disposal of cases enabled you to get evidence for the prosecution and also any evidence that was wanted for the defence?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Have you any reason to suppose that people were prejudiced by being tried on the spot as they might have had a better defence if they had had further time for consultation?

A. I do not think so. With the one exception of the telegraph man, the cases brought up by me were so trivial that they required no time for consideration.

Q. Was this telegraph man defended?

A. No, he had no one to defend him.

Q. Did he ask to be defended?

A. I cannot remember, but presumably one would always ask or be asked to be defended. I cannot remember now.

Q. I presume he was asked?

A. No, apparently he had no pleader.

Q. Did he ask for an adjournment and did he get one?

A. No.

Q. I see there is a provision in Martial Law Instruction No. 3,\* paragraph 5 that in case it should be deemed impracticable in the interests of Martial Law to bring offenders before an Area Officer, they may be disposed of by any of the officers mentioned in paragraph 18 of the Proclamation, but officers other than Field Officers, Area Officers, or officers specially nominated were to use their powers only after reference to Field Officers or officers so nominated. Was that section brought into force, do you remember?

A. No, that order was issued by General Campbell.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Major Smith, did you take charge on the 19th?

A. On the 18th.

Q. And Martial Law was proclaimed on the 19th?

A. On the afternoon of the 18th at Gujranwala: it was proclaimed by the Punjab Government in the Gazette, the date of which I don't know.

Q. On the 18th?

A. I don't know the date of the Gazette.

Q. In all the areas you were put in charge?

A. Only in the Gujranwala area.

Q. In that area there were no disturbances after the 19th at all?

A. No.

Q. I don't quite follow, Major Smith, what you say in your statement as regards crimes and punishments. You say that no person was dealt with under Martial Law for any offence prior to the establishment of Martial Law. All offences in connection with the actual disturbances had been committed before the 19th. I don't know what you mean by this, 'that for offences committed prior to the establishment of Martial Law no person was dealt with under Martial Law'?

A. I mean by that, that officers like myself whose magisterial powers came into existence by the application of Martial Law tried no cases of disturbances which had occurred prior to the proclamation of Martial Law.

Q. Then who took cognizance of those cases?

A. The civil powers.

Q. You don't mean to say the ordinary courts took cognizance of those offences?

A. They were taken cognizance of by the special tribunals.

Q. Those offences were taken cognizance of either by the special commissions appointed or by the special courts created under Martial Law?

A. The courts were.

Q. All those tribunals were created under Martial Law?

A. Yes.

Q. It would not be accurate, therefore, to say that all offences prior to the establishment of Martial Law were not dealt with under Martial Law. Obviously it would be inaccurate. They were not dealt with by the Area Officers?

A. Not by Area Officers. That is my meaning.

Q. Then was Mr. Bosworth-Smith an Area Officer or what was he?

A. Mr. Bosworth-Smith was appointed an Area Officer by the Lieutenant-Governor, I think, by an order.

Q. Was he an Area Officer or not?

A. He was an Area Officer at Chuharkana and at some other places.

Q. Mr. Bosworth-Smith says in his statement that he dealt with a large number of cases of people who were arrested for offences before the 19th, and he was an Area Officer at that place?

A. None of the cases dealt with by Mr. Bosworth-Smith reached my office. I don't know what happened after I left.

Q. I am speaking of the period when you were there. Mr. Bosworth-Smith's statement comes to this, if I understand it correctly, that he arrested a large number of people for offences committed before the 19th, and they were tried during the period when Martial Law was in force. Is that correct?

A. I don't know. None of the cases under Form V reached the Martial Law Office before I left. I know of no cases tried by Mr. Bosworth-Smith.

Q. You mean to say no returns came to you. They may have been tried but you don't know?

A. No.

Q. If they were so tried it would not be accurate again to say that offences committed before the 19th were not tried under Martial Law by any Area Officer?

A. That statement of mine is made from the knowledge I had judging by the Form V submitted to my office.

Q. After you took over Martial Law Administration, did the civil authorities carry on as before under your general supervision?

A. Yes.

Q. And they made arrests of people that were reported as suspicious?

A. I believe so. I did not go into the question closely.

Q. I mean all that was left to them. The civil authorities and the police acted in the ordinary course as before?

A. Yes, so far as I know.

Q. Now with regard to the various orders that were issued under Martial Law, I see one was issued for controlling prices. Under what authority did you issue that?

A. Under the authority of Martial Law.

Q. Why was the controlling of prices necessary for the administration of Martial Law?

A. Because prices rose in the bazar just after the disturbances and it was creating considerable discontent amongst a very large body of men employed in the railway workshops, and it was considered necessary in the interests of good order that some measures should be taken to stop the rise of prices.

Q. You thought it was necessary to do so to maintain law and order?

A. Yes.

17 December 1919.]

Major C. W. J. SMITH.

[Continued.]

Q. Did you fix the prices of all commodities or how did you act?

A. I acted through the tahsildar and several members of the Municipal Committee who came before me. We discussed this matter and finally decided that until the end of April—I forget the date now but I think it was the 13th April—prices were to be fixed. After that the civil authorities fixed the limit weekly or fortnightly, I don't remember which.

Q. The prices were fixed in several places in your area or only at one place?

A. The prices were fixed in Wazirabad by me only. At the request of the Officer Commanding the detachment at Kanki a Martial Law Order was also issued. I think up to the 7th May those were the only two.

Q. Those restrictions on prices remained in force all throughout your administration?

A. I don't know, but they remained in force up to the end of my administration, the 7th of May.

Q. Now with regard to your Martial Law Instruction No. 6.\* This is how you put it with regard to pleaders: "Pleaders should be regarded as suspicious characters unless they can prove that they are travelling to attend a case in court the date of which is actually fixed." Why did you regard the pleaders as a class as suspicious characters?

A. Because I believed that some pleaders had been instrumental in spreading disaffection.

Q. Because you were told that some pleaders were instrumental in spreading disaffection. Who told you this?

A. I cannot say who told me.

Q. Mr. Bosworth-Smith or Colonel O'Brien?

A. I think it was the general impression I got at the time, and from reading what had happened elsewhere I considered it desirable.

Q. Did you get this impression merely from reading what had happened elsewhere or you were told by any officers, or did you gather it from what you read of what was taking place at several places?

A. I think so.

Q. Do you mean thereby that you read in the newspapers that at other places than Gujranwala pleaders had taken part in agitation? Is that what you say?

A. Yes. I fancy I got the impression at the time. Pleaders had taken part in Gujranwala also.

Q. The impression that you got was that some pleaders were instrumental in spreading disaffection?

A. Yes.

Q. On that do you think you were justified in casting an unmerited reflection on the whole class of pleaders; because some pleaders were creating disaffection you thought you were justified in casting a reflection on the whole class?

A. I think I was justified in issuing that order to Area Officers.

Q. What I put to you, Major Smith, is this. You say you felt yourself justified in making that statement. But do you still think that you were justified in making a sweeping assertion like this, in casting a reflection on the whole class of pleaders that they should be regarded as suspicious characters? Do you think that was a right thing to do?

A. I still think so. I feel I was quite justified.

Q. Because some pleaders behaved badly, you thought it right to casting a reflection of this character on the whole class of pleaders?

A. In using the words suspicious characters, I meant that care should be exercised in granting them passes.

Q. That is not the language you use. You say that pleaders should be regarded as suspicious characters. Was that sweeping assertion casting a reflection on the whole class of pleaders a right thing to do?

A. I still think I was justified in using that expression there?

Q. Some pleaders had taken part in spreading disaffection, but I suppose people of other classes, merchants and shopkeepers had done the same, had not they?

A. I have no knowledge.

Q. Surely, you do not mean to suggest, Major Smith, that all the agitation and creating of disaffection in Gujranwala and other places was the work only of pleaders and not of any other class. People of other classes such as merchants and shopkeepers and others must have also done the same, more or less?

A. Yes.

Q. You don't characterise those classes as suspicious characters as you do the pleaders. Some shopkeepers had spread disaffection, some merchants had done the same, so had some pleaders, but while in the case of merchants and shopkeepers you do not make that sweeping assertion that they are all to be regarded as suspicious characters, you choose to make that assertion on the whole class of pleaders. Why do you distinguish the pleaders like that from all the other classes?

A. Everybody was suspected in a way then.

Q. What had the pleaders as a class done to merit your displeasure in this manner?

A. I considered it desirable that the movements of certain people should be specially watched including the pleaders.

Q. Surely, Major Smith, you could have done that without using language of this character?

A. This was not a public proclamation. This was an official instruction to certain Area Officers.

Q. You think you were therefore justified in doing it?

A. Yes.

Q. You issued an order, Martial Law Instruction No. 11,\* requiring students to salute the flag. Schoolboys together with their masters were made to salute the flag at every parade with a view to inculcating a sense of respect for the British flag. What I want to know, Major Smith, is, when they were asked to do that at every parade, how many parades had you in a day?

A. The carrying out of this order was handed to the Assistant Provost Marshal. I think I am right in saying that there were two parades for the older boys, and only the morning parades, I think, for the smaller boys, but I am speaking from memory.

Q. Was this order made with regard to all towns within your jurisdiction or at particular places?

A. I think my instructions were with regard to all towns. As Administrator of Martial Law I issued an instruction that in all towns wherever there were detachments of troops this order should be obeyed.

Q. In all towns where troops were stationed this order was carried out?

A. Yes, at all places where there were Area Officers or officers commanding the troops.

Q. It applied to all schoolboys including the infant classes?

A. The infant classes were exempted from the evening parades. I think all schoolboys had to attend one parade at Wazirabad, and the infant classes were exempted from the second parade.

Q. Infants also had to come in once, and they included boys of the age of 5, 6 or 7. You are aware of that?

A. I don't know what the ages of the boys were.

Q. And you thought that by asking children of 5, 6, or 7 to attend the parade and salute the flag you were inculcating in them a sense of respect for the British flag.

A. Yes, certainly, because I think a child of 5, 6 or 7 is quite capable of appreciating.

Q. You do not suggest that those children of 5, 6 or 7 had taken part in the riots or in the disturbances?

A. I don't know of what age the youngest boy was who took part or was present in the riots in Wazirabad.

Q. You do not suggest any appreciable number of boys of 5, 6 or 7 took part in any place in these disturbances?

A. I think it improbable.

Q. Then why was it necessary with regard certainly to the infant students in schools, to enforce this order of saluting the flag. What were you effecting thereby, Major Smith?

A. It was considered that this would teach all school boys respect for authority as represented by the British flag.

17 December 1919.]

Major C. W. J. SMITH.

[Continued]

Q. Do you think you can teach respect by enforcing orders of this character? Do you believe in them?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. You do not think that it was a hardship on those small boys of 5 or 6 who were brought there every day for saluting the flag.

A. No. The distance was very small. I think the distance was a few hundred yards. I doubt if the distance exceeded 800 yards from the school in any case.

Q. Do you seriously think that you were serving any earthly object by enforcing an order of this character with regard to infant boys?

A. I think so.

Q. If you were again put in charge of Martial Law administration, I think you will do the same?

A. Yes, if I was satisfied that the schoolboys as a whole had been guilty of offences and had taken part in riots, etc., I would do the same.

Q. Then do I understand that this was done as a matter of punishment?

A. As a matter of discipline.

Q. You said just now that you would do the same if you found the schoolboys taking part in disturbances. Do I understand that this was inflicted as a sort of punishment? Evidently from what you say it looks like it?

A. Yes. If I found school-boys in a similar case taking part in riots or disturbances, I should consider that they would require further instruction in their duty as citizens.

Q. Then it comes to this, Major Smith, that certain boys in this area, according to you, had taken part in the disturbances?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore you thought that it was necessary partly by way of punishment and partly by way of inculcating respect in their minds to enforce this order on the infant boys of 5 or 6 who had not taken part in these disturbances at all?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you still think that was a wise thing to do?

A. Yes.

Q. The restrictions about travelling, were they also put as a matter of punishment at Gujranwala?

A. Not originally.

Q. Those restrictions were continued as a matter of punishment?

A. They were continued, I think, for a fortnight after they were taken off at other places.

Q. They were re-imposed again, I understand?

A. I do not know. I had left.

Q. After you left?

A. They were originally imposed on the whole area. They were taken off the whole area and imposed on Gujranwala for a period of one fortnight during which I left the district.

Q. That is after you left?

A. The period expired after I left. I know nothing more.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You were the Administrator of Martial Law, and I think that all the Area Officers and all the persons who were trying cases in summary courts, were subordinate to you; their duty was to obey your orders?

A. Their duty was to obey the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Area.

Q. It was their duty to carry out your instructions and to obey the orders passed?

A. Yes, as emanating from the General Officer Commanding the Area.

Q. Therefore I take it that it would be the duty of Mr. Bosworth-Smith, Mr. Penny and Mr. Howell to obey your instructions dated 21st April.\*

A. Yes.

Q. Now I would refer you to Martial Law Instruction No. 8,† paragraph 12. There you say that the "officers holding summary courts will take the oath laid down for Summary Courts, Martial, and, if necessary, the interpreter's oath. Evidence will be taken on oath of affirmation and a very brief precis, of evidence and

accused's statement will be submitted on or with a Form 5." They were also bound to obey this order?

A. Yes.

Q. Then so far as you were concerned up to the time that you remained you did not receive any Form 5 from Mr. Bosworth-Smith or Mr. Penny or Mr. Hoyle?

A. I cannot catch the last two names.

Q. Mr. Penny and Mr. Hoyle?

A. Where was Mr. Hoyle?

Q. He was in Lyallpur.

A. Some Forms 5 came in from Lyallpur. I was not able to refer to them. But as far as I remember they were cases tried either by Colonel Hodgson or Major Polley.

Q. Do you know whether these gentlemen obeyed this order or not?

A. No, I do not know whether they obeyed or disobeyed them.

Q. So practically I take it you don't know what cases were tried by them and who investigated those cases?

A. No. I should only be able to judge by Form 5.

Q. The cases were tried by them. They were not investigated by the Provost Marshal, they may have been investigated by somebody, but you don't know by whom they were investigated?

A. No.

Q. Were Area Officers empowered to issue any instructions or regulations when you were there as Administrator?

A. Up to the time I left on May 7th, all Martial Law orders were issued by him, but if an Area Officer deemed it necessary to take immediate action, he could issue a proclamation and send it to General Campbell for approval and this was being done when I left.

Q. Will you kindly see Nos. 28 and 29. There it is said "Whereas I understand that a large number of people concerned in the riots at Wazirabad and Hafizabad have left those cities and are hiding themselves elsewhere, it is now notified for information that if such persons do not return immediately, their property or the property of their fathers or of their nearest relations will be liable to confiscation." Do you know if Colonel O'Brien is responsible for this or it is the Brigadier-General?

A. It is signed by General Campbell.

Q. The previous one is exactly in the same terms?

A. No, I had left when that order was published.

Q. I think it is useless for me to ask you as to whether you thought that the order to confiscate the property of those who had left the city or of their nearest relations was just and equitable?

A. It had nothing to do with me. I have formed no opinion on it.

Q. With regard to the parading of boys, I take it that your statement is confined to what happened at Wazirabad?

A. As Administrator of Martial Law I issued general orders and instructions to Area Officers and as Area Officer of Wazirabad I instructed the Assistant Provost Marshal to take certain action on that order.

Q. So far as other villages and towns are concerned I take it that you do not know whether parades were held three or four times a day?

A. I do not know.

Q. You left it to the discretion of your Area Officers to hold the parades as many times as they liked?

A. Yes; once daily or more often if considered desirable.

Q. I would like to draw your attention to an order which was issued regarding the fixing of prices and the replenishing of grain.

A. That is no order of mine. Kindly quote the order you refer to.

Q. It is No. 31.\* "Whereas it has come to my knowledge that in certain districts of this area merchants are selling . . . will be arrested and punished under Martial Law?"

A. That order is dated the 9th of May. I left on the 7th. I know nothing about that.

17 December 1919.]

Major C. W. J. SMITH.

[Concluded.]

Q. Now with regard to restrictions on travelling in Gujranwala. These restrictions were removed after sometime and within two or three days they were re-imposed. What was the reason for this?

A. They were re-imposed as a punishment and this was done on a report received from the Officer Commanding Troops at Gujranwala and in this report it was stated that as hostility and sullenness in Gujranwala had increased he asked that steps should be taken to deal with it, and the Officer Commanding considered that this was a suitable step to take.

Q. Was there anything definite in that report?

A. I cannot remember the actual report now but that was the outcome of it—that the tone in Gujranwala had deteriorated.

Q. What I want to know is whether anything definite was put down in that report or was it simply put down in a vague sort of way?

A. No; nothing serious had been done by any person. As far as I remember the gist of the report was that hostility and sullenness had increased and the general tone had deteriorated in Gujranwala.

Q. Now please refer to No. 86 where it says "whereas for the furtherance of the public safety the Lieutenant-Governor concurs that the movements of legal practitioners be restricted; Now therefore I order that no legal practitioner whose ordinary place of business is outside the Sialkot Brigade Martial Law Area and Gujrat will enter that Area without the permission of the Administrator, Martial Law, Lahore Divisional Area?"

A. I know nothing about that order.

Q. Now refer to No. 83 which is an order to control the movements of school-boys and the answering of roll calls at certain specified times; and also refer to No. 27 where it says "whereas it has been shown to my satisfaction that the attitude of the inhabitants of Gujranwala towards Europeans has decreased . . . shall be again imposed." Do you remember if anything happened?

A. I cannot now remember the statement made by the Officer Commanding, Gujranwala, but that was the purport of the statement that the inhabitants of Gujranwala had been more sullen and more hostile and he considered that general action should be taken.

Q. Were any internment orders issued by you or the Officer Commanding during your time?

A. Only one was issued by me and that is No. 25.

Q. One is No. 21?

A. That was issued by Colonel Hodgson and afterwards approved by the General Officer Commanding.

Q. There are two such orders?

A. Yes, one No. 25 and the other is No. 21.

Q. So far as your command was concerned, I understand that during these weeks trouble was expected from the railway employees and telegraph men and that there was a sort of strike from Rawalpindi to Gujranwala?

A. There was.

Q. Were arrangements made by the military to prevent this strike from spreading?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it found that the cutting of telegraph wires and the removal of rails were done by expert gangs?

A. I have heard that stated.

Q. Do you know anything about the firing by the first train that went to Gujranwala and Wazirabad?

A. I know nothing. I did not arrive till the 17th.

Q. That was before your arrival?

A. Yes.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. Were you acting under general instructions issued by General Beynon?

A. No, I was acting under the orders of General Dobell.

Q. You felt bound to act on the instruction issued by General Dobell?

A. Yes, I was bound by the instructions of General Dobell.

Q. You attribute in your statement that calmness and quietness to Martial Law? What grounds have you for saying that?

A. The prompt appearance of the troops in the town seemed to overawe.

Q. Do you mean Martial Law?

A. Yes.

Q. Assuming that there were only troops and no Martial Law do you think that there would not very likely have been calm?

A. In my opinion evil-doers knew more about Civil Law and were more likely to take advantage of the delays of Civil Law and I think the promptitude of Martial Law had a very deterrent effect.

Q. But there are always evil-doers present. You do not suggest that there should be Martial Law for ever?

A. No.

Q. I think that you simply made that suggestion because there was Martial Law, otherwise you have no ground for saying that?

A. I think I expressed my own opinion in that statement—the opinion I formed at the time.

Q. Further on you say "Wazirabad city was a little sullen at first, and Gujranwala, from what I saw of it, seemed sullen to the end of my administration. Am I right in concluding that the sullenness of the people was due to the introduction of Martial Law?"

A. No, I do not think sullenness was caused by the introduction of Martial Law. In my opinion the sullenness was after the effect of the riots, not as a result of Martial Law. I do not think the infliction of Martial Law caused sullenness. Martial Law at first I think created a certain amount of uncertainty in people's minds. For instance one of the reasons suggested to me for the increase of prices in Wazirabad city was that the *semindars* in the neighbourhood were uncertain of their reception under Martial Law and were not anxious therefore to come into Wazirabad.

Q. Don't you think that the introduction of Martial Law would cause sullenness?

A. No; not sullenness. Sullenness is a different thing to uncertainty and even fear.

Q. You do not think Martial Law would cause any sort of disrespect or displeasure?

A. No, I think Martial Law would instil nervousness until they knew what it really was.

17 December 1919.]

Mr. T. H. NORRIS—Mr. B. N. BOSWORTH-SMITH.

Mr. T. H. NORRIS, Station Master, Wazirabad.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Norris, are you Station Master, Wazirabad?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you there during the period of the riots?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What damage was done to the station?

A. There was very slight damage done; some window glasses were smashed; and a culvert and gate house were burnt about two miles out of Wazirabad.

Q. When was that done?

A. That was done on the 15th.

Q. Did anything occur on the 14th at Wazirabad?

A. A mob of about 100 Indian lads came to the station about half-past eight at night but I managed to turn them off with the assistance of Mr. Gerson, Inspector of Police, and Muhammad Akram, assistant station master. The mob was told not to create a disturbance on the platform, so after a little while they went away and when they were going over the bridge they threw a number of stones at us but nobody was hit.

Q. Was any damage done to the goods?

A. There was no damage done to the goods.

Q. What happened at the goods-shed?

A. About 8 in the morning the mob made their way to the goods-shed but the troops dispersed the mob.

Q. After they were dispersed, did the mob start cutting telegraph wires?

A. Yes, Sir, they began cutting wires and uprooting posts near the station.

Q. Did you advance in the direction of Gujrat station?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. How far is Gujrat from Wazirabad?

A. About 22 miles.

Q. Did you notice from the station that the mob had knocked down the outer signal?

A. Yes.

Q. That was on the 15th?

A. Yes.

Q. In the meantime the 2-Down Mail left Kathala?

A. We trolleyed down the line—the Permanent-way Inspector, the Police Inspector and I. We found a number of boulders on the line which we removed. When we got to the outer signal I showed the danger signal and stopped the Mail and piloted her into the station.

Q. If you had not removed the boulders what would have been the effect?

A. The train would have got derailed.

Q. Would that have caused loss of life?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. After you removed the boulders, where did the mob go?

A. They went in the direction of Gujrat, Sir.

Q. On the arrival of the Mail you found that the culvert between Wazirabad and D. U. X. had been burnt?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you in consequence order the Mail to be detained?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you found the culvert burnt?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you extinguish the fire?

A. The Engineering department did that. They were there before I got there.

Q. The Sub-Divisional Officer was there and he gave you instructions to return to Wazirabad?

A. Yes, Sir.

Mr. B. N. BOSWORTH-SMITH (I.C.S.), Joint Deputy Commissioner, Sheikhupura, Gujranwala District.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Bosworth-Smith are you Joint Deputy Commissioner, Sheikhupura?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. That is one of the districts of Gujranwala?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. That is the southern division of the district?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. It includes apparently a considerable area?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In connection with that district, when did the riots start?

A. I only arrived and took over charge on the 21st. The riots started from about the 8th or 10th of April.

Q. I think this statement is in response to a circular letter which you got?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the information which you collected in consequence of an official enquiry which you made? Was this statement of yours giving detailed information as to the occurrences, prepared as a result of the official investigation you made?

A. It is a summary or report.

Q. In Section III of your statement you give a chronological narrative of the events and you start with Sangla, which I think is a village on the west of your district?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the damage that was done at Sangla and when was it done? You state here it started with a *hartal* held on the 12th. You also refer to certain agitation that took place in a village. It seems to have been very much on the lines of the agitation at other villages, *viz.*, making strong statements about the Rowlett Act and such other matters?

A. Yes.

Q. Then on the 13th April, you state that "the effect of these meetings on the popular mind was not at once made evident." Then on the 18th, there was the *Baisakhi* festival which passed off fairly quietly

and on 14/15th April, in the night, the railway station was burnt. That seems to be at a short distance to the east of Sangla.

A. Yes.

Q. On the 15th, you refer to the cutting of telegraph wires between Sangla and Salarwala. Where is the other station?

A. That is on the further side of Sangla.

Q. Is it on the west of Sangla or on the east?

A. It is on the far side from Moman.

Q. Is it in Lyallpur direction?

A. I think it is.

Q. On the 16th April, you say that a Sikh with the help of some other Sikhs, backed by a large mob from the town, forcibly released a military prisoner at Sangla station?

A. Yes.

Q. What escort was there?

A. Some native troops, about four or five.

Q. Was the prisoner an Indian prisoner?

A. An Indian prisoner.

Q. Then on the evening of the 16th, you say that some man made a murderous attack on Mr. Wale, Telegraph Inspector, at Sangla post office?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was Mr. Wale seriously injured on that occasion?

A. Yes and those people were found and punished by the tribunal in consequence.

Q. How many people were there when the attack was made? Was that an individual attack on Mr. Wale?

A. One man was caught actually and identified by Mr. Wale.

Q. Was he one of a crowd?

A. Yes; there were others with him.

Q. On the 16th-17th, did you find that the villagers of Baroa tore down telegraph wires on the Lahore line near their village? Where is that village?

A. It is on the other side of Sheikhupura.

17 December 1919.]

Mr. B. N. ROSWORTH SMITH.

[Continued.]

Q. Is it on the eastern side?  
 A. On the Lahore side.  
 Q. Is it in your district?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. In connection with the incidents to which you have referred, were a number of arrests made?  
 A. I only took charge on the 21st April.  
 Q. I see you state "numerous arrests were made after a rather belated investigation." Does that mean that the investigation was conducted by you?  
 A. There were so many incidents of violence that very little could be done for some days.  
 Q. Were the arrests made after you went to the district or were they made before?  
 A. Very few were arrested before I went to the district. Only two or three people were arrested before I went.  
 Q. Then you arrested upon information which you got as to what had occurred at these different places?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. How many arrests did you effect altogether?  
 A. I cannot say definitely. I think it was about 300 or 400.  
 Q. That was as regards the whole period and covering the whole district?  
 A. I think so.  
 Q. I see again you refer to an incident under Dhaban Singh. This is a station also to the east of Moman?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Apparently there was some damage done to the railway plant there?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. I see you say that a railway bridge was cut 1½ miles from Dhaban Singh railway station and attempts made to wreck the line?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. And you refer to certain people going from there to the village of Mahniawala and getting others to come and assist them in the burning of the bridge?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Was serious damage done to the bridge?  
 A. Yes, it was partially burnt.  
 Q. Was Dhaban Singh railway station itself looted and burnt on the morning of the 16th April?  
 A. Yes, it was nearly morning and partly in the night.  
 Q. So far as your information went, had many people participated in that act of incendiarism or destruction?  
 A. Yes, Sir. There was a large crowd there.  
 Q. Then you refer to occurrences at Chuharkana. Of what size village is that?  
 A. It is a market village of about 300 or 400 people.  
 Q. I see you say that the trouble there started on the 11th and then you give similar causes to the other villages, and on the 12th you mention that a complete *hartal* was held. Was there any damage done at Chuharkana?  
 A. There was a great deal of damage done.  
 Q. That was later on I believe?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. What was the exact damage done there?  
 A. The bridge was pulled by a crowd of about 2,000 people during the day. It took a long time to do and the signals were pulled down, and afterwards the railway station itself, which is a big station, was looted and burnt.  
 Q. That was on the 15th?  
 A. Yes; and the missionaries' house and hospital burnt.  
 Q. I see you say that about 11 a special troop train arrived, containing a detachment of the 2/22 Punjab's on their way to Hong Kong. Were some of these men detained?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. You refer there to some endeavour to get the soldiers to join in the looting?  
 A. Yes.

Q. Did you get much evidence at the time with reference to that? What information had you on that point?  
 A. There was a special enquiry and a report was made to Government about it and it was undoubted that some people rather fraternised and attacked together.  
 Q. I see that later in the day after the troop train had departed, a crowd assembled and wrecked the line between the canal bridge and the station. Did a passenger train in the meanwhile arrive there on that day?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Was it attacked and looted and the engine damaged?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. And do you remember whether much loot was taken from that train?  
 A. I do not remember much about the train. Everything in the station worth taking was taken.  
 Q. Then you say following on that, the station staff were assaulted and the station looted and burnt. That is Chuharkana station?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Was it burnt to the ground or partially burnt?  
 A. Everything that was burnable was burnt pretty well.  
 Q. And you say that the station itself was looted. What sort of things were looted?  
 A. Anything that was available. Goods in transit were robbed and carried away and anything they could carry away was taken away, and the station was cleared out.  
 Q. Then you refer to two bridges being damaged by fire and the telegraph wires cut. Where are those bridges?  
 A. One bridge is about half a mile from Chuharkana.  
 Q. Where is the other?  
 A. I forget where the other was.  
 Q. The telegraph wires were also cut at that time?  
 A. Yes, in several places.  
 Q. Did a mob finally collect from the villages north of the line and approach the station?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. You say their intention was to hold up the train and then to loot the *mandi*. Did they attempt to hold up the train and loot it?  
 A. I think so. I was not there at the time. I think they were dispersed by the armoured train.  
 Q. You refer to their being dispersed because the first train that arrived was an armoured train, which opened fire and dispersed the mob?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Then the next town you deal with is Sheikhpura. What size of town is that?  
 A. I should think it has about 5,000 or 6,000 inhabitants.  
 Q. How far is it situated from Chuharkana?  
 A. About seven miles.  
 Q. I think the occurrence that took place there was on the 14th April?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Did it appear from your information that at about 5 a small party went to the railway station to meet the train?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. They tore up signals and signal wire pegs on their way back from the station?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Did they collect in greater numbers at the bazar and then proceed to assault some one?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Later on the same night, I think the post office telegraph wires were cut.  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Also the wires between Sheikhpura and Lahore?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. I should have asked you at the outset as regards Moman which is the first you refer to. I think there was an attempt there on the 14th April to destroy the station?

17 December 1919.]

Mr. B. N. BOSWORTH SMITH.

[Continued.]

A. Yes.

Q. I see certain men seem to have broken into a lamp room to get oil for fuel and set fire to the station?

A. Yes.

Q. Martial Law was proclaimed on the 19th April?

A. Yes.

Q. I think we have had a statement from Colonel O'Brien as to the administration of Martial Law. You started on the 21st of April?

A. Yes.

Q. I think you arrived at Chuharkana on the 21st and took statements of the railway staff, and on the following day, you say you held an identification parade? Can you describe the way in which you conducted the identification parade?

A. On the day previously, I had taken statements of certain railway employees that they had been present on the occasion, they had seen a large crowd and that if they were confronted with the people they could probably identify them. On the following day or days, I sent for all the inhabitants of selected villages, it being common knowledge that certain villagers who were quite close to the scene of occurrence had attended. The villagers were lined up round a large compound and first class magistrates were called for, and they walked down the line with these railway employees, the other railway employees being kept away at a distance. The railway employee would stop and say that that man was there and the magistrate would note the fact down, and then proceed further on through the whole line. Then another fellow would be taken. It took about two or three hours. The railway employees were often people of the locality, so that they knew the people either by name or by sight. The villages chiefly concerned in these disturbances were quite close to the station.

Q. When a man was identified, was he at once arrested?

A. Not in all cases; where only one witness identified the man and there was a possibility of doubt, he was not arrested at all. Where two people independently identified, then he was invariably arrested.

Q. Was he taken at once to jail or where?

A. He was kept in police custody for some days and then notice was given and if he wanted to have any defence witnesses he was told to bring them and all the *lambardars* went and summary trial took place then.

Q. I think you adopted the procedure followed in connection with the arrest of people implicated in the occurrences at Chuharkana in the neighbouring villages as well, in Dhaban Singh, Moman and Sangla?

A. Yes.

Q. The procedure adopted there was just the same as you described in connection with what was adopted at Chuharkana?

A. Yes, similar.

Q. As regards getting information from the villagers who were implicated in the disturbances, did you find that an easy matter? Were the villagers reluctant to communicate information?

A. At first practically no information was forthcoming, till the railway staff identified the people.

Q. After the railway staff had identified people, did they give more information?

A. Yes, the village headman helped certainly.

Q. When did you start trying cases? Was it between the 6th and 20th May?

A. Yes.

Q. In what capacity did you try the cases? Was that as a judge sitting in a summary court?

A. Yes.

Q. From whom did you receive your appointment as a judge in that court? Was it from the military authorities?

A. I was appointed by the Government.

Q. I see you say between the 6th and 20th May, 477 persons were tried and 294 convicted. They were tried by you and Mr. Penny?

A. Yes.

Q. I see you suggest that there was some considerable delay in trying cases. But if you had 477 people to try, the 6th to 20th May did not give you a great deal of time for it?

A. Summary procedure was not lengthy. The people were all ready. There was nothing doing till the orders came giving us power.

Q. You think you could have with advantage started trials earlier than 6th May?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. Then in the last paragraph of Section IV, you say "Practically no Martial Law has been enforced in this part of the district and no punishments given under Martial Law." What do you mean by that statement?

A. Other than the summary courts.

Q. That is a very substantial exception? You were acting under Martial Law.

A. No Martial Law was enforced in this part of the district as soon as Martial Law was started, for offences committed, i.e., after Martial Law was proclaimed. That is what I mean.

Q. I do not quite follow you. The cases you tried were cases of offences under Martial Law?

A. They were offences committed before Martial Law.

Q. Do you mean that so far as obedience to the orders issued under Martial Law is concerned, you had not to deal with any cases of such offences?

A. No case at all was dealt with.

Q. I see you made the school boys of Sangla parade every morning and salute the Union Jack?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that done under your orders or under the orders of the military?

A. I think that was done by a military officer at Sangla.

Q. Generally speaking, have the people behaved well under Martial Law?

A. There was no trouble at all.

Q. I see you express the view as to the movement being anti-European and also anti-Christian?

A. Yes.

Q. That, I take it, was based upon the information you got before you arrived there, or was that in consequence of what you yourself saw during the period that you were actually in office?

A. No; it was based on frequent incidents of crowds running down to the trains that pass through Chuharkana to look for people to assault and the American missionary's statement that he ran away on the day his house and dispensary were burnt; and similarly at Sangla.

Q. You yourself gave substantial sentences?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you have any whippings in public?

A. They were done in the compound of the Canal Bungalow after the court had finished its sittings.

Q. Was not an order issued by the Government that whippings should not take place in public?

A. Yes.

Q. After that order was issued, did you continue to whip in public?

A. No.

Q. The whippings then were entirely in private?

A. I cannot remember if any whippings were carried out after that order came. There were no public whippings at all.

Q. You say it was administered in the compound of the Canal Bungalow after the court rose; is not that an area open to the public view?

A. The Canal Bungalow compound is a long way from any habitations.

Q. Were the public who attended the court allowed to remain to see the whippings?

A. Yes, there were some of them probably present.

Q. But that only occurred up to the time when you received the order from the Government as to the advisability of whippings being in private?

A. Yes.



17 December 1919.]

Mr. B. N. BOSWORTH-SMITH.

[Continued.]

Q. In your view was Martial Law necessary or advisable for the maintenance of peace and order during the period for which it was inaugurated?

A. It might perhaps have been taken off a little sooner.

Q. That is to say, so far as the particular district administered by you was concerned?

A. Yes.

Q. Were the Martial Law orders relaxed as time went on in your district, or did they remain as they were originally promulgated?

A. I think we had very few Martial Law orders that affected the district as a whole at all.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Mr. Bosworth-Smith, were the cases that you tried for breaches of the Martial Law proclamations, or for offences specified under the Indian Penal Code, or for offences of any other kind?

A. I think for offences specified in that proclamation of April 19th, I think it is.

Q. So you did not try any people except as a summary court and except for offences against that proclamation of the Major General's?

A. No.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Mr. Bosworth-Smith, how long have you been in the Punjab?

A. About 21 years.

Q. Your whole service has been in this province?

A. With the exception of a short time down in Bombay.

Q. When was that?

A. I was down there for some famine.

Q. What year?

A. I cannot remember the year; it was in the Panch Mahals.

Q. Were your services lent to the Bombay Government for the famine?

A. Yes.

Q. You were there for a short time I take it?

A. Yes.

Q. You have known Gujranwala and the surrounding places for a long time?

A. No, I have never been in this district before.

Q. Then what was your charge during these 21 years?

A. I have been in charge of various districts. I have been in charge of Attock district for 5 years and Ferozepore district for 5 years.

Q. You have never had any official connection with the Gujranwala district?

A. No.

Q. Now in the districts of which you had charge all these years did you find the people loyal and law-abiding generally?

A. Pretty loyal, but not too law-abiding.

Q. You mean they committed robberies and thefts and things of that kind?

A. Both the Attock and the Ferozepore districts are said to be exceedingly criminal.

Q. In the way of dacoities, and so forth?

A. They are given to murders, house-breaking and the like.

Q. Resulting from disputes as regards property?

A. A large proportion.

Q. And so far as you observed, there was no anti-European or anti-British feeling to any appreciable extent?

A. No, with the exception of the Sikh movement which spread from certain Sikhs from America in the Ferozepore district.

Q. You mean what is called the *Ghadr* movement?

A. Yes.

Q. That was an exotic thing brought from Canada by certain emigrants returned from San Francisco and other places?

A. Yes.

Q. Barring that, so far as the indigenous population is concerned, you did not observe any anti-British or anti-European feeling all these years?

A. No, none.

Q. When this disturbance took place where were you?

A. At Ambala.

Q. And the Punjab Government sent you to Gujranwala as Deputy Commissioner?

A. Yes.

Q. Now before you were sent, had you any consultation with any officers here at headquarters?

A. No, none.

Q. You were not called up here to consult with Government or take any instructions from them before you went to Gujranwala?

A. No, I was telegraphed for and went straight there from Ambala.

Q. I see that in your view *hartal* itself is illegal and an offence. You say: "A *hartal* is in itself illegal, and an open incitement of violence, which should not be allowed after the present experience in the Punjab." Your view seems to be that a *hartal* is in itself illegal?

A. Perhaps it would be better to say "Should be deemed illegal."

Q. What you mean is that it is not illegal as the law stands at present, but the law should be amended so as to make it illegal?

A. That is what it comes to.

Q. That was the view you held when you went to Gujranwala?

A. After I had been there, I think.

Q. And in your view any person shutting his shop should be deemed guilty of having committed an offence and should be punished?

A. I think a general shutting of shops is undesirable.

Q. It may be undesirable, but is it your view that, if there are a large number of shops shut, each individual shutting his shop should be deemed to have committed an offence and should be punished accordingly?

A. Perhaps illegal is too strong: most undesirable.

Q. You think it is undesirable, you don't think it should be made illegal or should be made an offence under the law?

A. I say perhaps it is too strong; that was my opinion at the time I wrote it.

Q. Was that opinion this, that it should be made an offence for any person to shut his shop?

A. Not any person; by a *hartal* you mean every one shutting his shop.

Q. What happens is that each individual shuts his shop, and if that is done on a large scale, or by a certain number, then each one committing that act should be deemed to have committed an offence?

A. I cannot say.

Q. Was it your view, or is it your view that people attending meetings where a *hartal* is advocated should also be deemed to be guilty of committing an offence?

A. No.

Q. In the second paragraph of Section V of your statement you say:—"There is no place where disloyalty is so deep as in Delhi, Lahore and Amritsar." Have you had any personal experience of Delhi?

A. I have spent a certain amount of time there.

Q. Have you been ever connected officially with Delhi?

A. No.

Q. You have gone there on occasions as many of us have gone there?

A. Yes.

Q. That is all your experience of Delhi?

A. That is so.

Q. On what material do you base this statement that there is no place more deeply disloyal than Delhi?

A. This report was a confidential report made to Government of my opinion.

Q. I quite see that, but when you make a confidential report surely any statement you make is based on some material, and not merely because you think so or assume so? What I want to know is on what material you base this statement. You had no material at all I take it?

17 December 1919.]

Mr. B. N. BOSWORTH SMITH.

[Continued.]

A. I had my own opinion.

Q. True, but you do not arrive at opinions without any materials for those opinions. What were the materials on which you arrived at this opinion? You cannot tell me?

A. I prefer not to say.

Q. I do not follow whether you have materials on which you base this opinion, and are not prepared to disclose them, or that you have none?

A. I have a good number of reasons which I could give, but I do not wish to give them.

Q. You do not wish to tell us what those reasons are?

A. No.

Q. Why?

A. I do not think it is desirable.

Q. And those materials are materials which you collected from others or were the result of your knowledge by your occasional visits to Delhi? Is that the only way in which you got those materials?

A. No.

Q. Where did you get those materials from?

A. I do not care to say unless I am ordered to do so.

Q. May I know why you do not care to enlighten the Committee as to the materials on which you base this opinion? Is it because it is against the public interests to do so, or have you been ordered by your Government not to state them? Why are you so unwilling?

A. I do not care to say.

Q. You do not care to give me the materials, or you do not care to answer the last question I have put to you. You do not desire to give these materials because you think it would be against the public interest to do so, or because you have been ordered by superior authority?

A. In my opinion it is not desirable.

Q. Undesirable for what purpose? Why is it undesirable? You a responsible official choose to make this statement in a responsible manner, surely you ought to tell us the materials upon which you base it?

A. It is not for me to say that.

Q. I want to have the position clear; you do not wish to answer this question?

A. I have said already I do not think it is desirable.

Q. I want to know in what manner it is undesirable, whether it is against the public interest in your view, or what it is?

A. And I say I do not wish to answer that question.

Q. May I know the reasons why you do not wish to answer?

A. I do not wish to give reasons.

Q. You do not wish to give reasons and you do not wish to tell me why you do not; do you think that is the way to assist the Committee? Does the same thing apply to your assertion about Lahore and Amritsar?

A. Yes, the same thing.

Q. That you won't tell us the materials on which it is based, and you won't answer those questions?

A. Yes.

Q. Then, I see that you seem to be very much against the lawyer or pleader class, and you say on in Section V of your statement:—"Had there been no pleaders in Sheikhpura, it is safe to say that there would have been no trouble there." You think generally the pleader class is a nuisance? If it did not exist there would be no trouble in India at all, is that your view?

A. No.

Q. What is your view about the pleader class, why do you dislike them?

A. Is that a fair question?

The President.—You have expressed an opinion on that, you have not?

Witness.—About Sheikhpura. I have expressed no opinion about the pleader class at all.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. I have read to you your view with regard to the pleaders of Sheikhpura. You do not apply this to pleaders anywhere else?

A. I have not said so one way or the other. I merely stated my opinion about what happened at Sheikhpura.

Q. But you have a large experience of other districts in the Punjab, what is your view about pleaders there? Do I take it that your general view is against that class so far as you have had experience of it?

A. I wish to make no general statement about pleaders at all.

Q. I do not know whether I am correct in describing it in that manner, but your view seems to be that if Martial Law were permanent and there were no lawyers, that would be an ideal state of things.

A. I did not say that, I think.

Q. You say "Martial Law is eminently adapted for a people of this kind in times of disturbance, and indeed always, if properly carried out, and supervised." In your view Martial Law if introduced normally as a permanent measure and properly carried out and supervised would be a much better thing than the present system of administration, is that so?

A. No, I do not think I quite meant that really.

Q. Then you go on to indicate the reasons "Quick and ready justice without the uncertainties of law, cost of pleaders and the oppression of the police is what is wanted." You would have no difficulties about law and pleaders if you had permanent Martial Law, is that your view?

A. Not exactly. The meaning of this was that Martial Law worked very well.

Q. So far as Chuharkana is concerned, from the materials before you it appears that on the 11th of April there was a meeting at Chuharkana? The 11th of April passed off peacefully? There was no disturbance on the 11th?

A. I think so.

Q. On the 12th there was a *hartal* which also passed off peacefully and you had also a meeting on that day? That day I see that there was a great fair which is called the *Sacha Sauda* fair?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that a big fair?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. That also passed off peaceably?

A. Yes.

Q. Then on the 13th and 14th you had the *Baisakhi* festivals which also passed off peacefully. Then on the 15th there was no *hartal* I take it, is that so?

A. I think there was a *hartal* on the 15th. I was not there.

Q. And it was on that day that the railway line was damaged at about midday?

A. Yes.

Q. Where did they get the tools for causing damage to the railway line? Did any railway people join it, or any railway labourers' gang? How did they get the necessary tools for uprooting the line?

A. I do not know.

Q. Were any enquiries made by the police as to that?

A. No railway people were convicted.

Q. You require special implements for that purpose? Uprooting the railway line is not an easy thing?

A. Yes.

Q. And therefore they must have got hold of them from some railway men?

A. Yes: Some of the crowd came to the Chuharkana Canal Bungalow to try and get instruments from there, but they were turned off.

Q. But where did they actually get the instruments?

A. I do not know.

Q. There was no result of the investigation in that matter?

A. No, nothing was found.

Q. At that time the police arrived and dispersed the crowd when they were trying to uproot the railway line?

A. They did not disperse them. They would not disperse apparently.

Q. Did the police make any arrests on that occasion?

17 December 1919.]

Mr. B. N. BOSWORTH-SMITH.

[Continued.]

A. No, none.

Q. Why not?

A. They were paralysed by fear and outnumbered.

Q. What was the number of the police at that time?

A. About four or five men.

Q. Were they armed?

A. I was not there.

Q. So far as your information goes?

A. I should think they were probably not armed. There were about 2,000 people engaged in pulling up the lines.

Q. Were any measures taken that day to prevent further mischief after the railway line was damaged?

A. Further mischief proceeded; Chuharkana station was burned and looted after that.

Q. When the police found they could not disperse the crowd when they were uprooting the railway line, what measures did they take to ask the authorities to come to their assistance? What did they do?

A. The wires were out.

Q. What was the nearest place they could ask help from?

A. Lahore.

Q. There was no nearer place to which they could appeal for help?

A. No.

Q. And did they inform Lahore?

A. The police? Yes, information was sent as soon as they could send it.

Q. And did any help arrive from Lahore?

A. An armoured train came along.

Q. An armoured train was sent from Lahore. Was it in pursuance of that appeal for help?

A. Probably from the railway staff's appeal; things leaking through from the railway staff.

Q. And the armoured train left Lahore, I understand, on the night of the 15th?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was armed with machine guns and search-lights, is that so?

A. I think so.

Q. And was Lala Sri Ram in charge of the armoured train?

A. He went with it.

Q. Who is he, is he your assistant?

A. He is Sub-Divisional Officer at Sheikhpura.

Q. He was there before you arrived in charge?

A. Yes.

Q. And when did this armoured train arrive at Chuharkana?

A. You had better ask him this question; he is a witness here.

Q. He was all through on the train during all these operations?

A. Yes, he was there throughout, you can ask him.

Q. This train I find was working on the line for several days?

A. Yes.

Q. Then if you will turn to Section III, under date 16th-17th April of your statement, you will see you there say that numerous arrests were made. Is that in Sangla or also in other places?

A. It refers to many villages.

Q. Thereafter you say "Numerous arrests were made after a rather belated investigation, but the attitude of the people including those of local status indicated so clearly that they had no intention of implicating their fellows by making a full statement that it was ultimately decided to prosecute only the leaders." Then, does this mean, at first it was felt there was not justification enough to arrest or prosecute the leaders but it was only when the villagers would not give information implicating those who participated in the riot that this method was resorted to?

A. It is too long for me to follow. If you ask more simply, I can answer.

Q. Take your statement "Numerous arrests were made after a rather belated investigation..... they had no intention of implicating their fellows;" you found that people had no intention of implicating their

fellows? These fellows were people who actually took part in the disturbance; is that what you mean?

A. Yes; I think so.

Q. These were not the leaders?

A. No; I think not.

Q. Then you say, because the attitude of the people was not to implicate their fellows by making a full statements it led you ultimately to decide to prosecute only the leaders?

A. I would like to correct myself. This refers only to the village of Baroa.

Q. We will confine it to Baroa; the question still remains. That shows that at first in that village you did not feel yourself justified to arrest or prosecute the leaders. It was the attitude of the people that they would not implicate the actual perpetrators that made you ultimately resort to this expedient. Is that so?

A. These chronological events of the 11th were taken from the Superintendent of Police's diary, and I incorporated them in my report.

Q. It may be you are merely repeating what the Superintendent of Police has said?

A. Yes, repeating *verbatim*.

Q. I want to know whether the Superintendent of Police meant that at first he did not arrest or prosecute the leaders, but ultimately when it was found that the people of the village would not implicate the actual perpetrators by making a full statement he resorted to this expedient of arresting the leaders?

A. I think that is the meaning of it.

Q. What is the meaning of it?

A. We wanted to get everybody, and when we could not get all, we went on to the leaders.

Q. Then before these identification parades were gone through was any census of the village taken?

A. No.

Q. And as to persons who had gone away from the village, who were absentees, were any of their relations arrested as hostages and kept in custody till the absentees returned?

A. I think not.

Q. No single instance of that kind?

A. I cannot remember any case.

Q. You may say the allegation is untrue?

A. I cannot remember any case.

Q. Now, were these identification parades resorted to in many villages? In how many villages?

A. About 7 or 8.

Q. How often in each village was this parade gone through?

A. Once.

Q. Only once?

A. Once.

Q. And the whole population was turned out practically?

A. Except the women and children.

Q. Now, you tried a large number of cases yourself?

A. A good number.

Q. And was that for offences committed before the Martial Law came into operation?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it not that a large number were put up for trial in batches?

A. A fair number together.

Q. In one trial about 100 people were put together?

A. Not so many as hundred.

Q. Any number approaching one hundred?

A. I think about 40 were put up in one lot; generally less.

Q. At these trials were counsel allowed to appear?

A. If they appeared, they were allowed.

Q. Is it true that they were not allowed to cross-examine witnesses, but you allowed them merely to suggest questions? Is that correct?

A. I think generally they suggested questions, and these questions were put by me.

Q. When you say that they only suggested questions, was that method of their own choice or did you ask them to do it? Did counsel say, which is very unlikely, 'I won't cross-examine; I would only suggest

17 December 1919.]

Mr. B. N. BOSWORTH SMITH.

[Continued.]

questions, or did you make that order that you would not allow counsel to cross-examine, but you would allow them only to suggest questions to you?

A. I made no definite order. I merely put the questions they wanted to ask.

Q. No counsel said that they wanted to cross-examine?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Very curious. Unless you restrict him to suggest questions, it is very unlikely that counsel appearing in a case would content himself to merely suggesting questions?

A. I think in only one or two cases counsel appeared.

Q. Did Mr. Morton appear before you?

A. He appeared on one occasion.

Q. Is it true that he suggested a question which you disallowed?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. Upon that he refused to do anything further? Is it true?

A. Is what true?

Q. First, the question that he suggested was disallowed. On that he said: "If you do that, I cannot further appear in that case"?

A. I can't remember.

Q. This is a matter which if it happened is not one which could go out of your memory. It is rather a peculiar incident. If it did happen, you would remember it?

A. To the best of my belief, he asked some questions.

Q. Was there no incident of that sort? You disallowed his questions and on that he did not take any further part in that case?

A. I do not think so.

Q. With regard to the people who were absent from the villages, were any orders issued prohibiting any people connected with them from sowing the fields or reaping the harvests till they returned?

A. Yes; I think an order was passed that no crops should be cut till the absentees returned.

Q. In the Mahnianwala village, were the women folk ordered to come out?

A. No; I think not.

Q. That is not correct?

A. I think not.

Q. No women of any village were asked to come out?

A. I think not.

Q. You know the *lambardar* of this place—Mahnianwala,—called Atar Singh?

A. I do not remember him.

Q. Do you remember ordering his arrest?

A. I do not.

Q. He is an old man?

A. I do not remember that.

Q. He was put on horseback and marched handcuffed to Lahore?

A. I remember nothing.

Q. That could not have taken place without your knowledge?

A. I do not think it happened in my time.

Q. Now, in Sheikhpura, one Gohur Singh was arrested. Do you remember it?

A. That was not in my time.

Q. You came on the 21st April?

A. Yes.

Q. How long did you continue?

A. I continued there till the end of June.

Q. You were there in May?

A. Yes.

Q. This man was first arrested, you have it in Colonel O'Brien's evidence, as hostage for his sons who were wanted. He was arrested on the 19th April and released on the 30th, or somewhere about that, of the same month. He was re-arrested while you were there on the 17th May?

A. I think not.

Q. He was released on the 30th May?

A. I think you are wrong in your facts. I do not think Gohur Singh was arrested.

Q. He was not arrested?

A. I do not think so.

Q. It has been asserted very often that this man was arrested on the 17th May and was let off after the Martial Law was removed on the 29th. Did you release him after the 29th?

A. I do not remember his arrest.

Q. Was any charge formulated against this man, Gohur Singh?

A. I do not remember.

Q. Who would be able to tell us? When you do not seem to remember these things that happened in your administration, who would be able to tell us about them?

A. I think Colonel O'Brien. He arrested him?

Q. He first arrested him; then the second arrest was during your time?

A. I do not remember.

Q. There must be some record somewhere?

A. I do not think he was arrested by my order.

Q. That may be. But you say 'I do not remember.'

A. When I say 'I do not remember' I do not think he was arrested.

Q. There must be somewhere some record of the people who were arrested from time to time. You might not remember it; I quite see that. If you have a record we can find out from that. If he was arrested his name would be there. If he was not, his name would not appear there. There must be some record of the arrested persons?

A. There probably would be.

Q. Did you not keep any such record?

A. The police keep a register of the people arrested.

Q. You were in charge of the administration and you must have supervised the work of the police and seen whether records of that kind were properly kept or not?

A. Probably so. I did that with the under-trial people.

Q. With regard to this man, is it true that on your recommendation his pension has been stopped?

A. I made some recommendation to that effect.

Q. You remember having done something of this kind?

A. Very well.

Q. When did you make that recommendation?

A. I cannot remember when I made it. I made the recommendation.

Q. Did you make it while you were there or after?

A. When I was there.

Q. Was that recommendation made because he had been arrested and was in custody at the time? Was it while he was in custody?

A. I do not know whether he was in custody at that time.

Q. How did you come to make that recommendation?

A. If you see a copy of my letter, you will know it. I made an official report. I have not got it now.

Q. Surely you can tell me what he was guilty of?

A. I think, to the best of my belief, his three sons were implicated in the disturbances at Sheikhpura and two of these sons absconded.

Q. That Colonel O'Brien has told us. These sons ultimately in a few days surrendered themselves. That was finished. But what was this man personally guilty of?

A. He was not charged with any offence under the Indian Penal Code. In my report, he was not charged under the Indian Penal Code.

Q. Then why did you recommend that he should be deprived of his pension?

A. I recommended that because his three sons had taken a leading part in the disturbances, and because he apparently failed to exercise his father's control over them.

Q. Then you recommended him to be deprived of his pension for what his sons had done?

A. He also took some part.

Q. Had he himself taken some prominent part in the disturbances at Sheikhpura?

A. Apparently.

Q. Why was he not prosecuted if he had taken part?

A. At the meetings prior to the disturbances.

17 December 1919.]

Mr. B. N. BOSWORTH-SMITH.

[Continued.]

Q. Then he has not taken part in the disturbances themselves?

A. No.

Q. He has attended certain meetings?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that your report?

A. That was on the conduct of his sons.

Q. At Sheikhpura, did you arrest certain pleaders?

A. No; that was all done by Colonel O'Brien before I came.

Q. After you came, these pleaders were still in custody?

A. Probably.

Q. And they remained in custody for a considerable time, till Martial Law was removed?

A. That had nothing to do with me.

Q. You arrived on the 21st April?

A. I think so.

Q. When you came on the 21st April, you were thenceforward in charge of the division that was assigned to you?

A. Yes.

Q. Surely, after that date, if these people remained in custody, they were so in custody under your administration?

A. No; they were arrested by Colonel O'Brien and dealt with by him.

Q. These people were never brought to trial; nothing was done to them; they were merely kept in jail and released after Martial Law was over?

A. That may be.

Q. What people were in jail after you took over charge?

A. Colonel O'Brien arrested them, and Colonel O'Brien knows the accused.

Q. Is it true that all the male population, including pleaders and others, were made to assemble on a certain day and you talked to them?

A. Yes.

Q. When was that?

A. I do not know the date.

Q. Somewhere in May?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you ask them to assemble for?

A. To address them on the disgrace that had fallen on Sheikhpura and to ask if any of them would come forward and say as to who were to blame.

Q. Was that late in May?

A. About the middle, I think.

Q. Is the allegation true that you abused the people calling them *Suar log* and *Gandimakhi*?

A. No; I did not.

Q. That is untrue?

A. I think so.

Q. You know what school boys were made to salute the flag?

A. I believe that was at Sangla.

Q. How many times during the day were they made to do that?

A. I have no knowledge of that. That was apparently a military order.

Q. You knew what was done?

A. I heard that they did salute the flag.

Q. Four times a day?

A. That I do not know.

Q. That order applied to all school boys, including the infant classes?

A. That I do not know.

Q. Then with regard to sentences of whipping, was that inflicted with regard to offences committed prior to the 19th April?

A. Yes; prior to that.

Q. For not taking part in the actual disturbances, but for taking part in meetings?

A. I do not understand your question.

Q. For what offences was whipping inflicted?

A. For offences connected with the disturbances.

Q. For offences connected with the actual disturbances on the 14th and the 15th?

A. Yes.

Q. In Section IV, you say with regard to Sangla that very few offenders had been brought to account, and

therefore executive action of another kind was recommended to deal with the situation there. What was the executive action that you were going to take?

A. I recommended fines and certain disciplinary action with regard to the honorary magistrates.

Q. Was that all?

A. Yes.

Q. Has that been carried out?

A. I do not know.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You used to hold your Court in the Canal Bungalow?

A. Very often.

Q. Everyone of these cases that has been tried by you has been tried there?

A. Not every one of them.

Q. In all 14 cases have been tried by you?

A. I daresay.

Q. And was any one of these cases tried anywhere else?

A. One or two were tried at Chuharkana and Sangla.

Q. Excepting these two cases every one of them was tried at the Canal Bungalow which has a wall on one side while the other sides are open?

A. It is more or less open all round save for trees.

Q. And there usually as soon as you decided your cases you pronounced judgment, and then at the time of the rising of the Court the flogging used to take place?

A. Yes.

Q. You commenced the trial of these cases from the 9th of May?

A. Very likely.

Q. May I know as to whether, as is usual, there was any daily diary of the cases tried kept by your reader or *sherishtadar*? You know that in every Court a diary is kept where all the cases that come up for trial are mentioned?

A. No, I do not expect he kept any diary.

Q. Now, I do not suppose any of these cases was heard for two days continuously, that is, you take up a case, hear the evidence and pass the sentence then and there?

A. Generally.

Q. On the 9th May you tried 6 cases and decided them on the 9th. You will find that there are 65 accused persons in these 6 cases. You will also find that excepting the one case, i.e., the first of these cases, in every one of the cases you found the accused had pleaded 'guilty' or admitted their guilt?

A. Very likely.

Q. Your second hearing was on the 14th May. On that date you tried six cases?

A. Yes.

Q. And in these there were 73 accused persons.

A. Very likely.

Q. And excepting the eight persons, every one of them, according to your record, pleaded guilty?

A. Very likely.

Q. The next trial took place on the 15th May. On that day you tried two cases. Well, here also I find, according to your record, that every one of them pleaded guilty.

A. Yes, very likely.

Q. The next trial was on the 20th May. Only one case was tried by you. And in this one case there were 70 accused persons.

A. Yes.

Q. Then on the 22nd May only one case was tried by you—King-Emperor *versus* Kesho Singh and others?

A. Yes.

Q. And then your next trial was on the 26th May when you tried two cases?

A. That is so.

Q. The rest of the cases tried by you were heard on the 30th May?

A. Yes.

Q. There were cases in which there were 70 accused persons and you will find that excepting one or two cases, out of a total number of 283 persons you have had before you only 8 or 10 pleaded not guilty and the rest pleaded guilty or admitted their guilt?

17 December 1919.]

Mr. B. N. BOSWORTH-SMITH.

[Continued.]

A. Yes.

Q. Now may I ask as to whether there was not something very peculiar in the procedure of your court that everyone who came before you at once confessed his guilt? It seems to me very peculiar that barring a dozen or two persons out of these hundreds tried by you, the whole lot confessed their guilt whenever they appeared before you. Have you any explanation to offer for this? Were they trying to adopt a repentant attitude by making a clean breast of their conduct, or was there some mistake in the statements you have made out?

A. I suppose they had been identified in public quite clearly and their own village people appeared in court and said that it was a common knowledge that they were there and they admitted guilt. There was no question about it.

Q. You will see that in answer to Mr. Justice Rankin you said that these persons were not tried under the Indian Penal Code?

A. What is your question?

Q. My question is whether it is not a fact that they have been tried under the Indian Penal Code sections 143, 436 and 149. When that question was put to you by Mr. Justice Rankin you said that you had not tried any persons under the Indian Penal Code but from this statement I find that the whole lot of them, with a few exceptions, were tried under the Indian Penal Code.

A. They were tried under the Proclamation of 1918 for offences under the Indian Penal Code.

Q. Then did you send a summary of these cases after filling up Form V to the Administrator of Martial Law?

A. Yes.

Q. And so far as these cases are concerned, there will be on record a précis of evidence of witness if we see the original files?

A. You can see for yourself; I do not know.

Q. Surely you know as to whether or not you did record the evidence of prosecution witnesses?

A. Their statements were recorded I think.

Q. When these accused persons were being tried, they would be present at the time of the flogging I presume, and supposing out of these 70 or 85 persons, you ordered the flogging of two: the flogging took place at the Canal Bungalow; so that all these accused persons and relations of the prosecution witnesses and *lambardars* would be present in the compound of your court?

A. Not necessarily. A lot of them very likely had gone away. Undertrials would be removed.

Q. You state that no flogging took place in public?

A. The general meaning of "whipping in public" is whipping in a town or city or some place where there are a lot of people.

Q. You say that they were not flogged in the town or in the city?

A. That is the general meaning.

Q. Do I understand that they were not flogged inside the city or town?

A. They were not.

Q. And the people that were flogged in the compound before these persons who were present, in your opinion, they were not flogged in public?

A. It was not altogether private and it was not public.

Q. In any of these trials was any substance of the statement detailed?

A. You are going to see the files.

Q. What is your recollection? Did you record statements of the accused or defence witnesses?

A. I recorded the statement of the accused.

Q. And in none of these cases the statements of the defence witnesses were recorded?

A. Very few I think.

Q. Now with regard to identification. When you were holding these identifications was any record of them made?

A. Yes.

Q. Was any record made of the statement of these witnesses coming after the identification statement?

A. I expect it was.

Q. Have you seen any of these statements?

A. I expect I took some of the statements of the witnesses in the cases I tried myself.

Q. Is it not a fact that in almost all these cases at one place every conviction is based upon the evidence of three or four railway officials?

A. No, I think not. There were more than three or four.

Q. Do you remember if there were more than five or six witnesses examined by you?

A. That you will see from the record.

Q. Do you think that when you tried these five cases or six cases charging and finishing these cases in one day, you were doing complete justice to these accused persons? Now with regard to this assault by Harnam Singh. In reply to the President you said that the European who was assaulted identified one man of a large mob and that was one of the reasons why you say that thing was anti-British?

A. Yes.

Q. I will read to you from the judgment of that case and I should like to know whether you are prepared to modify your opinion: "The evidence shows that this was an isolated occurrence—an attack by a fanatic upon an officer of the Government." Therefore I hope you will modify your opinion that he was not one of the mob?

A. Probably he was not.

By the President—

Q. Were you not wrong in your recollection?

A. Probably so.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Do you remember that it was admitted and alleged in favour of Harnam Singh who is a Sikh, that he and two other persons admitted that they did all this mischief. They lost their heads because they had heard that the Golden Temple had been attacked. Do you know?

A. I know nothing about it.

Q. I mean to say that it has nothing to do with the Rowlatt Bill agitation at all?

A. The case was not in front of me.

Q. It was within your jurisdiction. You mention it in your chronological statement. I want to know whether or not you connect this assault with the Rowlatt Bill agitation, or admit that this was a solitary attack done through panic because he believed that the Golden Temple was attacked?

A. I have no specific knowledge.

Q. Then may I take it that all those cases which were investigated and tried by other officers never came to you during the time that you were in charge of Sheikhpura and other places? The different cases were not tried by you, probably the investigation of those cases came to you for your information?

A. Sometimes they did.

Q. Not always?

A. No.

Q. Therefore this case of Harnam Singh regarding the attack on Mr. Wale did not come before you?

A. I don't think it did.

Q. At least you remember that Mr. Wale shot Harnam Singh twice?

A. It all happened before I got there.

Q. Then you have stated in answer to Sir Chimanlal Setalvad's question that your chronological statement is based upon the diary or report of the Superintendent of Police. That is true?

A. That is what I have said.

Q. It is not the result of your personal investigation?

A. No.

Q. You went to Sangla on the 12th of May?

A. Yes.

Q. And there you arrested on that very day 77 persons?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any evidence against them before you arrested these 77 persons?

A. There was a lot of general evidence of the disturbances.

17 December 1919.]

Mr. B. N. BOSWORTH-SMITH.

[Continued.]

Q. Was there any evidence before you that these 77 persons were concerned with that general disturbance?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there a statement by any person?

A. I don't think there was any recorded statement.

Q. Did you hear those witnesses make oral statements to you? Did about half a dozen or a dozen persons make any oral statements to you?

A. I think a lot of people told me in general terms.

Q. And they gave you the names of these 77 persons?

A. As far as I remember, some people pointed them out.

Q. That would be for the purpose of identification?

A. For the purpose of showing that they had taken part in the disorders.

Q. Therefore may I take it that at Sangla the identification took place before you arrested these men?

A. I think so.

Q. You first of all held an identification?

A. I think they were pointed out.

Q. On the 14th again you arrested 47 persons?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Is it not a fact that out of all these 122 or 123 persons whom you arrested, only eight people were challenged and the others were released after they were kept under arrest for four or five days?

A. I think that is so.

Q. Is it not a fact that one of the things suggested by you was the realisation of a fine of Rs. 50,000 from Sangla?

A. Yes.

Q. And you collected the respectable people of Sangla on the 19th, and told them that you would realise Rs. 50,000, and when they agreed to pay the fine of Rs. 50,000, you released all those persons?

A. No, that has nothing to do with the other matter.

Q. Is it or is it not a fact that the Government instead of making a demand of Rs. 50,000 has reduced it very considerably? Do you know what the Government demand is now?

A. No, I don't know.

Q. Do you remember that at Sangla under your order a roll-call was made under which boys had to attend four times a day—at 10 A.M., 2 P.M., 5 P.M. and 8 P.M.?

A. I have already answered that to your neighbour.

Q. Was it four times?

A. I have said in so many words that I don't remember how many times.

Q. Was it four times?

A. I have already answered that.

Q. I don't remember. Kindly give the answer again.

A. You will get it from this record. I don't remember it. It was a military order. I don't remember how many times they were required to attend.

Q. It was a military order, but you were the Area Officer there, and it was for you to see as to whether this order was obeyed or not?

A. It is a statement. Do you want me to agree to your statement?

Q. You were the Area Officer at Sangla?

A. I was the Area Officer at Sheikhpura.

Q. And also at Sangla?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Did you order that when these boys attended the roll-call they should make a statement?

A. I have already said that the order was given by a military officer.

Q. Do you know that the order to these boys given by the military officer was they should say *mainne koi qusur nahin kiya, aur na aage koi qusur karunga, tauba, tauba, tauba*. That is to say, we have not committed any offence, we will not in future commit any other offence, and *tauba, tauba, tauba*, that is, we repent, we repent, we repent. Do you know if any such order was given?

A. I do not know.

Q. Did you make any suggestion about erecting any house of repentance? Did you suggest any *tauba ghar* should be erected in any of these villages?

A. I suggested that possibly good might come out of evil by getting the leading people to subscribe to the building of a jail *ghar* at Sheikhpura.

Q. And you thought that this would cost about Rs. 10,000, and you wanted to realise half of it from the pleaders?

A. I don't think so.

Q. And your idea was that the people would go inside that building and repent for what they had done on the 14th or 15th April?

A. That was the idea.

Q. Did the Government accept your suggestion?

A. It was never laid before Government?

Q. So far as these pleaders were concerned, did you cause any proceedings to be instituted before the Punjab Chief Court?

A. I made a confidential report.

Q. Then the papers were sent back to you, and you put Mr. Penny on to make enquiries into the conduct of these pleaders?

A. You have asked me two or three questions, out of which which do you want me to answer, the first part or the second? You first say that the papers were sent back. I don't think the papers were sent back.

Q. Was this matter under your orders investigated by Mr. Penny?

A. I think Mr. Penny made some enquiries.

Q. Did you give any notice to these pleaders under the law? Did you give them time?

A. No, the matter was reported for the High Court's orders. There they take action.

Q. But before you report the case to the High Court and the High Court passes any orders, do you know that under the Legal Practitioners' Act you have to give the pleaders time, you have to take their explanation?

A. The High Court does that.

Q. Now am I right in saying that more than a dozen *durbars* were held by you during the month of May in different places?

A. I don't know what you mean by the word '*darbar*.' More than a dozen times people were collected no doubt in different villages.

Q. And you made speeches?

A. I talked to them sometimes.

Q. Of course those were *durbars* on a minor scale, and in those *durbars* was the conduct of the pleaders the subject of your discourse?

A. Very likely it was alluded to.

Q. And in very emphatic terms?

A. In not very favourable terms.

Q. You asked the people never to trust the pleaders, they were a set of cheats and so forth?

A. No.

Q. Do you know Ushanak Rai, pleader?

A. Whereof?

Q. Of Sheikhpura. He happened to be a *lambardar* and you dismissed him?

A. Very likely.

Q. Can you give me any idea of the number of persons who attacked the Sangla station?

A. The station was attacked, what do you mean?

Q. What was your information as to the total number of the mob that attacked the Sangla station?

A. Do you mean the crowds that went down to the station.

Q. Yes?

A. I cannot give any definite number.

Q. Am I right if I say that the number was less than a hundred?

A. I was not there. I can't say.

Q. Supposing they were less than a hundred, then how do you account for the arrest of more than a hundred persons?

A. Because a very large crowd paraded the town with a black flag, and a very large crowd collected outside the railway station and there were disturbances outside as well as inside.

Q. Was any amount collected under your orders at Sangla for the comfort of soldiers and receipts given?

A. No.

Q. Were any respectable persons to your knowledge called for the purpose of pulling *punkahs*?

A. No.

17 December 1919.]

Mr. B. N. BOOTHBY-SMITH.

[Continued.]

Q. Do you know one Mohan Lal, merchant, of Sangla, and one Sardar Sardari Lal, another cloth merchant, of Sangla?

A. I don't know them.

Q. Do you know that a number of persons were killed on the night of the 15th at Chuharkana?

A. I have heard of some.

Q. What happened to them, do you know anything?

A. No, I don't know.

Q. Do you remember that about 185 persons were arrested at Chuharkana?

A. Very likely.

Q. Do you know whether those persons who were killed or wounded at Chuharkana were residents of that place or came from outside villages?

A. No, I don't know that.

Q. Do you know one Mastan Chand?

A. Whereof?

Q. He was the assistant station master of Moman station?

A. Yes, I have met him.

Q. Did you arrest him?

A. I think I did.

Q. Do you know that he was kept in custody for four or five days?

A. Very likely.

Q. Then he was not prosecuted at all?

A. No.

Q. He was the principal witness in the case which came up for trial about the attack on Moman station?

A. I don't think he was. He may have been a witness.

Q. Now is it not a fact that the identification made by the station staff was made after this man was released?

A. That I don't know.

Q. You were able to make these large number of arrests without any military help?

A. Yes, the military were there at the back.

Q. I mean to say you did not requisition their help, but you arrested them as District Magistrate?

A. There was a force of military in Chuharkana at the time.

Q. You know the *Baisakhi* fair, it is a very big fair, within your jurisdiction?

A. This fair is different from the *sacha sauda* fair.

Q. It was held on the 13th or 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. And according to your statement all the seditious speeches or the strong speeches were delivered on the 11th or 12th?

A. Very likely.

Q. I would like to know if all this, as you say, happened as a result of the speeches and of what happened at Chuharkana and Moman and at other places on the 11th and the 12th: how is it that nothing happened on the 13th or 14th, when there was every opportunity for a very large crowd to commit all sorts of damage and disturbances?

A. That is one of the contributory causes. The speeches were one of the contributory causes prior to the outbreak.

Q. Nothing happened on the 13th and 14th.

A. People rushed down to the trains both on the 13th and the 14th asking for Europeans.

Q. What reasons had you to believe that what happened on the 15th was the result of the speeches delivered on the 11th?

A. Plenty of reasons. If people speak against the Government, against the Bills, and inflame the ignorant masses, that is a contributory cause to the outbreak that followed four days afterwards.

Q. If I understand your statement rightly, you do not say that those speeches were in any way objectionable?

A. When?

Q. On the 11th?

A. Where?

Q. At Sheikhpura and at some other places?

A. The speech on the 11th at the *sacha sauda* fair was a very objectionable one.

Q. The speeches at Chuharkana and at Sheikhpura?

A. They were. Objectionable language was used there too.

Q. Have you got any record of these speeches?

A. Some police were there.

Q. They have got the record.

A. I expect so.

Q. Do you or do you not believe as a matter of fact that all these disturbances and damage committed on the 15th were due to the fact of a number of Sikh soldiers going inside the town and inciting the mob?

A. What do you mean? In Chuharkana?

Q. At Sheikhpura. You make a statement that a number of Sikh soldiers went inside the city and incited the mob?

A. Are you talking of my report?

Q. Was it at Wasirabad?

A. No, no.

Q. Do you agree with me that all that had happened at Chuharkana was the result of the incitement of those soldiers?

A. No, certainly not.

Q. Have you seen the police reports about it?

A. Yes.

Q. Don't they ascribe what happened at Chuharkana to the incitement of these Sikh soldiers?

A. No.

Q. And if there is any such report before this committee, that report will not be correct that the Sikh soldiers were responsible for what happened at Chuharkana?

A. I don't think you will find any report to the effect that the Sikh soldiers were responsible. You will find some reports that some exciting language was used by some of the soldiers to those people.

Q. They said "go and commit the mischief, burn the thing, and so on." Up to that time nobody was inclined to destroy or burn anything. If my memory is correct, that is what is before us.

A. I have given you my answer.

Q. You yourself in your statement say that the sepoys urged them to commit further excesses by cutting telegraph wires, and so on?

A. That I believe to be true.

Q. Do you know one Ralla Ram of Chuharkana?

A. Who is he?

Q. Ralla Ram of Chuharkana, the father of Mangu. You wanted Mangu. This man Ralla Ram was arrested as a hostage as Mangu had absconded?

A. Possibly it is true.

Q. For how many days was he kept under arrest?

A. I cannot tell you.

Q. And he was taken as a hostage because his son Mangu had absconded?

A. Very likely.

Q. I would like to know whether in your opinion there was any need for the maintenance of Martial Law in your district after the 30th April?

A. Yes, I think it was desirable to keep it on a bit longer.

Q. What were your reasons for it?

A. Just to show the power of the *sarkar* and as a lesson to the people.

Q. Do you know the total population of the *tahsils* that were in your jurisdiction?

A. No.

Q. Do you know that the number suspected or who were in the crowd, even taking the largest figure, was infinitesimal as compared to the total population?

A. It was very small.

Q. You admit that after the 19th April nothing happened in your jurisdiction?

A. It was absolutely quiet.

Q. Then the arm of the law and existence of the military power was there for 11 days even before you arrived there?

A. Yes.

Q. And therefore I want to know if this military display for 10 days was not sufficient for bringing those persons who had forgotten the power of the Government to their senses?

A. Still we had to do a good lot of sweeping up, getting absconders, effecting the arrests of several persons, and so it was certainly advisable to have the help



17 December 1919.]

Mr. B. N. BOSWORTH-SMITH.

[Continued.]

of the military, because practically there is no police there at all.

Q. Do I understand that because there was Martial Law that would be an inducement for people to turn up?

A. We had our own way of getting men.

Q. So far as that is concerned, Martial Law had nothing to do with it at all?

A. The presence of the military, I think, had a great effect.

Q. I am not quarrelling with that at all. You may have got the assistance of the military. My point is about the maintenance of Martial Law?

A. There was no harm in it. Nobody was suffering any hardship. I am only giving my opinion.

Q. So far as the arrests were made, you have mentioned two points—Martial Law had got back absconders, and you admit they could have been got back without the military. Therefore I don't see how Martial Law could help you in making arrests and getting absconders.

A. I say the presence of the military, and the keeping on of Martial Law had a great effect.

Q. You admit that the military was there before the proclamation of Martial Law?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore you cannot give us any other facts which necessitated the maintenance of Martial Law after the 8th April?

A. I have already given you that information.

Q. You cannot add anything else to it?

A. No, I cannot.

Q. You have stated that a large number of these persons who were identified were known to the railway staff because they were the residents of the city itself or of the surrounding villages which were close to the railway station. Am I right in supposing that up to the date of your arrival these railway officials were questioned by the police and up to that time they had not given the names of any persons whatsoever?

A. I don't know whether they had been questioned by the police, but they had given the names of very few people.

Q. It was after your arrival that more names were given?

A. Yes.

Q. And am I right in supposing that till your arrival only three persons were arrested and no more?

A. Very few.

Q. When you were asked on what you based your opinion, you stated that you have based your opinion about the whole agitation being anti-European on the frequent statements that were made before you when trying cases?

A. I have never said so. I said there were manifestations against Europeans. I have never said that the disturbances were anti-European.

Q. So far as your district is concerned, the assault on Mr. Wale is one?

A. Yes.

Q. The second one, the American Mission which was burnt at Chuharkana?

A. The man there escaped.

Q. So far as this thing is concerned, I don't think the missionary was inside the house at all?

A. He ran away to Lahore the morning that his house and mission were burnt.

Q. At what time was this house attacked?

A. He left in the day and his house was burnt at night.

Q. He had already left in the day time and his house was burnt in the night time?

A. Yes.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. Do I understand you rightly, that people were generally loyal but not law-abiding?

A. That was my experience in the Punjab in two other districts.

Q. What about the people of those districts that you were in charge of?

A. I have already said that I had no personal experience before I went to that place.

Q. When you got there did you find anything against the Government going on or any organisation or conspiracy? Apart from these disturbances?

A. No, I found nothing else.

Q. When you came to these *tahsils* so far as you could see was there anything in their general conduct to make you modify your opinion as regards the people of districts of which you have experience?

A. Nothing.

Q. Am I correct in concluding that there were a number of *badmashes* always ready for opportunity and loot?

A. Yes, always.

Q. You say something about ill-disposed pleaders at Sheikhpura and seditionists in the markets of Chuharkana and Sangla misrepresenting the Rowlatt Bill—how did they express themselves in this matter, was it done privately or in public?

A. Both at public meetings and in private talk.

Q. Did they go round asking people to protest by means of a *hartal*?

A. I am not in a position to say.

Q. Then on what is your statement based?

A. It is based on police and other reports.

Q. What sort of reports?

A. Probably reports from the Sub-Divisional Officer and reports from people who attended the meeting.

Q. I presume most of the protest was done through meetings?

A. Perhaps.

Q. I understand there was very easy communication between Amritsar and Lahore and these places and probably events which happened to Lahore were carried to those places in a day?

A. Yes.

Q. The disturbances there took place on the 14th, 15th and 16th, so probably they had news of what happened at Amritsar on the 18th?

A. Yes.

Q. You have stated that crowds very often visited the railway station to meet trains and the object is stated to have been to attack Europeans? Did they attack any Europeans in the train at all?

A. They asked for them on several occasions, but I think there were no Europeans on the train. There were about two trains each way and they used to run down and ask for them.

Q. The crowds used to go down to the station and ask for Europeans?

A. They were heard shouting out "any *gora log*!"

Q. Who heard that?

A. The railway officials.

Q. They made reports to you and on that you founded your statement?

A. I have not put that in my statement at all.

Q. You say in your statement "at about 2 P.M. after the troop train had departed, a large crowd of villagers and rioters from the *mandi* assembled and set to work to wreck the line between the canal bridge and the station. The arrival of the passenger train from Lahore diverted their attention to the station; the train was attacked and looted and the engine damaged. Following on this the station staff was assaulted." Is that so?

A. The station master was rather badly knocked about.

Q. On the 15th you mention that an armoured train arrived which picked up a portion of a crowd with its search light and opened fire with a machine gun. The rioters hastily dispersed and thereafter there was no more trouble. I take it that there was no more trouble in your jurisdiction?

A. There was no more fresh trouble.

Q. Martial Law was proclaimed in those two *tahsils*, but as everything was quiet after 15th what was the object of proclaiming Martial Law if that was so?

A. I have already given an answer to that. I think it was a good thing to keep on Martial Law for a bit longer.

Q. But if everything was quiet what was the necessity for proclaiming Martial Law?

A. It was a good thing to teach the people what Martial Law is and also in case of any further outbreak it shows how quickly the *sarkar* gets on to them.

17 December 1919.]

Mr. B. N. BOSWORTH-SMITH—concluded—RAI SAHIB LALA SRI RAM SUD.

Q. If there is a possibility of a further outbreak then must Martial Law be imposed for ever?

A. No; that does not follow at all.

Q. You say the total number of really disaffected persons in this district was probably under three figures, though some ten thousand persons took part in demonstrations, looting or destroying without really knowing what they were doing?

A. Yes.

Q. Whom would you really call disaffected persons?

A. I cannot enumerate them all, but disaffected persons are those who are always ready to proceed to violence in order to attain their ends.

Q. But such persons were very few and the rest may be ready for mischief?

A. They thought they could go to Lahore and they thought that the end of the *sarkar* had come.

Q. You describe the black flag as an emblem of violence—is it not an emblem of sorrow?

A. It is generally used when violent action is contemplated.

Q. So you have experience of it being used in that way?

A. I cannot give you instances.

Q. Where is it generally used?

A. Generally in the Punjab. I cannot give you instances, but I have heard that it is used for purposes connected with violence.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Surprise has been expressed at the fact that when you made a certain number of arrests you only sent up eight for trial. Is that due to the salutary rule that persons will not be sent up for trial when there is not more than one witness against the accused?

A. Yes.

Q. With regard to very many persons who confessed their guilt, did you take measures to see that there was no undue pressure brought to bear on them?

A. The police had no dealings in the matter at all.

Q. After how many days were these men tried?

A. About six or eight days.

Q. And where would they remain in the meantime?

A. They remained in police custody.

Q. When you brought these men up did you ask them whether they were confessing voluntarily and did they appear to confess voluntarily?

A. It was quite clear that they were guilty.

Q. Were you ordinarily present when these floggings were being administered?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell us approximately how many men were present at these floggings?

A. There were about twenty or thirty persons, if the man being whipped howled, to see what was happening.

Rai Sahib LALA SRI RAM SUD, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Sub-Divisional Officer, Sheikhpura.

By the President—

Q. I think you were in charge of the Sharakpur sub-division of the Gujranwala District?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And your head-quarters were at Sheikhpura?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you were there during the whole of the disturbances?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. I see that nothing happened in Sharakpur *tahsil* except that telephone wires were broken near Muridke?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it ever discovered who did that damage?

A. It remained untraced.

Q. You start off by explaining what happened at Sheikhpura and I see that there was *hartal* on the 8th of April?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And there was a meeting at which a certain amount of political discussion ensued?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Had that a tendency to excite people?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I see there was a calm on the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th April?

A. Yes; there was an outward calm.

Q. I think you left for Gujranwala on the 10th April?

A. On the evening of the 10th.

Q. You returned to Gujranwala on the 13th of April?

A. Yes.

Q. I think your train ran all right on that day although there was some discussion as to whether it would go or not?

A. I had no connecting train at Shahdara but the train from Gujranwala to Shahdara ran all right, but I missed connection and I had to go in a *tonga*.

Q. How far is that?

A. 19 miles from Shahdara.

Q. Did you travel that distance in a *tonga*?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you got back to head-quarters at Sheikhpura in the afternoon was there a second *hartal* at Sheikhpura on the 14th April?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. There was a free *langar* opened for the people?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was there a riot in the afternoon at a baker's shop?

A. Yes the same evening.

Q. Why was that?

A. Some people sold *jhatka* meat and some Muhammadans objected. On this matter there was a riot and those people who sympathised with the *hartal* came and threw things down from his shop as they did not like it.

Q. After dark were the telegraph lines interfered with?

A. The same evening both postal and railway telegraph lines.

Q. And this resulted in delaying the Bombay Mail?

A. Yes, both the Bombay Mail and a troop train. The delay of these trains arose from the fact that the main line near Gujranwala was broken.

Q. You heard about that damage on the morning of the 15th and did you visit the place and make arrangements for the damage being repaired?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that damage serious?

A. It was a serious damage because it stopped the train from going and telegraphic communication was also stopped. I had to wait till telegraphic communication was restored in order to send telegrams to my officers.

Q. Did you send a telegraphic message asking for military assistance and were you apprehensive of the situation?

A. I was very apprehensive that the situation would get out of hand.

Q. Are the people of Chuharkana in close commercial relationship with Lahore and Amritsar?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You refer to a meeting that was held on the 11th?

A. That was held during my absence on the evening of the 11th.

Q. Was another meeting held on the 13th near Chuharkana village?

A. On the 12th there was a meeting and again on the 13th.

Q. Were violent speeches delivered at any of these meetings?

A. Yes, Sir. Violent speeches were made both on the 12th and 13th.

Q. Did you get a report at the time?

A. I did not get a report from anybody. I was away and I came to know later.

Q. Nothing particular happened on the 14th?

A. No, nothing happened.

17 December 1919.]

Rai Sahib LALA SRI RAM SUD.

[Continued.]

Q. On the 15th what occurred?

A. On the morning of 15th a number of people from the Chuharkana market—shop-keepers and others—went and broke a part of the rail road near the canal bridge. After some time a troop train came and found the lines broken. A permanent way man was also there and in order to let the troop train pass he had that damage repaired and then the troop train passed.

Q. After the troop train passed the damage was done again?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was this done by another crowd?

A. Another and a bigger crowd because the people of Chuharkana also joined.

Q. On this occasion was the line torn up?

A. The line and the telegraph wires were also put out of action for a considerable distance.

Q. After that had been done did the mob turn their attention to the station?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What did they do there?

A. They burnt the station and looted it. There was a safe inside the station master's room which was looted. There was also Rs. 1,500 worth of jewellery belonging to the station master on leave which he had left behind together with some notes and all this was also looted. The jewellery was subsequently found intact in the possession of a rioter.

Q. Was a railway train held up?

A. Yes, the railway train was held up. It reached just about the time the station was burnt.

Q. Was any looting done?

A. The contents of the brake van were looted which consisted of fruit and vegetables.

Q. Was not damage done to the train?

A. I found the glasses broken and the machinery of the engine was smashed and besides this they looted a number of tickets which they scattered. They told people that they could get free tickets to Calcutta and other places.

Q. That same night did you receive word as to damage being done by a crowd?

A. The same evening at 5 o'clock I received a telegram from a member of the notified area. As a matter of fact I had sent for the members that morning and asked them why they had allowed a *hartal* to be held on the morning of the 16th; and they told me that they were trying to prevent people from putting stones on the railway line. When I heard about this I told them to go back and look after the line and they probably delayed in doing so as they were going in *tongas* and their horses had to be fed.

Q. Was that about 12 o'clock?

A. At 10 o'clock again came the *saidar* of that place and informed me that about 2,000 or 3,000 people had assembled at the canal bridge and he heard rumours that other people beyond Chuharkana were pulling up the rail road towards Sangla side. This was at about 10 o'clock in the evening. Then came the armoured train.

Q. Did you get into the armoured train?

A. I got into the armoured train.

Q. And did you proceed to Chuharkana station?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you move slowly and carefully along the line?

A. Yes, because we were afraid that the lines on the way might be torn up.

Q. Did you find any obstructions on the line?

A. We found one pointsman's box placed across the line just as we were nearing Chuharkana station, i.e., near the distant signal.

Q. After removing that did you proceed further?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see any men about?

A. We saw men about and then from what we had heard, we thought it advisable to open fire.

Q. Did you open fire?

A. We did open fire.

Q. Were there many men on whom you opened fire? Was there a large crowd?

A. There were men, but I cannot say how many men were there, because the night was not moon-lit. We could only see by the searchlight. We only found one man dead in the morning and probably there might have been more people dead, but we did not know. People might have been removed during the night.

Q. When you took that action, what opinion had you as regards the intentions of these people?

A. They were probably out for mischief on the line.

Q. Was there any lawful occasion for their being on the line?

A. There was no lawful occasion for their being on the line at that time.

Q. If you had not removed that pointsman's box from the line, might it have derailed the train?

A. Quite so.

Q. Did you next morning find not only the body of the one man who was killed, but also a coil of broken telegraph wires?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that found near the man?

A. Quite near the man.

Q. Did you know how that wire had been broken?

A. We did not know whether he was in the crowd or broke it later on. This man did not belong to Chuharkana village or market, but came from another village; probably he came as other people from neighbouring villages were rushing towards Chuharkana market to loot it. He was a *machchi* by caste and belonged to Kujar; he had no connection with the market or with Chuharkana village ostensibly, but had evidently come for the purpose of looting.

Q. Did you then proceed to Chuharkana Station itself?

A. Yes.

Q. What happened to the mob after you had fired?

A. They heard our gun shots; of course the searchlight could be seen from a distance. They dispersed before our arrival.

Q. You were using a searchlight?

A. Yes, we were still suspecting that there might be some hiding themselves in the neighbourhood; we got down from the armoured train and went into a factory where we suspected some people were hiding. We actually forced open the door of a room and found a brand new *chavi* outside it and inside there was a stalwart young Jat. He had probably left the *chavi* outside. A *chavi* is a pointed weapon with a long sweep which can be fixed to a long handle. It is the weapon used in these parts to kill people.

Q. Were some rifle shots fired?

A. Yes.

Q. At whom?

A. They were fired in the dark simply to terrify people. There was no particular aim.

Q. So far as you could ascertain afterwards, was anyone killed?

A. No one was killed.

Q. Meantime it was daybreak and you proceeded along the line?

A. We proceeded to the village of Chuharkana, because it was some distance from the Chuharkana market.

Q. Did you then supervise the mending of the telegraph wires?

A. Yes.

Q. When you were there, did you notice any movement of a large number of people from the far side of the village?

A. Sitting in the armoured train, I noticed movements of people and we thought that they were arranging to attack us.

Q. What did you do?

A. Then we went into the village and we did some firing there; but no one was hurt in the village itself, so far as I know. Then during our absence, the machine gun was opened, because a number of people tried to get out of the house and I think two or three people were wounded and one man subsequently died.

Q. I see you refer to a number of people having armed themselves with a view to attack?

17 December 1919.]

Rai Sahib LALA SHI RAM SUD.

[Continued]

A. Yes, later on. I found from those very people of Chuharkana that they had in fact collected in places to attack us.

Q. Did you yourself actually see any hatchets in the hands of the people?

A. No; we had no occasion to go near a dangerous mob. But I heard from a reliable source.

Q. The next morning did you look for the bodies of people who might have been killed?

A. Yes, we went into the fields and we found the dead body of only one man.

Q. That is the one you have already referred to?

A. Yes.

Q. When you were engaged in that operation, did you see anything occur?

A. We saw a man waving a signal from the mission house there. The Rev. Smith, the owner of the house, who was residing there before had fled a day or two before, because some Indian-friends had told him that he might be molested, being a European; so he left by a night train.

Q. At this time, was there strong anti-European feeling among these villagers?

A. So it seemed. The gentleman had to fly for his life; and as a matter of fact in the train that was held up at Chuharkana, there was one man, Iqbal Singh, pleader, Lyallpur. There was also with him another young man, son of Khan Sahib Abdul Khudus, Sessions Judge in the Punjab, who was in European dress. As the train reached Chuharkana, Iqbal Singh gave him his pugree and asked him to change his European hat, and the young man did change. They were all held up and they had to stop in a house for the night. There was also an executive engineer; he was electrical engineer of Lyallpur and he was with his family. They were afraid of these looters. They hid themselves in a house and fastened it from inside, and they had brickbats and other things. I subsequently came to know this from the owner of the house and there were a number of women and children in the house. They were all crying for help just before we arrived. Not only this, but a good many people from that market had left for the fields and had to pass the night on filth.

Q. Do you mean to say that there was such a state of alarm?

A. Yes, my Lord.

Q. You saw that yourself?

A. I did not see the people in the fields, but I heard as soon as I went there the next morning.

Q. You are referring to the 16th?

A. Yes, I am referring to the night between 15th and 16th April.

Q. The armoured train returned to Lahore on the 16th?

A. Yes.

Q. Did it go back again to Chuharkana on the 17th?

A. On the 17th we went back again to Chuharkana.

Q. Did a party of soldiers come to the village to effect the arrest of somebody there?

A. Yes. They went to another village Padranwala close to Chuharkana. Ram Singh Thakuria who was wanted had fled towards that village from Chuharkana, of which he was a resident.

Q. Did you find from them that there had been some firing?

A. As the soldiers returned, they told us that there was some firing because two men armed with guns fired at them and in exchange they had also to fire upon them.

Q. Coming to Dhaban Singh and Moman, these are two railway stations situated, as we know, between Chuharkana and Sangala?

A. Yes.

Q. Were both those stations burnt?

A. Both stations were burnt and the goods lying on the station premises looted.

Q. Were large mobs engaged in these acts of incendiarism?

A. Two whole villages were concerned in the looting of Dhaban Singh station, and so far as my informa-

tion goes, 8 or 9 villages were concerned in the looting of Moman station.

Q. Was much loot obtained at these occasions?

A. No loot was obtained from the station. Some rice was taken from Dhaban Singh station and we came to know it was thrown in the pond on our arrival.

Q. On the morning of the 16th was through communication restored?

A. Yes, my Lord.

Q. And did you then proceed in the armoured train towards Sangala?

A. Yes, because Sangala was also within my subdivision.

Q. Where is that village Mahnianwala?

A. It is between Moman and Dhaban Singh.

Q. Did anything occur there?

A. Yes, as both the villages of Mahnianwala and Pakka Dalla were concerned in the mischief in the case of Dhaban Singh, and had looted that station, I and the Officer Commanding took counsel together and thought it advisable that some lesson must be taught to these villagers. Then we walked into the village. I had no occasion to go into Pakka Dalla village, because it is further away. Mahnianwala is nearer at a distance of one mile. Myself, the Officer Commanding and some soldiers walked together, and on the way a crowd that was in the fields was fired upon.

Q. Was that crowd bent on mischief in your opinion?

A. Yes, the whole countryside was bent on mischief in those days. It was only after this firing had been done that they came to their senses.

Q. You effected the arrest of the village lambardar?

A. Yes.

Q. Had he been engaged in any of these things?

A. His son was involved.

Q. Had the lambardar himself personally anything to do with these things?

A. I do not think so. At any rate he ought to have given information. He could stop his son from joining the mob. He, being a lambardar, it was his duty to give information.

Q. He gave no information?

A. No.

Q. Did you then proceed to Sangla?

A. Yes.

Q. I think there had been a *hartal* there on the 12th April?

A. Yes.

Q. And wires had been cut in several places on the night of 15-16th?

A. Yes, in three directions, towards Sangla Hill, Hafizabad and towards Lahore.

Q. Was a European telegraph inspector attacked by a religious fanatic?

A. Yes.

Q. At Sangla then did you learn that the station of Marh Bilochan was in danger?

A. I saw a note written by a lambardar, when I went to Sangla. On seeing that note, I took the armoured train there, because I had to arrange for the safety of the station. After I had arranged for the safety of the station, we came again.

Q. Did all go well after the 18th?

A. Yes, nothing happened.

Q. On the 19th April, I think Lt.-Col. O'Brien visited the affected places?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he take part along with you?

A. Of course, he being the Deputy Commissioner, I had to work under him.

Q. Did you supervise the police investigation?

A. Yes, thereafter.

Q. Was it at Sheikhpura?

A. Both at Sheikhpura and Chuharkana.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Had you anything to do with the cases which Mr. Bosworth-Smith tried?

A. I had not except that I supervised the preliminary police investigation.

Q. Were you present in court when he tried cases on any particular occasion?

17 December 1919.]

Rai Sahib LALA SRI RAM SUD.

[Continued.]

A. Once.

Q. Do you remember whether on that occasion lots of people pleaded guilty?

A. Yes.

Q. From what you saw there, were the people pleading guilty genuinely?

A. Yes, as a matter of fact people came to confess what they had done.

Q. As I understand the identification parades were the basis of the crown case or had you independent witnesses?

A. That and also the evidence of the notified area committee members. The committee members were all reliable people and they also testified.

Q. Then as regards the bulk of the people who were tried by Mr. Bosworth-Smith, were they charged with rioting?

A. They were charged with breaking the lines and the telegraph. This is a most serious charge under the Railway Act.

By Sir. C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Lala Sri Ram, how many years have you been employed in these parts?

A. I joined Sheikhupura on the 24th August 1918. That is, I was there about six months before these disturbances took place.

Q. Before that were you in some other districts?

A. I was in a good many districts of the Punjab.

Q. Your service is a long one in the Punjab?

A. Yes.

Q. You have known the people of the Punjab intimately, I take it?

A. Yes; they are my countrymen and I know them very well.

Q. Have you found the people in the Punjab, in your experience all these years, loyal and law-abiding?

A. Not since some time.

Q. Up to what period did you find them loyal?

A. Some time before these occurrences I had found them openly talking against Government in the railway trains.

Q. When did that begin?

A. I was not a touring officer before I came to Sheikhupura, but since I became touring officer, I found that.

Q. I want the period?

A. Nearly seven months.

Q. Before what?

A. Before these occurrences.

Q. Seven months before April 1919?

A. Yes.

Q. Till then they were perfectly loyal?

A. Not that even.

Q. They were never loyal?

A. Not never, but not everyone of them.

Q. You cannot expect everyone in a country to be loyal? When you speak of the Punjab, you cannot single out individuals.

A. But I did not meet everybody in the Punjab. I met only some; out of this some I found some not loyal.

Q. You are an experienced officer of the Punjab and surely you can give me a general view as to your opinion about the people of the Punjab. In your experience did you find them generally loyal and law-abiding?

A. So far as the ignorant people are concerned, they know nothing about loyalty and disloyalty. They cannot make any difference.

Q. Surely, Lala, you can answer this simple question?

A. The word generally means a lot. It is not a simple question.

Q. You understand what loyalty means?

A. It is very difficult to define things, but I understand it according to my light.

Q. You are the first officer who has found difficulty in answering this question. So many officers have in one way or another answered this question?

A. I have to give a correct answer.

Q. I do not mean to suggest that you should give an incorrect answer.

A. I do not say you want to suggest to me that I should give a wrong answer. As a witness, I am supposed to give a true answer.

Q. What is your experience? Did you generally find people loyal?

A. With regard to which class, the masses or the educated class?

Q. Take the masses first?

A. The masses so far have been loyal.

Q. Did they also begin to show signs of disloyalty during these 7 months that you referred to or not?

A. Not before the Amritsar occurrences.

Q. Till we come to the 10th April or somewhere about that, the masses were loyal?

A. Yes, about the 10th or 6th April, when the agitation began.

Q. I will take the beginning of April. Up to that the masses were quite loyal?

A. I think so.

Q. Then the educated classes compared to the masses are very infinitesimal?

A. They are very impulsive, I should say.

Q. That is not my question. They are infinitesimal; they are a small minority compared to the masses?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they loyal or disloyal before the 7 months?

A. Some loyal and some disloyal.

Q. As a class did you find them loyal or disloyal?

A. It is very difficult to say 'as a class' what their attitude was. I can only give the names of a few people whom I met and who were loyal. I have not met everybody.

Q. Do you consider yourself among the educated class?

A. I think so.

Q. Now, the educated classes, you will agree, Lala, are the product of the western education that the British Government have given to them?

A. Yes, they are.

Q. And their influence and position is intimately bound up with the maintenance of British rule in this country?

A. Quite so.

Q. Therefore even pure self-interest will dictate loyalty?

A. They ought to be loyal if they think of this.

Q. Did you say that some of them were perverse?

A. Not all of them.

Q. Was it a very small proportion?

A. I cannot say a very small proportion, but I would say some of them.

Q. You would grant then that the bulk of them are loyal?

A. I cannot say that. Some are loyal and some disloyal.

Q. Have you met with more loyal people or disloyal people?

A. That I cannot say, because I have never counted the number. Some loyal and some disloyal.

Q. These masses were loyal according to you up to the beginning of April. How did it happen that they so suddenly took part in these disturbances?

A. With regard to the masses, so far as I have come to know, most of the trouble was due to the fact that false rumours were circulated to these masses that the golden temple at Amritsar was being bombarded. This I learnt from a leader Jagat Singh, who was concerned in the Dhaban Singh loot. It was due not only to this cause, but there are other causes also. This agitation about the Rowlatt Act also had something to do with it, because *hartal* and meetings took place in Chubarkana in connection with the Rowlatt Act. That prepared the greater part of the ground.

Q. You attribute these disturbances in Sheikhupura and the adjoining places to the agitation over the Rowlatt Act and the rumours that came about the golden temple at Amritsar having been bombarded?

A. Yes.

Q. That excited the crowd?

A. Yes.

17 December 1919.]

Rai Sahib LALA SRI RAM SUD.

[Continued.]

Q. Then I suppose that the people who were out for loot, they joined merely for loot?

A. Not only for loot, because when Chuharkana Station was looted, a member tried to stop it, and the men said they would not stop.

Q. Which member?

A. Member of the Notified Area.

Q. Were you present?

A. No, I was not.

Q. Then you had better not give that. We want what you actually know.

A. Why not if you want me to hear fully? I have deposed to many things which are not within my personal knowledge; but as a matter of fact, I was the officer in charge of the sub-division and I know things better than anybody else.

Q. My only question was this, Lala: that a considerable number of people who joined in those disturbances from the various villages joined because they thought that this was a good opportunity to loot. Is it not so?

A. Not simply this; I am going to answer this question.

Q. Was loot one of the objects or not?

A. It became that object later, but not when the railway lines were broken first.

Q. With what object did they come?

A. The object was religious; they thought of the religious persecution by the British Government with reference to the bombarding of the golden temple.

Q. That brought them on?

A. That brought them on; of course, as I have said in my statement, seditious speeches were made on the 13th, before a large crowd by two men.

Q. Were you present at that meeting?

A. I heard a good deal about it.

Q. Did you get reports about that meeting?

A. I heard reports as soon as I came back from Gujranwala, as soon as I had occasion to go there.

Q. Kindly follow me and do not be hasty. Was any official present at that meeting?

A. There was one sub-inspector, who unfortunately was busy with the dispersing of the rioters at the *mela* and he could not attend the meeting and find out what was going on.

Q. There was no official present at the meeting?

A. Not at the meeting, but somewhere near.

Q. No official was present at the meeting?

A. Because none knew that seditious speeches were going to be delivered.

Q. The reason is another matter. No official was present. We want to get at the facts.

A. No.

Q. Therefore no report could have been made to you or to any other officer of what happened at the meeting, by any official?

A. Yes, but the report of other people is just as good as that of an officer.

Q. What you are saying is from what you heard from some other people?

A. Some reliable people.

Q. You have no official record of any speech made at that meeting?

A. No official record.

Q. This is about Chuharkana?

A. Yes.

Q. In Chuharkana on the 11th April there was a meeting?

A. Yes, on the evening of the 11th, there was a meeting in the mosque, a union meeting between the Hindus and Muhammadans; there they distributed sweetmeats to each other, and pledged to stand together.

Q. You think that was wrong?

A. So far as this went, it was not wrong, but the meeting became wrong by reason of what happened later.

Q. There was nothing wrong about the meeting of the 11th?

A. In itself, no.

Q. On the 12th you had a *hartal*?

A. And a seditious meeting in which two men came from a village 20 miles away.

Q. I am first dealing with the *hartal*?

A. Yes, I want to give out the whole thing at once. Q. On the 12th April you had the *hartal*?

A. Yes.

Q. And that *hartal* passed off peacefully?

A. There was no disturbance but there was a meeting in which sedition was preached.

Q. We are now dealing with the *harta*. Will you concentrate attention on that?

A. Sir, you have to take my answer with the qualifications I have to make.

Q. I am going to ask you about the meeting. The *hartal* passed off without any disturbance?

A. Will you not allow me to qualify my answer?

Q. It did pass off without any disturbance?

A. No disturbance.

Q. There was a meeting on the 12th?

A. There was a meeting on the 12th in which sedition was preached.

Q. Where was this meeting?

A. At the grain market.

Q. What was the meeting about?

A. Two men gave the incidents at Lyallpur.

Q. What was it called for ostensibly?

A. Ostensibly to preach against the Rowlatt Act.

Q. And did they pass any particular resolutions at that meeting?

A. No resolutions were passed but they talked a good deal.

Q. Were any resolutions passed protesting against the Bill or to petition the Secretary of State or the Government of India?

A. The people were not sufficiently educated to know that resolutions should be passed.

Q. How many people were there?

A. About 200.

Q. Of Chuharkana?

A. Chuharkana.

Q. Were you present?

A. No.

Q. You had no official information of what was done at that meeting?

A. Because no official was present. I had none.

Q. On the 13th and 14th you had the *Basakhi* festival?

A. On the 13th only, not on the 14th.

Q. And there was a fair?

A. A big fair.

Q. All that passed off peacefully, there was no disturbance?

A. No disturbance showing that they were against Government.

Q. There was a *hartal* on the 15th, was there?

A. There was a *hartal* on the 15th at Sheikhupura, not at Chuharkana.

Q. All these happenings that you have deposed to took place within 4 days?

A. Yes, within 4 days. The disturbances ended on the night of the 16th. Most of what happened happened on the night between the 15th and the 16th. There was no repetition because of the firing.

Q. After the 16th nothing happened?

A. After the 16th, no, so far as the people were concerned; except that it was reported to me that the station of Mir Bilochi was in danger.

Q. So far as Chuharkana and these other places you have spoken about are concerned, everything was over by the 16th?

A. Yes.

Q. You say that was the result of firing?

A. I think so.

Q. Things became quiet because you fired?

A. Yes.

Q. About this armoured train that came from Lahore, was it asked for or how was it sent?

A. I wrote to Government for 100 British soldiers early on the morning of the 15th as I found that the railway and the telegraph wires at Sheikhupura had been broken during the previous evening.

17 December 1919.]

Rai Sahib LALA SRI RAM SUD.

[Continued.]

- Q. You asked for military?  
A. Yes for military aid.  
Q. And an armoured train was sent down?  
A. Yes, it came about midnight.  
Q. It came first to Sheikhpura?  
A. Yes.  
Q. And you got in there?  
A. Yes.  
Q. At what time?  
A. We left Sheikhpura at 11-55.  
Q. And as you have told us, it was a dark night?  
A. As far as I remember.  
Q. You had British soldiers on the armoured train?  
A. Yes.  
Q. How many?  
A. I cannot say the actual strength.  
Q. And you had machine guns?  
A. I think so.  
Q. How many?  
A. I did not try to find out.  
Q. And you had searchlights?  
A. Yes.  
Q. From Sheikhpura you proceeded to Chuharkana on the train?  
A. Yes.  
Q. When did you reach Chuharkana?  
A. I cannot say. In my estimation we might have taken two hours; it was a distance of 9 miles.  
Q. Then you say you saw certain men on whom you opened fire?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Where did you find them?  
A. They were near the distant signal towards Chuharkana.  
Q. Where were they, on the line itself or outside?  
A. Outside.  
Q. Outside the railway railing?  
A. The railway fence you mean? There is no railway fence there, it only stretches up to the station yard.  
Q. How many people were there?  
A. I cannot say; there were a good number.  
Q. You could not see?  
A. I might be able to see, but I could not see how many they were.  
Q. The searchlight was thrown on them?  
A. Yes, but it could not make them so very distinct. Perhaps we could see more distinctly in front than on each side. At any rate I found it so.  
Q. The searchlight would throw its light in front and not on the sides?  
A. It turns to the sides also, and it was by turning the light to the sides that we were able to discover their presence.  
Q. By turning the searchlight on them you must have been able to see them? Could you not see how many there were, whether they were five or more?  
A. There may have been five or more but from what I have come to know the number must have been more.  
Q. Anything may be possible; I am only asking you how many you saw?  
A. I have answered the question; I cannot say.  
Q. Did anybody else see them?  
A. Those who were on the train might be questioned and they may give an answer.  
Q. Did you see what they were doing there, were they standing or what were they doing?  
A. We found, as I have written in my statement, a coil of wire.  
Q. You found it afterwards? You found that wire after the firing, not before?  
A. Yes, after the firing, next morning.  
Q. When you fired you had not seen the wire?  
A. No.  
Q. When you saw them by the searchlight what were they doing?  
A. I cannot say. They were standing very probably or doing something; I could not see anything.  
Q. You did not make out what they were doing?  
A. No.  
Q. And who decided to open fire on them, did you or the soldiers?  
A. Myself and the Officer Commanding.  
Q. Who ordered it?  
A. We took counsel together. If an order was necessary, I am ready to take the responsibility.  
Q. I only want to get at the facts as to who decided to fire.  
A. Both, I myself and the Officer Commanding.  
Q. You consulted together and decided to fire?  
A. Yes.  
Q. When you consulted together, on what did you come to the conclusion that you should fire?  
A. Because we had already come to know that a mob of so many had assembled near the canal bridge. I knew it, there was reliable information with me.  
Q. When you came at this point and saw these people standing there by means of the searchlight you had no particular information about these people being there?  
A. It mattered little whether they were near there or at some distance; we knew there was a big mob at Chuharkana.  
Q. You knew the people of Chuharkana had assembled at some time, that there was a large mob? That must have been early in the day?  
A. Not early in the day; I learnt about it at 10 o'clock in the evening.  
Q. But when had they assembled?  
A. They were still there even at 2 o'clock in the morning. As I said, they were out for looting the market.  
Q. At this point you did not see the mob at all?  
A. Of course we could not see the mob, as I say the information was given at the canal bridge which was probably a mile away.  
Q. From the point where you were, the crowd you had heard about, if still there, was over a mile away?  
A. I had not simply heard the mob was there, I had also heard that the people from neighbouring villages were rushing towards Chuharkana to loot it.  
Q. Therefore you believed the people you saw standing there were people come to loot the market?  
A. Yes, and to do damage to the railway line.  
Q. And, therefore, without any further enquiry, you opened fire?  
A. Yes, we determined to open fire.  
Q. And your idea was, as you have said once or twice, that you wanted to strike terror?  
A. Yes, certainly.  
Q. You had started on the armoured train with the intention to strike terror?  
A. Yes, if necessary. We found it necessary; we found men near about the line.  
Q. After that firing did you proceed further to the station?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Did you do anything there?  
A. Yes, as I said we came to know that there were some police people at Chuharkana who were fearing for their own lives and for their wives.  
Q. You are now speaking of the return journey?  
A. No, I am speaking of the outward journey. As we reached the station the few people of the police who were there and who had tried to dissuade these people from tearing up the line, without success, came and informed us that the mob was no longer there and had fled on hearing the shots that we had fired from the machine gun, and they also informed us that some people were hiding in a factory near by.  
Q. You went to the factory then?  
A. Yes, we got down from the armoured car and went to the factory.  
Q. That was in the night?  
A. Yes.  
Q. And having got back from the factory, you proceeded on your journey?  
A. No, it was daylight then. We had to pass the remainder of the night there.  
Q. Then in the morning you pulled up your armoured train at a village? How far was that village?  
A. It was about a mile off.  
Q. And is it on the railway line?

17 December 1919.]

Rai Sahib LALA SRI RAM SUB.

[Continued]

- A. Yes, quite close to the railway line.
- Q. So you moved your armoured train from the station to a place in front of this village and pulled it up there?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And then you fired into the village, did you?
- A. I have said in my statement that while we were in the armoured train we noticed the movement of a number of people in the village.
- Q. Yes, I will deal with that in a minute. How far were these people whose movements you saw from the train?
- A. So far as the eyesight could reach.
- Q. How many yards from you?
- A. I cannot give the number of yards. It was as far as my eyesight went.
- Q. You were on the railway line?
- A. Yes, and I could see the movement of the people.
- Q. You were in your armoured train opposite to the village? The village consists of houses?
- A. Yes, but we discovered the movements of the people on the outskirts of the village.
- Q. That is between the village houses and the railway line?
- A. No, on the other side.
- Q. There must be several rows of houses, there cannot be only one row?
- A. Yes, but I am speaking of the outskirts of the village. The outskirts could be seen, but not the inside of the village.
- Q. Where were these people, on the other side or where?
- A. By other side I do not mean a place which I could not see. I mean they were near the village, but on the outskirts of the village, and that I could see them from the armoured train.
- Q. Were they between you and the village houses?
- A. No.
- Q. Between you and the village houses there was nothing?
- A. No.
- Q. Where were these people?
- A. These people were on one side of the village.
- Q. What do you mean by other side? Do you mean behind the houses?
- A. No, I do not mean that, I mean a side that I could see myself.
- Q. They were in some outskirt that you could see?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How many were there?
- A. I could see movements of people.
- Q. You could not see the people at all?
- A. I could see the people. Some of them could be seen moving on horseback a little further away. I could not give an exact idea of their number.
- Q. You must have formed some idea? You cannot say whether they were 5 or 10 or 100?
- A. No, I say I discovered movements of people.
- Q. You saw the people and you cannot tell me whether there were five or a hundred?
- A. I cannot tell you. There might have been a hundred people hidden behind.
- Q. I am asking you about the people you saw?
- A. There were a good many people. They were considerably more than five certainly.
- Q. Could you see their faces from there very well?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What were their movements?
- A. They were moving.
- Q. I want to know what you mean by saying you saw their movements, what movements?
- A. They were not committing any mischief, I do not say that. They were probably in consultation.
- Q. They were not committing any mischief?
- A. No, not at that time.
- Q. What were their actual movements?
- A. People were coming into and going out of the village.
- Q. You did not know what their object was?
- A. As I came to know later their object was to attack us in the armoured train.
- Q. Their object was to attack you?
- A. Yes; they were collecting and some were going to call other people.
- Q. From looking at them in the distance you made out that they were going to call people from the village to attack you?
- A. No, I did not say so. I said I learnt about it later, but we could guess that they were meaning some mischief to us.
- Q. It is true that you learnt that afterwards; I am dealing now with what happened then?
- A. Unfortunately I cannot eliminate things that are in my brain; I have to take things together.
- Q. What we are dealing with now is what you saw at that time and what materials you had then, and what your frame of mind was. For that purpose what you learnt afterwards is utterly useless. When you refer to their movements, what were their actual movements?
- A. As I said they were coming and going. I fancied they were collected for some object.
- Q. You saw some people going into the village and some people coming out of it and from that you concluded that they were collecting to attack you?
- A. Yes, they were collecting with some sinister purpose.
- Q. From the mere fact that some people were going into the village and some coming out at the time, you concluded that they were assembling for some sinister purpose?
- A. Yes. I knew what their temper was before. We were still there and they had collected and had not gone into hiding.
- Q. May I take it in this way, that because when you arrived in your armoured train they did not go into hiding, you thought they were out for some sinister object?
- A. Not exactly. I knew these men had done mischief, and on the arrival of the armoured train they did not disperse, and as they were still moving about I knew some mischief was intended.
- Q. You say these people had done the mischief?
- A. The whole village was there, I could not make any distinction.
- Q. You did not make any distinction?
- A. No, certainly not, and as a matter of fact the whole village was there.
- Q. And you considered the whole village to be guilty?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And because they were not in hiding and were still showing themselves you thought you were entitled to fire?
- A. Those people ought to have dispersed in the ordinary course.
- Q. Your view was that when your armoured train arrived opposite the village, no villager ought to be seen, is that your idea? That is what it comes to?
- A. It does not come to that, that no villager should be seen.
- Q. When the armoured train came there you noticed certain movements?
- A. Yes I noticed certain movements and I concluded those movements were intended for some sinister object.
- Q. What I want to know is why did you conclude that?
- A. They were not there in the morning; they had collected then; why were they there?
- Q. What time of day was this, early in the morning?
- A. It was about 12 or 1.
- Q. And your idea was that they had no business to be going out of or coming into the village at that time?
- A. Not going out and coming in. They had some horses with them, why had they these with them?
- Q. These village people should not have any horses at all?
- A. No, but they should not be on their horses at that time.
- Q. Your reason for concluding that you must fire was because you saw some people on horses, is that so?



