

SOME SUGGESTIONS

FOR

**The Reorganisation of the Indian Territorial and
Auxiliary Forces ;**

AND FOR

**THE ADOPTION OF A DEFINITE PROGRAMME
FOR PREPARING INDIA FOR SELF-DEFENCE,
WITHIN TEN YEARS ;**

LAI D BEFORE

**The Committee on Reorganisation of the Indian
Territorial Force.**

BY

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FOREWORD.

For a good many years, we have advocated the military training of all Parsee youths, realising the risks to which a small community is exposed in times of trouble, and to that end, have recommended the formation of Parsee Cadet Corps, Rifle Clubs, and Volunteer Battalions, for communal self-defence, and also for rendering timely help to the Government and the Public, if called upon to do so, in any emergency. We have thus for long tried to educate, guide and represent Parsee public opinion on the subject of Voluntary Military Training. Recently we have been favoured with an invitation to offer our views on the subject, and also to represent Parsee public opinion before the Committee on Reorganisation of the I. T. F., as may be seen from the following.

At the end of last June, the Editor of the *Kaiser-i-Hind*, was kind enough to forward to us a letter he had received from Sir Jamsedji Jijibhoy, Bart., the Head of the Parsee Community of Bombay, and President, the Provincial Advisory Committee, I. T. F., Bombay District, saying that: "I have much pleasure in informing you that the Advisory Committee have resolved to submit the name of your Special Military Correspondent, Dr. Kaikhushroo Kersasp Dadachanji, to give evidence before the Indian Territorial Force Reorganisation Committee."

"The Advisory Committee of the Parsee Battalion propose to submit a representation, setting forth their views before the Reorganisation Committee. Before doing so, however, the Committee is anxious to have your views as well as those of Dr. Dadachanji, and I shall feel obliged if you could put your views down in writing, and send them to me at your early convenience. I enclose herewith a copy of the letter which I have received from Government, on the question, and I have to draw your particular attention to para 2 (v), viz., "improvement of the Force generally, having regard to the role for which it has been constituted. I need hardly add that the role for which it has been constituted is to supply a Second Line of Defence in case of emergency." In accordance with the desire expressed by Sir Jamsedji Jijibhoy in the said letter, we have put down our views in writing. It would be as well to explain here the basis for the views expressed by us. Having read the debates in the Legislative Assembly on the subject, as also the criticism of our public journals, we could come to but one conclusion, viz., the whole subject was enveloped in a fog of words, which indicated muddled thinking. We prefer to follow the exact method of science and logic, in dealing with this subject of national importance, e.g., practical suggestions are wanted for the Improvement of the I. T. Force, under four Heads, prescribed by the Committee on Reorganisation.

From the scientific and logical point of view, one cannot consider the improvement of the Second Line, i.e., the I. T. F., except in relation to the First Line, i.e., the Regular Army; nor can one make suggestions for the improvement of the Second Line without considering their effect on the First Line, as

both the Lines are so closely inter-related. We have therefore followed the scientific method of considering the two inter-related Lines together. Further, we do not assume, as the Government of India seems to do, that there is no need for improvement of the First Line, because such an assumption cannot be justified by the logic of facts.

We have considered the subject under the four Heads above mentioned, and discussed these, at length, under several sub-headings. Under (I)—Pay and Allowance, we have suggested the approximation of the Pay and Allowance of Indian Ranks to that of British Ranks. Under (II)—Popularity of the Force (page 6), the subject is considered under 14 sub-headings. The attention of the Committee is particularly drawn to the humiliating conditions of Service in the I. T. F., compared with those of the British T. F., and to the significant contrast between the two. A comparison has also been made between the relevant Sections of the India Army Act 1911, and the I. T. F. Act 1920, and Rules under both the Acts, and the British Army Act and the Territorial and Reserve Forces Acts, and the need for making necessary alterations in the former, and correspondingly in the I.A.F. Act, emphasised. Some of the obsessions of the military experts of the Government of India have been laid bare, and the fallacy of their arbitrary classification of Indians into martial and non-martial classes has been exposed. Attention is drawn to a practical lesson in militarisation of all classes of the Nation, taught by modern Japan, and its application to India.

Under (III)—Methods of selecting Candidates for Commission (page 26), the present system of selection of Officers and Non-Com.'s is condemned as productive of inefficiency and unpopularity of the I. T. F. Suggestions have been made for the selection of candidates for Commission by Provincial Military Boards of Examiners, and also for the establishment in India of Military Schools and Colleges for the training of an Indian Officers' Training Corps. Attention is also drawn to the Regulations, under which both University candidates and Officers in the Territorial Army can obtain Commissions in the Regular British Army, as the outcome of the Report of the Haldane Committee, issued by the War Office, London. It is shown that, even in England, the Army is no longer a preserve for the aristocrat, but is now open to the democrat. If India is to be prepared for Self-Defence, an I. T. O. C., of 40,000 will be required (see Table on page 34).

Under (IV)—Improvement of the Force generally, having regard to the role for which it has been constituted, (page 32), the question is considered under three sub-headings. Because an efficient Second Line should be (A) adequate in numbers to support and supplement the Regular Army; (B) organized and trained on a Divisional basis, and provided with a complete Divisional Staff, like the Regular Army; (C) provided with equipment and armament, identical with that of the Regular Army. Under (A) we have shown the absolute inadequacy of the I. T. F. for which a limit of 20,000 has been arbitrarily fixed, and the need for raising the limit to 300,000. The attention of the Committee on Territorial Reorganization is particularly drawn to the Table of Comparative Strength

of the Army in England and in India (page 34). In the third column of the Table, a tentative proposal is made for reorganizing the Armed Forces of the Indian Empire, from which it will be seen that, if adopted, every 10 years will see an addition of 1,712,500 men trained to Arms, thus rendering India competent for Self-Defence, without British aid. As to relative cost, 1) British Battalion costs as much as 4) Indian Regular Battalions, and 32) I. Territorial Battalions (page 39). Proper emphasis is laid on the *unmistakable warnings given by the Government of India, and its military experts, that Britain may not be able to help India in future wars, as she used to in the past, and so on the need for preparing India for Self-Defence, within a period of 10 years*. Further, the fallacy of the Military Experts has been exposed, *viz., "that India cannot be fitted for Self-Defence, she is not within three generations (i.e., ninety years) of it."* In contrast with this opinion of the Government, is that of the representatives of the people, who have expressed the hope, in some of the Resolutions passed by the Indian Legislative Assembly, that India may be prepared for Self-Defence, within 10 to 20 years. Thus the contrast between the two points of view is quite glaring. We may point out that, like time and tide, wars wait for no man; they wait neither to satisfy the political expediencies of Governments, nor the well-spun theories of Military Experts, but break out any day, without warning, like a thief in the night. Hence, we have suggested, as the solution of the problem, a ten years' Programme of Reorganisation of all the Armed Forces of India. We believe that the motive, underlying the appointment of the Committee on Reorganisation of the I. T. F., is rooted in the healthy aspirations of all classes of Indians, for being prepared for shouldering the burden of National Self-Defence. Hence, we suggest to the Committee that the problem of Reorganisation of the I. T. F. be considered *only as a part of the problem of Indian Self-Defence*.

Under (B) we have suggested that the I. T. F. should be trained on a Divisional basis, and that all Arms of the Service should be open to members of the I. T. F. and I. A. F., and that all essential Ancillary Services should be completely organised for the I. T. F., on the scale of the Regular Army. Under (C) we have suggested that the I.T.F. should be provided with equipment and armament, identical with that of the Regular Army, to enable it to act as an efficient Second Line. Men without munitions, or munitions without men are equally useless, and so, Indianization of the Military Services should be accompanied by *Indianization of the Military Industries, and thus provide employment for a million and a half of Indians*.

Finally, we have brought to the notice of the Government, and the Committee, "the reasonable complaints and grievances of the (Parsee) 11th and 12th Battalions, 2nd Bombay Pioneers, I. T. F." and have suggested the transfer of both the Battalions from the I. T. F. to the I. A. F. We wish to emphasise the fact, that we have not asked for any special preferential treatment for the Parsees, apart from our Indian fellow-subjects, for, in these democratic days, it would not do, nor is there any need, to ask for any such preference. Our democratic suggestion is for the (D) removal of all Racial Distinctions, and the

omission of the word 'European', wherever it occurs in the Auxiliary Forces Act, 1920, and also the omission of the words 'not being a European British subject' from § 5 (1) of the Indian Territorial Forces Act, 1920. Thus eliminating "all racial distinctions in the constitution of the non-regular military forces in India, including the Indian Auxiliary Force," and so removing the root of racial bitterness between European and Indian subjects of the Empire, as also the unpopularity of the I. T. F., arising out of such humiliating distinctions. We hope that the Government will observe the solemn pledge given to the Parsees by its authorized agent, who acted as the Director, I. A. and T. Forces, Bombay District, and thus vindicate the eternal principles of justice and equity. We need not remind the Government of the services rendered by the Parsee Community during the last War, in the contribution of men, munitions and money, out of all proportion to its small numbers. And we appeal to its sense of justice and fair-play to remove the grievances of the Parsee Battalions, by sanctioning their transfer from the I. T. F. to the I. A. F., for reasons explained at length in the Appendix; and we hope that the Committee on Reorganisation of the I. T. F. will see the justice of our claim, and take the necessary steps for its vindication.

We were favoured with a copy of the Questionnaire by the Secretary, the Auxiliary and Territorial Forces Committee, in September last, some time after we had sent our Suggestions for printing. We believe that, having expressed at length our independent views on the question, and also seeing that, some of the Suggestions in the Questionnaire coincide with ours, it would be superfluous for us to send a detailed reply to it. Moreover, on certain questions of principle, as will be noticed, we hold views which do not correspond with those expressed in the Questionnaire, which we believe, is based on a very narrow interpretation of motives, which led to the appointment of the Committee on Reorganisation.

I concur with the striking and original Suggestions presented here so ably by Dr. Kaikhushru K. Dadachanji, who has been contributing Special Articles on Military subjects to my journal, for the last many years.

ERACHSHAW R. HEERJIBEHEDIN, J.P.,
Editor and Proprietor, the "Kaiseri-Hind".

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Some Practical Suggestions for the Improvement of the Indian Territorial Force.

We proceed to make the following practical suggestions for the improvement of the Force, under the heads noted below :—

- (i) Pay and Allowance.
- (ii) Popularity of the Force.
- (iii) Methods of selecting candidates for Commission.
- (iv) Improvement of the Force generally, having regard to the role for which it has been constituted.

I.—PAY AND ALLOWANCE.

We believe it is now about time that the Government and its Military Advisers should realise that as every man is worthy of his hire, so is the soldier worthy of his pay. The Indian martial races have long been exploited very cheaply, and paid a Killing-Wage instead of a Living-Wage. The Pay and Allowance of an Indian Sepoy was fixed during an age, when all the necessaries of life were dirt cheap, and a sepoy could maintain his family, if not in comfort, at least in straitened circumstances. What may have sufficed in 1824, is hopelessly inadequate in 1924. The price of a Rupee in 1824 was 16 annas, while its value in 1924 has so far depreciated, that it hardly comes up to 4 annas, and in many cases, even 2 annas.

The Esher Committee urges that the pay of Indian Non-Coms. and Sepoys should be raised.

The Government is no doubt aware of the discontent of all ranks of the Indian Army, as regards Pay and Allowances. "The Report of the Army in India Committee, 1919-1920" states distinctly that, §69 "All witnesses belonging to the Indian Army,—British and Indian,—whom we have seen, urged that the pay of the Indian Non-Commissioned Officers and Men should be raised."

Under § 76, the Committee state that "We think it desirable, even at the risk of repetition, to recapitulate briefly the main considerations, which tell in favour of an increase of Pay. These are:—

- (a) That the Indian Army expects a substantial increase, and that it would be impolitic to disappoint this expectation, especially at a time like the present, when political agitators aim at undermining the Army's loyalty.
- (b) That the general rise in cost of living renders the present scale of pay insufficient, to enable the sepoy to support a wife and family, or other dependents.
- (c) That the industrial and agricultural development of India offers other and more lucrative employment to youths of the martial classes, and that this competition will adversely affect recruitment for the Army, unless better terms are offered."

§ 77. "After the most earnest consideration, we have formed the conclusion that it is necessary, in order to secure the contentment of the Indian Army, to

improve the terms of service of Indian other ranks, and our specific recommendations will be found in Appendix L. (Item 6.)”

Why has the Govt. suppressed the Specific Recommendations of the Esher Committee ?

We are surprised that the specific recommendations referred to above in section 77, have been deliberately withheld, and not published, by the Government of India, for reasons best known to itself. We consider it very strange that one of the most important items in the Report should be thus dealt with by the Government, and the public prevented from learning the specific recommendations of the Army in India Committee, with regard to the improvement of the pay, allowance and terms of service of Indian other ranks. We have no doubt that, if these specific recommendations had been published, they would have undoubtedly been of help to the present Committee, appointed to investigate and report upon the re-organization of the Indian Territorial Force. We hope that the Indian Legislative Assembly will induce or compel the Government to publish these specific recommendations.

Contrast between British and Indian Pay of Rank, below that of British Commissioned Officers.

In the absence of the specific recommendations mentioned above, we present below a Comparative Table of British and Indian Pay of Rank, to show up the contrast of “unequal pay for equal work”.

British Commissioned Officers.

(Identical pay in Indian and British Forces.)

				Rs.	a.	p.
Lieutenant Colonel	1,250	0	0
Major, after 5 years' service in that rank	1,050	0	0
Major	850	0	0
Captain, after 15 years' commissioned service	850	0	0
Captain	750	0	0
Lieutenant, after 7 years' commissioned service	550	0	0
Lieutenant	574	0	0
2nd Lieutenant, after 2 years' commissioned service	475	0	0
2nd Lieutenant	425	0	0
<i>British Pay of Rank.</i>				<i>Indian Pay of Rank.</i>		
<i>Warrant Officer.</i>				<i>Indian Commissioned Officers.</i>		
Regimental Sergt.-Major	315	0	0	Subedar-Major	200	0 0
				Subedar	130—160	
				Jamadar	75—100	
<i>Non-Com.</i>				<i>Non-Com.</i>		
Sergeant	158	0	0	Havildar	25	0 0
Lance-Sergeant	124	0	0	Lance-Havildar	23	8 0
Corporal	113	0	0	Naik	22	0 0
Lance-Corporal	96	0	0	Lance-Naik	18	0 0
Private	62	0	0	Sepoy	16	0 0
Reservist	22	0	0	Reservist	5	0 0

Comment on the above is superfluous. It is not a comparison, but a contrast between the two colored sides of the Indian Army. To avoid any false criticism, we have to state here, that the above figures have been borrowed from "The Pay and Allowance Regulations of the Army in India" (Part I, 1923.)

Not only is the contrast glaring between the British and the Indian Pay of Rank, the more surprising fact is this that, according to the "Royal Warrant for the Army," the pay of the British Private, per day, on enlistment, is 2/9d., whilst, the increment of his pay, *after 2 years' of service*, is 9d., i.e. a total of 3/6d. per day. It means that a British Private gets, after 2 years' service in the Army, an increment of nine annas per day, whilst the Indian Sepoy, for his whole term of service does not get even a pay of 9 annas per day. The same contrast will be found as regards the pay of the Reservists. The British Private is paid as a Reservist, 12 annas per day, whilst the Indian Sepoy gets about 3 annas a day, as a Reservist!

We have often heard the economists' slogan "Equal Pay for Equal Work" but in the Indian Army, it appears that the slogan is "Unequal pay for equal Work", in the proportion of 1:4. One can say without hesitation that the Indian Sepoy and his family are starved, whilst the British Private and his family are well fed and looked after, on their respective pay of rank.

Major Portion of our Military Budget of 70 crores benefits only the ring of Army Contractors and their families.

The Military Authorities know quite well that the Indian Sepoy is forced, by his straitened circumstances, to sell a *part of his free ration* in order to send cash to his family, and thus is forced to a vicarious sacrifice, and starve himself, owing to the killing-wage paid by the Government of India, which is spending on the Indian Army, 70 crores of rupees a year,—the greater proportion of which sum goes to the enrichment of the ring of Army Contractors and their families! We believe, that the time has arrived now for the Members of the Legislative Assembly to take up a strong attitude on this subject, and to compel the Government of India to revise the scale of pay of Indian other ranks; and so far as possible, to approximate it to the pay of the British other ranks.

Some suggestions for Military Economy.

We are not here concerned with the consideration of the Military Budget, and particularly as to how the additional money required for raising the pay of other Indian ranks to the British level should be found. To avoid being considered irresponsible arm-chair critics, we can suggest from experience that, if the Military Stores Department be put under economic business management, instead of the present extravagant unbusinesslike military management, at least 4 to 5 crores of rupees, going to waste every year on the Stores, can be spared and utilized for a better purpose than that of benefitting the Army Contractors. We believe it is no secret that annual bonfires are made of condemned—which should not have been purchased in the first instance—Military Stores worth lacs of rupees; and the selling of Surplus Stores at ruinous reductions, and re-purchasing the same at fancy prices, show where economy can be practised, if the Military Authorities were induced to practise and had the will, to do so. For, where there is a will,

there is a way. But so far, the Military have repressed their will !

We wish to insist on the fact that the greatest commanders of all times and of all ages have realized the fact that, in war, men count far more than machines, and a well-paid and contented small army is of more military value, than a large, ill-paid and discontented army. It is unfortunate that in the Annual Military Budgets these two items, viz., men and machines, and their costs, are not shown separately, otherwise the contrast would be illuminating !

Another item on which reduction can be made in the Annual Military Budget is that of Military Home Charges.

With the gradual Indianisation of the Army, and reduction of British Troops, the Home Charges will automatically decline. We do not know how far this policy of reducing the British Army in India is likely to proceed. If India is really to be granted Dominion Status, it naturally follows that India will have soon to provide an Indian Army of defence and offence, and the British Troops will be gradually replaced by Indian Troops, just as the self-governing Dominions like Canada, Australia, etc., have done. And if gradually the British Troops are reduced to a vanishing margin, the Home Charges will be correspondingly reduced, thus affording the much needed money for the raising of pay of Indian other ranks.

