

REPORT
OF
THE COMMISSIONERS
APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE
ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY;
TOGETHER WITH THE
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE
AND APPENDIX.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



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FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1859.

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COMMISSION.

Victoria, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland Queen, Defender of the Faith.

To Our right trusty and well-beloved Councillor Jonathan Peel, Major General of our Forces, and One of Our Principal Secretaries of State, having the Department of War;

Our dearly beloved Cousin and Councillor George William Frederick Charles Duke of Cambridge, Knight of Our Most Noble Order of the Garter, Knight Grand Cross of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Knight of Our Most Illustrious Order of Saint Patrick, Knight Grand Cross of Our Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, General Commanding-in-Chief Our Forces;

Our right trusty and well-beloved Councillor Edward Henry Stanley, commonly called Lord Stanley, Our Commissioner for the Affairs of India;

Our right trusty and right entirely beloved Cousin and Councillor George Marquess of Tweeddale, Knight of Our Most Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle, Companion of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, General of Our Forces, and Colonel of Our Thirtieth Regiment of Foot;

Our right trusty and right well-beloved Cousin Henry Viscount Melville, Knight Commander of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Major General of Our Forces and Colonel of Our One Hundredth Regiment of Foot;

Our trusty and well-beloved Sir Henry George Wakelyn Smith, Baronet, Knight Grand Cross of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Lieutenant General of Our Forces;

Our trusty and well-beloved Sir George Augustus Wetherall, Knight Commander of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Lieutenant General and Adjutant General of Our Forces;

Our trusty and well-beloved Patrick Montgomerie, Esquire, Companion of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Major General in the East India Company's Service;

Our trusty and well-beloved Henry Hancock, Esquire, Major General in the East India Company's Service;

Our trusty and well-beloved William Burlton, Esquire, Companion of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Colonel on the Retired List of the East India Company's Service; and

Our Trusty and well-beloved Thomas Forsyth Tait, Esquire, Companion of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Colonel in the East India Company's Service, One of Our Aides-de-Camp,—Greeting.

Whereas We have deemed it expedient that a Commission should issue, for the use of inquiring into the organization of the Army at present serving in the Pay, and under the control and management, of the Honourable the East India Company, and that the said Commission should report to Us what changes it may be expedient to make in the existing system.

Now know ye, that We, reposing great trust and confidence in your zeal, discretion, and ability, have nominated and appointed, and do by these presents nominate and appoint, you the said Jonathan Peel, George William Frederick Charles Duke of Cambridge, Edward Henry Lord Stanley, George Marquess of Tweeddale, Henry Viscount Melville, Sir Henry George Wakelyn Smith, Sir George Augustus Wetherall, Patrick Montgomerie, Henry Hancock, William Burlton, and Thomas Forsyth Tait, to be Our Commissioners for the purposes aforesaid.

And We do hereby authorize and empower you, Our said Commissioners, or any five or more of you, to obtain information thereupon by the examination of all persons most competent, by reason of their knowledge, habits, or experience, to afford it; and also by calling for all Documents, papers, or records, which may appear to you, or any five or more of you, calculated to assist your researches, and to promote the formation of a sound judgment upon the subject.

And We do hereby command and require you, or any five or more of you, to report to Us, under your hands and seals, with all convenient speed, your Opinion upon the following questions:—

1. The terms on which the Army of the East India Company is to be transferred to the Crown?

2. The permanent force necessary to be maintained in the Indian Provinces respectively, after the restoration of tranquillity?

3. The proportion which European should bear to Native Troops, in Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery respectively?

4. How far the European portion of the Army should be composed of Troops of the Line, taking India as part of the regular tour of service, and how far of Troops raised for service in India only?

5. In connexion with this question, the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion, and of securing the efficiency of the latter?

6. Whether it be possible to consolidate the European Forces, so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other; and what Regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object, with perfect justice to the claims of all Officers now in the service of the East India Company?

7. Whether there should be any admixture of European and Native Forces, either Regimentally or by Brigade?

8. Whether the Local European Force should be kept up by Drafts and Volunteers from the Line, or should be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain?

9. Whether it would be possible to raise any Regiments in the Colonies, either for temporary or permanent service in India?

10. Whether the Native Forces should be Regular, or Irregular, or both; and if so, in what proportions?

11. Whether any Native Artillery Corps should be sanctioned?

12. Whether Cadets sent out for service with Native Troops should, in the first instance, be attached to European Regiments to secure uniformity of drill and discipline?

And We will and command, and by these presents ordain, that this Our Commission shall continue in full force and virtue, and that you Our said Commissioners, or any or more of you, may from time to time proceed in the execution thereof, and of every matter and thing therein contained, although the same be not continued from time to time by adjournment.

And, for your further assistance in the Execution of these presents, We do hereby authorize and empower you to appoint a Secretary to this Our Commission, whose services and assistance, We require you to use from time to time, as occasion may require.

Given at Our Court at Osborne House, Isle of Wight, the Fifteenth day of July
One thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight, in the Twenty-second year
of Our Reign.

By Her Majesty's Command.

(Signed) J. PEEL.

REPORT.

TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.

WE, the Commissioners appointed by Your Majesty for the purpose of inquiring into the Organization of the Army lately serving in the pay, and under the control and management, of the Honourable East India Company, have carefully investigated the subjects referred for our consideration; and we now beg humbly to lay before Your Majesty, Minutes of the Evidence which we have taken, and the result of our deliberations thereon.

With reference to the first point suggested in Your Majesty's Warrant, viz. "The terms " on which the Army of the East India Company is to be transferred to the Crown," Your Majesty's Commissioners observe, that the 56th Clause of the Act for the better Government of India, assures to the forces which now belong to Your Majesty's Indian Army, " the like Pay, Pensions, Allowances, and Privileges, and like Advantages as " regards Promotion and otherwise, as if they had continued in the Service of the said " Company."

21 & 22 Vict.
cap. 106.,
Aug. 2, 1858.

The privileges and advantages thus referred to, are detailed in the Appendix, but may be briefly stated to consist in a prescriptive right to rise strictly by seniority to the rank and emoluments of colonel of a regiment, with the option of retiring before attaining that position, or after various periods of service, on a scale of pay, or pension, considerably higher than that granted to officers of Your Majesty's Army of the Line. No change, therefore, can be made, which would in any way disturb the system of promotion by seniority, as affecting officers now in the service, or interfere with any of their existing privileges; but the 57th section of the above-recited Act, gives to Your Majesty full power to frame new regulations on this, and all other points, to be applied to the case of officers and others, who hereafter may enter the Indian Army.

No. 1, p. 1.

The second question, viz., the " permanent force necessary to be maintained in the " Indian Provinces respectively, after the restoration of tranquillity," does not appear to Your Majesty's Commissioners to admit of a reply, in a definite numerical form, as the amount of force must depend on the probability of either internal disturbances or external aggression. The estimates of force given in the evidence are most conflicting, ranging from 50,000 to 100,000 Europeans; and there can be no doubt, that it will be necessary to maintain for the future defence of India, a European force of much greater strength than that which existed previous to the outbreak of 1857. [The amount of such force should, in the opinion of Your Majesty's Commissioners, be about 80,000; of which 50,000 would be required for Bengal, 15,000 for Madras, and 15,000 for Bombay. This amount and distribution, however, must always be affected by the political exigencies of the country; the introduction of railroads, and river steam navigation; the establishment of fortified posts, and other military considerations.

1571.
App. 50, p. 175.
No. 55, p. 58.

1150.
3056.
5723.

As regards the third question, the proportion " which European should bear to Native " corps in Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery respectively," Your Majesty's Commissioners are of opinion, that the amount of Native force should not, under present circumstances, bear a greater proportion to the European, in Cavalry and Infantry, than two to one for Bengal, and three to one for Madras and Bombay respectively.

322. 445.
535. 1862.
2266. 2437.
2687. 2964.

The evidence before the Commissioners is unanimous, that the Artillery should be mainly a European force, and they agree in the opinion thus expressed, exceptions being made for such stations as are peculiarly detrimental to the European constitution.

103. 1909.
323. 2443.
628. 2836.
2718. 338
5614.

In connexion with this question, Your Commissioners observe, that Military Police Corps have been formed, or are in course of formation, throughout India. They see in this Force, in its numerical strength, and military organization, differing, as it does, in no essential respect, from the regular Sepoy Army, the elements of future danger.

6738.
App. 11, p. 17.

They would, therefore, recommend that great caution be used, in not giving to this Force a stricter military training, than may be required for the maintenance of discipline, lest a new Native Force be formed, which may hereafter become a source of embarrassment to the Government.

On the fourth question, as to "How far the European portion of the Army should be composed of troops of the Line, taking India as part of the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only?" Your Majesty's Commissioners are unable to arrive at any unanimity of opinion; and it will be found, on reference to the Minutes of Evidence, and to other papers in the Appendix, that the sentiments of many distinguished men, who have been examined, or have recorded their views on the subject, are no less divided than those of the Commissioners themselves. The latter can, therefore, offer no recommendation as a body, and must confine themselves to a report of the opinions of the Majority and Minority.

The Majority observe that a double European Army, such as that now established, has had its origin in the double government, which has hitherto existed;—the authority of the East India Company having been distinct from that of the Crown, though derived from it, and subordinate to its general control.

The original formation was thus anomalous, and exceptional; and as the transfer by Parliament of the Government of India, from the Company to the Crown, has not carried with it the total amalgamation of the European portion of the two Armies, it has become necessary fully to consider the subject.

It does not appear that any case in history can be adduced, of the co-existence of two distinct armies supplied from the same sources, both as regards officers and men, serving the same Sovereign.

They observe that, on the contrary, the great object of legislation in all civilized countries has been, so to organize the military forces, and resources of the State, as to produce unity of feeling and interest, under one supreme authority, throughout the whole body. That it is impossible to arrive at these ends, in the case of two separate armies, not amenable to the same authority as regards discipline and organization, however closely assimilated in other respects. That nothing could be more unfortunate, not to say dangerous, than so to organise the armed forces of the State, as to sow the seeds, and form the ground-work, of professional jealousies and heart-burnings—the inevitable result of a double system.—the consequence of which would be, that no selection for appointment could be made, from either service, which would be judged on its own intrinsic merits, but would be viewed rather with reference to that branch, whether line or local, from which the officer was selected.

That, however good the Local Force of the late East India Company has proved itself to be, still it is the opinion of the Majority, that a Local Force deteriorates more than one, which by frequent relief, has infused into it fresh European notions and feelings, and a vigorous system of European discipline; and that this would more particularly be the case in a climate like that of India, where according to the statistical statement of Sir Alex. Tulloch, backed by the professional opinion of Dr. Martin, (himself an advocate for a local army) and others, the European constitution can never be said to become acclimatized, but, on the contrary, deteriorates, gradually and surely, in increasing ratio.

That the resources of the State, as regards Imperial purposes, would be crippled, by having a large body of its troops placed solely under the control of the Government of India.

That the very fact of the Local troops not being enabled to share in the battle fields of Europe, is a great disadvantage to them, and may lead to a feeling of inferiority on their part, which would be extremely prejudicial to their general discipline; and that, while the Crown ought to possess the advantage of giving to its Army the most extended sphere of action, the very nature of a double army would, in a great measure, deprive the Line Army of the valuable experience it would acquire in India, whilst the Local Army would, in like manner, be debarred from all the benefits of field service in Europe.

That no Government, under any circumstances, would ever venture to withdraw from India the troops necessary for its defence. The question as to the force to be maintained in that Country, must be always decided by the Home Government, responsible to the Sovereign, and to the Country, through Parliament.

3911.
5180.
6082.

3967.
925.
586.
274.
4759.
4542.
4975.
5654.
5661.

2567.
4042.
App. 62. p. 101.
A. p. 67. p. 143.
4911. 5035.
3229.
4384. 4385.
4522. 4527.
App. 44. p. 38.

3901. 1670.
4739. 4746.
5762.

4759.
App. 67. p. 143.
6686.

70.

4700.

That regulations could be drawn up, for retaining in India officers of the Line Army, whose services might be required by the Local Government; and that officers of the Line would, undoubtedly, qualify themselves for employment in India, if such employment, and all the advantages attending it, were open to them; and so far from the resources of the Governor-General being curtailed by such an arrangement, it would, on the contrary, afford him a much larger field for the selection of able and useful officers.

6892.
3998.
4253.
4002.

That in a financial point of view, Line Regiments ought not to be, and with due regulations, as regards transport and organization, would not be, more expensive than Local corps; but, even if they should be to some extent more costly, greater vigour would exist in their ranks, and the wisest economy consists in having the best organized body of troops the State can supply. This is more particularly the case in a vast Empire such as that of India, in which the European Army must ever play so conspicuous a part; and where, consequently, whatever tends to the greater efficiency of that Army, must at the same time add to our power, and secure most effectually the safety of Your Majesty's Indian Possessions.

5983.
App. 51, 52, 5
p. 44.

That the Local Army of India, as now constituted, is more expensive than the Line in its non-effective charges.

6014. 4993
App. 1. p. 4.

That a double system of recruiting, the natural result of a double army, would operate most injuriously on recruiting in general; and that it would be next to impossible to carry it on satisfactorily, or with good results, if worked by two distinct authorities.

3881.
4299.
6632.

That England cannot raise, and maintain permanently, very large armies by voluntary enlistment; and therefore the best troops must be supplied, at even an increased cost, if necessary, in order to compensate by their efficiency and vigour for their numerical inferiority.

Should it, however, be ultimately decided, contrary to the strong and sincere conviction of the Majority of your Majesty's Commissioners, that, with a view of leaving undisturbed present vested interests, a Local European Force is to be maintained for service in India, they recommend that the amount of such force should be limited to that now authorized by Parliament to be raised and maintained out of the revenues of India. It is admitted, even by the witnesses in favour of a double army, that the Local Force is greatly benefitted by the example set to it by the Troops of the Line; and that it is most important, and, indeed, absolutely necessary, to retain a proportion of Line Regiments in India. To diminish the relative proportion of Line Regiments to Local corps, would render the Line auxiliaries to the latter,—a fatal error, which must, inevitably, tend to lower the position of the Line,—by rendering it numerically, and, consequently, morally, inferior to the Local or larger force.

31st clause
of 16 & 17
Vict. cap. 5
App. 61. p. 5
App. 65. p. 1.
3781. 4067
4549.
4552.

These views of the Majority are supported by the valuable opinions of the following civil servants, and officers of the Army, all of whom have great Indian experience:— Lord Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, and late Governor of Madras; Sir George Clerk, Under Secretary of State for India; Sir Charles Trevelyan, appointed Governor of Madras; Sir Archdale Wilson, 39 years in India; Sir Edward Lugard, 26 years; in India; Major-General Pratt, 25 years; Sir Willoughby Cotton, 16 years; Sir Sydney Cotton, 30 years; Sir Thomas Franks, 15 years; Sir A. Tulloch, and others.

The Minority take an entirely different view of the question at issue. They entertain a strong conviction, that the maintenance of a powerful Local Army, European as well as Native, is essential to the efficiency and permanence of British rule in India. They fear that to replace a large body of officers, accustomed to the habits, and acquainted with the language, of the country in which they serve, by others, doubtless of equal ability, but who, during their comparatively brief residence in the East, would have neither time, nor possibly inclination, to qualify themselves in the same manner for administrative duty, would seriously impair the power and curtail the resources of the Governor-General, and Governors of the several Presidencies. They regard the anomaly, which has been referred to, of maintaining two separate armies under one Sovereign, to be necessarily incident to the connexion (in itself one of the greatest of anomalies) of England with her Indian Empire. They consider that late events have proved the benefit of having distinct armies for Bengal, Madras, and Bombay; and that to dis sever the Native, from the Local European, forces, by the fusion of the latter with the Line Army, would be to deteriorate the position, and destroy the *esprit de corps* of officers, serving with Native troops, who would feel themselves reduced to a level below that of their brother Officers of the Line.

6107. 610
4074. 41
5236.
5180.

5253.
6065.

The Minority, bearing in mind the limited amount, and inelastic nature, of the revenues of India, the present financial difficulties of its government, and the great additional burthen, which they conceive the system advocated by the Majority must impose, object earnestly, on economical and financial grounds, to an arrangement, which, in their opinion, would practically diminish the control of Her Majesty's Secretary of State, and of the Government of India, over the application of its revenues. The Minority do not admit the validity of the unqualified objections raised to double recruiting, neither do they concur in the opinions expressed, as to the alleged deterioration of Local European troops, subjected to like discipline and organization with the Line, or the crippling of the available resources of the State, by the existence of a Local European Force in India. They consider such a Force to be a wholesome check on the precipitate withdrawal of European troops from India, in cases where the Home Government might happen to find itself under the pressure of political emergencies in Europe; and they feel confident that the transfer of the Indian Armies to the Crown will prove a source of present and future security to Her Majesty's Empire in India, in proportion as radical and organic changes are few, and the weight and stability of the Local Armies are maintained by largely, but economically, increasing their European element.

The Minority will not add to the length of this Report, by entering into any further discussion of the opinions of their Colleagues, as embodied in previous paragraphs, neither do they deem it necessary to set forth any more detailed exposition of their own views on the subject, or to recapitulate any of the powerful and, to them, most convincing arguments, by which the expediency (not to say necessity) of maintaining a purely Local European, as well as Native force, for the protection of our Indian possessions, has been manifested and upheld in the evidence adduced before Your Majesty's Commissioners. In support, however, of the views, which the Minority take of this question, they would wish to call special attention to the evidence (*vivâ voce* or written) of the Governor-General of India, of the Earl of Ellenborough, of the Governor and the Commander-in-Chief of Madras, of the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay, the Military Secretary to the Government of India, Sir John Lawrence, and the Punjab Commissioners, Sir James Outram, Sir R. H. Vivian, Sir Frederick Abbott, the Adjutant-General of the Bengal Army, Colonels Holland and Durand, J. P. Willoughby Esquire, and others, as containing irrefragable arguments, and powerful reasons, for maintaining the policy, which they advocate. There are, it is true, some able men who espouse the opposite side of the question; but it will scarcely fail to be remarked, that, with two or three exceptions, they are of much more limited Indian experience than those, who concur in the views of the Minority of the Commission, and comprise only three officers, Sir George Clerk, Sir A. Wilson, and Sir Charles Trevelyan, of the late East India Company's service, the remainder, with the single exception of the Governor of Bombay, being all officers of Her Majesty's Army of the Line. It may be added, that the Minority of Your Majesty's Commissioners are quite agreed, that a portion of the European force to be maintained in India hereafter, should be supplied from the Army of the Line, to the extent, perhaps, of one fourth, or even one third, of the whole.

On the fifth question, "The best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion, and securing the efficiency of the latter," Your Majesty's Commissioners observe, that if it be determined, that the European Force be partly of the Line and partly Local, the periodical relief of the former portion may be effected, as has hitherto been done; but, they strongly recommend, that the tour of service in India should not exceed twelve years. The efficiency of the latter may be secured by the establishment of *depôt* battalions, composed of the officers of one company from each regiment, having a double proportion of non-commissioned officers attached, to which, all newly appointed officers, and all recruits should be sent, and thoroughly instructed in their duties, previous to proceeding to India; the *depôt* battalions to be disciplined under the orders of the General Commanding-in-Chief, and to be considered available for service within the United Kingdom, in cases of emergency.

The establishment of a convalescent station at the Cape of Good Hope, for the invalids belonging to European regiments serving in India, is worthy of consideration.

With reference to the sixth question, "Whether it be possible to consolidate the European Forces, so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other; and what regulations would be necessary and practicable, to effect this object, with perfect justice to the claims of all officers, now in the service of the East India Company," Your Majesty's Commissioners are of opinion, that, although there are many difficulties in so amalgamating the Local European Forces, with those of the Line,

such an arrangement would be advantageous, if it could be effected without prejudice to existing rights. 5112, p

There is no obstacle to at once allowing the officers of the junior ranks, (second lieutenants, cornets, and ensigns,) to exchange from one branch of the service to the other; but there is a great difficulty in the higher ranks, arising from the seniority system of promotion, which exists in the armies of India. If no other interests were concerned than those of the two officers who proposed to exchange, the question might be settled between them, but it is obvious, that in a seniority service, the interest of every individual, junior to the exchanging officer, must be affected for better or for worse, by every exchange that took place, unless (which is next to impossible) the ages, or rather the value of the lives of the two parties, could be ascertained, and proved to be exactly the same. Much difficulty would also arise, from the complicated nature of the arrangements, under which officers and their families hold beneficial interests in the funds maintained by themselves, and aided by the Local Government of India. 4941. 5378. 5602. 5609. App. 79. p. 246.

Your Commissioners see no means of removing this difficulty, except by the Government taking upon itself the management of the funds, and guaranteeing all their liabilities, past, present, and future. 5381. 6892.

Officers hereafter entering the Service may do so under such regulations, as Your Majesty may prescribe, as already stated; but if the Government should not take on itself all the liabilities and engagements of the funds, it will be necessary to continue the present system, of requiring all officers to subscribe to them, from their first entering the Army, or the insolvency of these admirable institutions, and their consequent inability to keep faith with their present and future annuitants (widows and orphans), must be the eventual and inevitable result. 3952.

On the seventh question suggested for inquiry in Your Majesty's Warrant, viz., "Whether there should be any admixture of European and Native Forces, either regimentally or by brigade," the preponderance of evidence is, that any admixture of the two forces, regimentally, would be detrimental to the efficiency and discipline of both, but that the admixture, by brigade, would be most advantageous. 489. 527. 431. 1706 614. 2404 3207.

Your Commissioners concur in this opinion.

On the eighth point, "Whether the Local European Force should be kept up by drafts and volunteers from the Line, or should be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain," Your Majesty's Commissioners are of opinion, that the European Force, if Local, may be partially kept up by volunteers from regiments of the Line returning to England; and that the recruiting in England, should be carried on under the same authority, and regulations, as for regiments of the Line, officers of the Local Force being employed on that service. 3937. 4060. 4874.

As regards the ninth question, Your Commissioners consider that it would not be advisable to raise any regiments in the Colonies, composed of men of colour, either for temporary or permanent service in India. App. 55. p. 59. App. 70. p. 148 1346.

With regard to the tenth point, "Whether the Native Force should be regular or irregular, or both, and if so, in what proportions," Your Commissioners are of opinion, that the irregular system is the best adapted for Native Cavalry in India, and recommend that it be adopted. 725. 1634. 1765. 1960. 2302.

That the number of European officers, attached to an Irregular Cavalry regiment should be—

- One commandant,
- One adjutant,
- One European officer per squadron, and a medical officer.

Your Commissioners also recommend, that the pay of the Irregular Cavalry be increased to such an extent, as will enable them to purchase and maintain horses and arms of a superior description, rendering them in every respect more efficient. 738. 1187. 1627. 1291.

In the Regular Cavalry at Madras and Bombay Your Commissioners would, for the present, make no change, but recommend, that the existing interests, both of the Native officers and men, be most carefully respected; and if hereafter, the irregular system should be extended to those Presidencies, Your Commissioners suggest, that the change should be introduced gradually, and with caution. App. 55. p. 55. App. 60. p. 74.

49. That the Native Infantry be mainly regular, but that such number of regiments
2300. be maintained and organized on the irregular system, as the Governor-General and the
3208. Governors of the Presidencies may respectively recommend for the sanction of Her
Majesty's Government.

The number and organization of irregular regiments, being thus left to the discretion of the Local Authorities, Your Commissioners are unable to fix a proportion between them, and the regular Native Infantry, but are of opinion, that the regular regiments should preponderate.

On the eleventh point, "Whether any Native Artillery corps should be sanctioned," Your Commissioners would refer to the opinion already expressed in reply to the 3d Question.

Your Commissioners, however, submit, that every consideration should be given to those corps of Native Artillery, which have proved their loyalty during the late events in India.

Your Commissioners are of opinion, with regard to the twelfth point, "Whether cadets, sent out for service with Native troops, should in the first instance be attached to European regiments, to secure uniformity of drill and discipline," that such officers, should be thoroughly drilled, and instructed in their military duties in this country, as recommended in the reply to Question 5, before they are sent out to India.

Your Commissioners, having disposed of the questions specially referred for their inquiry, beg to submit the following recommendations on certain important points, which in the course of examination of evidence have come under their notice.

372. 1193.
501. 2132. 1. That the Native Army should be composed of different nationalities and castes, and as a general rule, mixed promiscuously through each regiment.
 77. 2341.
22. 2474. 2. That all men of the regular Native Army, in Your Majesty's Eastern possessions, should be enlisted for general service.
 - p. 60, p. 127.
115. 2354.
209. 3. That a modification should be made in the uniform of the Native troops, assimilating it more to the dress of the country, and making it more suitable to the climate.
 357. 2841.
3145. 2714.
1936. 4. That Europeans should, as far as possible, be employed in the scientific branches of the service, but that Corps of pioneers be formed, for the purpose of relieving the European Sappers from those duties which entail exposure to the climate.
 250. 789.
994. 2056.
1252. 5. That the Articles of War, which govern the Native Army, be revised, and that the power of commanding officers be increased.
 2378. 416.
3051. 514.
3089. 5501.
7050. 6. That the promotion of Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, be regulated on the principle of efficiency, rather than of seniority, and that commanding officers of regiments have the same power to promote non-commissioned officers, as is vested in officers commanding regiments of the Line.
 2344. 2355.
3200. 7. That, whereas the pay and allowances of officers and men are now issued under various heads, the attention of Her Majesty's Government be drawn to the expediency of simplifying the pay codes, and of adopting, if practicable, fixed scales of allowances for the troops in garrison or cantonments, and in the field.
 4907.
6673.
6897. 6925. 8. That the Commander-in-Chief in Bengal be styled the Commander-in-Chief in India, and that the General Officers commanding the armies of the minor Presidencies be Commanders of the Forces, with the power and advantages which they have hitherto enjoyed.
 1092.
1953.
2206.
3604. 9. Your Commissioners observe, that the efficiency of the Indian Army, has hitherto been injuriously affected by the small number of officers, usually doing duty with the regiments, to which they belong.
- This evil has arisen from the number withdrawn for staff and other duties, and civil employment.
- All the evidence before Your Commissioners points out the necessity of improving the position of officers, serving regimentally. For the attainment of this object, and for the remedy of the evil complained of, various schemes have been suggested, viz. :—
2336. 4715.
App. 65. p. 142.
5890. 2918. 1st. The formation of a Staff Corps :
 - App. 60. p. 75. a 2dly. The system of "seconding" officers who are on detached employ, which exists to a certain extent in the Line army :
 3100.
6894. 3dly. Placing the European officers of each Presidency on general lists for promotion.

INTO THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY.

Your Commissioners, not being prepared to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion on this point, without further reference to India, recommend that the subject be submitted without delay, for the report of the Governors and Commanders-in-Chief at the several Presidencies, with a view to the framing of regulations, which will ensure the greater efficiency of regiments.

Previous to closing their Report, Your Majesty's Commissioners would respectfully beg to state, that they have felt themselves precluded from entering into minute details, on many subjects referred to them for inquiry, from an apprehension of fettering the free action of the authorities in India, on points of a purely local nature, which, they conceive, must ultimately be decided in that country.

J. PEEL.
GEORGE
STANLEY.
TWEEDDALE.
MELVILLE.
H. G. SMITH.
G. A. WETHERALL.
P. MONTGOMERIE.
WILL BURLTON.
THOS. F. TAIT.

R. B. Wood, Secretary,
Office for Military Boards, 7th March 1859.

I have signed this Report as a matter of duty, and, speaking generally, concur in its recommendations.

There are two points, however, on which I am at issue with my colleagues, and I desire therefore to state in this form, that I still adhere to the opinions which I recorded in my Minutes of the 11th of October and 30th of December last, as to the proportion which European should bear to Native Troops in India, and that I look with much apprehension to the number of the latter which is contemplated, or may be considered as sanctioned by the terms of the fifth paragraph of the Report.

I am also of opinion that the proposed measure of requiring all men of the regular Native Army, without exception, to be enlisted for "general service" (including embarkation on board ship), is one not only of very doubtful expediency, but, in the case of the Bengal Presidency especially, highly calculated to produce serious detriment and difficulties, with comparatively small advantages to the public service.

The arguments by which I support these views will be found in No. 79, p. 245, of the Appendix, and I abstain, therefore, from any recapitulation of them here.

WILL BURLTON.

KEY TO THE EVIDENCE.

WITNESS.	EVIDENCE EXTENDS FROM Question. Question.	WITNESS.	EVIDENCE EXTENDS FROM Question. Question.
Lieut.-General Sir Geo. Pollock	- - 1 to 315	Major-General Capon	- - - 3558 to 3679
Major-General Low	- - - 316 to 438	Colonel E. Wintle	- - - 3680 to 3778
Colonel Welchman	- - - 439 to 528	Major-General Sir R. Vivian	- - - 3779 to 3962
Lieut.-Colonel Wyllie	- - - 529 to 615	Major-General Sir E. Lugard	- - - 3963 to 4064
Colonel Becher	- - - 616 to 854	Colonel Jas. Holland	- - - 4065 to 4210
Major Sir David Baird	- - - 855 to 941	Major-General Sir Thos. Franks	- - - 4211 to 4301
Captain G. F. S. Browne	- - - 942 to 1122	Surgeon-General Chas. Renny	- - - 4302 to 4377
Sir George Clerk	- - - 1123 to 1353	Surgeon J. R. Martin	- - - 4378 to 4516
	and 4670 to 4805	Colonel Sir A. Tulloch	- - - 4517 to 4582
Lieut.-Colonel Harington	- - - 1354 to 1543		and 5983 to 6059
Major Merewether	- - - 1544 to 1724	General Sir W. Cotton	- - - 4583 to 4669
Lieut.-Colonel Master	- - - 1725 to 1857	Colonel G. Campbell	- - - 4806 to 4874
Colonel Felix	- - - 1858 to 2093	Major-General Pratt	- - - 4875 to 5013
Major-General Sir S. Steel	- - - 2094 to 2258	Major Balcarres Ramsay	- - - 5014 to 5104
Major-General Alexander	- - - 2259 to 2424	Colonel H. M. Durand	- - - 5105 to 5545
Mr. J. F. Thomas	- - - 2424 to 2572		and 6995 to 7068
Lieut.-Col. A. T. Wilde	- - - 2573 to 2679	Major-General Sir A. Wilson	- - - 5546 to 5714
Colonel Leslie	- - - 2680 to 2748	Major-General Sir F. Abbott	- - - 5715 to 5919
	and 6318 to 6395	Physician-General McLennan	- - - 5920 to 5982
Colonel John Hill	- - - 2749 to 2830	Mr. J. P. Willoughby	- - - 6060 to 6317
Colonel John Sinclair	- - - 2831 to 2959	Mr. Chas. Raikes	- - - 6396 to 6496
Colonel M. Willoughby	- - - 2960 to 3051	Earl of Ellenborough	- - - 6497 to 6693
Sir Charles Trevelyan	- - - 3052 to 3210	Major-General Sir C. Yorke	- - - 6694 to 6726
Colonel S. Poole	- - - 3211 to 3361	Mr. E. F. Elliott	- - - 6728 to 6890
Major-General Griffith	- - - 3362 to 3428	Colonel R. B. Wood	- - - 6891 to 6994
Major-General Ashburnham	- - - 3429 to 3557		

ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE.

POLLOCK, Lieutenant-General Sir GEORGE, G. C. B.

Is Lieut.-Gen. in the Indian army, 1.—Has been in the service since 1803, 2.—Belongs to the artillery, but has had commands embracing all arms of the service, 5.—The proportion of European to native troops in India to be permanently maintained hereafter should be as 1 to 4, 11-14.—A great deal, however, would depend on the efficiency of the police, 14.—The above proportion is exclusive of the contingents, 15.—Artillery should be entirely European; some few lascars might be allowed for each battery, to clean the guns; but they should not have anything to do with the loading of the guns, 20.—There might be, perhaps, 15 to a battery, 30.—Would not recommend a police force in substitution entirely of native troops, 32.—There might be 50,000 sepoy, 32, 33, 34.—Sepoys have hitherto performed duties which ought to have been done by the police, 38.—Would transfer all civil duties to the police, 40.—Would have in Bengal 14 or 15 regiments of European infantry of 1,000 strong each, 46.—About 8 or 10 regiments of European cavalry, 63.—The proportion of 1 to 4 refers only to infantry and cavalry; the artillery should be additional, 71, 72.—2 brigades of horse artillery and 12 battalions of foot, 88.—All artillery should be European, 103, 104.—There should be 2 guns for every 1,000 men, that is, 120 guns for an army of 60,000 men, 97, 98.—Native force in Bengal should be on both the regular and irregular system, 109.—Is not prepared to say in what proportion, 114.—The irregular cavalry not as efficient for service as the regular; in a charge the irregulars would fail, 112.—Native gentlemen more likely to serve in the irregular, 115.—An irregular trooper has 25 or 30 rupees a month, and he finds his horse, arms, and everything, 116, 128.—Some corps have a fund from which, if he loses his horse, another is found him; a sort of tontine, 117, 118.—Would extend the irregular system to the infantry, 120.—Irregulars are more easily fed, and travel more easily, than a regular regiment, 122.—They feed themselves, but beyond our own provinces they draw rations from the commissariat, 126, 136.—Irregular cavalry are as efficient in the field for certain duties as the regular; not so as respects a general action, 137, 138.—Sappers and miners should almost all be Europeans; a few natives must, however, be allowed, 142.—Europeans would suffer greatly if not assisted by natives, 143.—Europeans should be in all arsenals assisted by natives; but the latter should not have anything to do with the ammunition, or the preparation of percussion caps, 147.—This work has been hitherto done by natives, 148.—Bengal native army should be of different castes. If men could be got from the Cape or elsewhere, it would be desirable, 150.—Men of the West India regiments might be mixed up with the others; could not exchange them, 152.—Indians could not be induced to go to other colonies, 153.—Some low-caste men are as brave as high-caste men. Half-castes might be introduced into the ranks with advantage, 158.—A great many of the drummers in regiments are half-castes, 159.—Sees no objection to the formation of regiments composed partly of natives, partly of Europeans, 161.—Would have the two flank companies European, and the rest natives, in the proportion of 1 to 4; considers the experiment worth the trial, 162.—Does not consider that the Europeans would deteriorate if divided into such small bodies. They can always be assembled, as was done in 1809-10, when the light companies of different regiments were united at Cawnpore, 163, 164.—Native companies of a regiment so composed should have the same proportion of European officers as the European companies, 167.—Europeans should have the best arm that is made, a rifle. The natives should have a somewhat inferior weapon, 168.—Separate ammunition might be kept for the Europeans and the natives, 170.—Being mixed up in the same regiment with natives would not be distasteful to the European; it is so now in the artillery. With European officers to lead them, natives will go anywhere, 176.—Natives should be enlisted for general service, to do anything, 180.—Would enlist every one for "general service," irregulars also, 181, 182.—Objections of natives to going to sea, how they arise, 185.—Thinks the Bengal code sufficient for all purposes of discipline. Going to sea and working in the trenches might however be entered in Articles of War, and made part of the duties, 196.—Would not recognize caste, but

would not do anything to offend it, 200.—Bengal sepoy always expect leave of absence each year. They would consider themselves much injured if they did not get it, 216.—In time of war they have never complained at being deprived of this leave, 217.—A portion of their pay is always deducted during such leave, 218.—Feasts and holidays need not be interfered with, 221.—They could not be prevented without occasioning discontent, 223.—Commanding officers respect the feelings of their men in all matters not opposed to their duty, 227.—Sees no advantage to be derived from a division of the Bengal army, 233.—There has been an advantage in having the separate armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, 235.—The grade of native commissioned officer should be continued, although, perhaps, the number of such officers might be reduced. With regard to their promotion, seniority should have the preference if the man is capable of doing the duty. Selection leaves too much power to commanding officers, and it might be abused, 240.—Seniority should be the rule and selection the exception, 241.—Many in Bengal are now unfit for their position; they are of a very advanced age, 247.—Commanding officers should have more power to punish and reward. A commanding officer in the present state of things does not command his regiment, 250.—It has not always been so. When he commanded a regiment it was not so, 253.—Present system emanated from a circular from the adjutant-general's office, 255, 256.—In irregular corps commanding officers have more power, and in this respect the system is better, 258, 259.—As respects admixture of Europeans and natives, would prefer it should be by brigades; but sees no objection to their being joined in regiments, 263.—Believes a commanding officer cannot make a havildar without reference to Government, 264.—Stringency of the rule depends on the commander-in-chief, 265, 266.—Would not mix civil with military punishment for offences, 269.—A man sentenced to hard labour on the roads never rejoins his regiment, 271, 272.—Corporal punishment was done away with by Lord William Bentinck, but restored by Lord Hardinge. It still exists, 273, 274.—It is a national punishment, 276.—Present establishment of European officers for a regular native regiment is sufficient if they are kept complete, 281.—All the captains should be with their regiments. They are the very essence of regiments, 282.—Each company should have a captain not to be taken away for other duties, 283.—Young men now joining a regiment learn the language in order to be removed to staff; they have not the interest of their regiment at heart, 287.—Officers should undergo examination as to their military acquirements before they are appointed to staff situations, 289-293.—Has known captains commanding regiments frequently, with six or eight officers with them, 295, 296.—It would be desirable to have a staff corps, but does not quite understand how such a corps is to be formed, 297.—Each regular native infantry regiment should have a lieutenant-colonel, a major, a captain to each company, with a lieutenant and an ensign, 298.—The same establishment as a European regiment, 299.—Present system has, perhaps, a tendency to produce most intelligent officers, 301.—In time of war officers do join their regiments, 302.—There is seldom a major with a regiment when there is a lieutenant-colonel, 310.—Sees no good reason for the transfer of majors from regiments, as well as lieutenant-colonels; it would interfere with promotion, 311.