17 December 1919.]

Rai Sahib LALA SRI RAM SUD.

[Continued.]

- A. As I say, this was one of the factors; do not take things in an isolated manner.
- Q. One of the factors on which you decided to fire was that you saw people on horses?
- A. Yes, some coming and some going.
- Q. And you thought these people had no business to be on horses at all?
- A. Not at that time.
- Q. And on that you fired?
- A. Yes.
- Q. That was the joint action of yourself and the officer?
- A. Yes; we went into the village. I took the party into the village.
- Q. When you left the armoured train it had not fired?
- A. The armoured train had not fired at that time.
- Q. Then you decided you should fire?
- A. At that time we held no consultation as to whether firing should take place or not.
- Q. When you saw the movements of the crowd you did not then decide to fire?
- A. We did not then decide to fire, but we went into the village with the idea of dispersing them.
- Q. You did not then decide to fire?
- A. Not at that time.
- Q. Those movements did not decide you then to fire?
- A. They made us go into the village.
- Q. For what purpose?
- A. To see what was happening.
- Q. Who else went into the village?
- A. British soldiers and the Officer Commanding.
- Q. How many?
- A. I cannot say, probably 10 or 12.
- Q. You went to the village with a machine gun?
- A. No, with rifles.
- Q. Did you go into the village?
- A. We went into the village, but we found nobody there. Very few people were there.
- Q. You first went into the village?
- A. I think so; we first went into the village.
- Q. In the village you found very few people? Had they gone out of the village, or were they in their houses?
- A. I cannot say where they were.
- Q. What did you do next?
- A. We went out and saw a number of people and the British soldiers fired, but it did not take effect.
- Q. Where did you see them?
- A. On the outskirts of the village.
- Q. At the same place as you had seen those people before?
- A. On the same side.
- Q. When you saw the people what were they doing?
- A. I cannot say.
- Q. You did not notice what they were doing?
- A. I have already said what they were doing.
- Q. But you now came near them, you had first seen them from the train; you had now alighted, did you see what they were doing?
- A. At that time I did not notice what they were doing.
- Q. You did not care to enquire what they were doing?
- A. I did not care to enquire.
- Q. You at once decided to fire?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Why did you decide to fire?
- A. Because we knew they were out for mischief. I had already come to know these men were doing some mischief.
- Q. Because you had the fixed idea in your mind that these people were bent on mischief you fired?
- A. Yes.
- Q. When you reached near them you did not enquire what they were doing at the time?
- A. No.
- Q. Or look at them?
- A. We were looking at them.
- Q. You did not care to see what they were doing, you straightaway opened fire at them? How many shots were fired?
- A. I do not know, some shots were fired.
- Q. How many people were killed?
- A. I do not think anybody was killed; one man was wounded.
- Q. And did you do this also to teach the people a lesson and strike terror?
- A. I said to avert that danger.
- Q. To avoid the danger of their doing further mischief?
- A. And attacking, and eventually it was found that they were ready to attack.
- Q. After having done this, did you go back to the train?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And then to what place did you move the train?
- A. We stopped there for some time mending the telegraph wires and then returned to Sheikhupura, because we had to look after Sheikhupura as well, and the armoured train went to Lahore.
- Q. This was on the 16th?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And the armoured train came back on the 17th?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Where did you board it?
- A. At Sheikhupura again.
- Q. Did the armoured train do anything at Sheikhupura?
- A. It did nothing.
- Q. Then you proceeded where?
- A. Proceeded to Chuharkana.
- Q. At what time did you proceed to Chuharkana?
- A. Might be about 10 o'clock.
- Q. 10 o'clock in the night?
- A. In the morning.
- Q. What did you do there?
- A. Nothing was done.
- Q. Did you pull up at the station or opposite the village?
- A. Opposite the village, because those wires had to be mended again.
- Q. What did you do?
- A. Nothing was done at Chuharkana.
- Q. No further firing?
- A. No.
- Q. Then you went further?
- A. Not that day. I returned to Sheikhupura.
- Q. Nothing further was done on that day, the 17th?
- A. No.
- Q. Did you again go in the armoured car on the 18th?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You again started from Sheikhupura?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Where did you go?
- A. Now that communication was restored I wanted to visit those places again. I have said in my statement: 'We pulled up the armoured train between Dhaban Singh and Moman
- Q. Is Dhaban Singh a railway station?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And Moman?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You pulled up somewhere between the stations? What did you do?
- A. We went to Mahnianwala village, a village which had taken considerable part in the disturbances.
- Q. You came with soldiers?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What did you do there?
- A. On the way, a crowd was seen and they were fired on.
- Q. Where?
- A. Near Mahnianwala.
- Q. Outside it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What was the number?
- A. I cannot give the number. It was a crowd.
- Q. Will it be 10 or 15 people?
- A. More than that.

17 December 1919.]

Rai Sahib LALA SRI RAM SUB.

[Continued.]

Q. How many?  
 A. More than 25.  
 Q. What were they doing?  
 A. There was the crowd. They did nothing. I cannot say they were doing anything.  
 Q. At what distance were you from it?  
 A. About 2 furlongs, I should say.  
 Q. You did not see what they were doing?  
 A. No.  
 Q. You did not care to see?  
 A. No.  
 Q. In what direction were they going? Were they standing or moving?  
 A. They were probably standing.  
 Q. You were not sure?  
 A. They were probably standing.  
 Q. What do you mean by 'probably'? You were not sure? They might be moving in some direction?  
 A. They were there.  
 Q. What were they doing? Were they standing there or moving?  
 A. Some might be standing and some might be moving.  
 Q. You do not know what they were doing?  
 A. No.  
 Q. And you opened fire on them?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Who decided that? Yourself?  
 A. Myself and the Commanding Officer.  
 Q. Why did you decide to fire?  
 A. Because these people had taken a very large share in the loot.  
 Q. What do you mean by 'these people'?  
 A. The people of Mahnianwala.  
 Q. It cannot be the whole village?  
 A. Yes; it was the whole village.  
 Q. What is the population of Mahnianwala village?  
 A. I cannot give the exact number.  
 Q. Roughly, how many thousands?  
 A. I cannot say.  
 Q. Surely when you say that the whole village took part, you would also be able to say how many?  
 A. I cannot say; I did not try to find out the population.  
 Q. About 10,000?  
 A. I do not think so.  
 Q. About 7,000?  
 A. No, we have not such big villages here.  
 Q. Can you give me some rough estimate?  
 A. I cannot give. I have not tried to find out the population.  
 Q. You say the whole village took part?  
 A. That was my information.  
 Q. Surely that must be exaggerated. You cannot say what the whole population is?  
 A. That was my information.  
 Q. Because your information was that the whole of the Mahnianwala village had taken part in the riots, therefore any people of Mahnianwala you saw standing there you thought you were entitled to fire on?  
 A. I considered none of them to be innocent.  
 Q. The people that you saw you thought were not innocent; therefore you opened fire on them, though at the moment they were doing nothing?  
 A. They were doing nothing at that particular moment, but there was a crowd.  
 Q. You thought you were justified in firing, because you believed they were concerned in the riots?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. How many were killed on that occasion?  
 A. One man killed and one wounded, as I came to know later. But I have said in my statement one man was killed.  
 Q. After you went into the village, what did you do there?  
 A. We arrested the *lambardar*.  
 Q. And passed the night there?  
 A. No, we came to Sangla.  
 Q. You proceeded to Sangla that very night?  
 A. That afternoon.  
 Q. Did you stop at Sangla?

A. I stopped at Sangla for some time and went into the market and learned some things about what had happened there.  
 Q. Had you any firing there?  
 A. No.  
 Q. You gathered certain information at Sangla?  
 A. Yes; about what happened.  
 Q. Where did you go then?  
 A. There is a railway station, Mark Bilochan, 8 miles off. That station was in danger. I learnt at Sangla from a letter of a *lambardar* that that station was in danger; so I took the armoured car and there, with the help of some people, arranged for the safety of the station.  
 Q. That was all you did there? Did you take the armoured train anywhere else that day?  
 A. No.  
 Q. Was there no further action of the armoured car?  
 A. Nothing.  
 Q. Then the armoured car returned to Lahore on the 18th?  
 A. Yes; on the 19th, Colonel O'Brien came in the special.  
 Q. That was at Gujranwala. You wanted to teach the village of Mahnianwala a lesson and so you fired upon the crowd there?  
 A. You may take it that way.  
 Q. That was in your mind?  
 A. Yes. They would have returned to the charge again had nothing been done. Of course when quiet has been restored, it is very easy to say that nothing had happened and firing was not justified.  
 Q. Were you carrying out arrests in various places at this time?  
 A. At that time arrest was impossible; it was after this firing had been done it became easy, and some arrests were effected, but not wholesale arrests; no one could go near them, such was the temper of the people. And it was on the 19th that the Deputy Commissioner arrived after the firing was done, and there some 50 people were arrested at Mahnianwala and Pakka Dalla villages.  
 Q. You began the arrests on the 19th?  
 A. On the 19th, the Deputy Commissioner's special came and on that day, the police made some arrests.  
 Q. Did you make any arrests on the 19th?  
 A. Some arrests were made.  
 Q. You began the arrests on the 19th?  
 A. Some people were arrested even before. For instance, we arrested that man whom we found in the market the same day. Some were arrested the next day.  
 Q. These people that were arrested, where were they kept?  
 A. They were taken in the Deputy Commissioner's special to Lahore.  
 Q. How many?  
 A. About 50; and they came from the villages of Mahnianwala and Pakka Dalla.  
 Q. Before you arrested them, had you any definite information against these people?  
 A. It was the police that did it. They probably had some information. The police made the arrests. I was with the Deputy Commissioner moving on the line.  
 Q. He ordered their arrest?  
 A. It was the business of the police to make the arrests. They were afraid to make arrests before.  
 Q. That was under a special order?  
 A. Of course under a special order. As we were coming, the Deputy Commissioner asked the inspector, and the inspector of police had brought those people.  
 Q. You know Gohur Singh of Sheikhpura?  
 A. Yes; I know him.  
 Q. He was arrested, was he not, on the 19th April?  
 A. I do not know the date.  
 Q. Somewhere about that date?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. He was arrested as hostage for his two sons that were not forthcoming?

17 December 1919.]

Rai Sahib LALA SRI RAM SUD.

[Continued.]

- A. Yes; other people were also arrested.  
 Q. How many hostages did you take in all?  
 A. I think, 2 or 3 men were taken at Chuharkana market and village.  
 Q. At Chuharkana, 2 or 3 were taken?  
 A. Two, I remember.  
 Q. Hostages for what?  
 A. Because their sons had absconded after committing mischief.  
 Q. At other places similarly people were taken as hostages?  
 A. Not a good many. One Amar Singh was arrested. I think Gohur Singh was the fourth man that was arrested.  
 Q. After the arrest about the 19th, he was kept in custody till the 30th April?  
 A. I do not think so; he was released next day, because his sons appeared.  
 Q. Was he arrested again in May?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. What was he arrested for?  
 A. He was arrested, because he was threatening the witnesses for the prosecution.  
 Q. He was never charged with anything and never brought to trial?  
 A. Not for this offence.  
 Q. Not for anything, after his second arrest he was never brought to trial?  
 A. He was not brought to trial.  
 Q. He was released on the 30th?
- A. I do not know on which date he was released.  
 Q. He was kept in custody for a considerable time?  
 A. I do not know.  
 Q. Were any hostages taken in your district for the good behaviour of the villagers?  
 A. I think these hostages served both purposes; they served the purpose of bringing back absconders and they also served the purpose of keeping the people under restraint.  
 Q. Then do I understand that these hostages that you took were kept on as hostages, even after the absconding people had come back, for the good behaviour of the people?  
 A. No, they were not; as soon as they appeared, these were released.  
 Q. What do you mean?  
 A. Some people were kept as hostages for the good behaviour of the other people; that was what I said.  
 Q. Were any people taken as hostages, even when there was no question of absconding?  
 A. No.  
 Q. You say during the trials various people came to confess.  
 A. As a matter of fact, once this took place in my presence.  
 Q. Why do you say that people came to confess?  
 A. Once I was present.  
 Q. It is only on one occasion you saw this?  
 A. Yes.

18 December 1919.]

Rai Sahib LALA SRI RAM SUD.

At Lahore, Thursday, the 18th December 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.  
 The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.  
 Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B.,  
 K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.  
 The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.  
 Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.  
 Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., Secretary.

Rai Sahib LALA SRI RAM SUD, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Sub-Divisional Officer, Sheikhupura—*continued*

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. About the meeting at Sheikhupura, in your statement you say that this was largely responsible for the atmosphere of hatred against the Government that was thereby created?

A. Yes.

Q. Am I to understand that at that meeting speeches were made in a tone of incitement to violence or anything of that sort?

A. Not incitement to violence actually, but some speeches were made. For instance, a man Atma Singh recited a prayer in which he said that we should suffer all these misfortunes with some strength, i.e., he preached the doctrine of passive resistance in India of Mr. Gandhi.

Q. And therefore you say that these speeches created an atmosphere of hatred against the Government?

A. Yes.

Q. And the hartal also?

A. Yes; not only the meeting, because the people became curious as to why the hartal was held.

Q. So far as the speakers were concerned, did they in any way misinterpret the Rowlatt Act. Did they circulate rumours?

A. Not at the meeting itself. To judge from reports coming to me, no such thing was done there.

Q. And it is a fact that, so far as you were concerned, when you reported the result of this meeting to your superior officers you said there was nothing objectionable. Am I right?

A. Yes.

Q. And as a matter of fact you deputed three persons to attend this meeting and after their return they reported to you that so far as this meeting was concerned and so far as the speeches that were delivered at this meeting were concerned, there was nothing objectionable?

A. Yes.

Q. I am reading from the first paragraph of your statement. You say that "even illiterate women in the streets of Sheikhupura were heard to say that the British people were intending to interfere with marital and sisterly relations by legislation preventing husbands and wives, sisters and brothers to come together." This was not the result of anything said or done at that meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. Now before this meeting was held did you call a number of pleaders on the 5th at your place?

A. On the morning of the 6th.

Q. And you dissuaded them from holding and attending this meeting?

A. Yes, I did. Before this I had heard . . .

Q. I do not want the grounds.

A. Please hear me. Before this I had heard about the riots at Delhi and I told the gentlemen that they were welcome to hold the meeting, but it was just possible that they might not have been

able to control the mob later on, and on these grounds I asked them to beware.

Q. Did you also threaten them to the effect that if they attended the meeting, their licences would be forfeited?

A. I told them that if any seditious speeches were made—and subject only to this condition—that they were not to attend any seditious meetings and if they persisted in talking sedition, I would be compelled to report against them.

Q. Is there any clause in their licences making such restrictions?

A. Yes, there is a clause so far as I know, that they should not attend seditious meetings.

Q. Like school-boys?

A. That rests with the High Court. I have no say on that point.

Q. You say that there was an outward calm on the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th. By this you imply as a matter of fact that there was no real disturbance?

A. Outwardly they appeared calm, but there were misapprehensions in my mind.

Q. You were already in possession of what had happened at Delhi?

A. Yes.

Q. And according to you there were misgivings in your mind on the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th. Therefore I want to know why you left your post and why you went to salaam Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien?

A. I did not go simply to salaam Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien. I had to attend a meeting.

Q. Why did you leave your post?

A. Well, I had to leave my post, because I was summoned to do so.

Q. Was there a regular darbar?

A. Yes.

Q. When you had thought that there was a possibility of some riot and serious consequences, why did you leave your post?

A. There was nothing serious at that time. There were no misgivings and there was no tangible proof that violence was actually going to take place.

Q. You were also aware that during those riots there was a very strong rumour of a general railway strike materialising?

A. This rumour came to my notice when I was at Gujranwala.

Q. The people of your district were aware on the 15th as to what had happened at Amritsar on the 10th and 11th?

A. Yes.

Q. There is no doubt in your mind?

A. No. Not only on the 15th, but also on the 16th when the railway and telegraph wires were broken at Sheikhupura.

Q. May I know to what you ascribe the immediate cause of this outburst at Sheikhupura

18 December 1919.]

Rai Sahib LALA SRI RAM SUD.

[Continued.]

and other places within your jurisdiction? Was it the immediate result of the meetings held within your jurisdiction, or was it the result of news coming from Amritsar, or was it due to some other causes; that is to the agitation against the Rowlatt Act and the seditious speeches that were made both in the market of Chuharkana and in the Chuharkana village itself, and also to the misrepresentations that had been made regarding the Amritsar affairs, i.e., about the damage done to the Golden Temple?

A. Yes. This I learnt from a man who was concerned in the riot at Dhaban Singh. He was Jagat Singh, the ring-leader at the Dhaban Singh loot.

Q. Any other cause?

A. To my mind these were the two causes—the two principal causes.

Q. Did you consider any other cause to be the principal cause of all this?

A. I do not think so.

Q. You are quite sure?

A. I have given you my answer. I said I do not think so.

Q. And you did not give your opinion to any other officers of what happened at Chuharkana and Sheikhpura? Have you up to this time given any other reasons to any officer?

A. I was never asked and never gave any.

Q. I will remind you. Did you or did you not inform Capt. Flowerdew that nothing would have happened at Sheikhpura or Chuharkana, that all this was due to what was done by the Punjabis on the 14th or 15th?

A. Well, I do not know the gentlemen to whom you refer.

Q. Well, I will give you the exact words. Capt. Flowerdew says "I was informed by the Sub-Divisional Officer" (he means you, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate) "and the Sub-Inspector of Police at Sheikhpura that the real cause of the riot was due to a party from a troop train of the 22nd Punjabis which helped at the station the day before?"

A. I could not say so, because I knew early that morning at about 9 o'clock that the people of Muridke had already broken into the railway station.

Q. I am bringing out this information, and am asking whether or not you did make this statement?

A. Not in these very words. I could not. But as I have also stated in my statement, the troops did something.

Q. Did you or did you not say that the real cause of the riot . . . ?

President.—He says the troops may have done something.

The Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan.—Therefore Captain Flowerdew was wrong in what he says in his statement?

A. Well, he might have misunderstood me.

Q. Probably you were carrying on the conversation with him in English and not in Urdu?

A. Very probably in English.

Q. Have you any doubt about it?

A. I do not remember, but very probably it was in English. It was just the same if we conversed in English or Urdu or any other language.

Q. What do you mean by saying that the people of Sheikhpura were waiting for your return to have another *hartal*?

A. Well, I was informed by a man and, so far as I could gather, they thought that as I had sent for those pleaders on the 6th morning they were against me and they probably thought that whatever they wanted to do they should do in my presence, and so wished to have the *hartal* in my presence. This was because I had dissuaded them, as you say, from the meeting.

Q. Therefore there was some ill-feeling between the pleaders and yourself?

A. No ill-feeling had arisen from my conversation with them on the 6th, and if they had engendered any sort of ill-feeling I was unaware of it, and naturally I could not help it.

Q. Were you responsible for collecting funds for the O'Dwyer Memorial?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any dispute between you and the pleaders over this affair?

A. Not at all.

Q. Did you not ask every one of the pleaders to subscribe and they refused?

A. Not at all.

Q. Now you say a free *langar* was also opened in imitation of the Lahore *langars*, and there was a baker about whom there was a row. Do you know if this baker was a Hindu or a Muhammadan?

A. He was a Hindu.

Q. This was one of the *langars* that was started on the 14th?

A. I do not think so. It might be one of them. I do not remember. But the riot took place at Shahdara.

Q. Do you know why it is that if it was considered to be a riot and a serious thing when for the first time you instituted the investigation of the case? Do you know the date?

A. It was the business of the police to investigate.

Q. But you were the officer in this part.

A. I say it was the business of the police and not of the magistrate. The information comes to the police first; that is the ordinary practice. I come to know of it later.

Q. Is not any information of a serious nature which comes to the police, transmitted to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate within 24 hours?

A. Well, those were days in which everyone was busy.

Q. Do you know that this matter was tried on the 26th May?

A. I do not know the date on which it was tried. It may have been so.

Q. Why was it tried so late?

A. Because we were busy with the Chuharkana investigation and could not therefore attend to the Sheikhpura investigations.

Q. Do you know that *jhatka* meat is not taken by Muhammadans?

A. Yes.

Q. In this case, were they all Hindus?

A. Yes. I think so.

Q. Do you not think that you have made this case into a riot, when it was only a remonstrance on behalf of the Hindus who remonstrated with this man when he was preparing *jhatka* meat?

A. You may think so. We thought it was a riot case.

Q. But there was no riot. The origin of the dispute was due to *jhatka* meat. The Hindus said that the Muhammadans were also taking it from this *langar*. They said "why did you prepare *jhatka* meat instead of *halal* meat?"

A. Yes.

Q. You were paying the bills of this man who was supplying the authorities with food for prisoners?

A. I did not know who the man was. But we got our food from one of these *jhawars*. There were 2 men—one a Hindu and another a Muhammadan.

Q. Is it not a fact that on the 14th and 15th the bill of this man was paid and he did supply food to prisoners?

A. Well, if he was the man his bill must have been paid. I do not know what actually happened, because I did not attend each time the food was being supplied. It was the business of the man in charge.

Q. Did you have any complaints against this man?

A. I had none. I think the Sub-Inspector told me perhaps that this man at first refused to supply food, for the people asked him not to open his shop. Subsequently the sub-inspector asked him to supply food and it was supplied. I think, from the *langar*, so far as I know.

Q. You made a statement yesterday that Gohur Singh, after he was released from his arrest, threatened certain witnesses?

18 December 1919.]

Rai Sahib LALA SRI RAM SUD.

[Continued.]

A. Yes.

Q. Did you record the statement of these witnesses?

A. Yes. Well, I do not know who these witnesses were. I did record the statements of certain witnesses of Shaukhupura.

Q. Did you record the statement of any persons who came to you and complained that they were threatened by Gohur Singh, because they were prosecution witnesses?

A. Not to that effect, but I know it as a matter of fact that this had happened.

Q. Were you present?

A. I was not present at the actual threatening but people came complaining.

Q. Have you seen these statements recorded anywhere, in any paper or anywhere?

A. Where do you mean?

Q. In any paper?

A. Before the police you mean or anywhere else?

Q. It may not have been recorded by any police officer, but have you seen these recorded statements anywhere?

A. I don't know. The police might have recorded those statements.

Q. Do you know how many persons were threatened by this man?

A. I did not try to make out the number.

Q. Have you ever brought a case against this man for threatening prosecution witnesses?

A. It was not my business. It was the business of Mr. Bosworth Smith. He was in charge and I was working under him. I was supervising the police investigation, and I was under Mr. Smith.

Q. I want to know as to whether any criminal prosecution was instituted against this man for threatening prosecution witnesses.

A. So far as I know, none. But your question was different first.

Q. You were not present on the 12th, 13th and 14th at Chuharkana?

A. I came back on the evening of the 13th. I was not present on the 11th and 12th.

Q. And therefore as you were not present probably nobody was deputed to be present at the meetings that were held on the 12th? It is quite possible that the inspector or somebody else might have deputed someone, but I want to know if any person was deputed.

A. None could be deputed, because we had no information that a meeting was to be held.

Q. There is no written record of the speeches on the 12th and the 13th?

A. There might be something in the police diaries.

Q. Have you seen them?

A. I have not seen any, but there might be something.

Q. So far as your knowledge goes, you have not seen any recorded notes of these speeches?

A. I have not seen any, but there might be some. This can be ascertained from other witnesses.

Q. I am concerned for the moment to know as to whether so far as your knowledge goes you have seen any recorded notes?

A. I have told you all the things that I know in order to convince you. You want to get facts from me, and I am giving them.

Q. How far away were the people from the armoured train when the machine-gun was fired for the first on the night of the 15th?

A. Well, it is difficult to give the distance.

Q. You can give us some idea?

A. They were quite near; that is all I can say. They could be seen so far as eye-sight could reach.

Q. Was it 10 or 15 yards?

A. I cannot give the exact measurements.

Q. I don't want the exact measurements. I want you to give me some approximate idea of the distance?

A. I can't give you the distance, they were near and they could be seen. That is all I can say.

Q. How many rounds were fired?

A. I could not say that. The officer in charge could tell you that.

Q. How is it that although the crowd was so near when the machine-gun was turned upon them and although more than one round was fired only one person was killed or wounded?

A. It is just possible that there might have been some other people wounded and they might have been taken away during the night.

Q. Up to this time you have not been able to trace any of those wounded persons?

A. We have not been able to trace them, because those who removed the wounded were not in a mood to give us any information.

Q. That is only your guess?

A. Perhaps it is a right guess.

Q. Have you seen any wounded persons removed?

A. We saw some traces on the ground.

Q. Persons had been dragged on the ground?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore you think that the wounded persons were dragged in that fashion?

A. I don't know whether they were wounded or dead.

Q. Therefore what I want to know is, whether any wounded persons were dragged by the mob?

A. I have not seen any. That is also circumstantial evidence.

Q. Is it not a fact that in all the surrounding villages you went wherever you suspected anyone, identification proceedings were held and people were taken out of their houses and made to parade at all these different places?

A. Except, I think, in one village Banduki.

Q. You have not been able to trace any of those wounded persons up to this time?

A. No.

Q. Supposing there was no one else wounded except that one man, how do you account for it? You say that the crowd was near, the machine-gun was turned upon them, and so far as your personal knowledge goes there was only one person wounded or killed.

A. I did not say that the crowd had assembled at one place. People were here and there in the neighbourhood. Some might have been hit by the machine-gun and some might not have been hit.

Q. May I know what is the highest number you put? Give me a guess. What was the number of that crowd upon which the machine-gun was turned?

A. You don't want me to give any guess. I can't say. I have already answered this question yesterday. I never tried to ascertain the number at that horrible hour. I could not think of these things.

Q. It was horrible for those upon whom the machine-gun was turned?

A. It was horrible for the whole *ilaka*. It was horrible for the other people, and not for the crowd which was out for mischief.

Q. May I know whether the burden of the Empire was on your shoulders?

A. Not the burden of the Empire; at any rate the burden of the division was on my shoulders. I was responsible.

Q. Was there a large crowd?

A. I can't say. There were people there. I can't say the exact number.

Q. Give me some idea of the crowd.

A. There were some people here and there. I can't say the exact number.

Q. Some may mean 5 or 5,000?

A. You may take it in any way you like. As I understand by the word 'some' I have said that some people were here and there.

Q. You gave me the word 'some.' What is the highest and what is the lowest number you mean by the word 'some'?

A. It is very difficult to define words. I can't give you the exact number. They might be 10, 20 or 30. There were hedges there and some of them might have hidden under these hedges.

18 December 1919.]

Rai Sahib LALA SRI RAM SUD.

[Continued.]

Q. So far as you saw, I would like to know the number.

A. There were some people round about in that neighbourhood. I can't give the exact number.

Q. Could a crowd of 100 be described by the word 'some'? Let us now take it in a negative form.

A. The crowd was not in one place. They were on both sides.

Q. Would you call them 'some' if they were 75?

A. Well, that is also 'some.'

Q. If there were 50 people will you call it 'some'?

A. No.

Q. Well, I am satisfied. I won't go any further. Therefore I take it that at that time you are quite sure you did not see about 800 persons assembled there?

A. They were not there. The 800 or 1,000 people were half a mile away and they had fled away on hearing the gun shots. There were not so many people there.

Q. On the first occasion you did not see 800 persons there?

A. No.

Q. You saw only some persons there and those some persons would not include 75?

A. Yes.

Q. I am quite satisfied with that. How many persons had been prosecuted and proceedings had been instituted against them in connection with these occurrences. Was one Mangal Singh, *zaildar*, mentioned by you, produced as a witness in any of those cases?

A. This Mangal Singh was a *zaildar* and as he was taken as a hostage for his son, and he could not possibly be a good witness for the prosecution. He could not be produced.

Q. According to your statement, this Mangal Singh was the informant who gave you news from time to time of important matters?

A. I do not say so anywhere. He gave me news only once when he came to me at 10 o'clock at night, and he did not give me news from time to time.

Q. In your statement you have deposed certain matters of which you received information from some persons. I want to know whether these persons were produced as witnesses?

A. Kindly tell those parts of the statement where I say so, so that I may give you full details.

Q. Were you examined as a witness in any of these cases?

A. No. I was a supervising officer, and it is generally regarded as improper for a supervising officer to give evidence.

Q. Is it the case throughout the Punjab or only in your district, because in other places even officers of the rank of Deputy Commissioner and others have come forward?

A. It is generally regarded as not very good evidence.

Q. It may be regarded as *infra dig.* for an officer . . . . .?

A. I would have told them that I had no objection, but they did not examine me.

Q. Yesterday you made two or three statements saying that although certain matters were not within your personal knowledge, yet either on the second day or subsequently you were informed by some that something did happen, and you may remember that with regard to two or three occasions when firing took place you said that you came to know of it afterwards, that the intention of the mob was such and such, therefore I want to know were any one of your informants produced as witnesses in any of these cases?

A. What about?

Q. As to the intention of the mob and as to who were in the mob and what the mob was doing and so forth?

A. I think two or three members of the Notified Area Committee of Chuharkana came as witnesses.

Q. They were your informants?

A. They and also other people, in fact all people from the market whom I met on the day after the occurrence.

Q. If I cannot get the answer, I will take your statements one by one. You made a statement that you were subsequently informed of the intention of the mob and that was to attack the armoured car and to attack you and you said that that was the information given to you. Who was the person?

A. This information leaked out.

Q. Who gave you that information?

A. Shivdev Singh was one. The *lambaradar* of Chuharkana.

Q. Was he examined in any of these cases?

A. I think he was examined in other matters regarding Chuharkana affairs.

Q. He was never examined and he never made a statement?

A. I think he did not make a statement. He made a verbal statement to me only.

Q. Now is there any person who gave you that information and who was examined in any of those cases and who made a statement to this effect? Is there any recorded statement?

A. No, so far as I know.

Q. On the first occasion, according to you, there was a mob of about a thousand persons?

A. Not a thousand, but two or three thousand.

Q. Therefore by the mere fact of the firing, the hearing of the noise of the machine-gun and the sight of the searchlight from a distance, they all bolted away and when you reached the place nobody could be found there?

A. Except one man whom we found hiding in a factory.

Q. I want to know how is it that within the brief space of a few hours from a crowd of three thousand which had bolted a crowd of about 3 or 4 hundred persons were ready to attack the armoured car?

A. Firing could control any number of people.

Q. They knew that the armoured train was there?

A. They would have all been killed if they had come there.

Q. They had seen the armoured train, and there was a crowd of 3,000 which bolted away. Therefore I want to know how this change occurred within a period of 3 or 4 hours, that only 300 or 400 persons were ready to attack the armoured train the next day?

A. The others probably thought it safer not to come near us.

Q. Therefore may I take it that, according to you, it was not safe for them to attack the armoured train in the night time when they were 3,000 strong but they thought it safer during day time and when they were only 300 or 400 strong to attack the car?

A. That rested with them. I could not guess their intentions. I have told you what I know, and it is a fact, and you can form your own opinions. I am here merely to give facts.

Q. In answer to Sir Chimanlal Setalvad you stated that you did not identify any one of those who were fired upon, but you only saw people coming and going?

A. Yes.

Q. This side of the village is the north side where the crowd was fired upon, the place where the firing took place?

A. I gave you the description.

Q. But I want to know whether it was the north side?

A. The railway line runs from east to west, I think.

Q. This firing, according to you, took place on the north side of the village according to the map?

A. North side of the railway line.

Q. The railway line runs from east to west?

A. That is the west side of the village and not the north side.

Q. How far was that place from the railway line?

A. Not very far away. It was daylight and people could be seen moving about.

Q. How far were they away from the railway line?

18 December 1919.]

Rai Sahib LALA SRI RAM SUD.

[Continued.]

A. I think the village is nearly a furlong away from the railway line.

Q. You were not able to identify as a matter of fact any of these persons?

A. No.

Q. Why did you come to the conclusion that every one of them was a resident of Chuharkana?

A. Well, there might be other people also for aught I know. I never said that they were all residents of Chuharkana.

Q. One of the reasons given by you is that every resident of Chuharkana was in the riot and therefore you said that you were justified in giving your order to fire on them?

A. That was on the night between the 15th and 16th April, and not in the morning. In the riot there were not only the people of Chuharkana who were concerned but there were people of other villages also. I could not wait for the introduction of Martial Law to order firing.

Q. I understand that your power as a civil authority to give the order for firing is limited by the Criminal Procedure Code? Do you know that, as a magistrate, your powers are limited in the matter of giving the order to fire?

A. You can take it in any way you like. I had to act in that emergency. There was no help.

Q. I want to know whether, as a Magistrate, you know it or not that your powers of giving orders to fire are limited?

A. Limited in what respect?

Q. In every respect. Do you know that you are not authorised to order firing?

A. You should give me credit for knowing something.

Q. Do you know whether or not you are empowered to give order to fire?

A. I am empowered to give order to fire.

Q. By which Act?

A. By the Criminal Procedure Code.

Q. Is there any other Code under which you can order firing?

A. I do not know of any other Code.

Q. Therefore your powers are limited by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you fulfil the conditions laid down there when you ordered firing?

A. I think I did.

Q. Did you ask the crowd to disperse? Did you give them any time to disperse?

A. I don't think they could be begged to disperse at that time.

Q. Do you know, as a matter of fact, that under the Criminal Procedure Code you should have given them some time and you should have told them that unless they dispersed within a prescribed time they would be fired upon?

A. There was no time for telling them that. They were in no mood to hear us.

Q. You know, I think, by this time that it is not the military authority that is responsible for that firing, but you are yourself responsible?

A. If I am responsible I am ready to take the responsibility. It rests with you. I did what I thought proper at the time.

Q. Do you or do you not realise that you are responsible for that?

A. I have told you that I have done what I thought proper and necessary in the interest of peace and good order, and I have acted in good faith so far as I know, and if I have exceeded my limits, it is for the Committee to decide.

Q. Did you take any steps to disperse the crowd upon which you fired on the night of the 15th?

A. I have said that you should take it from me that my answer is the same with respect to every crowd. I could not help it. Would they have gone away by my begging them to disperse?

Q. How many persons were arrested on the night of the 15th?

A. On the night between 15th or 16th, I arrested one man Mana Singh.

Q. No one else was arrested?

A. No one else was found on the night between the 15th and the 16th.

Q. On the night between the 15th and 16th was anyone else arrested by you?

A. I arrested one man and no one else was found.

Q. And therefore it would be wrong if anywhere it is stated that at least between 22 and 40 persons were arrested during that night?

A. So far as I know we only arrested one man. Others might have been arrested the next morning. You can take it from me that only one man was arrested and you can compare my statement with the evidence you have received. It is for you and not for me to say whether that statement is right or wrong.

Q. You were present all along with the party that went?

A. I was.

Q. Therefore I say that if the statement is made that at least between 22 and 40 persons were arrested during that night, it would be wrong?

A. Some people, I think, were arrested either on the 16th morning or perhaps on the morning of the 17th in Chuharkana.

Q. I am talking of what happened between the night of the 15th and the 16th?

A. So far as I know, only one man, Mana Singh, was arrested. You need not ask my opinion whether if any other statement is made it is right or wrong. It is for you to decide and not for me.

Q. I am asking you.....?

A. You asked me whether it was wrong. That would be a question of opinion. You asked me whether it was right or not, it is a question of opinion. But the fact is only one man was arrested.

Q. You have stated in answer to Sir Chimanlal Setalvad that first of all when you went inside the village on the morning of the 17th no one was to be found there?

A. A good many people were found, but a good many had also fled away.

Q. And therefore why should it not be concluded that those men whom you saw on the west side of the village were those who were leaving the village on account of the presence of the armoured car?

A. They had not left the village. They had rather collected there, so far as my information went, at a village pond.

Q. Your information was subsequent and two days later. I am talking of what happened at the time. At that time you had no information as to who those people were?

A. They were people probably from Chuharkana. They had not fled from the village. We did not go through the whole village. We went through only a part of the village and then we went outside. I did not search the whole village.

Q. In your statement before this Committee you have stated that you saw certain persons on horseback?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you make that point clear in your written statement that there were other persons?

A. There were a good many things which I have omitted from the written statement which I did not think to be necessary for the sake of brevity. Those things I left over for your cross-examination.

Q. You were prepared for cross-examination when you wrote this?

A. I was, certainly. I have given you many details now which I have not mentioned in the written statement.

Q. And therefore you thought it was a very unimportant matter?

A. I did not think it very important. The important thing was firing and the reasons for that I have already explained. Some people were walking, some were on horseback, that was not an important matter to my mind.

Q. As a magistrate you know that if people are killed an inquest is held?

A. Yes.



18 December 1919.]

Rai Sahib LALA SRI RAM SUD.

[Continued.]

Q. Now there were three firings, one near the bridge, another on the next day in the village itself and the third at the Padiwan village. May I know if any inquest was held at these three places?

A. No. It is the business of the police. The police ask for inquest, and then the thing is done.

Q. Were any inquests held?

A. No, so far as I know. We had no time.

Q. Apart from that man did you make any attempt to find out the names of those persons who were killed?

A. Yes; I think so. There was one Mehna, a sweeper, who was killed and Mahounda—a number of persons were also wounded at these three firings. I saw one man wounded and one man dead.

Q. Was this man who was wounded *challaned* or was any case brought against him?

A. No.

Q. Why not?

A. That is a matter which rested with the police or Mr. Bosworth Smith.

Q. But were you not Sub-Divisional Officer?

A. Yes, I was; but these things go through the police.

Q. Did you make any enquiry about the man who was caught red-handed?

A. The man wounded was not caught red-handed. As I have said that firing took place in Chuharkana. Only one man was caught red-handed and he was killed.

Q. Was this man who was wounded an innocent person?

A. I do not believe he was an innocent person.

Q. He was one of the crowd that was fired upon?

A. Where?

Q. At the Chuharkana market?

A. That man was dead.

Q. Then this man who was wounded—where was he wounded?

A. He was wounded near the distant signal on the Sheikhpura side.

Q. This man who was wounded, why was he not prosecuted?

A. He was not caught red-handed; he was not found tearing up the line or doing damage to the telegraph wires.

Q. My point is this: The men were members of an unlawful assembly and were fired upon.....?

A. There were a good many unlawful assemblies—some were found tearing up the line, some had escaped, and some were prosecuted.

Q. I want to know whether this man who was wounded was prosecuted? He was not prosecuted because he was an innocent person who had nothing to do with it?

A. No; not for that reason. He was not prosecuted because he was not caught red-handed.

Q. Up to this time was there anybody else wounded at all?

A. Where?

Q. At the three firings?

A. One man was wounded and one killed. In my statement I had said one but I corrected that yesterday. There were two casualties instead of one.

Q. Was there any man Asa Ram who was wounded?

A. I did not know about him.

Q. Was there any man wounded who was easing himself in the field?

A. No; I know nothing about that either.

Q. Do you know any man by the name of Bhai Ishar Singh?

A. Possibly he is the very man whom I have mentioned.

Q. He had four shot wounds?

A. I do not know how many wounds.

Q. Variam Singh—was he wounded?

A. I do not know.

Q. Do you know whether Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien arrested certain pleaders at Sheikhpura?

A. Yes, and those pleaders were arrested under my advice.

Q. And they were kept under arrest for about forty days?

A. Yes, up to the 29th May?

Q. And they were released on the 29th May?

A. Yes.

Q. Was any police investigation made into their conduct?

A. Yes.

Q. And is there a record of the investigation?

A. Yes.

Q. By whom was that investigation made?

A. It was I think, made by Autar Singh and Ali Mohammed. I myself recorded the statement of two men.

Q. We are talking of the investigation made by the police?

A. I also took part in the investigation and recorded certain statements and statements were recorded also by police officers.

Q. Was any investigation made?

A. Yes, investigation was made.

Q. And therefore when you say investigation was made you mean that the statement of persons were recorded?

A. Yes.

Q. And above and over that you also recorded two statements of two persons?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you also record the statement of this man Gohur Singh about those pleaders?

A. No; I did not record it.

Q. Was the statement of Gohur Singh recorded by anybody in connection with the investigation of those pleaders?

A. That was perhaps being done departmentally—a departmental enquiry was perhaps being held into the conduct of those pleaders and that ought to be taken separately from the police investigation. The departmental enquiry took place later on.

Q. I am talking of the police investigation.

A. I heard that some statements of some people were recorded against pleaders later on in the departmental investigation.

Q. In the departmental investigation was Gohur Singh's statement recorded?

A. It was not recorded in my presence, so I do not know.

Q. Were these papers submitted to the High Court?

A. I do not know. It was not in my hands. It was in the hands of Mr. Penny.

Q. Do you know whether during this time any papers were submitted to the Chief Court, either of the police investigation or of the departmental enquiry?

A. I heard that some papers were submitted to the High Court.

Q. I presume these police investigation papers will be in existence?

A. Yes, the papers must be in existence.

Q. So far as you are concerned, I would like to know whether you suggested as a result of the enquiry certain things against those pleaders.....

A. The departmental enquiry was in Mr. Penny's hands; I took part only in the police investigation.

Q. After the matter had been represented to the High Court and when there was a subsequent enquiry did you take any part in this?

A. All that I know is that a preliminary enquiry was held into their conduct and that certain papers were submitted against them to the High Court. I do not know what the orders of the High Court were.

Q. Did you formulate any opinion of your own about this?

A. I had my own opinion.

Q. Did you put it down in writing?

A. I do not remember having done so.

Q. Now with regard to one Alamdin. You formulated certain charges against him and the gist of them were (1) that he subscribed to the "Moslem Herald," (2) that he was seen at the house of another pleader on the day of the *hartal*, and (3)

13 December 1919.]

Rai Sahib LALA SRI RAM SUD.

[Continued.]

that he had written a letter to the President of the meeting expressing regret for his non-attendance. The above was a gist of the charges against Alamdin?

A. Yes.

Q. Then there was another pleader Ushnak Rai and the gist of the charges against him were that he subscribed to the *Tribune*, that he was seen bare-headed at another man's house and that he wrote a letter regretting his inability to attend the meeting?

A. This man led the rest and also presided at some meetings.

Q. How far off were you and your party when you fired upon the crowd on the 16th?

A. I think the distance was a furlong.

Q. You said in your statement that the train was a furlong away.....

A. This means that we did not fire on them from the armoured train, we fired upon them when we were in the village.

Q. Therefore your statement is not correct that you fired upon them from a distance of one furlong?

A. It is just possible that the crowd was that distance.

Q. The nearest approach to the crowd so far as your party was concerned was one furlong?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it you who proclaimed Martial Law at Sheikhpura on the 16th?

A. There was no Martial Law at Sheikhpura on the 16th. I do not know who proclaimed Martial Law on any date. At Sheikhpura I was with the armoured train and with the Deputy Commissioner's special.

Q. You did not follow the example of other places and hold a *darbar* and proclaim Martial Law?

A. No.

Q. You did not proclaim Martial Law in any way?

A. No.

Q. Did you inform the people of Sheikhpura or the people who were within your jurisdiction that Sheikhpura was going to be bombarded and that the bombardment of the place was prevented by your intercession?

A. No.

Q. Up to what time did you remain at Chuharkana?

A. I think till about 5 or 6 o'clock in the evening.

Q. What I want to know is whether you had any police papers or statements with you when you left Sheikhpura?

A. No.

Q. Did you ask the military authorities to arrest a certain number of persons?

A. Only one man was arrested at my request and that man was Mana Singh.

Q. Between the 15th and 17th, did you give to any of those military commanders any list of persons to be arrested.

A. No.

Q. At Chuharkana or any other place?

A. I gave a list of some persons on the 17th.

Q. Was there any evidence against them?

A. There was good deal of suspicion. I should arrest people on suspicion.

Q. Therefore all those persons who were arrested on the 17th and 18th in various villages—they were arrested at your suggestion because there was strong suspicion against them?

A. Except those who were taken as hostages.

Q. There was no recorded evidence with you up to that time?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith—

Q. There was a question put to-day and again yesterday about firing from the armoured train. It would be perfectly wrong and unfair to suggest that you fired wantonly or without justification?

A. Certainly.

Q. I think you said that before any action was taken you took counsel with the military authorities who were on the train with you?

A. Yes.

Q. Now that day had been a very exciting day?

A. It was a critical day. The Chuharkana station had been burnt and looted, the wires had been cut and the lines obstructed and I gathered from the temper of the people that they were turbulent and bent on anything.

Q. I take it that you had every reason to believe that the crowd was out for mischief?

A. Yes, and I heard from a guard of a railway train what was being done at other places.

Q. So all these events were in your mind and you know that the crowd was out for mischief and you would have been failing in your duty had you not taken the action which you took to restore order?

A. Yes, if I had not done so there would have been a regular mutiny.

Q. And as a matter of fact after this peace was restored?

A. Yes.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmed Khan—

Q. Of the educated people some were loyal and some were not loyal. Am I right in taking it that you speak from personal experience and not from hearsay?

A. I daily come across educated people who are not very loyal.

Q. Whom would you regard as not loyal?

A. People who tell me that foreign domination is not wanted. To my mind these people are disloyal.

Q. That foreign domination is not wanted?

A. That is my idea of disloyalty.

Q. How many educated people do you know who are your acquaintances and who express such sentiments?

A. That is a very difficult question to answer. That is my opinion and it is not good to give names.

Q. I am asking as to the number of educated people.

A. I cannot give you the exact number.

Q. Can you give me an approximate number?

A. It is very difficult to say.

Q. Are they over 100?

A. I think much more than 100.

Q. About 200?

A. More than that number.

Q. Is it 300?

A. It is very difficult to answer that question. It is a question of memory and not an easy question to answer.

Q. How many told you that foreign domination was not a good thing?

A. I daily hear it in conversation in the railway train and in private also.

Q. Anything else?

A. I think I have told you the worst.

Q. Are those your friends who told you this?

A. No; not only friends but companions in the same train.

Q. Have any of your friends told you that foreign domination is not a good thing?

A. Well, not my friends.

Q. I want to know whether any of your friends told you this?

A. Some of them might be friends.

Q. Don't you know your own friends?

A. My friends may consist of good and bad people. It is very difficult to answer this question as to whether they were my friends or my enemies. That is my general impression.

Q. If any of your friends told you this you would probably have remembered?

A. Not necessarily; I might forget things told by my friends.

Q. And would you still continue to be friends with him?

A. That is a difficult matter. He might have his own opinion. A person may not be loyal but at the same time he forms his own opinions. Why what do you see in Parliament—the members embrace each other outside and in Parliament they tear each other.

Q. I presume that your friends are all educated people?

A. Some are educated and some are uneducated.

Q. Now as regards whipping—was any doctor present at the time of whipping?

18 December 1919.]

Rai Sahib LALA SBI RAM SUD—concluded—Lieutenant TATAM.

- A. I had no hand in the whipping.
- Q. Do you know whether any doctor was present?
- A. Only one case of whipping took place in my presence and on this occasion there was no doctor present. The whipping took place at the Canal Bungalow and it is just possible that he was examined but so far as I know he was not.
- Q. And if anybody was examined you would probably know?
- A. Not necessarily. I was not the magistrate who inflicted the punishment. I was not with Mr. Bosworth-Smith always.
- Q. Then no doctor was there?
- A. The doctor was close by and he may have been examined.
- Q. At the time that you were there you did not see any doctor?
- A. No.
- Q. They did not examine those who were going to be whipped?
- A. Not to my knowledge.

Lieutenant TATAM, Military Grass Farm, 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division.

By the President—

- Q. Lieutenant Tatam, you are stationed at Rawalpindi?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And, have been there for some time?
- A. Yes.
- Q. On the 14th April last, did you leave Lyallpur by the 8-16 train on duty for Rawalpindi?
- A. Yes, Sir.
- Q. At that time you were looking after a little boy?
- A. Yes.
- Q. When you arrived at Hafizabad railway station did anything occur?
- A. I heard a noise just before the train reached the station near the level crossing and I looked out and I saw a huge crowd of men with flags and sticks and making shouts. Thinking there would probably be trouble to the little boy and myself, I at once closed all the shutters of the windows and bolted the doors of the carriage. We went into the station and stayed there for about seven or eight minutes. Then I heard the crowd coming along from the level crossing and up to the platform. They soon came to my carriage and they were shouting. They tried to open the doors of the carriage by turning the handle. Finding they could not they moved further up. Two or three minutes afterwards, they returned and applied the same operation of turning the handles. Finding they could not open the doors or windows, they smashed them.
- Q. Why did the crowd select you as their object?
- A. I could not say that.
- Q. Did you form any opinion about it at the time?
- A. No.
- Q. Had you done anything?
- A. Not at all.
- Q. Were you in uniform?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Was there anyone else in the train?
- A. No other European.
- Q. Was any attack made on anyone except yourself?
- A. Not to my knowledge.
- Q. What happened afterwards?
- A. When they saw me, they were very much excited, and asked me to come out. I sat on the further side from them. They started throwing in sticks, stones, shoes, etc. They were dancing about in front of me, beating their breasts, and waving their flags and sticks. As I was apprehensive and anticipated danger, I removed into the bath-room with the boy and locked the door. Immediately they went through the back of my carriage and through the other compartment (second or third class) came to the other side of the carriage and smashed the windows.
- Q. The window of the bath-room was protected by bars?

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

- Q. With regard to those pleaders whom you said were arrested on your advice, how many were arrested?
- A. Four. There were ten but six were not arrested because they had taken no part.
- Q. When you gave that advice what information did you have against them?
- A. I had very strong suspicions against them. They held the *hartal* and they held meetings and on the night of the same day that the *hartal* was held the telegraph wires were cut.
- Q. They were kept in jail for 40 days?
- A. They were kept for 40 days.
- Q. They were not let out on bail?
- A. I think none applied for bail so far as I know.
- Q. They were better off in jail?
- A. They were better off in not being prosecuted. I did not say they were better off in jail.

A. Yes. I thought that it was insecure as long *lathis* were coming through the window. I came out into the main carriage again, and on arriving there, as soon as I got outside, I saw two Indian gentlemen near the door talking and beating the mob with sticks and preventing the crowd from coming in. I sat down for a few minutes and then the crowd seemed to me to be increasing all the time. I tried to talk and asked them what I had to do with their *tamasha* as I was simply going to Rawalpindi. The only satisfaction I got was that I was struck in the stomach by a *lathi*, and another *lathi* just missed my eye. So I got across from that side to the further side from the platform. Then there was another man of the crowd, who was evidently one of the ringleaders at the commencement. He evidently had some hold over the crowd and seemed to keep the mob under control and tried to get into the carriage. After about seven or eight minutes, there was no sign of the train going. A native Christian guard came to my carriage. I asked him to get the train started. He had been to the station master's room, but he could not find him anywhere. He was nowhere to be seen. But as things were getting very bad, he telephoned to the next station and moved the train to the signal, and eventually the train did start again amidst jeers and shouts of abuse and throwing of stones. We eventually went out of the station. The carriage was smashed a bit, the three windows, glass, venetians and wire, were all smashed.

- Q. As I understand, you never went out of the carriage?
- A. No.
- Q. If you had gone out of the carriage, and the crowd had got hold of you, what would have happened to you?
- A. I think probably in the excited state in which they were, they would not have me let off.
- Q. Had you any doubt about their intention?
- A. I certainly think that that was their intention, because as they saw me, they at once came to the carriage and started all those things that I have mentioned. That was their object.
- Q. In your statement, I see you say that the crowd was shouting *Captain sahib ko maro; sahib sala andar hai*.
- A. Yes.
- Q. When the train was moved on, I suppose you reached your destination all right?
- A. From there I got to Wazirabad. I was held up there. On the way somebody who got out at the next station, told me that there was another crowd there about two stations off, but there was nothing there at all.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

- Q. You say in your statement, Lieutenant, that there were two men who assisted you in keeping back the crowd?

18 December 1919.]

Lieutenant TATAN—concluded—Captain S. P. FLOWERDEW.

A. Yes.  
 Q. Who were they? Did they come from the crowd or were they people in the train?  
 A. One man was in the train. He got in at a station further down, and the other man was on the platform at the time.  
 Q. Was he in your compartment?  
 A. Neither of them was in my compartment.  
 Q. He came to your compartment and assisted you?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Some days after the incidents, were you asked to identify any people?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Where were you taken for that purpose?  
 A. First of all I went to Gujranwala.  
 Q. Did anything happen at Gujranwala about which you could identify people?  
 A. No; it had nothing to do with me.  
 Q. What were you taken to Gujranwala for?  
 A. I believe some men were arrested at Hafizabad and taken to the Gujranwala jail.  
 Q. You were taken to the jail to identify?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Did you identify anyone?  
 A. I identified two or three.  
 Q. As forming part of the crowd at the station?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Then where were you taken?  
 A. To Hafizabad.  
 Q. And there, how was the identification made?  
 A. In the afternoon I went round with the Deputy Commissioner, Colonel O'Brien and the Superintendent of Police and some inspectors and sub-inspectors of police. We just casually walked through the *mandis* and bazars. Colonel O'Brien asked me to say if I could recognise anybody that might have been in the crowd. That is what took place that afternoon at Hafizabad.

Q. Did you recognise anybody?  
 A. I recognised three or four there.  
 Q. Then what happened further?  
 A. The next morning, probably about two or three thousand people were paraded under the orders of the Deputy Commissioner.  
 Q. At Hafizabad?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Where was it done? Was it at the station?  
 A. This was just outside on the road near the dak bungalow, and I went carefully up the lines and picked out men that I recognised as having formed part of the crowd.  
 Q. How many in all did you identify like that?  
 A. 85 or 86.  
 Q. Were they among those who actually attacked your compartment?  
 A. They were in the crowd all round my compartment.  
 Q. You were in the carriage itself?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. For some time you were in the bath-room?  
 A. Yes, for about two or three minutes.  
 Q. You could have seen only a very small number of people at the carriage window.  
 A. I could see the whole crowd as all the windows were smashed open on one side.  
 Q. With regard to the two men who assisted you, was anyone of them arrested and shown to you afterwards?  
 A. No.  
 Q. Did it happen that you were shown someone and asked to identify him?  
 A. I was not asked to identify anybody; I simply had to pick out anybody whom I thought was in the crowd on my own initiative.  
 Q. No particular man was brought to you?  
 A. Nobody was pointed out to me.

**Captain S. P. FLOWERDEW, 1-24th North-Western Railway Battalion, Indian Defence Force, Lahore.**

*By the President—*

Q. Captain Flowerdew, were you Captain in the North-Western Railway Battalion of the Indian Defence Force?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 17th April last were you ordered to proceed with one non-commissioned officer and 14 men by special train from Lahore to Chuharkana?

A. Yes.

Q. That was early in the afternoon?

A. I was given my orders on the night of the 16th some time about midnight and I actually went to the station about 6 o'clock on the morning of the 17th and there was some delay in getting the train assembled to take me out. The first thing in the morning as soon as the train could be got ready, I went to Chuharkana.

Q. When did you arrive in Chuharkana?

A. At about 1 o'clock in the afternoon.

Q. I think you found no civil authorities at the station and so pushed on to the village and there you met armoured train No. 1 and the sub-divisional magistrate?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there a sub-inspector with him?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you receive instructions about a man to be arrested there?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was he? In Chuharkana?

A. He was a man who lived at Chuharkana.

Q. Were you able to effect the arrest?

A. No.

Q. Why was that?

A. He was not at the village, but had gone to a well a couple of miles away and was there with a party of men. The information I received from the sub-inspector of police was to that effect, and when we approached the well they all ran away.

Q. I think you could not overtake him?

A. We could not overtake them as they ran very fast.

Q. What action did you take?

A. We followed them up and they went into a village Padiawala and we went through the village to see if we could find him there. We could not find him as he had gone on.

Q. Did you take some people from the village with you?

A. We obtained information that there were a certain number of people hiding in the village who had joined in burning the Chuharkana station and destroyed the lines, and we arrested some. We had to search the houses. They were hidden inside the house in all places and in the roof and the houses were all locked from outside.

Q. Among those prisoners, was there a sepoy on leave?

A. There was a sepoy named Fauza Singh.

Q. Was Ram Singh an ex-sepoy?

A. He was; so I was told.

Q. Before this had you fired on the party?

A. We fired on the party when we started pursuing them from the well.

Q. Were any casualties caused in consequence of your fire?

A. One man was killed there to the best of my knowledge.

Q. When you returned to the lines, did you find Sergeant Davies?

A. Sergeant Davies and one or two men had gone out.

Q. Had he gone out separately?

A. We went out together, but when Ram Singh fled, we divided into two groups and I took most of the men with me in a larger group, and Sergeant Davies took I think about four men in the other group.

Q. Did Sergeant Davies do any firing?

18 December 1919.]

Captain S. P. FLOWERDEW.

[Continued.]

A. Yes. One of a large party some of whom were armed fired at Sergeant Davies.

Q. And Sergeant Davies returned the fire?

A. He shot him at once. Sergeant Davies was a very good shot.

Q. Did Sergeant Davies bring back any prisoners?

A. He brought altogether, I think, four.

Q. Of these two were retained and two released?

A. That was about it. The Magistrate examined them and was of opinion that two were not concerned in the riots.

Q. Your assistance was not required?

A. I suggested that I should set out the next day to effect the arrest of Ram Singh, but I was assured that there would be no difficulty in arresting him.

Q. You were informed, I think, that this Ram Singh was one of the important ringleaders?

A. I was told that he was a leader of the riots at Chuharkana.

Q. Was he captured?

A. I believe he was taken prisoner the next day.

Q. You yourself returned to Lahore with some eight prisoners with you?

A. Yes.

Q. Or was it more? I see you returned with eight prisoners taken by your own party and some three taken by Captain Joscelyne's party?

A. Yes.

Q. Was Captain Joscelyne the officer in charge?

A. Yes, of No. 1 armoured train.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You went with this armoured train on the 17th?

A. It was not an armoured train. It was an ordinary special train, with two carriages, a brake-van and an engine.

Q. You were not with the last witness, that we have had, in the party?

A. The last witness was at Hafizabad.

Q. I understand. I meant to refer to the one before the last witness, Rai Sahib Lala Sri Ram.

A. I met him at Chuharkana.

Q. When you arrived at Chuharkana, the armoured train was there?

A. It was there repairing the line and repairing the telegraph wires.

Q. You formed your own party and had nothing to do with the armoured train?

A. I had nothing to do with it. I came with a special object.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. In the reports which you made to your superior officers after returning from this expedition, it is put down that "Captain Flowerdew states that he was told by the Sub-Divisional Officer and Sub-Inspector of Police that the real cause of the riot at Chuharkana was due to a party from the special train of the 22nd Punjabis which halted at the station the day before the riot."

A. That was not the actual report I made on the actual events of the day. That was a special report on the other information. I sent in a special secret report to the General Officer Commanding. I wrote it out about the middle of the night, as I had been out all day long.

Q. I am just giving it word for word. Therefore I take it that to the best of your recollection and belief that was the information given to you? "Captain Flowerdew states that he was told by the sub-divisional officer and the sub-inspector of police that the real cause of the riot at Chuharkana was due to a party from the special train of the 22nd Punjabis which halted at the station the day before the riot."

A. I said that it was the spark which caused the whole conflagration. The field was prepared before.

Q. And this man was speaking to you in English?

A. He probably spoke in English. I have seen him; he speaks English better than I speak Hindustani.

Q. There is one more fact. Neither this report on which you have been examined nor any other thing mentions the fact that anyone fired upon Sergeant Davies?

A. No.

Q. And to-day you add this statement that one man fired upon Sergeant Davies and upon that he returned the fire?

A. Yes; I may explain it. At the time I wrote this report there was no need to prove to anybody that there were riots on. It was a self-evident fact.

Q. Because there were riots on, therefore to your mind it was quite clear that any party of soldiers that would go to any village would be fired on?

A. No.

Q. The mere fact that there were riots does not necessarily prove that Sergeant Davies must have been fired upon?

A. I did not refer to it because it was self-evident that there were riots at the time.

Q. Then it appears to me that on the night of the 15th-16th, there were 22 other persons who were arrested?

A. I was not there.

Q. Did they come to Lahore with you?

A. Three men were handed over by Captain Joscelyne.

Q. So far as you are concerned, no other persons were with you on the 17th?

A. I had eight taken by myself and three taken by Captain Joscelyne.

Q. All the leaders or persons that were arrested by you, were arrested practically at the instance of the gentleman who has just now given his evidence, Lala Sri Ram Sud?

A. No; he was not with me at Padiawala. He met us five or six miles away from the railway line. He did not accompany us.

Q. The magistrate gave you the names of Teja Singh, Kartar Singh, Sohan Singh, Mehar Din and Syed Nahal Shah?

A. But they were not arrested that day.

Q. He gave you the names of those men who were really wanted?

A. No; he gave me names of these men, when I was going home after the day's proceedings were all over.

Q. At least the names of men who were arrested were given to you by that man?

A. I wrote them down myself.

Q. At his dictation?

A. I asked the men their names.

Q. You did not know who they were at all?

A. No.

Q. The men who were wanted, were given by this magistrate?

A. The magistrate was not there when I arrested them. I did not know the names of the men that I was arresting. I did not know the men. I only knew Ram Singh. After being able to get him, I came to this village somewhere on the line. I was informed that there were various men hiding in the house who had taken part in the riots. As I was there, the best thing was to apprehend them and take them home with me.

Q. By whom were you informed?

A. By a man of the village. We found a man in the village and asked him if he had joined in the riots. He said he had not, and we asked him to let us know the names of those who had joined, and he told us the names and where they were hiding. We had some difficulty as the houses were all locked and men hid themselves behind walls and behind bales of cloth.

Q. That was on the information given to you by the informer?

A. Yes.

Q. There was another sepoy who was on leave, Fauza Singh.

A. He was one of the men who were hiding there.

Q. Was he on leave from the regiment?

A. I could not say. He belongs to the 3rd Guides. I do not know where his regiment was stationed.

Q. There is only one more explanation. The persons who were shot by Sergeant Davies were shot by him from a distance and that is why he could not go close to them and take their arms?

18 December 1919.] Captain S. P. FLOWERDEN—concluded—Sardar Sahib AMAR SINGH—  
Lieut. Khan ABDUR RAHIM KHAN.

A. As far as he explained, they were not very far, probably about 200 yards away. Some of them were quite close to the man who was shot and they picked the rifle up and ran away.

Q. You say that the servants ran away with the arms?

A. Yes.

Q. Servants were not on horseback?

A. Certainly not. But the Punjabi can run much faster than a heavily laden soldier with a rifle and kit on.

Sardar Sahib AMAR SINGH, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Sheikhupura.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Amar Singh, you are an Extra Assistant Commissioner at Sheikhupura?

A. Yes.

Q. You are cognisant of certain incidents that occurred there?

A. Certainly.

Q. May I take it that you agree with the account that has already been given by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Rai Sahib Lala Sri Ram Sud?

A. I do not remember exactly what he said.

Q. Were you instructed to make investigations into Sangla, Moman and Machhike cases?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In connection with the investigations you made as to those occurrences did you employ any force to extract statements from witnesses or use any threats?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Will you explain what method you adopted in getting statements from witnesses as to what had occurred?

A. The police investigated and I called the witness and told him that no threat was meant to be offered and he should give a true statement, and I wrote the statement.

Q. At the time of the investigation were a number of men made to stand in a line and was the witness then asked to point out any man that he recognised as having taken part in the incidents?

A. That was the way in which people were found out. We made a list of those persons who were pointed out by witnesses and then that list was handed over to the police.

Q. And before being handed over, was the list signed by those identifying the people?

A. No, Sir, but it was signed by myself.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. At Sheikhupura you attended the meeting which took place there on the 6th of February?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. There was nothing seditious spoken at that meeting?

A. Not at all.

Q. Then you had a *hartal* on the 10th?

A. Not on the 10th. I have some doubt about the date, but I think it was on the 6th.

Q. Whenever it was, it passed off peacefully?

A. There was no disturbance in my presence.

Q. There was a further *hartal* on the 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. And that went off peacefully also?

A. There was no disturbance in my presence, but during the night a wire was cut.

Q. The cutting of wires was on the night of the 14th?

A. The night between the 14th and 15th.

Q. Were you concerned with the arrest of the pleaders at Sheikhupura?

A. They were not arrested in my presence.

Q. Had you anything to do with their arrest? Did you make any investigation?

A. Nothing.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. The wire cutting at Machhike had nothing to do with the riot; it was only a private personal grudge?

A. As far as I could investigate it was due to a personal grudge.

Q. How long after your reaching Sangla did the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Bosworth Smith, arrive?

A. I accompanied him on the first day.

Q. And when did he come again?

A. Perhaps after 5 or 6 days later, I do not remember the exact date.

Q. Mr. Bosworth Smith arrested a large number of persons at Sangla on one day, was it on the first or the second occasion?

A. I think it was the second day.

Q. And when you went to Sangla there was some inspector also sent with you?

A. Yes, Kartar Singh, Inspector, accompanied me.

Q. Till the second arrival of Mr. Bosworth Smith you had only arrested three persons?

A. I do not remember the exact number, either 3 or 4 or 5; the inspector did it.

Q. According to the investigation made by you up to that day only these persons were liable to be arrested?

A. I had not completed the investigation yet and I was awaiting its completion.

Q. So I say up to that stage of your investigation only these three persons were arrested and no others?

A. As far as I remember, I made no arrests. They were already arrested.

Q. Did not the pleaders at Sheikhupura, when you were there, help you in keeping law and order?

A. On the night of the 15th-16th, when Rai Sahib had left me in charge of the place, I called Lala Sheonath Rai and asked him to help me in patrolling the city.

Q. And did he and other pleaders help you or not?

A. Lala Sheonath Rai offered to help and did so.

Q. Was he deprived of his *lambardarship*, do you know?

A. I do not know.

Q. You do not know up to this time whether Lala Sheonath Rai has been deprived of his *lambardarship* up to this time?

A. I have heard of it now, but have nothing to do with the revenue work.

Q. Did you know he was a *lambardar*?

A. Yes, he was a *lambardar*.

Q. Now the man, Harnam Singh, who assaulted Mr. Wale, the telegraph inspector, do you know him? You have made a statement that you never saw him. You know about the attack by Harnam Singh on Mr. Wale?

A. I investigated and found that he had done it.

Q. He was the man who released a prisoner from the railway station?

A. The same.

Lieutenant Khan ABDUR RAHIM KHAN of Zaida, Cadet, Indian Army.

By the President—

Q. You are a Lieutenant in the Indian Army?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you leave Lahore on the 15th of April last for Lyallpur at about 2 in the afternoon?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think you were accompanied by another cadet?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you reach Chuharkana at about 4 in the afternoon?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When the train was stopped there did you notice anything?

18 December 1919.]

Lieutenant Khan ABDUR RAHIM KHAN.

[Continued.]

A. Yes, Sir, when the train reached Chuharkana I noticed a lot of *mandi* people running towards the train as if expecting to see something.

Q. Did you look out of the window?

A. When I looked out of the window there was a servant of mine there and I asked him why the train was halted for such a long time. He told me there were some people in front who were trying to dismantle the line, and when I looked out I saw about 50 to 60 persons. I cannot give you the exact number. I did not see them actually dismantling the line, but they were on the line and the engine was detached and taken over there, and after some time I found the engine coming back and going past the train on the other line, and then I found all those people who were in front were running towards the station, and they had axes in their hands, and some people rushed the station master's room and some people rushed a few hundred yards towards the Lahore side and got on to the telegraph poles and started cutting the wires, and also started dismantling the lines towards the Lahore side.

Q. Was there a crowd collected on the station itself or a number of people collected there?

A. There were the passengers and also some *mandi* people.

Q. Did you hear any one addressing any of the people?

A. Yes, there was a man very shabbily dressed, an unimportant sort of person, and he was quite close to my window and he was addressing them generally, not any particular audience, and he was telling them to wake up and start looting.

Q. Did he say anything about regaining the *Raj*?

A. Yes, he said "You Sikh people, get up, now is your time, if you try you will get your *Raj*." I did not pay very great attention to what he was saying.

Q. Was he exciting the people?

A. The people did not seem to be very much excited by his speech.

Q. But they were excited otherwise?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you notice that two railway employees were attacked or surrounded by men?

A. Yes, Sir. There was the station master (I was told he was the station master) and another man and some people rushed the station master's room and he was dragged out and one man who had a big iron rod in his hand was trying to hit him on the head.

Q. With an iron rod?

A. Yes, Sir. Then a pleader, who was travelling with me, interfered and stopped him.

Q. Did you notice that a signal was given to loot the train?

A. No, Sir. I did not notice any particular signal.

Q. I see you say the signal to loot was given by an old man, probably a Muhammadan and a very unimportant sort of person?

A. By that I mean he was the first man to start the looting.

Q. Did you see the looting proceeding?

A. Yes, Sir. There was not very much to loot. No passengers were looted in my presence, but the people rushed the station master's room and pulled him out and they were inside; they must have been looting.

Q. Then did you go along with Mr. Iqbal Singh, a pleader, to the *mandi*?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And from thence did you go to a house close by where Mr. Budh Singh, Executive Engineer, followed you?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you got there what did you do?

A. When we got there we first thought the best thing would be to get out of the place, but we had our luggage with us. I was coming on vacation from Lahore and Bawa Budh Singh had his family with him, and as we could not get a conveyance there nor at any near place, we thought the best thing would be to get into the house and try to protect ourselves in the house.

Q. Did you think there was risk of general massacre, of people being killed?

A. I cannot say about a general massacre, but of course there was some risk of these people coming and trying to loot us.

Q. I think the gentleman in whose house you were staying made arrangements for food?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And were altogether about 20 passengers of the train collected in that house?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What had happened to the train itself? Were the mob looting it?

A. I could not see the train from there, but I could see a portion of the train. In the morning when I came to the station I found the panes were broken and the cushions were torn.

Q. You stayed all night in this house?

A. Yes.

Q. You had not intended to stay there of course?

A. We could not find any means of leaving the place, so we stayed there.

Q. It was only because you were unable to leave the place that you got accommodation in this house?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was the station itself set on fire?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you see it blazing?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was a whistle blown by some one?

A. The train whistle was being blown.

Q. By some member of the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. The station and the train and everything seem to have been in the possession of the mob?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think you collected bricks in your house to throw if necessary?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you sleep that night on the roof?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Then on the morning of the 15th-16th were you awakened by Mr. Iqbal Singh and told to get ready?

A. Yes, Sir, that was about 1 or 2 o'clock in the morning.

Q. Why were you to get ready?

A. Because Iqbal Singh told me the word had been sent by the rioters that we should accompany them and lead them to Lahore and other places they intended to attack or be ready for the consequences.

Q. What did you understand the consequences would be if you didn't fall in with their proposal?

A. We drew our own conjecture; we thought they would come and loot us and we would have to put up a fight, and if they were in superior strength then they might kill us.

Q. Did you find out whether there was a large crowd?

A. We heard shouts all night long; all round, but we could not see any particular crowd; it was quite dark.

Q. I think you loaded your revolver?

A. Yes, Sir. I had a small pocket revolver with me.

Q. Did these shouts continue throughout the whole night?

A. At first they were continuing but after the machine-gun had fired and the armoured train arrived they ceased. One could hear one or two shouts at intervals.

Q. After the firing from the armoured train the noise stopped to some extent?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you in the morning go to the place from which the shots had been fired from the armoured train?

A. We went first to the armoured train which was repairing the railway bridge over the canal and then we got into the armoured train. At the same time the armoured train was taken back and I was told they were going to search for dead bodies at the place where the armoured train had first started firing. When we reached there I went a few hundred yards away from the armoured train and did not find anything, but later on I was told by my fellow cadet that there was one person lying dead.

18 December 1919.]

Lieutenant Khan ABDUR RAHIM KHAN.

[Concluded.]

Q. You did not actually see that?  
 A. No, Sir, I did not see it.  
 Q. Did you resume your forward journey at about 10-30 in the morning?  
 A. Yes, Sir, I think it was about that time.  
 Q. As you crossed the railway bridge in what state did you find the telegraph wires and poles?  
 A. Absolutely broken.  
 Q. Was that all along the way in front of Chuharkana village?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. What had happened to the small bridge over the canal?  
 A. It had been burnt.  
 Q. Was the line dismantled there?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Then another armoured train arrived?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. And did you hear some firing from it?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. When did this second armoured train arrive?  
 A. I think it was after midday. I cannot remember the exact time.  
 Q. And you resumed your journey at 10-30? How far did you get?  
 A. We went about 1,000 yards.  
 Q. And were you detained there?  
 A. Yes, Sir, because the bridge was burnt and the line was being repaired.  
 Q. You were detained 1,000 yards outside the station and were unable to proceed on your journey? For how long were you detained there?  
 A. Till 5 in the evening.  
 Q. And it was while you were detained there that this second armoured train came up?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. Did you see the sub-divisional officer of Sheikhpura bringing some villagers under a guard?  
 A. I could see it at a distance. The armoured train in which I was repairing the bridge.  
 Q. And I think you spent that night in the train?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. And you reached Sangla next evening?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. At midnight?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. So that altogether your journey from Lahore to Lyallpur had occupied 2½ days?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. What is the distance?  
 A. I cannot tell you, I think it is about 100 miles.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—  
 Q. In Chuharkana you remained from 11th to 16th?  
 A. 15th and 16th.  
 Q. You stayed there on the night of the 15th?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. That night, an armoured train came and you heard the firing one after another in the night?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. After that you say the people quieted down?  
 A. We first heard a loud noise; then one or two cries.  
 Q. After which the people considerably quieted down?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. In the morning, you considered it safe to leave the house and resume your journey?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. And then you came to the station in the morning at about 10?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. And you found the armoured train there?  
 A. Not in the station actually; it was about 400 yards towards the Lyallpur side.  
 Q. You took that armoured train?  
 A. We got into the armoured train.  
 Q. While your armoured train was near the station, about 1,000 yards away, the other armoured train came?  
 A. No, Sir. There are two bridges, one of which is on the main canal. When we went in the morning, they had nearly repaired it. There is another bridge

and we were there when the next armoured train came.

Q. You were near the second bridge?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. And the armoured train came from the other direction?  
 A. From the Lahore side.  
 Q. It came to the station?  
 A. I do not know.  
 Q. How far was the second armoured train from where you were?  
 A. It was about 200 yards.  
 Q. And this was behind you?  
 A. Behind us; towards the Lahore side.  
 Q. You could see from your armoured train the second armoured train?  
 A. I could only hear the firing.  
 Q. And the firing was done from the armoured train?  
 A. Yes; and we heard also some firing inside the village.  
 Q. You could not say at what the firing was aimed?  
 A. No, Sir.  
 Q. You say here "another armoured train arrived and after some time we heard its machine gun firing on the village; also rifle shots were heard being fired inside the village."  
 A. It was far in the direction of that village. The other armoured train was at the extreme end of the village and this armoured train towards the Lahore end of the village.  
 Q. In front of the village?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. And from there, they fired on the village?  
 A. In the direction of the village.  
 Q. After that you heard some firing in the village itself?  
 A. Yes, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. I think, being conversant with these matters, you could have no doubt about the noise of the machine-gun firing and the noise of the rifle? You could distinguish between the two?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Therefore there was no doubt that the second armoured train did use its machine-gun.  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. After that, you heard rifle firing?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Then with regard to the first armoured train, I think you were quite particular about your time because you were looking at your watch?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. And the whole night you were not able to sleep?  
 A. It was very uncomfortable.  
 Q. You heard the machine-gun firing at about 1-45 or 2 o'clock?  
 A. Is it the first night you mean?  
 Q. On the first night. Then you say, the rest of the night you heard it firing from time to time. You have no doubt about it?  
 A. Absolutely none.  
 Q. It is not only one firing; but you heard the firing from time to time?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. Then you went to find the dead bodies of the men that were fired upon?  
 A. Yes, Sir; in the morning.  
 Q. In how many lines were the armoured trains standing?  
 A. At the station, there were two; there it was only one single line.  
 Q. And to the best of your recollection, belief and memory, you did not find any dead body on or about the line there?  
 A. None.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. P. Rice—

Q. Do you think firing was necessary to bring the people to their senses on that occasion?  
 A. It is very difficult to answer.  
 Q. Do you think it was necessary to fire at all?  
 A. I think it was.



18. December 1919.]

Rev. S. C. PICKEN.

## Reverend S. C. PICKEN of the American Mission, Sangla Hill, Sheikhpura.

*By the President—*

Q. Mr. Picken, you were a missionary at Sangla?

A. Yes.

Q. Is your bungalow near Sangla?

A. Yes.

Q. How far?

A. Just across the canal, about a mile from the railway station.

Q. The *hartal* was held on the 12th of April?

A. I believe so.

Q. You were at the railway station on that day?

A. Yes.

Q. There was a large crowd gathered there?

A. Yes.

Q. The crowd was being addressed by one or two people?

A. Yes.

Q. As you left the station did the crowd do anything?

A. They gathered round my car and round me when I started from the station.

Q. Did they do anything?

A. They hooted and jeered at me.

Q. Was that very unusual?

A. It was very unusual. I could not understand it. I had not seen it before.

Q. Were stones thrown at your car?

A. I was told afterwards that stones were thrown but I did not see anything then.

Q. Did you remain in Sangla till the evening of the 15th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. During the period between the 12th and the 15th, what was the attitude of the people?

A. After the 12th I did not go out of my bungalow. The attitude of the people was very hostile towards us.

Q. Were many rumours afloat?

A. Very many.

Q. What sort of rumours?

A. Different rumours; rumours regarding the Rowlatt Act, rumours against Government, and other bazar rumours.

Q. Did this excitement last for some time?

A. I left on the evening of the 15th. It lasted up to that time and even after that, till investigations were started.

Q. Were you subject to great inconvenience and anxiety during the period at Sangla?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And afterwards too?

A. Afterwards too. We do not have any protection in Sangla other than the good-will of the people.

Q. Did you seem to have lost the good-will?

A. I must judge so from the treatment I received on the Saturday previous at the railway station.

Q. How do you account for that?

A. I think so because when people gathered there for the *hartal* there were some violent speeches being made. I did not hear them myself, nor see any report of those speeches.

Q. In your statement here, I see you indicate something in connection with the investigation, that it gave an opportunity for some people to wipe out old scores.

A. That is, it was rumoured, if one person had an enemy then there was an opportunity to get back on him by reporting against him, and on that report an arrest was made.

Q. Do you know of any cases where false testimony was given against innocent people in view to wipe off old scores?

A. I do not think so; that is the only case.

Q. What is the case?

A. That is the cutting of the wires near Sangla.

Q. Did you hear that wrong people were arrested?

A. I heard both ways. In the first investigation, there were one or two arrested.

Q. Wires must have been cut by some men?

A. Yes, that is evident.

Q. Some people said to you that innocent people were arrested and the guilty escaped?

A. I heard so. It might be some man might have been arrested, though the fact was that he was not guilty at all.

Q. Can you tell me whether it was a difficult matter to get information from the people as to who had been instrumental during the acts of destruction?

A. Yes, because of two reasons. One is the fear of revenge. The other is, all reports might be made public. And if they were making any reports public, they would not want to be brought into the investigation.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—*

Q. You say something about the police, that "had they done so (tried to suppress the disturbances), they would have been a bit roughly handled." From the 12th to the 15th were you going about or remaining in your bungalow?

A. I was in my bungalow. I had gone as far as the canal.

Q. Then on the 15th, I think, you left?

A. Yes.

Q. So, during the actual time of the disturbances you did not know what the police did?

A. No.

Q. You think that the police might have had a difficult time of it?

A. That is my opinion.

Q. You were saying something of this wire-cutting case?

A. Yes.

Q. You said that two people were arrested?

A. I have said two people; later there were further arrests.

Q. I want to make that quite sure. Is there any circumstance in connection with the time and manner of making arrests that was brought to your notice, and that seemed to you to be suspicious?

A. Nothing. Only the second investigation was rather suspicious.

Q. When Mr. Bosworth Smith came, things began to open up?

A. Yes.

*By Sir C. H. Setalvad—*

Q. How many years you have been at Sangla?

A. I went there in January 1918.

Q. And before that were you in the Punjab?

A. I was in the Punjab.

Q. Now, how many years have you been in the Punjab?

A. I came to the Punjab in October 1909.

Q. Nearly 10 years?

A. Yes.

Q. In your experience of these ten years, did you find the people exhibiting anti-British feeling?

A. I could not see any signs.

Q. Wherever you went you were treated well?

A. I must say, yes.

Q. On the whole you found the people law-abiding?

A. Yes, I think.

Q. The villagers who came in contact with you were all law-abiding?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there no indications that the events that did happen in April were likely to happen?

A. There were no indications at all.

Q. What is the investigation that you are referring to here: "Those who came to investigate seemed to make it more of a personal matter . . . ." By "those who came to investigate" do you mean the investigating officers?

A. I would hardly make it the investigating officers, because the investigating officers would have to come from outside.

Q. What do you mean by "those investigating"?

A. My meaning is there is a Muhammadan community, there is a Sikh community and there are different communities, and they judge.

18 December 1919.]

Rev. S. C. PICKER.

[Continued.]

Q. You do not mean the divisional officer?

A. No. Those who would bring witnesses to him. For instance, one Kartar Singh had to do investigation there.

Q. So, by 'those who came to investigate' you mean the persons who are investigating and come for that purpose?

A. Yes, the Divisional officer had got his evidence through the police.

Q. Do you mean by the words the officer or officers who investigate and come there for that purpose?

A. I hardly referred to them here in my statement. I mean those who were giving evidence, bringing the evidence, getting the evidence. The reports that came to me led me to form this opinion.

Q. You mean the people who gave evidence. This does not mean 'those who came to investigate.'

A. They were gathered by some one. Witnesses were brought in by some one.

Q. It must be some investigating officer, not the witnesses.

A. The investigating officer and those who were giving evidence. This opinion of mine I formed from things I gathered.

Q. You mean the investigating officer and the people who gave evidence?

A. Yes.

Q. I want to know what did the investigating officer do in the way of making it a personal matter.

A. I would not say it was a personal matter. The investigating officer would not have a personal matter. No one was willing to give evidence, no evidence was forthcoming when the matter was investigated. It was difficult for them to get at the real facts and in gathering these facts, people were asked and complaints were placed upon certain individuals; and I considered that on all these complaints they arrested the men.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. I will read out to you what you have stated here: "In the matter of investigation of cases here several things came to my notice. Those who came to investigate seemed to make it more of a personal matter, and it gave an opportunity for some to wipe out old scores." I believe this was written by you?

A. Yes.

Q. It is your own statement, not translated by any one, added to or subtracted?

A. In the beginning of my statement . . . . .

Q. I am referring to the last paragraph.

A. It is mine.

Q. You say 'in the matter of investigation of cases here several things came to my notice; those who came to investigate seemed to make it more of a personal matter, and it gave an opportunity for some to wipe out old scores, I mean the guilty party would be shielded as much as possible and the blame placed on some poor fellow who happened to be standing round at the time and yet was not doing anything. In this way it was very difficult to get at the real facts. So what I have heard has been gathered not from one man but many. The Deputy Commissioner had his difficulties along this line when he came. No one seemed willing to tell anything and in this way some men may have been convicted who were really not guilty.' If this means anything, it means that according to you the investigation was not strict, that this opinion you have not based on one man coming to you and making the complaint but it is based on general information, that practically witnesses were coming forward with the view to wipe out old scores and people who were not really concerned were accused and those who were the real culprits they were not dealt with. Am I right in my interpretation of those sentences?

A. I suppose that is right.

Q. Only one thing more. The 12th of April was the day of the *hartal*, was it not?

A. I believe so.

Q. You know that on the day of the *hartal* all the shops were closed and if there were any conveyances, they were not allowed to ply for hire. Why should I not understand, unless you say otherwise, that when

you left the station they were shouting because you were going in a car?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Were you able to catch the words of the mob?

A. Of those who gathered round the station?

A. Yes.

A. They were shouting regarding Gandhi, they were shouting regarding the Rowlatt Act. I did not catch anything.

Q. When you left the station in your car, people hooted and jeered?

A. They only hooted and jeered; I did not catch any real words.

Q. Why do you say that this hooting was not due to the fact that you were in your car, that day being a *hartal* day?

A. I shall say that it was not due to that. I have said that I do not know the reason for the treatment I received.

Q. Is it possible that that might have been the case?

A. Might have been. But there are few conveyances in Sangla; people do not drive in *tum-tums*.

Q. Do I understand that up to the 10th of April nothing of the kind was going on?

A. They might have talked, but they did not hoot us.

Q. You did talk with the people?

A. Somewhat.

Q. What sort of work you do? Preaching?

A. Yes; preaching.

Q. You were likely to know everything that was going on before the 12th?

A. I would not say that I am likely to know everything before the 12th.

Q. You did not notice anything?

A. I noticed nothing.

Q. Then how far away do you live from Sangla?

A. I live outside; it is about a mile from the railway station. The town is on one side of the canal and the bungalow on the other side.

Q. How far?

A. It is about a mile from the railway station. The bungalow is beyond the canal.

Q. How far is the bungalow from the town?

A. It is about half to three-quarters of a mile.

Q. From the 12th to 15th, you did not visit the town at all?

A. No; I did not.

Q. Then how could you say that the attitude of the people was hostile towards you?

A. From the treatment I received on the 12th when I was at the railway station (I was at the railway station on the 12th), and from the rumours I received through my servants, and others coming to me.

Q. What sort of rumours did you receive? What did they tell you?

A. For instance, the Calcutta Mail came there. It was on the 13th or 14th. Stones were thrown at it. From these things I judged that the attitude of the people was hostile.

Q. Stones were thrown at the train? You also say that two stones were thrown at your car?

A. So I was told.

Q. By whom?

A. By some individuals; I do not know.

Q. People who were in the crowd told you that they had done so?

A. I learnt this some time later, about stones being thrown at the car.

Q. Who told you?

A. Several people; I did not see anything.

Q. Were the crowd around your car?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You would very likely have seen it?

A. Not necessarily. My attention was in front, because the car was going on.

Q. No stones struck your car?

A. I have said no stones struck my car.

Q. Now you say that something was being said against Government? What was that?

18 December 1919.]

Rev. S. C. PICKEN—concluded—Bawa BUDH SINGH.

A. Rumours of different kinds concerning the Rowlatt Act, marriages and of people gathering together; just the ordinary rumours.

Q. It is against the Rowlatt Act, and not against the Government?

A. That is all.

Q. That is what you call "something being said against Government"?

A. That is all; nothing else.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Mr. Picken, whatever you might have said in this written statement of yours, do you mean to suggest to the Committee that the Government officials who went to Sangla to investigate, tried to wipe out the old scores which they had?

A. No, indeed.

Q. You mean the people, the Muhammadan and Hindu inhabitants?

A. Yes.

Bawa BUDH SINGH, Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, Provincial Division, Lyallpur.

By the President—

Q. You are an executive engineer, I think?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you journeyed from Lahore to Lyallpur leaving on the 16th April and reaching Lyallpur on the 18th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you hear the evidence that was given by Lieutenant Abdur Rahim Khan?

A. Yes, I heard it.

Q. Do you agree with that?

A. Yes, mostly.

Q. You were confined during one night I think in a house at Chuharkana, and your wife and family were with you?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were they in a state of alarm during that time?

A. Yes, mostly.

Q. Was it a very critical position in which you were all placed?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the village practically in the hands of the mob?

A. Not at the *mandi* where we were putting up. There was no mob, but there were only some villagers who were patrolling the town; the mob was somewhere near the railway bridge.

Q. What about the railway station?

A. It was burnt by the mob.

Q. And they were shouting hard at that time?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Do you remember during the night some firing was heard?

A. Yes.

Q. I think you were informed by some one that it was machine-gun fire. What effect had it upon you?

A. Of course, as soon as we heard the machine-gun firing we were much terrified, but we felt some relief that we were out of danger.

Q. Did the relief come from the attention of the mob?

A. We were informed that the mob was collecting at the railway bridge and that they would probably attack the *mandi*.

Q. Did you see the station master being attacked?

A. Not exactly. I was outside the station and I heard the cries and screams of somebody who was being beaten inside.

Q. Was he being beaten by the mob?

A. Yes.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You speak of an old Muhammadan trying to beat a babu clerk with a *lathi*, and you said that the crowd intervened to stop the assailant?

A. Yes, some people on the platform stopped this man from beating him.

Q. Then they were against any violence being used against individuals?

A. As a matter of fact the crowd at the station had been suppressed. The crowd consisted of passengers.

Q. By "crowd" you mean not the rioters?

A. Only passengers and other people on the platform.

Q. I see. You left the next morning, did you?

A. Yes.

Q. And you left by the armoured train?

A. Yes.

Q. And while you were getting into your armoured train, a second armoured train arrived?

A. The second armoured train arrived while we were standing at Chuharkana village.

Q. How far from you?

A. It stopped about a furlong or two from where we were.

Q. At that time everything was quiet?

A. At that time there was no mob nor were there crowds.

Q. After the first machine-gun fire by the armoured train at night things had quietened down?

A. Of course, they must have quietened down.

Q. After the second armoured train had come and stopped, did you see them firing into the village?

A. I did not exactly see if they were doing so as I was in my armoured train. But they were standing behind us and firing into the town. Then a party went into the town later.

Q. Did they begin firing soon after their arrival?

A. The first notice we got of the train's arrival was the firing we heard.

Q. How long before had it arrived?

A. That I cannot say.

Q. When the party from the armoured train went into the village, do you know what they did?

A. I simply heard some firing after the party had gone into the village.

Q. Did your armoured train go away first or did the other one leave before yours?

A. The other one.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. On the first occasion, before the crowd of hooligans came to the station, there was a large number of people from the *mandi* also coming to the station to see the *tamasha*?

A. Yes.

Q. Numerically the mob was not very large?

A. No, the mob on the platform was large; the hooligans were not many.

Q. And you could only see about a dozen people with *lathis*?

A. Yes.

Q. And about another dozen people who were on the other side of the train cutting wires?

A. Yes.

Q. As a matter of fact, your wife and mother were in the train?

A. Yes.

Q. When these people passed the carriage in which your wife and mother were, and when they saw them shutting the windows, they told them not to be afraid, that no harm would be done to them as they only intended to pull down wires?

A. Yes.

Q. As a matter of fact the principal portion from which the inhabitants of Chuharkana come is the *mandi*?

A. *Mandi* is quite a different place from the village of Chuharkana. All the merchants and principal people live in *mandi*.

Q. They were invited to join the mob, but they refused?

A. Rumour had it to that effect, but I cannot say whether they were actually invited or not.

18 December 1919.] Bawa BUDH SINGH—*concluded*—Babu DEWAN CHAND—Khan Sahib DURAN KHAN.

Q. When the armoured train came, you, from time to time, heard the firing of a machine-gun and the cracking of rifles not only once but several times?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you heard the noise of a drum beating from the Padre's bungalow, and you saw there a man waving a white flag on the top of the bungalow. You thought that the mob was there and assaulting. But when the train moved nearer to the bungalow a party with loaded rifles left to rescue them. But not a shot was fired as there was no mob to be found?

A. Yes.

Q. On the next morning the big gun in the train was ranged on the village and villagers were given a few hours to remove their women and children before bombarding?

A. That is what I had heard. A friend of mine had told me.

Q. You say while the train was still standing at the bridge, the commander saw through his binoculars some miles distant a huge crowd moving towards the train?

A. Yes.

Q. While you were standing there, another armoured train arrived and stopped opposite the village of Chuharkana and without waiting they opened fire with the machine-gun. With what result do you know?

A. That I do not know.

Q. Then when you were going in your armoured train and after you had reached Bahalike, then also the machine-guns cracked a volley into the village?

A. Not into the village. We went beyond Bahalike. There was a bridge burnt by the mob.

Q. Searchlights flashed and the whole country side was lit up? You found no mob at the place?

A. Yes.

**Babu DEWAN CHAND, Sub-Permanent Way Inspector, North-Western Railway, Lyallpur.**

*By the President—*

Q. Were you sub-permanent way inspector at Lyallpur connected with the North-Western Railway?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On the 14th April did anything occur on your railway near Chuharkana?

A. Not on the 14th but on the 15th.

Q. What occurred?

A. Between Chuharkana and Bahalike at mile 80 the line was uprooted and a bridge set on fire.

Q. Were you near at hand when that occurred?

A. I was patrolling on the line.

Q. Did you interfere with the rioters when they were doing this?

A. I accompanied the special train which contained troops and when I arrived there no rioters were to be found.

Q. Before that, when you were alone on your patrol, had you not to leave because the mob threatened to burn your trolley?

A. This happened when I was coming in my trolley. The mob met me and threatened me to the effect that if I refused to get down from my trolley they would burn it. But I told them that there was no use burning the trolley. They then left me. I came back to the station. The mob meanwhile had uprooted and burnt down the station.

Q. After the special troop train had been there, did the mob gather again late in the evening?

A. After the troop train had departed between 3 and 5, the mob gathered there, uprooted the line and burnt the station.

**Khan Sahib DURAN KHAN, Honorary Civil Judge and Vice-President, Notified Area Committee, Sangla Hill, Shelkhpura.**

*By the President—*

Q. Are you Honorary Civil Judge and Vice-President of the Notified Area Committee, Sangla (Sheikhupura)?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In the beginning of March, was there some agitation in the town of Sangla?

A. No, not in the beginning of March.

Q. But did not a *Brahmacharya* come to Sangla in the beginning of March?

A. Yes.

Q. What was he doing?

A. He used to preach in the Sanatan Dharma School and Thakurdwara Temple.

Q. Did you know what he was preaching?

A. On enquiry I was told that he used to recite *Mahabharata* and preach religious sermons.

Q. Was there a *hartal* held in Sangla on the 13th April?

A. On the 12th April.

Q. Did anything occur on that day?

A. I was at Gujranwala at the time, but when I came back I heard that a crowd of Muhammadans and Hindus at first bathed in the canal and then walked through the city bareheaded with a black mourning flag.

Q. Were they shouting anything?

A. They were mourning and shouting cries against the Government and the Rowlatt Act and they were not using desirable words.

Q. What do you mean by "desirable words"?

A. They said "we have been subjected to tyranny and we will not suffer this tyranny any longer."

Q. Were the crowd apparently anti-Government?

A. Yes, apparently against the Government.

Q. Did you hear a rumour at this time that the line had been broken up?

A. On the 14th news was brought to me that the line leading to Gujranwala had been broken up and that the Calcutta Mail would run by Sangla.

Q. Did you go to the station and find out about this?

A. I went to the station, made enquiries from the station master and asked him to inform me when he got news about the arrival of the train.

Q. Were you at the station again later in the evening?

A. Then there was a storm, but at a quarter to six a man came to me from the station and told me that the station master had intimated that the train had arrived at the station and he wanted me to go to the station because a mob had gathered there.

Q. Then on the next day in the morning did a special troop train pass through Lyallpur?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. After that train passed through, was there excitement noticeable among the people?

A. Just as the train passed the people got excited and there was a general excitement all over the city and people began to gather in the city.

Q. How did the passing of this train cause this excitement?

A. We had checked people before the train had arrived there. But when the train came in they also arrived there with sweetmeats, water and other things to serve these people and so we allowed them. After the train passed through they came out and told the people that the troops had informed them that this was the time for them to wake up because the world was all along sleeping and that the troops would side with them.

Q. On the evening of that day was a note sent to you by the station master that the station was on fire?

18 December 1919.]

Khan Sahib DURAN KHAN.

[Continued.]

A. On the evening of the 15th I received a note from the station master saying that the Chuharkana station had been burnt and they were in danger and he wanted me to help and rescue them.

Q. Then did you go?

A. I accompanied by my servants and with my weapons went to the station.

Q. Did you make any announcement in the bazar?

A. I sent the railway station staff and my servants to the city to inform the people that if anybody was found after 8 with any mischievous intentions coming towards the station he would be shot down, because we had received orders from the Government to fire at such persons.

Q. Did you consider it was necessary for the maintenance of order and peace that that step of firing should be taken?

A. Yes, Sir, there was great excitement then.

Q. The next day were you at the station again on the 16th in the morning?

A. I remained at the station throughout the night.

Q. And did a train come in from Lyallpur?

A. A train arrived going to Lyallpur from Wazirabad.

Q. Did you make any request to any one there for military assistance?

A. The Hon'ble Sayad Mehdi Shah was in that train, and as the train would not go further I arranged for his conveyance to take him to Lyallpur and I sent a message with him that they could not receive any help from Gujranwala or Lahore. Therefore the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. deMontmorency, should despatch some military assistance.

Q. Was there any incident when Mr. Wale was assaulted?

A. On the evening of the 16th Mr. Wale came with me to the post office. I went away to my house to say my prayers. At that time I heard a woman crying that a European soldier had been killed by a Sikh. I ran at once on hearing this report and I found that a Sikh had caught hold of a European by his right hand and he was beating him on his head with a club which he had in his hand, and the European gentleman was pulling the Sikh towards the station through the post office. There was a fencing ahead and I myself saw the European gentleman jump over the fencing, and this Sikh's hand slipped. Then the European gentleman took out the revolver he had with him and shot him, three or four shots.

Q. Was that European Mr. Wale?

A. Yes, Sir. I went there myself and saw blood oozing out of his head and his clothes were besmeared with blood.

Q. Did you follow Mr. Wale's assailant into the bazar in the town?

A. Just at the time when I reached that European gentleman, Mr. August, the D. T. S., with his staff arrived and he asked me to follow the assailant. I at once followed him and found that the assailant was lying on a cot in the bazar and a big crowd had gathered round him. I told them that they should go away and that they should not interfere in the matter and if they did so they would come to trouble and grief. But I heard that assailant saying that he had been done for but that he had also finished the work of another man.

Q. The man said he himself had been done for, but at least he had done the work of another man at the same time. I understand from you that he said he had done the work of one of them. What did you understand he meant by "them"?

A. He did not mention "them," he only said he had done the work of another.

Q. I think the police came and that man was taken to hospital?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you stay that night again at the station?

A. Yes, Sir, because there was a lot of danger that night.

Q. Was this a very critical time for those in authority?

A. It was a critical time especially for Europeans.

Q. Why was it especially a dangerous time for Europeans?

A. Though the Rowlatt Act was made a pretext, yet people were excited and I think there was a certain movement.

Q. Movement against what?

A. Against the Government.

Q. Do you know who is responsible for that movement?

A. It was imported from outside, and I think that the *Brahmachari* who had arrived from the Kangri Gurukul at Hardwar was the cause of this movement.

Q. Then on the next day a train arrived with a number of Gurkha soldiers?

A. During the night between the 16th and the 17th a train arrived with Gurkha troops, and that night was full of danger because Harnam Singh was wounded and we were apprehending danger from his villagers.

Q. Were troops necessary in order to quell the disturbances?

A. They were essentially necessary, and had the troops not arrived, the hooligans would have looted the country.

Q. Were they absolutely defiant of all order and of Government?

A. They were defiant and also minute by minute they were becoming worse.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. This *Brahmachari* you say came from the Gurukul. You say you often saw him?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you saw him, did you notice that he was anything beyond a religious preacher?

A. After seeing him I made enquiries of the members of the municipal committee and also from Lala Girdhari Lal, the Manager of the Sanatan Dharma School, as to who that *Brahmachari* was. They informed me that the man in yellow robes was their religious preacher, and after that I had nothing to do with it.

Q. What do you mean by saying, "I often saw him"?

A. The Sanatan Dharma School is situated just in front of my house. Besides that he was strolling all over the city, and I had on different occasions seen him.

Q. When you say "I often saw him," you mean that you merely saw him from a distance, you never spoke to him?

A. I only saw him from a distance.

Q. You did not hear what he was preaching at any time?

A. I was told that he recited *Mahabharata* and delivered religious sermons. He stayed in the houses of Hindus, so I could not go in.

Q. You did not hear any sermon of his at all?

A. No.

Q. Then what reason have you for suggesting that it was this *Brahmachari* who had imported this movement against Government in Sangla?

A. When I returned I heard about the incident of the 12th. I came to know that this *Brahmachari* was the leader of the mob. He made them mourn, he made speeches and he led them throughout the city, and therefore I considered that he was the fountain-head of all this mischief.

Q. Was this *Brahmachari* arrested?

A. He fled away on the night between the 15th and the 16th.

Q. You saw him taking part in the occurrences of the 12th at Sangla?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you see him on the 12th leading the mob or lecturing to them or taking part or did you hear about it?

A. I have already stated that I was not at Sangla on the 12th. I came back after the 12th and I heard of what had happened.

Q. Where do you live?

A. I live at Sangla.

Q. Were you not in Sangla on the 12th?

18 December 1919.] Khan Sahib DURAN KHAN—continued—Munshi ABDUL KADIR—Mr. R. C. CHOPRA.

A. I had gone to Gujranwala.

Q. When did you return to Sangla?

A. On the night between the 13th and 14th.

Q. When you returned there you heard that this *Brahmachari* had taken part on the 12th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you report that fact to the authorities or take any steps to have him arrested?

A. Throughout the 14th he hid himself in some house in the city. We could not find him; on the night between the 14th and the 15th, he had fled away. But I informed the authorities that the man at the bottom of all this mischief was there.

Q. Did the police make any further enquiries about this *Brahmachari*?

A. They tried their level best, but they were not successful.

Q. Then this *Brahmachari* was not in Sangla on the 15th and 16th?

A. He was not to be seen.

Q. He did not lead any of these disturbances?

A. No, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You have stated to-day that it was reported that the troops would side with the people. Did you make that allegation in your statement before this committee?

A. I think I have done it. I submitted a statement in vernacular. It is not with me. I submitted it to the Government.

Q. It is not here in this English translation, the fact that the troops would side with the rioters is not mentioned here?

A. I am pretty sure it was mentioned in my statement.

Munshi ABDUL KADIR, Permanent Way Inspector, North Western Railway, Lyallpur.

By the President—

Q. Were you permanent way inspector on the North Western Railway?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think you were formerly on the Lyallpur section?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Had you charge of the section from Lyallpur to Chuharkana via Sangla on the 15th April 1919?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think you got information on that day as to the destruction of railway lines and burning of bridges?

A. Yes, Sir, from my Assistant, Dewan Chand.

Q. Did you leave by passenger train at about 4 P.M.?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think you were instructed to see that the passenger train did not go beyond Sangla station without your being sure that the line was safe?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You passed through Sangla station, I think?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Is Moman a station before you come to Sangla or after you leave Sangla?

A. It is a station after leaving Sangla.

Q. You got information as to what occurred. After you left Sangla you went on to Moman. What did you find there?

A. Everything was intact there and the station master was working. I wired to the station master, Sangla, saying that the line was safe up to Moman. Then I trolled onward to Dhaban Singh and everything was all right. I wrote out my telegram and gave it to the station master saying that the line up to that place was all right, but he told me that the instruments were not working.

Q. Did you go back to Moman?

A. Then I wanted to go further on to Bahalike, but I saw a flame of light on one of the bridges, and those

foot passengers who had got down at Chuharkana from the Lahore train were walking from that place. They brought me news that the people were burning the bridges and uprooting the lines. That bridge was about two miles away from Dhaban Singh. I sent my *jamadar* to see what was being done there. He went there in disguise and came back and told me that the people were burning the bridge and uprooting the railway line, and some of them were coming towards Dhaban Singh. When I actually heard the noise quite close to the station, I trolled back to Moman, and there I found that the Moman station was all in flames. I asked the station master what had happened. He told me that about 60 or 70 men came there and burnt the station, and that they had gone to Sangla to attack that station. So seeing that those people were damaging the lines all along, I took off my trolley and hid in the bushes and came on foot and saw many marks on the line, that is sleepers hacked with axes and such like things. On the way I also saw that telegraph wires were cut near Baroa village. When I reached Sangla, I saw that the Sangla station was not attacked.

Q. Was the situation one that required an armed force to control it?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think you requested an armed force to be sent and thirty Indian troops came?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did the situation appear critical after that?

A. Up to the time the Gurkhas arrived and they came on the 17th.

Q. They were a party of about 170?

A. I did not count.

Q. Before that was the situation in which you were critical?

A. Yes, Sir.

Mr. R. C. CHOPRA, Hafizabad.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Chopra, you have requested to give evidence?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. How long have you been in Hafizabad?

A. For the last three years off and on.

Q. You desire to give us your views as to the occurrences there?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. We have been informed that upon the 14th of April.....

A. I know nothing before the 17th. I only know of things after the 17th.

Q. When were you in Hafizabad previously?

A. In March. I went away for a few days.

Q. I would like to know this—we have been informed that upon the 14th of April a crowd went to the station of Hafizabad and attempted to enter the compartment

which was occupied by Lieutenant Tatam and a little boy with a view to put them to death? With your knowledge of Hafizabad can you give us any explanation of how that occurred?

A. As far as I know that was done by two or three people from outside, who came from adjacent villages. It was not done by the ordinary public. That is my view.

Q. Your view is that the occurrences cannot have happened owing to the action of the Hafizabad people themselves?

A. With the exception of a very few men.

Q. I think that on the day after there was some destruction done to the railway lines—how do you account for that?

A. That was also done by a man from outside—a Gujrati: that is what I heard; and that this man was a drunkard.

18 December 1919.]

Mr. R. C. CHOPRA.

[Continued.]

Q. On what matters do you think you can give us useful explanation?

A. The only information that I can give is about matters after the 17th. For instance about punishments that were given to people without any charges being framed against them.

Q. Do you know of some cases where you think people were punished who ought not to have been punished?

A. I have given a number of examples.

Q. As regards the measures that were taken, what exception do you take to the measures that were adopted?

A. In the first place all these people were tried in one day—the 7th of June.

Q. How many people were tried in one day?

A. From 50 to 90. There were two kinds of complaints—on the one hand that people were kept too long before they were tried and the other complaint that too many people were tried in one day.

Q. Do you know whether the people who ought to have tried these cases were engaged during this time in trying other cases?

A. I do not know.

Q. Then you want to make a general expression of opinion that these people were detained too long and all tried in one day

A. I made enquiries from people about this.

Q. Did you hear the cases that were tried?

A. No; I could not go inside.

Q. You cannot say whether or not the magistrate or the officer who tried the case did not hear everything that was to be said in the defence of each person?

A. Not exactly; but I asked those who were acquitted how they were treated and I had some of my friends who were witnesses.

Q. But the people who were acquitted would not have any complaints?

A. Even they had complaints.

Q. The complaints were they did not get proper trial on the ground that they were tried under Martial Law and not tried by a civil court?

A. Yes; and they said that the witnesses gave false evidence and a headmaster of one of the schools, who was one of the prosecution witnesses, gave false evidence.

Q. Who is this headmaster?

A. Ramsahib.

Q. What school does he belong to?

A. There is only one high school there.

Q. Do you mean to say that he perjured himself?

A. Yes, he has mentioned this to the Congress Committee.

Q. How do you know?

A. Because he told me—this man Ramsahib.

Q. I want to know whether from your own personal knowledge you can give us some useful information?

A. In the first place I do not think there was any necessity for Martial Law after the 17th.

Q. But how can you express an opinion when you do not know what occurred?

A. At that time there was no necessity at any rate. At that time the city was quiet and there was nothing on.

Q. What would you consider a necessity for establishing Martial Law less?

A. Rioting; and when the civil power could not manage affairs.

Q. Then you think Martial Law is necessary?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you say whether on the 14th Martial Law was not necessary?

A. I cannot say as I did not see—only on the 17th, 18th and 19th.

Q. During the 17th, 18th and 19th, is it not the case that there were considerable forces of military in Hafizabad?

A. I do not think—at least I do not know.

Q. Were there no military?

A. None.

Q. How far is Hafizabad from Wazirabad?

A. 88 miles.

Q. And how far is it from Gujranwala?

A. By the direct route 30 miles and by train it is about 62.

Q. There were a great number of serious occurrences taking place about this time in that neighbourhood. I suppose you knew about that?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you an observer of any one of those occurrences or not?

A. No; I was a good bit away.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Did you say that the headmaster of the high school told you himself that he committed perjury before the summary courts martial?

A. He told me that he had given his statement to the Congress Committee.

Q. Did he or did he not lead you to suppose that the evidence he gave before the summary courts martial was perjury and erroneous evidence?

A. The impression he gave me was that he was forced to do it.

Q. Is he one of those people that were locked up at any time?

A. Yes.

Q. Was he locked in a place that did not have a good lavatory and did he complain of the smell?

A. No.

Q. Did he tell you that a policeman sat over him and threatened to brain him unless he gave perjured evidence?

A. No; I did not ask him.

Q. And did you send up his name to the Director of Public Instruction as a headmaster of a high school who ought to be enquired about?

A. No; he gave his statement to Mr. Andrews.

Q. Is this headmaster going about openly stating that the evidence he gave was false and excusing himself on the ground that he was forced to give evidence but not stating in what way he was forced?

A. Not exactly; I asked him about it and he told me that he had given a statement to the Congress Committee and that he would come to this Committee as a witness.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. What are you?

A. I am doing nothing at present.

Q. What is your profession?

A. I am in the commercial line.

Q. What are you doing in the way of commerce?

A. Anything I can get.

Q. Are you doing anything at present?

A. I am in some rice business just at present.

Q. Do you export or import rice?

A. I send to different towns. I am not doing it myself but through some people.

Q. Do you buy rice and export it?

A. Yes.

Q. In Hafizabad?

A. Yes.

Q. How long have you been there?

A. Since a couple of months.

Q. What were you doing before?

A. Doing nothing before.

Q. For how many years?

A. For the last three years.

Q. How have you been living?

A. I have been living on my means and my parents also helped me.

Q. You say in your statement that before you were residing in Europe for about 13 years. What were you doing there?

A. First of all I was educated there. Then I got into the commercial line.

Q. What commercial business were you doing?

A. Some stock-exchange business.

Q. Did you take part in politics in England?

A. No; I once went to hear some lectures delivered by Mr. Gokhale.

Q. Beyond that you did not interest yourself in politics?

A. No.

18 December 1919.]

Mr. R. C. CHOPRA.

[Continued.]

Q. After you returned to India, have you interested yourself in politics?

A. No.

Q. Did you take part in the Rowlatt Act agitation?

A. No.

Q. At any place in Hafizabad and Wazirabad?

A. I was in Bikaner in those days.

Q. What were you doing there?

A. I went to see some relations of mine.

Q. When the Rowlatt Bill was going on you were at Bikaner all the time?

A. From the 8rd to the 17th of April.

Q. The Rowlatt Act agitation started in February or March. Did anything happen in Hafizabad?

A. At Hafizabad there was no agitation about the Rowlatt Act—at any rate before the end of March.

Q. Was there any *hartal* at Hafizabad on the 30th March?

A. No.

Q. Was there a *hartal* on the 6th of April?

A. I do not know. I was not in Hafizabad. I came there on the 17th.

Q. You speak about recruiting in your statement, have you any personal knowledge about the matter?

A. I have some personal knowledge.

Q. Did you take part yourself in recruiting?

A. No; but I have seen them being beaten.

Q. Where?

A. In the *tahsil* in Hafizabad.

Q. Were you present yourself when anybody was beaten?

A. I was with my cousin when I saw this.

Q. On what date was that?

A. About a year back.

Q. Why had you gone there?

A. My cousin was going there on some business and I accompanied him. I accompanied him a part of the way.

Q. You did not go into the *tahsil*?

A. I did go half way.

Q. Has it a compound?

A. Yes.

Q. Your cousin went inside and you stayed outside?

A. Yes.

Q. Why did you go with him?

A. He had some business and I used to go with him for walks.

Q. When you arrived there what did you observe?

A. I saw a man being beaten with shoes.

Q. Who was doing the beating?

A. Some *chaprassi*.

Q. You saw who was being beaten and who was doing the beating?

A. I do not know their names.

Q. Was the *tahsildar* there?

A. Yes.

Q. Was he doing the beating?

A. No; some *chaprassi* was doing the beating.

Q. Was the Deputy Commissioner there?

A. No.

Q. How many people were being beaten like that?

A. I only saw one.

Q. And he was being beaten with shoes?

A. Yes.

Q. And did he undergo that beating without any protest?

A. He was simply lying down.

Q. Was he thrown down after you arrived?

A. This happened before I reached there.

Q. Somebody was standing near him and beating him with shoes?

A. Yes, on his ribs.

Q. This man was quietly lying down suffering all that?

A. Yes, he was suffering and moaning.

Q. Was he howling?

A. Yes.

Q. Why didn't you help that man?

A. We could not do anything at Hafizabad.

Q. You saw a man being beaten by a *chaprassi* and you took no action to prevent that?

A. No.

Q. How do you know that this beating was in connection with recruiting?

A. Because there was nothing in those days going on except recruiting, and I heard many times before that people were being beaten like that.