Another matter to which we beg to draw the attention of the Members of the Committee, is to the "Report of the Lee Commission" on the well-paid Services. The Commission has reported that poorly paid Civil officers on Rs. 1500 or more a month are starving, and being moved to tears by their woes, has recommended a rise in their fat pay. We should like to know how a poor Sepoy on Rs. 15 a month can flourish, whilst the poor officer on Rs. 1500 a month can starve ! It is about time, such cant were put an end to.

We believe that owing to the starvation wages of the Sepoy, some of our finest fighting-races are being deprived of their legitimate increase in numbers, and where formerly large families used to be the rule, much smaller families are found today.

The blame for this decrease in the number of martial races must lie on the head of the Military Authorities. The Members of the Committee need not be frightened by the spectre of increased taxation being necessary to meet the proposed increase in the pay of the Indian Sepoy, for, as we have shown above, economies can certainly be made in the wasteful Stores Department, and the money thus saved transferred to this item of increased pay of Indian other ranks, and thus indirectly, help in the growth of the population of our martial races.

If one were to make some general remarks as to the inadequacy of Rs. 16 a month for an adult Sepoy and his family, one may say that a decent beggar in the city of Bombay would be ashamed of himself, if he did not earn much more than the Sepoy's pay per month !

✓ If the Military Authorities expect that educated Indians are going to join the I. T. F. on such degrading terms of pay, they are quite mistaken.

To state that the experiment of the I. T. F. is a failure is mere hypocrisy. No educated Indian, with any sense of self-respect, can be expected to join the

I. T. F. on such degrading terms of Pay and Allowance. The Military Authorities themselves are responsible for the failure of the experiment. They have deliberately fixed the pay and allowance very low, and as we shall see further on, the terms of service in the I. T. F. are also not conducive to Indian self-respect. If the Military Authorities and the Government of India honestly desire to make this experiment of I. T. F. a success, the obvious thing for them to do is to make the terms of pay and service in the I. T. F., sufficiently attractive for the right class of men, *i.e.*, same as those of the Indian Auxiliary Force. And if the experiment then fails, under those circumstances, it would supply a real justification for the Government to call this experiment a failure. We cannot therefore so far agree with the verdict of the Government as to the so-called failure of the Territorial Movement, for the reasons advanced above, realising that the Government itself has furnished the conditions of inevitable failure.

We have hitherto proposed the approximation of the (1) Pay of the Indian Army to that of the British Army in India. And further, we would propose that the (2) Allowances and (3) Pensions of the Indian Army be raised to the scale of the British Army. A Sepoy's pension, after many years service, amounts to Rs. 5 a month. And to expect an adult Indian to live on such a miserable sum—which would not satisfy the wants even of a small boy—is to expect the impossible! The same criticism applies to (4) Good Service and Good Conduct Pay. And the Esher Committee has made specific suggestions for increase in §78.

As to (5) Family-Pensions, the Esher Committee in section 79 states that “we consider that the present rates of family pension for Sepoys are inadequate. We recommend the abolition of the lower rate; and think that there should be one flat rate for all other ranks, plus an allowance for each child on the same principles as for Indian Officers.”

Finally, we will refer to the question of (6) Injury-Pensions. The Esher Committee's Report makes the following statement in §91:

“It has been represented to us that the regulations governing the grant of Injury Pensions, produce discontent, and in some cases, actual hardship. The reference to Army Regulation, India, Vol. I, para 1058 etc. will show, we think, that they are too limited in scope and lack elasticity. A comparison between these Regulations, and those contained in the Royal Warrant dated 6th December 1919, for the Pensions of Soldiers disabled in the Great War, confirms this view. The Committee has made its recommendations for readjusting the scale of Injury-Pensions in section 98, to which attention is invited.”

It must be clearly understood that as the role of the Indian Territorial Force is to serve as a second line to the Regular Indian Army, it may be urged that the second line troops cannot be paid on a higher scale than the first line troops. Our contention is that the first line troops are badly and unjustly paid on an out-of-date scale, and that it is necessary to raise the scale of the Regular Indian Army to that of the Regular British Army, and thus abolish the racial as well as economic distinctions between the two classes of soldiers. We do not believe in any racial distinctions, and we believe that, unless the distinctions are now abolished, the Indian Territorial Force will continue to be a failure, and that the responsibility of such

failure must rest on the Government and its Military Advisers, who are in a position to make or mar the future of the I. T. F.

In old days, the greatest attraction for the Soldiers of fortune were the spoils of War. In these days, the Government grabs everything, and leaves only grumbling to the fighters! Some substitute needed.

We believe, much more need not be added to this plea for the approximation of the scales of Pay, Allowance and Pensions of the Indian and British Armies. And we hope that the honourable profession of Arms will be paid honourable rates of pay, instead of the present humiliating rates. We may add that, in the days of yore, the sepoye had the opportunity and the privilege of supplementing their small pay, by the spoils of war. But, in these degenerate days, the Government grabs everything, and the sepoye get nothing! For example, after the last War, the British Empire grabbed the spoils of war, in the shape of millions of miles of enemy territory, which the sepoye helped to win. And the British Government kept the lot, and left only grumbling to the sepoye, as their share of the spoils of war! We believe this was one of the greatest attractions of the martial career in the past. Hence the Government ought to find some substitute for this, the greatest of attractions of soldiers of fortune. We know that grants of land were made to a small number of distinguished sepoye of the last war, but the majority were disbanded, and granted destitution for their great services. Same was the case in England where Earl Haig has been trying to get employment for officers and soldiers for the last 6 years with some belated success.

To popularise both the first and second line troops raise their pay, etc., simultaneonsly, and thus remove the economic racial distinction between the Indian and European armies.

In conclusion, we may state without fear of contradiction, that the Indian sepoy is as good as any soldier in the world. That uptill now, his military traditions of 'Izzat,' have been very cheaply exploited, and that his services ought to be paid on the universally recognized standard of 'Equal Pay for Equal Work'. And Rs. 15 per month is a starvation or a killing-wage, and that the present scale of pay of sepoye should be raised to the level of the British soldiers. We should not consider the raising of the pay as a measure of generosity, but as one of justice.

Finally, we hope that this plea for justice will be properly considered by the Committee of the Indian Legislative Assembly, who should insist on the suggested increase of Pay of the Regular Indian Army, so that no excuse could be brought forward by the Military Authorities that the Second Line Troops cannot be paid higher than the First Line Troops! If the Committee are determined to popularize the Indian Territorial Force, the first step necessary is to remove the racial distinction in the Pay, Allowance and Prospects of the Indian Sepoy and the British Soldier. We hope that the Committee will not rest satisfied with the removal of mere sentimental distinction, but insist on the removal of this intolerable economic racial distinction.

II.—POPULARITY OF THE FORCE.

We now come to a consideration of the practical suggestions for the im-

provement of the Force under the second heading. Naturally, the popularity of every Force must depend on the conditions of service, and contentment resulting from such conditions. We have already shown above that the conditions of service in the Indian Territorial Force as regards (1) Pay, Allowance and Prospects are not only unattractive, but are in a sense degrading to the economic conscience of any self-respecting person.

1.—First and most essential condition for popularising the Force is to raise the Pay, etc. of the Indian Army to the level of the British.

Hence, the obvious necessity of raising the pay etc. of the Indian ranks to the level of the British, to popularise the Force. We have also quoted the recommendations of the Esher Committee to emphasise the importance of the same. We may add that for people earning Rs. 1,500 a month, to preach patriotism to those earning Rs. 15 a month, and asking them to rest satisfied with their miserable lot, is sheer bunkum. A sepoy is worth his pay, just as any other person in this world. That the man who offers his life for his country deserves and ought to be paid in proportion to the value of his services to the State. We believe that justice and public morality alike demand the increase of pay etc. of the ranks of the Indian Army—both Regular and Territorial. To increase the popularity and contentment of both, the first and most essential condition is the increase of pay and prospects of the Indian Army to the level of the British Army in India. A part of the huge Indian Army Budget should be deviated from the pockets of the ring of unworthy and grasping Army Contractors to those of the worthy and self-sacrificing sepoys.

2.—Abolition of Provincial Advisory Committees, and Establishment of Provincial Territorial Associations in India, for the popularisation of the I.T.F.—Formation of County Associations in England.—Separation of Command and Administration, and reasons for same.

Our second suggestion for popularising the I. T. F. is for the abolition of Provincial Advisory Committees, nominated by the local Governments, and the establishment of Provincial Territorial Associations, on the lines of County T. Associations in England, with modifications adapted to local circumstances.

In England, County Associations have been established for the purpose of raising and administering the Territorial Army, whose duty it is, in conjunction with the Army Council, to recruit, organise and equip this Force, and make the necessary provision for ranges, buildings, camping grounds, etc., required.

The general principle on which the Territorial Force is organised, is the assimilation of its form and composition to those of the Regular Army, so far as is consistent with the civil character and occupation of its members. The provinces of Command and Administration, however, are kept rigidly distinct, and for the purposes of the latter, it has a special machinery of its own. An explanation of this division of powers may be found in the fact that, Command and Training to be efficient must be centralized, the administration of citizen forces raised on a voluntary basis can only be efficient if it is decentralised. Unity of command and, to some extent, unity of training are essential to success in the field, but diversity and elasticity in administration are no less essential to the encouragement of local effort, and the development of local resources in time of peace.

Numbers of Member of a County Association. Employers and Workmen to be represented.

Subject to the numbers of qualified persons available, and to the statutory provision, that the military members must form not less than half of the whole Association, an Association may be composed of any such number of persons, as may be provided in the scheme.

Among the numbers may be included, if thought desirable, representatives of interests of employers and workmen.

Comparison of Local Advisory Committees, and County Associations of England.

Recommendation for establishment of Provincial Territorial Associations of 12 members, half nominated, and half elected.

If a comparison be made between this English system of establishment of county Associations, and of the Advisory Committees of the I. T. F., as laid down in the I. T. F. Act, and the Rules under the Act, it will be seen that these latter are composed of three members only—two non-official and one military.

As a matter of practice, it is the military member who rules the roost. If the I. T. F. is to be made really popular, it is necessary that the composition of the Advisory Committees under the I. T. F. Act should be altered, both in numbers and in the qualifications of the members. As it is, the three members of the Provincial Advisory Committee are nominated by the local Government of each Province, and as our people have lost all faith in Government nomination, the following suggestions are made for the appointment of Advisory Committees in the future :—

I—The Committee, or Provincial Territorial Association (as it may be better renamed) should consist of at least a dozen members, half of whom should be military members nominated by the Government, whilst the other half should be elected by the Local Legislative Council; so that men of light and leading and public popularity may be enabled to take a share, as real representatives of the people, in the administration of the I. T. F.

II—Powers and Duties of Local Advisory Committees and of English County Associations, compared and contrasted.

It would be helpful first to examine the powers and duties of English County Associations, and later, to compare same with those of the local Advisory Committees of the I. T. F.

Powers and Duties of County Associations—No power of command or training over any part of His Majesty's Military Forces can be exercised by an Association, but, apart from this express exception, it has by statute an *unlimited range* of possible duties in connection with the organisation and administration of those Forces, including the Regulars and Reserves. For these purposes, any powers residing in the Crown, and any powers or duties conferred or imposed on the Army Council or a Secretary of State, by Act of Parliament or otherwise, may, so far as concerned with organization and administration, be conferred upon a County Association, either from time to time or permanently.

Regulations may also direct the manner in which Associations are to exercise the powers and perform the duties assigned to them, and may provide generally

for effectively carrying into operation, the part of the Act dealing with Associations.

General Duties of County Association.

The Act lays down three general duties, which are incumbent on every Association, and also enumerates certain particulars, powers and duties, which may be assigned to it, by Orders of His Majesty or Regulations of the Army Council.

✓ The three general duties, imposed under the T. and R. F. Act, are

- (a) To learn and conform to the plan of the Army Council for the organization of the Territorial Force within the County.
- (b) To ascertain the military resources and capability of the County,
- (c) To tender advice and assistance to the military authorities, which are defined in the Act, as under :

General Duties under T. & R. F. Act Sec. 2—(1)

(1) It shall be the duty of an Association when constituted, (a) to make itself acquainted with and conform to the plan of the Army Council for the organisation of the Territorial Force within the county, and (b) to ascertain the military resources and capabilities of the county, and (c) to render advice and assistance to the Army Council and to such officers as the Army Council may direct; and an Association shall have, exercise, and discharge such powers and duties connected with the organisation and administration of His Majesty's Military Forces, as may for the time being be transferred or assigned to it, by order of His Majesty signified under the hand of a Secretary of State or, subject thereto, by regulations under this Act, but an Association shall not have any powers of command or training over any part of his His Majesty's Military Forces.

✓ In addition to the General Duties, the following Particular Duties are imposed upon the County Associations, and are so defined in the T. R. F. Act, Sec. 2—(2).

T. & R. F. Act Sec. 2—(2)

✓ (2) The powers and duties so transferred or assigned may include any powers conferred on or vested in His Majesty, and any powers or duties conferred or imposed on the Army Council or a Secretary of State, by statute or otherwise, and in particular respecting the following matters :—

- (a) The organisation of the units of the Territorial Force and their administration (including maintenance) at all times, other than when they are called out for training or actual military service, or when embodied.
- (b) The recruiting for the Territorial Force both in peace and in war, and defining the limits of recruiting areas.
- (c) The provision and maintenance of rifle ranges, buildings, magazines, and sites of camps for the Territorial Force.
- (d) Facilitating the provision of areas to be used for manœuvres.
- (e) Arranging with employers of labour as to holidays for training, and ascertaining the times of training best suited to the circumstances of civil life.

- (f) Establishing or assisting cadet battallions and corps and also rifle clubs, provided that no financial assistance out of money voted by Parliament, shall be given by an association in respect of any person, in a battalion, or corps in a school, in receipt of a parliamentary grant, until such person has attained the age of sixteen.
- (g) The provision of horses for the peace requirements of the Territorial Force.
- (h) Providing accommodation for the safe custody of arms and equipment.
- (i) The supply of the requirements on mobilisation of the units of the Territorial Force within the county, in so far as those requirements are directed by the Army Council to be met locally, such requirements where practicable to be embodied in regulations, which shall be issued to County Associations from time to time, and on the first occasion, not later than the first day of January one thousand nine hundred and nine.
- (j) The payment of separation and other allowances to the families of men of the Territorial Force, when embodied or called out on actual military service.
- (k) The registration, in conjunction with the Military authorities, of horses for any of His Majesty's Forces.
- (l) The care of reservists and discharged soldiers.

Contrast between powers and duties of English County Associations and I. T. F. Advisory Committees.—Establish a Provincial Territorial Association in Bombay.

Comparing the General Duties and Special Duties of the County Associations with those of the local Advisory Committees, as laid down in the Rules under the I. T. F. Act, part VI, section 30, the evident contrast between both ought to convince the Committee on Reorganization, that the object of the Government in appointing such committees is to have 'mere automatons' who should register the recommendations, however undesirable they may be, of the Officer Commanding the District, or of the Officer Commanding the local Battalion. One fails to see the necessity of such an Advisory Committee, as in practice, it merely registers the advice of the O. C. If the object of the Committee on Reorganization is to alter this farcical arrangement, and to make the Territorial Force really popular with both the classes and masses, it is necessary that it should recommend the formation of Territorial County Associations on lines similar to those of England, but adapted to the peculiar conditions of our country. It would be superfluous here to go into the details of such recommendations, relating to their organization.

In short, one may state that, to popularise the Territorial Force, first democratise and popularize the Advisory Committees of the Force, so that the public may be induced to believe that the Force is their own National Force, organized for their own benefit, and not merely a mercenary force, organized by the Government for its own sinister purposes, as seems to be the general impression in the public mind of today. To this end establish Provincial Territorial Associations.

Absurdity and futility of powers bestowed upon the Advisory Committees under the I. T. F. Act.—An apt illustration.

To show the absurdity and futility of the so-called powers bestowed upon the Advisory Committees, under the I. T. F. Act and Rules under the Act, one may take up Sec. 30 (a) under which applications for discharge may be disposed of by the Committee. Both Sec. 13 (c) and Sec. 30 (a), are so badly worded, that they are in a sense meaningless.

Sec. 13 (2)—The Commanding Officer may either grant such application, or forward it with his own recommendation thereon to the Advisory Committee, constituted for the Province in which the corps or unit is located.

Sec. 30 (a)—The Advisory Committee may make recommendations to the O. C. the District (a) on applications forwarded to it by the Officer Commanding a corps or unit, under sub-rule (2) of rule 13.

Under Sec. 13 (2), in the first place, the C. O. makes recommendations to the Advisory Committee, and subsequently under Sec. 30 (a) the Advisory Committee makes recommendations to the C. O. the District ! It sounds very gilbertian, that such an absurd section should be allowed to exist in the badly-worded I. T. F. Act. Supposing that the C. O. and the Advisory Committee are at loggerheads, what happens to the application for Discharge or Resignation ! Why should such an important matter be left to the discretion, or rather the caprice of the C. O., or the Advisory Committee which generally agrees with the C. O. ? This matter of Resignation from the I. T. F. will be again considered under a separate heading. But it is one illustration of the lack of power of the Advisory Committees in the matter, and the absurdity of the badly drafted Act. The English Act is sensible, and gives definite instructions for dealing with this subject.

✓ 3.—To popularise military service and training among Indians, establish Cadet Corps for School children, and Rifle Clubs for youths and adults, which will act as Reservoirs and Feeders for Regular and Territorial Forces, and also help to improve the musketry training of all interested Indians. Mere Government distrust of Indian subjects cannot improve their military capacity or training !

In the preceding suggestions for the formation of County Associations, we have seen that in England they have to carry out the following important duty :—

✓ (f) Establishing or assisting cadet battalions and corps, and also rifle clubs, provided that no financial assistance out of money voted by Parliament, shall be given by an association in respect of any person in a battalion, or corps in a school, in receipt of a parliamentary grant, until such person has attained the age of sixteen.

