

REPORT

OF

HIS MAJESTY'S COMMISSIONERS

APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE MILITARY

PREPARATIONS AND OTHER MATTERS CONNECTED

WITH THE

WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.



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Royal Warrant.

EDWARD, R.

Edward the Seventh, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, King, Defender of the Faith; To Our Right Trusty and Right Well-beloved Cousin and Councillor Victor Alexander, Earl of Elgin and Kincardine, Knight of Our Most Noble Order of the Garter, Knight Grand Commander of Our Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Knight Grand Commander of Our Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire; Our Right Trusty and Well-beloved Cousin, Reginald Baliol, Viscount Esher, Knight Commander of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Knight Commander of the Royal Victoria Order; Our Right Trusty and Well-beloved Councillor, Sir George Dashwood Taubman-Goldie, Knight Commander of Our Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George; Our Trusty and Well-beloved Sir Henry Wylie Norman, Knight Grand Cross of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Knight Grand Cross of Our Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Companion of Our Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire, Field-Marshal of Our Forces; Our Trusty and Well-beloved Sir John Ommanney Hopkins, Knight Grand Cross of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Admiral on the Retired List of Our Navy; Our Trusty and Well-beloved Sir John Edge, Knight, and Our Trusty and Well-beloved Sir John Jackson, Knight: Greeting!

Whereas We have deemed it expedient that a Commission should forthwith issue to inquire into the Military preparations for the War in South Africa, and into the supply of men, ammunition, equipment, and transport by sea and land in connection with the campaign, and into the Military operations up to the occupation of Pretoria;

Now know ye, that We, reposing great trust and confidence in your knowledge and ability, have authorised and appointed, and do by these Presents authorise and appoint, you, the said Victor Alexander, Earl of Elgin and Kincardine; Reginald Baliol, Viscount Esher; Sir George Dashwood Taubman-Goldie; Sir Henry Wylie Norman; Sir John Ommanney Hopkins; Sir John Edge and Sir John Jackson to be Our Commissioners for the purposes of the said Inquiry.

And, for the better effecting the purposes of this Our Commission, We do by these Presents give and grant unto you, or any three or more of you, full power to call before you such persons as you shall judge likely to afford you any information upon the subject of this Our Commission; and also to call for, have access to, and examine, all such books, documents, registers, and records as may afford you the fullest information on the subject, and to inquire of and concerning the premises by all other lawful ways and means whatsoever.

And We do by these Presents authorise and empower you, or any three or more of you, to visit and personally inspect such places as you may deem it expedient so to inspect for the more effectual carrying out of the purposes aforesaid.

And We do by these Presents Will and Ordain that this Our Commission shall continue in full force and virtue, and that you, Our said Commissioners, or any three or more of you, may from time to time proceed in the execution thereof, and of every matter and thing therein contained, although the same be not continued from time to time by adjournment.

And We do further Ordain that you, or any three or more of you, have liberty to report your proceedings under this Our Commission from time to time, if you shall judge it expedient so to do.

And Our further Wish and Pleasure is that you do, with as little delay as possible, report to Us under your hands and seals, or under the hands and seals of any three or more of you, your opinion upon the matters herein submitted for your consideration.

Given at Our Court at Balmoral, the
Ninth day of September, One thousand nine
hundred and two, in the Second Year of
Our Reign.

By His Majesty's Command,

(Signed) A. AKERS DOUGLAS.

Royal Warrant.

EDWARD R.

Edward the Seventh, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, King, Defender of the Faith.

To Our right trusty and well-beloved Donald Alexander, Baron Strathcona and Mount Royal, Knight Grand Cross of Our Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, High Commissioner in London for Our Dominion of Canada; and Our trusty and well-beloved Sir Frederick Matthew Darley, Knight Grand Cross of Our Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Lieutenant Governor of the State of New South Wales, and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of that State; Greeting!

Whereas by Warrant under Our Royal Sign Manual bearing date the ninth day of September, One thousand nine hundred and two, We were pleased to appoint our right trusty and right well-beloved cousin and councillor Victor Alexander, Earl of Elgin and Kincardine, Knight of Our Most Noble Order of the Garter, Our right trusty and well-beloved cousin Reginald Baliol, Viscount Esher, Knight Commander of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, and the several gentlemen, therein named, or any three or more of them, to be Our Commissioners to inquire into the military preparations for the war in South Africa, and into the supply of men, ammunition, equipment and transport by sea and land in connection with the campaign, and into the military operations up to the occupation of Pretoria;

Now know ye, that We, reposing great trust and confidence in your knowledge and ability, have authorised and appointed, and do by these Presents authorise and appoint, you, the said Donald Alexander, Baron Strathcona and Mount Royal; and Sir Frederick Matthew Darley, to be Commissioners for the purpose aforesaid, in addition to and together with the Commissioners whom we have already appointed.

Given at Our Court at Saint James's, the eleventh day of October, One thousand nine hundred and two, in the second year of Our Reign.

By His Majesty's Command,

(Signed) **A. AKERS DOUGLAS,**

A P P E N D I C E S.

ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

APPENDICES TO VOLUME I. OF THE MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

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APPENDIX A

Appendix A.

REPLY BY GENERAL VISCOUNT-KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM TO A LETTER ADDRESSED TO HIM BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION, ASKING WHETHER HE DESIRED TO ADD ANYTHING TO HIS EVIDENCE.

(See Question 233.)

Commander-in-Chief's Camp, India.
Hindubagh, April 13th, 1903.

My Lord,—Your Lordship's communication from the Royal Commission only reached me after I had started on an extended tour along the Afghan frontier, and I regret to say that I am, therefore, not at present in a position to offer any additional evidence that might be of special value to the Royal Commission.

2. I see that there has been a divergence of opinion on the question of how transport should be most profitably employed in a campaign. The point I should like to accentuate is that by the formation of a proper independent Transport Department, the question of transport in different parts of the world could be thoroughly studied, and a sound, practical system, adaptable to the ever-varying forms of transport at our disposal, could be developed. It must always depend on the General Commanding in the field how the available transport should be utilised to the best advantage. I can quite realise that cases may exist when the regimental system could be adapted, and as that system gives greater comfort to the officers and men, it would naturally be preferred; on the other hand, if extreme mobility is required for a large mixed force for a considerable time, the utmost development of transport resources necessitates the reduction to a minimum of regimental transport, and I consider that in such cir-

cumstances a General will be able to achieve his object far better by this means than by dividing his available transport amongst the units of his command.

3. I would urge that officers can, if properly selected, be trained to deal efficiently with financial questions of considerable importance, and that it would be greatly to the advantage of the State if officers were made to realise more fully than they do now, the grave importance of all Army expenditure. When Army officers have learnt to appreciate the financial bearing of military matters of importance, I feel sure greater economy, combined with necessary efficiency, will be obtained.

Though civilian advisers may be of the greatest assistance, and cause considerable savings in Army expenditure, still it is to my mind impossible for them to have the same effect on general economy in the Army as would surely follow on the employment of trained officers in similar positions.

The simplification of the present system of accounting in the Army is a matter of great importance if officers are to effectively deal with this subject.

By the introduction on the staff of trained officers for financial duties, I am of opinion decentralisation of financial control could be safely effected.—I have the honour to be, your Lordship's most obedient servant,

(Signed) KITCHENER.

Appendix B.

APPENDIX B.

LIST OF BOOKS, ETC. HANDED TO THE COMMISSION BY LIEUT.-COLONEL E. A. ALTHAM, C.M.G., ON
OCTOBER 15TH, 1902, ON BEHALF OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

(See Question 524.)

Report on the Communications in Natal north of the latitude of Ladysmith, Intelligence Division, War Office, July, 1897.	
South African Republic: Road and Railway Reports.—Prepared in the Intelligence Division of the War Office, 1897.	
Précis of Information: Swaziland.—Compiled by Major F. A. Fortescue, King's Royal Rifles, Intelligence Division, War Office February, 1898.	
Précis of Information concerning Basutoland.—Prepared in the Intelligence Division of the War Office. Revised February, 1898.	
Notes on the Lines of Communication in the Cape Colony.—Collated by Major E. A. Altham, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Intelligence Division, War Office, June, 1899.	
South Africa: Supplementary Reconnaissance Reports.—Intelligence Division, War Office, September, 1899.	
Report on the Natal Government Railways and on the Defence of them and of the inland portion of the Colony, against possible invasion from South African Republic or Orange Free State, 1896.	
Reconnaissance of the Bridges over the Vaal and Orange Rivers, by Major E. A. Altham, with Covering Letters from Lieut.-General W. H. Goodenough, C.B., Commanding Troops in South Africa, 1899.	
Report on the Defence of Kimberley, Cape Colony, by Lieut.-Colonel J. K. Trotter, R.A., dated 11th June, 1898, with Remarks and Covering Letters by Lieut.-General Sir W. Goodenough, K.C.B., Commanding Troops, South Africa, dated 1st August, 1898.	
One Case containing Reconnaissance Reports on the Lines of Advance through the Orange Free State. (2 books and 10 maps.) Part I. by Major E. A. Altham, the Royal Scots, Staff Captain, Intelligence Division, War Office; Part II. by Major M. F. Rimington, 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons; and Part III. by Captain H. Sloggett, R.E.; and the following Intelligence Division Maps:—	
	Nos.
Burghersdorp to Bethulie Bridges -	1251 (a)
Bethulie Bridges to Springfontein -	1251 (b)
Springfontein to Edenburg -	1251 (c)
Edenburg to Bethanie Station -	1251 (d)
Bethanie Station to Bloemfontein -	1251 (e)
Bloemfontein -	1254
	Nos.
Colesberg to Norval's Pont -	1251 (f)
Norval's Pont to Springfontein -	1251 (g)
Colesberg to Colesberg Road Bridge -	1251 (h)
Colesberg Road Bridge to Philippolis -	1251 (i)
Philippolis to Springfontein -	1251 (j)
Railway Traverse Bloemfontein to Viljoen's Drift -	1260
One case containing Reconnaissance Reports on the Lines of Advance through the Orange Free State. Part II., by Captain A. H. Wolley-Dod, R.A., 1897; and the following Intelligence Division Maps:—	
	Nos.
Bloemfontein to Kroonstad -	1303
Kroonstad to Viljoen's Drift -	1304
Parys to Viljoen's Drift -	1304
Parys to Venterskroon Drift -	1304
Kroonstad to Shoeman's Drift -	1304
Index Map -	1305
One case containing (1) Supplementary Reconnaissance Reports, September, 1899; (2) Reconnaissance Sketches on the Lines of Advance through the Orange Free State and Transvaal; and the following Intelligence Division Maps:—	
	Nos.
Colesberg to Norval's Pont -	1443 (a)
Colesberg to Orange River Bridges -	1443 (b)
Philippolis to Jagersfontein -	1443 (c)
Jagersfontein to Bethanie -	1443 (d)
Bloemfontein to Petrusburg -	1443 (e)
Petrusburg to Kimberley -	1443 (f)
Mafeking to Johannesburg -	1443 (g)
Klerksdorp to Warrenton -	1443 (h)
Mafeking to Kunwana (via Lichten- berg) -	1443 (i)
Tati District -	1443 (j)
Tuli to Macloutsie -	1443 (k)
Palapye to Macloutsie -	1443 (l)
Orange River Station to Hopetown Road Bridge -	1443 (m)
Reitzburg to Potchefstroom -	1443 (n)
Charlestown to Heidelberg (via Stan- derton) -	1443 (o)
Smithfield Position -	1443 (p)
Plan of Warrenton and Fourteen Streams Bridge -	1437

APPENDIX C.

Appendix C.

LIST OF PLANS, MAPS, AND SKETCHES SUPPLIED TO THE COMMISSION BY THE WAR OFFICE.

(See Question 753.)

Name of Map, Plan, or Sketch.	Number.	Date.
Military Sketch Map of the Biggarsberg, and of communications in Natal north of the parallel of Ladysmith, in 21 sheets, with index.	I.D.W.O. 1223	1897.
Map of the Colony of Natal, drawn in the Office of the Superintendent Inspector of Schools, 1893, in four sheets (better known as Jeppe's Map).	—	1893.
Bartholomew's Reduced Survey Map of South Africa.	—	—
Map of the South African Republic and adjoining territories.	I.D.W.O. 1159	—
Sketch Map bounded by Colesberg, Steynsburg, and Adock.	—	—
Diagram of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, showing special maps by Intelligence Division, War Office, with dates in red, showing when the sheet was sent off from England.	I.D.W.O. 1445	—
Sketch issued with the object of illustrating the detail and hilly features, so far as they are known, of those portions of the South African Republic and Orange Free State bordering on the Northern portion of Natal.	I.D.W.O. 1190	May 1897
Map of the Biggarsberg Road Pass, from a sketch by Captain C. F. C. Beresford, R.E., 1881.	I.D.W.O. 1428	July 1899.
Military Sketch of the Biggarsberg, and of communications in Natal north of the parallel of Ladysmith.	I.D.W.O. 1442	September 1899.
Confidential, No. 26, South Africa.—Plan to accompany Report on the Defence of Kimberley.	I.D.W.O. 1360	August 1898.
Plan of Johannesburg - - - - -	I.D.W.O. 1245	1899.
Plan of Pretoria - - - - -	I.D.W.O. 1438	1899.
Natal.—Map of the country round Pietermaritzburg, from a sketch by Captain C. B. FitzHenry, 7th Hussars, 1897.	I.D.W.O. 1294	—
Confidential, No. 183.—Natal.—Plan of Amajuba and Laing's Nek, from a survey by Lieutenant W. Yolland, R.E., November 1882; two sheets.	I.D.W.O. 1255,	—
Sketches by the Intelligence Division of the following places:—		
Bethulie - - - - -	I.D.W.O. 1367	1899; revised 3rd February 1900.
Bloemfontein - - - - -		1899; revised 8th February 1900.
Bloemhof - - - - -		1900; revised 18th April 1900.
Boshof - - - - -		1900; revised 20th February 1900.
Ermelo - - - - -		1900; revised 21st May 1900.
Harrismith - - - - -		1899; revised 5th February 1900.
Heidelberg - - - - -		1900; revised 9th April 1900.
Hopetown - - - - -		1899; revised 22nd February 1900.
Kimberley - - - - -		1899; revised 11th February 1900

Appendix C.

List of the Plans, Maps, and Sketches supplied to the Commission by the War Office—*continued.*

Name of Map, Plan, or Sketch.	Number.	Date.
Sketches by the Intelligence Division of the following places— <i>continued.</i>		
Komati Port' - - - - -	I.D.W.O. 1367	1900
Kroonstad - - - - -		1900 ; revised 20th March 1900.
Ladybrand - - - - -		1900 ; revised 27th April 1900.
Ladysmith - - - - -		1900.
Lichtenburg - - - - -		1900 ; revised 2nd March 1900.
Lydenburg - - - - -		1900.
Mafeking - - - - -		1900 ; revised February 1900.
Nylstroom - - - - -		1900.
Pietermaritzburg - - - - -		1900.
Philipstown - - - - -		1900 ; revised 19th February 1900.
Pochefstroom - - - - -		1900 ; revised 2nd April 1900.
Pretoria - - - - -		1900 ; revised 27th March 1900.
Rouxville - - - - -		1899.
Rustenburg - - - - -		1900 ; revised 30th May 1900.
Taungs - - - - -		1900 ; revised February and March 1900.
Vrede - - - - -		1900 ; revised 4th May 1900.
Vryburg - - - - -	1900 ; revised 9th March 1900. [L]	
Wakkerstroom - - - - -	1900 ; revised 15th May 1900.	
Winburg - - - - -	1900 ; revised 7th March 1900.	
Stanford's Large Map of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope and neighbouring territories, compiled from the best available information.	—	1895.