Q. You heard it many times before?

A. Practically every day.

Q. That people were being beaten?

A. Yes.

Q. And this was the only occasion on which you saw it personally?

A. Yes.

Q. After that you never saw it again?

A. That was only accidental.

Q. Did you make any complaint about what you saw to any person in authority?

A. No.

Q. Why didn't you do that?

A. This kind of thing was being done every day in the rural districts.

Q. You are an educated person in Hafizabad and you have been in Europe for 18 years and when you heard of this bad treatment to the people you did not think it your duty to inform the authorities?

A. A man would get into trouble if he did so.

Q. Why didn't you inform the authorities?

A. Because I was afraid.

Q. Then you are not afraid now to come before this Committee and tell us about these things?

A. No, because the Lieutenant-Governor has given full permission to come forward and inform the authorities about these things.

Q. Why didn't you come forward before?

A. Because it would be of no use and besides I was afraid.

Q. It would not have been of any use then?

A. No.

Q. Why do you think so?

A. For several reasons. One of my relation was being interfered with in connection with the war loan.

Q. So you thought it discreet to keep quiet and not say anything about your cousin's affair?

A. Yes.

Q. You are re-assured now?

A. Yes.

Q. You speak of some proclamation of the 30th April under which all people were brought up to the *tahsil*—did you see that yourself?

A. I was present there myself. Under the order I had to be present.

Q. By whom was that order issued?

A. By the Deputy Commissioner.

Q. The whole population of Hafizabad was asked to go there except the females?

A. Yes; all the adult male population were ordered to go.

Q. And you were among them.

A. Yes.

Q. And what happened?

A. Lieutenant Tatam picked out about forty men.

Q. Lieutenant Tatam was asked to identify?

A. Yes.

Q. You do not think that this should have been done?

A. People would have gone there without the proclamation which was worded rather harshly.

Q. You objected to the terms of the order because the orders were according to you that every adult male person should present himself to-morrow morning in front of the *tahsil*—if anybody absented himself he would be shot?

A. Yes.

Q. How was this notification published?

A. By beat of drum.

Q. You heard the proclamation yourself?

A. Yes; two or three times.

Q. Was that the only occasion when you were asked to go or was there any further notification?

A. Only once.

Q. When you speak of roll-call for school children, did you see that yourself?



18 December 1919.]

Mr. R. C. CHOPRA.

[Continued.]

A. That was another proclamation which was notified by beat of drum in Hafizabad itself.

Q. That proclamation required all school boys to attend roll-call?

A. Yes.

Q. How many times was that done?

A. I could not tell you.

Q. Who took this roll-call?

A. A military officer of the Supply and Transport Corps.

Q. What were they expected to do in this roll-call?

A. I used to see the boys standing there.

Q. What were they asked to do?

A. I do not know.

Q. Did the school children include even small boys of four?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jaat Narayan—

Q. In your statement you refer to some humiliation to the people especially by the Deputy Commissioner—have you any personal knowledge?

A. Well after the lecture everybody was made to catch their ears and say "Taubha, Taubha, Taubha."

Q. After Colonel O'Brien made his speech he made you do all this and did you do it?

A. Yes.

Q. You were present once?

A. Yes.

Q. And you had to do it also?

A. Well, I did it all the same.

Q. Colonel O'Brien ordered this to be done?

A. Yes.

Q. And were there a large number of persons?

A. Yes, anything from 200 to 500.

Q. And what was the subject of his lecture?

A. The subject of it was, "You are going to fight against the British Government. The British Government is very powerful. It has suppressed Germany and so forth, what are you? You must not do these things: these days are not like the days of the Divans."

Q. Was there anything else that you saw?

A. I did not myself see any other thing.

Q. Do you pay any land revenue?

A. No, my father is alive.

Q. Your father pays it?

A. Yes.

Q. Was any order received by your father about payment of land revenue?

A. The cultivators and the *lamhaddars* received orders.

Q. You say Colonel O'Brien issued an order through the local *tahsil* that the land revenue must be paid at a certain date, otherwise proceedings would be taken under Martial Law? Had that anything to do with you or your father?

A. No.

Q. How did you know about this order?

A. The order was issued from the *tahsil* and given to *lamhaddars* and other people.

Q. You have seen this order given to large numbers of people?

A. I have not seen it.

Q. Then how do you know?

A. The people who had it, told me.

Q. Then you say about Gopal Daas, Ahluwalia, that he was pressed by the police to give evidence and he refused to be a party to false evidence and he was arrested on May 16th. Have you any personal knowledge of that?

A. He told me this himself, and the people he consulted on the 14th and 15th, I asked one of them.

Q. You talk of the arrest of a *dhobi*, have you any personal knowledge of this?

A. I did not see him being arrested, but I saw one man under arrest.

Q. You saw him under arrest?

A. No, I saw the Sikh under arrest.

Q. Did you see the *dhobi* under arrest, or arrested?

A. No, I did not see him.

Q. Then all this is hearsay about the *dhobi*?

A. I asked the *dhobi* himself how he was arrested.

Q. Therefore your knowledge is confined to what the *dhobi* himself told you?

A. What the *dhobi* himself told me and what other people told me, and I saw one of these persons in prison one day and he told me.

Q. Whom did you see in prison?

A. Ladha Singh, the Sikh.

Q. He was kept in prison for one day and he was released?

A. Yes.

Q. You saw him with your own eyes?

A. I saw him under arrest once, because I was told so and I went specially to see him.

Q. Do you know that Lala Muthra Das, *tahsildar*, Hafizabad, was obliged to take leave on transfer?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know from your own knowledge that the local *munsif* was also transferred by Colonel O'Brien?

A. Yes, the local *munsif* was transferred in those days.

Q. Do you know that Lala Srinath, *saidar*, was dismissed from his position?

A. Yes.

Q. These things are within your own knowledge?

A. Yes.

Q. And the officiating Inspector of Police was transferred?

A. Yes.

Q. Why were all these changes made?

A. All these changes were made when Colonel O'Brien came on the 13th of April.

Q. And why were they transferred?

A. That I cannot say.

Q. Why have you put it down?

A. Because the impression on the people was that they were transferred to enable those people to be arrested easily. That was the idea the people had because they were all transferred at once.

Q. How could they prevent the arrest of people? First of all you have no personal knowledge as to why they were transferred?

A. They were transferred on the 30th April and the people were arrested on the 1st May, and some whose houses had been searched before, even they were not arrested before, but after the transfers all these *wakils* and so on were arrested.

Q. How could they prevent the arrest of these pleaders and others even supposing your impression be true?

A. They might or might not.

Q. You come before the Committee and you put this down in black and white and make any allegation, there must be some reasonable grounds for what you say, otherwise what is the good of putting it down here?

A. Because they were transferred and other people came in their places who were quite new to the situation.

Q. If some officers are transferred, others have to come in their places?

A. But they were quite new to the situation and they knew nothing about it.

Q. Were you present on the occasion of any speeches delivered by Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien at recruiting *durbars*?

A. *Main lunga, main lunga, main lunga* was the only thing I heard.

Q. What did you hear?

A. He said "We want recruits," and "*Main lunga, main lunga, main lunga.*" These were his words.

Q. What objection have you to that?

A. The way he said it, people took it to mean that he would take the recruits by force.

Q. You say press-gang methods were adopted by Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien, what do you mean by this expression? First of all, are you giving me your hearsay story or have you any personal knowledge of these methods?

A. Some of the cultivators came to me and complained that they were forced to join as recruits.

Q. Of your father's village?

A. Yes of my father's village or my cousin's village.

---

18 December 1919.]

Mr. R. C. CHOPRA.

[Concluded.]

---

Q. Now from the 17th onwards, what was the attitude of the people? Were they sullen or were they terror-struck and demoralized? What is your impression?

A. Nothing from the 17th to the 30th; only after the 30th they were terror-struck.

Q. You here say the people were terror-struck by the Martial Law régime?

A. People were so terrified that they did not even speak. That was during the whole of May. They would not say anything whatsoever and kept indoors.

Q. You say a cruel wrong had been done, what do you mean by that?

A. People have been punished without fair trial.

Q. Your complaint is about the method of trial?

A. Yes.

19 December 1919.]

Mr. V. W. SMITH.

## At Lahore, Friday, the 19th December 1919.

## PRESENT.

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.  
 The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.Q.S.  
 Major-General Sir. GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B.,  
 K.C.M.G., I.A.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.  
 The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.  
 Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.  
 Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., *Secretary*.

Mr. V. W. SMITH, Superintendent of Police, Lyallpur.

*By the President—*

Q. Mr. Smith, you are in the Indian Police?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. Were you transferred to Lyallpur on the 1st April last?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. You had previous experience of the district?  
 A. I went first in May 1915 and stayed there until May 1916; then from October 1916 to May 1917.  
 Q. Is Lyallpur a large district?  
 A. Yes; very thickly populated.  
 Q. Are there any large towns?  
 A. The headquarters is a large town; others are small towns.  
 Q. Is the district liable to be affected by political movements?  
 A. In 1907 there was very serious political unrest over the Colonization Act and for some months this unrest continued. There was a good deal of wire cutting, and on one occasion an attack was made on the police station, and a number of seditious speeches were made.  
 Q. Was a District Congress Committee formed there early in 1919?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. To agitate against the Rowlatt Act?  
 A. Yes, Sir. I think they were about 20 or 80 to start with. I think, it was in February; a meeting was held and on that occasion the membership was considerably increased.  
 Q. A public meeting was organised on the 5th April?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. That was organized by the Congress Committee?  
 A. That was run entirely by the Congress Committee.  
 Q. It was resolved at that meeting that the *hartal* should be held next day?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. And I think the *hartal* was held?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. Was it completely successful?  
 A. It was a complete success.  
 Q. Was there another meeting in the evening of the 6th?  
 A. On the 6th there was a meeting.  
 Q. The meetings on the 5th and 6th were orderly?  
 A. Some of the speeches were strongly worded.  
 Q. Was there any further agitation until the 12th?  
 A. Nothing at all.  
 Q. At that time, the question of renewed *hartal* came up?  
 A. That came up on the 12th.  
 Q. Was any active propaganda work done in connection with the proposed *hartal*?  
 A. It was scarcely active in the sense that I could see it. But it was done in the open bazar.  
 Q. You say misrepresentations took place. What do you mean by misrepresentation?  
 A. Misrepresentation of the intentions of the Rowlatt Act.

Q. What sorts of misrepresentations were made?  
 A. The chief misrepresentation was that any body of persons, it may be 5 or 10 (the figures differed), would be liable to arrest by the police.  
 Q. Who was responsible for that misrepresentation?  
 A. It came out subsequently in the investigation that the leaders of the Congress Committee were responsible. A number of shop-keepers had been drawn into the Committee.  
 Q. Did the misrepresentation with reference to the Rowlatt Act create a considerable amount of agitation among the people?  
 A. By that time, the question of the arrest of Gandhi had arisen, and there was a good deal of misrepresentation about that. It was generally believed that he was arrested and put in jail.  
 Q. A *hartal* was decided upon for the 13th (Sunday)?  
 A. I do not know how it was decided. The *hartal* came into existence on Sunday.  
 Q. Did the crowds collect early in the bazar?  
 A. There was nothing very much, I think, till about midday.  
 Q. What happened then?  
 A. At about 3 o'clock, we heard shouts in the civil station, shouts of *Mahatma ki jai*. And the Deputy Commissioner and myself became alarmed and went into the city. Between 5 or 6 o'clock, a big crowd began to collect and move about.  
 Q. You patrolled the streets?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. What reception did you meet with?  
 A. We found the people very sullen, and scarcely a single man paid us the usual mark of respect. We saw one or two objectionable posters stuck up on the wall. (The Government Advocate put in a printed translation of the objectionable posters, and a copy was handed to the President).  
 Q. I see there are 17 posters. Did you find all these posters pasted up?  
 A. They were pasted practically every day. I found some, my subordinates others.  
 Q. You take it that all these posters were in point of fact pasted up?  
 A. Yes, they were.  
 Q. Among the posters, I see this one, Nos. 8-9 "O Sikhs, die or drown yourselves in the tank of Deputy Commissioner's bungalow as your daughters were dishonoured at the hands of the sweepers. Allow your young men to take revenge." This is one of the posters?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. What is the reference there?  
 A. It refers to the *Kirpan* trouble. There was a rumour as regards the girls at Amritsar.  
 Q. That was investigated by Mr. Kitchin and he found that the rumour was without foundation?  
 A. Yes, Sir.  
 Q. I see there is another poster:—"Blessed be Mahatma Gandhi! We are sons of India. We shall

19 December 1919.]

Mr. V. W. Sharma.

[Continued.]

not give way. We shall lose our lives. We shall never abide by this Rowlett Bill. Gandhi! We the Indians will fight to death after you. The flag of cruelty and oppression has been fixed in the ground. Alas, British, how you have cheated us. Do you remember those days when you were groaning; when Germans were threatening you in the battlefields of Europe. Your boat was light, but the storm was heavy and you were calling us (the Indian ship) for help. We the Indians lost our lives for you and defeated your enemies. Now be ashamed you have done much oppression upon us, and our cup of patience is about to overflow. You have fired on the Indians and have shot them to death. See that night is coming for your days of wrongs. The times are coming when you will not be here and all your oppressions and cruelties will come to an end." Then another poster runs:—"The treatments which have been meted out to our girls at Amritsar are unbearable, and we cannot express them. You should ponder over this that we should have seen such a time even in a dream. It is very sad that all your brethren are keeping silent at this moment." Another is: "Sangla is far better than your town. It is smaller than our place. It has brought out a black flag, but don't you feel shame for this. You should follow." Then I see 'Black Bill' in which there are these statements contained:—"Oh! Get up and let these monkey-faced know that you possess a tongue in your mouth." "Sacrifice yourself for the nation and the country. Nothing can be done without sacrifices. Why do you fear dying and murdering? Burn Government buildings." Then another appeal to the people "to be up and doing and enforce unity as the inhabitants of Lahore and Amritsar have done." Further the poster says: "What time are you waiting for? Send for your brethren from the *Chaks* at once, and do at once the acts committed in Gujranwala, Amritsar and Lahore, so that the enemies of our life and honour may surrender. This time won't come again and again. What time are you waiting for now? There are many ladies here to dishonour. Go all round India, clear the country of the ladies and these sinful creatures, and then will be the only time when we can all say together: "Blessed be the Hindus, Muhammadans and Sikhs." You say these different posters to which I have referred appeared every day?

A. Every day from the 13th to the 16th.

Q. In large numbers?

A. 2 or 3; at the most 4 a day.

Q. Were the posters in different parts of the town?

A. I think a large number were pasted near the shop of Dina Nath who was subsequently convicted. But there was no particular place.

Q. I suppose you realised that such posters might have a very serious effect on the population?

A. They were undoubtedly very inflammatory.

Q. Now you were referring to your patrolling the town with the Deputy Commissioner. How long did you continue your patrol on that day (13th)?

A. Less than an hour I think.

Q. Did the excitement that was manifest when you were going through the city continue through the whole day?

A. Yes; it got worse towards the evening.

Q. Did the Deputy Commissioner send out to the neighbouring cavalry farms for assistance?

A. That was after I came back. I have mentioned here that we met with a hostile reception. I was passing down through one bazar, which has a square in the middle, into another bazar. I stopped there to take my sub-inspector, and I noticed a big crowd gathering behind my back, 300 or 400 I should think. Certainly I heard shouts and jeering around me. I looked round and saw all facing me and shouting; obviously it was aimed at my person. I went a little further and came back and informed the Deputy Commissioner. Then we had dinner. Information came to the bungalow that there were one or two petty riots in the city. We went out to the Sadar police station; the Deputy Commissioner issued written orders to the cavalry farms.

Q. Did you realise that you had not sufficient force in the town to maintain order?

A. Yes. There was not sufficient force. Particularly, we had no mounted police.

Q. Did the mounted men come in?

A. They came in just before the meeting on the following day. It took them 24 hours to come in.

Q. They came on the 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. Where were they posted?

A. They were picketed in the Deputy Commissioner's garden.

Q. Then on the 14th did the *hartal* continue?

A. Yes; there was a complete *hartal* on the 14th.

Q. Were efforts made to cause a strike in the civil offices?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What sort of efforts do you refer to?

A. The Irrigation clerks and the Railway clerks were met on their way to office and they were told not to go to office. Eventually they went to office and informed the District Traffic Superintendent of what was happening and he said 'we had better close our office entirely.'

Q. Where is the *Idgah*?

A. The organisers were attempting to hold a meeting. They provisionally fixed a certain garden (the other side of the garden). And the Deputy Commissioner sent for the owner of the garden and told him that if a meeting were to be held there permission should be obtained first, and he would be held responsible for what happened. This upset their plans. At a very short notice, they fixed a joint meeting at the *Idgah*. We got notice of this only a few minutes before the meeting.

Q. Did you make arrangements?

A. The Deputy Commissioner went straight up with a number of *sowars*. He sent word to the two trustees of the *Idgah* and informed them that they would be held personally responsible for anything that happened, and I myself hurried to arrange the police guard.

Q. Meantime, what did the European residents in Lyallpur do?

A. They got wind of these petty riots the night before. They were rather alarmed, and they decided that the best thing to do would be to concentrate in two bungalows in the centre of the Civil Station. That was on the evening of the 14th.

Q. I think in fact the meeting at the *Idgah* did not result in any violence?

A. No. It fell flat entirely. The only real work that they did was to appoint a committee of 20 which was to sit together and decide whether the *hartal* should continue or cease.

Q. I think the *hartal* did continue on the 15th, and some shops began to close?

A. They were waiting for the decision. It took them 2½ hours to decide.

Q. What did they resolve upon?

A. They decided to open their shops again.

Q. I think you say that the situation became worse owing to news of the outrage at Chuharkana and the spreading of the infection down the line?

A. On the morning of the 16th we got information that on the previous night the train had been held up at Chuharkana. Later on, further information came about Dhaban Singh and Moman. There was a general belief that a huge mob was travelling down the line towards Sangla, and in order to hold up this mob the Deputy Commissioner diverted a portion of the troops coming from the town to protect Sangla.

Q. Was the village Sangla burnt?

A. There were rumours going round. One was that Sangla was burnt. Another was that the next station down the line was burnt, and so on. These rumours were false.

Q. Sangla station was burnt?

A. It was not burnt. Those 80 men of the 50th Rifles saved the situation.

Q. Was the situation in those days extremely acute?

19 December 1919.]

Mr. V. W. SMITH.

[Continued.]

A. I think it was most critical on the night of the 16th, between the 16th and 17th. It was after that date that all the excesses occurred.

Q. Were the exits of the town strongly picketed by the police?

A. Yes. It was about 9 o'clock or 10 o'clock on the evening of the 16th that the District Traffic Superintendent who had been sent to Sangla with these 30 men reported that the situation was extremely critical, and but for that assistance he would not have been able to hold up the mob. We were afraid that, next morning, the mob after burning Sangla would advance towards Lyallpur. I knew that I had sufficient men to keep the city in hand, but we were afraid of trouble from the other side towards Sangla, so I practically sent every man available there next morning and the remainder of the troops protected the civil station.

Q. Did bands of men emerge from the city?

A. About 17 or 20 men left by the morning train and got down at Jammu or some station; their intention was to join the Chuharkianians. The idea was that a big mob was coming down and they wanted to join this big mob. I forget where they got down exactly. On their way back to Lyallpur they did damage to telegraph wires.

Q. Was destruction done to property about this time?

A. The wires were cut on three or four occasions, and that same night Government stacks of *bhusa* were burnt.

Q. What is that?

A. Lyallpur is a great wheat-producing colony and vast quantities of straw are always kept in reserve there. Government was making a big purchase for the army. In these market towns, big stacks of straw were kept ready for despatch. On this night at about 11 o'clock someone set fire to one of these stacks. Just at that moment an enormous dust storm came on and 4 out of the 8 stacks were in flames.

Q. That was on the 17th?

A. On the night of the 17th.

Q. Then did a moveable column arrive the next day?

A. I think a moveable column arrived on the 19th.

Q. When did the *hartal* come to an end?

A. It came to an end on the decision of this committee to end the *hartal* and the next day shops were opened. Meanwhile this inducement about Sangla came in; either for that reason or some other reason, on the next day all the shops were again closed. That lasted until the evening.

Q. That was on the following day, 18th or 19th?

A. On the 17th shops were again closed and on the 18th shops were opened.

Q. Was this agitation confined to Lyallpur, or did it extend?

A. It started independent at Jaranwala.

Q. How far is that?

A. That is in another direction, almost in a straight-line to Lahore.

Q. Is it far from Lyallpur?

A. It is about 28 miles from Lyallpur.

Q. At this town, a *hartal* was held on the 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. Were some features of the *hartal* openly seditious? What do you mean by that?

A. There was a man called Nand Lal who came back from Delhi after the 30th March *via* Bhatinda and Rohtak, where there had been some *Satyagraha* demonstrations. He is reported to have induced the people to join him in the seditious endeavours in the bazars. I will give you particulars if you like.

Q. You might give us particulars.

A. This is the report: "Everything remained quiet in Jaranwala until the arrival from Delhi of Nand Lal, petition-writer. He had been working at Jaranwala as a petition-writer for some years. On his arrival from Delhi he began to spread false and alarming rumours saying he had seen the British kill Hindus and Muhammadans for nothing in Delhi on the 30th March. Mahatma Gandhi had been arrested by the authorities. They all knew him to be innocent.

Hindus and Muhammadans of Delhi had joined. Again the British had that most dangerous weapon, the Rowlatt Bill had been introduced. This he declared should be named *kala nag* (cobra) or *Danda* (cudgel). By the introduction of this Bill, liberty will be lost. Ten men sitting together will be convicted by the police without being given a fair chance of trial. Birth, death and marriage ceremonies will then be performed with great difficulty." After this he had advertised (with a postal peon and two or three shopkeepers) that a meeting would be held at the cremation ground that same evening, at which Nand Lal would explain what he had seen in Delhi. This meeting was held and was attended by both Hindus and Muhammadans. Nand Lal made a speech.

Q. How did you get that information?

A. This is the result of our subsequent investigation.

Q. What was the result?

A. First he spoke of the services of India during the war. He said "Now you know actually that the reward was something quite different. The Rowlatt Bill properly speaking should be called *Kala Bill* (Black Bill) or *kala nag* (cobra). It lays down that where ten men are seen sitting together they will be arrested by the Police and convicted without being given a fair chance to prove their innocence. This is hanging over our heads. Mr. Gandhi has stood up to help Indians. He has opposed the Bill and has sent us a message to do the same. He has also directed us to adopt *Satyagraha*." At this stage Nand Lal removed his *pagri* and his shoes, and said that he would not wear them until the Rowlatt Bills were cancelled. He then began saying that "in Delhi on the 30th March Hindus and Muhammadans had joined with one mind. I have seen this with my own eyes." After this one or two others made similar speeches, and the five chief men moved into the town bare-headed shouting "*Mahatma Gandhi ki jai*" and "*Hindu-Mussalman ki jai*" and directed the people to observe *hartal* on the following day. All shops, he said, should be shut, and if anyone did not shut he would have to suffer. On the next day there was *hartal* in Jaranwala.

Q. Were any acts of violence committed during the *hartal*?

A. There was a certain amount of coercion in the *hartal*. People were made to shut their shops.

Q. Was there any destruction of property?

A. There was no violence of any kind.

Q. Then at Gojra was there agitation?

A. Yes, the agitation appears to have spread from Lyallpur further down.

Q. How far is it?

A. It is about 80 miles.

Q. When did agitation start at Gojra?

A. It started on the 14th. There was a Hindu shopkeeper who died. His body was taken as usual to the cremation ground, and in the middle of the proceedings before the body had reached the cremation ground, a Hindu got up and said that everyone must come to the cremation ground. Ordinarily only relatives of the deceased follow the body as far as the cremation ground. On the arrival of the dead body at the cremation ground, there was some sort of speech made. Then they came back to Gojra and later in the day a meeting was held. I think that was also in the *Idgah*.

Q. I see you say that the missionaries were compelled to leave in consequence of the rumours?

A. The church missionary there heard that his house was going to be burnt; so he thought it best to leave the station.

Q. The *hartal* continued on the 15th and 16th?

A. On the following day the *hartal* really started. Early in the morning, a big crowd went to the station and we have reason to believe that they went there to find out if there were any Europeans in the train. They actually held up the train and two men mounted the train and said it could not go. They assaulted a sweetmeat vendor and attempted to close the refreshment stall. They came back to the city and later in the day there was a seditious demonstration in the *mandi*—grain market. There was a black flag and

19 December 1919.]

Mr. V. W. SMITH.

[Continued.]

there was a certain amount of speech-making. On the 16th there was a similar demonstration.

Q. You say that the crowd was decidedly anti-British. Is that in consequence of this demonstration, the attack on the train, etc.?

A. Yes. It was said that British troops had been murdered, and Indian troops had risen in revolt. One man was heard to say 'there was no European in the train.'

Q. That was after they held up the train?

A. Yes.

Q. In connection with the agitation in the villages, there were numbers of rumours that you referred to. What sort of rumours were they in the Sikh villages?

A. They were rumours regarding the Rowlatt Bill, but in actual fact, they were rumours regarding other social matters, such as the Patel Bill, the Income-Tax Act. For instance, the rumour about four men being liable to be arrested was extremely common. That was heard everywhere. The other rumours, which I call social rumours varied considerably. In some places it was generally believed that 50 per cent. of the sale proceeds of grain would be taken by Government, that any man who sold his daughter in marriage would have to give half of the sale proceeds to Government. These were two of the many rumours that were afloat.

Q. Were those rumours tacked on to rumours connected with the Rowlatt Bill or were they independent of the Rowlatt Bill?

A. Rowlatt Bill was the name; everyone knew the Rowlatt Bill.

Q. Where is the village Jehangir?

A. It is about 9 miles from Lyallpur.

Q. Canal wire was out there?

A. Yes.

Q. At Chak 150 what happened?

A. A gang of people emerged from the village and went to the railway line and attempted to take off a rail.

Q. What distance is the Chak from Lyallpur?

A. That is a long way, 40 miles at least.

Q. In that case were the culprits followed to their village by the police?

A. The police got information at once and they got a party out and by the evening they arrived at the village. The men surrendered the next day.

Q. I see you express the opinion that the movement connected with the *hartal* was anti-official and anti-Government but not anti-British?

A. Yes.

Q. You think it became anti-British afterwards?

A. Yes.

Q. From the 18th onwards was there strong feeling in the bazar against Europeans?

A. Yes, it began from the 18th.

Q. You also express the opinion that the movement in its more undesirable aspect was almost entirely Hindu?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that the result of your investigation made at the time?

A. It is my opinion from the very beginning. It was obvious from the information we were getting that the Hindus were mainly responsible. The population of Lyallpur is largely Hindu.

Q. You say that a few Muhammadans allowed themselves to be involved?

A. Yes. As a matter of fact, the whole city observed the *hartal*; there is no question about that. But in its most undesirable aspect, it was Hindu.

Q. You mean that many who joined the *hartal* might have had no intention of committing violence?

A. Quite so.

Q. And those who were bent on violence were mainly Hindus?

A. Yes.

Q. In your opinion was Martial Law desirable?

A. It was certainly desirable.

Q. Was it essential?

A. It was not essential.

Q. What do you mean by that?

A. As things turned out, nothing subsequently happened after the 20th.

Q. How far was the fact that nothing happened due to the circumstances that Martial Law was in operation?

A. The information that Martial Law had been declared in Lyallpur spread everywhere rapidly and had an undoubted restraining effect.

Q. I see you say here that it was only enforced at headquarters and did not interfere with the liberties of the general public except in the matter of travelling by rail. What do you mean by that?

A. Martial Law had no effect in any place except Lyallpur. In the matter of travelling by rail, there were certain restrictions.

Q. In the other villages in the Lyallpur District, there were no orders issued under Martial Law?

A. None. Things were absolutely normal in the villages and in the smaller towns also. It was only at headquarters that any notices were issued. After that if anything serious had happened, Martial Law was there to provide the remedy.

Q. In Lyallpur district you say the only restriction on the public was the order as regards travelling?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that order essential or advisable?

A. I do not know who passed that order. I was not consulted in the matter, but I think it was certainly advisable, because the population of Lyallpur is drawn from practically every district in the province.

Q. And therefore did you restrict travelling by the public?

A. It spread from Lyallpur and there was importation into Lyallpur. Subsequently the Afghan War altered the situation.

Q. Did you not have the Curfew Order or any of these other orders?

A. We had a salaaming order; that is all.

Q. That was as regards all the officers?

A. All British officers.

Q. Were there any convictions for failure to *salaam*?

A. Yes, there were a few convictions.

Q. What sort of punishments were meted out?

A. I think usually it was a reprimand and I think fines of Rs. 5 or Rs. 10. I do not think any man was whipped for not salaaming.

Q. I do not know whether you can tell us, you do not mention it in your statement. But during the existence of Martial Law, were there many cases from the Lyallpur district dealt with either by the special tribunals that were set up or by summary courts?

A. The only case dealt with by the tribunal is 150 Chak case, attempt to remove railway line and cutting of telegraph wires. All the other cases were dealt with by the local summary courts.

Q. Were there many cases that were tried by the summary courts?

A. A very large number of cases.

Q. Were they rioting?

A. Petty rioting and cutting of telegraph wires and the situation created at Kiala Kalan, and also the demonstrations at Jaranwala and Gojra.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. You referred to the salaaming order. Was it simply that people must *salaam* British officers or salute them, or was there some special form of salute or *salaam*?

A. It was said that every Indian should accord to British officers the measure of respect which they normally would accord to an Indian of high rank, i.e., they should salute with the hand or *salaam*, and if riding, they should descend and if carrying umbrellas, they should lower them.

Q. Was any other order enforced or was this the only one?

A. This was the only one.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. In Lyallpur itself, there were no serious disturbances at any time?

A. There was the offence of attempting to remove the railway lines, etc. It is a very serious offence.

Q. That was not in Lyallpur itself?

A. In headquarters, there was the offence of setting fire to the *bhusa* stacks. It was a very serious offence, the loss involved was Rs. 60,000.

19 December 1919.]

Mr. V. W. SMITH.

[Continued.]

- Q. Besides the burning of the stacks of *bhusa*, there was no other serious disturbance in Lyallpur itself?
- A. There were only petty riots; that is all.
- Q. That applies also, I take it, to the surrounding parts?
- A. In the immediate neighbourhood there were riots in Kiala Kalan of a very serious nature.
- Q. There was no disturbance?
- A. It was a preparation before a very serious disturbance.
- Q. For what purpose?
- A. A party had come to Lyallpur for attacking the treasury.
- Q. When did all this happen? Between what dates?
- A. Petty riots occurred on the 13th. I considered that it was really dangerous subsequent to the burning of Chuharkana about the 16th and 17th.
- Q. When did petty riots take place?
- A. On the 13th and there was another one on the 15th.
- Q. Owing to what took place at Chuharkana on the 16th, there was reflex action here?
- A. Yes, there was the general feeling prevailing that the Chuharkanians were coming to their assistance. That was the general attitude of the people.
- Q. How long did that feeling continue? For a few days?
- A. It continued practically until sufficient troops arrived. On the 19th April a moveable column arrived and everything was over.
- Q. This feeling continued till troops arrived on the 19th?
- A. It already arrived on the 16th and again on the 19th.
- Q. You had some troops on the 16th and 17th, and more arrived on the 19th?
- A. Yes.
- Q. That quieted the whole thing?
- A. Absolutely.
- Q. There was nothing after that?
- A. Nothing after that.
- Q. Was no unrest at all after that?
- A. A good deal of bitterness was left. The Amritsar Sikhs were certainly sullen for about two months afterwards.
- Q. There was no open manifestation after the 19th?
- A. No.
- Q. For all practical purposes, things were quiet, shops were open and business was doing?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Martial Law was not introduced in Lyallpur till the 24th?
- A. It was proclaimed then, but the date on which the Local Government was asked to sanction Martial Law was the 20th. It was asked for on the reports which the Deputy Commissioner and myself were sending in.
- Q. The actual proclamation of Martial Law was on the 20th?
- A. Much later, on the 24th.
- Q. In view of what you have told me that things had quieted down after the 19th, in the manner you have described, was it essential on the 24th to have Martial Law?
- A. It was desirable.
- Q. Not essential?
- A. Not essential.
- Q. How long was Martial Law continued? Till July?
- A. Till the first week of June.
- Q. It was not essential on the 24th April when it was introduced, although desirable. Was it necessary to have continued it for such a long period till the end of June?
- A. I think it was necessary.
- Q. You told me that it was not essential to have introduced it in the first instance, though desirable?
- A. Yes.
- Q. If it was not essential when introducing it, was it essential to continue it?
- A. We required some special form of machinery to dispose of all these cases. That is the point.
- Q. It was only necessary to deal with the cases?
- A. It was necessary up to about the third week of May because of the Afghan War. Almost immediately after the introduction of Martial Law, the Afghan campaign started and it was quite impossible for us to say at the time what reflex action it would have on the Lyallpur district. After the third week of May it would have been safe to remove Martial Law in its military aspect, but I consider it most desirable that we should have had some special machinery to get rid of all these cases. It is only in the third week of May that we started disposing of the cases. Even when Martial Law had been removed, the chief case in which the really big men were concerned, had not been decided.
- Q. I take it that the continuance of Martial Law was required in your view in order to dispose of cases in which people had been arrested?
- A. Quite so.
- Q. About the Rowlatt Act and the misrepresentations in connection therewith, you say in your statement that the pleader class was responsible for these misrepresentations?
- A. Yes.
- Q. There were misrepresentations and, you say, that pleaders were responsible for them. What is the evidence?
- A. A lot of evidence came out in investigation. I can give you details if you like to have them.
- Q. Were any particular pleaders found to have done this?
- A. Yes, particular pleaders.
- Q. Who had made misrepresentations?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Where?
- A. In the city. They were saying that to shopkeepers and others.
- Q. Were there meetings?
- A. Not many meetings. I think it occurred at one of the meetings. Mention was made at the meeting on the 5th or 6th. There was certainly one misrepresentation about the intention of the Bill. It was said that there was no appeal and no vakil.
- Q. The misrepresentation that you refer to is that there was no appeal and no vakil?
- A. That is only one slight misrepresentation. The general effect of that on the mind of the public was that some special Act had been enforced which would affect all criminal cases. It was not made clear that the Bill would only apply to anarchical and revolutionary crimes.
- Q. Speaking of misrepresentation, do you mean that the pleaders did not make it clear to the people that this Bill was a special one which would apply to anarchical movement?
- A. Apart from that they misrepresented the Act in the paper. I can give you particulars if you like.
- Q. They went about misrepresenting the Act?
- A. They called the shopkeepers and were giving them wrong information.
- Q. Were these pleaders traced?
- A. I will give you particulars if you like to have.
- Q. Was any action taken against them?
- A. Three chief men were arrested. I should like to tell you that the arrests were made on the evidence we had.
- Q. Were they prosecuted?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Were they convicted?
- A. Yes; the case was almost decided when Martial Law was withdrawn. Then they decided to let the case go on. They were convicted and then they appealed. The Summary Courts started the case. The same magistrate continued the case and convicted them as an ordinary court. Then they appealed to the Sessions Judge who acquitted them because of a misjoinder of charges. It was then decided to take the case again into the ordinary court of law. Eventually the Local Government stepped in and withdrew the prosecution.
- Q. Your view that the pleaders misrepresented is based on what you came to learn in connection with the case of these three pleaders?

19 December 1919.]

Mr. V. W. SAHRA.

[Continued.]

A. Well, there were others with them. We arrested 12 men altogether and started an investigation. During that investigation this information came out.

Q. You prosecuted 12, of whom two were convicted. The rest were shopkeepers. The Sessions Judge ultimately acquitted them?

A. No, he said there should be a further trial.

Q. The further trial was not proceeded with?

A. Yes.

Q. And so your observation about the pleaders is based on the information that came to your knowledge during the investigation of this case in which the three pleaders were concerned?

A. Here I should like to bring in the question of the arrest of these men. During the week of agitation when things were safe at headquarters, the Deputy Commissioner wrote a private letter to each of the Members of the Municipal Committee and also to the President of this body of 20. He asked them to inform him confidentially which men of Lyallpur were mainly responsible for the *hartal* and the consequent excitement. All the Members of the Municipal Committee sent in their reports to the President of this body. The President was asked to send in a report, but he refused to give a reply. It was on the statements of these Municipal Commissioners that the arrests were made. Practically every one of the municipal commissioners implicated these three pleaders.

Q. So far as the pleaders were concerned, three of them came before you?

A. Well, there was a very large number of other pleaders who were also mentioned by the Municipal Commissioners.

Q. So that against the other pleaders, you did not think there was sufficient evidence or information to justify you to proceed against them? Is not that so?

A. It practically comes to that. We did not want to go and arrest the whole city. We wanted to get hold of the big men only.

Q. You had definite information and evidence with regard to these three pleaders and not against the others so you did not want to arrest them?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, about these posters, they were not printed but written in manuscript?

A. Yes.

Q. How many posters in all were there?

A. I cannot tell you the exact number, but I think there must have been over a dozen.

Q. And did you trace the person or persons responsible for these?

A. We traced the writer of one poster only. I think his name was Tilok Chand. I think he was one of the witnesses. We thought it was unnecessary to prosecute him at all. I think he was a student. No, I am wrong, he was a bookseller. He was instigated by other people.

Q. He said that himself?

A. Yes.

Q. Who were those people according to him?

A. I have forgotten their names.

Q. You said in your statement that you think there was a widespread organisation?

A. Certainly. In the first *hartal* there was a widespread organization. It was an anti-Rowlatt Bill agitation.

Q. What do you mean by "widespread organisation?"

A. Spreading all over India.

Q. The *Satyaagraha* movement was to be found in many parts of India, therefore your view was that there was a widespread organisation?

A. Yes.

Q. This man Anand Lal that you speak of at Jaranwala, he was a person residing for a long time in Jaranwala. He was not a person who had come from Delhi. He simply went to Delhi and returned to Jaranwala. He was not a Delhi man?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jaqat Narayan—

Q. Did you make an enquiry about the burning of *bhusa*?

A. Yes.

Q. Has any one been convicted for that?

A. No one was convicted, as sufficient evidence was not forthcoming. But I have no doubt in my mind as to the man who actually burnt it.

Q. Was there any evidence to the effect that this was the action of the crowd?

A. It was the action of three men. It was not done by the crowd, otherwise the culprits would have been found out at once.

Q. So far as your investigation goes, you found out that it was not the action of the mob that was going about in the city but of three men?

A. Quite so.

Q. So far as the information about these three pleaders is concerned it is based on the statements made by certain shopkeepers I suppose?

A. Not only shopkeepers, but some respectable people also.

Q. About the misrepresentations you said that some shopkeepers further misrepresented the Rowlatt Bill when they went inside the city. May I know how many shopkeepers misrepresented?

A. I do not know.

Q. Is there no record?

A. There is, but I cannot give you the number.

Q. Approximately?

A. Well, I think about a dozen.

Q. What were the misrepresentations?

A. They were to the effect that the intention of the Rowlatt Bill was that if a party of four or ten men, as the case may be, were seen anywhere, they were to be arrested. That was one; I will give you others.

Q. I am specially confining it to the misrepresentation by the pleaders.

A. Here is one report which I have got. On the night of the 4th a certain baker was sent for by Barucha pleader. There were also Bhagat Ram and Sant Singh there. All these men were subsequently arrested. Another pleader Mian Chand and four others who were subsequently arrested were sitting there. They told this baker that he was summoned as a representative of the bakers and that they were all to close their shops as a protest against a tyrannical new law under which any five persons seen gathered together would be liable to summary arrest and imprisonment. That is one instance. Another instance. This was on the night of the 5th just after the first meeting of a number of men consisting, among others, of Barucha, Bhagat Ram, Sant Singh. These are the three arrested pleaders. Others subsequently arrested, but who were not pleaders, went about the town joining traders in the observance of the *hartal*. The next day traders, etc., were persuaded to close their shops on account of the Rowlatt Act. They said that it was given to the police to arrest without warrant 5 persons collected together and that restrictions were placed on marriages and funerals.

Q. You yourself did not record any of these statements?

A. No.

Q. By whom were these statements of the shopkeepers recorded?

A. By my inspector.

Q. And these investigations were held after the arrest of the pleaders?

A. Yes.

Q. And these statements were recorded after their arrest?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore they were arrested before the investigations were made?

A. Yes.

Q. As a matter of fact there is no written record in your possession of the misrepresentations either at the meetings or at any other place?

A. Yes, I think we have a full account of the meetings.

Q. Now, people were arrested from time to time by the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. de Montmorency, who has now gone on leave to England?

A. Yes.



19 December 1919.]

Mr. V. W. SMITH.

[Continued.]

Q. Will you be able to say as to whether this note is correct. That is, on the 20th April the Deputy Commissioner arrested 9 persons at Jaranwala, and on the 21st April the Deputy Commissioner arrested 9 persons at Gojra. On the 22nd April, he arrested 10 persons and 8 pleaders at Lyallpur city?

A. Twelve arrests were made including Dina Nath and three pleaders.

Q. Therefore up to the 23rd April, no investigation was started by the police at all?

A. No.

Q. Then on the 23rd April, 13 arrests were made at Kiala Kalan?

A. Yes.

Q. Five arrests were made on the 24th April at Jehangir?

A. I cannot give the date, but I think it was later, about the 25th.

Q. And some arrests were made at Toba Tek Singh village on the 25th April.

A. I think they were made on the 20th or the 21st.

Q. Some other persons who were arrested have been left out?

A. They may have been subsequently arrested, probably.

Q. On the 27th, some arrests were made at Soha village.

A. I think the Deputy Commissioner did go and arrest 2 or 3 people.

Q. With regard to these meetings, is it not a fact that at these two places all the mischief done was committed by the 3 young men who had come back from Amritsar after the Baisakhi fair on the 13th and that the brother of one of them was shot and he started this?

A. You are mixing up the two instances. In Chak No. 150 the brother or the brother-in-law of one of the men implicated had been wounded at Amritsar.

Q. I am sorry I am mixing that up. I think you are right. It was after these men had returned to this village from the Baisakhi fair on the 13th at Amritsar?

A. I think it was after.

Q. There were also in Lyallpur allegations about bombing the Golden Temple?

A. There were allegations.

Q. Were there also some rumours that Sikhs were not allowed to keep kirpans?

A. I was told that Lyallpur is a very strong Sikh centre and that was the reason why these rumours were so prevalent.

Q. Something happened at Amritsar and it was not serious, but simply magnified and that rumour was received?

A. Yes.

Q. A great deal of wire-cutting roundabout this Chak was done by a gang of young persons headed by this very man who had returned from Amritsar?

A. That is not true. Well, wire-cutting did occur on one occasion. They came and they went after cutting the wires. I do not think that the man who headed the gang was a deserter, nor do I think that any other gang has been to Amritsar.

Q. Is it not a fact that some serious allegations were made by this young man who had returned after the 13th from Amritsar?

A. I cannot say for certain.

Q. Had you not any news?

A. I have got a list of men who had returned from Amritsar and of those who lived in its neighbourhood.

Q. You are not sure of Kiala Kalan?

A. It is probable that the reports of men getting back from Kiala Kalan had an unsettling effect, but that was not the cause of the meeting there.

Q. Now about the occurrence of the 15th at the railway station. When you say that the sweetmeat-seller was assaulted and people went to the station, is it not a fact that when they went to the station and made a demonstration, their idea was to ask the guard and the driver not to move the train but to observe *hartal*?

A. Yes, one of their ideas was to stop the train. Perhaps that may have been their intention.

Q. At Lyallpur about 80 Indian Infantry were called in on the 16th and 80 were sent to Sangla. More infantry arrived on the 17th?

A. Yes.

Q. And on the 19th there was a Moveable Column with a Motor Machine Battery and a Squadron of Cavalry?

A. Yes.

Q. And you had already introduced the *thikri pahra* system by the 16th?

A. I think orders on the railway were issued on the 13th. It took about 3 days to get into proper working order.

Q. The Martial Law order about the posting of notices was also introduced there, i.e., the protection and posting of notices as was done in Lahore. They were placed on the houses of these pleaders who were ordered to see that they were not removed, these pleaders and so-called agitators who were taking an active part in the political agitation worked up by the members of the Congress Committee?

A. Yes.

Q. There was a similar proclamation to the effect that no outside legal practitioners were allowed to come to Lyallpur?

A. I do not think that was passed. I cannot say for certain. I had practically nothing to do with the administration of Martial Law, and therefore cannot say.

Q. May I ask you as to whether Martial Law orders were in force at Lyallpur?

A. I think there were three orders in force.

Q. Then there was some order about replenishing stock and selling off grain?

A. I don't know.

Q. Do you know anything about summary trials?

A. Yes, I know something about them.

Q. Is it not a fact that about 24 cases were tried by Major Polley?

A. Those were Martial Law cases.

Q. Then there was a case of obstructing a recruit?

A. I know nothing about that.

Q. Then there were some cases under the heading of harbouring rebels?

A. Yes, this wire-cutting case at Chuharkana was reported to us very late. On the 19th we got the first information about this occurrence. First of all the Deputy Commissioner sent out an extra assistant commissioner to hold a judicial enquiry. Subsequently we got instructions regarding the prosecution of Martial Law cases and he decided that the police should take it over and start investigations after which we would turn the case over to the Summary Court. The story of the prosecution was that this wire was cut at mid-day on the 16th by two Musalmans which was an obvious falsehood. It was proved on an examination of the Canal records, that that wire was working on the 16th and it was probably cut on the morning of the 17th. We told them that the evidence was obviously a fabricated statement. One of them actually knew when the breach had occurred. So we gave them to understand that if they failed to produce the evidence they would be arrested under Martial Law. They were arrested accordingly under Martial Law and were convicted.

Q. Therefore up to this time you do not know the names of the offenders?

A. No.

Q. And nobody stated as to who were the persons who actually cut the wires?

A. We could not say definitely. We had our suspicions.

Q. And therefore without knowing the names of the persons and without making any investigations you arrested these 2 persons and punished them?

A. Well, they were the *lamhardars* of the village and were expected to know all that happened within 200 yards of the village.

Q. I want to know how you prosecuted these 2 men for protecting rebels when the names of the rebels were not known and when they were not mentioned in the charge sheet. You cannot prosecute any person for protecting a, b and c?

19 December 1919.]

Mr. V. W. SMITH.

[Continued.]

A. Well, this may have been under one of the other sections of the law. They were arrested because they failed to give any information about these rebels whom they were naturally assisting.

Q. Was any person prosecuted for tampering with evidence?

A. Yes, one man.

Q. What are the facts of this case?

A. I have forgotten the facts. It was an unlawful case of five men. I think 2 or 3 were standing at an assembly on the 16th. I think they went and visited Dr. Dina Nath and they formed an unlawful assembly to meet at Chuharkana. We intended to prosecute these 5 men, but eventually the case was withdrawn as 4 of them were already convicted in another case. A few days before the prosecution I got the information that one witness—I think his name was Bhola Nath—had been tampering with evidence and told them to make a false statement. So I prosecuted him.

Q. How many witnesses made that statement to you?

A. I think he was convicted on the statement of 2 main witnesses and I think there were 2 others corroborating them.

Q. Can you give me the names of the witnesses?

A. I cannot give their names, as I do not remember.

Q. What is your opinion about the behaviour of the college students in your district?

A. The resident students behaved very well. There are two big colleges there, the Khalsa College and the Agricultural College. The behaviour of the students of both these colleges was excellent. The Government High School, which is very close to the city, kept rather lax control and two or three students got embroiled.

Q. Was it not the result of your investigation that the underlying idea of all these gangs at Kiala Kalan was to do some injury to Government for what had happened on the 13th at Amritsar?

A. Well, the idea at that time was that the Government was dissolving. The general impression was that everything was going *phut*, and therefore they created mischief.

Q. Is it not a fact that the result of your investigation was that the authorities came to the conclusion as a matter of fact that the underlying idea of these people was to do some injury to Government for what had happened at Amritsar on the 13th?

A. I should say that was a minor motive. That was certainly an indirect or distant cause, but the immediate intention was to do damage to Government property because the authorities were weakening.

Q. Now about the demonstration at the railway station, on arrival of the trains, you said that one of the persons was heard saying that there was no European in the train? Was that statement made to you direct by him?

A. No, not to me.

Q. Then it was made to some C. I. D. man or police officer?

A. It came out in the investigation.

Q. This statement must have been recorded by somebody?

A. It appears in the police diary.

Q. That some person came before the police and said that he heard so and so making that statement. That appears in the police diary?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore your information is third hand?

A. Yes.

Q. First of all that statement was not made to any person in authority either police or civil. Practically, it came in this way that one person who came before the police made a statement that he heard somebody making that statement?

A. The probability is it was made before the honorary magistrate on the spot. I cannot say for certain that it was made before the honorary magistrate, but it is probable because he heard all the statements.

Q. And this statement was made by a person who was produced before him as a witness and he gave him the information that he heard this in the bazars?

A. Yes.

Q. That is third or fourth hand information?

A. Yes.

Q. There was practically one demonstration one day at the railway station so far as Lyallpur was concerned?

A. None at Lyallpur.

Q. There was only one at Gojra?

A. In almost every big town every train was met by large crowds of people.

Q. During those days when there was no source of information everybody would be anxious to find out what was happening in Lahore and Amritsar?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. You said, Mr. Smith, as regards the introduction of Martial Law, you thought it desirable but not essential. Is that your expression?

A. Yes, that is my expression.

Q. What exactly is the distinction that you draw between desirable and essential in this connection?

A. Well, we had troops. But, as things turned out, it has been impossible for us to dispose of all these pending cases.

Q. That is a continuation, but to begin with, if you had not had Martial Law, do you think you could have carried on merely with the presence of the troops without any authority exercised by any military officer?

A. As a matter of fact, before Martial Law was declared, we had troops, but we should have required an extra large force; we should have kept a larger force.

Q. That is to say, without Martial Law you would have required a larger military column than with Martial Law?

A. Yes, quite so.

By Sardar Bahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. You say in your statement that violent speeches were expected, but action taken by Deputy Commissioner resulted in orderly proceedings. What sort of violent speeches were expected?

A. We had very definite information that on the morning of the 13th, two men came from the Lahore side with very alarming rumours about the Kairon girls and the bombing of the Golden Temple and things of that sort. This created a great sensation in Lyallpur, because there are a large number of Sikhs there, and during the day efforts were made to agitate on the point, and it was largely on account of these rumours that this meeting was held. It had a bad effect not only on Sikhs but on all classes of people, and we had definite information that one particular man was going to deliver a violent speech on the subject. Therefore the Deputy Commissioner issued this order.

Q. What order?

A. Informing the two trustees that if anything serious occurred they themselves will be held responsible.

Q. And that resulted in the proceedings being orderly?

A. It took the wind out of their sails.

Q. What was expected to be a very serious thing was averted by these proceedings?

A. I think so. The possibility of serious trouble was averted.

Q. When did things become serious at Lyallpur, you say about the 16th or 17th or 14th?

A. From the evening of the 16th, things began to get really very serious. On the 14th and 15th our anxiety was only regarding the city of Lyallpur. Subsequently we were afraid of the Jats rising when we heard of the events at Gujranwala, and we were afraid that the neighbouring villages on the border would also rise.

Q. How long will it take for news to travel from Amritsar to Lyallpur?

A. We had to go *nid* Multan, but usually news came by train when the wires were cut.

Q. How long will it take?

A. The ordinary train journey is 5 hours from Lyallpur.

Q. From Amritsar?

A. About 6 or 7 hours.

Q. What happened on the morning of the 13th at Amritsar would probably be known on the afternoon of the 18th at Lyallpur?

19 December 1919.]

Mr. V. W. SMITH—concluded—Pandit AVATAR KISHEN KAUL.

A. I don't think that could have come. The evening train does not leave Amritsar until 7 o'clock, so that no news could have reached until the following morning.

Q. You say in your statement that from the 13th onward, the feeling in the bazar was one of hatred of the white man. Do you not attribute that to what had happened in Amritsar and Lahore and to the shooting of people?

A. Shooting of the people was not known in Lyallpur. There were rumours, but there was no definite information, I did not know myself about it.

Q. Don't you think that exaggerated rumours were afloat?

A. I think that rumour about the Jallianwala Bagh was not exaggerated. I don't think people knew very much about it. I have forgotten when that news arrived in Lyallpur.

Q. On the 13th?

A. It must have been later.

Q. Did it reach on the 14th?

A. It may have reached, but there were other absurd rumours.

Q. I want to know when the news arrived.

A. I cannot say about the firing on the mob. The rumour about the bombing of the Golden Temple was a far more important thing to the people there.

Q. But when did that news arrive there?

A. It may have arrived late on the 16th.

Q. It is likely to have reached there on the 14th?

A. Yes, probably.

Q. If it reached on the 14th, don't you think it would excite the feelings of the people?

A. Nothing like that.

Q. That would excite feelings?

A. I don't think it did so. I think the story about the burning of Chuharkana would have a far greater effect.

Q. You have stated that one Nand Lal incited people by telling them that people had been killed in Delhi and that excited the feelings of the people?

A. Yes.

Q. At the same time you say that the killing of people in Amritsar would not excite the feelings of the people in Lyallpur?

A. People had been killed in Amritsar on the 10th, that information had reached us. People were killed on the 14th. But they had already been agitated by the story of the happenings on the 10th, and the happenings on the 13th would have no greater effect.

Q. It would not add to it?

A. It was not known then how many people had been killed.

Q. Naturally exaggerated reports get about. If 100 people are killed, people will say about 1,000 have been killed and soon therefore there must have been great exaggeration about the number of people who had been killed at Amritsar on the 13th, and do you think that would not excite the feelings of the people?

A. The only thing that I can say is, any rumour regarding the Jallianwala Bagh affair had no great effect on public feelings. The incidents that were agitating the public were the story of the Kairon girls and the bombing of the Golden Temple. These were the main things.

Q. And those in your opinion caused the feeling of hatred towards white men?

A. Yes. I can give the details of that if necessary.

Q. I think I can take your word for that. Now, you say that some features of the *hartal* were openly seditious. This refers to the *hartal* at Jaranwala?

A. About Nand Lal's speech and attitude. That is the instance.

Q. From that you say, of the *hartal* itself?

A. I mean the demonstrations which led up to the *hartal*.

Q. Not the *hartal* itself?

A. No, not the *hartal* itself.

Q. There was no attempt made to assault any European in Lyallpur?

A. There was one case of assault on a Greek, a European subject. He was threatened by a tailor. This gentleman had gone to make some purchases and an Indian tailor took up a ruler and brandished it.

Q. Did he come and report that to you?

A. The man was convicted eventually. There was no other assault, but this instance did occur.

Q. Nothing happened beyond that?

A. There was no attempt made to assault a white man.

Q. How many white men were there during those days of disturbances in the Lyallpur district?

A. I think about 40 or 50.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Mr. Smith, you told us that during these disturbances the European residents were concentrated in two bungalows. Can you say how many Europeans took refuge in these two bungalows?

A. I think the final number was about 90.

Q. How many of those were ladies and how many were children approximately?

A. About 20 or 30 ladies and about 20 or 30 children.

Q. Did they find any difficulty in getting the necessities of life?

A. I have stated an instance here that during the days of the disturbances I questioned my bearer if he had been to the bazar. He said that he was afraid to go to the bazar, and if he did so he would be injured. I asked him what he meant by that. He said that all servants of Europeans were in danger of the general public at Lyallpur. He related the case of a baker who used to bring bread. When bringing bread the baker was assaulted and all his loaves of bread were thrown out, and he was told never again to take any bread to Europeans and eventually he had to send bread to the Europeans in handkerchiefs.

Q. For how many days did these people live in these bungalows?

A. They actually lived in two bungalows. At the end of the troubles there were 90 people living in one bungalow.

Q. Why did they live in one bungalow?

A. It was found very difficult to defend two places in case of an attack, so that they were all concentrated in one bungalow.

Q. Was it an ordinary bungalow or a large bungalow?

A. It was a very ordinary bungalow.

Q. About the garrison that you had there, on what date had you the largest number?

A. I should say about the 19th. I do not know the exact date, but I should think it was on the 19th.

Q. After that the number decreased. The mobile column left when?

A. About a week after its arrival, about the 1st of May I should think; I cannot give you the exact date and numbers.

Q. After the 19th the number decreased. On the 19th you had the largest number?

A. I should say so, I am afraid I cannot tell you the exact number.

Pandit AVATAR KISHEN KAUL, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Lyallpur.

By the President—

Q. Are you an Extra Assistant Commissioner at Lyallpur?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. We have been told about the *hartal* by the last witness, so that I need not trouble you about

that matter, but tell me as regards the *hartal* that occurred, was it entirely a voluntary movement?

A. From the statements made by some of the men who appeared before me I am inclined to think it was not voluntary.

Q. Do you mean that undue influence and coercion were exercised to make people observe *hartal*?

19 December 1919.]

Pandit AVATAR KISHAN KAUL

[Continued.]

A. Some sort of influence was brought to bear upon the people.

Q. After the 13th was the city in a restless state in your opinion?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there wild and unfounded rumours in circulation?

A. I believe there were.

Q. After that date can you say whether the population became anti-British or not?

A. Well, taking into consideration that there was an attack on one telegraph inspector and that there was a poster put up to outrage European women, I am inclined to think that the population had become anti-British.

Q. What do you mean by the insult offered to Messrs. deMontmorency and Smith?

A. I mean people clapped their hands.

Q. On what date was that?

A. I believe it was on the 14th or 15th.

Q. Were these gentlemen engaged in official duty at the time?

A. They used to come early in the morning to the clock tower. They had the police force there, and one magistrate remained there by turns. When one morning these two gentlemen came there, they were hooted by some people.

Q. I think you also put forward the cutting of communications and the damage done to Government property in support of the view which you have expressed as regards the attitude of the people becoming anti-British?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Now, did the officials lose influence over the people?

A. Judging by the fact that the Government did not want a meeting to be held at all on that day and the people had in defiance of the orders of the Deputy Commissioner collected there, I am inclined to think that they did not care for the Deputy Commissioner's orders at all.

Q. Were you in charge of the war loan at Lyallpur?

A. Yes, Sir, I was in charge of the war loan in Lyallpur town.

Q. Was there any complaint made about compulsion?

A. No complaint was made.

Q. Had you anything to do with recruiting?

A. No, I had nothing to do with it.

Q. In your official capacity was any complaint made to you about the methods adopted?

A. No.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Now, about the hooting and hissing that you spoke of, were you present at that time?

A. I came immediately afterwards.

Q. You did not see that?

A. No, I did not see it myself.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Are you aware that the attack on Mr. Wale was by a single individual, and there was no crowd?

A. I was at the Sangla station in the District Traffic Superintendent's carriage, when we heard revolver shots and we all rushed out.

Q. I don't want you to give facts. What I want to know is, are you aware that the attack on Mr. Wale was by a single individual and not by a crowd?

A. Mr. Wale said that he saw 10 or 12 people standing about 10 or 12 yards away, and he seemed to think that this man was acting with them, but only one man actually attacked Mr. Wale.

Q. Do you know that Mr. Wale never suggested that there were more persons involved in the affair, but said there was only one man?

A. I do not know. That case was tried in the Gujranwala district.

Q. For how many years have you been Extra Assistant Commissioner?

A. For 3½ years. I joined in May 1916.

Q. Is it or is it not your experience that during the course of the year there were many fires at railway stations or goods sheds where goods were burnt, or do you mean to say that this was the sole and the only instance where you heard that blues were burnt? Is it or is it not your experience that things are burnt during the course of the year in several places?

A. I do not know of any special instance.

Q. Why do you connect this burning of blues with this *hartal* movement?

A. That was my opinion upon it. I certainly had no evidence about it.

Q. About the war loan, is it not a fact that in the Lyallpur district people rightly or wrongly were complaining against the war loan and recruiting methods?

A. I never heard anything.

Q. Had you ever any talk with your Deputy Commissioner about this matter?

A. No.

Q. Do you know up to this time what his views were upon this point?

A. No.

Q. Do you know that any complaint was made to His Excellency the Viceroy about the recruiting affair in your district?

A. I do not know anything about it.

Q. You say in your statement, and I think it is true, that the shooting at the Jallianwala Bagh made Lyallpur excited?

A. Yes.

Q. That is your opinion, that is correct, you have put it down here?

A. Yes.

Q. And that the rumours about the Kairon girls and the bombing of the Golden Temple were also circulated at Lyallpur?

A. Yes.

Q. So far as your personal knowledge is concerned was any coercion used by anybody?

A. One day when I was on duty at the clock tower—I think it was on the 15th—a few shops were being opened when a mob came out and forced the shopkeepers to close their shops.

Q. Can you tell me whether any shopkeepers were assaulted or shops looted?

A. No, not in my presence.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. At about what time did the news of the Jallianwala Bagh shooting reach Lyallpur?

A. I think it was on the 14th, though I am not quite sure. I have kept no diary.

Q. What is your idea?

A. I think it was on the 14th.

Q. What did the people say about it?

A. They said that a thousand or twelve hundred people had been killed—some said fifteen hundred.

Q. Did that excite the people a great deal?

A. All these things taken together—the firing at Delhi, the arrest of Gaudhi—excited the people a great deal.

Q. You say in your statement that leaders supposed to be siding with Government were not listened to—what is the reason for that?

A. I do not know.

Q. Can you assign any reason?

A. I suppose simply because they were siding with Government.

Q. I think the people were anti-Government?

A. This started with the Rowlatt Act and the other incidents also affected the people to a certain extent.

Q. And that is why the leaders who were supposed to be siding with Government were not listened to?

A. Yes.

19 December 1919.]

Mr. H. S. WILLIAMSON.

Mr. H. S. WILLIAMSON, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Gujrat.

*By the President—*

Q. You are Deputy Commissioner in Gujrat?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Is that a large district?

A. Moderately large—rather less than the average.

Q. When was Martial Law declared in that district?

A. I got a telegram from Government on the 19th and a general proclamation was issued on the 20th April.

Q. As regards the unrest that existed in your district, what do you think were the causes of it?

A. The causes were not very much apparent at the time—it was largely an agitation about the Rowlatt Bill.

Q. I think the agitation about the Rowlatt Bill arose in a district which was given to political agitation?

A. Yes.

Q. Were rumours circulated about the effect of the Rowlatt Bill?

A. Yes; rumours were prevalent both in towns and villages.

Q. What were these rumours?

A. Rumours were that the Bill would affect the domestic and private life of the people.

Q. Did people believe these rumours?

A. Some of them did.

Q. Did that cause agitation?

A. Yes; to some extent.

Q. Have you any newspapers in the district?

A. Only one and it is chiefly confined to religious subjects.

Q. Is the eastern half of the district a congested tract of small holdings?

A. Yes.

Q. Do many of these people migrate?

A. A good many. Wherever there are small holdings of people who have no livelihood they usually migrate and take service elsewhere—they go into the army and the police and some take up private employment.

Q. What is the size of Gujrat city itself?

A. About 19,000.

Q. And do the people of that city have commercial relations with Bombay and Karachi?

A. Yes.

Q. Are the men of the district in touch with affairs outside?

A. Yes. They have constant knowledge of what is going on elsewhere.

Q. Do you know whether in the district there was any fear of a boycott unless they joined in the *hartal*?

A. I was led to believe that some traders were told so, though I have no proof of it. But several people have told me so.

Q. So far as the pleaders in Gujranwala are concerned they have not shown any marked interest in politics?

A. No; but they naturally read newspapers and take more interest in outside affairs than the rest of the community.

Q. Have you ever had occasion to take exception generally to their action?

A. No; no cause.

Q. On the 6th of April was there any sign of agitation?

A. No.

Q. There was no *hartal* on the 6th?

A. No.

Q. In your statement you say "between the 6th and 14th April the apathy of Gujrat in the passive resistance movement began to be the subject of comment"—what do you mean?

A. I mean that one or two people who went to other places to see their friends there were rebuked. The people used to say "why don't you do something in Gujrat"?

Q. Where is Sialkot?

A. About 16 miles away on the other side of the Chenab river.

Q. In which district?

A. In the Sialkot district.

Q. You refer to a pleader who came back after being remonstrated with?

A. Yes. He was one instance of the comments just noted.

Q. Early on the morning of the 14th were two inflammatory notices posted in the city?

A. Yes.

Q. What notices were they?

A. They were manuscript notices written in a way that suggested a student or at any rate an inexperienced writer. It said that on the following day some violence would take place. I forget the wording of it. They simply said that something would be done on the following day.

Q. Was it indicated that that something was to be violent?

A. Yes.

Q. Against whom?

A. Against the Europeans.

Q. Did that notice which you refer to or the other notices proceed from certain men from Amritsar?

A. There were no means of telling—the notices were not signed. The notice itself did not say that it was issued by certain men from Amritsar.

Q. These notices did not seem to be widely read?

A. Very little attention was paid to them.

Q. I think the first indication of anything unusual occurring was on the 14th at about 10?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you meet on the morning of that day with some of the leaders of the town?

A. The Superintendent of Police had a meeting.

Q. You say in your statement that "on the morning of the 14th I saw several leading men at the request of the Deputy Commissioner....."

A. That paragraph is a quotation from a report sent in by the Superintendent of Police.

Q. About 10 in the morning did the shops suddenly begin to close?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did anything occur in the nature of acts of violence on that day?

A. I was told that the shops gradually closed and I was given to understand that people induced others to close their shops mainly by pressure and not by violence.

Q. I see that some course was taken by the authorities to stop this?

A. Yes, we had a police patrol parading the roads.

Q. On the 15th did anything occur?

A. I had come back myself on the 14th so on the 15th I was there. I went round the town in the morning to see what was happening and I met a crowd and I spoke to them for a few minutes and as they were not committing acts of violence I left them to be looked after by the police. The crowd appeared to be a little violent, so I thought I had better get away. I then called a small conference of officials and the leading men of the town in order to talk over matters and we discussed how to deal with the situation. When that was finished we heard that the Mission School had had its windows broken. I went along with the Superintendent of Police to see the damage and I found that the crowd had gone to the Mission School and asked the boys to join them. The headmaster and others resisted the crowd but they were not able to do anything and the crowd began to throw stones and brickbats, some of which hit the headmaster and others did some damage in the shape of damaging furniture; then the crowd passed on.

Q. I understand that the crowd then went to the Zamindara School and the Government High School?

A. Yes, but these closed before their arrival and so there was no disturbance. I had troops and I called them out at once on hearing of the damage; but the damage appeared to be slight and the crowd

19 December 1919.]

Mr. H. S. WILLIAMSON.

(Continued.)

disappeared and they appeared to be doing nothing further, so we took no action for the time being. The troops went back because they had had no food. I was told that the crowd had dispersed. I gave instructions to my magistrates to let me know when the crowd became dangerous; but no reports were brought to me for some time I think. In the afternoon apparently the crowd formed again somewhat unexpectedly and it was observed emerging from the Kabuli gate from where it proceeded to the Shrine of Shah Hussain near by and halted and here they all drank water. They then made a dash for the railway station where considerable amount of damage was done by the crowd. They broke furniture, doors, panes of glasses, etc. They then went into the station master's office where they broke the telegraph instruments and clock outside and then passed on to the booking office where there were a certain number of papers and parcels. Some of the parcels were of a rather inflammable character and these things were set on fire. Apparently on the road to the station they broke the street lamps and took up tins of oil and they appeared to have used this oil picked up in this way. In the meantime the senior magistrate, the Deputy Superintendent of Police and other magistrates and other people who were helping me had followed the crowd and they dashed up and immediately helped to put out the fire by dragging out all the burning articles and the Senior Magistrate gave orders to the police guard of twenty men to fire and the crowd dispersed.

Q. Were you present at the firing?

A. No; I arrived a few minutes later.

Q. Were any casualties caused by that fire?

A. No.

Q. How many rounds were fired?

[Mr. Herbert.—The senior magistrate who is coming to give evidence will speak about that.]

Q. Did a number of military troops arrive that day?

A. Troops were in Gujrat at the time.

Q. But you say you asked for some troops?

A. Yes, they arrived after the station was burnt. I thought it would be wise to have some more troops, so I sent for some more.

Q. On the morning of the 16th were notices issued under the Police Act prohibiting meetings?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was that particularly directed against meetings connected with the Rowlatt Act?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were police posted throughout the city?

A. The police at first were not very numerous but as soon as the military arrived and took over the defence of certain points we were able to put the police on to their legitimate duties of unarmed work.

Q. You refer to a place called Jalalpur Jattan? How far is that?

A. It is about 8 miles from Gujrat.

Q. What occurred there?

A. A meeting had been called to arrange a *hartal* but nothing very much happened—the shops began to close and a crowd paraded through the town when the municipal commissioners went to the municipal Hall to arrange matters and the crowd came there and assaulted the municipal commissioners.

Q. Apparently there was a force of *sowars* sent round to take charge?

A. Yes. I was not quite certain of Jalalpur. I did not receive any notices of disturbances at this place but I thought it would be wise to take precautions by sending for some troops.

Q. Was it on the night of the 15th that some telegraph wires were cut?

A. That was the most serious offence that took place. Much more serious than the actual rioting.

Q. On the 16th of April did anything occur?

A. On the 16th the shops were again closed but there was no general *hartal* as far as I remember.

Q. I think you had a conference in the Town Hall to discuss what was to be done in the way of stopping the trouble?

A. That is the conference to which I have referred.

Q. Were you at that meeting?

A. No.

Q. Did the crowd interfere with the proceedings?

A. The crowd went into the hall and created a disturbance while the members of the committee were discussing what to do and assaulted the municipal commissioners.

Q. Did they damage the furniture in the hall?

A. Yes.

Q. I think they insisted upon the municipal commissioners observing the *hartal*?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. The conference was held for the purpose of considering how they should maintain peace and order?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did anything occur about that time in the way of violent action?

A. The main violent action was that they had cut the telegraph wires.

Q. On the 17th I think the shops gradually opened?

A. Yes.

Q. You refer to a place called Malakwal—is that a railway junction?

A. Yes.

Q. How far is that from Gujrat?

A. About 55 miles.

Q. Is the village itself a fairly large village?

A. Yes. It is a village but not a town.

Q. At the railway station is there a bazaar?

A. Yes.

Q. Are there a great number of railway employees there?

A. Yes.

Q. For some time prior to the 14th of April was there a certain amount of discontent among the railway staff?

A. Yes, a railway strike was being arranged.

Q. Were signallers getting news of events on their instruments?

A. Yes.

Q. You refer here to the signallers getting information on their instruments of the things at other places, what do you mean by that?

A. It is a common thing I understand for the signalling clerks to talk to one another when work is slack.

Q. And the information you mean is information as to occurrences at Lahore and Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. Did a railway strike come off at all at that time?

A. No, not actually.

Q. And you have no means of saying whether there were any political agitators behind the railway strike?

A. No.

Q. I think there was a resolution carried that a strike should be held?

A. Yes, I believe so.

Q. Was that at a meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. Did a crowd go to the station?

A. Yes.

Q. Was any damage done?

A. No damage. There were some troops there and the sergeant of the guard told the men to go away and they thought they had better do so.

Q. Had the crowd come intending to do damage?

A. I don't think so.

Q. What was their intention so far as you think?

A. They had been intending to make a demonstration, but I think they wanted to call off the men who were on duty.

Q. I think some men struck but there was no general strike?

A. Yes, so far as I am informed.

Q. Then on the 16th what occurred at Malakwal?

A. A meeting was held at the mosque there which both Hindus and Mussalmans attended. But there was no very definite result from the meeting.

Q. Was there on that day any destruction of property there?

A. On the 16th nothing happened till the evening.

19 December 1919.]

Mr. H. S. WILLIAMSON.

[Continued.]

Q. What occurred in the evening?

A. Some of the men who had been at the meeting in the mosque seemed to think they must do something, so they arranged among themselves to break communications. A party went out and cut the telegraph wires. They went away from the junction, well clear of the station off the main line to a quiet place far from any habitation near a village called Kalawal. There they cut all the telegraph wires, seven or eight of them, leading towards the main line of the railway. The party who had done that were then coming back and they met the other party who were going to take up the railway line and joined them. Some men of the combined party turned back but such as were left of the combined party returned and took up a section of the railway line and threw the whole piece of the two lines attached to the sleepers down a steep railway embankment, and the result was that on the following morning a train which came along there was derailed and two lives were lost.

Q. The next town you mention is Kunjah, how far is that?

A. About 7 miles to the west of Gujrat.

Q. What occurred there?

A. Practically nothing except that there was the beginning of a *hartal* and a man went round telling people to close their shops but they were soon opened again as some men came along and induced the shopkeepers to open.

Q. The next place you mention is Rasul?

A. That is the headquarters of the Lower Jhelum canal where there is a fairly large canal staff and an Engineering College. The chief thing that happened there was that there was some indiscipline among the students of the College and there was a meeting at which both Hindus and Musalmans attended. When the Principal of the College came back he expelled some of the students and that seemed to put an end to the disturbance. There was no violence there.

Q. You have referred generally to the military assistance that you received; you give it more in detail in section 4 of your statement I see?

A. Yes.

Q. It just amounted to this, that from time to time you did receive drafts of military to help you to maintain peace and order?

A. Yes. I asked on two occasions, the night of the 14th and the night of the 16th, for troops to be sent to Gujrat, and meanwhile the General Officer Commanding at Jhelum had on his own initiative sent troops to other places in the district as a precaution in case anything happened. He sent troops to Lala Musa, Malakwal and Rasul.

Q. At all these different places occurrences were taking place which necessitated this?

A. Which necessitated it. Lala Musa and Malakwal were large railway junctions which certainly ought to be guarded. Rasul was a place where there had been a report of some disturbance, although it did not amount to much in the end, and the engineers of the Canal department had asked for help to be sent.

Q. Now in connection with the proclamation of Martial Law in Gujrat area, what was your view as to the necessity or advisability of it?

A. By the time Martial Law was proclaimed there was no riot or disturbance; they had ceased.

Q. Then in your opinion was it advisable that there should be Martial Law?

A. It was not necessary for the quelling of riots or disturbances. It was a precaution against further trouble; it was a very wise precaution. I could not tell whether disturbances from Wazirabad or Gujranwala were likely to increase so as to come into my district and cause trouble there. That was known to the Government very much better than to me.

Q. Were the different measures that were taken in your opinion adequate and successful?

A. Yes.

Q. As regards Martial Law in your area, were there many special orders issued under Martial Law?

A. Not many.

Q. Were there many cases of offences against those orders?

A. Very few. I think the total number of men tried was about 12 or 13.

Q. For offences against the orders?

A. Yes. One or two men for spreading false rumours, a couple of cases of men refusing to sell, and I forget the others. They were not very serious offences.

Q. What sort of sentences were passed on these men speaking generally?

A. Speaking generally, mostly fines.

Q. Were there cases of whipping?

A. In one case a sentence of whipping was imposed, but it involved two men.

Q. Who were the officers who were acting in the special summary courts?

A. There were three officers in the district. At Gujrat itself Colonel O'Brien was Area Officer, at Malakwal Colonel Grant, and at Lala Musa Major Besley.

Q. There was no civil magistrate?

A. I had powers myself.

Q. And did you try some cases?

A. I tried no cases.

Q. As regards the rioting and the destruction of railway plant to which you have referred, were there cases arising out of these incidents?

A. Yes, the destruction of property in Gujrat railway station where the telegraph and telephone instruments were smashed, and the booking office set fire to, ended in a case which was tried by a Martial Law Commission.

Q. That is one of the Tribunals?

A. Yes. The Jalalpur case was also tried by a tribunal and the Malakwal derailment was tried by a tribunal.

Q. Did these trials take place in Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. I see in your statement you say the rioters themselves were mostly composed of the scum of the town?

A. Yes.

Q. So far as Gujrat was concerned, the influential classes did not seem to participate at all?

A. They were not among the rioters; they were not actually in the crowd.

Q. Of the people sent up for trial in the Gujrat cases, I see you say 13 were petty shop-keepers, five big shop-keepers, four students, three *tum-tum* drivers, two teachers, two members of the Bar, and three miscellaneous.

A. Yes.

Q. Was the rural population implicated?

A. Not at all.

Q. Did they on the contrary render assistance in patrolling the railway line?

A. Yes.

Q. By the rural population do you refer to any particular part of the rural population as having rendered that assistance?

A. That is to say the cultivating class.

Q. The *zemindars*?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you mean that they generally throughout the whole district rendered that assistance?

A. I only called upon them to patrol the railway line for a few miles on either side of the railway. It was not necessary to send for them from any great distance.

Q. I see you express the opinion that the movement in your district was absolutely anti-Government, but that there were no manifestations of anti-British or anti-Christian action?

A. Yes, that is my general conclusion.

Q. Is that the general conclusion you came to from the enquiries you made at the time?

A. Yes.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Mr. Williamson, after the 16th or 17th there were really no events of any importance in your district?

A. Not after the morning of the 17th.

19 December 1919.]

Mr. H. S. WILLIAMSON.

[Continued.]

Q. And you have told us the villagers assisted in maintaining order and patrolling and so on?

A. Yes.

Q. Martial Law was extended to Gujrat on the 19th?

A. I got the orders on the night of the 19th.

Q. And you have told us that in your view you could have carried on without Martial Law?

A. If Gujrat is considered isolated I could have done so.

Q. It was your view then?

A. It was my view then that no more riots or disturbances were actually taking place.

Q. And were likely, so far as you knew, to take place?

A. I could not tell.

Q. But your view was you could go on without Martial Law?

A. If Gujrat was considered by itself.

Q. Your view was that you could have carried on at that time without Martial Law?

A. I do not think I would quite express it in that way.

Q. However, when Martial Law was notified you wired to the Punjab Government saying that in your view it should not be so extended?

A. I wired that the district was quiet.

Q. With regard to Martial Law you definitely stated that in your view it was not necessary to extend it to Gujrat

A. I did.

Q. And after it had remained in force for a few days, you again wired to the Punjab Government stating your view that it should be removed?

A. I did.

Q. On what date was that?

A. It would be on the 21st or 22nd.

Q. Martial Law was only in operation for two or three days and after that you wired again asking that it should be removed?

A. I did not ask that it should be removed; I wired that it was not necessary.

Q. So you again repeated on the 21st or 22nd your view that you had expressed on the 19th?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jayat Narayan—

Q. The first disturbance took place at Delhi on the 30th March?

A. I do not know.

Q. Not even up to this time?

A. I am unable to say whether it is right or wrong. I don't know much about Delhi.

Q. From 30th March to 20th April, from different sources, you were aware as to what was happening at Lahore, Amritsar, Wazirabad, Gujranwala and Kasur?

A. Only from what I saw in the paper.

Q. From time to time various officers were going to your place previous to the 20th?

A. I went at the end of March, and I was on tour until the 14th April.

Q. You were aware before the 20th April as to what took place at Lahore, at Amritsar and at Gujranwala?

A. A very little.

Q. So far as Lahore and Amritsar were concerned you were aware of what had happened there?

A. I received information about Amritsar.

Q. When you received the news of the introduction of Martial Law at Gujrat, were you surprised?

A. Yes.

Q. At that time, you practically thought that this communication did not refer to Gujrat, but it referred to the Gujarat in the Bombay Presidency?

A. That was my idea.

Q. I find from the military report here "the Deputy Commissioner received orders that Martial Law had been extended to Gujrat District, but it was not proclaimed as the Deputy Commissioner thought it must be a mistake and meant for the Gujarat District near Bombay. Is that so?"

A. It was proclaimed.

Q. I shall read the report of the Officer Commanding, Gujrat (Captain Churchill). He says.....

A. I am not responsible for it.

Q. He says: "A mobile column arrived from Jhelum and proceeded to Malakwal and everything was found quiet. The police arrested several persons in connection with the recent disturbances." Further on he says:—"The Deputy Commissioner received orders that Martial Law has been extended to the Gujrat District; it was not proclaimed, as the Deputy Commissioner thought it was a mistake and meant for the Gujrat district near Bombay."

A. I do not know what authority Captain Churchill has for saying that no proclamation was made.

Q. You thought it was for Gujarat near Bombay?

A. I did not say it anywhere.

Q. You did say it to Captain Churchill?

A. I was not aware of it.

Q. You thought that it might be for Gujarat near Bombay.

A. So I thought, but that is not evidence.

Q. It is evidence. I want to know whether you thought that it was meant for the Gujarat District near Bombay?

A. I thought so. It is a private thought; it is my own.

Q. Do you think so?

A. I did for a few minutes.

Q. And you communicated it to Captain Churchill?

A. I was not aware of it.

Q. How was he able to know what was in your mind?

A. Captain Churchill stayed with me for one or two days as a guest. I cannot say any more than that.

Q. It was a communication published on the 23rd April that the Deputy Commissioner wanted Martial Law to be suspended in his district. It is in the War Diary?

A. Whose War Diary?

Q. The War Diary of the Rawalpindi Division?

A. I know nothing of it.

Q. Did you communicate to any officer on the 23rd April that you wanted Martial Law to be suspended in your district?

A. I do not know the page to which you refer. I must see the War Diary.

Q. It does not matter what paper I am referring to. I am reading it to you "the Deputy Commissioner wants Martial Law to be suspended within his district?" It is dated 28th April 1919.

A. I told the Punjab Government at that time that it was not necessary. That is all I could say.

Q. There was only one accused tried by the Tribunal from your district?

A. Several cases were tried.

Q. By the Tribunal? How many?

A. Of the number I am not sure. Three cases were in Gujrat.

Q. Two or 3 combined into one?

A. I think so; the investigating officer is here; he can give you details.

Q. There was a case on the day when the Conference was held?

A. On the 15th April.

Q. You remember that in that case Sayad Faizul Hassan Shah, Deputy Superintendent of Police, and the Senior Sub-Judge Asad Jan were witnesses?

A. Yes; they were present that day and asked many questions.

Q. In that case, about 22 persons were tried?

A. I do not remember the number.

Q. Do you know that more than half the number were convicted by the Tribunal?

A. I do not remember the details. It did not come to me.

Q. You know that one of the accused persons was a barrister of your district?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know that in their judgment, dated 7th May, the Tribunal have passed this remark:—"In some instances, there is no evidence which even if believed would justify conviction and in some others evidence is very thin: in many more, personal and party animosity clearly played a very large part."



19 December 1919.]

Mr. H. S. WILLIAMSON.

[Continued.]

Much of the evidence, even that of the officials, is tainted in that way and there has always been very much of perjury." Was this brought to your notice?

A. I read the judgment of the commission.

Q. Do you know that subsequent to this, this barrister filed an application before the local Government for prosecuting those two officers of perjury and that application was not granted?

A. I have no knowledge of it.

Q. Have you taken any steps to enquire into this allegation, *vis.*, that they committed perjury, and they were actuated by personal animosity?

A. I asked the Commissioner whether the Martial Law Commission could inform me by whom the perjury was committed. I received no reply.

Q. You know in this case one Mr. Ram Chand appeared as a defence witness?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. Then, after he came back from giving his evidence, do you know that he was removed from his Municipal Commissionership?

A. He was.

Q. He has been removed from his Municipal Commissionership?

A. He has been removed.

Q. The name of that barrister is Hargopal?

A. I do not remember that.

Q. I want to know whether this barrister is Hargopal?

A. Yes.

Q. Then do you remember that, as a matter of fact, on the 15th he was asked by you to get the shops opened, and that he went there and mud was thrown at him.

A. Do you refer to Lala Ram Chand or Hargopal?

Q. You asked him to help you in getting the shops opened and he tried to get the shops opened?

A. I do not remember asking Ram Chand to do anything.

Q. Then some indemnity has been assessed on him to meet the cost of the additional police. You had assessed one-fourth on this man, Rs. 8,168, on Ram Chand.

A. I have assessed neither one-fourth nor any other thing. I have assessed him whatever he was due to pay under the general scheme.

Q. May I know what this amount is?

A. He pays the amount according to his income-tax.

Q. I say Rs. 8,168.

A. That is approximately the correct figure.

Q. Before he gave his evidence, was he *challenged* or was he implicated in any case?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Do you remember the case of one Muttra Das?

A. No.

Q. The man was *challenged* for a breach of Martial Law, for selling sugar or something else at a higher rate than what was put down under the regulation?

A. I do not remember his name.

Q. The man was *challenged* for the breach of Martial Law regulations. At the time, he was suffering from kidney disease?

A. I have no idea.

Q. You knew he was kept under arrest for 3 days?

A. I have no idea.

Q. You know he applied for bail, and bail was refused?

A. I do not remember.

Q. He was fined for breach of Martial Law?

A. He was fined; I do not remember the amount of fine.

Q. About this Malakwal affair, it is given as an opinion in these diaries before this committee that it was the work of expert men—the damage that was done to the railway.

A. Did I give that opinion? I can only say with regard to the taking up of the line that some time later when I went to Malakwal where they were reconstructing certain portion, I saw a certain number of people taking the section of the railway. They were ordinary men. Whether they were experts or not

I cannot say. They took it up and reconstructed the whole scene.

Q. That was the station where there was a great deal of discontent among the railway people?

A. As I understand, yes.

Q. It is put down in these words: it is from the War Diary; Diary of the Rawalpindi Division?

A. I cannot make any comments on it.

Q. It must be written under the order of the Commanding Officer?

A. I cannot say. I have not seen it.

Q. Here it is put down "the taking up" of the Malakwal line was undoubtedly the work of experienced railway men.

A. I presume that is the opinion.

Q. I am reading word for word.

A. I cannot criticise his opinion.

Q. You do not agree with me?

A. May or may not, I cannot say. It was done by persons who had possibly worked on the railway. To the extent of calling them experts, I do not know how long it took them. An ordinary man is quite enough.

Q. With regard to the boycott, were you really shown the letters of any firms which threatened to boycott the shop-keepers?

A. No.

Q. Was any oral statement made by some shop-keepers?

A. Not by any shop-keepers.

Q. Who gave you that information, that outside pressure was brought to bear upon these shop-keepers?

A. I cannot give you the name. I talked with them, and understood that such was the case. I can give you no proof.

Q. Any actual shop-keeper who was threatened?

A. I have got no proof. If any letters were received, they would probably have been destroyed long ago.

Q. What I wanted was whether that was second hand information or any person who was threatened came to you and informed you?

A. Second hand information. I naturally formed my opinion on what people told me.

Q. I want to know whether it was first hand information or second hand information given to you by somebody else who obtained the information?

A. No, that was my general impression. I can give no definite proof.

Q. Did at any time in the Gujrat District an occasion arise when in your opinion it was necessary for the civil authorities to surrender its functions to the military?

A. Affairs did not reach that stage.

Q. This introduction of Martial Law practically did not affect the rural population and did not reach them?

A. To a very small extent.

Q. I think you will agree with me that throughout the province of Punjab, that was the harvesting time?

A. It is the normal harvesting time.

Q. It will be a time when the rural population would not co-operate with anybody else and their first concern would be to reap their crops and be engaged in that work. It will not be the proper time for any propaganda to take root and make them rebel against any authority?

A. I could say nothing about rebellion. That was the normal time for reaping the crops.

Q. The man who arranged all this at Malakwal, I think, is Raja Ram?

A. Raja Ram was one of the chief offenders.

Q. The head of one gang was Raja Ram and the head of another was Sarwar?

A. Yes.

Q. Both of them asked for volunteers and their party was 10 strong?

A. It was probably a dozen. The actual number I cannot say. At one time it was reported that there might be anything up to 20 men.

Q. And is it true that even out of these ten men who were with these 2 leaders, some, when they ac-

19 December 1919.]

Mr. H. S. WILLIAMSON.

[Continued.]

tually found what they had to do, turned back. You yourself said that 6 men out of the 10 that Sarwar brought turned back on learning what they were to do.

A. They joined another party.

Q. Out of 10, 6 refused to do what he ordered them to do?

A. Yes.

Q. According to your statement, these two young men got into their heads to emulate some people, and they asked for volunteers and these were supplied by the *maulvi*. They were formed into two parties and they were out to do mischief at Malakwal. Out of this party, six refused to do anything and went away.

A. The six referred to one part of the gang.

Q. There were 20 men, 10 in each party?

A. Probably.

Q. At Malakwal, there never arose any need for using military force?

A. Certainly, if you are able to find gangs of men committing very serious crimes like that, military force is necessary.

Q. I do not see that actually any need arose for the military force. The military were there. There was no occasion for their help?

A. It depends upon the occasion. If there is a derailment of trains, there is necessity for action by preventive force.

Q. There were actual disturbances?

A. There were riots. That is distinct from derailment.

Q. Had you at any time to quell a disturbance?

A. Yes.

Q. You say that their presence was sufficient to quell it?

A. That I cannot say.

Q. Their very presence at the railway station was sufficient to stop disturbances?

A. That I cannot say. There were no more riots, whether they intended it or not.

Q. You say that the presence of the troops at the station was adequate precaution against riot and against further disturbances and crimes?

A. Yes.

Q. At the meeting of the 5th or 6th I would like to know the worst possible thing in your opinion that was said at the meeting?

A. I do not know whether there was any meeting on the 5th or 6th.

Q. There was a meeting and certain speeches were made on the 6th.

A. Can you refer me to the paragraph?

Q. On what day were the speeches made?

A. On many days.

Q. The first day was on the 6th?

A. I do not follow your reference.

Q. A meeting was held and certain speeches were made by some pleaders or someone in Gujrat?

A. That I cannot say. If you tell me which paragraph in the report you refer to, I will be more precise.

Q. You say that pleaders instigated this. It is in Section V. The persons who instigated were pleaders among others?

A. There is no reference there to the 6th April.

Q. Either the meeting was held on the 6th or on the 12th and 13th?

A. I was on tour on both occasions.

Q. You do not know?

A. I was not there.

Q. Have you read those speeches?

A. No.

Q. By what other means do you accuse pleaders of instigating people to observe *hartal*?

A. I have got no definite report.

Q. There you say that the pleaders were the prominent persons who instigated people to observe *hartal* and caused these disturbances?

A. They were among the people who did it.

Q. Therefore by this I understood that they were instigating by means of certain meetings and certain speeches which they delivered?

A. I did not say they instigated by means of speeches.

Q. By what other means did they do that?

A. It was done in various ways which I did not specify.

Q. I would like to know whether you are in possession of any other facts at all?

A. No; I was on tour at the time. I think if you ask Sayad Faizul Hassan who was in charge in Gujrat at the time and investigated, you may get the information.

Q. Therefore you are not in possession of any tangible facts to show that the pleaders instigated others?

A. I can give you no definite written proof.

Q. Neither anything about the traders and cloth merchants?

A. I have no definite proofs. These are my general conclusions which are put down there; they are not in the form of proofs.

Q. Do you know that at Lala Musa station about 800 passengers were stopped at the instigation of the authorities? Are you aware of it?

A. On what day?

Q. Between the 6th and 14th.

A. Were they stopped, 300 passengers all from one train?

Q. From these papers it appears so.

A. I have no knowledge of it.

Q. Did you ever ask the military authorities to stop third class passengers at Lala Musa station or any other station?

A. I did not ask. There were certain regulations about permits to travel. They were not issued under my orders; so I cannot give you any details.

Q. Was Gujrat station ever damaged?

A. I described it before. It was damaged.

Q. Some papers were burnt inside that room?

A. Which room are you referring to? There are four rooms there. There was considerable damage. The four rooms included the station master's office in which the instruments of communications were situated and they were all broken.

Q. Here it is put down that a mob of 200 or 300 boys were in possession of the station; 20 constables attempted to keep order. Mob fired on, four casualties and they dispersed.

A. That is not my report.

Q. I only want to know whether that report is true.

A. The details of this are incorrect, because there were no casualties.

Q. Here it is put down that the mob was fired on and there were four casualties.

A. As far as I am aware, there were no casualties.

Q. Whose report is that?

A. It is page 29, War Diary.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. There were no casualties. Was there no firing at all?

A. There was firing, but there were no casualties.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. On what date did the news of Amritsar reach Gujrat?

A. I do not know. What news of Amritsar?

Q. News of the 13th?

A. If you will ask me more precisely, I can answer.

Q. There was only one important thing that happened at Amritsar on the 13th, and that is the firing at Jallianwala Bagh. When did it reach Gujrat?

A. I cannot say.

Q. When did you yourself become aware of it?

A. I cannot remember the date. It was some days later when I saw it in the newspapers. So far as I remember, I cannot be precise after this lapse of time.

Q. Do I understand that these different officers that were coming to Gujrat never gave you information until you saw that in the newspapers?

A. I am not aware that I received any information from any military officer on the 13th or 14th. I did

19 December 1919.]

Mr. H. S. WILLIAMSON—concluded—Sardar ASAD JAN.

not reach Gujrat till the afternoon of the 14th. I was not in touch with any military officer until the 14th.

Q. At the time when damage was done to the railway line at Malakwal station, there were troops at the station?

A. Yes.

Q. Because the damage was done by a very few men, they could not get hold of the persons?

A. The crime committed by this gang of men at night was done by a small number who could naturally get past the sentry.

Q. Therefore they got past the sentry and the military were not able to discover them at the time they were committing the offence?

A. No; that does not excuse their crime.

Q. Then you say that this movement was anti-Government?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you base your opinion on the speeches that were made or anything else?

A. No; on the facts recorded and crimes committed.

Q. The crimes that were committed were—(1) the cutting of wires, (2) removal of the line at Malakwal station, and (3) the burning of papers in the ticket collector's office?

A. There were various things. Why do you minimise the crimes committed at Gujrat? They were very much more serious; the burning of papers and the breaking of lines of communication were deliberately done.

Q. Therefore in addition to the cutting of wires and removing line from Malakwal station, the crime in Gujrat was the damaging of instruments of communications and setting fire to the office.

A. They probably would have done very much more, had they not been stopped.

Q. Don't you think that if the railway staff are not satisfied and they were about to strike, then practically they would make common cause with these persons who were not well disposed inside the city and all these things could have happened?

A. I cannot say what the railway staff could have done, and I cannot say anything about common cause.

Q. But so far as the intention of the mob was concerned, you base your opinion upon the acts that were done by them, not upon anything that was said?

A. Yes, upon the crimes committed.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith—

Q. I gather that the people in Gujrat were rather apathetic about the *hartal*. Were they not?

A. Not about the *hartal*; practically all the shops were closed as far as I know.

Q. But stories of what was happening elsewhere had worked them up seriously?

A. I would not say that. It was done quickly and obviously spontaneously, because the Superintendent of Police was told on the morning of the 14th that there would be no *hartal*, but after some time, the *hartal* was observed obviously quite quickly and it was very complete.

Q. You did not find it difficult to guard the bridges on the lines of railway with the assistance of the villagers?

A. With the assistance of the villagers I had patrols.

Q. They did their duties to your satisfaction?

A. They worked very well.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Mr. Williamson, you have told us that you wrote to the Punjab Government in regard to the introduction of Martial Law, that you did not think it necessary for Gujrat. Having regard to what you now know as facts as they transpired in the Punjab as a whole do you now think that Martial Law was not justified in Gujrat?

A. I was referring at that time to the state of affairs in my own district. It was a very wise precaution.

Q. Quite apart from anything in the other districts?

A. It was my duty to report the state of affairs in my own district.

Sardar ASAD JAN, Senior Sub-Judge, Gujrat.

By the President—

Q. You were the Senior Sub-Judge, Gujrat?

A. Yes, my Lord.

Q. There is just one point that we have not got out quite clearly, and that is as regards the firing at Gujrat railway station. Do you remember when that occurred?

A. Yes.

Q. On what date was that and at what time?

A. On the 15th April.

Q. At the time when firing took place, what was the mob doing?

A. The mob actually broke the doors, windows and glass panes and were setting fire to the building.

Q. Did you endeavour to get them to disperse?

A. Yes.

Q. Would they disperse?

A. No, they would not.

Q. When they would not do so, what did you do?

A. I ordered the police guard who was arriving at the time to fire at them.

Q. Were shots fired?

A. Yes.

Q. How many?

A. About 25.

Q. Were there any casualties in consequence?

A. None.

Q. How was that?

A. Because people were inside the railway station and the guard was outside. These people had entered the building inside and the guard was outside and fired through the railing which was of about a man's height.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Did you order the police to fire on the mob while the mob was in the act of attempting to burn down the station?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you any other means at your disposal of putting an end there and then to this attempted arson without firing?

A. None whatever.

Q. The mob all day, I think, had been roaming about the place?

A. Yes.

Q. They had numerous warnings both on this and previous occasions?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the police fire buckshot?

A. Yes.

Q. They did not either kill or wound anyone?

A. Not at all; nobody was even wounded.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You were one of the witnesses before the Commission?

A. Yes.

Q. There were other official witnesses from this place?

A. Yes, Diwan Sita Ram, Lala Vidyadhar and Sayad Faizul Hassan.

Q. You know what the Tribunal has stated about official witnesses?

A. They have said about both sides.

Q. There were six officials?

A. There were two sets.

19 December 1919.]

SARDAR ASAD JAR.

[Continued.]

Q. If your evidence had been believed, that barrister would have been punished?

A. They did not say anything about believing.

Q. Your evidence was that this barrister was in the mob and that he was not present at the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow?

A. Yes.

Q. What was his defence, why was he challenged? Was it because he was one of the mob?

A. Because there was evidence that he was instigating people.

Q. The main reason was that he was one of the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. That was also the evidence of Faizul Hassan Shah?

A. Yes.

Q. His defence was that he was at the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow and was not one of the mob?

A. That is right.

Q. And he was acquitted?

A. Nobody knows on what grounds he was acquitted. Of course, he was acquitted.

Q. There were other officials who said that he was not in the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. You were the only two officers who said that he was in the mob and he was not present at the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow?

A. There were 18 persons.

Q. I am talking about officials examined in this case?

A. The Deputy Commissioner held an enquiry afterwards and there were 18 persons. The police sent up only two men.

Q. In the trial before the Tribunal you were the only two officials who made that statement?

A. Yes, who were sent up.

Q. And you know in that Tribunal what the Judges have said?

A. There were two sets, one set said that he was not in the mob and the other said he was.

Q. It is not a question of doubt. What they say is this: "Much of the evidence, even that of the officials is tainted and there has been deliberate perjury."

A. Yes; there had been. There were two sets, one set said he was there and the other said he was not there. There were Hindu officials also who said he was not there.

Q. So far as the facts of the 15th were concerned, you were not with the mob?

A. I was with the mob.

Q. You were sent for later?

A. I was with the mob, but not all the time with them because, when we approached them, they used to increase their lamentations. So we kept at a distance from them, but we were watching their movements.

Q. Were you present at Shah Hussain shrine?

A. I was not there.

Q. When did you go to the railway station?

A. I had posted my men who came and told me that they were first going round the city and Circular Road. When they took that route he came and informed me.

Q. Therefore when the mob started from the Shah Hussain shrine to the railway station, you were not with the mob. You were subsequently informed and then you came to the railway station?

A. Not to the railway station, but to a place half a mile away that way. They had not arrived at the station yet.

Q. You were outside the railway station when you ordered firing?

Q. You were not inside the railway station?

A. No.

Q. You were inside the room where papers were burnt?

A. Not then, but after they dispersed and ran away, we entered.

Q. You had not seen what the mob was doing inside?

A. We could see very well as the windows and doors were open.

Q. Is it not a fact that not more than half a dozen were inside that room?

A. There was not only one room. There are several rooms. I do not know which you mean.

Q. The room where papers were burnt?

A. I cannot say how many there were, but I could see simply through the windows. We could see some men. I cannot give the exact number.

Q. Therefore the room which was burnt you could see from the outside of the station?

A. Yes.

Q. How long is the window?

A. About 4 feet in length.

Q. You arrested some men then?

A. Yes, 7 men.

Q. After that, the fire was extinguished?

A. Yes.

Q. Were any doors or roof of any room burnt?

A. Not burnt, because we were inside the room and attended to it at once.

Q. When you reached the inside of the room, were all the things inside the room burnt?

A. Papers, packets and everything which was lying inside the room were ablaze.

Q. I want to know what you mean by everything. I can understand papers and packets being burnt.

A. Some papers, packets were burnt and some chairs and tables were put on the fire.

Q. Therefore when you say that the station was burnt, you mean that inside the room there were some broken chairs which were burnt.

A. The chairs, papers and everything.

Q. You went inside as soon as the mob dispersed and the fire had been extinguished?

A. Yes.

Q. At Jalalpur Jattan also you made arrests?

A. I did not go there.

Q. You sent orders?

A. Not I.

Q. Then the Superintendent of Police did?

A. He might have.

Q. You know nothing about that?

A. No.

*By the Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith—*

Q. About the point which was just put to you about a case, the judgment said that the evidence of the officials was not free from taint and there had been perjury?

A. Yes.

Q. How many official witnesses were there?

A. There were 5 of us.

Q. May I know them?

A. Diwan Sita Ram, Junior Sub-Judge, Lala Vidya-dhar, and Chaudhri Kesari Ram, revenue assistant, were the three officials who said he was in the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow.

Myself and the Deputy Superintendent of Police were the other two witnesses who said he was not there.

Q. You personally were never named as having given that misleading or tainted evidence?

A. No.

Q. You were never called upon officially to make any reply to such a thing?

A. No.

Q. Your evidence was to the effect that he was amongst the crowd?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore that judgment could not apply to you?

A. No.

*By Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate—*

Q. This thing, My Lord, has been cleared by the Hon'ble Mr. Smith, but if there is anything necessary, I can put another question to clear up this point. I know something myself about these things.

*The President—*It is quite fair that there should be no stigma.

19 December 1919.]

SARDAR ASAD JAN—concluded—Sayad FAIZUL HASSAN SHAH.

Q. With regard to this question of Mr. Hargopal, Barrister-at-Law, being present at the house of the Deputy Commissioner or not at a certain time on the 15th, your evidence was simply to the effect that you did not see him at the conference at the Deputy Commissioner's house?

A. Yes.

Q. Some other officials, all Hindus, came forward to say that they did see him at the Deputy Commissioner's house?

A. Yes.

Q. All those Hindus came forward to say that they did see him at the Deputy Commissioner's house?

There were other witnesses apart from these officials who said that they did see him in the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. This was a side-issue. Was this not his evidence that he was just about the Deputy Commissioner's house at that time? Your evidence was that you were at the Deputy Commissioner's house in a small room and you never saw him there, and none of the witnesses who swore that he was there could tell the court anything as to what Mr. Hargopal said or did at that conference?

A. Yes. Mr. Williamson held an enquiry afterwards, and some Hindu leader supported us and said he was not there.

Sayad FAIZUL HASSAN SHAH, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Gujrat.

By the President—

Q. You are a Deputy Superintendent of Police?

A. Yes, my Lord.

Q. You were at Gujrat I suppose?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you present on the occasion when the firing, which has just been referred to by the other witness, took place?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you agree with the account that was given by him?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you also a witness in that case in which Mr. Hargopal was involved?

A. Yes.

Q. Was one of the issues of fact involved in the case—the question as to whether he had been at the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow? Did you testify to the fact that you did not see him there?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you give any other testimony in the case as regards his being implicated in the rioting?

A. That was enquired into and investigated by the Superintendent himself and he gave the order for that man's arrest.

Q. I see in your statement you refer to an incident which occurred on the morning of the 15th under an "artificial funeral"?

A. Yes.

Q. That is a different occasion from the one on which the firing took place?

A. Yes, this occurred on the 14th and the firing took place on the 15th.

Q. I see that that incident was earlier in the morning. Were the mob in a very unsettled state of mind?

A. Yes, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. What was Mr. Hargopal accused of?

A. Simply of abetting the mob. When the first mob went and rushed into the Mission School at that time it was stated that Hargopal was there and was abetting the mob to enter into the Mission School to loot the place and break things, etc.

Q. On what date?

A. On the 15th morning.

Q. Was he tried by himself or was he one of the batch of accused tried all together?

A. He was tried with other people.

Q. How many people was he tried altogether with, approximately?

A. There were 23 of them.

Q. Were these all tried together as one case?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Now apart from the defence of other accused in that case, I understand that one of the defences of this individual accused was an alibi that he had been at the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow and I want to find out from the judgment whether that reference of perjury would implicate this individual man or all the accused generally. The judgment says—"So far as the general facts are concerned the cases are simple enough, but the matter is different as regards individuals. In some

instances there is no evidence which, even if believed, would justify conviction, and in some others the evidence is very thin. In a good many more personal and party animosities have clearly played a very large part. Much of the evidence, even that of officials, is tainted in this way, and there has also been some deliberate perjury. We do not intend to discuss individual cases, but for various reasons we are not satisfied of the guilt of the following, who are, therefore, acquitted." Has it ever been suggested to you before that that sentence has any necessary reference to Hargopal's case at all?

A. No.

Q. Who were the Tribunal? Who were the Members?

A. Justice Leslie Jones, Mr. Harrison and Sheikh Din Muhammad, Extra Assistant Commissioner.

Q. That is to say, a Judge of the High Court, a gentleman who acted as Sessions Judge and an Extra Assistant Commissioner?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you think it at all likely that a Judge of the High Court if he intended to find a senior sub-judge of the same Province or a Deputy Superintendent of Police guilty of perjury, he would have been able to let the matter stand like that?

A. No.

Q. And so far as you are concerned, until this afternoon have you ever heard it stated that it was a part of the intention of this Tribunal to make an imputation of perjury against one of the senior sub-judges of the province?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Do you know that before to-day an application was put in by Hargopal for the purpose of obtaining sanction to prosecute a Sub-Judge?

A. Never.

Q. Here is some mention about there being two parties. It was stated by the defence that at the head of one party were yourself and the senior sub-judge? Here it is said: "there are a good many personal and party animosities which played a very large part." Now the ordinary parties in this judgment just now referred to were the two parties set up by the accused Hargopal?

A. There were no parties so far as I am aware.

Q. Was there not an allegation made that there were two parties?

A. They were giving out rumours that the senior sub-judge and the Deputy Commissioner made up the case.

Q. There was no mention of any party?

A. No.

Q. No evidence was adduced by him?

A. No.

Q. Now the reference to this party in this judgment is a wrong reference?

A. I do not know what he means by that party.

Q. His defence was—"The case was engineered against him and his allegation was that he was not at the conference, but at the Deputy Commissioner's

19 December 1919.]

Sayad FAISUL HASSAN SEAN.

[Concluded.]

house, and that he did not go near the mission school." So the charge against him was that he was one of the crowd which went to the mission school and he there beat the headmaster?

A. Yes.

Q. And the first witness in this case was Yusuf Ali Khan, sub-inspector of police?

A. Yes.

Q. He was all alone with the crowd. He submitted a report in which he stated what happened on the 15th, but nowhere in that report was this barrister's name mentioned—in fact even in the witness-box?

A. Yes.

Q. He stated on oath that he knew Hargopal very well, but he did not see him on any occasion with the crowd?

A. He was not with the mob. The witness who appeared before the Superintendent said that he was far away, nearly 200 paces.

Q. Then it was alleged that there was a dispute between you and the sub-judge and one Chiragh Din and this man was a friend of his?

A. Chiragh Din made a false affidavit and I asked permission to prosecute him. That is true.

Q. And this was brought out in your cross-examination by Hargopal's pleader?

A. Yes.

Q. And Hargopal was not arrested with the others, but subsequently on the 26th?

A. Yes.

Q. And before he was arrested by you, Dewan Sitaram, junior sub-judge, and Vidyadhar, Extra Assistant Commissioner, both these two officers had already informed you that at the time the mission school was being assaulted this man Hargopal was in the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow.

A. It was subsequently said that they had seen him at the conference.

Q. Then further on, you know that before this matter there was another case in the court of the sub-judge in which an application was made for a transfer?

A. No, I do not know anything about that.

Q. I believe that Seth Tarachand, Hargopal and Chiragh Din are close friends, and Hargopal and others filed an affidavit asking that the case be transferred from that court?

A. That was not Hargopal's case. It was another case.

Q. And that the accused was attending the court of the previous witness—Dewan Sitaram—who was also a witness and had deposed that he was with the Deputy Commissioner at that time?

A. He said Chiragh Din was not there and Hargopal was also not there, while some others said just the opposite.

Q. Here is an allegation made by one of the counsel for Government that he was present in the case and the witnesses who deposed to the effect that Hargopal was at the Deputy Commissioner's house gave no details or reasons when cross-examined and therefore their statement was not considered reliable. This is the

statement of the sub-judge. He says: "Hargopal was seated opposite me at the conference. I have known Hargopal for some years and believe he is loyal. On the morning of the 15th I was trying to open shops. I tried to get that of Ram Chand opened, but the mob threw mud at him. Hargopal was one of those who were at that time collected at the District Office and were trying to get shops opened. Hargopal accompanied me to Asmat Ullah's house and from there we went to the Deputy Commissioner's. He was there when news came about the Mission School. There are parties in Gujrat. Hargopal, Tara Chand and Chiragh Din are on one side and Karamat Ullah, Asmat Ullah, Shahzada Muhammad Yusuf and Chaudhri Abdullah, municipal commissioner, on the other. Hargopal was holding the rival candidate against Karamat Ullah in the Municipal election." Who is Karamat Ullah and how is he related to the previous witness? Anyhow was this statement made by the sub-judge?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore he practically says there were two parties. Then further on in his defence Hargopal also produces certain respectable witnesses to prove that he was at the conference?

A. Yes.

Q. With regard to what happened at the station. According to the statement of this man, he was actually with him—I mean Yusuf Ali Khan. He says that it was he who informed you that the mob was doing damage on the station and then you came?

A. Yes.

Q. The damage that was being done by this mob was the throwing of stones and breaking of windows.

A. First of all they rushed into the office of the Station Master and all the other rooms.

Q. And they damaged the telegraph instruments and burnt the forms of the booking office?

A. Yes.

Q. He was the man who was all along present with the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. And he gives details of the damage that was done by the mob at that time. What he says is this, that the mob broke windows with stones, destroyed telegraph instruments and burnt the forms of the booking office. He says nothing else.

A. Then what else do you want to know?

Q. Did you see anything more? He only gives these three things?

A. I was outside when the mob was inside the railway station. They were breaking the panes of glasses inside and setting fire to all things. I was outside, because under the orders of the magistrate independent fire was opened. I saw only the telephone instrument being broken by a *lathi* by Najimuddin.

Q. Inside the room?

A. I did not go inside the room at that time.

Q. After the mob had dispersed, you went inside. What things did you see burning?

A. One door of the booking office, one chair, a table and some books and packets of papers were burning.

20 December 1919.]

Mr. V. H. BOALTH.

## At Lahore, Saturday, the 20th December 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.  
The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.  
The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.  
Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.  
Saidar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., *Secretary*.

Mr. V. H. BOALTH, Traffic Manager, North-Western Railway.

*By the President—*

Q. I think you are Traffic Manager of the North-Western Railway?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In connection with the disturbances and riots that took place, was your railway system considerably dislocated?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. The first incident was at Delhi on the 30th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. After that incident, what was the first thing that occurred in the Punjab?

A. The disturbances at Amritsar on April the 10th.

Q. So far as the destruction to railway plant was concerned, you might say what damage was done on that day. We do not want the incidents themselves because we have got them from other witnesses.

A. There was damage done to the Amritsar goods shed and property burnt on the goods platform. Telegraph wires were also cut on that afternoon.

Q. Was damage done to Bhagtanwala station. What date was that? On the 10th?

A. On the afternoon of the 10th.

Q. On the same day did a mob collect at Chheharta station?

A. Yes.

Q. How far is that from Amritsar?

A. It is about 3 miles from the station. It is on the outskirts of the city.

Q. At Chheharta did a mob break the seals of some wagons?

A. Yes, they broke the seals of some wagons and looted some piece goods, on the night of the 10th.

Q. Was the cutting of telegraph wires a frequent occurrence during that time?

A. From the 10th onwards for some days reports were coming in from all directions about the cutting of telegraph wires.

Q. Did that interruption of the telegraph system interfere with goods trains being run?

A. Yes, they interfered considerably with the running of trains, but we managed to get the passenger trains through though they were running late, but the goods trains were hung up.

Q. The next day I think much did not occur so far as the railway system was concerned?

A. No.

Q. Then on Saturday the 12th, there was considerable destruction to railway property at Kasur?

A. Yes.

Q. What was that exactly?

A. They smashed up, all the telegraph instruments, burnt all things that could be burnt like furniture, records and some goods in the wagons. Our stations are pretty solidly built and so they did not lend themselves to total destruction, but all the furniture and things of that sort were burnt.

Q. Khem Karan station was also looted?

A. Yes.

Q. What distance was it?

A. 5 or 6 miles from Kasur.

Q. On the same day Patti station was burnt?

A. Yes, the station was attacked, the goods office doors were broken and signals were damaged.

Q. What is the distance?

A. It is between Kasur and Amritsar, I think it is about 25 miles.

Q. In addition to this destruction of plant, did you experience difficulty in getting men to work?

A. Not at first. For two or three days the staff worked, but they were all agitated.

Q. What was it that was interfering with the staff and preventing them from doing their work?

A. They complained that people from the cities and towns were inciting the staff not to do their work, but to stay away from their work and if they did go to work they would be molested.