We believe that the policy hitherto followed by the Indian Government of excluding Indian subjects of His Majesty from participating in any sort of military training outside of the Regular and recently raised Territorial Forces, e.g. by the formation of Cadet Corps or Rifle Clubs—permission for which has been so far reserved for Europeans only,—is dictated by the distrust of the Indian subjects, and considered by the latter as humiliating and degrading to their self-respect. The Government and the military authorities must realise that, if India is to be granted Dominion Status, sooner or later, she will certainly demand the rights and privileges accruing from such status. One

of the most important rights will be that of military training of her sons for self-defence, and defence against aggression. The object of establishing Cadet Corps and of Rifle Clubs, in England and other European countries, is to act as reservoirs and feeders for the Regular and Territorial Armies, and also help to improve the Musketry Training of members of such armies, as well as members of the general public, who may be precluded by circumstances from joining the Army.

Perverse policy of Government distrust of Indian subjects, responsible for the lack of interest and apathy of the Indian nation in military matters. Further, present system of education responsible for physical deterioration and degeneration of the literate classes. Therefore introduce necessary reforms in the Educational System—physical training, medical inspection, supervision and treatment of children, as a preliminary to military training in cadet corps, etc.

The general apathy and indifference of the Indian public and lack of all interest in military matters can be explained by the perverse policy of the Government, which has deliberately precluded Indians of all classes, with the exception only of the martial races required for the purposes of the Regular Indian Army, from taking any intelligent interest in the military affairs of the nation. The Government has, till recently, ignored all active or passive co-operation of the Indian public in all military matters. To expect that any nation under such conditions would suddenly change its nature and traditions, and co-operate with Government in raising the large Territorial Army, under humiliating conditions of service, is to expect the impossible. It would be just as absurd to expect the Indians to take any active interest in the Navy, or in the Air Force, as in the Army, for the obvious reason that all intelligent Indians have been excluded from participating in the military affairs of the country for nearly a century or more. In this respect, both the literate classes and the illiterate masses of India are smarting under the same grievance.

✓ In England, France, or pre-war Germany, boys from the age of 10, 12, or 14 could, if they wished, join the School Cadet Corps or the Church Brigades, and thus at a plastic age be initiated into the mysteries and glories of Mars! Teach the young idea how to shoot, and when the boy comes to the age of discretion, he will very likely join the Territorial or the Regular Army, through the spirit of patriotism, kindled by the early association.

Any one who understands the psychology of childhood, will agree with us that such early impressions on the minds of growing children leave indelible marks for a life-time; and once the growing youth of the nation takes an interest in military training, it is very likely to continue for a life-time. We believe that, to make military training compulsory for the under-graduates of the University is to begin at the wrong end, in the wrong way. The present system of Indian education is responsible for the physical, mental and moral degeneration of the educated classes; and the sorry samples of physical wrecks—thousands of whom appear for the Matriculation Examination, every year,—are absolute witness to the destructive function of Indian education. We may quote only one example, out of many. For example, the Calcutta University wanted to raise a Territorial University Corps. An official communique was issued

some time back, from which we find that, out of nearly 800 recruits, only about 150 were found 'just satisfactory' for admission into the Force! It shows what a stupid and senseless system of education, such as that established in India, can do to destroy and ruin the physique of children and youths, subjected to its senseless, mechanical grinding. Take again the reports of the medical examination of the undergraduates of the Calcutta University, or of the Municipal Schools of Bombay, or of the Parsee school children of Bombay. And they all tell the same tale of the physical deterioration and degeneration of Indian children and youths, attending schools and colleges. Personally we have drawn the attention of the local authorities and of the local Government to the savagery of the present educational system, but without avail. The local Government has not funds enough for providing efficient medical inspection, supervision and treatment for the physical development of our children and youths. But it can easily spare crores of rupees for the so-called 'Development' of Bombay. We consider such neglect of humanity absolutely criminal on the part of the Government. Every civilized country has established a School Medical Service. The fact that the Central and Provincial Governments of India have utterly neglected on false and untenable economic grounds, the establishment of such School Medical Service in this country is witness to the fact that the Government does not care for the physical improvement of its subjects. We can see no difference between such criminal neglect of a civilized Government and the criminal infanticide by savage races! Both plead poverty as an excuse for the crime. But the Government of Bombay has no excuse whatever. For common sense suggests that the development of citizens should take precedence of the development of a city. Hence we believe, the charge is proved that the Government is doubly responsible for the physical ruin, and for the apathy and lack of interest in the military affairs of the Indian nation as a whole. Because the present educational policy of the Government renders the children and youths physically defective and so militarily ineffective, and secondly by excluding Indians from a fair share in the military affairs of the country, has deprived them of all interest in same. Hence the Government itself is responsible for the failure and unpopularity of the Indian Territorial Force. We would therefore make the following suggestions:—

- (a) That School and College Medical Services should be established for the Medical Inspection, Supervision and Treatment of all students, from the day of admission to the day of departure, from all Schools and Colleges.
- ✓(b) That authorities of Schools and Colleges should be encouraged to form Cadet Corps or Rifle Clubs, and to that end, the necessary legislation should be included in the new Territorial Forces Act. There should be no compulsion on any one, in this matter of choice.
- ✓(c) Aside from Schools and Colleges, those members of the public, precluded from joining the Army, owing to age or other circumstances, who may not attend or may have left such educational institutions, and particularly members of all minor communities should be given the rights, under specified conditions, to establish their own Cadet Corps or Rifle Clubs.

4.—Period of service should be reduced from six to four years, which would increase the number of new recruits by 50 per cent, every four years. A Territorial Reserve should be established for those willing to join, after 4 years of service in the I. T. F., for a further period of 4 years. In England, the Territorial Army has its own Reserve at its back.

We do not know who was the military genius, who proposed the terms of service in the Indian Territorial Force; and particularly, on what grounds he invented such humiliating terms. We can say, without much hesitation, after a comparison of the terms of service in the Indian T. F. and the British T. F., that the terms of service for the I. T. F. are meant for slaves, and those in the B. T. F. for freemen.

As a matter of fact, the I. T. F. is supposed to be a Volunteer Force, but, in practice, the terms of service are like those of a Conscript Force, and even much worse at that. In the French and German Armies, conscription was for periods varying from 18 months to three years at the most; while in the I. T. F. it is for six years. In the B. T. F. it is for four years, and the same is the case with the Indian Auxiliary Force. We see no reason why the period for the I. T. F. should be fixed at six years. We suggest that the period should be reduced to four years only. We find that a similar suggestion is made by the Esher Committee. Our objections to the length of service are two-fold.

In the first place, it is too much to expect a volunteer to offer his services for such a long period as six years, during which time, his circumstances may change, and unforeseen occasions arise, which may render it necessary for him to leave the Force, but owing to the preposterous conditions of Discharge, he is prevented from obtaining same. In the next place, it appears that it is a clever device for preventing a large number of Indians from joining the Force. By shortening the period from six to four years, the number of new recruits can be increased by 50 per cent every four years, and the number of Territorial Reservists also can be correspondingly increased. We suggest that the period of service in the I. T. F. be reduced from six to four years, and that instead of allowing those discharged, after finishing their term of four years, to rejoin the I. T. F., they ought to be given the option of joining the I. T. F. Reserve for 4 years.

We find that no provision has been made in the direction of having a sufficient Reserve at the back of the I. T. F. We believe that the whole scheme of the I. T. F. as it stands is a practical and very expensive joke on the public; and that it should be thoroughly revised, in the light of experience of the last war, and of Territorial Forces in other countries. We hope to deal with this subject under the heading of "Efficiency of the I. T. F." later on.

5.—Conditions of Resignation and Discharge laid down in the I. T. F. Act, and the Rules under the Act are unworthy of freemen, and fit for slaves only. They need alteration on the lines of the British T. Forces Act.

Next to the question of the period of service in the I. T. F., the most important is that of Voluntary Discharge from the Force. We have said above that the I. T. F. being a Volunteer Force, it should be treated as such and not as a Conscript Force of unwilling recruits. For instance, comparing the rules of discharge for the I. T. F. with those for the British T. F., we again find the distinction of slave and freeman between the two. The English freeman is

entitled according to the B. T. F. Act, to a free and voluntary discharge on giving three months' notice to the O. C., and paying £5. In many cases, the payment is dispensed with. While his fellow citizen in the I. T. F. is treated like a slave, and is not allowed to resign from the Force, except on the recommendation of the O. C., or the local Advisory Committee. So that practically, like a slave, he is subject to the freaks and frowns of the latter. We wish to draw the attention of the Committee to the grave scandal of the Ahmedabad Company of the Parsee Pioneers, which happened in 1923. The military martinets and the local Advisory Committee, instead of accepting the resignations of the Privates and N. C. O.'s of the local Company, bullied them with pains and penalties, and threatened them with capital punishment for not obeying their illegal orders ! Such a contretemps would be impossible in a self-governing country like England, where the superior officers would have been duly punished and cashiered out of the Force for exceeding their authority ! But, here in this slave-driven country, with the arbitrary and oppressive powers given by the I. T. F. Act, such a scandal did happen, with the expected result. The eyes of the majority of all ranks of the Parsee Pioneers, and their friends, parents and guardians were fully opened, and they realised that they were mere slaves in the hands of the military octopus, without any rights and privileges of volunteers, and weighed down with all the duties and obligations of helpless slaves, and deprived of all the privileges of freemen, offering their voluntary services for the defence of the country. We hope that the military advisers of the Government have learnt a lesson from this unfortunate episode. We further hope that the Committee on Reorganisation will realise that the I. T. F. Act requires a thorough revision ; and the removal of all sections obnoxious to our sense of national self-respect, otherwise its labours will be in vain, and the I.T.F. will continue to be as unpopular as ever.

The following alterations in the conditions of Discharge from the I. T. F. should be adopted.

T. & R. F. Act § 9 (3).

Any man of the Territorial Force shall, except when a proclamation ordering the Army Reserve to be called out on permanent service is in force, be entitled to be discharged before the end of his current term of service, on complying with the following conditions :—

- (I) Giving to his Commanding Officers three months' notice in writing, or such less notice as may be prescribed, of his desire to be discharged ; and
- (II) Paying for the use of the association for the county for which he was enlisted such sum as may be prescribed not exceeding five pounds ; and
- (III) Delivering up in good order, fair wear and tear only excepted, all arms, clothing, and appointments, being public property, issued to him, or, in cases where for any good and sufficient cause, the delivery of the property aforesaid is impossible, on paying the value thereof :

Provided that it shall be lawful for the association for the county or for any officer authorised by the association, in any case in which it appears that the reasons for which the discharge is claimed, are of

sufficient urgency or weight, to dispense either wholly or in part with all or any of the above conditions.

6.—Sections dealing with discipline in the I. T. F. fit for slaves, and not for freemen; hence, should be altered on the lines of the British T. F. Act.

(4) The sections of the I. T. F. Act dealing with discipline are fit for slaves, and just as absurd as the one about discharge. Take for instance, the Ahmedabad Company of Parsee Pioneers, ordered to attend the Annual Training at Tithal, last year. The O. C. of the Company threatened the absentees with capital punishment! That such a savage penalty should be prescribed for such a venial offence, undoubtedly proves the brutal mentality of the framers of the I. T. F. Act, and their resolve to show the Indians, that even if they volunteer their services, they will be treated as no better than helpless slaves of old, whose lives were at the mercy of their masters, who could chop off their heads at their own sweet will! We know that slavery was abolished a century back, but we find a survival of the slave-owning mentality, amongst the Military Officers of the Government of India. If it be said that we are making carping criticisms, and that discipline cannot be maintained without the prescription of such inhuman punishments, we suggest to them, the perusal of the British B. T. R. F. Act, under which the rigour of the ordinary military law of the land is softened, in its application to the Terriers.

“If any man of the B. T. F. fails to attend for preliminary or annual training, or the prescribed number of drills, he is liable to be tried by a Court of Summary Jurisdiction, and pay a fine not exceeding £5.” (T. & R. F. Act § 21.)

Even the meanest intelligence can note the evident difference between a British freeman and an Indian slave of the Territorial Force, as the former gets off with a fine of £5, whilst the latter loses his head for the same offence! We are almost certain that no self-respecting Indians, least of all, members of the Indian Legislative Assembly, now that their attention is drawn to the brutality of the I. T. F. Act, will allow a continuation of the same, but will insist on a radical alteration of all the brutal and slavish sections of the Act, including the above. Attention is here drawn to the definition of the T. F., and men of the T. F., in the T. R. F. Act, as under.

Men of the T. F.—citizen-soldiers. Punishments deterrent only. New standard of military value.

Territorial Force. This is the title assigned by statute, and there is no authority for the use of the expression “Territorial Army,” or of any other. The rank and file, including non-commissioned officers, are throughout the Act referred to as “men of the Territorial Force”. They become “soldiers” only when subject to military law [cf. Army Act, s. 190 (6)]. They are “persons in the military service of the Crown” for the purposes of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (6 Edward VII, c. 58, s. 9).

Adaptibility to civilian conditions of the T. F. is to be observed in the penal provisions applied to the British T. F. The individual man is subject to military law, whenever performing any military duty, and is also liable to penalties, generally of less severity, for certain offences peculiar to the Territorial Force. But this portion of the law is less rigid in its practical application than would at first sight appear from the phraseology of its enactment. It is subject to

considerable relaxation in proper cases, and its general purpose may be described as "deterrent" rather than punitive. Hence the B. T. F. Act is much more sensible than the stupid and inhuman I. T. F. Act. Further, a new and improved "standard of military value" appropriate to membership in a citizen force is applied to the British T. F. For example, in the past, military efficiency consisted in compliance with the letter of the Regulations and the mechanical performance of same. Under the Regulations for the T. F., certain training requirements are indicated, and, for the sake of uniformity, must so far as possible be duly carried out. Efficiency, however, no longer depends on their technical performance, but on the judgment of the Divisional Commander, that the necessary "standard of military value" has been attained by each individual member of a unit. Efficiency, in fact, has been interpreted, not in terms of past performance under peace conditions, but of "potential value in time of war".

We believe that so far, the local Battalions of the I. T. F. may have complied with the letter of their regulations, but their efficiency, in terms of "potential value in time of war," is not hard to judge from their performance to-day! Without keenness and enthusiasm, there can be no military efficiency. And in the absence of contentment and justice, there can be no enthusiasm. Hence, to improve the military efficiency, the contentment of the men should be looked after, and justice done to them, by equalising the status of the Indians and the Europeans, in the new I. T. F., to promote military efficiency of the whole I. T. F.

7.—Curtailment of extraordinary powers of the Officer Commanding, as regards discipline, control and selections and nominations for promotion of officers and men of the unit under his Command.

We are convinced that the extraordinary powers of discipline, control and selection and nominations for promotion granted to the Officers Commanding should be definitely curtailed. A study of the India Army Act (Act VIII of 1911), to which the men of the I. T. F. are subject, in accordance with the provisions of the I. T. F. Act, will make it apparent that extraordinary powers with regard to abovementioned matters have been conferred on the C. O.'s.

It is taken for granted, that a battalion or a company is the private property of the C. O., that he is the slave-owner endowed with all the arbitrary and brutal powers of the slave-owners of old. If it be suggested that the C. O.'s of Battalions etc., in the Indian Army, should be endowed with such powers, and that in the absence of same, discipline cannot be maintained, we can say that, we do not believe in such absurd nonsense. The days are dead and gone, when such absurd ideas would have been accepted. In these days of Dominion Status, "Swaraj", and what not, it would be an insult to our self-respect and intelligence, to suggest that Indians cannot or will not behave properly, and observe discipline, in the absence of such arbitrary powers of the C. O.'s. We believe that, such unnecessary and arbitrary powers of the C. O.'s cause grave discontent and inefficiency, and that they should be thoroughly revised, and curtailed in accordance with the altered notions of self-government and self-respect of these times. We beg to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to the following remark in the Manual of "Indian Military Law" published by the Government of India, wherein the Government itself acknowledges that "no person should be permanently subjected to an *exceptional*

and severe code, like that contained in the Indian Army Act, etc., etc." We feel justified in suggesting that no person in the I. T. F. be subjected to such a savage and severe code, like the Indian Army Act. As a matter of fact, we would suggest to the Committee, that it might recommend the revision of the I. A. Act, in accordance with the changed and changing ideas of these days. We have no time to enter into details, but those acquainted with military laws of England and other European countries can easily suggest the necessary modifications in the India Army Act.

8.—Abolition of the inferior and humiliating Designations and Ranks of Jamadar, Subedar, etc., and also of Viceroy's Commissions, from the I. T. F., as well as from the Regular Army. Substitute Warrants for inferior ranks, and Substantive King's Commissions for superior ranks of Indian Officers, as in the British Army.

We consider that the designations and ranks of Indian Officers, *viz.*, Jamadar, Subedar, etc., are a badge of inferiority, and as such humiliating to the self-respect of all right-minded persons.

So, the time has arrived for the abolition of these Indian Officers' ranks, both from the Infantry and the Cavalry, and consequently of the Second Class Commissions granted by the Viceroy. There are obvious reasons for such a suggestion. In the comparative list of pay, we have shown above that Indian Officers holding the Viceroy's Commission, in spite of their holding a higher rank and status in the Indian Army than the Warrant Officer of the British Army, are paid much less. Even the pay of a non-commissioned officer like a Sergeant in the British Army, is higher than that of a Subedar, and of a Corporal higher than that of a commissioned Jamadar! In spite of the fact that in the Indian Army, the Indian Officers holding the Viceroy's Commission rank much higher than the non-commissioned officers of the same Army, they are paid at a rate which does not correspond with their status and position in the Indian Army; and thus the invidious *racial distinction* is maintained of a higher pay for a lower rank in the British Army, and of a lower pay for a higher rank in the Indian Army! We do not believe that there is any other army in the world, where such racial distinctions exist between the emoluments of different ranks of the armies of the same nation!