Low, Major-General, C. B.

Has been in the service 43 years, 317.—About 40 of that period in India, 318.—Belongs to the Madras presidency, but has served principally in Bengal, 319.—Would like to see 1 European to every 2 natives in the regular army, 322, 325.—There should be no native artillery. Natives should never load a gun, 323.—They might be employed as gun lascars, 324.—Would have irregular infantry regiments, with a few selected officers, 327.—For some time to come 45,000 European troops are necessary for Bengal, 328.—When the country is settled a reduction might be made, 329.—This should be done by reducing the strength of regiments rather than their number, 329.—A regiment 800 strong has as much moral effect in peace as a regiment 1,000 strong, 329.—45,000 Europeans and 90,000 natives will be sufficient for Bengal hereafter, 329.—This to

include irregulars, but not police, 331, 332.—One-twelfth should be artillery; 50 or 60 men in every European regiment should be instructed to work field guns, 333.—All the artillery to be European, 334.—Thinks two guns to every 1,000 Europeans more than necessary, 336.—Excepting the corps that have continued faithful, the native force should be irregular. In a native regiment much more depends on the qualities of the officers than on their number, 338.—Sees a difficulty, if the regular native corps are abolished, in providing well-qualified officers for the irregular corps, but it must be got over, 341.—Would transfer Queen's officers, subject to an examination. It is now done, 343, 344.—Native gentlemen would take service in the irregular infantry, 347.—On political grounds, would not exclude any tribe or race. Would mix all up as much as possible, 352.—Would acknowledge caste in a due proportion, 354.—Sappers and miners could not all be Europeans, but the natives should not be taught the scientific branches, 357.—Has the same view with respect to their employment in arsenals, 359.—The Bengal native army should be composed of different nationalities and castes, but no rule can be laid down, 360.—Companies of different tribes are to be preferred, 362, 363.—Present code of enlistment must be altered, 366.—There should be minor punishments as well as punishments by court-martial, 367.—Would not object to the rattan, which is a summary punishment, 368.—Present code is not attended to, 371-373.—Native troops should be required to serve beyond sea. This not the cause of the recent revolt, 377.—Power of commanding officers has been too much curtailed of late years, both for reward and punishment, 379, 380.—System of punchayet should be continued, 394.—System described, 395-403.—Irregular troops are amenable to articles of war, 404.—Thinks the Bengal army should not be divided, 405.—Division of the other armies has been beneficial, 408.—In course of time the Bengal army might be divided, but not now, 413.—Merit and fitness should be more consulted in the promotion of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, 416.—They are now too old before they are promoted, 418.—Would not altogether put aside seniority, 419.—Has served in all three presidencies, 428.—In Bombay younger men are promoted, 430.—European and native forces should be mixed by brigade rather than regimentally, 431.—Would not attach Europeans to natives in small bodies, 433.—Would arm the natives well, but not give them the Enfield musket, 434.—Present number of native officers in regiments is unnecessarily large, 438.

WELCHMAN, Colonel JOHN, C.B.

commands 1st Bengal European Fusiliers, 440.—Has been thirty-eight years in the service, 442.—European proportion of force should not be less than one-third, 445.—No native artillery should be allowed, 446.—The artillery should be independent of this proportion, 447.—One-third of the infantry and cavalry should be Europeans, 448.—The scientific branches should be kept distinct, 449.—Would take away artillery from all contingent forces, 450.—And not allow native princes any artillery at all, 452.—Strength of native army depends much on the police to be employed, 454, 455.—It is a question whether the troops could not be paid by native bankers, and thus relieve the troops from escort duty, 454.—No such thing as a bank note in Upper India. The relief from escort of treasure is most material, 456.—Would not take the police into consideration in fixing the proportion of Europeans to natives, 457, 458.—If India were disarmed, as it ought to be, the strength of the army might not be so considerable, 459.—The police should not have a musket, merely a tulwar. It should be more civil than at present, 460, 461, 462, 463.—Has no idea of amount of police required, 464.—Would not have them in battalions, 465.—Future strength of the army will depend on the disarming of the natives and introduction of railways, 468.—Prefers, for economy, an irregular native army, but the regular army cannot be entirely dispensed with, on account of the regular regiments supplying officers for the irregulars, 469.—Would not extend such selection to officers of Queen's army, 471.—Sees no objection to the selection as regards the interests of the country generally, if fully qualified; but sees objections otherwise, 472.—Would increase the proportion of officers allowed to irregular corps, 473.—Has commanded a local regiment, a regular native regiment, and a European regiment, 475.—The native officer at the present time is an incumbrance to the army, in both regular and irregular infantry. They never reach that rank till superannuated, 477, 478, 479.—In the irregular cavalry they are not so generally promoted by seniority. Promotions

in regiments should only be to ranks of naiks and havildars. If there are to be native officers, they should be native gentlemen not belonging to a regiment. These should be army promotions, 481.—If there are not to be native officers, would place European non-commissioned officers at the head of companies, 482.—This could not be done in irregular regiments, 483.—Would have two European non-commissioned officers to each company in native regiments, 484, 485.—There are now only two to a regiment, 486.—Their employment would check intrigue and conspiracy, 487.—From being much more with the men than the European officers, they might, perhaps, have prevented the late combination, 488.—The European non-commissioned officers would not live with the men, but they would tend to maintain discipline, and the natives in a short time would look up to them, 489.—European soldiers now learn the languages to get employment with native corps, 490.—If a non-commissioned staff officer misconducts himself, he is sent back to his regiment, 491.—The moment a soldier is selected for service on the staff of a native corps he is struck off the regiment to which he belongs. If native gentlemen could be induced to enter the service, they would have more power over the men, 492.—If they had such officers there would be less danger of mutiny, as they have an interest in the country, 493.—A certain portion of native sappers will be necessary, but not for employment in the scientific branches, 494, 495.—The system of teaching native soldiers gunnery is very mischievous. Every sepoy regiment, in consequence, furnished some really good gunners, 497.—Strongly objects to the mixture of Europeans and natives, even by companies, 498.—A mixture of caste as much as can possibly be effected is very desirable, 499.—Such mixture should be general. Nationalities should not be preserved in companies, 501.—Present code of enlistment is sufficient. Every sepoy is now enlisted for general service, 504, 509.—Standing orders of the army are not acted up to. The recommendations of commanding officers are not attended to, 505-507.—Their authority was first undermined by Lord William Bentinck, 508.—Though the power of flogging exists under the articles of war, it cannot be inflicted except in particular cases. A confidential circular on this subject was sent to every commanding officer in 1852, 510-512.—Standing orders, though good, are not acted up to. In promotions of native commissioned officers in nine cases out of ten the commanding officer's recommendations are neglected. Promotion by seniority the bane of the army, 514-516.—In the non-commissioned ranks it does rest with the commanding officer, 517.—Never permitted the practice called "weekly guards." If allowed, it must be the fault of commanding officers, 518, 519.—It is not the fault of the men; they perform their duty well, 522.—Division of the Bengal army would be advantageous, 523.—Commanding officers should have more power of reward and punishment, 525.—The circular referred to was issued by Governor-General, 526.—Mixture of Europeans and natives should be in battalions. Discipline would suffer by any other plan, 527.

WYLLIE, Lieutenant-Colonel.

Is lieutenant-colonel on the retired list of the Bengal army, 529.—Was 27 years in the service, of which 25 years were spent in India, 530, 531.—Has held several staff appointments, and for the last seven years and a half was in the military secretariat of the Government of India, 532.—Thinks 40,000 European troops, and not much more than an equal proportion of native, exclusive of the police, will hereafter be sufficient for Bengal, 534.—Would have 30,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, and 5,000 artillery, as respects Europeans; and 60,000 regular and irregular native infantry. Would have some native cavalry, probably 10,000 regular and irregular, 542, 543.—Doubts whether the whole artillery could be European. There are the contingents, 544.—We should not have less than 6,000 artillery, 546.—Means gunners, or actual fighting men, 548.—In Central India the native artillery of the contingents has often been called out for field service in the hot season, 553.—It would be an advantage to have this artillery European, 555.—Would have regular and irregular troops combined, 556.—Would not have less than 200 European sappers, 557.—Would not teach the natives the scientific branches of engineering; but doubts if Europeans could entirely perform the duties, 559.—Not even the scientific duties, 560.—The greater number of castes in each regiment the better, 562.—Would disperse nationalities throughout regiments as respects natives; would not mix Europeans with natives, 563.—Would take Africans, Malays, and even East Indians, 564.—The greater variety of nationalities and castes the better, 567.—They should be dis-

persed throughout regiments, 568.—Practically men of low caste are not enlisted. Preference is given to high-caste men, 572.—This is not by order, but by practice, 573.—Considers the Mussulman sepoy a better soldier than the Hindoo, but sees little superiority as regards the Hindoos over each other, 575.—Never knew caste brought forward as a plea for the nonperformance of duty, 578.—Sees no advantage in the division of the Bengal army, 583.—Native troops should not be kept too near their homes, 584.—As respects reliefs, the usual practice is not to keep a native regiment more than three years at the same station, but it has been impracticable to carry this out of late, 585.—When adjutant, would not enlist a very low-caste man, but now thinks he was mistaken, 591.—Rules as respects the promotion of non-commissioned and commissioned officers are good if they were carried out, but they are not carried out, 593.—Each company of a regular native regiment should have two European sergeants, 594.—Native officers under Bengal system useless, 595.—Increase of pay for length of service was given to prevent disappointment in being passed over in promotion, 597.—Commanding officers are afraid to exercise their authority, 598.—How this is occasioned. Commanding officers are afraid to pass over a man in promoting, 600.—Non-commissioned officers can be promoted by them according to the regulations, 602.—Sepoys have been permitted to petition the commander-in-chief direct, 608.—Such petitions are sent to the commanding officer for explanation, 611.—Would not allow admixture of Europeans and natives in regiments, but by brigades, 614, 615.

BECHER, Colonel, C.B.

Is captain and brevet-colonel in Bengal army, 616.—Been nearly 25 years in the service, 618.—Belongs to the infantry, but has been on the staff, 621.—Is quarter-master-general of the Bengal army, 622.—European force should be as one to three, 625.—Artillery should be European, 628.—Taking into account the artillery, the European force should be not less than one to three, 630.—A properly organised military police force will reduce the necessity of so large a native army, 643.—Everything is police just now, 644.—Native force of Bengal should be both regular and irregular. Infantry must be principally regular, 649, 650.—Prefers irregular cavalry, if not too large a force, 652.—Irregulars are not supplied with carriage and other requirements like regular troops, but they have rations in cases of necessity, 655, 656.—Require the same arrangements for their food on foreign service as the regulars, 663.—Native officers of the irregular cavalry are of great service, 669.—They are men of rank, money, and means, 670.—They represent the gentry of the country, 672.—They bring men with them to the corps, 673.—Some regiments have troops of separate countries, Afghans, for instance, 674.—It is better they should be mixed up altogether, 676.—Promotion in regular native army is made by seniority, 677.—Native officers, too old, 678.—Still their removal altogether would have a very bad effect, 696.—European non-commissioned officers should not be attached to companies, 707.—No company should be without a European officer of experience, 708.—Lieutenants are quite equal to the charge, 709.—Present establishment of officers sufficient if too many not withdrawn for the staff, 711.—A staff corps should be formed, 713.—A European officer has sometimes charge of three or four companies, 716.—All cavalry should be on the irregular system, 721.—Would have no regular native cavalry, 722.—Regular native army was well disciplined as far as parade duties went, 729.—But they had not a loyal spirit, 731.—Horses in the regular cavalry cost Government 400 or 500 rupees, 735.—Irregular cavalry pay too low, 738.—Natives should be employed as sappers and miners, 739.—Copper caps are made entirely by Europeans, 744.—Would have a corps of pioneers as well as sappers and miners, 748.—Native army should be of mixed bodies, without reference to caste, 759.—They should be distributed promiscuously throughout the regiments, 760.—No caste should be excluded but Brahmins, 761.—Caste on service has never seriously interfered with the performance of duty, 763.—Six regiments only are "general service" corps, 765.—If foreign service is required, volunteers must be invited, 766.—Every native soldier should be required to enter for unrestricted service, 772.—Regular and irregular, 773.—A great evil is, that men cannot be pensioned unless on report of a medical committee of unfitness, 778.—Would not divide the Bengal army, 779.—The separate armies should be maintained, 780.—Commander-in-chief should be allowed to establish his head-quarters where most desirable, 788.—Commanding officer should have more power to reward and punish, 789.—Of irregular corps, have more power, 792.—By the articles of war the

commanding officers of both have the same power, 795.—But in an irregular regiment matters are settled in the regiment, 796.—Three articles of war are in force in India, 801.—The articles of war for the native troops have been lately revised, 802.—They are not revised annually, 803.—A sepoy can appeal against his commanding officer, 804.—If commanding officers had more power they would be more looked up to by their men, 807.—Privilege of appealing by soldiers too great, 809.—The appeal is not required to pass through the commanding officer, 810.—Military codes of the three presidencies are all different, 814.—Articles of war are the same, 815.—A large magazine is forming at Ferozepore, 818.—Mixture of Europeans with natives should be by distinct regiments, 821.—It would lower the European to have natives with him, 823.—Would not for many years give the most effective arms to natives, 824.—Percussion musket is as good a weapon as they require for Indian service, 829.—It would not do to meet a European foe, 831.—Native troops should be made to feel they are subordinate to Europeans, 836.—Africans might be introduced into the ranks, 838.—Malays might be advantageous, 841.—Colonial regiments might be brought; West Indian, for instance, 842, 843.—In Bengal and Bombay armies are now occasional cases of Africans, 845.—Would prefer having Africans and men of West Indian regiments as artillerymen to natives of India for some time to come, 850.—Ceylon rifles are Malays, 851.—Corporal punishment is inflicted in Bengal, though very rarely, 852.—Is not aware of any circular on the subject, 853.

BAIRD, Major Sir DAVID, Bart.

Is brevet-major and captain in 98th foot, 855.—Went out as aide-de-camp to Sir Colin Campbell, 856.—Would not have more than 2 natives to 1 European; would rather have them divided equally, 858.—Prospectively it might be 1 to 3 or 4, 859.—80,000 Europeans will be required in India altogether, 868.—50,000 in Bengal, 869.—Artillery should be all European, 871.—No natives should be allowed to serve the guns, 873.—Irregular cavalry of India are the best in the world, 875.—Native trooper is a better horseman and uses his sword better than a European, 881.—Has greater command of his horse, 882.—Their system is to scatter not charge, 895.—All artillery duties might be performed by Europeans, 903.—Punjab irregular corps are officered by Europeans, 920.—These officers suffered more than other regiments by exposing themselves more, 921.—Does not think the Bengal army should be divided, 922.—Thinks head-quarters should be fixed in Central India, 924.—Commanding officers have not sufficient power, 926.—General discipline of native troops was good, 931.

BROWNE, Captain G. F. S., 24th Madras Native Infantry.

Has served in India above 15 years; six years in the North-west, 942, 943.—Has recently been serving at Agra, 944.—Hereafter one-fourth of the troops in Bengal should be European, the larger proportion being with the artillery and infantry, 945.—Would have no natives for artillery except as gun lascars, 946.—Half-castes serve uncommonly well, 947.—40,000 Europeans will hereafter do for Bengal, 948.—200,000 in all, European and native, including the police, 949.—Would arm the police with muskets, 952.—Native troops should have the percussion musket, with a rifle company in every regiment, 954.—To have the ordinary rifle, 955.—Native force should be both regular and irregular, 960.—But no regular native cavalry, 961.—Five European officers should be attached to irregular regiments, 963-669.—In Colonel Coke's regiment there are separate companies of different tribes, 971.—This answers well, 974.—No more European non-commissioned officers are required with native regiments. They do not get on well, 980.—Present class of native officers are entirely inefficient, 987.—On account of age, and to promotion by seniority, 988, 989.—Commanding officers should have more power, 994.—Native officers should be selected, 995.—And undergo an examination, 996.—Numbers of the elder ones cannot read or write, 998.—Queen's regulations are acted on at Madras as to mounting guard, 1000.—Such is not the case in Bengal, 1001.—Men there are allowed to take off accoutrements to eat. This is not allowed at Madras, 1002.—Was in Saugor in 1851, 1009.—Men of Seikh regiments are most efficient, 1010.—They bear us no goodwill, 1012.—Will hereafter be fully as dangerous as the Bengal sepoy, 1012.—Looks for safety of India to prohibition of importation of sulphur. It would deprive natives of the use of fire-arms, 1013.—Would not take railroads so much into account, a quarter of a mile could be dug up in a night, 1014.—Would enlist every man for general service. Men raised in

the north should serve in the south; and men raised in Oude in the Punjab. More than two regiments raised in the same locality should never be allowed in the same garrison, 1015.—Madras troops might do duty in Bengal, 1018.—Would make it a tour of foreign service, 1019.—A Bengal Brahmin will not eat food until he has bathed, but he will do it in Madras, 1022.—This is owing to discipline and custom, 1025.—State of the Bombay army is not sound, that of Madras is, 1026.—The mass of the men is from Southern India, about one-third Mahomedans, 1026, 1027.—Prefers the Hindoo to the Mahomedan, 1029.—Four-fifths of the men in the Madras cavalry are Mahomedans, 1030.—Madras troops are getting batta in the field now; when they cross the water they get extra batta, 1032.—On service in Bengal they get full batta, but not provisions, 1034, 1035.—Objects to enlistment of Malays, but not Africans, 1038.—Would not object to Hottentots, 1039.—Thinks their appearance in India would be beneficial, 1040.—Would not divide the Bengal army. Commander-in-chief should be in some central position, 1041.—No man should be made lance naik of above five years' standing, 1042.—Commanding officers should be allowed to promote to havildar, and should have power to degrade a non-commissioned officer, 1043.—At Bombay they promote very young men to be native officers, 1046.—Would introduce native gentry as officers into irregular corps, 1048.—Native officers are promoted too young at Bombay, 1050.—In Bengal men are 50 or 60 when promoted to jemadars, 1054.—They are 40 when made naiks, 1055.—Men cannot be discharged until declared unfit by a medical committee, 1056.—At twenty years they can receive a pension if unfit, not otherwise, 1059, 1060.—Flogging has not been re-introduced in the Bengal army. At Madras they flog frequently, 1063.—A circular on the subject was issued, 1062-1067.—There should be an efficient European officer in every company, 1068.—A number should always be present in addition, learning their duties, 1069.—There is no real reason why regular regiments should have more European officers than the irregular, 1072-1075.—There is only one field officer to regiments in Madras, 1076.—Senior captain mounts on parade, 1077.—Young lieutenants have held charge of three or four companies for months together, 1079.—Eight or ten have often been away on staff from the Bengal army, 1082.—Officers qualify to get away, 1085.—Would not limit the tenure of staff appointments, 1087.—Service suffers from officers returning to command corps after long absence, 1092.—Would have a staff corps, 1093.—An officer on the staff should have the option of rising in the staff corps or working his way up in his regiment, 1094.—Madras troops in the Straits used to get free rations, also Bengal troops, 1097, 1098.—All but military staff officers should be removed from their regiments and placed in a staff corps, 1103.—They should commence regimentally, and be afterwards appointed to the staff corps, 1104, 1105.—They should pass an examination previously to being promoted to staff corps, 1106.—Native infantry officers should undergo European drill in all arms of the service, 1108, 1109.—They should be attached to corps in India, not in England, 1110, 1111.—Cadets sent to European corps before posting to native corps are much better up in their drill than others, 1112.—A Madras regiment on foreign service is free from all incumbrance of families, 1116.—It is equipped as lightly as a regiment can be, 1117.—In the Bengal army it is the same in the general service regiments, 1119, 1120.—In these the men are enlisted for life, 1122.

CLERK, SIR GEORGE, K.C.B.

Has served in different parts of India and been a good deal in camps. Was latterly Governor of Bombay, 1123.—Resided about twenty-seven years in India, 1124.—Taking the whole force, regular and irregular, would consider one European to four natives ample for Bengal, 1126.—This is exclusive of police, 1127.—The Punjab force must be separately considered, 1129.—A European supper and minor corps would be a secure measure, but it would appear like weakness to exclude natives altogether from scientific departments, 1133.—Would not abolish native artillery, 1135.—Native artillery should not be detached by themselves, 1145.—Native troops might be armed with the Enfield rifle; they are indifferent marksmen, 1146, 1147.—50,000 European troops are required for the Bengal presidency, including Burmah, 1149.—Artillery included, 1151;—and 200,000 natives, 1156;—exclusive of police, 1156.—Would have two troops of European to one troop of native artillery, 1158.—30,000 Europeans will be required for Bengal and the North-western provinces, 1167.—Would endeavour to reduce the natives raised in the Punjab from 82,000 to 30,000, 1170.—There should be 20,000 Europeans in the Punjab and 30,000 natives, exclusive of police, 1171.

—Loyalty of the Sikhs is to be attributed to their lust of plunder, 1172.—A large Sikh force is dangerous, 1173.—Punjab has been kept tranquil by its strong garrisons of Europeans, 1175.—Proposed force might be reduced hereafter, 1179.—Would make over Bundelcund and Saugor to Madras army, 1180.—The proposed force might be 50,000 Europeans to 150,000 natives, 1182;—of which about 30,000 would be artillery, 1184.—Native force should be both regular and irregular, 1185.—Irregular cavalry are very useful if properly paid, 1187.—They have not been disloyal without cause, 1188.—Men of the line have proved the worst, 1189.—Would not regard proportions of castes in enlisting. Would take a good soldier wherever found, 1192.—Castes should be mixed throughout the regiments, 1193.—There is no reason for not trying it in companies, 1196, 1197.—No caste should be excluded, 1201.—A regulation should be made, forbidding employment of too many Brahmins, 1203.—Caste must, in some instances, be attended to with native soldiers, 1204.—General enlistment desirable, 1211.—Cause of revolt not the number of Brahmins and Rajpoots, 1214.—No particular class should predominate in a regiment if it can be avoided, 1215, 1216.—Ghoorkhas will not enlist in numbers, 1219.—How they came to enlist, 1220.—Would move Madras troops into Bengal, 1221.—Eight or nine officers present with a regular regiment sufficient, 1227. Native gentlemen prefer irregular corps, 1229.—Has always advocated the system of reserved battalions as affording positions for native officers of rank, 1232.—Would maintain some regiments regularly organized, 1234.—There is no selection for command from the lieutenant-colonel down to the subdar, 1236.—There is less authority trusted to officers commanding regiments and companies than there used to be, 1237.—Incompetent officers should be got rid of, 1239.—Commanding officers would then be invested with due authority, 1240.—Sepoy battalions should be reduced to 600 men, 1242;—they are too large now, 1243.—Commanding officers should be selected, 1244.—Native officers also, 1250.—Commanding officers should have greater power to reward and punish, 1252.—Native gentlemen might be admitted into regiments at once as officers, 1257.—There is a want of communication between European and native officers, 1259.—European officers are too exclusive, 1261.—Regulations might remedy this, 1263.—More communication between European and native officers would be productive of good result, 1265.—This is the case in irregular corps, 1267.—In former years there was more association, but it arose from causes which no longer exist, 1270.—Native festivals might be recognized in some way, 1273.—An officer should be obliged to speak the language before he joins any corps, 1275.—Gentry of the country must be employed in both civil and military service, 1278.—They will not enter the infantry service, 1285.—System of reserve battalions, 1288.—Irregular cavalry in Bengal are under-paid, 1291.—Bengal army should not be divided, 1292.—Enlistments should be for general service, 1294.—Would introduce the Bombay and Madras armies into Bundelcund, Saugor, and Rajpootana, 1302.—Madras and Bombay armies have been overworked, 1309.—Bengal army has been held up as the pattern army, but this is now ended, 1312.—Nagpore and Saugor should be under Madras, 1314.—Native troops on foreign service should have additional allowances, but not on service in India, 1316.—European officers might do duty with European corps before being appointed to native regiments, 1323.—Native promotions should go by selection, 1328.—Seniority should be the rule, selection the exception, with power always to select, 1331.—Appeals of native soldiers not passing through the commanding officers most objectionable, 1339.—When India is settled, there will be no need to resort to other colonies for troops other than European, 1346.—Native troops of India may be trusted hereafter, 1351.—But on annexing fresh territories, the army, European and native, must in future be increased, 1353.—There should be a considerable native army; that army should be a local army, 4670.—If the recent act would admit of it, the European portion of the army should be a general army, not local, 4670.—It should be one European army, all having the advantage of employment in India, 4671.—Great advantages would result to India also, 4672.—Native armies of the three presidencies should be separate, 4673.—European army should be furnished from the line and be under the Crown; the native army should be under the authority of the government of India, 4674-4676.—The Indian army, by the recent act, has all its privileges guaranteed to it, 4679.—As respects those who are now in it, 4682.—There should be separate Commanders-in-chief in India as there are now, 4684.—They should have authority over

the terms of the use in the several presidencies, but not the organization of the Commander-in-chief in India, 468-470.—If a necessity arose for calling troops from India for service elsewhere, their place would, of course, be probably supplied, 468.—Local troops would be as likely to be withdrawn on an emergency, 469.—By having an increased Royal European army there would be more troops available, and the system of remedial relief and transport might be matured, 470.—Troops should be stationed some time at the Cape on their way to India, 470.—On withdrawal of troops from India the Governor-General would always be consulted, 470.—Recommendations for honours from India should come to the Secretary of State in the first instance, 470.—Secretary of State would have entire control over everything involving expense, 471.—Native army would be provided for as now, by appointment of officers from England, 471, 474.—Would advocate the formation of a staff corps, 471.—If officers were withdrawn from Queen's regiments for the staff, their places should be supplied, 471.—The tendency of all late measures has been to bring officers home as often as you can to Europeanise them, 472.—The scientific corps would not be the worse by being amalgamated with the Queen's engineers and artillery, 472.—In some respects it would be benefited, 472.—Officers of Her Majesty's service have hitherto had no inducement to qualify themselves in the languages, 473.—Amount of troops to be withdrawn from India should be dependent on the approval of the Governor-General, 473.—Sees no advantage to be derived by having troops raised exclusively for service in India, 473.—There is no such thing now as the feeling of having no views beyond India. Altered furlough system has destroyed this, 474.—Wealth cannot now be accumulated in India by public servants, 474.—Services of valuable staff officers would be lost to the empire if you have exclusive local armies, 474.—Advantages of service in India to the line army are very great, 474.—Hereafter a considerable reduction may be made in the European force in India, 474.—Locating troops upon the mountains of India is a false measure. With good barracks in the plains they would be more healthy than in the West Indies, or in many other colonies, 475.—With two armies jealousies must exist, 475.—Local European regiments of India are admirable, but not better than the line, 475.—A Sikh army is a dangerous weapon, 475.—Officers of European and native corps might be allowed to exchange, 475.—Native army might be officered from the line but for the patronage, 475.—All cadets ought to go through a military college, 475.—Cape of Good Hope should be made a depot for reliefs of regiments, 475.—Regiments should remain there three or four years before going to India, 475.—There should also be a depot for invalids at the Cape, 475.—A regiment that has been three or four years in Caffraria is in the best possible condition for service anywhere, 475.—Transport of troops should be by the Cape, not Egypt. They should be landed on the west of India, 475.—The place of a regiment taken from India for service elsewhere should be supplied by one from home, 475.—Exchanges should be permitted between the two armies, 475, 479.—European force should be kept up by both recruiting and volunteering, 480.—Is aware there is a difference of expense in recruiting for the line and the local army, 480, 480.

HARRINGTON, Lieutenant-Colonel THOMAS LOWE.

Belongs to 5th Bengal native cavalry, which regiment has not continued, 1354.—Has been 31 years in the service, 1355.—One-fourth of the force in Bengal should be Europeans, 1359.—No native artillery should be allowed, 1361.—100,000 natives would be sufficient, regular and irregular, 1362.—60 regiments should be regular, 40 should be irregular, and 20 should be veteran battalions, 1363.—Would have 30,000 European infantry, 1366.—About 10,000 cavalry, 1367.—About the same artillery, 1374.—Would not allow artillery with contingents, 1375.—Native sappers might be employed in digging, sapping, &c., 1377.—Would have regular cavalry, 1387.—Irregular are not so well horsed, 1391.—Number of European officers with a native regiment could not be reduced, 1391.—It is not necessary to have one to a troop, 1395.—Would have a staff corps, if practicable, 1400.—All men should be enlisted without reference to caste, 1410.—Nationalities should be preserved in regiments, 1411.—There should not be more low caste men in the Bengal cavalry, 1414.—The others would not like to associate with them, 1416.—Has never heard of caste interfering with duty, 1421.—Irregulars are allowed to draw on the commissariat on account of their horses, on foreign service, but they are never supplied with tents or carriages, 1428.—In our

own territories they supply themselves, 1429.—They are not so efficient in action as the regulars. This is owing to the larger number of European officers with the latter, 1431.—Irregulars should have more officers on service, 1434.—Pay of the privates should be increased to 25 rupees a month; and the regimental banks abolished, 1439.—Would have a squadron of regular cavalry with European dragoons, but would dispense with entire regiments of regulars, 1441.—Would give the native cavalry the same carbine, only lighter, 1445.—Regular cavalry is too expensive in horses and arms, 1451.—Relative cost of a regular and irregular trooper, 1451.—More power should be given to commanding officers, 1454.—Would not enlist for service beyond sea, 1455.—Allowance should be made for the objections to this, 1456.—Natives would be of little use beyond India and China, 1459.—They should be required to serve everywhere in India, 1462.—Bengal army should not be divided, 1465.—Would not recommend the promotion of native officers by selection; it is liable to abuse, 1474.—Reasons for the late revolt, 1477.—There should be more intercourse between the European and native officers, 1493.—Commanding officers have had no power since Lord W. Bentinck's time, 1497.—They have no power to reward, 1500.—Corporal punishment was stopped by a circular, 1512.—About three years ago, 1513.—Except for theft and disgraceful conduct, 1513.—Native officers all joined in the mutiny, 1522.—There should be no native officers in regular regiments, 1524.—Would not attach more European non-commissioned officers to native regiments, 1528, 1529.—Mixture of Europeans with natives should in the cavalry be in regiments, in the infantry in brigades, 1542.

MEREWETHER, Major W. L.

Has been 17½ years in the service, 1545.—Belongs to Bombay army, 1547.—Has been 15½ years with the Sind horse, 1548.—Considers 32,000 European troops sufficient for Bengal presidency, 1552.—There must be a good native army. European troops are not necessary to overawe the native army, 1556.—System must be improved, a moral power introduced, 1566.—Commanding officers must have increased powers, 1567.—For all India 50,000 European troops are sufficient, 1571.—Exclusive of artillery, 1572.—Native force should be irregular, 1575.—System of Sind horse, 1576, 1577, 1578.—Commanding officers of irregulars have more power than those of the regulars, 1584.—Native officers in Sind horse go through the ranks, 1592, 1593.—All soldiers should be enlisted for general service, 1622.—System of remounts in Sind horse, 1623.—Pay of irregular cavalry should be raised, 1627.—Regular cavalry are comparatively useless; they cost about 82 rupees a month per man, 1634.—System in Sind horse is punchayet not court-martial, 1637.—Corporal punishment is only administered for disgraceful crimes, and after dismissal from the regiment, 1648.—Regiment was recruited from Delhi, 1658.—Artillery should be European, with some few natives for certain stations, and some gun Lascars, 1667, 1671.—Sappers and miners should be European, with Lascars attached, 1671.—The same arm should be given alike to Europeans and natives, 1672.—Men should be enlisted without regard to caste, 1674.—Castes should be distributed indiscriminately, 1691.—Enlistment should be for general service only, 1696.—Present articles of war are a mistake, 1697.—A fourth presidency might be made and the Bengal army divided, 1700.—Commanding officers should be selected, 1704.—Would have a general list, from which officers for native army should be selected, 1705.—Mixture of Europeans with natives should be by brigade, not regimentally, 1708.—System of Sind horse might be introduced into infantry, 1713.—Would have no regular corps, cavalry, or infantry, 1717.

MASTER, Lieutenant-Colonel ROBT. A.

Has been 33 years in the service; in Bengal, 1726, 1728.—Has served in both regular and irregular regiments, 1730.—40,000 or 50,000 Europeans will be required in Bengal, 1733.—To 60 regiments of native infantry, 1734.—No native artillery should be allowed.—There might be native sappers, 1735.—Irregular system preferable for native army, 1741, 1743.—Sees no objection to attaching a squadron of native cavalry to a European cavalry regiment, 1762, 1763.—Is decidedly opposed to regular cavalry, 1765.—Irregular cavalry supply themselves, except when they cannot provide food, it is then furnished them by the commissariat, 1773, 1783.—Name of caste should not be admitted into an army, 1786.—There are too many Brahmins in corps.—In the infantry three-fourths are Brahmins, 1790.—Would not allow nationalities in corps, 1794.—Enlist-

ments should be for general service, 1796.—A less quantity of Brahmins might enlist, 1801.—Enlistment has been for general service for the last two years, and there has been no falling off in recruits, 1803.—Flogging is only resorted to in great crimes, 1805.—Punishments are insufficient, 1806.—When in command of a corps was not interfered with from head-quarters, 1808.—Commanding officers might have a little more power, 1809.—Promotion of native officers should be by merit, 1814.—A complaint against him as commanding officer was sent to the Commander-in-chief without being submitted to him, 1818.—Native soldiers are between 40 and 50 when made jemadars, 1843.—Would not mix Europeans and natives in regiments, 1848, 1849.—Commanding officers have no power to grant leave of absence to men, except between musters, 1851.—Proportion having leave, 1854.

FELIX, Colonel ORLANDO.