Q. And on the 12th, I think a large proportion of the men in the Locomotive shops failed to turn up?

A. Yes, there was a lot of unrest on the 12th.

Q. At this time were you keeping the line clear by the assistance of an armoured train?

A. The armoured train went out, I think, on the night of the 10th or the 11th. I think the military authorities will be able to tell you the exact date. I think the armoured trains went out soon after the disturbances started.

Q. Was there a good deal of talking over telegraph wires by station signallers?

A. Yes.

Q. How did you discover that?

A. The telegraph inspectors and telegraph masters reported that there was a lot of unauthorised talk going on. They had a number of code words and sentences which they used.

Q. Were these station signallers in an unsettled state?

A. Yes, they were more or less unsettled after the 10th.

Q. On the 13th April, I think there was a considerable amount of telegraph signal wire cutting at Patti, Tarn Taran and Gohlwar Varpal?

A. Yes.

Q. On the afternoon of that day, was there a considerable amount of railway track removed from Chheharta and Khasa?

A. It was not a considerable amount, but it was sufficient to make the trains impassable. The joints were removed.

Q. Was the engine of a goods train derailed?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that train looted?

A. There was some looting on that train. Certain wagons were broken open and stuff taken away.

Q. Did you learn that there were designs to burn a number of stations at this time?

A. There was a lot of talk and rumours were afloat that they wanted to attack and burn stations.

Q. I think at Bahawalnagar there was a decision to strike on the next day?

A. Yes, on the next day there was trouble.

Q. I think at Shakurpur on the 13th, the locomotive, carriage, wagon and traffic staff struck work?

20 December 1919.]

Mr. V. H. BOALTE.

[Continued.]

- A. Yes.
- Q. It was on this day that a stone was thrown at one of the Mail trains and injured one of the passengers?
- A. Yes, the train was passing through Kot Radha Kishen.
- Q. On the night, did the Wagah mob make an attempt to loot the station?
- A. Yes, that was on the night of the 13th.
- Q. I think one armoured train went through?
- A. Yes, it was patrolling the line.
- Q. After the train had passed, did the mob start looting again?
- A. Yes, the mob looted the station, broke the telegraph instruments and furniture and other things were burnt.
- Q. Was the station staff turned away?
- A. Yes.
- Q. They were allowed to take their property?
- A. Yes, but occasionally they lost some of their private property.
- Q. Wires were cut?
- A. Wires were cut the whole time after the 10th till about the 18th or 20th in all directions.
- Q. Then the armoured train returned again and the mob hid themselves for a time?
- A. Yes, in the crops by the side of the line.
- Q. When the armoured train again passed on, they went to the permanent way huts?
- A. There was derailment to the armoured train. The mob had pulled out the rails.
- Q. Did they do damage to the permanent way?
- A. Yes, they had shifted some rails.
- Q. I think the armoured train itself was derailed?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Do you know how it happened?
- A. They had not actually uprooted the rails, they had removed the joints and that was sufficient to cause derailment.
- Q. Was this derailing done with skill?
- A. It did not want much skill to derail a train or open out rails. There were a lot of men who had been working in the gangs who knew these things.
- Q. On the 14th there was damage done at Gujranwala. What was the exact damage done to the railway?
- A. The whole station building was burnt, the goods shed was set on fire and a lot of property was burnt in the goods shed. The station building is still in ruins. There was a lot of wood work about it so it was burnt down easily. They set on fire the railway overbridge, they burnt the timbers of two more small bridges.
- Q. At Bahawalnagar a strike occurred on that day?
- A. Yes, there was a strike.
- Q. Did the strikers, helped by the people in the city, refuse to allow an engine to pass?
- A. Yes, they sat on the line and said that they would be cut if the engine went over them.
- Q. At that place I think the situation was well kept in hand?
- A. It was well kept in hand by Captain Watson.
- Q. What departments struck on that day?
- A. Well, practically all departments but the Loco. men said that the Traffic men would not work and they would not allow them to work, while the Traffic men said that the Loco. men were interfering with them.
- Q. You refer in your statement to one of the strikers inciting the mob to assault Europeans. How did you get that information?
- A. It was reported by the officer in charge, A. T. S. and the Traffic Inspector.
- Q. On the 10th there was damage done to telegraph wires?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did anything happen on the 14th at Lahore itself in the way of destruction to railway property?
- A. Very little was actually done at Lahore. I don't think much damage was done. They merely tried to throw over some of the points, they were very much excited.
- Q. Was there a strike at Shakurpur?
- A. On the 13th and 14th.
- Q. Were telegraph wires cut there?
- A. Yes, there were interruptions.
- Q. Then at Bahadurgarh was an attempt made to tamper with a bridge and the permanent way?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did the strike at Shakurpur spread to Delhi (Kishanganj)?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Where is it?
- A. That is the next station to Delhi, it is 2½ miles from Delhi.
- Q. That is outside the Punjab?
- A. That is in the Delhi Province, I believe.
- Q. Was any damage done to telegraph wires at that place?
- A. Yes.
- Q. I see you note that it was done by the station staff?
- A. That is what they reported at the time, that the station staff was mixed up with the people doing damage.
- Q. Did minor damage and destruction occur between Bahadurgarh and Gheora, at Okara, Hafizabad, Akalgarh and Mansurwali?
- A. Yes; from all these places reports came in of destruction and damage.
- Q. What sort of destruction?
- A. They tried to pull out the line; iron shackles were put on at Okara over the line, but they were all removed promptly by the staff.
- Q. It was on this day, I think, that a mob made an attempt to attack some passenger train at Hafizabad?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Were restrictions on booking put on Intermediate and third class passengers?
- A. Yes, on the 14th restrictions were put on.
- Q. Looking to the difficulties with which you were faced in running your traffic, were these restrictions necessary?
- A. Yes, they were necessary.
- Q. During the night of the 14th/15th, did a mob begin to attack Wazirabad, and were the signals broken down?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did they do any damage there?
- A. Yes, they broke the signal lamps and some lamp posts.
- Q. On the 15th, what occurred on the railway system? You say there was extensive cutting of telegraph wires, and minor disturbances occurred at Kundian, Lala Musa, Qila Sheikhpura and Bahalike. What sort of disturbances do you refer to?
- A. At Kundian there was an attempted strike. The mob came up there and refused to let the train pass. At Lala Musa they burnt the goods and the mob kept a train outside the station.
- Q. I see you mentioned that the train service was disorganized at certain places at Narwana, Dhandhan and Tohana?
- A. A driver reported that there were mobs inside and it was unsafe to go in the night and hung up the Mail. They stayed back at the station.
- Q. Did you receive a report that threats were being made to fire at any train leaving Bahawalnagar?
- A. Yes; Captain Watson and our Assistant Traffic Superintendent reported that there was a rumour that the train would be fired upon.
- Q. Were measures taken to prevent that?
- A. Yes, Captain Watson took steps.
- Q. At Ambala there was a short strike of the Traffic staff?
- A. Yes, there was an attempted strike, it was not very serious.
- Q. At Sialkot after dark was a third class carriage found to be burning in the station yard?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How was that damage done?
- A. There were crowds about, and it was believed that they did it as they were all very much excited.
- Q. Was trouble threatened at the same time at Lala Musa?
- A. Yes.
- Q. On that day was Chuharkana Station destroyed?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Can you describe what was the extent of damage done there?



20 December 1919.]

Mr. V. H. BOALTE.

[Continued.]

A. They collected all the moveable property, put it into the Station Master's Office and set fire to it and burnt everything.

Q. They not only destroyed the station but they uprooted the line?

A. They pulled out a rail near the distant signal near the canal bridge.

Q. How did they do it?

A. The crowd must have got together, it is easy enough to get hold of spanners and open out the line.

Q. In this case had they taken the tools from a hut?

A. Yes; most of the men in the villages have worked on the railway line, and it was quite easy for them to find a few who could understand the dismantling of rails.

Q. Had any material been used in the burning of the station?

A. They generally poured kerosene oil on the top.

Q. I see they also tried to smash a train?

A. They smashed it, broke all the windows and smashed all the sieves and tried to burn it. But the damage was not very excessive.

Q. Were the rails in a bridge approach removed?

A. Yes.

Q. Canal bridge timbers were also burnt?

A. Yes.

Q. Another bridge was burnt and rails in its approach removed?

A. Yes, two canal bridges were burnt one after another.

Q. Was the station cash safe on that occasion?

A. There was a small safe at the Station Master's office which contained some money. The Station Master however managed to hide the money in his house which he afterwards made good. The cash safe was rifled.

Q. Were tickets and racks destroyed?

A. All the moveable property like tickets, racks, etc., were thrown on the fire.

Q. During that night was a rail removed at Kala?

A. It was reported that a rail was removed at Kala, just north of Jhelum.

Q. Was a passenger train derailed?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there any casualties?

A. No, they were very careful.

Q. I suppose the derailment of the passenger train might have been more serious?

A. Yes, it might have been very serious.

Q. Was a troop train expected about that time?

A. Yes.

Q. I see you say that the intention was obviously to derail a special troop train, containing 20 motor lorries?

A. Yes; from reports we received, we had reason to believe that that was their intention.

Q. That troop train would have had a higher speed?

A. It was coming down the line, the damage would have been much more serious.

Q. Did the mob from Chuharkana proceed towards Sangla Hill on the 16th?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they burn and loot Dhaban Singh and Moman stations?

A. Yes, they burnt all the property, but the station building being *pakka* did not suffer much.

Q. Was a canal bridge fired on about two miles beyond Dhaban Singh?

A. Yes.

Q. You refer to Mr. Wait being injured in a collision?

A. It is Mr. Wale, the Telegraph Master, it was the same occurrence. It was not a collision.

Q. I think in the meantime an armoured train visited the place?

A. Yes, after the 13th we began to put on military guards.

Q. You considered it safe to put on armoured trains on various sections?

A. The military authorities considered it safe, as the people were getting very nervous.

Q. In addition, was there a number of armed trains?

A. There were armoured trains and armed trains and these are two different things.

Q. Were guards placed on bridges and tunnels on the main line?

A. Yes.

Q. As far as the Indus?

A. Yes.

Q. And an armed train patrolled the district for the purpose of rationing the guard?

A. Yes.

Q. That train worked daily through the period of the riots?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 17th of April, was some *bhusa* burnt at Lyallpur.

A. Yes and it was Government *bhusa*.

Q. At Malakpore was a train wrecked and a pair of rails removed?

A. Yes.

Q. Were an engine and a loaded wagon of the passenger train overturned?

A. Yes.

Q. And two people killed and two injured?

A. Yes.

Q. Were telegraph wires cut at a number of places on this date?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 18th April, did the situation somewhat ease?

A. Yes.

Q. How was that?

A. By that time the situation was well in hand as military columns were travelling about and guards patrolling the country and the people also understood that the Government had not come to an end at Lahore.

Q. During the night of the 17th and 18th, was Sidhwan Station burnt?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that a small station?

A. A very small station.

Q. Were there few instances of telegraph wires being cut on that day?

A. Yes.

Q. Were obstructions placed on the line between certain points?

A. Yes, between Ladhuka and Bahmniwala. Sleepers were reported on the line.

Q. Were these obstructions such as to overturn a train?

A. It might have been serious but the lines were patrolled by gangmen who pulled them away.

Q. On the 21st April, there was one successful attempt to cut wires and one unsuccessful?

A. Yes.

Q. After that date there was no incident worth reporting?

A. Things calmed down considerably after that.

Q. Can you give me roughly an idea of the amount of damage that was done to the railway system during these days by the action of the mob?

A. It is difficult to estimate exactly the amount of money actually paid out but so far one lakh has already been paid, in addition we have to restore Gujranwala.

Q. And will that amount to several lakhs?

A. Well it depends; if we have to rebuild it as it stands it will cost less, on the other hand if we have to rebuild the whole structure it will cost considerably more.

Q. Did the effect of disturbances paralyse the railway and commercial system from the 10th to the 21st April?

A. It practically did in the disturbed areas.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. If I follow you rightly the great bulk of the damage to the railway, including the telegraph and signal lines, was done by outside mobs rather than by railway people?

A. I think they were all done by outside mobs; though quite often some railway people assisted them but as a rule by outside men.

Q. Therefore is that the reason why you say here that it is impossible to regard the movement as

20 December 1919.]

Mr. V. H. BOALTE.

[Continued.]

merely industrial or commercial as distinct from political?

A. Yes.

Q. I suppose you have had threats of a strike before on this railway?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you ever found in your past experience that an ordinary strike takes form at its beginning by attempts to cut the lines of communication?

A. No.

Q. I see that the Assistant Station Master and the signalling class were apparently the most active among the railway employees?

A. The men who were most agitated were the signallers as they talked a lot on the wires and a certain number of the Station Masters.

Q. Can you tell me whether at this time—about the beginning of April—some of the railway employees had legitimate grievances about pay and so on—at any rate what they thought were legitimate grievances?

A. They had sent in a memorial for more pay on account of the increased cost of living.

Q. Take the signalling class first—was that the class which had some special economic reason?

A. Not more than any other class.

Q. The Assistant Station Master class—is that a class of exception?

A. They were the same class of men as the signallers.

Q. Would it be right to say that those two classes of people would be about the best educated type of railway servant?

A. They are more or less better educated than the other lot but the Station Masters are the best educated.

Q. Apart from the people at the top they would come perhaps in the second class?

A. Most of the railway staff of Assistant Station Masters and signallers are all entrance passed men.

Q. How do you account for these two classes of people being particularly prominent in this work of destruction?

A. They were not prominent—they were agitated and disturbed more than others. They actually did not do much damage or very little, but they were the most disturbed and agitated.

Q. I want to get that clear from what you say—if I follow you you do not say that these two classes of people were prominent either in committing offences or directly inciting people to commit those offences?

A. All they used to do was to talk about strikes and also talk on their instruments.

Q. Of course with regard to the signaller class—they have a speciality about them in that they have the means of communicating with one another?

A. Yes.

Q. There is a station called Wagah—where is that?

A. The third station down from Lahore, between this and Amritsar.

Q. How far from Lahore?

A. About 14 miles.

*By Sir C. H. Setalvad—*

Q. Was the dissatisfaction among the railway employees—the signallers, the Assistant Station Masters and the Loco men—of long standing with regard to their salaries?

A. It was not of long standing. They sent in applications in February or March.

Q. In February or March they were agitating for more pay?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was before any indication of these disturbances?

A. Yes.

Q. When were salaries last revised?

A. In January and April 1918.

Q. Were they demanding more pay?

A. Yes.

Q. All these classes—the Loco, the signallers and the Assistant Station Masters?

A. Yes; some of the other classes too.

Q. Almost all the railway employees?

A. Yes; practically.

Q. Had they sent in memorials in large numbers?

A. Yes.

Q. And that in February or March?

A. Yes.

Q. When these disturbances came on in April, at what stage was the consideration of those applications?

A. They were under consideration. The office had been given some increment.

Q. They had not been finally disposed of?

A. No.

Q. Therefore anterior to these disturbances, there was considerable dissatisfaction among the railway employees?

A. There was some dissatisfaction. I would not say considerable. They had already received an increment and those applications came in February.

Q. Although they had got an increase in 1918, still in February and March 1919 a very large number of them were persistently asking for more salary—whether that demand may be reasonable or unreasonable—the fact remains that they had—at least they thought they had—considerable reason for dissatisfaction?

A. I do not think there was considerable reason. They said they wanted more pay on account of the high cost of living.

Q. Were they very united in their demand?

A. Appeals came from all over the line. Individually I could not say if they were all united.

Q. But appeals came in generally?

A. Yes.

Q. About these restrictions on travelling, they were put on somewhere on the 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. You say that looking to the traffic exigencies they were necessary?

A. Yes.

Q. How long did these traffic exigencies last?

A. In the coaching conditions they lasted up to about the first week in May.

Q. After that so far as the railway exigencies were concerned there was no necessity to put any restrictions on travelling?

A. No; after that except north of Lahore when the Afghan War started. According to the military programme the whole of the line had to be made over to the military authorities and we had to put on restrictions for all classes. The further exigencies came on account of the Afghan War.

*By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—*

Q. Is it not a fact that before the 14th the military authorities for their own reasons repeatedly pressed for putting restrictions on third class and intermediate travelling?

A. They did not ask me. They might have asked local officers.

Q. Are you not aware that they were making repeated demands to place restrictions on travelling?

A. I am not aware of that but the district officer told me that they wanted to control the traffic.

Q. Do you know that at Lala Musa at the request of the military authorities about three hundred third class passengers were stopped?

A. I am not aware of it.

Q. So far as your report is concerned, you yourself did not personally enquire into the cases of any of these men?

A. No reports were sent to me.

Q. With regard to Sidhwan station—it was practically a sleeper hut?

A. Yes.

Q. And it was probably burnt by the station master himself?

A. We could not say so but we presumed that he had done it.

Q. Anyhow it was possible?

A. At the time it was reported that the station master probably burnt it.

20 December 1919.] Mr. V. H. BOALTE—concluded—The Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Mian FAZL-I-HUSSAIN.

Q. You say that the injury to Mr. Wafe was due to a collision between the mob and the military?

A. I think I have explained that. A man came and struck him in the office.

Q. Even before these disturbances, was it not known to the authorities that a day was fixed for a

general strike throughout the North-Western Railway?

A. There were some rumours but we heard nothing definite from our men.

Q. But rumours were there?

A. Yes.

The Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Mian FAZL-I-HUSSAIN, Member, Punjab Legislative Council.

By the President—

Q. You are a member of the Punjab Legislative Council?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You have expressed a desire to make a statement to us about the subject of our inquiry?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. During the period of the riots where were you?

A. I left Lahore on the afternoon of the 10th for Sialkot by motor to keep a professional engagement on the 11th. On the 11th I was at Sialkot. I left Sialkot about two o'clock on the 11th for Lahore in order to proceed to Ambala for the 12th where I had to keep another professional engagement. On the evening of the 12th I returned from Ambala to Lahore by train but the train was detained on the morning of the 13th at a railway station near Amritsar. I did not reach Lahore till the evening of the 13th.

Q. May I take it that you have no personal knowledge of the occurrences at Lahore or elsewhere?

A. None from the evening of the 10th to the evening of the 13th.

Q. As regards the period subsequent to the 13th have you any personal knowledge?

A. I was in Lahore from the evening of the 13th right on to the morning of the 16th when I left for Delhi and on the evening of the 16th I proceeded from Delhi to Simla. I stayed in Simla for three days and then returned to Lahore. I believe it was on the 20th that I returned to Lahore. I remained here straight on.

Q. I believe you wish to place your views before us as to the causes of unrest?

A. Those that I have stated in my statement.

Q. Do you wish to supplement the statement you have made?

A. No, I do not think I have got any supplementary statement to make.

Q. I think we may take your statement as giving your account of the causes of the disturbances?

A. Quite so.

Q. In connection with the working of Martial Law I think you considered that certain of the measures adopted were unfortunate?

A. Yes.

Q. And that they were unnecessarily harsh?

A. Yes.

Q. I see that you have particularised a number of these and the first thing you mention is as regards night passes; but under Martial Law it is quite a usual thing to have a period of time when the people are not supposed to be out?

A. Yes.

Q. So the question of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of night passes depends very largely upon whether it was properly carried out under Martial Law?

A. Except that the passes were regulated on national grounds. On the ground that Indians had to apply for passes and Europeans did not require passes—that was a racial distinction.

Q. Then as regards passes for travelling your objection is very much on the same lines to this?

A. Yes.

Q. I suppose, however, you admit that during the period at all events when the railway system was dislocated, owing to the occurrences on the railway system some restriction was essential?

A. Absolutely, that was very natural, but I saw in several cases empty carriages proceeding from one place to another.

Q. But here again, as I understand, you think restrictions were unfortunately placed upon Indians so as to particularise them as compared with Europeans?

A. Yes.

Q. You have an objection I see about notices that were placed outside doors?

A. Yes.

Q. You were yourself unfortunately selected?

A. Yes.

Q. I suppose you did not suffer much inconvenience from that?

A. No, it was only a matter of a couple of extra *chaukidars* to watch over them.

Q. To watch the notices to see they were not destroyed?

A. Yes that was essential.

Q. You say the places selected for the exhibition of these notices were not selected with a view to promulgation of the notices, but rather with a view to selecting certain individuals who might not happen to be on very good terms with the Government?

A. Quite so.

Q. You mention one case where there were three notices?

A. That is Fane Road in Lahore where the lawyers live. It is a short road; there are I believe about 6 or 7 houses on it, and three of them had these notices, and so I thought it was possibly too much for promulgation in that particular street.

Q. I see lawyers in India, just as lawyers in England and Scotland, get the credit of being exceptionally active in political propaganda work?

A. But in that case only one notice might have sufficed; they could have shared it.

Q. That may have been either an oversight on the part of the military administrator or it might have been done intentionally?

A. Quite, there is the possibility.

Q. You are inclined to think it was done intentionally?

A. Yes, knowing Fane Road has so very few houses and the people selected were persons—at all events two of them—who had taken part in political propaganda.

Q. But as I understand, the Military Administrator in Lahore Civil Area was not very familiar with Lahore itself?

A. It is generally believed that the inspiration came generally, if not invariably, from the Civil authorities.

Q. I am reminded that Colonel Johnson practically indicates that people on whose doors notices were put were the people who were supposed to be not too conspicuous for their loyalty?

A. Quite so.

Q. You refer to the regulations as regards students. We had the views of some of the principals or educators upon that question. Probably their views very much coincide with your own?

A. Yes.

Q. You also mention as a matter of complaint this salaaming order. We have heard a good deal about the salaaming order and I quite appreciate your point of view if it is that unnecessary salaaming was imposed upon all gentlemen of Indian nationality. Do I understand that the salaaming of British Officers was imposed only on Indians?

A. That is so.

Q. And was it imposed upon all classes of Indians?

A. The instance I have given is of salaaming by Mr. Bashir Ahmad, a graduate of this University as well as of Oxford, who was made to salaam, not

20 December 1919.]

The Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Mian FAZL-I-HUSSAIN.

(Continued.)

any European Officer, but a row of young recruits of mixed classes.

Q. Surely there must have been some error about that, because I thought at all events so far as the Administrators of Martial Law are concerned, the intention was merely to impose the duty of *salaaming* so far as officers were concerned?

A. Then in that case their orders were very generally misunderstood by their subordinates.

Q. Then I also understand from your point of view that this method of *salaaming* that was adopted is practically archaic, even among Indians themselves?

A. Quite.

Q. You think it was unfortunate and unfair that this method of *salaaming* should be resorted to for this particular purpose?

A. Yes.

Q. In your opinion it serves no good purpose to have such an order as that?

A. None whatsoever.

Q. I do not think I need ask you about whether Martial Law should have been imposed because, after all, you are not familiar with the events at the time, but you have expressed the view that Martial Law was continued longer than was in the circumstances necessary. That is your view based upon your knowledge of the situation in Lahore from the 20th from which you were continually resident there?

A. Yes.

Q. But I suppose you will admit that the question of the continuation of Martial Law would not have been so serious a question if it had not been for some of the more objectionable regulations connected with it?

A. My opinion is that, inasmuch as it means setting the ordinary law more or less in abeyance, Martial Law is a bad thing in itself, even if it is not accompanied by objectionable Martial Law Orders.

Q. Of course all of us with civil rather than military ideas prefer the civil to the military administration, that is natural enough, but if a situation has arisen in a country where military requirements necessitate the existence of Martial Law, the objectionable character of Martial Law may not be very great?

A. Yes.

Q. If the regulations are eased off and the special courts try only cases that have actually occurred during the period of riot and disturbance, there would be, in your opinion, much less objection than?

A. I am distinctly of opinion that if Martial Law were really needed in the interests of peace and order in the country, there would be no objection to it, but the whole difficulty came from the feeling that it was continued, not because it was really necessary, but in order to carry on what was begun. It was that feeling which made things so difficult.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Would you mind explaining your last answer to me a little further? You say there was a feeling that Martial Law was continued not because it was really necessary but to carry on what was begun. Will you put that with a little more in detail for me?

A. It was felt that there was really no need for the introduction of Martial Law in order to restore peace and order; that in the very beginning certain acts were done by the authorities which acts were, in the opinion of the people, not easily defensible; that it was found necessary to carry on a wrong which had begun possibly in haste, but which could not be corrected easily afterwards. Have I been able to convey my meaning?

Q. Do I understand that you are speaking now not so much of the introduction of Martial Law, but of its continuance? Apart from the question, as I understand, that you don't think it ever ought to have been introduced at all, do you think, for instance, that it was kept on after, let us say, the middle of May simply because it had been introduced and nobody wanted to go back on it?

A. Simply because certain proceedings had begun which they wanted to finish before Martial Law was removed.

Q. Do you mean the proceedings before the Summary Courts?

A. Yes.

Q. You think that, in order that the administration which had been set up might have time to do the work for which it was originally intended, Martial Law was carried on, although it might have been abrogated earlier?

A. Yes.

Q. Your view then on the assumption that Martial Law was introduced, was that some arrangement should have been made for carrying on that judicial work without Martial Law itself going forward?

A. Quite so.

Q. I suppose if Martial Law had to be introduced at all, it would have to be introduced for a reasonable time; you could not introduce it for a week or a fortnight or three weeks?

A. I am afraid that is not my opinion. As I understand, the need for the introduction of Martial Law comes to an end as soon as peace and order is restored.

Q. That is quite sound if I may say so, but do you think that is the same thing as saying it ought to have come to an end the moment the last riot had occurred?

A. I should say, as soon as the riot, if it had occurred, had been put down.

Q. May I suggest this to you because I want you just to consider it with me for a few moments? Assuming, for the sake of argument, that what we have heard about all this wire cutting along the line, of these various mobs and these disturbances taking place any time between the 10th and about the 21st of April are true, you will agree with me that such a widespread movement as that would have to be dealt with very cautiously?

A. Undoubtedly.

Q. A thing that has spread itself so wide would be very likely to recur at individual points for some time afterwards? And you will agree with me that the communication system of the Punjab is a thing which no Government of India can deal with otherwise than on the principles of the greatest urgency? Well now, considering those facts and assuming it to be the case that Martial Law was rightly introduced and should have been kept on until it was clear that this movement had come to an end, do you think you could put the time within which it would have been safe, on those assumptions, to bring Martial Law to an end earlier than, let us say, the middle of May?

A. Of course the difficulty in answering this question that I feel is whether it was to be removed from all parts wherein it was introduced, or whether it could be removed piecemeal. With reference to the wire-cutting and the railway breaches, the easiest thing would have been to restrict Martial Law within those areas and not have it in outlying districts and in cities.

Q. Now have you considered that, Mr. Hussain? Because if as a matter of fact the cutting of the wires and the railway breaches were due to the political and other discontent of the people in the surrounding country, do you think that military law merely on the railway lines would have been effective for that purpose?

A. This is actually what the Government did.

Q. They did it afterwards?

A. Yes.

Q. But I am speaking now of whether you think that at any time before the middle of May it would have been of very much use to have Martial Law simply on the railway line?

A. So far as, I may say, Lahore, Gujranwala, Gujrat Districts are concerned (I am not in a position to say with reference to Lyallpur, as I have not studied that), the end of April would have been quite safe to put an end to this Martial Law.

Q. Now there is just one other thing, and that is about the compulsory *salaaming* by respectable

20 December 1919.]

The Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Mian FAZL-I-HUSSAIN.

[Continued.]

people. You mentioned two gentlemen's names. What exactly happened? You mentioned Mr. Shah Nawaz as one who knew about the case?

A. It was the case of Mr. Bashir Ahmad. What happened in Bashir Ahmad's case was that he was going out for a walk and at that time there was an officer with a small body of volunteers, Anglo-Indian boys.

Q. Cadets of the Indian Defence Force?

A. They may have been. He was going out for a walk and an officer with some of these men was near the village of Bhagwanpura and was calling out men to *salaam* this company, and several men were called up to do that.

Q. You mean there was a crowd of the population standing by?

A. No.

Q. Who were being called out to *salaam*?

A. Different people of the village. Not that they were passing by and were told to *salaam*, but they were actually being called up with the object of *salaaming* on purpose.

Q. You mean he held a parade and then called out people from the villages and made them come up and *salaam*?

A. Yes. And as this gentleman was going out for a walk, he said "Who is this?" People told him and he said "he may as well *salaam*."

Q. You mean they took him from where he was and made him *salaam*?

A. Yes.

Q. Of course there is nothing within a thousand miles of the Martial Law Order that would justify that?

A. No.

Q. Would you mind telling me where is the place where that happened?

A. Near the Shalimar Gardens.

Q. This gentleman is, I see you say, a graduate of the Punjab University and of Oxford?

A. Yes, he was the son of Mr. Justice Shah Din.

Q. Is he in India now?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whether he has ever made a complaint either to a superior officer or anybody else about this treatment?

A. He has mentioned it to his friends; I don't think he has put in any complaint.

Q. You see the trouble is that he has not put in that complaint to us and you, of course, were not present at the time, and there is an officer concerned; one wants to get at the facts?

A. Quite so.

Q. You say the case there is not a compulsory *salaaming* by a person who passed an officer, but a compulsory hauling up of some one to *salaam*, for which there is no justification?

A. Yes, that is it.

Q. There is just one thing on your statement as a whole that I would like to put to you without going into details. I rather gather from it that the general effect, according to your opinion, of the way in which the Government has attempted to deal with these disturbances has been apparently to undermine the faith of the people in British justice, and I rather gather that you give that, not only as a general opinion, but as your own opinion?

A. That is so.

Q. Don't you think there is a confusion there between a difference of opinion as to the right way to tackle a very difficult problem, and a difference of opinion as to principles of justice?

A. So far as the introduction or non-introduction of Martial Law is concerned it is possible that it may be that there is a difference of opinion as to that, but if we put all things together and see the effect on the people at large, one cannot escape the conclusion that the result, however, unforeseen it may have been, is there.

Q. Now just let me put this to you. Taking the disturbances as a whole, do you agree that they took a turn that was not only violent, but was anti-Government and anti-European; you agree with that?

A. The disturbances as a whole, yes.

Q. And do you agree that that makes a problem for the Government of India as at present constituted which goes absolutely to the root of its existence?

A. It does.

Q. Now so far as any persons who were directly or indirectly connected with those disturbances or murders or riots are concerned, I take it you do not feel any particular sympathy for their being subjected to Martial Law?

A. None whatsoever.

Q. And the difficulty and hardship about Martial Law is that because a certain part of the community thoroughly deserves certain treatment, a good deal of hardship has to be imposed also on other parts of the community; that is the real difficulty about Martial Law after all?

A. That is exactly the position so far as the feeling of the people is concerned.

Q. Well now that is, is it not, what is really pointed to? When people talk about the principles of justice or of law not being applied any more to them, they are feeling the pinch of the fact that, in order to deal with one large section of the population, you have unfortunately to bring the whole population under a particular system of administration. That is the point?

A. Yes.

Q. Don't you think that to that extent, and assuming that Martial Law was imposed in good faith, it is up to all educated Indians in India to do their best to point out to the people who think that it is a slackening in the belief in justice that has brought this about, that there is no such question at the bottom of it? Don't you agree with me?

A. The difficulty in the task of educated Indians lies in this that, just as for the faults of a few, a large number is suspected, similarly for the faults of a few who rule badly, the Government in its entirety is being blamed.

Q. You mean that because people may have been unnecessarily or indiscriminately flogged by individual officers, it is those kinds of mistakes that get the whole Government into bad odour?

A. Exactly.

Q. Do you think that the educated portion of the community in the Punjab (I refer to barristers and people like that) have done very much, or done their fair share in trying to point out to their fellow countrymen that the fact that Martial Law necessarily means hardships upon the whole community, and even the fact that particular officers abuse in particular cases their authority, does not in the least mean that British law and justice is not as much as ever it was at the basis of British rule in India? Do you think that they have done their fair share in pointing that out to the community as a whole here?

A. No, it was impossible for them under these circumstances to do it with any success.

Q. It would be difficult to do it at the time people's passions were up and so on?

A. Not only that, that the people's passions were up. I think one should attempt it even if the people's passions were up, if it was clearly one's duty to do so. What I meant to convey was that, instead of the Government finding its way to discover what sort of people they were who did actually create the disturbances and what it was that led them to commit those disturbances, they, without any adequate enquiry, fastened the blame on to the educated classes and practically turned that educated class into a sort of opposite party or the enemy. Then how can you expect, under those circumstances, this educated class, after they had finished with them to start a campaign of preaching that it was all right and that really no harm was intended?

Q. I quite appreciate the force of what you say there; there is a great deal of force in it, but just tell me, the educated class in this part of India are very largely represented, are they not, by the barrister or pleader class?

A. They are.

20 December 1919.]

The Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Mian Fazl-i-Hussain.

[Continued.]

Q. And a great deal of the antipathy to and censure of the pleader class, if I follow your view, simply arises from the fact that an educated class in India which has become politically minded, is apt to become a bit of a nuisance to the local administration in some of its phases?

A. Quite so.

Q. And although it is absolutely legitimate and absolutely necessary to the country, the pleader class gets abused simply because it is the educated class and India is what it is?

A. That is the unfortunate position.

Q. And you say the attitude of some of the officials has made it particularly difficult for that same class to do its fair share in explaining what it is necessary to explain?

A. Quite so.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Mr. Fazl-i-Hussain, how many years have you been in Lahore?

A. 14.

Q. You are a permanent resident of Lahore?

A. No.

Q. From what place do you come?

A. Gurdaspur district.

Q. And you are settled down here for the practice of your profession?

A. Yes.

Q. And all these 14 years have you been taking a prominent part in public affairs?

A. Yes, public affairs.

Q. You have been connected with the Congress?

A. Yes, intimately for the last four years.

Q. Before that you were not connected with them?

A. Not much.

Q. Were you connected before that with any active political association in the Punjab?

A. Yes, three or four years before that I was connected with the Muslim League.

Q. The Muslim League is a Muhammadan institution?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you connected with any general political association or activity?

A. Well I believe I was a sleeping member of the Provincial Congress institution since my arrival in Lahore.

Q. And when the Rowlatt Bills came on, did you take part in the agitation against those Bills?

A. I did.

Q. Took a very active part?

A. Yes, fairly active I should say.

Q. And when the *Satyagraha* movement came on, did you join in that?

A. No, I did not.

Q. You did not take the *Satyagraha* vow?

A. No, I don't believe any one in Lahore did.

Q. No one in Lahore took the *Satyagraha* vow?

A. That is my impression.

Q. Mr. Gandhi's propaganda in that behalf, was that not taken up in Lahore?

A. No.

Q. Was not his propaganda about what is called civil disobedience of laws taken up in Lahore?

A. We did not adopt it.

Q. With regard to the Rowlatt Bills you had many meetings I suppose in Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you take part in meetings outside Lahore?

A. No.

Q. You are aware that there were considerable misapprehensions in the minds of the general public as regards the actual provisions of those Bills, you have heard of that?

A. Yes.

Q. For instance people thought that their marriages would be interfered with, or they would be deprived of half the produce of their lands, or that 10 people or 5 people could not meet together without making themselves liable to be arrested by the police, and things of

that kind? Did it come to your notice that these beliefs had been in the minds of the people in the Punjab?

A. I did not hear these rumours before April.

Q. In April you did hear them?

A. I did hear in April, I cannot say definitely when, but it was either during the disturbances or after the disturbances, or it may be immediately before the disturbances, I cannot be definite.

Q. It did come to your ears that the ignorant people were believing these things about that legislation?

A. I cannot say that they were believing; I did hear that there were rumours to that effect.

Q. Were any steps taken by what you call the educated classes in Lahore to disabuse the minds of the people of those rumours and place before them what the actual provisions of the Bill were, however, objectionable they might otherwise be?

A. So far as I remember, between the time that these rumours were afloat and the time troubles came on in the Punjab, there was hardly breathing time between the two to do anything.

Q. Immediately after this came to your notice, that is yourself and your coadjutors, these disturbances broke out?

A. Either immediately after or at the same time, I cannot say.

Q. There was hardly any time for you to take any action?

A. Quite.

Q. In your statement you go into what you believe to be the causes of the unrest in the Punjab and the disturbances. There you refer to what you call causes in common with other parts of India, and you mention the ferment in political thought due to the principles enunciated by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George, what do you mean by that?

A. The importance given to the question of self-determination.

Q. You mean the new outlook that came to all parts of the world with regard to freedom and liberty?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you refer to the economic conditions?

A. Yes.

Q. What do you refer to there?

A. High prices, expectations of alleviation in the immediate future in those prices.

Q. They did not go down, they possibly went up.

A. Yes.

Q. That caused considerable disappointment?

A. Yes.

Q. And dissatisfaction among the ignorant classes?

A. Naturally.

Q. When you speak of the war strain, what do you refer to there?

A. Recruitment, monetary and financial help.

Q. These are causes which you speak of as peculiar to the Punjab.

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore you call it as special war strain and you specify underneath that head recruitment, war loan and charity. You say 'the circumstances attending upon these were such as to undermine the faith of the people in British justice.' What do you mean by that?

A. I mean thereby what they call compulsory voluntary aid.

Q. Compulsory voluntary aid? That is a contradiction in terms?

A. That may be, but it is expressive and it is a Government phrase, I understand. If aid is voluntary or if it is legalised, then there can be no reasonable objection to its being given, but when the thing is not put on a voluntary basis then those who are not poor or weak they escape.

Q. Those who are not poor?

A. Yes; those who are not poor or weak, they escape the liability to pay. For instance . . .

Q. Let us first confine ourselves to one head. With regard to this compulsory voluntary aid, I understand you to say that if there is compulsion throughout, that

20 December 1919.]

The Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Mian FAZL-I-HUSSAIN.

[Continued.]

would have been a different thing. Do I understand you to say that you would have welcomed conscription in the Punjab?

A. Yes; as a matter of fact, I supported the movement for conscription in the war conference at Delhi in 1917.

Q. In your own view, it would have been much better to resort to conscription?

A. To resort to honest conscription.

Q. What is your opinion with regard to the recruitment?

A. The burden of recruitment, as I saw, fell on persons who were not in a position to resist it. Those living in towns who were in a position to resist it and pleaded law in their favour escaped it.

Q. You say it being voluntary the townspeople escaped it?

A. Yes.

Q. They could stand on their own rights and say 'it is voluntary, we won't go' but the village people, poor and comparatively ignorant had to submit to it although they were not willing?

A. In some cases, yes.

Q. People were impressed into service against their wish?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you yourself anything to do personally with recruiting in the Punjab?

A. No.

Q. Then on what do you base this statement that people in the villages were impressed against their wish, they were compelled to go into recruitment against their wish?

A. I did two cases which arose out of recruitment incidents.

Q. You appeared in 2 cases?

A. Yes.

Q. How did those cases arise?

A. In the Shahpur district. One arose out of conscription. I believe 150 people were prosecuted for rioting and so on.

Q. 150 people were prosecuted for rioting?

A. Yes.

Q. You appeared for the defence?

A. Yes.

Q. How did the rioting take place?

A. They were again and again asked to give recruits.

Q. These 150 people?

A. Yes. I forget the name of the village. It is in Shahpur district about 10 miles from Sargodha. None of those people was even literate and I find that only one, since the introduction of British rule in the Punjab had ever occupied a place in Government service. They were altogether opposed to give any out of their village.

Q. These 150 people—were they asked themselves to recruit?

A. No, out of 1,000 in that village, 150 came forward.

Q. The villagers were asked to supply recruits?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the number fixed?

A. No; and they supplied none. Then again and again, the authorities persuaded them but to no purpose, then it was considered that these people had conspired together and opposed recruitment in their own village as well as in the neighbouring villages. On the basis of that, action was taken under the Defence of India Act.

Q. Action against the village?

A. Against some men of the village.

Q. That they were obstructing the recruitment?

A. Yes. Warrants were issued against these persons. When villagers would not surrender those persons it was found necessary to send a force against them, to capture those against whom warrants were issued.

Q. When they went there, the result was rioting?

A. Yes.

Q. For this rioting, the 150 people were arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. What happened to them?

A. Most of them got convicted. It was found that they had taken part in the actual riot.

Q. This is one case in which you were concerned?

A. Yes.

Q. You said there was some other case?

A. There was another case in which the recruiting Tahsildar was murdered.

Q. Did you appear in that case?

A. Yes.

Q. For whom? For the accused?

A. Yes.

Q. What happened.

A. That case arose out of deserters capturing a column. There were a number of deserters in that thana.

Q. What is thana?

A. Thana is a police station having certain jurisdiction within the area of a tahsil.

Q. Who deserted? People who offered for recruitment?

A. People are recruited, they join the regiment and then they run away.

Q. After joining the regiment?

A. Yes; when they are called deserters.

Q. These recruits come from a particular part of the country?

A. Yes; a good number of them deserted.

Q. What happened?

A. Then they had to be captured.

Q. What happened then?

A. This Tahsildar was going about in order to secure more recruits and capture such as had deserted, at that particular village. That is a village from which not a single recruit has been obtained. When he was putting up there he was set upon by a large number of people and eventually murdered.

Q. What facts came to your knowledge in the course of the trial?

A. These facts: that in that ilaka recruitment was being done after bringing a good deal of pressure on the people; and that such persons when recruited were deserting the regiment to which they had been allotted, in larger numbers than before. That was in 1917-18. Of course, there was a mass of evidence as to the ways in which recruitment was done and so on in that case.

Q. Objectionable ways were alleged to have been adopted by the authorities?

A. Yes.

Q. What did the court find on them?

A. As a matter of fact, on that point the Government pleader had taken up the position; that inasmuch as there was pressure brought to bear in recruitment on the people, therefore there was a feeling of resentment amongst the people and that was the motive for the people to attack the Tahsildar.

Q. Those are the two cases that came to your notice. Nothing else?

A. Nothing else?

Q. Are you aware that in various cases people who were unwilling had been brought as recruits, they were ordered to be released and sent back by the higher authorities?

A. Undoubtedly; in a large number of cases.

Q. You would not impute to these higher authorities any intention to impress people against their wish?

A. No. In fact there was more of unfair recruitment under Indian officers than under European officers. The fact was that over-zealous subordinate Indian officers resorted to these objectionable methods of recruitment, and in individual cases when the matter was brought to the notice of the higher authorities, it was set right.

Q. That won't be quite accurate. You specify Indian subordinate officers. Complaints against the European officers also existed?

A. Yes.

Q. Who were they?

A. District officers. They winked during those days. They would not have winked in other days.

20 December 1919.]

The Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Mian FAZL-I-HUSSAIN.

[Continued]

Q. What do you say was the position of the Central Government in the Punjab. Had Government themselves any desire to impress people against their will?

A. The local Government knew of it.

Q. And when they came to know of it did not they dissociate themselves from those methods and express themselves to that effect?

A. They have no doubt warned their officers that it is not the right thing to do.

Q. If that is so, you would grant that the Government themselves were no party to these objectionable methods and they were in that particular badly served by their subordinate officers?

A. That might be so.

Q. What do you think?

A. In my opinion, if there had been any strong condemnation by the authorities that could have been stopped.

Q. You think that the condemnation of these practices by Government was not sufficient?

A. Not sufficiently strong. In fact, I may add that it was in view of these very reasons that the local Government was very readily in favour of legalising conscription and moved the Government of India to let them do it.

Q. The local Government themselves were taking quite a correct view, in your opinion, about the situation?

A. Yes.

Q. Any way, according to you, the position is this: whether the local Government took or did not take efficient steps to condemn what was done by some individual officers, the effect of the operations of those officers created certain amount of discontent among the people?

A. Quite.

Q. Then you refer to war loan and charity. What happened with regard to that which caused discontent?

A. An enthusiastic gentleman takes it into his head that all *samindars* should pay so much loan or so much money towards a charity. He places the matter before the officers of his district and at once proceeds to make a collection.

Q. You have no knowledge of any particular officer who has done this?

A. Yes.

Q. To your knowledge?

A. Yes. I paid myself towards it.

Q. In what capacity?

A. As a *samindar*.

Q. In what place?

A. In Lyallpur district.

Q. Who was the officer who made this order?

A. Not the officer. The man who collected money was *Rasildar Pratap Singh*.

Q. Every person holding land was to pay so much?

A. Yes. And the *Tahsildar* wrote out letters saying that this is being done and you should pay so much.

Q. He did it with the co-operation of the *Tahsildar*?

A. Yes.

Q. You got a letter that as you as a land holder of that particular locality you must pay a particular amount?

A. He pointed out to me that in his *tahsil* I was one of the few who had not paid up and it was a great pity and so on and he expected a better example to be set. I at once wrote to my *Mukhtar* that it should be paid early.

Q. You did not disapprove of it?

A. I did not inasmuch as I could afford it. There were other *samindars* who were not able to afford it.

Q. You were aware of this, that you were in a position to afford it and there were other people holding lands who were not; and did you when this came to your notice raise any objection?

A. No.

Q. Why did you not do that?

A. I felt that it was a good thing that was being done so far as collecting money was concerned. No doubt, there were poor victims to it, but I could not

very well take up the cudgels on their behalf in three days.

Q. When was this?

A. In 1917-18.

Q. On the whole you acquiesced? You thought that it was not such a bad thing as to require a protest?

A. As a matter of fact, I had made two or three protests already.

Q. Prior to this?

A. Yes.

Q. With reference to this locality or any other locality?

A. With reference to the recruitment.

Q. Not with reference to the war loan?

A. With reference to the war loan, I had mentioned the method; the *Jhelum* incidents I had brought to the notice of the Government.

Q. The one you spoke of?

A. That is not *Jhelum*.

Q. What about *Jhelum*?

A. There was an officer who was assessing different people to income-tax.

Q. I do not follow you?

A. Under the Income-tax Act, people have to be assessed in order to pay a particular amount of income-tax. In *Jhelum*, there was a complaint that those people who never paid income-tax and had paid no war loan or any amount towards charities were being assessed now. Their complaint was they were being assessed not because they were liable, but because they did not pay anything to the war loan or the charities. They brought a number of judgments of the income-tax officer.

Q. You saw them?

A. Yes. On that matter Government did take some action later on.

Q. You represented matters to Government on their behalf?

A. No.

Q. In your public capacity?

A. I simply wrote a letter.

Q. On that Government took action?

A. With reference to that particular case.

Q. They instructed the Income-tax officer not to do that?

A. They instructed the Income-tax officer to the effect that he should not put down in his orders that this amount was paid under war loan and so on.

Q. They instructed that he should not record that as a circumstance or reason for arriving at his decision with regard to income-tax?

A. Quite.

Q. The Government did what was the right thing to do?

A. Quite.

Q. There again it comes to this; that certain overzealous subordinate officers, in order to get the favour of Government, behaved in this manner?

A. Quite.

Q. And not that it was the policy of Government that that should be done?

A. Oh, no.

Q. With regard to recruiting, the efforts of the subordinate officers produced certain amount of discontent among the people?

A. In certain districts.

Q. Then you refer to what you call the attitude of the local Government towards political movements and Indian leaders. What do you mean by that? What do you refer to there?

A. Well, for instance, take the Reforms Scheme movement. When first it was launched, certain meetings were held here in Lahore. Immediately after that, the first pronouncement made by the local Government was to the effect that these people who have put forward the schemes are no less revolutionary than the persons who committed the outrages, and those emigrants who returned from America.

Q. That is the *Ghadr* movement?

A. Yes.

Q. When was this?



20 December 1919.]

The Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Mian FAZL-I-HUSSAIN.

[Continued.]

A. That was after the Lucknow Congress meeting in 1916.

Q. Was that after what has been called the memorandum of the 19 members of the Imperial Legislative Council?

A. When was it?

Q. That was in 1916.

A. Yes. This pronouncement was in 1917. The memorandum came up for consideration in December 1916.

Q. After that memorandum was published there was a meeting called in Lahore to support that?

A. Yes.

Q. And it was after that meeting that this pronouncement was made?

A. Yes. Similarly, the attitude of the local Government, with reference to the Reforms Scheme and the agitation in support of that scheme had been expressed in fairly violent language. It was in connection with that very scheme that here a provincial conference was held.

Q. There was a provincial conference held in Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. After the memorandum of nineteen?

A. Yes.

Q. What happened?

A. Naturally the organisers of that meeting . . . .

Q. Were you one of the organisers?

A. I was President of that Conference.

Q. What happened?

A. Invitations were issued to a large number of Indian leaders. The Government said that they should not come in and attend the meeting. That was the attitude adopted by them.

Q. When you say the Government adopted that attitude, had you any personal communication with regard to that matter with any official?

A. I had.

Q. With whom?

A. The Chief Secretary.

Q. Mr. Thompson?

A. Yes.

Q. You saw him with regard to that or did he call you?

A. He called me with reference to that meeting and pointed out that it was undesirable to call in the men to whom invitations had been issued.

Q. Who were they to whom objection was taken?

A. The Raja of Mahmudabad, Mr. Jinnah, Dr. Sapru, Mr. Sastri (he was allowed a permit; I think an exception was made in his favour) and others.

Q. All others were objected to except Mr. Sastri?

A. Yes.

Q. Then what happened?

A. As a matter of fact, most of these gentlemen were laid with some sort of epidemic or were unable to come. Therefore that did not come into effect.

Q. Is that the incident you refer to when you speak of the attitude towards the Indian leaders?

A. That was the one glaring instance in my mind; then the orders of externment that have been passed from time to time and the further position taken up by Government.

Q. To whose externment you refer? Mr. Tilak's?

A. Yes; Mr. Gandhi's.

Q. Mr. Gandhi's was later on?

A. Yes.

Q. But you are now speaking of the period anterior to the disturbances; you put them down among the causes? The order against Mr. Gandhi did not come on the 10th April?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it only Mr. Tilak you refer to?

A. That is the one in my mind at present. I do not recollect anybody or whether there were any other orders to that effect.

Q. At the time the order against Mr. Tilak was made you had in the Punjab the unrest over the Ghadr movement?

A. I cannot say.

Q. About that time?

A. Might have been, I do not recollect.

Q. It was risky I suppose at that time to have any political ferment? That was the idea I take it when the order was made.

A. That was the very reason given for the exclusion of the persons I have mentioned.

Q. That movement was in 1915?

A. Yes, the reason was the same; whether other movements existed or not, the reason given by the local Government was the same that there should not be any ferment or excitement in the Punjab.

Q. Particularly because it was the field from which army was recruited?

A. Yes; that was one reason.

Q. Anything else you refer to in this attitude?

A. No. Nothing I can think of.

Q. Then you say that the educated classes were being put back. What do you mean by that? How were they put back?

A. The idea with reference to this war period has been that the educated classes are a sort of obstruction.

Q. I do not follow you?

A. That the educated classes have been a sort of obstruction. That was the view the local Government took.

Q. Where did you get that?

A. I will explain presently.

Q. Yes.

A. That the urban classes did not do their part.

Q. In the recruitment for the war?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it a fact that the urban population did not do their proper share?

A. I do not think it is quite fair to say that. There is some truth in it no doubt, but it is not entirely correct.

Q. Yes.

A. And that in the Punjab there existed no such opposition or distinction, as has been brought about afterwards, between the urban and rural population. You might have noticed that that has been accentuated in the Reforms Scheme, so far as our province is concerned.

Q. I do not quite follow that. There was no distinction between urban and rural before that?

A. There was no clashing between urban and rural interests; there was no opposition between each other or any feeling of hostility or anything of that kind.

Q. Then what was done?

A. It is during these 3 or 4 years that the idea has been steadily brought forward that really the persons who should be looked after are the rural classes; they represent the masses of the country, and it is in their interest that a great deal should be done. It is an abstract proposition to which no one can possibly take any exception. In the course of developing this policy steadily, the educated classes have been put back.

Q. What was done to put them back?

A. For instance, take the case of different constituencies for returning candidates to the Legislative Council. It is ruled no one from a borough or a city or urban area can stand outside that area to represent a rural area.

Q. That restriction, Mr. Fazl-i-Hussain, is not inflicted only in the Punjab; the Reform Scheme has inflicted it upon us in Bombay too?

A. Perhaps you have to be grateful to us for it.

Q. That is possible. You suggest that the policy was to bring about arrangements by which the importance of the educated classes should be minimised. Is that what you mean?

A. That is so.

Q. Then you speak of certain causes, which you call the immediate causes, and you first put down the Rowlatt legislation and the agitation attendant upon that?

A. Yes.

Q. You have already told us that after the introduction of the bill there was considerable agitation throughout the country against that; in Punjab had you

20 December 1919.]

The Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Mian FAIZ-I-HUSAIN.

[Continued.]

the same opposition as you had in the other parts of the country against this bill?

A. Yes.

Q. Were meetings held in various parts of the Punjab to protest against the bill?

A. Yes; I believe so.

Q. Then you know that Mr. Gandhi entered the arena somewhere in February?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was, I suppose, made known to the people in the Punjab?

A. Yes.

Q. He preached what is called passive resistance civil disobedience to laws, etc.?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that propaganda of Mr. Gandhi accepted in the Punjab?

A. This led to some difference of opinion; so far as I know the educated classes, or rather the majority of them, did not accept it.

Q. Was not the *hartal* movement really a part of Mr. Gandhi's propaganda?

A. It was.

Q. That was accepted in the Punjab?

A. There again I beg to make a distinction between the different schools of thought. At all events the large majority of the educated classes were not in support of it.

Q. When you speak of the educated classes, I take it that you speak of Lahore itself?

A. I am talking of Lahore itself.

Q. A large majority of the educated classes were not in favour of the *hartal* movement or in favour of either the passive resistance movement or in any way organising a *hartal* or doing anything of that kind?

A. Yes.

Q. Then how do you account for the *hartal* taking place in Lahore?

A. I have thought over it and the conclusions I have arrived at are that it was something novel and as such its novelty by itself was one of the causes of its success, and secondly that it caught the imagination of the people.

Q. Do you mean to say that people resorted to it in spite of the educated classes?

A. Not in spite of the educated classes, but without consulting them, or taking their advice. They did it on their own.

Q. The educated classes were not able to restrain them?

A. I should not say that; the educated classes took no pains to restrain them. The educated classes did not start a counter movement to that effect.

Q. You told me that the educated classes or the majority of them were against passive resistance movement and the *hartal* movement here?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they express that view or did they try to impress that upon the people?

A. You might say that they passively resisted passive resistance movement.

Q. I do not quite follow. We are getting very much mixed.

A. They showed their attitude by not actively opposing passive resistance movement, but by abstaining from it themselves.

Q. Though the view of the educated classes or leaders, whatever you call them, was that passive resistance and *hartal* movement should not be followed, they did not give active expression to that view, but they merely abstained from joining it?

A. That is fairly correct.

Q. The educated classes did regard that the passive resistance movement and the *hartal* movement was not a desirable thing to be adopted?

A. That is it.

Q. They apprehended that if that was adopted, it may lead to undesirable results?

A. Yes, after the 30th, such apprehensions were entertained.

Q. In the beginning they were against adopting that in Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. They got more firm in that view after the 30th March?

A. Yes.

Q. They then were of the view that these movements were unsuited to be adopted with regard to large masses?

A. Yes.

Q. And that if adopted, they must inevitably or more or less certainly result in undesirable developments?

A. Yes.

Q. That was their view?

A. Yes.

Q. If that was their view, do you think they did what they ought to have done merely by themselves abstaining from it or should they not have as leaders of the people tried to impress their view, as you have described it, on the people?

A. There is no doubt they could have attempted to do so.

Q. They may not have succeeded?

A. My idea is that the movement had taken the shape of a mass movement, and as such the chances of their successfully carrying out a campaign against it were very poor.

Q. They would have carried on a campaign against it if they had felt that they could have done it with some success?

A. With any success.

Q. They felt that the masses were so taken by Mr. Gandhi's propaganda that the educated people in Lahore, though they did not approve of it, did not feel that they could keep back the masses from joining it successfully. Is that the position?

A. That is fairly correct.

Q. Then did they do anything? Though they may have felt that they could not induce the people to abstain from it successfully, did they themselves clear their position by declaring in any open manner that in their view those were movements that were undesirable to be adopted?

A. Well, as a matter of fact, somewhere about the middle of March there was a public meeting held in Lahore on this very question, and there was a great demand for adopting Mr. Gandhi's vow and other things.

Q. Did you preside over that meeting?

A. Yes, I presided over it on the 9th March, and I was able in those days to pass a resolution after discussion to the effect that we cannot adopt Mr. Gandhi's vow. It was I believe when the Bill was not passed. After the Bill becomes law, then we should consider whether any plan of passively resisting it could be adopted or not. There was a great demand then to adopt Mr. Gandhi's vow; in preference to doing that we passed this resolution, more or less to tide over the difficulty.

Q. Because you thought that was the line of least resistance for the moment?

A. Yes, exactly, and that was actually adopted. After that politically minded persons considered this matter several times, with the result that Mr. Gandhi's movement was not adopted in any meeting whatsoever, neither of the Congress nor any other political institution.

Q. You took up the position that you could not consider this or adopt this till the Bill was passed. Did you consider the situation again after the Bill became law?

A. Yes.

Q. After the Bill was passed, did the educated classes including yourself still continue to hold the old opinion that the passive resistance movement and the *hartal* and the *Satyagraha* movement were not desirable to be adopted?

A. I do not believe any meeting was held till the 6th.

Q. True, but in your own mind what was the attitude?

A. As I said, the mind of most of the educated people in Lahore was still the same.

Q. Even after the Bill was passed, it still continued to be of the view that Mr. Gandhi's propaganda of

20 December 1919.]

The Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Mirza FAZL-I-HUSSAIN.

[Continued.]

Satyagraha and hartal should not be adopted, and it was undesirable and unsuited?

A. Yes.

Q. Then holding that view did you do anything to give effect to it or did you feel that the forces against you were so rising that you could not do anything?

A. Nothing definite was done.

Q. You took no steps to give effect to your views?

A. No.

Q. Did these leaders including yourself hold a meeting and consider about this view?

A. I was not present at the meetings wherein this was considered, but I knew it was considered, and the view taken was not to adopt it; I was not present myself at those meetings.

Q. That was the view you were told was adopted by the leaders?

A. Yes.

Q. When was this?

A. That was before the meeting of the 6th.

Q. And you still hold the same view that this passive resistance and hartal are undesirable to be adopted?

A. So far as passive resistance is concerned, I am absolutely clear but I do not think that hartal by itself comes into the same category.

Q. Let us take one by one. You are clearly of opinion that the passive resistance movement as started by Mr. Gandhi in this connection is undesirable?

A. Yes.

Q. And that it is unsuited to the conditions generally obtaining in this country?

A. Yes.

Q. And then you say that the hartal in itself is not undesirable in your view?

A. Quite.

Q. But you see, Mr. Fazl-i-Hussain, that if you have a hartal on as large a scale as you had in those days, then you have a large number of people idle, not all of them very discreet or wise, and it must lead to undesirable results?

A. Quite.

Q. From that point of view, don't you think that the hartal more or less stands on the same footing possibly as the other, *vis.*, civil disobedience movement?

A. To my mind there is a clear distinction between the two. The civil disobedience movement is a breach of law. The hartal is not, and as such it cannot be the same. It is undesirable, I agree, but it cannot be condemnable to the same extent.

Q. I quite agree with your distinction. With regard to the civil disobedience, you grant or I take your view to be that if you place that ideal before the ordinary mind, it is dangerous in this way, that it is unable to understand the limitation of it, and is merely carried away by the idea that you have to disobey laws?

A. Yes.

Q. And therefore it is an undesirable ideal to place before the masses such as you find them?

A. I should say even before other minds.

Q. Your view, I take it, is that there are very few people indeed who can grasp or practise the idealism of Mr. Gandhi?

A. Yes; I should think I know of none else.

Q. Therefore it is very unpractical and fraught with danger to push it among the people generally?

A. Yes.

Q. You do not think the same about the hartal?

A. No; I think it is different.

Q. I quite see that, but you do grant that to have hartal on a very, very large scale for days and days, though initially not meant for mischief, creates a situation eminently fitted for undesirable results?

A. Very.

Q. And from that point of view I take it that you would not encourage a thing of that sort under those circumstances?

A. No.

Q. Then the hartal that was continued in Lahore was not a thing that was encouraged or engineered by the educated classes?

A. Which hartal?

Q. When did hartal start here? On the 6th?

A. Yes.

Q. It stopped, there was no hartal after the 6th?

A. None whatsoever, it came to an end on the 6th.

Q. Then it came to an end?

A. Absolutely; and, as a matter of fact, I may confess those who were in support of the idea of the hartal on the 6th, had the best of others who thought there should be no hartal, inasmuch as it was a very passive one. We all recognised that.

Q. Then among the other causes, you speak of the Government policy of repression having strengthened to meet the Rowlatt Act agitation. To what particular action of the local Government do you refer to?

A. Not only the instance that I gave you already, but even in the matter of publication of reports of proceedings of public meetings.

Q. Public meetings in connection with the Rowlatt Act?

A. Am I to speak of things subsequent to that?

Q. You say among the causes—

(a) Rowlatt Bill legislation and the agitation which attended upon it.

(b) Local Government's policy of repression further strengthened to meet this agitation."

A. Yes.

Q. I want to know what particular acts of repression by Government you refer to with regard to this agitation?

A. I cannot specify any particular act subsequent to the passing of this Bill.

Q. Or before?

A. So far as the previous period is concerned, whenever there was a public meeting held, the chances of its proceedings being published were never very hopeful.

Q. Publication in the papers was prevented by any order?

A. Yes.

Q. Were any orders actually issued in that behalf?

A. Yes, whenever there was a meeting one never knew whether the proceedings were going to be published or not. I remember one instance.

Q. You say one never knew. I do not follow you. What do you refer to?

A. I am going to give you an instance. A meeting was held. The proceedings of that meeting would have appeared but for an order to the effect that no proceedings were to be published by paper, and that order was served on all the papers in Lahore.

Q. When was this?

A. In 1917.

Q. Was it a general order on all papers?

A. Yes, served at midnight.

Q. Not to publish the proceedings of that meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. For what purpose?

A. I think it referred to Mrs. Besant.

Q. About Mrs. Besant's internment?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you refer to the Amritsar deportations. We know about that?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you refer to Mr. Gandhi's exclusion from the Punjab and Delhi?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you disapprove of that?

A. Yes.

Q. You think that was unnecessary?

A. Yes, quite unnecessary.

Q. And you think that led people to great excitement even by itself?

A. I believe but for that nothing would have happened.

Q. If Mr. Gandhi had not been turned back on the 9th or 10th, you think nothing would have happened?

A. No. Why should anything happen, considering that on the 7th, 8th and 9th the place was absolutely quiet?

Q. In Lahore?

A. Throughout the Punjab. The two things that happened on the 10th in the Punjab were the Amritsar deportations and news of Mr. Gandhi's internment.

20 December 1919.]

The Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Mian FAZL-I-HUSSAIN.

[Continued.]

Q. That may be the immediate events, on which the disturbances immediately burst, but, you will grant, Mr. Fazl-i-Hussain, that the preceding excitement for various reasons was of such a character that any event of importance like this or any other event would have brought about the burst?

A. I cannot agree to that, unless you suggest any other event of that kind about which I could express opinion that it would have brought about the same result.

Q. What you mean to say is that although there was excitement existing over the Rowlatt Act, it would never burst into a great thing in the manner it did, but for these deportations?

A. Yes, it may not burst at all. Is it not possible, Sir?

Q. If there were considerable apprehensions based on misrepresentations with regard to the Rowlatt Act?

A. I am not clear that they were there before.

Q. When did they come in according to you?

A. I cannot say.

Q. They were there, you will grant, in March?

A. I cannot say.

Q. In April?

A. Yes, in April, whether they were there in the first week or second week, I am not clear.

Q. They were certainly there before these deportations and Mr. Gandhi's arrest?

A. As I submitted before, I am not clear about it. Whether they preceded it or not, I am not at all clear.

Q. Then, Mr. Fazl-i-Hussain, so far as you know, do you know whether these disorders in the Punjab were the result of any conspiracy?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Was there any conspiracy at all against Government?

A. I should have known it had it been amongst the educated classes in Lahore.

Q. In Lahore, you are able to say positively, there was no conspiracy at all?

A. None whatsoever.

Q. Against the Government?

A. No.

Q. Before these events, or rather before the Rowlatt Bills came, was there in the Punjab, in Lahore particularly, any anti-British feeling?

A. None.

Q. As you say, in Lahore even before the 10th, there was no anti-British feeling?

A. None.

Q. Then how do you account for the disturbances actually coming on? You know that there were anti-British demonstrations and Europeans were killed?

A. Yes.

Q. How do you account for the sudden turn that the public demonstrations and outbursts took?

A. Where?

Q. For instance in Amritsar and other places?

A. So far as I have been able to analyse the position, it seems to me that it has been a mistake on one side giving rise to another mistake on the other side, and that was growing worse and worse. In other words, people at Amritsar appear to have taken the deportations of their men as illegal acts, and then it appears that at the time when they were fired on, they lost their heads absolutely.

Q. Then you say, Mr. Fazl-i-Hussain: "Why Martial Law introduced? Martial Law appears to have been introduced not to suppress revolt, rebellion on even disorders, but to punish political workers suspected of having directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously, contributed towards the creation of an atmosphere which was favourable to disturbances." What reasons have you for saying that? You will grant, Mr. Fazl-i-Hussain, that at the time when Martial Law was introduced, there were considerable disorders in various parts of the country?

A. Martial Law was introduced in certain districts and not in the Punjab as a whole.

Q. Yes, in the districts in which disorders of considerable magnitude took place?

A. So far as Lahore is concerned all the disorders were over.

Q. But why do you suggest that the introduction of Martial Law was not for the purposes of dealing with the disorders that took place, but with a view to punishing particular people?

A. I do not think I said this.

Q. You make this statement that because there were no disturbances immediately before the introduction of Martial Law?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you agree that after the disorders took place those in authority had to make themselves secure, also the people, against any recrudescence of such disorders?

A. I agree.

Q. Therefore why do you attribute the introduction of Martial Law solely to the object you suggested?

A. I never thought that the introduction of Martial Law could be justified as a protective measure or a preventive measure. Martial Law in its essence is for removing such rebellion, or disturbance, or riot, as exists, not as a sort of defence against the possible repetition of it.

Q. But if the situation is of such a character that a repetition is apprehended, then surely you do not disarm yourself of the weapon you have got, for the purpose of dealing with the situation?

A. That is a point on which I cannot give a very definite answer, but I feel doubtful as to its justification on that ground.

Q. You were asked about this matter by Justice Rankin; when you say "the administration of Martial Law has shaken faith in British justice," all that you mean is that in the actual administration of the law there were such hardships suffered by the law abiding portion of the population that they felt they were not justly treated. Is that so?

A. Yes.

Q. And was it also felt that some of the educated leaders who had not actually taken part in the disturbances were arrested and tried by the Summary Courts with regard to their utterances or their doings long before these disturbances, and they were prejudiced by not being given a trial in the ordinary way?

A. Yes.

Q. Did that create a feeling in the public mind?

A. As a matter of fact that applies not only to the cases of the educated or suspected accused persons, but also to all trials. The villager in the Punjab had a very deep-seated faith in the administration of justice, and the way in which the Martial Law Courts acted had caused them to be shaken in that faith. It had really shaken the faith of the ignorant people rather than that of the educated people.

Q. What do you mean thereby? Is it that instead of being tried by the ordinary courts, these villagers were tried by the Summary Courts?

A. Yes.

Q. How is that possible when you have Martial Law? Surely it is no grievance to say that they were not tried by the ordinary courts, when these people who were committing murders or arson, destroying property, were tried by the Martial Law Courts?

A. As a matter of fact I cannot say that it is a grievance, or a good grievance. What I mean is that the usual way in which accused persons are tried and given opportunities of defending themselves, was set at naught.

Q. Do I understand you to say that there is a considerable feeling on the part of the educated classes that certain leaders were tried by the Courts of Martial Law and not by the ordinary courts with regard to charges not connected with actual disturbances?

A. Yes: there is a very strong feeling on this subject.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You have given your opinion about recruiting in answer to Sir Chimanlal's questions. I want to know why should recruiting be a ground for complaint so far as the urban population is concerned when practically they did not contribute to it? It is said that these dis-

20 December 1919.]

The Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Mian FAZL-I-HUSSAIN.

[Continued.]

turbances have taken place principally in towns. Take, for example, Lahore and Amritsar. These towns did not contribute their quota at all. They did practically nothing so far as recruiting is concerned. Therefore why should there be any resentment so far as the inhabitants of Lahore and Amritsar are concerned?

A. I should not say that there is any resentment on personal grounds amongst the urban population at all.

Q. Why then should you mention it as one of the contributory causes?

A. Because of the feeling that spreads.

Q. That is, you mean to say the educated classes practically take up the grievances of the rural classes?

A. Not exactly. There is a wave of feeling that spreads over all parts, and it is because of the effect it has on them.

Q. There is a second point which I wish to make clear. You will admit that Mr. Gandhi cannot speak Punjabi. There are thousands and thousands of persons in the Punjab, and a large majority of those who were employing themselves in these disturbances had never seen the face of Mahatma Gandhi?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore, why do you say that the extradition of Mahatma Gandhi was not justified, and that as a matter of fact it was a contributory cause to the excitement of feeling that prevailed and also of what subsequently happened? I mean to say the contention is when Mahatma Gandhi was not known to the majority but only to very few people, if he was excluded from the Punjab, how did it excite the feelings of those who did not know him?

A. Probably they were so fond of him because they did not know him then.

Q. What is your opinion for the fact that notwithstanding that he was not known by the great majority of the people, he was wielding such power over the younger generation?

A. It was a matter of sentiment. If a man is made into a saint that is one sure sign that those who have made a saint of him, do not know him well.

Q. He was made a saint and he had got that control. That is my point. Whether he was known or not is immaterial.

A. Quite so.

Q. You said something about the meeting that was held in support of the Memorandum of the 19—the so-called Reforms Scheme. Do you know anything personally as to what happened to those who supported the Reforms Scheme? There was a meeting at which Ram Saran Das and others were present?

A. Yes, they got reprimanded for it.

Q. By whom?

A. By the Chief Secretary.

Q. During all these days and all these meetings, there was an unusual fraternisation of Hindus and Muhammadans, and it is said that all this was not genuine at all. What is your opinion? First of all do you think that the relations between Hindus and Muhammadans had improved in the last 2 or 3 years or not?

A. There had been a distinct improvement, and the feelings towards each other—of the two communities, and not of individuals—are distinctly better than they had ever been before. But I think it would be saying too much if one went so far as to say that by themselves they are bound to last. No doubt the causes that brought about this *rapprochement* were largely political. So it is possible that if those causes are removed, then the union may not remain effective to some extent. But otherwise I do not think it is incorrect.

Q. Are you prepared to subscribe to the opinion that this fraternisation was the result of some sinister conspiracy against the British Government?

A. That is not correct at all.

Q. Was it the result of the Reform Scheme and the communal representation of classes that have been discussed for the last 2 or 3 years?

A. Quite.

Q. It appears to me to be the suggestion that in the Punjab the Muhammadans are the dupes of the Hindus, and consequently the former are in the meshes of the latter, and that is the reason for the fraternization?

A. I do not think it is quite correct.

Q. It is said that the Muhammadans excited the religious feelings and *vice versa*, and that is why the Muhammadans have joined the Hindus?

A. That is not quite correct.

Q. So far as the Muhammadan feeling about Turkey is concerned, the Hindus have nothing to do with it. Have the Hindus excited this feeling? It is said that the Hindus have practically taken advantage of this position, and they have excited the Muhammadans to resent all these things, and therefore the latter ultimately became the dupes of the former?

A. I should not admit being in the position of a dupe in this matter at all, but there seems to be no definite school of thought amongst Hindus to that effect.

Q. My point is whether, so far as Turkey is concerned, it is a genuine movement or have they been excited by the Hindus?

A. I believe it is genuine.

Q. Are you quite sure in your mind that if Gandhi had been allowed to come to the Punjab nothing untoward would have happened? It is said that having regard to the martial nature of the inhabitants of the Punjab nothing untoward would happen. Or would it have had a contrary effect?

A. I think by Gandhi's advent nothing would have happened in the way of creating disturbances. Probably the effect would have been just the other way.

Q. At several places you have mentioned that tact has not been used in dealing with the mobs. I would like to ask one general question. Supposing it is proved that a mob consisting of about two or three thousand persons were requested to disperse, but they defied the authorities, and that soldiers or the police were hit and injured, and after exercising patience for one or two hours they were ultimately fired upon, would you say that no tact was used?

A. No. In that case I would not say so.

Q. Now, I am going to ask you this question—others have also asked it. Now as a barrister, knowing what was happening in the Punjab, was it possible, or would even the educated persons, much less the uneducated persons, during these days of Martial Law, have dared to go before any of the authorities and complain of what was happening? What is your opinion?

A. They would never.

Q. As a barrister of 18 years' standing is it not your knowledge, even in ordinary times, that when there is police oppression with regard to these villagers, perhaps one out of a hundred goes and makes a complaint?

A. Yes.

Q. You were in Lahore on the evening of the 13th?

A. Yes.

Q. You left Lahore on the morning of the 16th?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore from the 13th to the 16th you were cognisant of what was happening at Lahore. What was the feeling of the people? How were things being managed? What was decided at the different conferences that were held between the leaders and the authorities?

A. None were held.

Q. Considering the position between the 13th and 16th, from your own personal knowledge can you say that there was any occasion for the introduction of Martial Law so far as Lahore was concerned?

A. I was in Lahore on the 14th and 15th and left on the 16th, and I was astonished when I heard that Martial Law was going to be introduced.

Q. Did you see any European ladies cycling and walking in the streets of Lahore on the 14th and 15th?

A. Yes.

Q. In what portion of the city?

A. All over Upper Mall.

Q. Only in the civil lines which was protected by the presence of the military?

A. Yes, it was either on the afternoon of the 15th or the 14th, the military were conspicuous by their absence even in the civil lines. I remember that distinctly well inasmuch as I noticed that things were improving.

20 December 1919.]

The Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Mian FAIZ-I-HUSSAIN.

[Continued.]

Q. Now with regard to the political aspect of the question. Have any new associations come into existence in Lahore recently?

A. I think Secretary of State's visit brought into existence one association—The Muslim Association.

Q. I am talking of the last 2 years.

A. The Hindu Sabha.

Q. How long is it in existence?

A. It is an old thing.

Q. Any other?

A. The Muslim.....

Q. Any other?

A. None, that I remember at present.

Q. Do you think there was any danger to life and property on the 14th, 15th and upwards either to the British soldier, to the so-called Army of Occupation, or to any of the inhabitants, for the purposes of introducing all these Martial Law precautions which are enforced in an enemy country?

A. No, not in my humble opinion.

Q. Therefore I take it that so far as the introduction of these Martial Law orders is concerned, it was not necessary for the maintenance of peace and order at all, or for the safety of His Majesty's Forces?

A. Not at all.

Q. Or for the safety of the life and limb of the civil lines?

A. Not at all.

Q. Or against any rebellion?

A. Not at all.

Q. Can you give me your opinion as to why they were at all introduced?

A. I have already submitted in my statement that it was either to demonstrate to the people that they should not always rely upon the letter of the law or to show that they should not be anxious to expect too much in the future. There is no other explanation.

Q. There is one sentence in your evidence which I do not understand. I understand you wrote that certain things had already been done by the introduction of Martial Law, and as those things were considered to be wrong, therefore in order to justify that wrong Martial Law was continued. Was that the position?

A. Yes.

Q. Now you say that even Mr. Shafi and Justice Abdul Rauf could not get a pass for travelling without their being recommended by their chauffeur or clerk if he happened to be an Anglo-Indian?

A. That was what Mr. Shafi told me.

Q. With regard to travelling, i.e., the restrictions that were placed on travelling. Is it your opinion that the restrictions were due to there being some difficulty about traffic or was it merely political in order to prevent outsiders from coming inside?

A. I believe one of the Martial Law orders states that it is necessary in the interests of Martial Law administration to make these restrictions.

Q. It has nothing to do with the traffic on the lines?

A. That of course is a matter on which I cannot give an opinion.

Q. You say that members of the legal profession were subjected to greater annoyance and animosities than others. What do you attribute that to?

A. That is with reference to those posters, carriages and specially restricting the movements of their cars.

Q. Now, what do you mean when you speak of these students? You say "under the shadow of bayonets and machine-guns." Do I understand that at these places of roll-call, machine guns used to be placed?

A. Yes, at the parades of the students.

Q. But they would be naturally placed there?

A. I do not understand you. You call a roll-call of the students and at the place where you are having it, there would be soldiers between each row of the students.

Q. And machine-guns too?

A. Not between the rows, but at the ends.

Q. Now you make a complaint about the subordinate police officers. You say there is no complaint against the superior officers of the service. But the subordinate police were guilty of certain things. Is that information of your's hearsay?

A. Yes, hearsay.

Q. We have been told by other witnesses that have expressed opinions that Afghanistan took advantage of all these things and declared war. Is it not a fact that the Afghan Envoy in his reply to Sir Hamilton Grant said that because Martial Law was introduced in the Punjab and these things came to their notice, it encouraged them to declare war.

A. Quite. That is what I said. As a matter of fact the introduction of Martial Law in the Punjab was a contributory cause of the Afghan War.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmed Khan—

Q. Do you know Dr. Kitchlew and Satyapal?

A. I know Dr. Kitchlew, but not Satyapal.

Q. Were they not acting against the authorities in Amritsar?

A. It is impossible for me to say one way or the other.

Q. They were instrumental in bringing about some trouble?

A. In all probability, but I know nothing definitely.

Q. But assuming that they were, and if the authorities told them that they were not acting as they ought, then would they (the authorities) not be justified in deporting them?

A. Deportation is a measure that I do not approve of even if they were doing something wrong or not. If they were doing something wrong against the Law, there is no reason why they should not have been proceeded against.

Q. Well, they may not have been doing anything strictly illegal, but at the same time their actions and movements may have been designed to certain things which may not have been very satisfactory.

A. Even then I do not subscribe to deportations.

Q. Then according to your view, the introduction of Martial Law was due not so much because it was needed for the sake of law and order, but because certain action has been taken by the authorities which were not legal actions, so it was necessary to enable them to cover themselves?

A. That is the view to which I am inclined.

Q. You must be aware of the fact as to whether educated people in Lahore and the Punjab generally subscribed or not to the Satyagraha movement?

A. Yes.

Q. And a very large crowd did collect at Lahore on the 10th?

A. Yes.

Q. And they were marching towards Government House, but they were prevented from going.

A. Yes.

Q. How do you account for wire-cutting and to the rails being damaged in many parts of the province? Are not these factors enough for the authorities to deal distinctly and summarily, i.e., by introducing Martial Law.

A. The view I take of these occurrences is very briefly put. First the firing at Amritsar led to the whole thing, and the rumours of what had happened at Amritsar practically created a feeling of ill-will in other districts. It having come into existence, then the question was whether, with the help of the ordinary law and the co-operation of the saner portion of the population, which was by far the larger portion, the authorities could not have maintained peace and order and prevented wire-cutting and things of a similar nature without bringing in Martial Law.

Q. So you mean to say with all these disturbances, the situation could have been controlled without recourse to Martial Law?

A. Certainly.

Q. You will agree that the people of the Punjab generally are different from other provinces, being more martial and more virile?

A. Yes.

Q. And therefore the Government of the Punjab is forced to take this factor into consideration and also the situation on the frontier?

A. Yes.

20 December 1919.]

The Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Mian FAZL-I-HUSSAIN.

[Continued]

Q. In view of what happened on the frontier, and the character of the people of the Punjab, would they not have been justified in associating themselves with the authorities?

A. I did not know when the trouble on the frontier actually commenced. The Government may have known the time. It is difficult to say what view one could take at a juncture such as when the frontier disturbances came into consideration.

Q. Assuming that there was fear of Afghan invasion?

A. That would depend entirely upon the seriousness of the frontier problem. I have already submitted my view independently and that is, Martial Law as a preventive measure is not justified. It is a curative thing and not a preventive thing.

Q. As regards the *hartal* there was some meeting I understand and notices were issued under the signatures of educated people in Lahore for the *Satyagraha* movement?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Was there no meeting held after Mr. Gandhi came to Lahore?

A. There was a meeting on the 6th.

Q. What happened at that meeting?

A. I was present at that meeting for merely half-an-hour. I could not tell you what happened after that. But during the time I was there a resolution was passed condemning the Rowlatt Act and passing the usual resolution. The proceedings are I believe to be found in the Conspiracy Trial.

Q. Was anything said about holding the *hartal*?

A. Not during the time that I was there. I believe no resolution as to the *hartal* was passed throughout the meeting.

Q. And to your knowledge, nobody sent notices of the *hartal*?

A. No.

Q. Have the people of the Punjab been generally loyal to the British Government?

A. Absolutely.

Q. In all difficult circumstances they have stood by the Government?

A. Yes.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Did you appear as a witness for 5 or 6 practitioners in the main Lahore Conspiracy Case? And did you make this statement:—

"I am a member of the Managing Committee of the Anjuman Islamia which controls the Badshahi Mosque. Mr. Shafi is also a member and Nawab Fateh Ali Khan is the President. I have lived in Lahore during the last 12 years. Have never heard of any political meeting being held in the Badshahi Mosque. Have never heard of any non-Moslem addressing the congregation from the pulpit. It is permissible to discuss social questions after Friday prayers, but in practice this has never been done. The pulpit is for religious use. It came as a great shock to Moslems that it was used for other purposes. My view is that the use to which the Mosque was put on the 11th and 12th practically amounted to sacrilege, and was improper."

A. Quite correct.

Q. This statement was purported to be made on the 20th May 1919. You also said then that you had not quite decided up to that date whether you were an Extremist or a Moderate?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you decided yet?

A. I will probably decide by the end of this year.

Q. Well you told us that if Mr. Gandhi had not been stopped from coming into Punjab, nothing would have happened?

A. Yes.

Q. Would you be surprised to hear that before the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest reached the people of Amritsar, murders, arson and the like had been committed there?

A. No. I would not.

Q. Then will you withdraw that portion of your statement in which you mention this?

A. That was only local. In Amritsar there was merely a local grievance.

Q. Then you stated at another of the meetings, that so far as you were aware Mr. Gandhi's propaganda of passive resistance was not preached, adopted or expounded. Would you again be surprised to hear to the contrary, according to a resolution which was passed at a meeting at which you presided? The resolution ran thus:—

"That in the event of those Bills being passed into law, in spite of the united opposition offered to them by Indians of all shades of opinion, the Indian people will be justified in having resort to such form of passive resistance" and was carried unanimously.

A. As a matter of fact the resolution which was proposed by Pandit Ram Bhaj Datt was framed by me.

Q. Then of your speech at that meeting a summary is given below:—

"The chairman, the Hon'ble Mr. Fazl-i-Hussain, before putting the last resolution to vote in his concluding remarks said he was glad to notice that the resolution (on passive resistance) had been put before them very carefully and that they had received it with that calmness which the seriousness of the subject deserved.

"Referring to the point brought out in the speeches at the meetings, he said the laws proposed were supposed to be for the good of the people, the dacoities were directed against the Indian people, and the Bills were, it was said brought forward for the protection of the people. But, asked the speaker, had the people who admittedly would be the sufferers come forward to ask for these Bills? On the other hand, was it not a fact that all those who had been opposing the Bills were men of property—the class who would suffer from anarchical crime? If anarchical crime became rampant, they were the people who would suffer. And yet they had no such fear, and had not come forward to ask Government to come to their help.

"The next point brought out in the speeches was that this was the second time, if not the first, when there was absolute unanimity among Indians. When Mrs. Besant was interned there was unanimity among the people, those who agreed with her and those who did not, were alike of one mind. This unanimity was shown in the meetings held. The present was an occasion when the unanimity was brought out in the Indian Legislative Council where all non-official Indian members had united to oppose the Bills. In their report on reforms Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford had stated that there was good reason for the complaint that non-official members did not see eye to eye with the elected members. This was an occasion when Moderates, Extremists and even reactionaries, had agreed to oppose the measures. The law enacted would thus be one which was forced from outside, and not based on the will of the people, and to which, therefore, they were not bound to subscribe. That was a principle imported from the west which they had been taught to accept as a recognized maxim of Law. Here was a measure to which the Government could not induce even a nominated member to extend his support. This was not a law, therefore, which in the eyes of law-abiding people would have the force of law.

"The matter, the speaker went on to say, was simple but serious. The law if enacted was not going to apply to most people in that Hall, and there was no merit in taking credit for being ready to resist it. Therefore the resolution (on passive resistance) was left in that form so that they could calmly and coolly deliberate on it with that common sense and sanity for which they had somehow acquired a reputation (laughter), and consult their friends and relatives, and then come to a decision for themselves, if the need for it arose. The resolution was theoretically sound, and it left them to decide when the occasion arose how to carry it into practice. (Loud applause.)

"The resolution was carried standing.

"The proceedings concluded with a vote of thanks moved by Mr. Manohar Lal, M.A., Bar-at-Law, to the Chairman for his able conduct in the chair and car"

20 December 1919.] The Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Mian FAYAZ-HUSSAIN—concluded—Mr. H. K. TREVASKIS.

ried by acclamation." Is it not a correct description of what actually transpired there?

A. That is correct, but as for the speech I do not actually recollect; I think the resolution was deliberately framed with the object of not taking Gandhi's vow of passive resistance. We said that only when the Bill is passed into legislation would we decide whether passive resistance should be adopted or not.

Q. When the Act was passed there was no further resolution passed subsequent to that?

A. No.

Q. At this particular meeting of the 6th, I think you said you were present?

A. During the time that I was there, there was one resolution about cabling to the Secretary of State, which was passed.

Q. Now, at either of the meetings of the 6th April and 9th March at one of which you presided and at the other of which you seconded were the provisions of the Rowlatt Bill explained to the audience?

A. I think some of the provisions were.

Q. Can you recollect any particular portion?

A. No.

Q. Well, then we will take it that the Bill as a whole was not explained? You also said I think that you were not aware of any rumours afloat misrepresenting the provisions of the Bill. Have you read the papers?

A. I did not say that. I cannot be quite sure

whether immediately before the 10th or subsequent to the 10th I had heard the rumours were afloat.

Q. You were aware that the rumours were afloat, but cannot indicate the time?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you also said that there was a pronouncement by the local Government in 1916 in connection with the Reforms Scheme?

A. 1917 if you do not mind, Mr. Herbert.

Q. Well, 1917?

Q. Where, when and by whom was this pronouncement made?

A. This pronouncement was made by the Lieutenant-Governor in the Council Chamber of the Punjab Legislative Council in his speech.

Q. When was that?

A. In 1917.

Q. Can you give us a copy?

A. I have not got it at the moment, but I can certainly let the Committee have a copy of it.

Q. Did you also have the pleasure of presiding at some other meeting recently in Lahore?

A. Yes. I presided over the Khilafat question at the public meeting.

Q. One of the resolutions passed was that all Muhammadans should refrain from participating in the peace celebrations?

A. Yes.

Mr. H. K. TREVASKIS, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Trevaskis you are Deputy Commissioner of Gurgaon district?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Is that close to Delhi?

A. Yes, Sir, it is on the south.

Q. Was there any indication in the district itself of unrest prior to these disturbances?

A. No, Sir, it was a particularly quiet district.

Q. What sort of *hartal* was held in the Gurgaon district?

A. Originally the first *hartal* was at Rewari on the 6th. In the rest of the district there was no *hartal* on the 6th. Then the next *hartal* that took place was after the 11th or 12th, but there was no *hartal* immediately on the arrest of Mr. Gandhi which took place on the 9th in the Gurgaon district. That goes to show that there was no spontaneous feeling in the district about *hartal* and that it was engineered from Delhi.

Q. Have you any evidence that Delhi influence was brought to bear upon the people of your district to observe *hartal*?

A. Yes, I have got reports made to me at the time. I have got evidence of witnesses who can come forward, and I think you have selected some of them. All this evidence goes to show that influence was brought to bear from Delhi. I have a few other witnesses who are not selected, but who will come forward to give evidence.

Q. But that Delhi influence was confined to getting the people of the district to observe *hartal*. It did not go beyond that, did it, or have you any information that leads you to believe that pressure was brought to bear upon the district from Delhi to get them to go beyond holding a *hartal*?

A. There was a meeting of the *samindars* at a place in the Delhi Province to try and get them to stop paying land-revenue and I think income-tax too, and one or two emissaries travelled up and down by train, and I think they tried to induce people to stop income-tax and land-revenue. I believe Surendranath Sarma also preached to that effect.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Where does Surendranath Sarma live?

A. I don't know, Sir.

Q. And have you got any notes of his speech reported by the C. I. D. or by the regular police?

A. I had reports made to me at the time.

Q. Have you any extracts from his speech? What did he say?

A. He told people to refuse to pay land-revenue and income-tax. He also said that Government intended to throw beef into Hindu temples and swine flesh into Muhammadan mosques at a meeting.

Q. What evidence had you to believe that he was sent by any of the Delhi leaders?

A. That is not alleged. I only say he was an emissary. He came from Delhi.

Q. He might have come from Delhi without being sent by any of the Delhi leaders. The mere fact of his coming from Delhi does not prove that he was sent by the leaders of Delhi?

A. I understand that the people of Gurgaon realised that he came from Delhi with some sort of authoritative powers.

Q. Was anything known as to who had sent him?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. You did not record any evidence to the effect that either Shradhanand or Dr. Ansari or anybody else sent him?

A. No.

Q. Then with regard to the other evidence on this point, can you give me the name of any other person who came to your district from Delhi as an emissary?

A. I have got evidence more or less of 30 people. Some were identified by name.

Q. Surely in those days there was no restriction on travelling, and therefore naturally people from Gurgaon would go to Delhi and from Delhi to Gurgaon. But is there any evidence to show by whom these emissaries were sent to Gurgaon and as to who asked the people of Gurgaon to do anything more than observe *hartal*? Is there any evidence before you of any person having come and induced people to commit violent acts or anything like that?

A. There was a big meeting held by the *samindars* at a place called Moulaband in the Delhi province, and a man, whose name was not known but who, it was subsequently ascertained, belonged to Jeypur village, publicly announced that people should not pay land-revenue to the Government even under pain of death.

Q. This meeting was held not in Gurgaon?

A. But the Gurgaon villagers were invited to it and there was an attempt made to hold another meeting at Salapur village.

Q. Even the police were not able to find out the name of this man?



20 December 1919.]

Mr. H. K. TREVASKIS—concluded—Mr. R. C. BOLSTER.

A. This evidence was given to me by a Muhammadan gentleman of Faridabad and not by the police.

Q. And, therefore, so far as you are concerned, there is no evidence in your possession to connect this man with any of the leaders of the Delhi movement?

A. Not definitely. Everyone understood that these people were speaking with authority, otherwise the public would not have listened to them in any other way. There is our telegram which at some stage I should like to produce.

*The President.*—What is that telegram?

A. It purports to have been sent by Dr. Ansari, to the Secretary of the Panchayat, Faridabad, and the evidence that was given by Dewan, son of Chiranjilal, was to this effect, that the people of Faridabad were boycotted by Delhi because they had not observed *hartal* on the 6th April, that they had to suffer a good deal from this boycott, and finally, on the 12th April after consultation they asked Delhi for what period the *hartal* should remain and when it should discontinue. Then this telegram was received saying "Delhi market opening definitely to-morrow, hope Faridabad follow example. Signed Ansari"

*The President.*—That is encouraging them to open, and not to close?

A. Yes, Sir, but it shows a form of connection between Delhi and the district.

*The Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith.*—What is the date of that telegram?

A. The 12th.

*By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—*

Q. You say in your statement "though this propaganda failed in its intentions and found Gurgaon an unsatisfactory breeding ground, the latter district was not entirely without predisposing causes of unrest, which primarily affected the municipal areas and only secondarily and through them, the villages." What do you mean by saying "this propaganda failed in its intention?" What was the intention?

A. I wrote that quickly, I mean the presumed intentions, namely, spreading unrest in the district generally mainly by means of *hartal* and resistance to Government, such as not paying land-revenue.

Q. Who were the organizers of this propaganda at Delhi?

A. That I don't know. But I know that Dr. Ansari was one of them and Shradhanand Swami was another.

Q. What did they preach or say?

A. In Gurgaon one only observed the results of the propaganda. We do not know what they were saying originally.

Q. Here you say that the propaganda at Delhi failed in its presumed intentions. What were they?

A. I say I may have written it. I wrote this as part of a report at the time. By intentions I mean what people understood to be the intentions, namely of spreading unrest generally.

Q. Either from their speeches or from leaflets?

A. From these emissaries who were coming in the district.

Q. Only from the emissaries?

A. Yes.

Q. What ground had you to connect these emissaries with this unrest unless they preached similar doctrines that might possibly be a ground for connecting them, though not necessarily?

A. The only thing is that when you have got about 30 emissaries of some kind all going from one place, you may deduce that there was some organization sending them. Of course it is only a matter of deduction. I am not prepared to give any proofs that they came from a central organization there.

Q. Is it not possible that they might have felt in the same way as Gandhi who started this movement?

A. I think it is conceivable, but I think that people in Gurgaon generally understood that there was an organization and the fact that they were sent from Delhi to Faridabad to give instructions points to this.

Q. And these people did not preach any resistance to authority in the Gurgaon District?

A. Yes, this man Surendranath Sarma preached it, but as I said it was difficult to find out before what these emissaries were saying. I mean we only got vague reports at first, but there is no doubt they were generally preaching resistance to Government. For instance, in Gurgaon itself one of the *banias* refused to give any supplies for the rallying posts and in other ways.

Q. It is from those things that you drew the inference that probably it was due to some influence from Delhi?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. There is no evidence of any sort that it is the general condition which produced that impression?

A. No.

Mr. R. C. BOLSTER, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Rohtak.

*By the President—*

Q. You are Deputy Commissioner of the district of Rohtak?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Is that a large district in the Punjab?

A. It is one of the smaller districts, it is a three-tahsil district.

Q. Is it situated near Gurgaon?

A. It is 44 miles west of Delhi.

Q. Now as regards the events in your district, was a *hartal* held in any of the towns?

A. Yes, Sir. You will see a list of the places where *hartal* was held in paragraph 8 of my evidence. In addition to that I find from police reports and the evidence of witnesses that *hartal* was also held at Jhajjar on the 6th April and at Gohana on the 15th April.

Q. The first one that was held at Rohtak was on the 6th?

A. There was one held at Sonapat on the 6th, at Jhajjar on the 11th, at Beri on the 12th, and at Sonapat on the 15th?

Q. On later dates were there *hartals* held?

A. No, Sir, nothing later than that.

Q. Did you notice in your district any disturbing incidents indicative of violent behaviour on the part of the people throughout the period of April?

A. I only joined the district on the 18th March. During the last week of March, I was out on tour,

Q. I would like to know what occurred in your district in the nature of rioting?

*Mr. Herbert.*—The witness is produced in connection with the pressure exercised from Delhi, which caused excitement in the Rohtak District.

*The President.*—Now what caused the people in your district to hold a *hartal*?

A. Pressure from Delhi, Sir.

Q. What makes you say that?

A. I have a number of facts to show that pressure from Delhi was exercised or that people sought inspiration from Delhi.

Q. You might shortly enumerate them.

A. I got a report which I have noted in paragraph 9 of my printed evidence from the Deputy Superintendent of Police. He had been sent to tour on the Delhi border, and he reported that a big meeting would be held at Delhi, the object of which was to send emissaries from Delhi to the adjoining districts to take up *hartal*. Then I was told in a Police report that Jhajjar was urged by pressure from Delhi to take up *hartal* before the 3rd April. I am told that at Gohana *hartal* was observed on the 15th April.

Q. These are very vague reports. Have you anything definite in the way of information about Delhi influence?

A. Yes, Sir, I have in the judgment of Bahadurgarh case. I have made reference there to the speeches made by Hashir Ahmad who came from Delhi.

20 December 1919.]

Mr. R. C. BOLSTER—concluded—Mr. R. B. WHITEHEAD.

Q. Is that the only thing?

A. He was a Delhi man and he was also collecting subscriptions in aid of those who were wounded or killed in the riots.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Before Delhi became the capital, it was part of the Punjab, was it not?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. For this district of Rohtak, I take it, Delhi would be a principal town for business purposes?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I suppose naturally Delhi being within easy reach, people of your district would frequently visit the place?

A. That is so.

Q. And of course in ordinary times people go to and from between Delhi and Rohtak in the ordinary way?

A. Yes.

Q. And you would expect, apart from supposing that there was anything by way of a conspiracy, that Delhi even now, and all the more so because it is the capital of India, would exercise a certain amount of influence on the surrounding districts?

A. Yes, Sir.

Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate.—Have you anything tangible to show that pressure was brought to bear from Delhi?

A. I have one thing which I think is important, and it is this. A deputation of Jat *samindars* from some eight villages to the south and west of the district went to some Muhammadan Rajput village and preached doctrines which they said they had got from Delhi, and the object of that deputation was to make the residents of that place who had till then stood out join the disorders or in the protest.

The President.—Protest against the Rowlatt legislation?

A. I can tell you exactly what they said. I have an abstract from the police report.....

The President.—At the present moment I am not satisfied with the material so far laid before us.

Witness.—40 or 45 people came from the villages of Duran, etc., on the 11th April and at a mass meeting Ramlal, Jat, preached Hindu-Muhammadan unity and advised Muhammadans to give up cow-killing. Another man also got up and gave a vehement harangue and said

that when Hindus went into mosques and Muhammadans into temples it would be a good thing. He exhorted unity and said that Hindus and Muhammadans had drunk water out of one glass at Delhi. He also asked for subscriptions for the wounded in the Delhi riots.

Q. Is Bahadurgarh in your district?

A. Yes.

Q. Was really a great attempt made to wreck a Mail train?

A. Yes; an attempt was made on the morning of the 14th April to damage a bridge in order to wreck the No. 4-Down Mail from Lahore which was supposed to carry European wireless operatives or troops.

Q. Was there any evidence produced in the case to show that this was incited by people from Delhi?

A. The court in its judgment says that Bashir Ahmad came from Delhi and preached to a meeting on two occasions.....

Q. Preached to what effect?

A. I can show you the judgment.

The President.—That is only about the speech that was made, but there is nothing to show that there was anything behind this movement to instigate people in the neighbouring districts.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. This Bahadurgarh case is still under appeal before the Chief Court?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In this case the Assistant Station Master and the Railway employees were the chief culprits? The first three or four persons were employed at the station?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And is it not a fact that even according to the evidence of the approver in that case, it was alleged that it was expected that no train would come?

A. No, Sir, I cannot say that.

Q. Is it not a fact that according to the evidence in that case it was expected that no train would come?

A. I do not know. I am not aware of it.

Q. Is it not a fact that in that case it was said that the whole trouble was due to a certain thing done by the Assistant Station Master?

A. I understand a private message came through on the 13th April saying that a strike was taking place at Shakurpur station.

Mr. R. B. WHITEHEAD, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Ambala.

By the President—

Q. You are Deputy Commissioner, Ambala?

A. I am Settlement Officer. I officiated from the 11th April to the 19th June during an interregnum.

Will you allow me, Sir, to give my evidence in the form of a brief statement?

The President.—You may take it for granted that I am not going to ask you about everything in your statement. I want to ask you about one or two things only. In the first place, on what dates did a *hartal* take place in your district?

A. There was a *hartal* on the 6th April, and a solitary *hartal* on the 13th April at Ambala Cantonment.

Q. Then your district includes the cantonment and seems to have 26,000 inhabitants?

A. The city has 26,000 inhabitants, while the cantonment has about 52,000 inhabitants.

Q. How do you account for the *hartal* that took place in your district?

A. The *hartal* on the 6th was part of the general *hartal*, that is the All-India *hartal*. I took over charge on the 11th. On Sunday morning of the 13th, I rode through Ambala City and found business was going on as usual. But I was told that there was a complete *hartal* in Ambala Cantonment. So it appeared that on the 6th April there was a *hartal* in Ambala City and not a single shop was closed in Ambala Cantonment. On the 13th April not a single shop was closed in Ambala City and there was a complete *hartal* in the

Ambala Cantonment. This struck me as rather a curious thing and I was keen to enquire into it. I was told that the *hartal* on the 13th April in Ambala Cantonment was entirely due to pressure from Delhi. This was the common opinion and this was communicated to me by all my informants and these opinions are supported by the following facts. The Ambala Cantonment Sadar Bazar has intimate business and social relations with Delhi. At least five prominent dry-goods merchants whose names I can supply, are residents of Delhi doing business in the Cantonment and get their stores from Delhi. I can give the names of 10 cloth merchants who get their supplies from Delhi and one or two have, it is alleged, admitted that the influence from Delhi consisted of social pressure and also threats of boycott by the Delhi wholesale firms. I am informed that threatening letters were received between the 6th and the 13th April by various cloth merchants whose names I can give if required. On the afternoon of the 13th April there was a mass meeting held in the Ambala Cantonment, the chairman of which was Rai Benarsi Dass, mill-owner.....

Q. As I understand, the influence you refer to was the influence brought to bear upon the traders of your district by shop-keepers in Delhi and it does not go beyond that?

A. Well, beyond the fact that the usual run of sinister rumours were floating about the districts, and I never caught them up though I pursued them as hard as I could.

20 December 1919.]

Mr. R. B. WHITEHEAD.

[Concluded.]

Q. In your district were there any riots or disturbances?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Well, you have been very fortunate?

A. Yes, I admit that.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Ambala is on a direct straight line by railway from Karnal?

A. Yes, it is on the main lines of both the East Indian and the North-Western Railway.

Q. It has very good communications with Delhi?

A. Yes.

Q. It looks upon Delhi as a sort of capital city?

A. No, I don't think so, but there are very good communications with Delhi.

Q. Don't these traders you were speaking of get their stocks from Delhi?

A. Ambala City is a small country town whose chief business is collecting grain for export, but the Cantonment Sadar Bazar is the bazar of the Cantonment and was founded to supply goods to the soldiers and people of Ambala Cantonment, so they import European stores and imported cloth, and they get practically all these from Delhi; so the circumstances of Cantonment Sadar Bazar are rather unusual.

Q. And it was the Cantonment Sadar Bazar that was affected and it was the ordinary city which was not?

A. The ordinary city was only partially affected.

Q. The Delhi emissaries made very little headway in the city?

A. I do not think they were necessarily emissaries, but the Delhi influence was, I think, undoubtedly manifested in what took place in Ambala Cantonment on the 18th of April.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Were these letters produced before you?

A. No.

Q. You have never read them?

A. I as Deputy Commissioner had nothing to do with Ambala Sadar Bazar.

Q. Therefore the boycott letters have never been produced?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith—

Q. I suppose you have a fairly strong garrison at Ambala?

A. Yes, it is a very big Cantonment.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. Ambala was in the old Delhi Division before the creation of the Delhi Province?

A. Yes.

Q. And it is a great centre of railways? Railways go to Kalka, Lahore and elsewhere?

A. I would not call it a great centre; it is a big junction. There is not a large railway colony there.

Q. It may not be like Lahore, but it is one of the large junctions?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. The main lines of the East Indian and North-Western Railways go through Ambala to Delhi *via* Karnal and *via* Saharanpur?

A. Yes, the Delhi-Saharanpur and the Delhi-Ludhiana lines cross there.

Q. There were no attempted derailments of trains and wire-cutting?

A. There was one case of wire-cutting near Barara station.

Q. How far is that from Ambala?

A. It is the second station from the Cantonment towards Saharanpur.

Q. It took place on the Cantonment side?

A. It took place on the Saharanpur side of the Cantonment.

Q. You say some butchers came from Delhi to stop cow-killing at Ambala, but it produced no effect whatever?

A. I have no proof of that, but I have no reason to believe it is untrue.

Q. You say "about the middle of April a deputation of Delhi butchers came and endeavoured to stop cow-killing." That came to your notice?

A. It came to my notice.

Q. Also you say at this time an emissary of Swami Shradhanand arrived, presumably from Delhi, but had a cold reception at Ambala?

A. Yes.

22 December 1919.]

Mr. L. L. TOMKINS.

At Lahore, Monday, the 22nd December 1919.

PRESENT.

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.  
The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.  
Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., Secretary.

Mr. L. L. TOMKINS, C.I.E., Deputy Inspector-General of Police.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Tomkins, you are Deputy Inspector-General of Police?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you asked to deal with the question of securing the conviction of the promoters and leaders in the disturbances?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And had you also to explore the organisation, if any, underlying the disturbances?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You made your investigations I think in conjunction with Mr. Cocks, the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department?

A. That is correct, Sir.

Q. And did you utilise the staff of that department as it stood?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was that in order not to dislocate the existing organisation?

A. Yes, Sir, and to avoid the delay of getting extra men.

Q. Did that arrangement work smoothly?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you divide the disturbed area into three sections—

- (a) Amritsar and country south of Lahore, including Kasur and Khem Karn, etc.,
- (b) Lahore headquarters, and
- (c) Gujranwala and places north of Lahore?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you then divide the staff of the Criminal Investigation Department into three equal sections?

A. Yes.

Q. To the first section were deputed Mr. Howell, Superintendent of Police, Criminal Branch, and Sardar Bahadur Sukha Singh, Deputy Superintendent?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And they had one-third of the staff of Inspectors, sub-inspectors and subordinates of the Criminal Investigation Department?

A. That is correct, Sir.

Q. To the second section were deputed Mr. Bowing, Superintendent of Police, Political Branch, and Khan Sahib Abdul Aziz, Deputy Superintendent, with a similar staff?

A. Correct, Sir.

Q. And to the third was Mr. Ikram-ul-Haq, Deputy Superintendent, detailed? I think Mr. Isemonger was originally selected to take charge of the third section, but he had other work to do?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And did you issue instructions to the Superintendents of Police of the districts concerned?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What instructions did you send to them?

A. I sent them the names of the people who were to help them, that is, the Criminal Investigation staff, and asked that they should assist the enquiry. I gave them the lines on which the enquiry was to be held and I asked that the cases which were complete should be sent in without delay, and that the

cases which required further investigation should be kept until they were ready.

Q. As we know, two Special Commissions were set up in order to try the more important cases. Did you detail certain officers for work at these Commissions?

A. There were four Special Commissions in all.

Q. Did you detail certain officers to attend to them?

A. I got them deputed by the Inspector-General, court inspectors and a court staff.

Q. What arrangements did you make in connection with the work?

A. One court inspector and one court sub-inspector, together with clerks and orderlies, were deputed to each court and they were instructed to carry on the ordinary court duties in accordance with the requirements of the courts.

Q. What were the duties of those officers?

A. They had to arrange for the summoning of witnesses, to get the processes issued, to have the papers and exhibits and every other document or article in connection with the case present at the time required, and they had to keep those documents when the courts were not sitting, and they had to maintain a register of the cases sent for trial and the results.

Q. In consequence of the numbers of people involved, were the lockups in a congested state?

A. Yes, Sir, they were at the beginning, and it was in order to relieve them that I called upon the police to send up the cases which were complete immediately.

Q. And were those cases dealt with as soon as possible?

A. As soon as possible.

Q. The cases that were dealt with at first were cases where the evidence was readily available?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. But if further investigation was required?

A. Then they could not be immediately sent up for trial and had to wait till the investigation was complete.

Q. Was there any case purposely delayed?

A. Not to my knowledge, except for the completion of the investigation.

Q. You issued instructions explaining the new procedure to be adopted and the method of preparing the précis of evidence?

A. I did, Sir.

Q. And each case with its précis of evidence was to be accompanied to the office of the Criminal Investigation Department by an officer of police who had taken part in the investigation and by the accused persons?

A. That is correct, Sir.

Q. What procedure then followed?

A. The case was brought by the officer who had investigated to the office of the Criminal Investigation Department, where I was sitting, and I vetted it with him, asking questions which were necessary to elucidate information which was not readily available from the papers, and if I was satisfied that the case was a good one, I either took it personally or, where it was a plain case, I sent it to the Legal Remembrancer, who again vetted it from the legal point of view, and if he found there was a *prima facie* case, he framed the charges and sent it for trial to the Commission.

22 December 1919.]

Mr. L. L. TOMKINS.

[Continued.]

Q. Looking at the situation as a whole, what view have you to express as to the efficiency of the officers?

A. I found them extremely good. The police did their work extremely well as far as I am aware.

Q. And you yourself closely examined them upon the different cases?

A. In every case, Sir.

Q. I think you were faced with a considerable difficulty in consequence of the magnitude of the cases?

A. That is so.

Q. Did that render it difficult to place the cases before the courts in a form that would not lead to confusion?

A. It did, that was a difficulty.

Q. I think the procedure in the Commissions, although they were Summary General Court-Martial in a sense, had a pretty lengthy procedure?

A. It was very lengthy, very detailed and very careful.

Q. In some cases, as we know, large numbers of people were charged with the same offence, and in the same indictment?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And particularly in the Lahore and Amritsar conspiracy cases?

A. That is so.

Q. Did you find in these cases it was difficult to deal with the people separately except in the group system?

A. The difficulty was to keep the cases down in point of size and so prevent complication at the trials. There was a mass of identification evidence which was very difficult to deal with.

Q. As the work increased, were more cases sent to be tried by Summary Courts-Martial than had originally been the case?

A. That was the case.

Q. Why was that?

A. Because the Commissions were unable to take any more work.

Q. And the Commissions I think were limited in the sentences they were entitled to pronounce. They were not entitled to pronounce sentences of short imprisonment?

A. That is also the case.

Q. I suppose you came to consider the sentences that Summary Courts-Martial could pronounce adequate for the less serious offences?

A. That is so, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Did you notice any difference in the procedure in the three different sections, or were they all the same?

A. In the three different sections. I am not quite clear.

Q. You told us you divided the work into three different sections and had a staff for each?

A. No, I noticed no difference.

Q. When you began your work, I gather that the local magistrate had already arrested everybody he thought there was evidence against and these people were under arrest at the time you began; is that so?

A. Most of them.

Q. Now with regard to these three sections, in some places is it not the case that people, before trial, were taken before a magistrate for remand from time to time and in other places that system was not adopted?

A. I have no knowledge of that, Sir; I was not there.

Q. Had you anything to do with considering the question whether persons whose cases could not be investigated in a short time should be admitted to bail?

A. No, I had nothing to do with that. No question of bail came before me at all.

Q. Had you any difficulty as regards the question of commitment of accused persons owing to the large numbers of witnesses concerned?

A. There was difficulty in several cases in the courts and in some instances the courts required the accused to show cause for which they wanted the witnesses. It did not come really within the scope of my work, but I knew of it.

Q. Could you tell me from your knowledge whether it was the general practice in the Summary Courts to

refuse to summon, on behalf of the accused, witnesses except from the immediate neighbourhood?

A. I had nothing to do with the procedure of Summary Courts because I was working at the provincial headquarters, and the Summary Courts were working at the headquarters of the different districts. They did not come within the scope of my work.

Q. The decision whether some witnesses should be examined or not rested, I take it, with the court?

A. Yes.

Q. And the officers deputed simply carried out the orders of the court in that respect?

A. Quite so.

Q. Did you have occasion ever, in the course of your duties, to visit any of these lockups or places where the persons accused were being detained?

A. I went down to the City Kotwali on one occasion in Lahore.

Q. On that occasion was the accommodation for prisoners reasonable according to ordinary standards?

A. I think so; the lockups were full, but they were not overcrowded.

Q. The men you saw there, were they kept in solitary confinement?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Was any temporary accommodation employed at that place or was it the ordinary accommodation?

A. The ordinary accommodation was used.

Q. As regards the Summary Courts, first of all they tried cases of alleged offences against the Martial Law proclamations?

A. Yes.

Q. Apart from that, certain officers had power to try cases for offences committed before Martial Law came into existence?

A. I do not know. My duty was principally with the Commissions sitting in Lahore, and I have very little, or practically no knowledge of what the Summary Courts-Martial did at the headquarters of the districts. I was unable to visit any of the headquarters or districts owing to the pressure at Lahore.

Q. When the investigation of a case was completed and it came up to you and you did not think it very serious, did you decide or did the Legal Remembrancer decide to send it back for instructions to the Summary Court?

A. He and I in consultation.

Q. As regards cases you returned for trial by Summary Court, were they cases of offences committed before the introduction of Martial Law?

A. They were cases in which no overt act had been committed.

Q. Yes, but in cases where you determined that the men should be tried by a Summary Court, were they cases of alleged offences committed during the riots and before Martial Law, or were they cases of offences committed after Martial Law had been introduced?

A. I think they all came into the jurisdiction of Martial Law.

Q. I dare say they did, but I am trying to get my mind clear on the question whether the bulk of these people would be people arrested in connection with the riots?

A. Yes.

Q. Some of them would be arrested no doubt after the introduction of Martial Law, but other offences were offences committed before Martial Law had been proclaimed in that area?

A. There must have been men like that amongst them.

Q. And among the cases you returned to be tried by Summary Courts you included a good many cases where the offence triable was committed prior to the introduction of Martial Law?

A. It may have been so. I kept no notes regarding that particular point.

Q. Then when an accused was returned to the Summary Court, was he returned with the charge framed under the Indian Penal Code?

22 December 1919.]

Mr. L. L. TOMKINS.

[Continued.]

A. No, I think they were sent back without the charge being framed. We decided whether they were fit cases to go before the Commissions, and if they were not they were returned without a charge being framed.

Q. But for purposes of the investigation before you I take it the investigation was always with a view to showing whether there was a case or not under some section of the Indian Penal Code or other statutory law?

A. That is so. The police put their own sections or according to their lights.

Q. Was it the fact that the Commissions were very busy that induced you to send a good many of these cases to Summary Courts?

A. If the Commissions had had the time to take them, we should undoubtedly have sent them all to the Commissions, but we found the Courts so congested and their time booked up so much in advance that Mr. Ellis and I came to the conclusion that it would be advisable to return all cases in which no overt act had been committed.

Q. Of course certain offences you would always send before the Commission, graver offences?

A. Yes.

Q. Any question of waging war?

A. That would always go to the Commission.

Q. Any question of sedition?

A. Quite so; the only cases that were returned on that account were those in which it was sought to prove that the man had been a member of an unlawful assembly, where no overt act had been committed, and for that it was considered that a sentence of two years' simple imprisonment would be ample.