APPENDIX D.

PRECIS OF EVIDENCE OF THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES NOT PRINTED IN THE MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>1.—Major General Sir ELLIOTT WOOD, K.C.B.</p> <p>2.—Colonel Sir C. E. HOWARD VINCENT, K.C.M.G., C.B., V.D., M.P., A.D.C.</p> | <p>3.—Major WYNDHAM C. KNIGHT, C.S.I., D.S.O.</p> <p>4.—Mr. F. T. MARZIALS, C.B.</p> |
|---|--|

1.—Precis of Evidence by Major-General Sir ELLIOTT WOOD, K.C.B.

(See Questions 1835-2341.)

GENERAL WORK OF THE ROYAL ENGINEERS IN THE FIELD.

The Special Report on Organisation and Equipment of the Engineer Arm in South Africa (Confidential, 079/3305) practically covers nearly all the recommendations that I can make in order to ensure the most efficient carrying out of the general work of the Royal Engineers in the Field, which hardly needs description.

Those recommendations are the result of the most comprehensive experience which we have ever had in a campaign, and I might specially point to a few of them, though all are important.

1st. As to Commanding Royal Engineers being on the Staff of Divisional Generals, I am very strongly of opinion that, until that is the case, full advantage of special Engineer training will not be desired; and the early and intelligent direction of all available working power (Engineer, Infantry, and Civil) will be absolutely impossible. This affects very seriously the prompt and efficient development of Field Works in Attack and Defence and improvement of roads and communications, whereby delay in the movement of troops is minimised.

2. The importance of carrying sappers on horseback became more and more apparent as the campaign went on.

On the march men continually had to work on the roads and drifts; and, unless mounted, it was impossible for them to get to the front again to undertake fresh work there.

Again, if some sappers can arrive early and comparatively fresh at camping grounds the question of water supply would be greatly helped, and the health and comfort of the troops would be benefited to a most important extent. Moreover, the defence of the camp, if works are necessary, would be earlier secured.

To avoid heavy "Peace" expense, it would perhaps suffice for provision to be made for war only; and for Field Company sappers to be taught just enough riding to enable them to sit on the quiet animals that generally obtain in war.

3. Great increase of Pontoon Establishment necessary. At the end of 1899 Natal applied to Cape Town for 60 pontoons, although the allowance for an Army Corps was barely one-third of that. We could only spare 30.

We had at the beginning of 1900 three bridges standing over the Modder River with Lord Methuen, two flying bridges over the Orange River at Zoutpan's Drift, and a bridge train with Lord Roberts' advance on Paardeberg.

Finally, we had also to bridge the Orange River for all Arms near Norvals Pont. This bridge was of unusual length, 266 yards.

Some of the old pontoons from Schools of Instruction

practically unfit for service, sank before the troops began to cross, and had to be replaced by barrel piers, which had been prepared to meet casualties. We had exhausted all pontoons.

4. *Telegraphs.* Large increase of personnel and equipment necessary, especially to meet future requirements of Cavalry and Mounted Infantry.

5. *Railways.* Although I think Colonel Girouard's estimate of Staff in Peace is too great, yet it is absolutely necessary to provide some staff. Possibly a branch at the Inspector-General of Fortifications' office, similar to that for Submarine Mining, might suffice. This is even more necessary for Home Defence than for War abroad.

6. Steam Road Transport proved very economical and efficient.

Its trains are compact, move rapidly, especially when returning empty, and are less liable to successful attack than other convoys. This will hardly, however, be an Engineer service in particular.

7. Motor-Car search lights should certainly form part of Engineer equipment, and might advantageously form part of the Field Company. We started them.

8. Wireless Telegraphy. Although this proved a failure when fully tried between Orange and Modder Rivers, yet its value in the field would have been incalculable had the system worked.

Experiments should be pushed on in high rough country, such as Wales or Scotland, and, if possible, on the high lands in South Africa.

9. Purchase of Stores, when in the Field, from any source, local, foreign, or home, by Commandant Royal Engineers and Directors should be freely admitted, subject, of course, to usual inspection and audit of books and accounts.

Although the War Orders for Engineer services impose no limit in this respect, yet in practice a freer hand as regards some special orders would have been distinctly advantageous.

Under our present system of training and experience, the officers in question have generally ample business aptitude for working such a system to the economical and rapid supply of the Engineer requirements of the Army. Rapidity of supply is generally of paramount importance in the Field.

10. As before stated, I would desire that effect may be given to all my recommendations in the special Report mentioned on the first page.

ELLIOTT WOOD, Major General.

18/10/1902.

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40 of Report.

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Page 83.

(See Questions 5444-5692.)

ABSENCE OF ANY ARRANGEMENTS FOR UTILISATION OF AUXILIARY FORCES IN THE EVENT OF WAR.

1. Member of Parliament for Central Sheffield since 1885, Colonel Commandant Queen's Westminster Volunteers since 1864, and an Aide-de-camp to the King.

2. Joined the Royal Military College, 1866, the Royal Welsh Fusiliers in 1868, from 1873 to 1875 Captain Royal Berks Militia, from 1875 to 1878 Colonel Central London Rangers, and 1878 to 1884 Director of Criminal Investigations, Metropolitan Police.

3. Considerable experience with Continental armies; cognisant of all preparations by Prussia for war of 1866 and 1870, and by Russia for Turkish war in 1877. Was military correspondent of "Daily Telegraph" for part of two latter campaigns.

4. War appearing highly probable in August, 1899, wrote on the 16th of that month to the War Office offering to raise from the Volunteer Force at own expense a battalion 1,000 strong for active service, all members to be unmarried, between 20 and 30 years of age, returned as efficient for two years as marksmen, and also a battalion for garrison duty in London or at home. The offer was sent direct to the Under Secretary of State for War, according to the regulations, but the answer came back that it had reached the War Office "through the wrong channel."

5. A verbal offer was made about the same time to the Adjutant-General by Colonel Eustace Balfour to augment the Gordon Highlanders by a service company from the London Scottish. It was not accepted.

6. On the outbreak of war my offer was renewed through the General Commanding the Home District, who strongly recommended its acceptance, and a memorandum was sent giving full details. But no answer was made.

7. On October 31st, 1899, 20 days after the declaration of war, having since August received many hundreds of offers of service from the Volunteer Force, wrote again to the War Office. The reply of November 1st, 1899, was to the effect "that the Secretary of State fully appreciates the patriotic spirit which has led to so many offers of service by the Volunteers, and will not hesitate to avail himself of the powers given by the Volunteer Act of 1895 should the occasion arise. But that Act gives no powers to send Volunteers abroad. It is meant to facilitate the preparations for home defence. If any crisis arises in which a large increase in the home garrison is required (of which there is at present no sign) the Volunteers would be the appropriate force to use. As to enlistment, the Army Act only lays down that enlistment must not be for more than 12 years, but it allows enlistment for any shorter term. The Army Regulations, however, only allow it for terms of 3, 7, or 12 years with the colours. If it is decided to accept the offers of service from individual Volunteers to fill gaps, regulations will be published allowing enlistment for a short time and giving directions."

8. On November 24th, 1899, I again returned to the charge by a letter to Mr. Wyndham to the effect "that I ventured to make one more appeal before going abroad. Let the conditions be what they may, I suggest two years' efficient Volunteer service, age between 21 and 28, marksmanship this year, recommendation by the Commanding Officer and Adjutant, medical examination, and celibacy. I cannot believe that while the Volunteers of Cape Colony, Natal, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia are being given an opportunity, advantage is not to be taken of the occasion to see what reserves might be forthcoming from the Volunteers of Great Britain to cement the tie between the Regulars and the Volunteers, to improve the tone of Army recruits, to get them otherwise than at street corners, and to draw Volunteers into the Army. Am I to tell men, eager to serve their country, that the only course before them is to leave the Volunteers and join the Army for seven years or more? Of course, they are not prepared to do that, as many are in well remunerated positions. The casualties are already over 2,000, independently of the sick. Some of the vacancies could be well filled by

zealous and approved marksmen or the Volunteers, rather than by the ordinary recruit, or some of the 36½ per cent. rejected as under age or lacking in physique."

The answer was: "It would be a great mistake to issue regulations for the special enlistment of Volunteers until there is some prospect of their services being required. There is at present no probability of this."

On November 29th, 1899, Lord Wolseley, then Commander-in-Chief, wrote himself:—"The idea is a good one, though many and serious difficulties stand in the way. There are many officers in the Volunteer Force who are admirable, and who have studied the military profession as closely as many of our good officers in the Regular Army. There are some corps, like the Westminsters, who have first-rate men in command of them, and who have been in the Regular Army. But there is not that evenness of efficiency in any Volunteer battalion that would bring it up to the level of an ordinary line regiment. However, the day may come when we shall be only too glad to employ Volunteer corps on active service, and I shall rejoice to see it."

9. After the reverses of Magersfontein, Stormberg, and Colenso, the temper of the public was such that the continued military refusal of Volunteers would not have been tolerated. I was in the South of France, having had a severe attack of displacement of the heart. But my proposals were sent for to the Queen's Westminster Headquarters, and the City Imperial Volunteers decided upon. I was offered the command of the Mounted Infantry, but, not well enough for that, was appointed to the command of the infantry, and even for that was unable to pass the doctors, the journey home and other disturbing influences having brought on a recurrence of the physical trouble.

But I took part in the preparations of the corps, the ordering of the equipment, the selection of the officers, and the enrolment of the men. It was but too evident that what might have been easily done in August or even in October or November could only be done extravagantly and badly at such speed, despite the liberality of the City Companies. I had even to call in and take all the belts off my own corps for the City Imperial Volunteers, so impossible was it to obtain leather and equipment. The officers, the non-commissioned officers, and the men were also hastily selected, and many went out whose campaign defects a few weeks in barracks would have discovered. Nor did the War Office show much disposition to help. No adjutant of Volunteers was allowed to go. It was proposed to send a cavalry adjutant with the infantry, and no qualified sergeant instructors of mounted infantry were sanctioned. It was all bustle, confusion, *laissez aller*, if not obstruction.

10. I left for South Africa on January 6th, 1900, arriving a week before the mounted infantry under Colonel Cholmondeley, and was able to get their camp pitched for them at Green Point and other arrangements made.

Returning from the Tugela and the headquarters of Sir Redvers Buller for the Army Headquarters at Paardeberg, I saw both the infantry battalion of the City Imperial Volunteers and the mounted infantry at Paardeberg. The former were kept in training at Orange River for several months. The latter had been rushed up to the front before they were ready, and the platforms up the line were littered with their equipment.

I bring this out to emphasise my contention that had the War Office made preparation in August, October, or even November, as was urged upon them, all this confusion and extravagance would have been avoided, and the units sent out been perfected at home instead of in the field.

11. In February, 1900, sixty-six special service companies were called for from the Volunteer Force, consisting entirely of single men, marksmen, twice efficient. The reports concerning these special service companies have been uniformly excellent, and corroborated by every single officer under whom or with whom they served in South Africa. The men proved

to be the best behaved, the most intelligent, and were invariably assigned to outposts and other stations requiring especial reliability and resource.

In 1901 further special service companies were called for, and again in 1902 further companies.

12. The response to the second and third calls was less good than to the first, and upon this ground, that whereas the Volunteers in the special service companies were men of especial military qualifications—two years' efficiency, marksmanship, celibacy, and received nothing but soldier's pay—1s. a day—men with very inferior qualifications or no qualifications at all, neither character, nor military training, nor marksmanship, nor riding, were taken haphazard and given 5s. a day.

The Volunteers desiring, therefore, to serve their country in the field in 1901 and 1902, naturally, therefore, went to the 5s. a day service, instead of to the 1s. a day. The former also offered great chances of advancement to commissioned and non-commissioned rank, which was wholly absent from the service companies. For instance, nearly every Queen's Westminster joining the Imperial Yeomanry was promoted at once to sergeant, and a large number received commissions subsequently.

The recruiting in 1901 for the second levy of Imperial Yeomanry was scandalous. It was conducted in the street. Officers commanding regiments were consulted in no way as to either officers or men, and no advantage was given either to Yeomen or Volunteers.

Even with the third or 1902 levy, exactly the same mistakes were made as in 1900, and the battalions were prevented by the War Office from obtaining the services of reliable officers and non-commissioned officers. On this point the evidence of Colonel Kemp, M.P., would be valuable to the Royal Commission, as he had experience of the levies both of 1900 and 1902.

It is difficult to exaggerate the extraordinary want of forethought or provision upon the military side of the War Office, and every concession had to be carried, so to say, at the point of the bayonet. It was extracted with evident unwillingness from scarcely concealed hostility.

Nor even now, despite the efforts of General Sir Alfred Turner, the Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces, does there appear to be the slightest realisation by the Adjutant-General's Department of the great lesson of the war, that it is essential to attract the largest possible number of men to some military training, to perfect the *cadres* of officers and non-commissioned officers, with a view to the most rapid and effective expansion in time of war or necessity.

Despite the fact that 589 officers of Volunteers and 19,161 Volunteers served with Volunteer units in the South African war, and that a large proportion of the 1,398 officers and 34,192 men of the Imperial Yeomanry were members of the Volunteer Force, the difficulties of the Volunteer Service have been greatly increased since the war. The duties have been made more onerous, more costly, more difficult to carry out, demanding a greater sacrifice of time and employment hours. The consequence is, thousands of resignations, greater difficulty in obtaining officers, greater difficulty in finance.

Army Order 16 of 1902, which stated in paragraph 5: "For some years past the Volunteer Force has constantly claimed to be seriously accepted as a reliable and organised section of the Army for Home Defence" was taken as insulting to a force which, without the slightest legal liability, had contributed to the Army in the field not less than 30,000 men, and had by their spirit and example practically saved the military situation at the end of 1900.

3.—Précis of Evidence by Major WYNDHAM C. KNIGHT, C.S.I., D.S.O., late Chief Staff Officer, Imperial Yeomanry.

(See Questions 7089-7243.)

Equipment

The first contingent Imperial Yeomanry raised at a time when the War Office were able to give little or no help beyond the grant of money for each man enlisted, was, thanks to the large funds subscribed by the public, sent out to South Africa equipped in a far superior manner to the regular Army.

Not only had they better clothes and more of them, but thanks to the generosity of private individuals a large proportion of the non-commissioned officers and men had field glasses or telescopes, and most battalions had machine guns.

In addition to these, in many cases, light carts had been provided for squadrons. The clothing supplied was of such superior quality that, after the occupation of Pretoria, officers were offering men of the Imperial Yeomanry a good deal more than the original cost in order to obtain their jackets, hats, and breeches.

The general excellence of the clothing reflected the greatest credit on the officers responsible for its selection and examination.

The Yeomanry stores of clothing were not replenished from England, and as those sent out became exhausted, the Yeomanry depended more and more on the Army Ordnance Department, and latterly were on exactly the same footing as regular troops.

Although the Yeomanry derived some benefit from having their own clothing, it led to the unnecessary multiplication of clothing depôts, and it is undoubtedly for the general good that in future campaigns volunteers of all kinds should be treated as integral parts of the regular Army, and clothed and equipped by the Army Ordnance Department.