Is colonel in Her Majesty's service, 1858.—Has been deputy quartermaster-general to Her Majesty's forces at Madras, 1859.—Was 18 years in India, and private secretary to two Governors, 1860.—There should be two natives to one European in Bengal, three to one in Bombay, and four to one in Madras. Taking all India, the proportion should be three to one, 1862.—This only applies to regulars, 1863.—Estimate of force required when the country is settled, exclusive of police, for a peace establishment, 60,000 Europeans and 180,000 natives, 1864-1870.—Considers the number of the corps more important than their strength, 1871.—A large police force should be employed for escort duties, 1879.—Would not put a rifle into any native's hand, 1881.—The old percussion musket only should be given, 1889.—A large native army cannot be dispensed with, 1902.—No natives should be employed as artillerymen, 1909.—Would not allow a gun to go into the hands of natives, 1910.—The native artillery at Madras and Bombay should be allowed to die off, 1919.—The artillery of the contingents also, 1928.—None but Europeans should be scientifically employed in arsenals, 1931.—Would have no native sappers in Bengal, but would keep them up in Madras and Bombay, 1935.—They should not be scientifically taught, 1936.—Native infantry should be regular, the cavalry irregular, 1943.—With irregular cavalry regiments there should be six officers, 1945.—If a squadron were detached it could then be commanded by a European officer, 1946.—The full fixed establishment of officers should be always present with the native infantry regiments, 1947.—Inconvenience has arisen from their absence, 1953.—Irregular cavalry are more generally serviceable than the regular, 1960.—Nizam's are irregular, and very good, 1961.—There is no irregular cavalry in the Madras army; there is the Mysore Horse, but they are merely police, 1964.—More officers have been away from regiments in Bengal for staff than at the other presidencies, 1966.—Native officers should be encouraged to learn English, 1967.—A knowledge of it should be a qualification for promotion, 1968.—In Madras English is freely spoken by the native officers, 1971.—A native officer arrives at that rank at about 50 years of age, 1983.—Castes and nationalities should be mixed up as much as possible, 1995.—Caste should not be recognized, 1996.—Men should be enlisted for general service, 1998.—And for limited service, 1999.—Would not increase the pay, but the pension, 1999.—At Madras the men's families are with them; in Bengal they are left in their villages, 2002.—Having their families with them, a great security, 2003.—Madras soldiers never refuse to go on any service, 2008.—Would abolish good-conduct pay; the pension is a greater inducement, 2012.—Would give a pension after 21 years without report of a medical committee, 2014.—Madras army almost all low-caste men, 2016.—They have no objection to going to sea, 2021.—Would select native officers, 2024.—Madras sepoys, when at sea, are entitled to rations, 2027.—Would divide the Bengal army by joining Scinde to the Punjaub, and having a fourth presidency, 2032.—Madras army should hold Saugor, and the Bombay, Mhow, 2035.—Separate armies a great advantage, 2036.—Would give the same pay for the same appointments at all the presidencies, 2043.—Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers should be promoted entirely by selection, 2048.—Commanding officer should recommend, 2050.—Native commissioned officers at Madras are selected from the non-commissioned, 2053.—Commanding officers should have more power to reward, 2056.—Mixture of European with native forces should be by brigade, but four companies of natives might be attached to European regiments in Bengal; natives and Europeans, when placed together, become good friends, 2078.—The natives

might take the day and police duties, 2080.—There might, however, be an objection to this plan in regard to the two sorts of ammunition, 2086.—The natives would be under the command of the commanding officer of the European regiment, 2090.

STEEL, Major-General Sir SCUDAMORE W., K.C.B.

Served in India uninterruptedly for 50 years, 2096.—At Madras, 2097.—Has been 40 years on the staff in all ranks and grades, 2099.—Europeans should be to natives in Bengal as one to three, 40,000 Europeans to 120,000 natives, 2102.—This is exclusive of the police, 2107.—When the country is settled, 160,000 to 200,000 troops will be necessary, exclusive of artillery, 2103.—Native force should be both regular and irregular, 2104.—Police should perform the gaol and escort duties, 2111.—Natives should not have the Enfield rifle, 2117.—No native artillery should be allowed in Bengal, 2118.—Nor in either of the armies, 2119.—Natives make most efficient sappers, 2121.—They should be men of low caste, 2125.—Europeans should be in the nature of superintendents, 2126.—Natives should not be employed in the manufacture of percussion caps, and such scientific duties, 2129.—Half-castes might be so employed, 2131.—Nationalities and castes should be diversified as much as possible in regiments, 2132.—Sepoys should be enlisted for general service, 2133.—Some allowance must be made for caste, 2135.—Caste very often interferes with duty, 2136.—Madras troops undertake to serve wherever ordered, except on board ship, 2148.—They always volunteer to go to sea, if required, 2142.—Practically, they do not object to go, 2153.—They could be enlisted for general service, 2158.—And should be so, 2160.—That is to say, to go anywhere in India, anywhere to the Eastward, and to Persia, 2161.—Madras sepoys are entitled to rations when on board ship, 2165.—Usages of caste are more acted up to in Bengal than in Madras, 2167.—Sepoys are more indulged in Bengal, 2172.—Bengal army might be divided; it is so very large, 2181.—They should be under the same Commander-in-chief for India, 2187.—It might be of advantage to have the separate armies of India of nearly equal strength, 2190.—The late combination of the Bengal army would not have been so general had it consisted of two separate armies, 2191.—Does not see how a staff corps could be arranged, 2197.—One European officer to a company should always be present, 2201.—Present establishment of officers, if kept complete, quite sufficient, 2202.—Officers selected for staff appointments should be struck off the roll of their regiments, 2211.—Promotion in non-commissioned and commissioned ranks at Madras is made by selection, 2219.—It should be the same in Bengal, 2215.—Corporal punishment is constantly inflicted at Madras under sentence of courts-martial, 2233.—Natives and Europeans should not be mixed in regiments, 2249.—Great difference of system in Bengal and Madras armies, 2251.—Discipline in Bengal is less severe, 2253.—It would be more advantageous for the men in Bengal to have their families with them, 2256.

ALEXANDER, Major-General ROBERT.

Was adjutant general, Madras army, 2260.—Was about thirty years in active service, 2261.—Was adjutant-general ten years, 2264.—The proportion of European to native troops over all India should be one European to three native regiments, 2266.—And three European batteries to one native battery, 2270.—Europeans and natives should be armed alike with the best arms that could be made, 2274.—There should be no European sappers except as non-commissioned officers, 2276.—Troops in India have been too much scattered about in small parties, 2281.—They should be concentrated at certain fixed stations, 2281.—There should be for Bengal 25 to 30 European infantry regiments, five or six of European cavalry, 2285.—How they should be distributed, 2286.—When India is tranquil, European regiments should not be more than 800 strong, with a reserve of 400 men in this country, 2291.—Would have four guns to every 1,000 men, 2294.—Artillery in India is inadequately manned and horsed, 2295.—And inadequately officered, 2296.—Batteries should have eight guns, 2298.—Irregular corps are necessary. The regular army should remain as it has always been, 2300.—Would have cavalry, regular and irregular, 2301.—Advantages of the latter, 2302.—Local corps are in some parts indispensable, 2305.—As respects one European to three natives, this applies to the regular army, 2306.—Armies of India should recruit all descriptions of natives, 2307.—Caste is recognized and respected in Madras army, but it is never allowed to interfere with any military duty, 2309.—Discipline in Madras is more efficient and soldierlike, 2313.—Discipline might overcome any caste difficulties in the exe-

cution of military duty, 2314.—When he commanded a regiment, the Hindustani men were among the best in the regiment, 2322.—Native troops now have duties to do which they should not have to do, such as duties at goals, duties over treasuries, and many escort duties, 2329.—Present number of officers for regiments quite sufficient, 2330.—Commissariat department should not be a draught on regiments. Civil staff duties should be discharged by officers not physically equal to active duties, 2331.—A staff corps would be very useful, 2336.—After a certain time officers in civil appointments should have the option of leaving the army, 2339.—One concurrent cause of the late mutiny in Bengal was that men were enlisted to go on foreign service beyond sea, 2341.—Very few Hindustanis in the Madras army, 2342.—An improved pay code might be formed, 2344.—Difference of discipline in past times and the present, caused by not conciliating native opinions, and a harsher line of feeling between European officer and native, 2346.—Pension is of the greatest importance, 2347.—A new pay code should be framed. Pay of the native army is insufficient, 2348.—It should increase with length of service, 2351.—Native gentlemen might enter in the regular army without going through the ranks, 2358.—Bengal army was ill-composed and ill-disciplined, 2362.—High-caste men have been too much pampered, 2363.—Duties were carried on in a lax way, 2365.—Some Bengal officers frequently brought up before Courts of Requests for debts. This is a rare thing at Madras, 2368.—Raising the status of native officers would not prove dangerous, 2373.—Native army should be organized by mixing races and nationalities, 2375.—Bengal army should not be divided, 2376.—There should be three armies, and the paramount authority should be vested in a military minister of war, a member of the Supreme Government of India, 2376.—Promotion in the native grades should be by selection, 2378.—System in practice at Madras, 2380.—Age does not constitute incompetency, unless it involves weakness and inefficiency, 2385.—At Madras, a native commissioned officer would be 50 years of age when promoted, 2386.—Thinks it better that European officers should learn the native languages rather than the natives the English, 2392.—If strict discipline had been maintained, the Bengal army might have been brought to the highest standard of efficiency, 2393.—Instances of misconduct in the field have been few, the men have generally followed their officers nobly, 2393.—Native regimental schools should be improved, 2394.—Late mutiny a calamity which might have been guarded against, 2395.—Madras men have complained and asked for the privileges allowed in Bengal, 2399.—Commanding officers in Madras have sufficient power to reward and punish, 2401.—Thinks a mixture of Europeans and natives in regiments would be fatal, 2404.—Contrary to order to receive petitions from natives, 2407.—Has not served in Bengal, 2410.—Present mode of dress objectionable, 2413.—There should be an oriental costume, 2414.—Cantonments are badly laid out. The barracks are traps in which the European might be destroyed in the event of a sudden outbreak, 2415.—Secunderabad affords an instance, 2417.—Artillery should be increased, and the condition of the European officer considered, 2418.—Clothing of European troops might be further improved, 2424.

THOMAS, MR. JOHN F.

Belonged to the Madras civil service, 2424.—Served for 39 years, 2425.—Was in both the revenue and judicial departments, but for the last ten years of his service was chief secretary to the government, and a member of the government, 2426.—Proportion of European to native force must depend on the police and other considerations, 2429.—A police corps was formed in Malabar with European officers, 2430.—It was proposed to put some European non-commissioned with it, but this was overruled, 2431.—It was armed with rifles, 2435.—In Madras, one European to three or four natives would suffice, including police, 2437.—This proportion would not do if Saugor be included, 2440.—Would not give the natives as efficient a weapon as the Europeans, 2443.—Artillery and the rifle must be kept in the hands of the Europeans, 2443.—Sappers and miners might be natives, 2445.—Proportion of castes in the Madras army, 2446.—Native soldiers at Madras are not liable to be sent beyond sea against their will, 2448.—Practically they have been in the habit of going, 2449.—No case of a regiment declining to embark on account of caste, 2453.—Individuals have; they take their discharge, 2454.—Men should be enlisted for service beyond sea, 2473.—There would be no difficulty in this at Madras, 2475.—At Madras there are no irregulars, 2477.

—Rule as to absentees from regiments on staff has been kept with a rigidity at Madras unknown in Bengal, 2479.—An European officer should be present with each company, to make a regiment efficient, 2483.—There are more detached appointments in Bengal than at Madras, 2484.—A regular police corps is now being organized at Madras, 2485.—There are several duties done by the native troops, which do not require soldiers; still this depends very much on the country, 2486.—Treasury guards in the provinces are all native guards, 2487.—Would allow the native artillery at Madras to die off, 2491.—Native army should be composed of different nationalities, and the larger the body of low-caste men, the better, 2493.—Civil employment in high appointments might be open to natives, but not military, 2494.—Prefers, for reasons of safety, the promotion of natives by seniority, 2496.—Reasons why the natives should not be rendered as effective as the Europeans, 2499.—Would like European non-commissioned officers with native regiments, 2504.—Some to each company, 2507.—They would form a better channel of communication between the natives and the European officers than the present native officer does, 2509.—Present communication is not sufficient, 2511.—Native officers during the recent mutiny in Bengal have in no case given information, 2512.—They have an interest distinct from the European officer, 2512.—52 native regiments are sufficient for Madras, 2517.—Europeans should be as one to four, 2518.—There should be 12 European regiments in Madras, 2520.—Exclusive of artillery and cavalry, 2522, 2523.—Native cavalry, being principally Mahomedan, will not act against Mahomedans, 2524.—Horses are obtained from the Gulf, and latterly from the Cape, 2532.—There is no stud at Madras, 2533.—There is an agency at Bangalore, and the dealers bring horses thither, 2534.—Predominant caste in the infantry is the Sudra or common Ryot, 2536.—About 35 per cent. of Mahomedans, 2537.—European influence over the native greater at Madras than in Bengal, 2543.—High-caste men in Madras have done what in Bengal they have refused to do, 2550.—In the southern part of India no man carries arms, 2556.—Would not withhold the use of arms from the respectable portion of the natives, 2559.—European local troops when ordered to embark on foreign service have kept Madras in a state of disorder and siege, 2564.—In the field they fight admirably, 2565.—They are not under the same discipline as the Queen's troops, 2567.—Would rather the Europeans should come and go; but there are opposite considerations to, 2568.—Men of the local troops form marriages, and become attached to the natives, 2568.—Better state of discipline in Queen's regiments caused by purchase system, 2570.—Mixture of Europeans and natives should not be by companies, 2571.

WILDE, Lieutenant-Colonel ALFRED THOS.

Has been 20 years in the service; in India the whole time, 2574, 2575.—Belongs to Madras army, but has been nine years in the Punjab irregular infantry, 2577.—One European to four native soldiers should be about the average; a purely European force, however large, could not hold India, 2580.—Above proportion includes all arms, but not the police, 2581, 2582.—Would have some native artillery, say half, in the troops and batteries, 2583.—Would employ them as drivers, 2585.—25,000 Europeans to 100,000 natives would suffice for Bengal, 2590.—Irregular system for both cavalry and infantry preferable, 2598, 2599.—Would have all irregular, 2604.—Reasons, 2605-2609.—Men of Punjab irregular force are amenable to articles of war, 2620.—Native officers are appointed by selection; they are not necessarily required to go through the ranks, 2622-2624.—Would abolish the native articles of war, 2628.—Occasional introduction of native gentlemen as officers, answered wonderfully, 2644.—Six European officers are required in irregular regiments, 2636.—The men are enlisted for general service, and receive the same pay wherever serving, 2637.—They are entitled to discharge after three years, 2638.—A man refusing obedience would be immediately flogged, 2641.—There are 20 native commissioned officers with the Punjab regiments, 2649.—Commandants have magisterial powers; they can imprison, dismiss, flog, or fine, 2652.—Caste is never set up as a plea for not performing duty, 2665.—Prefers having caste mixed up in companies, rather than companies of separate castes, 2673.—Enlistments should be for service everywhere, 2676.

LESLIE, Colonel JOHN T. C.B.

Served in India 20 years, 2682.—In the Bombay artillery, 2683.—At present the proportion of Europeans to natives in Bengal should be as two to one, 2687, 2688.—There should hereafter be a larger proportion of Euro-

pean troops than there has heretofore been, 2689.—Would have native artillery in the proportion of one native to four Europeans, 2690-2692.—Would not trust the natives alone with the guns, 2697.—Would arm the natives the same as the Europeans, 2700.—Native artillerymen should be always with the Europeans, 2704.—Infantry should be regular, cavalry irregular, 2707.—Sappers and miners, for scientific work or overseers, should be European, and for labour, natives, 2714, 2715.—The more castes are mixed up the better, 2721.—Enlistment should be for general service, 2727.—Promotion of native officers should be by selection, 2734.—Would attach native companies to each European regiment, 2739.—An increase of artillery wanted in Bombay, 2744.—Considers the Bombay detachment system of artillery the best, 2748.—Recruiting has lately gone on most favourably; number sent to India, 6319.—There has been no limit to recruiting since the disturbances, 6324.—Men are recruited for the different arms, not for the presidencies, 6325.—They are sent to the presidencies according to the proportions at the dépôt, 6328.—Services of the men are confined to India alone, 6329.—It is so considered, 6331.—Their understanding is that they are to belong to an army, the head quarters of which are in India, 6334.—It is a local army for service to the east of the Cape, 6336.—Discipline at Warley under Her Majesty's Articles of War, 6337.—The courts-martial are held at Chatham, and confirmed by the Commander-in-chief, 6338.—Time men remain at the dépôt very uncertain. It used to be four or five months, 6339.—They now go out to India before they are drilled, 6341.—Warley can only accommodate 12,000 men, 6341.—Recruits go to India as non-commissioned officers, 6343.—On arrival their rank is lost, 6346.—Expense of a recruit for both services the same, 6349.—Returns of number of recruits are sent weekly to War Office, 6353.—Inspecting field officers of the line pass all recruits, 6355.—On going to India they have the same clothing as the line, 6357.—They will soon have the light clothing also, 6358.—They are provided with every thing, and receive 19s. 10d. on arriving in India, 6363, 6364.—Men should be kept at the dépôt for four months, not longer, 6369.—If kept longer desertions increase, 6369.—Very many men desert from the line and enlist for Indian service, 6371.—They receive the double bounty, and then desert again, 6373.—Recruits use the Enfield rifle at Warley, 6375.—But they are not armed till they join their regiments, 6376.—If local force were increased, the accommodation at Warley must be much increased, 6379.—Ten or twelve per cent. would be the proportion in dépôt to the force in India, 6380.—Staff sergeants do the duties of officers, 6383.—It has answered admirably, 6384.—They are chiefly pensioners from Her Majesty's service, 6386.—The uniform of the recruits is supplied in India, 6391.

HILL, Colonel JOHN.

Entered the service in 1834; was 24 years in India, 2750.—Belonged to the Bombay engineers, 2753, 2754.—Considers one-third European to natives sufficient, 2757.—European dragoons are not efficiently armed, 2759.—There should be an irregular native army, 2762.—Including this, the Europeans might be one-fourth of the whole, 2766.—Would have a considerable body of native artillery, 2769.—And by far the larger portion of sappers and miners natives, 2771.—Commanded the Bombay sappers from 1855 to 1857, 2773.—In Bombay, caste is never urged as an objection to duty, 2781.—There is no difficulty in getting men to enlist for general service, 2784.—Has known Bengal troops refuse to work on the plea of caste, 2789, 2790.—At Moultan they did no work whatever in the trenches, 2796.—There should be a fair proportion of the various castes in a regiment; but caste should never be alluded to, 2798.—Would not have castes by companies, they should be mixed in regiments, 2799.—Promotion of native officers should go by selection, 2808.—Native officers of Bombay army are young, active, intelligent; in the Bengal they are generally the contrary, 2812.—Discipline of Bengal army very much inferior to that of Bombay, 2816.—Mixture of European and native troops should be by brigades, 2817.—In Bombay there should be eight companies of native sappers to two of European, 2818.—Considers the European sappers of the Company superior to the Royal sappers, 2820.—In former years the pay of the native sappers was higher, 2825.

SINCLAIR, Colonel JAMES.

Is a colonel in the Bombay artillery, 2831.—Has been 41 years in the service, 34 of which in India, 2832, 2833.—Proportion of force should be one European to two natives,

2835.—There should be in Bombay, artillery 5,000, cavalry 2,400, all European; would have no native artillery or regular cavalry, 2836, 2837.—European infantry 6,400, 2839.—Sappers and miners should be both European and native, 2840.—Scientific work in the arsenals should be confined to Europeans, 2842.—Prefers irregular to regular native cavalry, 2849.—Scinde Horse the model of a cavalry regiment, 2851.—Would have in Bombay about 14,000 Europeans and 28,000 natives, 2853.—There should be with the artillery a guard, irrespective of the men required to work the guns, 2853-2855.—Police should be entirely distinct from the army, 2867.—Natives should be armed with the most efficient weapon, 2869.—Enlistment of native troops should be confined to their own presidencies, and castes mixed up, 2870.—All should be enlisted for general service, 2874.—Irregular corps should be local, 2874.—Artillerymen were chiefly enlisted in Hindostan, 2879.—Caste is never allowed to interfere with the performance of duty in Bombay, 2884.—Under proper discipline it would not interfere, 2890.—Pay of native artillery should be increased, 2893.—Present establishment of artillery at Bombay insufficient, 2895.—Royal establishment better for batteries than the Indian, 2896.—But would have native drivers and followers, 2898.—For horse artillery, the drivers should be European, 2901.—The establishment of a troop or battery is fixed at one captain and three subalterns, but this has been constantly reduced, 2909.—Causes of this reduction, 2915.—And proposed remedies, 2918.—Officers drawn away for staff should be "seconded," 2918.—Thinks a staff corps would not work in India, 2919.—No change required in Bombay as to promotion of native officers, 2929.—Power of commanding officers too much circumscribed, 2933.—If a man is flogged he is turned out of the service, 2943.—In Bombay, each captain commands a battery as if it were his own regiment, 2944.—Bengal army should be divided; it is too large, 2948.—Division of the armies has been of great advantage during the recent crisis, 2949.—Each army should have its own Commander-in-chief, 2951.—As respects the Europeans, there should be but one system for all the presidencies, 2953.—Would not alter the terms of enlistment or the pay of the regular native army, 2954.—Artillery system and matériel should be the same at all the presidencies, 2955, 2956.

WILLOUGHBY, Colonel MICHAEL, C.B.

Belongs to the Bombay artillery, 2960.—Has been 37 years in the service, 2961.—With an adequate proportion of artillery, one European to three natives would be sufficient, 2964.—The regular native cavalry should be done away with, and European cavalry substituted, 2965.—For the cavalry, the proportion might be the same, the native being all irregular, 2966-2970.—There must be some native artillery; an European battery should always have the support of a company of European infantry, 2971.—Natives must be armed with the same arms as the Europeans, 2974.—Reduction of the pay of the native artillery in 1840 was most injurious, 2975.—This service is not looked up to as it was, 2976.—This applies to the sappers also. Pay of both should be restored to the former rates, 2978, 2979.—Native artillery should be merely auxiliary to the European, 2982.—Six batteries of native artillery sufficient for Bombay, 2984.—Present European artillery insufficient, 2985.—Reserve battalion lately raised has not officers, 2985.—Present establishment of officers of artillery, 2991.—It should be raised to that of the Royal establishment, 2995.—Artillery officers are employed on the staff, 2997.—Native army should be composed of different castes mixed up as much as possible, 3003.—Would enlist throughout India, 3004.—Caste does not interfere with duty at Bombay, 3005.—Enlistment should be for general service, 3010.—System of promotion in the Bombay army is good, it rests with the commanding officer, 3013.—Commanding officer should have more power, 3016.—In Bombay a native becomes a commissioned officer at about 33 years of age, 3024.—Mixture of Europeans and natives should be by brigade, not regimentally, 3029, 3030.—Would divide the Bengal army, it is too large, 3033.—The appointments and allowances at the three presidencies should be assimilated, 3034.—Establishment of officers for a native regiment sufficient, 3037.—A staff corps might be advisable, but it would be very difficult to carry out, 3041, 3042.—Appointment to the command of regiments should be by selection, 3043.—Transfers of lieutenant-colonels are made so that there may be a field-officer in command of every regiment, 3049.

TREVELYAN, Sir CHARLES E., K.C.B.

Was in India from 1826 to 1838, 3052.—Held various appointments connected with the residency at Delhi,

&c. and was deputy secretary in the political department at Calcutta, 3053.—Aggregate force in India, and the proportion between Europeans and natives, depends on arrangements other than military, 3055.—Native army has been too much employed on civil duties, 3056.—Railroads, and a proper arrangement for disarming the country, will diminish the necessity for so large a native army, 3056.—About 40,000 European troops, and double that number of natives as an auxiliary force, will hereafter be sufficient for Bengal, 3057.—Police should be civil, but with a quasi military organization, 3058.—Numbers stated are what would be required in the ordinary state of things in India, 3063.—Magazines should be in fortified places at the principal stations, and should be entirely under the charge of Europeans, 3068.—Troops should be massed in large bodies, and at each station there should be a fortified post, 3069.—A much smaller number of military stations will be necessary hereafter, 3072.—Native force should be organized on the irregular system, and be clothed according to the native fashion, 3073.—It should have the best equipments and the best arms, 3074.—Diversity of practice in the native army a great advantage, 3077.—It has hitherto been too much assimilated to the English, 3078.—Officers with native regiments should be few in number, should have large powers, and should be personally very efficient, 3079.—Native officers should be appointed by merit, 3081.—They should all be promoted from the ranks, 3082.—There is more scope for the employment and promotion of natives in the civil than in the military branch, 3086.—Their promotion in the army will be hereafter according to qualification and merit, 3089.—It has been thus at Madras and Bombay, but not in Bengal, 3090, 3091.—Connecting link between the European officer and native soldier should be maintained by the instrumentality of the native officer, 3094.—Superior native officers should have additional advantages, 3095.—Present pension to the soldier sufficiently liberal, 3098.—European infantry, cavalry, and artillery should belong to the royal army, and have regular reliefs, 3099.—The engineers might be local, 3099.—Carefully selected cadets should be appointed as supernumeraries to the European infantry in India to serve at least a year, 3099.—All officers for native corps, and all staff officers, should be borne on one list, and be recruited by selection from the above, 3099.—Officers from this general staff corps might be told off for the different duties, 3100.—The utmost freedom should be reserved of transferring officers from one branch to another; from the cavalry to the infantry for instance, 3100.—Promotion should be entirely according to conduct and qualification as respects actual employment, 3103.—Promotion might be of two kinds on the general list, from rank to rank, and from one appointment to another, 3104-3107.—Native infantry regiments should have a lieutenant-colonel, a captain, and two lieutenants, 3109.—As a general rule, the proposed arrangement should apply only to new appointments, 3110.—The main principle of promotion from rank to rank should be seniority, 3111.—In every case of admitted deficiency an officer should be passed over, 3111.—Qualifications required from officers would be a check on favouritism, 3121.—Proposed general list, how to be formed, 3123.—The officers of the native infantry, cavalry, and staff should all be of one corps, 3127.—Candidates for commissions should be instructed in this country in the elements of military science, and of the native languages, and there should especially be a probation of his moral qualities, 3133.—They should all go through a military college for a short time, 3135.—The limited auxiliary native army should be enlisted for general service, 3137.—Would not allow exchanges into the Queen's army according to the present arrangements. Purchase should be excluded from the Indian army, 3139.—An officer entering the Indian army in a superior rank could not have had experience of native troops, 3142.—Management of the natives is the business of a life, and requires early appropriation to the duty, 3143.—Purchase in the Indian army is merely a mode of retirement, 3144.—Artillery should be all European. Scientific matters in arsenals should be also entirely in the hands of Europeans, 3145.—The staff, having special reference to Indian business and Indian habits, should be officered entirely from the native army. The general military staff should be composed of officers drawn from both services, 3150.—All the nationalities that can furnish efficient soldiers should be represented in the native army, 3151.—Nationalities and castes might compose companies or regiments. In the latter case they should be employed in parts in which they were not recruited, 3152.—So far as military service is concerned, caste should not be mentioned, 3153.—It should not be tol-

erated as an objection to the performance of any military duty, 3155.—Undue deference has been paid to it in the Bengal army, 3156, 3157.—Code for the native army should be simplified, 3160.—Recruits should be enlisted for general service, 3161.—Number of Sikhs now in pay should be diminished, 3164.—The Bengal army should not be divided, 3165.—As a general rule, the army of each presidency should be employed within that presidency, 3169.—Punjab and Sind should be erected into a lieutenant-governorship for civil purposes, 3171.—Head quarters of Commander-in-chief should be at some central station, 3172.—At Allahabad or Agra; and, in the cold season, he should make a tour of inspection, 3173.—System on which the Bengal army was constituted was defective, 3178.—Management of the native troops at Madras and Bombay was very preferable, 3185.—Different results at the three presidencies; how to be accounted for, 3187.—System in force in Bengal was quite irrespective of the extent of the command, 3190.—The functions of the Commander-in-chief in India, as Commander-in-chief, greatly preponderate in public importance over his functions as member of the Government, 3194.—Rates of pay, to a certain extent, have been higher in Bengal, 3197.—A higher standard of expenditure has been established there from the first, 3198.—The general government of India should be more completely separated from all the local governments, 3199.—As close an approximation towards equality of allowances should be made as possible, 3200.—Pay of staff officers should be in proportion to the duty and responsibility, and also to the expenses of living, 3203.—Europeans and natives should not be mixed in the same regiment, 3207.—Tendency of opinion is in favour of irregular native troops, 3208.—They should be dressed according to their nationality and religion, 3208.—European saddle for the native cavalry should be done away with. Irregular native cavalry preferable. They should not be dressed like Europeans, 3209.

POOLE, Colonel SKEFFINGTON.

Was about thirty years in India, 3211.—In the Bombay cavalry, 3213.—Has served in the field with Bengal as well as Bombay troops, 3215.—As respects Bombay, one European to four native soldiers sufficient, exclusive of artillery, 3222.—There must be some native artillery, but it should be as small as possible, 3224, 3225.—Sappers and Miners must, to a great extent, be natives, 3227.—But under the superintendence of Europeans, 3228.—The natives should be allowed to do as little scientific work as possible, 3229.—Force in Bombay should be on the regular and irregular system, combined in certain proportions, 3235.—Both cavalry and infantry, 3236.—For actual service the regular cavalry is much better than the irregular, 3242.—The irregular are not as well mounted, 3244.—Would enlist all castes, and they should be mixed up in companies as they are now, 3246, 3247.—Native army should be clothed more according to native ideas, 3248.—Does not object to the English saddle, 3250.—Discipline of an irregular regiment in charging in line, not equal to that of a regular regiment, 3256.—Has known regular regiments do well with only three or four officers; and native officers conduct the duties just as well on parade, and command a troop, as the European, 3262.—Does not attach much importance to the number of officers with regiments, 3263.—A smaller number of highly qualified officers make a regiment more efficient than a larger number not so qualified, 3264.—No change in the code of enlistment necessary, 3265.—All classes should be enlisted for general service, 3266.—Caste does not interfere with duty in Bombay. Has seen it do so in Bengal, 3271-3275.—This arises from the difference of system, 3279.—Everything appears to be caste in Bengal, 3281.—Promotion of natives is by seniority in Bengal, 3285.—In Bombay it is by selection, 3289.—Native officers in Bombay would not fail to give information of anything going wrong, 3298.—Two Brahmins of the 21st native infantry did so, 3300.—And others have done so, 3301.—In Bengal they gave no information, 3302.—Promotion by selection better than that by seniority, 3304.—Native officers at Bombay when promoted are about thirty-five years old, 3310.—Native gentlemen should not be introduced into regiments as officers without passing through the ranks, 3312.—No more European non-commissioned officers required in regiments, 3315.—If a native officer of his corps were sick he would visit him, 3317.—System of Bengal-native cavalry was very bad, 3323.—In Bengal native troopers do not clean their own horses; in Bombay they always do so, 3331.—Europeans and natives should not be mixed in regiments, 3333.—European and native lines are always kept apart, 3336.—Petitions are sometimes re-

ceived from men that have not gone through the commanding officer, 3341.—Commanding officers should have much more power, 3351.—In some cases they cannot confirm the sentences of regimental courts-martial, 3357.—The discipline of a regiment depends much on the power of the officer commanding, 3360.—Particularly with native troops, 3361.

GRIFFITH, Major-General JULIUS GEORGE.

Was upwards of thirty-six years in India. Belonged to the Bombay artillery, 3362.—Commanded it for ten years, 3363.—Proportion of Europeans to natives should be one in four, 3368.—This refers to the regular army alone, 3371.—Many of the duties now performed by native troops might be transferred to the police, 3372.—From 30,000 to 35,000 troops are required for Bombay, 3377.—Native force should be both on the regular and irregular system, 3382.—Native cavalry should be entirely irregular, 3384.—No native artillery should be allowed, 3388.—A few gun lascars should be in every troop or company, 3390.—Not a single native should be trusted with a gun, 3394.—Native regulars should have the Enfield rifle, 3396.—All scientific sappers should be Europeans. There might be a few native pioneers, 3398.—Caste should not be acknowledged in any way; all should be enlisted, 3401.—Under proper discipline, caste does not operate against the performance of military duty, 3406.—Code of enlistment should be simplified, 3408.—Enlistment should be for general service, 3409.—Promotion of natives should be entirely by selection, 3412.—Commanding officers should have more power, 3413.—Has known petitions received without going through the commanding officer, 3418.—Europeans and natives should not be mixed in regiments, 3424.—Native officers should all go through the ranks, 3427.—Except in the irregular cavalry, 3428.

ASHBURNHAM, Major-General the Hon. T., C.B.

Is a major-general in Her Majesty's service. Has served about twelve years in India; ten in the Bengal and two in the Bombay presidency, 3429-3433.—Considers that there should be one European to two natives in the army, 3434, 3435.—If Sikhs are employed, a larger proportion of Europeans will be required, 3436-3439.—Employment of police or local battalions would be desirable, 3440.—Would not arm natives with the Minié rifle. Would make no change in the clothing of the regulars, but would clothe the irregulars more in accordance with the native dress, 3441-3443.—Considers that an army of 40,000 Europeans and 80,000 natives, exclusive of irregulars and the police, will be required for Bengal. The native cavalry to be on the irregular system, part of the infantry to be on the regular, and part on the irregular system, 3444-3464.—The artillery to be all Europeans, 3465.—Would employ as few natives as possible as sappers and in the arsenals, 3466-3469.—Must enlist in the army much the same description of persons as has hitherto been the case. The castes should be mixed promiscuously throughout the regiments, 3470-3473.—Has known difficulties to accrue from caste, but they ought not to do so, 3474-3476.—The troops should be enlisted for general service, 3478.—No advantage would be gained by dividing the Bengal army, 3479-3482.—If the Commander-in-chief were in a more central position, it would obviate the necessity for any such division, 3483, 3484.—It would be advisable to increase the Madras and Bombay armies, 3485.—Change much required in the system of promotion. Would not have any native commissioned officers in regular regiments, 3486-3491.—It would be a good arrangement to have two European sergeants attached to each company, 3492.—The native commissioned officers of the Bombay army are superior to the native officers of Bengal, but considers that native officers are not required. A native officer of inferior caste is less respected in his regiment than a Brahmin recruit, 3493-3498.—Native officers are required in irregular corps, because there are fewer European officers. In regular regiments, a native officer is in an anomalous position, 3499-3503.—If the number of European officers in the regular regiments were reduced, the native officers would equal those of the irregular corps. Every officer in excess of the number required for the performance of duty is an injury to the service. That excess encourages idleness. A few officers selected for superior qualifications would render a regiment more efficient than a large number not so selected, 3504-3513.—Much larger powers should be given to commanding officers of regiments to reward and punish, 3514, 3515.—It would be highly beneficial to have permanently attached to European regiments in India certain native companies. They would always move with the

European regiments, and be under the command of a major or captain, who would be responsible for the interior economy and discipline of the corps, 3516-3536.—Does not think the arming the Europeans with a superior arm to that given to the natives would be any objection to his plan. At Gwalior the Queen's regiments had the percussion musket, while the native troops were armed with flint and steel, 3537-3545.—It is just as well that natives should not be taught to fire at long distances. If told that their arm is effective at 1400 yards, they are very likely to keep at that distance, 3546-3550.

CAPON, Major-General DAVID, C.B.