Q. The Summary Courts had no cases before them charged under the section about sedition?

A. No cases that came through me. In fact I may say they never had them.

Q. There were some cases, I think, where the charge ultimately alleged was that of being a member of an unlawful assembly and committing mischief by fire?

A. There may have been cases of that nature.

Q. Was that a charge which you would send before the Summary Courts or before the Commission?

A. If the mischief committed by fire was the portion of a building, it was invariably sent before a Commission. That would come into the category of an overt act.

Q. In connection with the attacks upon communications, I think there were a good many persons tried under sections of the Railway Act or Posts and Telegraphs Act?

A. Yes.

Q. Those I think were mostly tried locally by Summary Courts?

A. Some of them were.

Q. Some were not?

A. Some of them. A large majority of them went before the Commission.

Q. I rather gather from the printed statement put before us by the Legal Remembrancer, Mr. Ellis, who is not in India at the moment, that, in spite of the fact that it was considered that every person who took part in agitation leading to riot might be held to be guilty of conspiracy, the only persons who were charged with conspiracy in that sense were the accused in the three conspiracy cases, the Lahore, Amritsar and the Gujranwala conspiracy cases, is that so?

A. I have no notes upon the point, but I think that is the correct statement.

Q. I understand that the reason why that statement was made was that it was desired to have a judicial finding upon the question whether there had been a conspiracy in fact or not in these three different cases?

A. I know he held that view, but it really does not come into the scope of my police work.

Q. You were not the person who decided it?

A. I had nothing to do with the framing of the charges; it did not come into the scope of my duties at all.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. How long have you been connected with the Punjab?

A. Since 1901.

Q. How long have you been at the head of the C. I. D.?

A. Over four years.

Q. Were you in the C. I. D. before also?

A. I took over charge in the C. I. D. in September 1914, and in one capacity or another I was in it till January 1919, about 4 years and 2 months.

Q. Then in your capacity as head of the C. I. D. you were in constant touch with what was going on in the province?

A. I am expected to be.

Q. Taking these various districts of Lahore, Amritsar and Gujranwala where Martial Law was proclaimed, what was the state of the political parties in those places?

A. At what time?

Q. Before the disturbances, say in February or March

A. It was apparent that there was a distinct feeling working up. Up to the time I left the C. I. D. in January, I noticed there was a growing feeling of unrest.

Q. You left in January this year?

A. Yes. When I gave over charge, I had already observed a growing unrest in the principal towns of the Punjab, especially in those you mentioned.

Q. Throughout the province?

A. No. I won't go so far as that. It was apparently Lahore, Amritsar—these two certainly.

Q. What was that due to?

A. It was due in part to economic causes; apparently, I think, to the Turkish question, also to, I think, the general unrest caused by the war.

Q. In what sense was it a general unrest?

A. I think the war has upset the whole world. It was apparent in every country in the world.

Q. Were there any political or other organisations with the object of subverting Government?

A. I do not think there was any organisation in connection with the subverting of Government. But there was certainly an organisation organised against the constituted authority.

Q. In what way?

A. It was apparent in the newspapers; it was apparent in the speeches made from the platforms.

Q. I asked about some organisation?

A. The organisation was apparent in the newspapers.

Q. That was the inference from what you read in the newspapers?

A. Yes.

Q. I think you are not aware of any organisation?

A. Not in the Punjab.

Q. You mentioned two places?

A. There was no organisation in the Punjab; not so far as I am aware of, but later on of course there were local conspiracies which were started in the principal towns.

Q. Local conspiracies in the principal towns?

A. Not in all the principal towns. In Lahore, Amritsar and Gujranwala.

Q. In three towns?

A. And I may also include Kasur.

Q. What was the nature of these conspiracies? Let us take, for instance, Lahore?

A. The conspiracies were constituted by the leading agitators who were subsequently convicted.

Q. What did they do?

A. They conspired.

Q. Conspired to do what?

A. To agitate and excite people against Government.

Q. In what manner?

A. By holding meetings, making speeches.

Q. Which meetings you refer to?

A. Those held in Lahore. There were several held in Lahore, Amritsar and Gujranwala. There were two, I think, in Kasur.

Q. You were aware as to what was said in those meetings?

22 December 1919.]

Mr. J. L. TOMKINS.

[Continued

A. I read the speeches during the enquiries. I have not got the reports here.

Q. What was said in those meetings?

A. To sum up, generally, the speeches were very wild and violent.

Q. And who were those speakers who made violent speeches?

A. I cannot give you the names. I have not got the reports of the meetings here. I went through them at the time of my enquiry, when the information was put forward in the précis of evidence.

Q. May I take it that the conspiracy, in your opinion, consisted of holding of meetings and making of speeches?

A. Yes.

Q. Nothing beyond that?

A. In various places, emissaries were discovered. They were sent out from the different centres. For instance, emissaries from Amritsar visited Kasur.

Q. What did they do there?

A. They went there to spread sedition.

Q. What did they do there?

A. I do not know; we never got them. Their presence was reported. They came there and spread unrest by means of threatening the shopkeepers that they would boycott their shops.

Q. They told them to shut their shops?

A. That if they did not fall in with them, their supplies would be cut off.

Q. What is the agitation you refer to?

A. The holding of the *hartal*.

Q. That is, if the Kasur people did not hold a *hartal* their supplies would be cut off?

A. It was done in Kasur, and also in Ambala and in Rohtak.

Q. By whom?

A. By people from Delhi. People from Lahore also visited Karnal.

Q. Those are Delhi people who went to Amritsar?

A. Delhi people.

Q. The Amritsar people only went so far as Kasur?

A. So far as I know, they certainly went to Kasur; they might have gone to other places also.

Q. We were just talking about Lahore. Nobody went from Lahore anywhere?

A. I cannot say; they might have done.

Q. You would know it?

A. I should not necessarily know it.

Q. Then may I take it that so far as Lahore and Amritsar are concerned, the only form of conspiracy that took place was agitation started at these meetings and also the inducing of people to shut their shops?

A. I include also the newspaper articles, speeches from platforms, and emissaries.

Q. Emissaries to ask people to shut their shops?

A. Yes, under threats that they would cut off their supplies if they did not obey.

Q. Nothing more happened?

A. Something more might have happened.

Q. What about Gujranwala?

A. Emissaries had been present at Chuharkana in the Gujranwala District and the probability is that they also went up to Lahore which is quite close to Gujranwala.

Q. Did the Gujranwala people come from Gujranwala to Lahore and induce the people to shut their shops there?

A. I cannot say; the two places were so close to each other.

Q. You have no definite knowledge.

A. We have not got emissaries there.

Q. In Gujranwala, did any conspiracy take place? Any agitation, any meetings?

A. Yes.

Q. Are there any newspapers there in Gujranwala?

A. The newspapers from Lahore circulated in Gujranwala.

Q. So far as the people of Gujranwala were concerned, the form of agitation that took place there was through meetings only?

A. No; I think they had access to Lahore newspapers.

Q. They also wrote to the Lahore newspapers?

A. They had access to the Lahore newspapers. That is to say, the Lahore papers circulated in Gujranwala.

Q. The Lahore people agitating and the Gujranwala people reading the reports of the agitation in the newspapers are different things. What did the Gujranwala people do except reading the newspapers?

A. I think they agitated by means of meetings and by wild and violent speeches.

Q. In the meetings?

A. In the meetings; as I said before, there was a local conspiracy, agitators pulling the wires and so on.

Q. How did the conspiracy show itself? Was it through meetings?

A. Through meetings; through the secret meetings that were held there.

Q. Were there secret meetings?

A. There were secret meetings in Gujranwala to which the public would not be admitted. Just the same in Amritsar and Lahore too.

Q. And you have got the reports of these?

A. All the information that we had was put forward at the trials.

Q. The speeches of the secret meetings were put forward?

A. Yes.

Q. Besides the three districts, according to your information, in your opinion, was any other district or headquarters where there was any agitation against the Government, or any sedition?

A. Because a *hartal* constitutes the cutting off of unrest and as I have just said emissaries went from Delhi to Ambala and Rohtak.

Q. At Ambala? Was there any disturbance at Ambala?

A. A *hartal* was held there much against the wish of the shopkeepers.

Q. And that was in connection with a conspiracy?

A. I think it was the beginning of it.

Q. *Hartal* was the beginning of the conspiracy?

A. I do not quite follow.

Q. *Hartal* was not the result of conspiracy?

A. It depends how you look at it.

Q. You said there were other districts beyond these three where there was some conspiracy? You mentioned Ambala and Rohtak?

A. I would say that they constituted the *hartal* against the authority of the Government; that probably constituted the beginning of the conspiracy.

Q. A *hartal* against the constituted authority of Government?

A. A general *hartal*.

Q. How is a *hartal* against the constituted authority?

A. Because a *hartal* constitutes the cutting off of supplies which is a recognised form of warfare.

Q. Cutting off of supplies from Government officials?

A. That is a well known form of warfare.

Q. And *hartal* takes that form?

A. It naturally does; because the shopkeepers shut their shops.

Q. They may do so on account of sorrow or any other thing?

A. That might be for a short time. Here the motive is absent.

Q. That is, cutting off supplies?

A. They would open their shops after a short time; besides the whole city would not do it at once, and that for a long period.

Q. *Hartal* then means that everybody should shut their shops?

A. Yes.

Q. Then the general closing of shops would constitute defiance of authority?

A. If it is done with the object of cutting off the supplies from Government officials.

22 December 1919.]

Mr. L. L. TOMKINS.

[Concluded.]

Q. That was the object imported into it when they held the *hartal*?

A. I think it was done with the object of starving the Government officials.

Q. *Hartal* is also observed on other occasions?

A. It may be.

Q. It may not be to cut off supplies?

A. If the *hartal* is held with some other object it results in the cutting off of supplies.

Q. Is it also not a form of protest if there is any ground to show their displeasure or certain other thing?

A. It might be.

Q. Are you not aware that a *hartal* was started with the object of protesting against the passing of the Rowlatt Act?

A. This particular one.

Q. All these *hartals* which resulted in some places in disturbances were held because Mr. Gandhi started the movement?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. It was with the object of protesting against the Bill and not of waging war or cutting off of the supplies?

A. I think the prolonged *hartal* which he organised and which went on here in Lahore for some 15 days or so, was done with the object of preventing Government officials and Europeans generally from obtaining supplies.

Q. It caused inconveniences to everybody, naturally.

A. Yes.

Q. This *hartal* you regard as making war against Government because it cut off supplies?

A. Yes.

Q. How many lockups did you visit during the period?

A. I think only one—in Lahore.

Q. You do not know anything as to what was done in Amritsar?

A. Not in regard to the lockup.

Q. Was there sufficient room for the people who were put in there?

A. I could not say. I had no complaints made to me.

Q. You had no complaints as to the conditions prevailing there?

A. Everybody who came before me had an opportunity of doing so.

Q. Did they come before you.

A. Practically all did. Except those cases in which from papers it appeared that it was unnecessary to send to the Commission.

Q. Only those cases which came up before you?

A. There were those cases which from an examination of the papers I thought unnecessary to send to the Commission on account of the Commission being over-worked; I took the papers for having them put to the Legal Remembrancer, and in those circumstances I did not see them.

Q. Do I understand that you had dealt with more important cases, more serious cases?

A. All those that were brought in to me I had to deal with.

Q. I understand you to say when you first dealt with a case if you had any legal difficulty you sent it to the Legal Remembrancer?

A. Not necessarily; two of the important cases I took to him and discussed with him.

Q. Whether to send them to the Commission or not?

A. It might be a legal point. I might want his advice from a legal point of view. I saw him most days; sometimes 2 or 3 times a day.

Q. What were the cases which you regarded as serious offences in your opinion and which you thought necessary should be tried by a Commission? Which were the cases?

A. All those in which rioting was committed.

Q. So if anybody took part in rioting, if he helped the burning of railways, that case would be sent to a Commission. If a man had looted a railway train he would be sent for trial before a Commission.

Under what charge was he sent in?

A. I do not quite follow the question.

Q. If any person committed any offence, destroyed any railway, or cut the wires or burnt anything, you said you would send him to the Commission?

A. Yes.

Q. Suppose a person had gone and helped in derauling trains, the matter came before you and you thought it a serious charge. Under what section of the Penal Code did you charge him?

A. That would be for the Legal Remembrancer to settle. I had nothing to do with it. I merely put the facts before him and he applied the law.

Q. You simply put the facts?

A. I had nothing to do with the framing of charges.

Q. You gave him facts and he framed the charges.

A. On his own account; I had nothing to do with it.

Q. So, every case had to go through him, I presume.

A. Yes. Go to him, not necessarily through him, because some he sent back.

Q. Had to go to him, and then he had to decide whether it was to go to this tribunal or not?

A. Yes.

Q. You also stated that there was some difficulty about the identification of these persons?

A. I had nothing to do with identification. When the cases came, the investigations were completed and the identifications had already been held.

Q. Then you transferred the case to the Legal Remembrancer?

A. Yes.

Q. And were you ever present in court when the cases were on?

A. I attended several cases, not for a lengthy period, just to see how things were going on. Some of course were held in the same building where Mr. Ellis's office was, only in another part of the building. Usually after I had settled anything, I walked round just to see how things went on.

Q. Otherwise you did not go?

A. I was constantly in the courts some time each day.

Q. To see whether the accused were given sufficient time to produce witnesses and other things?

A. That is matter for the court to decide.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Were you aware of the special instructions issued in regard to the treatment of the under-trial prisoners in jail?

A. Certainly. Under-trial prisoners in jail were allowed to take their own bedding and have their own food.

Q. You saw them yourself?

A. I think I went through them.

Q. There were four Commissions appointed by Government. Was the Lahore Leader Case tried in one of the Commissions by Mr. Justice Leslie Jones? (The question was disallowed by the President.)

Q. Is it a fact that most of the cases dealt with by Mr. Ellis were discussed by you and him together?

A. Invariably.

Q. Have you read Mr. Ellis's statement?

A. I have.

Q. Can you say whether the facts as arranged by him are quite correct?

A. I think they are quite correct. I went through them carefully.

Q. Mr. Ellis has also annexed a tabular statement showing the particulars of cases tried by Commissions and of punishments inflicted in each case. Were those correct?

A. They may be taken as correct.

Q. It is quite sufficient to bring the statement on record. (With the approval of the Committee, the statement was put on record.)\*

A. I may say this statement was compiled from the Court registers.



20 December 1919.]

The Hon'ble Mr. C. A. H. TOWNSEND.

## The Hon'ble Mr. C. A. H. TOWNSEND, I.C.S., Director of Civil Supplies in the Punjab.

*By the President—*

Q. Mr. Townsend, you were Director of Civil Supplies in the Punjab?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When were you appointed to that post?

A. In May 1918. The post was created; it did not exist before.

Q. Was that created in consequence of the difficulties arising out of fluctuation in prices of essential commodities?

A. Not primarily that. We were primarily appointed to assist the railways by informing them as to what articles should have priority independent of civil needs.

Q. I suppose the question of fluctuation of prices has been a serious one during the war in India as much as it had been in England?

A. Very much. We had a very bad monsoon, and the functions of the Director of Civil Supplies then assumed very much more importance than before.

Q. In consequence of the bad monsoon, did the prices of some of the essentials of life rise to a higher figure?

A. Very much so; for instance, wheat went up in price in December 1917 and December 1918 by about 40 per cent. and similar considerations applied to other food grains.

Q. Had the wages of the poorer classes risen in proportion to the rise in price of commodities?

A. I have been studying the question, and I have made some detailed enquiries in this matter. The conclusion I have arrived at is that generally in the province wages of unskilled labour had risen in proportion, in villages particularly so because they generally got, in addition to money wage, one or two meals a day from their employers, and to that extent they have got free food. However, in the towns skilled labour had not had its wages risen to the same extent as the cost of living had risen, and the high prices particularly affected clerks and people on fixed incomes.

Q. So that fluctuation in prices was a cause of uneasiness to a number of people who had to depend for their livelihood on what they earn?

A. Very much so, Sir. My own view is that the trouble in this province is due at least 50 per cent. to economic troubles.

Q. I think in your official capacity, you had to take certain means in order to minimise the trouble?

A. We tried to do so.

Q. Were you successful or not?

A. That is another matter.

Q. The regulation of prices of commodities by fixing maximum and minimum prices is a difficult thing?

A. Universal experience shows it, and our experience is the same.

Q. You attempted to fix prices, I think?

A. We only attempted generally in the province by this acquisition of wheat. Of course Colonel Johnson and I co-operated greatly in the fixing of prices in Lahore, and to some extent in the other towns, where they tried to fix prices; it was exceedingly difficult.

Q. About acquisition of wheat, for a time I think there had been prohibition of exportation from the Punjab and from the Punjab to other provinces and from India as a whole to Europe?

A. That prohibition was put on about October 1918, but we had to export to other provinces of India, otherwise they would have starved.

Q. Then there was never prohibition to other provinces?

A. Never, but the prohibition on export was regulated.

Q. I think there was some curtailment of the outside supplies, from Australia?

A. This province never imports as a rule wheat from Australia.

Q. If there was a curtailment of the supply that India generally was getting from Australia, that

would lead to greater exportation from the Punjab than would otherwise take place?

A. I am speaking from memory. I do not think that India imports any wheat. We export wheat far more than we import wheat. Last year on account of exceptional conditions, we did import Australian wheat.

Q. Was it in consequence of the bad monsoon?

A. Quite so.

Q. About the acquisition of wheat, what exactly was done? Was all the wheat in the province acquired by Government?

A. No; the exact figures are given in the statement which I have submitted, of which you may have a copy.

Q. I do not want to go into details. Can you tell me roughly?

A. The total amount of wheat in the province was over 8 million tons and the total quantity that was acquired by Government was 16,600 tons out of 3 millions. That was the total amount of our acquisitions.

Q. What was the object of acquiring that?

A. The object of acquiring wheat was to bring home to the speculators who came very much to the fore during these troublesome times on account of the scarcity of things generally that Government was watching the situation, and that speculation might be dangerous, and there was the possibility of Government taking the wheat at a price perhaps even less than that at which they paid for it; thereby we discouraged and prevented their buying more wheat and tried to keep prices down, at any rate to prevent them going up.

Q. What did Government do with the wheat acquired?

A. It was made over for the requirements of Indian Army, and to some extent cheap grain shops for the poor were opened.

Q. Did you find whether the action of Government was appreciated or misunderstood generally by the people in connection with this matter?

A. It was appreciated by some of the more intelligent gentlemen of the province. On the whole, however, I am inclined to say it was misunderstood, because it did not have the effect which we had hoped of bringing the price of wheat permanently down.

Q. How do you account for that?

A. Because we could not possibly take up as much wheat as was needed to be purchased in this province, not only for the Army but for other provinces. We were taking at Rs. 5-4-0 per maund, and a man from Bombay would come prepared to pay Rs. 10 a maund. We learnt it was obvious that we could not permanently fix the price of wheat. If we had taken the whole wheat that was wanted for export or for military needs that would have changed the situation.

Q. Were there rumours circulated as to the object of the Government in acquiring wheat?

A. So I have been informed.

Q. What were they?

A. That the mere object of the Government in acquiring wheat was to get wheat cheap and the Government had no other motive except benefitting their own pockets. That was the one rumour that was very strongly circulated.

Q. No doubt there is no foundation for that?

A. Not in the least, Sir.

Q. You mention about the fluctuations in price of wheat, but I do not know if you have got a statement of the fluctuations in the essential articles of food, etc.?

A. I have got a statement and I shall be very glad to give you a copy of it. Kerosene oil is a thing which caused as much trouble. There was a world shortage of kerosene oil. Between December 1st, 1914, and December 1st, 1918, it rose 67 per cent. in price. Ghee between December 1st, 1914, and December 1st, 1918, went up 86 per cent. in price, but since then it has almost gone up 150 per cent.

19 December 1919.]

The Hon'ble Mr. C. A. H. TOWNSEND.

[Continued.]

I have mentioned about wheat. Wheat flour also went up in price. Iron which is a thing of very common consumption went up 480 per cent; English cloth 275 per cent.; Indian piecegoods about 200 per cent.; country leather 125 per cent.; cotton 400 per cent.; sugar 168 per cent. in price. All these went up very considerably. That caused great suffering to people of fixed incomes.

Q. You say you have got a statement?

A. I will let you have a copy\* of it, Sir.

Q. That is briefly the gist of your statement. Owing to the rise in prices, there was a considerable amount of discontent and dissatisfaction?

A. Yes, Sir, but I would qualify that by saying that discontent and dissatisfaction were to a large extent confined to the inhabitants of towns, because the inhabitants of villages, at any rate the larger holders, produced these things which they were able to sell at high prices.

Q. And in particular, may I take it, that in towns particularly it was thought that on the armistice occurring, you would altogether get back the normal prices?

A. That was the general impression.

Q. Was there a considerable amount of unrest in consequence of that hope not being realised?

A. Yes, the prices are even now very much higher than they were any time during the war.

Q. Are you regulating prices just now?

A. We never attempt to regulate them generally. All I do is to facilitate trade as much as possible, and always to dispute wheat and grain being taken away from this province to other provinces of India. No wheat is allowed to leave India at present.

Q. I suppose during the war that railway restrictions of curtailing transport from one province to another would have the same bad effect on trade?

A. Undoubtedly trade and movement inside the province too were very seriously restricted.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Apart from the particular statistics of these particular commodities which you are going to give us, have you at any time made a typical family budget to find out by how much per cent. the cost of living has gone up roughly?

A. I have rough figures to that extent. I have got an assistant who kindly worked out for me a comparative statement† of the cost of living for a clerk on Rs. 50 a month with his family. He worked out in detail the increases up to December 1918, that is about a year ago, and they have not changed much since then. The cost of living had increased for such clerks by 62 per cent. or about 60 per cent. I have similar statements, but not in the same detail.

Q. I do not think you said anything about rice. Is that an important commodity in this province?

A. No. It is a staple article for the hill tribes, and largely used by Kashmir pandits of whom we have a certain amount in the towns. Otherwise it is only used for weddings and funerals.

Q. Is there in this province an index of prices kept up from month to month?

A. It is kept by the Director of Statistics. We record our prices, but I cannot say at this moment whether the figures you wish can be obtained. We got them from the Director of Statistics, Calcutta.

Q. There will be such a thing, I suppose?

A. We regularly keep a record of our prices; every fortnight or every month we get it in detail.

Q. No doubt there is an index‡ of prices somewhere maintained, probably by the Director of Statistics, Calcutta?

A. Yes, certainly; it is published in the *Gazette of India*.

Q. And reduced to graph?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith—

Q. Mr. Townsend, were these high prices of crops, cotton and wheat beneficial to the cultivators in the Punjab?

A. Yes, cultivators of large holdings; it was questionable with regard to cultivators of very small holdings, such as those who had a couple of acres. On the whole cultivators in this province had the benefit of the high prices, specially in the canal colonies where people had large holdings.

Q. I do not suppose they got the full benefit of the increase in prices?

A. No; but they were doing so to an increasing extent from year to year. They are getting more wealthy and at present they have held up a great deal of their grain; they have not sold it; they have not been forced to put it on the market.

Q. They need to sell the crop as soon as it ripened. They are doing so less and less every year, as the state of the ryots is much better now?

A. Yes, specially in the canal colonies where you have commercial agriculture.

Q. And co-operative banks have been doing much good?

A. Yes; they have been very successful specially among the Sikh districts and also among the Mussalman districts, I think. They have been very successful on the whole.

Q. And I think you did your level best to give as much as possible to Punjab in the way of cloth.

A. Standard cloth was very successful here. We did our best in all these ways; the suggestions, so far as they went, were successful. We were always fighting about kerosene oil. I gave every possible help to import anything they wanted. We had considerable difficulty with regard to salt. The Government of India gave us concession as regards getting salt from the Government mines. We started cheap salt shops which were very useful to the poorer classes.

Q. Of course these high prices obtained all over India. They were not peculiar to the Punjab?

A. That is correct. The cost of living is the same. The price of food grains is much cheaper in this province than in other provinces.

Q. You had them on the spot and therefore they were cheaper here?

A. That is probably as regards grains. Pulses were dearer, and we had to import from Central India, Bhopal. They would not let us have any. As regards wheat, it was thought that it was cheaper here than in other provinces of India.

Q. As against the high prices, there was a great scarcity of the actual crop itself in wheat?

A. The crop of 1918-19 was the worst we have had for 40 years, owing to the bad monsoon.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. Didn't you stop the export of wheat and gram from the Punjab last year?

A. We put restriction on it under the orders of the Government of India. We said we must have restrictions and the only thing that was done was a system of control was put on.

Q. That was of course for the benefit of the people in the Punjab?

A. I would not confine it to them, because if that control had not been put, I think the people of other provinces will suffer too, because prices would have gone even higher than they did. I think on the whole control has been beneficial not only to us, but to the other provinces; they had not realised the extreme trouble caused by bad monsoon and the shortage of grain.

Q. On the whole the conditions in this province compared to other provinces were better decidedly?

A. I do not know about other provinces, so I cannot say. I can only say about the larger holders of this province and they have done very well.

Q. Food grains were cheaper in this province on the whole than they were in the other provinces?

A. Yes.

\* Vide Statement II, p. 183.

† Vide Statement I, p. 192.

‡ Vide page 181.

22 December 1919.]

The Hon'ble Mr. C. A. H. TOWNSEND.

ANNEXURE A.

I send herewith (1) a statement showing the cost of various articles in general use, at Lahore, in 1914, and every year since then. It will be seen that all have risen greatly in price; and (2) the family budget of a clerk in Lahore on Rs. 50 per mensem in (a) 1914, and (b) 1918. Roughly speaking, the last figures apply also now. Some articles have risen in price since then, but some have fallen. It will be seen that it is estimated that his expenditure has increased by about 60 per cent. To counterbalance this increase, rises in salary have been given, whether as war allowances or otherwise, in the various Government offices in the Punjab during the last five years; but the enquiries I have made show that in the case of no clerks has the increase given in salary been equal to the increased cost of living. Speaking generally, the increases given have been generally about 25 per cent. The obvious result of this has been discontent. My own opinion is that the Punjab troubles of last April were due to the extent of at least 50 per cent. to economic reasons.

Investigations I have made show me that the wages of unskilled labour, whether in villages or towns, have

generally risen about 100 per cent. in the last five years, and have kept pace with the increased cost of living. With skilled labourers the rise has been rather less, about 65 per cent., and they are generally discontented. The prevailing high prices have of course helped the producers of those articles, as wheat, *ghi*, *gur*, cotton, and indeed all agricultural produce, in the Punjab. They mostly live in villages; on the other hand high prices have hit very hard those on fixed incomes, as Government clerks, who mostly live in towns. This explains, to some extent, why we had more troubles in towns than in villages. I estimate that about 60 per cent. of the Punjab people have benefited by our high prices; 25 per cent. have suffered, and the case of the remaining 15 per cent. is doubtful.

C. A. H. TOWNSEND,  
Director of Civil Supplies,  
Punjab.

The 31st December 1919.

*Index number of prices on the Punjab for 1919 as compared with previous years.*

1900—1909 (pre war)	Index Number, say 100
1919	Index number 175 or 180, as worked out by two experts independently.

(Sd.) C. A. H. TOWNSEND.

4th January 1920.

## The Hon'ble Mr. C. A. H. TOWNSEND. Annexure A, Statement I

Comparative statement of cost of living of a clerk on Rs. 50 per mensem with his family in Lahore.  
(The family consists of the clerk himself, his wife and two children).

Name of articles.	Daily consumption.	Monthly consumption.	Monthly cost in December 1914.	Monthly cost in December 1918.	REMARKS.	
Atta, at the rate of 4 <i>chataks</i> per head per meal.	2 seers	60 seers	Rs. A. P. 7 8 0	Rs. A. P. 10 9 6	For adults the estimate is 6 <i>chataks</i> per head per diet. But in view of two children, it is reduced to 4 <i>chataks</i> per head per meal.	
Ghee at the rate of $\frac{1}{2}$ <i>chataks</i> per head per meal.	3 <i>chataks</i>	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ seers	6 8 0	10 0 0		
Rent	...	...	5 0 0	8 0 0	In the statement herewith wholesale rate is given; cost here is estimated at retail rates.	
Dal, Mash and gram (evening meal).	2 <i>chataks</i>	5 seers	0 12 0	1 8 0		
Vegetables (morning meal)	...	...	3 0 0	5 0 0		
Spices	...	...	1 0 0	2 0 0		
Oils (including Kerosene oil)	...	Half a tin	1 7 0	2 5 0		This leaves a margin for country oil.
Washing charges	...	...	2 8 0	4 0 0		
Barber	...	...	1 0 0	1 8 0		
Shoes	...	...	2 0 0	3 0 0		
2 pairs for each child a year, cost Rs. 16 in 1918. 4 pairs for husband and wife, cost Rs. 20 in 1918 total Rs. 36 in 1918. Rs. 24 in 1914.	...	...	...	...		
Cloth	...	...	4 0 0	10 0 0		
3 shirts, 4 pajamas, 2 coats and 2 <i>turbans</i> a year for a clerk which cost him Rs. 36 a year in 1918. Approximately the same for his wife. For clothes of 2 children the cost is estimated Rs. 48 a year in 1918. Total cost is Rs. 120 for the whole family in 1918. It comes to Rs. 48 in 1914.	...	...	...	...		
Milk at the rate of $\frac{1}{2}$ seer per head daily.	2 seers	60 seers	7 8 0	12 0 0	This leaves margin for curd.	
Sugar	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ <i>chataks</i>	5 seers	1 4 0	2 0 0	Retail price of sugar in December, 1918 was 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ seers per rupee. In December 1914 it was 4 seers per rupee.	
Fuel at the rate of 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ seers per head daily.	6 seers	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ maunds	2 13 0	4 8 0		
Water charges	...	...	1 2 0	1 2 0	This is water tax of the Municipality for a tap in the house.	
Sweeper charges	...	...	0 4 0	0 8 0		
TOTAL	...	...	*47 10 0	78 0 6	Cost of living has increased 62%.	

\* This does not include anything for such modest luxuries as tobacco, nor for medical charges.

Comparative statement of prices of different articles in the Punjab at Lahore.

Period.	KEROSENE OIL ELEPHANT BRAND.		GRRR.		WHEAT.		WHEAT ATTA.		IRON (FLAT).		CLOTH (ENGLISH MAKE) LATHA "KEY" BRAND.		INDIAN PIECE GOODS (CAWN- PORE TWILL No. 3).		COUNTRY LEATHER.		COUNTRY COTTON UN- GINNED.		COTTON GINNED.		GUR.			
	Price per tin.	Per- centage of 1914 figure, taking it as 100.	Price per maund.	Per- centage of 1914 figure, taking it as 100.	Price per maund.	Per- centage of 1914 figure, taking it as 100.	Price per maund.	Per- centage of 1914 figure, taking it as 100.	Price per maund.	Per- centage of 1914 figure, taking it as 100.	Price per piece of 40 yards.	Per- centage of 1914 figure, taking it as 100.	Price per piece of 40 yards.	Per- centage of 1914 figure, taking it as 100.	Price per maund.	Per- centage of 1914 figure, taking it as 100.	Price per maund.	Per- centage of 1914 figure, taking it as 100.	Price per maund.	Per- centage of 1914 figure, taking it as 100.	Price per maund.	Per- centage of 1914 figure, taking it as 100.	Price per maund.	Per- centage of 1914 figure, taking it as 100.
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22		
	Rs. A. P.		Rs. A.		Rs. A.		Rs. A.		Rs. A.		Rs. A.		Rs. A.		Rs. A.		Rs. A.		Rs. A.		Rs. A.		Rs. A.	
1st December 1914 . . .	2 13 6	100	35 0	100	4 6	100	5 0	100	6 4	100	10 0	100	7 0	100	40 0	100	4 2	100	11 4	100	4 12	100		
Do. 1915 . . .	2 11 6	96	38 0	109	4 8	103	5 2	103	11 4	130	13 12	138	10 0	143	40 0	100	8 0	194	19 12	177	8 0	168		
Do. 1916 . . .	3 6 3	119	50 0	143	4 8	103	5 2	103	25 0	400	18 0	180	12 0	171	40 0	100	10 0	242	23 0	240	6 0	126		
Do. 1917 . . .	4 0 6	142	55 0	157	4 15	113	5 9	111	29 0	464	25 0	250	16 0	229	55 0	138	12 8	303	38 12	344	6 8	137		
Do. 1918 . . .	4 10 0	163	65 0	186	6 7	147	7 1	141	30 0	490	27 8	275	14 0	200	60 0	125	23 0	557	46 2	410	8 0	168		
Do. 1919 . . .	4 11 6	166	105 0	300	6 4	143	6 10	132	23 0	368	32 9	325	19 8	279	50 0	125	14 0	339	38 0	337	10 0	210		

The Honble Mr. C. A. H. TOWNSEND. Annexure A, Statement II.

## PART II

# Written Statements accepted by the Committee without Oral Examination.

Mr. J. M. COODE, Director of Telegraph Engineering, Northern Circle.

### *Chronological Narrative of Events.*

The trouble began with the attack by the rioters on the Central Telegraph Office at Amritsar, on 10th April 1919, where the windows of the telephone exchange located in a room built into the verandah, were broken and the room entered. The switchboard and fittings were completely destroyed and the whole telephone system thus rendered unworkable, communication between one subscriber and another, on an exchange system, being possible only through the exchange.

A spare telegraph battery temporarily erected in the verandah, for want of space, was also destroyed. At the same time the quarters of the Telegraph Master were entered, particulars of which incident may be sought in the report of the Postmaster-General, Punjab and North-West Frontier Circle, who controls telegraph offices and staff in his Circle.

Had a rescue party not arrived in time considerably more damage would have been done and telegraph instruments would not have escaped destruction.

The telephones and fittings in the National Bank, the Alliance Bank and the Town Hall were also destroyed and telegraph instruments and fittings were destroyed at the Bhagtanwala railway station and the local combined post and telegraph offices, viz., Golden Temple, Town Hall and Majith Mandi.

Telegraph wires and telephone cables in the town were cut inside Hall Gate, near Hathi and Lohari Gate and the Golden Temple and 1½ miles from the exchange on the waterworks line. The main telegraph wires were cut 1½ miles from the telegraph office, towards Mananwala railway station. Here 27 wires were cut and one post and 50 insulators were broken, interrupting all communication on both departmental and railway wires from Amritsar towards Ambala. Communication with Lahore was interrupted by the cutting of 11 wires near the goods shed. The 11th passed without incident.

On the 12th, the trouble was resumed by the cutting of telegraph wires between Amritsar and Chheharta, between Khasa and Chheharta and Khasa and Gurusar Satlani. On the same day, much damage was done at Kasur, where telegraph instruments were destroyed in the fire at the railway station and at the combined post and telegraph office, and the telegraph line was damaged for half a mile.

Between Harbanspura and Jallo, stations within 3 and 7 miles of Lahore Cantonment respectively, 26 wires were cut, the release of the strain on so many wires resulting in 10 posts being broken and the wires being thrown out of level for 2 miles.

On the same day two wires were cut between Nurmahal and Nakodar in the Jullundur District.

On the 13th April all Government and railway wires were cut near the distant signal, Barara railway station, in the Ambala District; and slight damage was done to the wires in three places near Khemkaran railway station in the Lahore District and in two places between Batala and Gurdaspur railway stations in the Gurdaspur District. All six wires were cut between Batala and Jaintipura on the same day.

On the 14th April serious damage was again done to the telegraph line between Amritsar and Mananwala, 19 wires being cut in several places. Slight damage was done between Gharyala and Kairon, Tarn Taran and Jandoki and between Tarn Taran and Gohlwar on the same day.

On this date beside other slight damage, all instruments and fittings were burnt at the Wagah railway station and 10 wires were cut and some insulators broken between Wagah and Attari railway station.

Serious trouble occurred at Gujranwala the same day, 20 wires being cut and the line damaged for 2½ miles, 450 insulators being smashed. Similar damage occurred at Nizamabad, 1½ miles from Wazirabad railway station towards Gujranwala, where 7 posts and 400 insulators were broken. Telegraph instruments were burnt at Gujranwala railway station and at the combined post and telegraph office.

There was again some slight damage done to telegraph wires in the Gurdaspur District on this date, wires being cut in 3 places and carried away between Dhariwal and Sobal railway stations and near Kunjar and Aliwal villages.

In Delhi District 11 wires were cut and some insulators broken at Shakurpur, 8 miles from Delhi, on this date.

Forty-one telegraph posts were damaged on the 15th April between Wazirabad and Sialkot. 850 insulators were broken and wires cut in 4 places near Wazirabad and Begowala Ghartal railway stations.

On this date, in the fires at Chuharkana, Dhaban Singh and Moman railway stations the telegraph instruments were burnt. All wires were cut at 7 places, posts, damaged and about 415 insulators broken between Sangla Hill and Chichoki Mallian. It was on this occasion that Mr. A. E. Wale, an Inspecting Telegraphist, was attacked near Lyallpur by a fanatic Sikh with a *lathi* and sustained injuries on his head. Mr. Wale was obliged to use his revolver and wounded the man.

Slight damage was done in the shape of the cutting of wires and breaking of insulators at miles 1½, 9, 12 and 22 from Wazirabad towards Sangla Hill. All wires were cut and 180 insulators broken near Hafizabad and Sangla Hill Stations.

At Malakwal railway station all wires were cut and a post was damaged near Gohana post office and Rohatak railway station in the Rohtak District on this date. Slight damage again occurred in the Gurdaspur District on this date, wires having been cut and 200 feet carried away.

At Malakwal railway station all wires were cut and about 100 insulators broken on this date. On the same date all wires were cut, some insulators broken and the level of the wires thrown out between Sangla Hill and Salarwala railway stations in the Lyallpur District.

On 16th April 1919, 16 wires were cut and several insulators broken between Jullundur and Cheheru railway stations.

Slight damage occurred again between Valtoha and Gharyala railway stations by the cutting of 2 wires in several places and destruction of some insulators, on this date.

Two wires were cut between Jandiala and Butari railway stations and 80 insulators broken between Sangrana Sahib and Bhagtanwala, 3 and 6 miles from Amritsar towards Tarn Taran, respectively. The telegraph line was damaged, wires cut and insulators broken for ¼ mile between Premnagar and Pattoki, on this date.

Slight damage was again done to the wires on the 17th by pulling them down from the posts in some places between Gharyala and Patti railway stations.

In the Lyallpur District slight damage was done to telegraph posts, wires and insulators between Lyallpur and Gatti railway stations.

One wire was cut between Nakodar and Thabalke railway stations on this date.

One wire was again cut at mile 13¼ between Nakodar and Thabalke railway stations on the 18th April

Mr. J. M. CLUDE—continued—Mr. G. BURLINGAM.

and 7 insulators were broken between Gatti and Chak Jhumra railway stations.

Two wires were cut between Chhina and Dbariwal railway stations in Gurdaspur District on this date.

On 19th April 1919 the canal wire was cut and 300 feet stolen between Manihala and Valtoba canal telegraph office in the Lahore District.

All wires were cut in 3 places, 120 insulators and 2 posts broken and wires thrown out of level between Janiwala and Toba Tek Singh railway stations in Lyallpur District.

On the same day 2 wires were cut and 1 post broken 13 miles from Pathankot towards Dunera railway station.

There was slight damage done in the Rohtak District again on the 20th April, the canal wire being cut near the Jat School at Rohtak. On this date 2 wires were cut at 7 miles from Pathankot towards Nurpur.

On 21st April slight damage to wire and insulators was done between Sujampur and Madhopur canal offices.

#### Classes concerned.

All damage as detailed in section 3 above was done by the general mob. In no instance was any damage caused by servants of this department. In fact there was no reason to suspect anybody being in any way concerned with what happened.

The whole staff, Indian and non-Indian, behaved exceedingly well, going out promptly to restore communication as soon as an interruption occurred.

This may be seen from the long list of men, of all ranks, who have been rewarded by money grants by the Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs.

The only cause for anxiety arose from the persistent way in which the Indian telephone operators employed in the Lahore telephone exchange tapped the wires during conversations on the telephones.

This may have been due to mere curiosity to learn how the various phases of the disturbances in Lahore were being viewed and the manner in which it was proposed to deal with them.

#### Methods adopted by the rioters.

These are detailed in the narrative of events in section 3.

The most serious damage done in any office was the wrecking of the telephone exchange at Amritsar. The telegraph office there would undoubtedly have shared the same fate, had it not been for the arrival of timely relief.

The systematic way in which telegraphic communication was interfered with proves that there was some organization controlling the disturbances and the smashing of hundreds of insulators shows that it possessed intelligence. Numbers of tubular iron posts were broken and many heavy iron rails twisted out of shape. This would result from the cutting of several wires simultaneously and the consequent sudden release of the heavy strain on the posts. Many insulators would break in the process, but the quantities broken show that they were smashed to pieces subsequently.

The following claims were submitted by me and the amounts will no doubt appear in the reports being submitted by your Commissioners:—

Name of District.	Amount of claim.	Presented to	On
	Rs.		
Amritsar . . .	22,200	District Magistrate	5th May 1919.
Lahore . . .	19,000	Ditto	Ditto.
Gujranwala . . .	17,000	Ditto	Ditto.
Jullundur . . .	1,700	Ditto	Ditto.
Gurdaspur . . .	1,300	Ditto	Ditto.
Lyallpur . . .	3,000	Ditto	Ditto.
Rohtak . . .	100	Ditto	10th May 1919.
Delhi . . .	150	Ditto	14th May 1919.

Statement showing number of separate outrages committed on the Telegraph lines, etc., on each date during the recent disturbances in the Punjab. The number given is only approximate as it is not now (29th August) possible to quote accurate figures:—

Date.	No. of outrages.
10th April 1919 . . . . .	9
12th April 1919 . . . . .	4
13th April 1919 . . . . .	4
14th April 1919 . . . . .	12
15th April 1919 . . . . .	7
16th April 1919 . . . . .	7
17th April 1919 . . . . .	8
18th April 1919 . . . . .	2
19th April 1919 . . . . .	4
20th April 1919 . . . . .	1
21st April 1919 . . . . .	1
TOTAL . . . . .	64

Mr. G. BURLINGAM, Superintendent, Railway Telegraphs, North-Western Railway and Oudh-Rohilkhand Railway, on the working of the North-Western Railway Telegraph system during the disturbances in the Punjab in April 1919.

*April 10th.*—At 14 hours all Railway Telegraph wires near Amritsar were cut, but there was no stoppage to traffic as messages were diverted through other routes. Trains proceeded on caution order over sections where lines were interrupted.

*April 11th.*—No further reports of wire cutting received during the day, and communication on all wires near Amritsar restored by 18.30 hours.

*April 12th.*—All railway wires near Kasur cut at 10.30 hours no great delay to messages as they were diverted through other routes. Communication restored same night. Certain signallers at Kasur gave trouble and false information on this day, and also tampered with telegraph instruments. This was personally noticed and reported by the Deputy Superintendent in charge, Lahore Telegraph Office.

*April 13th.*—Early morning all wires cut between Lahore and Amritsar near Jallo and repaired again by midday, they were again interrupted at midnight.

Deputy Superintendent, Lahore office, on this day had great difficulty in disposing of traffic owing to passive resistance on many circuits, and practice messages, i.e., (conversation on the wires) regarding en-

quiries as to when Lahore and other stations proposed going out on strike. Many practice messages from stations on line were signalled as originating from Lahore. This information was brought to the notice of the Deputy Superintendent by his office staff. Many stations during the day asked Lahore at what time Lahore staff were going out on strike, and the reply was invariably given that Lahore had no intention of striking. The effect of the Lahore office remaining loyal undoubtedly stopped a general strike amongst the signalling staff at the majority of the stations on the North-Western Railway. It may be here mentioned that during the whole of these disturbances there were no casualties whatsoever amongst the staff of Lahore office which is very marked as the signalling staff employed at that time numbered between 40 and 45.

*April 14th.*—All wires on the Rawalpindi side Gujranwala cut at 12 hours. The Station Telegraph Office and instruments burnt, also all wires between Sheikhupura and Sangla Hill cut in many places and Telegraph offices and instruments burnt at a few small stations. Telegraph message traffic was not seriously delayed as it was passed through branch lines.

Mr. G. BURLINGHAM.

[Concluded.]

At 9-30 hours telegraph staff of Bhatinda office, with the exception of the Signaller-in-charge, went out on strike, but returned to duty at 20-30 hours the same night. Work was carried on in this office by Signaller-in-charge and Telegraph Inspector, who managed to clear the very important clear line messages. Meanwhile staff had been ordered from Lahore to proceed there, but were stopped at Bhatinda and sent on to Bahawalnagar where the staff had also struck. Traffic at the latter station was not seriously interrupted in consequence.

Telegraph communication between Lahore and Delhi *via* Bhatinda was also interrupted at 22 hours.

*April 15th.*—All lines continued interrupted throughout the day with the exception of the line between Delhi and Lahore *via* Bhatinda which were restored at 15 hours.

At 10-30 in the morning the staff of Ambala office went out on strike, but returned to duty later in the day. There were no serious delays to message traffic, as the signaller-in-charge and a certain number of the senior signallers remained on duty throughout the day. At 9 hours in the morning the staff of Khanewal office also went out on strike, but returned to duty at 18 hours, traffic was much dislocated at this station, as no telegraph staff remained loyal.

*April 16th.*—All lines between Lahore, Karachi and Multan were cut near Chang Manga in the early morning, all other wires remained interrupted throughout the day and message traffic between important stations on the whole railway much dislocated.

*April 17th.*—Communication on all wires between Lahore, Karachi and Multan restored by midday, all other lines remain interrupted.

*April 18th.*—Communication on one wire to Rawalpindi restored at 10 hours which greatly facilitated up-country traffic.

*April 19th.*—Communication restored on all lines forwards Rawalpindi and all lines between Sangla Hill restored by midday.

*April 20th.*—Communication on all lines between Lahore and Amritsar restored.

During the whole of this period a great bulk of the less important telegraph message traffic was despatched by every available train, thus relieving a great deal of the congestion in the large offices.

Besides the reports of wire cutting mentioned above, several of the less important branch lines were cut at various places, but this did not interfere with the more important main line traffic.

Having given a brief outline of the effect of the disturbances on the Railway Telegraph system, I take the opportunity of bringing to notice several points which may be of interest.

*Lahore Railway Telegraph Office.*—Lahore is not only the largest and most important Telegraph office on the Railway, but controls the main circuits to all the most distant and important offices on the system, such as Karachi, Ambala, Rawalpindi, etc., and in consequence its influence during the recent disturbances was most marked. This has been brought to light by the numerous and repeated enquiries on the lines from various offices as to when Lahore was going out on strike, and I am convinced that had this office not remained loyal a more or less general strike amongst the signalling staff throughout the Railway would have followed, which might have extended to other branches of the staff, and had this been the case it is more than probable that the strike would have spread further afield. I have evidence of this from my European Inspector on the Oudh and Rohilkhand Railway, who overheard a conversation on the wires on the Northern section of that railway to this effect.

I have in consequence recommended rewards for the whole staff of this office and especially for Mr. Harding, the Deputy Superintendent of this office, as it was in a great measure due to his untiring energy and tact in dealing with his staff that work was carried on in such a successful manner.

I have emphasized the importance of Lahore Office in order to bring to notice the necessity of proper control and supervision over the staff of that office during disturbances of this kind, and the following occurrence during the recent riots will enable me to explain my reasons.

On the night of the 14th the staff living in Lahore City complained that they had been warned by their landlords that if they remained loyal, they would be ejected from their houses in 24 hours' notice. Luckily, this came to nothing through martial law being declared, but the fact remains that staff living in the city were subjected to considerable inconvenience through remaining loyal, and *vice versa* others of the staff may have remained loyal in order to give information in the city that they had accumulated during their duty by conversation on the wires.

I, therefore, consider that accommodation should be provided for them away from the city so that should a repetition of the recent disturbances occur they may remain unmolested and not be in touch with agitators in the city.

*Censorship of private messages.*—Censors were appointed to the Lahore office at the commencement of the disturbances and are still employed at the present time. The censorship has proved to be more of a preventive than a detective measure, and it is extremely unlikely that any messages of a seditious nature will be presented by the public for transmission. These censors, however, in no way make the Railway telegraph system a water-tight compartment, in fact, it would be no more so if censors were employed at all the more important stations, as news of a seditious and alarmist nature and false and bogus messages have been, and can always be sent from end to end of the railway by the telegraph staff themselves by means of practice messages and conversations on the wires, and for the stoppage of this I can see no solution. To appreciate this fact I may mention that even the staff at Howrah (Calcutta) during the commencement of the disturbances were in close touch with the strike movement on this railway by means of these practice messages.

*Wire cutting by rioters.*—The cutting of communications caused great anxiety and dislocation to the train service, as the whereabouts and fate of any mail and passenger trains were unknown, and almost all trains whether ordinary or special were seriously delayed, but the rioters by cutting our main communications temporarily solved the problem of practice messages and conversation over the wires most effectively and prevented any possibility of a further attempt to organise a general strike throughout the Railway during the critical period from the 15th to the 19th of April.

It may appear that I place too much importance on this means of organizing a general strike so I give the following illustration to support my argument.

Information was received from the Railway Board at the commencement of the disturbances that a general strike was being organized throughout the Railway, and that the word "Rowlatt" transmitted by means of practice messages would be the signal for a general strike to commence. This fortunately did not occur, but it brings to light three important points—

- (a) The value of the Railway Telegraph system for organizing general strike.
- (b) That the organization could only have succeeded at the commencement of the disturbances, as after the 14th most of our important circuits were interrupted during the remainder of the critical period due to the cutting of communications by the rioters and thus stopping all possibility of organizing a strike in this manner.
- (c) That during the critical period all communication with Rawalpindi and beyond other than by wireless was severed and this leads me to surmise that subsequent events on the Frontier occurred when they did and not in sequence to the events in the Punjab.



# PART III

## Written Statements of Witnesses subsequently examined Orally.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN, C.I.E., C.B.E., Deputy Commissioner of Gujranwala.

### I.—SURVEY OF THE PREDISPOSING CAUSES.

It is difficult for any one in Gujranwala to make a survey of the predisposing causes of the unrest, because they lay elsewhere. This much is certain that there were no economic causes. Gujranwala being a district with two large canals in it has thriven exceedingly during the war owing to the high prices obtainable by agricultural produce, and even during the last year when other districts were suffering for want of rain on unirrigated areas the canal-irrigated crops have been magnificent. Traders have gained concomitantly with the agriculturists and labourers have obtained wages proportionate to the rise of prices. The only persons who have suffered have been Government servants and others on fixed wages. There has been an immense absorption of gold and silver throughout the district. Equally the unrest is in no way connected with the recruiting campaign. If it had been anywhere in the Punjab it would have been visible in Gujranwala where, as it is known, a very intensive campaign took place in a district not previously accustomed to recruiting from November 1917 to the end of the war. The agricultural classes which provided the recruits took no part in the outbreak, except in the neighbourhood of Chuharkana where it happened that the agriculturists had shown great reluctance to recruit. The townspeople did not do their share even in providing men for the subsidiary and less dangerous sections of the army. The unrest, therefore, was entirely political. It was organized from outside. It was confined to the towns on the railway.

### II.—IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE OUTBREAK.

The immediate causes of the outbreak were the previous outbreaks in Delhi and Amritsar. Mr. Gandhi's campaign of passive resistance was intended to be a challenge to Government and as such it was generally understood by the intelligent classes. In Delhi, when the mob came into conflict with the police, no action was taken against the organizers. Consequently it was decided to push a *hartal* in as many places in the Punjab as possible. The campaign of misrepresentation of the Rowlatt Act was systematically worked up, and local leaders (almost all members of the Bar) concerted the measures for *hartal*. In Gujranwala the barristers and pleaders made arrangements for a public meeting on April 5th. A notice of this meeting, to which some 15 men put their signatures, was hurriedly printed and circulated through the town. The printing, it may be mentioned, was carried out in Lahore, as the Gujranwala presses would not undertake the work. At 1 P.M. on the 5th I sent for leaders of the movement and warned them that if disorder resulted I would hold them responsible as instigators.

The meeting on the evening of 5th was held near the house of one of the pleaders, Lala Amar Nath Uberoi and was fairly well attended; all classes appeared to be represented by the audience but the large majority were Hindus. The speeches were of usual character, denouncing the Rowlatt Bill as a shameful recompense for India's loyalty and support during the war. No attempt was made to explain the Bill but it was summed up as allowing "*Na Dahi, Na Appeal, Na Fakt*." A particularly objectionable speech was delivered by one Mangal Sen. One Chuni Lal, Manohanda, spoke as an eye-witness

of the incidents at Delhi and alleged that the official account was incorrect.

On the 6th, therefore, the shops of the city remained closed. Rumours of the usual nature about the Rowlatt Act were industriously circulated, and it was also published that the closing of shops was itself by Government order; the leaders had realized that extra Police would be posted to prevent any disorder, which would lend colour to this report. In order to introduce the element of fasting, it was also reported that Government had forbidden any fires for cooking that day. The day passed off peacefully as its organizers intended; the shopkeepers accepted it merely as an extra holiday, and the population wandered round idly and was without excitement, fasting and humiliation being conspicuous by their absence.

This description has been introduced to show how unreal the first demonstration was; and it was this very unreality which had the effect of obscuring the real danger which lay behind it. It seems probable as has already been said that the next test of strength against the Government would have been postponed, but the deportation of Kitchlew and Satya Pal stirred up Amritsar to acts of serious nature and Lahore tried to follow suit. Distorted versions of the occurrences in these places were widely manufactured and circulated with the intent of inflaming people's minds against Government. Special efforts were made to stir up the Sikhs by the rumour of damage done to the Golden Temple. This was quite unsuccessful among the educated Sikhs, who have behaved well throughout but took effect among the ignorant Sikh peasants of the neighbourhood of Chuharkana. At the same time it had been noted by the organizers that Government had done nothing against the leaders at Delhi and they thought, as the approver has stated in his evidence, that at most they will be sent to a Hill Station to enjoy a holiday at Government expense. In fact it is clear that none of the interments from that of Lajpat Rai in Rangoon have had any deterrent effect, except the interments inside the gaols. Another factor which is well worthy of notice is that in Gujranwala the Municipal elections were shortly to have taken place, and the candidates felt themselves bound to take a prominent part in what was going forward, in order not to lose the reputation of being leaders.

### III.—CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.

A description of the main course of events leading up to the first *hartal* in Gujranwala itself has been given in some detail in the section dealing with the immediate causes of the outbreak. It will, however, be convenient to include the whole series of events in this narrative, in order to give a true perspective of the movement. It also seems better to give a continuous account of the occurrences in each place affected, rather than to compile a daily narrative of events in the whole district.

#### Gujranwala.

5th April.—As the result of informal discussions in the Bar room, it was decided by the local leaders to hold a meeting of protest against the Rowlatt Bill on this evening. Hand bills were hurriedly printed in Lahore and distributed throughout the town. This notice announced that a public meeting of the citizens of Gujranwala would be held at the house of Lala Amar Nath, Pleader,

Continued.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

at 5-30 P.M. that day, under the presidency of Lala Hakim Rai, Pleader, to signify displeasure at the passage of the Rowlatt Bill. Members of all religions and communities were invited to attend and lend their support to the meeting. At 1 P.M. I summoned the leaders of this movement and warned them that they would be held responsible for any disturbances. The meeting was held as advertised and the following resolutions were passed:—

- (1) That this meeting expresses its strong protest against the Rowlatt Bill and views with consternation and disapproval the manner in which it has been passed in the teeth of unanimous opposition and the considered judgment of the country as a whole.
- (2) This meeting expects that the 6th of April be observed as a national protest day and a fast of 24 hours be kept by all, and that all business in the town be suspended for the day.
- (3) That this meeting views with alarm the action of the Delhi authorities in firing upon the people of the city, which resulted in the deaths of so many citizens; and urges on the Government the need of enquiring into responsibility for the said occurrence.
- (4) That a cable be despatched to the Secretary of State, etc., etc., conveying the purport of the resolutions.

Some of the speeches, as already mentioned, were highly objectionable in character.

*6th April.*—General *hartal* was observed throughout the city, induced and encouraged by the rumours mentioned in the preceding section. The day passed off peacefully and there were no incidents worthy of record.

*7th to 10th April.*—No movements were visible and the demonstration appeared to be to an end, although rumours were still afloat and it was evident that a certain amount of excitement prevailed in the city. Late on the night of the 10th news reached Gujranwala of the occurrences at Amritsar and Lahore.

*11th April.*—In the morning there were meetings of the Executive Committee of the District War League and of the District Board. Referring to the Amritsar incidents I warned the meetings, only in their own interest, to see that no such incident occurred in Gujranwala. In the evening I held a minor Durbar for the distribution of recruiting and other rewards.

*12th April.*—I left the district in the evening on transfer, handing over officiating charge to Khan Bahadur Mirza Sultan Ahmad, Extra Assistant Commissioner. Other Magistrates and notable people of the district left the same evening or the following morning for Lahore to attend the Durbar on the 14th.

*13th April.*—In the morning the Assistant Commissioner, with the Naib Tahsildar, left for Eminabad to superintend the annual cattle fair. It appears that the local leaders had held a meeting on the evening of the previous day, but had come to no decision as to measures to be taken. To-day, however, at a further meeting it was definitely decided "to repeat the incidents of Lahore and Amritsar in order to discredit the Government and to show sympathy with the people of these places." The plans decided upon were to interrupt railway and telegraphic communications. These plans, however, were kept well concealed and the only information which reached the Superintendent of Police was that there would probably be a new *hartal* on the 14th.

The American Missionaries received a warning late at night from the Indian Christians that it would be as well for them to leave. They did so during the night on the assurance that the Indian Christians would be safe without them.

*14th April.*—Early in the morning a calf was killed and hung up by the neck to the Kachchi railway bridge. Rumours were circulated that this was the work of the Police. The calf was discovered and promptly buried by the Police. From early morning crowds collected

in the bazars, raising various cries and seeing to the closure of all the shops. When the 1<sup>st</sup> morning train came into the station, large numbers of people were prepared to go by this train to the *Baisakhi* fair at Wazirabad. Certain leaders, however, walked up and down the station platform shouting out that this was no day for holiday making, and that any one who went to Wazirabad should be considered a *bastard*. Many people thereupon alighted. As the train was starting the guard was also seized and prevented from mounting the train. The train moved on, but came to a standstill short of the distant signal, the crowd meanwhile surrounding it and stoning it, and attempting to damage the engine. Part of the mob then proceeded to set on fire a small bridge over the Railway opposite the *Gurukul*. Mr. Heron, Superintendent of Police, observed the train at a standstill from his bungalow and after enquiry despatched Mr. Nevill, Assistant Superintendent of Police, to the spot with a small guard, while he himself set off towards Police Lines to collect more men and to warn the station. Mr. Nevill on arrival found two or three sleepers of the bridge burning fiercely with the help of kerosene oil. The crowd, consisting mainly of small boys, ran off on his approach and he set to work to extinguish the fire. The Superintendent of Police after making his other dispositions went to the station to see how matters stood there. He found that the Telegraph wire had been cut on both sides, but as the telephone to Lahore was still open he sent a brief message of what had occurred to the Inspector-General of Police through the Controller. It was found very difficult to keep the station clear as the station staff refused to co-operate.

Up to this time no Magistrate had been present, but the officiating Deputy Commissioner, with Agha Ghulam Hassan Khan, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Lala Amar Nath, Extra Assistant Commissioner, now appeared. At 9 P.M., as the Permanent-Way Inspector certified that the bridge was safe, the morning train was sent off to Wazirabad. Shortly after 10 o'clock information was received that the Kachchi bridge on the Lahore side of the railway station had been set on fire. Police were at once sent to extinguish it. All communication to Wazirabad and Lahore had by this time been cut. The crowd in front of the railway station greatly increased in numbers and one or two black flags made their appearance. Two men meanwhile were moving among the crowd distributing *chapatis* and calling out "*langar is roti*." The three Magistrates meanwhile were endeavouring to induce the people to go quietly to their homes. One or two pleaders also made a pretence of leading away a portion of the crowd into the city. It was afterwards found that they were led away to listen to further inflammatory speeches. The mob next attacked the Railway near the distant signal on the Lahore side, having secured tools for the purpose, from the gang huts. The Superintendent of Police, with Lala Amar Nath, Extra Assistant Commissioner, and a small force of Police proceeded to the spot and the crowd ran off. The Kachchi bridge was still burning and more constables were deputed to extinguish it. The Superintendent of Police was returning to the station when a large mob came up and commenced to throw stones at him and his Police escort. At this moment Chaudhri Ghulam Rasul, Deputy Superintendent of Police, and Agha Ghulam Hussain Khan arrived from the city with another *posse* of Police. But despite their presence, the mob worked themselves up and made a rush and attempted to seize the Superintendent of Police himself. He had to use his revolver and the Police also fired with buck-shot, so the crowd dispersed in the direction of the city. As the state of affairs was now more really serious Mr. Heron sent off telegrams by special messengers to be despatched from Eminabad and Rahwali to Lahore and Sialkot respectively, requesting military assistance. There was still a large mob in front of the station, all the members of it being by now in a state of great excitement. During this time it appears that access had been gained to the

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

[Continued.]

Post Office from the rear and the inner rooms of the Telegraph Office had been set on fire. All water had been removed from the premises and the pumps at the station had been damaged obviously by previous arrangement. It was therefore impossible to save the building. This damage done, the mob cleared off for a time, but returned again in numbers opposite the station. The rioters had been greatly inflamed by the speeches made by mob orators at various meetings and by the stimulus given by the leaders on the arrival of a couple of wounded men into the assemblage. There were in consequence a number of persons wild with excitement.

Later on, news came that two other mobs had crossed the Railway line some way from the station, one mob intending to attack the Tahsil and open the jail, and the other to attack the Kutcheri, Treasury, Mission Compound and Civil bungalows. The Superintendent of Police and Assistant Superintendent of Police both set off to deal with these mobs, but the crowds had already succeeded in setting fire to the Tahsil, Dāk Bungalow and Kutcheri. They were driven off from the Police Lines and the jail, but the guard on the Church failed to prevent the rioters from destroying the building. The crowd was fired on whenever seen, but scattered on the approach of the Police. Meanwhile, during the absence of the Superintendent of Police, the crowd had gained access to the station premises and had set the building on fire and the Casson Industrial School had also been gutted. Subsequently to this another party set fire to the goods shed, and what property was not burnt was looted by the crowd of bad characters who collected on the spot. While this was going on, aeroplanes arrived from Lahore and by dropping bombs drove the crowd to the safety of their own houses. Two of these bombs are known to have fallen into the thick of the rioters. About this time, I arrived by motor car from Lahore. The more violent of the rioters had full intention not only of completing their evil work of destroying the Civil Station and its white inhabitants, but of looting the wealthy merchants of the town. The unexpected arrival of the aeroplanes effectually discouraged the rioters who lost five killed and four wounded by one bomb alone outside the railway godown. Whether they would have plucked up courage during the night to make a fresh attack on the small party with women and children which had taken refuge in the Treasury, cannot be said. Fortunately, however, the arrival of troops from Sialkot at 9 p.m. finally quieted the situation.

**15th April.**—During the morning I went round the city with Mr. Douglas Donald, Deputy Inspector-General of Police, the Superintendent of Police and a party of British soldiers and made some 23 arrests of those who were known to be the leaders, including several barristers and pleaders. Word had been sent out on the 14th evening by special messengers to the various Tahsils giving orders for the prompt suppression of any disorder, for the assemblage of all persons licensed to carry arms and for the institution of a system of civil patrols on the Railway line.

**16th April.**—Martial Law was proclaimed over the district.

#### Wazirabad.

**6th April.**—Efforts were made by various Hindus to force a *hartal* in the town, but this was frustrated by the efforts of prominent Muhammadans.

**12th April.**—A secret meeting was held at the house of Dial Shah, Municipal Commissioner, where it was first decided to have a *hartal* on the 13th, but at the request of the sweetmeat sellers it was postponed to the 15th, so that they should not lose their profits for the *Baisakhi* fair.

**14th April.**—The news of the riot at Gujranwala spread quickly to Wazirabad. Local agitators paraded the streets exhorting the people to observe *hartal*. In the afternoon a meeting was convened in the Juma Masjid of Hindus and Muhammadans together, under the presidency of Jamiat Singh Bagga. Speeches were

made by him and others denouncing the Rowlatt Act and preaching *hartal*. After dark groups marched through the streets singing inflammatory ballads. No actual violence occurred.

**15th April.**—A general *hartal* was observed. Led by the local agitators, mobs went round to the schools and forced them to close, and so added a number of school-boys to their ranks. The crowd then gathered in front of the Tahsil. The Tahsildar called in the most prominent leaders and advised them to disperse. No heed, however, was taken and the crowd split up in several directions. One portion proceeded to the engine shed and attempted to induce a strike of the employees. Another lot went to the Dāk Bungalow where they damaged Telegraph wires and also the compound fencing. A party of cavalry guarding the station proper partially dispersed the mob; the latter, however, returned and pelted them with stones. The Military, considering that they had not sufficient authority to disperse the mob by fire, only fired in the air. A part of this mob moved on to the Palku Railway Bridge. They cut Telegraph wires, damaged the distant signal and set fire to the bridge itself. The mob was dispersed by the Police and driven to the city and the fire extinguished. They re-assembled and did more wire cutting near the civil hospital, but were dispersed by Police near the District Board bungalow. Another mob went towards Nizamabad and were joined by a crowd from that village, where *hartal* had been induced by the Lambardar, Mubarak Ali, and others. They set fire to a gang hut, took the tools and did what damage they could to the Railway bridges and level crossing gates. They then went to the house of the Reverend Grahame Bailey, burnt it and looted it. After this they returned to Wazirabad and gathered before the Post Office with a view to destroying it, but they were prevented by the action of the Police.

Further down the line a few bad characters in the neighbourhood of Ghakhar tried to persuade the people of Ghakhar to attack the line and the railway station. The people, however, refused.

**16th April.**—I, with Superintendent of Police, visited Wazirabad and superintended the arrest of certain of the leaders. Sufficient troops had by this time arrived to maintain order and the headquarters of the Sialkot Brigade was subsequently moved to Wazirabad.

#### Hafizabad.

**5th April.**—The anniversary of the Arya Samaj High School was in progress. Among the speakers was Lala Raja Ram, Professor of the D. A.-V. College, Lahore. A secret meeting of the leading local agitators was held at the house of Ram Sahai, soda-water manufacturer, to discuss measures of passive resistance. A special delegate was sent from here to consult the editor of the *Desh* at Lahore, Dina Nath Pasi, a resident of Hafizabad.

**6th April.**—A *hartal* was observed, but it was apparently only partial and was not fully organized. In the evening a meeting was held at which speeches were made in opposition to the Rowlatt Bill of the same tenor as in Gujranwala.

**12th April.**—Another meeting was called to organize *hartal* for the 14th.

**14th April.**—A *hartal* was carried out as previously arranged. A crowd gathered in front of the Tahsil, but on the Tahsildar's order to disperse, it went away. It re-assembled, however, outside the town and proceeded towards the railway station. Speeches were made in the neighbourhood of the goods shed, openly advising rebellion. While these were going on a passenger train steamed into the station, in a first class carriage of which Lieutenant Tatam, of the Military Farms Department, was travelling with a small boy. The crowd sighted him and rushed towards the station. He scented trouble and shut up the carriage all round, but the crowd made a fierce attack with sticks and stones and broke in the windows. It was only the plucky action of two or three Indians who came to his rescue and the moving off of the train which saved his life and that of the small

Continued.]

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

child with him. After this the mob dispersed and nothing further happened that day.

15th April.—*Hartal* was again observed. A mob collected with the intention of destroying a culvert, but dispersed without doing any damage. It then re-assembled, damaged the distant signal and cut wires. One man who climbed the signal was promptly arrested and so was another who came to rescue him. They were taken to the Tahsil, whereupon the mob collected outside and threw stones at the building. The Police from the roof fired in the air and the mob dispersed. Later on the Police Inspector went into the city and dispersed a gathering which he found there, without causing any casualties.

16th April.—Shops were open as usual and no further disturbance occurred.

#### *Akalgarh and Ramnagar.*

6th April.—Members of the Diwan family, descendants of Diwan Mulraj, the rebel of Multan fame, with other Hindus went round the bazars of Akalgarh inducing shopkeepers to close their shops. In the evening, a meeting was held under the presidency of Diwan Gopal Lal, the speeches being mostly moderate in tone. At Ramnagar *hartal* was also observed.

14th April.—The shops at Akalgarh opened as usual in the morning. At about 9 A.M., however, rumours began to arrive about the disturbances at Kasur, etc. The leaders thereupon formed a procession and again forced *hartal* by the threat of boycott. The mob collected and proceeded shouting towards the station and the Mandi. They threatened to burn down the factories of those who refused to join in the *hartal*. They then went on to the railway station. A party was sent off to Wazirabad to find out what was happening there and two of these returned at 4-30 and brought news about the riot at Gujranwala. The mob was a half-hearted one and no actual damage was done. At Ramnagar also, apparently, the day was uneventful.

15th April.—A meeting had been arranged to promote Hindu-Musalman unity, but it fell through as leading Musalmans refused to join. The mob was again very half-hearted and contented itself with the consumption and circulation of every kind of rumour. Slight damage was done to telegraph wires, signal lamps were broken and an attempt was made to burn a bridge. One of the Railway staff announced that there would be a Railway strike that evening, but nothing came of it.

At Ramnagar a most serious event occurred. A party of Hindus collected, and proceeded to the banks of the Chenab. They there produced a small rag effigy of the King-Emperor and proceeded to burn it with every species of insult. The ashes were thrown into the water and the crowd then had a bath in token of purification and returned in triumph to the town. The perpetrators of this outrage were apparently exceedingly frightened afterwards at their own rashness and endeavoured to hush the incident up. No further trouble occurred in the town.

Only one more incident remains to be recorded, and that is the burning of the patwari's papers at Aulakh. It appears that two of the Lambardars and other zamindars of the village were deluded into the idea that the power of Government had weakened; and as the Tahsil copies of the village records had been burnt they imagined they would gain some advantage by destroying the patwari's records as well. Accordingly, they attacked and burnt the Patwarkhana on April 16th. The act met with prompt retribution for on the 18th the Assistant Superintendent of Police with a party of British soldiers and Police proceeded to the village and arrested all those who were concerned.

#### IV.—MARTIAL LAW AND OTHER MEASURES ADOPTED FOR SUPPRESSION OF DISTURBANCES.

The Military authorities despatched troops with great promptitude all over the disturbed area. The headquarters of the Sialkot Brigade were moved to Wazir-

abad, and detachments were sent to Gujranwala, Khanki and Hafizabad. The British troops sent to Gujranwala were utilized in the prompt raid on Aulakh, the one village of the Gujranwala half of the district that misbehaved itself. They were also taken out on escort duty with officers at the beginning and especially were paraded in Akalgarh and the disreputable town of Ramnagar where the effigy of the King-Emperor was burnt.

Under Martial Law the Curfew Law was enforced from 8 P.M. to 5 A.M. in the towns where there were troops. This measure was liked at first, as it prevented indiscriminate stealing by bad characters, who would have taken advantage of the occasion. It was, however, eased off and finally removed at an early date as the heat increased, because it interfered with the movements of carts, and pack animals to market. It was necessary to punish a few individuals at the commencement of curfew, because the people had no idea what discipline meant and that it was necessary to obey orders. Rules were also issued prohibiting the carrying of cudgels. It was necessary at an early date prohibiting the issue of railway tickets, except on passes given by the military authorities, because the railway was made use of by the agents of rebellion to disseminate evil ideas far and wide. Orders were also issued for the inculcation of respect for authority and the schoolboys were ordered to salute the British flag for some days. These orders were, I consider, salutary as the youth of the present day is brought up without respect even for his parents. The troops gave some displays of the use of the Lewis Gun, Machine Gun and six-pounder gun in different places which all had a good effect on the population which had forgotten the troops' existence and had no knowledge of modern arms. No orders issued under Martial Law in this district appear to have been unnecessary or undesirable.

#### V.—CLASSES PROMINENT.

The majority of the persons who were prominent belonged to the Arya Samaj.

Rural notables and agriculturists not connected with disturbances.

Principal classes:—

- (1) Pleaders and their Munshis.
- (2) Students and schoolboys.
- (3) Traders.
- (4) Certain classes of Government servants.

#### VI.—METHODS ADOPTED BY REBELS AND DISTURBERS OF THE PEACE.

As directed by Mr. Gandhi the rebels organized a test *hartal* on the 6th of April. This was successful everywhere, not only in this district but elsewhere, and its success came as a great surprise. The organization of the evil-doers was complete and the better classes appeared quite unable to do anything except look on. In Wazirabad, however, the presence of a sufficient body of reliable Muhammadans prevented the *hartal* from taking place. The feature of the later days of riot was the employment of a large number of boys and although the crowd got out of hand and older men joined in, it would appear as if the leaders had desired a second test of the organization in which boys and youths only should take part and which could be put down as mere boyish pranks. In the attack on Lieutenant Tatam there was hardly one of the assailants whose age exceeded 20 and in Gujranwala Mr. Heron was undoubtedly hampered in taking energetic action by the fact that all the people in the forefront were boys. A strike of Railway employees was undoubtedly under consideration, though it is probable that it was timed for a much later date and thus never came off at all. The North-Western Railway authorities have taken some punitive action, though perhaps hardly sufficient, considering the sympathy shown by the Railway staff. The first thing that the mob thought of in Gujranwala was to attack the communications. The Telegraph and Telephone wires

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN—concluded—Khan Bahadur MIRZA SULTAN AHMAD.

were cut at an early hour. Attempts were made to burn the bridges on both sides of the station. That they did no more damage is probably due to the fact that the rising was premature and the experts who should have assisted them were not available. In Wazirabad as the station was defended by troops the mob could only destroy Telegraph wires on all four sides of the station. In Hafizabad on the 15th of April the cry of the leaders was "See how, although the main line is stopped, troops are able to go round through Hafizabad towards Lahore, Amritsar and Delhi to fight against our brothers. We should stop this line also."

Government buildings were attacked as already described to show contempt to lawful authority.

#### VII.—PUNITIVE MEASURES.

There were five sentences of whipping passed by the Commissions and four by Summary Courts for minor offences between the 30th March and the date of the proclamation. These were mainly juvenile offenders sentenced to whipping after the manner of school discipline, or persons found guilty of committing theft only, for which whipping is suitable under the ordinary law. There were only 15 sentences of whipping by Summary Courts for offences against Martial Law. One

is reported to have been inflicted in public before instructions in this connection had been issued. I cannot go into detail as to each of the cases. The majority, however, were youths, or men who were caught out of their houses during the curfew hours. A very few sentences of this type were sufficient in each of the different places, where Martial Law was in force, to remind the people, unaccustomed to discipline, that orders were orders. Whipping in such cases was distinctly a more suitable punishment than imprisonment. Of the 16 orders only one was of 20 stripes and over, three of 10 stripes, 10 of five stripes and one less than five stripes.

The claims under section 15-A of the Police Act are as under :—

	Rs.	A.	P.
Gujranwala . . . . .	5,37,494	7	6
Wazirabad . . . . .	69,276	8	0
Hafizabad . . . . .	6,525	0	0
Akalgah . . . . .	1,001	0	0

The claim of Rs. 8,20,000 put in by the North-Western Railway is under consideration, but probably under section 82 of the Railway Act the claims for the damage done by the act of the King's enemies are not recoverable. The Police staff was very inadequate.

#### Khan Bahadur MIRZA SULTAN AHMAD, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Gujranwala.

(Events before the 14th April.)

Disturbance at Gujranwala on the 14th April last was due to the following reasons in my opinion.

1. On 6th April *hartal* was observed throughout the City. Although I was not at headquarters that day but I was told that it was due to the Rowlatt Bill.

2. False and baseless rumours were widely spread in the city regarding the Rowlatt Bill and even in villages the following was the topic among the inhabitants :—

(a) That according to Rowlatt Bill more than 5 or 10 men are prohibited from accompanying a marriage or funeral party without permission.

(b) That Government will take half the produce from the zamindars for each harvest.

3. Event of 10th April at Amritsar were spread everywhere through the agency of newspapers and moreover the passengers spread false rumours as well where they happened to stop, as for example "Durbar Sahib has been disgraced and inhabitants of Amritsar are in possession of the fort there." These false rumours deceived the public at large who ultimately got enraged.

Meetings which were convened on the 14th April and in which some two or three thousand of persons were present, were mainly to oppose the Rowlatt Bill. The event of Khushi Ram of Lahore was also related therein.

4. At the same time it was made known through newspapers that Mahatma Gandhi was arrested at Palwal. This news enraged the people very much.

5. On the evening of 13th April some leaflets were seen posted in the city advising the public to help the meetings of Lahore and Amritsar. These are the reasons which led to the *hartal* on 14th April last.

6. As far as I remember on 9th or 10th April last received an official letter at Sharakpur that Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien will make over charge on the 12th April. Thereupon I returned to Gujranwala and took over

charge from Colonel O'Brien on the afternoon of 12th April.

7. On the evening of 13th April last I received a letter from the Superintendent of Police informing me that there will be a *hartal* on the 14th April in the city and will last till *hartal* at Lahore ends.

At about 7 A.M. on the 14th April I went towards the city, but in the way I was told that Sialkot train which was late that day and which reached here at 8 A.M. has been stopped by the people and the driver has been threatened not to take the train further. Hearing this I repaired to the Railway Station and saw the train standing at the platform. The passengers seeing the state of affairs alighted and left for their homes.

8. Superintendent of Police along with some constables was standing there at the time. There and then I received information as to the burning of the railway bridge near the Gurukul. Superintendent of Police proceeded towards that direction and I after deputing Agha Ghulam Hassan Khan, Extra Assistant Commissioner, in the city and Lala Amar Nath, Extra Assistant Commissioner, at the Railway Station went towards the city. I saw all the shops closed and people going to and fro who were shouting out that they would not accept the Rowlatt Bill. Except this no disturbance was observed in the city. People were hurrying to the place where lectures were to be delivered. I then returned to the Railway Station. There I heard a report of shots being fired and was told that one Girdhari Dal attacked the Superintendent of Police and so it was fired.

That in spite of the people being fired at they were seen standing outside the Railway fencing and shouted out "hai hai Rowlatt Bill."

Two men were wounded by these shots. They were carried away by other men to the place where lectures were being delivered. Seeing the enraged condition of the mob and the insufficiency of the police force I sent an urgent telegram to Lahore for military help. As telegraphic communication on both sides of the station was cut off, I sent one man each to Rahwali and Eminabad Railway Stations for despatching these telegrams.

Khan Bahadur MIRZA SULTAN AHMAD—concluded—Captain D. H. M. CARBERRY.

9. When the mob carried the two wound dānen to the place of meeting they spread false rumours as to many men having been killed. Seeing the men wounded the mob got enraged very much and repaired towards the Railway Station and collected in front of the Railway gates. This mob consisted of the boys of tender age. Superintendent of Police and some of the Police Constables were standing near the Railway Station. The mob was using fiery language and addressed the Superintendent of Police either to fire at them or they will take revenge from him.

10. I and Munshi Taj-ud-Din went towards this dangerous mob and attempted some of them to give ear to us. We advised them not to make a row and told them that if Girdhari Lal had not attacked the Superintendent of Police they would not have been fired at and ultimately persuaded some of the mob to move towards the city whom we carried them to some extent. But there remained still some men standing who were using fiery language at the time.

After a short while when I returned I saw the Post Office ablaze. Some of the men were still devising to burn the Railway Station as well, but owing to the presence of the Superintendent of Police and a sufficient police force they could not succeed in carrying out their intention.

When Police used to threaten the mob by fire they dispersed but boys of tender age still remained to their places. So I thought it inadvisable to fire at them. Some 20 or 25 men succeeded in entering the Railway Station but as the Railway Staff proceeded to check them they were not fired at.

11. Besides the mob which was in front of the Railway Station other small batches were seen moving here and there who were shouting out that they would not accept the Rowlatt Bill.

12. Although some of the men threw stones at Superintendent of Police still he did not give up his courage and avoided to fire at them.

13. It was at 1 P.M. that I was told by a police constable that Dak Bungalow, Tahsil and District Courts are all set on fire. Hearing this I despatched Agha Ghulam Hassan Khan, Extra Assistant Commissioner to District Courts and after a short while I and the Superintendent of Police followed him. Before we reached there, District Courts, Tahsil and Dak Bungalow were all burnt. Before leaving for District Courts I left some 6 or 7 police constables with Lala Amar Nath, Extra Assistant Commissioner, to guard the Railway Station. When we reached District Courts we heard reports of shots from the direction of the Railway Station. On enquiry I came to know that Station and the Church have also been burnt.

14. At about 3 P.M. Colonel O'Brien arrived here from Lahore. At that time some of the mob in batches were seen moving here and there and the remainder was engaged in looting the Railway Goods shed. After a short while three aeroplanes reached here and began to throw bombs. Light showers of rain also fell at the time and the mob dispersed.

15. On the morning of 15th April military force also arrived. Had it come on the 14th April then there would have been no need of aeroplanes. If the aeroplanes had not arrived that day and were not a danger to the mob, then in my opinion the evil-doers would have committed more blunders in the city as well. It was to the exertion of Colonel O'Brien that nothing happened after the 14th April.

16. On the 15th April I was ordered by the Deputy Commissioner to go to Muridke and arrange for the safety of Railway line and telegraphic communication, as some of the evil-doers had cut the telegraph wire near Muridke. I accordingly reached Muridke on the morning of 16th April.

Captain D. H. M. CARBERRY, M.C., D.F.C., Flight Commander, No. 31 Squadron, Royal Air Force.

At about 14-00 hours on the afternoon of the 14th April 1919 I was given verbal instructions by Lieutenant Colonel F. F. Minchin, Commanding 52nd Wing, Royal Air Force, to proceed to Gujranwala and bomb and machine gun any people I saw causing damage to property, or any large crowds. I was also to reconnoitre the country round Gujranwala and to take offensive action against any parties who may have been coming in from the outlying villages to Gujranwala or returning to the villages.

Colonel Minchin also told me not to drop bombs on the native city unless in my opinion I considered it necessary.

I arrived at Gujranwala at 15-10 hours and found the Railway Station on fire and bales of goods on the platform burning. A passenger train on the up line appeared to be on fire, and the English church and 4 houses in civil lines on the east of the Railway burning.

I was flying at heights varying from 100 to 700 feet when over Gujranwala and neighbouring country and I should like to point out that no action was taken until I had satisfied myself that the target was a justifiable one.

There were large number round the station, on the roads going from the native city to the civil lines, and in the streets in the native city.

I took no action to start with and flew round the neighbouring villages. At about 15-20 I dropped three bombs on a party of natives 150 strong outside a village about 2 miles north-west of Gujranwala. One bomb failed to explode, and the others fell near the party

which scattered and ran back to the village. Three casualties were seen. 50 rounds machine gun were fired into the village.

A few minutes later at a village about 1 mile south of the above a party of 50 natives was seen returning from Gujranwala; two bombs were dropped, but only one burst; no casualties were seen. Party disappeared into village, 25 rounds machine gun fired into village.

Coming back to Gujranwala I noticed a party of about 200 natives in a field near a large red building on the north-west outskirts of town. One bomb dropped which burst in the courtyard of a house. Several people appeared to be wounded 30 rounds machine gun fired into party who took cover in the house.

I now noticed that the police held the station and were moving the crowd away into the native city. There was a large crowd of natives near the centre of the city. I dropped two bombs which I did not see burst. These must be the bombs that burst near the station. Only eight bombs were dropped and these were dropped by me. No other machines dropped bombs.

I fired about 150 rounds machine gun into the native city, causing casualties. At 15-50 hours when I left for Lahore no natives could be seen in the streets. No offensive action was taken in civil lines as I did not want to damage civilian property. I should like to point out that my original report was a bombing report, and was confined to statements of where bombs were dropped and machine gun fired.

Captain D. H. M. CARBERRY—concluded—Lieutenant L. DODKINS.

ANNEXURE TO CAPTAIN CARBERRY'S STATEMENT.

Copy of aerial reconnaissance report from 15-10 hours, 14th April 1919 to 15-40 hours 14th April 1919.

Time.	Place.	Observations.
15-10	Gujranwala	Railway station on fire, bales of goods on platform burning. Passenger train in station, Up Line, on fire. English Church and four houses in the Civil Lines on the East of Railway burning. All these were still burning at 15-30 hours.
15-20	"	Dropped three bombs on party of natives, 150 strong outside village about two miles north-west of Gujranwala. 1 bomb failed to explode. The others fell near party which scattered 3 casualties seen, 50 rounds machine gun fired into village.
15-30	"	Party of 50 natives outside village about 1 mile south of above village, 2 bombs dropped, only one exploded within 10 yards of party. No casualties were seen, 25 rounds machine gun fired into village. Party dispersed into village.
15-36	"	About 200 hundred natives in the Fields near a large red building on north-west outskirts on town. One bomb dropped which burst in courtyard of house; several people appeared to be wounded, 30 rounds machine gun fired into party who took cover in house.
15-40	"	2 bombs, which failed to burst, dropped on large crowd of natives in centre of town. 100 rounds machine guns fired into parties of natives in the streets. At 15-40 when machine left for Lahore no natives could be seen in streets. At 15-40 Station occupied by police.

D. H. M. CARBERRY, *Captain,*  
*Observer.*

Lieutenant L. DODKINS, *Observer, Royal Air Force.*

*Aeroplane Reconnaissance report Lahore to Gujranwala, dated 15th April 1919.*

Date.	Place.	Time.	Extract.
	Lahore	07—50	Left aerodrome.
	Gujranwala	08—30	Arrived. Found main line railway culvert about 300 yards S. main station partly demolished but under repair. No other damage to railway permanent way noticed between Lahore and 3 miles N. Gujranwala. Much rolling stock in station but no activity. Two trucks of goods train in station detached, one burning. House on main road opposite station almost burnt out, still burning slightly. No large congregations of people.
	Gujranwala	08—55	Gathering of about 20, noticed in field about 1 mile W. of town, scattered with Lewis Gun.
	Gujranwala	08—58	Similar gathering outside house in village ½ mile W. of town, on approaching them they entered house. One bomb dropped which hit adjoining house and blew side-in.
	Gujranwala	09—05	Truck still burning strongly and deadstock on adjoining platform. Main station building demolished. Church and large house near demolished, but no fire. Station occupied by armed Native Police and a few British ranks. Working parties busy on permanent way.
	Gujranwala	09—30	Left Gujranwala.
	Lahore	10—10	Arrived at aerodrome.

Captain W. E. GODFREY—AGHA GHULAM HASSAN.

Captain W. E. GODFREY, I.A.R.O., Gujranwala.

In giving the sequence of events which preceded the riots at Gujranwala on the 14th April 1919, I should like to say that from a personal experience which extended from June 1918 to January 1919 when I was in command of the 71st Punjabis recruiting depot and therefore in close connection with the recruiting. I am of very strong conviction that these riots had nothing whatever to do with the recruiting and it was not till well into the summer of this year that I ever heard the two things connected, at least as far as Gujranwala was concerned. I am also able if necessary to give one or two experiences of my own in refutation of the connection. During the week which preceded the riots although there were all sorts of rumours floating about the city which subsequently came to our ears through the servants, etc., I noticed nothing untoward until Friday, the 11th, when I had occasion to go to the Railway Station to make arrangements for sending my furniture to Gojra, where I was hoping to move to the following week in order to take up my work as a Missionary of the Church Missionary Society. When I reached the Station platform I noticed a group of men standing talking, this was of course nothing unusual and I should have thought nothing of it were it not for the fact that my coming evidently caused some comment from some one in the group for they all turned and looked at me, and one of them made an action of throat cutting or of the slipping on of a noose at which the others all laughed. The action was so deliberate that I made a step towards the individual to ask him what he meant, but changed my mind and continued my way to the Station Master's office. My change of mind made these men laugh again.

The servants coming in from the bazar that day brought all sorts of rumours. I therefore went to see Mr. Heron, the Superintendent of Police, but he was not able to tell me much more than I myself knew, about the attitude of the towns people.

There was to be a Darbar and a farewell garden party to Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien who was leaving the next day. In view of the rumours that were floating about I discussed with the missionaries the advisability of the ladies not attending the garden party. I also saw Colonel O'Brien in case he decided to put off the Darbar. He decided he would not do so and the missionary ladies decided also that it would be better to attend the garden party as if there was nothing unusual happening. But most of us men decided to go armed. Colonel and Mrs. O'Brien, Mr. Heron and I and my wife all drove down together to the Darbar.

Nothing unusual happened at either the Darbar or the garden party except for the fact of the presence of an unusual number of police about the municipal gardens.

*Saturday, April 12th.*—The next day Saturday morning I had again to go to the Railway Station about my furniture. I found the station staff in a very rude and independent frame of mind. I quickly noticed this as during my six months recruiting duty when I had much to do with them I always found them very polite and obliging. Two incidents happened at this time which the light of subsequent events emphasises but which at the time did not cause me undue concern. I wished to make arrangements for sending off the children's donkey to Gojra also, but during the talk with the goods clerks about this one of them said "Sir I would not send the donkey by rail if I were you." I asked him why? To which he replied it will be too hot. As it was a hot day I thought he meant it would be climatically so but afterwards I remembered the others laughed at the remark.

AGHA GHULAM HASSAN, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Gujranwala.

On the 14th April at 6 A.M., Mirza Sultan Ahmad's *chaprasi* came to my house with his note that he wants me to see him at his house on account of some urgent business. I accordingly hastened to his house along with the *chaprasi*. On my way to Mirza Sultan Ahmad's

Again later in the day having fixed up with bullock carts to convey this furniture to the Station, I went again myself to see it loaded. I left the yard, and went to the passenger platform and was talking to some of the Railway staff outside the Parcel Office when one of them said to me, "Sir, do you think you will see your furniture again?" I replied "Yes of course," why do you ask? He said "Oh there is going to be a very big railway strike." I did not wish to appear alarmed before them so I laughingly said "*Accha Kismet*" at which they all laughed. Next day one of them told me as we were leaving by the Bombay Mail that he was getting my van off that night by a goods train then standing in the station. I don't know whether he did so or not but I gave him Rs. 2 I think.

Later in the day Dr. Charles of Gujranwala came to me and said that all sorts of things were happening in the city and he would be glad to know what the arrangements were for the safety of the Indian Christians in case of trouble. We went to Mr. Heron who advised Dr. Charles, I believe, to arrange for all to go into the Treasury if there was trouble. The question of provision was also discussed. I advised the Missionaries also to make arrangements in this way.

*Sunday 13th.*—On Sunday morning at about 9 A.M. Mr. Heron, the Superintendent of Police, called to see me. He asked me to come out on to the verandah and there told me he had come to the conclusion that it would be better if I took my wife and family away to Lahore. I was not at first inclined to agree with him, as I was leaving in any case on the following Tuesday or Wednesday but agreed to be ready to go off at short notice.

The American Missionaries were having their Sabbath School at this time so when it was over I called the Rev. Dr. McConnellee over. The Rev. M. McArthur and another also came and we sat and discussed the situation and also the advisability of the ladies of the mission leaving also; while we were talking Dr. Charles, who was passing on his cycle, also joined us and reported to Mr. Heron other things he had heard. Dr. McConnellee told Mr. Heron he would tell the ladies how matters stood. I went with the Doctor to his house and all the missionaries came over. We had prayer before the discussion but the result at the time was that the ladies decided that they could not leave their Indian Christians. About 2 P.M. that afternoon Mr. Heron came again and said he had heard something which compelled him to urge me to take my family by the Bombay Mail that evening. He also promised me any help I needed to get away. We therefore hurried with our packing and were ready to leave by 4-30, but the servants having failed to get tongas I sent a note to Mr. Heron who kindly sent two policemen for us.

When we reached Gujranwala Station Mr. Heron was there with two of his Inspectors and some constables; there was a larger crowd than usual which may have been due to the Baisakhi Fair, but Mr. Heron advised my wife to sit in the waiting room. When I entered the carriage in which I was to travel and sat down a gentleman who was looking out of the window and who I afterwards saw by his luggage was a Colonel in the Indian Army remarked "If I know anything of an Indian crowd there is going to be trouble here before long." His words proved only too true. I promised Mr. Heron that I would try and come over to Gujranwala again the next day as he had expressed a wish to this effect but next morning we learned in Lahore that no trains were running to Gujranwala.

house I saw Mohan Lal, son of Jowanda Mal, riding a horse bareheaded and talking with eight or nine persons round him in Chauk Kalan. No sooner I reached them they kept silent and I passed off. On reaching Mirza Sahib's house I was told by him that it has been reported



AGHA GHULAM HASSAN—concluded—CHAUDHRI GHULAM RASUL.

that the city is going to observe *hartal* to-day. I was further told that all the Municipal Commissioners had been called out by him last night and asked to use their influence in stopping the *hartal*. I was subsequently ordered to be in charge of the city for this purpose and to remain in the city *thana* till further orders. When I returned from Mirza Sahib's house I found all the shops closed in the bazar. While going towards the Railway Station I saw a mob of about hundred boys most of them appeared to me to be students coming from the Railway Station towards the city and shouting *Hindu-Musliman ki jai*. As I had to write to the Sessions Judge, Amritsar, about my inability to attend his court in a murder case so I went straight to the Post Office. No sooner after doing so I came out of the Post Office I came to know that Mirza Sahib has come on the Railway Station. I accordingly went into the station and found Mirza Sahib with Sheikh Taj-ud-Din, Superintendent, Vernacular Office, on the platform. In the meantime Lala Amar Nath, Extra Assistant Commissioner, also reached there and a few minutes later Mr. Heron, Superintendent, Police, also came in and conversed with Mirza Sahib for some minutes and told us that all the Magistrates should not keep themselves in one place but should go to different places. I accordingly hastened to the City Police Station. Chaudhri Ghulam Rasul, Deputy Superintendent, Police, S. Bhag Singh, Court Inspector, Sheikh Jalal-ud-Din, Sub-Inspector and Babu Jang Bahadur, Sub-Inspector, with police guard were also present there. After about half-an-hour we were informed that some boys are pulling down distant signal. On hearing this I with above mentioned Police Officers and some 20 constables ran to the spot outside the city. Superintendent Police, with Rai Bahadur Ganga Ram, Deputy Superintendent, Police, and Lala Amar Nath, Extra Assistant Commissioner, had also reached there a few minutes before we reached. We all joined together. A mob of young boys was standing outside the Railway wire fencing, we asked them to disperse but useless. The ring-leader of this batch was a young man in white costume and wearing necktie. His name was however afterwards ascertained and found to be Girdhari Lal. He was in great excitement and was the first to come over to us on the Railway line, the others followed him. He came very close to us and made a murderous assault on Mr. Heron but was repulsed. The other men of the mob pelted us with stones. I was hit on shoulder. When the mob refused to disperse and resisted they were fired on. On firing the enraged mob took to its heels out of the wire fencing. It was however made known afterwards that some persons had been injured by the shot and the orderly of Chaudhri Ghulam Rasul who was holding his horse had also received a shot on the fore-head. In the meantime Mirza Sahib with Superintendent, Vernacular Office, Sheikh Taj-ud-Din, also came there. At the same time the Railway bridge on the south of this place was seen on fire and some persons were sent there to extinguish it. At this moment M. Din Muhammad, Pleader, B. B. Bhagat, Bar.-at-Law and Pandit Iqbal Narain, Secretary, Municipal Committee, came on the spot and M. Din Muhammad reported that liquor shop in the city should be closed because the people after taking liquor joined the mob and excited them. On this report Pandit Iqbal Narain was sent to have all the liquor shops closed. B. B. Bhagat was asking the mob to disperse. We then returned to the Railway Station. On our arrival there we came to know that fire has also been set to the Post Office. We all ran to the spot and found it in flames. We cried for the Municipal Water engine but were told that the mob in the city did not allow it to pass. I myself broke into the room of the Post Master and took some of the furniture out and saved. I put one of the constables to work at the

adjoining well and began myself to pour water with a bucket on the burning places but as unfortunately heavy wind was blowing and one man could not supply sufficient water against the heavy fire hence all my efforts remained unsuccessful. Then all of us returned to the Railway Station and dispersed the mob from that place. At this stage M. Din Muhammad, Pleader, came in and assisted us in dispersing the mob and took away a great number of men with him into the city. In the meantime we received information that fire has also been set to *Tahsil* buildings. On this report having been received I with Chaudhri Ghulam Rasul and some constables left for the spot. On my way to *Tahsil* I found the District Board *Dak* Bungalow also on fire. The doors of the bungalow were closed. I instantly broke open the door of burning bungalow and saved some of the furniture and luggage of junior sub-judge who was putting up there, with great trouble. Chaudhri Ghulam Rasul then returned from the *Tahsil* and asked me to accompany him to the Railway Station where a big mob had gathered together. We came again to the Railway platform and it was reported to us that another mob of boys has gone to the Treasury. As I was in charge of the Treasury I hastened along to the spot and in the way I took Mr. Jacob with me and ran to the Treasury but no mob was there. Treasury Guard was found standing in the upper storey on the alert. Mr. Shaw, District Engineer, was also there. I then ordered the Havildar in charge that in case he finds any one of the mob coming towards the Treasury he should at once fire without hesitation. I then proceeded towards the *Kachari* buildings which were also found to be in flames. I and Mr. Jacob broke open the door of Head Clerk's room in which the fire had recently taken place, first of all we took the confidential almirah out of the room and saved it in every way and saved some furniture of the Head Clerk's room and then from the adjoining rooms I and Mr. Jacob, Chaudhri Ghulam Rasul, Deputy Superintendent of Police, B. B. Fazal Karim, Head Clerk, Police, Fazal Ilahi, Copyist, Ahmad Din, Daftri, Nawab, Sweeper, and his wife Mussammat Laohmi began to take out English files from almirah of the burning room. Fazal Ilahi opened the almirah and threw the file down and we took them away. I then alone hastened to the Treasury Office room which had also caught fire and broke open the window and succeeded in saving the most important books especially cash book and daily balance sheet and other current treasury registers and account books and some files with great hardship and risk were also saved. Fazal Ilahi, copyist, assisted gallantly at this place also as the fire was heavily increasing and on account of suffocation we had to leave the Treasury Office room and could not save other. At this time Superintendent of Police also came there. We were then informed that another mob intended to burn the police lines. Superintendent of Police asked me to accompany him which I did. When we reached the Police Lines with police constables, etc., we saw a big mob standing thereby. They were asked to disperse and on refusal fired and turned out of the Police Lines towards the District Board Gardens. We pursued them again and fired at them and turned all of them out of the gardens towards the city. At this time it began to rain and aeroplanes also reached in and bombed the mob at different places and made them to run towards their homes. At this time while returning to the Railway Station I saw the Railway Station and the Goods sheds in flames. At that time it was quite impossible to try to extinguish it without the help of a big fire engine.

None of the Honorary Magistrates, City Zaildar, Jagirdars, Government Grantees, Members of the Municipality were seen there; neither they rendered any service.

CHAUDHRI GHULAM RASUL, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala.

I am in charge of City Gujranwala since January 1918. On the passing of the Rowlett Act the educated people of the City and especially the Pleaders began an agitation against the Act. Many wild rumours were afloat that on

marriages and deaths taxes will be imposed, and if more than three or four persons would sit together it would be considered an offence. It was also rumoured that the Police will have unlimited powers and that on Police

Continued.]

CHAUDHRI GHULAM RASUL.

evidence alone men will be convicted under the Rowlatt Act.

It was with a view to have the Act repealed that a meeting was held at the Gujranwala Bar room on 4th April 1919, in which it was decided that a secret meeting be held on the same evening at the house of Amar Nath, Pleader. In this meeting the four resolutions to be proposed in the public meeting which was to be held on the following evening were drafted, and the names of the movers were selected.

On the evening of the 5th of April as arranged a mass meeting of the citizens of Gujranwala under the Presidency of Hakim Rai, Pleader, was convened at which strong speeches condemning the Rowlatt Act and advocating a general *hartal* in the City next day were made. The result was that a general *hartal* was observed in the City on the 6th of April.

Then came the news of the arrest of Gandhi, and of Satyapal and Kitchlew, and of the Amritsar and Lahore disturbances. On receipt of this news the leaders at Gujranwala held secret meetings on the 12th and 13th of April, and a fresh *hartal* was decided upon for the 14th. Mr. Heron having come to know of this made the necessary arrangements, and I was put on duty at City Gujranwala for the 14th.

I reached the City Police Station at about 7 A.M. perhaps somewhat earlier. On my way to the *Thana* a Hindu young man met me coming from the opposite direction. He was clad in Khaki and was riding a horse.

Shortly afterwards Lala Hakim Rai, Pleader, accompanied by a tall Sikh came from the *Thana* chowk side. They passed in front of the *Thana* and I called Hakim Rai to me. He stopped with me for a short time and then went away.

About the same time Maulvi Nazir Hussain, Honorary Magistrate, told me that he had heard that a she calf was hanging by a girder on the Kachchi railway bridge. I sent Sub-Inspector Ghulam Rasul to go to the spot and ascertain if it was correct. He returned and said that a she calf was hanging there. I hastened to the spot myself, and got it buried without loss of time at a reasonable distance from the place. From there I proceeded straight to Superintendent of Police's bungalow to inform him of the matter. This was not later than 7-45 A.M. On reaching there I saw Mr. Nevill, Assistant Superintendent of Police, falling in men of the Bungalow Guard, and on looking to the west, I saw a crowd of men collected, and a Railway train standing near the Gurukula railway bridge (Wazirabad) side.

Superintendent of Police ordered me to proceed to where the train was with a Police Guard from the Lines which I did. From the place where I was standing at the time I could see the Gurukula Railway bridge on fire. This was at about 8 A.M. On the arrival of this guard the crowd dispersed. The train was moved back to the Railway Station, and the Police Guard went along with it. The train was near the level crossing when Superintendent of Police reached there. He ordered me to proceed to Police Station City Gujranwala with half the guard. I proceeded thither.

When I was at the *Thana* with Court Inspector Bhag Singh, Sub-Inspector Pars Ram and one Sikandar Lall, a mob came from the Sialkot Gate side of the *Thana* bazar, and went towards the *Thana* chowk past the City Police Station. After a short time information reached me that a mob had gone towards the Sadar Police Station and the Kachchi bridge side. I sent information of this to Superintendent of Police, and proceeded to that side with a Police Guard. When we reached Mandir Sidhan a mob was seen on and around the Kachchi railway bridge which was on fire. When the Police Guard left the Grand Trunk Road from where a way leads to the Kachchi bridge, the mob dispersed.

I had hardly reached this bridge, when Sub-Inspector Ghulam Rasul also arrived there. He had with him a Police Guard and according to the orders of Superintendent of Police was proceeding to Kangriawala bridge for guarding it. He went on. I posted a guard of one Head Constable and 8 Foot Constables at the bridge. I saw that further on in the Parade, Sub-In-

spector Ghulam Rasul was surrounded by a mob. I proceeded thither, and the mob dispersed. I returned to the City Police Station. Shortly after this news reached me that a mob of rioters were going to dismantle rails near the distant signal (Lahore side). I, in company with Khan Ghulam Hussain Khan, Magistrate (who had just arrived), proceeded to the spot and joined Superintendent of Police, Rai Bahadur Ganga Ram, Deputy Superintendent of Police, and Lala Amar Nath, Extra Assistant Commissioner, who had already reached there with a Police Guard. Mr. Brij Bhushan, Bar-at-law, was also there. The mob was collected at the Grand Trunk Road and near the railway fencing. From there some of the mob came nearer and nearer, and would not disperse although ordered repeatedly to do so. After this they began to throw stones at all of us, and some of them rushed on Superintendent of Police. One of them actually assaulted Superintendent of Police. The Officers hastened to Superintendent of Police's side, and shots were fired. The mob took to their heels, and went back to the Grand Trunk Road. From there they hurled abuses. After sometime we marched to the Railway Station. The men began to hurl stones on all of us. They directed their stones particularly against Superintendent of Police. Superintendent of Police ordered me to act as a rear-guard in company with Deputy Superintendent of Police, Rai Bahadur Lala Ganga Ram. We both faced the crowd with our men, and the rest of the men and Superintendent of Police went on to the Railway Station. We followed when Superintendent of Police had reached there. We were at the Railway Station for some time when one man, well built, height about 5 feet 9 inches came to the platform with a few others, and said that he would kill Superintendent of Police as he had shot his brother. He was turned out, but more men came in, and the guard was fallen in to disperse them by force when it was heard that the Post Office had been set on fire. The Police went there. A mob was collected on the other side of the Grand Trunk Road and outside the Railway gate.

This mob refused to disperse, although repeatedly asked to do so. Some of the mob threw stones at Superintendent of Police. At this time I heard people saying that they would kill Superintendent of Police. We were standing outside the Railway Station when we heard that the *Tahsil* was set on fire. I was ordered to proceed thither with a Police force, but when I reached the *Tahsil*, it was all ablaze, and the incendiaries had already disappeared. The *Dak* Bungalow and the Honorary Magistrate's Court were also ablaze. I returned to the Railway Station where Superintendent of Police was. There we heard that Treasury and Jail were threatened. I and Mr. Nevill, Assistant Superintendent of Police, both left for these places. I went to Jail which was safe, and Assistant Superintendent of Police returned to the Lines. We had divided the men between ourselves. From Jail I proceeded to the Treasury which was safe. The *Kutcheri* had been set on fire sometime before, and no mob was there. Superintendent of Police arrived a little later at the Treasury, and he ordered me to go to the Mission compound, and guard it against any possible attacks. I went there, but there was no mob there. Nor did any turn up there after this. We were there when aeroplanes arrived, and, I along with Superintendent of Police and the men, went to the city.

Outside Sialkot gate a Sikh was sitting near the corpse of a Muhammadan. He was saying "A poor innocent foreigner Muhammadan has been killed." We asked him to leave the place which he did with great hesitation and reluctance. He requested that the dead body may be given to him, which was made over to him by Superintendent of Police's orders.

After this all was quiet.

In the end I would say that on the 14th of April the rioters began by stopping the train by maltreating the guard and the driver, and setting fire to the Railway bridges and assaulting Superintendent of Police without any provocation whatsoever from the authorities, and the conduct of the people on this day was in my opinion

CHAUDHURI GHULAM RASUL—concluded—Mr. V. W. SMITH—Mr. F. K. SHAW—Mr. B. C. CHATTERJEE.

*anti-Government* generally, and *anti-British* specially. This was proved by the mob selecting Mr. Heron for assault, although I and Sub-Inspector Pars Ram were in their midst stopping them from doing mischief.

I am further of opinion that if the firing had been resorted to after the Post Office was burnt, no further damage to Government property had taken place. The District Magistrate, however, did not allow it at the time.

**Mr. V. W. SMITH, Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala.**

Owing to the number of vacancies and of raw recruits which amounted on the 13th April to 106 constables out of a sanctioned strength of 569 constables for the whole district, there was a shortage in every police station of 2 or 3 constables and in each of the large towns of 8 or 10 constables. It was therefore impossible to recall men into lines from the police stations and cities, though it was found practicable to call the following strength into head-quarters from punitive police posts, viz. :—

2 Sub-Inspectors,  
3 Head Constables, and  
23 Constables.

Unfortunately the *Baisakhi* fairs at Eminabad and Wazirabad, to which as in previous years, a number of policemen had been deputed still further reduced the reserves at headquarters. On the 14th April the total strength at Gujranwala, including the City and the office staff, was—

1 Inspector,  
6 Sub-Inspectors,  
22 Head Constables, and  
119 Constables (two-thirds of the normal number).

This force was split up into three main guards (Lines, Lines Reserve and City Reserve), consisting of 3 Sub-Inspectors, 10 Head Constables and 59 Constables, and a number of small guards posted at points which required special protection. At the most critical time the total

number of men available for the protection of the railway station and Civil Station was only 3 Sub-Inspectors, 10 Head Constables and 61 Constables.

At Wazirabad the total available strength of police could not have been more than 4 Head Constables and 30 Constables, including City, Sadar and Treasury guard.

At Hafizabad, when Lieutenant Tatam was attacked there were only 3 or 4 men in the police station apart from the Treasury guard.

On the Railway line from Shahdara to Sangla there was the following strength of police :—

*Sheikhupura*.—Thana staff, judicial guards, and prosecuting staff amounting in all to—  
2 Sub-Inspectors,  
5 Head Constables, and about  
20 Constables, half of whom were attached to the police station and not immediately available.

*Chuharkana*.—Police post of—  
1 Head Constable,  
4 Constables.

*Dhaban Singh*.—Nil.

*Moman*.—Nil.

*Sangla*.—Staff of one police station, mostly engaged on miscellaneous rural duties, and not immediately available for an emergency.

**Mr. F. K. SHAW, District Engineer, Gujranwala.**

At 6-30 A.M. on the 14th April last Mr. Heron, Superintendent of Police, came to my bungalow and warned me to keep myself in readiness for any emergency as rioting had started in the city and some of the rioters were burning the railway bridge to the north of the station.

He very kindly left five policemen as a guard at my bungalow and told me if matters assumed a serious turn he would send me word, when I was to take my wife and children into the Treasury building. Mr. Heron was then on his way from his bungalow to the scene where rioting was taking place.

About 12 noon, being warned by a messenger from Mr. Heron I took my wife and children to the Treasury, which is a square, walled enclosure, rising about twenty-five feet above the plain, with a bastion at each corner. On entering the enclosure I immediately mounted the bastion to the North-East, a position from which I was enabled to see any one approaching, as also to obtain a good view of the road leading to the Railway Station where rioting was still in progress. The Treasury is a distance of about two hundred and fifty yards from my bungalow, the court house being approximately fifty yards closer.

About five minutes after my arrival at the Treasury some of the rioters came from the direction of the railway

station and set fire to the court house. This party would not be greater than twenty or twenty-five boys and men, the latter numbering half a dozen at the outside and the ages of the boys averaging between twelve and fourteen years.

These boys had with them small cans and some were carrying what I took to be short sticks. Within a minute or two after these boys had broken into and set fire to the interior of the court house I saw the flames rising through the clerestory windows a height of about eighteen feet from floor level. I was very impressed by this sight and concluded at the time that the boys must have been carrying some very inflammable liquid in the cans and that the short sticks were squirts used in spraying the furniture and roof with the material in the cans, and to come so prepared and to work as concertedly as they did, implied previous training.

Some time after the court house had been on fire I saw an aeroplane hovering over the treasury buildings. This aeroplane flew towards the Railway Station and firing commenced from its machine gun on the rioters, after which, I take it, all rioting ceased as there was no further shouting. I am firmly convinced, had it not been for the timely arrival of the aeroplanes and the action taken, the whole of the Civil Station would have been destroyed and there is a possibility that innocent lives would have been taken by the rioters.

**Mr. B. C. CHATTERJEE, Head Master, Mission High School, and Member, Municipal Committee, Gujranwala.**

On the morning of 14th April at about 7, I went over to the School, though it was a holiday, to see certain things, and was told by one of the Chaprasis, who had just come from the city that there was a great noise and uproar in the city. While coming home I met some friends on the road in front of my house who also told me the same, also that the up train from Lahore was

stopped by a crowd at the Railway Station by throwing out all fire and coal and letting out all water from the engine. At this time one of my servants who came to call me home being sent by my wife, who was ailing for some time, and was feeling very afraid and nervous, on account of the noise in the city, told me that the Railway bridges up and down, had been set fire to.

Mr. B. C. CHATTERJEE—concluded—Captain J. A. S. EWING.

Revd. Jivan Mal, an Evangelist of the U. P. Mission, who had met me in the way, came with me to my house, and told me that things in the city were assuming a serious aspect and there was fear of trouble. People were shouting "*Hindu Musalman ki ai.*" Some even said, "*Hai Hai George mar gaya hai.*" I advised Revd. Jivan Mal to bring his wife and children over to the boarding house (which is in the same compound in which my house is) where we could all be together in case of any trouble. On his way home the crowd had increased to such an extent that it was impossible for him to bring his family to the boarding house. (His house being on the other side of the city.)

During the time from 9 A.M. to 11 A.M. I could hear from my house the noise in the city increasing every moment and coming nearer and nearer the Civil Station. At about 11 A.M. a crowd marched towards the Post Office and set fire to it, then the crowd set fire to the Railway Station, which is just opposite to the Post Office. While coming to the Civil Lines it burnt the Casson Industrial School, then the Dāk Bungalow and then the Tahsil, which is just opposite to the former. After this the crowd went back towards the city. In about an hour it again came back to the Civil Lines, proceeded towards the District Court and set fire to it. After this the Station Church was set fire to and then the Goods shed. Just as the Goods shed had been set fire to, the aeroplanes appeared at about half past two or three, when the crowd had not yet dispersed. The aeroplanes brought very great relief to all those who were in a state of dreadful suspense during the time when all these events were happening. Many people

of the city have said that if the aeroplanes did not arrive, they were in danger of being plundered.

A few days before the outbreak the feelings of the people seemed excited owing to the misrepresentations made to them of the Rowlett Act. These misrepresentations were the levying of fees by Government on the birth of children, the death of the persons, on the occasion of a wedding according to the number of persons attending it, and the taking away by Government of half the produce of land.

I may add here that I was in danger zone all the time as my house and the Mission School Boarding House are situated in the centre of the area within which all this happened.

I was in dread of damage and danger, after I was advised by a Hindu friend of mine to apply to the Superintendent of Police for the guarding of my house which was exposed on all sides. From 11 A.M. to 4 P.M. I was some time in my own house and some time in the Boarding House, from the roof of which I could see the mob passing this side and that side, and setting fire to the house with shouts and yells. Hearing a rumour in the evening that the houses of Christians would be burnt during the night I with my wife, who could hardly move on account of sickness, took shelter for the night in the Treasury, which was for the time being converted into a sort of a fort, through the kind permission of Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien, the then Deputy Commissioner of Gujranwala, and were sent to Lahore the following day along with a few others, where I stayed for a week and my wife for about twelve days.