Mounting.

The Imperial Yeomanry at first had their own Remount Department, and purchased and sent out some 13,000 horses.

6719.

This was a great mistake, and should never be allowed again. It led to multiplication of remount officers and depôts, and to anomalous situations as to how far Yeomanry Remounts were available for general purposes, and *vice versa*.

This system was abolished early in the campaign, and the Imperial Yeomanry drew their horses just like other mounted units.

These varied according to the contingent.

The first contingent, enlisted in a time of national emergency, consisted almost entirely of men superior to the classes ordinarily enlisted. The bulk of these men could ride and handle fire-arms, though owing to want of experience with rifles, their shooting was in most cases indifferent.

There were a large number of men in the ranks who, after a short experience of actual warfare, were fit to fill vacancies in the commissioned ranks, and the men so promoted were the backbone of the Yeomanry when the officers, who had brought out the original contingents, went home.

In nearly every part of England more men had come forward than were actually required, so the local authorities had been able to get rid of men who after due trial proved incompetent or undesirable.

The presence of large numbers of educated men in the ranks was of great service as the country was gradually occupied, and a large number of positions of trust had to be taken over. Many of the non-commissioned officers and men of this contingent have already risen high in the civil administration of the Orange River Colony and Transvaal.

There were a number of men who had considerably understated their ages in their enthusiasm to get to the front.

Appendix

Special qualities

Men.

Appendix D. As a general rule these men were unable to stand the hard work and roughing, and it would have been better to adhere rigidly to the thirty-five years age limit.

The general physique of this contingent was excellent, and far above that of the regular Army.

Second contingent.

In the second contingent (17,000 men) enlisted as before at home Yeomanry centres and in the larger towns, the general stamp, though below that of the first contingent, was good. There were, however, exceptions. The contingents sent from Leicester and Reading were bad, and that enlisted at one of the London offices, as the Duke of Cambridge's Own, was disgraceful; and it is impossible to understand how an officer could have accepted or a medical officer have passed a large proportion of these men. Surgeon-Major C. R. Kilkelly, C.M.G., First Grenadier Guards, late in charge of the Imperial Yeomanry Hospitals at Pretoria and Elandsfontein, could give particulars of men sent home for medical reasons. A large number of this contingent could neither ride nor shoot in spite of having passed tests in both in England, and it was necessary to send home over a thousand men of this contingent, of whom a very large proportion belonged to the Duke of Cambridge's Own referred to above.

The shooting of those who remained compared favourably with that of the first contingent, but 75 per cent. could not ride at all. The men of this contingent were much younger than their predecessors, and it was necessary to keep them under much stricter discipline. Many men had been sent out who were too heavy for mounted work, and numbers suffered from organic disease and could not have been fit for military duty at the time they left England. There were numerous deaths on the way out.

After weeding, the bulk of this contingent made excellent soldiers, and the attached opinions of regular and other officers under whom they served show their value in the field.

Enclosures marked A. and B. and C. In latter, officers marked * were selected in South Africa, those marked + in England.

Third contingent.

This contingent had the advantage of four months' training at home before being sent out.

As they were never tried by the test of active service it is difficult to estimate their fighting value.

On arrival in South Africa they probably shot better than the other contingents, and rode better than the second contingent, but were far inferior to the first contingent in riding and horse management.

ENCLOSURE "A."

Captain Lumby, old Y. officer.

EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding 74th Irish Squadron Imperial Yeomanry, dated 8th October, 1901.

Am delighted to say my men are splendid, and a grand lot of fellows, though they are now beginning to get a little bit tired, and want a rest. I have had 25 per cent. of casualties, but they are always pleased with an engagement.

Lieut.-Col. Leir, P.S.C., H.A.

EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding 1st Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated 30th September, 1901.

Much indignation in 1st Imperial Yeomanry at reports in papers about new Yeoman. Most unjust. In my opinion my men are very good indeed.

Lieut.-Col. W. Jarvis.

EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding 21st Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated 28th September, 1901.

I took a small Commando out on Thursday night; left at seven p.m., and went twenty-eight miles out, rounding up some farms. Caught six Boers, and collared 160 head of cattle and 300 sheep, two Cape carts, some rifles, ammunition, etc., and got them all safe in here by nine a.m. yesterday morning. It was a long ride in the time. We covered at least sixty miles, and both horses and men did well.

Lieut.-Col. Banon, P.S.C., Shropshire L.I.

EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding 17th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated 10th September, 1901.

Now about the Regiment. I am more sanguine about

it than I have ever been before. The two Squadrons here are getting much better. Two troops, 50th, the other day turned an equal number of Boers out of three positions, and chased them into some Yeomanry of another Column

I took out the 60th a few nights ago, and made a night march of 15 miles, and two hours after daylight bagged a patrol of 7 armed Boers with two horses and a telescope. Yesterday with a troop of the 60th we chased four Boers four or five miles and bagged them.

EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding 17th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated 18th September, 1901. Lieut.-Col. Banon, P.S.C., Shropshire L.I.

You will be glad to hear that the 17th Imperial Yeomanry had another little success yesterday. I took out 70 of the best mounted men of the 50th for a 15-mile ride, and just after it was light we saw some horses near a kopje. I sent one troop to the left, one to the right, and some to the kopje, and found a small laager behind; they had seen us, but could not get their horses in time, and the few that did we galloped down, and the rest seeing the game was up put up their hands. We got 17 prisoners, adults four, white lads 13 to 15, and six natives, 45 horses, 50 cattle, and some 300 sheep. These two Squadrons have since the first of the month got themselves 26 adult prisoners and six white boys of 13 to 16, and helped to get the 10 prisoners four days ago, when we got into a Commando at dusk.

EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding 17th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated 21st September, 1901. Lieut.-Col. Banon, P.S.C., Shropshire L.I.

I think I told you of my taking out 70 of the 50th Squadron a night march, and surprising a laager at sunrise, getting 17 adult prisoners and five lads, horses, cattle, etc. Two nights after I took half a Company of Mounted Infantry, and a troop each of the 50th and the 60th. We marched 26 miles, and at dawn laid up in some hills. I saw some Boers in a kloof and got a helio message to Williams, and he worked round them. They moved out when he was seven or eight miles away and came towards me; I got their first scout who came towards me, but the second saw me and gave the alarm. I had my men all ready, and forthwith sent a troop to gallop to cut them off from another lot of kopjes; they thought they were surrounded, and put up the white flag, and I took 50 prisoners, five white lads, five blacks, and nearly 150 horses. This is the third time in September I have got prisoners by making a long night march, and making for some spot one knows the Boers frequent, and I am sure that this despatching a party and following it up with the Column at daylight pays.

EXTRACT from letter from Staff Officer, Mounted Troops, Kekewich's Column, dated October 2nd, 1901. Capt. Baldwin, P.S.C., D.A.A.G. Written after the attack on Kekewich's Camp by Delarey and Kemp.

The Boers, about 1,200, under Kemp and Delarey, meant business, and it was rather serious for a short time, but our men played up splendidly, not only the Derbys, but the Scottish and the Imperial Yeomanry, not a pin to choose between any of them. Do your best for us in officers, men, and horses, the latter especially we are very short of. They were shot down in scores.

EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding Mounted Troops, Methuen's Force, dated 12th September, 1901. Lieut.-Col. S. B. Von Donop, H.A. The Yeomanry are doing very well and are very keen.

EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding 18th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated 11th September, 1901.

We are getting on very well. All ranks have shaken into their work now, and are doing well. With the small Column we have now the duties are very heavy, and the men do not have an easy time in the field by any means.

EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding Imperial Yeomanry, Damant's Column, dated October 6th, 1901. Major D. Campbell, 9th Lancers

It may interest you to know that the three Companies,

30th, 31st, and 91st, which I now have with Damant's Column have been doing excellent work and making a name for themselves quite worthy of the best traditions of the Old Yeomanry.

remainder have found most willing, hard-working, and full of keenness, and in all the fighting we have had they have always shown up well. Appendix

Lieut.-Col. Hickie, P.S.C., Royal Fusiliers. EXTRACT from letter from Lieut.-Colonel Hickie, Commanding Column, Transvaal, dated September 16th, 1901.

I see that they have been asking questions in the House about the New Yeomanry. I send you the following unofficially, but if it is of any use to you at any time I shall be glad to repeat it officially. The 103rd and the 107th Companies joined me on May 1st at Syfer-keyl, near Klerksdorp. I was then commanding Babington's Mounted Troops. On May 17th I was appointed to the command of the Column, and the two Companies have therefore been with me now for nearly five months; during that time the men have gone on improving. I have served for nineteen months with the Mounted Infantry, and have been intimately acquainted with 18 regiments of Regulars and Irregulars. I would not change these two Companies for an equal number of men from any corps in South Africa. The officers are excellent and the men are A1. I put this down to, first, Captain Norman Stewart, Captain Haughton (especially to this officer), Captain Boyd, to the fact that nearly all the officers had previously served in the field, notably McEwen, Wolf, Tredennick, and Francis, are all very good officers. The Companies worked with the 14th Hussars and Imperial Light Horse, both of which regiments were particularly good. The men have improved wonderfully in physique, their morale is excellent, and their self-confidence enormous. They scout well, and they perform all the duties as I would wish them to do, and they look after their horses excellently. They have had a few little successes lately, and there is no holding them at present; they consider themselves much superior to any mounted troops in this part of the country. I wish I had four more companies of the same sort.

Lieut.-Col. A. C. Hamilton, 6th D.G. EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding 9th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated August 17th, 1901.

They are doing very well. Broadbent, with his troop, captured 14 of the enemy the other day. I still hear good accounts of the 30th and 31st with Colonel Damant.

Major P.M. Sykes, 2nd D.G. EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding Welsh Yeomanry Companies, Methuen's Force, dated September 16th, 1901.

The 89th did splendidly, and although there were only Jameson and two men unwounded at the end, plus myself legged, we kept the Boers at bay for three-quarters of an hour, and practically saved 20 ox waggons, a Maxim, and perhaps even more.

Lieut.-Col. De Rougemont, P.S.C., D.S.O., R.A. EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding 12th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated 6th September, 1901.

Can you enlighten me as to why everyone crabs the New Yeomanry? I consider they are extremely good, and brave as lions. They have been highly tried, having to be alongside Cavalry Regiments doing the same work.

Lieut.-Col. Anderson, D.S.O., old I.Y. officer. EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding 5th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated 1st October, 1901.

General efficiency. The men can now ride well and can shoot well; and are in a very good state of discipline. They appear to be keen, and fight well in action. The officers look well after their men and perform their duties conscientiously, and I have no complaints to make.

Major D.G. Campbell, 9th Lancers. EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding Yeomanry, Damant's Column.

By judicious weeding and getting hold of good officers and non-commissioned officers, they improved by leaps and bounds, and are now, I think, as good a lot of Yeomanry as there are in South Africa; in fact, so pleased is Damant with the Yeomanry, that he is always applying for more. Of course, there are a certain number of wrong 'uns amongst the men, but those I have got rid of, and the

ENCLOSURE "B."

COPY of REPORT by Colonel R. G. KEKEWICH, C.B., 7th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry.

In bringing the good services of all ranks of this Battalion to notice, I trust that the valuable services it has rendered during the War may be taken into special consideration.

The Regiment came under my command in July, 1901, and its record is most distinguished. There has always been a real good fighting spirit in it, and all ranks have always "played the game" and fought well.

Once, when about a dozen men were cut off and surrounded by several hundred Boers, they fought it out until half of their number (six) had been killed and wounded.

Its casualties since March, 1901, have been:—

	Officers.	Men.
Killed in action - - - -	8	43
Died of wounds - - - -	—	7
Wounded - - - -	6	96
Died of disease - - - -	—	16
Accidentally injured - - - -	—	2
	14	164

Not a single instance has ever come under my notice of any officer, non-commissioned officer, or men in any way showing "the white feather," and this will probably be considered a very special record, considering that it was at Vlaakfontein (six officers killed), Middlefontein, Moedwil, and Rooiwal.

(Signed) R. E. KEKEWICH, Colonel
Commanding Mobile Force.

Kaalkraal,
3rd June, 1902.

ENCLOSURE "C."

Fauriesmith, 3rd August, 1901.

To C.S.O., Imperial Yeomanry,
Johannesburg.

Sir,
I have the honour to forward to you confidential reports on the officers of the 30th and 31st Imperial Yeomanry under my command.

*30th Company.—Blunt, R.A. Capt.**—A very good hard-working officer who thoroughly knows his work, and is getting his company into good working order as rapidly as possible.

*Bazley, W. H., Lieut.**—A very good officer—very keen—very willing and thoroughly up in his work.

*Gray, H. G. S., Lieut.**—A very good officer—very willing, and thoroughly up in his work.

Hope, A., 2nd Lieut.†—This officer was sadly lacking in the experience requisite to instruct untaught Yeomen in their work; he is, however, keen and willing, and will be all right in time.

Stewart, C. C., 2nd Lieut.†—Same as 2nd Lieut. Hope.

*31st Company.—Ardagh, G. H., Capt.**—A very hard-working officer, who thoroughly understands his work, and is making the best of the very raw material he has to work upon.

*Livingstone, A. M., Lieut.**—A very good officer indeed, and thoroughly up in his work. He is desirous of obtaining a commission in the Connaught Rangers, for which I wish most strongly to recommend him, as he is thoroughly fitted in every way, and the regiment will be lucky to get him. If he obtains his commission, I should like him to remain on with the 31st Company, as unless I have some good officers, I shall never be able to get the men up to the mark, as when I took them over such a crew in my life to be expected to ever take Boers—but thanks to the officers they are now rapidly coming to hand.

*Hunt, O. D., Lieut.**—A thoroughly good and reliable officer, who has been my Adjutant since I took over com-

mand. He is hard-working and keen, and is perfectly up in his work. In fact, thanks to Lieut. Hunt, my work of getting the two companies into fighting order has been much easier than I ever expected. I have thorough confidence in him.

He wishes for a commission in the South African Constabulary, and I can most strongly recommend him as fitted in every way. Although, of course, I should not stand in his way of getting a good billet, I should like him to remain with the Yeomanry until it is in more ship-shape condition, as at present his services are invaluable, and I cannot spare any officer who knows his work with so much teaching to be done.

*Underwood, T. P. D., 2nd Lieut.**—A young officer who has the making of a first-class soldier—he is keen and hard-working, and seems to have a very good head on his shoulders.

Hine, A., 2nd Lieut.†—Lacking in knowledge to instruct untaught men, but is keen and willing and will be all right with more experience.

Noad, P. H., 2nd Lieut.†—This officer has been sick, and I have seen little of him, and do not feel justified in expressing an opinion, although I think he will be all right.

(Signed) DAVID G. M. CAMPBELL.

Commanding 30-31st Imperial Yeomanry

rafts.

There should never have been any second and third contingents.

The first contingent should have been fed by constant drafts sent out to a central Yeomanry Depot, where they could have been at least partially trained, and then sent to join the squadron for which they were enlisted.

The manner in which the men of the second contingent were mixed up on arrival at Aldershot was extraordinary, and made it very difficult to send them, on arrival in South Africa, to the units for which they enlisted.

fficers.

The success of any irregular force must depend on the way in which it is officered.

The most difficult task which devolved on the Yeomanry Staff in South Africa was the getting rid of the large number of undesirable and incapable officers sent out from England

Here again the difference between the three contingents is very clearly marked.

irst contingent.