Is a major-general in the Bombay army; has been 48 years in the service; has served in the field with Madras and Bengal troops, 3558-3561.—If the Bengal army is kept up in the same state of undiscipline as that in which he saw it, a large proportion of Europeans (one-half) will be required, 3562.—One-fourth in the other presidencies will be sufficient, 3564.—Would let the Europeans have a superior arm to the natives, 3566, 3567.—Should like to see the army and police force totally distinct, 3569.—Included the police in the proportions he has given of Europeans and natives, 3571.—Europeans are required to keep both the sepoys and police force in check, 3573, 3574.—A much smaller native army will now be required for Bengal. The Bengal army has been indulged; four men are allowed for one sentry in Bengal, and only three in Madras and Bombay, 3575-3579.—Cannot form an opinion as to the European force required for Bengal, 3580.—Should think that 12,000 Europeans, exclusive of artillery, will be enough for Bombay, 3582.—The Bombay and Madras native artillery might be kept up, 3585.—Would not have native horse artillery, 3586.—Would not approve of native artillery for Bengal, 3587.—If a well-disciplined native army was established in Bengal, one-third instead of one-half of Europeans would suffice, 3588, 3589.—The system of the Bengal army is so lax it cannot be depended upon. Has seen the sentry at the tent of the officer commanding a division at Moulton, lounging about only half clothed, 3590-3594.—Would have the cavalry on the irregular system, 3595.—The infantry also, 3597.—The present number of European officers with native regiments would be sufficient if they were present, but they are not, and great inconvenience arises, 3598, 3599.—Has commanded a brigade and division, but generally a regiment. When he first went to India there were twenty-six European officers with his regiment. Has lately had only eight or ten present, and many of them undrilled; this has had a bad effect, 3600-3604.—Regimental officers are taken for staff appointments from their regiments without the commanding officer being consulted, 3607.—Promotion of native non-commissioned officers should be made by selection, 3608-3610.—Under the seniority system the men do not care for their officers, 3611.—Ever looked to the native officers as responsible for the interior economy in the men's lines, 3612.—The native officers should not be put under an ensign who does not know his work, and for that reason the irregular system the best, 3613, 3614.—Would give three or four companies to native, the rest to European officers, 3614.—System of promotion by selection entails communication between the European and native officers, and is therefore preferable to the seniority system, 3618.—There ought to be at least four European officers in a regiment of irregular cavalry, 3620.—With a native infantry regiment, fifteen, 3621-3623.—Should not like to see the regular regiments done away with altogether. Infantry regiments with only a few officers would not have a mess, and a regiment of infantry without a mess would degenerate, 3627.—Officers of the irregular cavalry are kept more on active service than the officers of an infantry regiment stationed for two or three years in a cantonment, and do not, therefore, require a mess so much, 3628-3630.—Would not introduce into the army the native gentry as officers, 3631.—Caste ought not to be acknowledged, except in the embarkation of troops, when dry provisions are laid in for the high-caste Hindoo, 3632-3638.—Enlistment should be for general service, 3641.—The Bengal army overgrown. If half the army was for Lower Bengal and half for the Punjab and Upper Provinces, it would be an advantage, 3639-3643.—Three years not too long to keep a regiment at the same station, but five is, 3650.—Cantonments of 5,000 men would be better than small detachments, 3652.—The powers of a commanding officer in Bombay are sufficient, 3653.—Never heard in Bombay of petitions being sent direct to the Commander-in-chief. Such practice strikes at the root of all discipline, 3654-3656.—Natives and Europeans should be raised only by brigades, 3659.—Sent up to the adjutant-general the names

of those havildars only whom he recommended for promotion, 3660-3663.—Never sent any names that a choice might be made, 3662.—Never had any complaints from men passed over, but it is beneficial to have officers of experience in command of companies; if all were boys the system might be abused, 3665.—No major is removed from the command of a regiment, but the lieutenant-colonel, under whom the major may be serving, is moved to the command of a regiment in which no field officer is present, in order that the not transferable major may obtain the command of his own regiment. It would be an improvement to remove the majors. Has himself been sent to three or four regiments in two years, 3666-3670.—The removal of majors was stopped in Bombay by orders from the Supreme Government, 3672.—Some of the native officers in the Bombay army were more efficient than some of the younger European officers, 3673.—They manœuvre a battalion very well, 3675.—The Bengal native officers appear to be much older than they ought to be, 3679.

WINTLE, Colonel EDMUND.

Has been thirty-nine years in the service, thirty-four of which in India. Belonged to the Bengal presidency, 3680-3684.—Taking all branches of the service, Europeans should be in the proportion of one to three, 3688.—Would have regular and irregular native infantry, 3691.—Promotion among the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers in Bengal goes by seniority, 3695, 3696.—Commanding officers of native regiments have not sufficient power, 3701.—Men appeal from them direct to the Commander-in-chief, 3701-3705.—Artillery should be European only, 3707.—Natives should not have the Minié rifle, 3709.—Powers taken away of late years from commanding officers described, 3715.—There must be native sappers and miners for the manual labour, 3720.—Castes should be distributed throughout regiments, 3723.—Inconvenience arises from the necessity of attending to caste in some matters, 3725.—Believes caste is not so much attended to at the other presidencies as at Bengal, 3732.—Practice of weekly guards is now going out, 3741.—Natives should be enlisted for general service, 3749, 3750.—Promotion of natives should be by selection, 3757.—Commanding officers have very little power in granting leave of absence, 3758.—Rule for granting it, 3759.—Establishment of officers sufficient, 3761.—Officers try to get on the staff, but not in civil appointments more than in military, 3766.—Native officers are of little use, 3769.—Would rather be without them, 3772.—Native gentlemen would not enter the line, 3774.—Would not put more European non-commissioned officers to native regiments, 3775, 3778.

VIVIAN, Major-General Sir ROBERT J. H., K.C.B.

Is a major-general on the Madras establishment; has been about 38 years in the service. Was adjutant-general of the Madras army five years, 3779, 3780.—Is in favour of a large body of European troops raised for service in India alone. It is essential that there should be likewise a large body of troops of the line. The bulk of the troops should be local, because troops of the line are liable to be withdrawn from India to meet emergencies elsewhere, 3782.—Troops raised for service in India would be only withdrawn under most extraordinary emergencies; the same emergencies would not arise if there are two separate forces, as there would be more troops at home; and if it was necessary to withdraw some troops from India, it might be done without the same risk, because there would be a fixed portion of troops there for service, 3782-3787.—Is aware that the European force is limited by Act of Parliament, 3788.—This force should be increased, 3789.—The advantage of a local force over regiments of the line, in a very great measure depends upon the liability of the latter to be removed, 3790.—Considers it is an advantage to instil fresh blood into India, but it does not meet the disadvantage of the troops being withdrawn on any great emergency, 3791, 3792.—The local European troops in India are equal to any troops in the world; no difference in their discipline or efficiency, 3793.—There always has been, and always will be, a certain amount of jealousy, 3794.—It is the object of military organization to prevent jealousy if it can be prevented, 3795.—Emulation exists in different regiments, but it exists to a greater extent when the services are distinct, 3797.—Though the whole of the European troops in India will be under Her Majesty, if the two armies are kept really distinct, there will be jealousy, 3798.—As a question of discipline and military organization, it never occurred to him when in India to make distinction between the two services, 3799.—Believes that regiments in India are ordinarily in as fine a condition as

regiments kept in England, 3800.—Advocates a local European force on financial grounds; employment must be provided for the officers whose services are at the disposal of the Government, in consequence of the mutiny of the native army;—the cost of the European officers of a regiment to and from India amounts to 11,000*l.*, and if the whole force now required in India were composed of troops of the line, there would be from 6,000 to 7,000 men continually on the seas, 3801.—If the existing officers were all accepted into regiments of the line, his argument on the ground of providing employment would drop, 3804.—The expense of a regiment in each service is nearly equal, 3805.—Independent of the regiments sent out as reliefs, draughts would be necessary for both services, 3806.—Presuming that regiments of the line are to form the European force in India, their reliefs will be an extra expense to the Indian finances, 3807.—The draughts are the same either way, 3808.—There would be a downright saving to the State by the force being local, 3809.—A European local corps is quite as efficient as a regiment of the line, 3812.—Would bow to the Duke of Wellington's opinion, but does not consider the local troops in India inferior, 3813-3815.—Has seen differences in Queen's regiments; all regiments cannot be kept up to the same state of discipline, 3816.—A European officer of the Indian army, after certain service, may retire on a pension, which is a charge on the resources of India, while no pension is paid to the Queen's officers; so far, the Indian finances would be relieved, 3820-3826.—A large increase to the establishment at Warley would be necessary, but even then the expense of a local force would not be the same, 3828.—Knows no reason why a recruit should cost the Indian Government more than he costs Her Majesty, 3830.—Has heard that Lord Hardinge recommended a frequent relief of the Royal troops, 3833.—Local corps desirable, because they have more experience of the climate, 3834.—Is surprised that regiments from Australia suffer more than regiments arriving from England, 3837.—Regiments on first arrival in India are subject to greater mortality than they are afterwards, 3838.—Local experience is of great importance: instanced by the case of Her Majesty's 71st regiment, 3839.—Considerable relief might be given to the recruiting at home by the admission of Indo-Britons into the local force, 3841.—They might also be introduced into the line. Pensioners from the local force select India for their place of residence, 3842.—Men discharged from the line do not stay in India, 3843.—The larger the local force, the larger will be the body of veterans and pensioners, 3845.—Veteran companies are not open to men of the line, 3847.—Local corps is the natural source from which the men required for the public works department are taken, 3848.—A local regiment quite equal to a regiment of the line, 3849.—The men of the local force fraternise and intermarry more with the natives than the men of the line, 3850.—Advocates a local force on account of the number of officers without employment in Bengal, 3852.—Does not think there is more than sufficient to officer 100,000 men, 3854.—If all these officers are employed by being attached to regiments of the line, the argument on the point of expense falls to the ground, 3855.—Was not aware that the local regiments have been invariably below their establishment 3850.—From the return of the military forces in India, the European foot artillery of the Company was, in 1852, 5173, and in 1857, 4390. These numbers in each year are more than the establishment. The European infantry regiments in 1852 had 449 supernumeraries; in 1853, 500. They were wanting to complete in 1854, 2125; in 1855, 933; in 1856, 545; and in 1857, 357. Recruiting fell off during the Crimean war, but increased again in 1856-57. Return of the recruits embarked for India from 1851 to 8th October 1858 inclusive, 3857.—Previous to 1853 the Company had the power of raising only 12,000 Europeans to be kept in India and 2,000 at home; in 1853 this power was increased to 20,000 men in India and 4,000 at home; in 1857 there were only 357 wanting to complete. Recruiting has been recently suspended because there were not barracks for the men, and the men have been sent out in a manner in which they would not ordinarily be sent, 3859-3865.—One-fourth or one-third of the European force in India should be regiments of the line. It is quite impossible to have in India less than from 60,000 to 70,000 Europeans, 3866.—Would have fewer regiments of the line than formerly because of the expense, 3867.—Contemplates raising this additional local force in the same manner as the force is now raised; attaches great importance to the local army, both officers and men, 3869-3875.—The establishments here must be increased. Recruiting for a large army in India and here is a difficult thing, but the

establishments would be able to raise them, 3875-3878.—A large majority of the 8,000 recruits sent out being only 5 ft. 2 in. does not prove the facility of recruiting, 3879.—Has no doubt that recruiting for two services may have the disadvantage of increasing desertion, but thinks that it might easily be checked, 3881.—Although there was 783 fewer foot artillerymen in India in 1857 than in 1852 they had supernumeraries to the last, 3882.—In 1852 there were 5,173; in 1857, 4,390; the establishment was 4,252, 3883.—Is not sure whether the half-castes are permitted to enlist, 3886.—At present there is a feeling against half-castes, because they have not the requisite stamina, 3889.—Would not disband regiments of the line to form local corps, but in lieu of sending out a regiment to relieve any regiment going home, would raise a local corps, 3890.—The pensioners of the Indian army not to be considered as part of the local force, two-thirds of any European force to be kept in India should be enlisted for local duties. There should be local artillery, cavalry, and infantry, both the armies to be Royal armies, 3892-3900.—The only change to be that the army is to be called a Royal army instead of being the army of the Company. Her Majesty is, through certain instrumentality, to exercise the same authority over both armies, 3901-3906.—Sees no objection to one army being responsible to the Secretary of State for War, and Commander-in-chief, and the other to the Secretary of State for India, 3907-3908.—Knows of no parallel case to the position the Government now holds as regards India, 3911.—Considers the Act definitive, that all the charges of that army are vested in the President in Council, 3913.—Sees no difficulty with regard to discipline in two armies, 3916.—Is not aware of any inconveniences which has arisen from the present arrangement, 3916.—The local army must be under the authority of the Governor-General, 3917.—It would detract from the prestige of the Governor-General to withdraw from him the supreme control of the army, 3918.—If the authority of the Commander-in-chief was established over the local army there might be conflicting opinions between him and the Council, 3920.—Measures might be proposed by him which the Council would not carry out, 3921.—Thinks that there would be collision between the Commander-in-chief and the Council of India, 3922-3927.—While there is a large native army the Governor-General should have over it the supreme authority, 3928.—Has never known an officer of Her Majesty's service appointed to superintend a court-martial on native troops, 3929.—Considers local knowledge and experience of the highest importance, 3932.—Competition in recruiting may be objectionable, but cannot conceive what difference it will make if parties are permitted to recruit for India, treating it as part of the same army, 3933.—There is objection to depending entirely on volunteering for keeping up the local establishment, 3935.—Volunteering to a certain extent advantageous, 3937.—If the bulk of the European force be composed of the line, the expediency of a transport service might be considered. Is doubtful whether it would be advantageous to have a depot at the Cape, 3938-3940.—With reference to the claims of the officers now in the service, considers a consolidation of the two services impracticable, 3941-3949.—There can be nothing unfair in a prospective arrangement. If the army in India is to be composed entirely of regiments of the line the sooner that arrangement is made the better, 3950.—If any portion of the army is continued a local army, and the military funds were allowed to drop, it would be a most fatal error, 3952.—The funds may to a certain extent encourage early marriages, 3953.—No advantage to the public service would accrue from exchanges, 3954.—The Government contribute largely to the funds, 3955.—The contribution of Government is less than the pensions would amount to if these funds were abolished, 3958.—Would encourage volunteering from the Queen's into the local force. The nucleus of a new corps to be attached to a Queen's regiment until officers and men become acquainted with their duties. Officers of native infantry regiments would require some such training, 3961.—Although a young officer is more likely to be thoroughly initiated in his military duties in a European than a native regiment, is not favourable to the system of attaching all cadets to European corps, 3962.

LUGARD, Major-General Sir EDWARD, K.C.B.

Has been in the army since 1828, and served in India 26 years; the staff appointments he has held 3963-3965.—The whole of the European troops in India should belong to the line, 3966.—This would be advantageous for imperial purposes, for discipline, and efficiency, 3967.—A tendency to a looseness of discipline in India, 3968,

3969.—A regiment too long in India deteriorates; after 12 or 15 years, it suffers from the climate, 3970-3973.—The efficiency caused by reliefs would counterbalance the expense, 3984, 3985.—Strongly objects to increasing the local force, 3990, 3991.—The local force does not mix more with the natives than does the line, 3992-3994.—The interpreter at head quarters for many years was a Queen's officer, 3995-3997.—If a career was opened to line officers, they would study the language, and the Government would have a larger field from which to select officers, 3998-4002.—If there was a large line army in India, many officers would devote their lives to India, 4003, 4004.—Many soldiers of the Queen's regiments speak the language, 4006.—The local regiments generally below their strength; Queen's regiments have been above their strength, 4007.—Local corps more lax in discipline than line troops, 4011-4019.—A regiment coming from England, brings with it an improved system, 4024.—A great army should have one interest, 4025, 4026.—Would make service with native troops a superior service, 4028.—Would raise the pay of the officers of native regiments; they will then take an interest in their corps, 4029-4033.—Advocates one European Queen's army, 4034.—The officers for the native corps should be selected from the European regiments, 4036.—For many years the discipline of the Bengal army has been very lax, 4059.—A local force is always inferior to a line force, 4040-4048.—Some reliefs should be sent direct from England, others should take a tour, 4050.—Recommends a steam transport service round the Cape, and 300 soldiers being sent via the Red Sea every month, so long as that route is open, 4051.—The Cape an advantageous climate for soldiers returning from India, 4052.—Cannot suggest any arrangement by which exchanges between officers of the two services could be effected; the amalgamation of the services must be prospective, 4056.—Exchanges would be desirable if they could be effected, 4057-4059.—Volunteering from regiments leaving India should be encouraged; recruits should be drilled before they go out to India, 4060.

HOLLAND, Colonel JAMES.

Is colonel on the retired list of the Bombay establishment. Served 32 years in India, principally on the staff. Was for the six last years quartermaster-general of the army; 4065.—A portion of the European force for India should be from the line, and a portion raised for service in India only, 4067.—Local European force should be strong enough to be self-dependent, and should be a powerful body as compared with the line, 4067, par. 2.—Beyond having more officers, can detect no superiority in the line over the local force. On the other hand, the officers of the local force have the advantage of local information and experience, 4067, par. 3.—If the local force were increased more officers would be available for staff, and the number withdrawn from regiments would be reduced, 4067, par. 4.—Increase of the line officers would place in the superior commands in India a body of officers without experience of the country, 4067, par. 4.—No European regiment is acclimatized till after a residence of two or three years, 4067, par. 4.—One-half only of the European force, cavalry and infantry, should be of the line, 4067, par. 5, 4068.—All the sappers should be local, 4067, par. 5.—Entire establishment of artillery should be supplied by the local army, 4067, par. 6.—60,000 Europeans will hereafter suffice for the garrison of India, 4069.—About 24,000 of these should be of the line, 4070.—Line force should not be larger than before, 4071.—A local force could not be withdrawn from India, 4073.—Opinions of Governors-General on this point, 4073.—In India the army should be mainly at the disposal of the local authorities, 4079.—Governor-General should have at his disposal a large body of officers trained from youth in India, and with no views beyond India, 4074.—Reliefs for the line could be effected much as at present. Reliefs cannot now be carried out as frequently as is desirable, 4075.—Line regiments should not be kept in India too long, so as to become localised, 4076.—Officers by long service in India become more efficient for their duties there, but not for duties elsewhere, 4077.—A large body of experienced men is necessary for India, 4078.—Many line officers after serving years in India, leave the country with little knowledge of it, 4080.—In the event of a war in Europe a line officer would throw up his appointment in India, to join his comrades in Europe, 4081.—The officers from the Company's armies, who were in the Turkish Contingent, were on leave, or had retired from the service, 4083.—Officers should adopt India as their country, 4084.—That is the great hold we have on India, 4085.—A minimum number of officers should be fixed to

be always present with regiments. Quality of officers of far more importance than their number. Field officers and commanders of regiments should be selected. Useless and incompetent men should be compelled to retire. Government should have the power of dispensing with their services when they are entitled to a pension, 4086.—They have not that power now, 4089.—Cadets might be appointed in England to the European or native branches according to their qualifications or choice. They should be equally eligible as now for staff employ, 4096.—Commander-in-chief of the three presidencies should be independent of each other, 4096, par. 2.—No Commander-in-chief or divisional general should be nominated to an Indian command who has not had local experience, 4096, par. 2.—An amalgamation of the two services most undesirable, 4096, par. 3.—It could not be effected without seriously compromising the prospects of the officers of the Indian army, 4096, par. 3.—Local force should be kept up by drafts and volunteers from the line, 4096, par. 4.—Large line force now in India might be reduced gradually, or be transferred by volunteering, 4103. And the officers placed on half-pay, 4104.—Recruiting for a local force would not materially interfere with the recruiting for the line, 4106.—Local force has not been kept to its full strength, owing to financial considerations, 4109, 4111.—Line regiments cost more because of the cost of reliefs, 4112.—A regiment newly landed and sent into the field loses men from their not being acclimatized, 4114.—Discipline in local regiments as good as in the line, 4120.—It is an advantage to the royal service to have royal artillery in India, but it would be disadvantageous to the public service to have any considerable portion of it there, 4124.—If the local governments had the power of altering the dress of the European soldier, it would be beneficial, 4130.—Uniform is not suited to the climate of India, 4134.—Troops in India wear light clothing during the hot weather, but not sufficient, 4143.—Officers of the line are always liable to be recalled from India, 4165.—Lieutenant-colonels in the Indian army are available for general service, and are constantly brought into contact with natives, 4170.—Line officers would not have the abiding interest in India that the local officers have, 4171.—If it be wished to get for the Indian service the greatest number of efficient men, the main body must be a local force, 4171.—Officers do not associate so much with natives as formerly, 4174.—Local force should be increased, otherwise they will not carry much weight, 4176.—Very great advantage arises to the English army from having troops of the line in India, 4177.—Local force must be recruited in England, 4181.—There might be the army of the east and the army of the west, 4183.—With one exception there is no instance of a commander-in-chief in India being selected from the local officers, 4184.—Officers of the line have much the greater proportion of commands, 4184.—The chief honour falling to officers holding superior commands, it follows that the line officers reap those honours more than the local officers, 4187.—Local army should be irrespective of the control of the Commander-in-chief here, 4190.—Native army could not be efficiently officered by line officers, 4193.—If there were only a native local army it would be looked down upon, 4195.—Company's officers have not their full proportion of honours, 4204.—Number of officers holding divisional and brigade commands, 4206.—Queen's troops in India should be auxiliary to the Company's troops, 4208.—Proportion between the Queen's and Company's troops in Bombay, 4209.—Native officers should be retained, 4200.

FRANKS, Major-General Sir T. H., K.C.B.

Has served in India fifteen years, 4212.—Recently commanded a division in the field, 4213.—European force in India should be wholly composed of troops of the line, 4214.—Reasons for this opinion, 4215.—Such a force more efficient, 4216.—Regiments coming fresh from England an advantage, 4218.—After a lengthened service in India discipline deteriorates, 4220.—Twelve or thirteen years service long enough, 4221.—Nothing can surpass the gallantry of the local force, but it is not equal in discipline to the line, 4222.—As respects discipline a great deal depends on the commanding officer, 4224.—Has known regiments in first-rate order after a long service in India, but these are rare exceptions, 4229.—In sixteen years his regiment, the 10th foot, has had 1,200 casualties of all kinds, 4231-4233.—Local experience is of the greatest advantage, but it could be acquired in five or six years, 4235, 4236.—One of the causes of the local force not being in such good discipline in quarters is the paucity of officers, 4238.—Company's officers generally made more efficient staff officers than the line; but recently Her Majesty's force in India has produced numbers of first-

rate staff officers, 4240.—Making them eligible for staff employ has created the difference, 4242.—Until lately very few staff appointments were open to them, 4244.—They have not had an undue proportion of high commands, 4245, 4246.—If employments were open to them they would prepare themselves for them, 4253.—The two services have not equal claims to employment on the staff, 4254.—Supply of light clothing in India is regulated by an order of the Commander-in-chief in India, 4259-4262.—It is paid for entirely by the men, 4265, 4266.—The uniform is regulated by Her Majesty's warrant, 4268.—Is in favour of sending troops by way of the Cape of Good Hope, 4270.—A regiment should not be kept in India beyond twelve or thirteen years, and for three years of that it should be cantoned at a hill station, 4273.—Does not see how exchanges between the two services are to be carried out; but the advantages would be great, if it could be so arranged. Under the present system the army cannot be efficient; 4274.—Two separate armies, with different discipline, very objectionable, 4275.—Native troops should be the same as the colonial corps, 4276.—Officers with them would not be looked down upon, 4277.—Line officers would go into them, 4278.—An officer could not command a native regiment without speaking the language, 4286.—Any system of exchange must apply to officers hereafter entering the service, 4289, 4290.—The claims of officers now in the service being duly considered, the question is a simple one, 4292.—Force should be kept up by recruits from England. System of volunteering is most injurious, 4297.—Unless there is one united army in India, there will never be a perfectly effective one, 4298.—Recruiting for two separate armies is a great disadvantage, 4299.—Is strongly opposed to filling up vacancies in any regiment in India, line or local, by volunteering, 4301.

BENNY, CHARLES, C.B.

Was surgeon-general and member of the medical board in Bengal, 4302.—Was forty-four and a-half years there, 4303.—Is of opinion that troops should be raised for service in India only, 4306.—Health of local troops has been as good as that of the line under considerable disadvantages, 4307.—The best men are withdrawn from the local regiments for staff appointments, 4312.—A European soldier should be efficient for at least fifteen years, 4315.—Considers this the limit, 4316.—European troops should be located in stations as elevated as possible, and well and carefully selected, 4321.—Reliefs should arrive in India in October or November. They should be sent via the Cape in steamers, 4322.—Loss of men would be greater by the Overland route, 4324.—Clothing of the troops in India is too thick and warm, 4329.—It is said they are not permitted to wear the light clothing they have, 4331.—Owing to regimental regulations, 4336.—Indian medical service is a military branch, but a portion is employed on civil duties, 4347.—Force could not be kept up by volunteering alone, 4349.—Company's recruits are rather inferior, 4351.—New barracks are better than the old, 4355.—They are somewhat raised, and the more recently erected have upper rooms, 4356.—Regiments in first going out suffer much from cholera, 4359.—Arrack most detrimental to health, 4360.—Beer has a beneficial effect, 4363.—Hospitals are much improved, 4364.—In Bengal the average mortality is about 5 per cent. per annum, to strength, 4373.—At Bombay about the same; at Madras 3 per cent., 4374.

MARTIN, JAMES RANALD, F.R.S.

Belonged to the medical staff of the Bengal army; was twenty-two years in India, 4378.—Is the author of a work on the influence of tropical climates on European constitutions, and of various reports on the sanitary condition of the army of India, 4380.—Submits the result of inquiries as to the effect of tropical climates on the constitution of Europeans, officers and soldiers, 4383, (1).—No advantage in the way of acclimation has hitherto been derived from length of residence, 4383, (4).—Annual mortality after certain periods of residence, 4383.—Reasons for the large mortality in regiments on first arrival in India, 4383, (7).—Suggestions with respect to securing the efficiency of European troops in India, 4383, (1).—They should be removed to the mountain ranges, 4383.—A man who has suffered severely from the serious diseases of India is generally injured for service in a tropical climate, and should at once be sent home, 4383, (6).—As to the period at which British soldiers should be relieved, it should depend on the state of their health after a service of ten years, 4383.—Statistical reports much required, 4383.—As regards the preservation of European health in India, due selection of locality is the first considera-

tion, 4383.—A series of careful examinations should take place of the lower and medium ranges of hills throughout India, and a medical officer of health should be appointed at each presidency. Suggestions for the investigation of mountain climates in India, 4383.—Prolonged residence in India leads to physical degradation, 4385.—Reliefs should be frequent, 4386.—Climate of the hills will prevent disease, but will not cure it, 4388.—Men sent home owing to acute tropical disease will recover so as to be able to do duty in another climate, 4390.—Men are unwilling to acknowledge illness owing to the heavy hospital stoppages, 4397.—Troops when sent to the hills have been hitherto carried to too great an elevation, 4398.—There are other elevations which have been overlooked, but which would be of extreme value. Names of these, 4401.—Troops should be brought from the hills for exercise from November to March, 4406.—Mortality is always greater among young officers and soldiers, 4415.—Middle-aged officers and soldiers have always far out-worked the younger, 4418.—Physically, there is no such thing as acclimation, 4423.—Had never seen a good barrack in India, 4424.—The one in Sind, erected by Sir Charles Napier, is said to be very fine, 4424.—Cholera invariably attacks the dissipated, 4428.—Soldiers inhabiting the lower ranges of barracks suffer more than those in the upper rooms, 4430.—Barracks in tropical climates should be raised on arches; they should be two stories high, and the roof should be double, 4435.—They are generally built on the ground in India, 4436.—Average age of a British regiment may be set down at 26 years; a Company's regiment the same, 4439, 4440.—Present clothing suitable only for the cold season, 4445.—Soldiers should not be called on for their utmost exertion till they are 23 years of age, 4451.—Under proper regulations, a soldier may serve many years in India, 4452.—Spirit ration an injury, but a dram after dinner does no harm, 4453.—In the morning it is deleterious, 4454.—Establishment of convalescent hospitals, a great desideratum, 4461.—Army of India should not be composed exclusively of troops of the line. Soldiers should be raised for service in India only. There should be model battalions of the Queen's army. The two armies should be maintained as separate and distinct bodies. Has not been able to arrive at any scheme of exchange from one branch to the other. Opinion of the Duke of Wellington quoted, 4462. Competition more important than unity of action, 4463.—Never saw or heard anything but a good feeling of emulation between the two services, 4446.—Immense advantage, no doubt, would result from the interchange of eminent officers, 4468.—There is a double staff in India. On the plea of competition this may be an advantage. Is not aware of any disadvantage from this beyond the expense, 4474, 4475.—The local force should be more than the half, 4477.—Soldiers who have served in India are averse to European service afterwards, 4480.—There is little difference in the sickness of a line and a local regiment, 4485, 4486.—Any plan of exchange leaving out the relative condition of age between officers would be prejudicial, 4489.—Company's regiments not so smart as those recently arriving, but this has never detracted from their efficiency in the field, 4494.—Regiments coming from home will always be held up as patterns, 4498.—No difference in recruits sent out. Those for the artillery fine, 4504.—Drafts should arrive the first or second week in November, 4505.—Discharged men from the Company's service re-enlist, 4506.—Good discipline is a most powerful element in the health of a regiment, 4512.—Permanent regiments are more agreeable to the natives than regiments coming and going, and this is advantageous, 4515, 4516.

TULLOCH, Colonel Sir ALEXANDER, K.C.B.

Is at present attached to the statistical department, War Office. Served four years in India, 4519.—No object can be attained by the employment of a local force which cannot be gained as well by the employment of troops of the line. All the duties could be performed as well or better by the line. Bounty should not be allowed on volunteering in India. Facility of volunteering gives to the soldier all the advantages he could obtain in a local force, without its disadvantages. All military legislation for the last twenty years has been opposed to prolonged tropical service. In the West Indies the term of service has been reduced from eleven or twelve years to three or four years, with the greatest benefit. Mortality at every age among troops for seven years, in every climate, as illustrative of the influence of age in the climate, 4522.—The longer stay in India, the more likely is health to be deteriorated, 4525.—Loss in regiments relieved every ten years must be less than in regi-

ments permanently resident. As respects expense of reliefs, an important change will be made in the local force by the Limited Enlistment Act now coming into operation. If the men wish to come home, they must be discharged at the end of ten years. In the event of a European war, second battalions could be raised for the line force, and the first battalions brought home. Some question of pay, or other coveted advantage, might induce a local force to mutiny. Such a case has arisen. If this happened in a line regiment it could be immediately removed. The larger the army the greater this danger. Whatever force may be employed, the large establishment which will be required in future can only be kept up by a much greater economy of life. Table of mortality for forty years. Proportion invalided, &c. Average number of recruits raised in the United Kingdom annually, 4527.—Selection of healthy stations no longer a matter of choice, but necessity. Abstract sickness and mortality at stations in the Indian presidencies from 1817 to 1836, and 1838 to 1856, 4527.—Comparative estimates of the cost of reliefs by the Cape and Red Sea. Arrangement by which the latter route might be made the cheaper. Forces might be consolidated so as to admit of exchanges from one branch to the other. The officers of the Bengal presidency are in a different position from the others. There the native army no longer exists. Those under the rank of field officer should be liable to be transferred to the new European corps to be formed, and if they decline, should be placed on retired list. At Madras and Bombay they should only be transferred at their own request. Value of their claims on the funds could be calculated, and this should be repaid to those leaving the native army. Great advantages would arise to both armies by the interchange of officers, 4529.—All regiments of the line raised for India might be non-purchasing corps. Local force would be kept up by both recruiting and volunteering, as at present, 4529.—6*d.* a day is stopped from the men's pay on board ship, 4534.—One system under one head would add to the strength of the nation, rather than diminish it, 4536.—Officers of the local force coming home have nothing to do. Line officers are available in both countries, 4539.—Emulation of corps in one army is a different thing from the emulation of two armies, 4541.—If there is to be a large European army it should be entirely local, and all line regiments be withdrawn, 4552.—The two combined would not be good. Regular army derives advantage from service in India, 4553.—Having had a portion of it in India has produced good effects, 4555.—Would prefer 60,000 or 70,000 of the line and a few battalions of the other, if they must be had, 4559.—Present local regiments, and those to be raised, should be numbered as regiments of the line. Officers should be removed to them according to their standing, 4561.—It rests with those who say there should be two armies to show the reasons for it, 4568.—If the whole were a local force, it might involve a serious question as to discipline, 4569.—Expense of reliefs in future will be much the same for both forces, owing to the Limited Enlistment Act, 4572.—Soldiers for the local corps enlist now for ten years only. They do not go out intending to remain more than the others, 4580.—About 2½ per cent. now come home annually, 4581.—Indian Government should repay to officers exchanging from the local force their contributions to the funds, 4582.—Estimate of the cost of converting a sailing 80-gun ship into a screw ship for the conveyance of troops, 4582.—Relative cost of a regiment of the line and of a local European corps, 5983.—Queen's officers returning from India do duty with the depôts. East India Company's officers have none to go to, 5987.—A great number of the civil appointments in India might be filled at a cheap rate by persons from this country, 5995.—A Queen's officer coming home is replaced from the depôt, and the officer coming home goes there, 6002.—Local European corps have more officers with less men, 6009.—Explanation respecting the relative cost of the Cape and Red Sea routes for relief of troops in India, 6011.—Value of a soldier's rations on board ship on 1st May 1858, 6011.—Purchase system provides for one half of the Queen's officers. They cost the public nothing on quitting, 6013.—Cost of retiring pensions in the Queen's and Company's services, 6014.—Value of all the commissions in the army about 7,000,000*l.*, 6016.—2,870 pensioners from the Company's service are paid here, 6021.—These have all very nearly completed 21 years' service, 6023.—They do not remain in India so much as formerly. Reason for this, 6025.—Regiments on embarking for India have a great many men discharged from it as unfit for the service, others are left at the depôt, 6035.—Few of the men are 30 years old, 6037.—Expense of drafts for the two

services about the same, 6038.—Men of local force after serving ten years will now return home, 6039.—On a regiment returning all the efficient men are permitted to volunteer to corps remaining, 6044.—The regiment comes home a skeleton, and a perfect regiment goes out, 6045.—On completion of ten years' service men should come home, 6046.—Men of short periods of service come home, 6048.—Explanation as to the deaths in India between 1815 and 1855, 6051.—Greater portion of that loss might have been saved, 6052.—Health of troops in India equal to that of troops in England, if located on elevated table land, 6057.—About 2,800 feet above the sea the most eligible elevation, 6059.

COTTON, General Sir WILLOUGHBY, G.C.B.

Went to India with the rank of full colonel in 1821, 4584.—Commanded the Madras troops employed in Burmah in 1825-26, with the rank of brigadier-general, 4584.—Has held staff appointments in India, 4584.—Commanded the Bengal troops employed beyond the Indus in 1838 to 1840, 4584.—Was Commander-in-chief at Bombay from 1847 to 1851, 4584.—As India is now under Her Majesty's government there ought to be but one European army, and that called a royal army, 4591.—It should be recruited wholly in England, but regiments coming home should give volunteers to it, 4591.—Period of service in India of a regiment should not exceed fourteen years, 4591.—It should be a general Queen's army. Great difficulties will arise with respect to the European officers, but they are not insurmountable, 4592.—The Company's European officers should be blended by exchanges with the Queen's army until the whole becomes one system, 4593.—The whole army in India should be formed of Queen's troops from England, 4605.—It should be one army under the Commander-in-chief at home, 4606.—But the authorities at Madras and Bombay should have the power of moving troops, 4607.—Each presidency should still have its Commander-in-chief, 4610.—In the field it is not possible that there should be a more efficient force than the Indian artillery, 4618.—Better staff officers than the Indian army has produced it is not possible to have, 4619.—Europeans and natives have behaved in the most gallant manner, 4620.—Commander-in-chief in England should have the supreme control over the European army in India, 4632.—Local European troops have always behaved remarkably well in quarters, 4649.—Always opposed the withdrawal of more officers from a regiment, if the prescribed quota were already on staff employ, 4651.—Relief of regiments should be effected by large steamers, via the Cape of Good Hope, 4660.—It is conducive to discipline and health to have a whole regiment together on board ship, 4661.—Formation of rules regarding the exchanges between officers of the two services most difficult, 4664.—If the difficulties could be got over, such exchanges would be most desirable, 4665.—And an advantage to both services, 4666.

CAMPBELL, Colonel GEO.