**Report of Captain J. A. S. EWING, 19th Lancers on operations of Mobile Column in Sialkot Area during the Punjab Disturbances.**

*April 13th.*—Half squadron, 18th Lancers, and half squadron, 19th Lancers, left Sialkot by road for Wazirabad.

*April 14th.*—Employed on disturbances in Wazirabad.

*April 15th.*—Employed with the Deputy Commissioner in making arrests in Wazirabad.

*April 16th.*—Employed on patrols in surrounding country and along railways.

*April 17th.*—Same as 16th April.

*April 18th.*—Same as above.

*April 19th.*—Mobile column composed of half squadron, 19th Lancers, two sections Motor Machine Gun Battery, under command of Major Maloney, left Wazirabad for Lyallpur.

*April 20th.*—Motor Machine Gun Battery proceeded to Jaranwala to make arrests there, and arrested 12 men. Cavalry was employed on patrols both by night and day to a distance of five miles round Lyallpur.

*April 21st.*—Cavalry employed on patrols round Lyallpur. Major Maloney handed over command of Mobile Column to Captain Ewing, 19th Lancers.

*April 22nd.*—Mobile column less horses of 19th Lancers went by rail to Gugera to make arrests. Arrested 10. Returned to Lyallpur by rail.

*April 23rd.*—Mobile column went to Kiala, Baba Bakala, Chotakiala, Chak No. 27, and made 16 arrests. Distance 38 miles.

*April 24th.*—Mobile column went to Jahangir, and made six arrests. Distance 34 miles.

*April 25th.*—Mobile column went to Summar 181, arrested one man and gained information of others who had been damaging telegraphs, which afterwards led to their arrest. Afternoon, April 25th, entrained for Toba Tek Singh, marched to 18th Lancers Farm visiting two small villages *en route* and arrested three men who had been concerned in damaging railway. Camped 18th Farm for night, 8 miles.

*April 26th.*—Visited three villages in this district and arrested 27 men who had been concerned in cutting telegraph wires and damaging railway; distance 32 miles. Returned to Lyallpur by rail.

*April 27th.*—Surrounded Lyallpur and arrested 18 men and gained information which enabled the Civil authorities to arrest some others. Evening marched to Risalewala; camped the night; 17 miles.

*April 28th.*—Marched to Soeul and made 9 arrests, returned direct to Lyallpur, distance 47 miles.

*April 29th.*—Motor Machine Gun Battery went to a village 57 miles away to make two arrests, returning same evening, distance 114 miles.

*April 30th.*—Marched through Lyallpur City. During the whole of this time patrols were found night and day in the vicinity of Lyallpur by the Cavalry. The method employed in arresting villagers was to march to the village by night and surround it before dawn, then have out the Lambardars and make them produce offenders, then hold a 'jirga' and get as much information as possible regarding other miscreants in surrounding villages.

*May 1st.*—Mobile column went to Sukeke where it picked up one troop of 18th Lancers having left one troop, 19th Lancers, at Lyallpur.

Motor Machine Gun Battery had to go on to Hafizabad to detrain and come back by road. Camped Sukeke for the night.

*May 2nd.*—Commenced a march 'Showing the Flag'; marched to Chuharkana, interviewed Deputy Commissioner, visiting *en route* village of Khanga Dogran where a small durbar was held, distance 21 miles. Road good, passable for motor transport.

*May 3rd.*—Marched to Sheikhpura, distance 20 miles, road passable for motor transport, but bad in places. Camped at Sheikhpura.

*May 4th.*—Held a large durbar at Sheikhpura and gave a demonstration of Motor Machine Guns firing, also Lewis Guns from an armed train.

Raja Fateh Singh of Sheikhpura Quilla gave me great help in getting all surrounding inhabitants to the durbar and making a speech himself. Addresses to the people were read out in Urdu and Punjabi. Raja Fateh Singh

Captain J. A. S. EWING—concluded—Captain A. HARWOOD.

was extremely kind to the troops under my command, both British and Indian giving them presents of fruit, mineral water, ice and meat.

*May 5th.*—Marched in two parties to Harpoki on the Chenab Canal, one party visiting several villages, the largest of which was Santpur. This party (cavalry) moved across country. The other party, Motor Machine Gun; went along banks of canal, visiting village of Chichoki Mallian. Camped at Harpoki the night. Distance 29 miles.

*May 6th.*—Marched to Gujranwala and camped the night, distance 21 miles.

Received orders to return direct to Wazirabad the following day.

*The 7th May.*—Marched straight to Wazirabad, distance 20 miles.

The total distance covered by the horses from the time of leaving Sialkot on the night, April 13th, was about 300 miles and every horse finished as sound as he started and accomplished the whole trip.

Particulars of the people arrested are all in the hands of the Civil authorities.

I wish to bring the following Indian Officer to your notice:—

Risaldar Khwaja Muhammad Pehdur, O.B.E., a Khatak Khel of the 19th Lancers.

At Wazirabad on the 14th April he went personally at his own request into the middle of a large hostile crowd, as he said he thought he could talk them into 'sense' and submission. He was heavily stoned at first, but taking no notice of this he went into the middle of the crowd and eventually after half an hour's talking persuaded them all to return peacefully to their houses.

This same Indian Officer Khwaja Muhammad Pehdur, O.B.E., was invaluable to me throughout the whole operations and by his tact with officials and villagers enabled me to make many arrests of offenders which I could not have effected otherwise. His good horsemanship and energy were mainly responsible for keeping the horses in the good condition they were. He also kept the men cheery under somewhat trying and fatiguing circumstances.

Captain A. HARWOOD, 1st Durham Light Infantry.

I have the honour to report the events that took place during the time I was in command of a detachment 1st Durham Light Infantry on No. 1 Telegraph Repair Special on the occasion of the riots of April 1919. About 12-15 hours, 15th April 1919, I was detailed to command a detachment of 25 Non-Commissioned Officers and men and to proceed to Gujranwala. On arrival at the Railway Station, Rawalpindi, I was met by Mr. Langdon, Superintendent, Telegraphs, and a Brigade Signal Section under command of Lieutenant B. Humphreys, 39th Divisional Signal Company. I entrained my party and proceeded by the Bombay Mail at about 13-00 hours. Owing to the urgency to the move I left Rawalpindi without rations or the men's kit. On arrival at Wazirabad, I transferred my party to a special train and was reinforced by a Detachment of 50 Non-Commissioned Officers and men of the South Lancashire Regiment under command of 2nd-Lieutenant Burghope. Mr. Sims, Railway Engineer, also joined the train with a railway breakdown gang. The mail was then diverted by a loop line to Lahore. I then gave orders to proceed to Gujranwala and arrived there about 20-30 hours. An attempt had been made to burn a bridge on the permanent way, and the whole of the Station, Goods Yard, Post Office and the Church were in flames. The city was absolutely silent. I was met at the station by the station master and a small detachment of police. I then ordered Lieutenant Burghope to take his detachment and to obtain information of the civil population. Lieutenant Burghope returned and reported that all the civil population were in the treasury and that there were 7 women and 9 children, and that everybody was safe. I then accompanied Mr. Langdon to investigate the damage done to the telegraph lines. We walked about 2 miles back along the line till we came to the end of the break and tapped in on the telephone wire and obtained communication with Rawalpindi. I informed Colonel Ward, G.S.O.I., 2nd Division, of the state of affairs at Gujranwala and also asked for troops to be sent to Wazirabad, as I did not like the aspect of affairs on passing through, there being only about half a dozen rifles there under the R. T. O. (Captain Topley). I was informed that 100 cavalry had been ordered there from Sialkot, but I was given orders to the General-Officer Commanding, Sialkot, to send 50 British ranks. As the telegraph lines to Sialkot had been cut, on my return to the station, I detached the engine from my train and sent it back with an escort, with the orders to the R. T. O. at Wazirabad. I also asked for a special train to be sent to me

so as to enable me to evacuate the women and children from Gujranwala. This train arrived at Gujranwala at 04-30 hours, 15th April, and my own engine returned at 06-00 hours with the information that the cavalry had arrived at Wazirabad and a rumour that the railway line to Sialkot had been cut. By 08-30 hours the Brigade Signal Section laid two ground lines and bridged the gap in the telegraph lines, which were damaged over 4 miles. An attempt had been made to burn a railway bridge on the Lahore side of Gujranwala. The damage was repaired by 8 A.M. just as an armoured train arrived from Lahore. I then investigated the damage done to the town. The Station, Goods Sheds, Church, Post Office, Law Courts and the Dak Bungalow had been completely gutted. About 10-30 A.M., I tried to get communication by telephone with Rawalpindi, but failed to do so, as the line had been cut at Wazirabad. The women and children were sent on to Lahore about 09-30 hours. Work was commenced on the telegraph lines at dawn and temporary repairs were completed the next day. About 13-00 hours, 15th April, Colonel O'Brien, Deputy Commissioner, decided to raid Gujranwala City and make arrests. He was escorted by 2nd-Lieutenant Burghope and 25 Non-Commissioned Officers and men. I posted pickets along the railway line which divides the native part of the city and the civil lines with instructions to prevent any person from leaving the city. 22 arrests were made by Colonel O'Brien. These were sent off to Lahore the same afternoon by special train. Railway communication was opened through Gujranwala early on the morning of the 15th. I supplied a number of British Troops with ammunition who were travelling on these trains and in one instance I placed a guard of 6 Non-Commissioned Officers and men on a train running to Lahore, as there were a number of ladies aboard. These men rejoined me early next morning. Mr. Langdon also proceeded to Lahore to obtain telegraphic stores and rations for the men of my detachment. About 00-30 hours on the 16th I received a message from the station master of the next station on the Wazirabad side of Gujranwala by runner, that the whole of the permanent way near Wazirabad was ablaze. I immediately detached the engine and one truck from my train and sent Mr. Sims with the Railway breakdown gang to investigate. I gave them an escort of 10 rifles. They reported late that evening when I arrived at Wazirabad that a determined attempt had been made to burn through the sleepers and to wreck a bridge on the line. The engine was nearly emptied of water to get the fire under control.

Captain A. HARWOOD—concluded—Mr. J. B. NEVILL.

About 12-30 hours, 16th April, I was informed by one of my escorts to the Telegraph repair parties that they had been jeered at and shouts of *Gandhi ki jai* had been raised by a crowd of sepoys in a passing train. I ordered the train to be detained in the station and the coach from which the jeering came was examined. I arrested all the occupants of the carriage, they were mostly young Sikh sepoys returning from leave to Sialkot. I handed them over to the local police and reported the case to Colonel O'Brien, who, I believe, disposed of the case a few days later. About 13-30 hours, 16th April, I left Gujranwala to investigate the damage done to the telegraph at Wazirabad. The first big break was just outside the village of Nizamabad and the damage extended over 2 miles; the next break was at Wazirabad, the damage extended for nearly 4 miles. Seeing the extent of the damage done Mr. Langdon decided to push on towards Lala Musa. A few minor breaks were repaired and on arrival at Gujrat we found the telegraph instruments in the railway station had been damaged. I met the Deputy Commissioner of Gujrat District on the station platform and he accompanied us to Lala Musa. Leaving Mr. Langdon at Lala Musa, I returned to Wazirabad, and temporary repair were commenced on the lines there that night. I left an escort with the working party and returned to Lala Musa, arriving there at 23-30 hours. The telephone line to Rawalpindi was tapped and I gave a verbal report to 2nd Divisional Headquarters. About 06-30 hours, 17th April, the telegraphist on duty reported that interruptions were coming on the line. Tests were made and the fault was located at Gujar Khan. Mr. Langdon decided to investigate and the train left Lala Musa at 06-45 hours. On arrival at Gujar Khan we found that a detachment of troops under a British Officer had arrived about 6-30 A.M. The station master reported that an attempt had been made to tamper with the lines. As the men of my detachment had no kits and telegraphic stores were required, the train was run to Rawalpindi. I reported personally at Divisional Headquarters. At 15-30 hours, 17th April, I returned to Lala Musa and there picked up reinforcements of 15 Non-Commissioned Officers and men and 2 Lewis Guns that were ordered to report to me. During the journey the train was detained without apparent cause outside Sarai Alam Gir Station. After waiting for about 15 minutes I ordered the train to draw into the station. I immediately enquired the cause of the delay from the station master and did not get a satisfactory reply. The station master then gave us line clear to the next station. The driver of my train then pointed out that the line clear was not satisfactory, as the duplicate in the book had not been filled in and the station master

had not asked for line clear to the next station. I verified this with one of the Government telegraphists with me. I immediately arrested the station master and handed him over to the Officer Commanding Troops at Lala Musa on my arrival there. The case was reported to the Railway Traffic Superintendent. On the morning of the 18th April temporary repairs were commenced near the village of Nazimabad. I posted pickets round the village with orders to prevent anybody from leaving the village as Mr. Langdon wished to see if he could get any information as to who had wrecked the telegraph lines. After a lot of trouble I saw the lambardar of the village and by dint of questioning he gave the information that he knew who was responsible for the damage done. I then enquired if he had informed the authorities at Wazirabad. This he had failed to do, although the damage had been done 4 days previously. I arrested him. A student from Gujranwala was also arrested, as he could not explain his presence in the village and nobody belonging to the village could recognise him as an inhabitant of the village. Just before I left the village I received a report that one of the pickets had been compelled to fire at a man who was attempting to leave the village and would not stop when repeatedly ordered to do so. I immediately went to the scene, but I could not find the man, or get any information regarding him. I reported the case to the Officer Commanding Troops at Wazirabad and by telephone to 2nd Divisional Headquarters, Rawalpindi. That afternoon temporary repairs were carried out on the Wazirabad-Sialkot telegraph lines. The line was damaged in a number of places. Temporary repairs were completed at Wazirabad early on the morning of the 19th and repairs were commenced on the Wazirabad-Sangla Hill and Lahore lines. I reported the case of shooting to Colonel O'Brien, Deputy Commissioner, at Sangla Hill that afternoon. The night of the 19th-20th was spent at Lahore, where extra telegraphic stores were obtained. Permanent repairs were carried out at Gujranwala on the 20th April. On arrival at Wazirabad on the 21st I returned the Brigade Signal Section to Rawalpindi, as there was no further use for them. From the 21st to 27th April permanent repairs were carried out on the following lines:—Wazirabad to Shorkot Road, Wazirabad to Sialkot, Wazirabad to Gujranwala, and the breaks round Wazirabad. I assisted the Deputy Commissioner, Lyallpur District, to make 9 arrests at the village of Goja about the 23rd April. Escorts were supplied to all working parties on the lines and telephonic reports were frequently made to 2nd Divisional Headquarters, Rawalpindi. Detachment returned to Rawalpindi at 13-00 hours on the 28th April 1919.

Mr. J. B. NEVILL, Assistant Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala.

The agitation in Gujranwala first showed its fruit in a *hartal* on 5th April. Nothing untoward happened nor was great excitement manifest. Another *hartal* was arranged for the 15th, at a private meeting. However the date was suddenly changed on the 13th for the 14th. The Deputy Commissioner left on the 12th. No very great apprehension was felt on the evening of the 13th, as it was hoped that the *hartal* would pass off as on the 5th, but as a precautionary measure, all available police were called into headquarters. The changing of the date to the 14th found the police arrangements incomplete and only about fifty men were available as a striking force after deducting necessary guards, etc. This changing of the date was deliberate on the part of the leaders in order to foil the arrangements of the authorities for preserving order.

Early on the morning of the 14th a calf was found hanging to a railway bridge and excited crowds were wandering round the city. At the railway station attempts were made to prevent people going to Wazirabad and to wreck the early morning train. The train

was stopped at the distant signal and damaged. The crowd fired a railway bridge in front of the train. I was ordered to disperse this crowd. With a guard of 1 Head Constable and 6 Foot Constables, I did this and managed to put out the fire with small damage to the bridge. Meanwhile the train was taken back to the station.

The Superintendent of Police had during this time warned all guards at the Treasury, etc., to be on the alert and had taken the reserve to the station. Here he managed to clear the railway premises and line of the crowd. It may be mentioned here that the railway officials gave no assistance at all, showing passive, if not active sympathy with the crowd. A large crowd of Kashmiris had been taken back to the city by Din Muhammad, Pleader, and things seemed to be settling down. The Police then consolidated their position along the railway line. I stayed by my bridge as small portions of the crowd kept coming here obviously intent on mischief. Shortly after, I heard a few shots fired. This was done as the result of an assault on the Superin-

Mr. J. B. NEVILL—concluded—PANDIT IQBAL NARAIN,

tendent of Police in which he was badly hurt. I then marched with my guard to the railway station. Here I found the Post Office blazing and a huge mob. They were waving black flags and hurling bricks and epithets at the Police who were keeping them in check. The Superintendent of Police was struck several times and the Police were severely tested. The Deputy Commissioner and the few magistrates present, backed up by one or two pleaders, persuaded the Superintendent of Police not to fire. This state of things went on for about an hour. Suddenly we saw smoke from the Civil Lines. I and the Deputy Superintendent were immediately sent with some of the Police here. We were soon followed by the Superintendent, who had stayed to post a guard at the railway station. The Police now fired at the mob wherever they could catch them, but most of the Government buildings were burnt. The mob had evidently prepared themselves and the actual firing of buildings was carried out inside ten minutes. The mob now fled before the Police to collect again in another place. By great efforts they were forced beyond the railway line. Here they paused, both Police and mob, consolidating their position and re-collecting. The mob at this time was in a most dangerous mood. They were calling out that they would kill all British Officers and burn all Government buildings. The Police were nearly exhausted. At this extremely critical moment aeroplanes arrived and after a reconnaissance began bombing and firing. Luckily this finally dispersed the crowd and the Police were able to take up positions at the city gates.

At this stage Colonel O'Brien arrived. In the evening a party of British troops arrived and this finally restored security. Next day the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, and the Deputy Commissioner with troops went round the city and arrested the ringleaders. This restored partial order to the city. The application of Martial Law on the 16th finally ended all opposition.

Up to the time of proclaiming Martial Law the disorder was rapidly spreading to the villages and in Aulakh a "Patwar Khana" was burnt. On the 18th, I and a party of British troops under Captain

Whealty went there and arrested the culprits immediately. The effect of Martial Law was by this time noticeable and no more trouble occurred.

On the 21st, I was sent down to Chuharkana to supervise the investigation in the Sheikhpura Sub-division. Here the centres of the agitation were Sheikhpura, Chuharkana and Sangla. *Hartals* had been held at all these places. The results at Sheikhpura were not very important. But at Chuharkana the Virks and at Dhaban Singh the Kambhos, led by disaffected persons, attacked and did considerable damage to the railway line and premises, telegraph, etc. At Sangla a band of Sikhs practically ruled the country, burnt the station at Moman, cut telegraph wires, assaulted Mr. Wale and rescued a military deserter. Their cry was that even if the British *Raj* returned, the Sikhs ruled to-day. Before my arrival the line had been patrolled by armoured trains, but the population were still truculent and very disturbed. It was obviously only the fear of Martial Law that kept them from resisting. At first investigation was extremely difficult and not unattended with danger, but by the application of Martial Law and trial by Summary Courts soon enabled the local authorities to get the malcontents in hand. The effect of immediate sentence influenced any waverers. With the unruly population of these parts, it was often a question of touch and go until they had been made thoroughly acquainted with the results of resistance under Martial Law. But slowly order was again restored and nothing further occurred.

The small force of available police made it impossible to control the huge mob of Gujranwala. In the early stages the mob's determination was at its nadir, but as the day wore on and success seemed sure it reached its zenith just before the arrival of the aeroplanes. The delay of the police in firing until the mob actually set fire to the Government buildings, insisted on by the Deputy Commissioner undoubtedly led to more trouble in the end. But the bad effects of this were luckily remedied by the timely application of Martial Law and the presence of British troops. This, as I have mentioned above, prevented the contagion of the disorder to the rural population.

#### PANDIT IQBAL NARAIN, Secretary, Municipal Committee, Gujranwala.

##### *Recruiting and War Loan.*

Recruiting had absolutely nothing to do with the disturbances. Recruiting was chiefly confined to mufasil, while disturbances generally took place in towns. Gujranwala had given no recruits. Recruits were chiefly taken from the Zemindar class who had very little to do with disturbances.

Recruiting had ceased long before 14th April, in fact the Durbar in this connection had taken place in the beginning of August last year and people rewarded. The recruits who were brought to Gujranwala and were there found unwilling to join the Army were at once allowed to go back to their homes. This was done every day.

##### *War Loan.*

This was given by people quite voluntarily. The people now feel the advantages of thus investing their money. There is not a single case known to me where anybody was obliged to invest money in War Loan.

##### *General attitude of pleaders etc. before the 14th.*

(b) Bar-room was the only place where politics were freely discussed and great resentment was shown on the actions of the Government. Rowlatt Act was the chief topic although 99 per cent. of them who took part in these discussions had not read it. General attitude of the members of the Bar and especially of those who were afterwards arrested was most defiant. The meeting of the 5th was arranged and organized in the Bar-room.

##### *Meeting of the 5th.*

Pleaders were the chief speakers in this meeting. Delhi incidents were narrated before public in a very exaggerated form. The lectures had a very unwholesome effect on the public.

##### *Meeting of 12th and 13th.*

Only heard of this, do not know what happened and what was arranged there.

##### *Meeting of the 14th.*

Went to railway station early in the morning. The train had not come; there was a crowd of people on the railway platform most of them bare-headed. Came back from the railway station. Kachchi bridge burnt, railway train damaged, wires cut. A crowd of about 500 men surrounded Mr. Heron. Mob was armed with *lathis*, crowbars, hammers, etc. Mob was dispersed and taken towards city by myself and B. Muhammad Din. Mr. Heron went by the railway line to the railway station. Mob throwing stones all the way long. Mob collected before railway station and was joined by the mob from the city; numbering about 5,000—6,000. Post office burnt, Dak Bungalow burnt, Tahsil burnt, District Courts burnt, Church burnt, Railway Goods shed and Station burnt. Mob proceeded to attack and break open the jail, was stopped by M. Din Muhammad, myself and Abbas Ali; aeroplanes arrived, mob dispersed.

People contemplating more mischief had aeroplane not come.

SARDAR SUNDAR SINGH—Mr. S. M. JACOB.

SARDAR SUNDAR SINGH, B.A., LL.B., M.B.E., Honorary Secretary, Central Co-Operative Bank, Gujranwala

*Events on the 15th April 1919 at Gujranwala.*

On the morning of the 14th April 1919 at about 7.30 A.M. while I was proceeding from my bungalow (on the GharjaKh Road) towards the town, I heard the loud cries of the people from the Arya Samaj Gurukula side. I hastened to the town, and on my way I stopped for a while at the house of Lala Amar Nath, M.B.E., Extra Assistant Commissioner, where somebody conveyed to us the frightful news that the mob had stopped the railway train on the station, and had set fire to the railway bridge near the distant signal on the Wazirabad side. I was further told that the Superintendent of Police was on the station guarding the railway and postal premises. I proceeded immediately to the railway station, and put my services at the disposal of Mr. F. A. Heron, Superintendent of Police, who was the only European official in the station, as Colonel A. J. O'Brien, C.I.E., C.B.E., Deputy Commissioner, had left Gujranwala for Ambala on the evening of 12th April 1919. There was a crowd of people in front of the railway station, and all efforts were used in persuading the mob to return to the city, with the view to check further developments, as more troubles were anticipated. It took good deal of time in persuading the people to return to their homes. But in the meantime, it being a general *hartal* at that day, parties of people were moving in and about the town in a most disorderly state. Superintendent of Police told me that it was better to divide, and survey the situation in other quarters. It was also said that the railway bridge near Kadhehi (a little beyond the distant signal on the Lahore side) was in flames, and the Government High School building was about to be attacked by the mob. I left the Railway Station and made a round in the Civil Lines, and after having a look at the District Courts, District Board Office, Tahsil, Honorary Magistrates' Courts and the Veterinary Hospital, which were till then quite safe, I proceeded towards the Government High School. On the way just close to Sardar Mahan Singh's Garden I met a disorderly crowd mixed of boys and grown up people, greatly agitated and howling "Rowlatt Bill hai hai, Rowlatt Bill hai hai." They were hurriedly proceeding towards the railway station, and all persuasions to retire to the city fell on deaf ears. On proceeding a little further, I saw men climbing up the telegraph posts and cutting the telegraphic wires with iron instruments in their hands, with the result that the communications towards Lahore side were entirely cut off. By this time, the situation had become very grave, and the spirit of rowdiness had reached its climax. The situation had passed practically out of control, as there was only a small force of police in the station. I passed on to the Government High School, and with the help of the head master, who was with me, took proper measures to protect the building in case of assault. Some time after I was told at the school that some of the mob had attacked the Superintendent of Police and he had fired a pistol to rescue himself. I proceeded towards Sidhan ka Asthan and saw Superintendent of Police with a party of police constables and others returning back to the railway station by the rail-road side. There was a big crowd following by the Grand Trunk Road. I took some time there to persuade people to enter the town and desist from following the Superin-

endent of Police. Some people entered the town by Eminabad Gate, while others in large numbers were seen proceeding in haste towards the railway station. Some time after the Post Office was set on fire by the mob. Later on Railway Station, Church, Tahsil, Dak Bungalow, District Courts, &c., were set on fire by the mob which roamed about in different parties.

Being the Honorary Secretary of the Central Co-operative Bank, Limited, Gujranwala, I closed the business of the Bank and put Lala Sohan Lal, the clerk and accountant of the Bank, in charge of the premises. The mob showed inclination to attack the premises, but the clerk succeeded in saving the situation by persuasions, that it was mainly a business concern.

The following points are worthy of notice:—

(1) *Recruitment.*—The present disorders were not the result of recruitment. From my personal knowledge as an Honorary Secretary of the District War League, Gujranwala, and Joint Secretary of the Red Cross Society; I can state with all assurance that the disturbances are in no way connected with the recruitment in the district. I have travelled about 3,000 miles in the district during the Great War in connection with Red Cross, recruitment and other matters allied with War, and can confidently state that recruitment was confined to rural classes and the success in recruitment was due to the excellent organization and whole-hearted co-operation of tribal *panchayats*. The District War League and the Sub-Committees in various Tahsils and Zails stimulated real enthusiasm among the people and secured their whole-hearted support in the cause. The organization worked excellently under the guidance of Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'Brien, C.I.E., C.B.E., the President of the League. The urban classes did not join the Army, and it was only artisan classes who took up service overseas being mainly induced by higher wages.

(2) *Aeroplanes and Troops.*—In a state of affairs when the public buildings were set on fire, and the goods shed looted, aeroplanes and additional force were a necessity. The aeroplanes arrived between 2 and 3 p.m. and their appearance terrified the mob. Before their appearance, there was a great apprehension of the District jail being broken into and the convicts being set free. The Jail ruffians having joined the mob would have looted the Treasury and burnt all other public buildings saved so far. It was due to the arrival of the aeroplanes that the mob took to heels and fled to their homes with the result that the calm was restored.

The *hartal* continued for a couple of days more and was brought to end on the persuasions of Lala Harnam Dass, Tahsildar, myself and some other respectables of the town.

In the end I may state that the agitation in consequence of the Rowlatt Act was increasing. Many false rumours were afloat as to the repressive nature of the Act, so much so that many a man thought that the police was authorised under the act to arrest any four or five persons who were seen talking together. *Hartal* having thrown many a people out of business afforded an incentive to join the mob. Speeches of some irresponsible persons tended to increase agitation.

The wide circulation of vernacular papers like *Naqqash* in the masses, before the disturbances produced an undesirable effect on the mind of the people.

Mr. S. M. JACOB, I.C.S., Director of Agriculture.

Under instructions from the Punjab Government left Lahore as Civil Officer with a mobile column at 3 A.M. on 20th April 1919 to investigate and punish offenders for cutting the telegraph wires at mile 354 at Kamoke. On arrival there the lambaradar, Bhagwan Singh, refused for a long time to budge from his house, whence I had to go and fetch him myself. Even then he was insolent and obstructive, and when I told him to get other lam-

bardars merely smirked. I had to get on with the work of the column and therefore sentenced him to 15 strokes whipping and a fine of Ra. 200. Other villagers then told me the cutting of the wires had taken place at Nangal Sadan, and I proceeded thither. Six hostages were taken here as information as to the persons responsible for the cutting of the wire was not forthcoming. The column then returned to Lahore.



Mr. S. M. JACOB—concluded—Mr. A. R. B. ARMSTRONG—MUNSHI KIRPA SINGH.

2. Went with a mobile column under the command of Colonel Smithers from Amritsar on about the 23rd/24th April. Made many enquiries, but found no one with any loot from Amritsar, except at Mari Megha where 5 or 6 men were arrested with loot in their possession. One man, who got on the roof of a house to warn villagers

to make away with loot, was given 15 strokes. Three of the arrested men were subsequently convicted by Mr. Keough, Additional District Magistrate, Lahore. A lambardar of Mari Megha, who was very helpful, was recommended by me for a reward of land.

**Mr. A. R. B. ARMSTRONG, Executive Engineer, Wazirabad.**

In April last the European residents near Wazirabad consisted of the Rev. Grahame Bailey, Mrs. Bailey, and two small children who lived some two miles south of the railway station; Mr. and Mrs. Ward with two small children about one mile south of the railway station, about ten Railway officials and their families all residing in the railway lines close to the station, Mr. and Mrs. Lindsay and my wife and myself who were living at Haripur about one and a half miles north of railway station, also my Assistant Engineer, Mr. Anderton, at Kathala 3 miles further north. There were also two British Officers and about twelve British soldiers residing in the railway lines; these had been stationed for some time at Wazirabad as Railway Military Police during demobilisation. The railway station at Wazirabad lies between the native town and the railway lines.

On the 12th and 13th I observed an insolent demeanour was generally displayed by the crowds which passed my bungalow on their way to and from Wazirabad to the Chenab river during the *Baisakhi mela*.

On the 13th owing to the news from Amritsar and Lahore the Officer Commanding warned all Europeans residing outside Wazirabad to be prepared to rendezvous in the railway lines at short notice. At about 2 P.M. on the following day he called us all in and instructed us to reside in the Railway Rest House; I also received instructions from the Deputy Commissioner, Gujrat, to take steps to safeguard my European staff at Kathala, and called Mr. Anderton to Wazirabad also. The last people to arrive came in about 4 P.M. by which time there were about 24 people including families living in this four-roomed house. The British troops' camp was close to the rest house.

During that afternoon I saw an aeroplane circling close overhead and eventually making a landing in fields about a mile away; crowds from the direction of the native city ran to the spot and a few minutes after they arrived the machine rose again and flew overhead in the direction of Lahore.

That night we were instructed to post armed sentries around the rest house as no troops could be spared from guarding the railway station.

During the night, which passed off quietly, more troops came in till by the following morning there might have been 80 of all ranks of which some 20 were British infantry

and rest chiefly Indian Cavalry and Sikh Pioneers. Major Marsh had also arrived from Sialkot and assumed command of the station during the night.

During the whole of the following day (April 15th) attacks were made by crowds from the city on the station, and civilians, other than railway officials were confined to the railway lines. Stones were thrown from the street into the station and an attempt was made to fire the railway oil tanks and to dissuade employees of the Loco. department from working, railway telegraph wires were cut in several places, and one signal entirely pulled down, the Bailey's house was burnt with all their furniture, clothes, etc., and attempts were made to burn railway bridges and permanent way.

The only act of this sort I personally saw was the cutting of wires and burning of sleepers just north of the station, but several people who saw the mob at close quarters including Major Marsh, told me the people were in a dangerous mood, that youths and boys were usually in front of the rioters, that their hostility appeared directed chiefly against Europeans, and that the appearance of a British sentry was the signal for a shower of stones, several of which took effect.

The chief danger apprehended by us civilians was that the station might be rushed and we might be invested by the crowd in the railway lines.

During that day no supplies were available in the bazar and some flour was obtained through the good offices of one of my contractors, Rai Bahadur Ram Ratan, who collected it from some villages some 5 miles away with great difficulty and in small quantities as the villagers suspected it was wanted for Europeans; this gentleman was also instrumental in dissuading the mob from their attempt to fire the railway oil tanks.

That evening more troops including Colonel Burbery arrived, and the latter, on taking over command, issued notices that armed force would be used, if necessary, should further rioting occur.

The night of the 15th-16th passed off quietly and after that no disturbances occurred, though it was necessary to ration us civilians from the military stores at Sialkot owing to the difficulty of obtaining provisions locally, civilians were allowed to proceed to their work during daylight with armed escorts, and the latter were dispensed with after a couple of days.

**MUNSHI KIRPA SINGH, Tahsildar, Wazirabad.**

Ever since 15th April 1919, the day after the *hartal*, I have been endeavouring to ascertain facts in connection with the recent disturbances. Owing to factions and strikes, in the town of Wazirabad, there is not a single man who could be relied upon. In such circumstances only those facts, which appeared to me to be reliable, are detailed below:—

On the arrival at Wazirabad on the 12th April of certain men of Gujranwala, whose names could not be ascertained, Pritam Das, Badri Nath Phul, Jowanda Mal, Jagan Nath Salooha, nephew of Pritam Das, Master Muhammad Jan, Kesar Singh, Shaikh Inayat Ullah, *alias* Basha, commenced to incite the shopkeepers in the town to observe "*Hartal*."

On 13th April 1919, at the request of the *halwais* (sweet-meat vendors), the leaders of the movement postponed the *hartal* to 14th April 1919, so that the sweets

prepared by the *halwais* may be sold and they be put to no loss.

On the 14th evening a meeting was convened in the Juma Masjid under the Presidentship of Jamiat Singh and lectures were given by Sheikh Inayat Ullah, *alias* Basha, Master Muhammad Jan, Pritam Das and Badri Nath Phul, on the subjects of (1) Hindu-Muhammadan unity, (2) Protest against Rowlatt Bill, (3) Observance of *hartal*.

Kesar Singh, Jagan Nath, Saluja, Arur Chand, Municipal Commissioner, and Master Muhammad Hussain were also present in the Jumma Masjid when the lectures were delivered. There were about two thousand persons present at the meeting. On the night of the 14th at about 10 P.M., a clerk arrived with an order from the Deputy Commissioner, and at once the Sub-Inspector of the city and Sadar *thanas* were summoned and

MUNSHI KIRPA SINGH—~~concluded~~—MUNSHI GHULAM MOHI-UD-DIN.

instructed to arrange to put down disturbance and to guard all Government property. In accordance with the order above cited all respectable citizens and license-holders of arms were called on the morning of the 15th April. Chaudhuri Ali Ahmad, Sultan Ahmad, Zaidar, Qazi Baqi Shah, Lala Behi Ram, Coal Merchant, Diwan Sikander Lal, Diwan Badri Das, Chaudhuri Sultan Ali, Lala Jagan Nath, Mahant, Kirpal Singh, Municipal Commissioner, Muhammad Khan, Lambardar, Sardul Singh, Lambardar, Sub-Inspector, City Thana, Jamiat Singh Bagga, and a few others attended at the Tahsil-dar's house, which is situated in Tahsil buildings, and the orders of the Deputy Commissioner were communicated to them. Thereafter enquiry was made from them as to who were present at the meeting held in the Jumma Masjid the night previous. All replied that from among them only Jamiat Singh Bagga had attended the meeting. Jamiat Singh admitted this, but conceded that he went on the understanding that it was an ordinary meeting. After this it was decided that all the remaining leaders, who had supported the *hartal* movement, be summoned and advised to desist from doing so. At this juncture a large crowd collected outside the Tahsil building in front of the gate to whom one Abdul Satar was lecturing. Jamiat Singh thereon said that if any other person went to summon the leaders, it would make them angry, and that he would go to bring them. He accordingly went and brought with him (1) Master Muhammad Jan, (2) Pritam Das, (3) Kesar Singh, (4) Sheikh Inayat Ullah, *alias* Basha, (5) Sheikh Abdulla, boot seller. Master Muhammad Jan came bare-headed and tied his turban in our presence. Master Muhammad Hussain, Municipal Commissioner, came to us a little before the above-mentioned five men. Master Muhammad Jan and his companions were later addressed by Diwan Sikander Lal, who tried to dissuade them from the movement by emphasising the fact that the Government was all powerful, and that anything done by them against it would be of no avail, and further that the observance of *hartal* would lead to bad results. He advised them to do their best to check the *hartal*. Pritam Das, one of the ringleaders, then spoke and said that the *hartal* could not be stopped, but that the intention was not to create a disturbance. As people have already been moved to observe a *hartal* so it must be observed. It was then explained to the leaders to instruct the mob not to do anything repugnant to law, otherwise they will be fired upon. Arms licenses were ordered to keep themselves in readiness with their arms to assist the Government should peace be disturbed.

At 9 o'clock A.M. all the gentlemen, who were summoned to meet me, were allowed to depart, and the mob that had collected outside the Lohari gate was also dispersed. A part of the mob went towards the railway station and a part towards Nizamabad by the Grand Trunk Road. The mob which went towards Nizamabad

included Muhammad Hussain, *alias* Bakra, son of Hafiz Abdul Manan, Babeshar Nath, Abdul Rashid and others. They took with them men from Nizamabad, Viroka, etc., and looted and set fire to the bungalow of Reverend Bailey. The mob that went towards the railway station was accompanied by Master Muhammad Jan, Jowanda Mal, Jagan Nath Saluja and others. This mob subsequently damaged the telegraph wires and posts and railway signals. After the mob had dispersed from by the Lohari Gate I sat armed at the Tahsil to protect the Treasury, etc., as there was danger of the Treasury being attacked.

A meeting was arranged to be held that day at about 2 P.M. in the Mandi. When at this time it was found that a large number of people could not be collected in the Mandi, Jowanda Mal excited the people that Municipal Commissioners and the leaders of the town should be forced to present themselves at the meeting. On hearing this all those present numbering about 5 or 6 hundred went towards the mosque of Sheikh Niaz Ahmad, Member, Committee, which is situate in Bazar Bakrainwala. They met Sheikh Niaz Ahmad and his brother, Sheikh Muhammad Khan, and forced them to join the meeting, but they refused. Sheikh Niaz Ahmad returned the mob, but detained the following persons, *viz.*, Pritam Das, Master Muhammad Jan, Badri Nath Phul and Jagan Nath Saluja, whom he took to the house of Diwan Sikander Lal to advise them. These four men, on reaching Diwan Sikander Lal's house, requested him to attend the meeting, but he turned them out of his house and advised them not to hold any meeting. These men returned to the Mandi and at 4 o'clock in the evening held a meeting, which was presided over by Nand Lal Chopra. The following persons delivered lectures at this meeting:—

(1) Master Muhammad Jan, (2) Jagan Nath Saluja, (3) Bawa Ishar Singh, servant of the liquor licensee, (4) Pritam Das, (5) Brij Lal, student, Mission College, Lahore, and (6) a Maulvi whose name could not be ascertained. In this meeting it was advocated that since the leaders of the town had not participated in the movement the *hartal* should be ended the next day. After this there was no shouting or disturbance of any kind. Between 3 and 4 o'clock P.M., I was informed that the mob intended attacking the Post Office. I immediately, in company with Sultan Ahmad, Zaidar, and both the Police Sub-Inspectors of Wazirabad (Sadar and City) rode towards the Post Office and dispersed the mob. This mob, on entering the city and attending the meeting of the Mandi, realised that nothing more was contemplated. So after the meeting in the Mandi no disturbance took place and quiet was restored in the city and railway station once more. Arrangements, however, were made for guarding the Munsif's Court, the Tahsil and other Government buildings.

## MUNSHI GHULAM MOHI-UD-DIN, Retired Military Sub-Assistant Surgeon, Wazirabad.

I most respectfully beg to state that I am prepared to appear as a witness before the above Committee to give evidence in respect of affairs at Wazirabad in the Gujranwala District. A brief outline of the evidence that I can give is submitted below:—

## I.—RESPONSIBILITY FOR HARTAL IN GENERAL AND DISTURBANCES.

(a) On the 13th and 14th April 1919, there was the *Baisakhi* fair at Wazirabad, the bazars and streets of which were consequently thronged with rustic villagers from the several districts, most of whom freely indulged in drinking and on that occasion are popularly believed to have taken a prominent part in the disturbances which are attributed exclusively to the Wazirabad people.

## II.—ARRESTS MADE.

## A. General.

(a) Majority of arrests made in Wazirabad particularly in connection with the case of the supposed *hartal* leaders were unjustified and the evidence produced by the prosecution was a fabrication.

(b) Majority of the leaders' cases were got up and arose out of malice and strong party faction mainly due to local Municipal elections, for which I must confess Wazirabad is notorious and which is fully corroborated by public record in the Wazirabad Tahsil and Gujranwala District.

(c) The clique that has manufactured the whole evidence for prosecution is headed by Chaudhuri Ali Ahmad, who belongs to a Zamindar family.

MUNSHI GHULAM MOHI-UD-DIN—concluded—Major C. W. J. SMITH.

(d) It is significant that although most of the Zamindars who attended the *Baisakhi* fair are popularly and certainly believed to have participated in the Wazirabad disturbances, yet not a single individual of the whole lot, that was arrested, happened to be a Zamindar, and this was so because the present head of the Zamindar family, i.e., Chaudri Ali Ahmad while feeding his grudge fat and getting respectable bankers, merchants, Municipal Commissioners arrested, cleverly managed to have the Zamindars quite untouched, lest the Zamindar community should turn against him.

#### B. Particulars.

Master Muhammad Hussain Jolly, Municipal Commissioner—

- (a) Quite innocent victim to private grudge and deep-seated plot, that dates from the day he stood as a candidate for Municipal Commissionership in January 1919.
- (b) Chaudri Ali Ahmad, out of the important prosecution witnesses had grudge against M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly on account of Chaudri Nabi Bux, who was a rival candidate for Municipal election against M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly, but who was defeated in spite of Chaudri Ali Ahmad's support and hard struggle.
- (c) Malik Inayat Ullah, the chief witness against M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly, was also one of the candidates at the Municipal election in January 1919 and owed his success solely to Ali Ahmad's support and help and therefore gave evidence against M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly, because he was egged on by Chaudri Ali Ahmad, who also intimidated and warned him that he had only two alternatives, either he must give evidence against M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly or allow himself to be arrested.
- (d) The Municipal record, which was brought to the notice of the trying Magistrate on 9th June 1919, bears an eloquent testimony to the fact that Ali Ahmad and other members of the clique certainly had private grudge against M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly, a fact which was fully corroborated by both the defence and the prosecution witnesses examined by the Court.
- (e) M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly never preached *hartal*. He did not join any mob at any place and he did not take any part whatsoever in any of the disturbances.

(f) The dates on which he is alleged by prosecution were occupied as shown below.

14th April 1919.

1. Between 5 to 8 P.M. M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly and myself were in Munshi Alla Jowaya's Timber Mandi, outside Lohari Gate.
2. We said our evening prayers there at about 7-45 P.M.
3. At about 8 P.M. we heard loud shouts and cries coming from the side of the Tahsil, which seemed to be the cries raised by the young boys.
4. We left the place at once and took our way, not towards the Tahsil from which the shouts came, but *via* Trunk Road to the Akalghari Gate.
5. We parted at about 9 P.M. and went to our houses.

15th April 1919.

1. As invited by M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly, I called at his house at about 9 A.M. to attend to his wife who was sick.
2. While I was there, M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly left for Tahsil saying that he as a Municipal Commissioner was sent for by the Tahsildar in connection with the *hartal* in the city.
3. M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly came back within about 15 minutes.
4. I left M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly at about 10 A.M. with the direction that he should tell me the result of the treatment after about two or three hours.
5. M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly came to my house at about 12 A.M. to report the effect of the treatment and returned after staying a few minutes.
6. I again called at his house at about 2 P.M. and found him attending his wife.
7. Some of very important defence witnesses were not at all summoned by the Court, those who attended the Court at about 9 A.M. were not examined at all.

#### C. Martial Law in Wazirabad.

- (a) Martial Law in Wazirabad introduced after 16th April 1919.
- (b) The public subjected to indescribable suffering, misery and disgrace.
- (c) A house-tax at the rate of rupee one was levied and collected during the Martial Law days by Chaudri Ali Ahmad from all the inhabitants in the name of the Government, though without any legal authority, and when anyone ventured to protest against this illegal and unauthorised tax, he was threatened with arrest.

Major C. W. J. SMITH, D. S. O., 2-54th Sikhs, F. F. Administrator, Martial Law in Gujranwala, Gujrat and Lyallpur.

At the commencement of the Punjab riots I was serving with my unit at Rawalpindi and was not concerned with any of the riots which took place in the disturbed areas. On April 17th, I proceeded to Wazirabad under the orders of the General Officer Commanding, 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division, and entered on my duties as Administrator of Martial Law under the late Colonel Burbury, then commanding the troops in the Gujranwala District. That same afternoon I proceeded with Colonel Burbury to Gujranwala where Martial Law was proclaimed publicly. The following morning a similar proclamation was made at Wazirabad itself.

Copies of the general proclamation of Martial Law, reassuring well behaved persons and warning possible evil-doers, were sent throughout the district both through Officers Commanding detachments of troops and through the Civil authorities and a further proclamation carrying on the methods of protecting the railways and canals, which had been instituted by the civil authorities was similarly distributed. Certain local orders dealing with the cities of Wazirabad and Gujranwala were also issued,

and then under the orders first of Colonel Burbury and afterwards of Brigadier-General Campbell, Commanding the Sialkot Brigade Area, I busied myself creating the machinery for the administration of Martial Law. Area Officers were appointed and certain other officers were given special powers, i.e., Captain Cole, Supply and Transport, and Captain Wheatley. I cannot recall that any other officers were given special powers, who were below the rank of field officers. At the same time I issued a Martial Law Instruction, of which every British officer in the disturbed area was furnished with a copy, in which the powers of officers were laid down, and also a clear direction that those powers were not to be exceeded. Further instructions were issued from time to time as was found necessary by means of Martial Law Instructions. Some time about April 23rd, Gujrat came under Martial Law, and at the end of April or beginning of May, Lyallpur district also came under Martial Law, and both these districts came under my administration. Area Officers were at once appointed and such proclamations, as had already been issued in

Major C. W. J. SMITH—concluded—Mr. T. H. NORRIS.

the Gujranwala district, and which were deemed suitable, were made applicable to these districts also. To ensure publicity copies of all Martial Law Instructions and orders were posted in Wazirabad Railway station and copies in English and the vernacular were posted at the Indian troops camp and in six or seven places in the city, including the Tahsil. Orders were issued to all Area Officers and Officers Commanding detachments to take similar measures.

Knowing it was almost impossible to carry on smoothly the administration of Martial Law without the good will and assistance of the civil powers, I consulted the latter as frequently as possible. I paid several visits to the Deputy Commissioner of Gujranwala and the Superintendent of Police, besides seeing them when they were on tour, visited the Deputy Commissioner of Gujrat twice, if not three times, and the Deputy Commissioner of Lyallpur once, consulting them freely as to the advisability or necessity of various actions. In my capacity as Area Officer of Wazirabad I worked almost entirely through the Tahsildar and the Municipal Committee of whom one Sardar Sahib Khan was in constant attendance, both he and the Tahsildar rendering me the greatest assistance. I did not know of any action of mine as Administrator of Martial Law to which the Civil authorities took the slightest exception.

I was unfortunately debarred from carrying out anything approaching the amount of touring in the district that I felt was necessary, partly because I was terribly handicapped, especially at first, for want of an adequate office establishment, which necessitated my doing much mechanical clerical work myself: and also because Martial Law being a new procedure to everyone concerned, it was imperative that I should remain chiefly at headquarters, where I could deal promptly with the numerous points on which Area and other officers required orders or advice, and whence I could endeavour to co-ordinate their methods of procedure into one general system. The administration had begun to work with fair smoothness, and General Campbell had given me an assistant, so as to enable me to tour more freely, when I was ordered to rejoin my unit for Field Service on May 8th, 1919.

I cannot, without reference to the various proclamations, remember the subject matter in them, but amongst others was a proclamation controlling prices, which was issued owing to a distinct rise in prices immediately after the riots, which was leading to hardship and discontent amongst the labouring classes. At the same time the district zamindars were urged through the district authorities to bring supplies to Wazirabad as usual, their non-molestation being guaranteed. Another forbade movement after dark in a proscribed area near Wazirabad Station. This was introduced for the safety of the public to avoid any unfortunate occurrence owing to ignorant persons failing to answer the challenge of sentries. Other proclamations dealt with the restrictions in railway traffic and to the closing of certain stations to passenger booking. Another ordered school-boys to salute the Union Jack daily as a parade. This was introduced as a disciplinary measure as there was

indisputable proof that boys from the schools had played a large part in the recent riots.

During my administration no disturbances occurred in the districts under my control. The prompt appearance of troops in the towns where riots had occurred and the wholesome fear of this new form of law administration seemed to overawe the townfolk, whilst the villagers in the neighbourhood of Gujrat and Wazirabad appeared indifferent. Wazirabad City was a little sullen at first, and Gujranwala, from what I saw of it, seemed sullen to the end of my administration, but as a whole, once they realised Martial Law affected nobody who behaved in a normal manner, the people of the districts concerned seemed to accept it quite contentedly. I received no complaints against the hardships of Military Law, except against the restrictions in railway travelling, which undoubtedly did inflict considerable hardship, but this was alleviated as far as possible by the granting of railway permits to anyone recommended by the local civil administration, such as Tahsildars, Magistrates, etc. I do not know of any cases of passes having been refused to those having such recommendations.

As regards crimes and punishments, no person was dealt with under Martial Law for an offence prior to the establishment of Martial Law. Offences against Martial Law in the Gujranwala and Gujrat districts were mostly trivial, the offenders being dismissed with a caution, or being punished by a few strokes with a cane, or by a small fine according to circumstances. So far as I remember there were only two cases of imprisonment. One case was tried by me personally, and a careful record of the evidence was placed on the files, the offender—a telegraph clerk—being awarded two years' imprisonment for deliberately tampering with the instruments, thereby putting two lines out of action. The other was the case of a European who was awarded a term of imprisonment for drunkenness, indecent conduct, and disobedience of orders issued under Martial Law. This case was tried by the Area Officer, at Malakwal. I believe the summary of cases tried at Lyallpur by the Area Officer showed several cases of imprisonment or moderately heavy fines, but I cannot now quote from memory.

I only received two complaints against the behaviour of the troops themselves. Some menials, who worked down the river near Wazirabad, reported that the British guard on the Pulkoo Nullah Bridge had been passing familiar remarks with their womenfolk. The Tahsildar and Sardar Sahib Khan did not seem to consider the case of much importance and personally I thought there was very little in it, and as the British guard had already been replaced by an Indian guard, the case was allowed to drop. Another complaint made was that a sepoy had "commandeered" some articles from a shop in Wazirabad city, in the name of Martial Law. This had been anticipated and a bazar was already being formed in the Indian troops camp. The completion of this bazar was hurried on, and the city put strictly out of bounds to all troops and followers.

SRINAGAR: October 25th, 1919.

Mr. T. H. NORRIS, Station Master, Wazirabad.

I beg to report that about 100 Indian men and lads between the ages of 16 and 18 years forcibly entered the main platform at about 20-30 hours on 14th April 1919, and I turned them off with the assistance of Mr. Gereson, Inspector of Police, and Muhammad Akram, Assistant Station Master: the men went off and when passing the overbridge they stoned the station building, but fortunately damages were slight.

Then about 8 hours on the 15th April 1919 a mob of about 1,200 men with sticks and stones made their way to the goods shed: I immediately informed the Military authorities, who sent down their cavalry and they dispersed the mobs, and the situation was saved.

At about 9 hours on 15th April 1919 the mobs started cutting the telegraph wires and knocking down the posts near the station and advanced in the direction of Gujrat station.

At about 11-10 hours the same day I noticed from the station that the mobs had knocked down the outer signal. In the meanwhile 2-Down mail left Kathala. I immediately got the Permanent Way Inspector to trolley me down, and we found the mobs had placed a number of large boulders on the line and also placed the outer signal close to the running line.

I stopped the mail beyond the outer signal and removed the boulders with the assistance of the Permanent Way

Mr. T. H. NORRIS—concluded—Mr. B. N. BOSWORTH SMITH.

Inspector and personally piloted the mail into the station : had the boulders not been removed, I am sure the mail would have got derailed.

The mobs then made off in the direction of Gujrat.

On arrival of the mail at the station I was informed that a culvert between Wazirabad and D. U. X. was burnt by the mob.

I immediately ordered 2-Down mail to be detained, got a shunting engine and went down and found that

the culvert was burnt, but the fire extinguished by the Engineering staff: the Sub-Divisional Officer, Wazirabad, was on the spot, he ordered me to return to Wazirabad, and on arrival of 1-Up at Wazirabad I could start 2-Down, which orders were carried out.

The Railway staff held a meeting on 13th April 1919, beyond the Pulku River, at which it was suggested to strike work, the chief agitator was Babu Mokand Lal, Chief Booking Clerk.

**Mr. B. N. BOSWORTH-SMITH, I.C.S., Joint Deputy Commissioner, Sheikhpura Gujranwala District.**

This report deals with disturbances in April in the two Tahsils, Khangah Dogran and Sharaqpur, which are shortly to be formed into a new district.

**I.—SURVEY OF PREDISPOSING CAUSES:**

The actual scene of disturbances was confined to the Railway between Sheikhpura and Sangla and spread over a period of four days only. The general predisposing causes will be more appropriately dealt with by the Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala.

It is sufficient to state here that for four days the narrow tract of 36 miles along the line was in a state of open rebellion, and the people imagined that the last day of British Rule had come.

The immediate predisposing cause of this extraordinary ignorance and credulity is the fact that Gujranwala District in its unwieldy size and multiplicity of work of all kinds has been probably the worst administered in the Punjab.

These two Tahsils have had even less attention than the other three Tahsils on account of their remoteness from the district headquarters. Despite its vicinity to Lahore, the rural population is extremely backward, very illiterate, ignorant and credulous to a degree, and so it falls a very ready prey to any malicious persons spreading false reports. Apart from this there was no other local predisposing cause. There is of course constant railway communication with Lahore, Amritsar and Delhi.

Ill disposed pleaders at Sheikhpura and seditionists in the markets of Chuharkana and Sangla misrepresented the Rowlatt Bill, and by distorting offences that had happened at Delhi, Amritsar and Lahore persuaded a good number of persons that the *Sarkar* had turned *Be-iman*; that its days were over; that Hindus and Mussulmans should join together and make common cause against the Government; that the native army was ready to help them; that all India was in flames of revolution; and that if the people did their part here, there would be Home Rule with no land revenue to pay and they would have their own army.

Crowds flocked down to meet every train that passed through and the wildest rumours were afloat. The outbreak was immediately preceded by the *Baisakhi* festival. A large number of Sikhs and others went to Amritsar. Some of these were shot or wounded there, and the wildest tales came back of Government oppression, which further inflamed the population, particularly against Europeans.

In this part of the Punjab people are extraordinarily prosperous and are practically unaffected by high prices and the high cost of living. Comparatively few of the neighbouring villages have joined the Indian Army, and those who have done so are thoroughly content with the conditions. No doubt during the year immediately preceding, some executive measures had been taken to induce recruitment, and this was cleverly turned to account by seditious persons at public and private meetings.

**II.—IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE OUTBREAK.**

The immediate causes of the outbreak were the double *hartal* on 6th and 14th at Sheikhpura, carefully organized by the pleaders' community, the two public meetings

and the *hartal* at Chuharkana on the 11th and 12th, the three meetings at Sangla with a procession round the town to the railway station accompanied by a black flag, which is an emblem of violence, public bathing of Hindus and Musalmans together at the canal and the *hartal* there on 12th. The disturbances took place on the 14th, 15th and 16th, and, in that time, at Sheikhpura the wires were cut in two places, a riot took place and a signal was pulled down. In the next village of Machhike the wires were cut. Chuharkana Station was burnt, two bridges were pulled up, a crowd of some three or four thousand persons were engaged in open rebellion all day and wires were cut. The railway line was pulled up and the Missionary's Bungalow was looted.

The whole population of Chuharkana market and of the surrounding villages were out for war in the firm belief that the *Sarkar's* days were numbered.

As the train service was suspended, some persons walked towards Dhaban Singh Station. The villagers of Nawar Pind and Mahnianwala turned out in force with beat of drum, marched towards Dhaban Singh Railway Station, burnt it and looted all that was worth stealing. The looting continued without disguise till 6 in the morning of 16th. Certain Sikhs, who attended the meeting at Sangla organized a large party and marched towards Moman Railway Station on the night of 15th, which was similarly looted and destroyed. Baroa villagers, Aryans by caste, destroyed the railway wires. Wires were also cut at Marh Balochan in two places. A *sahib* was attacked in broad daylight at Sangla on the 16th, and a sepoy was rescued from an armed guard of soldiers. Stones were thrown at the Calcutta Mail, which, was diverted that way, and a party of Sikhs was ready to loot the Mission. Wires were also cut at Nangal Sadhan.

All these crimes followed immediately after the meetings at Sheikhpura, Chuharkana and Sangla, and in the immediate vicinity of these places, where a good deal of extra liquor was also consumed from 13th to 16th.

**III.—CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.**

The chronological order is given in rather more details in this section.

*Sangla.*

The fact that a Brahmachari, probably an Arya in disguise, was allowed for a month to give vent to open sedition in Sangla market is a stain on the community, both high and low, which it will be hard for them to wipe out.

About a month before the series of disturbances at Sangla commencing from the 12th April, a Brahmachari by name Gobind Parshad came to the town and stayed at the Thakardawara (temple); he is said to have come from Delhi and to have professed the Sanatan Dharam creed. His activities were in the beginning confined entirely to recitals and sermons on religious subjects, including the protection of cows, but latterly he formed acquaintance with the local leaders of the *Arya Samaj*. This circumstance has given rise to the belief that he may have been an accredited agent of the *Samaj* sent out in pursuance of a definite policy to preach sedition, but of this there is no definite proof.

The first outward sign of unrest made its appearance on the 11th April when a meeting was convened at the

Mr. B. N. BOSWORTH SMITH.

[Continued.]

house of Gyan Chand, Soap Merchant (a *Samajis'*) to protest against the Rowlatt Bill and urge *hartal*. The three chief speakers were the Brahmachari, Thakar Dass (manager of the Thakardawara) and Gyan Chand himself. The subject matter of all the speeches was the same—"by the passing of the Bill inconceivable hardships would be imposed on the people, not more than ten persons would be permitted together at birth and death ceremonies without permission, police powers of arrest and detention were to be almost unlimited, etc." On the motion for *hartal* being put to the meeting some difference of opinion was manifested. Accordingly a second meeting was announced to be held the same evening in the *Mandi*. At this meeting the Brahmachari, after touching again on the severity of the Bill and mentioning Mr. Gandhi's arrest, pleaded for unity of Hindus and Mussalmans in opposing Government and forcing the withdrawal of the Bill.

On the morning of the 12th April the whole town, with the exception of three ginning factories and a drug shop observed *hartal*. Nothing was done until about 10 A.M., when a move was made to the canal to hold a meeting and to bathe in token of mourning. Speeches were made exhorting the people to a spirited opposition to Government, and some inflammatory extracts were read from newspapers regarding the events at Lahore and Amritsar. On returning from the canal the crowd dispersed, but reassembled after two hours and formed a procession to march round the town. At the head of the procession were a black flag of mourning, and an effigy of the Rowlatt Bill, a crude figure of a man wearing a white helmet on its head and a snake round its neck— emblems of the origin and nature of the Bill. The *sarai* was reached about 3 P.M. when a halt was made for speeches and a song with the refrain "*hai hai Rowlatt Bill mizra, hai hai Rowlatt Bill saria*" was sung by the people. The crowd then moved over to the railway station and showed their intention of entering, but were prevailed on by the station master to remain outside. Until the arrival of the train from Lahore the crowd amused itself by shouting "*Hindu-Mussalman ki jai, Mr. Gandhi ki jai, Mohammed Ali Shaukat Ali ki jai*", etc. The arrival of the train brought various local members of the Notified Area Committee, returning from Gujranwala, and an American Missionary, at whom it is alleged stones were thrown as he drove away from the station in his car. There is, however, no direct evidence of any stones having been thrown, though there can be no doubt that the crowd gave full vent to its feelings by clapping hands and jeering. From the station the procession returned to the *Mandi*, where a meeting was held attended by almost all the townfolk. Speeches of the same seditious nature as before were delivered by the leaders, and telegrams were despatched to His Majesty the King-Emperor and His Excellency the Viceroy.

13th April 1919.—The effect of these meetings on the popular mind was not at once made evident. The 13th April was observed as the *Baisakhi* festival and passed off quietly, but on the 14th April a crowd collected at the station on the arrival of the Calcutta Mail, diverted to avoid the damaged portion of the main line at Gujranwala, and on its departure stoned it as it left the station.

14th—15th April 1919.—On the following night three Sikhs cut the railway telegraph wires between Sangla and Salarwala at a distance of about half a mile from Sangla Station.

16th April 1919.—On the morning of the 16th April a Sikh named Harnam Singh, with the help of three other Sikhs, backed up by a large mob from the town, forcibly released a military prisoner and maltreated his escort on the platform at Sangla Station.

On the evening of the same day Harnam Singh made a murderous attack on Mr. Wale, Telegraph Inspector, at Sangla Post Office and was wounded and captured.

16th—17th April 1919.—And lastly, on the night of the 16th—17th the villagers of Baroa tore down the telegraph wires on the Lahore line near their village.

Numerous arrests were made after a rather belated investigation, but the attitude of the people including

those of some local status indicated so clearly that they had no intention of implicating their fellows by making full statements, that it was ultimately deemed to prosecute only the leaders.

#### Moman.

11th April 1919.—On the 11th April Harnam Singh and Banta Singh, two leaders in the attack on Moman Railway Station, were present at a meeting of protest against the passing of the Rowlatt Bill at Nangla Mandi. What they heard at the meeting impressed them to such an extent that, on their way to attend the *Kanka* ceremony of a *Bairagi* at village Wara Labb Singh, they did their utmost to incite villagers to take active measures in opposing Government. The *Kanka* ceremony took place on the evening of the 14th April and there were gathered there some sixty or seventy men from neighbouring villages. After passages from the *Granth Sahib* had been read, Harnam Singh rose and addressed the assembly, and, after enumerating the evils that the Rowlatt Bill would bring upon the people, called on all present to come with him and commit some open act against Government. Banta Singh and Mian Singh at once responded, and later the rest of those present followed their example. Headed by these three men the mob proceeded to Moman Railway Station, which they looted, and then, after breaking into the Lamp Room to get oil for fuel, set fire to the station buildings.

#### Dhaban Singh.

15th—16th April 1919.—On the 15th April at about 9 A.M., Jagat Singh and Gyan Singh, *Kambohs* of village Nawan Pind summoned the villagers to a meeting and told them that the *Darbar Sahib* had been bombarded, many people had been killed at Amritsar and Lahore, and that Hindus and Mussalmans had united to force Government to withdraw the Rowlatt Bill. The villagers were thoroughly roused by these words and were readily induced to go and help to destroy Government property. Accordingly a mob set out under the leadership of the two men above named and having come to the railway bridge 1½ miles from Dhaban Singh Railway Station set to work to wreck the line, tearing up the rails, cutting the telegraph wires and burning the railway bridge. Having done this Jagat Singh and Gyan Singh went off to village Mahianwala about a mile away where they collected more men and then returned to the bridge. From here the whole crowd proceeded with beating drum to Dhaban Singh Railway Station, which they looted and burnt at about 4 A.M. on the morning of the 16th April.

#### Chuharkana.

12th April 1919.—Prior to the 11th April there was no sign of unrest at Chuharkana. The trouble started on that date in the *Mandi* adjoining the railway station, where a meeting attended by all the residents of the *Mandi*, Hindus and Mussalmans alike, was held at the mosque to protest against the iniquities of the Rowlatt Bill. Speeches were made misrepresenting the provisions of the Bill and it was resolved to hold another meeting on the following day to which villagers from the surrounding countryside should be invited. On the 12th April a complete *hartal* throughout the *mandi* was observed, and during the course of the day the proposed meeting of the villagers and residents of the *mandi* was held. The ground covered by the speeches was much the same as in the meeting of the day before.

13th April 1919.—On the 13th April, the *Baisakhi* fair was held at *Sacha Sauda* (Chuharkana) and was attended by large numbers of villagers; Teja Singh of Chuharkana and Kartar Singh of Jabbar took this opportunity of stirring up the people to overt acts of violence and called upon them to display their feelings against Government by tearing up the railway line. The effect of this was seen next day when crowds assembled at the railway station to meet the trains, and, it is said, to maltreat any European who might be travelling.

Mr. B. N. BOSWORTH-SMITH.

[Continued.]

Fortunately no victim for assault was found, and the mob dispersed with cheers for Gandhi and Hindu-Muslim unity.

15th April 1919.—The climax was reached on the 15th April. In the morning a party of some fifteen or twenty people from the *mandi* went to the railway bridge and started to tear up the railway lines. At about 11 A.M. a special troop train arrived containing a detachment of the 2-22nd Punjab (Sikh and Muhammadans) on their way to Hong Kong. The Officer Commanding detained a portion of his men, some of whom remained to protect the station, while others were sent to the *mandi*. It is said that on being asked by the men of the *mandi* why they, their brothers, had come to prevent them from resisting Government, the sepoys replied urging them to commit further excesses by cutting the telegraph wires and tearing up the line.

At about 2 P.M., after the troop train had departed, a large crowd of villagers and rioters from the *mandi* assembled and set to work to wreck the line between the canal bridge and the station. The arrival of the passenger train from Lahore diverted their attention to the station; the train was attacked and looted and the engine damaged. Following on this the station staff was assaulted and the station looted and burnt. Two bridges were damaged by fire and the telegraph wires cut. The final act occurred after dark when a mob from villages north of the line approached the station with the intention of holding up a train and then going on to loot the *Mandi*. The first train to arrive was an armoured train which picked up a portion of a crowd with its search light and opened fire with a machine gun. The rioters hastily dispersed, and thereafter there was no more trouble.

#### Sheikhupura.

6th April 1919.—On the 6th April *hartal* was observed throughout the bazar, the only open objector being a Muhammadan meat vendor, who was ultimately forced to comply by sympathisers of the movement pouring water on his fire. In the evening a mass meeting of protest against the Rowlatt Bill, attended by both Hindus and Muhammadans, was held, in which the local pleaders took the leading part; that nothing violent was said in the course of speeches is properly due to the fact that various Government officials were present taking notes. Nothing further occurred until the 14th April when *hartal* was again observed. About 5 P.M. a small party headed by Santokh Singh, Arora, went to the railway station to meet the train and learn the latest news of events in Lahore and Amritsar, and as a result damaged the signals and tore up the signal wire pegs on their way back. Arriving in the bazar they gathered more men together and proceeded to assault Gurmukh Singh Jhatkai and wreck his shop for his failing to observe *hartal*. After dark Santokh Singh with a few others went out and cut the Post Office telegraph wires, and later on the same night cut the wires between Sheikhupura and Lahore. Prompt measures by the authorities on the spot in having the wires repaired and summoning military aid from Lahore effectively prevented the occurrence of any disturbance.

#### III.—MARTIAL LAW AND OTHER MEASURES ADOPTED FOR SUPPRESSION OF DISTURBANCES.

Martial Law was proclaimed on the 19th and its effect was instantaneous and electric. On the night of the 15th an armoured train came down the line from Lahore to Chuharkana, taking up with them from Sheikhupura Rai Sahib Sri Ram, Sub-Divisional Officer. The armoured train worked hard in patrolling the line for three days with Sri Ram on board. Machine guns were taken to Chuharkana and even beyond. The effect was excellent and instantaneous. This armoured train undoubtedly saved the market of Chuharkana from being looted, and if it had not come, when it did, looting would certainly have spread further, and possibly Sheikhupura

and even Lahore would have been visited by an ill-conditioned mob of ruffians. Similarly on the 16th, the Deputy Commissioner, Lyallpur, despatched troops to Sangla with a District Traffic Superintendent and an Extra Assistant Commissioner, and had not the troops come, when they did, Sangla market would have shared the fate of Chuharkana and Station and other Government property would have been wrecked and looted.

On the 19th, Colonel O'Brien, Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala, came down the line with a Special Train and made arrests of pleaders and others at Sheikhupura, Dhaban Singh and Sangla. The people concerned in these atrocities had by this time become thoroughly scared. The markets and the neighbouring villages were practically empty.

On the 21st April, I arrived at Chuharkana and immediately took the statements of the railway staff, and on the following morning held a large identification parade, which was continued for the next three days. Some four thousand villagers were paraded, and fourteen or fifteen of the railway staff passed down separately and independently in the presence of Magistrates for identification. This resulted in the arrest of some three hundred offenders, nearly all of whom have been punished.

On the 24th I proceeded to Dhaban Singh, where similar procedure was undertaken. Till then only some twenty persons were arrested. Two villages of Mah-nianwala and Nawan Pind were paraded at length and some hundred more arrests were made, and nearly all of these have been punished.

From Dhaban Singh I went to Moman, where the villagers were similarly collected, but unluckily I had sent before me a Sikh Inspector, Kartar Singh, and a Sikh Extra Assistant Commissioner Sardar Amar Singh. The Superintendent of Police is dealing departmentally with the Inspector, who undoubtedly tried to screen his brother Sikhs. Some hundred Sikhs had attacked the Moman Railway Station but the railway staff was got at by them, and refused to admit that more than three persons had looted the station. Unfortunately very few of these Sikhs have been convicted.

From there I passed on to Sangla, which I reached the same day. Here too there was a conspiracy of silence, as the market people and the neighbouring villages had all agreed not to give each other away. The consequence is that in Sangla and its vicinity very few offenders have been brought to account, and an executive action of another kind has been recommended to deal with the situation here.

There was a considerable delay in deciding whether Mr. Penny, Assistant Commissioner, and myself could use the powers of a Summary Court Martial, and we were not able to start trying the accused till the 6th May. Between 6th and 20th May 477 persons were tried and 294 were convicted. This long delay at such a critical time was a most unfortunate episode, and the keeping of nearly four hundred persons under arrest placed a great strain on the police, and they could not have undertaken these arduous duties without the assistance of the Military, which was fully availed of. Three prison vans were obtained and temporary *Hawalats* were constructed at Chuharkana and Dhaban Singh. Troops arrived promptly on 18th at Chuharkana and Sangla. However, by the time that the troops actually came, the countryside had been thoroughly frightened and all was quiet.

Practically no Martial Law has been enforced in this part of the district and no punishments given under Martial Law. The school boys of Sangla were for a number of days made to parade every morning and salute the Union Jack. The people, as a whole, have been entirely unaffected by Martial Law. They appreciated and enjoyed the importance of having troops and their behaviour has been admirable. People in this part of the country little realized before how efficient and quick the arm of the "*Sarkar*" could be. Repeated visits of Armoured Cars, a display of gun firing at Sangla and elsewhere and the passing of a Mobile Section of Machine Guns on Ford cars and Motor bicycles through

*Continued.]*

Mr. B. N. BOSWORTH-SMITH.

the district attended by cavalry, have been useful in showing how quickly the military can get to any disturbed part of the country. The Military Officers Commanding troops at Sheikhpura, Chuharkana and Sangla have acted with the greatest discretion, and have made themselves popular with the community. These recent disturbances have emphasized to a marked degree the value of armoured cars along railway communications, and of Mobile Machine Gun Sections for other parts of the district. Such an armed force should always be ready for emergencies in the Punjab, where everything depends on quickness. The civil authorities certainly are greatly indebted to the military in this part of the district for their promptness and efficiency in responding to the call.

#### IV.—CLASSES PROMINENT IN PROMOTING DISTURBANCES.

The total number of really disaffected persons in this district was probably under three figures, though some ten thousand persons took part in demonstrations, looting or destroying without really knowing what they were doing.

In tracing the causes of disaffection it is a safe and golden rule to look near home first of all. There is no place where disloyalty is so deep as in Delhi, Lahore and Amritsar. Similarly in this tract, the homes of disloyalty were to be found in Sheikhpura, the headquarters of the Sub-Division, and the two markets at Chuharkana and Sangla. In Sheikhpura, a retired Inspector of Police, whose two sons were convicted and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, and half a dozen pleaders and their munshis were prominent. Had there been no pleaders in Sheikhpura, it is safe to say that there would have been no trouble there.

In Chuharkana the chief leader was a discredited Manager of the Khalsa School named Kartar Singh, who gave lectures and embezzled school funds. He has been sentenced to death.

Teja Singh, another Updeshak, who had attended a seditious meeting at Lahore, also gave lectures and inflamed a large number of *Wirks* in the village of Chuharkana, close to Guru Nanak's *Sacha Sauda*. The other ringleaders at Chuharkana consisted of a half-fledged Patwari from the United Provinces, a Pseudo-Maulvi from a neighbouring village and a sprinkling of *Arya Samajists*. The station staff, which toyed with sedition, was ready to strike, but had not the courage to do so. They showed an utter incompetency to deal with the crowds which thronged the station. They encouraged the rioters in private and by attending meetings of sedition in the market.

Proceeding to Sangla we find the "*fons et origo mali*" to be a Brahmachari, who was hospitably entertained by the Aryas of Sangla for more than a month, and whose utterances were listened to by a sympathetic audience without protest. There can be no doubt that all the leaders at Sangla played a double game. They were only too pleased to see the trouble brewing, but when things came to a head, they took care to be out of the way, and at all events not to do anything. Here too the attitude of the railway staff was not above suspicion. When special trains were expected, information was conveyed to the Bazar and crowds rushed to the station long before the trains were signalled.

Sangla is closer to civilization than any of the other places, and the feeling against the Europeans and the Government was in consequence more bitter. The Bench of Honorary Magistrates and the members of this Notified Area did nothing to prevent disturbances and to help detection of those guilty after the event.

#### V.—NATURE OF MOVEMENT, SHOWING ESPECIALLY HOW FAR DISLOYAL ANTI-EUROPEANS AND ANTI-CHRISTIANS.

It has already been shown that the would-be serious revolutionists were very few in number, possibly 60 or 80 out of ten thousand, who took part in the work of looting, destructing or demonstration.

After the news from Amritsar came in, there were very unmistakable anti-European and anti-Christian manifestations. The American Missionary at Chuharkana escaped on the night of the 15th or he would certainly have been murdered. His house and hospital were looted and burnt on the 15th by the villagers, who had enjoyed his hospitality.

The motor car of an American Missionary at Sangla was greeted with abuse. The Roman Catholic father at Sangla found it convenient to immure himself in a barbed wire enclosure with other Europeans at Lyallpur for fifteen days. Mr. Wale, Telegraph Superintendent, was attacked on the 16th at Sangla in broad day light. Any European found between Sheikhpura and Sangla from 15th to 17th would have been murdered. The Native Christians were apprehensive, and would have been attacked, had it not been for the timely arrival of the armoured car, and the Native Christian girls of the American School of Sangla would have been raped but for the timely advent of the troops there.

#### VI.—PUNITIVE MEASURES.

The total damage to public and private property was Rs. 27,367-3-9, mostly at the railway stations. Only seven cases were dealt with by the Commissions and substantial sentences were given; over 490 people were dealt with and 323 were convicted. In all 40 whipping sentences were ordered, nearly all in the case of juveniles to save them from going to jail. The whipping was much less severe than that given in jail, and it was not public, though it was administered in the compound of the Canal Bungalows after the court rose. No sentences of whipping were given for any offences committed after the 19th of April.

#### VII.—EFFECT OF DISTURBANCES AND THE MEASURES TAKEN

The promptitude and complete manner in which Government has dealt with the disturbances, have made a deep and far-reaching impression on the people. They will certainly not be so ready in future to act on the false reports of the ill-disposed persons.

The following general suggestions and remarks are offered for what they are worth:—

The recent occurrences have shown clearly that Gujranwala District is too large for one charge, and possibly at some future time there may be an outbreak in some rural tract. This part of the district has long been undermanned in police personnel, and it needs nearly double the quantity of police stations and police. The police staff was throughout short. What was wanted was a permanent Superintendent of Police, a good native Deputy Superintendent of Police, and two other experienced Sub-Inspectors. In future outbreaks, experienced Sub-Inspectors should be sent at once from other districts and also a Deputy Superintendent of Police.

The people are extremely democratic and ill-disciplined, given to crimes and cattle stealing, and their increasing wealth has made them worse rather than better. They have practically no interest outside money-making, drinking and vice, and enjoy very few pleasures. There are no national sports, few social gatherings, no cattle fairs, and little interest is taken in education. There is no pride in the village community in its institutions of its history. There are no bonds of sympathy between village and village. There are no natural leaders of society, and no close and friendly intercourse, as there should be, between Government and the governed. The people want amusement as much as they want encouragement to take an intelligent interest in all round progress and development. They should take a pride in their own Zaildars and leaders, in their own village, Tahsil and district. There is no "*esprit de corps*" or love for their own country. The more wealthy leaders should be encouraged to associate with each



Mr. B. N. BOSWORTH-SMITH—concluded—Rai Sahib SRI RAM SUD.

other. They should also be encouraged to take a pride in the education of their children and train them for Government's service, especially for the Army.

The real secret of preventing disturbances of this kind and more far-reaching outbursts of unrest in the future lies in the early formation of the new district, when closer contact with the people can be ensured. The Summary procedure of Martial Law is admirably adopted for a people of this kind in times of disturbances, and indeed always if properly carried out and supervised. Quick and ready justice without the uncertainties of law, cost of pleaders and the oppression of the police is what is wanted.

No more suitable method could have been devised for dealing with a widespread rebellion of this kind than Regulation No. 4 of Bengal of 1804. Its presence on the Statute Book was an untold blessing, for otherwise temporary anarchy of a widespread and most destructive nature would have resulted.

Loyalty must be insisted on in all Government servants and school masters. Black lists should be maintained of masters whose loyalty is doubtful, and such should be summarily dismissed. If the school masters are made all right, the school boys will have a chance of growing up well disciplined men.

The Educational Department has hitherto largely failed in this direction. It has probably been a problem too difficult to tackle and so has been left. Progress in this direction means a "voite-face" on the part of Government. A frank recognition of the error of the principle originally laid down that Government should not interfere in matters of religion should be made. Education without religion is worthless and harmful, as the great bulk of the Indian rural community feel. In the village schools no less than in town schools or colleges, religion must be taught, and the master or masters should be religious people, whose life's work will be to look after the welfare of that particular school.

The railway staff did not do well on this occasion, and it was hardly to be expected they would, considering the class of station masters and clerks who are enlisted. A good station master at a large station would be a successful man anywhere in any walk of life. A station master at a small wayside station should be a man accustomed to control, to use authority and to act in emergencies. The Railway does not appoint such persons except by accident. It is essential that the Station masters should be loyal, should know their staff, should be in touch with the people amongst whom they live, and able to collect timely aid when needed. The station master at Bhalike, who is a man of fine stature and some courage, unlike his *confreres* at the other stations, called in thirty villagers on the night of 15th with the result that this station was not attacked.

Traders are always a source of danger in bringing in new ideas, and will become increasingly so amongst the fiery and warlike population of the Punjab when places like Delhi are allowed to bring compulsion and pressure to bear on the trading community in the Punjab by refusing credit and the like with the object of securing their own disloyal aims. It should be made a penal offence for any trader to threaten another with stoppage of credit, etc., in order to achieve a political end. There is nothing to prevent Delhi in the future stirring up similar trouble in the Punjab by similar methods. It was Delhi which forced a *hartal* on Ambala Canton-

ment and bazar, where the people were most loyal and most reluctant to take up such an attitude. A *hartal* is in itself illegal, and an open incitement of violence, which should not be allowed after the present experience in the Punjab.

I have taken the occasion of the past six weeks to see the inhabitants of about sixty villages and to talk with them, and I am convinced that their attitude is all that could be desired, and that they are most loyal. The bulk of the country is entirely unaffected and is probably more loyal than ever it was.

There can be no doubt that a general railway strike was just averted. At Ambala Cantonment on 12th April, all the railway staff struck, and the Commissioner and myself spent the whole day in getting them back. If the strikes at these central stations had been successful, it is certain that all the small stations would have followed suit.

#### VIII.—GENERAL.

It would seem that the most important lesson to draw from the present experience of Martial Law is that the executive control by the Civil should never be surrendered to the military, otherwise there is a great danger of something being done, which will be misunderstood or cause great trouble.

The summary procedure was admirably adopted to meet the emergency. Nearly 400 persons were punished, and in this way the bulk of them were disposed of within fourteen days. The total imprisonment thus awarded was 465 years with a fine of Rs. 23,150. The policy adopted was in the main to deal with all offenders under the Summary Courts, and they got off much lighter than they would have done if they had been sent up before the Tribunal. The view taken from the start was that the ringleaders only should be severely dealt with and the misguided zamindars and others, though they were guilty of open rebellion, have got off with a year or two years' imprisonment.

The system adopted was simplicity itself. The statements of the railway staff and others, who had seen the occurrences, were first recorded by a magistrate in detail, and then all the inhabitants of suspected villages were paraded and most careful identifications took place in the presence of magistrates. This was only done after measures had been taken to get in the very many absconders as the villages were practically deserted at first. Police investigation and police enquiry were thus reduced to a minimum, and there was practically no opportunity for corruption.

Similarly the question of reward and punishment was kept in my own hands and there was no opportunity for *Safarash*. The investigation and enquiry as well as the trials were all held in public, and the general justice of the sentences and other action taken is universally admitted.

The general effect of these disturbances will be, I take it, that would-be agitators will in future find it very much more difficult to get zamindars and other people to believe their false reports or to act on them. The people here have learnt a bitter lesson. Quick and severe justice has been administered. Those who took part in the riot have been the laughing stock of the country-side and have been abused by their own women folk.

Rai Sahib SRI RAM SUD, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Sub-Divisional Officer, Sheikhpura.

I was in charge of the Sharakpur Sub-Division of the Gujranwala District with Headquarters at Sheikhpura during the disturbances of April last, and this sub-division was composed of the two tahsils of Sharakpur and Khangah Dogran. Nothing happened in Sharakpur Tahsil except that telephone wires were broken near Muridke on a certain night between 14th and 18th April, an offence which still remains untraced. However,

the following events happened at several places of the Khangah Dogran Tahsil.

#### HAPPENINGS AT SHEIKHPURA.

On the 6th of April there was an *hartal* at Sheikhpura and a meeting in the evening with a pleader in the chair and both of these functions had been organized

Continued.]

Rai Sahib SRI RAM SUD.

by the pleaders in general. Speeches were made at the meeting by three pleaders including the President. The Rowlett Act was condemned and a resolution passed asking the Secretary of State to cancel it. Nothing untoward happened that day, but there seemed no doubt that the organizers of the *hartal* and the meeting were largely responsible for the atmosphere of hatred against Government that was thereby created, for even illiterate women in the streets of Sheikhupura were heard to say that the British people were intending to interfere with marital and sisterly relations by legislation, preventing husbands and wives, sisters and brothers to come together.

There was outward calm on the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th April. I left for Gujranwala on the evening of 10th April to attend a District Darbar and so did most of the influential people at Khangaah Dogran Tahsil. The Darbar was held on the 11th and the District Board meeting on the 12th and I took the morning train at Gujranwala on the 13th April for a return journey, but in the meantime the news of the incidents at Amritsar and Lahore on the 10th April had come through. While seated in the train on the morning of 13th April I heard a station Babu, at a wayside station between Gujranwala and Muridke, telling passengers in an audible voice that such of them who hoped to return from Lahore were hoping against hope, and I could well see his point, for I had heard at Gujranwala rumours of a general railway strike materializing at any moment. However we were not stranded on the way and reached Shahdara about 10 A.M. and waited there for the connecting train. Here, as we (that is myself, Mian Khan Dauran, Civil Judge at Sangla, and Jagat Singh, Pleader, at Sheikhupura) were walking on the platform, we were accosted by a Sikh youth. The latter informed us that everybody was on strike at Lahore even including the railway workshop people and that he had come down from there to ascertain our views as we appeared to him to be educated people, but he received no encouraging replies from us and he went away.

I waited for the connecting train at Shahdara which was due at Sheikhupura at 1 P.M., but it was not certain up to 2 P.M. that it would ever arrive. About this time a man named Garib Muhammad of Harn Munara village arrived in the train from the direction of Sheikhupura and gave me the news that the people of Sheikhupura were waiting for my return to close their shops once more, and on hearing this I sent for a tonga and in the company of Sardar Sahib Amar Singh (another Extra Assistant Commissioner at Sheikhupura—in those days) hastened back to my headquarters and reached there at 5 P.M. and next day (14th April) Sheikhupura saw a second *hartal* which was organized by two or three pleaders in conjunction with Alma Singh, a man who had recited a prayer at the meeting of 6th April mentioned before, and had actively participated in the *langar* of that day. A free *langar* was also opened on the 14th April by the people of Sheikhupura for the benefit of the hungry people in imitation of the Lahore *langars*. Towards the evening of that day there occurred a riot at a baker's, because the latter had cooked *jhalka* meat and the Muhammadans had objected to it and in this riot the baker was beaten by a mob and his utensils and cooked *rotis* and meat had been thrown in the dust. That same evening after dark both railway telegraphic wires and signals and the postal wires were broken with the result that the Bombay Mail and another troop train that passed through Sheikhupura station that night towards Lahore out of its ordinary route (because the main line between Peshawar and Lahore had been damaged by the mob near Gujranwala) had to be joined and taken forward without any line clear towards the next station of Chichoki Mallian, after being piloted by a station assistant at Sheikhupura going ahead on a trolley. I learnt about the damage done to the wires and the signals above on the morning of 15th April and I saw the spot and had the damage repaired in my presence. The Police Sub-Inspector was also accompanying me when the postal wires were

mended after the railway wires, and we were both armed at the time. As soon as the postal wires became in working order (and it was between 10 and 11 A.M.) I sent a telegraphic message to Deputy Commissioner through the Post Office asking for British soldiers' help before it was too late. The railway wires were mended somewhat earlier, but I did not trust my message to them because I did not believe in the integrity of railway people generally in those days. Precautions were taken and nothing more happened at Sheikhupura.

#### HAPPENINGS AT CHUHARKANA MARKET AND VILLAGE.

The people of Chuharkana market were in close commercial relationship with Lahore and Amritsar. During my absence in Gujranwala, the Hindus and the Muslims of the market held a Union meeting in a mosque on the evening of 11th April after the news from Lahore and Amritsar had reached them and next day (12th April) they held a meeting in the quadrangle of the grain *mandi*, when seditious speeches were made by some of the people of the market and by two Muslims (a Hakim and a canal *patwari*) who came from a village some 20 miles away. This meeting was followed by another meeting on the 13th April near Chuharkana village (a distance of one mile from the Chuharkana market) and this last meeting was held in the grounds of *sachcha sauda* (true bargain) temple dedicated to Guru Nanak when the *Laisakki fair* was then being held. More sedition was preached at this meeting by two ringleaders—named Teja Singh and Kartar Singh (the former of whom had attended the mob meetings at Lahore and the latter of whom was managing a Khalsa School in Chuharkana market) to a large audience from neighbouring villages that had collected at the fair. Nothing happened on the 14th April. On the morning of the 15th April the people of the Chuharkana market who had probably information about the incidents at Gujranwala and Sheikhupura on the previous day tore up a part of the rail road near the canal bridge in the neighbourhood of Chuharkana village. This damage was soon repaired by a troop train that was passing that way towards Lahore about the time, but as soon as this troop train left Chuharkana station between 2 and 3 P.M. the people of Chuharkana market, of Chuharkana village and of many neighbouring villages (who I heard were also incited by the troop train people, a matter which has already formed the subject of a separate enquiry) combined and tore up the line that had been repaired and much more of it and also pulled out the telegraph posts in the neighbourhood for a considerable distance. This done, they turned their attention to the Chuharkana station which was situated close to the market and looted and burnt it about 4 P.M. and further held up a railway train that reached there about the time and looted the goods in the brakevan and smashed the carriage glasses and other furniture and I received a wire from a member of the Chuharkana market notified area about 5 P.M. re the incidents above. At 10 P.M. the same evening Mangal Singh, Zaidar of Chuharkana, whose own son was subsequently found to have been concerned in the above riots, came to me at Sheikhupura, a distance of 9 miles from Chuharkana market, with the information that a mob of two to three thousand had collected near the broken canal bridge above mentioned on the Sangla side of Chuharkana station and was bent on mischief, that he had noticed people from villages on his way rushing to join the same mob and that he had further heard of rumours that the line far beyond Chuharkana towards Sangla was being broken by other villagers and a guard of the train held up and mentioned before who had trudged on foot from Chuharkana to Sheikhupura confirmed the events he had seen soon after the arrival of the said Mangal Singh. At 11-55 P.M. that evening an armoured train arrived at Sheikhupura, and I proceeded therein to Chuharkana station. We moved very slowly and on our way near the Chuharkana distant signal towards Sheikhupura we found a pointsman's box placed across the line. This

Rai Sahib SRI RAM SUD—concluded—Lieutenant TATAM.

was removed to one side and we went forward, but not far off we discovered some men near the line who were presumably out for more mischief to the line. The fire from the machine gun was opened and at this spot next morning we found the dead body of one man (a *Machhi* by caste) who came from the neighbouring village of Kujar and we also found a coil of broken telegraphic wires near him. We next went forward to Chuharkana station, but the mob mentioned by Mangal Singh, Zaidar, which came, as the report went, from 20 to 30 villages in the neighbourhood and had collected to loot the Chuharkana market, dispersed in the meantime on hearing the gun-shots and at the sight of the flash of the searchlight which could be seen from long distances. However, we were informed at Chuharkana station that some people were hidden in a factory there and we went into it and on forcing open the door of a room which was fastened from inside we found therein a stalwart Jat youth named Mahana Singh who came from the neighbouring village of Nokhar. We also found a brand new *chhavi* standing against the outer wall of this house and this weapon apparently belonged to the said Mahana Singh who had left it there when he hid himself on hearing of our approach. Some rifle shots were also fired after this, but no one was hurt.

The day now broke and we proceeded on the line and pulled up the train opposite Chuharkana village and supervised the mending of the damage to the telegraph and railway line. As we were there we noticed the movements of the people on the far side of the village and we went into the village and shots were fired from the rifles and the machine gun and they were dispersed and I came to know later that people numbering some five hundred had armed themselves with *kulharis* and sticks and were preparing themselves to attack us before they were dispersed and the above firing had caused three casualties including one death so far as I have come to know. On the morning of the 16th April we were in the fields looking for the bodies of the people who might have been killed near the distant signal when the first shot was fired, when we noticed a man giving a flag signal from the top of the Mission house in that neighbourhood and thinking that the man waving the signal was in distress, the soldiers went up to him and learnt from him that the Mission house, where Revd. Smith was in residence formerly and which was then untenanted because the reverend gentleman had fled for his life to Lahore a day or two previous, had been looted of its valuable contents during the previous night before the arrival of the armoured train.

The armoured train returned to Lahore that evening as it could not proceed beyond Chuharkana on account of the damage done to the line beyond, but it came back to Chuharkana again the next morning—(17th April). That day (17th April) a party of soldiers went to Paddranwala village to effect the arrest of one Ram Singh Thakuria who was wanted, and on their return they informed us that they had been fired upon by two men armed with guns and that they had also fired shots in exchange. The above closes the chapter of events at Chuharkana and its neighbourhood.

#### EVENTS AT DHABAN SINGH AND MOMAN.

Dhaban Singh and Moman are two railway stations situated on the line between Chuharkana and Sangla and both these stations were burnt and looted by large mobs on the night between 15th and 16th April when the armed car was working at Chuharkana, and the mischief in the case of Dhaban Singh was committed

by two whole villages of Mahanianwala and Pucca Dalla who were inhabited by Sikh settlers and not by old settlers as the people of Chuharkana were. On the morning of 18th through communication had been restored and we now proceeded in the armoured train towards Sangla and on our way filled it up opposite the Mahanianwala village and we walked into the said village—a distance of more than one mile and there arrested a village lambaradar whose son was actively involved in the Dhaban Singh affair and *en route* for the village we fired upon a crowd that had collected in the distance and dispersed it with one casualty.

#### EVENTS AT SANGLA.

Thereafter we proceeded to Sangla when after an *hartal* on the 12th April wires had been cut in three places on the night between 15th and 16th April and when a European Telegraph Inspector was hurt with a stick by a religious fanatic of the Kuka fraternity. But at Sangla we learnt that the station of Marh Bilochan, which lay five miles out and had a small market, was in danger and so I took the armoured train there and came away after arranging for the safety of that station. All went well after the 18th April. On the 19th April the Deputy Commissioner (Colonel O'Brien) visited the affected stations and on the 21st April, Mr. Bosworth Smith arrived in the Sub-Division and took charge of it as Joint Deputy Commissioner and I worked under him and supervised the police investigation at Chuharkana and Sheikhpura, and took care that no innocent people were run in.

#### GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

To the above narrative of events should also be added the common reports that I received on my arrival in Chuharkana on the night between 15th and 16th April and as well as the information I received from Bhai Buta Singh, Pleader, after his release from prison (and he was one of the four Pleaders arrested at Sheikhpura) and which was to the effect that on the 15th April some people from the neighbouring villages of Sheikhpura had come to him and told him that the people of their villages were prepared to tear up the line even in the neighbourhood of Sheikhpura if he advised that course, and from this and other things that came to my notice during the period commencing from 6th April and ending on 18th April I could not help feeling that the situation was of the gravest on the 15th April, that few people had remained loyal to Government by that date, that had it not been for the timely arrival of the armoured train, the surging mob that had collected at Chuharkana canal bridge would have thoroughly looted the Chuharkana market during the night of 15th and 16th April and then proceeded to loot the Khangah Dogran Tahsil treasury and that thereafter it would have extended its depredations to the villages about, that other people would have joined it in its course and that the situation (which would have otherwise developed into a regular mutiny) was only saved by the firing that took place on the night between 15th and 16th April and the next three days, though it would be readily seen from the few casualties inflicted that this firing was directed with the utmost care. I would also like to add that it was the double *hartal* at Sheikhpura on the 6th and the 14th April and the *hartal* at Chuharkana and Sangla on the 12th April that had largely contributed to the events that had happened, for nothing serious happened in the Sharakpur Tahsil because there was no *hartal* in that part.

Lieutenant TATAM, Military Grass Farm, 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division.

On the 14th April I left Lyallpur by 8-16 train on duty for Rawalpindi, and at the time I was looking after a little boy, the son of Mrs. Holland. On arriving near Hafizabad Railway Station, I heard the noise of

a large crowd shouting and on nearing the level crossing about 300 yards from the station, I looked out and saw a crowd of about 2 to 300 persons armed with sticks and shouting in a very excited manner and carrying

Lieutenant TATAM—concluded—Captain S. P. FLOWERDEW—Rai Sahib AMAR SINGH.

black flags. Thinking there would probably be trouble, I at once closed all the shutters of the windows of the carriage on both sides and bolted the doors on the inside. When the train stopped at the station the same crowd came up on the platform side and tried to open the door with the object of finding out, whether I was in the carriage or not, or any other Europeans. They then moved up to the other first class carriage. Shortly afterwards they returned to my carriage and tried to open the door again. On finding the door would not open, they smashed in the windows with stones and *lathis* and heavy wooden clubs. And on seeing me they got more and more excited making a horrible noise and shouting out, "*Captain Sahib ko miro, Sahib sala andar hai,*" then bombarded me with stones and shoes also, and started prodding at me with long *lathis* and all the time made frenzied efforts to get at me. Their demeanour and conduct were such as to show clearly that they would have killed me if they could have got hold of me. As the situation became more critical, I got up from the further side of the carriage and took the little boy with me into the bath room and shut the doors bolting it from inside so as he would not be hit by the stones coming in. There was only one window in the bath room and that had iron bars and glass panes. This window was on the off side of the train, so the crowd immediately went round to the other side of the carriage getting through the other compartment and smashed in the window by throwing large stones, which nearly caught the little boy on the head. On finding the bath room was not secure as *lathis* and stones were able to reach me easily through the window, I came

back into the main carriage again. At this time two Indians came to my assistance. Both these men stood and faced the crowd and prevented them getting into the carriage by using their sticks and urging them to move away. The crowd was very excited and continued abusing and throwing stones and was in every way most aggressive.

A third man whom I recognised as one of the foremost of the gang evidently thought the situation was getting worse changed his attitude and tried to keep the crowd in hand, and came near the window at the top end of the carriage and prevented stones from coming in, and told me to sit down quietly. Thinking that the position was hopeless and the train not starting I went over to the other side of the carriage and sat down facing the crowd and spoke to them, asking, "What had I to do with their *Gandhi tamasha,*" and the only satisfaction I got was a *lathi* thrust at me which only just missed my eye, and another man got me in the ribs, so I at once shifted away. The crowd at this time seemed to me to be increasing and swarmed round both sides of the carriage. I saw the Guard come along to my carriage and I told him to see the Station Master and to get the train moved on, but he came back after a few moments and said, "The Station Master could not be found anywhere, so he was not going to wait any more and had given Line Clear himself." Eventually the train started amidst jeers and shouts of abuse and another bombardment of stones. The attitude of the crowd left no doubt in my mind that they would have killed me and the little boy if they had got their hands on us.

Captain S. P. FLOWERDEW, 1-24th North-Western Railway Battalion, Indian Defence Force, Lahore.

As ordered I proceeded with 1 non-commissioned officer and 14 men by special train leaving Lahore at 11-12 hours on the 17th April 1919 and arriving at Chuharkana at about 13-00 hours. I found no civil authorities at the Railway station so pushed on about a mile to Chuharkana village where I met Armoured Train No. 1 (Captain Joscelyne) and the Sub-Divisional Officer (Magistrate) who had with him a Sub-Inspector and few details of civil police.

I was told the man to be arrested had fled from his village (Chuharkana) the day before and was camping at a well about 2 miles further on. We set out with the Sub-Inspector in the direction of the well but were seen by the fugitive from about half a mile and could not overtake the party.

Fire was opened and one of the party was killed in a wheat field. The main body was chased into a village named Padiawala about 3 miles further on and we entered this village from the south, posting four men to stop exit from the north. We took eight men from the village who were all concealed in houses locked from outside and were said by an informant to have been in the mob that burnt Chuharkana station. Among the prisoners was Fauza Singh, Sepoy of 3rd Guides, on leave from Mardan.

Ram Singh had passed through Padiawala and fled, probably on horseback, before we arrived. He is an *ex-sepoy*.

On returning to the line I found Sergeant Davies D. L. I., who had gone off after another party. He reported that in the following up a party of the group from the well he had run into an armed party some of whom were mounted. It seems that two men were armed with rifles and two with guns. Sergeant Davies killed three of this party but their arms were taken away by their servants. He also killed one other man in following them.

Sergeant Davies had taken four prisoners, two of whom were strongly suspected by the police and the other two were released.

The number of others hit is not known but several were seen with wounds.

The Magistrate did not require any further assistance and as there was a party of 100 Gurkhas from Abbottabad at Chuharkana I returned to Lahore with 8 prisoners taken by my party and also 3 handed over by Captain Joscelyne.

The Magistrate informed me that Ram Singh was in the front of the rioters but the most important ring-leaders are—

- (1) Teja Singh, son of Partap, Chuharkana.
- (2) Kartar Singh of Jabba, Manager, Khalsa High School, Chuharkana.
- (3) Sohan Singh, son of Bhagwan Singh of Kaloki.
- (4) Mehar Din, Blacksmith of Kaloki.
- (5) Syed Nahal Shah, Fakir.

Sardar Sahib AMAR SINGH, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Sheikhpura.

In the morning of 6th April 1919 I went to see Rai Sahib Lala Sri Ram, Sud, Sub-Divisional Officer, from my house in the Fort to the town (a distance about  $\frac{1}{2}$  of a mile) where he lived. On my way I saw the shops closed. There was a general *hartal* in the town in compliance with the message of Mr. Gandhi. I talked about the *hartal* with the Sub-Divisional Officer who sent for pleaders one by one who were present in the town on that day and advised them not to hold any

meeting and take part in the *hartal*, but they said that they could not help joining the public meeting if there would be any, and that the *hartal* was observed by the public and they could not interfere with this. They also said that as the meeting would not be seditious therefore there was no harm in joining it. On this Sub-Divisional Officer deputed me, S. Din Muhammad, Colony Naib-Tahsildar, and Babu Ali Muhammad, Police Sub-Inspector, to attend the meeting and record

Sardar Rai Sahib AMAR SINGH—concluded—Lieutenant Khan ABDUR RAHIM KHAN.

word by word what was said there. Meeting was held in the temple and we three went there, and B. Ali Muhammad was asked to write the speeches made there. Nothing seditious was spoken there, and on return we read it to the Sub-Divisional Officer who, I believe, reported the matter to the Deputy Commissioner. On 10th April 1919 the Sub-Divisional Officer and I went to Gujranwala to attend meeting and join the garden party of Colonel J. A. O'Brien, Deputy Commissioner there, who was transferred to Ambala. We halted there for 11th and 12th. In the morning of 13th April we left for Sheikhpura. Before the departure of the train I heard someone saying "Railway servants are going to make a strike and it is possible that they may leave the train in the way." We were in danger that we might not be left in the way, but this proved wrong; we reached Shahdara safely. There on the station there were different rumours. Some said Hindu Muhammadan regiments have refused to fire on the public, some thousand men have been killed by machine guns at Amritsar, and machine gun has been snatched away by the public, Railway lines have been broken and banks, etc., have been burnt, and so on. We were anxious about our *Ilaga*. As no train was expected to run towards Lyallpur on account of the breach of the line near Amritsar we left for Sheikhpura by Tongas. On arrival there we learnt that another *hartal* is being arranged. On 14th April there was again *hartal* at Sheikhpura. The public did the following mischief in the Sheikhpura Sub-Division:—

- (1) Telegraph wire was cut near the town of Sheikhpura during the night between 14th and 15th April.
- (2) Railway wire at Machhike was cut during the night between 17th and 18th April.
- (3) On 15th April at Chuharkana Canal Bridge was damaged, Railway line in some places was taken off, wires were cut and Railway Station was burnt and looted by the Mandi men and villagers around the Station.
- (4) On the night between 15th and 16th April Dhaban Singh Railway Station was burnt and looted and a canal bridge near it as burnt by beat of drum by the villagers of Manianwala and Nawanpind.
- (5) On the same night Moman Station was burnt and lamps, signals, etc., were broken.
- (6) On the same night Railway wire was cut near Baroa,—a village two miles from Sangla towards Lahore side.
- (7) A Brahmachari, Gobind Parshad, who is said to belong to Gurukul Kangri, has been the cause of all the trouble at Sangla and its neighbourhood. He excited the people, spreading false news, such as (a) at the times of marriage or funeral procession not more than 5 persons will be allowed to join under the Rowlatt Act, (b) half of the income of every man will be taken by the Government, etc.

At Sangla proper the following things occurred—

- (1) On 12th April (a) *hartal* was observed; (b) prayers were offered by men of every sect at canal bank for the cancellation of the Bill; (c) a procession was started and a black *Jhanda* and an effigy of Rowlatt Act was carried with the procession through the Bazaars to the Railway Station, (d)

this crowd jeered, shouted and threw stones at the motor of Rev. Picken; (e) the crowd recited poems and said "Hindu-Mussalman ki jai," "Mahatma Gandhi ki jai," and "Shaukat Ali and Muhammad Ali ki jai" and so forth.

- (2) On the night intervening 15th and 16th April Railway wires near Sangla were cut (a) at one place on Lyallpur line, (b) at other place at Wazirabad line.
- (3) Stones at the Mail Train were thrown on 14th April at 6-40 p.m. by some boys.
- (4) On 16th April (a) one Harnam Singh, Kuka, with three others released a prisoner from a Fauji sepoy while he was sitting in the Station Master's Office and asking help from him at about 8 or 9 a.m.
- (b) The same Harnam Singh made a brutal attack on Mr. Wale, Telegraph Inspector, on the same evening when the Inspector was working in the Post Office, and Post Office staff and his orderly were present there.

False rumours as given above excited the simple zamindars, and for a day or two they thought that Government has become weak, and the Mail Trains passing through Sangla was thought a proof of it as they thought even Dak could not be carried on main line. It was generally said that a Fauji train passed *via* Sangla on 15th April, and wherever these Fauji men got chance they excited the people. This was adding fuel to the fire on the false rumours. The people were excited at once, otherwise there were no ideas against Government before these dates.

As to how the disturbance was suppressed:—

Armoured train reached Sheikhpura Railway Station at about 12 night between 15th and 16th April. The Sub-Divisional Officer and I met the Officer-in-charge in compliance with his wire. He took the Senior Officer with him in the train to Chuharkana, and I was left in charge of Sheikhpura. On 16th and 17th I remained in Sheikhpura, and on 18th April I went to Chichoki Mallian to guard the line from Shahdara to the boundary of Nankana Sahib *via* Chichoki Mallian as I was put in charge of this line by the Deputy Commissioner. Everything was alright on this line. The Sub-Divisional Officer can throw full light as to how the disturbance was suppressed in the disturbed area as he was in that part in those days. Up to 20th April I was patrolling this line, and went to Chuharkana on 21st April when there was no disturbance and people were frightened. I think the machine gun had this effect, as it was necessary to adopt harsh measures to suppress the unrest.

As to how the investigation was made:—

I was put in charge of Sangla and Moman and Machhike cases, and I also helped in Chuharkana and Dhaban Singh in writing the statements of witnesses produced before me by the Police and in making identifications. During the investigations I conducted no force was used on any witness, and at the time of writing statements I always asked the witness that he should speak the truth of his own free will. At the time of investigation many men were made to stand in a line, and the witness was asked to point out the man whom he recognized. The list of the men pointed out was made and signatures were affixed on it, handed over to the Police to put on the Police file. The Railway wire cut at Machhike on 17th and 18th was not proved to have been cut due to disturbance, but was out by one to get his enemy into-trouble falsely accusing him of it.

Lieutenant Khan ABDUR RAHIM KHAN of Zaida, Cadet, Indian Army.

I left Lahore at 2 p.m. on the 15th for Lyallpur, and had another Cadet Muhammad Munir Khan with me in the same compartment. We had an uneventful journey till Chuharkana, where we reached at 4 p.m. though on the way at Chichoki Mallian we met a troop

train, and I heard some one say that we shall have to come back, as the line at Chuharkana will be damaged. When the train stopped at Chuharkana, I noticed the Mandi people running towards the station, as if expecting to see something happen. I was shortly afterwards

Lieutenant Khan ABDUR RAHIM KHAN—concluded—Reverend S. C. PICKEN.

told that the line near the canal bridge was being dismantled and that the engine was being sent forward to prevent the people from doing so, and to repair it. I looked out of the window and saw some 200 to 300 people collected at the spot where the engine had gone to repair the line. During this time many Sikh people were collected in the station, and one mean-looking person, shabbily dressed, was lecturing them to wake up, as now the time for the Khalsas had come to uproot every rule and regain their *Raj*. The man was standing about 9 feet away from my carriage. At this time the engine was brought back, as some more people had started dismantling the line towards Lahore side of the station. Very soon, I saw people running from among the mob at canal towards the station, and started cutting the telegraph wires. By now all the passengers had got down from the train and I also got down. A section of the mob rushed the Station Master's room, and began looting it. Two railway employes, who ran out of the room, were surrounded by two men, with *lathis* and iron rods in their hands and were about to split open their heads when Mr. Iqbal Singh, Pleader, who was in the same train, intervened and saved them. The signal to *loot* was given by an old man, probably Muhammadan, and a very unimportant sort of a person. Iqbal Singh and I went to the *Mandi*, and from thence to a house close by, where Bawa Budh Singh, Executive Engineer, with his family and our luggage, followed us. We closed the doors, and our medium of communications now with the outside people were Jiwan Singh in whose house we were accommodated, and a few other *Mandi* people. Jiwan Singh made arrangements for food, etc., for us, and we were about 20 passengers in the same house. At night we were informed that some people had been looted. I forgot to say that soon after we left the station it was set on fire, and some of the members of the mob enjoyed themselves by blowing the whistle of the engine till about 8 P.M. We closed the doors having brought in as many bricks as possible.

to protect ourselves with, in case the mob attacked us. I was sleeping on the roof, when at 1 o'clock on the night of 15-16th, I was awakened by Iqbal Singh and told to get ready as the mob had sent word to either join them and lead them to Lahore, or be prepared for the consequences of not becoming one of them. On enquiry how many they were, I was informed that people from 16 different villages had collected, and were about 2,000 in number. I loaded my small pocket revolver and prepared to meet them. All night shouts and noise was heard all round in the country. Every now and then I was looking at my watch, when exactly at 1-45 A.M. I heard the machine gun firing. The rest of the night we heard it firing now and then. In the morning we went to the armoured train, and were accommodated in it. When we went to see the place where it had first fired on the mob we found one man lying dead, but there were signs of other men having been killed as well. This man was a young Muhammadan *Masht*, as those people said, and was hit with two bullets on the right groin.

We resumed our forward journey at 10.30, and crossing the bridge we found the telegraph wires and poles were broken and cut to pieces all along the way in front of the Chuharkana village. The small bridge on the canal was burnt, and the line was greatly burned and dismantled. A Sub-Inspector of Police and a policeman were sent to bring in the *lanbardars*, but they returned without them. Another armoured train arrived, and after some time we heard its machine gun firing on the village, also some rifle shots were heard being fired inside the village. Some time afterwards the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sheikhpura, was seen bringing in some few villagers under a guard and took them into other train, which soon after left for Lahore.

We spent that night in the train and next evening reached Sangla, and from thence getting into passenger train, I reached Lyallpur at 12 midnight on 17-18th.

Reverend S. C. PICKEN of the American Mission, Sangla Hill, Sheikhpura.

This part of the country did not seem to be affected very much regarding what was going on until about April 10th when some agitators came into stir up the people. Regarding events that had occurred in Delhi and other places there was considerable interest, but I would say that had not outsiders come in things would likely have passed off quietly.

The 12th of April was the first *hartal* that occurred in Sangla. I happened to have a trip down to the Railway Station to meet a friend, who came to stay the week end with me. On my arrival there I found a very large crowd gathered, which was being addressed by men of the city and by one or two agitators. As I left the station in my car the crowd gathered around jeering and hooting. I did not then know the reason of the meeting or of the treatment I had received. I was told that dirt and stones were thrown at my car, but I did not get hit neither did I see any.

From the 12th or until I left Sangla on the evening of the 15th, I noted a very hostile attitude on the part of the people. Not so much against the Rowlatt Act, but against most everything in general. It was only by the timely arrival of the District Traffic Superintendent, North-Western Railway, and some Indian soldiers that there was no damage done to the Railway property and other buildings. All kinds of rumours were afloat and one could hear most anything. Most of the talk was against the Government and I should say was caused by the agitators setting rumours afloat. The excitement lasted about a week and it was not until investigations were started that the people began to know how badly they had acted.

Regarding the measures that were taken to suppress the disturbances I should say that they were nothing more than ample. No firing was done and no excessive measures were taken. If anything the people got off a bit easy considering how they talked and acted. I do not know how much the police tried to stop them during those days, but from what I heard they did not try to do anything, and had they done so I am afraid that they would have been a bit roughly handled.

The inconvenience and anxiety that we missionaries had to endure during those days and at Lyallpur, I care not to describe, for fear of being misunderstood. With no protection here but the good will of the people and they seemed hostile, it was a bit uncertain to say the least. Having to take flight in the night, because you realized that you were being watched by day was another thing that we had to consider.

In the matter of investigation of cases here several things came to my notice. Those who came to investigate seemed to make it more of a personal matter, and it gave an opportunity for some to wipe out old scores. I mean the guilty party would be shielded as much as possible and the blame placed on some poor fellow who happened to be standing round at the time and yet was not doing anything. In this way it was very difficult to get at the real facts. So what I have heard has been gathered not from one man but many. The Deputy Commissioner had his difficulties along this line when he came. No one seemed willing to tell anything and in this way some men may have been convicted who were really not guilty.

I trust that I have made myself clear and have stated matters rightly.

## BABA BUDH SINGH.

## BABA BUDH SINGH, Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, Provincial Division, Lyallpur.

On the 15th April, I was travelling with my family from Lahore to Lyallpur by 47-Up. We were occupying a second class compartment all to ourselves. The train left Lahore at about 14-00. Rumours were afloat that railway line towards Gujranwala had been destroyed by mob, but I could hardly believe that we would meet a similar fate on our journey, as trains had so far been running safely *via* Sangla, and just before we left Lahore, a Troop Special had arrived from Sangla side. At Chichoki Malian another troop train was met. The sepoy in the train informed us that they had passed Chuharkana after repairing the line and that probably we will find the line again dismantled, when we reach there. This was a danger signal and I was rather much apprehensive of the safety of my women and children. Up to Chuharkana we did not notice any unruly crowd. We reached Chuharkana at about 16-30. The train stopped at the railway station. There was no crowd then at the station. The Station Master, however, informed us that railway line at the canal bridge, further beyond, had been destroyed and bridge set on fire. The engine of the train went with some railway staff, I believe, to find out the condition of the permanent-way ahead. In the meantime most of the passengers came out of the train, and many people from the *mandi* also came to the station to see the "*tamasha*:" and in a short time the whole platform was full of men, women and children; passengers and lookers-on.

People were holding conversations in small groups here and there. Newcomers hearing stories from the local men. Everybody was discussing the situation. By the time the engine came back from the bridge, mob had also arrived at the station. Numerically the mob was not very large. It was all mixed up on the platform with the passengers from the train. Only a dozen people with *lathis* could be discerned. About a similar number was on the other side of the train, engaged in cutting wires, etc. The engine was attached to the other end of the train, with the idea of railing the train back to Sheikhpura, this was certainly a capital idea, but attempt to act upon it was rather made too late, I saw some people cutting the telegraph wires and some villagers were seen near the distant signal, Lahore side. I was standing near the engine then. I ran to my carriage and asked the ladies to pull up all window shutters. It was then related to me by my mother and wife that some villagers had been picking up dry grass and fuel and when they passed their carriage and saw them shutting the windows they assured them not to be afraid as no harm would be done to them, they intended to pull down the wires only: some of them had hatchets in their hands.