The officers were in most cases men of position and a certain age, with as far as possible previous military experience. They were selected at Yeomanry centres by the Colonels of home Yeomanry regiments, except the Commanding Officers, who were selected by the Yeomanry Committee.

Socially, they were rather above the average of Regular officers, and they showed great keenness and adaptability in the field. The officers of the regiments raised by small committees, as Paget's, Roughriders, Duke of Cambridge's Own, Sharpshooters, were not quite so good socially or professionally.

The weakest point about the officers of the first contingent was the large number who went home before their men after a very few months in the field.

Luckily there were in most cases better men in the ranks to take their places.

second contingent.

Consisting of four formed battalions, two formed squadrons, and 400 officers and 14,000 men as drafts.

This gave a total of about 530 officers. These officers were selected in England, and were far in excess of the number actually required.

They were supposed to have held a commission in some branch of the service, or to have had "previous South African experience during the War."

Instead of being selected by the County Yeomanry authorities, the Yeomanry office in London advertised for them.

The result, as seen in South Africa, was startling.

Some had never ridden, some had never been in decent society before, some had indifferent records as privates in the first contingent.

Many were physically unfit. From memory, I think

it was necessary to get rid of over 100 of these officers, and that in one week's *London Gazette* over twenty resigned, or were dismissed.

The harm done to the name of the Imperial Yeomanry, and to the officer class generally, was incalculable.

Their ideas on money matters were so irregular that it became necessary for the Field Force canteen to refuse to cash Yeomanry officers' cheques.

This contingent contained a number of good officers, and a larger number of those capable of being made into good officers. Nearly sixty regular officers, mostly from units serving in South Africa, were lent to the Yeomanry, and by their work, and that of the officers of the first contingent who had remained on, coupled with constant weeding of those found inefficient or undesirable, the second contingent reach the standard of efficiency of which the regiment mentioned in Colonel Kekewich's letter (marked Enclosure B) was a fair example.

The Inspector-General Imperial Yeomanry had cabled asking that senior officers should not be sent, but no notice was taken of this, and four battalions were sent out fully officered, and in three cases so badly officered that it was found necessary to break them up and reform the four into two battalions, and even then to put in a regular officer to command one of them.

Selected as before by the central Yeomanry authorities without any reference to the counties. The general stamp of officer was not as good as it might have been, and men were sent out in higher positions without any reference to their previous record during the War. Third contingent

In two cases men who had held subordinate positions were sent out in command of regiments. One of these left South Africa as a subaltern, and the other as a Quartermaster.

It was used mostly by squadrons. At first there was a tendency to employ the Imperial Yeomanry on lines of communication, but latterly they were used exactly the same as any other mounted units. It became easier to work them in battalions towards the end of the War owing to the commanding officers and battalion staffs being either regular or those who had proved their fitness for their position during the campaign. "Way in which the force was used in South Africa, and the purposes for which it was found most valuable."

The first contingent was during the first ten months very much split up in squadrons, acting for themselves and with no central authority to whom they could refer.

Gradually this was changed and the whole force highly centralised, each squadron corresponding direct with the office of the Inspector-General Imperial Yeomanry, which was established in the neighbourhood of a large Yeomanry camp which was formed at Elandsfontein.

A pay office was established at Elandsfontein, and every effort made to bring the pay work up to date, and to help the squadron commanders with their accounts. This work was made very much more difficult by the 1901 contingent having been sent out without numbers, last pay certificates, or next-of-kin rolls. Pay.

Owing to the way the country drafts had been mixed up at Aldershot, and the incompetency of the officers placed in charge of them, it was exceedingly difficult to trace some men at all.

This contingent left England in the spring of 1901, and in the autumn of the same year only a portion of the missing documents had reached South Africa. A few had not arrived by the end of the War.

The system of making squadron or company commanders responsible for the compilation of the accounts of their units failed completely. Failure of pay system.

We ought to begin at once to form the nucleus from which to officer the Yeomanry of the future. The future.

More than 2,200 officers have served in the Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa, and there is a large amount of detailed information as to the capabilities or defects of these officers in the Imperial Yeomanry officers in South Africa.

I would propose that every officer who served with the Imperial Yeomanry during the campaign, and is certified by his late Commanding Officer and one of the late Inspector-Generals of Imperial Yeomanry as suitable, should be asked to record his name on the Reserve of the Imperial Yeomanry and be affiliated to one of the some Yeomanry regiments.

An officer so affiliated should be able to come out for training with such regiments as supernumerary in the rank he held in South Africa, and to draw the pay of his rank during training.

In this manner officers would be able to keep in touch not only with soldiering, but with units with which they could serve in a future campaign.

All enlistments of men and selection of officers in the future must be by the home regiments of Imperial Yeomanry, helped in the case of officers by the Lord-Lieutenants of counties, or committees selected by them. All appointments of officers to be approved by the Army Corps Commander, and if regimental staffs are formed, they should be selected by the Army Corps Commander. The weak point all through the successive contingents

has been the difficulty of finding efficient regimental staffs, and, generally speaking, from Commandant down to Regimental Sergeant-Majors, it has been necessary to draw on the regular Army. Where amateurs were given field rank it was frequently impossible to employ them in active operations, owing to their being senior to the Column Commanders, and when they attempted duties of Quartermaster and Adjutant they generally failed.

To obviate these difficulties I would suggest that in future only squadrons should be formed, and that they should be attached to cavalry regiments and treated in every respect as the Volunteer service companies were treated, being kept up to a strength of 150 rank and file by drafts.

4.—Précis of Evidence by Mr. F. T. MARZIALS, C.B., Accountant-General, War Office.

(See Questions 7797-8016.)

Under the Order in Council of the 23rd June, 1870, the Surveyor-General of the Ordnance was charged "with preparing Estimates for all the above (following) services:—

"Providing, holding, and issuing to all branches of the army and reserve forces, food, forage, fuel and light, clothing, arms, accoutrements, munitions of war, and all other stores necessary for the efficient performance of their duties by such forces, of proper quality and pattern, and in proper quantities according to the regulations governing the provision, custody, and issue of such supplies;

"With exercising a strict control over the expenditure of such supplies, and with seeing that they are properly accounted for by the several officers and others who may be charged with their custody, issue and use;

"With the custody of all buildings in which troops are quartered, and with allotting quarters;

"With providing transport for troops, and directing land and inland water transport."

Under another Order of the same date, the Financial Secretary was charged:—

"With preparing the annual Estimate for the Pay of the Army and Reserve Forces; with collecting and incorporating into a general Estimate for Army Services the Estimates of the other departments of the War Office, and with financially reviewing the expenditure proposed in such Estimates;

"With submitting for the instructions of the Secretary of State for War any proposed re-distribution of the sums allotted to the different sub-divisions of the Votes for Army Services;

"With advising the Secretary of State on all questions of Pay, Retired Pay, and Pensions of the Army and Reserve Forces;

"And with the duty of rendering such other advice and assistance as may be required of him by the Secretary of State for War."

The Order in Council of the 21st February, 1888, assigned the duty of preparing the Estimates generally to the Commander-in-Chief, and with that Order was issued a Memorandum defining the duties of various subordinate officers, assigning—

1. To the Quartermaster-General the duty of preparing Estimates for Transport and Provisions (Votes 6 and 7 of the Army Estimates).

2. To the Inspector-General of Fortifications the duty of preparing Estimates for Works (Vote 10).

3. To the Director of Artillery the duty of preparing Estimates for Warlike Stores (Vote 9).

4. To the Director-General Army Medical Department the duty of preparing Estimates for Medical Services.

5. To the Director-General of Ordnance Factories the duty of preparing the Estimates for those Factories.

Under the Order in Council of the 21st November, 1895, the Adjutant-General is charged "with annually submitting proposals for the Establishments * * *"—the duties of the Quartermaster-General, Inspector-General of Fortifications, and Inspector-General of Ordnance remaining as before,—and in these respects the Order in Council of the 7th March, 1899, made no difference. It, however, gave to the Director-General of Ordnance the Estimates for the Factories, and repeated the former Order assigning to the Director-General Army Medical Department the Estimates for Medical Services.

Finally, on the 12th October, 1901, an "Office Memorandum," assigned to the Army Board, "in addition to its present duties," the "consideration of—

1. The annual Estimates prepared by heads of departments, and the allocation of the sums allotted for military purposes, and

2. The establishments of officers and men of the Regular Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteer Forces."

When the time for preparing the Estimates comes round, i.e., in the autumn, the Adjutant-General puts forward his proposals for the establishments for the ensuing year, i.e., his schedule of the proposed strength of the various corps and arms; and the other military branches designated put forward their estimates of proposed expenditure, which are considered and reviewed by the Finance Branch.

The establishments are translated into money by the Finance Branch, which is, in the main, responsible for the preparation of what may be called the Votes dealing with personnel, i.e. :—

Vote 1.—The pay of the Army generally.

" 2.—The pay of Medical Establishments.

" 3.—The pay of Militia.

" 4.—The pay of Yeomanry.

" 5.—The pay of Volunteers.

" 11.—The pay of Educational Establishments.

" 12.—Miscellaneous Services.

" 13.—Pay of War Office Establishments.

Votes 14 to 16.—Non-Effective Services.

With regard to Votes 6 and 7 which deal with Transport and Provisions, and Votes 8 and 9, Clothing and Stores, and Vote 10, Works, the Votes are prepared by the Military and Finance branches in concert, the demand for any new service or increased expenditure coming primarily from the Military branch.

Under the procedure inaugurated in 1901, all Votes, with the new proposals, are considered by the Army Board, and submitted to the Secretary of State, who, in view of the funds available, refers the proposals back to the Army Board, and finally decides, in consultation with the Commander-in-Chief, and his military advisers, what is to be accepted and what rejected.

Appendix D

Though, however, the Orders in Council above quoted assign to various Military Departments the preparation of Annual Estimates for specific services, and the War Office Memorandum assigns to the Army Board the general consideration of those Estimates, yet it is not to be understood that new proposals for increased or altered expenditure are only put forward while the Annual Estimates are in preparation. New proposals come forward all through the year. If urgent and approved, and if money is available, they are, with Treasury consent if necessary, carried into immediate effect. If not urgent they are reported upon by the various branches concerned, and the cost is calculated, and if considered *prima facie* desirable, noted for consideration when the next year's Estimates are in progress. It would be generally in this way that any large and important proposal would be put forward.

The proposals that have thus accumulated during the year are epitomised and scheduled in the Finance Branch, and considered by the Army Board and Secretary of State, as forming, in embryo, part of the Estimates under consideration.

With regard to No. (2) of Mr. Holland's letter (4) of the 5th November, it is rather difficult for me, as a financial officer, to say what proposals have been put forward by the Military Branches for increasing the warlike and other stores. Primarily it would be for the Director-General of Ordnance, for instance, to say what he had demanded in any specific case; and the reasons for refusal, if refusal had ensued, could then, no doubt, be obtained. As far as our records go we can trace no scheme of reserves antecedent to that of the Director-General of Ordnance at the beginning of 1900, which was considered by Sir F. Mowatt's Committee. Of course, the Committee will bear in mind that before the War the scale of preparation was based on a force of three Army Corps and four Cavalry Brigades for service at home, of which two Army Corps, a Cavalry Division, and some troops for Line of Communication were available for foreign service, and in the years 1896-1899 we had made all necessary provision for their equipment, i.e., we had locked up in special storehouses the complete "mobilization equipment" the troops have in war, but not in peace. Besides this, we had very considerable stocks of other stores of all kinds, not especially as War Reserves, but as working stocks. On 31st March, 1899, the total value of the stores in storehouses was eight and a-half millions, of which nearly three millions was at Woolwich.

If the Commission so desire I will hand in a statement showing the reserves in question.

It was considered that the trade of the country would be able to meet any further requirements for stores not of a specially warlike character.

In certain cases, which lay outside ordinary trade sources of supply, demands for the war reserves then considered necessary for the force authorised were formulated by the Military Authorities, and sanctioned. Thus—

HORSE AND FIELD ARTILLERY : BATTERIES.

In February, 1897, the then Secretary of State, Lord Landsdowne, approved, on the recommendation of the Army Board, of the provision of guns to complete the *war* reserve for three Army Corps at 10 per cent. of the equipment.

This was then laid down by the Military Authorities as sufficient. They seemed to have based their opinion

on the loss of guns in previous wars. It will be remembered that the losses in South Africa have been practically unprecedented.

HORSE AND FIELD ARTILLERY : AMMUNITION.

In 1897 the question of *war* reserves of ammunition for Horse and Field Batteries was considered. After reviewing the expenditure of such batteries in the Franco-Prussian War, Military Authority fixed the necessary scale at 200 rounds per gun reserve, in addition to 300 rounds per gun to be carried with batteries, ammunition columns and parks. Most of this was already in existence, and provision to complete was approved by Secretary of State in January, 1898.

In December, 1898, in connection with the conversion of batteries to a "quick-firing" system, the Military Authorities asked for an increase of the *equipment* from 300 to 450 rounds a gun. This involved provision of extra wagons, harness, &c., and was approved as a two years' programme for provision in Estimates 1899-1900 and 1900-1.

SMALL ARMS.

Sir R. Buller, in 1895, put forward definite proposals for reserve arms on a scale which he said would be "ample" for war :—

Regulars	-	-	-	Arm for arm.
Reservists, Militia, and				
Volunteers	-	-	-	One arm for every two.

The Militia scale was subsequently raised by the Army Board to "arm for arm."

A programme of manufacture providing for these reserves as well as for the equipment of the Volunteers with the magazine rifle was commenced in 1896. It was not complete when the war broke out, but even with the large new forces raised we never ran short of rifles.

SMALL-ARM AMMUNITION.

In 1895 a scale of 400 rounds per rifle for units in the Field Army and other units in other proportions was laid down, and provision has been based on that scale from 1896 onwards.

The war came at a time when we were changing the pattern of ammunition from Mark V. to Mark II., but otherwise there was nothing to show that the accepted reserve was insufficient for the force contemplated.

The producing power of the country was gradually expanded until we could produce four millions a week, half in the Government Factory and half in contractors' works, without overtime, and of course at a pinch this output could be considerably increased.

From the time when the war was begun it may be said that no question of money stood in the way of supply in any direction.

FOOD RESERVES.

With regard to food reserve, the Commission have doubtless received information from the representatives of the Quartermaster-General's Department. Reserves of preserved meat, biscuit, forage, &c., were held before the war for a force of 40,000 men and 20,000 horses, for varying periods.

This scale of reserves had existed for some years.

(4) Royal Commission on the War in South Africa,
St. Stephen's House,
Victoria Embankment,
Westminster, S.W.,
5th November, 1902.

Sir,—

I understand from my interview with you to-day that the procedure followed previously to 1901 with regard to the compilation of estimates and the representation and discussion of requirements makes it impossible to furnish a statement in the formal shape suggested in my letter of the 3rd instant.

The Commission will, however, desire to hear from you—

1. What that procedure was, including the action of your department in the case of any proposals involving expenditure.
2. Whether in the years preceding the War any specific proposals for the expenditure of large

sums on increasing the warlike and other stores were definitely put forward in writing by the heads of any of the military departments, and, if so, what was the result of such action.

If there are any records of such demands they should be produced.

I should be furnished by the 15th instant, if possible, with a short *précis* of any information which you are able to give on this subject, to form a basis for oral examination.