Commands the 52nd regiment. Has been in India about four and a half years, 4806, 4807.—Has been latterly on field service at Delhi, 4809.—And commanded a brigade at Lucknow, 4810.—The local force, if it be necessary to have one, should not exceed one-fourth of the number of the troops, 4812.—Would rather the whole European force should be a royal one, 4813.—In the local force the discipline is inferior, 4816-4819.—Officers of European regiments should go out as formed officers, 4823.—Climate would not deteriorate discipline if it were properly looked after, 4832.—Has only seen one line regiment in India in a low state of discipline, 4839.—Relief of troops can only be effected from England, 4845.—Any previous residence at the Cape of no advantage; a dépôt for invalids might be formed there, 4846-4849.—Cape route is better than the Egypt route, 4849.—12 years' service in India at the outside should be exacted from regiments, 4850.—Retaining them after a certain period acts disadvantageously, 4854.—Men dislike India most the first two or three years, 4857.—Sees no objection to men exchanging from regiments ordered home to regiments remaining, 4860, 4861.—Exchanges of officers would not be desirable for the local force, 4865.—Local force should be kept up by recruiting and volunteering, 4872-4874.

PRATT, Major-General THOS. S., C.B.

Has been 25 years in India. Was deputy adjutant-general in Her Majesty's forces at Madras, from 1844 to 1856, 4875-4879.—Served in Bengal for nine years, 4880.—And three years in China, 4881.—European force in India should be, if not all together, at least the greater part, composed of troops of the line, 4883.

—Reliefs should be effected by troop-ships of the royal navy, both by the Cape and the Red Sea, 4883.—Good feeling and harmony will never be perfect until the armies serving in India cease to be separate bodies, 4883.—All future European troops for service in India, should be regular troops of the line, 4883.—Compulsory subscriptions to the funds for the future, is a question now to be considered, 4883.—Would permit exchanges in all ranks of the two services, 4883.—In native regiments, they would only be admissible in the very junior ranks, 4883.—European force should be kept up solely by recruiting; system of volunteering very objectionable, 4883.—55,000 or 60,000 Europeans ample after tranquillity is restored, 4885.—Would like to see one distinct army in India under one Commander-in-chief, with deputies in the other presidencies, and one set of pay and audit regulations, 4907.—Present powers of Commanders-in-chief at Madras and Bombay, 4908.—Case of a soldier of the 4th regiment convicted of attempt to murder, 4911.—There should be but one army in India to do away with all jealousies, 4912.—Does not think the fact recently of some of the troops not being mutinous was caused by the division of the armies, 4919.—The Madras army was in an admirable state of discipline. Discipline and interior economy of Her Majesty's troops there were nearly perfect, 4924.—Division into three armies has led to a most injurious result, 4927.—Cases where inefficient officers command regiments are isolated cases, 4932.—Exchanges in the junior grades might be effected without injury, 4941.—Officers appointed from England to the native army would not be looked down upon, 4943.—Native army should be small and well armed, 4946.—With the Enfield rifle, 4948.—120,000 natives to 60,000 Europeans ample, 4954.—Would not arm police in the same way, 4957.—System of a local European force should not be perpetuated, 4972.—All new enlistments should be for general service, 4972.—Faith must be kept with the officers now in the service, 4973.—As respects exchanges, the funds make a difficulty; they should not be perpetuated, 4978-4980.—Subscriptions to them should no longer be compulsory, 4985.—Under the 10 years' enlistment Act, soldiers of the local force claim to come home at the expiration of that period, 4989.—With regard to reliefs for the local force, an expense is incurred in the transfer of individuals if not of a body, 4991.—Officers of the local force have large retiring pensions, 4993.—This expense would be saved by employing a line regiment, 4994.—If men were near their discharge, they would not be sent to India, 4998.—Supercession of Her Majesty's colonels by colonels of the East India Company's service, under warrant of Her Majesty, 1854, 4999.—Proportion of commands in India ordered not to be interfered with by local governments, 5007.—Having one army would do away with jealousies in every possible way, 5011.

RAMSAY, Major BALCARRES DALRYMPLE WARDLAW.

Is brevet major, 75th foot. Has served in India on three different occasions, 5014.—Had charge of the adjutant and quartermaster-general's department at Calcutta, 5015.—The European army in India should be entirely line, 5016.—A double staff most objectionable, 5016.—Quartermaster-general of Queen's troops could not carry into effect the orders he received as to those troops, 5018.—There have been uncomfortable feelings between the officers of the two services, 5021.—This would be rather heightened in future, 5022.—If the officers of the local force were transferred to the line they would consider themselves in a better position, 5025.—Power of exchange would, in a great measure, do away with any feeling of inferiority, 5030.—In all armies a uniformity of feeling is a great advantage, 5032.—Most of the junior officers of the local army would desire to be incorporated with the line, 5034.—The local European corps are decidedly inferior, as respects discipline, 5035.—There is great want of discipline among the Company's invalids, 5037.—The local European corps have comparatively few officers, 5040.—Want of discipline attributable to this, 5041.—Invalids are sent down for embarkation without officers, 5044.—Want of unanimity among the staff would be obviated by having one army only, 5051.—If there is to be a local force, exchanges should be permitted, 5053.—It should be under the Commander-in-chief at home, as respects discipline, 5055.—Subject as now to local orders, 5056.—Officers of native regiments should have extra pay, 5057.—Native army should be officered from the general body of officers, 5058.—Would not make a difference in the arms of the natives, 5061.—Would train them equally well, 5062.—Superior number of appointments held by Company's officers had

something to do with the feelings of jealousy, 5067.—If appointments were thrown open, all would qualify for them, 5068.—Service in India would be far from unpopular, 5069.—Appointments at home should also be thrown open to both, 5070.—Officers of the line appointed to native corps would conciliate the men, 5072.—There has been a careless feeling of late among young officers of native regiments, 5073.—Officers remaining long in India imbibe strong prejudices, 5074.—Good feeling between Her Majesty's line regiments and the native troops, 5076.—Young officers of the present day do not associate with the natives as formerly, 5077.—All the officers of the late Company's service could be employed in India advantageously, 5084.—Has not served with local European corps, 5088.—Natives should be employed away from their homes, 5095.—Drunkenness in a regiment at Calcutta arose from want of proper arrangements for its reception, 5103.

DURAND, Colonel H. Y. M., C.B

Belongs to the Bengal engineers; has served 28 years in India, 5105, 5107.—Appointments he has filled, 5108.—Was directed to deliver to the Secretary of State the general views of the Governor-General on the organization of the Indian army, 5110.—His own opinions coincide with those of the Governor-General, 5112.—Considers that 45 battalions of European infantry will ultimately suffice for Bengal and 12 for Madras, and about the same number for Bombay, 5113-5118.—Two-thirds of this force should be local, and one-third of the line, 5119.—A large local force is necessary, upon the principle of economy, for the purpose of affording employment for the officers of the Bengal army, in order to get rid of the useless expenditure of having a large number of officers who have no corps. The military expenditure in 1856-57 was 7,000,000*l.*; for 1857-58, it is estimated at 11,000,000*l.*; also, because a body of officers are required in India, who look upon India, for the greater part of their lives, as their homes, 5120.—The native army is 30,000 in excess of what it was previous to the mutiny; a great number of the officers are temporarily employed in command of these levies, 5121-5124.—The withdrawal of the line regiments will be a slow operation, because the raising the local corps will take time. There would therefore be no inconvenience from the return home of those line regiments which have been raised for this service, 5125.—It is absolutely necessary that India should be free from the danger of a sudden recal of a large body of European troops, in consequence of a European war, 5126.—The responsibility of the withdrawing the troops rests with the Government, but the home pressure will not be withstood, 5128.—In the event of a European war, public opinion, which influences every government here, would be concentrated upon the European difficulty, and the risk to India would be overlooked, 5131.—It takes time to get over the technical difficulties of moving a local force to and fro: the Government would consider the matter before they stripped the Indian empire of that force, 5132-5134.—For the future, India must be held by well balanced forces, and a large permanent European force will always be required. The object of paramount importance is England itself; but that paramount importance is perilled by endangering India, if India be suddenly stripped of troops, 5135-5140.—The local force would be available for service in Europe in case of extreme emergency; but there would be a useful check to its employment in Europe, to the danger of India, without mature considerations, 5142-5146.—The distance of India from this country renders the immediate services of the local force unavailable, 5147.—A large force at home for the purpose of relieving the troops in India, would add to the military power of this country with respect to Europe, but would not give stability to our Indian empire. If the natives see our army always changing, it will have a great political bearing on them, 5148.—The natives are aware that an extreme exertion was made to meet the late Indian emergency, 5149.—They will regard officers unaccustomed to the country as a transient body, and as another element of instability, 5150.—Never observed any difference in the discipline of the local force, as compared with that of the line, 5151.—Not much difference in the discipline of all three armies, 5152.—As the amount of European force to be maintained is the minimum required for India, there should be a check against its recall by its being local, 5153-5156.—Does not consider the local service as a competing force in recruiting against the line. It is all under the Crown, and to all intents a royal army, 5157-5159.—The views and interests of both should be the same, 5160-5162.—The local army is under the Government of India and Secretary of State for India, acting, he supposes, with the advice of the Commander-in-chief in this country,

5163, 5164.—Considers it of great importance that the Governor-General of India and Secretary of State for India should have great powers for India; that country cannot be managed otherwise, 5165-5167.—The armies of India, by the 56th clause of the Act, are directed to continue in their actual position, 5168.—If the local force is increased, the principle upon which the Government of India has been conducted is not altered, 5170, 5171.—Does not consider an increase of the local force would be detrimental to Great Britain, 5172.—Not aware of any injury having resulted to the public service from there having been two armies, 5173, 5174.—Understands the Act for the time being to limit and define the status of the local Indian army, 5175-5179.—Cannot adduce an instance of two armies serving one country under two heads. There is no parallel case to India, 5180.—The two services do not involve a difference of interest; they serve the same executive, 5181-5183.—The home Government on any emergency would not at any time be able to withdraw more than the proportion of line regiments proposed by Lord Canning, 5184, 5185.—The field of India is of great advantage to the officers of England; therefore, would not close that field to the line by having the whole force local, 5186-5188.—The number of colonels of the local force being reduced, the officers of the line would have their proportion of commands, 5189, 5190.—Lord Canning wishes to guard against the risk of the local force being looked down upon by the line by providing for exchanges, 5191-5196.—Exchanges may be regarded in a politic and a personal point of view. Politically, it is desirable that there should be the power of exchange, and if two officers can satisfy their own executives that the exchange is proper with reference to the individuals, it must be a question of pecuniary arrangement between them, 5197-5203.—The strength of the artillery before the mutiny was altogether 78 companies, including contingents, 5204.—The number of officers of artillery unemployed, 5205-5223.—The artillery was under-officered; the cry was always for more officers, 5224-5227.—The raising the local force will be so gradual a process that the disembodiment of the line troops now in India will not throw any number of officers on the country at once, and the advantages of having a local army would overbalance the temporary disadvantages, 5230-5232.—The one is a temporary inconvenience, the other involves the safety of India, 5234.—Because if there was no check on the withdrawal of troops from India it would be very likely to cause the loss of India, 5235.—Because a body of officers accustomed to the country are required who are not liable to be relieved, 5236.—India was in a different state during the Peninsular war to what it is now, 5237, 5238.—If allowed, a portion of the line regiments now in India would volunteer for the local corps, 5239.—Does not consider it an equal hardship to the officer of Her Majesty's service to be unemployed, as it is to the officer of the local service, because the former entered the service liable to be placed on half-pay, and the other on certain conditions which have lately been assured to him by the Act, 5240-5244.—It is to the advantage of the Government to employ the officers accustomed to the country, 5246.—The relative feeling between the officers of the two services, 5248-5253.—Too much care cannot be taken in keeping the armies of the three presidencies distinct. The amalgamation would tend to fuse the three armies together, 5253.—The local European forces of the three armies cannot be amalgamated without fusing all the armies into one, 5254.—The European officers of the local force and the native army have the same interests, 5257.—Instances have occurred in which they have shown a disposition to defend their own interests, 5258.—Not necessary to keep the Line army in preponderance, for the purpose of balancing that interest, if both armies are treated alike, 5261-5264.—Amalgamation would strip the Governor-General of authority by introducing into the local service a system of promotion which would be in no respect under the local government, 5265, 5266.—Considers a local army, looking to the Governor-General and local Commander-in-chief as its immediate superiors, far more closely connected with India than any portion of the general service army, 5265-5275.—Lord Elphinstone's opinion on this point, 5276.—Always looked upon the native portion as auxiliary to the European portion of the army, 5277, 5278.—If political considerations be excluded, one army under one control would be advantageous, 5280.—The discipline of the army in India is brought through the Government of India before the Government here, who consult the Commander-in-chief, 5281.—The Commander-in-chief in England should not exercise direct action upon the local armies without reference to the local governments, 5284.—Because none but the local governments

are competent to deal with the complex regulations, 5285.—This state of things unavoidable where there are three distinct armies, 3286.—It is almost impossible for one government to write instructions exactly to another upon anything which involves these regulations, 5288.—This creates no advantage to the Europeans, but the amalgamation of the European branches would lead to the fusion of the native troops, 5289.—The tendency to assimilate and centralise has been carried too far, the powers of commanding officers of native troops should be increased, 5290-5292.—It has been mainly the Commanders-in-chief who have adopted this centralising system, 5293.—Has heard that jealousies existed between the commanders of the Bombay and Bengal armies, 5295.—Nothing should be done to diminish the power of the local governments; the Commander-in-chief here should not have direct control of the armies in India, everything should be done through the Secretary of State and the Government, 5296-5299.—Considers the Indian army as belonging to the Crown; does not know the working of the Cabinet, 5300-5303.—There is no danger of a small numerical force of the general service army in India being looked down upon by reason of its smallness, whereas there is a great danger of a small local army in the presence of a preponderant line force being regarded as an inferior service, 5304-5306.—As regards the services getting on well together, has not seen any difference, 5307, 5308.—The two services have not been placed exactly on an equal footing by the home authorities, 5309, 5310.—The political advantages of having a local European force overbalances the minor disadvantage of jealousy which may exist, 5311.—A permanent local European force preferable to a system which involves rapid changes and direct action from home upon the armies, 5312.—The position of the Governor-General would be lowered in the eyes of the natives if he had not control of the armies, 5314.—Would give a consultative power to the Commander-in-chief here, to be exercised over the Indian army through the Secretary of State and Government of India, but no direct authority or control over the local Commander-in-chief, 5315-5317.—Not the same advantage to the local artillery in the royal artillery going to India, 5318-5329.—If all the European troops in India were of the line, there must be a large increase to the civil list, because there would not be a sufficient number of officers qualified for the civil appointments, 5330.—Does not consider the presence of the royal artillery in India necessary as an example to the Indian artillery, which as a scientific body are unequalled, 5336.—The officers of a local force look to the local government for promotion, 5339, 5340.—A good commanding officer of a native regiment will most likely make a good commanding officer of a European regiment, 5341.—There is nothing in the habit of dealing with native troops which should preclude the officers of the native infantry doing well with European troops, 5344.—Apprehends a difficulty in obtaining non-commissioned officers; volunteers might be received from the line, 5345-5349.—Some officers prefer serving with natives, others with Europeans; it is an advantage for officers to be trained to both, 5350-5352.—Exchanges between officers of the two services desirable; they would produce a satisfactory feeling, 5353-5356.—Would trust the respective heads of the two armies to protect the forces which they represent against bad bargains and to the personal interest of the two individuals to arrange what either of them should pay, 5358-5361.—If there was no local European force in India, the chance of long and frequent service in India would have a tendency to diminish the number of men of rank and wealth entering the army, 5362.—Would limit the power of exchange to the case where the value of the lives of the parties were equal; the officer exchanging from the local service must satisfy the funds and his own government, and the officer from the line must satisfy his. The Commanders-in-chief and the managers of the funds would arrange it, 5363-5370. The officer exchanging must do whatever is found necessary, in order that he may be a just equivalent for the man he replaces, 5371-5376.—Exchanges would seldom take place except in the junior ranks; the adjustment of the claims would be difficult, but not impossible, 5378-5380.—It would facilitate the arrangement if the Government undertook the liabilities of the funds, 5381-5383.—The sympathy of the people is against us in that part of the country where the military operations are being carried on, 5385.—The preponderance of the Punjaabee element in our present native army very dangerous, and on this account Lord Canning urges that the views of the Home Government should be sent to him without delay, and that a local Bengal army should be immediately placed on a footing which will

permit the Government at once to proceed to reduce this Punjaabee element, 5386.—Lord Canning proposes to raise some local European battalions, and augment the artillery, 5387.—Comparative advantages in augmenting the local artillery to sending to India more royal artillery, 5388-5411.—There has been an assimilation of the grades of officers of the Indian with the royal artillery, but no augmentation, 5413, 5414.—No want of employment for artillery officers; there is a deficiency of officers, 5415-5420.—Would not change the Bengal organization on account of the expense, 5421-5427.—Artillery in India should always feel that it has European horse and foot for support, 5428.—The detachment system, comprising more men than the Bengal system, is the most efficient for service; but it would not be advantageous to put the whole of the artillery in India on that system, 5430.—In a military point of view an increase to the establishment would be advantageous, but not in a financial one, 5431-5437.—Believes that batteries have often been left with only one officer, 5439.—The Indian artillery is under officered, 5441.—The materiel of all the artillery should be of the same pattern, 5442.—Until a local army is formed the Government in India is exposed to the chance of the European troops being withdrawn from emergency at home. No time should be lost in forming this force, 5497.—It would take eighteen months to form a regiment, 5451.—The effect of European recruits being sent out is important on the people, 5452.—A body of trained men would have a greater effect as regards military efficiency in the field, but a local force would have more moral influence, 5453-5456.—Advocates a local army because officers and men become acclimated, 5457-5465.—The order directing commanding officers to be selected, emanated from home, 5469.—Great stress is laid on the necessity of increasing the powers of commanding officers; it is therefore a matter of great moment that the officers who join the army should be officers of higher attainments than youths of sixteen usually are, 5470.—The power of selection must be exercised with wisdom and discretion, 5474.—As far as his experience goes the appointment for brigade and divisional commands has been by selection, 5475.—Officers have repeatedly been transferred from the command of natives to the command of Europeans, 5479.—The Punjaabee levies are not under the Articles of War; commanding officers can dismiss for misconduct, and the board of administration can increase or diminish the force, 5480-5484.—The commanding officer of a native regiment should have great power, 5487.—Would not limit the Crown in the selection of the Commander-in-chief, 5491-5493.—The position of the Commander-in-chief in India if selected from the local force, 5494-5497.—The army, both European and native, must be subordinate to the Government of India, 5499.—Reasons for retaining the commissioned grades in the native army. Promotion should be made for merit combined with seniority, 5500-5507.—Grounds on which the Governor-General advocates having 10 small European cavalry regiments, rather than five large regiments, 5508-5510.—Would divide the Bengal army, but keep them under one command, 5511-5514.—Equalizing the three armies would not have the same effect. Very desirable to keep the presidential armies distinct, 5515-5517.—Would confine the Madras and Bombay troops to their respective presidencies, 5518-5520.—Grounds on which separate armies are advocated, 5521-5529.—The Bombay army should not be increased more than is recommended, 5530-5533.—The rule for appointment to command is one of selection, with preference to the claims of seniority if not unfit, 5535-5538.—Not aware that the Government has come to any decision as to the constitution of the Bengal army, 5540-5545.—In appointing officers to responsible positions, public interests are the main thing considered. It is not purely personal, but general, motives which gives seniority a claim for consideration. It is equally undesirable to adhere rigidly to the rule of seniority, or to treat with disregard the claims of seniority, 6995-7009.—The local Commanders-in-chief should retain their powers intact, 7014.—The disadvantages attendant on dividing the command of Bengal army greater than the disadvantages arising from the extent of the command, 7015.—As to the expediency of disarming the population of India, 7016-7020.—The police institution must depend on the social state of the people and their feelings towards the Government, 7021-7024.—Native troops should be trained as the European troops, but not armed with the Enfield rifle; all improvements in the small arms should be kept to the Europeans, 7025-7038.—An inferior arm would be perfectly efficient for any service the native army would be called upon to perform, 7039.—The police should not have military training to

the same extent as native soldiers; a marked distinction should be kept up between the two, 7047, 7048.—As far as the commissioned grade the merit of the soldier should predominate in every way. When once a native officer it would be proper to give more consideration to seniority, 7050.—As a general rule regiments should confine their recruiting to particular districts, 7052.—The Bengal sepoy had been led to think themselves of greater value to the state than they ought to have been, 7053-7056.—The extent to which the powers of commanding officers should be increased requires much consideration, 7057.—Opinion is unfavorable to native courts-martial, 7058.—Would prefer European courts, 7059.—A well understood covenant contract with native soldiers sufficient, 7062.—Opinion as to pensions and limited enlistment, 7063-7068.

WILSON, Major-General Sir ARCHDALE, Bart., K.C.B.

Has been 39 years in India, 5547.—The whole time in the Bengal artillery. Commanded the artillery with Wheeler's force in 1849, and the force before Delhi in 1857, 5548.—All the European force in India should be composed of troops of the line, 5549.—There would otherwise be jealousies, and constant supercession of the local officers, 5550.—One system of discipline a decided advantage. In the scientific branches the materiel and equipment should be assimilated, 5551.—A system of relief for these branches advisable, that they may learn improvements at home, 5552.—The royal artillery brought a number of improvements to India, 5553.—Difference between the royal and Bengal artillery, 5555.—There is a difference between the systems of Bengal and the other presidencies, 5557.—The first troop of Bengal artillery was raised to go to Egypt, 5559.—Bengal artillery never had sufficient officers, 5563.—The establishment is not sufficient, 5567.—Non-commissioned officers are much taken away for civil employment, 5570.—The vacancies are not filled up. Corps has always been short of men, 5574.—Bengal artillery would be improved by having the detachment system, 5575.—All the artillery in India should be assimilated, 5577.—This was ordered, but not carried out, 5573-5583.—Having royal artillery in India an advantage to both services, 5585.—Reliefs should go via the Cape, 5588.—A European should not serve in India more than 12 years, 5589.—They should be relieved after that time, 5590.—Officers now in the Company's service would not wish to exchange, on account of the pensions they would have to give up, 5591.—Regiments now existing should be maintained, until the present generation of officers is absorbed, 5593.—A local officer exchanging should forfeit all advantages as to funds, &c., 5594.—All hereafter entering the service should come in by purchase, 5597.—It should be on the same footing as the royal army, 5600.—Officers should not be called on to subscribe to the funds, 5601.—There could be no exchange into the local army, 5602, 5603.—If, however, the officer came in junior of his rank, there would be no objection, 5604.—Local officers should be allowed to remove out of the army, but none should be taken in their places, 5608.—All arms of the service should be amalgamated with the royal army, 5610, 5611.—They should be kept in battalions, as now, 5612.—No native artilleryman should be allowed in the service, 5614.—Bengal native regiments may be kept up in name, and the officers employed as thought best, 5617.—They may be employed in any way, provided their rights are secured, 5619, 5620.—If the population are disarmed, 25,000 Europeans would suffice for Bengal, 5625.—Excluding police, would have an equal number of Europeans and natives, 5626.—No native should be allowed the Enfield rifle, 5631.—Present local battalions should be numbered as Queen's regiments, 5638.—Officers, if called on to serve away from India, should not draw Indian rates of pay, 5643-5645.—Those now in the service might be retained in India, unless they preferred to take their share of duties elsewhere, 5647, 5648.—Generally, the wish of the Bengal artillery is to be amalgamated with the royal, 5649.—The two corps have lately served very amicably in India, and both have benefited by working together, 5652.—In time of peace jealousies might arise, 5653.—There is much jealousy between the Queen's and Company's troops, and must be, 5654-5661.—Colonial regiments are looked down upon by the line, 5662.—Officers of colonial corps can exchange, 5668.—No want of efficiency in the royal artillery on landing, 5672.—Stud horses are used in Bengal with the artillery, 5681.—Course of instruction of artillery recruits, 5684.—They should not be trained before going out, 5685.—Fresh companies would take a twelvemonth before they could be fit for any duties in the field, 5689.—Royal artillery has axes and grass cutters, 5691.—No difference of expense between the two corps, 5694, 5695.—Magazines

of one presidency are useless for another, owing to want of assimilation, 5701.—Detachment system preferable; it is more perfect, 5711, 5712.

ABBOTT, Major-General Sir FREDERICK, C.B.

Belonged to the Bengal engineers, 5716.—Served in India from 1822 to 1847, 5717.—All the European force for India should be enlisted for local service there, 5720.—A portion of the line might occasionally be sent to learn their duties, 5721.—Reason for having a local force, 5722.—Between 40,000 and 50,000 Europeans only required for India, 5723.—One European to two natives would be a fair proportion, 5724.—Recruiting should be in England only, 5725.—Regiments proceeding to India should be made over to the Commander-in-chief there, 5731.—They are, as it were, lent to India, 5732.—The regiments lent should be an additional force, 5740.—They would be sent chiefly for the benefit of Great Britain, and partly for that of India, 5741.—Their expense should be borne by both, 5743.—India has been acquired chiefly by the aid of the sepoy, 5746.—A certain number of troops should be attached to the soil to guard against India ever being denuded of troops, 5750.—There has been one case of mutiny in the local force, 5754-5755.—This is a contingency not necessary to be taken into account, 5757.—Local force should not be removed beyond the Indian territories. It should be so enlisted, 5759.—Recruiting depôts should be formed on a scale sufficient to enlist the men, 5766.—Recruits in depôt here would be under the Commander-in-chief, 5769.—China and Persia a European question, 5770.—Troops have been suddenly sent to India with danger to Great Britain, 5776.—Safety of England could not depend on troops 10,000 miles off, 5779.—More attention would be given to the wants of England than of India, 5780.—Troops were taken from India for Persia, 5781-5782, and for China, 5783.—By increasing the bounty there would be plenty of men, 5790.—The same number of men will be required whether enlisted for general or local service, 5792.—Safety of India should not be entrusted to Parliament, 5794.—Difficulty of recruiting for a line force would be increased, owing to the reliefs; 8,000 men would be constantly on the voyage, 5799.—Many troops arriving with European ideas shock the natives, 5802.—The prejudices of the natives are not respected or consulted, 5804.—New arrivals cannot take care of their health, and are more likely to come into collision with the people, 5806.—Men think they are in Europe a long time after they are in India, 5808.—Offence is given without the person being aware of it, 5813.—In a local force half the expense of reliefs would be saved, 5814.—Retiring allowances of officers are greater than in Her Majesty's service, 5817.—If the regiment were a moveable one this would be saved, 5818.—Low caste natives should be raised, 5820.—They should not be enlisted for a lengthened period, 5821.—If they desert they do not take their arms or uniform, 5826.—Police should not have fire arms, 5830.—The treasuries should be at large stations, 5837.—European regiments should have only 500 men each, 5838.—Small regiments have as much moral effect in India as large; they have also other advantages, 5839.—Number of regiments should be multiplied instead of strengthening each, 5848.—They would brigade more easily with natives, 5853.—There should be no small detachments in India, 5855.—Local European regiments of 500 men should have about the same number of officers as the native regiments, 5859.—By recruiting from the army, you get better men for the civil service, 5863.—After serving a certain time these officers might be struck off their regiments, 5865.—Non-commissioned officers also must be so withdrawn, 5867.—There would be very little study of the language, if civil appointments were not open to officers, 5872.—It is a great stimulus in every way, 5873.—If it were not for the prospect of civil employment, people would prefer entering the Queen's service, 5877, 5878.—Best regimental officers are not withdrawn for staff, 5881.—Regiments have been under-officered, 5885.—After a certain number of years' civil service, an officer should not be allowed to return to military duty, 5889.—Present system of recruiting does not affect that for Her Majesty's service, 5896.—Indian army too far separated to be united, 5899.—No inconvenient jealousies between the two services, 5902, 5903.—Since staff appointments have been thrown open to them, Queen's officers, to a certain extent, acquire the languages, 5913.—Local officers are excluded from appointments in the colonies, 5916, 5917.—Any system of exchange impossible, 5919.

McLENNAN, Dr. JOHN.

Belonged to the Bombay medical service, 5920.—Served 32 years in India, from 1822 to 1855, 5922.—Line and local

troops equally good, but men of the line are more carefully recruited, 5924.—A man may serve in India well and efficiently 16 or 18 years, 5925.—Average would probably be 10 to 13 years, 5926.—Volunteering should be allowed to the greatest possible extent, 5928.—More depends on the selection of the men than on any previous service elsewhere, 5928.—Men have been not unfrequently sent to India who were unfit for soldiers, 5928.—This refers to the infantry, the local artillery have been well recruited, 5928.—There should be lock hospitals, and a clergyman with each regiment, 5929.—The men of the different forces might be consolidated, 5930.—As respects the officers there are difficulties, 5930.—They do not, however, appear to be insurmountable, 5930.—Local European force should be kept up by drafts and volunteers from the line, 5932.—Such volunteering was formerly permitted, 5932.—Acclimation exists, but men are worn out sooner in India than in Europe, 5933.—A residence of from three to five years renders a man more efficient, 4934.—By residence in India a man's habits change, not his constitution, 5936, 5937.—Less mortality among men of three or four years' service, than among new arrivals, 5938.—That men coming from Australia or Mauritius are better fitted for service than men landed at once in India, doubtful, 5940.—Beer is less injurious than arrack; water is best, 5941.—No man should be sent to India under 22, 5943.—Growing boys are more susceptible of disease, 5945.—Location on elevated ranges, a very great advantage, 5946.—Troops in India are too much burthened with clothes, 5963.—No general rule on the subject can be laid down for the whole of India, the climate varies so much, 5963.—Is not aware why lock hospitals in India were abandoned, 5981.

WILLOUGHBY, MR. JOHN POLLARD.

Is a member of the Council of India, 6060.—Belonged formerly to the Bombay civil service, 6060.—Served continuously in India for upwards of 30 years, 6061, 6062.—Was Secretary to Government of Bombay, and afterwards member of the Government, 6063.—European forces in India should be partly local, partly line; three-fifths of the cavalry and infantry, and the whole, or three-fourths of the artillery, should be local, 6065.—Reason for this opinion is, it is impossible to do without a native army; India could not be kept by European troops alone, 6066.—A larger proportion of Europeans, than hitherto should be kept, 6067.—Local European force would be recruited in England, 6070.—Present recruiting establishments do not compete against each other. They are both under the Horse Guards, 6072.—East India Company were always anxious to increase their European force, but could not gain assent to it, 6073.—Such assent was very recently refused, 6077.—No difficulty hitherto in recruiting for a local force, 6079.—Doubts that the interest of the imperial army would be damaged by recruiting for a larger local army, 6081.—By emulation means a wholesome rivalry between the two forces, 6082.—This is one of the effects of a double army, not a reason for maintaining two armies, 6086.—Advantages of a local army, 6089.—It is equal to the Queen's army in the field, 6090.—Both benefit by serving together, 6091.—A fresh regiment in India has a great deal to learn, 6093.—Local soldiers pensioned more frequently marry natives and settle in India, 6097.—Number now there, 6098.—Acquaintance with the habits of a people a great advantage, 6098.—It is possessed by both officers and men of the local army, but in a greater degree by the officers, 6100.—They have great advantages thereby over the line, 6103.—Officers of the line, as a general rule, would not study the languages, 6106.—There is no reason now why any pernicious jealousy should exist, 6111.—Privileges recently conceded to the local armies, 6111.—Interests of the empire are no doubt paramount to every other consideration, 6115.—The interests of the empire and of India are identical; the loss of India would be grievously felt, 6116.—The local force has been frequently employed out of India, 6117.—The authorities at home should not have the power to withdraw troops without the consent of the local authorities, 6117.—Troops raised for service in India would volunteer to go elsewhere if required, 6119, 6120.—Finances of India would not bear the expense of an army, unless a large portion of it is local, 6121.—The expense of the transport would render it impracticable, 6123.—Government at home might very often recall troops against the opinion of the local authority, 6128.—Two cavalry and two infantry regiments were withdrawn during the war in the Crimea, 6129.—Knows of no other instance of the withdrawal of troops, 6132.—Service in India not popular with Her Majesty's officers, 6144.—They cannot feel the same interest in India as the officers of an army specially raised for service there, 6143.—Another

great reason for a local army is, that the troops become inured to the climate, 6147.—Regiments so inured stand field service and the climate better than a recently arrived regiment, 6148.—Cases of mortality in newly arrived regiments, 6148.—The only difference between the two armies is, that the head quarters of one is in India, and of the other in England, 6152.—The Persian war was proclaimed by Her Majesty's Government, 6154.—There is much less probability of local troops being withdrawn during a war than line troops, 6161.—India cannot afford to keep up a larger force than is required for her own defence, 6162.—Officers trained from youth in India must be more efficient for high appointments than others, 6169, 6170.—Two armies for the sake of emulation not necessary under ordinary circumstances, 6176.—Still such emulation is beneficial, 6177.—Armies of India cannot be controlled by a distant authority in the same manner as the army of England is controlled, 6181.—Under the existing system everything is provided for, 6186.—All situations in India should be filled up by the local authority, 6197.—Double staff is expensive, but it could not be got rid of. There must be a staff for the native army, 6209.—The more appointments placed in the hands of the government of India the better, 6213.—Officers for divisional commands are sometimes appointed from England, 6216.—Governor-General has the power of selecting for commands, his arrangements are final, 6232, 6233.—Commanders-in-chief in India recommend, and the Governments appoint, 6239.—Seniority system used to be pushed to an extreme; this is now remedied, 6243.—At Bombay some of the best native officers are of low caste, 6244.—In reliefs the first point to be attended to is, to take care they are sent out at the proper season, 6245.—They should arrive from the beginning of November till February, 6246.—If a local army is determined on, the recruiting establishments should be enlarged, 6247.—They are now under the Commander-in-chief at home, 6248.—Establishment at Warley is not under him 6252.—No difficulty has arisen from the present system and there would not be any should the force at home be enlarged, 6256.—In a case of emergency the men could be available for service here, 6263.—The only difference would be, that the order would be given by the Secretary of State, 6266.—Soldiers do not deteriorate after a few years residence in India. Cases of mortality in regiments arriving at a bad season pointed out, 6269.—A degree of seasoning and acclimatization is required, 6275.—Regiments of the line arriving in India are not so efficient for two or three years as the local regiments, 6277.—Recruits for local corps do not suffer so much, 6279.—The overland route should only be resorted to for the despatch of troops in times of great emergency, 6284.—About 60,000 troops have been recently sent to India at a cost of upwards of two millions, 6284, 6285.—Rates at which they are being conveyed, 6285.—A Government system of transport not advisable, 6287.—Local force should be recruited as at present, 6297.—System of volunteering might be extended to it, 6298.—Local army a very popular service, 6299.—Does not see how the system of exchange could be introduced, 6300.—Under the purchase system India would suffer, 6301.—Local officers can now be employed by Her Majesty, 6302.—Secretary of State in Council has the power of dismissal and restoration, 6303, 6304.—Bounty money of a line and local recruit is the same, 6307.—Average cost of the latter, 6308.—If there be any difference of expense it might be equalized, 6310.—One reason for an increase of the local force is, that the unemployed officers might be attached to it, 6311.

RAIKES, MR. CHARLES.

Belongs to the Bengal civil service, 6396.—Has been 27 years in India, chiefly in the North-western provinces, 6397.—Has also been commissioner at Lahore, 6398.—Civil police in India very inefficient. It should have a military organization. Civil duties should be taken from the army and transferred to the police, 6400.—Native army should be reduced in the same proportion as the police are organized, 6402.—The police should have light muskets, 6403.—They should have military training, 6406.—There should be one-third Europeans. Artillery in our hands, India is safe. There should be companies of castes in regiments, 6408.—Police would be under the civil authority, 6415.—Police should have the same pay and pensions as troops of the line, 6425.—Commanding officer should have absolute power, 6427.—For North-west provinces, 8,500 cavalry and 20,000 European infantry sufficient, 6434.—For Bengal, 8,100 horse, and 32,400 foot police sufficient, 6441.—Including the civil police, 52,000 altogether, 6449.—There should be one officer to 100 horse and 400 foot,

6455.—The service would be highly popular, 6458.—They would not be more dangerous than the native army, 6459.—Policemen must be able to speak the language of the country in which they are employed, 6460.—But they should be brought from a distance, 6461.—They might be employed in war, 6464.—Discipline, how to be conducted, 6485.—Civil treasuries should be under the charge of the military police, 6494.