Later I was listening to some conversations on the platform, between my carriage and station building when I heard from inside the building, sound of heavy strokes and human cries, and gathered that Station Master had been beaten severely. Instantly I found a few places distant, a railway babu crouching on the ground or perhaps seated on something, imploring his assailant, and an old Muhammadan with a raised *lathi* ready to strike him and another young Muhammadan with a crow bar in hand supporting the assailant. The crowd intervened to stop the assailant from striking an innocent babu, and the men left the clerk alone. At the same time, one Kartar Singh told me that it was not safe for us to stay there any longer, and advised us to go to his school building near by, pointing to it at the same time. When I informed him that I had lot of luggage with me and that Lala Todar Mal, who had gone to fetch coolies for us from his kiln, had not then arrived, Kartar Singh volunteered to help us. I therefore ordered my servants to take out my luggage from the compartment, which they did. I left the railway station with my family and servants carrying luggage for the school building. Lot of luggage was left on the platform uncared for. We put our things inside a room of the school, ladies and children were

also sent into it and the outer door was chained from outside. I stood guard as the room was not well protected. I sent away my servants to bring back the remaining luggage. They came after some time with Kartar Singh, who was himself carrying some bundles. Kartar Singh told me to bring ladies and children to another part of the school, which was safer than the room, occupied. At the same time Lala Todar Mal had also come and he advised us to go into his house, next to the school building, which I preferred, as I knew Todar Mal before; and we all went there. Our luggage continued coming after us. At that place M. Muhammad Munir (?) a cadet from Indore College, also came in with his luggage and servants. When everything had been removed to Todar Mal's house, Sardar Iqbal Singh, Pleader, came there and asked us to go to another house to which he had taken Khan Abdur Rahim Khan, son of Khan of Zaida, and other cadet from Indore; and informed us that other passengers from train had gone there, too. We agreed and left Lala Todar Mal's house. We passed the streets hastily, but did not notice any unruly mob on the way.

## REFUGE HOUSE.

On reaching the house, which I call Refuge House we found there were already about thirty people inside it. To the ladies and children a room of the upper floor was assigned, there was another room occupied by some other women, also passengers; while in a room on the ground floor, the *mandi* people had stored their valuables and put their women inside it. Luggage continued coming in for a long time after us. I wrote out a letter to the Tahsildar, Khangah Dogran, which was signed by the two cadets also, it was then handed over to some one for being sent out to Tahsildar, per some *tumtumwala*. From the house top we noticed the station building was in flames. All disliked these depredations committed by the mob.

We partook of the hospitality offered by Sardar Jiwan Singh, Vice-President, Chuharkana Notified Area Committee. We had taken care to barricade one of the two doors, while the other was left alone for ingress and egress. In order to defend ourselves against every eventuality we had collected brickbats on the house top. We were all in a great consternation during the whole night. Having finished their meals, children and ladies went to bed, but the women could hardly sleep as they were much terrified. There were some stalwart men with *lathis* in hand, patrolling the bazaars, it was said they had come from an adjoining village to protect the town. It was about 11 p.m. that Sardar Jiwan Singh communicated news to Sardar Iqbal Singh, that about two thousand people had collected near the canal bridge, and that they had sent message to the *mandi* leaders to join them, otherwise they would loot the *mandi* the same night. Some similar messages, I was told, continued passing at night. Last of them was that the rioters were marching on the *mandi*. With this information at our disposal we surveyed the whole situation and decided, any prolonged and real defence against such odds was a hopeless task, as we were not well armed. I had a repeating pistol with three rounds in the magazine, while Khan Abdur Rahim Khan had a pocket revolver with lots of ammunition. There were two swords belonging to some Police Inspectors, who were also taking shelter in the house. We could do nothing but sit and wait the arrival of the alleged mob. The condition of the women was indescribable. They had taken off their ornaments to avoid molestation and kept them in various nooks and corners of the room they were occupying. It was about midnight when every body was in the height of excitement, that we heard sudden and cracking sound of machine gun fire. First impression was, "They have come," but a little later the cadets told us it was a machine gun fire. We breathed a sigh of relief and thanked God.

Continued.]

BABA BUDH SINGH.

Our first impression was that armoured cars had come from Lahore by road, but later on as we saw search light moving towards the railway station we were satisfied that it was a train.

After hearing the first shot we imagined we were faced with another danger, that of promiscuous bombardment from armoured cars and that we might suffer along with others. To ward off this danger, so far as possible, we hung a lighted lantern with a written notice, from the house top into the bazar. All women and children were sent downstairs, only few people remained on the top of the house, as flash light was searching all sides of the country side and rifles and guns cracked every now and then. The train moved to the bridge and stopped there, where there was some machine gun firing also. After some time we observed that a party from the train had left, to scare away the mob in an adjoining village. We heard the crack of rifle fire and noticed some moving figures in the brilliant glare of the searchlight, on the other side of the village. This eventful night after all came to an end and signs of twilight on the eastern horizon brought us a message of hope. As soon as it was light we hastily dressed ourselves and went to meet the Commander of the armoured train.

#### THE ARMOURD TRAIN.

The events of previous night were narrated to the Commander by Sardar Iqbal Singh, Pleader. I found Lala Sri Ram, Sub-Divisional Officer, Sheikhpura, with the train. I requested the Commander to give us shelter in the armoured train, which he permitted. We boarded the train at the bridge and she moved back to the distant singal, Lahore side; where the train stopped and a party went out into the fields in search of the dead bodies shot down the previous night. I did not go far out from the train. Lot of people went to the spot where a dead body was then lying and I heard some arrests were also made. While we were there a noise of drum-beating was heard from the Padri's bungalow and we saw a gentleman waving a white cloth or flag on the top of the bungalow. We thought there was probably a mob attacking the inmates. Train moved nearer the bungalow and a party with loaded rifles left to rescue them. But not a shot was fired as there was no mob to be found. I do not know the identity of the persons who caused all this noise and show. Sardar Iqbal Singh who had been to the spot told me it was only a bluff, to see if the armoured train people took prompt action to rescue a party in danger of attack. The inmates of the bungalow had, however, left the place before they could be molested; but in the course of the night the bungalow had been looted. There is a Mission Hospital at Chuharkana, I believe. The train then moved up to the platform where I noticed the station building had been badly burnt and the rolling stock of the train which brought us from Lahore, had been damaged in way of broken glass panes, fans, etc. The engine had also some damage done to its fragile parts. Postal letters and covers were scattered on the platform and near the brake van there were lot of broken cases, etc., which showed that goods in the brake van had been looted.

I hastily brought my family and things from the Refuge House to the train. All other passengers from that house had also come to the train and some from the town also sought accommodation in the armoured train. All were cramped in third class compartment available for the purpose. I must bear testimony to the forbearing temper and regard for the stranded passengers, shown by Captain Scott (India Army Reserve of Officers of North Western Railway), who commanded the train. We no doubt put the railway staff accompanying the train to great inconvenience by overcrowding the few third class compartments.

In the armoured train, in spite of its inconveniences we felt a sort of security. The train stopped at the bridge, repaired it and crossed it. After repairing the line here and there, the train finally stopped near the

canal minor bridge beyond Chuharkana village. At this place some people came to see the Sub-Divisional Officer or Commandant. The big gun in the train was ranged on the village, and I think villagers were given a few hours' notice to remove their women and children. The idea probably was to bombard the village, or terrify the people. During this period several people were seen moving out of the village, all avoided the side on which the train was standing. We all eagerly awaited bombardment of the village, but it never occurred from our train, as after the expiry of the period, some one was sent into the village and he returned with some information, which I do not know. While our train was still standing at the bridge the Commander saw through his binoculars a huge crowd moving towards the train. The crowd was some two miles away. The machine guns were ordered to be ranged on the mob, but not to fire until crowd was within 50 yards. The Commandant clearly said that he did not know what was the intention of the crowd. The mob on arriving near the metalled road, melted away.

While we were standing near the bridge, another armoured train arrived from Lahore. She stopped opposite the village Chuharkana and opened fire with machine guns, with what result we do not know. After machine gun fire, a firing party from the train went into the village and we heard several shots fired. When the party returned to the train, I with some other persons went to that train, and found that the party had arrested some people from the village. I cannot say what casualties occurred in the village. The 2nd armoured train then left the place, for Lahore I believe, taking with it the arrested persons.

The repairs-gang of our armoured train was all the time engaged in repairing the line. The male passengers actively helped the railway gang men in their task. Having repaired the line, the train crossed the bridge and travelled to Bahalike, while a truck with a machine gun was detached and left opposite Chuharkana village to keep guard over the line. Up to Bahalike the line was all right, we travelled a few miles beyond the place and near Dhabansingh, a bridge was found burnt down and permanent way torn off. The timbers of the bridge were still smouldering, water was thrown over them to put out fire. Machine gun cracked a volley again. Searchlight flashed and the whole country side was lit up. No mob was found at the place. It was quite dark by this time, we came back to canal bridge at Chuharkana and the train stopped there for the night.

The Commandant, being hopeless of discharging his load of passengers at Sangla, decided to take us (passengers) to Chichoke Mallian and leave us there to catch a train for Lahore or Jarranwala. We agreed but on reaching Chichoki Mallian it was found that all train service to Lahore had already stopped. At that very station, it is said, a telegram was received from Sangla to the effect that the railway station there was on fire. I did not see the telegram. Our train with all its live load moved to Bahalike again, and went beyond it to the bridge, we had visited on the previous evening. Here we noticed another train from Lyallpur, with a military escort and railway repairing staff, had arrived on the scene and repaired the remaining portions of the line up to the place we had left the night before.

Cordial greetings between the two trains and both moved down to Bahalike, where they stood for some time and then our train left for Sangla and the other for Chuharkana. Our train on her way to Sangla repaired telegraph wires wherever they had been smashed. We noticed that stations at Dhabansingh and Moman had suffered a fate similar to Chuharkana. We reached Sangla at about 5 P.M. and were glad to find the station intact, but it was in military possession. We were ordered to detrain at this place and so all the passengers left the armoured train, after a close on 32 hours sojourn in it.

We all were thankful to the Commandant for the great indulgence shown by him, towards us during all



BABA BUDH SINGH—concluded—BABU DEWAN CHAND—Khan DURAN KHAN.

this tiresome journey when he had to perform the double duty of protecting passengers and the line.

SANGLA TO LYALLPUR.

At Sangla we waited up to about 11 P.M. to catch the Down train. Our anxiety all the time was, whether

the train would reach Sangla at all, but she did come and we reached Lyallpur at about 1-30 A.M. on 18th, April. The station was in military possession. We heard there that stacks of Bhusa were on fire. We slept in the small hours of the morning and woke to find that we were in Martial Law area.

Babu DEWAN CHAND, Sub-Permanent Way Inspector, North-Western Railway, Lyallpur.

On the 14th the rioters took away forcibly tools from gang No. 8 near Chuharkana and uprooted the line. This Sub-Way Inspector was near at hand, but had to run away as the mob threatened to burn his trolley and throw the rest into the canal. A troop special bound for Lahore appeared in sight and Dewan Chand forthwith returned and under its protection repaired the line—thus enabling the troop special to continue its journey.

The crowd gathered again late in the evening—a train bound for Lyallpur arrived—rioters having overpowered the Station Master compelled all the passengers to alight. The rioters set fire to the station and attempted to treat the train similarly. The rioters then moved in the direction of Sangla Hill cutting telegraph wires, uprooting the line, setting fire to the bridge timbers, breaking signal wires and discs and platform lamps and firing the stations as they went along Bahalike station.

Khan DURAN KHAN, Honorary Civil Judge and Vice-President, Notified Area Committee, Sangla Hill, Sheikhpura.

In the beginning of March a *Brahmachari* from the Kangri Gurukul came to Sangla. He wore yellow clothes. He preached in the Thakurdwara and the Sanatan Dharm School, which is opposite my house. I often saw him. I asked Girdhari Lal, member of the Committee who was manager of the school who he was; he said he was a religious preacher. Hence I had no suspicion of him. At the end of March it was known that there was to be general *hartal* on the 30th March. Some Hindu and Muhammadan shop-keepers told me that they were being urged to keep the *hartal* and the Secretary of the Arya Samaj, Sohan Lal, was particularly active in urging *hartal*. They said they were going to keep *hartal* as Government was about to pass the Rowlatt Act, in accordance with which permission would have to be obtained from Government for marriages, and not more than five people would be allowed to assemble for a funeral or a marriage, and Government would fix a share of the income and take it from zamindars and shop-keepers. I told them that this was quite wrong. I had a copy of the Rowlatt Act and there was no mention of this in it. I specially urged the Muhammadans not to join the movement. There was no *hartal* on the 30th March despite their efforts.

On 6th April there were again rumours of a *hartal* but it did not take place.

On the 10th I and other Honorary Magistrates and Members went to Gujranwala for the Durbar. On the evening of the 12th news of the *hartal* on that day came from Sangla and we were ordered to return.

I and the Sub-Divisional Officer and others started on the morning of 13th but had to stay in Shahdara as no train went to Sangla that day. In the evening a train came and I reached Sangla at 1 A.M. on the night of the 13th-14th. There were 300 or 400 people crowding the platform crying "*Hindu-Mussulman ki jai*." One Dr. Amir Chand of Lyallpur, who had come by the same train as I had, went among the crowd and told them that he had come from Amritsar and the European troops had seized the girls of the Kairon girls school and disgraced them. The Hindus and Muhammadans had united there; what were they doing? Sohan Lal told him that Hindus and Muhammadans had united; a few men were opposing but they would come round. Then the people saw me. The train started and Amir Chand got into it. The people went off to the town shouting "*Hindu-Mussulman ki jai*," "*Gandhi ki jai*," I went home.

On the 11th about 4 P.M. it was rumoured that the line had been broken at Gujranwala and the Calcutta Mail would come round by Sangla. I went and asked

the station master and he said it was so: I told him to let me know when it was arriving. A duststorm sprang up and at that time the station master sent word that the train had come. This was about 6 P.M. When I reached the station the train had left the platform. The station master and some constables told me that people had thrown stones at the train. I asked who had done it; they said it was mostly boys but there were some men among them, but owing to the duststorm they could not identify anyone. There was a large crowd of the towns-people standing outside the railway fencing. I told them that it was wrong to behave thus; they said boys had done it. I told the station master to keep his staff in control and not let out the news if any other train came that way. At 9 P.M. he sent me word that the Bombay Mail was coming that way and I should go to the station. About 10 P.M. the mail arrived. The station was closed and people not allowed in. I was there.

On the morning of the 15th about 8 or 9 A.M. a special came from Lyallpur which was to go to Lahore. It was a troop train, perhaps the 23th Punjab. On the pretext of giving them water and selling sweetmeats a lot of people came on to the platform. The train stopped more than half an hour there. After the departure of the train it was said that the soldiers had said that the whole world was awake, the people of Sangla were asleep; they should awake and do something. After that the town got excited and people collected in groups of 30 to 50.

On the evening of the 15th the station master sent me a note about 8 P.M. to come quickly to the station as Chuharkana Station had been burnt. I went and took my servants and the men who were with me. I sent my servants and the station staff to make it known in the bazar that if anyone came to the station they would be fired at as Government had given permission. About 11 P.M. I was standing in the station verandah when the station master told me the wires had been cut on the Lyallpur side. About 1 A.M. he said that the wires had been cut on the Wazirabad side also. He said that he could get no answer on the Lahore side though the wire did not seem to have been cut. A shuttle train arrived from Wazirabad. The Hon'ble Mehdi-Shah was in it. He was going to Lyallpur by road as the Deputy Commissioner had sent for him. I told him to ask Mr. deMontmorency to send us assistance as none was obtainable from Gujranwala or Lahore.

About 9 A.M. on the 16th a train came from Lyallpur while the station master and I were repairing the wires about a mile on the Lyallpur side of the station. The

Khan Duran Khan—continued—MUNSHI ABDUL KADIR—MR. R. C. CHOPRA.

train stopped by us. Mr. Bhoia Nath, Assistant Traffic Superintendent and Mr. DeSouza, Railway Sub-Divisional Officer asked for news. I told them that there was danger and that 30 or 40 soldiers would suffice. They left the train there and returned on the engine to Lyallpur. About 3 P.M. Mr. August arrived in a special with 30 soldiers. Mr. Wale Telegraph Master and others were with him. Guards were set. I got leave to go home to say my prayers. About 15 minutes later there was an uproar. A woman on the road said a Sikh had killed a European. I ran back and saw a Sikh had hold of Mr. Wale by the arm. Mr. Wale was dragging him towards the station from the post office and he was hitting Mr. Wale on the head with a stick from behind. They got to a wire and Mr. Wale jumped it and the Sikh remained behind. Mr. Wale drew a pistol and fired three shots. The Sikh fell. Mr. Wale was bleeding and all his clothes were stained with blood. Mr. August and the soldiers ran up and took

Mr. Wale and told me to catch the *bandook* who ran off wounded to the bazar. I followed him and found him lying down on a *charpoy* and a large crowd of 300 or 400 around. He said he was done for but he had done for one of them (*mere ham Arzaya karia ki ha ham mainne bhi kardiyen*). The police came and he was taken to hospital.

I stayed the night at the station. It was proclaimed that no one should come to the side of the station or they would be fired on. About 1-30 A.M. 175 Gurkhas arrived by special from Wazirabad side; they were for Bahalike and Chuharkana. They stopped the night at Sangla as Mr. August said the line was broken.

After this there was no further disturbance.

On my return from Gujranwala I had heard that the car of Mr. Picken the missionary had been stoned.

The people were much excited and if the troops had not arrived things would have been beyond control.

**MUNSHI ABDUL KADIR, Permanent-Way Inspector, North-Western Railway, Lyallpur.**

I was Permanent Way Inspector in charge of section Lyallpur to Chuharkana *via* Sangla on 15th April 1919. I received a telegram at about 3 P.M. from my Assistant B. Dewah Chand, Sub-Permanent Way Inspector, that a mob was uprooting the line and burning bridges. I left Lyallpur by the passenger train leaving about 4 P.M. with instructions from Mr. August, Deputy Traffic Superintendent, that the passenger train should not proceed beyond Sangla Hill Station without my being sure that the line was safe. On arrival at Sangla Hill, I asked the help of Railway and District Police, but could not have any. I requested the Honorary Magistrate, Khan Duran Khan, for any sort of armed help, but he also had none and supplied me two men unarmed. I took those men and my other Assistant, Mohammad Jamil, on my trolley and started for Moman Station. At about 8 P.M. on arrival there I reported by wire that the line up to Moman was safe and trolled on to Dhaban Singh, giving instructions to my gangmen to hide their tools so that the people may not snatch them from them and damage the line with them. On arrival at Dhaban Singh I found everything in tact and wired the same to my officers, but the Station Master told me that telegraph instruments on both sides were not working, therefore he was not able to send through my message when ready to start for Bhaliki. I found a big flame of light on one of the bridges. The passengers who got down at Chuharkana by Lahore passenger train came walking and informed me that I should not proceed any further as the people were uprooting the line and burning bridges, and that they have also burnt the Chuharkana Station and damaged the train standing there. I did not go any further but sent my Jemadar to go in the disguise of a foot passenger and see what was being done. On his return he corroborated the statement of foot passengers, and told me that the mob was coming this side. Being unarmed I could take no precaution to stop them. When I actually heard their noise quite close to station (Dhaban Singh) I trolled back to Moman, and found that station was in flames. On my questioning the Station Master he told me that after I had just passed the station a mob of about 60—70 men came and burned the station, and they have gone to Sangla to attack that station. After hiding my trolley I with others walked on the line and found many

marks on line, i.e., sleepers latched with axe, gradient and mile-posts broken. I found the Telegraph wire also cut near Baroa village. On arrival at Sangla in the morning of the 16th, I found that the station had not been attacked, but the telegraph wires from all three sides were cut. I trolled to Salarwala Station and wired my report to Lyallpur and returned to Sangla with the Wazirabad train. Sub-Divisional Officer No. 1 Railway, Mr. F. J. DeSouza and Lala Bhoia Nath, Assistant District Traffic Superintendent, also came by the same train and we all had a council, of war as to what should be done to protect Sangla, as the feelings of the people were very much excited, and we expected the station to be attacked at any moment. We agreed that the situation could only be controlled if we got an armed force for which Assistant District Traffic Superintendent wired to Lyallpur District Traffic Superintendent. Mr. August, Mr. Pushkar Lal, Executive Engineer, with Mr. Wale, Telegraph Inspector, and 30 Indian troops came by special train and were posted by Mr. August District Traffic Superintendent, where he thought fit. Mr. Wale, Telegraph Inspector, went to Post Office to see the telegraph instruments there and was attacked by a Sikh with a stick and came running on to station, with all his face and hand wounded. The local doctor was at once called, and with the help of Mr. August, Mr. Pushkar Lal and Mr. DeSouza the wound was dressed and he was sent to Lyallpur in charge of Mr. Pushkar Lal, Executive Engineer, in his reserved carriage by the evening Wazirabad train. Up to about 1 o'clock at night the situation on Sangla Hill Station was very critical, as we had only a handful of troops, but at about 1 A.M. on the 17th morning a Gurkha troops special came from Rawalpindi side and eased the situation. On the 17th morning Gurkha train was started for Chuharkana and under their protection we repaired the line up to the bridge beyond Dhaban Singh, and the line beyond that was repaired by the armoured train which came from Lahore side. The villagers did not come near us, nor interfered when we were repairing the line under protection of Gurkha troops.

After restoring communication I went back to my headquarters at Lyallpur, which I reached there in the afternoon of 18th April 1919.

**Mr. R. C. CHOPRA, Hafizabad.**

Before proceeding to the main issue, a little personal explanation may not be out of place. I am an Oxford man and have resided in Europe, mostly in England, for over 13 years. At the outbreak of the war in 1914 I offered my services in the war. Later on I became a

member of the Indian Ambulance Corps and was among the City of London men who volunteered to make small arms ammunition at the Royal Arsenal, Woolwich, on week-ends. On my return to India at the end of 1915, I have resided at various places including Hafizabad.

Mr. R. C. CHOPRA.

[Continued.]

My relations hold a good deal of landed and other property in Hafizabad Tahsil, thus, though having no *locus standi*, I may be said to belong to Hafizabad. So far I have taken no part in politics or meetings and my reasons to come forward as a witness now are:—

1. People seem to be demoralized and terror-struck by the martial law régime. (2) They seem to be sullen. (3) A strong feeling of injustice rankles in the hearts of many persons. (4) A cruel wrong has been done and (5) People may be afraid to come forward and tell truth.

For the first two years or so of the war, Gujranwala district supplied a comparatively smaller number of recruits as the then Deputy Commissioner, Mr. W. S. Hamilton, I.C.S., would not use forcible methods to obtain recruits. But with the advent of Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien as Deputy Commissioner, press gang methods were adopted on his first public appearance at Hafizabad. Colonel O'Brien used the words "*main lunga, main lunga, main lunga*" (I will take, I will take, I will take, *via*, recruits.) In his time rigorous methods were employed to get recruits and war loans; people were bullied, beaten and coerced, consequently malpractices followed; thus it came to pass that recruits could be purchased like cattle and indeed things came to such a pass that complaints against the high-handed actions of the local Tahsildar with reference to recruiting and war loan found their way into "*Naggaash*"—a defunct Calcutta paper. But the Punjab Government stopped the entry of the paper into the Punjab on the report of Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien.

The Rowlett Act agitation led to disturbances in Hafizabad also but the one here was confined to breaking of the glass panes of the Tahsil, breaking of railway signal and signal wires of the local station, and a cowardly attack on Lieutenant Tatam, a railway passenger, by the mob composed, if I am correctly informed, of riff-raff. But no serious injury seems to have been done to Lieutenant Tatam.

Hafizabad was quiet and calm after the 15th of April but martial law was suddenly declared on the evening of 19th April, i.e., 4 days after any disturbances. Even after the declaration of martial law, things were not very bad. On the 30th of April, Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien paid Hafizabad a visit, and ushered in such a reign of terror as only a person who was present in those days at Hafizabad can realize the stern reality of the thing, but I hope to give some idea of it.

(1) L. Mathra Das, one of the best Tehsildars Hafizabad has had for many a long day, was asked by the Deputy Commissioner to take leave and subsequently transferred.

(2) The local Munsiff also was transferred.

(3) L. Srinath, Zaildar, was relieved of his position.

(4) The officiating Inspector of Police was transferred and the charge of investigations given to Muhammad Khan assisted by a new Sub-Inspector of Police.

(5) Not contented with the superior officials, Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien sent for minor officials, such as the *Moharrirs* to his bungalow and is reported to have used various threats to induce them to give evidence in spite of the plea and prayer of these persons that they were inside the Tahsil on April 15th and consequently could not see what was happening outside.

On the other hand Colonel O'Brien, in company with Lieutenant Tatam visited *mandis* and *Bazars* and arrested a number of persons whom Lieutenant Tatam suspected of being implicated in attack upon him.

2. On the evening of April 30th between 9 and 10 P.M., a proclamation was issued by beat of drum to the following effect:—*Deputy Commissioner ka hukm hai jo paghbandh hai subah sai baje tehsil ki samne hazar hove, jo hazar na hoga goli se mara javega.* [By order of Deputy Commissioner, every turban-wearer—i.e., adult male—should present himself (to-morrow) morning in front of the Tehsil. If anybody absents himself, he will be shot (or killed) by the bullet.] Henceforth proclamations by beat of drum became a regular feature.

3. On May 1st, a number of respectable persons including *Vakils* and *Chowdhries* of *mandi* were arrested. The Deputy Commissioner left Hafizabad on May 1st or 2nd.

(1) The new Inspector and Sub-Inspectors of Police began their work of collecting evidence and the methods adopted by them to secure evidence, baffle description and a few examples may be cited, (a) they would invite people and make them sit all day long in the open and ask them to come again next morning. This process continued almost to the end of martial law days and was repeated now with the people of *mandi* and then with the people of *Bazars* and so on, (b) filthy abuse was hurled against the people in addition to threats.

(2) The new military officer at the head of a number of sowars (cavalry) began his bi-daily patrols on *bazars*, roads, etc., and all persons had to salute, standing up, all officers, civil or military.

(3) School children, even of the lowest classes, were required to be present twice a day (8 A.M. and 5 P.M.) at the roll call by this new military officer.

4. I propose to give a short analysis of the nature of evidence obtained to secure convictions. Take first of all the case of the Tehsil staff (*amla*) such as *moharrirs* on the 15th of April; when assault on the Tehsil was taking place, all *moharrirs* were ordered by the *tehsildar* to stand round the treasurer who had some cash with him. As the treasury is *inside* the *tehsil* and the doors of the Tehsil were bolted, it was physically impossible for these *moharrirs* to see what was happening outside the Tehsil, yet one and all of them have given evidence of what happened outside the Tehsil at that time.

(2) *Gobinda* and *Vaishno* swore before the Summary Court that they saw *Beliram Kapur* (fined Rs. 1,000) inciting people near the railway station on the morning (at about 8 or 9 A.M.) of April 15th. As a matter of fact, *Beliram* was absent from Hafizabad at that time having gone to *Lyallpur*. I have taken this case as an example, because in this case the Deputy Commissioner must have noted down particulars of evidence as the accused put in defence a post card written by himself from *Lyallpur* and bearing postmarks of *Lyallpur* and *Hafizabad* of April 14th and 15th respectively; and the public prosecutor *L. Bhagirath Mall* put the suggestion to the accused "you can get a post card postmarked for 2 or 4 annas" and the answer of the accused was "I will give you Rs. 1,000 if you will get one for me similarly postmarked."

(3) Prosecution witness *Ladha Singh* retracted his police version before the Summary Court, because he said he was coerced by the police into giving false evidence. He was immediately handcuffed by the order of the Deputy Commissioner and thrown in *hawalat* (Jail). He was taken several times before the Deputy Commissioner who pressed him to keep to his police version, but he stuck to his guns. After remaining in *hawalat* he was released next morning at about 5 A.M.

(4) *Dhobi* (washerman) another prosecution witness who after giving evidence against several persons stopped at the name of *L. Arud Chand* and said that not the *Chowdhri Arud Chand* but another person by name of *Arud Chand* was meant by him in his police version, was also arrested by the order of the Deputy Commissioner and thrown into *hawalat* but released next day.

5. For two or three days *L. Gopal Dass Ahluwalia* was pressed by the police to give evidence against the *Vakils* (*L. Gurdas Ram* and *L. Shiv Ram*) but he refused to be a party to false witness. He was arrested on May 16th on the evidence of *Gobinda* and *Kuahalya Gosain* and was subsequently fined Rs. 1,000 by the Summary Court.

6. The accused were kept ignorant of the charges against them and could not properly defend themselves. Some of them (e.g., *Beliram*) do not even now know the guilt for which they were punished.

Now a few examples of a different kind may be given to show the electric condition of the atmosphere in martial law days.

Mr. R. C. (N. P. R.)—concluded—Mr. V. W. SMITH.

1. Karam Singh; after his acquittal by the Martial Law Commission at Lahore, betook himself to Hardwar or Jammu as he considered himself free after acquittal. During his absence another charge was brought against him; his property along with the property of his widowed mother and minor brothers was locked up by the authorities; subsequently he was fined Rs. 150.

2. Bhagwan Singh Khanna and had the list of their property taken in anticipation of forfeiture before they were sent up before the Martial Law Commission at Lahore. Both of them were subsequently acquitted.

3. Hiranand Kapur was arrested on June 8th and taken to Wazirabad by the next day train and placed before the Deputy Commissioner who was at Wazirabad on that day. The Deputy Commissioner made Hiranand write his resignation of the post of *moharrir*, Judicial, whilst both hands were handcuffed. He was then released without any evidence (Prosecution or Defence) being taken.

4. Humiliation of the people, especially by the Deputy Commissioner.

5. Colonel O'Brien issued an order through the local Tehsil that the land revenue (*manila*) must be paid within a certain date; otherwise proceedings will be taken under martial law.

Thus from the account given above, which can be easily corroborated, it follows that there must have been some ulterior motive in the declaration of martial law at Hafizabad if we bear in mind that it was declared more than four days after any disturbance and that its rigorous use was not enforced till 11 days later. The consequences have been serious; estrangement between the rulers and the people, loss in British sense of justice, have been some of the obvious consequences. Moreover, some quite innocent persons have been punished, thus though it is a public property at Hafizabad that Karam Chand and Hari Singh were not present at Hafizabad on the 14th and 15th of April, yet one was sentenced to death and the other to transportation for life, whilst about Summary Courts the least said the better.

Mr. V. W. SMITH, Superintendent of Police, Lyallpur.

Was transferred to Lyallpur on the 1st April 1919. Had previous experience of the district, having worked there as Assistant Superintendent of Police and officiating Superintendent of Police for about 18 months. A district liable to be affected by political movements, as its colonists are drawn from almost every district in the province (e.g., the unrest of 1907 and the Rikabganj agitation of 1913). District Congress Committee formed early in 1919 began to agitate over the Rowlatt Act and thereby largely increased its membership. Organised a public meeting on the 5th April which resulted in a *hartal* on the following day. *Hartal* completely successful. Another public meeting in the evening. Proceedings orderly on both occasions, though some of the speeches were strongly worded. No further open agitation until the 12th, when the question of a renewed *hartal* was taken up by the Congress Committee. Active propaganda and misrepresentation. *Hartal* arranged for the 13th, a Sunday and the Baisakhi day. Crowds begin to collect in the *bazzars* and by evening the demeanour of the people distinctly restless and unruly. Much fraternisation of Hindus and Muhammadans. Proposal for another meeting unfavourably received by the Deputy Commissioner. Patrolled town with Deputy Commissioner in the evening and met with a hostile reception. Objectionable notices found posted up. Mobs collected and coerced shopkeepers, who had opened their shops. Some minor damage done. Police and Magistrate induce crowds to disperse. Excitement subsided by 10 P.M. Deputy Commissioner sent out to neighbouring cavalry farms for assistance and decided to utilise for night patrols camel sarwans mobilised at Lyallpur. Well disposed zamindars also requested to bring in mounted patrols for same purpose. Orders issued for protection of railway line by voluntary *thikri pahra*. Arrangements made to have a more open show of police. Armed guard posted at centre of town on following morning. All liquor shops closed. Some pleaders and petition-writers go on strike. Sedulous efforts made to cause a strike in civil offices. Sikh public agitated by false rumours imported from Amritsar. Attempts made to hold another public meeting frustrated. Idgah finally selected for the purpose. Meeting attended by all sects and classes. Violent speeches expected, but action taken by Deputy Commissioner resulted in orderly proceedings. European residents concentrated and prepared to place themselves in a state of defence. Continued *hartal* on the 15th, but shops began to open in the evening. Excitement, however, not abated and more objectionable and seditious notices posted up. Temporary collapse of *hartal*, but the situation became worse when the news arrived of the outrage at Chuharkana and the spreading of the infection down the line.

Military assistance arrived, but was partially diverted to save Sangla. This was the turning point: had Sangla been burnt serious damage would have been done in the Lyallpur District and the restoration of normal conditions would have been correspondingly more difficult. Meanwhile situation acute at Lyallpur. Exit of town strongly picketed by police on following morning. Renewed *hartal* and much excitement. More objectionable notices. Military reinforcements arrived. *Badmaash* element, encouraged by the successes of the mobs at Chuharkana, etc., emerged from the City and did damage further up the line. Telegraph wires cut. Stacks of *bhusa* burnt at night by incendiaries. Voluntary patrols sent out as additional protection. *Hartal* definitely abandoned on following day. Movable column arrived.

Agitation not confined to Lyallpur. All the important grain-markets affected in greater or less degree. No serious agitation at Jaranwala until the 13th April. Public meeting followed by *hartal* on the 14th. Muhammadan asked to preside at the meeting, which was held in a Hindu place of worship. Some features of the *hartal* openly seditious. At Gojra agitation was successfully combated until the 14th, when a Hindu meeting was followed by a joint Hindu-Muhammadan gathering in the Idgah, presided over by a Muhammadan Municipal Commissioner. *Hartal* decided on. Missionary compelled by ugly rumours to leave Gojra. Complete and coercive *hartal* on the two following days.

Crowd unruly and decidedly anti-British. Demonstrations with black flag. Toba Tek Singh, Tandlianwala and Dijkot also affected by the agitation.

Since the beginning of the agitation the most alarming rumours had been current in the villages, particularly in the neighbourhood of Lyallpur. Distorted ideas of the intentions of the new Act, most of them agrarian and social in their application. Partly the result of the agitation in Lyallpur itself, partly imported by colonists returning from other districts. Excitement and disaffection particularly marked in Amritsar Sikh villages. Unlawful assembly of Sikh villagers at Kiats Kalan on the 17th April. Intention to prepare plans for an attack on Lyallpur. Canal wire cut at Jahangir, another Amritsar Sikh village. Conspiracy at Chak 150 C. B. on the 18th results in an unsuccessful attempt to dismantle the railway line. Culprits followed to their village by police and arrested.

The original intention of the promoters of the *hartal* was apparently to defeat, and thereby discredit, Government. So far there was a common and united purpose, and a widespread organization. The movement was in its inception anti-official and anti-Government, but not anti-British. The atmosphere thereby created, however, was favourable to the growth of racial hatred, which

Mr. V. W. SMITH—concluded—PANDIT AVATAR KISHEN KAUL—Mr. H. S. WILLIAMSON.

immediately made its appearance when news arrived of the riots and murders at Lahore and Amritsar, and the further excesses at Kasur. From the 13th onward the feeling in the *bazars* was one of hatred of the white man.

The pleader community, which formed the majority of the Congress Committee, was most active in organising the *hartal* and in misrepresenting the Rowlatt Act, but it was the petty shopkeeper and the lower class Hindu who were carried away with themselves and indulged in excesses. The movement in its more undesirable

aspects was almost entirely Hindu. Only a few Muhammadans allowed themselves to be involved. Most of the promoters were Arya Samajists or Hindus and Sikh with Arya leanings.

Proclamation of Martial Law was a precautionary measure. It gave the power to deal promptly with any further trouble which might arise, and ensured a speedy return to normal conditions. It was only enforced at headquarters and did not interfere with the liberties of the general public except in the matter of travelling by rail.

PANDIT AVATAR KISHEN KAUL, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Lyallpur.

1. *Hartal* and agitation against the Rowlatt Act started by the District Congress Committee.

2. *Hartal* was used to force the hands of Government to repeal the Act.

3. *Hartal* did not appear entirely voluntary: undue influence and coercion—

(a) Some shopkeepers expressed fear of boycotting and ill-treatment if they did not join and continue in the strike.

(b) Shops were being opened one evening when crowds turned out and commenced looting and making matters unpleasant. This resulted in the closing of such shops at once.

(c) Witnesses from Gojra stated they were threatened by the mob and had to close their shops.

(d) Heard Amira, *halwai*, was forced to close his shop

4. After the 13th April, the people were told all kinds of rumours. The city was restless—

(a) Prohibitory order about Gandhi, Amritsar riots, firing at Delhi and Lahore, Jallianwala shooting made Lyallpur excited.

(b) Kairon girls' story and the bombing of the Golden Temple were mainly used to incite the people—so I was told.

(c) Other rumours circulated were: Mutiny of a regiment; of another regiment having gone to Amritsar; railway strike at Khanewal and all over the line.

5. People were after this anti-British and wanted to embarrass the Government—

(a) Attack on Wale, Inspector, Telegraphs, at Sangla without any provocation.

(b) Poster to outrage European women in revenge of the Kairon girls.

(c) Insult offered to Messrs. deMontmorency and Smith.

(d) Cutting of communications.

(e) Damage to Government property—

(i) fire set to Government *bhusa*.

(ii) damage to Sangla Hill military station—people removed all goods from the railway goods shed.

6. Loss of official influence over the people—

(a) Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police insulted.

(b) Leaders supposed to be siding with Government were not listened to.

(c) Contradiction of rumours re-arrest of Gandhi in *Civil and Military Gazette* not believed, as it was considered a Government organ.

(d) Holding of 'Idgah meeting in defiance of Deputy Commissioner's orders and especially when permission had been taken for the meeting of the 6th April.

7. Was in charge of War Loan, Lyallpur town. No complaints made about compulsion.

8. Patrolling considered necessary at night by Deputy Commissioner.

9. Troops sent to Sangla to save the station.

10. No complaints made about recruiting to me.

Mr. H. S. WILLIAMSON, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Gujrat.

1.

The predisposing causes of the unrest are hard to trace, because they do not appear to be local. There are no prominent political organisations in the district. The most important is the Arya Samaj which has branches in the district, but except at Jalalpur-Jattan it has not shown itself active in the district as a body. Some of its members have been concerned individually. The Musalman organisations have done nothing. The district has no history of political organisation and there is no one in the district (except Muhammad Habib, interned at Jalalpur-Jattan) who has hitherto been classed as an agitator. There is no newspaper in the district, except the *Sufi* which up to recently has not written about politics. But the eastern half of the district is a congested tract of small holdings, and a very large number of men from the district are in Government service of various kinds and in private service. The men of the district are adventurous. Many go to Hong Kong and the East in the Police. A large number travel to Australia and other places as traders. A large number trade regularly in Central India as pedlars. In Gujrat City there is a small number of men who have trade relations in cloth, sugar, etc., with Bombay and Karachi.

In all these ways the men of the district are in touch with affairs elsewhere, but looking back at the disturbances it cannot be said that political influence has been brought to bear through any of these channels. It is fairly certain, though it cannot be proved, that some traders were influenced by a threat of boycott which has been found elsewhere, and some pleaders were influenced by their friends elsewhere, particularly in Gujranwala and Sialkot, who urged active participation in the movement. Ordinarily the Bar at Gujrat as a whole has not shown any political activity or been guilty of any objectionable conduct, though as in other places they take more interest than the rest of the town in politics.

2.

With regard to the immediate causes no trace of political agitation is seen in Gujrat before the 6th April. On or about that day it is alleged that a shopkeeper received messages from friends in Amritsar urging him and his friends to have shops closed and threatening to boycott them if they would not. However, these efforts failed and no *hartal* was observed. Between the 6th and 14th April the apathy of Gujrat in the passive resistance movement began to be the subject of comment.

Continued.]

Mr. H. S. WILLIAMSON.

A pleader visited Sialkot and came back with an account of the bitter reproaches he had suffered from the members of the Sialkot Bar. On the 11th or 12th a barrister returned from Lahore and gave a highly coloured account of happenings there to certain members of the bar, including an account of the Badahahi mosque affair at which he implied that he was present.

Early on the morning of the 14th April two inflammatory notices were found posted in the city, possibly written by students, saying they were seven men from Amritsar. The notices said there would be a mutiny at 8 in the evening on the 15th April, in which English and Christians would be killed: Musalmans and Hindûs should unite as in Amritsar: the English should look to themselves.

3.

## NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.

The following account shows what disturbances took place at various places in the Gujrat District:—

*Gujrat.*

The following quotation from a report sent in at the time by the Superintendent of Police shows what happened. "The very first incident was the discovery of two manuscript notices in the *bazar* inciting to mutiny, but these were seen by few people and apparently caused no excitement. At about 2 A.M. on the morning of 14th April a band of Baisakhi revellers returned from Wazirabad shouting "Gandhi ki jai, Muhammad Ali ki jai, Shaikat Ali ki jai," but they immediately dispersed to their homes.

There was no disturbance or general excitement of any kind up to 10 o'clock on the morning of 14th April. On that morning I saw several of the leading men at the request of the Deputy Commissioner who was in camp, and they all assured me that there was no likelihood of any closing of shops or other demonstrations in Gujrat. About 10 A.M. the shops suddenly began to close without warning and in a very short time practically every shop was closed. On hearing this I issued orders for an armed guard of 20 Constables and two Head Constables to be sent to the City Police Station and after a brief consultation with the senior sub-judge and Shahzada Muhammad Yusuf, Honorary Magistrate, I proceeded with the latter to the *bazar*. I addressed a crowd of shopkeepers in the Shishanwala Bazar, telling them that I should afford protection from any intimidation and advised them not to be coerced by any one into closing their shops. I also asked various Honorary and stipendiary Magistrates to use their influence to check the *hartal*. About 3 P.M. I received a report that a procession had been formed. I ordered another guard of 10 men to the city and one of two Head Constables and 20 Foot Constables to be ready for use in the Civil Lines while I proceeded to the City. At this time a thunderstorm came on with heavy rain and by the time I reached the city the ardour of the crowd was cooling. They were standing in the Chauk with a black flag and presently they broke up. At 5 P.M. the Deputy Commissioner returned by train and shortly after he and I went through the City and found another crowd collected, consisting mostly of boys and loafers uttering cries of lamentations. The Deputy Commissioner spoke a few words to them about the Rowlatt Bill to which they listened, but they did not disperse. We decided to send for some troops as a precautionary measure and at 4 A.M. next morning two platoons of the 37th Dogras, consisting of 70 rank and file, arrived from Jhelum under a British officer.

The Deputy Commissioner ordered all Municipal Commissioners to arrange for *thikri pahra* in their wards and the night passed quietly. Next morning, 15th April, the shops were still closed and at about 7-30 A.M., a crowd, mostly youths, collected at the Shishanwala Gate with a black flag and a picture of Gandhi. The

crowd was more excitable than that of the previous day.

The Police were now distributed according to the local alarm orders, i.e., a piquet of 20 men at the Jail, and 20 in the Superintendent of Police's compound ready to take up its position between his *lungahw* and the Mission houses, 20 in the Lines and remainder (some 15 rank and file) in the City Thana as a mobile force.

At 10 A.M. a conference was held by the Deputy Commissioner with the Magistrates and leading men of the City, and it was decided that efforts should at present be directed towards bringing the crowd to reason and getting shops open, trying to find out who were the ring-leaders and preventing schoolboys, through their masters and parents, from joining the crowd. Half an hour later the crowd went to the Mission High School and compelled it to close. They threw brick-bats, breaking some windows and doors and damaging some furniture. They also assaulted one or two of the masters. They then went to the Zamindara School and the Government High School, but these closed before their arrival and no disturbance occurred. Subsequently the crowd disappeared.

At about 4 P.M. it was observed emerging from the Kabuli Gate from where it proceeded to the Shrine of Shah Hussain near by and halted. Presently it moved off in the direction of the railway station. On receiving intimation the Senior Sub-Judge and the Deputy Superintendent followed it up and accompanied it, ordering the mobile force from the City Police Station to follow. On reaching the railway station the crowd immediately swarmed into it and began destroying the telegraph and telephone instruments and furniture and setting fire to records. The senior sub-judge gave the order to fire and the Police opened independent fire, the crowd being too scattered to admit of a volley. A few shots were sufficient to disperse them and seven arrests were made on the spot. The Police and the Magistrates promptly extinguished the fire which had been started among the records in the Booking Office. On receiving the news in the Civil Station the Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police proceeded to the station, ordering the troops, which were quartered in the Zail Sarai between the Civil Station and the City, to follow. By the time the troops arrived everything was quiet, but they were marched through the City by way of a demonstration. A Police guard was placed on the station and sentries were posted in the Civil Station from the piquet there. One hundred more troops were wired for and at midnight three platoons, comprising 120 men and three British officers, arrived from Lala Muss. The night passed quietly, *thikri pahra* being carried out as before, strengthened by a small force of Military pensioners from the surrounding villages.

On the morning of the 16th notices were issued under the Police Act prohibiting meetings and processions without licence in connection with the Rowlatt Bill and the restriction of Gandhi. The Police being now relieved of Military duties were strongly posted unarmd in the City to enforce order and practically all shops opened, confidence being largely restored.

*Jalalpur Jattan.*

A meeting to arrange for a *hartal* or closing of shops was held on the evening of 14th and shops began to close on the 15th and a crowd paraded through the town with the usual shouts about Gandhi and the Rowlatt-Bill.

The crowd made other shopkeepers close, but committed no acts of violence. They were watched by the Police of the Police Station, and two Magistrates who had been sent from Gujrat and 10 sowars lent by the Commandant of the Temporary Remount Depot at Gujrat also arrived under the command of Lieutenant Batchelor, Assistant Commandant, and patrolled the town. But this evening the most serious offence com-

Mr. H. S. WILLIAMSON.

[Continued.]

mitted at Jalalpur occurred, as two men cut the telegraph wire at two places.

On the 16th April, the crowd gathered again and shops were again closed. Some members of the Municipal Committee and other leading men gathered at the Municipal Hall to discuss how to stop the trouble, but the crowd entered the Hall and made a disturbance. They insisted on the members of the Municipal Committee mourning with them by knocking off their *pagris* forcibly and damaged the furniture of the Hall (but the cost of the damage is reported to be only Rs. 18). The crowd then proceeded to break some windows of the Mission School and went on further, taking the funeral of the local Sanitary Inspector who had not joined them to the house of the headmaster of the Mission School and also made some Police Constables take off their *pagris*. The Sub-Inspector called back his Police force and picketed it at suitable places. Meanwhile, the two Magistrates and respectable people had been making efforts to quieten the crowd and thanks to these and to the firm attitude taken by Dr. H. M. Newton of the Church of Scotland Mission Hospital, the crowd made no further disturbance, though the bolder spirits are reported to have said they ought to have attacked the Police Station and Dr. Newton's bungalow. Meantime news had arrived that the crowd at Gujrat had been fired on, and this helped to make the crowd disperse.

On the 17th the shops gradually opened and the crowd did not collect again. The sowars were replaced by an additional force of Police and later by a guard of Dogras and there was no further disturbance in the town, though two men from Jalalpur were subsequently found to be making seditious speeches at Suk and Gujrat.

#### Malakwal.

The predisposing causes here are different because Malakwal is a large railway junction in a thinly populated agricultural tract: Malakwal itself is a fairly large village about a mile from the railway station and the men are Musalman Khokar. Round the railway station has sprung up a *bazar* largely depended on the railway staff for its prosperity. In this *bazar* and on the railway premises is a large colony of railway employees of all departments—traffic, locomotive and engineering. For some time past the railway staff has been discontented and a strike was being arranged. Moreover, the signallers had been getting news on their instruments of events in other places. It cannot be said on the material available here whether the political agitators had any hand in the railway strike. After a meeting it was decided to hold a meeting next day in the large mosque and to make a *hartal* in the *bazar*, and that the railway strike should be brought to a head by stopping work. Accordingly a number of people, mostly railway employees, came to the station to call off the men on duty; this was because some of the men off duty did not want the odium of refusing to go on duty when their turn came. When the crowd got to the station they were turned back by the troops who had already arrived and up to that stage their proceedings did not constitute a riot. As the crowd was going away a messenger boy came to inform a guard living in one of the quarters that it was his turn for duty; the crowd tore up the call book. The boy went and fetched another and the crowd this time burnt the book and assaulted the boy. The crowd then dispersed or at any rate made no definite disturbance, though the European and Eurasian staff were much alarmed at the demeanour of the crowd, and had collected in one house. It appears that some of the men did strike by leaving their duty.

Next day, the 16th April, a meeting was held in the mosque at which Hindus also attended, but no definite result was attained, because the shopkeepers complained that though they had closed their shops the railway staff had not carried out their strike. At this meeting one Raja Ram, a goldsmith by caste and an ex-student

of the D. A. V. College at Lahore had been speaking. He had also spoken at the meeting at the dharmshala on the previous evening. He had seen Sarwar at the meeting and thought him a likely man to join in some definite action and during the day Raja Ram busied himself in arranging the definite step of cutting the telegraph wires, and taking up a section of the rails. The volunteers he got were partly his own friends and relations, partly some of the locomotive people who were inclined for mischief, and partly the Maulvi of the mosque who offered the services of his four students. It is not proved that the suggestion of this crime was made at either of the two meetings, but it seems that Raja Ram had got the idea from knowledge of what had been done elsewhere. It is also not clear whether any other had been asked to join and had refused. However, in the evening one party under Raja Ram went out first, took the burners off the distant signal, and cut all the telegraph wires about 21.0 hours. Finding that the other party who had promised to take up the rails had not come, they started back, but on the way heard a whistle which informed them that the other party was coming. This other party was headed by Sarwar who had brought ten men, but six of them turned back on learning what they were to do. The rest with Sarwar and Raja Ram's party then took up a section of rail (24 feet long), sleepers and all, and pushed it down the embankment out of sight of a coming train. Ten men were concerned in this deliberate crime, and later experiment has proved that this number was enough to remove the rails. On the way back they were challenged by a British officer and a sentry, but said they were looking for a lost buffalo and were allowed to pass. The interruption in the telegraph was known to one of the signallers in the Malakwal station at 21.30 and he sent a message to the linesman, but did not inform the Assistant Station Master on duty or the signaller who relieved him, otherwise the action might have been taken in time. Next morning, 17th April, at 6.50 A.M. 34-Down train, which had been detained some time at Haria, was allowed to proceed at caution without line clear, and it was derailed at the gap. Damage was done to stock and two lives were lost.

The European and Eurasian staff were alarmed on 15th April and gathered at the house of the Sub-Divisional Officer, but as a force of 60 Indian infantry and one British officer arrived that evening they were adequately protected. It was, however, considered advisable to remove a party of 12 women and three children who left Malakwal on the evening of the 16th April for Jhelum and returned on the evening of the 22nd April.

#### Kunjah.

In Kunjah on the 15th April there was the beginning of a *hartal*. A drunken mistri succeeded in getting some shopkeepers to close, but some members of the Municipal Committee soon succeeded in getting them open again. The man was convicted and sentenced under section 25 of the Defence of India Rules. The incident shows the difficulty of dealing with political agitation when any respectable man can so readily act at the bidding of such a man.

#### Rasul.

There was some indiscipline on the 15th and 16th April among the students of the Engineering College. They refused to attend lectures and marched round the head-works of the Canal  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles away as a demonstration, but there was no disturbance. On the 16th there was a meeting of Canal officials in the mosque at which Hindus also attended and prayers were offered for unity and for the repeal of the Rowlett Act. On these days the Principal of the Engineering College was away, but on his return he took disciplinary action by expelling some students, and when the College re-opened he took further precautions against trouble. A force of 20 troops was sent here on the 15th April.

Continued.]

M. H. S. WILLIAMSON.

It is therefore seen that disturbances took place at Gujrat, Jalalpur and Malakwal on the 15th and 16th April. (The cutting of wires and removal of rails at Malakwal was done on the night of the 16th, though the derailment took place on the morning of the 17th). Beyond this, cases were found of the spread of seditious rumours. Three men of Daulatnagar and two of Mangat were punished under the Martial Law proclamation for spreading false rumours.

4

#### MILITARY AND CIVIL MEASURES ADOPTED FOR SUPPRESSION OF DISTURBANCES.

On the 14th April the General Officer Commanding, Jhelum, received orders from the General Officer Commanding, 2nd Rawalpindi Division, to send one company with a Lewis gun to Lala Musa, and two platoons with a Lewis gun to Gujrat for the protection of Europeans and Government property. These troops were despatched from Jhelum at 1-21 on the 15th. A force was also sent to Rasul. In the meantime I had returned from tour on the 14th and after consulting with the Superintendent of Police and the Magistrates thought it advisable to ask for troops. Therefore, about 9 P.M., I sent a wire asking for 50 troops to support the Police, and received a reply "sending." Before my arrival on the 14th the Superintendent of Police had wired to the Chief Secretary asking that the General Officer Commanding, Jhelum or Sialkot, might be instructed to send troops on requisition as trouble was feared.

A force of 70 men of the 37th Dogras under a British officer arrived in the early morning of the 15th. They were put in the *zailghar* in reserve as there seemed no immediate need for using them. Moreover, the men had no rations and it took some time before food could be supplied, because the shops were closed. In fact, it was almost midday when they got their food. The troops were then kept where they were, because of the strong representation of the officer in command that he wished to keep his men together. Otherwise it is now clear after the event that it would have been better to relieve the Police by armed troops at once and let the Police perform their ordinary duties unarmed. When the Mission School was damaged by the crowd the troops were called out and marched towards the place, but as the Superintendent of Police and I saw that the crowd had disappeared and at the Government High School were informed that no disturbance had taken place we sent the troops back to have their food. Later we were told the crowd had scattered to get its own food.

At 5-0 P.M. news was brought that the crowd had reformed and had gone towards the railway station followed by a police guard of 20 armed men, the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the Magistrates who had been appointed to watch the crowd.

Shortly afterwards another message was brought that the crowd had attacked the railway station. I went off with the Superintendent of Police, calling on the troops on the way, but found that the Police had fired under the orders of the senior Magistrate, and dispersed the crowd, of which no trace could be seen. The troops therefore were not needed for action, but were marched through the city and returned to quarters.

As a precaution I wired asking for 100 more troops, and during the night of the 15-16th 120 more troops under two British officers arrived. With this large force now available in addition to the police the city and railway station and Government offices and the civil station were all protected. Later on the force at Gujrat supplied guards at Kathala railway station, the railway bridge over the Bhimbar, and at Jalalpur Jattan. These guards were gradually reduced when it was seen that no further disturbance was to be feared, and at present (the end of June) there is a force of 50 men and two British officers at Gujrat.

The force sent to Lala Musa was originally one company with a Lewis gun under three British officers. The number varied later. On the 25th April it consisted of 50 men and a mobile column of eight sabres and a platoon of infantry. On the 11th May it consisted of a mobile column of 50 infantry and eight cavalry with one British and one Indian officer and 36 infantry at the railway station. A detachment of 14 men at Dinga was also supplied from here. The mobile column was withdrawn at the beginning of June. The troops were not at any time needed to quell disturbances as nothing happened here. A report that disturbances were likely turned out to be nothing more than the noisy exit from the railway station of men returning from the Baisakhi festival.

The force at Malakwal which arrived on the evening of the 15th April consisted of one British officer and two platoons, but was later increased. I have not got details, but at the end of April there were six or seven British officers under Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, V.C. On the 11th May there were about 150 men and a detachment of 15 men for the Mona Remount Depot was, I think, supplied from here. The troops at Malakwal were not used at any time to quell actual disturbance. They were at the railway station when the telegraph wires were cut and the section of rails taken up, but this crime was committed by a small gang of men who could not be watched by the troops. The presence of the troops was an adequate precaution against rioting and against further crimes. There is still a small force there.

A force of one Indian officer and 20 men was sent to Rasul on the 15th April on the receipt of news that the students of the Engineering College were threatening to give trouble. The force stayed till the beginning of June.

On the 15th April it was considered advisable to send a force to Jalalpur Jattan, and I borrowed ten horsemen from Lieutenant-Colonel Wikeley, Commandant of the Temporary Remount Depot at Gujrat. They stayed two days. From the 21st April 12 men under a havildar were kept at Jalalpur. A mobile column of 50 infantry and a few cavalry under a British officer visited Jalalpur on the 20th April and marched through the town to impress the inhabitants. It also visited Kunjah on the 21st. A column also went to Dinga and Pindi Baha-ud-din, but it was not so necessary there as there were detachments already at the railway stations. The General Officer Commanding was prepared to send the mobile column to other places, but I thought it unnecessary as no disturbances were being reported.

Extra civil measures were also adopted for the prevention of disturbance. In Gujrat City, on the night of the 14th April and for some subsequent nights, the ward members were instructed to arrange patrol by house-holders and they were helped by military pensioners from neighbouring villages. On the 16th April I issued orders through Tahsildars that all railway lines should be patrolled by villagers. On the 17th I received a telegram from Government saying that efforts should be made to organise patrols for the protection of railways. I issued orders that every culvert and bridge should have men posted on it according to its size, and that the line between should be patrolled. On the 28th I gave orders similar to those in the Shahpur district that there should be three men to two miles in the day time and to one mile at night, including culverts, but that larger bridges should be guarded separately as before. The men were provided with tickets showing their authority and with *khaki* armlets which were ready under the internal security scheme. These armlets are better than the white flags adopted in Gujranwala as they cannot readily be imitated. The patrols were later reduced to two men in each section, and finally taken off on the 24th May. The villagers did the work of patrol without complaint and without friction, and deserve credit. Supervision was entrusted to a few Police, and the *zaildars* and *sufedposhes*, under the orders of the Tahsildars and Naib-Tahsildars, and Magistrates and Honorary Magistrates. The Police



Mr. H. S. WILLIAMSON—concluded—Sardar ASAD JAN.

employed on railway patrolling duty were one Sub-Inspector, eight Head Constables and 30 Constables. When the arrival of troops relieved the Police, extra guards were also sent to the tahsil treasuries. Use was made of the Shahpur armed reserve of one Sub-Inspector, two Head Constables and 25 Constables, which had been ordered here in connection with the Sikh Conference at Dinga, and stayed from the 18th April till the 8th May.

The measures taken appear to have been adequate and successful. After the crime at Malakwal on the 16th which resulted in the derailment on the 17th no further disturbance took place. On the night of the 19th April, a telegram from Government informed me that Martial Law had been extended to Gujrat on the same lines as to Lahore, Amritsar and Gujranwala. Regulations for its enforcement were issued in a Proclamation by the General Officer Commanding, 2nd Rawalpindi Division, dated 20th April. This was followed by Martial Law Notice No. 9, dated 24th April, signed by Brigadier-General Campbell, Commanding Sialkot Brigade Military Area, announcing that he had been appointed to administer Martial Law in the Gujrat District. Notice No. 10 of the same date provided for the civil patrol of the railway line. I was informed that for the time being other notices would not be issued. On the 25th April, Lieutenant-Colonel L. S. Browne of the 37th Dogras, arrived from Jhelum as administrator of Martial Law. On the 27th, the Commissioner came to discuss matters, and apparently after consulting him the General Officer Commanding, 2nd Rawalpindi Division, informed the General Officer Commanding at Wazirabad, that the Gujrat Area should be dealt with more leniently than in the case of the Lyallpur and Gujranwala Districts, but measures similar to those adopted in other towns should continue to be taken in the towns of Gujrat Lala Musa, Jalalpur and Malakwal. Subsequently other Martial Law notices and instructions were made applicable to the district by Lieutenant-Colonel Browne or by the General Officer Commanding at Wazirabad. I was not consulted in all cases. It was arranged that it was not necessary to publish the notices everywhere, but only in the four towns named. The General Officer Commanding's original proclamation was sent to all Railway and Police stations.

Offences against the proclamation and notices were tried by the Military offices at Gujrat, Lala Musa and Malakwal. The total, as shown in section 9 of this report, comes to 13 persons tried, 11 convicted. Lieutenant-Colonel Browne, on going on service, was relieved by Major Monk on the 8th May.

Sardar ASAD JAN, Senior Sub-Judge, Gujrat.

#### A.—CAUSES OF THE DISTURBANCES.

In my opinion the speeches in the Council to a great extent were responsible for the late disturbances. The said speeches were reproduced in papers of different provinces and through those the educated community came to know what had happened and through them the masses were informed of the protest of the members of the Council as to the enactment of the Rowlatt Act. Subsequently through mischief-makers and sedition-mongers the object of the introduction of the Bill was interpreted to the public in a different light and such false rumours, which would suit the taste of the masses and which would create panic among them, were spread. The educated community, especially the lawyer class as a whole, became averse to the introduction of the Bill and they through different agencies, say through their agents, Sahukars and other people of importance, tried to agitate against the Bill. They called meetings, decided on organising *hartals*, and on organising open demonstrations against the Bill. The Government

5.

(a) *Instigation*.—Pleaders, traders and cloth merchants were prominent among the promoters of the shop closing. Sarafs both in this and the disturbances.

(b) The rioters themselves were composed of the scum of the town, kanjars, loafers and petty shopkeepers, though with a sprinkling of students and better class shopkeepers. The persons sent up for trial in the Gujrat cases were:—13 petty shopkeepers, five big shopkeepers, four students, three tum-tum drivers, two teachers, two members of the Bar, and three miscellaneous. The Arya Samaj did not take a prominent part in the disturbances in Gujrat.

In Jalalpur the leaders were the Arya Samaj and the teacher and manager of the Islamia School.

In Malakwal the ring-leaders were a goldsmith and a Railway engine shed hand.

The rural population was not implicated. They were chiefly concerned with the harvest and showed no signs of sympathy with the movement, except to ask what it was all about. They helped willingly in patrolling the railway line.

Returned emigrants were not found to be taking any share at all.

6.

The movement in this district was disloyal and *anti*-Government, but there were no manifestations of *anti*-British or *anti*-Christian action.

At Suk Kalan, Abdul Rashid and Ahsan Ali of Jalalpur are alleged to have called on the schoolboys to repeat after them a scurrilous couplet to the effect that the King was dead and had 'pawned' his daughter. This only came to light after the original enquiry, and it was not thought advisable to collect evidence about so unseemly a saying. Hence it did not appear on the record of the case.

Though no *anti*-British action was seen, there are two instances of *anti*-British spirit in the wording of the anonymous notices found at Gujrat on the morning of the 14th April, and in the words of Abdul Aziz, accused in the Jalalpur riot, who spoke of an attack on Dr. Newton's house.

It is of course possible that if the unrest had not been checked it would have ended in being *anti*-British. The supervising railway staff at Malakwal were alarmed, and it was thought advisable to send away 12 women and three children for some days, but I cannot find that the crowd at any time was preparing a definite attack on Europeans there or elsewhere.

instead of nipping the evil in the bud, watched all the activities silently, which emboldened the people more with the result that they came down to unconstitutional methods of agitation. To a certain extent the disturbances can be called the result of organised efforts, but I am not prepared to say that each and every lawyer or Sahukar was concerned in it. The disturbances, in my opinion, were due to a great extent to copying the adjoining districts where something had happened rather than to any actual cause of grievance.

#### B.—NARRATIVE OF EVENTS AT GUJRAT.

When the news of the *hartals* and demonstrations in Amritsar, Lahore, Gujranwala and Wazirabad towns were spread in this town through letters of traders, through messengers and through some of the members of the Bar of this place, on the morning of the 14th April the *hartal* started from the Station bazar, and in a short time it was extended to the city of Gujrat. A party,

SARDAR ASAD JAN—concluded—Sayad FAIZUL HASSAN SHAH.

which consisted of some young *sahukars* of this place, was formed and they went about in the Bazar and asked the shopkeepers to close their shops. The Deputy Commissioner, on the 14th, was out in camp. On hearing this news I went to the city to see things for myself and found that the Bazar was practically closed, except a few bakers' or cobblers' shops. After a short time, there was formed a mob which started going through the Bazar and main streets of Gujrat making the usual lamentations and shouting different sorts of cries. Then, in consultation with the Superintendent of Police, the police were armed and the reserve police were called. As the police were found insufficient to cope with the situations, Military were also requisitioned. This mob went round the city for some time and then a sharp shower of rain dispersed them. After the rain stopped they again collected and started the same sort of demonstrations. The Deputy Commissioner on getting information arrived from camp and he, accompanied by the Superintendent of Police, visited the town and meeting the mob he gave them some advice, but some of the members of the mob remonstrated with him and they would not listen to what he said. About evening the mob dispersed. Suitable arrangements were made for the night which passed off without any occurrence. The following morning the mob collected and it had then grown in number as well as importance on account of the presence of men of better position and of more grown up people than those who had taken part on the previous day. About 8-0 the Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police again visited the town and Deputy Commissioner tried to soothe the agitation, but the mob evidently appeared to be more exasperated than the day before. At about 10-0 a meeting of the officials and *raises* of the town was called by the Deputy Commissioner at his house to consider how the situation should be met, and it was there that the news of the attack on the mission school was brought. The meeting then dispersed and we returned to the city. The mob was then found near the Government school, and was proceeding towards

the civil lines. Through the persuasions and entreaties of some of those present they however decided to return to the city. They thus kept raming about till 12-0 and then they dispersed, to collect again in the afternoon. About 4-0 again there was formed a mob superior in its importance and numerical strength to the previous mobs, and it started its usual lamentations. They then started on the circular road and near the place where the road branches off towards the railway station they started on that road. After going for some distance they showed signs of rowdiness and some trouble was apprehended. At this juncture the reserve police guard, which was stationed near the city police station out of the view of the mob for fear of their provocation, was ordered to follow us to the railway station. The mob as soon as it arrived at the railway station rushed inside the building and began to break down glass panes, windows, and other furniture. They tried to set fire to the building and actually set fire to the bundle of papers lying in the booking office. They were ordered to desist and disperse, and when they did not do so I ordered the police to fire. As soon as a few shots were fired the mob bolted away in different directions. Some arrests were made and the fire was extinguished. After this occurrence no mob collected again and everything remained quiet in the city.

Except the above occurrence nothing further happened in the city proper and in Gujrat comparatively less mischief was wrought than in the other towns. Considering the condition of Gujrat itself introduction of martial law cannot be considered as an indispensable measure, but having in view the occurrences of neighbouring districts it was a wise step to extend it to this place. It was given as an extra tool in the hands of authorities to use it in time of need. Its introduction no doubt deadened the zeal of mischievous people, and restricted their activities, and curbed some restive lawyers who, before its introduction, did not hesitate in giving vent to their feelings openly.

Sayad FAIZUL HASSAN SHAH, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Gujrat.

## CAUSES OF DISTURBANCE.

1. *Satyagraha* movements and Gandhi's message, which was widely published in all the vernacular and English newspapers and were read up with great interest to show resentment against the Rowlatt Act, was the general cause in the Province.

2. The cause of disturbance in the Gujrat district was due to the following:—

- (a) The traders of the Gujrat town had trade relations in cloth, sugar, etc., with Bombay, Karachi, Amritsar and Lahore. They were urged by the Amritsar traders to have their and their friends' shops closed with the threat to boycott them if they would not.
- (b) Between the 6th and 14th April the feelings of Gujrat in the passive resistance movement began to be the subject of comment.
- (c) Lala Kirpa Ram, Pleader, visited Sialkot and came back with an account of the bitter reproaches he had suffered from the members of the Sialkot Bar.
- (d) Mr. Hargopal, Barrister, on 11th or 12th returned from Lahore and gave a highly coloured account of the Shahi mosque affair at Lahore at which he implied that he was present.
- (e) On 13th April many people went from Gujrat to Wazirabad for Baisakhi festival. Some of them returned by a night train and went from the station to the city shouting "Gandhi ki jai" "Muhammad Ali Shaikat Ali ki jai."
- (f) On the morning of 14th two inflammatory notices were found posted in the city Bazar. The

notices said there would be a mutiny at 8 P.M. on the 15th April in which English and Christians would be killed. Muslims and Hindus should unite as in Amritsar. The English should look to themselves.

3. Efforts were made by a few traders to effect *hartal* on the 6th April, but with no success.

## INCIDENTS.

4. (1) The closing of shops started in the Station Bazar first by the traders on the morning of 14th April and soon after all the shops of the city Bazar were closed or made to close. Consequently it was a regular *hartal* all round in the city.

(2) A little after noon a disorderly mob was formed in the main Bazar and began to parade in the city streets, some of them were wearing black badges and shouting "Rowlatt Bill namanszur," "Gandhi ki jai" till later in the night.

(3) On the morning of 15th mob was again formed and started with black flag and Gandhi's picture at 7 A.M., and artificial funeral was arranged and was taken along with the mob on a *charpai* shouting the words "Ashiq ka janaza zara dhum se nikle." The mob then went to the Mission School and compelled the Head Master to close the school between 10 and 11 A.M. On being refused they threw brickbats breaking some windows, doors and damaging some furniture and also assaulted one or two of the masters. The mob then went towards the Zamindara and Government High Schools, but both of them were closed before their arrival. The mob then returned back to the Shishanwala gate where one Niranjan Das, Pansari, delivered a lecture to present a bold front

Siyad FAIZUL HASSAN SHAH—concluded—Mr. V. H. BOALTH.

against the Rowlett Act and on the Unity of Hindus and Muhammadans, etc.

The report of this incident was brought to the notice of Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police at the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow where all the officers and the leading men of the city were present to hold a conference to devise some suitable prompt preventive measures.

The mob in the meantime began to disperse to their respective houses to have their meals.

The mob in the afternoon again assembled and reached the Shah Hussain shrine where they all unanimously drank the water from the well and at once moved towards the Railway Station, and on reaching there rushed into the Station Master's Office and Booking Offices and began to smash the telephone and furniture and set fire the records and parcels.

MEASURES TAKEN BY THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE.

5. On the morning of 14th the Superintendent of Police interviewed the non-officials and leading pleaders of the town and explained to them that they should take keen interest, that there should be no 'hartal' and unrest in the town.

The Deputy Commissioner also held the officers and the leading gentry of the town responsible to patrol at night and also try to induce relatives of the boys and men of the mob not to join the mob.

The Superintendent of Police deputed armed pickets at the Treasury guard and all kutoheri and Post-Offices buildings.

The strength available in the Lines on the 14th including officers orderlies was—

Inspector . . . . .	1
Sub-Inspectors . . . . .	3
Head Constables . . . . .	19
Foot Constables . . . . .	79

When the mob was smashing the Railway Station furniture and setting fire, I with the Senior Magistrate and the armed Reserve Guard at once reached the Station

and the Reserve Guard began to open independent firing under the orders of the Senior Magistrate. The mob soon dispersed and seven men were arrested on the spot, but no one was injured and the fire was extinguished. Had this measure not been taken at once it would have caused a serious loss to the Station building and breach of peace. In spite of the prompt action taken by the Police at the headquarters the nearest town, Jalalpur, was not left unaffected.

Owing to the shortage of the available men in the Line it was deemed necessary to obtain Military assistance. A telegram was accordingly sent by the Deputy Commissioner and a small detachment of 70 men of 37th Dogras arrived, of which 10 Sowars and Resaldar and a Lieutenant were sent to Jalalpur on the same evening 15th, where the *hatal* was started. Although the Military Guard had reached there yet the telegraph wires were cut and damaged on the same evening and other damage to property was done in the Mission School and Municipal Committee Office on the morning of the following day, and inflammatory lectures were delivered. Meanwhile the Malakwal incident (breaking of the lines) was reported on the 17th, which was very serious. Consequently more Military men were asked by wire. 120 men arrived. The Police Guard were then relieved by the Military from the continuous day and nights duties.

Under the circumstances while the Police strength was inadequate and the towns were disturbed, it was absolutely essential to seek the help of the Military and apply for the enforcement of the Martial Laws.

One Head Constable and ten foot constables were despatched to Jalalpur Jattan where the arrests were made and investigation was started.

The Police did very well in discharging their duties throughout in connection with the patrolling at night and looking after the Treasury, Courts, Offices, Post Office and the bungalows of the Civil Station, and especially dispersing the mob at the Railway Station.

Had the Police and Military Guards would have not reached in time to the spots it would have caused serious consequences, and it was the enforcement of Martial Laws which stopped all the future troubles.

Mr. V. H. BOALTH, C.B.E., Traffic Manager, North-Western Railway.

The disturbances started at Delhi on 30th March and a week afterwards spread to the centre of the Punjab where Amritsar seemed to be the focus of the troubles. From Amritsar the trouble spread outwards in all directions, but was checked at the Jhelum and Sutlej rivers.

From April 10th to April 18th the disturbed areas were in a state of riot and rebellion and areas outside this may be said to be restive awaiting results.

The Civil Authorities, with the help of the Military, had by this time the situation well in hand; as far as the Railway was concerned the outrages were diminishing daily and communication increasing—after the 21st April no further trouble was experienced.

The main object seems to have been to—

- (i) cut the telegraph lines,
- (ii) destroy Railway communication,
- (iii) paralyse the Railway by means of a general strike.

As regards (i), at first this was successful, but the Telegraph Department rapidly restored the communication, and although the telegraph wire were cut every night at various places, so far as the Railway was concerned the results did not cause much interference with the running of trains.

As regards (ii), the attempts at train wrecking (such as dismantling the tracks, burning of bridges) were frustrated by the liberal use of armoured and armed trains. I attach a special note on the use of these trains—see Annexure A.

As regards (iii), a general strike was abortive for several reasons, chiefly that on the whole the staff did not want to strike, the exception being the small Station Masters and Signallers. Strong attempts were made to get the workshop employees to go out on strike, but this was also abortive. Martial Law was proclaimed on the 15th and this had a great steadying effect on the whole of the Railway. Claims for damages have been submitted to the Civil authorities.

The interruption to traffic working was as follows:—

On the 10th owing to telegraphic interruption goods trains were delayed at junctions, but passenger trains were run through. On the 11th goods trains delayed at Ludhiana and Lahore were ordered to get through. On the morning of the 13th No. 3 Up Goods Special from Amritsar was reported to have been derailed, due to a rail having been taken out. This was the first intimation of actual mischief as regards derailments, and after this precautions were taken to guard passenger trains and to restrict goods trains during night. Military guards were put on passenger trains on Sunday, 13th, and a particularly strong guard on No. 4 Down Mail, as intimation had been received that trouble was expected near Attari. As a matter of fact this train did not get through on the night of the 13th, as the armoured train patrolling the line got derailed and Wagha station was burnt, the Military did not consider it safe for the Mail to go out. From this date up to the 19th passenger trains were practically restricted in the Lahore area to the two Mails and one day train to Pathankot. On the Bhatinda side after the Kasur incident on the 12th passenger trains

Continued.]

Mr. V. H. BOALTE.

were greatly disorganized, and we practically only ran the Mail by daylight from Lahore to Delhi, no night running being allowed. From the 13th we advised all Railways to stop booking through the affected areas and goods booking was not generally resumed till 25th. On the 20th the full services of passenger trains were run between Lahore and Multan as there was least trouble experienced on this section. From the 21st to the 23rd restrictions on passenger trains were gradually withdrawn till a restricted normal service was set up about the 25th. Goods and parcels restrictions were gradually withdrawn till the end of the month. Free night running of Mails and passenger trains was not fully opened till the 28th. Goods and parcel restrictions were gradually removed till the 6th of May, when restrictions had to be imposed owing to concentration having been ordered on the 6th.

The actual restrictions and control of passenger booking were ordered from time to time under instructions from the Military and Permits were supplied by them up to about the 28th. These Permits were very rigid at first, but were gradually made easier. At no time were Military passengers in uniform, Government servants on duty, and servants of European 1st and 2nd class passengers restricted.

LAHORE: F. J. HARVEY,  
The 1st July 1919. Agent, North-Western Railway.

ACCOUNT OF THE DISTURBANCES IN THE PUNJAB SO FAR AS THEY HAVE AFFECTED THE NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY.

The first overt act occurred on the 30th March. A large mob attacked Delhi Station, broke the windows of the Railway Offices and beat the Railway staff and the Railway Police. After this nothing open occurred on the Railway at this Station; but there were conditions in that neighbourhood which encouraged those who were disloyal to strike and, in some cases, almost forced loyal members of the staff into the conspiracy.

The strike at Shakurpur, for instance, seems directly caused by the continued *hartal* in Delhi and consequently the inability of the local staff to get food.

At Delhi itself the passive resisters were, during this period, said to be offering food at below market rates to the Railway staff on condition that they would strike.

There seems to have been also, at various centres, seditious talking at meetings connected with the *Baisakhi Mela*, during this period.

Thursday, 10th April.

There was considerable tension on April the 6th at many places, but nothing occurred till April the 10th. On this day, at Amritsar, a part of the mob advancing towards the civil station was turned back at the Railway by the Military and diverted into the station yard. The mob burned the goods shed, brutally murdered Guard Robinson who was defending Government property, beat Mr. Bennett, Station Superintendent, and did considerable damage to the station and telegraph wires. Fortunately a troop train for Rawalpindi arrived at the crisis, containing a detachment of Gurkhas. These were detained at the insistent demand of the Station Superintendent and this undoubtedly saved the situation at Amritsar. The main body of the mob went into the city. After having looted and burned the banks, the mob moved on to Bhagtanwala station, looted and burned the station building, looted the goods shed and a wagon, and broke the pointlocks. This occurred at about half past three in the afternoon. The same evening at about 8 o'clock, a mob collected near Chheharta station; they discussed the Amritsar riot, and decided to loot Chheharta Station. Arriving there they found a goods train (88-Down), broke the seals of four wagons, removed piece-goods to the value of Rs. 8,000—sugar, cotton seeds, etc. Included in all these acts of violence

was the cutting of telegraph wires. Meanwhile, the mob in Lahore had been dispersed by the Police and the Military; and armoured trains Nos. 1 and 3 were held ready at Moghalpura.

Friday, 11th April.

This was a day of suspense; very little occurred.

At the Loco. Workshops, Moghalpura, a commotion was started by half a dozen students from Lahore during the breakfast hour. The result was that 20 per cent. of the men absented themselves in the afternoon.

Bhagtanwala station was inspected by the Executive Engineer who spiked over facing points, crossed out signals and closed the station.

Armoured train No. 1 left Lahore for Amritsar in the morning; armoured train No. 3 was still waiting at Moghalpura.

Saturday, 12th April.

On this day things began to move again. At 10 A.M. a mob looted Kasur station, held up two trains (14-Down and 61-Up), killed two British soldiers, badly wounded another, assaulted the fourth and was only restrained from killing Mr. Sherbourn, Interlocking Inspector, and his family by the active loyalty of Mr. Khair Din, Inspector of Accounts. This riot was over within an hour. A relief troop train left Ferozpur at 14-5 hours, arriving at Kasur 15-5. Armoured train No. 3 picked up a military guard at Lahore Cantonment West at 17 hours, arriving at Kasur at 20 hours. Nothing further occurred at Kasur.

Khemkaran station was looted at 15-45 hours by the same mob that wrecked Kasur.

On the same day Patti station was attacked, the goods office doors broken, points locks taken away, signals damaged.

At Lahore Loco. and Carriage and Wagon Workshops the greatest difficulty was experienced by the men going to work. Bands of men with sticks tried to prevent them by force and threats. Only 50 per cent. of the Loco. Shops attended in the morning and 5 per cent. in the afternoon. The attendance at the Carriage and Wagon Shops was good, as it was pay day. Orders were received to armour another engine at 15 hours. The European staff, helped by a few loyal Indians, worked all through the night and completed this by 9 o'clock next morning—Sunday.

At Multan 40 men of the Loco. Workshops stayed away from work, but there was no subsequent trouble there.

Armoured train No. 3 arrived at Kasur, received a message from Khemkaran, arrived there at 23-40 hours, found the station looted and unoccupied, as reported above.

During this afternoon there were seditious meetings convened by the most influential people of the neighbourhoods at Ambala, Wagah and possibly other centres.

There was during the night a good deal of talking over the telegraph wires by the station signallers.

Sunday, 13th April.

In the early morning armoured train No. 3 patrolling between Kasur and Amritsar, found telegraph and signal wires cut at Patti, Tarn Taran and Gohlwar Varpal.

At Ludhiana there was a three hours' *hartal*, hastily abandoned on the arrival of a military guard from Ambala.

At 2-30 hours a rail-length of track was removed from both up and down lines, between Chheharta and Khawa near Amritsar. The engine and eight vehicles of 3-Up Special Goods were derailed. The train was badly looted, 3 wagons of furniture, sacks of barley, sugar sacks, etc., were broken open. At this place a *lambardar* incited the people.

At Wagah two *lambardars* and a disloyal Indian soldier convened a secret meeting of several villages at which it was agreed to burn three stations, Jallo, Wagah and Attari.

During the evening a meeting was held at Bahawalnagar at which it was decided to strike at 10-30 A.M. next day.

Mr. V. H. BOALTE.

[Continued.]

At Shakurpur at midnight the Loco., the Carriage and Wagon, and the Traffic staff struck work.

This was the day on which the prohibited meeting of 6,000 people at Amritsar was dispersed, with heavy casualties, by Indian troops.

A minor incident of this day was the throwing of a stone at 7-Up Mail passing through Kot Radha Kishan. A first class passenger was injured.

After dark, probably well on into the night, the Wagha mob went to the station to loot it; and as they approached, armoured train No. 1 went through with searchlights. As soon as the train had passed, the mob looted the station, broke the telegraph instruments, collected and burned the furniture and Government property, turned away the station staff with their private property, cut wires and so on. When the armoured train returned they hid themselves. When it had again passed on they went to the permanent-way huts, stole tools, and began to wreck the permanent way. They completed the wrecking between the trips of the armoured train. The armoured train was derailed with a great noise. The rioters proceeded to Jallo, delighted with their work, but for some reason did not more damage on the Railway.

#### Monday, 14th April.

The chief events of this day were the disturbances at Gujranwala and Bahawalnagar.

At Gujranwala in the morning—exact time uncertain—a local mob attacked the Civil station, burnt the Church and other public buildings, proceeding to the railway station, burnt and looted it, set on fire the railway over-bridge, burnt the timbers of two more small railway bridges, burnt the staff quarters and the goods shed and one covered goods wagon standing in the yard. The damage at Gujranwala was stopped at 3-30 p.m. by an aeroplane from Lahore.

At Bahawalnagar a strike occurred at 10-30 hours, as arranged the day before. The signal for the strike was the arrival of 29-Up. After some discussion the strikers allowed the incoming engine to be detached; but they, helped by a mob of city people, refused to allow the outgoing engine to be attached. The strike at this station was passive rather than active because the situation was taken in hand very promptly by Captain Watson of the H. L. E., a passenger of 29-Up, helped by his Sergeant, the Traffic Inspector, the Permanent-Way Inspector, the Station Master and the Loco. Foreman. The whole of the Traffic staff went on strike at once. The other Departments were slow in following them, but were finally overpersuaded at a meeting at 14 hours at which the chief speaker was a Sikh, whose brother had returned from Canada by the "Komagata Maru." He incited the strikers and the mob to assault Europeans. A message from Gandhi was read at this meeting by another speaker. The station staff, however, hesitated to attack Europeans. By 21 hours the Loco. running staff had joined the strike in spirit; they actively joined at 9 o'clock next morning. The strike was heartily supported by the citizens of Bahawalnagar. In the early afternoon a party went by trolley and cut the Telegraph wires. It is reported that, leader of the strike at this station was the Loco. Department School Master. There was another meeting of strikers at 10 o'clock in the Loco. quarters at which it was proposed to cut the track. This proposal was, however, not carried out, possibly because the ardour of the strikers had been damped by the arrival of the Assistant Traffic Superintendent with an armoured guard and extra arms at 20-15 hours.

At Lahore a large party of workmen assembled on the workmen's train platform, but was too excited to get into the train. The train platform was eventually cleared by a party of North-Western Railway Rifles (I. D. F.) with fixed bayonets, but on arrival at Moghalpura the men did not go to work, and a large number returned to Lahore in the "empty" train. The majority of men in the Coach appeared willing to work but feared the strike-leaders and waited to see what would happen.

At Shakurpur where the strike started at midnight of 13th-14th, the Station Master and the Yard Master proceeded to Delhi, returned by 13-Up to Shakurpur with armoured police, re-opened the station and passed the train without the aid of strikers. The telegraph wires were cut, but telephones were working. At 15-30 hours the strikers resumed duty.

At Bahadurgarh there was an attempt to tamper with a bridge and the permanent-way at mile 383. The leader of this attempt is reported to have been the Station Master, a local head of the Arya Samaj.

The strike at Shakurpur spread to Delhi Kishengunj. The menial staff only struck, apparently for a very short time. The damage to the telegraph wires in this neighbourhood was done by the station staff, helped by certain Great Indian Peninsula Railway employees.

At Gujrat *hartal* started on this date.

Minor damages and destructions occurred between Bahadurgarh and Geora, at Okara, Hafizabad, Akalgarh and Mansurwali.

At Hafizabad also, a mob of 300 people threw stones at 35-Up, assaulted Captain Tatam and a small boy with him who were passengers in that train. Armoured train No. 3 proceeded in the early morning on this date to Wagha and helped armoured train No. 1 derailed there. It then patrolled the section, Amritsar—Lahore Cantonment East.

On this date restrictions on booking of Intermediate and 3rd class passengers were put into force.

At Chuharkana the Railway Sub-Divisional Officer returning to Lyallpur in the evening noticed excitement at Qila Sheikhpura and an uproarious crowd on the platform at Chuharkana. He saw the crowd at Chuharkana dispersed by heavy rain and so contented himself with reporting the incident to the Executive Engineer and ordering the Permanent-Way Inspector, Lyallpur, to patrol his section day and night.

During the night of the 14th-15th a mob began to attack Wazirabad. Signals towards Kathala were broken down. There were troops at this station which had come across country from Sialkot.

During the night troops were sent by a special train from Jhelum at the request of the District Officers, Rawalpindi, to protect Lala Musa and Gujrat where trouble was expected.

#### Tuesday, 15th April.

At Lahore Martial Law was declared. Further restrictions on the booking of passengers were ordered. The attendance of the Loco. Workshops was about 60 per cent.

Gujranwala was visited again by an aeroplane from Lahore. Repairs to the bridges were taken in hand. The station was occupied by armoured Indian and British Forces.

At Gujrat there was a disturbance and during the temporary absence of armed forces the station was somewhat damaged.

The mob at Wazirabad, encouraged by the inaction of the troops, did a good deal of damage in the station, removed the rails and burned the sleepers of a bridge near the station, then cut across country to the Sialkot line. They had stolen the tools from gang-huts to damage the line near Sialkot. They left these tools behind when they cut across country, and so did very little damage afterwards.

There was an extensive cutting of telegraph wires all over the Railway on this date.

Minor disturbances occurred at Kundian, Lala Musa, Qila Sheikhpura and Bahalike.

The train service was disorganized at Narwana, Dhamthan and Tohana by false reports and the lack of enterprise exhibited by a European Driver.

At Jakhal there was a strike of all the staff, except the Station Master, for a few hours. This strike was sympathetic, caused by the confusion at Narwana.

At Bahawalnagar there was an appeal to the strikers to resume duty in the morning. A meeting was held by them at 2 o'clock to consider it. At about 17 hours

Mr. V. H. BOALTS.

[Continued.]

troops arrived at Ferozepur by a special train under the command of Captain W. W. Maud of the Queen's Regiment. Considerable damage had been done to the station and railway property. Captain Maud took over charge from Captain Watson and gave the Loco. strikers an hour to resume duty. They gave in. He made the same offer to the Traffic running staff, who refused. Telegraphic communication was partly restored to Bhatinda at 19-40 hours. The first train that left the station since the strike began was 21-Up mixed at 22-41 starting to time. 30-Down delayed started at 23 hours. It was reported that the people of Bahawalnagar threatened to fire at any train leaving the station: Captain Maud took measures to prevent this and sent a letter by Captain Watson who left by the first train to the Political Agent, Bahawalpur State, complaining of the attitude of the State people. It is reported that during the day B. Banwari Lal, Overseer, and a Guard had taken a prominent part in preventing food being brought to Europeans; that they stopped servants coming from the Bazar and forcibly took away their purchases; and that they tried to persuade the Refreshment Room Manager from cooking food for Europeans.

At Ambala there was a short strike of the Traffic staff. The Sub-Divisional Officer had suggested to the Station Master that he might ask for Military signallers. He had refused to do so. At 7 hours in the morning rumours of the strike again reached the Sub-Divisional Officer who went to the station and questioned the Station Master. The Station Master, however, denied that there was any knowledge of a possible strike. At 8 o'clock the strike occurred, the reliefs did not come on duty, and all the strikers went to the Bazar. This strike lasted more or less till the evening when it was settled locally in a rather unsatisfactory manner.

At Sialkot after dark a 3rd class carriage was found to be burning in the station yard. This damage was certainly done by the crowd which arrived in 25-Up at 19-15 hours from the *Basakhi* festival at Wazirabad. This crowd was excited, swarming all over the outside of the train and the engine during the journey, and shouting "Mahatma Gandhi ki jai."

A similar train of people returning from the Wazirabad festival threatened trouble at Lala Musa, but the station staff there were armed.

The most serious event of the day was the destruction of Chuharkana station. The excited mob which had been seen by the Sub-Divisional Officer the evening before began to take action in the early morning of the 15th, forcibly took tools from a gang hut at Chuharkana and up rooted the line. The Sub-Way Inspector saw this done. He proceeded towards Lahore, met a troop special and returned with it to repair the line. The troop special proceeded over the repaired line through Chuharkana and onwards. The mob had temporarily dispersed rather late in the evening; they re-assembled at the station and found a train there. The Station Master was overpowered; the passengers were made to get out; the station building was fired with kerosene; an attempt was made to burn the train; the train was looted and damaged; the rails in a bridge approach were removed; the canal bridge timbers were burned; another bridge was burned and rails in its approach removed; the station cash safe was rifled; tickets and racks were destroyed and wires cut. Having done this damage the mob, late at night, moved off in the direction of Sangla Hill.

During this night a rail was removed at Kala, just north of Jhelum, and 19-Up passenger train was derailed. The intention was obviously to derail a down special troop train containing 20 motor lorries and much ammunition. This train would have been almost at the end of a long 1 in 100 grade down, but 19-Up passenger train fortunately entered the section first, and its speed was probably only about 15 miles an hour.

Wednesday, 16th April.

The mob from Chuharkana proceeded on its way towards Sangla Hill, missed Bahalike but burned and

looted Dhaban Singh and Moman stations. It fired the canal bridge about 2 miles beyond Dhaban Singh. Mr. DeSouza, Sub-Divisional Officer, saw this mob at Sangla Hill early in the morning: he returned to Lyallpur and reported to the Executive Engineer, who, with the District Traffic Superintendent, went to Sangla Hill with 30 troops. There was a collision with the mob in which Mr. Waite, L. T. M., was injured. The unexpected arrival of the 3-11th Gurkhas that evening prevented any further damage being done by this mob from Chuharkana.

No. 3 armoured train visited Chuharkana at 1-30 A.M. came into contact with the rioters, arrested a number of prisoners, repaired damages to permanent way, and patrolled towards Bahalike.

No. 1 armoured train arrived from Lahore a little later. The Officer Commanding sent for the headmen, Municipal Commissioners, arrested some met the Officer Commanding, armoured train No. 3, and took over his consignment of prisoners for Lahore.

At Kundian the strike, which was started the day before ended at 12 noon.

At Bahawalnagar the Traffic staff returned to work at 9 hours, but were turned away by Captain Maud as they would not give the names of the strikers who cut the wires. The Tahsildar also came to see Captain Maud at 9 hours. He promised a guard of responsible persons over the station by the afternoon. At 12-30 hours telegraphic communication to Samanata was restored. The Traffic staff, having given the names required from them, were allowed to resume duty. The Tahsildar's guard arrived at 16-40 hours. At about 18 hours the President, Council of Regency, arrived from Bahawalpur. At 18-30 hours Captain Maud left the station under Sergeant Linton and a mixed armed guard, taking with him to Ferozepur the women and children, and the prisoners.

There were six armoured trains on various sections on this date.

On the Rawalpindi District, Military guards were placed on all bridges and tunnels on the main line as far as the Indus, and an armoured train started the work of patrolling the District and rationing the armed guards. This train worked daily till the end of the riots.

Thursday, 17th April.

At Delhi, where no effective restrictions seem to have been imposed, pressure was brought on the staff to demand *atta* at a still cheaper rate. It had already been supplied below market rate.

At Lyallpur some baled *bhooosa* was burnt at 19-45 hours.

At Malakwal a train was wrecked by the removal of a pair of rails 1 mile to the east of the station, the engine and a loaded wagon of the passenger train overturned; 2 killed and 2 injured.

To Chuharkana a special train was sent to capture the rioters. A special train under Captain Flowerdew left Lahore at 11-42 hours, arrived Chuharkana at 13 hours the rioters were chased and fired on; the chase was kept up as far as Padawala and many rioters were arrested.

The Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil) was present. A party of 100 Gurkhas arrived from the Rawalpindi Division and the special train returned.

Telegraph wires were cut at a considerable number of places on this date.

At Moga the Station Master anticipated danger from the rioters. The General Officer Commanding, Ferozepur, wired the Station Master to tell the influential residents that he would send armoured cars if there were trouble. This threat had the desired effect.

Friday, 18th April.

By this time the large-scale organisation of the disturbances appeared absolutely to have broken down. Things were much quieter.

Mr. V. H. BOALTE.

[Continued.]

During the night 17th-18th Sidhwan station was burned, possibly by the Station Master himself; the station building was merely a sleeper hut.

At 8 o'clock in the morning crowds rushed through Kaithal station, damaged it, and there was a *hartal* in the city. A body of cavalry was despatched from Ambala and there seems to have been no further trouble.

At Karnal the troops were increased to 100 ranks. There were a few instances of telegraph wires being cut at various places.

At night obstructions were placed on the line between Ladhuka and Bahmniwala.

On this date the armoured trains were handed over to the Military.

*Saturday, 19th April.*

Beyond one or two cases of wire cutting no incident of importance occurred.

*Sunday, 20th April.*

No incident.

Telegraphic communication was improving rapidly as is evident from the receipt of telegraphic reports of disturbances which had occurred within the last few days.

*Monday, 21st April.*

There was one successful attempt to cut wires and one unsuccessful.

A request was received from the Jullundur Brigade for two armoured trains to work on the Hoshiarpur-Lohian Khas lines.

After this date there was no incident worth reporting and the disturbances may be said to have finished.

*Classes prominent in promoting disturbances.*

The only class of railway servants which can be singled out as especially involved is the Assistant Station Master and Signaller class, Traffic Department. Exceptions can be quoted, but it is generally correct to say that the labouring classes, skilled and unskilled, were either forced into the movement against their will, or resisted the agitators altogether.

It would be easy to supply the names of individual Railway servants who promoted disturbances, but these names do not easily arrange themselves into classes.

It should be especially noted that one Department of the railway was so far as can be seen, absolutely untouched by the disaffection, and took no part whatever in the outbreak—the Permanent-Way (Engineering) staff and men.

*Nature of movement.*

The movement was political in nature, not industrial or commercial: the North-Western Railway system was attacked generally as an important instrument of executive Government, and more especially as means of communication and transport of troops. Railway servants took part in the movement, but they were acting as disloyal citizens, not as disaffected railway servants.

There is no doubt that a general strike of the Railway staff had been planned and was attempted; but the agitation was external not internal. At one or two centres the railway strikers stated their grievances; the absurd character of their grievances is the best possible indication of the radical difference of these April disturbances from genuine labour troubles.

So far as the Railway has been concerned it has not appeared that the movement was anti-Christian; that it was anti-European is shown by the murders and attempted murders of isolated European passengers at Kasur and Hafizabad, and the attempt at Bahawalnagar to cut off supplies of food to the European staff, passenger and military guard. It is hardly necessary to advance the murder of Guard Robinson and the murderous assault on Mr. Bennett, the Station Superintendent, as proofs of the anti-European nature of the outbreak at Amritsar.

The effect of the disturbance was to paralyse the railway as a commercial system for the period 10th to (say) 21st April. As an instrument of Government administration and transport the railway was not paralysed: the outbreak, in that particular, signally failed.

On certain districts, Rawalpindi and Quetta, for instance, there was not much local disturbance; but owing to the trouble at the centre, Lahore, commercial traffic was impossible.

*Coaching Restrictions.*

THE train services were very much upset and trains were running considerably out of time to the telegraphic interruptions, but no general restrictions on booking were issued from the Traffic Manager's office till the 14th April. On this date it became obvious that we could not move passenger traffic offering over the disturbed area and restrictions were absolutely necessary and these had to be imposed. All bookings of inter and 3rd class passengers were suspended to and from stations, Ludhiana to Lala Musa. Similarly, bookings of these classes of passengers were also stopped from all Foreign Railways.

15th April.—On this date the District Traffic Superintendent, Bhatinda, stopped all coaching booking between Bhatinda and Samasatta owing to the troubles at Bahawalnagar. These restrictions were cancelled on the 16th April.

On the same date under Martial Law Ordinance No. 4, Station Masters, Lahore Cantonment, East and West, Badami Bagh and Lahore were ordered to stop booking of 3rd and inter class passengers from the morning of the 16th.

On the 16th April all Foreign Railways were wired to stop booking of inter and third class passenger traffic to this Railway.

On the same date District Traffic Superintendent, Rawalpindi, also issued orders stopping booking of all Indian 3rd, inter and 2nd class passengers in his district, after consultation I understand, with the Civil and Military authorities. The District Traffic Superintendent, Saharanpur, also stopped booking of parcels traffic *via* Ludhiana and Ambala upwards.

On 18th April all District Officers were ordered to stop booking of coaching traffic to stations on foreign lines and on the same date Foreign Railways were wired to stop coaching traffic to stations over the North-Western Railway. On this date all District Traffic Superintendents were ordered to stop booking of 3rd and inter class passenger traffic to and from stations between Lahore-Ferozepore, Lahore-Montgomery and Lahore-Shorkot Road *via* Chichoki and *via* Sangla Hill.

On 19th April bookings of all inter and 3rd class passengers from Amritsar, Gujranwala and Kasur were stopped under Martial Law Ordinance issued under Railway Restriction Order No. 1. Also District Traffic Superintendent, Kundian, at the request of the Officer Commanding, Troops, Malakwal, stopped booking on Kundian-Lala Musa Section of all 3rd, inter and 2nd class Indian passengers. All District Traffic Superintendents were also told to stop booking from and to Malakwal-Shorkot Road, Lala Musa-Kundian Section.

On the 20th April similar restrictions in booking of 3rd and inter class passengers on the Wazirabad-Sangla Section were enforced.

On 21st April booking of all coaching traffic including inter and 3rd class passengers was resumed to all Foreign Railways with the exception of the following sections:

- Lala Musa to Ludhiana (exclusive).
- Lahore to Ferozepore Cantonment.
- Lahore to Montgomery.
- Lahore to Shorkot Road *via* Chichoki Malian.
- Lahore to Shorkot Road *via* Sangla Hill and Lyallpur.
- Amritsar to Kasur *via* Patti.
- Malakwal to Shorkot Road.
- Lala Musa to Kundian.
- Wazirabad to Sangla Hill (inclusive).

Continued.]

Mr. V. H. BOALTE.

On 22nd April booking from Foreign Railways was resumed with the exception of booking to the above sections.

On 23rd April all restrictions from Foreign Railways were withdrawn and Railway Restriction Order No. 1 revised issued which show the position of restrictions on that date. On the same date Malakwal to Kundian and Malakwal to Sargodha was opened up and the section Ludhiana to Jullundur City was also opened up.

On 30th April coaching traffic was resumed on the Amritsar-Patti-Kasur Railway to Kasur, Tarn Taran, Patti, Waltoha and Amritsar.

On 5th May all restrictions in force were completely removed, except that passengers travelling by mail trains were subject to Military examination at certain examining stations.

Booking of all passengers from Gujranwala, Eminabad, Kamoke, Rahwali and Ghakkar was stopped from 5th May to 18th May under Martial Law, but booking was permitted to individuals on Military permits.

During these restrictions Military passengers, Government servants on duty and 1st and 2nd class passengers were not restricted, nor was urgent Military or Government parcels traffic interfered with. Necessaries of life, such as fresh vegetables, etc., were also booked and carried whenever possible except when particular restrictions were imposed by the Military authorities.

Railway Restriction Notices Nos. 5 and 6 clearly show the nature of the permits and the system on which passengers were allowed to book when restrictions were in force.

From the 6th May owing to the Afghan war all the train services from Lahore northwards over the Rawalpindi District were restricted to one passenger, one Mail and one Public Goods train, the rest of the accommodation being utilised by troop and military trains.

Restrictions on booking of all classes of passengers had to be imposed as notified under Special Notice No. 8. These restrictions remained in force more or less throughout the Afghan war, but as Military operations lessened greater latitude was allowed to the movement of non-Military passengers going northward.

Shortly after concentration started orders were received from the Commander-in-Chief that all Military traffic must have precedence over civil traffic going to the various fronts and this order necessitated closely restricting civil traffic.

Notices issued on the subject of the restrictions are appended.

V. H. BOALTE,

Traffic Manager, North-Western Railway.

*Special Notices of Restriction of Booking.*

(These, which were eight in number, have not been reproduced in printing. Their effect is summarized above.)

Annexure to statement of Mr. V. H. Boalte, Traffic Manager, North-Western Railway, prepared by Mr. E. Chisholm, Assistant Inspector-General, Railway Police and accepted by the Committee without oral evidence.

## SYNOPSIS.

A.—A chronological list of all the offences reported in the Punjab during the disturbances is submitted. The offences range from murder and arson to wire cutting and strikes.

B.—Restrictions on travelling were imposed by Martial Laws and a system of Martial Law permits was introduced. From April 22nd to May 3rd the Railway Police issued such passes to about 3,000 persons (1,800 permits). In addition to this the Traffic Manager considerably reduced the number of trains running between Lahore and Peshawar.

C.—On 19th April the Railway Police were asked to establish certain checking stations to supervise the traffic of suspicious persons in the Martial Law Area.

## RESTRICTIONS ON GOODS TRAFFIC.

NARRATION of events that occurred on the Railway during the time of the troubles has been stated in Agent's note. I give briefly a note on the restrictions in goods traffic which were in force during this time.

The train running at this period was very uncertain as telegraphic communication was frequently being interrupted and trains had to proceed with the greatest caution and there was much delay. In consequence there was a congestion of goods traffic at stations and junctions particularly coming off to the disturbed area.

On Monday, April 14th, District Traffic Superintendents were ordered to stop loading and booking of all goods traffic to and from the Lahore District in local and foreign booking. Foreign Railways were also asked to stop booking from their lines to and over the Lahore District area. Local and foreign bookings also stopped on the Bhatinda, Forekepore and Saharanpore Districts.

On this date District Traffic Superintendent, Bhatinda, had to suspend goods trains completely on the Bhatinda-Samasatta Section and this remained more or less closed up to the 18th April.

On Friday, 18th, all District Traffic Superintendents concerned were ordered to run one regular goods train over their districts during the hours of daylight to clear urgent goods traffic.

On Monday, the 21st, the number was increased to 2 goods trains and on this date we resumed booking from Delhi via the Southern Punjab Railway towards Samasatta.

From this date restrictions were gradually relaxed and on Thursday, the 24th, all District Traffic Superintendents and Foreign Railways were advised to resume goods bookings as were in force previous to the 14th April.

There were exceptions in regard to bookings to Amritsar, Gujranwala, Kasur and Bhagatwala and also the Amritsar, Patti-Kasur, line. Kasur was opened for all booking on 30th. Amritsar was completely reopened for all bookings on the 15th May, Bhagatwala on the 13th of May and the A. P. K. Railway was opened up on the 30th April. Gujranwala restrictions continued and remained on, due to the bad state of accommodation and the restriction owing to the Afghan war.

As soon as general restrictions were removed on the 24th or earlier unrestricted bookings of food-stuffs, kerosene oil, fuel, etc., were allowed to Amritsar, Gujranwala, Kasur, etc., and other restricted areas.

During all these restrictions booking of urgent Military traffic was kept open.

On the 8th of May all goods traffic about Lahore was restricted with the exception of food-stuffs, etc., owing to the Afghan war. These restrictions remained in force more or less during the war, but were gradually withdrawn as traffic permitted and the Military traffic got less.

V. H. BOALTE,

15th November 1919.

Traffic Manager, North-Western Railway.

On May 5th Administrator of Martial Law directed that inspection at checking stations should be held on in-coming trains only, and that inter and 3rd class passengers would have to alight at those stations. These posts were abolished with Martial Law in the Areas. Martial Law was still maintained on railway lines, but checking ceased with the general withdrawal of Martial Law.

D.—On 12th May 1919 orders were received to prevent certain gentlemen entering the Martial Law Area. As a result of this the Rev. Mr. Andrews was turned back at Amritsar.

E.—At the beginning of 1918. Railway employees agitated for an increase of pay. This was granted and for some time matters quieted down. The movement



Mr. V. H. BOALTH.

[Continued.]

was in no way political. In the first four months of 1919 the agitation was renewed and took a more aggressive form. Inflammatory notices were pasted and disturbances took place.

#### NOTE ON RESTRICTIONS ON RAILWAY TRAVELLING.

The restrictions on railway travelling imposed during the summer of 1919 were originally the outcome of the disturbances. They were subsequently renewed over an extended area as the result of the Afghan War and consequent mobilisation which created a military demand which the railways could not meet without a curtailment of civilian passenger traffic.

The restrictions necessitated by the disturbances were imposed under Martial Law Orders issued at an early stage of Martial Law administration. Regulation No. 8 in the Martial Law proclamations issued by the Divisional Commanders of the Lahore and Rawalpindi Divisions in its amended form merely laid down that where orders had issued regarding the control of travelling no person should enter or leave the Martial Law Area in contravention thereof. The actual imposition of restrictions was thus left to the Martial Law authorities in the various areas. For Lahore Civil Area and Amritsar District orders were issued prohibiting the issue of intermediate or third class tickets. In the Sialkot Brigade Area, comprising the districts of Gujrat, Gujranwala and Lyallpur, an order was issued requiring all travellers by rail, other than military employees travelling on warrant, Europeans, Anglo-Indians, servants accompanying them, and Government servants on duty to obtain a pass. In Kasur it would appear from Martial Law Order 15 that Regulation 8 in the Divisional Commander's Proclamation had been interpreted as requiring in itself that no person should travel without a pass and that no formal order issued locally. The general effect of the orders issued was to stop all unofficial travelling by intermediate and third class passengers to, from and within the areas under Martial Law except on permit. The permit system was in force throughout the Martial Law areas in the 16th Division and up to Gujrat and Lala Musa (see orders of 23rd April 1919 by Traffic Manager). The original justification for the restrictions thus imposed was the necessity of preventing communication between disaffected persons in the disturbed areas under Martial Law and agitators elsewhere. This argument in favour of restriction was, however, strongly re-inforced at an early stage by the necessity for effectually guarding against the cutting of telegraph wires by the side of railway lines. Government was authoritatively informed by Superintendent, Telegraphs, on 18th April that as long as unrestricted travelling by rail continued it would be impossible to stop this form of outrage, as bad characters were in the habit of alighting at wayside stations and slipping away in the dark to cut the line at some unguarded point.

Government was throughout anxious that the restrictions imposed should cause as little inconvenience as possible to the general public and an elaborate system for the grant of permits was worked out in conjunction with the Martial Law authorities, a system which imposed much additional labour on the civil administration. The rapid disappearance of disorder under the operation of Martial Law rendered it possible on May 5th to propose a general withdrawal of all the restrictions imposed, but it appears that the local Martial Law Administrators in some areas found themselves unable to give effect to the proposal. In all areas, however, the restrictions imposed under Martial Law automatically ceased on withdrawal thereof. Meanwhile on 22nd May the Punjab Government announced that the demands on railway accommodation for purposes of mobilisation had necessitated the stoppage of all booking of intermediate and third class non-military passengers to stations between Lahore and Peshawar. This action was not taken under Martial Law, or at the instance of the Punjab Government. It was an executive act dictated by military necessities, and having no connection with the disturbances. The part played by the Punjab

Government in regard to the stoppage of booking was confined to the inception of measures designed to prevent unnecessary hardship to the public resulting therefrom. On the order coming into force it was arranged that tickets for stations on the prohibited area should be issued to persons producing orders from Deputy Commissioners, Political Agents, Superintendents of Police and Military Commanding Officers, and more than one representation in the interests of the travelling public was brought to the notice of the Railway authorities. Government is advised that in practice travelling was restricted not so much by the necessity for obtaining an order, which was seldom refused, but by the difficulty experienced by 3rd class passengers in possession of orders in finding a place in over-crowded trains. In its extreme form, however, this difficulty arose only when mobilisation—and subsequently demobilisation—were in full swing.

On the 1st of September, the Punjab Government inquired from the Agent North-Western Railway, whether any modification in the restrictions was possible and received a reply in the negative. So far as Government is aware, they are still in force.

#### OFFENCES, ETC., ON THE RAILWAY.

1. *The 30th March 1919.*—A large mob invaded Delhi Station, broke glasses of various Railway Offices on the station and beat some members of the Railway Police and Station Staff.

2. *The 6th April 1919.*—Station Master, Palwal, reported that a first class passenger, Captain Hog, by 16-Up Express had stated that a revolver was fired at his carriage on 6th April 1919 between Assauti and Palwal. Since reported to be a cracker thrown by a sling.

3. *The 10th April 1919.*—A large and rowdy mob at Amritsar Station set fire to the Goods Shed, smashed the Cabin Point Lever and killed one European Guard, Mr. Robinson.

4. *The 10th April 1919.*—The mob looted and burnt Bhagtanwala Station; furniture, tickets, books and other property was looted and burnt.

5. *The 11th April 1919.*—A large mob looted and burnt Kasur Station, damaged wires, killed two Europeans, injured one European and made efforts to release a prisoner from the custody of a Police Constable.

6. *The 12th April 1919.*—Station Patti was attacked, Goods Office doors were broken, both level crossing gates, four points discs, two point locks and other things taken away. Telegraph wire between Posts Nos. 227-7 and 236-13 between Patti and Gharyala connection, one outer signal burner and wire seriously damaged.

7. *The 12th April 1919.*—Station Master, Nur Mahal, reported that the telegraph wire had been cut at Telegraph Post No. 4, Railway mile No. 13, towards Nakodar.

8. *The 12th April 1919.*—Station Master, Khem Karan reported that the station was attacked by a mob and Government property destroyed.

9. *The 13th April 1919.*—Station Superintendent, Amritsar, wired that about 2-30 on 13th April 1919 at mile No. 310-5, between Chheharta and Khasa one rail length complete with sleepers removed from both up and down lines. Engine and 8 vehicles of 3-Up Special Goods derailed. Both lines blocked. Station Master, Khasa, accident wire reported train badly looted.

10. *The 13th April 1919.*—Telegraph wires beyond Barara Station at mile 133-22 were found cut on 13th April 1919.

11. *The 13th April 1919.*—District Traffic Superintendent, Karachi, wired from Raewind that a stone was thrown at Refreshment Car 7-Up Mail on 13th April 1919 at Kot Radha Kishen facing points when going out from the platform; window of Car broken, passenger slightly injured on head.

12. *The 13th April 1919.*—Lahore. Guard train of No. 48 reports wires cut and posts uprooted at mile 27 between Harbanspura and Jallo.

13. *The 13th April 1919.*—Amritsar. Derailed wagon No. 2151 and robbed contents at Chheharta.

Continued.]

Mr. V. H. BOALTE.

14. *The 13th April 1919.*—Amritsar. Crowd set fire to Canal bridge at mile 290-19 near Amritsar.

15. *The 14th April 1919.*—Station Master, Gujranwala, wired that all wires beyond Gujranwala were cut on 14th April 1919 and trains wrecked; Station Bridge set on fire, Driver, Guard and Fireman mobbed and beaten and train was being robbed. Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police wired that two Railway bridges on both sides of the Station burnt by mob.

16. *The 14th April 1919.*—Wagah Station was burnt on 14th April 1919.

17. *The 14th April 1919.*—Sub-Divisional Officer, Delhi, wired that rails and Parnala Bridge, mile No. 385, between Bahadurgarh and Gheora dismantled, have since been repaired.

18. *The 14th April 1919.*—Sub-Divisional Officer, IV wired that the telegraph wires at mile 397-8 between Delhi, Kishengunj and Shakurpore had been cut.

19. *The 14th April 1919.*—Some 300 men threw stones at the 35-Up at Hafizabad and broke several windows. Case reported by Lieutenant Tatam of Grass Farm, Lyallpur, 1st class passenger in train.

20. *The 14th April 1919.*—Sub-Inspector, Lala Musa, wired that an attempt to burn the ticket almirah had been made at Jhelum at 20 hours on 14th April 1919.

21. *The 14th April 1919.*—Sub-Divisional Officer, S. S. Bishen Singh, reported that the Armoured Train had been derailed at Wagah in the early hours of 14th April 1919.

22. *The 14th April 1919.*—Sub-Inspector, Bahawalnagar, wired that Telegraph wires were interrupted and that the whole railway staff, Loco Engineering and Traffic struck work at 10-30 on 14th April 1919.

23. *The 14th April 1919.*—Montgomery. Wire cut at mile 674-23 and 24.

24. *The 14th April 1919.*—Railway employees put a trolley on the line at Bahawalnagar to stop train No. 29. The train was stopped.