The Commission will expect you to attend on Wednesday, the 19th instant.

I am, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) BERNARD HOLLAND,
Secretary.

The Accountant-General of the Army,
War Office, S.W.

APPENDIX E.

Appendix E

COPY OF LETTER FROM COLONEL A. G. LUCAS, C.B., M.V.O., TO LORD ROBERTS ON THE QUESTION OF RAISING DRAFTS FOR THE IMPERIAL YEOMANRY, AND AS TO THE DESIRABILITY OF APPOINTING INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF AUXILIARY FORCES.

(See Question No. 6606)

6th July, 1901.

Dear Lord Roberts,—I called at the War Office the other day on the chance of seeing you with regard to the question of raising drafts. In all the letters I have received from Colonel Deane he most strongly advocates the immediate commencement of raising drafts, and if this is decided upon, I do most strongly urge that it should be commenced at once in a quiet and properly organised manner, and that the men should be assembled at certain places for at least a month's instruction before they go to South Africa.

Last year, when the organisation was entirely in our own hands, and the men were kept at the Yeomanry Headquarters and received a month or six weeks' instruction, they were, as you know, ready for work when they got to South Africa, and I believe acquitted themselves to your satisfaction. This year, unfortunately, the organisation was different, and altogether too hurried, and it was quite impossible, under the circumstances, to prevent a certain number of undesirable officers and men being sent out. This would be guarded against if we could get them together for a time, when the useless ones could very soon be spotted and made to resign.

The question of providing suitable officers for a force such as the Imperial Yeomanry should, I think, receive the most serious consideration of the authorities. Our position this year was one of great difficulty, as the field for obtaining efficient officers was narrowed down to very small limits, and the drain on officers of all branches of the Service during the last 18 months has, as you know, been very heavy indeed. The rate at which recruiting was carried on this year was very rapid; and from various quarters the Imperial Yeomanry Headquarters Staff was urged to keep pace with the recruiting of the men in submitting recommendations for officers' commissions, so that no less than 500 names of officers had to be put forward in about 80 days. As a consequence, the extreme speed which was pressed on us proved detrimental to the leisurely selection of officers, which appears to me absolutely essential in such cases, although no name was submitted to the War Office without the specific recommendation of one or more officers of experience.

I cannot help thinking some system of registration of officers of the Auxiliary Forces, prepared to serve abroad in cases of emergency, might be made, so as to prevent in future the difficulties we had to contend with.

With the large proposed increase in the three branches of the Auxiliary Forces, I venture to suggest it would be of advantage if three Inspector-Generals were appointed instead of one, as at present; as humanly speaking it seems impossible for one man to properly consider and superintend such a large force as the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers, numbering, as proposed, close on 350,000 men. The three branches of the Auxiliary Forces have each their own traditions and peculiarities, which, in a voluntary force, should, I think, not be ignored; and by having an Inspector-General for each branch, more sympathy and appreciation would probably be shown by one who had only to think of the interests of one branch instead of three, as at present.

Should my suggestion meet with favour, it would be worthy of consideration whether it would not be advisable to place the Inspector-General of Yeomanry under the command of the Inspector-General of Cavalry, and so get all the mounted forces under one head.

If this scheme were carried out, a special staff from the three branches of the Auxiliary Forces should be selected from the officers of those forces to assist their own Inspector-General, and so keep closer in touch with the wants which long service and connection with their own particular branch of the Service has taught them are advisable.

I trust you will pardon my making these suggestions, but having already recommended in my report on last year's organisation certain administrative changes, and from the experience which I have had in my connection with the organisation of the Imperial Yeomanry Force during the last 18 months, I should feel I am not doing my duty if I did not mention these important points which have come before my notice, and I am only actuated, in writing to you, by the hope that my proposals may be of use to the Service.

(Signed) A. G. LUCAS.

APPENDIX F.

CORRESPONDENCE between Colonel Lucas, C.B., M.V.O., and the War Office on the Question of Drafts for the Imperial Yeomanry.

(See Question No. 6511.)

Proposals to Raise more Imperial Yeomanry in 1900 as Drafts to the First Contingent, and War Office Letters declining the Offers.

[EXTRACT.]

"Imperial Yeomanry,
"2nd May, 1900.

b. 124A.

"5. I am, however, to point out for the consideration of the Secretary of State for War that no arrangements have been made for the supply of drafts to the Imperial Yeomanry in the field, as the total number of men sent to the base have, with few exceptions, been specially enlisted therefor, and not for combatant duties. The Committee therefore await instructions from the War Office as to what is to be done in this matter, as, if the base depôt establishments are to be utilised for drafts at the front, they cannot be made available for remount organisation at the Cape.

"I have, etc.
(Signed) "A. G. LUCAS, D.A.G., I.Y."

"The Secretary of State for War,
"War Office."

Imperial Yeomanry,
16th May, 1900.

b. 134A

Sir,—I am directed by the Committee of the Imperial Yeomanry to invite attention to the concluding paragraph of this Office letter, No. 124a, dated the 2nd of May, 1900, stating that instructions from the War Office are awaited as to what is to be done in the matter of the provision of drafts for the Imperial Yeomanry Forces in the field.

A telegram has been received from the General Officer Commanding the Line of Communications, asking that more men may be sent to the Base Depôt, and that they should be enlisted for general service, as they are required at the front. Report has also been received that 150 men have been sent to Bloemfontein from the base to supply drafts required at the front. Under these circumstances, the Committee do not at present know whether more enlistments ought to be made in London for the purpose of supplying drafts in South Africa or not, and I am to request the favour of an early reply to the paragraph in this Office letter referred to.

The total strength of the Force, enrolled and despatched to date, amounts to 10,346, and there only remain 66 to be sent out to complete the strength authorised by the War Office, Base Depôt inclusive.

I have, etc.,
(Signed) A. G. LUCAS, Colonel,
D.A.G., I.Y.

The Under Secretary of State for War,
War Office.

War Office,
London, S.W.,
21st May, 1900.

b. 10/1790.

Sir,—I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 16th inst., No. 134a, relating to the provision of drafts to

make up losses in units of Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa.

In reply, I am to inform you that, after careful consideration of the matter, it has been decided to utilise the existing recruiting agencies for this purpose, and any recruits hereafter enlisted for the Imperial Yeomanry will be raised under arrangements made by this Department, and will be sent to Aldershot to be trained and formed into drafts.

Under these circumstances, Lord Lansdowne does not propose to ask your Committee to furnish any further drafts for South Africa.

I am, etc.,
(Signed) F. S. ROBB,
D.A.A.G., for A.G.

The Secretary,
Imperial Yeomanry Committee.

Imperial Yeomanry,
19th December, 1900.

Sir,—I have the honour to submit for your consideration the question as to whether it may not appear desirable, with reference to recent occurrences in South Africa, to increase the strength of the Imperial Yeomanry in that country to a figure which will make good the casualties which have occurred up to this date. No. 186A.

Those casualties have, up till the 12th inst., amounted to 20 per cent. of the entire strength of the Force, so far as information on the subject is available here. It is probable, however, that sickness and other causes have still further reduced the strength of the Force, and that the casualties up to date may be computed at about 30 per cent.

Should it be considered desirable to make good these losses, I am prepared to arrange for the enlistment of drafts to the extent of from 3,000 to 5,000 men with the least possible delay. Past experience shows, with regard to the organisation of Imperial Yeomanry, under the Committee appointed by the War Office, that had not recruiting been stopped in May last a much larger Force could have been obtained. Irrespective of the numbers raised at the recruiting centres of the Imperial Yeomanry, the Committee received, and declined, offers from various gentlemen to raise Forces amounting to over 5,000 men. There would, in my opinion, be very little difficulty in obtaining a further Force to this extent in the same manner as was previously arranged, and all that would be necessary is the approval of the War Office to the capitulation allowances previously given, and sanction to a small supplementary establishment at this office for the purpose required. The system by which the men could be raised is well known, and the preparation of the report on which I am now engaged gives all details of the method under which a similar Force to that sent out could be rapidly organised.

If active military operations in South Africa continue, it will, I assume, be necessary to relieve many of the regiments of the Regular Service which have endured considerable hardships for over a year. The men of the Imperial Yeomanry enlisted for a period of a year, or for as long as the war might last. I have no doubt that a large proportion of the Force would more willingly continue on active service, provided they knew that their losses were made good, and that it was the inten-

tion of the Government to keep them in the field with replenished ranks, as has been the case with the Regular Service. The Force has, however, been practically allowed almost to die out, and I trust, under the circumstances, I may be excused for pointing out what has occurred in the past, with reference to the supply of drafts for the Yeomanry.

W.O. 079/16/
680 of 10th
February
1900.

It was at one time decided that drafts should be provided at the calculation of 10 per cent. of the original numbers (10,000) which embarked. This involved the provision of a Force of the total strength of 11,608 men, as shown in the letter from the Imperial Yeomanry Committee, dated 27th March, 1900. Subsequently, however, this strength was reduced, and it was settled that no more than 10,500 men, Base Depot included, should be enlisted for service in South Africa.

W.O. 079/10/
1790.

In a letter from the War Office, dated 21st May, 1900, it was decided that if any more recruits were required they would be enlisted for the Imperial Yeomanry, under arrangements to be made by the War Office, but, so far as I am aware, none were thus obtained, and, therefore, with the casualties referred to in paragraph 1 of this letter, the strength of the Force in the field must be now a very attenuated one.

I am, therefore, encouraged to make the offer referred to regarding raising more men, feeling fully assured that, with the sanction and support of the War Office, a further efficient contingent of mounted men could be obtained in the manner already set forth.

I have, etc.,
(Signed) ALFRED G. LUCAS, Colonel,
D.A.G., I.Y.

To the Under Secretary of State for War.

War Office,
28th December, 1900.

079/10/4943. Sir,—I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th inst., and to express the thanks of

the Secretary of State for War for the suggestions you put forward with regard to the re-opening of recruiting for the Imperial Yeomanry, and the despatch of drafts to South Africa. Appen

As, however, steps are being taken to enrol a large number of men for service in the South African Constabulary, Mr. Brodrick is of opinion that it is not desirable to recommence recruiting for the Imperial Yeomanry.

I am, etc.,
(Signed) H. BORRETT,
Colonel A. G. Lucas. I.G.R.

War Office Letters appointing Colonel Lucas, General Badcock, and Colonel Deane to a Committee to assist in raising Drafts for the Imperial Yeomanry.

"War Office,
"London, S.W.,
15th January, 1901.

"Sir,—I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to inform you that he has nominated you to serve on a Committee which he has appointed to assist in raising drafts for the Imperial Yeomanry. With you on this Committee will be associated Lieut.-General Badcock and Colonel Thomas Deane, C.B. 079/11

"The Committee will meet at once, and will advise as to the best way of obtaining the men, rates of pay, term of enlistment, etc.

I am, etc.,
(Signed) "G. FLEETWOOD WILSON.
"Colonel A. G. Lucas,
"Deputy Adjutant-General, Imperial Yeomanry."

A similar letter was also sent to Lieut.-Gen. Badcock and Colonel Deane.

APPENDIX G.

Appen

REMARKS ON MATTERS CONNECTED WITH THE ORGANISATION OF THE IMPERIAL YEOMANRY FORCE OF 1901 IN SOUTH AFRICA.

1. This Appendix has been written in connection with the following War Office letter:—

War Office, London, S.W., March 18th, 1901.

Sir,—
I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to inform you that the Commander-in-Chief has approved of your being employed on special service in South Africa

079
Yeomanry
370

in connection with the Imperial Yeomanry. You will report your arrival to the Commander-in-Chief in South Africa and take his instructions.

I am, etc.,
(Signed) J. H. LAYR, D.A.G.
Colonel T. DEANE, C.B.,
U.S.C., I.S. Corps, etc.

CONSTITUTION OF THE FORCE.

Appendix G.

(The Appendices mentioned in this Report will be found in the Supplementary Report of the Deputy Adjutant General of the Imperial Yeomanry dated 1903, 1458.)

2. The constitution of the new Yeomanry force in April, 1901, was that of its formation into 17 battalions, comprising in all 96 squadrons, *vide* Appendix No. 54.
3. The battalions were of various establishments, some being composed of four squadrons, and others of double that number. The squadrons were located over the country in positions where they were most required; thus, in some instances, a battalion might have one squadron at Graff Reinet, and another at Springfontein, and a third at Kimberley. Under these circumstances, it was impossible for the battalions to be worked as units complete, and they may, therefore, be said to have been thus organised more for administrative purposes, than anything else. Orders were received in May, from Army Headquarters, that all officers and men of the old Yeomanry were to be allowed to proceed home. In some instances, individuals were sent separately, as opportunity occurred, and in other, the remnants of the old squadrons, or battalions, were sent home complete. Various squadrons were distributed throughout the districts, and were with the several columns in the field, along the Pretoria-Naauwpoort line, down as far as Graff Reinet; on the lines to the westward between Johannesburg, Krugersdorp, and Klerkesdorp, and on the eastern lines, between Elandsfontein, Standerton, Harrismith, and Bethlehem; also from De Aar, northwards. Such stations as Kimberley and Mafeking, as far as Zeerust, were also garrisoned by squadrons of Yeomanry, ready to operate from these bases as they might be most required. Wynburg and Fitzburg, to the south-east of the main line, were also occupied by squadrons of the force, as may be seen from Appendix No. 55, which shows the names of the commanders of the various columns and their location. These squadrons were visited, as far as possible, by the Inspector-General of the Imperial Yeomanry, or by officers whom he deputed, for the purpose of ascertaining their requirements.
4. With regard to this constitution of the force, there can be little doubt that, when it was possible to keep the battalions together, the regimental organisation answered best. Each unit was complete in itself, and had a sufficient staff, which was answerable for its well-being in all respects. The regimental unit, also, had perhaps a greater *esprit-de-corps* than that of the smaller squadron unit, but the latter was that which was found most useful in the field with the various columns. The strength of the new squadrons was increased to 155 all told, officers included, the old strength being 121. The increased strength was found better for work in the field, and, as the proportion of officers was not increased, it had the advantage of requiring less officers for the whole of the new force than would have been the case if the strength had remained as originally fixed. The difficulties in obtaining experienced officers for squadron commands were considerable, and these were eased by the new system introduced.
5. It may be observed that in the establishment of the new Yeomanry force, authorised in the War Office order dated 17th April, 1901, the total number of all ranks per squadron, officers included, is 142. It would, perhaps, be better to fix the future strength at 155, in accord with what has been found to be the actual requirements of field service. This would increase the strength of each regiment by 52 men, making the total 648 instead of 596; the number of officers allowed per squadron, *viz.*, 5, remaining the same.
6. In Appendix No. 60 is shown the constitution of the various divisions and brigades in the field and the operating columns to which the various squadrons of Yeomanry were attached during April, 1901. From this it will be seen how the Yeomanry force was divided, and how difficult, if not impossible, it was to keep regiments of Yeomanry intact. The appendix referred to shows the organisation of the forces during the specified period, but subsequent events often necessitated the transfer of the squadrons from one column to another, as circumstances might require. In one case, the second brigade of Major-General Elliott's division contained a brigade of Yeomanry of 12 squadrons; General Rundle's force at Harrismith had also two regiments of Yeomanry comprising 9 squadrons.
7. There is nothing in connection with the organisation of the new force of the Imperial Yeomanry which has been more generally discussed than the position of officers, and it cannot be said that the system of grading them has given satisfaction. In paragraph 157 of the former report the difficulties of the subject were pointed out, and it was admitted that a remedy to the method of making appointments adopted by the War Office was not apparent. Certain suggestions were, however, there made which it was thought, if adopted, might have mitigated the difficulties recently felt. This system was found to work in many respects with inconvenience.
8. The position of the officers of the new force is explained in paragraph 13 of Army Order dated 17th January, 1901 (see Appendix No. 6), whereby it was ruled that one second Lieutenant per section of 110 men would be given the temporary rank of Captain until arrival in South Africa, when all acting ranks were to cease. The officers who came out in charge of sections with the acting rank of Captain often had to perform what was practically Squadron Commander's work for a considerable period prior to their being posted to their regular squadrons as subalterns. In some instances these acting Captains thus remained in command of many hundreds of men, but according to the strict ruling of the Order referred to, they were not entitled to the temporary rank of Captain, and under the Order quoted were not allowed the pay of the temporary grades while performing Captain's duties. This was felt to be a hardship, and gave rise to a considerable amount of ill-feeling.
9. In other instances officers of more than twelve months' previous experience in the field in South Africa found themselves junior as 2nd Lieutenants to others who had no experience in the field whatever, and who, moreover, knew little of horsemanship or of musketry. Endeavour was, of course, made to post to the permanent squadrons the most capable officers in accordance with their seniority and qualification, but this could not always be done, for it takes some time to correctly ascertain the ability of the various officers for positions of responsibility in the field.
10. The question of how Yeomanry officers should in future be graded to prevent the occurrence of such difficulties as are here brought to notice is an intricate one, and it is difficult to make any definite suggestion whereby all the drawbacks referred to can be overcome. Possibly the best manner of solving the question would be to assemble a committee of officers who have had experience of dealing with the matter on service, in view to a report being submitted showing what is thought most suitable.
11. It may be here noted with regard to the officers referred to, that when the new force was raised in England, about 500 officers had to be appointed at the rate of three 2nd Lieutenants per 110 men, irrespective of the one Captain and one Lieutenant for that number, who had to be nominated by the Commander-in-Chief in South Africa. The selection of officers in South Africa was a comparatively easy matter to that which had to be accomplished in London. Officers who had proved themselves capable in the field were nominated to the grades referred to by the Commander-in-Chief, and others who were thought likely to eventually become fit for these positions were nominated on probation, and were attached to the Imperial Yeomanry camp at Elandsfontein to be there reported on as to their likelihood of proving fit for permanent commissions. In London, however, the situation was different. The War Office placed restrictions on the selection of officers to be made, none belonging to embodied Militia regiments were allowed to be chosen, those who belonged to the Reserve of Officers were mostly required for the Regular forces, and those who were borne on the rolls of the latter were, of course, ineligible for selection. There, therefore, only remained officers of unembodied Militia battalions, Volunteer officers, and Yeomanry officers to select from, together with a certain proportion of non-commissioned officers and men belonging to the Imperial Yeomanry who had returned to England, and who were specially recommended for selection. A very limited number of