It has been suggested that the granting of Honorary King's Commissions to Indian Officers holding Viceroy's Commissions can get over this difficulty of racial distinction! We fail to see how the granting of Honorary King's Commissions can raise the pay, status, and position of Indian Officers holding the Viceroy's Commission. If anything, we believe that the grant of Honorary King's Commissions merely adds to the chagrin of those on whom they are conferred. It does not remove, but exaggerates the distinction between the holders of Substantive and Honorary Commissions, because the definite distinctions between the two are self-evident. As shown above, the pay of an Indian Officer with an Honorary King's Commission is less than that of a Warrant Officer or an N. C. O. in the British Army.

We know that the rates of pay of rank for British Commissioned Officers of the Indian Army have been made applicable to Indian Officers, granted Honorary Commissions. But, even there, it is laid down that "they will *not* however be entitled to Command pay, or additional regimental pay". So that a definite

distinction is preserved between the holders of Substantive and Honorary Commissions. We presume that when the question of Pensions arises, there is bound to be trouble.

As regards those Indian Officers not granted Honorary King's Commissions, the previous criticism holds good, that in spite of holding higher ranks, they are paid at lower rates than W. O.'s and N. C. O.'s of the British Army. Thus, the distinction between Indian Officers granted Honorary King's Commissions, and those not granted same is accentuated, and is a source of bitter discontent and grievance in the army.

We fail to see why such an evidently unjust decision has been taken by the H. Q. It will lead to more trouble and discontent in the army, to grant Honorary King's Commissions to some lucky individuals only, and leaving others in the lurch! The decision is based on a false notion of expediency, but being in itself unjust, it should be rescinded as early as possible. If a Jamadar or Subedar is fit to hold an Honorary Commission, and in addition is fit to command a platoon or company, by virtue of holding the Viceroy's Indian Commission, it is unjust, unfair, and inexpedient to withhold from him the grant of Substantive King's Commission.

Further, if—as we are informed in a communique issued by the Southern Command—"the Territorial Officers receiving dual commissions possess *the same rank and precedence* as are enjoyed by British Officers holding King's Commissions," we can arrive only at one conclusion, *viz.*, that such an invidious distinction must be the outcome of stupidity, or of racial arrogance.

Finally, we should suggest that all Indian Officers, who are good enough to be granted Honorary King's Commissions, should be granted Substantive King's Commissions. Those Indian Officers, who are not good enough for same, should be granted Warrants, as in the British Army. Thus the abolition of Viceroy's Commissions will remove all heart-burning. Indian Warrant Officers may be called for the sake of nomenclature, Havildar-Majors instead of Sergeant-Majors, but their rank and status should be clearly defined as that of Warrant Officers and not of Indian Commissioned Officers, as all Viceroy's Commissions would be abolished.

To raise the executive authority and status of Indian Commissioned Officers and to give them a chance of promotion to the highest ranks in the Army, abolition of the grades of Indian Officers from both the Indian Army and the Indian Territorial Force, is strongly recommended. The genuine Indianization of the Army will be thus accelerated. There are 12 British, plus 20 Indian Commissioned Officers per Battalion, and these 20 Indians should be granted Substantive British Commissions, which they deserve.

In the Indian Army, the Indian Officer, Jamadar or Subedar, commands a platoon, or a company when necessary, and as such he has the same executive authority as a Lieutenant or Captain in the British Army. Hence the distinction between the corresponding ranks of the two armies is very suggestive. While Platoon-Commanders in both armies have the same executive authority, their rank, pay and status are quite distinct. Whilst an Indian Platoon-Commander can never hope to rise much higher,—save perhaps in very exceptional circumstances,—the Platoon-Commander in the British Army is destined from the first to a regular promotion to the highest ranks in the Army. If Indian

Officers are good enough to command platoons, or companies, they ought to be good enough for higher commands. The average number of British Officers and Indian Officers in an Indian Battalion are 12 British and 20 Indian, the former of whom can get promotion up to the highest ranks, whilst the latter have a limited status and power of command, and no hope of promotion, beyond the rank of a Subedar-Major in the Infantry.

We should like to know, from the Military Authorities, who have established this anomalous and clumsy method of granting Honorary King's Commissions to Indian Officers, whether their object is merely to make an *appearance* of granting the same for the sake of soothing the clamour of Indians for Substantive Commissions! It would be ridiculous to grant the Officer holding the rank, *eg.*, of Subedar, the Honorary rank of a Lieut.-Colonel or Colonel, as it would merely tend to lower the value of Honorary King's Commission, in the eyes of the Army. We believe, it is a very miserable make-shift and ought to be abandoned in the interests of all concerned. As the Committee on Reorganization of the I. T. F. is empowered to make recommendations with regard to all ranks of the I. T. F., we hope that, by recommending the removal of the inferior ranks of the Indian Officers from the I. T. F., it would help in the abolition of some ranks from the whole Indian Army in time; and thus help in the *genuine Indianization* of both the Regular and the Territorial Forces. We believe the abolition of the I. S. M. D. from the Medical Department of the Army was based on similar grounds of abolishing the distinction of racial inferiority. Such a recommendation will certainly add to the popularity of the I. T. F. We have to draw the attention of the Committee to the fact that, at present, Officers holding the Viceroy's and the Honorary King's Commissions in the I. T. F. are thoroughly discontented with their *inferior* status and position. We would draw the attention of the Committee to the remarks relative to this subject, in "The Army in India and its Evolution" (1924): "Accordingly, the promotion of the Viceroy's Commissioned Officers *does not afford the solution of the problem of Indianizing the higher ranks of the Army, which is satisfactory either to the individual or to the Service.*" As the I. T. F. is a clean slate, we would repeat our suggestion that the ranks of Indian Officers should be abolished in the I. T. F., and the same Substantive King's Commissions should be granted to all Officers of the I. T. F. on the same terms and conditions as are granted to the Officers of the British T. F., and the Officers of the Indian Auxiliary Force and of the I. A. R. O. We believe, that is the only just solution that will remove the unpopularity and the discontent now existing in the higher ranks of the I. T. F.

Abolition of all racial distinctions, particularly with reference to the admission of Indians into All Arms of the Service, which will serve as an acid test of the Sincerity of the Government about genuine Indianization of the Army.

We shall now deal with the abolition of all racial distinctions between the Indian and European sections of the Regular, Territorial and Auxiliary Forces. We have thus far shown the definite existence of galling racial distinctions in regard to the following items, between Indian and European subjects of His Majesty :

1. Pay of Rank, Allowance, etc.

2. Formation of County Associations, in place of Advisory Committees.
3. Formation of Cadet Corps and Rifle Clubs.
4. Period of Service in the Force.
5. Conditions of Resignation and Discharge.
6. Methods of Discipline
7. Extraordinary powers of C. O.'s.
8. Grant of King's Substantive Commissions.

9. We now come to one of the most galling racial distinctions, *viz.*, the practical exclusion of all Indian subjects of His Majesty from the Artillery, the Air Force, and most of the Technical Services. Practically the admission of Indians is limited to the Infantry and the Cavalry. The distinction is no doubt based on Government's absolute distrust of the Indian Nation. The British rulers must now forsake their age-long sentiment of distrust. Once that India is granted the status of a self-governing Dominion, it cannot be denied, on any just and reasonable grounds, the right of self-defence; for there is no alternative. If India is granted the right of self-defence, it will demand full control of the Army in India, both British and Indian, relying on the universal custom of every constitution, that the Military is always subject to the Civil power. Hence, we suggest that all Arms of the Service be thrown open for the admission of Indians. If the Territorial Army is genuinely meant to be a Second Line Army, it follows that the Second Line should have, in its composition, all Arms of the Service, of which the First Line is constituted. It would further add to the popularity of the I. T. F., for Indians gifted with varying capacities would have the choice of joining any arm of the Service for which they may have a natural bent, and feel peculiarly gifted. We may assert, without fear of contradiction, that however opposed the British War Office may be to this natural claim and right of the Indians for admission into all sections of their National Army, the Government of India will have, in the end, to yield to Indian public opinion, as expressed in the Indian Legislatures. Hence, it would be much more dignified for the military authorities to recognize coming portents, and in good time, yield gracefully to the demand for Indianization of the Army.

To conclude, we recommend the removal of all racial distinctions between the two armies. We do not wish to enter here into the question of military fitness of Indians, for there would have been no Indian Empire without the help of Indian Sepoys, who showed their mettle in 1914, during the last Great War, by serving the British Empire at a critical juncture, and thus saved practically the major part of the civilized world from destruction. If in the past, a Sivaji or Scindia or Gaekwar or Akbar or Tipoo Sultan was fit to rule and command armies in the field, and to build up empires and kingdoms, his descendants and tribesmen cannot be unfit to command a company or a battalion, in times of peace or war, in these days.

10.—A change in the mentality of the military authorities responsible for the organization of the I. T. F. is quite essential for its success. A further change in the military obsession of dividing the nation into 'military' and 'non-military' is also essential, for its success. A practical lesson taught by modern Japan, and its application to India.

Finally, we have to suggest a change in the mentality of the military

authorities, responsible for the organization of the I. T. F. We believe that no sound movement can be reared on the basis of mutual distrust, for in the end, distrust begets distrust; whilst generous trust begets gratitude and confidence. We particularly wish to draw the attention of the Committee to the remarks of "The Army in India Committee" with reference to the I. T. F. (Part VI, Sec. 12).

"Sec. 12. In forming our conclusions, we have been impressed by the fact that the highest military authorities in India accept the principle of a national defence force, and are of the opinion that it is to be encouraged. They have told us, however that we must not shut our eyes to the practical difficulties. They add:—'Not only have we to bear in mind *the risks that we run* in organizing a force that may be used against us in one way or another, but we have to create or revive the necessary military qualities in a collection of different races, who are striving under our control to evolve a common nationality, and with the ideal of national participation in the defence of their country We do not want to run more risks than is necessary; we do not want to interfere unduly with religious or local customs and ideals, and we do not want the country generally to get tired of what is admittedly an experiment, before the desired result is attained."

It sounds like "To be, or not to be!", which is a condition of suspense, in which nothing practical can be accomplished. We can see no reasons why India should get tired, and why the raising of I. T. F. should be considered an experiment. It is merely one of the fruits of distrustful military mentality, and a mirage of suspicious minds.

If, as we have shown before, genuine attempts be made to popularize the I. T. F., one may await the result with equanimity, for Indians have already shown that they are quite capable of making the greatest sacrifices in the service of their country. Hence we may expect that, they would, under favourable circumstances, be ready to join the I. T. F. in great numbers, to make the so-called 'experiment' a definite success.

Another obsession of the military mind, and arbitrary classification of Indians into martial and non-martial classes.

Another obsession of the military mind, in addition to that of distrust of the Indians, is the arbitrary classification of Indians into, 'martial' and 'non-martial' races.

Whilst no doubt there are certain races whose hereditary profession is that of arms, there are others who can be converted into 'citizen-soldiers', such as are to be found everywhere in European countries.

One practical method, we have already shown before, and that is to teach the young idea how to shoot during the plastic period of its life in schools and colleges. The young barbarian, thus inoculated with the poison of militarism, as is done in savage Europe of to-day, will grow up into a howling militarist, with the passing of years. This process will, no doubt, take some time. As it is, there are millions of young men who would like to join a genuine National Army in the service of their country. We have reason to believe that by

popularizing the I. T. F. in its various aspects. referred to before, an efficient Second Line Army can be raised and maintained.

A practical lesson in militarisation of all classes of the Nation, taught by modern Japan, and its application to India.

Until the abolition of feudalism, the soldiers of Japan were to be found only in one class of the people—the Samurai,—and on them alone fell the task of defending the Empire whenever necessary. Traders, farmers, and labourers were alike considered *unworthy and unfit* to bear arms. The new Government soon saw that no army *confined to one class alone* could ever be a *national force*, and one of its earliest steps was to subject all classes *alike* to the obligations of military service. A national army was substituted for a class one. Military colleges, training depôts, and fully equipped arsenals were gradually established, and the Satsuma rebellion showed beyond all doubt the early success, which attended the new system, and that the fighting instinct was no more wanting in the Japanese people as a whole, than it had been in the old hereditary military castes. *The raw material was found in all*, and only required working up. The military spirit was inculcated in all schools of every grade, and it has been a common sight for years past, to see regiments of small boys marching, during the holiday time, in military array, in the mountains of Japan, with miniature rifles, knapsacks, and blankets, under the command of retired non-commissioned officers, and practising drill and evolutions precisely as real soldiers. When these youths subsequently join the colours, under the conscription law, they do so already fortified with a very considerable appreciation of the duties of and the spirit which should actuate a soldier.

We do not advocate conscription for Indians, as it is not necessary. We only suggest that no obstruction should be permitted in the path of voluntary militarisation of all classes of Indians, willing and fit to serve in the volunteer national Armies—Regular, Territorial, and Auxiliary, and their Accessories, *viz.*, cadet corps, rifle clubs, and communal volunteer corps or associations.

11. Slavish conditions of Service in the U. T. C. should be altered. Excessive powers of the O. C.—re Discharge, etc.—need to be curtailed. U. T. Associations to be established in all provinces.

We have already dealt with the conditions of Service in the I. T. F., and shown them to be degrading and subversive of self-respect, and an examination of the conditions of service for the University Training Corps further confirms the same view. That under-graduates of any University, who are going to be the future leaders of Indian thought, should be expected to serve under such conditions of slavery proves, if any proof were needed, that the framers of the I. T. F. Act seem to attach no importance to the feelings and sentiments of Indians. Further the U. T. C. is made subject to the savage India Army Act, 1911. Hence we propose that the Rules applicable to the U. T. C. should also be thoroughly revised and liberalised. We shall give only one instance of how the possession of the arbitrary power of the O. C. creates a despotic desire for using it. Under Sec. 21 of the "Rules, for U. T. C., under the I. T. F. Act 1920," the O. C. can deal summarily with an offence under Sec. 19, and inflict punish-

ment prescribed under Sec. 21(a) *e.g.*, dismissal of the offender from the U. T. C. Practically the O. C. is given the summary power of dismissal, from which there is no appeal. The O. C. of the Bombay University Corps for example put down on the Notice Boards of the local Colleges, a number of names of students, dismissed by him week by week. The total of three months, July to September 1923, came to 272. Some of these dismissed students requested a proper investigation of their so-called 'offence'; and also a statement of offence. But the O. C. declined to give any reason or to undertake investigation. Among those dismissed were many who, by reason of sickness, etc., were prevented from appearing at the place of parade at the time fixed, and brought the fact to the notice of the O. C. But the latter declined to revise his unjust decision of dismissal. On the one hand, we are told that Indians do not join the I.T.F., whilst on the other, we find that under the Act, the O. C. is given the arbitrary power of dismissal, by which he can discourage and discharge those willing to continue in the Force? The blame must rest on the Act, which confers such extraordinary powers on the O. C., and leaves no right of redress or appeal to those under his charge; hence the Act requires revision.

Conflict between the arbitrary power of dismissal of the O. C., and the proposed introduction of Compulsion in the Bombay University.

It appears from the papers, that a proposition was before the Bombay Senate for Compulsory Military Training of all Under-graduates. Supposing such a proposal were passed, under the existing Rules of I. T. F. Act, the students would be in a very anomalous position. The University will demand a certificate of attendance at parades, such certificate it would be impossible for those students to receive, who may have been arbitrarily dismissed by the O. C. Naturally, if a student is dismissed on some trifling ground by the O. C., he will not be able to procure any certificate of attendance, and he will have to suffer in his academic career by the misuse of the despotic power of the O.C. Practically he would thus be debarred from proceeding for any University Examination, and his University career, thereby, prematurely ended. Such an intolerable injustice cannot be permitted in any free country, when we know that even in conscript countries, the Universities do not lay down such oppressive conditions for candidates. This is a very real grievance, and it ought to be remedied by restricting the power of dismissal of the O. C. to certain well-defined causes, after due investigation, and by allowing an appeal to higher authority, if the O.C.'s decision is challenged. It would be against the best interests of liberal education and culture to enforce Conscription or Militarism on Conscientious Objectors and others, unwilling to join the U. T. C.

A suggestion for establishing an University Territorial Corps Association to popularise the U. T. C. in every Province.

We suggest that, for popularizing the University Corps of the I.T.F., an University Territorial Corps Association for each province should be established, consisting of 8 to 12 members, half of whom should be military members nominated by Government, and the other half elected by the Senate, the past and present Graduates and Under-graduates of the University. We believe the past and present representatives of the University would understand the requirements, feelings and

sentiments of those willing to join the U. T. C., and so would be able to attract a large number of recruits, and would also act as a check on the arbitrary and despotic use of power by the O. C.

At present, there is no Association or Committee to guide the Under-graduates, and to induce them to join the U. T. C. Such University T. C. Associations of different Provinces might hold Annual Conferences for exchange of views and co-ordination of effort.

12. Recommendations for the Establishment of a Central or Imperial Territorial Association, elected jointly by the Central Government, Indian Legislative Assembly, and the Council of State.

We have to make another suggestion for the popularization of the I. T. Force. We have already suggested the formation of (A) Provincial Territorial Associations, and (B) University Territorial Corps Associations. We now suggest the formation of (C) a Central or Imperial Territorial Association of 12 members : 4 of them to be military members nominated by the Government, 4 elected by the Council of State, and 4 elected by the Legislative Assembly. Such a Central T. Association would be in a position to guide and co-ordinate the activities of the Provincial and University Territorial Associations. Besides passing pious resolutions, both the Council of State and the Indian Legislative Assembly will thereby be enabled to take a practical interest in the I. T. F., and will afford the acid test of sincerity of their genuine interest in the I. T. F. The House of Commons appoints Standing Committees to supervise the various activities of the State ; and membership of such a proposed Association would confer immense benefit, by the gain of practical knowledge and experience, thus acquired by the members of the Association. It would thus be in a position to guide, supervise and co-ordinate the activities of the Provincial and University Territorial Associations, and suggest necessary changes for popularising the I. T. F.