ELLENBOROUGH, Earl of, G.C.B.

It is necessary that there should be two armies in India, 6497, 6498.—That one force should be balanced against the other, 6499.—A reserve of 5,000 men at Chatham always ready for embarkation for India desirable, 6501, 6502.—If the establishment is reduced to the minimum, it would be a serious inconvenience to detach any troops from India; the decision would rest on the responsibility of the Government, 6504, 6505.—There should be royal as well as local artillery and cavalry, 6506.—The royal artillery more expensive than the local artillery, 6507-6510.—During a European war troops could least be spared from India, 6511.—Artillery not more likely to be withdrawn, than cavalry and infantry, 6512-6516.—The best education for every civil servant in India is service in the native army; plan for drawing the civil service through the army, 6518.—No advantages in dividing the Bengal army, 6519-6524.—The patronage as regards appointments in India should remain with the Indian authorities, 6525.—Appointments to divisional commands, 6526-6530.—The importance of fully qualified officers being placed in those commands, as well as in command of regiments and brigades, 6531-6541.—System of appointing officers between the Commander-in-chief and the Governor-General, 6542-6545.—Channel through which the recommendations for rewards should be made, 6546, 6547.—The relations between the local army of India and the Secretary of State and Council should be the same as those which existed between the army of India, the Board of Control, and Court of Directors, 6549.—The civil government must be superior to the military authorities, 6550.—Desires that there should be two distinct armies, two interests, and two feelings, 6551-6556.—The local army should remain as they now are, 6557.—Formerly he objected to an increase of the local European force, but now advocates it for the purpose of preserving the balance between the two armies, 6560-6564.—Appointments to be open equally to the officers of both services, 6566-6568.—Many officers of the royal army would qualify for appointments, which by affording the Government a larger field for selection would be a great advantage, 6569-6574.—The local force should be under the same articles of war as the line, 6575.—The Secretary for War should have the entire disposal of the local troops so long as they are in this country, 6576-6579.—Anticipates no inconveniences from raising a local force for India of 60,000, as it is a popular service, 6580.—Recruits are sent to India too young, 6581.—Advantageous if the depôts at home were on a larger scale, in order that the men sent out might be more trained, 6582-6584.—Officers should go out young, 6585.—If the native regiments are organised on the irregular system the young officers must do duty at first with European corps; plan for drawing the civil service from the army, 6586-6588.—Intercourse between the Commander-in-chief at home and the Commander-in-chief in India, when the latter is an officer of the Indian army. The Queen's army in India an allied subsidiary force; the Indian army a national army, to which the Governor-General stands in the same relation as the Crown stands to the royal army, 6589-6598.—The local army would prefer remaining under its own head, 6601.—Relative position of the Governor-General and Commander-in-chief in India towards the home authorities and the Commander-in-chief in England, 6603-6616.—The Secretary of State and Commander-in-chief in England should always communicate and act together, not by law, but by the necessities of political daily life, 6617-6619.—As to the eligibility of an officer of the local force being appointed Commander-in-chief of the line force serving in India, 6620, 6621.—The prerogative of the Crown to be the same towards both armies, 6622.—The men of the local European force to be trained in England, 6623, 6624.—The esprit de corps not more easily maintained in a line than in a local force, 6626, 6627.—The control exercised by the Commander-in-chief at home over the army serving in India, 6628-6630.—Recruiting of the local force, 6632.—Thought at one time that the European force of the Company was too large for the purpose of preserving the balance; that opinion modified by recent events, 6633-6636.—Does not think that officers of the local force would qualify themselves for the duties of Commander-in-chief,

6636, 6637.—In cases of emergency the local force training in England to be by law placed under the same authorities as the line, 6638-6640.—More necessary if the force is increased, 6641.—The discipline of the local force to be carried on by the Council of India, 6642.—The transfer of the force to the Commander-in-chief to be made only in case of emergency, 6643.—The bounty to be the same for both armies, 6644, 6647.—Not aware that any change would be necessary in the organization if the local force in this country be raised from 1200 to 10,000, 6648-6650.—The balance between the officers of the two armies, 6651-6657.—Line officers to be eligible for police corps, 6658.—The organization in Bombay and Madras not altered, 6659.—No necessity for a large increase to the local force of Madras and Bombay if the native armies remain the same, 6660-6664.—One European regiment requires two native, 6665-6666.—Police corps to have inferior training and inferior arms. A lower rate of pay, 6667-6671.—Relative positions of the Commanders-in-chief at the minor presidencies and the Commanders-in-chief in India, 6672-6678.—The Governor-General to select the best men for appointments irrespective of the service to which they belong, 6679-6683.—No difference in the efficiency of the local European force and the line, 6684-6685.—The field of India for the army an enormous advantage to the State, 6686, 6687.—The efficiency of the Indian army and the Duke of Wellington's opinion, 6688-6693.

YORKE, Major General Sir CHARLES, K.C.B.

Power of the Commander-in-chief at home over the Commander-in-chief in India, is confined to matters of discipline and promotion, 6694.—There has never been any interference as to the movement of troops, 6695.—Commander-in-chief in India has the power of approving general courts-martial, even to the dismissal or cashiering of officers; and the power of life and death. The proceedings are sent home to the Judge Advocate-general who lays them before the Commander-in-chief, 6696.—Should there be any irregularity, the attention of the Commander-in-chief in India is drawn to it, 6697.—Sentences of courts-martial are carried out in India, 6698-6700.—The Queen can remit the sentence, or interfere, as far as the Articles of War authorize interference, 6701.—This power is seldom exercised. Cases are considered to be decided on the spot, 6702, 6703.—Any informality only, would be noticed, 6705.—If a sentence were irregular or disproportionately severe, the Queen's power would remain to do justice in the case, 6706.—In cases of courts-martial in this country, the Queen's pleasure is taken before the sentence is carried out, 6707.—In India the Commander-in-chief approves the sentence on the spot, 6708.—Should there be any violation of the regulations, the Commander-in-chief here would give a direct order on the subject to the Commander-in-chief in India, 6713, 6714.—No orders are issued to the army in India except through the Commander-in-chief there, 6715.—There is no direct official communication between the Commander-in-chief here and the Commander-in-chief in India, except on questions of discipline and promotion, 6717-19.—Commanders-in-chief at Madras and Bombay cannot confirm sentences of capital punishment, 6721.—The Crown only can alter the regulations of the service, 6725, 6726.

ELLIOT, Mr. EDWARD FRANCIS.

Was formerly in the royal engineers. Has been employed for many years at the head of the police at Madras, 6728, 6729.—The police of the town of Madras was a purely civil body, 6734, 6735.—Scheme of police suggested for the Presidency of Madras. There should be a chief commissioner, and each district should be under the charge of a military officer, 6738.—It is now being carried out, 6738.—A European superintendent should have 1,000 or 1,200 men under him, with two deputies, Europeans, 6744.—Such a police will reduce the amount of native troops required, 6750.—They should be armed with a small carbine, 6752.—The Irish constabulary should be the basis of a police for India, 6758.—Officers withdrawn from their regiments to serve with the police should have the benefit of regimental promotion, 6761-3.—At the capitals the police should not be thus armed, 6764.—The police should be dressed as natives, not as Europeans, 6795.—They could not easily combine, 6799.—A regularly trained and good policeman is worth ten soldiers not properly trained; for his special duties, 6807.—A good policeman would prove the best of soldiers, 6809.—The police should be under military control and superintendence, 6813.—European non-commissioned officers are not required, 6818.—All classes and castes of natives should be taken, 6819.—At Madras the Europeans to natives might be as 1 in 5, including the

police, 6824, 6825.—If the police is efficiently trained and handled, every information would be obtained, 6828.—Instance of this in 1838-39, 6831.—There should be a detective police, the talliaris or village watchmen, are such from caste, 6837.—The present police peons should be done away with, 6840.—The men should not be employed in their own immediate country, amongst their relatives, 6846.—Mahomedans and Hindoos should be mixed together, 6847.—Chief commissioner should have power of dismissal, 6849.—There should be three classes of privates with different rates of pay, 6849.—And superior native officers, 6855.—There should be no European constables in the provinces. At the presidencies they are necessary, 6856.—Much persecution has hitherto existed in consequence of the police peons being employed in the collection of the revenue, 6869.—If a policeman is discharged it does not effect his caste, 6879.—Should Madras be denuded of troops a well organized police would be most valuable, 6882.—They might be used as a local militia, 6884.—Will furnish a copy of the proposal submitted by him respecting a police force, 6889, 6890.

WOOD, Colonel ROBERT BLUCHER, C.B.

Has been 24 years in the army. Was seven years secretary to Lord Hardinge. Has been lately deputy-adjutant-general in Ireland, 6891.—Principle of promotion for service might be adopted, in lieu of by regimental succession, 6892.—Indian army might at once be made a branch of the royal army, 6892.—Patronage might remain as now, 6892.—Administration of the Indian army would be carried on by the Commander-in-chief instead of by the Council of India, 6892.—Relative positions of the Commander-in-chief and Secretary of State for India, 6892.—Officers at present in the service must continue to be employed in India, 6892.—Supernumeraries, should there be any, might be attached to European regiments, 6892.—Patronage of all appointments should rest with the authorities in India, 6892.—Commanders-in-chief should correspond direct with the home authorities as respects European troops, 6892.—Memorandum regarding the

consolidation of the European forces, 6892.—The three armies should remain distinct, 6893.—Promotions in the European regiments would go regimentally, 6894.—There would be a list of the officers employed with the native army at each presidency, 6895.—Exchanges could take place, 6896.—Commanders-in-chief at each presidency would be in direct communication with the Commander-in-chief in England, 6897.—They should confirm courts-martial, subject to the home authorities, 6905.—Commander-in-chief at home has not the power of confirmation, 6915.—It rests with the sovereign, 6916.—Commander-in-chief in India has this power, 6918.—Appointments affecting officers of European regiments made in India should not be considered final until approved by the authorities at home, 6927.—There should be no local European force, 6928.—Native force should be on the irregular system. There should be fewer officers, and all selected, 6935.—They should be looked on as staff appointments, 6938.—Officers with native corps must be placed on the Indian list, 6936.—A step of rank should be given after fixed periods of service, 6942.—Officers on this list should be taken out of their regiments, 6946.—And be promoted on this list, 6948.—It would be for consideration whether service in India should count as two years for three, 6952.—There will be but one army list for all officers, 6956.—An officer on the Indian list could return to a European regiment in the same way as an officer is now brought from the unattached list to full pay, 6963.—Prospectively the whole army of India should be amalgamated with the line, 6969.—Officers now in the service should be promoted in the regiments to which they belonged, 6970.—Cadets would be appointed under the new regulations, 6973.—They should be appointed on the same pay and allowances as heretofore, 6981.—There should be no local artillery, 6986.—These arrangements are all intended to be prospective, 6986.—Every officer now in the service should by seniority rise to the emoluments of a full colonel, 6987.—Officers in civil employ should be withdrawn from the combatant list, 6989.—Those in political appointments should be eligible for military commands, 6991.—They should be placed on the Indian list, 6994.

APPENDIX.

I.—PAPERS LAID BEFORE THE COMMISSION.

APPENDIX No. 1.

CONDITIONS on which the OFFICERS of the EAST INDIA COMPANY'S ARMIES accepted SERVICE.

CONDITIONS of NOMINATION as CADETS.

A candidate must have attained the age of sixteen years. He is not eligible to be appointed a cadet after having attained the age of twenty-two years, unless he shall have been, for the space of one year at least, a commissioned officer in Her Majesty's service, or in the militia or fencible corps when embodied, and have been called into actual service, or shall have been in the company of cadets of the royal regiment of artillery. Such persons are eligible for the appointment of cadet, provided their age does not exceed twenty-five years. (A commission in the Guernsey militia, or in other corps similarly circumstanced, is not a qualification.)

A candidate who has been so employed must produce his commission, together with a certificate from the War Office or commanding officer of his regiment, of his having actually joined and done duty with the regiment for the full term of one year and upwards; and that he was neither dismissed nor resigned his regiment in consequence of any misconduct.

No person who has been dismissed or obliged to retire from the army or navy, the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, or from any other public institution, on account of immoral or ungentlemanly conduct, can be appointed a cadet.

The following are the points upon which candidates are to be examined before they are passed as cadets:—

1. Each candidate will be required to write English correctly from dictation.

2. He should possess a competent knowledge of the ordinary rules of arithmetic, including the rule of three, compound proportion, simple and compound interest, vulgar and decimal fractions, and the extraction of the square root. He should also have read the first three books of Euclid.

3. In languages he should be able to translate into English passages from Cæsar's Commentaries, or from the first four books of Virgil's *Æneid*, and he will be further expected to parse, and show his knowledge of grammar and syntax.

The candidate will be required to translate from French into English an extract from one of the following works, viz.:—*Telemachus*, Voltaire's *Charles the XII.* and *Peter the Great*. But the candidate will have the option of being examined in the Hindustani, in lieu of the French language; and in that case he will be required to translate from Hindustani into English, an extract from one of the following works; viz., *Bagh-o-Bahar*, and *Tota Kulanee*.

4. In history he should be prepared to pass an examination in Keightley's *Histories of Greece and Rome*, in Gleig's *History of England*, and in the *History of British India*, contained in vols. 1 and 2 of the Edinburgh Cabinet Library.

5. In geography he should possess a competent knowledge of the modern divisions of the world; the principal nations in Europe and Asia; the names of the capital of each nation in Europe, and of the chief cities of Hindustan; and the names and situations of the principal rivers and mountains in the world.

6. In fortification he should have read some elementary work on the subject (Straith's *Introductory Essay to the Study of Fortification*, or Macaulay's *Field Fortification*), and have received some instruction in drawing.

The evidence to be required from candidates of their having acquired "some knowledge of drawing," is that they shall trace correctly upon paper, in presence of the examiners, a front of fortification, according to Vauban's first system, and also the profile of a rampart and parapet.

The examination of the candidates will take place before a Board of Examiners to be convened for that purpose at the Military College at Addiscombe, near Croydon.

If not qualified on their first examination, they may be allowed a second trial within the next ensuing twelve months; and if not then found qualified, their nominations will revert to their patrons, and they will be deemed ineligible for another nomination for a direct appointment.

Candidates who have passed the prescribed examinations at Sandhurst for commissions in Her Majesty's cavalry or infantry, within one year from the date of their being presented to the political and military committee as cadets, and have not failed at the final examination at Addiscombe,

are eligible to appointments as cadets, on producing certificates from the professors at Sandhurst of their having duly passed the prescribed examination in the several subjects, without being required to pass an examination at Addiscombe.

If the candidate has been confirmed as a member of the Church of England, he will be required to make a declaration to that effect. If not so confirmed, or if not a member of the Church of England, he will be required to produce a certificate from a minister, stating that he has been well instructed in the principles of the religion in which he has been brought up.

The candidate will also be required to produce testimonials of good moral conduct, under the hand of the principal or superior authority of the college or public institution in which he may have been educated, or under the hand of the private instructor to whose care he may have been confided; and the said testimonials shall have reference to his conduct during the two years immediately preceding his presentation for admission.

Any person who shall be nominated to a cadetship, and who shall have obtained such nomination in consequence of purchase, or agreement to purchase, or of any corrupt practice whatever, either direct or indirect, by himself, or any other person with or without his privity, will be rejected from the service, and ordered back to England, if he shall have proceeded to India before a discovery of such corrupt practice be made; and if such appointment shall have been so corruptly procured by himself, or with his privity, he will be thereby rendered incapable of holding that or any other situation whatever in the said service. Provided always, that if a fair disclosure of any corrupt transaction or practice of the nature before described, wherein any Director has been concerned, shall be voluntarily made by the party or parties engaged in the same with such Director, the appointment thereby procured shall be confirmed by the Court.

All direct cadets appointed or sworn in before the committee for passing military appointments between the 10th March and 10th June, or between the 10th September and 10th December (or the days which may be fixed on for the public examination of the Addiscombe cadets), take rank after the Addiscombe cadets who may pass their said examinations, provided the latter sail for their respective destinations within *three months* after passing their said examinations.

N.B. All cadets who may be appointed between the dates of public examination at Addiscombe and the 10th March or 10th September, will be allowed to rank from the date of their sailing, provided this takes place within three months after their being passed and sworn.

All cadets in Bengal are required to become subscribers to the Military Orphan Society, and to the Military Widows' Fund at that Presidency.

All cadets appointed at Fort St. George and Bombay are required to become subscribers to the Military Fund at their respective Presidencies.

All cavalry and infantry cadets who fail to apply at the cadet office for their orders for embarkation within three months from the date of their being passed and sworn before the committee, or shall not actually proceed under such orders, are considered as having forfeited their appointments, unless special circumstances shall justify a departure from this regulation.

When the whole of the said certificates, duly filled in and signed, are delivered at the cadet office, the authority for the cadet's examination at Addiscombe will be issued to the candidate.

If no parish register can be found, it is provided as follows, viz.:—

"That if no register can be found, a declaration, pursuant to the act passed in the 5th and 6th year of his late Majesty William the Fourth, of that circumstance, shall be made by the party himself, with his information and belief, that his age is not under sixteen years, and that

"not exceed twenty-two years." (Act of the 33 Geo. 3.) Forms of the declaration may be obtained at the CADET OFFICE, at the East India House.

When the cadet is ready to embark, he must apply at the CADET OFFICE for a certificate of his having passed; which certificate will direct him to the secretary's office, where he will obtain the certificate of his appointment. He will then hold himself in readiness to embark, either previous to the ship's departure from Gravesend, or at the last port from whence the ship shall be ordered to take her departure from England.

It being in contemplation to establish new regulations under which ensigns will not be promoted to lieutenantcies until they have passed an examination, to be prescribed for that purpose, notice is hereby given, that all cadets passed and sworn in at the East India House after the 8th July 1857, will be subject to those regulations, when established.

CONDITIONS with respect to PROMOTION.

The officers of the artillery and engineer corps rise in their respective arms by seniority.

In the cavalry and infantry they rise by seniority in their respective regiments to the rank of major. They then take their place in the gradation list of their respective branches, and are promoted by seniority therein to the regimental rank of lieutenant-colonel. They continue in these separate regimental gradation lists for succession to regiments, and to the colonel's allowance.

The whole of the lieutenant-colonels of artillery, engineers, cavalry, and infantry are arranged in one gradation list for promotion to the brevet rank of colonel and general officer; and promotion to these grades is regulated according to the provisions of the Royal Warrant of October 1854. This brevet rank does not affect their succession to the colonel's allowance.

Subalterns, after fifteen years from the date of their first commissions, are promoted to the rank of captain by brevet.

CONDITION as respects of REGIMENTAL PAY and ALLOWANCES of the Officers of all Branches of the Service in India.

TABLE OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES FOR ANY MONTH.

CORPS AND RANK.	In Garrison or Cantonment, within 200 miles of direct distance from the seat of Government of each Presidency.					In the Field, and in Garrison or Cantonment, beyond 200 miles of direct distance from the seat of Government of each Presidency.					
	Pay and Indian Allowance.	Regl. House Rent.	Horse Allowance.	Tent.	Total.	Pay and Indian Allowance.	Extra Batta.	Horse Allowance.	Tentage.	Total.	
<i>Horse Artillery and Cavalry.</i>											
Colonel	RS. A. P. 1158 7 0	0	120 0 0	200	1478 7 0	RS. A. P. 1158 7 0	0 0 0	120 0 0	200	1478 7 0	
Lieutenant-Colonel	582 10 0	100	120 0 0	150	952 10 0	582 10 0	304 6 0	120 0 0	150	1157 0 0	
Major	461 1 10	80	120 0 0	120	781 1 10	461 1 10	228 4 6	120 0 0	120	929 6 4	
Captain or Surgeon or Vet. Surgeon, 20 years' service	306 11 4	50	90 0 0	75	521 11 4	306 11 4	91 5 0	90 0 0	75	563 0 4	
Lieutenant or Assiat. Surgeon or Vet. Surgeon, 10 years' service	194 6 0	30	60 0 0	50	334 6 0	194 6 0	60 14 0	60 0 0	50	36 4 0	
Cornet, or Vet. Sur., under 10 years' do.	154 15 10	25	60 0 0	50	289 15 10	154 15 10	45 10 6	60 0 0	50	310 10 4	
<i>Foot Artillery and Engineers.</i>											
Colonel	1065 5 0	0	30 0 0	200	1295 5 0	1065 5 0	0 0 0	30 0 0	200	1295 5 0	
Lieutenant-Colonel	547 14 0	100	30 0 0	150	827 14 0	547 14 0	304 6 0	30 0 0	150	1032 4 0	
Major	410 14 6	80	30 0 0	120	640 14 6	410 14 6	228 4 6	30 0 0	120	789 3 0	
Captain, or Surgeon	267 5 0	50	0 0 0	75	392 5 0	267 5 0	91 5 0	0 0 0	75	453 10 0	
Lieutenant, or Asst. Surgeon	154 14 0	0	0 0 0	50	234 14 0	154 14 0	60 14 0	0 0 0	50	265 12 0	
Second Lieutenant	117 10 6	35	0 0 0	50	182 10 6	117 10 6	45 10 6	0 0 0	50	313 5 0	
<i>European and Native Infantry.</i>											
Colonel	1065 5 0	0	30 0 0	200	1295 5 0	1065 5 0	0 0 0	30 0 0	200	1295 5 0	
Lieutenant-Colonel	547 14 6	100	30 0 0	150	827 14 0	547 14 0	304 6 0	30 0 0	150	1032 4 0	
Major	410 14 6	80	30 0 0	120	640 14 6	410 14 6	228 4 6	30 0 0	120	789 3 0	
Captain, or Surgeon	249 1 0	50	0 0 0	75	374 1 0	249 1 0	91 5 0	0 0 0	75	415 6 0	
Lieutenant, or Asst. Surgeon	145 12 0	30	0 0 0	50	225 12 0	145 12 0	60 14 0	0 0 0	50	256 10 0	
Ensign	107 1 11	35	0 0 0	50	182 1 11	107 1 11	45 10 6	0 0 0	50	202 12 5	

East India House, August 23, 1858.

FURLOUGH REGULATIONS.

The furlough regulations were revised in 1854, and all officers entering the service since that date come under the operation of the revised rules. The following are the rules:—

FURLOUGHS ON PRIVATE AFFAIRS.

Every officer will be allowed a furlough to Europe, or elsewhere beyond sea, for a period of two years at the expiration of ten years' service, and for a second period of two years after twenty years' service in India.

The second furlough of two years will only be granted after ten years' service in India, from the date of the return to duty after the first furlough of two years. These furloughs are not to be cumula-

tive under any circumstances, but are limited to two years. Officers who have taken leave of absence on sick certificate to Europe, or elsewhere beyond sea, will be ineligible to a furlough on private affairs until they have served six years from their last return to duty. This rule does not apply to short leaves to sea.

All grants of furlough on private affairs are subject to the exigencies of the public service, and to the regulations framed for the preservation of the efficiency of each regiment by limiting the number of absentees.

Officers holding staff or other detached appointments may be allowed furlough for a period of six months without losing their appointments; but, during that period, they will not be entitled to any portion of their staff salary, which will be drawn in full by the officers officiating for them.

All officers, whether staff or regimental, while on furlough on private affairs, will be entitled to "Furlough Pay" only.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE ON SICK CERTIFICATE.

Leave of absence on sick certificate will be granted for a term not exceeding eighteen months, whether it be to any place in Europe, or elsewhere out of India.

Extensions of such leave may be granted, as at present, on production of medical certificates, for further periods not exceeding eighteen months in the whole.

An officer holding a staff or other detached appointment will be allowed to be absent on sick certificate in England, or elsewhere beyond sea, for a period of fifteen months, without losing his appointment; and, during the first six months only of such absence, he will be entitled to draw half the staff salary of his appointment, the officer officiating for him drawing the remainder half salary during the first six months, and the whole salary during the remainder of the time.

An officer's claim to half staff salary for six months, as sanctioned in the preceding rule, will not be affected by his subsequently retiring from the service in Europe, or elsewhere.

No portion of command allowance, medical staff salary, or other similar allowance, which under the old rules was inadmissible to officers absent from their corps or stations at the Cape or elsewhere, will be allowed to absent officers under these regulations.

All officers, whether staff or regimental, while on leave of absence on sick certificate, will be entitled for a period of six months to the same rate of Indian pay and allowances as was allowed under the old regulations to officers proceeding to the Cape on medical certificate, and for the remaining period of their leave they will receive furlough pay only.

If the leave on sick certificate be extended, furlough pay will be continued; but under no circumstances for a longer period than three years altogether, from the commencement of the absence.

STAFF OFFICERS.

The term staff officer applies to all officers holding staff or detached appointments, military (general or regimental), political or civil; also to general officers commanding divisions, members of the Medical Board, superintending surgeons, and others who, under the old rules, were entitled to draw half staff allowance when absent at the Cape.

Staff officers absent on leave beyond the periods stated in Rules 9 and 13 respectively, cannot retain their appointments and allowances except on special grounds, to be sanctioned by the Government of the Presidency. Any such special grant of leave is to be reported at once to the Honourable the Court of Directors, with the reasons for it, and to be subject to their approbation.

The privilege of retaining staff appointments during leave of absence on sick certificate, or on furlough on private affairs, will not be available a second time, if the fresh leave is on sick certificate, until an officer has been three years, or if on private affairs, until he has been six years in the discharge of the duties of his appointment from the date of last return to it.

This rule, however, does not apply to leaves of absence, whether on sick certificate or on private affairs in India, or for brief periods to Ceylon, the Mauritius, or other places out of India.

Officers commanding troops of Horse Artillery and Light Field Batteries, and officers generally in employment, will be allowed leave out of India under the same rules with respect to allowance and tenure of command or office as regulated the grant of leave to the Cape to such officers under the old regulations, except as to the duration of those advantages, the time for their continuance being subject to the provisions of the new regulations.

DATE OF FURLOUGH AND ADVANCES OF PAY.

The period of furlough on private affairs, or leave of absence on sick certificate, is to be calculated from the date of the departure from India of the ship in which the officer proceeds.

Advances of pay and allowances, staff and regimental, to officers proceeding on leave of absence on sick certificate, who may be entitled to them, will be made in India for three months from date of embarkation. Payments in continuation will be made in England at the rates of exchange fixed annually for repayment of advances made on account of Her Majesty's Government. Furlough pay will continue to be issued in advance for six months when required by officers obtaining furlough on private affairs.

25. The existing regulations regarding passage money to officers are not affected by these rules.

The certificates issued to officers who are granted furloughs on private affairs, or leave of absence on sick certificate, are to specify the time each officer has been absent on leave within Indian limits, as well as the time of his previous absence in Europe; but will not include the periods allowed for proceeding to the Presidency or port of embarkation, and to enable officers to rejoin their regiments or stations after their return to India, nor the leave of one month's absence in six months as authorized by the regulations. The last pay certificate of all officers proceeding to England on sick certificate is to specify the rate of regimental pay and allowances and staff salary to which they would have been entitled under the old regulations if proceeding to sea on medical certificate. This information is necessary in order that no difficulty may arise in the Pay Department of the India House in adjusting the several payments which may be done.

OFFICERS OF H.M.'S SERVICE.

Officers of Her Majesty's service in India, whether employed regimentally or in staff or detached situations, are entitled to the advantages above laid down in respect to allowances and tenure of office when on furlough or leave of absence.

In the case of officers of Her Majesty's service on furlough or sick certificate in England or elsewhere, who may retire or exchange into regiments not on the Indian establishment, the grant to these officers of Indian allowances will cease from the date of their retirement or exchange, if it take place before the expiration of six months from the date of quitting India.

PERIODS OF ABSENCE ALLOWED TO BE COUNTED AS SERVICE FOR RETIRING PENSIONS.

In order that all officers quitting India on furlough or sick certificate may be placed on an exact equality as regards loss of time, the period allowed by regulation for proceeding to the Presidency or to the nearest port of embarkation, as well as the time to enable officers to rejoin their corps or station after their return to India, will be considered as time counting for service for the retiring pension.

No furlough or leave of absence, as announced in General Orders, exceeding two years in twenty years' aggregate service, three years in twenty-five years' service, and four years in thirty years' service, shall be allowed to count as service for the retiring pension; and no difference will be made in this respect between leave of absence taken in Europe or elsewhere, in or out of India, or whether the leave be on sick certificate or on private affairs.

In the term "Leave of Absence as announced in General Orders" is to be included all leave of absence, except the period allowed in Rule 39, and the ordinary indulgence of one month's leave in six months, as authorized by the existing regulations, and which are in all cases, whether of regimental or of staff officers, to be allowed to count as service for the pension. All leave to a greater extent, granted by political and other authorities, which may not hitherto have been published in General Orders, must be so announced hereafter.

Officers to be entitled to retire on the full pay of their regimental rank (under the regulations of 1796), must have served twenty-two years in India, out of which leaves of absence for two years in the aggregate, and not more, will be allowed to count as service for the retiring pension.

Officers to be entitled to retire on the full pay of captains and majors (under the regulations of 1835-7), must have served twenty and twenty-four years respectively; out of which time leaves of absence for two years in the aggregate, and not more, will be allowed to count as service.

Officers to be entitled to retire as lieutenant-colonels must have served twenty-eight years; out of which leaves of absence for three years in the aggregate, and not more, will be allowed to count as service.

Officers to be entitled to retire as colonels must have served thirty-two years; out of which leaves of absence for four years in the aggregate, and not more, will be allowed to count as service.

The scale for medical officers and veterinary surgeons of privileged furlough and leave of absence as counting for the retiring pension, will be as follows:—

Years.	Months.	
1	8	in 17 and under 20 years' service.
2	0	in 20 " " 25 " "
3	0	in 25 " " 30 " "
4	0	in 30 and upwards.

It is to be distinctly understood, that under no circumstances whatever will an officer be permitted to retire on full pay until he has completed the full time of service above specified, whether he be in England at the close of his service or elsewhere.

The privileged time of absence may, with the permission of the local government, be taken at any time subject to these regulations. If, therefore, at the end of twenty years' service, of which eighteen had been passed on actual duty in India, an officer should be on furlough or sick certificate in Europe or elsewhere, he will be entitled to retire on the full pay of a captain without returning to India, and so in the other terms of service for the higher pensions. In like manner, a medical officer on furlough or sick certificate in Europe, or elsewhere, at the end of seventeen years' service, fifteen years and four months of which have been passed on actual duty in India, will be entitled to retire on the lowest rate pension without returning to India, and so in the other terms of service for the higher pension.

These rules do not in any way affect the existing regulations regarding the grant of leave in India, or for short periods to sea, whether on private affairs or on sick certificate, except as to the periods of such absence being taken into calculation in the time allowed to count as service for retirement on full pay.

Under the Act 33 Geo. III. cap. 52. sect. 70. an officer who does not rejoin the presidency to which he belongs within a period of five years from the date of quitting is no longer in the Company's service.

RETIRING REGULATIONS.

FULL PAY.

All officers after a service in India of 22 years are entitled to retire on the pension of their rank. This rank must be the regimental rank attained in India, or the regimental rank (if on furlough) they may attain within the period of 12 months from the date of arrival in England.

The rates of full pay pension are:—

Colonel	25s. a day	£456 5s. a year.
Lieut.-Colonel	20s. "	365 "
Major	16s. "	292 "
Captain	10s. 6d. "	191 12s. 6d. "
Lieutenant	6s. 6d. "	118 12s. 6d. "

After certain specified periods of service in India, officers are entitled to retire on the following pensions, whatever may be their rank, viz:—

After 30 years' service,	on the pension of Captain.
" 24 "	" "
" 23 "	" "
" 32 "	" "

HALF PAY.

Without any fixed period of service being required, regimental captains, majors, and lieut.-colonels, whose ill state of health renders them unable to continue to serve in India, are allowed to retire on the half pay of their rank.

The rates are:—

Captains	7s. a day	£127 15s. a year.
Majors	9s. 6d. "	179 7s. 6d. "
Lt.-Colonels	11s. "	200 15s. "

A lieutenant after 10 years' service in India, an ensign after 6 years' service in India, can retire on the half pay of their rank, if unable to continue to serve in India. The rates are:—

Lieutenant	4s. a day	£73 a year.
Ensign	3s. "	54 15s. "

A lieutenant, after 6 years' service in India, if compelled by health to leave the army, may retire on ensign's half pay.

Officers compelled to quit the service by "wounds received in action, or by ill health contracted on duty," after 3 years' service in India, are permitted to retire on the half pay of their rank.

LORD CLIVE'S FUND.

By the rules of Lord Clive's Fund, established before any General Retiring Regulations were framed, officers incapable of continuing to serve in India are entitled to pensions as follow, without stipulation as to length of service, viz:—

RETIRING REGULATIONS.

Colonels	12s. 6d. a day	£228 12s. 6d. a year
Lt.-Colonels	10s. "	182 10s. "
Majors	7s. 6d. "	136 17s. 6d. "
Captains	5s. "	91 5s. "
Lieutenants	2s. 6d. "	45 12s. 6d. "
Ensigns	2s. "	36 10s. "

The pensions from Lord Clive's Fund being lower than the half-pay rates, the benefits of the Fund are now claimed only by officers not entitled to the higher rates.

Officers cannot receive the advantages of both the General Retiring Rules and Lord Clive's Fund.

In all cases of retirement on half pay and Lord Clive's Fund, medical testimony is required of the necessity for the retirement.

CONDITIONS with respect to the FUNDS of the several PRESIDENCIES.

All Officers of the East India Company's service are required, as a condition of their appointment, to subscribe to the Military Funds of their respective Presidencies. These Funds are as follow:—

Bengal	Military Fund.
"	Military Orphan Fund.
Madras	Military Fund.
Bombay	Military Fund.

The benefits derivable from them are twofold, viz:—

Those to the subscribers themselves; those to their widows and children.

The benefits to the Subscribers are:—

Passage Allowance from and back to India, if on furlough on sick certificate, restricted to the grades of captain and subaltern, when not provided with passages by Government.
An allowance in aid of pay while in Europe on sick certificate.

To the widows and families on the decease of the Subscribers, pensions as follows:—

	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.
Widow of a Colonel	£ 281	£ 235	£ 205
" " Lieut.-Colonel	225	208	175
" " Major	168	181	145
" " Captain	112	136	120
" " Lieutenant	84	102	102
" " Ensign	66	81	81
Children, an annual allowance varying from	30 to 45	20 to 60	22 to 60

In the case of widows this is exclusive of the pensions* to which they are entitled from the East India Company's Military (Lord Clive's) Fund, stated below:—

Widow of a Colonel	£124 a year.
" " Lieut. Colonel	91 "
" " Major	68 "
" " Captain	45 "
" " Lieutenant	22 "
" " Ensign	18 "

* These are, however, dependent on their husband's property not exceeding certain stipulated amounts.

The pensions to the widows of officers of Her Majesty's service, and of the East India Company's service, as derived from the Government, are as under:—

	From Her Majesty's Government.	From the East India Company.
Of a Colonel	£ 90	£ 114
" Lieut.-Colonel	80	91
" Major	70	68
" Captain	50	45
" Lieutenant	40	22
" Ensign	36	18

The pensions of the widows of the officers of the Company's service derived from their own fund and the Company's pension may be stated, taking the Bengal fund as an example, as follows, viz:—

	From the fund to which the officers subscribed.	From Clive's Fund.	Total.
Of a Colonel	£ 281	£ 114	£ 395
" Lieut.-Colonel	225	91	316
" Major	168	68	236
" Captain	112	45	157
" Lieutenant	84	22	106
" Ensign	66	18	84

The pensions from the officers' own fund have been gained by subscriptions, of which the following table will furnish an illustration:—

Table of Monthly Subscriptions.—Bengal Fund.

	In India.		In Europe.	
	Married.	Unmarried.	Married.	Unmarried.
Colonels	Rs. 62½	Rs. 28 2	£ s. d. 3 15 0	£ s. d. 1 18 9
Lieut.-Colonels	45	20 4	2 10 0	1 2 6
Majors	35	15 12	2 0 0	0 18 0
Captains	20	9 0	1 6 3	0 11 10
Lieutenants	12½	5 10	0 16 3	0 7 4
Ensigns	10-	4½ 0	0 13 2	0 5 11

Bengal Military Orphan Fund.