Officers.

Rank.

Difficulties of the situation.

Temporary ranks.

Future grading of Officers.

Proposed Committee.

Selection in South Africa.

Selection in England.

Yeomanry officers were, however, available, as most of those wishing to serve had gone out with the first force.

Method of selection.

12. The method of selection from this restricted field was that of obtaining from each individual a form, duly filled in, showing that he had some previous service in the forces referred to, that he was medically fit, and that his application was backed up by the Commanding Officer under whom he had previously served, or by some other officer whose opinion was likely to be of value, and who was prepared to vouch for his capabilities. When the selections were made, the names of the candidates, with a statement of their qualifications, were forwarded to the War Office, whose decisions on the recommendations made were awaited. In very few cases were any objections made to the names sent in.

Rejections.

13. Large numbers of applications were rejected for want of the necessary certificates, and on the whole it may be said that there was the greatest difficulty in obtaining the large number of officers required within the short space of about two months. It is very doubtful whether any better system could have been enforced than that alluded to, and it is believed that, although in some instances the officers recommended were found in South Africa to be unfit for their positions, the percentage of rejections was, under the circumstances, comparatively small for men who were expected to be ready to take the field after a period of training, which, however, they were unable to obtain either at Aldershot or Elandsfontein.

Reason of failure in South Africa.

14. The directions in which the officers mostly failed were those of capability to command and powers of instructing their men, due, of course, to want of experience and opportunities of obtaining these necessary qualifications. In many instances officers were found deficient in horsemanship, and this added much to their difficulties of properly exercising their commands in the field. It would have been better to have appointed the second Lieutenants on probation, in view of their possible rejection, or to their being graded in accordance with the capabilities they might have shown in camp or elsewhere, promotion being based on *merit* alone.

Nature of appointments.

15. This matter of the appointment of officers in large numbers for any future force will have to be carefully considered, with reference to the defects which have been found in those sent out with the 1901 force of Yeomanry. It is believed that one of the most difficult questions of Army reform has always been where to obtain trained officers in sufficient numbers for any large force suddenly called upon to take the field. The selection of officers for the original force of the Yeomanry was conducted in very much the same manner as that here alluded to, but the first force was a smaller one, and required fewer officers. Many of those obtained were of high social standing, and the number of applications for commissions from such during the enthusiasm which the war created was far greater than when the second supply was required. Socially, the officers of the second selection were, as a whole, much inferior; moreover, many of them, with the auxiliary forces from which they were selected, had comparatively few opportunities of exercising command, or of learning horsemanship. Under these circumstances, it is scarcely to be wondered at that there was a certain percentage of nominations which were not altogether satisfactory, or which, perhaps, had better not have been made at all. The alternative, however, was to admit that the supply of officers fit for their position was exhausted, and possibly to recommend that all further nominations should be made by the Commander-in-Chief in South Africa from men in the ranks who had proved themselves worthy of promotion, and who were thus capable of exercising command in the field owing to the opportunities they had gained of learning what was required on actual field service. This plan might have proved more satisfactory than the one adopted of obtaining officers from the auxiliary forces who were not up to the required standard.

Appointments from the ranks.

Testing.

16. It must at the same time, however, be borne in mind that it was originally intended to thoroughly test the capabilities of officers and men during a period of

training at Aldershot or Elandsfontein. At Aldershot this was not found feasible, the accommodation being of a comparatively limited character, and the object sought being to equip and draft away both officers and men as rapidly as possible, in order to make room for others who were being recruited within a very short period, and to satisfy the urgent demand for troops from England. Doubtless had time been available to test the qualifications of both officers and men at Aldershot, some might have been weeded out with satisfactory results, and at Elandsfontein, if given two months' training, as was the original plan, better results still would have been obtained. Service requirements were such, however, that nearly all had to be drafted away to the various columns within a few days. By appointing the officers on probation, instead of gazetted them to Army rank at once, it might have been easier to have dispensed with the services of those who had not the required qualifications, than was the case in several instances.

Capabilities

17. It is no easy matter in the Regular Service to ascertain the capabilities of officers, socially or otherwise. Time and actual tests are necessary before a correct opinion can be arrived at as to the probability of those concerned being eventually fit for their positions. This time was not available for the Yeomanry force, and therefore it is all the more necessary to carefully consider how such large numbers of trained officers can be obtained in a short period in future. It has been suggested as a possible alternative that under any future similar conditions both officers and men might be recruited under an engagement to proceed to the seat of operations, subject to their being finally approved after, say, two months' trial, and that until finally approved they should not receive full pay, but only a small retaining fee. Short of the application of the actual test of this plan, it is difficult to say whether such conditions would secure a better supply of officers and men in the required numbers. There seems little doubt, however, that they would not have been obtained with the same rapidity had such a course been adopted, and the requirements of the position at the time being were such that the early recruitment of the large number decided on was of primary importance.

Appointment on probation.

Gradual drafts.

18. These circumstances seem all to point to the desirability of obtaining gradual and regular drafts, both in officers and men, for any force the constitution of which is once definitely fixed. It is possible to obtain gradually a better supply of both, than it is to collect a large force in a brief period. For this reason it is thought that in future the supply required for any force should be fixed at whatever percentage may be thought necessary, and that the percentage wanted should be gradually obtained and despatched to the front. All authorities consulted seem to agree in this opinion, and for the sake of true efficiency it is hoped that it may in future be adopted.

Practical finding.

19. Up to December, 1901, the number of inefficient or undesirable officers sent home from South Africa was, according to returns received from the War Office, 42, or about 8 per cent. on the total number appointed. Close enquiries were made into these cases, all necessary information on each individual's case being forwarded to the War Office (*vide* Appendix No. 3). These cases were carefully enquired into by a War Office Committee, in view of those who have been responsible for faulty selections of officers being called on for explanations.

Undesirable officers.

20. A considerable number of applications were made by officers of the Imperial Yeomanry for commissions into the Line, and the rules regarding these are in Appendix No. 50. When the candidates concerned were thought to have the necessary social and other qualifications, and to have done good service in the field, their names were sent in for the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief in South Africa, with the necessary certificates attached in the form which he had laid down. In the case of officers of the new Yeomanry Force, it was decided that no names should be sent in until the General, or other officer commanding in the field, had had sufficient opportunities of judging the capabilities of the officers concerned for commissions, and this rule was also applied to non-commissioned officers and men of the Imperial Yeomanry, many of whom were applicants for commissions in that force. Commissions in it

Commissions from the ranks.

Appendix G. were, in many cases, given to those who had done good service in the field, and who had proved themselves capable of exercising command, and it would, perhaps, have been better to have made a much larger selection from individuals of this class than from those of the limited field of selection which was fixed for the officers appointed in England.

Miscellaneous applications. 21. Many officers of the new force of Imperial Yeomanry also applied for employment in other departments, such as Transport, Remounts, Army Service Corps, Government farms, and various other appointments, for they had ascertained officers were wanted. As a rule, these applicants were such as were doubtful of their own capability of exercising command in the field, who felt that they had not sufficient military training, or who were indifferent horsemen. Every endeavour was made to meet the wishes of these officers, without prejudice to the efficiency of the departments referred to. There were some who, although not sufficiently trained or experienced to exercise command of Yeomanry on service, were capable of undertaking less responsible work where sedentary business had to be conducted in offices, such as the Transport, Railway Staff, etc. Many applications were also received from officers to be allowed to serve with the county corps with which, although they had not originally put down their names, they wished, owing to past associations, to be connected. These applications were, as far as possible, complied with, and much the same may be said regarding similar applications from a large number of non-commissioned officers and men.

Selections from men outside the Army.

22. It is open to question whether selections of officers might not, to some extent, have been made from gentlemen of good social position, accustomed to the hunting-field and to horses, good shots, and used to outdoor pursuits, although deficient in military training. Had selection been made in this manner, there is no doubt men of a better social class would have been obtained. The ordinary Volunteer officer, from which class many were selected, is neither a horseman nor has he generally any eye for a country. The majority of officers thus selected were unable to ride well, and although with training they might have become proficient, time was not available to make them so. On the other hand, those who were at home in the saddle readily picked up the comparatively simple drill which is required to work men in open ranks and extended order. It must be recognised that Volunteer and Militia officers know little or nothing about mounted work, and when they have, in addition, to learn riding themselves before

exercising command, they are more handicapped than the gentleman who is at least accustomed to the saddle and to the general care of horses. Instances are not wanting in which very good officers were obtained from a class which had no previous military training whatever. This was notably the case in many of the South African contingents, which did not always select their officers on account of military qualifications, but because they were good all-round men, accustomed to shooting and riding, and such as their men would readily follow.

23. A large selection might, perhaps, also have been made from capable non-commissioned officers in the old force under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in South Africa. The number of officers he had to nominate for the new force was about 150 in the grades of captain and lieutenant. It would have been better to have selected from this class also a proportion of 2nd lieutenants, instead of sending over 500 from England. The only difficulty in doing so would, perhaps, have been that the best men would not have accepted commissions, as most were anxious for a term at home before again commencing work.

24. Those who failed from the English nominations were mainly of three classes: (I) those socially unfitted, who did not secure the necessary respect of their men; (II) those who proved unreliable owing to inebriety or monetary difficulties; and (III) those who were unable to ride, and had not sufficient training to be entrusted with the command of men. The third class was, perhaps, the largest, but it may be said that many amongst them would have become efficient had time been available to instruct them. The military riding-schools in the Regular service often contain novices in the art of horsemanship not much better than was observed in the Yeomanry. Two or three months' instruction would have made many of the inefficient fair horsemen; this period was, however, not available, and so it must be recognised that in future it is almost impossible to secure, within a brief period, capable trained horsemen from the limited field of selection fixed. In the same way it may be also said that it is impossible to secure officers and non-commissioned officers, in any large numbers, sufficiently trained to instruct and efficiently command their untrained men. The Regular officer often learns his work from his own non-commissioned officers and men; the Yeomanry officer, often comparatively untrained himself, has really to instruct those under him in almost everything *de novo*. This is the difficulty which should be recognised.

APPENDIX H.

Appendix H.

DOCUMENTS PUT IN BY FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ROBERTS, K.G., IN CONNECTION WITH HIS STATEMENT
AS TO HIS MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA.

Copy of Memorandum by Sir ALFRED MILNER, dated 4th February 1900, and addressed to LORD ROBERTS.

(See Question 10,843, page 462.)

Government House, Cape Town,
4th February, 1900.

THE FIELD-MARSHAL COMMANDING IN CHIEF.

As almost the whole of the forces in the Colony will soon be at the front, and headquarters will also be removed to the north, I wish once more to call attention to the weakness of the position in the rear of our fighting forces, in the hope that you may give instructions to have it strengthened as effectively and as promptly as possible in your absence.

I often hear it said that the danger of rebellion in the Colony is now over. That is not my opinion. I consider that with every month that the war lasts without decisive result—and an immediate result is out of the question—the danger of rebellion increases.

It is quite true, that I expected rebellion before now. I never believed that after the Stormberg-Magersfontein-Colenso week the Colony could have kept quiet. I am sure that it was only the knowledge that large additional forces were coming which kept it quiet. The fear of fresh forces coming in from England is now greatly diminished.

It has been freely stated, over and over again, by people well acquainted with the Dutch mind, that the Colonial rebels would wait till the British troops were well to the front, and then attempt to cut them off by a general rising directed against the line of communications. Such an idea is eminently in accordance with Dutch habits of thought and methods of warfare.

I do not indeed believe in any concerted scheme for a rising, but I do believe that the idea is deeply rooted in the minds of the people, and needs very little to give it concrete form. If there were a small revolt anywhere, which was locally successful, the thing would spread like wildfire.

Further, it may be taken as an axiom that, wherever a fairly strong commando of the enemy appears, the Dutch population will join it *en masse*.

Widespread rebellion in the Colony means two things:

- (1) Our lines of communication exposed to constant danger, and perhaps permanently interrupted;
- (2) A large access of fighting men to the ranks of the enemy.

I believe it is perfectly possible to prevent such a catastrophe, but hitherto attention has been so preponderatingly directed to the fighting line that the protection of the Colony has only been temporarily, and so to speak, accidentally, provided for. The large bodies of troops passing through it have incidentally tended to discourage rebellion. But this influx will presently cease, and, unless some of the forces now arriving are so disposed as to render a serious rising in the Colony impossible, we shall from now to the end of the campaign be running a grave and wholly unnecessary risk, and one which will increase in gravity with every forward step our army takes beyond the Orange River.