13. Provision of Clubs, Sports, Games, &c. to be arranged by the Provincial Territorial Associations.

It is now well recognized that for maintaining the efficiency of soldiers, it is necessary to make a sufficient provision of funds for establishing clubs, and for sports, games, amusements, etc., to help them to keep fit for service, and to prevent them from wasting their energy and leisure in undesirable channels. The Provincial Territorial Associations, proposed before, should be authorised to make the necessary arrangements for thus popularising the I. T. F.

14. A thorough Revision of the India Army Act 1911, and the I. T. F. Act 1920, and Rules under both the Acts.

A final suggestion is here made for a thorough revision of the I. T. F. Act 1920, and the Rules under the Act, and also of the relevant sections of the India Army Act, 1911, which as they stand, are not conducive to the self-respect of Indians, as explained in detail before. Hence to popularize the I. T. F., a thorough revision of both Acts is needed.

III. METHODS OF SELECTING CANDIDATES FOR COMMISSION.

Present system of selection of Officers and Non-Com.'s condemned, as productive of inefficiency and unpopularity of the I. T. F.

So far as we know, at present, there seems to be no recognized method of selecting candidates for Commission. Take for instance the appointment of Officers of the local Parsee Pioneer Battalions. We used to read in the Standing Orders of the Battalions, published in some of the local papers, that a Private was suddenly converted into a Second Lieutenant by the ukase of the O. C. After an interval, varying from days to weeks, the Second Lieutenant was suddenly converted into a First Lieutenant, and in some cases even without such conversion, was changed into a Captain and made a Company Commander! We believe that outside the stage, such a rapid promotion from Private to Captain is unheard-of, except perhaps in Monte Carlo or other big States like that! Nobody has been able to explain to us on what grounds of merit, or capacity, or previous distinguished military service, these flash-light appointments were made! This sort of irregular, arbitrary and inexplicable selection and nomination of Officers of the local I. A. F. and T. F. Battalions has produced much heart-burning and discontent in the rank and file and grave inefficiency. The selection and nomination of the N. C. O.'s has been just as arbitrary, and has been a source of grievance in the Battalions. Naturally, the popularity and efficiency of the I. T. F. are bound to suffer owing to such arbitrary standards of selection and nomination of Officers and N. C. O.'s. We have, in a previous recommendation, referred to the question of curtailing the extraordinary powers bestowed on O. C.'s by the I. T. F. Act. And this is one more reason for same.

First appointments as Officers in the British T. F. recommended by the President of the County Association. Such a system not suited to India.

Let us see how they manage these things in the British Territorial Force.

Subject to directions by His Majesty, first appointments to the lowest rank of Officer, in any unit of the Territorial Force are given to persons recommended by the President of the Association for the County, provided that:—

- (a) The recommendation is made within thirty days after the receipt of notice of the vacancy from the Commanding Officer of the unit.
- (b) The candidate has the qualifications required by regulations.
- (c) The candidate is approved by His Majesty.

Provincial Military Boards of Examiners proposed, for the selection and examination of Cadets. Prescription of Mental as well as Physical Tests of efficiency.

We believe that such a system may be quite suited to the English genius, but it will not do in India. To leave the power of first appointments of the lowest ranks of Officers in the gift of the President of the County Association practically means that these appointments are dependent on the President's patronage and not solely on merit. And so, families of candidates with influence with the President can always secure such appointments for their

nominees. Thus injustice and inefficiency and unpopularity are likely to be perpetuated by such method of nomination in this country. We have already shown that the system of nomination in the local Territorial Battalions is bad in the extreme. Hence, we suggest that the better plan would be as follows.

The Provincial Territorial Associations, as proposed before, should have power jointly with the Military Advisors of the Local Governments, to appoint Provincial Military Boards of Examiners. The Military Boards of Examiners should be responsible for the examination of all candidates for Certificates "A" and "B", as explained later on. The Board should have the power of selecting candidates after a thorough investigation of their qualities and qualifications, and also their status and standing in the locality from which they come.

Besides the usual tests as regards physique, education, etc., for testing the fitness of candidates for Commission, it is essential that, with the advance in knowledge of Mental Tests of fitness, such tests should now be introduced throughout the Army, for all selections, nominations and promotions of Non-Com.'s and Commissioned Officers. We believe that during the last War, the only army which selected its candidates, after putting them through scientific mental tests, was the American. So thoroughly were these mental tests carried out by the psychological experts, that they were able to fit the right man in the right place, and not as was the case in European Armies, the wrong man in the right place. The American Army had, through the instrumentality of such rigid mental tests, a corps of first class Officers, who put the troops under their charge through Intensive Training, and were able to achieve results within three months, such as took the European Armies six months or more to achieve.

Military Schools and Colleges, affiliated to Local Universities, should be established in every Province for imparting Military Training in Vernacular languages, to 15,000 Officers of the Regular and Territorial Armies.

We would suggest that every Province should have sufficient training facilities for the number of Officers and Non-Com.'s, required by its quota of the I. T. F. At present there are no Military Schools and Colleges of the type required for training of Officers and Non-Com.'s for the Army in India. In fact, the present system of trying to Indianise even the Regular Indian Army by sending a few Indian Cadets to the United Kingdom for Military Training is evidently absurd. India is a huge country, containing a population six times as large as the United Kingdom, and her Annual Military Budget amounts to 70 crores of Rupees, which, at the official Rs. 10 exchange, amounts to £70,000,000, whilst the expenditure of the United Kingdom on the Army during 1923-1924 was £64,916,000, i.e., in spite of spending more than the United Kingdom, India has no single Military College, where her sons can be trained in the science and art of war! It is now time that such absurdity should be put an end to. Self-governing Oriental Nations like Japan, China, Turkey, Persia, etc., and also self-governing Dominions of the British Empire, like Australia, Canada, New Zealand, have established in their own countries National Military Schools and Colleges in which Military training for all Arms of the Service, including the Air Force, is imparted in the National Vernacular Language of the country.

In these days of Nationalism and Swaraj, we can see every reason why Military Schools and Colleges should be established where training should be imparted in the Vernacular Language, *e.g.* Urdu, or Hindi ; and English taught as an optional subject.

If the Japanese and other Asiatics can translate Military Works in their vernaculars, we in India can do the same. If Indianization is to proceed at a rapid rate, it is absolutely necessary to establish Military Schools and Colleges for training N. C. O.'s and Officers in military subjects, in vernacular languages.

Some witnesses before the Indian Reforms Enquiry Committee have opined that the Army should be Indianised within 20 years. According to the present method of sending a few candidates to Sandhurst, the process of Indianization may take 2,000 years !

Indianization of the Army means military training of 5,000 Officers for the Regular Indian Army, and 10,000 Officers for the I. T. F., and many more thousands of Non-Com.'s.

The meaning and implication of the term Indianisation is hardly realised by either the Indian Government, or its Military Advisers, or the Indian public. Take for instance, the question of the number of British Commissioned Officers, required for the Indian Regular Army. They number about 5,000. If to this number, we add the possible future requirements of a proposed I. T. F. Force of 300,000, 10,000 more Officers would be required, making a grand total of 15,000 Officers, for complete Indianisation of both the Regular and Territorial Indian Armies. Hence, the scheme of sending a few boys to Sandhurst annually is a farce, and highly objectionable at that, as it leads to de-Indianisation or Anglicization of the boys, and is an entirely inadequate, unsatisfactory and expensive and futile method. To train 15,000 Indian Officers, Military Schools and Colleges affiliated, if possible, to the Local Universities, should be established in different Provinces of India. It would help in allaying unemployment among educated Indians, and is the only practicable method of training thousands of Officers, on a large scale, for both the Regular, and future Territorial Armies of India.

Establishment of Officers' Training Corps in India, based on the British model.

(A) Junior Division of the I. O. T. C., for secondary schools.

In England, the O. T. C. is divided into two Divisions, the Junior and the Senior.

Units of the Junior Divisions of the O. T. C. exist at all public schools. Joining is quite voluntary and Masters of the schools act as officers in the Corps. Instruction is given in such subjects as drill, musketry, field training and elementary tactics.

Cadets are eligible to take the War Office examination for certificate "A," and it is from those who have so qualified, that N. C. O.'s are chosen.

A cadet who has obtained certificate "A," receives additional marks, if he enters for the competitive examination for Woolwich or Sandhurst, and those

who enter civil life, are eligible for direct appointment to Commissions in the Territorial Army or its Reserve.

We believe that an O. T. C. for India should be organised in two divisions, the Junior and the Senior, on the model of the British O. T. C., with suitable modifications, so that there can always be a reservoir of supply for the thousands of N. C. O.'s, and Officers, required for the Indian Regular and Territorial Armies.

We have already suggested that authorities of Schools and Colleges should be encouraged to form Cadet-Corps and Rifle-Clubs, and that there should be no compulsion in this matter of choice. As there are no so-called Public Schools in India, we would suggest that students of secondary schools which have organized their own Cadet Corps, should be given the same opportunity as Public School boys in England, of competing for examination for certificate "A", to be organized by the Provincial Military Boards suggested before, on the model of the War Office Examination, but modified to suit Indian conditions.

(B) Senior Division of the I. O. T. C. for Colleges, in place of the present U. T. C., proposed.

In England, the Senior Division of the O. T. C. exists at the different Universities and contingents are organised not only into infantry, (as is the case with Junior Division,) but also into Field Ambulances, Field Artillery and sections of the Signal Service. Senior cadets are eligible to take the War Office examination "B", provided they are already in possession of "A," and have at least twelve months' service in the Senior Division. Those who pass receive an ante-date, if they are subsequently appointed to a Commission in the Territorial Force, and receive extra marks, at the examination for entrance to the R. A. M. C. and A. A. V. C. An extra grant is made to contingents, for each cadet in possession of certificate "B". Cadets of the Senior Division receive a free issue of uniform.

We would suggest that (B) Senior Division of the O. T. C. be organized on the British model, and the present University Territorial Corps be renamed the "I. O. T. C., Senior Division."

Present System of Education converts A1 fit into C3 and D4 hopelessly unfit human wrecks. Hence establish school and college medical inspection, and physical and Military Training in Cadet Corps and Rifle Clubs.

We have shown before that the present system of Education in India renders the children and youth physically defective and so militarily inefficient, as a matter of fact, it converts A1 or physically and mentally fit children attending Schools, into C3 candidates for the Matriculation Examination, who later deteriorate, and become D4 or hopeless physical wrecks, the under-graduates of the University, many of whom die prematurely between ages 21—30.

It is evidently absurd, to expect that such physically unfit under-graduates and graduates of the University can ever make physically fit Officers and N. C. O.'s for the Indian Army, and the present organization of the U. T. C. is really based on such absurdity. It is really strange that both the Military Authorities and some Indian Leaders, who swallow such absurdities of

the Military Experts, have failed to realise the essential unsoundness of their position in organizing the U. T. C.

If we must have really efficient Officers, we must begin their physical development and culture at the age of 10 or 12. The history of all Military nations of the past and in the present tells the same tale.

“ If you want good Soldiers and Officers, catch them young.” That is the only sound principle of Military Efficiency, recognized throughout the ages. The Goorkha, the Afghan, the Sikh, the Pathan and the Rajput, all follow the same sensible principle.

War Office Scheme for reserving 10 per cent of Commissions in the Regular Army for Territorial Officers. To popularize the I. T. F., introduce a similar scheme in the Indian Army.

We take this opportunity of drawing the attention of the I. T. F. Reform Committee to the report of the Haldane Committee appointed by the British Parliament. The Haldane Committee has suggested that 10 per cent of vacancies in the Regular Army be reserved for competition between the candidates from the Territorial Army, and lays down certain conditions.

We believe that it is a good model to be copied for popularizing the I. T. F. in India, as also for promoting camaraderie between the Regular and Territorial Officers.

Report of the Haldane Committee—New War Office Regulations for Commissions for Territorial Officers and University candidates.

Copies of the regulations under which both University candidates and Officers in the Territorial Army can obtain Commissions in the Regular Army as the outcome of the report of the Haldane Committee, have now been issued by the War-Office.

Qualifications of Territorial Officers for 10 per cent Regular Commissions.

Ten per cent of the vacancies in the Cavalry, Infantry, Tank Corps, and Army Service Corps, are in future to be offered annually for competition between candidates from the Territorial Army who are between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-five, and unmarried. The qualifications are (1) two years' service and two annual trainings; (2) attendance at the compulsory course prescribed for Territorial Officers during their first three years of service; (3) attachment (for a month?) to the regular unit in which commission is wanted and a certificate from the C. O.; (4) subsequent attachment to a regular unit, so that with (2) and (3) a period of six weeks may be made up; (5) the possession of certificate “A”, O. T. C. So far so good. Now comes the rub. The candidate has to obtain 50 per cent in the aggregate, 40 per cent in the total, marks given in a competitive examination of the subjects for the final term examination of Sandhurst Cadets, without the benefit of the eighteen months' instructions given at that establishment. This examination covers the usual military subjects (tactics, artillery, field, engineering, hygiene, map reading and field sketching, organisation and military training and military law), besides history, English, and geography. There is a medical examination for successful candidates, with the right to appeal under certain conditions,

and the standard is "good mental and bodily health, and freedom from any physical defect likely to interfere with the efficient performance of military duty."

The Expenses of Sandhurst or University Avoided.

One or two observations at once suggest themselves. There is no ante-dating, as shown below, for University candidates, and the difficulty in mastering the Sandhurst subjects without any instruction is serious. On the other hand, the expenses of Sandhurst or University are avoided, and the door through the Territorial Army is opened up to a later age, for those who may have made up their minds too late to go up for Sandhurst, or have failed in the entrance examination.

Inducement given to the Universities.

The inducement given to Universities to establish—at their own expense—courses of military study is that their candidates will be senior in the Army to others of the same grade. This applies at present to Oxford, Cambridge, London, Edinburgh, and Manchester in Britain; to McGill, Montreal; and Sydney. Other recognised Universities are St. Andrews, Glasgow, Aberdeen, Durham, Wales, Birmingham, Liverpool, Leeds, Belfast, Bristol, and Dublin (Trinity College). The lack of recognised Universities in the Dominions (other than Dublin) is conspicuous.

Qualifications for a University candidate for Regular Commissions.

The general qualifications for a University candidate are: Age 21-24 years, unmarried, approved by the Army Council, and "of good conduct and character". The academic qualifications are three years' residence and certain special qualifications for specialist services, first or second class honours (grade I), or third class honours or equivalent, according to the University (grade II), or a pass degree (grade III). The military qualifications are: certificate "B", membership of the O. T. C., and six weeks' attachment to a regular unit, with satisfactory certificate therefrom. As far as can be made out, the absence of certificate "B" entails the loss of three months' seniority, and not being a member of the O. T. C., the loss of an additional three months.

The grades are important. Men of grade I get an ante-date to the 20th birthday, grade II to 20½ years of age, and grade III to the 21st birthday, so University candidates will score heavily over Territorials, and the age advantage of Sandhurst over University will be wiped out. A nomination board (containing a representative of the General Staff) at each University will put the nominees from that University in order of merit. The recognised Universities will be put on a roster, moving up the roster every six months, those with courses of military study being in a separate list, group I at the top. Names will be taken successively in order of merit from each University list in succession in group I, and nominations from Universities without military instruction will then be considered. The conspicuous point about all this is that there is no open competition between candidates. Their prospects are left largely in the hands of the University authorities.

Three open doors to the Army. The Army no longer a preserve for the aristocrat, but now open to the democrat.

The whole scheme of entrance to the Army now stands thus: A candidate can get in (1) through Woolwich or Sandhurst. If he fails, he can get into any branch of the service, (2) through a University up to the age of twenty-four, with an ante-date giving him the same seniority as if he had passed. Or he can get into the Cavalry, Infantry, Tanks, or R. A. S. C., upto the age of twentyfive, (3) through the Territorial Army without ante-date. The doors into the Army have now, in all conscience, been opened widely enough. Let us hope that there will soon be a queue waiting to enter.

IV. IMPROVEMENT OF THE FORCE GENERALLY, HAVING REGARD TO THE ROLE FOR WHICH IT HAS BEEN CONSTITUTED.

Three main principles of efficiency of a Second Line Army. (A) An efficient Second Line Army should be adequate in numbers, to support and supplement the Regular Army. Hence an I. T. F. of 300,000, and an I. T. F. Reserve of 150,000, should be enrolled every four years. The Regular Army of 138,000 has a small actual Reserve of 8,900 and an actual Second Line of 8,500 I. T. F. only!

The terms of the Resolution, according to which the Committee on Territorial Reorganization has been appointed, are "To investigate and report on what steps should be taken to improve and expand the Indian Territorial Force, so as to constitute it an efficient Second Line of Reserve to the Regular Army, and also to remove all racial distinctions in the constitution of the non-regular Military Forces in India, including the Indian Auxiliary Force; and also on the numbers which might be enlisted in the Territorial Force". It will thus be seen that the Resolution is comprehensive and so requires equally comprehensive consideration. To begin with, certain principles may be laid down to guide us as to what should constitute an efficient Second Line of Reserve to the Regular Army. These principles may be laid down as follows. An efficient Second Line should be:

- (a) adequate in numbers, to support and supplement the Regular Army;
- (b) organized and trained on a Divisional basis, and provided with a complete Divisional Staff, like the Regular Army;
- (c) provided with equipment and armament, identical with that of the Regular Army.

(A) In the discussion on the Resolution, H. E. the Commander-in-Chief stated that the limit which had been imposed by the Secretary of State was 20,000 men, *i. e.* roughly one Division.

Remembering the first principle stated above, that an efficient Second Line should be adequate in numbers, we might state that the above limit imposed on the I. T. F. contradicts the very first principle of numerical efficiency, because nowhere in any army of the world is such a liliputian Second Line of 20,000.