Colonels	£2 10 0
Lieut.-Colonels	2 0 0
Majors	1 10 0
Captains	1 0 0
Lieutenants	0 12 6
Ensigns	0 10 0

Special pensions are in both services assigned for the widows of officers falling in action. The amounts are the same in both armies, viz:—

Colonel's widow	£200 a year.
Lieut.-Colonel's widow	200 "
Major's widow	120 "
Captain's widow	70 "
Lieutenant's widow	60 "
Ensign's widow	46 "

Indian Army Commission,
August, 1858.

APPENDIX No. 2.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH'S ANSWERS to the several QUESTIONS proposed to be put by the COMMISSIONERS as to the BENGAL ARMY.—Aug. 24, 1858.

1. The proportion of European to Native force to be maintained in the Bengal Presidency.

Apparently there will be established throughout the Bengal presidency a military police similar to that of which some battalions were raised in 1843, and many duties heretofore improperly thrown upon the army will henceforth be taken by this police, so as to leave only military duties to the army.

Formerly in some localities regiments were so much dispersed as to make the maintenance of discipline impossible. The dispersion of an irregular regiment, having only three officers, almost does away with European superintendence.

Assuming that our army is to be maintained henceforth for fighting purposes only, the proportion between Europeans and natives should be such as renders a military force most efficient, and a brigade of one European regiment and two native regiments would answer all purposes in war; it being understood that the arms of the Europeans are to be of a very superior description to those of the Natives, and that all the artillery is to be European.

This proportion has of late always been considered desirable for service in the field. The deficiency of our troops may have occasionally rendered unavoidable the having of a native brigade; but generally the object has been attained. No doubt in recent times native troops, be the cause what it may, have seemed to require the support of Europeans much more than they did in early times, when great actions were achieved by native troops alone.

When Lord Lake moved from Cawnpore for that glorious campaign in which he took Delhi and Agra, he had but one European regiment of infantry with thirteen native battalions. In European cavalry he was stronger, having three European and five native regiments. At Assaye, Sir A. Wellesley had 1,752 Europeans and 6,978 natives, besides 1,010 gun lascars and pioneers. Lieut.-Col. Stevenson, who co-operated with him, had only 898 Europeans, and 7,013 natives, besides 478 gun lascars and pioneers, all natives. So that in the whole of the army under Sir A. Wellesley there were 2,650 European soldiers, 13,991 natives, besides 1,488 native gun lascars and pioneers. Thus, inclusive of these last, the Europeans formed only one-fifth of Sir A. Wellesley's army.

It can hardly happen during our lives that a great military operation can be again safely entrusted to a force with so small a proportion of Europeans, still less that Saugor, Bundelcund, Rajpootana, and Mewar can be left, and safely left, as they were in 1844, with two companies of European foot artillery, and no other force of Europeans, in the midst of native troops amounting to more than 35,005 men, besides four regiments of military police.

Hereafter wherever we have native troops we must have Europeans at hand; and these Europeans must have provided for them at all times ample means of movement.

Wherever we have any European force it should be complete in itself, with cavalry, infantry, and artillery; the artillery being in proportion to the total force, and all European. At every station there should be a work capable of receiving all who could not move into the field, the baggage and stores, so that leaving a company there in security, the rest of the Europeans might move out at once for operations.

We have seen the utility lately even of the miserable places of defence at Neemuch, Mhow, and Saugor.

Either friendship or enmity will grow up between European and native troops constantly brigaded together. If enmity, they must be separated; if friendship, as is probable, the natives will become equal to the Europeans when acting with them, as they did in Afghanistan.

The force at a station consisting of one European and two native regiments of infantry, with a proportional force of European and native cavalry and artillery, could be formed by wings into two brigades, one of which might stand fast while the other moved out.

Assam might probably almost always be left to native troops; but, on the other hand, the five European regiments at and near Calcutta would require only two Native regiments to serve their guards, so that the proportion of one European to two native regiments might still be really preserved throughout the army.

2. What amount of force will be required in the Bengal presidency when the country is settled?

Until we know what sort of settlement takes place, we cannot with any degree of accuracy decide what amount of force will be sufficient; but we know what limits it cannot permanently exceed,—those of the revenue by which it is to be supported; and we cannot reasonably expect that the financial means of India will for many years be what they were in 1856, in which year there was a surplus of receipt over expenditure.

There are two new and increasing demands upon the Indian Treasury:—

First, the guaranteed interest upon the sums invested in railways and some other public works.

Secondly, the interest upon the extraordinary loans, lately raised here and in India on account of war charges and loss of treasure and revenue.

The capital of which the interest is guaranteed amounts to thirty millions. About sixteen millions have been paid up, and upon this sum the Government of India pays five per cent., receiving only yet about 100,000*l.* a year on account of the railways in working order. The interest payable will increase as the capital is paid, and rapidly,

while the receipts from the railways are distant and uncertain. A period of many years must elapse before, even if the railways should all succeed (a somewhat hazardous assumption not justified by experience elsewhere), the receipts for them are equal to the amount of guaranteed interest.

Under any circumstances it is not reasonable to expect the same amount of revenue from the land for a number of years.

There has been much wanton destruction on both sides, and so total a ruin of all public buildings, that the outlay to restore them must press very heavily upon the revenue.

There are besides large claims for compensation on account of losses arising out of the rebellion.

There are confiscations, no doubt, but there are also many loyal persons to be rewarded by the assignment of confiscated territory and the remission of revenue.

The loans during this year in India and in England will have amounted to about thirteen millions.

It is to be expected that the loans next year to meet the charges of the coming campaign, and the winding-up of the military charges, always far beyond their estimated amount, will not be less here and in India than ten millions; and it would be rather a sanguine view of affairs to assume that before any real settlement takes place less than thirty millions will have been borrowed to meet extraordinary charges, at an average interest of five per cent., making a new annual charge of 1,500,000*l.* a year.

It would be prudent to assume that on the returns of the railway and other speculations guaranteed by the Government, the loss will be one-third or half a million a year, even when the whole are in operation; until then, the annual loss will be much greater.

Public works on private account and these loans taken together can hardly be expected to bring upon India a smaller new charge than two millions a year.

Now, irrespective of financial considerations, what force would be sufficient to guard against all dangers, the Bengal presidency, including the Saugor and Nerbudda territory, Meywar, and Rajpootana?

Calcutta, the seat of government, should at all times be in security; and to effect this, it is desirable that at Dum Dum, Barrackpore, and Chinsura there should be stationed five European regiments, which must hold Ranecogunge as an outlying port.

Calcutta should also be the head-quarters of a naval brigade of 1,000 men (partly perhaps composed of natives of the east) with steam gunboats.

This naval force would hold Dacca, and pierce all the country as far as the depth of water would allow, being generally in movement.

In addition to this force,—a naval pontoon corps is much required. Berhanpore, Dinapore, Ghazipore, Rajghat, the new fortified position at Benares and Allahabad, each requires, under present circumstances, one European regiment, and two are required for Juanpore, Azimghur, and Goruckpore.

With these twelve regiments, and the auxiliary native battalions attached to them, and the naval brigade, we could firmly hold Bengal and Behar, with their rich plains and vast population, and by far the most valuable country we have in point of revenue; the country, in fact, of which the surplus revenue enables us to supply the great deficiency elsewhere.

Oude, with Cawnpore, would at present require eight regiments. Calpee, Mynpooree, Etawah, and Allyghur must be occupied in the Dooab; and Bareilly and Shahjehanpore in Rohilcund, as well as Futteghurgh on the Ganges; these several services at least require five regiments.

At the commencement of the insurrection there were at Meerut, and to the west and north of it, twelve regiments of European infantry.

The same number will be still required; and, in addition, Delhi must be occupied in ample strength, so as not only to secure it, but to exhibit there, in the pride of established sovereignty, the British Government, which there first suffered loss and dishonour. Less than three regiments there and in the immediate vicinity would hardly accomplish this object.

There remains to be held the whole of the Saugur and Nerbudda territory, with Bundelcund, Rajpootana, and Meywar. In this territory troops are required at—

Agra,
Gwalior,
Jhansi,
Jubbulpore,
Saugur,
Mhow,
Schoor,
Neemuch, and
Nusserabad.

There may be other points requiring temporary occupation. Less than ten regiments would not suffice for this district. According to this calculation there would be required for the territory under Bengal 50 regiments of European infantry. There were 15 regiments of European infantry in the same territory at the commencement of the insurrection. More may be required in some quarters, less in others, than has been above set down; but their adjustments will balance each other, and it will not be found that a smaller force of European infantry than has been estimated would give the desired security.

It will probably not be found that less than 25 regiments of European cavalry, each of 600 men, divided into wings, would suffice for this force of European infantry. Each regiment of European infantry would thus have attached to it 300 European cavalry, and at least a battery.

Cavalry would not be required at Calcutta. There would therefore be some disposable force of European cavalry for the upper country.

In 1844 the Bengal army consisted of—

Sappers	-	-	-	1,506
Artillery	-	-	-	5,767
Cavalry	-	-	-	16,820
Infantry	-	-	-	103,000
				<hr/>
				127,093

Of these about 15,586 were Europeans, and 111,507 natives; but there were eight battalions of military police, which being deducted, there were of regular and irregular native troops 103,507. Since that period there had been added eight regiments of irregular cavalry, the infantry regiment of Loodianah and Ferozepore, five regiments of Punjaub cavalry, six of Punjaub infantry, four of Sikh infantry, and the corps of guides, besides the Oude force, now gone. On the other hand, the Bundelcund legion had been reduced.

These several additions had probably created a net increase of 28,000 men to the native army employed in the territory under Bengal between 1844 and 1857, making the total force of that army about 131,500 men at the commencement of the insurrection.

There is no reason to suppose that that force was numerically too large to meet all the various duties imposed upon it, while it may be hoped that these duties will be lightened by the general establishment of a military police; other duties will, at least for the present, be imposed, arising out of the insurrection; and we must make everything thoroughly secure, so as not to afford the smallest inducement to renew the attempt to overthrow our power.

3. *Whether the Native force in the Bengal Presidency shall be on the regular or irregular system, or both combined?*

There are some few faithful regiments, the 31st, 47th, 65th, 70th, besides the newly-formed regiment of Lucknow, composed of the remains of the faithful sepoys who fought at Lucknow.

There may be one or two more.

These should be maintained on the regular establishment.

It will be a distinction, and there will be a convenience in it.

These regiments on the regular establishment will each afford six selected officers for detached employment, military or political; and I cannot but think that the early service of an officer with a native corps must tend to qualify him better than service with an European corps for future command of native troops. The remainder of the native army should be on the irregular system. It is cheaper, and with well selected officers, at least equally efficient. The early, and perhaps the greatest achievements of native troops were performed by regiments having few officers; in fact, the presence of many officers with a native regiment constitutes an European society, the intercourse with which takes the officer away from his military duties. In an irregular corps he has nothing to do but to attend to his men, and must do it. His familiar intercourse must be with the native officers.

But an irregular regiment should have five instead of three officers to provide against casualties, furlough, and the hospital, and to enable the corps to act in wings, having each at least one, if not two European officers in command.

4. *Whether any Native artillery shall be allowed in the Bengal army?*

It appears to be the concurrent opinion of all men that we should keep the artillery wholly in our own hands.

The natives have a genius for casting and working guns, and we should not afford them the means of indulging it. We should endeavour to induce all friendly princes to rely

upon our artillery, and not to have more guns of their own than they want for salutes.

The natives die at their guns. Their practice in this war is allowed to have been at least as good as our own.

Our European artillery must be increased, so as to more than make up for the loss of the native branch. It must be borne in mind that, be the cause what it may, the Indian artillery procures recruits of a very superior class. It is known to be a noble corps, nobly commanded. Many gentlemen's sons, unable to live in England, enter the Indian artillery. They impart their spirit to the whole corps: it fights as if it was all composed of officers.

It must be recollected that Indian service affords opportunities for advancement which are not to be found elsewhere. It is not impossible that it may be found both convenient and safe to have a proportion of natives employed in every battery; but it should be a small proportion, not beyond the necessity of the case. This is a matter for Indian officers who have served with the European artillery to decide.

5. *The same question with regard to Sappers and Miners.*

As sappers and miners are mostly at work at night, perhaps Europeans may be available to some extent; but obviously the natives must be more essential in this line than in any other, as hard work in the sun for many days together would prostrate the European.

The corps would probably be composed of low caste men, and might therefore seem to be more safely trusted; but our native sappers were amongst the first to mutiny.

6. *Whether the Bengal Native army should be composed of different nationalities or castes, and if so, in what proportion?*

The fewer elements of combination there are in the Native army the better; and therefore, the more nationalities, and castes, and religions, the more secure we shall be. Discipline alone should bind the army together, Our means of recruiting will be for some time much reduced. We might as well re-enlist mutinous sepoys as enlist principally, as we used to do, in Behar and Oude. We have too many Sikhs already. We may trust the Hindoos of Rohilcund, and the Rajpoots and Afghans (of whom there are a good many in the cavalry), and we may recruit in the Deccan.

It would be very advisable also to have some corps of natives of the east not Hindostanees, or largely to mix such men in our native Indian regiments.

It is distressing to think that we must abandon the hope of ever again seeing a native army composed like that we have lost. It was an army which, under a general it loved and trusted, would have marched victorious to the Dardanelles.

7. *Whether the native army in Bengal is to be enlisted under a new code?*

I must leave the decision upon this point to practical military officers: nor indeed is it easy to form any opinion without knowing to what points in the present code objection is taken. It must be remembered that we have in irregular corps a very large army in Bengal now, and that all the men in those corps are entitled to the terms of their enlistment. They cannot be sent beyond sea without their consent, if they have enlisted for home service. Many opinions have been given in favour of enlisting only for general service: but when it is considered how very small a portion of the native army of Bengal can ever be wanted for service beyond sea, it is open to much question whether it is advisable to give general alarm, and to impair the means of recruiting (thus forcing ourselves to take an inferior class of men), in order to establish a right to move all where not a tenth can by possibility be required, and in all probability not a twentieth, for service beyond sea. If one of the points in the present code which is called in question be the trial of offences by native courts-martial, I confess I should be unwilling, without a very general concurrence of Indian officers, to abolish or even materially change the present law. It is obvious that it must give great confidence to the native soldier; it tends to raise him in his own estimation, and to elevate his character; and whatever may have been their recent crimes, no doubt the sepoys do acquire, through military service, a character far superior to that of ordinary natives. There was at the commencement of these troubles one instance of the awarding of an inadequate punishment by a native court-martial; but there were others of the awarding of death. And generally, when we refer to the remarks made by successive Commanders-in-chief upon the finding of European courts-martial, we should hardly be just if we did not admit that there is much in practice defective even in them.

8. *Whether the Bengal army ought not to be divided into two or more armies?*

This, too, is very much a question to be left to the decision of practical men.

Such a division could not be effected without altering the present chances of promotion; and above all things, in dealing with military men, it is necessary not only to be strictly just, but to make it quite clear that we are so. Some would in practice be benefited, some injured; but all would be alarmed, and fear injury. We should add the danger of a discontented body of officers to that already existing of a discontented soldiery.

In any case, all below Allahabad must be held by regiments recruited in the upper provinces, for Bengal proper supplies no recruits, and at present none can be prudently taken from Behar.

The divided armies must still act together.

9. *Whether any change is required in the system of promotion as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers?*

I apprehend that the system of promotion by seniority did not prevail rigidly in the Bengal army, for I can recollect many instances of petitions from sepoys complaining of their being passed over by their juniors; but the principle no doubt was that of promotion by seniority; and where it was departed from in consequence of the unfitness of any one, the next fit man was taken; the tendency of this system is to make a contented, but not the most efficient regiment. It might perhaps be improved by making seniority (where there is not unfitness) the rule in a large proportion of cases (two-thirds?) and merit in the rest. It must be observed, that there will be extensive promotion for merit from the native army into the military police, of which probably one-third of the officers or more will be taken from the army, so that there will be new inducements to enter the army, even if the rules for promotion in it be not altered. I can recollect the late Duke of Wellington speaking to me once, as I thought, with approval, of the practice formerly prevailing in the Madras army, of having what he termed a "black commandant." This commandant was of course a subordinate to the European commanding officer of the regiment; but his allowance was very large, and, as I understood, he must have had the substantive rank of major, and could in no case be commanded by a captain; but I have never investigated the subject, and do not know how the system was introduced, or why it was abandoned. Probably the "black commandant" was a gentleman of large property who raised the regiment. It may be worth while to make inquiries upon the subject.

I see no reason why native gentlemen should not be admitted at once as officers into the army; I see many reasons why they should be so. There are native gentlemen in the irregular cavalry, and nobly they behave. I made one of them, who, in the Bolan Pass had saved a convoy, my aide-de-camp, and I never had any ground for regretting the appointment. His presence at durbars on the footing of equality with English aide-de-camps, struck the native princes very much, and seemed to have a very good effect.

I had the intention of adding to the body guard (which had been raised to 600 selected men, and was commanded by ten of the finest young officers I could find) a body of irregular cavalry, to be composed altogether of gentlemen and officered by princes; a noble guard, of which the officers would have had the rank of aide-de-camp, and would, on all occasions, have accompanied the Governor-General.

Treated on a footing of equality, they would have been proud of being made in a manner part of the government. What they learnt in the Governor-General's camp, through friendly communication with the principal officers there, they would have carried back to their own countries and taught to their sirdars.

Practically it is only, or certainly most efficiently, through military service, that education can really be given to the highest classes in India.

If we desire to retain the empire we have acquired without incurring a cost far exceeding its value, we must conciliate those who are the natural leaders of the people,—we must abandon the exclusive British system, and nationalise our government. I know no better way of doing so, than by bringing the first gentlemen in the country into the army. It is entirely in accordance with all eastern feelings to make military service the great road to honour and to power: and we cannot greatly err, if, in the endeavour to obtain the same objects, we adopt generally the same policy as every successful conqueror, from the time of Alexander to that of Akbar.

APPENDIX No. 3.

ANSWERS to suggested HEADS of INQUIRY.—By the Earl of ELLENBOROUGH.

1. *How far the European portion of the army in India should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as part of the regular tour of service; and how far of troops raised for service in India only.*

Until the commencement of this mutiny, there has always been some balance of strength between the Queen's army and that of the Company, and enough of jealousy and of divergent interests to prevent combination, without impeding the public service in operations against the enemy.

It is necessary to preserve this state of things. It affords the only security for the continued maintenance of the dependence of India upon England. But the present war in India has produced great changes in our position. There must at all times hereafter be a very much larger force of European troops in India than has hitherto been deemed sufficient. We can no longer rely upon the fidelity of our native army. That of Bengal is gone. The native army would heretofore have remained faithful under any circumstances of European mutiny. Now no one can tell whether it would act with or against the Government.

We had till lately 22 or 24 battalions of Queen's troops, and nine of Company's European troops in India. We have now about 75 battalions of Queen's troops, and (with the late additions) twelve battalions of local European troops, in all 87 battalions.

It is reasonable to look forward to the time, and that not very distant, when a portion of this force may be withdrawn; but it would be very sanguine to expect that we could safely leave India without 70 European battalions. There were at the commencement of the mutiny 22 Queen's battalions, and nine of the Company's. To the latter three have been added. Together these make 34 battalions, and therefore 36 are to be supplied.

Recently 27 battalions have been added to the Queen's army. If all these were to be stationed in India, still nine more would be required to give the requisite force in India, and leave the Queen's army as it was for the defence of England and our dominions abroad.

All these nine battalions at least should be raised for local service in India.

The comparative strength of the Queen's army and of the local army would then be 49 and 21 battalions respectively, and generally the officers of the native army would have the same interests as the officers of the local European army, for they must, on account of their knowledge of the language, be more commonly taken from the local than from the Queen's European regiments.

It would be far preferable, however, to raise the local European regiments to an equality in number with those of the Queen,—to have 35 Queen's battalions and as many local battalions. This would render necessary the raising of 23 battalions for local service.

The home and foreign demands for troops would in truth hardly be met by this, which would be a practical addition of 14 battalions to the Queen's army, for to 22 in India in May 1857 would be added 13, and 27 have been raised.

It is to be feared that unless the local army were raised to an equality in point of strength with the Queen's army, it would come to be considered an inferior service. Notwithstanding its great inferiority in European troops, the many advantages which the Company's army has hitherto exclusively enjoyed from the favor of the Court of Directors, which protected it, have secured to it high consideration. But the Company being gone, and the local army having no longer exclusive advantages, real strength can alone secure to it proper consideration. It would be a source of great danger if the officers and men of the Queen's army were to acquire notions of superiority to the local army in India.

They must mutually depend upon each other. There is no safety to either but in a good understanding and mutual respect. Equality of strength and equality of advantages will ensure this result.

There were in the Bengal army 74 battalions of native infantry. Of these, probably 5 may be maintained in an integral state; 6 have been absorbed in the three new European regiments. If 23 battalions are added to the local European army, these would absorb the officers of 46 more regiments, so that in all 57 regiments would be disposed of, and 17 only would remain as skeleton corps whose officers might partly be employed in irregular corps and the police, and on other detached service, and partly be attached to regiments weak in officers.

Perhaps it would be found advisable to use the cadres of some of these regiments in officering further new regiments of

European cavalry. The same principle of equality which it is proposed to apply to the European infantry should be applied also to the cavalry and artillery.

2. *In connexion with this question, the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion, and of securing the efficiency of the latter.*

The proposed equalization of strength between the Queen's and the local army would remove all difficulty about the periodical relief of the former. The amount of the reliefs would be increased only about one-third, and if the whole of the 27 battalions newly raised were, as is suggested, to be retained, there would be a new force of 14 regiments in England and elsewhere to furnish reliefs for 13 new battalions stationed in India.

If the whole force were relieved every ten years, three or four battalions in alternate years would effect the object. If the 70 battalions were to be all of the Queen's army, double that number of battalions would be required for the annual reliefs. The charge would be much increased, and from the extent of the demand the reliefs would be very irregular.

The only point, it is believed, in which the local European troops are now inferior to the Queen's, is in the quality of the non-commissioned officers. This has been occasioned by the withdrawal of some of the best men from those regiments for civil employment. That source of deterioration will now be much diminished, for the number of such civil employments remaining as it is, the number of Europeans, from amongst whom the persons to fill such employments must be selected, will be greatly increased, indeed including the additions to be made to the European cavalry and artillery, nearly quintupled; for it may be expected that hereafter the men of the Queen's army will be eligible for those appointments as well as those of the local army. Further, there will hereafter be extended means of employing the less efficient men in invalid corps; for at every principal station, and even at the minor posts, there will be small works and fortified houses such men could defend very well.

In the hills there may be some attempt to locate such less efficient men as have families. It will ultimately fail to create a self-supporting colony; but it will tend to weed the ranks. There does not, upon the whole, seem occasion to apprehend that the local European corps will be less effective than they have been,—on the contrary.

3. *Whether it be possible to consolidate the European forces, so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other; and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now in the service of the East India Company.*

Practical officers alone would seem to be competent to answer this question, and especially the second branch of it. A man without such practical knowledge of the service can only venture to say, that to an officer it can little signify whether one above him exchanges, provided the one who comes in his place has no better a life than the one who goes out. If he should have a better life, his introduction into the regiment must injure those below.

The public is interested in being enabled to employ military ability in whichever branch of the army it may appear in any part of the world. The precedent has been lately established of bringing into the Queen's service distinguished officers of the Indian army, and the Queen has always exercised the power of appointing her officers to command in India.

The proposed exchange would seem rather to concern the interests of individuals than those of the public.

4. *Whether the local European force should be kept up by drafts and volunteers from the line, or should be, at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain.*

If the local force of Europeans should be extended as proposed above, it would be impossible to keep it up otherwise than by separately recruiting for it at home.

Three or four regiments going home every year could not supply with the necessary volunteers a body of more than 10,000 men.

Young soldiers do not, it is apprehended, volunteer for other regiments when their own leave India. It is the old soldier with a native family and half native habits who most readily remains. Such men brought together would make the worst regiments, but dispersed, and especially when attached to regiments newly arrived, they are very valuable. They teach the young soldiers how to live in a hot climate, and give them all the advantages of their own experience in Indian warfare. The ignorance of newly-arrived officers and men left to themselves leads to fearful losses.

Further, men's tastes are various, and must be considered in raising recruits. Many would enter the local army who would not enter the Queen's. There has rarely, if ever, been any difficulty in raising recruits for the Company's army.

APPENDIX No. 4.

1. *The proportion of European to Native force to be maintained in the Bengal Presidency.*

In Bengal, one-third at least of European soldiers for the next few years; until it is seen whether the old feeling of the natives, of deference and respect for Europeans, can be re-established. If the European character is again suffered to fall into contempt, through the slight estimation and disregard in which for years it has been, perhaps unintentionally, the custom of the governments in India to hold the European officer, a larger force of British troops will be necessary. If our "empire of opinion" can be restored, fewer national troops will be requisite; but we must never again rely solely on this prestige, which is highly useful and desirable in its way, as a moral aid, but which it was all along a most unwise procedure to build upon so almost exclusively as our support and protection, to the neglect of a more material guarantee in the shape of an *adequate European force*. It is presumed that in future the Native troops will be employed in the common every-day details, and as an auxiliary and inferior body. The writer of this paper has often heard distinguished officers serving in India remark as a matter of reproach, at reviews and on other occasions, upon the inferiority of Native troops to the European, in the evolutions of regiments and brigades, and in point of smartness, dress, arms, accoutrements, &c. &c. To this he was accustomed to reply, that it was "desirable it should be so; that it was a mistake to endeavour to place the Native soldier on an equality with the European; that our policy as conquerors and foreigners should be to maintain most carefully the superiority of our national troops, and to use more freely the Native soldiery in those ordinary duties which, in addition to their usefulness, would also in part serve to mark the distinction between the two; that to puff up the Sepoy with a notion that he was equal to his European brother soldier was a fatal error." Unhappily this error was introduced into the system: the Sepoy officers (Europeans) naturally adopted it; commanders-in-chief and their staff thought in general that they were best advancing the interests of the Indian service in insisting upon these non-essentials. If the Native troops had been kept in their proper place, if they had not been petted, pampered, flattered, and indulged, until they came to regard themselves as quite on an equality with the British soldier, a mutiny might not have occurred for another hundred years; but when, without any adequate reason, his pay, already ample, was so injudiciously increased; when it was discovered that he must not escort treasure in the hot winds or rains; when it was forbidden to furnish the customary nightguard for his European officer, or to proceed with him "on command as his escort" when travelling; it was only natural that an inflated self-sufficient spirit should by degrees have been generated: add to these and other petty causes the insane abolition of the lash by Lord William Bentinck, and no one need wonder that "the quiet well-conducted" Sepoy became a Prætorian. If, therefore, this unwise system is again to be re-introduced, we shall require a far larger proportion of European troops; if it is discouraged and prohibited, the proportion I have indicated will, after the restoration of tranquillity, be probably found to suffice.

2. *What amount of force will be required in the Bengal Presidency after the country is settled.*

In Bengal, of British infantry, the amount, in the opinion of the writer, ought not to be less than 40,000 even in times of profound peace; and if 50,000 could be maintained, the number would be by no means excessive, the vast extent of country subject to our control in this Presidency being considered, and the necessity which exists of being to a certain extent prepared for external attack as well as internal revolt or insurrection. Of European cavalry, 5,000 might with advantage be maintained, and the same number for the artillery and engineer corps. British "Light Horse," accustomed and trained to much more active and independent action than has hitherto prevailed with the European cavalry in India, would prove a most useful and efficient arm; and instead of shutting them up in barracks every opportunity should be taken to make their presence practically known in the provinces. They should be most carefully and efficiently armed, and no sacrifices whatever made to mere show and tinsel. Of Native troops the numbers should be limited as much as possible; and, as connected with this subject, it is to be observed that the

force requisite must mainly depend on the system pursued by the government of India. If railroads, steam communication on the rivers, and the electric telegraph are freely introduced and maintained, fewer Native troops will be requisite. The rail will lessen the necessity for escorts; a change in the currency system of India would further obviate the necessity of large guards to protect treasure; and if the circulation of gold or notes in lieu of the present exclusive use of silver is not introduced, at least the accumulation of treasure at scattered and distant points all over the country should be interdicted; all in excess of the amount requisite for current use ought to be transmitted by rail to the principal stations, and it should be established as a principle that treasure must be guarded, if not exclusively, at least always in part by Europeans. There can be no doubt that in the late revolt many Native regiments were tempted to mutiny by the large amount of silver accumulated at isolated stations.

As in the past the government of India neglected to take obvious precautions; as, in their pride of place and position, those in authority refused to benefit by warning and suggestions, it may not with reference to the future be deemed superfluous to suggest that the railroads will need European protection. To this end, at various points, which should be timely decided upon, barracks should be constructed, and these ought always to be occupied by British soldiers; it will not be necessary to have them in large numbers, but such posts should not be too widely separated, and might be composed in part of cavalry, a troop or squadron at each according to local circumstances. The danger to the rail will be chiefly from the local attempts of the natives in times of commotion, in preventing which cavalry would prove most useful; but they must be cavalry we can depend on, not the common "irregulars," far less the "Bengal native cavalry," if any of this latter body be suffered to remain in the service. Mounted Seiks, of whom, it is believed, we have a large force, and for whom we must find active occupation, might be employed in this way in the Lower and North-west provinces, in Scinde and in Oude, European cavalry being kept at the principal stations of the various lines of rail and wherever treasuries are established. The Native (Seik) cavalry might be made to answer a double purpose; they could be used for the escort of civilians visiting their districts and the number of sowars in civil employ be thereby greatly reduced, for these last are the very reverse of a reliable body, and we ought to reduce their numbers to the lowest scale. We must not get into the old system, either, of pampering and flattering the pride of our Native soldiery, Seiks or others, but use them freely. If posts of the kind above advocated are adopted into our system, a considerable portion of the cavalry might be disposed of in this way. A well-qualified inspector ought to be appointed to see to their efficiency and to maintain a careful watch over them. It is undesirable to retain more Native cavalry than is absolutely required, and there can be little doubt that the numbers now in our pay could be greatly reduced. This opinion is only in keeping with that expressed officially by the writer *before the late mutiny*, when he advocated the reduction of the "light cavalry" (so called), and the substitution of *permanent* European cavalry regiments, *permanently attached*, that is, to the local Indian army. It is presumed that the necessity which must always continue to exist of possessing absolute and not merely implied security, is at last too generally admitted to need any further advocacy, and that fortified posts will be constructed to dominate over every large town or civil station occupied by Europeans; and these posts should be exclusively garrisoned by European troops as a *principle*, or where that from circumstances is difficult or undesirable, then by other reliable troops, such as the Goorkah regiments. The railway military posts before recommended will not be needed where these dominating positions exist.

To conclude this reply: the writer cannot say, and believes that no man can say, at present in so many arbitrary words, of what numbers the Native armies, regular and irregular, should in future consist; but his sentiments may be understood from this, that if still in office in India and permitted so to occupy himself, his study would be quietly and guardedly to reduce to a minimum the Native troops of all arms, and in all the Presidencies.

They appear to be again, as before, *overwhelming*; and if attention is not given to the subject at once, we may shortly experience as much danger from Seiks and others as from the ill-understood and wilfully mispraised Sepoy.

3. *Whether the Native force in the Bengal Presidency shall be on the regular or irregular system, or both combined.*

It would appear that the Native force to be maintained

must be necessarily of both systems combined; although in fact the *name* by which the component parts may be designated is quite immaterial; and "regulars," in the British acceptance of the term as applied to British infantry and cavalry, we can never, strictly speaking, hope to possess. Nor is it indeed at all desirable to construct regiments of Natives after the strict model of our British regulars. What is requisite is an efficient body of Native troops, both of regulars and irregulars, having reference to the uses and services for which such force is required, and having regard also to the material, habits, and the nature of the climate in which it is to be employed. We are placed in a peculiar and anomalous position in India; we require troops for the protection of our vast frontier, if need be for purposes also of aggression, and for the maintenance of internal tranquility. The Native troops are not in many respects so well qualified as we could desire for either purpose. Nevertheless, their employment in our service is a necessity, and, combined with our European troops, they have answered tolerably in many instances, despite the system, which was fortuitous and the work of no single man's hand or brain. As, during our career of conquest, where we found Native camps and towns, there we at once at haphazard formed our stations and cantonments, so in like manner we constructed our military system. In Bengal the Sepoys disliked the sea; service on that element was not, therefore, demanded of them; and, in short, an impolitic deference to Hindoo feeling and prejudice was unwisely suffered to pervade the military body on which our security depended. The reply offered to any observation of this sort was invariably to the effect, that "although no doubt faulty in theory, it was in practice found to answer admirably." The system pursued may be likened to that of constructing a house on a foundation of wooden piles; while the wood lasts, the superstructure appears to be perfect; but the decay and rottenness inherent in the material will ultimately manifest itself, the whole structure nods to its fall, and to repair or rebuild is alike difficult. The late crisis showed the utter worthlessness of our boasted but hollow system—the revolt dispersed to the winds, as if of no weight, all the undue dependence which was placed on the assumed influence upon the Sepoys of our pension establishment, good-conduct pay, &c. The great error in India appears to have been that of making the Native troops the principals; these, on the contrary, should have been retained in limited numbers as simple auxiliaries, and kept subordinate in every respect to our national troops. The course pursued appears very naturally to have originated in the delegated authority exercised by the Court of Directors of the East India Company. If the government had been conducted by officers of the Crown there can be no doubt that the system would have been quite different in many respects—other views must of necessity have prevailed—that jealousy on the part of the Horse Guards of adding European troops to the Company's army would not have existed; and in place of the ill-advised augmentations of the Native troops we may without hesitation assume that a sounder view would necessarily have been taken of our position, and that our empire in the East would not have been placed in jeopardy by the enlistment of overwhelming and disproportionate bodies of natives, while our real strength, our national British troops, were kept at a minimum figure. There is no denying the fact that a vulgar and sordid principle pervaded the system of the India House, and through them their governors-general, who thus imbibed the habit of regarding everything connected with government from the expense view of the subject. Thus Native troops were assumed to be "cheaper" than European; irregulars were cheaper than regulars; it was too great an expense to maintain an inspector of cavalry, and so on! The government, moreover, was a strictly civil government; it had no military knowledge or ideas; the few military men in the Court have been for the most part diplomatic agents at foreign Courts, or Engineer Officers without the least practical knowledge of military details. Thus the civil business of the empire was that which chiefly interested and engaged the attention of the governing body. In a system of military conquest and progression, the military were degraded, or at the least occupied a most inferior position; while the "covenanted" civilians in the employ of the company were as unduly and unwisely elevated in the scale of rank and estimation: and army details were thus made distasteful, and shuffled through or neglected in consequence. All this at home might have been unimportant, comparatively; but, in India, where we have to maintain our supremacy by force of arms and conquest over various races and nationalities, it has been well-nigh fatal. Will the same errors be persisted in? If they are, our empire in the East will be lost. Another such revolt, and our prestige will be so thoroughly used up and expended, that no efforts we are capable of will suffice to

re-establish our authority; and with the loss of empire in the East who will be found to deny that we shall have then "culminated?"

4. *Whether any Native Artillery shall be allowed in the Bengal army.*

The writer has always been strongly averse to the enlistment of Natives for the regular artillery in Bengal; and even for local purposes they should be *very sparingly employed*, if at all. The existing Native regular artillery could, however, be readily disposed of for the present, by employing them as local batteries, and absorbing those at present so designated; but the authorities on the spot will best know how these details can be carried out, and they alone can judge of the exceptional cases calling for a departure from the general principles to be established for guidance in the future.