The danger in the Colony is absolutely ubiquitous. There is no part of it in which the Dutch population are not rebels at heart, and would not rise against us if they saw a chance.

Under these circumstances, it is absolutely idle to rely upon the method of stationary defensive forces. One or two points of supreme importance, such as the ports, must, of course, be garrisoned. But to garrison the whole of the Colony would require 50,000 men. Probably one-tenth of that force, if *mobile and always ready*, would be equally effective.

There are two main objects which, in my opinion, should be constantly kept in view:—

- (1) To keep the enemy out;
- (2) To have a sufficient force stationed at two or three central points, and capable of being moved at a moment's notice, to deal with any local rising at the outset and prevent the flame spreading.

As regards (1), I have so often inflicted my views on this subject upon you that I need add little on that point. There are two points of danger, as regards invasion. One is the Stormberg-Steynsburg corner, which is by far the more important of the two. A commando successfully getting past Gatacre on his left would raise the whole of the Midlands and bring 10,000 recruits to the enemy, besides cutting the portions of the Colony remaining to us into two halves and making co-operation between them impossible. This danger can, of course, only be guarded against by the forces under Gatacre and by any force which we may be able to leave on the Naauwpoort-Steynsburg-Stormberg cross line, which I hope may be strengthened as further troops arrive.

The other danger of invasion is from the north-west—*i.e.*, the country just across the Orange River from Prieska to the German boundary. As regards this region, I have nothing to add to the representations already made to you.

Independently of invasion, there is no part of the Colony in which it can be said that the Dutch are more or less likely to rise than they are in another. The only thing is to be ready for them anywhere, from East London to Port Nolloth. This looks impossible, but it is not really so difficult as it looks, for any local rising, unaided from without, would not at first consist of great numbers, and the rebels would have but few magazine rifles and *no cannon*. Small but well-armed mounted forces with a gun or two would make short work of any of them, if brought up in time. The South-East district of the Colony may be regarded as sufficiently provided for by the Local Defence Corps already raised there, when they have recovered, as they soon will, from the withdrawal of a number of their members to swell the ranks of Brabant's force or of the Orange River Column.

In the rest of the Colony such local forces cannot be raised. If these parts are to be occupied at all in a military sense, it must be by some of the troops coming from across the sea.

At present only the railway lines are held by small detachments of infantry. These are not available to go any, even a small, distance from their stations. A whole countryside might be in revolt, but till the rebels actually attacked the line, they might be gathering and organising with impunity.

In my opinion, it is not enough merely to guard the lines. The most efficient way of guarding a line may be to strike a blow at some considerable distance from it.

My idea of the best way to keep the country quiet, and at the same time guard the lines, is as follows:—Select three or four central points at or near one of the main lines and establish a training camp at each of them. It should be an entrenched camp with a certain amount of supplies in reserve, so that, at an emergency, it could hold out for a few weeks against even a considerable force of the enemy.

Place in each such camp a militia battalion, some yeomanry (say three hundred), and half a field battery, with one or two machine guns; also a small body of

Appendix H

Colonial mounted troops, as scouts, who might, as a rule, be raised in the neighbourhood. Let them all practice as hard as possible, especially in shooting and getting to know the country. Professedly every such camp should be merely a stationary garrison and training ground. But really it should be so organised that the artillery and mounted men, with or without a portion of the infantry, could be off at any moment up or down the line, and within a certain area of country on either side of it, to deal at once with any local trouble, the rest of the infantry remaining to guard the camp.

The best localities for such camps would be a matter for careful consideration. I am not by any means sure which would be the best, but, if only to illustrate my idea, I will mention a few possible sites. These are Cradock, Graaf Reinet, the neighbourhood of Hex River, and Carnarvon, but there are a number of others which might be considered. Carnarvon, no doubt, is not on any railway, and, as a rule, it would be better to stick to the main lines; but, on the other hand, it has always seemed to me that the total absence of any force to the left of the great western trunk-line, the fact that the line itself is, so to speak, our military boundary, without as much as an outpost in front of it, is strategically an unsound position. I think, therefore, that one strong post at least should be established well to the west of the line, though whether it should be at Carnarvon, Fraserburg, or some other point in that region, is a question on which I have an open mind.

Assuming there were four such posts, they would only require altogether some 5,000 men and two batteries, while they would enormously strengthen the position in the Colony during the approaching months. And the men stationed in them would all the time be learning their duties, and to know the country. They would thus be growing steadily more efficient to take their places in the front, if wanted to do so. The above may not be the best way of proceeding against the danger I have indicated. If some other and better plan can doubtless be devised. My object is to direct attention to the matter, so that some system may be decided on for utilising such of the forces which will shortly be arriving, as are not absolutely required at the front, to guard the rest of the country in the most effective manner, and the manner most economical of numbers. If the general lines are laid down, the business could and ought to be proceeded with, while you are directing the more important operation to the front, without your being appealed to at every moment about details. If successful, the result should be to leave our main Field Force absolutely free to deal with the enemy in front without anxiety about its lines of railway communication or anything in its rear, and at the same time to prevent the enemy from drawing any further support from the Colony.

(Sd.) A. M.

4.2.1900.

COPY OF MEMORANDUM BY LORD ROBERTS, DATED 5th FEBRUARY 1900 IN REPLY TO SIR ALFRED MILNER.

Head Quarters, Cape Town,
5th February, 1900.

With reference to the High Commissioner's memorandum, dated 4th February, 1900, on the political and military position of affairs in Cape Colony, and the possible result of offensive action on a large scale in the direction of the Orange Free State, I recognise that the force at my disposal does not, at the present moment, admit of the Colony being held as strongly as would otherwise be desirable; and I can understand His Excellency's feeling of insecurity and his apprehension that the removal of regular troops may encourage the disloyal, and lead to local risings which, if left unchecked, may rapidly spread over a considerable area.

On the other hand, it seems unquestionable that the war cannot be brought to an end without prompt and decisive offensive action, and I observe that, in the High Commissioner's opinion, the longer the war lasts the greater is the danger of rebellion within the limits of the Colony.

Unless, moreover, immediate steps are taken for the relief of Kimberley, that place must fall into the enemy's hands. From the latest reports which I have received it would appear that the garrison cannot hold out beyond the end of the present month, and even now food supplies have to be carefully economised and reduced rations issued to the troops and civil population. Then, again, until Kimberley is relieved, Lord Methuen's force cannot be used for the general purposes of the campaign, and by operating through the Orange Free State I hope not only to extricate that force and to relieve Kimberley, but also to lessen the hostile pressure on Ladysmith, and enable Sir Redvers Buller to join hands with Sir George White. A serious rising in the Cape Colony is a problematical danger, while the fall of Kimberley and Ladysmith, which is inevitable unless those places can be relieved at an early date, would produce a far-reaching effect not only on the inhabitants of South Africa, but on the prestige of the British Army and on the prospects of the war. I am convinced that our only chance of striking a decisive blow is to carry the war into the enemy's country, and that action of this nature must necessarily lessen the risk of internal disaffection, inasmuch as, if the Boers are fully occupied in opposing our field army, they will be unable to render assistance to rebels in the Cape Colony, and without such assistance, as Sir Alfred Milner remarks, local risings are unlikely to occur, or, if they do occur, to be of a formidable description.

The High Commissioner thinks that the stoppage in the influx of fresh troops, combined with the withdrawal of troops for field operations, will encourage the dis-

affected and give the Dutch population the opportunity for which they have been waiting. On this point I would observe that, exclusive of the force which is being concentrated for offensive action on the Western railway line, every available man is being employed to strengthen the positions in rear and to guard the Midland and Eastern lines of communication. Reinforcements are arriving from England and the Colonies, and will continue to do so throughout the current month. No less than 15 batteries of Field Artillery and two companies of Garrison Artillery will reach Cape Town between the present date and the 19th instant. Artillery is also coming from New South Wales, Canada, and New Zealand. In addition to the City Imperial Volunteers, a large body of Yeomanry is being despatched from home, and Mounted Infantry from almost every Colony as well as India. The three Field Batteries which are expected on February 8th will go to the Orange River and De Aar; and the two Field Batteries and two Garrison Companies which are expected on the 12th will be allotted to Cape Town and the lines of communication; the two Field Batteries which are expected on the 13th will be quartered at Naauwpoort for service towards the Eastern Railway line; and of the five Field Batteries which are expected on the 18th, two will be sent to the Orange River, and three to East London to strengthen General Gatacre. Three Howitzer Batteries arriving the following day will be sent to Naauwpoort for any service that may be required. The Colonial and City Imperial Artillery will be placed at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding the Lines of Communication. Six more Militia battalions are expected in the course of this month, and I have asked that additional battalions may be sent out with the least possible delay. These troops will be available to strengthen the garrison of the Colony, which, by the end of this month, will be augmented to the extent of at least 10,000 men. It will be seen, therefore, that Sir Alfred Milner is mistaken in supposing that the influx of troops is about to cease, and as regards the unnecessary risk to which he alludes, I can only say that, so far as the means at my disposal will allow, I am as anxious to provide for the summary repression of rebellion within the Colony as to defeat the enemy outside the Colony. If I succeed in attaining the latter object, I shall go far towards securing the former, but the converse does not hold good. For this reason I consider it a sounder policy to incur some slight risk of internal disturbance than for the purpose of avoiding such a risk to abandon Kimberley, or endeavour to relieve it with an insufficient force.

With respect to the High Commissioner's remarks on the location and mobility of the Colonial garrisons

and the formation of training camps at certain strategic points, it may be observed that arrangements have been made for guarding those portions of the frontier which are specially liable to attack, that the other important centres are being held, that sufficient transport is being supplied to the troops employed for defensive purposes, and that the idea of forming the camps suggested by His Excellency will be carefully considered and acted on as reinforcements become available. As soon as a senior officer can be spared he will be ordered to Cape Town to organise and command the Imperial Yeomanry and to distribute them as Lieut.-General Forestier-Walker may consider expedient, after consultation with the High Commissioner. The City Imperial Infantry is being sent to Naauwpoort. Lieut.-General Gatacre is also getting more Field Artillery, which will enable him to keep his left clear of the enemy, and, as His Excellency is aware, Brigadier-General Brabant is about to move by General Gatacre's right to assist him in clearing his front. I agree with Sir Alfred Milner in thinking that the occupation of a position to the left of the Western

Line would be desirable, whether at Prieska, Carnarvon, or somewhere closer to the railway. The Northern section of the line is protected by the Orange River and De Aar garrisons, which are not being reduced, and, if necessary, when Kimberley has been relieved, I shall be prepared to locate troops in the proposed direction. Before leaving Cape Town I will show the High Commissioner's Memorandum and my reply to the General Officer Commanding the Lines of Communication, and will instruct him to do all in his power to meet His Excellency's views. I will also request him to keep His Excellency, as well as myself, constantly informed of the measures taken to keep the Dutch population under control, and to guard the Northern frontier against any further Boer advance. I trust that the precautions which I have briefly described, and the increasing force which will be available for defensive purposes, may ensure the tranquillity of the Colony during the operations in the Orange Free State.

(Sd.) ROBERTS, F.M.

MEMORANDUM ISSUED BY LORD ROBERTS IN SOUTH AFRICA CONTAINING SUGGESTIONS FOR LESSENING THE WEIGHT TO BE CARRIED ON HORSES.

CHIEF OF STAFF Circular Memo., No. 8.

Cape Town,
5th February, 1900.

The following suggestions for lessening the weight carried by horses on active service, which have been drawn up by Major Rimington, 6th Inniskilling Dragoons, and are based on that officer's personal experience during the present campaign, are published for information.

The Field Marshal Commanding in Chief looks to officers commanding regiments or corps of the Mounted Branch to do what lies in their power to reduce the weight carried by horses under their charge to the lowest point consistent with efficiency in the field.

By Order.
(Sd.) KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM,
Chief of Staff.

I put on saddle and horse:—

A warm cloak (cavalry pattern and not a waterproof, but would take a waterproof sheet if the weather were broken).

Mess tin with rations (patrol tin is better, in leather case).

Nosebag (some extra ammunition, if required can go in this).

A good ox rein in the head collar, of a Colonial pattern, head stall.

Wire cutter.

Carbine (carried by a man in my corps).

Bandolier, carried by a man, 50 rounds.

Haversack, carried by a man, 50 rounds.

Knife and lanyard.

Water bottle on man or horse, as preferred.

Telescope, if possible to obtain it.

Holdall (in haversack).

The English made Cape Police pattern of saddle with a blanket (no numnah, except in special cases) only is much preferred as lighter and more comfortable. The blanket can be used by man or horse.

I have done away with:—

(a) Wallets.

(b) The changes of clothes put therein.

* (c) Grooming kit.

† (d) Shoe cases and extra shoes.

‡ (e) Hay nets.

(f) Extra highlows strapped on wallets.

(g) Breast plate (unless in special cases).

(h) Picketing gear of any sort.

(i) Hoof picks.

On the wagons should be carried, rolled in a blanket and waterproof sheet:—

1 pair light shoes.

1 pair socks.

1 spare shirt.

1 stocking cap.

1 pair spare trousers (or breeches).

1 cardigan jacket (in cold weather, i.e., in April, or earlier, the man should have this on him).

1 towel and soap.

Note.—An extra blanket will be necessary in April.

MEMORANDUM ISSUED BY LORD ROBERTS IN SOUTH AFRICA ENTITLED "NOTES FOR GUIDANCE IN SOUTH AFRICAN WARFARE."

CHIEF OF STAFF Circular Memorandum.

Cape Town,
5th February, 1900.

The following notes by Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief are communicated for the guidance of all concerned.

By Order.
(Sd.) KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM,
Chief of Staff.

NOTES FOR GUIDANCE IN SOUTH AFRICAN WARFARE

Cavalry.

1. On reconnaissances or patrols not likely to be prolonged beyond one day, the cavalry soldier's equipment should be lightened as much as possible, nothing being taken that can possibly be dispensed with.

2. It has been brought to my notice that our cavalry move too slowly when on reconnaissance duty, and

* A wisp of straw or rushes can do all that is required and does not take the grease (which is his natural waterproofing in wet weather) out of a horse's coat.

† Shoes drop off a good deal after horses are first landed, as then feet are soft, but in a month this is all right, the horn grows hard, and the nails only require more than ordinary care on the part of officers, farriers, and troopers.

‡ But I would give the horses as much hay or straw or grass as they could eat. I use wheat or even barley straw, or green mealie stalks to stuff their bellies out, and use bran when obtainable for same reason. They must have a bellyful. I graze whenever safe (and sometimes when doubtful).

Appendix H. that unnecessary long halts are made, the result being that the enemy, although starting after the cavalry, are able to get ahead of it. I could understand this if the country were close and difficult, but between the Modder and the Orange rivers its general features are such as to admit of small parties of Cavalry, accompanied by Field guns, being employed with impunity.

Artillery.

3. If the enemy's guns have, in some instances, the advantage of ours in range, we have the advantage of theirs in mobility, and we should make use of them by not remaining in positions the precise distance of which from the enemy's batteries has evidently been fixed beforehand. Moreover, it has been proved that the Boers' fire is far less accurate at unknown distances. In taking up positions compact battery formations should be avoided. The guns should be opened out, or it may be desirable to advance by sections or batteries. Similarly, retirements should be carried out at considerably increased intervals, by alternate batteries or sections if necessary, and care should be taken to travel quickly through the danger zone of hostile artillery fire.