I. T. F. men on paper, and only 8,500 actually enrolled, considered efficient in numbers, to reinforce the First Line of 133,000 Regulars! Hence, if it is proposed to make the I. T. F. an efficient Second Line, the limit of 20,000 should be abolished, as leading to absolute inefficiency, and such a limit was not accepted by the Indian Legislative Assembly as will be seen from the terminal part of the Resolution quoted above. So the question arises, what is the minimum limit of numbers to be fixed to constitute the I. T. F. an efficient Second Line? For a reply, we ought to turn to the military experience of European nations, and particularly of England, as the organization of the Indian Army is based on the British model. Below is appended a Table showing at a glance, the comparative composition of the Military Forces of England and of India, and the proposed changes in the latter. An explanation of the Table follows.

The proportion of British to Indian is 1 : 2½ in the Regular Army; and of British or Anglo-Indian in the I. A. F. to Indian in the I. T. F. is 8 : 1.

This proportion is fixed arbitrarily, and is liable to alteration, according to circumstances. In the Table the numbers are for 1923-24, *i. e.* during the year when severe economies had to be practised, whilst the normal pre-war standard of England is given in brackets, as in 1914.

It will thus be noticed that the normal numerical standard laid down in England for the Territorial Second Line Army is nearly double that of the Regular First Line Army. Compared to which, the actual strength of the I. T. F. in India, is only 8,500 relative to the Regular Indian Army of 138,000; *i. e.* the strength of the Second Line is only one-sixteenth of the First! On the face of it, it is absurd to expect the I. T. F. to act as an efficient Second Line. Hence, it is suggested that, as shown in the Table, the Second Line should be, at least, 300,000 strong, with a Territorial Reserve of 150,000, if it is to act as an efficient reserve to the First Line. This increase in strength of the I. T. F. would automatically lead to the reduction of the strength of the Regular Army, *viz.* by 38,000 Indian Ranks, and 26,000 British Ranks, as explained in detail later. Thus allowing of a saving in military expenditure, and relieving the burden on the country, to the extent of 9 crores of rupees, *e.g.*, 6½ crores for the 26,000 British Ranks, and about 2½ crores for the 38,000 Indian Ranks, according to the figures given in the Inchcape Committee's Report. In the same Report, § 5, we are informed that "the authorised strength of the Regular Reserve is 34,000 Infantry, but actual strength is only 8,900, owing to considerable difficulty having been experienced in obtaining the required numbers".

"We have suggested to the Commander-in-Chief that an increase in the Reserve Pay would probably attract more men, and that, in addition, consideration should be given to the inclusion of a term of service with the reserve in every man's attestation on enrolment. This proposal has been considered by the military authorities, and it is suggested that *the terms of enlistment* should be altered to include five years' service with the colours, and ten years with the reserve if required; the pay of reservists to be increased to Rs. 7 per mensem for the first five years in the reserve, and Rs. 4 for the last five years, the total colour plus reserve service of 15 years, to count for pension at Rs. 5 per month."

We believe that the above recommendation of the Inchcape Committee is one more proof of the failure of the military authorities and of the Committee to realise the fact, that no self-respecting adult sepoy could be expected in these days of high prices, to be satisfied with a miserable pittance of Rs. 7—4—3, per mensem, as suggested by the Committee.

As we have already shown before, the British private is paid, as a reservist, 12 annas per day, and no one has made such an absurd suggestion, as the Inchcape Committee that the more experienced a reservist grows with age and experience, he should be paid less! In the end, the Government will have to pay a decent pay to the Reservists, viz. same as the British Private, if it wants a large number of sepoys, to continue as Reservists in the Army; otherwise they are bound to secure more profitable occupations, and will have nothing to do with the Army. Surely, the military authorities need a good legislative shake, to provide an adequate Regular Reserve.

Table of Comparative Strength of the Army in England 1923-1924 (and in 1914. In Brackets.)		In India 1923-1924.		Proposed Strength of the Army in India in 1928.	
	Nos.		Nos.		Nos.
FIRST LINE.		FIRST LINE.		FIRST LINE.	
I Regular Army	160,300	I (a) Indian Ranks	138,219	I (a) Indians' Ranks	100,000
(Do. In 1914, 171,536)		(b) British Ranks	66,106	(b) British Ranks	40,000
II Army Reserve	84,000	II Indian Reserve—Actual	8,900	II Indian Reserve	100,000
(Do. In 1914, 145,347)		Authorized	30,000	Do. Officers	3,500
III Militia (Special Reserve)		III	?	III	?
(In 1914, 63,933)		IV	?	IV	?
IV Supplementary Reserve	23,000				
(or War-Emergency Reserve)					
SECOND LINE.		SECOND LINE.		SECOND LINE.	
V Territorial Army	142,593	V Territorial Army—Actual	8,500	V Territorial Army	300,000
(Do. In 1914, 315,000)		Authorized	20,000	Do. Officers	10,000
VI Territorial Reserve	?	VI Territorial Reserve	?	VI Territorial Reserve	150,000
Do. Officers	4,000	VII U. T. C.	1,500	Do. Officers	5,000
VII O. T. C.	35,055			VII O. T. C.	40,000
(Do. In 1914, 25,208)					
THIRD LINE.		THIRD LINE.		THIRD LINE.	
VIII Home-Defence	?	VIII Auxiliary Force—		VIII Auxiliary Force	75,000
National Volunteers, etc.		Actual	60,000	(For all British Subjects.)	
(In 1914, 200,000)		(For Europeans & Anglo-Indians)		Officers	2,500
		Authorized	36,804		
FOURTH LINE.		FOURTH LINE.		FOURTH LINE.	
IX Cadet Corps, Rifle Clubs, etc., etc.	90,000, or more	IX (For Europeans and Anglo-Indians).	?	IX Secondary Schools, Colleges, and minor communities, to be empowered to raise Cadet Corps and Rifle Clubs.	
FIFTH LINE.		FIFTH LINE.		FIFTH LINE.	
X		X		X	
Whole manhood of the Nation, if a Conscription Act be passed, e. g. during the last Great War, 5,000,000 forced conscripts of England served.		During the War 1914-18, India contributed a total of 1,457,000 men (free volunteers) of whom 943,000 served overseas. Casualties amounted to 106,594.		Every 10 years will see an addition of 200,000 Regulars + 200,000 Reserves; and 750,000 Territorials + 375,000 Reserves; and 187,500 Auxiliaries, i.e. a total of men trained to arms,	1,712,500.

Organization of the Armed Forces of England (and Continental Nations) in Five Lines, one behind the other in support, as shown in the above Tables.

If we look at the military organizations of different European countries, we generally find four classes of national military forces ; at the back of which is the whole manhood of the nation, which may be called the Fifth Line.

- (1) The First Line consists of the Standing or Regular Army of youths, absolutely fit for Active Service as in English, and Continental Armies, complete with its Reserves, who supply drafts, to replace losses, through resignation, sickness or casualties of War, as in England. In Continental Armies, the Reserve Troops consist of those who have completed their training in the Active Army, and are organized into Divisions, corresponding to those of the Active Army in the same districts, as those to which the Active Divisions belong *e. g.*, in France.
- (2) The Second Line Troops are generally composed of those who have already served in the First Line, and its Reserve for a certain number of years, as in Continental Armies, or of those who join the Territorial Force from the beginning, as in England. It constitutes the Territorial Force. It has also its own Territorial Reserve. Its functions are to replace the First Line at Home, and if necessary to volunteer for Service at the Front, and support or supplement the First Line; to repel local raids; and undertake Garrison and Guard Duties.
- (3) The Third Line Troops consist of elderly men, who have been through the First Two Lines, and they constitute the Home-Defence Army. Their duties are mainly Garrison and Coast-Guard duties, and of helping the civil power, in times of emergency, if called upon to do so.
- (4) The Fourth Line consists of Cadet Corps, Rifle Clubs, and other semi-official organizations, which constantly give preparatory or advanced musketry training and drill to all conditions of men, who desire to have it, and who may or may not belong to or join any of the Three Lines mentioned above.
- (5) The Fifth Line consists of the whole manhood of the nation, if a Conscription Act be passed, as in the last War, during a national emergency.

Armed strength of potential enemies : I. Afghanistan—450,000 men. II. North-West Frontier—200,000 tribesmen. III. Russia—unknown millions. IV. Tibet. IV. China—unknown millions. Aerial and Maritime strength of these and other potential enemies—not known. Whilst, VI. Potentialities of Lewisite gas, 'Death Ray', etc. are incalculable.

It may be questioned, on what basis the proposed strength of the Army in 1928 is constructed ? In reply, we may state that India should always have at its disposal at least a million trained men, willing and ready to take up arms against aggression from the abovementioned restless neighbours on our Frontiers, or any other potential enemy.

If a small and poor State like Afghanistan can maintain 450,000 men, and the pauper tribesmen of the North-West Frontier can maintain 200,000 men, and be a standing menace to India, surely a rich and powerful Empire like India can maintain at least a million of her sons, trained to arms, and ready to counter-act the menace whenever it happens to actualise. 'To preserve peace, be prepared for war,' is a well known military slogan of centuries, and if India under Swaraj be prepared beforehand for any emergency, our enemies will have no temptation to jump into a hopeless war! Further, the potentialities of Lewisite gas,—the touch of 2 or 3 drops of which kills instantaneously,—dropped from aeroplanes, and of 'Death Rays' and other electrical discoveries are incalculable. Hence, modern armies must be organized in millions, and not hundreds of thousands, as in the past, to replace the huge wastage of modern wars.

The Defence of India. Inadequate First Line of Regulars and Reserve and inefficient Second Line of Territorials. Government of India states "H. M.'s Govt. will help India in an emergency, if it is humanly possible to do so," but does not state what India should do to help herself for self-defence, under such a possible emergency.

Looking at the problem of the defence of India, as a whole, we can find no basis for optimism in the present organization of the Indian Army. We have a small Regular Indian Army of 140,000, with its paper Reserve of 30,000, but an actual reserve of 8,900 only. There is a badly-organised and equipped, experimental Territorial Force of 8,500 to serve as a Second Line to the Regular Army! It is impossible for the I. T. F., owing to the smallness of its numbers, and its deficient organization and training to serve as an efficient Second Line Army, as at present constituted. Practically the defence of India by Indians is thus limited to 1,80,000 men, on paper,—a number entirely inadequate for the defence of a huge continent, seeing that in a modern war, millions are engaged on either side. Hence the first question is, whether India is really prepared for a Great War on an adequate scale, without the help of British Troops, who may be called away, and engaged elsewhere, during a grave national emergency. We believe the attention of the Committee on Reorganization should be drawn to the fact of public warnings given both by the British Government of India, and the Chief of the General Staff in India, that in a future war, Britain may not be able to come to our help; and so India must be prepared to stand on her own feet. For instance, the Government of India state in the "Army in India and its Evolution" that "If India is exposed to attack, which her own resources cannot effectively repel, His Majesty's Government, if it is humanly possible to do so, will come to her assistance with the armed forces of the United Kingdom". The Government of India has failed in its duty by not suggesting to India, the necessary measures to be taken for meeting such a possible contingency.

Chief of the General Staff in India supports the statement that "In the future, in such wars as that of 1914-18, the absolute continuity of British protection can never be guaranteed. There then lies India's ultimate goal, to defend herself against all comers, by herself, possibly without British aid. She is not fitted for self defence, she is not within three generations (i. e., 90 years) of it."

In the "Defence of India"; dedicated to the Chief of the General Staff in India, and presumably written under his inspiration, we are given another warning

that, "Should the task of her defence become too great, India will receive help from Imperial resources, but only as soon and for as long as they can be spared from other theatres. Should she ever perform her own task less than adequately, or even go so far as to abjure it, although that be a most unlikely contingency, she can count on none but herself to make good the deficiency". By which time, she may be crushed under the heels of a well prepared and successful enemy!

The question naturally arises, whether the Government of India is prepared in these times of peace, with all adequate measures for removing the expected deficiency, being the responsible head of India? We receive a reply, further on, in the same book. "Self-defence is a first principle of national existence; in India without it, there can be neither consolidation, nor development within her frontiers, a cogent consideration at a time, when she is even now entering upon a new era of political and constitutional life, in the path towards Dominion Home Rule.

India's ultimate task may thus be a great one. In the future, in such wars as that of 1914-18, *the absolute continuity of British protection can never be guaranteed.* In that war Britain's naval supremacy was such as to render India immune from any invasion by sea, and the great issues both by sea and land were fought out many thousands of miles away.

Maybe, Britain will have to contend with Powers possessing navies far superior to those of the late Central Powers, maybe British command of the sea will be temporarily insufficient to protect Indian waters, maybe wars will be fought out *with weapons as yet undiscovered*, which greatly depreciate the value of sea command. There, then, lies *her ultimate goal*, to defend herself against all comers by herself, possibly for a long time without British aid, other than the small British garrison she now possesses. How far she now is from being fitted for that is not even a matter for conjecture, *she is not within three generations (i. e. ninety years) of it.* And until her own intelligentsia have studied well both the present and the ultimate problems which confront her, and her peoples have received some solid grounding in the wider aspects of those problems, so as to afford a measure of intelligent and sympathetic support to their representatives in authority, she can progress but little indeed on the road of preparation for her eventual duty".

Thus, we are told that India is not within three generations of preparedness for self-defence, *i. e.* India will require at least 90 years to be able to defend herself!

That is poor consolation for the patriots of India! It clearly means that in any great war of the future, in which Britain is engaged and unable to send reinforcements to India, our country will be at the mercy of any powerful invader. The mere fact of Indianising a few units of the Indian Army in 25 years is not likely to add to the fighting strength of India! Hence it is perfectly clear that if the Committee on Reorganization of the I. T. F. takes into consideration the problem of *Defence of India* as a whole, and the reorganization of the I. T. F. as *only a part* of the problem, then alone will it be in a position to gauge the adequacy of the numbers of I. T. F. required, to serve as an efficient Second Line to the Regular Army.

During the last war India supplied a million and quarter Volunteers, who helped to save the British Empire and the degenerate Western Civilization. Can we believe that, in times of peace, India cannot raise an I. T. F. of even 20,000? Must India take 50 years to be prepared for self-defence, without relying on British help in the future?

However high be the Military Authority, that makes such a statement, we are bound to challenge it on the grounds of commonsense and military experience of other countries. But, in the first place, we must deplore the mentality of the Military Authorities in India, who seem to imagine that educated Indians are so blissfully ignorant of military history, science and art, that they would be prepared to swallow such unpardonable bunkum coming from them. For we shall prove the absurdity of such statements from the mouth of their own mouth-piece, Mr. "Arthur Vincent", the author of "The Defence of India". For instance, Mr. Arthur Vincent says that :

"What India did in the war is a matter of splendid history. None will forget the men of the Indian Contingent in France who brought *irreplaceable aid to our inadequate forces in 1914*, and who helped to stem the German rush by dying in hundreds where they stood. In Africa it was the Army of India, which bore more than half the brunt of our conflict with the flower of Germany's colonial troops; in Mesopotamia, in Egypt, Palestine and the Dardanelles it played its part; in fact India accomplished perhaps more than any other Dominion. *Each one of the million and a quarter men she sent to the war would have been hard indeed to replace from elsewhere; and we may well ask ourselves what would have happened had there been no India, or had she been forced, as she might be next time, to devote the efforts of every man and gun of her army to the close defence of her own soil.* In her material resources and products too, India was of solid value to us throughout the years of the war: next time, with her further development, she must be of far greater value still. By reason then of her loyal sons first of all, and of the less glorious but very important material aid she can offer, India is to-day a vital member of the Empire; and her defence against external aggression is a matter which touches closely each member of that Empire at home and abroad."

Thus we have *self-contradictory statements* by the same author, in the same book. One can no doubt admire the audacity of a man, who dares to state that India saved the British Empire and the degenerate Western civilization during the critical years 1914-18, but that the same India is incapable of defending herself in the future! Who can believe such inconsistent nonsense? Further Mr. "Arthur Vincent" says that "Each one of a million and a quarter men she sent to the war were hard indeed to replace from elsewhere", *i. e.* India could raise a million and a quarter men during the four years of a fierce war, but she cannot raise the same number of men for her self-defence, during the next ninety (!) years of profound peace? It is a ridiculous statement and unworthy of any man calling himself a military expert, and proves, if any proof were needed, the necessity of a change in mentality of our military experts.

Another absurd statement, which Mr. Vincent seems to have recognized, is the correction he has made, in the second impression of his book published in 1923, wherein he has substituted "many years" for "three generations". In the

end, Mr. Vincent himself states that for Indian self-defence, "Two chief needs there are for its solution, time and endeavour. Endeavour need not be questioned, it is there now, it will increase largely as the years go on, with every aid that Government can give. Time must tell however, and if in *fifty years*, the time has come, when India no longer needs men from Europe to lead her in the field, and to administer her army in times of peace, she will have progressed well indeed in the path of self-development". Here we find that Mr. Vincent has come down from ninety years to fifty years. We expect that in a future edition, he will probably go on reducing the probationary period by half or more, for rendering India self-dependent for self-defence!

Can India be prepared for self-defence in 10 years, and dispense with British reinforcements? A reduction of 26 British and 38 Indian Regular Battalions, and an increase of 100 Battalions of the Indian Regulars and 100 of the Reserve, every five years, and of 300 I. T. F. Battalions; and 150 of the I. T. F. Reserve, every four years, will render India self-supporting and prepared for any emergency.

Mr. Arthur Vincent gives India 50 years for Indianization of the army of self-defence, but we believe, at the outset 10 years ought to suffice, if the Government of India be in earnest. For instance, 26 British Regular Battalions, which are at present a luxury in India, can be reduced at the rate of 2 Battalions per annum for the first four years, and 3 per annum for the next six years, and Indian Regular Battalions at the rate of 4 per annum, for the next 10 years. If the reorganized I. T. F. be recruited at the rate of 75,000 a year for a term of four years, the country will always have at its disposal 300,000 men of the I. T. F., during the first four years, if the limit of the I. T. F. be fixed temporarily at 300,000. So that within the next 10 years, 750,000 men of the I. T. F. will have received sufficient training, to replace during a war, 26,000 British and 38,000 Indian Ranks, reduced as above and also the whole Regular Army itself. So far as cost is concerned, a Territorial Battalion costs only about one-eighth of a Regular Battalion according to the British Military Budget. Hence, for the total cost of the reduced 26 British Battalions, which cost as much as 104 Indian Battalions, plus 33 Indian Battalions, equivalent to a total of 142 Battalions of the Line, India can have, for the same price, 8 times as many, *i. e.* 1136 Battalions of the Second Line. But in practice, 300 Battalions of the I. T. F. may be taken as sufficient; and an I. T. F. Reserve of 150,000 should be maintained.