25. *The 14th April 1919.*—Wire cut near Chheru, Police Station, Jullundur.

26. *The 14th April 1919.*—Railway employees stole a trolley and placed it on the line at Bahawalnagar.

27. *The 15th April 1919.*—Permanent Way Inspector, Okara, wired that two loose shackles of carriage couplings had been placed on the line at mile 676-24.

28. *The 15th April 1919.*—Traffic Inspector, Qilla Sheikhupura, from Chichoki Mallian, wired that the wires of telegraph posts 19-5, 6, 7, and 8 between Chichoki Mallian and Qilla Sheikhupura were cut on the night of the 14-15th, and an outer signal of Up side of Qilla Sheikhupura damaged slightly.

29. *The 15th April 1919.*—Sub-Way Inspector and Railway Police wired from Chuharkana that outer signal wires and glasses were broken on 15th April 1919, Canal Bridge at mile No. 30-1 set on fire, line between Bahalike and Chuharkana dismantled to Telegraph Posts. Station Master of Chuharkana wired that telegraph wires were cut off and station looted and burnt. Head Constable, Chuharkana, wired that parcels from 17-Up mixed looted, carriage and engine damaged, Station Master seriously injured.

30. *The 15th April 1919.*—Railway Police, Lyallpur, wired that line was damaged between Qila Sheikhupura and Bahalike on 15th April 1919.

31. *The 15th April 1919.*—Sub-Inspector, Telegraph, reported to District Traffic Superintendent, that wires between Jantipur, Batala, Chhina, Sohal, Dhariwal and Dinanagar had been cut. A military party, which patrolled in a light engine up to Gurdaspur, subsequently reported that the wires were found damaged.

32. *The 15th April 1919.*—Station Master, Pattoki and Railway Police, Montgomery, wired that wires between Changa, Manga, and Pattoke at mile 708-11 and 12 were cut on 15th April 1919, and that heavy pieces of wood were placed on the line.

33. *The 15th April 1919.*—Station Master, Kot Radha Kishan, wired that he had been informed that three telegraph wires and one copper wire were cut at mile No. 730 post 4 between Raewind and Kot Radha Kishan on 15th April 1919.

34. *The 15th April 1919.*—Station Master, Sangla Hill, wired that about 4 hours on 15th April 1919, dacoits suddenly came from Bahalike side and burnt and looted everything at the Moman Station. Telegraph instruments, signal and lamps burnt and broken.

35. *The 15th April 1919.*—Station House Officer, Railway Police, Jind, wired that on 15th April 1919 telegraph wires were cut between Rohtak and Samargopalpur, mile No. 367.

36. *The 15th April 1919.*—Railway Police, Wazirabad, reported that a riot had taken place at Gujarat on 15th April 1919. The rioters first broke the clock in the Station Master's office and cut the telegraph wires. They then broke all the station lamps, windows on the platform and afterwards set fire to all articles in the 1st and 2nd class booking offices.

37. *The 15th April 1919.*—Sub-Inspector, Akalgarh, informed Sub-Inspector, Railway Police, Wazirabad, that on the night of 14th-15th April 1919 the telegraph wires between Wazirabad and Akalgarh had been cut at various places.

38. *The 15th April 1919.*—Montgomery. Stones thrown at Mail Train No. 8-Down near Kot Radha Kishan. Two shots fired from train.

39. *The 15th April 1919.*—Lyallpur. Crowd puts stones on line and broke glasses of signals and cut wires.

40. *The 15th April 1919.*—Wires cut by rioters between Wazirabad and Sodhra at mile 1-3 and 13. Distant signals thrown down. Bridge at Nizamabad burnt.

41. *The 15th April 1919.*—Crowd detraining from train No. 25 at Sialkot raised cries of "Mahatma Gandhi ki jai" and burnt a 3rd class carriage.

42. *The 15th April 1919.*—Wires cut between Sodoke and Muridki.

43. *The 16th April 1919.*—Railway Police, Sangrur, reported that the telegraph had been imperfect since 21 hours on 15th April 1919 between Barnala and Hadaya.

44. *The 16th April 1919.*—Station Master, Nhandar, wired that station was robbed by thieves on 16th April 1919. Heavy losses.

45. *The 16th April 1919.*—Sub-Inspector, Jaitu, reported that 4 insulators at mile 78-4 were broken on 16th April 1919.

46. *The 16th April 1919.*—Railway Police, Sialkot, informed that between miles 24-16 and 17 two joints of railway lines were opened by rioters on 16th April 1919. One plate and 3 bolts of one joint and 2 bolts of 2nd one have been taken away. At mile 23-14 and 15 telegraphic wires cut near Sialkot.

47. *The 16th April 1919.*—Railway Police, Jaranwala, wired that Dhaban Singh Station was looted and burnt on 16th April 1919.

48. *The 16th April 1919.*—Sub-Inspector, Railway Police, Jhelum, reported that the engine of 19-Up, with three carriages was overturned on 16th April 1919. The accident was due to one rail having been uprooted at mile 442-5 between Kala and Dina Stations.

49. *The 16th April 1919.*—Montgomery. Wires cut at mile 870-4.

50. *The 16th April 1919.*—Montgomery. Wires cut at mile 803.

51. *The 16th April 1919.*—Wires cut between mile 249 and 252 near Tarn Taran.

52. *The 17th April 1919.*—The Railway Police, Lyallpur, reported that a telegraph post near mile 106-4 between Lyallpur and Gatti had been cut.

53. *The 17th April 1919.*—Railway Police, Daud Khel, wired that all wires between Maasan and Daud Khel had been cut.

54. *The 17th April 1919.*—Railway Police, Jullundur City, wired that the wire between Nakodar and Shankar had been cut at mile 18-2.

55. *The 17th April 1919.*—Railway Police, Malakwal, wired that 34-Down mixed train worked by couple engines was wrecked between Harriah and Malakwal near canal bridge on 17th April 1919. Both engines derailed. Front brake and a 3rd class bogie smashed.

Mr. V. H. BOALTH.

[Continued.]

Accident due to removal of one set of rails with sleepers from track. Telegraph wires cut and communication interrupted between Harriah, Malakwal and Lala Musa. One Fireman and passenger killed. One Gurkha Sepoy injured.

56. *The 17th April 1919.*—Station Master, Lyallpur, wired that 4 stacks baled *bhusa* belonging to Military Grass Farm caught fire on 17th April 1919. Cause unknown.

57. *The 17th April 1919.*—About 15 men at Railway Station Chak Jhumra delivered seditious speeches.

58. *The 18th April 1919.*—Government Railway Police, Kaithal, wired that a crowd of about 100 boys and men rushed on to the platform at 8 hours on 18th April 1919, but did no damage. Again at 8-30 hours another group came and broke street lamps and window glasses. *Hartal* in City.

59. *The 18th April 1919.*—Sub-Inspector, Railway Police, Bhatinda, wired that telegraph wire had been cut between Roman and Shergarh at mile 170-14-15.

60. *The 18th April 1919.*—Station House Officer, Jullundur, wired that an armed group of men plundered Railway Station, Sidhwan, on 18th April 1919.

61. *The 18th April 1919.*—Sub-Divisional Officer at Amritsar reports that wire of outer signal at Bilga was cut on 18th April 1919.

62. *The 18th April 1919.*—Sub-Inspector, Railway Police, Bhatinda, wired that an attempt was made to cut wire at Telegraph Posts 219-18 between Katarsinghwal and Bhatinda on 21st April 1919.

63. *The 18th April 1919.*—Jullundur. A mile plate and a description board broken.

64. *The 18th April 1919.*—Lala Musa. Officer Commanding, Railway Station, reported that one Hira Singh was in possession of seditious literature. Hira Singh arrested, as he could give no satisfactory answers.

65. *The 18th April 1919.*—Ferozepore. At mile 50-10 a telegraph post was placed across the line and bolts were also removed at mile 50-10. Gates at mile 49-16 removed.

66. *The 19th April 1919.*—Station Master, Toba Tek Singh, wired that telegraph wire cut by dacoits at mile 61-1 and between Toba Tek Singh and Janiwala on the night of 18-19th April 1919 and communication interrupted.

67. *The 19th April 1919.*—A stack of reeds set fire to at Sargodha Station.

68. *The 21st April 1919.*—Sub-Inspector, Railway Police, Jullundur, wired that a telegraph wire was cut between Dasuya and Tanda Umar on the night of 20-21st April 1919.

69. *The 1st May 1919.*—Sub-Divisional Officer, Multan, wired that one telegraph wire had been cut at mile 141-21 on 1st May 1919, between MacLeod Gunj and Minchinabad and a mile piece of the post length is missing.

#### B.—RAILWAY PERMITS.

*Railway permits.*—On April 15th<sup>f</sup> 1919, Martial Law Notice No. 4 prohibited the issue of 3rd or Inter Class Tickets at all stations in the Lahore Civil Command, except in the case of servants travelling with their European masters or servants or others in the employ of Government.

On April 22nd, 1919, the following Martial Law Notice was issued:—"Notice is hereby given that permits to obtain 3rd and Inter Class Railway tickets at the stations in this area, viz., Lahore Junction and Badami Bagh, can only be obtained on personal application to the Assistant Inspector-General, Railway Police, near Lahore Junction Station or at Command Head-Quarters, Punjab Club, between 10-00 and 17-00 daily."

\* Between April 22nd and May 3rd (inclusive) 1,800 passes were issued by the Assistant Inspector-General.

The urgency of the application was decided by the Assistant Inspector-General. There was no real difficulty in obtaining passes. Passengers with through tickets, who broke journey at Lahore because there were no night trains running, did not require permits to proceed. On April 30th the Officer Commanding, Lahore (Civil) Area, decided that people leaving Lahore for a few days might be given passes to their destination and back. From May 5th Martial Law permits were abolished.

*Traffic Travelling Restrictions.*—On May 12th, owing to the reduction on train service on the Section Lahore to Peshwar, the booking of Inter\* and 3rd class passengers from stations on the North Western Railway to all stations on the Section Lahore to Peshawar and *via* that Section (Lahore exclusive) was stopped by the Traffic Manager.

The restriction did not apply to—

- (a) Government servants on duty.
- (b) Military and sepoy returning from furlough.
- (c) Servants (limited to two) of 1st and 2nd class passengers.

The restriction also did not apply to booking from Lahore to stations in the Lyallpur District and *vice versa* in through trains *via* Shahdara only.

*Complaints.*—After the abolition of the permit system on May 5th complaints were received of its re-introduction, but such complaints were generally false and, where true, were due to the Railway authorities demanding permits for the issue of 3rd and Inter class tickets for Mail Trains. On May 15th the Traffic Manager stopped this practice. No truth was found in complaints that sepoy and students were being harassed and prevented from travelling. The only real trouble experienced by the public was the restriction of the train service, and in this respect British and Indians suffered alike.

#### C.—CHECKING STATIONS.

On April 19th, 1919, Military orders were received verbally through the Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, that persons holding Inter and 3rd class tickets were forbidden to enter by rail the districts of Lahore and Amritsar. The following exceptions were made:—

- (a) Servants of European passengers.
- (b) Rank and File of the Indian Army holding warrants.
- (c) Government servants travelling on duty and in possession of written authority.

All passengers not coming within these exceptions were ordered to be detained and not allowed to proceed.

Orders were issued that tickets should be checked, but not that persons should be searched.

Checking stations were established by the Assistant Inspector-General, Railway Police, at Kaiser-i-Hind, Montgomery and Jullundur under the supervision of European Sergeants. A checking station was also formed at Beas by the Superintendent of Police, Amritsar, under Military orders. After the issue of these orders instructions were issued later on April 19th that they were only to be enforced against suspicious characters,—*vide* W. A. 195 Ordinance. The checking posts were accordingly notified at once. On April 19th the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, directed that suspects should be detained and orders applied for under Defence of India Act, Rule 3. On April 20th the Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, informed that Assistant Inspector-General Railway Police, that 1st and 2nd class Indian passengers should be detained if suspicious.

No suspects were ever detected by the Police at any of the checking stations. No complaints about searches were ever made by the public with the solitary exception of a complaint by the President, *Ahmadiyya-Anjuman-Ishaat-Islam*, on 10th May to the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, that some ladies related to him had been searched at Amritsar and Beas. An enquiry held by Sirdar Bishan Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police,

*Concluded.]*

Mr. V. H. BOALTE.

posted at Amritsar, showed that the report was ill-founded, and that the ladies' baggage only and not their persons had been searched.

On April 24th and 26th checking posts were established at Lala Musa and Wazirabad, respectively, by the Assistant Inspector-General, Railway Police, under the supervision of European Sergeants, on the request of the Military authorities, and orders were issued to the posts to detain suspicious characters and produce them before the military.

From May 5th Colonel Money, Administrator, Martial Law, 16th (Indian) Division, directed that inspections at checking posts should be held on in-coming mail trains only, and that Inter and 3rd class passengers would have to alight at those places and undergo inspection. The same date an order was issued by Colonel Money that a strict watch should be kept at Lala Musa for Frontier Emissaries of the Maulvi, Haji and Talib-ul-Ilm type. Khan Bahadur Abdul Hakim, Deputy Superintendent of Police, was put in charge of this work and engaged 3 informers. No complaints of oppression by the Police were received, and no further inspection orders were issued. The checking posts were abolished with Martial Law.

#### D.—PERSONS DEBARRED FROM ENTERING THE MARTIAL LAW AREA.

Under orders from the Military authorities communicated through the Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, on 12th May 1919, Mr. Eardley Norton, Mr. C. F. Andrews, Mr. Langford James, L. N. Roy and Saiyad-ul-Hassan (editor of the *Independent*) were prohibited from entering the Martial Law Area. If seen trying to enter that area by train, they were to be asked to turn back, and if they refused, they were to be produced before the Military authorities. On 16th May 1919, similar orders were passed concerning Moti Lal Nehru, Walter Gregory and C. R. Dass.

On May 14th, a proclamation was issued by Major-General C. M. Dobell, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding the 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division, that legal practitioners, whose ordinary place of business was outside the Punjab, would not be allowed to enter the Martial Law Area included in the limits of the 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division without the permission of the Administrator of Martial Law.

No trouble ever took place between the Police, and the persons debarred from entering the Martial Law Area. Mr. Andrews, on one occasion, managed to get as far as Amritsar where he was detected and asked not to continue his journey. He returned to Delhi directly the Martial Law orders were read out to him.

#### E.—RAILWAY EMPLOYEES.

Meetings of employees of various Railway Departments were held in February and March 1918 to propose an increase of pay through their superior officers. They represented that everything was dear and demanded an increase of pay. They also urged shorter working hours, as they said that they had to work longer than before without any increase of wages. They sent memorials which were favourably considered, and which ended the whole affair. There was no fear of a strike, and there was no political motive behind the meetings which were purely economical in origin.

The North Western Railway employees, however, as a result of their success in 1918, began another similar campaign in January, February, March and April 1919. This started on the evening of 14th January 1919, when notices were found in the train carrying Railway workmen to the shops. The Loco and Carriage and Wagon workmen consulted and started a nominal strike. The Loco men, however, thinking that the Carriage and Wagon had deserted them, threw stones at them, which caused slight injuries to some of the European staff. To satisfy

the Loco men that they were on their side the Carriage and Wagon workmen in the evening looted a few neighbouring shops.

This time the Railway employees asked for cheap grain to be supplied to them as well as an increase of pay. Considering the high prices cheap grain shops were opened by the Railway, and adequate steps were taken to meet the grievances of the men who had sent memorials to the Governor-General and Local Government and Railway authorities. Copies of some of these are attached.

#### *Translation of a notice posted by the Workshop men in carriages on 14th January 1919.*

*Second Notice.*—Brothers of the Loco and Carriage Departments, listen! There is a great famine, the rate of flour is nearly 4 seers per rupee and cloth and other things are dear. What can the poor man do? You people should arrange. It was given us to understand that from 1st January 1919 every man would be given one anna increase, but the English do not keep their word. You people must arrange. If the English were our true Rulers, they should have taken care of their subjects, but they are not worthy to rule over us. You people must attack them, and thus we shall receive an increment. They do not give an increase to anyone. From the time this bastard King has succeeded to the throne the subjects have been in trouble. It would have been better had the Empress been on the throne, for the world would have received better comfort. We should be repaid to by the 20th January 1919 or we will give great trouble to you, as those who are greatly troubled are obliged to fight. The English say that they treat us kindly, but if they do not, God knows what will happen.

#### *Translation of a vernacular notice posted by workmen on 15th January 1919.*

My dearly beloved brethren, Sikh and Muhammadan, you should unite together, as the rate of flour has risen considerably and you should also take steps to secure increments.

#### *Hundred curses on Carriage men.*

It is desired to strike work on 16th January 1919 at 12 hours and the oath of the cow is given to sikhs and that of the pig to Muhammadans if they go into the Carriage works at 12 hours on that day. He will be a bastard who goes into the workshops.

#### *Translation of a vernacular notice posted by workmen on 15th January 1919.*

You have done a very bad thing in that you looted the poor shopkeeper and did not touch the other fellow named Nathu. This is not an act of good men but of bastards.

Both Hindus and Muhammadans are ordered to loot the other shopkeeper, Nathu, by 11.20 in the morning. If this is not done, you will be considered scoundrels. All are ordered to loot Nathu, shopkeeper; he who does not do so will be a bastard.

This shopkeeper (Nathu) supplied different stuff to Babus and Mistris to that supplied to workmen. How is it that he was not looted?

You are again hereby directed that Nathu, shopkeeper, must be looted.

#### *Translation of a notice posted by workshop men in the carriage on 14th January 1919.*

I beg to state before every gentlemen that there is a great famine in these days. All the creation of God is dying from hunger; the rate of flour is 5 seers per rupee and Dal is 2 seers per rupee. If officers of the workshop do not remedy this, we all should go to Government House before His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab.

The Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Mian FAZL-I-HUSSAIN.

The Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Mian FAZL-I-HUSSAIN, M.A., Bar-at-Law, Member, Punjab Legislative Council.

Herewith notes of the points on which I can give evidence if required to do so:—

#### I. POSITION AND STATUS IN LIFE.

I am a Barrister of 18 years standing, President of the High Court Bar Association, Member of the Punjab Legislative Council (representing the Punjab University), a Fellow and a Syndicate of the Punjab University, Secretary of the Law Faculty and the Law College Committee, Secretary Provincial Muslim League, Member, Congress Committee, etc., etc., I am a member of an agricultural tribe, and a land owner.

#### II.—CAUSES OF THE DISTURBANCES.

##### 1. Remote and in common with other parts of India—

- (a) Ferment in Political thought due to the principles enunciated by Messrs. Wilson and Lloyd George.
- (b) Economic Conditions.
- (c) War and War strain.

##### 2. Remote and peculiar to the Punjab.

- (a) *Special war strain.*—Recruitment and war loans and charities; and circumstances attending upon these were such as to undermine the faith of the people in British India. Conscription and war taxation would have been less irksome and less harmful than the so-called voluntary recruitment and voluntary contributions;
- (b) attitude of the Local Government towards the Reforms Scheme, Political movements in general, the Press and the Indian Leaders. Then again, the people felt that Local Government had renounced British principles and ideals, and was for repression and abuse of the Defence of India Act after the Russian methods;
- (c) the educated classes were being put back, and by means of Jagirs and grants of lands a Rais class was being created to counterpoise the influence of the educated class.

##### 3. Immediate causes.

- (a) Rowlatt Bill legislation and all the agitation which attended upon it;
- (b) Local Government's policy of repression further strengthened to meet this agitation;
- (c) Amritsar deportations;
- (d) Gandhi's exclusion from the Punjab and from Delhi. This again demonstrated to the people that the authorities had no regard for law and justice, and were unnecessarily excluding respected and revered leaders, on pretexts which failed to convince the people;

4. The disorders in the Punjab were not the results of any conspiracy. At Amritsar, deportations caused excitement, and the mob instead of being tactfully soothed, were fired upon, again showing disregard for British principles of dealing with crowds and mobs. This act of lawlessness and tactlessness rendered the ignorant mob wild, and then the mob committed acts of violence. Exaggerated reports and rumours about Amritsar affairs spread to Kasur and caused excitement which the ignorant were not capable of controlling.

In Lahore also there was great excitement but as the people were not quite ignorant, they were able to control themselves and committed no deeds of violence, and were fired upon. Again exaggerated reports and rumours spread to Gujranwala and other places and caused disturbances there.

In each case one mistake led to another and the situation got worse.

#### III.—WAS THERE ANY NEED FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF MARTIAL LAW ?

(a) *Amritsar.*—On the 11th and 12th the Police and the Military were in full control of the city, and on the 13th in an un-British way the people were fired upon. On the 14th everything there had settled down. There was no occasion to introduce Martial Law on the 14th.

(b) *Lahore.*—There was no justification for it. On the 14th everything was quiet, and European ladies were walking and cycling about as usual, yet on the 15th Martial Law was introduced. Continuance of *Hartal* was due to successive mistakes of the authorities, and the unpopularity of the Head of the Province.

(c) The same holds true of other places.

#### Why Martial Law introduced ?

1. Martial Law appears to have been introduced not to suppress revolt, rebellion or even disorders, but to punish the political workers suspected of having directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously contributed towards the creation of an atmosphere which was favourable to disturbances. In almost every case Martial Law was introduced after the restoration of order.
2. To minimise the unwarranted and ruthless slaughter at the Jullianwala Bagh and to justify it subsequently.

#### IV.—WAS THERE ANY JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUING THE MARTIAL LAW DURING THE WHOLE OF APRIL AND ALSO DURING MAY AND JUNE ?

None whatsoever.

#### V.—ADMINISTRATION OF MARTIAL LAW.

This again was calculated not to restore peace and order, but "to strike the imagination of the Indians," to humiliate and disgrace them *e. g.* :—

1. *Night Passes.*—Required on the basis of nationality. An Indian Judge of the High Court, an Additional Secretary to the Punjab Government and pro-Government men like Mr. Shafi and Sir Zulfikar Ali all required Night Passes.

2. *Passes for Travelling.*—As a rule issued only on the recommendation of a non-Indian, an Indian could get a pass if recommended by his Anglo-Indian Chauffeur or Butler, but not on his own representation. Mr. Shafi (now member of the Executive Council of the Viceroy) and Sir Zulfikar Ali and Mr. Shah Nawaz can support this allegation.

3. Martial Law Regulations made to punish those who had been taking leading part in Political movements *e.g.*, placarding the gate posts and walls of the residences of such men. This distinction was conferred on me also though on account of my absence from Lahore, no fault could otherwise be found with me. The explanation that the posters and placards is incorrect, as in one small lane no less than three houses were selected, while there were many lanes where no posters were put up.

4. Members of the Legal profession were subjected to greater annoyances and indignities than others.

5. Students were subjected to great indignities and humiliation, in some Colleges parades were called four times a day in the hot sun, and the Military arrangements for roll call under the shadow of bayonets and Machine guns were obviously made to humiliate them and touch their imaginations rather than secure peace and good order.

6. Incidents as to compulsory *salaaming* by respectable people have occurred in Lahore (Mr. Shah Nawaz, B.A., L.L.B., Bar-at-law, Lahore, can give instances) and Mr. Bashir Ahmad, B.A. (Punjab and Oxon), Barrister-at-Law, son of the late Mr. Justice Shah Din and son-in-Law of the Hon'ble Mian Mohammad Shafi was one of the victims.

VI. *Police.*—In Lahore, the higher C. I. D. officials are not known to have done anything improper, though the police in general and others personating as police officials appear to have made great harvest.

In Amritsar, it is said, vast sums were collected by the Police as bribes.

VII. It was the news of the application of Martial Law in Lahore and Amritsar and other places that gave false alarm to other places and possibly to Afghanistan, and thus helped in bringing about Afghan War.

The Hon'ble Bahadur Khan Bahadur Mian FAEZ-I-HUSSAIN—concluded—MR. H. K. TREVASKIS—MR. R. C. BOLSTER.

VIII.—EFFECT OF THE INTRODUCTION OF MARTIAL LAW AND ITS CONTINUANCE FOR MORE THAN TWO MONTHS, AND ITS ADMINISTRATION.

1. Faith of the people in British Justice and Rule of law has been undermined. It has whitewashed Ahmad Shahs and Nadar Shahs whom in our school days taught to dread as inhuman tyrants.

The very foundations on which the British Empire in India is based have been shaken and in consequence the cause of peace and good order cannot be said to have been served.

2. Coming as it has done within a year of the end of the World War, it has shown that the authorities in India responsible for it have yet to be converted to the doctrine that Right is Might.

Mr. H. K. TREVASKIS, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon.

The circumstances of the Gurgaon District are exceptional, for, while the district is so very quiet, it is very close to the disturbed area of Delhi. Though the Delhi propaganda failed in its intentions, and found Gurgaon an unsatisfactory breeding ground, the latter district was not entirely without predisposing causes of unrest, which primarily affected the Municipal Areas and only secondarily and through them the villages.

Investigation has conclusively proved that the unrest in Gurgaon was almost entirely originated from Delhi. Pressure was exercised by the Delhi *Banias* on local

*Banias* to start *hartal* by refusing *Awadia*, threatening to break off marriage and other connections, and other forms of pressure, commercial and otherwise, which rich men can exercise over poor clients.

The *zamindars* of this district are in the hands of the *Banias* to an extent which can hardly be believed and the *Banias* here put pressure on the *zamindars* to join in demonstrations in favour of *hartal*.

Apart from commercial pressure, a number of emissaries were sent from Delhi to stir up the people.

Mr. R. C. BOLSTER, Deputy Commissioner, Rohtak.

I.—PREDISPOSING CAUSES OF THE UNREST.

A. Political.

The main predisposing cause was undoubtedly the doctrines of the Arya Samaj working upon the political ambition of the Jats, who are the dominant community in the District. Those officers who have been absent from the District in recent years would probably find it hard to realize how active and how avid of power the Jats have become. In past years it was perhaps the fashion to regard a Jat as a simple bucolic person with few ideas beyond husbandry and very slightly amenable to religious influences. With the advent of the Arya Samaj, some quarter of a century ago, and the extension of education all this has changed. The Arya Samaj has had a complete success among Jats (though there are of course some who still adhere to the tenets of the Sanatan Dharam), the reason being that it admits a claim of the Jat to be Rajput and thereby uplifts him in the social scale. The Jat is intensely clannish by nature and, however, prone to faction (Khap) within his own community, is always ready to make common cause against another race or creed. It is thus easy to see what an accretion of strength the conversion of Jats on a large scale has meant to the Arya Samaj and how suitable Arya doctrines of Swaraj are to the Jat appetite for political power.

Among every sect and race there are young hot-bloods reared on modern education who are impatiently awaiting the advent of the Political millenium. These restless spirits cherish a very vivid sense of their rights without keeping before them a corresponding view of their obligations. The *Satyagraha—Hartal* movement was pre-eminently a young man's movement.

The Indian National Congress has recently been very active. Last year was the first occasion on which converts in any numbers was made from the rural population.

The trading and business classes, though they cannot have failed to profit from the War, still cherish resentment against the Land Alienation and Co-operative Society Acts and dislike adequate taxation in the form of the Income and Excess Profits Taxes.

It is possible that after over four years of War the District and Provincial Administration had become too closely fashioned to the immediate needs of the War and took too little account of other contingencies and dangers. It is certainly a fact that the District Intelligence System proved singularly inadequate to the needs of the unrest, little or no information reaching the

authorities in time to enable them to deal with particular situations.

The international situation and the permeation of the world by Bolshevist doctrines is also not to be forgotten.

B. Economic.

The prominent predisposing economic cause was certainly the effect of the War in raising prices. The trading classes seized the opportunity for profiteering and acquired an added sense of their political power. People on small fixed incomes, and particularly petty Government servants, felt the pinch and began to swell the discontented classes.

The very high mortality from Influenza at the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919 shook and weakened the social structure, depriving many families of their bread-winners and many others of the moderate counsels of the older men.

As to the classes which were chiefly affected these certainly were the persons on small fixed incomes above referred to rather than the essentially agricultural and urban classes, both of whom profited by high prices while the former reaped the advantage of military pay and pensions.

The methods used to exploit existing discontent, other than the now classic ones of *Satyagraha* and *hartal*, were numerous. Newspapers like the "Vijaya" and "Congress" were widely circulated and eagerly read. The leaders of the movement at Delhi at the end of March and beginning of April started a well thought-out system of propaganda in adjoining districts; special emissaries like Maulvi Bashir Ahmad of Delhi and Pandit Tota Ram of Aligarh appeared in the Rohtak District; mass meetings were held and inflammatory speeches were made. A very successful oral "Publicity" scheme was started, the object of which was to circulate lying rumours of a kind most damaging to Government and the fact that it was exclusively oral made it most difficult to combat. The trading classes in centres of sedition brought financial pressure, such as the dishonouring of bills, to bear on persons and places which stood out against the movement. Finally, there was the Hindu-Muhammadan rapprochement, with its ban on cow-killing and its insistence on commensality and the ability of the two religions, if united, to settle their differences without the assistance of Government. While both religions were united in opposition to the Rowlatt Act the cordiality of the Muhammadan support given to the Hindu was certainly promoted by the desire of the pan-

Mr R. C. BOLSTER.

[Continued.]

Islamists for Hindu aid when the time should come to work up an agitation about the woes of Turkey.

Delhi became the centre of attraction for the rural population, and especially the Jats, of the Rohtak District, who in large numbers used a convenient train service to spend the day in Delhi and feed upon the local excitement there, with accounts of which they returned to regale those who had stayed behind in Rohtak, the evening gatherings in Rohtak Mandi, after the arrival of the evening train from Delhi being for long a special feature of an anxious period.

About the campaign of misrepresentation against the Rowlatt Act a great deal need not be said. It will be sufficient to note its essentially artificial nature; Indian politicians who were lawyers by profession, ended by saying that after study, they had convinced themselves that the Act was not as dangerous as they had first supposed; yet these were the men who had had every opportunity in both Imperial and Provincial Legislative Councils of informing themselves at every stage of the development of the Act and it is remarkable that their conversion dates from the time the folly and wickedness of their opposition had been proved by the actual result of rioting and disorder. The opposition to the Rowlatt Act was of course a means to an end and not an end in itself, and one of its most prominent features was the fact that the movement was so strong and so far-reaching that no single private person in the Rohtak District was able to stand out against it.

## II.—CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.

**3rd April.**—Deputy Superintendent, Police, who had been sent to tour on the Delhi border, reported that a big meeting had been held at Delhi, the object of which was to arrange visits by emissaries from Delhi to work up the *hartal* in all adjoining districts.

**5th April.**—Meeting held at Bahadurgarh; lecture by Pandit Tota Ram of Aligarh.

**6th April.**—*Rohtak.*—*Hartal* held during day, followed by a meeting in the evening. Refusal to make a bier and dig a grave for the Reverend Carlyon, who had died that morning.

*Bahadurgarh.*—Meeting in evening with address by Pandit Tota Ram of Aligarh.

*Sonepat.*—*Hartal* during day, followed by public meeting in City Mandi.

**11th April.**—*Rohtak.*—Mass meeting at Gaukaran Tank, at which sale of proscribed literature was advocated. Formation of a Joint Hindu and Muhammadan Committee.

*Bahadurgarh.*—*Hartal* held.

*Jhajjar.*—*Hartal* held.

**12th April.**—*Hartal* held at Bari after pressure from Delhi.

**14th April.**—*Rohtak.*—Offer of enrolment as Special Constables made by Deputy Commissioner to members of Joint Hindu and Muhammadan Committee and refused by them. Hon'ble Chaudhri Lal Chand confesses his inability either to get any residents of Rohtak to join him in a loyal manifesto or to issue one over his own name only.

*Bahadurgarh.*—Attempt by a joint mob of rioters from the Mandi and Railway Staff to damage a Railway Bridge and wreck a Mail train.

**15th April.**—*Rohtak.*—Seditious notice found posted on Delhi Gate Railway Telegraph wires cut at mile 357. Arrival of Troops.

*Sonepat.*—Mass meeting held at *Imambara*.

*Ganaur.*—Meeting of Kasisas, held under threat of injury from Hindus to stop cow-killing.

*Gohana.*—Postal telegraph wire damaged.

**16th April.**—*Rohtak.*—Lying story circulated about rape of a weaver woman by soldiers.

**17th April.**—*Rohtak.*—Leaders of Joint Hindu and Muhammadan Committee summoned and warned by Deputy Commissioner.

**18th April.**—*Sonepat.*—Mass meeting fixed for this day abandoned owing to action taken to warn leaders.

**20th April.**—Canal wire cut near Jat High School, Rohtak.

**24th April.**—Signs of resistance to *Thikri Pahra* shown by Arya villages.

**27th April.**—*Bahadurgarh.*—Mass meeting fixed for this day abandoned, owing to action taken to warn leaders.

**28th April.**—*Rohtak.*—Arrest under Defence of India Rules of Tek Ram Jat, a man of violent character and a likely leader of a Jat mob.

### *Measures for protection of life and property.*

*Thikri Pahra* under Punjab Act No. VIII of 1918 was introduced at the middle of April for the protection of the permanent-way and telegraphs of all Railways, of Postal-telegraph wires and of the Canal telegraph wire and is still in force.

A special scheme for guarding Railway Bridges was also introduced (not under Punjab Act No. VIII of 1918) for all the three Railways in the District; this was withdrawn in the case of the East Indian Railway on the 9th current.

The Canal wire was cut near the Jat High School on the 20th April; I gave the School the chance (since the case could not be proved against them) of showing their loyalty by guarding the wire for a distance of a mile on either side of the school.

It would be out of place here to detail those measures which were taken in accordance with the accepted principles of internal security schemes; I mention, however, the following which were of a rather special nature, viz. :—

- (i) preparation by Deputy Commissioner in consultation with a Military Officer of Local Defence Schemes for Tahsils, it having been found that few Tahsildars, or Thanedars had thought out what ought to be done in case of attack on a Tahsil;
- (ii) A sixteen-seater motor bus was obtained temporarily to ensure the mobility of the Troops at Rohtak and to enable the Deputy Commissioner to proceed promptly to the scene of any local disturbance.

The Armoured Train got together by the General Officer Commanding, Delhi Brigade, was, by permission of that officer, obtained and used for a journey to Bahadurgarh, where its appearance probably had a salutary effect. By arrangement with the same officer an aeroplane visited as a demonstration on the 22nd April Rohtak, Sampla, Bahadurgarh, Sonepat and Ganaur.

Most of the local pleaders were implicated in the *Satyagraha*—*Hartal* movement, though to varying extent.

A Canal telegraph wire was cut near the Jat High School. There was no actual proof that the students or staff were responsible, but there remained a very strong suspicion to that effect. Otherwise schoolboys took no known part in the disturbances.

Traders were especially prominent at the three places in the District at which there are *mandis*, viz., Rohtak, Sonepat and Bahadurgarh. In the mob that attempted to wreck the Bahadurgarh Railway bridge traders formed the very large majority. There are a close corporation and have their own leaders and their own representatives on Municipal Committees. A Vaish sectarian High School has lately been started in Rohtak. The traders of the larger centres, and particularly those of places on the Delhi border, exerted pressure on their caste fellows in other places.

Among Government servants the only known offenders were the Railway Staff at Bahadurgarh Station and one School Master. The District Inspector of Schools has been asked to keep his eyes open in future, as a number of school masters have been mentioned to me as men of doubtful loyalty.

In the little actual open disorder that occurred the rural population held aloof, but the statement requires some further qualification, thus, there are three main elements, viz. Jats, Muhammadan Rajputs and Gaur

Mr. R. C. BOLSTER—concluded—Mr. R. B. WHITEHEAD

Brahmans. Out of these no blame can be laid at the door of Gaur Brahmans and Ranghars (Muhammadan Rajputs), but it would not, I think, have taken much more to make the Jats ready to go in. A leading Jat (and not an Arya) once said to me "If anyone could lead us astray, it would be a Jat like ourselves," and the neo-Jats are all Aryas and they have no lack of Jat leaders.

### III.—NATURE OF THE MOVEMENT, HOW FAR DISLOYAL, ANTI-EUROPEAN OR ANTI-CHRISTIAN.

I have remarked above that the movement had all the above three elements. Native Christians resident in and near Gohana and Sonapat were very much alarmed and thought they were on the brink of another Mutiny. Throughout the *hartal* of the 6th at Rohtak, there was strong opposition to the idea of allowing the last duties to be paid to the body of the Reverend Mr. Carlyon, an aged Missionary, who was in the course of 25 years' self-denying ministrations in Rohtak had never offended the religious sentiment of any Indian community by an undue zeal in proselytizing. The cry of the mob, mostly composed of traders from the *mandi*, that made the attempt on the Bahadurgarh Railway bridge was "Break up the bridge; the rule of the English has disappeared." The meeting held on the 11th at Rohtak had the openly revolutionary object of selling proscribed literature in

accordance with Gandhi's recent campaign, and it was the point at which Hindu and Muhammadan unity took its start.

The attempt to wreck No. 4 Down Mail at Bahadurgarh appears to have been made because that train was known to be carrying a company of European wireless men from Karachi.

### IV.—METHODS ADOPTED BY RIBBIS AND DISTURBERS OF THE PEACE.

*Organisation of strikes.*—This method was most in evidence at Bahadurgarh, the station nearest to Delhi, though efforts were made on Sonapat. Here the principle that disorder breeds disorder was very much in evidence, for the rioters used a story that Shakurpur Station had been looted and the Station and Yard-Masters injured as an inducement to people at Bahadurgarh to break out. A private wire urging all Railway employes to strike appears to have been circulated on the 13th April, the day before the attempt was made on the bridge near Bahadurgarh.

*Attacks on communications.*—Of these there were, as already stated, four in the District, though only the one at Bahadurgarh was really serious in character. It is noticeable that a single plan seems to have inspired many of these attacks: thus the train wrecking mob at Bahadurgarh was preceded, as in the Gumanpura (Amritsar) case, by Railway gangmen.

Mr. R. B. WHITEHEAD, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Ambala.

Apparently the 30th March 1919 was first fixed by Mr. Gandhi for the *hartal* and the date seems to have been changed at the last moment to the 6th April. The leading pleaders in Ambala City were in touch with Delhi and Lahore and meetings were held on the 2nd and 3rd April at which it was decided to hold a *hartal* in Ambala City on the 6th April. Leaders in the public eye were Lalas Tara Chand and Nand Kishore (Arya Samaj) and Muhammad Hanif, Pleaders, but others were in the background. However the intellectuals do not appear to have much influence in Ambala City and on the 5th April the impression gained ground that the *hartal* fixed for the next day would be a fiasco as the citizens of influential old established families were holding aloof. Many shops opened on the morning of the 6th April but the *hartal* managers displayed much energy in getting shops to close and in organising a procession. Money-lenders and *sarrafis* identified themselves conspicuously with the *hartal* party. Some Muhammadan shops closed but many influential and respectable Muhammadans were unaffected. By midday possibly more than half the shops closed, but the demonstration was very lifeless and shops opened again in the afternoon. A meeting of protest against the Rowlatt Act was held on the evening of April 6th.

Nothing further happened till the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest arrived on the 11th April.

The first thing that happened during my brief but eventful reign was the receipt of a cypher wire on the evening of the 11th April informing me of the serious disturbances in Amritsar and Lahore. In Ambala City the *hartal* party tried to close shops without success and held a meeting on the evening of 11th April.

On the afternoon of April 12th I called an informal meeting of some 14 or 15 influential representatives of the Bar, the Municipality and the City, and put the matter to them as plainly and reasonably as I could. Representatives of the Bar included Lalas Tara Chand and Nand Kishore. The tone of the meeting was quite good and each individual member promised his aid in the maintenance of confidence and tranquility. I am glad to say that the members have played up and there has been no further organised attempt in Ambala City since the 11th April to disturb the peace.

On the 13th April there was a complete *hartal* in Ambala Cantonment Sadar Bazar which is said to have been

chiefly due to threats of boycott by the wholesalers of Delhi and Lahore. Apparently the latter have not got the same hold on Ambala City. At any rate when the Superintendent of Police and I rode through the City that morning, business was going on just as usual. Railway running was quite disorganised on that and the next day or two. That afternoon a large public meeting was held in Ambala Cantonment Sadar Bazar at which one or two very objectionable resolutions were passed. Just about this time telegraph wires were cut on the North Western Railway near Barara Station. This has been the only instance of wire cutting in this District.

Prompt action was taken by the General Officer Commanding, Ambala Cantonments, and military guards were posted in the civil station at the Police Lines and also at the Treasury by written orders of the 13th April.

The publicity campaign may be said to have started from the middle of April and I did my best to see that pamphlets and papers were sent to people who would not only read them but also explain the contents to others.

The main lines of both the North Western and East Indian Railways traverse parts of the District and a complete village patrol system was organised on the 15th April and following days. Special arrangements were made after consultation with the railway authorities, the military and the Commissioner for the protection of important railway bridges.

About the middle of April a delegation of Delhi butchers came and endeavoured to stop cow-killing in Ambala City without success. Just about this time too an emissary of the Swami Sharddhanand arrived but received so cold a reception that he left again by the next train.

At the end of April the tone of the City was so good that I obtained permission for the annual *Panah Mela* to be held as usual. It lasted three days and was attended by thousands of people, but no untoward incidents were reported beyond the posting up of three or four inflammatory appeals which were at once torn down when discovered. A month later similar posters were again found one morning. On each occasion they were only three or four in number, were written in an unformed hand on inferior foolscap paper and consisted of the crudest anti-British propaganda. They were torn down as soon as discovered in one or two cases by the people themselves.



Mr. R. B. WHITEHEAD—concluded—Mr. L. L. TOMKINS.

On the 20th to 23rd April there were one or two cases of undoubted incendiarism in the Pioneer Lines at Ambala Cantonment.

There can be no doubt that seditious emissaries have visited various parts of the district but nothing came of their efforts. I deprecate overconfidence but think that if anything was or is going on underground I should have had at least an inkling of it. I have now been in the district nearly five years and have personally visited every village in four of the five Tahsils, so people are not backward in visiting me.

One or two reasons why the recent movement made so little an impression here can at once be set down. First of all the District is essentially rural. The so-called Ambala City though the largest town after Ambala Cantonment only contains 26,000 inhabitants; Jagadhri

comes next with 11,000. Then the peasants of the three southern Tahsils are poor spirited and backward—for an expression of opinion see Mr. Kensington's Ambala Tahsil Assessment Report, paragraph 11. The Rupar Sub-Division is more efficient and progressive, but the District takes little or no interest in politics and modern problems of the day. Ambala is quite a different world from the Central Punjab. The people are leaderless, they still dislike and distrust the Jagirdars who are the only prominent figureheads. The Jagirdars themselves with a few honourable exceptions are sunk in a life of indolence and self-indulgence and have no influence.

The Arya Samajists have seized upon the *Satyagraha* movement as a means of embarrassing Government, but it happens that the leaders of that community in Ambala City are moderate men.

Mr. L. L. TOMKINS, C.I.E., Deputy Inspector-General of Police.

1. The duty assigned to me was—

- (a) to secure the conviction of the promoters and leaders in the disturbances, and
- (b) to explore the organization underlying the disturbances.

In order not to dislocate the existing organization of the Criminal Investigation Department, it was agreed that I should conduct the enquiries in conjunction with Mr. Cocks, Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, and utilize the staff of that department as it stood, instead of constituting a separate and impromptu bureau for the special purpose of the investigation. This arrangement worked smoothly and time was saved by avoiding a preparatory organization. In order to facilitate the enquiries, the disturbed area was divided into three sections as follows:—

- (a) Amritsar and country south of Lahore, including Kasur and Khem Karn, etc.,
- (b) Lahore headquarters, and
- (c) Gujranwala and places north of Lahore.

The staff of the Criminal Investigation Department was then similarly divided into three equal sections. To (a) were deputed Mr. Howell, Superintendent of Police, Criminal Branch, and Sardar Bahadur Sukha Singh, Deputy Superintendent, with one-third of the staff of Inspectors, Sub-inspectors and subordinates of the Criminal Investigation Department. To (b) were deputed Mr. Bowring, Superintendent of Police, Political Branch, and Khan Sahib Abdul Aziz, Deputy Superintendent, with a similar staff and to (c) was detailed M. Ikram-ul-Haq, Deputy Superintendent, with a similar staff. Mr. Isamonger was originally selected to be in charge of section (c) but his services were required elsewhere almost immediately.

Instructions were issued at the same time to the Superintendents of Police of the districts concerned, informing them of the arrangements made and requesting them to assist the Criminal Investigation Department officers by deputing specially selected local officers to co-operate in the enquiries. This arrangement worked well throughout and the co-operation by the local police with the officers of the Criminal Investigation Department, was all that could be desired.

2. In the meantime, two Special Commissions, consisting of three Judges each, were constituted by Government to try cases sent by me to the Legal Remembrancer, as Convening Officer, and by him to these Courts for trial. With the assistance of the Inspector-General of Police each of these courts was provided with a specially selected Court Inspector and Court Sub-Inspector, while clerks and orderlies were obtained from the Superintendent of Police, Lahore. Later on, as the work increased, a third court and then a fourth court was created and court staffs similarly provided for them also. The following are the officers selected for duty at these special Courts:—

These officers performed their duties satisfactorily throughout and the work of the courts proceeded smoothly with their assistance.

3. Having thus briefly outlined the broad organization of the police employed in dealing with the cases, I will now touch on the cases themselves, the manner of dealing with them, and the organization underlying the disturbances. In the first instance, in order to relieve the congested state of the lock-ups and at the same time to enable the courts to start work, orders were issued for all cases, in which evidence was readily available to be completed and sent in for trial without delay; cases requiring further investigation were to be sent in later as they were completed. Instructions were issued at the same time explaining the new procedure to be adopted and the method of preparing the precis of evidence. Each case with its precis of evidence was to be accompanied to the office of the Criminal Investigation Department, by an officer of police, who had taken part in the investigation and by the accused persons. The presence of the investigating officer proved in practice to be very necessary for, owing to the brevity of the precis of evidence, both the Convening Officer and I required much more information than it afforded before either I could pass the cases as fit for trial by a Commission, or the Convening Officer could frame the charges and convene the courts to try them. Viewing the cases, as a whole, and the preparation of them in accordance with a procedure unfamiliar to the police, I was much impressed by the high standard of intelligence shown by our officers and the apparent ease with which they were able to adapt themselves to the unusual circumstances arising out of the disturbances. I was also very favourably impressed by the keen, loyal and cheerful spirit shown by all the officers who came before me and whom I invariably subjected to a close examination, not only in regard to the particular case under review, but also in regard to the organization behind it. In only three instances had I to return cases for radical defects or omission in procedure to be rectified but, throughout the investigation, officers constantly came to consult me regarding procedure or to obtain advice on the best course to follow in view of the facts of cases.

4. One of the chief difficulties encountered in dealing with these cases lay in their magnitude, and in placing them before the courts in a form that would not lead to confusion of the masses of detail. It was speedily apparent that the trials, although termed Summary General Court-Martial, would be very thoroughly conducted by the Tribunals and that the case exercised by the Judges would be no wit less than in the ordinary courts of law. It, therefore, became necessary to reduce each case to the simplest possible form and to split up, as far as possible, the continuous excesses of riotous mobs into isolated acts of violence. In some of the more important cases, as in Lahore and Amritsar, where specific acts of violence were attributed to distinct sets of individuals, this was not difficult to accomplish, but there were other cases, as at Gujranwala, Wagah, Kasur and elsewhere where it was merely sought to prove that the accused were members of unlawful assemblies which had perpetrated deeds of violence. In these it was very

Mr. L. L. TOMKINS—concluded.—The Hon'ble Mr. C. A. H. TOWNSEND.

difficult to reduce the dimensions of the cases to any extent and, as the evidence consisted mainly identification on the one side and *alibis* on the other, they were never very satisfactory either from the point of view of the police or the courts. When the work of the courts increased, such cases of rioting, where no serious overt act was committed, were returned for trial by Summary Court-Martial before the local officers of the areas, it being considered that two years' rigorous imprisonment was sufficient punishment for the unimportant men and youths who figured as the accused.

5. The most important of the cases sent for trial were the three main cases from Lahore, Amritsar and Gujran-

wala, respectively. The local police and the officers of the Criminal Investigation Department very rightly concentrated their special attention on these three cases against the instigators and leaders of the disturbances. The evidence against the accused in these cases was of varied nature, presenting in this respect a welcome diversion from the inevitable stream of identification witnesses in the other cases. They were all well worked out and great credit is due to the investigating officers who worked night and day for many weeks. At the advice of the Convening Officer, the number of the accused in the Amritsar Case was cut down considerably before it was put in court, the smaller men being otherwise dealt with.

The Hon'ble Mr. C. A. H. TOWNSEND, I.C.S., Director of Civil Supplies in the Punjab.

Cheap grain and salt shops can be disposed of in a few words. The former was started in most of the larger Municipalities of the Province at various times during the last four years, whenever a Municipal Committee thought it proper to do so, on account of the rising price of grain. In some these shops are still being continued; in many municipalities, however, they have been closed. Many municipalities received help in financing them from the Imperial Relief Fund. They were nothing new; such shops have frequently been started before in the Province, in previous eras of high prices.

Cheap salt shops were started in most municipalities of the Province, with the help of Government, which gave them certain facilities in the way of getting their salt early from Khewra, in the autumn and winter of 1916, when the bazar price of salt went very high. They were undoubtedly of great benefit to the poorer classes. They have generally been continued up to the present, but are now being generally discontinued by order of the Government of India.

I do not think that the institution of these two kinds of cheap shops caused any real discontent to the trading classes, which were, generally speaking, making lots of money in other directions. Their institution was also in accordance with Oriental traditions.

Trade has been hampered in the last four years by restrictions on railway bookings by goods train. Up till October 1918 these restrictions were imposed by the Railway authorities themselves, partly on account of the press of Military traffic, partly on account of the ever-increasing shortage of rolling stock, on account of the war. But such restrictions were no new thing in the province; at no time in the last 12 years, since the development of the Canal Colonies, and the construction of many branch lines of rail all over the Province, has the North-Western Railway had as many wagons as it really needed to cope with the traffic in the busier seasons of the year. But during the war these restrictions were certainly severer than they had been before, and gradually increased. Thus during the winter and spring of 1917-18, it was almost impossible to move any of our important and valuable cotton crop to the Bombay and Ahmedabad Mills, which were crying out for it. The Punjab Government wrote frequently on this matter to the Railway Board, representing the loss thus caused to the trade of the province, and, partly at any rate as a result of our outcries, the appointment of Directors of Civil Supply was made in all provinces of India in May 1918. I think the appointment of these officers has been of use to trade generally. To give only one case, we got the cotton crop moved by rail this year much quicker than in the year before. The Punjab Government never imposed any restrictions whatever on the movement by rail of anything but foodgrains and fodder (of them I speak later). Indeed, it did all in its power to facilitate the movements of all articles not food grains or fodder.

As regards fodder, the general failure of the monsoon all through India in 1918, and the large demands by the Military Department, rendered the appointment of a special officer, the Fodder Controller, necessary, who

co-ordinated the Military and Civil demands, and distributed them over districts which have spare fodder. But the only restriction he imposed on the movement of fodder by rail was that its export from the Punjab, save on military account, by rail, was prohibited. He also seized, under Ordinance 9 of 1914, a few hundred tons of fodder, where the owners were charging exorbitant prices, not for military needs, but for the needy districts of the province. The price given by him was below what the owners asked, but much above the ordinary price. This fodder was seized not in towns, but generally from village owners. The total amount seized, nearly all in the Lyallpur District, was very small compared with the amount that changed hands in the ordinary way.

As regards food grains. The position as regards them was rendered very acute by the failure of the monsoon of 1918, the worst failure for India as a whole, that has occurred for 47 years. It was necessary to conserve the spare food supplies of this, as of other provinces, and to ensure that they went to those parts of India where they were really needed. Further, it was necessary to see that the best use possible was made of the railway wagons available. Accordingly, in October 1918, it was ordered that no grain should leave this province (except on military account) for other provinces unless on certificates issued, under the orders of the Government of India, by the Director of Civil Supplies of the importing province, and countersigned by me, as Director of Civil Supplies of the exporting province. Prior to October 1918 no restrictions at all on the movement of foodgrains existed. On movements of foodgrains inside the Province the restrictions imposed were, with one exception, trifling. Since last February, when the position was becoming daily more acute, with rising prices, no grain was allowed to leave the more important towns of the province—Lahore, Amritsar, Ambala, Rawalpindi, Sialkot, Multan and Ludhiana—save on certificates given by me. This was done in order to prevent the sudden export of large quantities of grain from these towns, and depletion of stocks in consequence, with the possibility of food-riots. Nor was grain allowed to be moved, save on certificates, to Punjab stations within about 50 miles of the borders of the United Provinces and Delhi Province; this was to prevent large amounts of grain passing into those provinces by road. I have said above that there was one exception to the general trifling character of these restrictions. For three weeks in February last, when the position as regards foodgrains was very acute, and also, more particularly, when wheat was being acquired under Ordinance 9 of 1914 in various parts of the Province, it was considered advisable to prohibit the movement of foodgrains by rail at all inside the province, save on certificates. This was really done in order to make these acquisition proceedings at any rate less ineffective than would have been otherwise the case. This restriction was, however, never meant to be otherwise than temporary, and was removed in three weeks. No other restrictions on the movements by rail of foodgrains, other than these, have been imposed, and many of them, particularly on movements inside the

The Hon'ble Mr. C. A. H. TOWNSEND.

[Continued.]

province, have been removed during the past months, as thought advisable. The guiding principle that lead to their imposition, especially within the province, was the wish that prices should be kept at as low a level as reasonably possible.

I have dis-cussed with more than one Indian gentleman interested in trade the effect these various restrictions have had in adding to the discontent felt by the trading classes with Government. All have agreed in replying they have had practically no effect in that direction. Restrictions on goods bookings are, as already said, nothing new in this province. Many traders appreciated the help Government was giving them, e.g., in getting their cotton moved. The position last winter as regards goods bookings in the province was certainly easier than in the winter of 1917-18. Certificates for the movements of foodgrains have always been freely given, when really necessary. And the richer members of the trading classes were generally making so much money in the last few years, whether as Army contractors, suppliers of grain to other provinces, or as profiteers, pure and simple, that they did not attach as much weight as they might perhaps otherwise have done, to these various restrictions, just enumerated, that were imposed on trade movements.

There remains for mention the important matter of acquisition of wheat, under Ordinance 9 of 1914, during the winter of 1918-19. It is necessary to say a little as explanation as to why these acquisition proceedings were instituted. The failure of the monsoon of 1918 has been already emphasized. As a result of it, all foodgrains, but especially wheat and gram, rose greatly in price in this province between May and September 1918. On May 15th, the price of wheat at Lahore was Rs. 4-1-6 per maund; of gram, Rs. 3-1-3. On September 15th the corresponding figures were Rs. 5-8-3 and Rs. 4-5-3. Similar rises were reported from all over the province. And they were nearly all due to the activities of speculators, who started buying up grain all over the province, in the hopes of a large demand from other parts of India later. It was imperatively necessary to do something to stop these speculative activities; otherwise grain might at one have gone to most dangerous heights. Various lines of action were considered, and eventually it was decided to make use, though on a limited scale, of Ordinance 9 of 1914, which was designed to meet emergencies such as this. Accordingly in November 1914 the Deputy Commissioners of the three important wheat districts of Lyallpur, Amritsar and Ferozepore, were instructed by Government to each take up under that Ordinance 100 tons of wheat, at such price as they thought reasonable. They did so, at an average price of Rs. 5-4-0 per maund; the market price was then about one rupee higher.\* The wheat acquired was made over to cheap grain shops for the use of the poor; the wheat seized in the rich town of Lyallpur, which had no cheap shops, was sent to Lahore, for those shops. The effect of these acquisitions, which were strictly limited in amount, was, on the whole, favourable. Though prices did not go down, their upward tendency was for the time being stopped, and Ralli Brothers who were purchasing wheat for the Army, found much more grain coming into the market after them than before.

But the effect on prices was only momentary, and they continued on their upward tendency. So the Food-stuffs Commissioner, Mr. Gubbay, after discussing the case with the Punjab Government advised us to acquire under the Ordinance considerably larger amounts of wheat, at lower than the prevailing price, in order to affect the general price of wheat in a downward direction. As the military department were purchasing considerable quantities of wheat in the province for the requirements of the Indian Army, it was decided to make the wheat so acquired over to that department. I would emphasise the fact that the saving of money to Government in this transaction had no effect whatever in inducing us to embark on it; this saving was an entirely incidental result of it. It was decided on entirely and only with the hope that the general price of wheat in the province

might be thereby affected in a downward direction. A certain amount of the wheat acquired, however, was made available for cheap grain shops. In this matter Deputy Commissioners, who did the actual acquisition were given a free hand, and were at liberty to acquire as much as they wished for cheap grain shops.

The amounts acquired were as follows; practically all in the months of February and March 1919—

In district.	For military needs. Tons.	For cheap shops. Tons.
Ferozepore . . . . .	2,932	37
Lyallpur . . . . .	4,075	..
Rawalpindi . . . . .	..	106
Muzaffargarh . . . . .	..	903
Ludhiana . . . . .	804	..
Amritsar . . . . .	1,500	500
Dera Ghazi Khan . . . . .	..	55
Shahpur . . . . .	881	..
Rohtak . . . . .	700	..
Karnal . . . . .	660	..
Montgomery . . . . .	751	124
Jhang . . . . .	228	6
Lahore . . . . .	1,050	..
Multan . . . . .	1,270	39
TOTAL . . . . .	14,849	1,770

GRAND TOTAL . 16,619 tons.

The heading "Lahore" above is slightly misleading. As a matter of fact, no grain whatever was acquired in Lahore City itself; what was acquired in that district was acquired in the markets of Pattoke and Kasur. The price at which the wheat was acquired varied from district to district, according to the circumstances of each. It varied between Rs. 5 and Rs. 5-8-0 per maund. The market price was between Rs. 6-6-0 and Rs. 6-10-0. The principle on which it was given was that noted in the margin\* substituting February for November. Appeals were filed, under the provisions of the Ordinance, against the price at which acquisitions were made in respect of about 5,000 tons of the wheat acquired. As a result, about 8 annas per maund more were generally given by the appellate tribunals, which, however, also generally found that the acquisitions were justified, so rampant was speculation in wheat. In a few cases, where the wheat had been acquired not from speculators, but from persons who genuinely required it for their own consumption, they were awarded the full amount they had paid for it.

It may at once be said that the desired effect of these acquisitions, that of bringing down the general price of wheat, was not attained. Many reasons contributed to this. The principal one was that during the whole time they were made the demand for wheat from the Punjab by other provinces of India was exceedingly keen, and purchasers from these provinces did not really mind how much they paid for wheat, so long as they got it. When a dealer from, say, Bombay was giving up to Rs. 6-8-0 per maund in Lyallpur, it will be understood that acquisitions by Government at Rs. 5 per mensem had practically no effect on the ordinary price of wheat.

Speaking from memory, I think that the Deputy Commissioner of Lyallpur was the only District officer who specifically, in his report on the late disturbances, mentions these wheat acquisitions as being one of the causes of the discontent of the trading classes with our administration. More wheat was acquired in that one district than in any other. There is no doubt but that the acquisitions were very unpopular with the trading classes. But I am of opinion that the recent troubles would certainly have occurred even if no acquisitions had been made: though they certainly added, especially in the districts where made, to the trading classes' dis-

\* The figure they adopted represented the market price at harvest time, the preceding May plus the usual difference between that price and that prevailing in November as a rule.

---

*Concluded.]*

The Hon'ble Mr. C. A. H. TOWNSEND.

---

content with Government. Considerable quantities of grain were acquired in the Ferozepore, Ludhiana, Shahpur and Montgomery districts. None, or only slight, disorders occurred in those districts. On the other hand, Lahore City and Gujranwala District gave much trouble. No grain was acquired in them.

The total amount of wheat acquired in the province, less than 17,000 tons, was small, whether compared with the total provincial outturn of wheat in the spring of 1918, which was well over three million tons, or with the total amount of wheat the province exported in the financial year 1918-19, 620,000 tons. Very large profits were made by dealers on the greater part of the latter amount.

Indian gentlemen have, however, told me that these acquisitions were generally misunderstood in the province, especially as they were unsuccessful in their object of bringing down the price of grain generally. Agitators told the ignorant mob that Government was merely getting its grain cheap. The poorer classes also resented the continued export of grain from this province to other provinces of India, not realising that their inhabitants might have starved if they had not got it, that the Punjab Government was fully alive to the needs of their own province, and was ever pressing its views in this

matter on the Government of India, which, however, overruled it in this matter, and ordered the export of grain from this province to continue.

A certain amount of discontent was also felt among the poorer classes in the fact that no Australian wheat, which came to India in fairly large quantities last spring was imported by Government into the Punjab. Agitators made full use of this handle. It was not realised that had this Australian wheat not come, the Punjab would probably have been called upon to export even more wheat to the provinces to which it went, than was actually the case.

I have been impressed by the fact that practically all Indian gentlemen with whom I have discussed the matter attribute a great deal of the discontent the trading classes undoubtedly feel with Government to the recent tightening up of the income-tax administration, and, to some extent, to its uneven administration between district and district. This, however, is a matter of which I have no personal knowledge. Some of my friends have said that this discontent owes its origin to the passing of the Alienation of Land Act, nearly 20 years ago.

*The 23rd October 1919.*

## PART IV

# Martial Law Notices and Instructions issued in the Gujranwala, Gujrat and Lyallpur Districts.

### WAZIRABAD AREA (GUJRANWALA DISTRICT).

WHEREAS the Government of India has for good reasons proclaimed Martial Law in the district of Gujranwala and WHEREAS I am appointed to command the troops and administer the said Martial Law in that portion of the said district known as ( ) I make known to the inhabitants of ( ):

1. That I am so appointed to enforce Law and Order and to guard the public safety.

2. That loyal and law-abiding persons have nothing to fear from the exercise of the aforesaid Martial Law.

3. That certain restrictions have been placed on the inhabitants of Gujranwala, Wazirabad, etc., by the officers appointed by me to command the troops and administer Martial Law therein.

4. That as against the inhabitants of any places which have been law-abiding and of good behaviour, similar instructions have not been issued, but such concession is dependent on the future good conduct of the inhabitants of such towns and villages.

5. That I forbid any meetings or processions or unlawful assemblies to be held (in ) without my permission. Any meetings, processions or unlawful assembly held in contravention of this order will be dispersed by force without warning.

6. That any person contravening the Martial Law Regulations or any of the above orders or any further orders I may issue from time to time shall be arrested and tried (by a first class Magistrate) and be liable to be punished with fine, whipping, imprisonment, or death according to the circumstances of the case.

F. W. BURBURY, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Gujranwala District.*

GUJRANWALA :  
*April 18th, 1919.*

### No. 1.

THE following orders will be strictly enforced by me until further notice in the Area of the Wazirabad Municipality and the Railway Line running through it:—

1. From and after the date of this order it shall be illegal for any male person to carry, or be in possession of an instrument known as a "Lathi" except that bullock drivers may pass through the Grand Trunk Road with their sticks.

2. In order to protect the lives of His Majesty's soldiers and police under my command I make known that if any firearm is discharged or bomb thrown at them or any weapon of offence raised against them the most drastic reprisals will instantly be made against the property in the neighbourhood of the outrage. Therefore it behoves all loyal citizens to see to it that no evil disposed agitator is allowed on their premises.

3. I prohibit all processions, meeting or gatherings of more than 10 persons without written authority, and any such meeting, gatherings or processions held in disobedience of this order will be broken up by force without warning.

4. I forbid any person to offer violence to or cause obstruction to any person desirous of opening his shop or conducting his business or proceeding to his work or business. Any person contravening this order will be arrested, tried by a Summary Court and liable to be shot.

5. Shop-keepers who close their shops on the approach of soldiers or police desirous of purchasing goods or who refuse to sell goods to such soldiers or police at a fair and reasonable price will be arrested and will be liable to be flogged and to have their goods forfeited.

6. Although at the present time it is not in my opinion necessary to extend to Wazirabad the order now in force at Gujranwala that no person shall leave his or her house or compound or the building in which he or she may be at 20.00 hours until 05.00 hours the following day except with my written permission, I hereby warn the inhabitants of Wazirabad that this exemption depends upon their continued good conduct. Moreover, this restriction will shortly be introduced in all circumstances over an area to be described hereafter in the immediate neighbourhood of Wazirabad Railway Station and the Railway Line.

F. W. BURBURY, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Gujranwala District Area.*

WAZIRABAD :  
*April 18th, 1919.*

### No. 2.

WHEREAS from information received by me it would appear that certain shop-keepers in the Municipality of Gujranwala have been closing their shops on the approach of soldiers and police desirous of purchasing goods or have refused to sell goods to such soldiers and police at a fair and reasonable price, notice is now given that from the date of this order any shop-keeper acting in this manner will be arrested and be liable to be flogged and to have his goods forfeited.

F. W. BURBURY, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
*Commanding Gujranwala District Area.*

WAZIRABAD :  
*April 18th, 1919.*

### No. 3.

SECOND-LIEUTENANT P. R. CHANIN, 2-41st Dogras, is appointed Assistant Provost Marshal in the Cantonment and Municipality of Wazirabad.

2. The Assistant Provost Marshal is hereby authorized to sign and issue military passes on my behalf in the Cantonment and Municipality of Wazirabad.

With reference to paragraph 5 of Notice under Martial Law No. 1, dated 18th April 1919, the area referred to is bounded as follows:—

On the East . . . by the West section of the City Circular Road (inclusive).

On the North . . . by the Pulkhoo Nalla.

On the West . . . by the North-Western Railway main line.

On the South . . . by the Sheru Mohalla of the City.

Commencing on the 20th April 1919, a bugle call will be sounded from the Railway Station at 20.00 hours daily and from that signal until 05.00 hours on the following day no person other than a European or a soldier or a policeman on duty or a person in possession of a military pass will be permitted to leave his or her house or compound or other building in which he or she may be at 20.00 hours. During these prohibited hours no person

Continued.]

## MARTIAL LAW NOTICES.

other than those exempted will be permitted to use the streets or roads.

Any person found disobeying this order will be arrested; if any attempt is made to escape or resist will be liable to be shot.

Persons permitted by pass to use the streets and roads, during prohibited hours will move in parties of not more than two persons, and every such party will carry a light.

F. W. BURBURY, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Gujranwala District Area.

WAZIRABAD:  
April 19th, 1919.

## No. 4.

WHEREAS I, Brigadier-General L. W. Y. Campbell, C.M.G., Commanding the Sialkot Brigade, have assumed command of the Gujranwala District with effect from the morning of April 20th, 1919, *vice* Lieutenant-Colonel F. W. Burbury, relieved, I hereby make known that I am empowered to issue orders under Martial Law throughout the District of Gujranwala.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General*,  
Commanding Gujranwala District Area.

WAZIRABAD:  
April 20th, 1919.

## No. 5.

WHEREAS I deem it expedient to ensure the safety of all railways and telegraphs in the Gujranwala District, I hereby issue the following Orders:—

1. The Civil railway patrols already instituted by the Civil power will continue until further notice.

2. Each patrol will be furnished with a pass signed by the Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner, gazetted Police Officer, Superintendent or Assistant Superintendent of Police, or a Magistrate, on which shall be stated in English and Urdu the number of persons in the patrol and the village or town from which furnished. Each Civil patrol will display a white flag.

3. On sighting any troops or police the headman of a Civil patrol will report to the Commander and produce the patrol pass for inspection.

4. In the event of any damage or attempted damage to any railway or telegraph in the Gujranwala District the nearest or any other town or village or towns or villages in the neighbourhood as may be selected by me will be visited forthwith by an armed force, and severe reprisals will be inflicted on persons and property of such town or village or towns or villages.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General*,  
Commanding Gujranwala District Area.

WAZIRABAD:  
April 20th, 1919.

## No. 6.

I HEREBY give notice that all traffic in the Wazirabad Cantonment other than military traffic will cease daily from 20.00 hours one day until 05.00 hours the following day on that section of Grand Trunk Road which extends from the bridge-of-boats over the Pulkhoo Nalla on the north to the level crossing over the North-Western Railway main line on the south. Any unauthorised person who approaches the abovementioned bridge-of-boats or level crossing without due authority from me is liable to be fired on without warning.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General*,  
Commanding Gujranwala District Area.

WAZIRABAD:  
April 21st, 1919.

## No. 7.

WHEREAS it has come to my notice that certain inhabitants of the Gujranwala District are habitually exhibiting a lack of respect for Gazetted or Commissioned European Civil and Military Officers of His Majesty's Services, thereby failing to maintain the dignity of that Government, I hereby order that the inhabitants of the Gujranwala District shall accord to all such officers, whenever met, the salutation usually accorded to Indian gentlemen of high social position in accordance with the customs of India. That is to say, persons riding on animals or on or in wheeled conveyance will alight, persons carrying opened and raised umbrellas shall lower them, and all persons shall salute or "Salam" with the hand.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General*,  
Commanding Gujranwala District Area.

WAZIRABAD:  
April 22nd, 1919

## No. 8.

WHEREAS it has been brought to my notice that the Nirakh rates of food in the Municipality of Wazirabad show a tendency to excessive increase, having due consideration to the supplies available, I therefore order that from the date of this order until the last day of April 1919, the Nirakh rates fixed by the Civil powers on April 7th, 1919, shall be the maximum rate at which any article of food shall be sold to the public.

Any shop-keeper who shall demand a higher rate than as laid down in that Nirakh-nama or who shall refuse to sell at that rate articles of food in his possession for the purpose of trading shall be deemed guilty of an offence under Martial Law, be arrested and punished accordingly.

The Civil authorities of Wazirabad will take steps to make public the Nirakh-nama abovementioned.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General*,  
Commanding Gujranwala District Area.

WAZIRABAD:  
April 22nd, 1919.

## No. 9.

WHEREAS the Government of India has proclaimed Martial Law in the District of Gujrat and WHEREAS I have been appointed by the General Officer Commanding, 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division, to administer the said Martial Law in that district, I make known to the inhabitants of the Gujrat District:—

1. That I am so appointed to enforce Law and Order and to guard the public safety.

2. The loyal and law-abiding persons have nothing to fear from exercise of the said Martial Law.

3. That the Regulations laid down in the proclamation, dated 20th April 1919, by Major-General C. M. Dobell, C.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division, will be enforced by me and any offence against those regulations will be dealt with and punished under Martial Law.

4. That all orders which may from time to time be issued by me under Martial Law must be obeyed during the period of such Martial Law and that any omission or neglect to obey such orders will be punished under Martial Law.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General*,  
Commanding Sialkot Brigade Military Area.

WAZIRABAD:  
April 24th, 1919.

## MARTIAL LAW NOTICES.

[Continued.]

## No. 10.

WHEREAS I deem it expedient to ensure the safety of all railway telegraphs in the Gujrat District, I hereby issue the following orders:—

1. The Civil Railway patrols already instituted by the Civil Power will continue until further notice.

2. Each patrol will be furnished with a pass signed by the Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner, Gazetted Police Officer, Superintendent or Assistant Superintendent of Police, or a Magistrate, on which shall be stated in English and Urdu the number of persons in the patrol and the village or town from which furnished. Each Civil patrol will display a khaki armet.

3. On sighting any troops or police the headman of a Civil patrol will report to the Commander and produce the patrol pass for inspection.

4. In the event of any damage or attempted damage to any railway or telegraph in the Gujrat District the nearest or any other town or village or towns or villages in the neighbourhood as may be selected by me will be visited forthwith by an armed force, and severe reprisals will be inflicted on persons and property of such town or village or towns or villages.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General*,  
*Commanding Gujrat District Area.*

WAZIRABAD

April 24th, 1919.

## No. 11.

WHEREAS I deem it expedient to regulate and control all classes of coaching traffic in the districts of Gujrat, Gujranwala and Lyallpur, I hereby issue the following Orders under Martial Law:—

1. All persons desirous of travelling by rail will first obtain a military pass under Martial Law unless they are—

- (a) Military passengers on warrants, leave passes, etc.
- (b) Europeans or Anglo-Indians.
- (c) Servants of 1st class and 2nd class European or Anglo-Indian passengers when actually accompanying their masters.
- (d) Government employees on duty.

2. Military passes under Martial Law may be obtained from the Civil or Military authorities at the following stations only:—

Gujranwala.	Chuhar Kana.
Wazirabad.	Lyallpur.
Gujrat.	Sangla Hill.
Lalamusa.	Hafizabad.
Malakwal.	Shorkot Road.

3. Any person found travelling in contravention of this Notice will be liable to punishment under Martial Law.

4. Any person issuing a Railway ticket to a person not authorised to travel by this Notice, will be liable to punishment under Martial Law.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General*,  
*Commanding Sialkot Brigade*  
*Martial Law Area.*

WAZIRABAD:

April 25th, 1919.

## No. 12.

WHEREAS I deem it expedient for the sake of the people themselves that they should not be exposed to the risk of disobeying my Orders through ignorance as to where they—my Orders—can be ascertained:

Now THEREFORE I give notice that copies of all Orders and Notices issued by me under Martial Law will be exhibited at the following places, houses or premises:—

- 1. House of Doctor Dina Nath, Kutoheri Bazar.
- 2. Shop of Harsa Singh, Rail Bazar.]

VOL. V

- 3. House of Khushabi Ram, Douglaspura.
- 4. Shop of Hakim Nur Din, Bhawana Bazar.
- 5. City Police Station.
- 6. Clock Tower.
- 7. Office of Mr. Ram Das, Chhakra, Kutcheri Bazar.
- 8. Office of Sant Singh, Pleader, Kutcheri Bazar.
- 9. Sadar Police Station.
- 10. Kutcheri Bazar—Entrance to Kutcheri.
- 11. Old Grain Market.
- 12. New Grain Market.
- 13. Railway Station.

G. C. HODGSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,for *General Officer Commanding Sialkot*  
*Military Area and Gujrat.*

LYALLPUR:

May, 7th, 1919.

## No. 13.

WHEREAS the Government of India have proclaimed Martial Law in the District of Lyallpur and WHEREAS I have been appointed by the General Officer Commanding, 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division, to administer the said Martial Law in that district, I make known to the inhabitants of the Lyallpur District—

1. That I am so appointed to enforce Law and Order and to guard the public safety.

2. That loyal and law-abiding persons have nothing to fear from exercise of the said Martial Law.

3. That the regulations laid down in the proclamation, dated 20th April 1919, by Major-General C. M. Dobell, C.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division, will be enforced by me, and any offence against those regulations will be dealt with and punished under Martial Law.

4. That all orders which may from time to time be issued by me under Martial Law must be obeyed during the period of such Martial Law, and that any omission or neglect to obey such orders will be punished under Martial Law.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General*,*Commanding Sialkot Brigade*  
*Martial Law Area.*

WAZIRABAD:

April 25th, 1919.

## No. 14.

WHEREAS I deem it expedient to ensure the safety of all canals, railways and telegraphs in the Lyallpur District, I hereby issue the following Orders:—

1. The Civil Railway patrols already instituted by the Civil power will continue until further notice.

2. In the event of any damage or attempted damage to any canal, railway and telegraph in the Lyallpur District the nearest or any other town or village or towns or villages in the neighbourhood as may be selected by me will be visited forthwith by an armed force, and severe reprisals will be inflicted on persons and property of such town or village or towns or villages.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General*,*Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.*

WAZIRABAD:

April 25th, 1919.

## No. 15.

BY VIRTUE of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I hereby direct that the proclamation, dated the 20th April 1919, issued by Major-General Sir Charles M. [Dobell, K.C.B., D.S.O., Commanding the 2nd

2 K

Continued.]

## MARTIAL LAW NOTICES.

(Rawalpindi) Division, shall be applied to the Civil District of Lyallpur.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*  
*Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.*

WAZIRABAD :

April 25th, 1919.

No. 16.

WHEREAS by Notice "B," dated 18th April 1919, and Notice 3, dated 19th April 1919, issued under Martial Law, I forbid the inhabitants of the Municipality of Gujranwala and of certain portions of the Municipality of Wazirabad to leave the houses or buildings or compounds in which they then were between the hours of 20.00 hours one day and 05.00 the next day : and WHEREAS since the promulgation of those orders the behaviour of the inhabitants of those Municipalities has been satisfactory, I hereby give notice that the above restrictions shall now be relaxed so far that they shall commence at 22.00 hours instead of at 20.00 hours as heretofore. This order will come into force from the evening of the 29th April 1919. Should any further misconduct arise in either Municipality the former restrictions will be re-imposed in that Municipality.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*  
*Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.*

WAZIRABAD :

April 29th, 1919.

No. 17.

WHEREAS it has been represented by the Deputy Commissioner of the Lyallpur District that it is in the interest of Government and of the inhabitants of the famine areas of the Bombay Presidency that persons connected with the grain traffic should be permitted special facilities for travel, I hereby give notice that military passes under Martial Law will be issued at the following stations in the Lyallpur District in addition to those laid down in notice under Martial Law No. 11, dated 25th April 1919 :—

Chak Jhumra.  
Risalawala,  
Gojra.

Toba Tek Singh.  
Jattanwala.  
Tandlianwala.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*  
*Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.*

WAZIRABAD :

April 30th, 1919.

No. 18.

WHEREAS it has been proved to my satisfaction that school boys formed a large portion of the crowds which committed offences on the 15th and 16th of April 1919 in Gujrat : and WHEREAS it is necessary to control the movement of these and other school boys, therefore I hereby order the Area Officer, Gujrat Area, to hold roll-calls of the masters and boys of such schools in the Gujrat area at such times as he shall deem necessary.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*  
*Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.*

WAZIRABAD :

April 30th, 1919.

No. 19.

WHEREAS it has come to my notice that the inhabitants of the Lyallpur District habitually exhibit a lack of respect for Gazetted and Commissioned Civil and Military Officers, I therefore now direct that Notice under Martial

Law No. 7, dated the 25th day of April 1919, be also made applicable to the Lyallpur District.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*  
*Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.*

WAZIRABAD :

April 30th, 1919.

No. 20.

Cancelled.

No. 21.

WHEREAS I deem it expedient, I order, that as long as Martial Law is in force in the Lyallpur District, the undermentioned persons will not move outside the boundaries of their villages without a permit from the Superintendent of Police :—

1. Teja Singh, son of Lal Singh, Chak No. 75 R. B.
2. Kishan Singh, son of Mangal Singh, Chak No. 103 R. B.
3. Gurbachan Singh, son of Hira Singh, Chak No. 95 R. B.
4. Mihan Singh, son of Hira Singh, Chak No. 95 R. B.
5. Chanda Singh, son of Jawahar Singh, Chak No. 90 R. B.
6. Maghar Singh, son of Boota Singh, Chak No. 71 R. B.
7. Pir Bakhsh, son of Jodha, Chak No. 136 G. B.
8. Bela Singh, son of Amar Singh, Chak No. 44. G. B.
9. Sarmukh Singh, son of Ram Singh, Chak No. 257 R. B.
10. Prem Singh, son of Pal Singh, Chak No. 75 R. B.
11. Munsha Singh, son of Ishar Singh, Chak No. 14 U. C. C.
12. Sewa Singh, son of Hazara Singh, Chak No. 200.

G. C. HODGSON, *Lieut.-Col.,*  
*Commanding Lyallpur Area.*

LYALLPUR :

April 26th, 1919.

No. 22.

WHEREAS I deem it expedient in the interests of the administration of Martial Law that my Notices under Martial Law Nos. 1 and 7 shall be made applicable to the Civil District of Gujrat ; therefore I now direct that the orders contained in these Notices shall be applied to and enforced in the Gujrat District subject to such variations as may be necessitated by local circumstances and approved of by the Area Officers of that District.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*  
*Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.*

WAZIRABAD :

May 2nd, 1919.

No. 23.

WHEREAS I deem it expedient for the better administration of Martial Law that Area Officers shall be appointed throughout the districts of Gujrat, Gujranwala and Lyallpur, therefore I now divide the said districts into the following areas to be controlled by the Officer named against each :—

*Gujrat District.*

Gujrat Area, comprising the Tahsils of Gujrat and Kharian : Area Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel L. A. Browne, 37th Dograe.

Malakwal Area, comprising the Tahsil of Phalia : Area Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Grat, V.C., 3-11th Gurkha Rifles.



## MARTIAL LAW NOTICES.

[Continued.]

*Gujranwala District.*

Gujranwala Area, comprising the Gujranwala Tahsil: Area Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'Brien, C.I.E., C.B.E., I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala District.

Chuhar Kana Area, comprising the Tahsils of Khangah Dogran and Sharakpur: Area Officer, Mr. B. N. Bosworth-Smith, I.C.S., Joint Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala District.

Hafizabad Area, comprising the Hafizabad Tahsil: Area Officer, Captain W. J. Cole, Supply and Transport Corps.

Wazirabad Area, comprising the Wazirabad Tahsil: Area Officer, Major C. W. J. Smith, D. S. O., 2-54th Sikhs F. F.

*Lyallpur District.*

Lyallpur Area, comprising the whole Civil District of Lyallpur: Area Officers, Mr. G. F. deMontmorency, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Lyallpur District, and Lieutenant-Colonel G. C. Hodgson, D.S.O., 3-34th Sikh Pioneers.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*  
*Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.*

WAZIRABAD:  
May 2nd, 1919.

## No. 24.

WHEREAS it has been brought to my notice that the rates for food-stuffs in Khanki are excessive and that the shop-keepers are in the habit of adulterating such food-stuffs I hereby direct that the Officer Commanding the troops at Khanki shall once a week fix the rates of all food-stuffs in consultation with the local Civil authorities, and that any shop-keeper who shall demand prices in excess of these rates or who shall refuse to sell at these rates, or who may be found to have adulterated any articles of food-stuffs will be punished for an offence under Martial Law.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*  
*Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.*

WAZIRABAD:  
May 5th, 1919.

## No. 25.

WHEREAS I deem it expedient I hereby order that Zafar Ali Khan, Jat Janjuah, son of Saraj Din, of the village of Karamabad, situated in Wazirabad Tahsil, Gujranwala District, shall not move outside the boundary of the village of Karamabad so long as Martial Law shall exist in the Gujranwala District without a permit from me or from a person authorised by me to issue the same.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*  
*Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.*

WAZIRABAD:  
May 5th, 1919.

## No. 26.

WHEREAS it has been proved to my satisfaction that the destruction of Government and private property in Gujranwala, Gujrat and Lyallpur Districts during the present disturbances has been largely the work of school boys, and WHEREAS I deem such action on their part to be due to a lack of instruction in discipline and respect for authority, I hereby direct that at all places in these districts where there are Area Officers or Officer Commanding Troops, school boys together with their masters shall be paraded once daily or more often as such Officers

consider desirable for the purpose of inculcating discipline and respect for authority.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*  
*Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.*

WAZIRABAD:  
May 5th, 1919.

*Martial Law Instruction Roll.*

With reference to Notice under Martial Law No. 26 the General Officer Commanding Sialkot Brigade directs that whenever a Union Jack is obtainable it should be erected at a suitable spot and the school boys together with their Masters should be made to salaam it at every parade with a view to inculcating a sense of respect for the British Flag as an emblem of the King-Emperor. The General Officer Commanding specially directs that School masters and school boys be instructed that it is the privilege of persons in the Army, Navy and Police only to salute, all other persons showing their respect by raising their hats or salaaming according to their nationality. It is probable that a Union Jack will be forthcoming on command from any town.

T. P. WHEATLY,  
*for Major Commanding Sialkot*  
*Military Area, &c., Gujrat.*

WAZIRABAD:  
May 6th, 1919.

## No. 27.

WHEREAS it has been shown to my satisfaction that the attitude of the inhabitants of Gujranwala towards Europeans has decreased in respect, and WHEREAS this is in contravention of my Notice under Martial Law No. 7, dated 22nd April 1919, I now order that as a punishment the restrictions regarding booking of passengers from Gujranwala and from the stations of Eminabad and Kamoki to the South and Rahwali and Ghakkar on the North, which were relaxed to-day, the 5th instant, shall be again imposed on these stations for a further period of 14 days from this date.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*  
*Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.*

WAZIRABAD:  
May 8th, 1919.

## No. 28.

WHEREAS I understand that a large number of people concerned in the riots at Gujranwala have left the City and are hiding themselves elsewhere: it is notified for information that if such persons do not return immediately their property or the property of their fathers or their nearest relations will be considered confiscated.

A. J. O'BRIEN, *Lieut.-Col.,*  
*Area Officer.*

## No. 29.

WHEREAS I understand that a large number of people concerned in the riots at Wazirabad and Hafizabad have left those Cities and are hiding themselves elsewhere, it is now notified for information that if such persons do not return immediately, their property or the property of their fathers or of their nearest relations will be liable to confiscation.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*  
*Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.*

WAZIRABAD:  
May 8th, 1919.

Continued.]

## MARTIAL LAW NOTICES.

## No. 30.

WHEREAS it has come to my notice that certain persons act prejudicially to good Government by refusing to sell goods to persons who tender notes in payment, and further that certain persons are deducting a certain discount from the face value of Currency Notes which are legal tender to the full value inscribed on them: Now therefore, I order—

1. That Notes are legal tender and their value is the value printed on the faces of the Notes.

2. That no person shall deduct discount from any Note when cashing it.

3. That no person shall refuse to accept in notes the value of goods bought.

Any one found contravening these orders shall be liable to be punished under Martial Law.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*  
*Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.*

WAZIRABAD:  
May 8th, 1919.

## No. 31.

WHEREAS it has come to my knowledge that in certain districts of this Area merchants are selling their existing stock and not replenishing it; and that other merchants are hiding their stock or holding it in hopes of rise in price: Now therefore I order for the public welfare that merchants shall not allow their stock to be depleted but shall replenish it in all cases and continue selling as usual nor shall they hide nor withhold their stock. Any one contravening this Order will be arrested and punished under Martial Law.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*  
*Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.*

WAZIRABAD:  
May 9th, 1919.

## No. 32.

UNTIL further orders no *Sadhu* will be permitted to leave Gujrat City without the permission of the Superintendent of Police, Gujrat.

L. S. BROWNE, *Lieut.-Col.,*  
*Area Officer, Gujrat.*

GUJRAT:  
May 2nd, 1919.

## No. 33.

WHEREAS it has been proved to my satisfaction that School boys formed a large portion of the crowds which committed offences on 15th and 16th April 1919 in the Gujrat Area, and WHEREAS I consider it expedient to control the movements of these school boys, I therefore order that the students of the following schools shall attend roll-calls as noted below, with their School-masters:—

*Gujrat.*

Government High School  
Zamindara High School  
Kidar Nath High School  
Sanatan Dharm High School.

- (1) Roll-calls will be held at 06.30, 12.00, 18.30 hours daily on the District Board fair ground.
- (2) 1st Roll-call will be held at 06.30 hours on 6th May 1919.
- (3) If any boy is absent without proper cause his father will attend in his place.
- (4) Only those school boys living in the Gujrat City and within  $\frac{1}{4}$  mile thereof will attend the roll-call at 18.30 hours.

Those living further away are exempt.

All School-masters will attend.

- (5) Lists of School-masters and school boys will be submitted to Area Officer, Gujrat, before 19.00 hours, 5th instant.

*Jalalpur Jattan.*

Arya Samaj School.

The same rules hold for this School as for Gujrat with the following exceptions:—

- (1) List of School-masters and school boys will reach Area Officer by 19.00 hours on 6th instant.
- (2) The first roll-call will be held at 12.00 hours 10th May 1919, at the Thana.
- (3) In the absence of a British Officer the roll-calls will be taken by the President of the Municipal Committee.

L. S. BROWNE, *Lieut.-Col.,*  
*Area Officer, Gujrat.*

GUJRAT:  
May 3rd, 1919.

## No. 34.

WHEREAS it has been brought to my notice that the Nirakh rates of Sugar, Meat and Milk in the Municipality of Gujrat have greatly risen, and having due consideration to the supplies available I therefore order that from 1st May 1919 till further orders the Nirakh rates shall be those prevalent on 13th April 1919 or as may be decided from time to time.

Any shop-keeper who shall demand a higher rate than as laid down or who shall refuse to sell at those rates, articles of food in his possession for the purpose of trading shall be deemed guilty of an offence under Martial Law, be arrested and punished accordingly.

The Civil authorities of Gujrat will take steps to make public the Nirakh-nama abovementioned.

L. S. BROWNE, *Lieut.-Col.,*  
*Area Officer, Gujrat.*

GUJRAT:  
May 1st, 1919.

## No. 35.

WHEREAS it is now considered desirable that bullock carts and animals with their drivers be allowed to travel by night to bring produce into cities to replenish lowering food-stock, with regard to the hot weather and inability to travel in the day time, now therefore, Notice under Martial Law No. 16 is allowed to lapse, but will, should any misbehaviour be noted on the part of citizens or towns-people, be immediately re-enforced in the cities and towns in which it is now enforced.

J. T. CORLETT, *Lieut.-Col.,*  
*Officer Commanding Sialkot Brigade*  
*Martial Law Area.*

GUJRAT:  
May 15th, 1919.

## No. 36.

WHEREAS for the furtherance of the public safety the Lieutenant-Governor concurs that the movements of legal practitioners be restricted; Now, therefore, I order that no legal practitioner whose ordinary place of business is outside the Sialkot Brigade Martial Law Area and Gujrat will enter that Area without the permission of the Administrator, Martial Law, Lahore Divisional Area.

J. T. CORLETT, *Lieut.-Col.,*  
*Officer Commanding Sialkot Brigade*  
*Martial Law Area and Gujrat.*

WAZIRABAD:  
May 16th, 1919.

## MARTIAL LAW NOTICES.

[Continued.]

No. 37.

WHEREAS it has been proved to my satisfaction that the inhabitants of the Sialkot Brigade Military Area and Gujrat have shown themselves with few exceptions (and these have been punished accordingly) amenable to Martial Law; Now, therefore, I, by the powers vested in me by the General Officer Commanding, 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division, do cancel Notices under Martial Law referring to—

1. Nirakh Rates.
2. Night Passes
3. Two men walking abreast.
4. Notice No. 6.
5. Notice No. 7.
6. Notice No. 11.
7. Notice No. 18.
8. Notice No. 24.
9. Notice No. 26.
10. Notice No. 27.

The aforesaid inhabitants must not consider this step as a weakening of Martial Law but only as a relaxing, and should clearly understand that should misbehaviour on their part be again noted these restrictions will be again still more strictly imposed than hitherto.

J. T. CORLETT, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade  
Martial Law Area.

WAZIRABAD:  
May 18th, 1919.

No. 38.

As a complete list of occupiers or owners of all buildings in the Municipal Area of Gujranwala under my Command is to be prepared:

Now THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I issue the following Orders:—

1. The entire area has been divided into 7 Blocks.
2. Each block has been put in charge of a Patwari (separate) to prepare the required list.
3. It will be the duty of the Patwari to give 24 hours' previous General Notice to the occupiers and owners of the particular part or locality of his block which he proposes to do each day.
4. It will be the duty of each occupier or owner of the house or area in the locality about which a General Notice has been issued to be present in person or by proxy at his place and cause to be furnished to the Patwari on his arrival the following information:—

- (i) His name, occupation and full address.
- (ii) Annual rent of the house or part of the house or of the area occupied by him.
- (iii) If a house or part of a house or area is occupied by the owner or is occupied free of rent he will state the annual rental value of the same, having regard to the cost of the building and the rent prevailing in the locality.
- (iv) Furnish any other information necessary for the correct preparation of the required list.

I WARN ALL CONCERNED that failure to comply with this Order or to furnish wrong information will result in severe punishment under Martial Law.

J. T. CORLETT, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Sialkot Brigade  
Martial Law Area.

WAZIRABAD:  
May 18th, 1919.

No. 39.

WHEREAS I have noticed to my satisfaction that "Thikri Pahras" on railways have done their duty thoroughly and WHEREAS I consider the weather to be unsuitable for Civil patrols; Now therefore do I cancel

Notice under Martial Law No. 10. Patrols are no longer required to be furnished by villages, towns and cities adjacent to the railways and canals, but still should any damage be done in future to railways or canals I will hold the neighbouring villages, towns or cities responsible, and will punish their inhabitants under the powers vested in me by Martial Law.

J. T. CORLETT, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade  
Martial Law Area.

WAZIRABAD:  
May 19th, 1919.

No. 40.

WHEREAS it has been represented to me that the good behaviour of the citizens of Gujrat warrants a relaxing of Martial Law; Now, therefore, do I cancel Martial Law No. 22, but with the assurance that should the said citizens be again guilty of misbehaviour more stringent Notices will be enforced.

J. T. CORLETT, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Sialkot Brigade  
Martial Law Area.

WAZIRABAD:  
May 19th, 1919.

No. 41.

WHEREAS two students of over 14 years of age failed to salam to me on 16th instant, thereby contravening "Notice under Martial Law No. 7," and WHEREAS it now transpires that they gave me their wrong names and addresses, I hereby direct that all students of over 14 years of age of the—

- (1) Municipal Board School, Lyallpur,
- (2) Arya School, Lyallpur,
- (3) Sanatan Dharm School, Lyallpur,
- (4) Government High School, Lyallpur,

shall parade in front of my office in the Public Library at 08-00 (eight) hours daily until the two offenders are given up, or failing this until such time as I consider necessary. They will be accompanied by a School-master from each school, and will march past a Union Jack, which will be erected in front of my office, and salam to it as they pass, under the supervision of an officer appointed by me.

The School-master, accompanying the boys of each school, will bring with him daily a nominal roll of all the boys of over 14 years of age at his school, signed as correct by the Head-master, and showing, against the name of each absentee from the parade, the reason for his absence. These parades will commence from Monday, 19th instant.

G. C. HODGSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lyallpur Area.

No. 42.

In continuation of Notice under Martial Law No. 37, Notice under Martial Law No. 10 is hereby cancelled.

J. T. CORLETT, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade  
Martial Law Area.

WAZIRABAD:  
May 22nd, 1919.

No. 43.

WHEREAS the grass on roadsides and in plantations, public gardens and public places in the Civil Stations of Lyallpur is required for the use of cavalry horses:

Continued.]

## MARTIAL LAW NOTICES AND INSTRUCTIONS.

I hereby direct that no person may cut grass or graze cattle, sheep or goats within this limit of the Civil station on the areas mentioned above. Any person disobeying order will be dealt with under Martial Law.

G. F. HODGSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lyallpur Area.

LYALLPUR :  
May 22nd, 1919.

No. 44.

WHEREAS it has come to my notice that many Afghans have been taught that orders under Martial Law cannot be lightly disobeyed, I am pleased to discontinue the parade at my office of the school boys of certain schools (Order under Martial Law Notice No. 41) with effect from Sunday, 25th instant.

G. F. HODGSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Lyallpur Area.

LYALLPUR :  
May 23rd, 1919.

No. 45.

WHEREAS it has come to my Notice that many Afghans are at present in the Tahsil of Hafizabad ; and WHEREAS

I deem it necessary for the furtherance of public safety that their movements be controlled ; Now therefore, I order that all Afghans must report at once to the Assistant Superintendent of Police, Hafizabad, and without permission from the Officer Commanding Troops, and Assistant Superintendent of Police, they will not leave that District.

J. T. CORLETT, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Commanding Sialkot Brigade  
Martial Law Area.

WAZIRABAD :  
May 26th, 1919.

No. 46.

WHEREAS the Government of India has proclaimed Martial Law at an end in Wazirabad, Gujranwala and Lyallpur, with the exception of the railways ; therefore I now order that the proclamation dated the 24th April 1919 be withdrawn, and that all Notices issued under Martial Law and posted in the City be taken down.

J. T. CORLETT, *Lieut.-Col.*,  
Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade  
Martial Law Area.

WAZIRABAD :  
June 10th, 1919.

## Martial Law Instructions issued in the Sialkot Brigade Area and Gujrat District.

*Instructions for guidance of officers administering Martial Law.*

The Form 5 Martial Law issued to all concerned is to be adhered to and a return to be sent in every time an offence is tried under Martial Law, so as to reach the Administrator of Martial Law, care of Brigade Headquarters, Wazirabad, as soon as possible. Column 6, statement of witnesses and of accused need not be filled up.

All persons arrested must be dealt with as follows :—

1. By summary court, Form 5, for offences not deserving of death.

The punishments to be inflicted are—

- (a) Rigorous Imprisonment up to two years.
- (b) Fine not exceeding Rs. 1,000.
- (c) Whipping not exceeding 30 lashes.

Any sentence may be combined.

In all cases immediate action should be taken and punishment inflicted on the spot.

In cases of imprisonment the offender or offenders are to be handed over to the nearest jail or lock-up with the prescribed order of committal, Form 3.

2. By Special Tribunal Court for offences deserving of greater punishment than those empowered by 1.

Attention is drawn to Martial Law Instruction No. 2, dated 21st April 1919.

C. W. J. SMITH, *Major*,  
Administrator of Martial Law,  
Gujranwala District.

April 21st, 1919.

## SIALKOT BRIGADE AREA AND GUJRAT.

*Martial Law Instruction No. 2.**Memorandum to Officers Commanding Units and Detachments, Police Officers and Magistrates.*

(1) In order to prevent the occurrence of regrettable incidents, it must be clearly understood that the existence of Martial Law neither necessitates nor justifies the committal of excesses either in—

- (a) The maintenance of order.
- (b) In enforcing obedience to Martial Law Regulations.
- (c) In the infliction of punishment.

(2) The guiding principle to be borne in mind is that the force required in (a) and (b) and the ensuing punishment should never exceed the necessities of the case.

(3) The punishment of whipping in particular, whilst probably the most efficacious and convenient method of summarily dealing with most minor breaches of Martial Law Regulations, requires tact and commensurate in its infliction. Under no circumstances should an old or feeble man be flogged, and the social status of the offender also needs consideration.

(4) It cannot be too clearly impressed upon all ranks that the temporary supersession of the ordinary process of Civil Law by the introduction of Martial Law does not mean that justice ceases to be administered ; on the contrary, the suspension of the usual safeguards makes it doubly imperative that all concerned should bear in mind that it is incumbent on them to see that justice, and not irresponsible violence, is administered.

(5) When in any case Officers or Magistrates acting on my behalf are doubtful as to the suitable punishment to be inflicted, the case can always be remanded and the question referred to me by express telegram or telephone.

(6) Nothing in the above is to be read as weakening the hands of those responsible for strictly maintaining good order and enforcing Martial Law Regulations.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General*,  
Commanding, Gujranwala District.

WAZIRABAD :  
April 21st, 1919.

## SIALKOT BRIGADE MILITARY AREA AND GUJRAT DISTRICT.

*Martial Law Instruction No. 3.*

I am directed by the General Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade, to issue the following instructions for the guidance of all officers, Civil and Military, in the Gujrat, Gujranwala and Lyallpur Districts.

1. With reference to the Proclamation, dated 20th April 1919, by the General Officer Commanding, 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division, paragraph 18, the following have been given powers by the Local Government to dispose of offences summarily under Martial Law :—

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'Brien, C.I.E., C.B.E.,  
D.C., Gujranwala.

MARTIAL LAW INSTRUCTIONS.

[Continued.]

Mr. B. N. Bosworth-Smith, Joint D.C., Gujranwala.  
Mr. F. B. Wace, Assistant Commissioner, Gujranwala.  
Mr. H. S. Williamson, D.C., Gujrat.

2. The following military officers have been given the above powers by the General Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade:—

Captain J. S. L. Ewing, M.C., 19th Lancers.  
- Captain T. P. Wheatly, 1st Garrison Bn., Yorkshire Regiment.

Captain W. J. Cole, Supply and Transport Corps.

3. The General Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade, hereby appoints the following as Area Officers under paragraph 18 of the proclamation referred to:—

Gujranwala District—

Gujranwala Area—Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'Brien, C.I.E., C.B.E., D.C., Gujranwala.

Chuharkana—Mr. B. N. Bosworth-Smith, Joint D. C., Gujranwala District.

Sangla Hill—Captain W. J. Cole, Supply and Transport Corps.

Wazirabad—Major C. W. J. Smith, D.S.O., Administrator, Martial Law, Sialkot Brigade Military Area and Gujranwala District.

Gujrat District—

Gujrat—Colonel L. S. Brown, 37th Dogras.

Lala Musa—Major W. E. Beazley, 37th Dogras.

Malakwal—Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Grant, V.C., 3-11th Gurkha Rifles.

4. The normal procedure will be that all offences against Martial Law will be referred to and disposed of by Area Officers who will either try offenders by Summary Court or remand them for trial by Special Tribunal Courts.

Summary powers should be used freely, and offenders remanded for trial by Special Tribunal Courts only in the most serious cases. Such cases will be handed over to the Civil or Police authorities for further investigation and this action noted in Form 5 and submitted to his Office.

5. Should it be deemed impracticable in the interests of Martial Law to bring offenders before an Area Officer, they may be disposed of by any of the officers mentioned in paragraph 18 of the above mentioned proclamation, but Officers other than Field Officers, Area Officers, or officers specially nominated to dispose of offences summarily under Martial Law will use their summary powers only after reference to a Field Officer, Area Officer or officers so nominated.

6. The officers appointed as Area Officers and officers nominated as having special powers to dispose of offences summarily under Martial Law in the Lyallpur District will be notified hereafter.

7. No officers other than those mentioned in the preceding paragraphs or who may hereafter be nominated by the Local Government or the General Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade, have summary powers to deal with offences under Martial Law.

8. Officers authorised to dispose of offences summarily under Martial Law can only inflict the punishments laid down in paragraph 16 of the above mentioned Proclamation. If a heavier punishment is deemed necessary, the offenders must be remanded for trial by a Special Tribunal Court.

9. All ranks are justified in using such force as is necessary, including the taking of life, to quell disorder or to protect Government or private property, but once such necessity has passed, i.e., when offenders have been arrested, they can only be tried and punished by Summary Courts or Special Tribunal Courts.

10. The special attention of officers authorised to dispose of offences summarily under Martial Law is invited to "Martial Law Instruction No. 2," dated April 21st, 1919, from the General Officer Commanding Gujranwala District.

11. The following Martial Law Forms will be used:—

(1) Form 3 A for committal to imprisonment to jail after sentence,

(b) Form 4 A for temporary committal prior to trial.

(c) Form 5 for record of trials.

An offender need not be committed temporarily to jail prior to trial if he can be retained with a Military guard.

In Form 3 A the words "imprisonment with hard labour" will be deleted and the words "Rigorous Imprisonment" substituted.

Form 5 will be submitted to this Office as soon as a case has been disposed of by a Summary Court.

The counterfoil of Forms 3 A and 4 A will be submitted to this Office when no longer required.

All the above Forms have been or will shortly be issued to Area and other officers mentioned in this instruction. Any further copies required may be had on application to this Office.

12. Officers holding Summary Court will take the oath laid down for Summary Courts Martial, and, if necessary, the interpreter's oath. Evidence will be taken on oath or affirmation and a very brief precis of evidence and accused's statement will be submitted on or with a Form 5.

C. W. J. SMITH, Major,

Administrator of Martial Law, Sialkot Brigade,  
Military Area and Gujrat District.

April 25th, 1919.

SIALKOT BRIGADE MILITARY AREA AND GUJRAT.

Martial Law Instruction No. 4.

With reference to Martial Law Notice No. 11, dated the 25th April 1919, the following instructions are issued for the better control of all classes of coaching traffic in the Gujrat, Gujranwala and Lyallpur Districts:—

1. The following persons only are permitted to book by 1st, 2nd, inter, or 3rd class from stations in the above Districts:—

(a) Military passengers on warrants, leave passes, etc.

(b) Europeans and Anglo-Indians.

(c) Servants of 1st and 2nd class European and Anglo-Indian passengers when actually accompanying their masters.

(d) Government Employees on Duty.

(e) Persons having Military Railway Passes.

2. Application for Military Passes under Martial Law will be made to the Civil and Military authorities at the following stations only:—

Gujranwala.	Chuharkana.
Wazirabad.	Lyallpur.
Gujrat.	Sherkot Road.
Lala Musa.	Sangla Hill.
Malakwal.	Hafizabad.

And any stations that may be published hereafter.

3. The authorities mentioned in paragraph 2 above will normally issue passes for bookings from the above stations only, but they may at their discretion issue passes permitting the holder to book from an intermediate station; their discretion should however be used sparingly.

4. The issue of a pass does not guarantee the holder a ticket or seat on a train. These matters are controlled by the Railway Authorities in accordance with the accommodation available.

5. Booking clerks will record—

(a) Date and number of all tickets issued.

(b) The number of the Military Pass on which issued.

(c) The name of persons to whom issued.

This record will be checked from time to time by the authority issuing passes at that station.

6. A person found travelling from a station in the Districts named and contrary to the orders contained in paragraph 1 of this instruction will be detained, his case investigated, after which he will be permitted to proceed or will be dealt with under Martial Law according to

Continued.]

## MARTIAL LAW INSTRUCTIONS

circumstances. Persons travelling without tickets will be similarly dealt with.

7. When a person is found travelling contrary to the orders contained in paragraph 1 of this instruction, his name, the date of his railway ticket, if any, and the name of the station from which issued will be forwarded to this office at once for investigation.

8. Any booking clerk or other person found issuing tickets to travellers other than those mentioned in paragraph 1 of this instruction will be punished for an offence against Martial Law Regulations.

C. W. J. SMITH, Major,

Administrator, Martial Law,  
Sialkot Brigade Military Area and Gujrat.

WAZIRABAD:

April 25th, 1919.

*Martial Law Instruction No. 5.*

1. With reference to Martial Law Instruction No. 3, paragraph 6, the General Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade, hereby appoints the following to be Area Officers in the Lyallpur Civil District:—

Mr. G. F. deMontmorency, I.C.S., D. C., Lyallpur District.

Lieutenant-Colonel G. C. Hodgson, D.S.O., 3-34th Sikh Pioneers.

2. With reference to Martial Law Instruction No. 3, paragraph 1, Major W. E. Beazley, 37th Dogras, having left the Gujrat District, the Lala Musa Area ceases to exist. Lala Musa will henceforward be included in the Gujrat Area.

T. P. WHEATLY, Captain,

for Major, Administrator, Martial Law,  
Sialkot Brigade Military Area and Gujrat.

WAZIRABAD:

April 30th, 1919.

*Martial Law Instruction No. 6.*

1. The following instructions are issued for the guidance of officers issuing railway passes, but are not to be read as tying the hands of such officers. Each case must be judged on its merits.

2. The following may be regarded as suspicious characters:—

(a) Sadhus.

(b) Fakirs.

(c) Arya Samaj School-masters.

3. Pleaders should be regarded as suspicious characters unless they can prove that they are travelling to attend a case in court the date of which is actually fixed.

4. Residents of disturbed areas need not be regarded as suspicious characters unless there are qualifying circumstances.

5. In order to restrict the numbers of travellers to the accommodation available, the fewer the trains that are running the stricter should be the standard of qualification for railway passes.

6. It is at present undesirable to have more movement than is necessary in affected areas. Applications for railway passes should only be considered when good reasons are given.

7. The chief object of the restriction is to prevent the movement of suspicious characters.

T. P. WHEATLY, Captain,

for Major, Administrator, Martial Law,  
Sialkot Brigade Military Area and Gujrat.

WAZIRABAD:

April 30th, 1919.

*Martial Law Instruction No. 7.*

(Ref. Martial Law Instruction No. 3.)

Under orders from Punjab Government it is necessary to lay down the boundaries of areas. Paragraph No. 3 of the above instruction is therefore cancelled and the following substituted.

3. The General Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade, hereby appoints the following as Area Officers under paragraph 18 of the proclamation referred to:—

Gujranwala District—

Gujranwala Tahsil—Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'Brien, C.I.E., C.B.E., D. C., Gujranwala.

Khangah Dogran, Sharapur Tahsils—Mr. B. N. Bosworth-Smith, I.C.S., Joint D. C., Gujranwala.

Hafizabad Tahsil—Captain W. J. Cole, Supply and Transport Corps.

Wazirabad Tahsil—Major C. W. J. Smith, D.S.O., 2-54th Sikhs (F. F.)

Gujrat District—

Gujrat and Kharian Tahsils—Lieutenant-Colonel Browne, 37th Dogras.

Phalia Tahsil—Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Grant, V.C., 3-11th Gurkha Rifles.

Lyallpur District—

Joint Area Officers for whole Civil Area, Lyallpur—Lieutenant-Colonel G. C. Hodgson, D.S.O., 3-34th Sikh Pioneers.—Mr. G. F. deMontmorency, I.C.S., D. C., Lyallpur.

Add the following to paragraph 4, sub-paragraph 1:—

"An exception is made to this in the case of Captain J. W. Cole, Supply and Transport Corps, and Captain J. S. L. Ewing, M.C., 19th Lancers, who will similarly dispose of cases in any area through which they may be travelling, without reference to the Area Officer concerned. Paragraph No. 6 is now cancelled.

C. W. J. SMITH, Major,

Administrator, Martial Law,  
Sialkot Brigade Military Area and Gujrat.

2nd May 1919.

*Martial Law Instruction No. 8.*

1. Considerable uncertainty still appears to exist regarding the restrictions on coaching traffic. This appears to be due to the fact that the restrictions laid down in North-Western Railway booking restrictions Notice No. 1 (revised) and No. 3 apply to intermediate and 3rd class passengers only, whereas Martial Law Instruction No. 4, dated 20th April 1919, applies to 1st and 2nd class Indian passengers in addition, but can only be enforced in the Gujrat, Gujranwala and Lyallpur districts which comprise the area under the General Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade, for the Administration of Martial Law.

2. The restrictions laid down operate as follows:—  
*1st and 2nd class bookings—*

(a) Indian passengers may book from any station outside the three districts named in paragraph 1, through or into those districts without first obtaining a permit, but at the first checking station inside any of those districts they will be provided with a railway pass to their destination in or through those districts, or will be returned back.

(b) Passengers desiring to book from a station inside the districts named in paragraph 1 to any station inside or outside those districts must first obtain a railway pass.

*Inter. and 3rd class bookings—*

(a) Passengers may book from any station on the North-Western Railway not Railway Special Notice No. 1 (revised) through the restricted

## MARTIAL LAW INSTRUCTIONS.

[Concluded.]

areas named in that Notice to any station beyond those restricted areas without first obtaining a railway pass but on reaching the first checking station in any of the areas so named they must be given a railway pass to carry them through the areas, or be turned back.

- (b) Passengers wishing to book from any station on the North-Western Railway to any station in the above areas must first obtain a railway pass before a ticket can be issued at the starting station.
- (c) Passengers booking from foreign railways into or through the areas so named will be given a railway pass at the first checking station inside those areas, or be turned back.
- (d) Passengers wishing to book from a station in any of the above areas to any station on the North-Western Railway or to a foreign railway must first obtain a railway pass.

3. These restrictions do not apply to persons exempted under the railway notices and Martial Law Instruction referred to in paragraph 1 or to pensioned Indian officers when travelling in uniform.

T. P. WHEATLY, *Captain,*

for Major, Administrator, Martial Law,  
Sialkot Brigade Military Area and Gujrat.

WAZIRABAD:  
May 3rd, 1919.

*Martial Law Instruction No. 9.*

Please note that Notice under Martial Law No. 20 is now cancelled.

T. P. WHEATLY, *Captain,*

for Major, Administrator, Martial Law,  
Sialkot Brigade Military Area and Gujrat.

WAZIRABAD:  
May 3rd, 1919.

*Martial Law Instruction No. 10.*

1. In confirmation of this office wire No. 136-M.-L., dated 4th May 1919, Notice is hereby given that on and from 5th May 1919 all classes of railway tickets may be issued without restriction. Military passes under Martial Law are no longer required.

2. For the present Mail trains will continue to be examined at Lala Musa and Wazirabad for suspicious characters, who will be dealt with at the discretion of examining officers. Passenger trains, other than mails will be examined occasionally at the discretion of examining officers.

T. P. WHEATLY, *Captain,*

for Major, Administrator, Martial Law,  
Sialkot Brigade Military Area and Gujrat.

WAZIRABAD:  
May 4th, 1919.

*Martial Law Instruction No. 11.*

With reference to Notice under Martial Law No. 26, the General Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade,

directs that whenever a Union Jack is obtainable it should be erected at a suitable spot and the school-boys together with their masters should be made to salaam it at every parade with a view to inculcating a sense of respect for the British Flag as an emblem of the King-Emperor. The General Officer Commanding especially directs that school-masters and school-boys be instructed that it is the privilege of persons in the Army, Navy and Police only to salute, all other persons showing their respect by raising their hats or salaaming according to their nationality. It is probable that a Union Jack will be forthcoming on demand from any town.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*

Commanding, Sialkot Brigade.

WAZIRABAD:

May 5th, 1919.

*Martial Law Instruction No. 12.*

It is reported by the Punjab Government that rumours are being spread to the effect that under Martial Law payment of money orders has been suspended. Area Officers and Officer Commanding Troops, will do their best to refute this story and will satisfy themselves by enquiries that money orders are being paid promptly and action under Martial Law will be taken against any postal officials who in any way lend colour to this falsehood.

T. P. WHEATLY, *Captain,*

for Major, Administrator, Martial Law,  
Sialkot Brigade Military Area and Gujrat.

WAZIRABAD:

May 7th, 1919.

*Martial Law Instruction No. 13.*

I am directed by the General Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade, to inform you that should a man accused of infringing a Martial Law Order be sentenced to imprisonment and flogging, the flogging will be administered at the commencement of the imprisonment.

Also I am to inform you that there are no appeals against sentences given by Summary Courts.

T. P. WHEATLY, *Captain,*

for Major, Administrator, Martial Law,  
Sialkot Brigade Military Area and Gujrat.

WAZIRABAD:

May 9th, 1919.

*Martial Law Instruction No. 14.*

Reference Notice under Martial Law No. 26. Please delete the word "Lyallpur."

T. P. WHEATLY, *Captain,*

for Major, Administrator, Martial Law,  
Sialkot Brigade Military Area and Gujrat.

WAZIRABAD:

May 9th, 1919.