The following plan, frequently adopted by the Boers, has succeeded in deceiving our artillery on several occasions :—

Suppose "A" to be a gun emplacement, the gun firing smokeless powder; simultaneously with the discharge of the gun at "A" a powder flask of black powder will be exploded at "B," a hill in rear, leading us to direct our projectile on "B." Careful calculation with a watch, however, will defeat this plan.

Infantry.

4. The present open formation renders it difficult for officers to exercise command over their men, except such as may be in their immediate vicinity. A remedy for this would appear to be a system of whistle calls by which a company lying in extended order could obey orders as readily as if in quarter column. I invite suggestions for such a system of whistle calls as would be useful.

5. It is difficult to recognise officers as equipped at present, and it seems desirable they should wear a distinguishing mark of some kind, either on the collar at the back of the neck, or on the back of the coat.

6. Soldiers, when under fire, do not take sufficient advantage of the sandy nature of the soil to construct cover for themselves. If such soil is scraped even with a canteen lid a certain amount of cover from rifle fire can be obtained in a short time.

7. The distribution of ammunition to the firing line is one of the most difficult problems of modern warfare. One solution which has been suggested to me is for a portion of the supports gradually to creep forward until a regular chain of men is established from the supports (where the ammunition carts should be) right up to the firing line. The ammunition could then be gradually worked up by hand till it reached the firing line, where it could be passed along as required. This would, no doubt, be a slow method of distributing ammunition, but it appears to be an improvement on the present method, which is almost impossible to carry out under fire.

8. Reports received suggest that the Boers are less likely to hold entrenchments on the plain with the same tenacity and courage as they display when defending kopjes, and it is stated that this applies especially in night time, if they know that British infantry are within easy striking distance from them. How far this is true time only can show.

(Sd.) ROBERTS, Field Marshal.
Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa.

CHIEF OF STAFF Circular Memo., No. 5.

Cape Town,
January 26th, 1900.

The following instructions by the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief are communicated for the guidance of all concerned.

By Order,
(Sd.) KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM,
Chief of Staff.

NOTES FOR GUIDANCE IN SOUTH AFRICAN WARFARE.

Infantry.

As it is desirable that full advantage should be taken of the experience gained during the past three months by our troops in South Africa, the following notes are issued for the guidance of all who may find themselves in command of a Force (large or small) on service in the field.

We have to deal with an enemy possessing remarkable mobility, intimately acquainted with the country, thoroughly understanding how to take advantage of ground, adept in improvising cover, and most skilful in the use of their weapons.

Against such an enemy any attempt to take a position by direct attack will assuredly fail. The only hope of success lies in being able to turn one or both flanks, or what would in many instances be equally effective, to threaten to cut the enemy's line of communication.

Before any plan of attack can be decided upon, the position must be carefully examined by reconnoitring parties, and every endeavour must be made to obtain all possible information about it from the people of the country. It must, however, be remembered that the position ostensibly occupied is not always the one the Boers intend to defend; it is often merely a decoy, a stronger position in the vicinity having previously been prepared upon which they move rapidly, and from which they can frequently bring a destructive fire to bear upon the attacking line. Their marvellous mobility enables them to do this without much risk to themselves, and also to be in strength at any point of the position that may be seriously threatened. It follows, therefore, that our object should be to cripple the mobility of the Boers, and to effect this, next to inflicting heavy losses on the men themselves, the surest means would be the capture or destruction of their horses.

When the extreme rifle range from the position is reached (1,500 to 1,800 yards) by the advance troops, or before, if they find themselves under Artillery fire, all column formations must be given up, and, when advancing to the attack of the position, Infantry must be freely extended, even on occasion, if necessary, to six or eight paces, the front and both flanks being well covered with scouts. This extended formation will throw increased responsibility on Battalion and Company Commanders. The objective aimed at, therefore, should be carefully explained to them. They should be allowed to make use of any opportunity that may offer to further the scheme, on the distinct understanding that no isolated acts are attempted such as might endanger the general plan. During the attack, Commanding Officers must be careful not to lose touch with the troops on their right and left, and they should, as far as possible, ensure their co-operation. Every advantage should be taken of cover, and Battalion and Company Commanders should look out for and occupy positions from which they would be able to bring an enfilading fire to bear upon the enemy. The capacity of these officers will be judged by the initiation displayed in seizing rapidly every opportunity to further the general scheme of attack.

An essential point, and one which must never be lost sight of, is the power of endurance of the Infantry soldier. If Infantry soldiers (carrying as they do a considerable weight on their backs) are called upon to march a longer distance than can reasonably be expected from men in a normal state of health, or if they are injudiciously pressed as regards the pace, they will necessarily commence to feel the strain before they reach a point where their best energies are required to surmount the difficulties which lie before them. If, at such a period, a man feels exhausted, moral deterioration, and the consequences to our arms which such deterioration entails, must readily supervene.

Artillery.

As a general rule, the Artillery appear to have adapted themselves to the situation, and to the special conditions which present themselves in a campaign in South Africa.

The following points, however, require to be noticed :—

- (1) At the commencement of an action Artillery should not be ordered to take up a position until it has been ascertained by scouts to be clear of the enemy, and out of range of infantry fire.

- (2) When it is intended to take a position with Infantry the preparation by Artillery should be thorough and not spasmodic. Unless a strong force of Infantry is pushed within 900 yards of the position, the enemy will not occupy his trenches, and the guns will have no target. It is a mere waste of ammunition also to bombard an entrenchment when the Infantry attack is likely to be delayed, even for a short time. To be of real value the fire of the guns should be continuous until the assault is about to be delivered.
- (3) The expenditure of ammunition is a matter which can only be regulated by the circumstances of the movement. Officers Commanding should, however, always bear in mind that the supply of Artillery ammunition in the field is necessarily limited.
- (4) It is of great importance that Artillery horses should be kept fit for any special effort. They are not easily replaced, and it is the duty of Artillery officers to represent to the commander of the column whenever they consider that their horses are being unduly worked, as regards either pace or distance.

Cavalry and Mounted Troops.

Similarly with Cavalry horses. Every endeavour should be made to save them as much as possible, for

unless this is done, they cannot be expected to last through a lengthened campaign Appendix I

The men should dismount on every available opportunity, if for a few minutes only at a time, and on the line of march it will be advantageous for them to occasionally lead instead of riding their horses.

Horses should be fed at short intervals, and not allowed to be kept too long without water. A sufficiency of grain is necessary to enable horses to withstand hard work, but they will never keep in condition unless they have an ample supply of hay or some bulky equivalent.

On the line of march scouting must be carried out by the mounted troops in the most searching manner, in front and on both flanks. All high ground should be visited, and, whenever practicable, horsemen should ride along ridges and hills. As soon as parties of the enemy are observed the Mounted troops (after sending back word to the Commander) should make a considerable detour round the position occupied by the Boers, endeavour to estimate their numbers, and to ascertain where their horses have been left. They should also see whether, by threatening the Boer line of communication, they would not be forced to fight on ground unprepared or defence.

(Sd.) ROBERTS, Field Marshal,
Commanding in Chief, South Africa.

MEMORANDUM ISSUED BY LORD ROBERTS IN SOUTH AFRICA ON THE PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE OF OFFICERS DOING ALL IN THEIR POWER TO KEEP THEIR HORSES IN PROPER CONDITION.

Government House, Bloemfontein,
11th April, 1900.

The Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief desires to call the attention of Commanding Officers of Cavalry, Artillery, and Mounted Infantry units, and of all Officers belonging or attached thereto, to the paramount importance of doing all in their power to keep their horses in proper condition.

In Circular Memorandum No. 5, dated 26th January, 1900, which was promulgated for the guidance of all concerned, Lord Roberts remarked as follows:—

“It is of great importance that Artillery horses should be kept fit for any special effort. They are not easily replaced, and it is the duty of Artillery Officers to represent to the Commander of a Column whenever they consider that their horses are being unduly worked as regards either pace or distance.

“Similarly with Cavalry horses. Every endeavour should be made to save them as much as possible, for unless this is done they cannot be expected to last through a lengthened campaign. The men should dismount on every available opportunity, if only for a few minutes at a time, and on the line of march it will be advantageous for them to occasionally lead instead of riding their horses. Horses should be fed at short intervals, and not allowed to be kept too long without water. A sufficiency of grain is necessary to enable horses to stand hard work, but they will never keep in condition unless they have an ample supply of hay or some bulky equivalent.”

The Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief fully recognises that under certain circumstances, and when some important advantage can be obtained by sustained rapidity of movement, the sacrifice of horses may become a military necessity. Contingencies of this nature have occurred during the recent operations, and have,

no doubt, contributed in no small degree to the present condition of the mounted corps. On the other hand, there have been periods when the troops have halted or only marched short distances, and on these occasions it is to be feared that due care has not always been taken to feed the horses at short intervals, and to water them whenever the opportunity offered. Moreover, Lord Roberts has frequently observed that men remain mounted when there is no necessity for it, and on the line of march he has never yet seen the horses being led.

Making every allowance for long and rapid marches, want of water, and deficient forage, Lord Roberts is of opinion that, if the horses, more particularly those of the Cavalry and Mounted Infantry, had been better cared for, fewer of them would have become useless. The supply of remounts is not unlimited, besides which, fresh horses are not likely to be immediately forthcoming at the moment when they may be most urgently wanted. The success of military operations in this country largely depends upon the mobility of the troops employed, and this ceases as soon as the horses fall into a bad condition.

The Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief is confident that the Officers to whom this order is addressed are as anxious as himself to maintain the efficiency of their respective corps, and he appeals to them to spare no trouble in looking after the feeding and watering of their horses, and to see that the men dismount, and that the horses are allowed to graze on every possible opportunity.

His Lordship draws the special attention of General and Commanding Officers to this subject, which is of vital importance to the Army in South Africa, and he holds them responsible that his instructions are clearly understood and strictly complied with by all those serving under them.

MEMORANDUM HANDED IN BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR IAN S. M. HAMILTON, K.C.B., AS TO THE DUTIES OF THE MILITARY SECRETARY'S DEPARTMENT.

(Referred to in Q. 10857.)

In normal times the duties of the Military Secretary's Department may be briefly defined under the following headings :—

- Candidates for Commissions, their qualifications and education.
- First Appointments.
- Promotion.
- Retirement.
- Reserve of Officers.
- Appointments to the Staff and other extra-regimental positions.
- Confidential Reports on Officers.
- Foreign and Colonial Services, Egyptian Army.
- Patronage, such as—
 - Gentlemen at Arms.
 - Exons and Yeomen of the Guard.
 - Military Knights of Windsor.
 - Good Service Rewards for Officers.
 - Medals for Meritorious Service.
 - Annuities to Warrant and Non-Commissioned Officers.
- Honours and Rewards.

Under the Order in Council of the 4th November, 1901, many of these duties are concentrated in the Commander-in-Chief, and some by the Military Secretary under control of the Commander-in-Chief, and in this respect he is a Personal Staff Officer of the Commander-in-Chief.

But practically he is a high departmental officer administering, under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, all the above services; and the office was raised from the status of a Division to that of a Department under the above-quoted Order in Council.

He sits on the Army and Selection Boards, and the recommendations of the Promotion Board are submitted by him to the Commander-in-Chief.

It is probable that the work connected with the education and examination of candidates for the Army will be taken from his charge, consequent on the Report of the Akers-Douglas Committee.

The work connected with most of the above subjects was enormously increased during the recent South African War.

The Colleges and the Militia were quite unequal to supply the demands for first appointments. These demands were, however, met from the undermentioned sources, and the qualifications exacted necessarily varied according to the urgency of the demands :—

- Militia Officers.
- Yeomanry Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.
- University Candidates.
- Malta Artillery Officers.
- Malta Militia Officers.
- Home Volunteer Officers and Men.
- Ceylon Volunteers.
- The various Local Colonial Military Forces.
- Irregular Regiments in South Africa.
- Lumsden's Horse and Corps.
- Non-Commissioned Officers from Regular Army (not below the rank of Corporal).

Retirements practically stopped when the War commenced; but the requirements of the Staff, Special Service, Lines of Communication, Mounted Infantry, Irregular Colonial Corps, etc., etc., involved the seconding of very large numbers of regimental officers, and regimental promotions followed on accordingly.

The Reserve of Officers were called out for duty. The lists had to be sifted and their qualifications noted, whether for Staff or Regimental duty, either in South Africa, or to fill temporarily appointments at home caused by their vacation, consequent on the permanent holders being selected for Active Service in South Africa.

- 4 Reserve Regiments of Cavalry.
 - 18 Reserve Regiments of Infantry.
 - 8 Provisional Regiments of Cavalry.
 - 15 Provisional Regiments of Infantry.
- (So far as the Regimental Staff went.)

The Royal Garrison Regiment, consisting of five battalions, has been officered from the Reserve of Officers, the Militia, and in a few cases by officers of the Regular Army.

Thirty-nine battalions of Imperial Yeomanry were raised. The officers who joined the battalions on formation were nominated by the Deputy Adjutant General Imperial Yeomanry, and approved here. Any vacancies which occurred afterwards were filled by the General Officer Commanding South Africa, subject to approval here. Each battalion had an Establishment of 20 officers, but the actual number of officers in each battalion was almost double this, as all invalided officers, etc., were succeeded. The battalions are disbanded as they return home to this country.

The sad duty of informing relatives of the death or wounding of officers also fell on the Department. After an engagement the office was crowded with anxious relatives of all classes of society, male and female, asking for particulars which, in many cases, it was not possible to give—such as nature of wounds or cause of death, etc., etc. They would be there before the casualty lists were even received. They wanted all sorts of possible and impossible inquiries made by telegraph. Directly the lists were received, the relatives were informed by telegraph and, week-day or Sunday, some one was always on the spot to pass out any urgent reports relating to casualties that came to hand.

The receipt of despatches from South Africa involved the noting of all officers and men who were mentioned. Their previous services were annexed and they were brought up for consideration when the question of honours and rewards was taken in hand and the Gazettes published. It has been a laborious task.

During recent years, too, the demand for officers for the Foreign and Colonial Services has largely increased; and it has been with difficulty that they have been met. They consist principally of :—

- West African Frontier Force.
- King's African Rifles.
- West African Regiment.
- And Officers in Civil Employment and Special Extra-Regimental Employment.

The demands of the Egyptian Army have also had to be met.

The Staff for the Army Corps was prepared by the Military Secretary under the personal direction of the Commander-in-Chief.

The Commands of Divisions and Brigades were filled by General Officers on the Active List, either already in employment or on the Half-Pay List waiting employment, and their qualifications and previous career were fully consulted in making the selections.

The higher Staff Officers on the General Staff were composed of officers filling staff or other appointments at home, or from the Half-Pay List. They were mostly officers either on, or who had seen service on, the Staff.

The minor appointments on the General Staff were largely filled by officers employed on the Staff at home or abroad, or by regimental officers who had obtained the Staff College Certificate, or by regimental officers whose qualifications appeared to warrant their employment on the Staff.

As regards questions bearing on the efficiency of the Army, the following points seem to take prominence :—

- The Military Education of Officers.
- The encouragement of independence of thought and action and decision in cases of emergency.
- A full knowledge of theory and practice of musketry.
- A. A reserve of candidates for Army Commissions.
- B. A reserve, an efficient one, for Military duty in emergency, and the more efficient it is made the less necessity will there be for suggestion A.

IAN HAMILTON,
Military Secretary.

4th December, 1902.