The reserve of the Regular Indian Army would be automatically raised from the present authorized strength of 30,000 to the proposed strength of 100,000, because *the new terms of Service* for the Indian Regular Army are 5 years with the Colours and 10 years with the Reserve, thus doubling the strength of the Regular Army Reserve, every 5 years. Hence, with a much enlarged army of defence, India will be able to make a substantial saving on the Military Budget. Simultaneously with the saving on the Military Budget the process of Indianization of the whole Army will be accelerated, and Mr. Arthur Vincent's 50 years will be reduced to 10. If India is to be granted Dominion Status, she is bound to claim Dominion Rights over the Military Administration, just as over the Civil, as in every constitution, the Military Power is subordinate to the Civil.

So far as recruiting for the I. T. F. is concerned, if the suggestions as to pay etc. for popularizing the I. T. F. made before by us be adopted, there ought to be no difficulty in finding 75,000 recruits a year *i. e.* 300,000 every four years, plus half the number, *i. e.* 150,000 in the I. T. F. Reserve, seeing that India contributed 1,457,000 men during four years of the last war.

Further, if the suggestions previously made for organizing an Indian O. T. C. be adopted, there will always be 40,000 Indian members of the Indian O. T. C., trained to act as Officers of the enlarged Indian Army,—Regular and Territorial—during any emergency, when more volunteers will join up, if the conditions of service be made sufficiently attractive for them, as during the last war.

In 1907 Mr. Haldane, the War Minister of England, undertook the organization of the Regular Army, and the Volunteers as the Territorial Force of England; and by 1912, *i. e.* in 5 years, when he resigned, the Army of the British Empire was so thoroughly reorganized and prepared for war, that the British Expeditionary Force was in France in scheduled time in the war of 1914, and the Territorial Force equally well stood the test of war. England was lucky in having a Haldane, and not an Arthur Vincent who would have taken 50 years to perform the same miracle. Will India ever have such luck?

(B) I. T. F., to be efficient, should be organized and trained on a Divisional basis, and be provided with a complete Divisional Staff, like the Regular Army. All Arms of the Service should be open to members of the I. T. F. and I. A. F.

And all essential Ancillary Services should be completely organised for the I. T. F., on the scale of the Regular Army.

As we have seen before, the actual strength of the I. T. F. is about 8,500, scattered in different provinces. Hence it is positively impossible for it to be organized, and trained on a Divisional basis, or to be provided with a complete Divisional Staff like the Regular Army. On the other hand, if as proposed, a minimum limit of 300,000 be fixed for the I. T. F., it can and ought to be organized, and trained on a Divisional basis, and be provided with a complete Divisional Staff like the Regular Army, based on the British model. Realizing that the system of Divisional Training in peace must be readily adaptable to war conditions, so as to permit of transition from peace to war with the least possible dislocation, the training of the I. T. F. should be so organized. To this end, periodical training and manœuvres with the Regular Army, and exchange of Regular and Territorial Officers and N. C. O.'s should be arranged. India is a vast and ideal training camp, equally well-suited for thousands or hundreds of thousands of men, for civilised warfare on plains and mountains, or for savage guerilla warfare anywhere.

All Arms of the Service, including the Air Force, should be open to members of the I. T. F., and all technical personnel should be organized on the same scale for the I. T. F., as for the Regular Army. An Army, in these days, consists not only of the Infantry, the Cavalry, the Artillery and the Air Force, but a host of Ancillary Services, such as the Medical, Ambulance, Engineering, Mechanical, Supply and Transport, Ordnance, Post, Telegraphs, Wireless, etc.; but so far

nothing has been done to supply the I. T. F. with such essential Ancillary Services, in the absence of which it would be hopeless to expect the I. T. F. to serve as an efficient Second Line.

(C) I. T. F., to be efficient, should be provided with equipment and armament, identical with that of the Regular Army, to act as an efficient Second Line. Men without munitions, or munitions without men equally useless. Indianization of the Military Services should be accompanied by Indianization of the Military Industries, and thus provide employment for a million and a half of Indians.

If the I. T. F. is to serve as an efficient Second Line, it necessarily follows that it should be provided with equipment and armament, identical with that of the Regular Army. Men without munitions and munitions without men are equally useless, either in peace or in war. Further, second-class rifles and guns are no good in any modern war. Hence it would not do to pass on the second-hand armament of the British Troops or of the Regular Army to the I. T. F. Nor would it do for a large army in India to rely for its supply on armament factories in England—thousands of miles away from India. During the last war factories for manufacturing munitions of peace in England had to be converted into factories for munitions of war. Hence, we believe that the terms of the Resolution, appointing the Territorial Reorganization Committee should have included a report upon the adequacy of the munitions factories in India, for supplying sufficient munitions for an army of at least a million engaged in a great war, and somehow cut off from all supplies from England. Mr. Arthur Vincent seems to have forgotten this most important point in his book on the "Defence of India". He has been good enough to warn us that India will have to depend on herself, for supplying the men, *i. e.* cannon-fodder; but he says nothing about the cannon or munitions! You can train a soldier in three months, but you cannot build a factory in as many years, realizing the industrial helplessness of India, and its absolute dependence on European countries, for the supply even of such every day articles as nails and needles. The question arises, what is the actual provision of munition factories in India? "The Army in India and its Evolution" states that "since 1911, there have been 7 main arsenals and 7 main factories, together with 4 or 5 small depots." Will Mr. Arthur Vincent or any other military expert explain, how India will be able to supply an army of a million in the field with sufficient munitions for 2 or 3 years? Hence, we would suggest to the Territorial Reorganization Committee, that it should consider this question of the munitions for the I. T. F., in addition to the men for the I. T. F., as there can be no efficiency of any army, without a sufficient and assured supply of modern equipment and armament.

It is well-known that, much of the industrial prosperity of England is due to the presence of a large number of armament firms, which supply the Army, the Navy, etc., and other Ancillary Services with munitions of war. Hundreds of thousands of English men and women are employed in such works. So, the I. T. F. Committee can help in providing employment for hundreds of thousands of Indian men and women in munition factories; and thus provide for the simultaneous Indianization of Military Services, and Indianization of Military Industries in India. It would thus indirectly, help in the problem of employing

the unemployed Indians, in both the army and the army factories to the extent of a million or more, and thus help to reduce the poverty of the masses as well as the middle-classes of Indians. Thus national military efficiency will *pari passu* promote national industrial efficiency.

(D) To remove all Racial Distinctions in the constitution of the non-regular military forces in India, omit the words 'not being a European British Subject' in § 5, I. T. F. Act, and omit the word 'European', wherever it occurs in the I. A. F. Act. Minor Communities have special claims to join the I. A. F. for local or home-defence only.

Coming now to the question of the Indian Auxiliary Force which is meant to act as Local or Home-defence Force, *i. e.* as the Third Line of Defence. According to the Resolution of the Indian Legislative Assembly, one of the duties of the Committee on Reorganization, is to "report upon the removal of all Racial Distinctions in the constitution of the non-regular military forces in India." Hence, the proper method of removing such distinctions in the I. A. F., is to omit the word 'European' wherever it occurs in the I. A. F. Act, thus enabling any British subject, whether European or Indian, to join the Force. Simultaneously in § 5-1 of the I. T. F. Act 1920, the words "not being a European British subject" should be omitted, so that there would be no restriction on a European joining the I. T. F. or an Indian joining the I. A. F. The strength of the I. A. F. should be sanctioned at 75,000. According to the present racial distinctions maintained in the two Acts, no Indian can volunteer purely for Home Defence, whilst no European can volunteer for General Service, unless he joins the Regular Army. The only democratic method of removing racial distinctions is to permit the admission of all British subjects either to the I. T. F. or to the I. A. F., just as it is the practice of all civilized countries. We beg to draw the attention of the Territorial Reorganization Committee to minor communities, like the Parsee, which cannot possibly afford to supply cannon-fodder during a war of any magnitude, by joining the I. T. F., meant to be a Second Line Army. As we know, in a modern war, whole battalions are wiped off the face of the earth, during the volcanic fight of a few hours, and it would be sheer lunacy on the part of a small community to ask the flower of its manhood to serve as cannon-fodder, and thus commit communal suicide. Seeing that other big communities like the Hindu and the Moslem count their sons by millions, it is the duty of such large communities, to be prepared for national self-defence, and sacrifice a part of their manhood for the good of the whole nation.

Such a small community as the Parsee should be satisfied with performing the duty of Home Defence, and of communal self-defence. As it is, the Parsees have raised 2 Battalions of the I. T. F. from among their small numbers, whilst the other large communities of the Bombay Presidency have failed to raise even a single Company, except the Mahrathas of Poona. We have always fought for the rights of the Parsees, secured to them during the last half century, of joining the Volunteers on exactly the same terms as the Europeans. The justice of our claim has never been denied. We have fought for our rights during the last two years, and we hope that the Committee on Territorial Reorganization will recommend transfer of the two Parsee Battalions of the I. T. F. to the I. A. F.,

bearing in mind the reasons mentioned above by us. Otherwise, both the Parsee Battalions of the I. T. F. will melt away into nothing. If a Platoon or Company of the Parsees wish to stay on in the I. T. F., that will be their look-out, but so far as the Parsee Community as a whole is concerned, it cannot afford to supply 2 Battalions of cannon-fodder in the I. T. F. The Committee might recommend the formation of *Special Volunteer Corps* for minor communities, for their communal self-defence only, in times of internecine trouble; and also of Cadet Corps and Rifle Clubs, as suggested before. These latter would serve as the *Fourth Line of Defence*.

Formation of Class Companies, or Battalions recommended both the I. T. F. and the I. A. F. for promoting camaraderie, and popularising both the Forces.

Though we are dead against racial distinctions in terms of service, so far as Class Companies or Battalions are concerned, such distinctions should be continued just as in the Regular Indian Army, so as to promote camaraderie among the members of every unit, *e. g.* Maratha, Sikh, Rajput, Punjabi, etc., and Anglo-Indians and Europeans should have their separate units, either Companies or Battalions, both in the I. T. F. and in the I. A. F. But all racial distinctions should be abolished so far as the terms of service, re-pay, etc. in the two forces, are concerned. One special distinction, *i. e.* of age for the I. T. F. which naturally would require fitter and younger men between 18 and 30, and for the I. A. F. between 18 and 40, should be maintained. Because, as we have suggested, the I. A. F. should be open to all Indian subjects, particularly those belonging to minor communities who may be willing to serve in Home Defence Units, between the ages of 18—40.

Particulars of the reasonable complaints and grievances of the Parsee Pioneer Battalions, I. T. F. Their just and equitable claims for transfer to the I. A. F., and the Government's duty of observing its solemn pledge.

In the memorandum, re the Reorganization of the I. T. F., it is stated that, "The Government of India would also be glad to be furnished with particulars of any reasonable complaints and grievances which the local Territorial Force Advisory Committee may desire to bring to notice."

We beg to draw the attention of the Government of India, as also of the Committee on Territorial Re-organization, to the particulars of the reasonable complaints and grievances of the Parsee Pioneer Battalions of Bombay I. T. F., as described fully in two articles under the heading of "A Parsee Military Betrayal," which appeared in the well-known and popular Parsee weekly, "the Kaiser-i-Hind" of Bombay. In dealing with the organization of the I. A. F., we have recommended the transfer of the Parsee Pioneer Battalions from the I. T. F. to the I. A. F., as the only proper, equitable and just solution of the grievances of the said Battalions.

As we have shown in the articles referred to above, the Parsee members of the Battalions were enrolled on the distinct understanding of their admission into the I. A. F., for limited local military service only, on the word of the Officer Commanding the Battalions. Hence the Government is bound to observe the solemn pledge given by its authorized agent, who also acted as the Director, I. A. F. and I. T. Forces, Bombay District, and thus vindicate the eternal principles of justice and equity.

APPENDIX.

Below are reproduced two articles from the "*Kaiser-i-Hind*", the leading representative organ of the Parsi Community, which furnish the particulars, desired by the Government of India, of reasonable complaints and grievances of the (Parsi) 11th and 12th Battalions, 2nd Bombay Pioneers, I. T. F.

A PARSİ MILITARY BETRAYAL. (—I)

Our fight for British Military Rights.

JUSTIFIED BY THE SIMLA COMMUNIQUE.

Who Is right?—The Commender-in-Chief

or

The Southern Command?

Important Correspondence with Col. Lavie.

Nemesis has at last overtaken the calumniators of truth, with regard to the status, position and responsibilities of the Bombay Parsi Pioneer Battalions (Territorial), and they are now trying to wriggle out of the evil net of their own design, by making scapegoats of those, who in season and out of season have championed the cause of truth, justice and military rights of the Parsi community. This journal has for nearly a decade been advocating the military training of all Parsi youths, both for self-defence and for the defence of the King and country, in times of emergency. If any proof were needed, the columns of this journal for the last ten years bear ample testimony to the fact. During the world-war, it was this journal which led the Parsi community in the path of duty, and succeeded in raising nearly half a battalion of recruits who would have no doubt given a good account of themselves, in any field they might have been called upon to serve.

Next, when the Government of India passed the Auxiliary and Territorial Forces Acts, we were the first and foremost to advocate the raising of Parsi Auxiliary Battalions, on the same terms and conditions, as enjoyed by the Parsi Auxiliary Company of the Bombay Battalion. It would thus be seen that we have consistently been the advocates of the military training of the Parsis for the last ten years, and we have also consistently insisted on all the British rights and privileges belonging to the Parsi community for the last fifty years. As is well known, Parsi Volunteers have been attached to British Regiments in Bombay, Poona, Karachi, and other centres, for the last half century.

In 1921, we were the first to advocate the recruiting of Parsi youths for the Auxiliary Battalion, but at the same time we gave a distinct warning to the Parsi community, that if under the misguidance of certain interested parties, Parsi youths were foolish enough to join any Territorial Battalion then proposed to be formed—the Parsis would lose all their British rights and privileges, as they would be subject to the Indian Territorial Forces Act, and not the Indian

Auxiliary Forces Act. Repeatedly we warned the Parsi community that the hysterical propaganda carried on by a certain Parsi journal, whose monopoly is that of ignorance, abuse and lack of foresight, would assuredly lead to the inevitable end, *viz.* the loss of all the British military rights and privileges, and degradation to the level of the Native Indian Army. Not only did that Parsi journal carry on an hysterical propaganda, based on falsehood and misrepresentations and unmerited abuse of this journal, but it reproduced from time to time, according to its own vain-glorious statements, *the authoritative guarantees* given by Lieut.-Col. Lavie, the O. C. of the P. P. Battalion, *that all British rights and privileges were definitely and irrevocably secured for ever for the Parsi community* through the powerful influence of Lieut.-Col. Lavie, in spite of the fact that, the P. P. B. was and is designated a Territorial Battalion. As it was our duty, we pointed out distinctly, that under the Acts passed by the Legislatures, not even the Commander-in-Chief of India was given either the authority or the privilege to grant Auxiliary, *i.e.* British rights, to Territorial battalions, under any circumstances whatever, the reason for which is perfectly plain,—that every other Territorial Battalion would demand the same. For this statement of the true position of the P. P. B., we were abused and villified, and even threatened with a prosecution by Col. Lavie, as will be evident from the correspondence we publish below, for the information of the Parsi community, whose cause we have always championed and shall always champion without fear or favour, and without being intimidated by any threats from any quarter, depending for our justification on the righteousness of our cause. Not only have we been showered with abuse, but our writer on military affairs has been maligned by certain malicious parties.^c He is too good a veteran fighter and a determined servant of the public, to be deterred from his duty by the most damnably scurrilous abuse of his malicious opponents, who, to gain the fleshpots of military favour, have betrayed and are still betraying the military rights and privileges, which the Parsi community has enjoyed for the last fifty years.

We have exposed till now all the falsehoods and frauds of our malicious detractors, and we are determined to follow that policy, *till we succeed in regaining for the community those military rights and privileges*, which have been battered away by its betrayers, who pose as well-wishers, and act as enemies of the community.

We now reproduce below the correspondence that has passed between the Editor of this journal and Col. Lavie.

7th October 1922.

From

Mr. Erachshaw R. Heerjibehedin, J.P.,
Editor and Proprietor,
The Kaiser-i-Hind.

To,

Lt.-Col. H. E. Lavie, D.S.O.,
I. G., Auxiliary and Territorial Forces,
Bombay District.

Dear Sir,

As you are aware my paper has always taken a keen interest in the question of military training of Parsi youths, for years together, and the prominent part it took in recruiting for the 1st and 2nd Parsi P. T. Battalions is too well known to the public to need any further reference. My paper has always been distinguished for its policy of independent criticism of men and measures, without fear or favour, and as such, my office has been inundated with a number of complaints—oral and written—from some of the members of the Battalions, for some time. I have thought fit to hold back these complaints from publication in order to give those concerned sufficient time, and a fair chance of removing all causes of complaint. Also in deference to the wishes of a deputation of certain members of the Advisory Committee and Officers of the

Battalion, who specially called upon me, I withheld the publication of all such complaints, until I heard of a bomb having been thrown into the camp, with the result that a general feeling of dissatisfaction has again prevailed amongst them, by the issue of your order, that officers and men of the two battalions are now deprived of their British Commissions and Designations already granted to them, and instead, they are now granted only Native Commissions and Designations.

You have repeatedly stated from the platform, and in your interview with a representative of a Parsi journal, given the public to understand that all ranks of the Parsi Battalion were entitled to the same rights and privileges as the British Auxiliary Battalions. How then could one reconcile the new Order about depriving the Parsi Battalions of British designations and substituting Native ones, with the assurances and promises alleged to have been held out to them by you? I am informed, that bitter discontent now prevails amongst all ranks of the two Battalions, and I am afraid there will be an end to further recruiting for the Battalions, unless some satisfactory course is adopted to redress the grievance.

Another question is "Why have the military authorities adopted the strange method of enrolling Parsis in Territorial Battalions, and promising them auxiliary rights,—and withdrawing same at their pleasure—instead of adopting the more sensible course of enrolling Parsis in Auxiliary Battalions, knowing that an Auxiliary Company of Parsis has been in existence since 1920, and that Parsi Volunteers have been attached to British Regular and Volunteer Battalions for the last 50 years?"

Was the Advisory Committee ever given to understand, that the mere prefix of "Pioneers" added to the designations of Territorial Battalions entitled them to claim the terms of Auxiliary Battalions, and if so under which section of the Indian Territorial Forces Act?

Another question is, "Is it a fact that B. O.'s Commissions have been given to a number of persons, without their being made to pass through the tests, put down in Army Regulations, and if so why, and what were the guiding principles?"

There are many other questions awaiting explanation, but for the present, these will suffice.

Finally, I hope that you will be so kind as to expedite a reply to the above, with a view to clear away the misunderstandings from the minds of the members of the Parsi community, for whom you have been evincing such deep and heartfelt interest.

Yours truly,

ERACHSHAW R. HEERJIBEHEDIN, J.P.

Editor and Proprietor,

The Kaiser-i-Hind.

Headquarters, Bombay District.

Bombay, 11th October 1922.

To,

Mr. Erachshah R. Heerjibehedin, J.P.,

Editor and Proprietor,

The Kaiser-i-Hind.

Dear Sir,

Reference your letter dated 7th October 1922.

Please note British rights have been accorded and not withdrawn from the Parsis, also the officers have been given Honorary King's Commissions which gives them the same status as other officers.

The reasons why Parsis cannot be enrolled in Auxiliary Forces is purely political, if the Parsis are enrolled in the Auxiliary Forces,—why not the other communities in India?

With reference to a scurrilous article signed Chestnut, I am forwarding this to the Government of Bombay with the purpose of having action taken, as it is against the interests of the service to have such harmful matter and false reports being published, and also holds the Battalion up to the ridicule of the public of India. The sooner members of the Battalion either leave the battalion or begin to soldier the better.

Yours faithfully,
H. E. LAVIE,
Lt.-Colonel.

Bombay, 11th October 1922.

To,

The Secretary to the Government of Bombay,
Secretariat,
BOMBAY.

Dear Sir,

Reference the attached correspondence.

I beg to point out that it is having a very detrimental effect on the members of the 1st and 2nd Parsee Pioneers.

They have been accorded with British rights as follows :—

British Clothing
" Rations
" Accommodation including hospital accommodation.

Authority Southern Command letter No. 25548-5-Terr. dated 11th January 1922. The Officers will be given Viceroy's and Honorary King's Commissions. The authority for this has not yet been received but the statement is official, and has been published as such both by the "Pioneer" and the "Times of India".

Can anything be done to put a stop to this and to make an example of 'Chestnut'?

H. E. LAVIE,
Lieut.-Colonel for Major—
General Commanding,
Bombay District.

From :—

Mr. Eracnshaw R. Heerjibehedin, J.P.

To,

Lieut.-Col. H. E. Lavie,
Inspector-General,
Auxiliary and Territorial Forces,
Bombay District.

Dear Sir,

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 11th October, in reply to mine of 7th October 1922.

You point out that the "British rights have been accorded and not withdrawn from the Parsis". On reference to the enclosure with your letter, you distinctly define British rights, accorded to Parsis as :—

" British Clothing
" Rations
" Accommodation "

and nothing more. I beg to point out that nowhere in my letter have I suggested that these elementary rights have been withdrawn. Further I beg to point out that these rights are not exclusive British rights in any sense of the term. For, as you are aware, the Government of India has adopted the policy of upholding the inalienable rights of every community to its own social usages and customs, with reference to clothing, food and accommodation, etc. As you are aware the style of Parsi clothing, food, etc. approximates to those of Europeans, and not to those of Hindus and Mahomedans, and further, for the last fifty years the Parsis have enrolled as British Volunteers, they have been entitled to those inalienable rights of their community. So this disposes of your contention that these are exclusive British rights. Apart from these inalienable rights of the Parsis, what are the other real rights and privileges, which are the inalienable rights and privileges of all British troops, whether Regular or Auxiliary, accorded to the Parsis? Surely, *the Parsi Battalion being a Territorial Battalion is and will be subject only to the rules and regulations formed under the Indian Territorial Forces Act 1920, and so the only rights the Parsis will have will be under the Act*, which is the contention of our correspondent as well.

I beg to point out emphatically that in my letter of 7th October, I have distinctly stated that "Officers and men of the two Battalions are now deprived of their British Commissions and Designations, already granted to them, and are now granted only Native Commissions and Designations". As a distinguished Military authority, you can see that what I meant was Substantive Commissions, and not Honorary. If, as your letter seems to assume, there is no distinction between Substantive and Honorary Commissions, why all this bother, and why have officers been deprived of their substantive British Commissions and Designations?

Your assertion is that "the officers have been given Honorary King's Commissions which gives them the same status as other officers". If that is so, why are their substantive Commissions only Native Officers' Commissions, which according to Indian Army Regulations, rank below the British Officers' Commissions? This is exactly the view, put forward by my correspondent.

So far as your opinion is concerned that the article by Chestnut is scurrilous and contains harmful matter and false reports, not all will agree with it. I for one honestly consider it to be a fair comment on a matter of public interest.

In your letter, you assert that "The reasons why Parsis cannot be enrolled in Auxiliary Forces, is purely political". But as I pointed out in my letter, the Auxiliary Company of Parsis already exists since 1920, and if in this case, the higher authorities had been properly informed, they would have certainly conceded the right of Parsis to join Auxiliary Forces on the basis of a long precedent of the last 50 years.

Finally, pray allow me to point out that your letter of 11th October practically ignores some of the questions which are agitating the minds of all ranks of the Parsi Battalions, and which my paper, as the representative organ of the Parsis, and as one keenly interested in the subject of military training for Parsis, for the last many years, consider as a duty to bring to your notice, for proper solution to soothe the ruffled feelings of those concerned. So I hope that you will be good enough to spare time to send categorical replies to the questions in my letter of the 7th October and oblige.

Yours truly,

ERACHSHAW R. HEERJIBEHEDIN.

Headquarters, Bombay District,
Bombay, 18th October 1922.

To,
The Editor,
The Kaiser-i-Hind,
Sassoon Building,
Elphinstone Circle, Fort.

Dear Sir,

Please note that I refuse to argue, write or express any remarks regarding the Parsi Units. Those men who wish to soldier can soldier, who do not can resign.

Everything in my power is being done and as I am doing my best for the Parsis every minute of the day,—I can do no more.

Yours faithfully,
H. E. LAVIE,
Lt.-Colonel,
Commandant, Auxiliary Force, Bombay.

From the above correspondence, the Parsi public will be able to judge for itself, that we have done our best according to our capacity to champion the Parsi cause against its betrayers, and that Col. Lavie has tried to evade giving a single definite reply, for the simple reason, as we suppose, that he was not in a position to do so, in spite of all the promises and guarantees that he had given in public and in the special interview granted to a contemporary of ours, who has ruined the Parsi cause, through his absolute ignorance of all military matters, and whose responsibility was all the greater as he was and is a member of the Advisory Committee of the P. P. B.

We hear that the self-complacence of the Advisory Committee has been utterly upset by the Communiqué issued by the Military Headquarters at Simla, and in which every word of what we had said with regard to the status and responsibilities of the P. P. B. has been justified, and for which we take natural pride in using our foresight and judgment, in place of short sight and hysteria of our maligners.

We are surprised that in a printed manual, called the Standing Orders of the P. P. B., the local military authorities stated distinctly that the military training for the P. P. B. is limited to what is required for aiding the Civil Power in times of emergency, which means in other words that the P. P. B. is meant for the purposes of internal security only, *i. e.*, is on the same basis as the Auxiliary Battalions, as stated by the Commander-in-Chief, during the recent debate in the Legislative Assembly, from which we had given an excerpt the other day. Now the question is:—Who is right?—the Commander-in-Chief or the Southern Command, under whose direction the Standing Orders are issued by the local authorities. The C.-in-C. distinctly stated that the Territorial Battalions were the reserve of the Indian Army and meant for service wherever required, even outside the limits of India, and he made no exception whatever of the P. P. B. Therefore, we suggest to the Southern Command and the Publicity Officer of the local Government, to clear this evident contradiction between the highest and the local military authorities.

A PARSI MILITARY BETRAYAL. (—II)

What is the Sequel?

THE REMEDY—DISBAND THE PIONEERS (TERRITORIAL), AND RE-ENLIST IN THE AUXILIARY FORCE.

The Communal Cry—"Restore our British Rights and Status".

In our issue of 29th July, we dealt with the grave question of the Parsee Military Betrayal. Since then, our attention has been drawn to the Memorandum addressed to the Parsee Battalions by Major J. St. Abyn King, in which the Major has tried in his own words to remove "some misconceptions which appeared to exist regarding the conditions of service in the 11th and 12th Battalions, 2nd Bombay Pioneers I. T. F." Having carefully considered the explanation given by the Major, we have to draw his attention to the fact that no such misconceptions have been fostered by us in our paper, and that the Memorandum merely repeats what we have already said as to the conditions of service in the P. P. Battalions. We need not repeat all the arguments put forward in our issue of July 29th, but we have to remind the Major once more, that if anybody has any misconceptions of service in the Battalions, it is not we, but the Major himself and the self-appointed self-seeking Advisory Committee, and Colonel Lavie, the late Inspector-General of I. T. F. and A. F. I., and the Southern Command, under whose authority the Standing Orders of the Battalions have been issued. So we shall try to remove these misconceptions, and put our case bluntly and clearly before the Military authorities and the public.

We have been the advocates of military service for more than a decade; we have claimed the right of our community to military training, as the lineal descendants of an ancient martial race of world-renown; and we have preached it as the duty of the Parsi community to be prepared for war, as the only means of preserving peace, and escaping communal annihilation; and finally as the citizens of the greatest Empire of to-day, we consider it a privilege to be prepared for rendering loyal and worthy service to the Government established by law, in times of trouble. Granting all these, let us say emphatically that we are dead against what we call the Parsee Military Betrayal in our issue of 29th July, for the following substantial reasons:—

In the first place, we have protested against the unrepresentative character of the self-seeking Advisory Committee which has brought the hopeful Parsi military movement to such a sad pass, within a year, according to our assured prognostications. Secondly, we have protested against the *absolutely unreasonable, and, as we shall show, unstatesmanlike policy* of Colonel Lavie. Remembering that Parsis are only a small community with such limited numbers, it should have been obvious to any military man with even the least experience, that to expose the youth of such a small community to the undoubted and the assured risk of annihilation at the hands of the enemy on the field of war—particularly with the modern, scientific, destructive armaments of war,—it was absolutely unjustifiable on the part of Colonel Lavie to suggest that Parsi youths should be enrolled in Pioneer Battalions, and let us repeat expose them to an almost certain risk of annihilation. That the Southern Command should have acquiesced in this obviously ill-advised arrangement took away our breath, and *so we have been protesting, ever since the inception of these Battalions, against such a preparation for communal suicide*, on a scale unknown in the history of any small community like ours. We are not cowards and we are not against all reasonable risks involved in military service. But

we know what happened in all previous wars, that the Pioneer Battalions bear the brunt of enemy attack and are practically annihilated. We have at our disposal, the figures of the last war, which are quite well-known to the Indian Military Authorities, so we need not reproduce them here.

PHYSICAL DISQUALIFICATION OF MIDDLE-CLASS PARSIS FOR ENROLMENT IN PIONEER BATTALIONS.

Not only was Colonel Lavie not justified by the paucity of our numbers in enrolling our boys in *Pioneer Battalions*, but as a distinguished Military officer of many years' standing, he should have realised that the poor physique of the Parsee youths and the knowledge of their sedentary habits and the deteriorating influence of school and college life on the physique of Indian students—which is known to the Military as well as Civil authorities of Government, could not possibly justify a military authority in recruiting boys of such poor physique, sedentary habits and low stamina for *Pioneer Battalions*, which require the best physique, active habits and magnificent vitality, which are supposed to be the hall-mark of qualifications for Pioneers.

Our third objection to Colonel Lavie's unreasonable arrangement is against the enrolment of youths of an educated community belonging to the middle class as *mere Sepoys* of Territorial Battalions, who are held in low estimation by Indian public opinion. The *sepoys'* ranks are supposed to be filled in from the masses and not from the classes, and we consider it a degradation for Parsis to be reduced to the position of *sepoys*, after enjoying for 50 years the privileges and rights of British soldiers, who are held in higher estimation by Indian public opinion.

Personally we believe that the *conditions of service* in the I. T. F. cannot and do not preserve the self-respect of our educated, intelligent and progressive community. Not only so, but we may venture to say that amongst the 75 Battalions of the British Army in India, there is not one which can boast of the same standard of education and of life as the P. P. Battalions. We see no reason why our cultured youths should be reduced to the level of illiterate *sepoys*, whose conditions of service are *naturally unsuited to our traditions and habits of life*.

Our fourth objection we have repeatedly put forward in our columns time and again, and we are sorry to say, that we have again to draw the attention of the higher authorities, to the misdirection of Colonel Lavie and misrepresentation of the conditions of service to the Parsi recruits.

In Standing Orders of the P. P. B. on page 4, section 4, sub-section 2, it is clearly stated that "If the C. O. is satisfied that the applicant (recruit) *understands the questions put to him, and consents to the conditions of service*, he shall sign a certificate to that effect on the said Form, and the applicant shall thereupon be deemed enrolled".

We have been positively informed by many Parsi recruits, that Colonel Lavie himself as well as his subordinates, distinctly gave them to understand at the time of signing the Form of enrolment, that they were not going to be enrolled in Territorial Battalions, but in Auxiliary Battalions, and the forms actually supplied by the Colonel and his subordinates were Auxiliary Forms of Enrolment; not only so, but Colonel Lavie's own words and promises on the platform and his interviews reproduced in his favourite journal—the "Jam-e-Jamshed," meant only one thing if anything at all—that *the conditions of service for the Parsee recruits were exactly the same as those of British Territorial Battalions*, and that it was only for the sake of formality, that the Parsi Battalions were called Territorial Battalions instead of Auxiliary. In our correspondence with Colonel Lavie, which we reproduced in our issue of 29th July last, Colonel Lavie takes a somersault, and tells us that "the reasons why Parsis cannot be enrolled

in A. F. I., is purely political". Further, he showed absolute discourtesy to us in replying that "I refuse to argue, write or express any remarks regarding the Parsi Units". His refusal means that he was unable to give any explanation, and we therefore suggest to the higher military authorities at Simla and the Southern Command, to demand an explanation from Colonel Lavie as to his inexplicable attitude in refusing to give an explanation to a journal of our standing, when it is the declared policy of the Government to seek the help of independent journals, which are always loyal to the cause, and secondly to demand an explanation for putting before recruits *unauthorised conditions of service*, and taking their consent on such evident misrepresentations, which are public property in the shape of Colonel Lavie's own words reproduced in the "Jam-e-Jamshed". We want to say positively that we are not making any false charges against Colonel Lavie, but we have protested before and again protest against such misrepresentations of the conditions of service by a Commanding Officer in the position of Colonel Lavie; for it is quite certain, that Colonel Lavie *would not have obtained a single recruit*, if he had told the Parsi recruits that they were to be enrolled as sepoys, without the British rights of soldiers, which our community has enjoyed for the last 50 years, and that they were to be enrolled in a *Pioneer Battalion*, which was going to be exposed to the almost certain risk of annihilation at the very beginning of any war.

**Summary and Conclusions. Disband the P. Pioneers (I. T. F.),
and re-enlist in the Auxiliary Forces. Modify the Conditions of Service,
to suit our limited numbers and capacity. Restore our
British Rights and Status.**

The only conclusion we can arrive at from the facts above-mentioned, is that, the only remedy for the existing dissatisfaction prevailing amongst all ranks of both the Parsi Battalions, as evident from general absence on parade, except of a dozen or two privates, is that the Battalions are getting quite disorganised, and are bound to break up in a short time. To anticipate such a certain eventuality, the only resource left to the military authorities is to disband both the Battalions, and re-enlist those members who are willing to do so, in ordinary Infantry Battalions of the Auxiliary Force. The talk of political reasons against such an arrangement is all nonsense. For we Parsis have enjoyed the right of Volunteering as British soldiers for the last fifty years, so that the long precedent, combined with the fact, that already there is in existence, a Parsi Company of the Auxiliary Force in Bombay, is a sufficient reason for enlisting Parsis in Auxiliary Battalions.

The efficiency and progress shown by the intelligent and smart Parsi recruits of the Pioneer Battalions, was testified to by H. E. the Governor of Bombay after a special parade, at which he was present to take the salute. So that the willingness and the military efficiency of Parsi youths are not, and never have been questioned. The record of our Parsi Volunteers for the last 50 years, and the record of war service of Parsis during the world-war are too-well-known to need recapitulation here. If the Government and the Military Authorities desire our military services as volunteers which we are willing to offer, *the conditions of service must be those of the Auxiliary Forces, modified to suit* (1) our limited numbers, (2) our physical disqualification as rough Pioneers, (3) our inability to supply any further drafts in case of heavy casualties in war—these three reasons suggest that our services should be reserved for Home Defence—(4) our moderate stake in the country, compared to that of our sister communities; (5) our disinclination to serve in the humble capacity of sepoys of the I. T. F.—a humiliating status, which no educated and enlightened community could ever accept under any circumstances. Otherwise we can anticipate without much doubt, that the two Pioneer Battalions, with their sadly dwindling ranks, will melt away into nothing, by following the advise of Colonel Lavie, who in his reply to us dated 18th October 1922, *gave them the option of resigning at will, e.g., "those men who wish to soldier can soldier, who do not can resign"*.