5. *Whether any Native sappers and miners should be allowed.*

For the mere manual labours of the corps, Natives will be required; the Seikhs entertained since the revolt are probably the best material of which it can be composed. But it would not be politic to dismiss the men of this regiment who were faithful and did good service, or to have only Seikhs in it. Perhaps an equal number of companies of each race would be the best plan. It may be here remarked that it does not appear to be judicious to introduce to the knowledge and practice of our Native Indian soldiery, all the scientific and professional improvements of European armies. These we should use and employ to maintain, in the hands of our national troops, our national superiority. The mistake committed hitherto has been in supposing that it was judicious to instruct in every respect alike the British and the Indian soldier. The native should be well instructed in that discipline and in those things which it is considered necessary for him to know, but in these alone. The retention of the very superior arms recently manufactured, for instance, in the hands of our British troops exclusively, ought to have been our object; we should have so neutralized in some measure the overwhelming force of armed Natives so idly and impolitically maintained. But no; in place of any such common-sense arrangement, the whole Native army, notwithstanding the uneasy feeling known to pervade it, was to have been armed with the best description of rifles. To what end? To be opposed ultimately to ourselves; for they cannot be opposed in India to highly armed and organized troops, for such nowhere exist.

These remarks and suggestions if worth anything apply alike to the three Presidencies. It is weakness to suppose that the Native troops of Madras and Bombay are for ever to prove faithful; to have no cause real or assumed for discontent or disaffection. That was the argument assumed and acted upon in the case of the Bengal Sepoy; and we have seen the result.

6. *Whether the Native Army of Bengal should be composed of different nationalities or castes.*

Talk as we will of the beneficial effects and paternal character of our rule, we never can alter the fact that in India we are foreigners and interlopers; and while we remain what we are, the Natives of Hindostan what they are, the haughty and offensive conscious manner, the consequence of our superiority, morally and intellectually, will remain indelibly stamped in the bearing and character of the European, outweighing all the material benefits we can confer; and it is opposed, therefore, to all experience and to common sense to suppose that ever under any circumstances the Natives in their inmost hearts can become really reconciled to our rule as a class. Some few indeed may—shopkeepers, camp followers, and a few others whose existing modes of livelihood are dependent on our presence; but the ineradicable feature of colour must always remain to mark and distinguish the foreign troops, and will for ever act as an incitement to our ejection, when time and circumstances are thought to present a favourable opportunity for again trying conclusions with us. The introduction of Christianity even, if that in the course of time should be brought about; the cultivation of the European sciences, learning, and the arts—nothing of all this will ever render our presence palatable. When we have civilized and nationalized India, we shall have to withdraw; and until then we must remain to a certain extent on the insecure footing of which we have so recently experienced so sad a specimen. This has never been sufficiently understood or insisted upon; nevertheless it is and will be found ultimately to be the truth; and it speaks forcibly for the strong necessity which exists for so dividing and separating into distinct bodies the "different nationalities or castes" the rulers in our

Eastern dominions may deem it safe and expedient to entertain in our armies, so as to render them as little dangerous as possible to the State which they undertake so solemnly and faithfully to serve, but to which solemnity they, be it always remembered, attach little or no real meaning or importance, and by which, as we have now seen, they are in no way really bound.

Seikhs, Rajpoots, and Goorkahs constitute perhaps the best description of men for soldiers in Bengal, and there are endless varieties of others; while the low castes will doubtlessly meet with great favour, after the events we have experienced so recently. It is, however, essential to be alike cautious with them all; and especially we should be most guarded and watchful with the Seikhs. Of these one fourth part would prove an ample proportion; of Goorkahs and Hill men generally a like number if procurable, but the real Goorkah is not to be found in any large numbers; another fourth part of low caste men of all sorts, and the rest must, it is presumed, be made up of the endless varieties of Hindostanees and Mussulmen usually employed. The introduction, however, of other different elements would be advisable, if it can be done—Africans, Malays, and Arabs; anything, in short, to divide and so neutralize the strength of the "castes and nationalities" which compose our armies in the East.

7. *Whether the Native army of Bengal is to be enlisted under a new code.*

Assuredly; but under what code shall we enlist all that alarming crowd of new levies and police corps raising for civil purposes? It is stated on reliable authority that in Oude alone the force thus to be raised, under the civil government, will in October amount to no less than 9,000 foot and 3,000 horse, the infantry of this force to be all armed with percussion muskets, and regularly and efficiently drilled. Now, who is to control and watch these civil soldiers? Your London commission is making inquiries; but already a *civil army* is being formed, without any proper rules and discipline to guide it. In our next revolt, if this goes on, we shall have a civil army in mutiny opposed to the military force of the State; or if these last should be the first to turn against us, then as assuredly we shall have them siding with the mutinous and ill-disposed levies, horse and foot, on no arranged system, police battalions, local corps, mounted police, &c. &c., ad infinitum. In short, any man who can collect one hundred sweepers together, put them into a coloured tunic, and a "fancy pugree," is called a "commandant," and intrusted with their charge. If all this is not speedily looked into, we shall have a second deadly revolt on hand in no time; but having, without the least effect, directed attention to what was before preparing for us, the writer despairs of the least adequate attention being given to this new, great, increasing, and pressing danger.

8. *Whether the Bengal army ought to be divided into two or more armies.*

It would seem to be a very injudicious proceeding to divide the troops in Bengal into two distinct armies. Innumerable reasons appear to make against it, and none of any real weight in favour of such a change. In the first place, in the reconstruction of the army much will depend on the wisdom, ability, and firmness of the commander-in-chief; for, whatever may be the plans and rules laid down here at home or by the government of India, the carrying out of the new system effectively and consistently must be intrusted to one responsible head; and the formation of two or more distinct armies must naturally interfere with this, for it is impossible that two chiefs would have exactly the same views, or be likely to adopt the same measures of detail. To start, therefore, a second army and chief would be merely to complicate and confuse matters, already *alarmingly* complicated and confused. The expense moreover would be very great—utterly thrown away; while in the necessary arrangements great difficulties may be anticipated, and all the evils of delay, uncertainty, and confusion must be inevitably incurred,—in the event of such a plan being carried out;—it will be a "double government" of the army, with the usual result. One consistent system for the whole of the Bengal Presidency should be introduced, and with as little delay as the importance of the subject will admit of. The governor and commander-in-chief—besides the attention to be given to the thorough suppression of the revolt (which is still on our hands, and far from ended, despite the seeming lull and quiet,)—will have to form opinions, and decide on plans innumerable connected with the re-organization of the system, and the re-establishment of peace; for the due arrangement of all which the consistency derivable from one plan and one head is essential.

9. *Whether any change is required in the system of promotion as regards Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers.*

The writer four years since, in a demi-official paper of suggestions which he prepared for Lord Dalhousie, recommended and advocated the eventual extinction of the Native commissioned officers, and his opinion to this effect has only been strengthened by late events. In time, additional good-service pay can be given to deserving non-commissioned officers, who should be formed for the purpose into classes. The details will be best arranged in India.

To conclude: The Bengal army may be likened to a watch that has stopped, that will no longer go—the *main-spring has snapped*; while our rulers, amidst the conflict of plans and opinions submitted to their judgment, sit melancholy and depressed, in doubt as to the best course to be pursued for its renovation. Of this at least they may be assured, that the preservation of our dominions in the East must depend on our retaining there an “adequate European force;” on the retention in the hands of our European troops solely the power and superiority conferred by the possession of artillery (which, if possible, should in no instance be entrusted to Natives); and generally in making it a point and matter of recognized policy never to arm prematurely with the superior weapons which the science and genius of this country is always producing, any Natives, whether they be of the old regiments of Madras or Bombay, or the new levies of Bengal; on the enforcement of a system of strict discipline and effective and efficient command over the Native troops of all denominations; and, finally, in everywhere throughout the country disarming the Natives—a measure which can and ought to be carried out, despite the sneers and objections at such a proposal by those in authority in India, too timid and too vacillating to adventure on a bold and decided course, although justified, even in the eyes of the Natives themselves, by the late barbarous and calamitous revolt.

H. T. TUCKER,
Major-General.

Puckaster Niton, I.W.
Sept. 18, 1858.

APPENDIX No. 5.

ANSWERS of Major-General TUCKER to QUESTIONS submitted to him as to the selection of Officers for commands.

1. *As you held the appointment of Adjutant-General of the Bengal army from the year 1850 to 1856, will you be good enough to state whether previously to that period seniority did not form the rule, and selection for efficiency the exception, under the established system of appointing officers to brigade and divisional commands in that presidency?*

The practice was as above stated.

2. *Was it not in consequence of a strong and earnest representation by the Commander-in-Chief in India, of the evils resulting from a system under which mere negative merit when backed by seniority was considered to give officers a claim to appointments of so great importance and responsibility, that the then Government of India sanctioned selection for efficiency being made the rule in future, and was this rule subsequently fully carried out?*

Yes; precisely as above stated, and the records at the head-quarters of the Bengal army will be seen to prove that the suggestion to change the old system was first made and suggested by me, as Adjutant-General (*vide* the schedules in which this subject is referred to). But I cannot conscientiously say that in my opinion the new rule introduced was “fully carried out,” in the broad, full, and complete extent originally contemplated.

H. T. TUCKER,
Major-General.
Late Adjutant-General of the
Army in Bengal.

Puckaster Niton,
December 13, 1858.

APPENDIX No. 6.

MEMORANDUM by Major MEREWETHER on the CONSTITUTION of the SIND HORSE.

The brigade of Sind Horse consists of three regiments, 801 strong each, formed on what is called the irregular system.

In each regiment there is a commandant, second in command, an adjutant, and an assistant-surgeon. These are the only European officers.

Detailed strength of one Regiment of Sind Horse.

European Command.	{	1 Commandant.
		1 Second in command.
		1 Adjutant.
		1 Assistant-Surgeon.
Native Commissioned.	{	4 Russuldars.
		1 Wordee Major.
		4 Russaidars.
		8 Nath Russuldars. 8 Junadars.
Native Non-Command.	{	8 Kote Duffadars.
		8 Nishan Burdars (Standard Bearers).
		64 Duffadars.
		8 Trumpeters, 688 Sowars.
		801

There are twenty-five native commissioned officers in each regiment, as marginally shown. This gives three officers to a troop, besides the Wordee major or native adjutant. The senior commands the troop, is either a Russuldar or Russaidar, and is held strictly responsible for its complete efficiency in every respect. If any men belonging to the troop wish to prefer complaints or to make any application, the troop commander brings them up before the commandant at the regimental orderly room, when the merits of the cases are openly discussed, and at once decided on. The subalterns assist the commander in maintaining discipline in the troop.

There are besides to each troop, a Kote duffadar (troop orderly serjeant), a pay duffadar (non-effective), who keeps the accounts, Troop Order Book, &c., &c.; a Nishan burdar, and eight duffadars (serjeants). No naiks (corporals) were allowed in the establishment sanctioned by government; but, as duty could not be properly carried on without them, ten were appointed to each troop; they receive no extra pay, but the position is the stepping stone to further promotion.

Nature and Mode of Enlistment.

The men are enlisted from all parts of India, but principally from the Delhi districts and from Rohilkund. They are enlisted for general service and without limit as to time. The mode of enlistment is this:—On a vacancy occurring, candidates for admission into the ranks, of whom there are always a number present with the head-quarters of the regiment, appear before the commandant; he selects those who from their looks and make are likely to make the best soldiers. These are then placed on horses, bare backed, with merely a bridle and bit in their mouths, and are made to ride over a course in which there are several sharp turnings; the man who comes in first gains the vacancy. This not only tries their powers of riding, but also shows whether they have proper boldness or not. After approval the recruit has read to him a declaration, which he signs, to the effect that he binds himself to abide by all rules at present existing, or that may hereafter be made by the commandant for the good of the whole; and that in the event of his being discharged from the regiment for misconduct, all stoppages on account of clothing, arms, &c., will be forfeited by him. The recruit is then considered duly admitted, and is sent to learn his drill, which he generally manages to do in from three to four months.

Horses, how obtained.

Horses are obtained from the Punjab, Afghanistan, Beloochistan, Sind, and Cutch. A set of dealers have established themselves at the head-quarters at Jacobabad, who have always horses ready for sale. The purchase is managed by the soldier himself entirely. The commandant merely has the horse brought before him to see if it is fit for the ranks. On its being approved the regimental brand is applied and the horse admitted. All new horses are sent to the drill until they will remain steady in the ranks. To aid in the purchase of a horse to replace one that has died from natural causes, the man receives a certain sum (Rs. 100) from a fund to which he subscribes monthly.

Rate and Nature of Monthly Pay.

Government gives to each sowar Rs. 30 per mensem; with this sum he has to supply himself with clothing, arms, accoutrements, keep, cloth, and furnish trapping for his horse, and to maintain carriage, so as to be able to move at a moment's notice wherever he may be ordered to go.

Manner of Clothing and Arming.

At first clothing, arms, accoutrements, &c., were picked up where the men could, and were of the worst possible description. Several attempts were made to remedy this on the spot, but they ended at last in General Jacob, at the request of the native officers, getting everything from England of the best quality. Clothing, issued every two years, is obtained through the clothing agent of the army.

Accoutrements: a plain strong black leather belt and pouch, a plain strong black leather sword belt with frog; strong jack-boots, strong white leather bridles and stirrup leathers, iron bits and stirrup* irons from Messrs. Garden and Son, Piccadilly, a good serviceable double-barrelled carbine, and a good curved sabre, old dragoon pattern, with strong leather scabbard, from Messrs. Swinburn and Co., Birmingham. Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers carry one good double-barrelled pistol. Ammunition is supplied by government.

Cost of Equipment, how defrayed.

To meet the cost of the above articles, a certain sum is deducted monthly from each man's pay until the whole are paid for. If a man, after a term of service, took his discharge with the consent of the commandant, his arms, accoutrements, &c. for which he had by that time paid, were returned into the regimental stores, he receiving value for them according to the condition they were in; this being decided by a committee of native officers appointed for the purpose. In case of the death of a soldier the same course is pursued, the value being paid to the estate.

If a man is discharged in disgrace, his arms, accoutrements, &c. are taken from him, and his forfeited stoppages are paid into the regimental fund.

Repair of Arms, &c.

To keep the arms, &c., in thorough repair, a regimental workshop is kept up, and moves with the regiment wherever it goes; the expense is partly paid by government and partly by regimental contribution. Every evening on the roll-call parade the troop officers carefully inspect the arms and accoutrements of their men: any requiring repair are brought next day before the commandant at orderly room and sent to the workshop. Spare articles are kept in store to meet these cases, so that no one should for any time be unprovided with arms, &c.

Inspection and Use of Arms.

Once a week—every Saturday—troop officers inspect every article belonging to the men of their troops, and report on their state personally to the commandant on the following Monday. To accustom the men as much as possible to their arms, a troop turns out every evening all the year round for ball practice on foot. The men are also encouraged to use them for private practice at a mark, or in pursuit of game.

Means of keeping up the condition of the Horses.

Each owner is made individually responsible for the good and serviceable condition of his horse. Should it from want of proper care become unserviceable the horse is cast by the commandant, and the owner has to replace it without assistance from the fund. It is his interest, therefore, to keep the animal in the most efficient state.

Nature of Instruction.

The regiments parade once a week all the year round for exercise—more if necessary; but this is generally found quite sufficient to keep them up to their work. The men are thus not fagged and disgusted by perpetual drilling; they take an interest in their work, and all strive to do well. The awkward and careless on parade are sent to the drill which is carried on daily under the adjutant, and they remain there until reported qualified by the adjutant.

Communication between Officers and Men.

There is daily orderly room at 10 A.M., at which all the European officers attend, and any native officers who may have business. Any man can come and communicate with the commanding officer accompanied by his troop officer;—justice is openly done to all, the orders for the day are issued in the presence of all who like to attend, and matters affecting the welfare of the regiment are generally discussed and disposed of.

Every evening there is roll-call parade, excepting on Sundays; troop officers inspect their troops, orders are read out, and one troop has ball-practice.

Powers of Commandant.

The commandant has the power of enlisting and discharging, promoting and reducing. He selects from the non-commissioned ranks, and recommends to the Commander-in-chief those he considers best fitted for commissions. These recommendations have always been attended to.

Promotion.

The system of promotion is this:—Every soldier must first pass an examination before the adjutant, showing he is

qualified to perform the duties of naik (corporal) and to command a guard. A general roll is kept, showing the character of every man in the regiment. A certain number of the best characters among the passed are picked out, and the one who on examination proves the best of these is promoted. And so on throughout, only that the standard of efficiency is of course raised as you go up the list.

Other Rewards.

The commandant has, besides promotion, another means of rewarding, viz., by the presentation of "assamees" (right of property—holding a horse in the regiment) forfeited from misconduct or from other reason. These are in his gift, and can be bestowed on the deserving. This belongs, however, solely to the Sillidar horse system.

Punishments and Trials.

In such a system as that in vogue in the Sind horse, punishment is comparatively rare: for minor offences, punishment drill, or confinement to the quarter guard for a few days, being found amply sufficient. More serious offences are tried by regimental punchayet, a court consisting of five native commissioned officers, who thoroughly investigate the case, record evidence, and lay their finding before the court, with a recommendation as to the nature of punishment to be awarded. This, in case of unsoldierlike crimes, is almost invariably dismissal from the service. This is approved or not by the commandant, as the case may seem to demand.

The commandant of the Sind horse is also a magistrate, and his officers deputy magistrates, so that where further punishment is necessary after dismissal, the offender can be tried and punished by the civil power for the crime of which he has been guilty.

The proceedings of a punchayet are regularly recorded in the vernacular, and when completed are read out publicly before the commandant at orderly room, and his decision is then pronounced.

Articles of War.

The Sind horse are at present under the articles of war for native troops, but it is to be hoped that these articles will now be done away. They are totally inapplicable to such a state of affairs as exists in the Sind horse.

Conclusion.

The effect of such a system as prevails in the Sind horse is to produce the best and most satisfactory state of discipline. It excites perfect trust, confidence, and mutual respect on all sides. It teaches the soldier to look up to his own officers as those in whose hands his well-being, comfort, and honour are placed. It makes him feel that he is not merely a machine but a reasoning being, whose labours are of use, and whose efforts are appreciated by those with whom he works. He feels proud of being a soldier, and whatever powers he has he willingly devotes to sustain the credit of that regiment to which he feels it an honour to belong.

W. L. MREWETHER, Major,
Commandant 1st Sind Horse,
and Assistant Political Superintendent,
Frontier of Upper Sind.

August 25, 1858.

NOTES.

1. A most valuable addition to the establishment of a regiment of Sind horse would be that of a Russuldar Major (the same as Subadar Major in the line) and of a Kote Duffadar Major (corresponding with the Serjeant-Major of the line).

General Jacob repeatedly applied for these, pointing out the advisability of the former and the indispensability of the latter, but the request was always refused, because such ranks did not exist in similar regiments in Bengal.

2. The Sillidar system might be made applicable to the infantry as well as to cavalry, indeed is being so now by General Jacob, who is raising two rifle regiments on that plan for service on the frontier of Upper Sind. Its great advantages are, that by making soldiers provide everything for themselves, carriage included, it increases their intelligence and activity, saves them from helplessness, and teaches them how to maintain themselves wherever they may go.

W. L. M.

APPENDIX No. 7.

NOTES ON CERTAIN PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS IN THE NATIVE ARMY OF INDIA.—By Colonel HOLLAND.

1. Almost all officers of Indian experience concur in the opinion that the regular native army is not in the same

* The Native saddle is used.

satisfactory state of discipline it once was; that there is not the same zeal and esprit de corps among the officers, nor the same ready, unhesitating, and cheerful obedience among the men; that all classes feel duty irksome, and look forward with hope to the time when they may retire on their pensions. Many causes have, doubtless, combined to produce this state of things. The thoughts and wishes of the European officers have, during the last thirty years, more and more tended to home, with the rapidly increasing means of communication. Every year sees an increase in the proportion of married officers; the improved habits of life, by decreasing mortality, and the additions that have from time to time been made in the number of subordinate officers, have rendered promotion to the higher grades slower and slower. As regards the men, the bonds of discipline have been much loosened by the injudicious abolition of corporal punishment in the native ranks, while retaining it in the European; by the constantly increasing tendency to withdraw power from the hands of commanding officers (the necessary consequence of permitting, as is too often the case, unfit men to occupy that position); by the introduction of the technicalities of British law in military criminal procedure, and by injudicious tampering with, and alteration of, the rates of pay, batta, and pension. While those whose advice has been mainly followed as to the best mode of remedying defects are usually officers of high rank in the royal army, often able and distinguished men, but unqualified by their antecedents to form sound opinions on such subjects, and the remedies have been such as officers conversant with English troops only would naturally suggest; viz., more officers, more drill, more entire assimilation with the English system; and the result has been an increase of the outward seeming of discipline, in Bombay at least, with a gradually increasing feeling of discontent, and a vast increase to the cost; while in the Bengal army, even the form and appearance of discipline seem to have vanished.

2. The remedies which I would venture to suggest for this state of things consist in retracing our steps to some extent, while adopting all improvements found in practice to work well; in recognizing and acting on the fact, that rules which may be admirable for English soldiers may not be adapted to Asiatics, and in placing before all ranks and classes the stimuli of hope and fear suitable to their condition.

3. I consider the native army, although overworked, very much larger than is necessary. It performs at present most of the police duties of the country, by no means so well as could be done by local police raised and trained for the work, and at very much greater cost. I would, therefore, increase and improve the police, and considerably reduce the numerical amount of the native army; the individuals composing the force so retained could then be selected with more attention to thews and sinews, want of height being disregarded, and the Bombay practice of mixing and enlisting all castes and classes in the same regiment retained and improved on.

4. The force so reduced, and no longer required to be broken up into detachments for the security of gaoles and civil stations, should be cantoned in large masses at a few well-selected stations, with a view to training and facility of movement by land or water, in various directions, rifle practice and the constant use of the spade and pickaxe taking the place of many of the useless and wearisome pedantries of drill. No man should be enlisted who is not ready to go anywhere, and to do anything he is ordered; and all hesitation, murmuring, or doubtful obedience, to be punished promptly and severely, not by the tedious and uncertain process of court-martial, but by the will and order of the commander.

5. The dress should be modified, by substituting a turban for the uncomfortable schako, and an "angurka" (which is simply a loose tunic without collar) for the tight-fitting European coat; the belt should be of uncoloured well tanned leather, without breastplate, for the white is troublesome to clean, and forms an admirable mark for an enemy's marksman, while the black composition stains the cloth and rots the leather. In regimental organization a company should be selected of the crack shots, in lieu of forming rifle regiments; for the qualities which make a man a first-rate marksman, though they may be greatly improved by training, must be innate, and cannot be created. We may as well expect that teaching will make a first-rate painter, musician, or poet, as a marksman. At present we enlist 1,000 bumpkins indiscriminately, clothe them in green (not the best colour, it may be remarked, for riflemen), put an expensive rifle in their hands, and, by dint of great pains, make really good shots of about one-tenth of the number, and indifferent shots of the remainder. In the cavalry we can hardly improve on the dress and equipments of the best of the irregular horse, and their example should be followed. An English light dragoon rides on an average more than

18 stone; an Indian regular light cavalry soldier about the same, and an irregular horseman about 14 stone.

6. The real discipline of the best of our irregular corps is at least equal to that of the regular army; officers and men in the former, as a general rule, are more contented and zealous, and in action they have proved themselves second to none in gallantry. These results are generally attributed to the fact that the European officers, though few, are selected men, with handsome pay, and that to the system which drains the best men from regular regiments for detached duties may be attributed alike the excellence of the irregular, and the deteriorated state of the regular army; that, in fact, the latter is sacrificed to supply officers for detached employ.

7. There is some truth in this view, but it is not the whole truth, and the remedy often proposed, of creating staff corps, so as to leave every regiment with its full complement of officers, with no duties of interest or importance to occupy their minds and thoughts, with far less prospect than at present of detached employ, would be far worse than the disease; it would create, at a vast addition of cost, one dead level of hopelessness among regimental officers. The example of irregular corps proves not only that it is not more officers that are wanted, but that regiments could well spare many they have, provided the means were found of making the few left take an interest and a pride in their duty. The desire to rise above regimental employ may, undoubtedly, under the existing system occasionally spoil a regimental officer, but it has produced many eminent men, and we should be very careful how we deal with a system which has wrought such effects.

8. Further, in irregular regiments the native officers have duties of importance to perform, and are more suitably paid than in the regular service; they are, therefore, more respected by the men, and have more self respect, and mix more on a footing of equality with their European comrades; they are in all corps (in Bombay) selected for fitness alone, a practice of incalculable value.

9. Prior to 1824 the native infantry possessed a regimental organization of which the most was certainly not made, but which had advantages and capabilities we should do well to avail ourselves of. Each regiment consisted of two battalions, the European officers of which rose in one general line of promotion, and could be drafted from one battalion to another, as occasion required. In order to give some temporary impetus to promotion, this system was altered, each battalion was converted into a distinct regiment, with its own colonel; and for this trifling object, which could have been gained equally well by a mere change of name, an immensely increased amount of supercession, with its attendant heart-burnings and disgusts, was created.

10. I propose to revert to and extend the battalion system. Each regiment should consist of three battalions of about 800 men; officers and men to be interchangeable as required. When any battalion is engaged on distant service, one of those left in quarters should serve as a reserve or depot; should keep it complete by drafts of trained men; should receive from the service battalion all partially worn-out men, such as are now (in Bombay) sent to the veteran battalions, fit for easy garrison duty, but unfit for active service, men sent for recovery from the seat of war; and all families unable or unwilling to return to their homes should be taken charge of by it.

11. The establishment of European officers of a native infantry regiment is 26 of all ranks; this number multiplied by three, for a regiment of three battalions, gives a total of 78; or, omitting the colonels of battalions as not on the working strength, of 75 officers. The establishment I propose admits of a reduction of fully 18 officers in a regiment, leaving 57 to be disposed of as follows:—

For the staff of three battalions*	-	15	officers.
" detached (staff and other duties)	-	21	"
" absent on furlough and sick	-	12	"
		—	
		48	
Unemployed	-	9	"
		—	
Total	-	57	"

12. The officers left by the proposed arrangement "unemployed" would consist partly of young officers learning their regimental duties, and of others returned from fur-

* The establishment for each battalion should be the same as it was prior to 1839; viz.,—

2	field officers.
5	captains.
8	lieutenants.
4	ensigns.
—	
Total	- 19

lough, &c.; they should not, however, be allowed to interfere with the command of companies. Arrangements should be made and facilities afforded for such unemployed officers as desired it, to be temporarily attached to the cavalry, artillery, and sappers, to the commissariat and other departments, in order to qualify for employment on the staff.

13. The commandants of battalions to be selected without reference to seniority from among the most active and best qualified field officers, who should be all on the same footing that lieutenant-colonels now are in the Indian army; viz., available for duty with any regiment. The pay of those officers to be increased, and with their pay their powers of reward and punishment; the great majority of offences now tried by court-martial to be adjudged by the commandants, and, as regards the remainder, a much more simple code and form of procedure to be adopted. The commandants should have the selection, subject to the approval of the commander-in-chief, of their own staff, including two captains, an adjutant and a quartermaster and paymaster. Interpreters, under a better system, should be dispensed with, for no officer should be considered qualified to undertake any duty in a native battalion who is not able to converse with reasonable ease and fluency with his men. The whole of the staff of battalions should be paid on the same average scale as general staff officers of corresponding grades, both to attach them to their duty, and to render removal a thing to be avoided.

14. The selection of officers for general staff and detached duties should be made subject to the usual restrictions as to a certain amount of regimental duty, but the test of fitness should embrace more than a knowledge, often very superficial, of one or more native languages. A candidate for the general staff should be required to go through an examination as to a competent practical knowledge of cavalry, artillery, field engineering, and infantry duties, (with which, view, officers desirous of qualifying should be permitted to serve for a limited term with various corps.) and a colloquial and idiomatic knowledge of Hindostanee. The qualifications of candidates for the civil staff and miscellaneous employments should be adapted to the special requirements, so that every man possessed of a fair share of industry, ability, or useful knowledge of any kind might find an opening for its development, and benefit the state and himself by its exercise.

15. Cadets should, on arrival in India, be sent immediately to a battalion to do duty, and complete their military education. The suggestion to train young officers for a year or two with a European regiment before commencing their career in the native army, I consider most injudicious, as the probable result would be a distaste and contempt for the troops among whom they would have to pass their lives. Should any young officer, after a year passed with his battalion, be reported on so unfavourably as to render his continuance in the service clearly inexpedient, he should be furnished with a free passage to England, and be struck off the strength of the army. Promotion from the grade of lieutenant to captain should, as a rule, proceed by seniority, subject, however, to the passing over of a senior officer unfavourably reported on, and to the occasional promotion out of his turn of a junior who may be specially noticed for any distinguished course of conduct. Promotion to the grade of field officer, however, should in all cases be by selection, and no length of service or respectability of character should authorize the advance to this important grade of any captain who may not be considered fully qualified to perform its duties.

16. An invalid list, much on the present footing, should be retained, and all officers of good character unfitted for the duties of their profession by wounds, sickness, or other infirmity, should be transferred to it. The fact of having been absent from duty, on account of ill health, for more than a certain number of months within any given number of years, should render invaliding compulsory. Officers on the civil staff who might be reported on as fit for and useful in their present duties, although not fit for active service, should also be transferred to the invalid corps, and still be capable of retaining their appointments, should the Government desire to make use of their services.

17. The rules, according to which pensions are now given according to rank, or to service irrespective of rank, should still remain in force; but it should be in the power of the Government, and the power not unfrequently made use of, to require any officer to take his pension whenever, from whatever cause, it may be considered no longer desirable to retain him on the strength of the army.

18. With such rules, strictly carried out, the promotion of qualified officers for the higher grades would be sufficiently rapid, and the stimulus of hope on the one hand, and fear of removal to the pension list or of supercession on the other, would draw forth the best energies of all; activity and zeal would take the place of the indifference, weariness,

and distaste now unhappily too prevalent—and not without cause,—among regimental officers; a distaste which no assertion in general orders, that an officer's most honourable position is with his regiment, and that it is unsoldierlike to desire a transfer from it, will ever effect.

19. Believing the best of the irregular cavalry to be equal to the best of the regular, and on the average better fitted for the required duties, and at a cost per man of little more than half, I would place the whole of the native cavalry on the footing of the best of the irregular or Sillidar horse, with somewhat larger pay, so as to ensure a better class of horses; their European officers to be drawn, as at present, from all the services, commandants being allowed to select their own staff.

20. One general evil which all the armies of India have suffered from has arisen from the fact of the Governor-General and Commander-in-chief of all India having been governor and commander of the Bengal presidency and army. This evil, so far as regards the Governor-General, has been modified by the creation of a separate government for Bengal; but the supreme controlling power of the Commander-in-chief in India has been constantly extended, while he is still commander of the separate army of Bengal, which has been taken as a model on which to mould the others, much to the detriment of all; while jealousy has been justly felt at the higher scale of allowances granted to almost all grades of officers of the favoured army. This should be remedied by making the commander of each army quite independent of the others.

21. The plans above suggested involve much larger powers and a much greater degree of confidence than is at present reposed in commanders-in-chief, and, through them, in officers commanding divisions, brigades, and regiments, and a much more summary removal of any of those functionaries for inefficiency or abuse of trust. Hitherto the practice has been frequently to nominate unfit men, and then to multiply checks on a probable abuse of power, ineffective as regards those they are intended to restrain, but destructive of the usefulness of energetic and honest commanders, anxious and able, if only unfettered, to do their duty by the service they may be said to reign over, but not to govern. There is no want of qualified men, if inquiry be made for them, and no object be regarded but the good of the service.

Doubtless no system that man can devise can be free from error, and in spite of all endeavours, private influence, prejudice, or indolence will sometimes override the claims of the public for the services of the fittest man. But so much seems clear, that if we establish a system, in itself vicious, however much we may try to counterbalance its effects in the practical working, the result must be unsatisfactory.

J. HOLLAND.

Bombay, February 1849.

NOTE.

The foregoing memorandum (with some subsequent modification) was written some years since. I see little in it to alter in remodelling the native army, but the considerable increase to the local European force now called for, by giving more regiments from which to select officers for detached employ, and thereby reducing the number required to be taken from any one, renders it possible still further to diminish the establishment of officers of native regiments. A still further reduction can be made in the absentees on furlough, as stated below, and thus a very important saving effected, while providing for the officers of a much more powerful and efficient army. According to my judgment, the large number of officers now attached to native regiments is an unmixed evil; not only do they do no good, but from want of interest and occupation they individually deteriorate; and in place of teaching the native soldiers to look up to and respect the European character, they, in too many cases, present the humiliating spectacle of idle, discontented, or dissipated officers, most of whom, under a better system, would have exhibited the fine qualities which a fair field of action rarely fails to develop in the English gentleman.

The subjoined tables give the strength, composition, and establishment of the Indian army, such as, combined with a general disarmament of the population, and an extensive addition to the police force, would suffice, in my opinion, for the future wants of India.

STATEMENT of the Strength, in Non-commissioned and Rank and File, of the Indian Army, as the same stood before the Mutiny, and as proposed to stand when the Country is settled; including Troops of the Line and Local Corps, but exclusive of Sappers and Miners.

ARM.	Strength before the Mutiny.				Proposed Strength.				REMARKS.
	Line.	Local Troops.		Total European and Native.	Line.	Local Troops.		Total European and Native.	
	European.	European.	Native.		European.	European.	Native.		
Artillery - -	—	6,500	9,000	15,500	—	12,000	6,000	18,000	
Cavalry - - -	2,500	—	30,500	33,000	2,500	5,000	20,000	27,500	
Infantry - - -	21,000	8,000	190,000	219,000	20,000	20,000	124,800	164,800	
Total - - -	23,500	14,500	229,500	267,500	22,500	37,000	150,800	209,300	

STRENGTH of the Indian Local Army, in Regiments, Battalions, and Officers, before the Mutiny, and as now proposed. The Engineer Corps and Colonels of Regiments not included.

ARM.	Before the Mutiny.			Proposed Establishment.			Increase.			Decrease.			Maximum Number of Officers for detached Duty.		REMARKS.
	Regiment or Battalion.	Officers.		Regiment or Battalion.	Officers.		Regiment or Battalion.	Officers.		Regiment or Battalion.	Officers.		Per Regiment, &c.	Total.	
		Field.	Captains and Subalterns.		Field.	Captains and Subalterns.		Field.	Captains and Subalterns.		Field.	Captains and Subalterns.			
Artillery Battalion or Brigade -	24	2	22	30	3	24	6	42	192	—	—	—	7	210	The number of Staff given for the Artillery includes their own peculiar Ordnance appointments.
European Cavalry Regiment -	—	—	—	10	4	32	10	40	320	—	—	—	9	90	
Native Cavalry Regiment -	21	2	20	—	—	—	—	—	—	21	42	420	—	—	
European Infantry Regiment -	9	4	46	25	6	44	16	114	686	—	—	—	12	300	The total number of officers reduced amounts to 2,153, less 1,394; or 759.
Native Infantry Regiment -	155	2	23	52	5	37	1	—	—	—	50	1,641	12	624	
Total - - -								196	1,198	—	92	2,061	—	1,224	

The proportion of field officers to those of the lower grades is here increased from 1 to 10, as it stood in 1857, to about 1 to 8, as it stood prior to 1839, since which time successive augmentations have injuriously increased the disproportion.

The allotment of officers to the different regiments I propose as follows, strongly advocating the abolition of the regimental grades of major and ensign as superfluous, and as an injurious distinction between the ordnance and the other corps.

Artillery Battalion, 6 Companies.	European Cavalry Regiment, 8 Troops.	European Infantry Regiment, 10 Companies.	Native Infantry Regiments, 3 Battalions, 10 Companies.
3 Field Officers 6 Captains 6 2nd Captains 12 Lieutenants	4 Field Officers 10 Captains 22 Lieutenants	6 Field Officers 14 Captains 30 Lieutenants	5 Field Officers 12 Captains 25 Lieutenants

The native cavalry being entirely on the irregular system, the officers will be supplied, as at present, by selections from other corps.

The number of officers employed on staff and other detached duties throughout India, previous to the mutiny, was 1,237; but as the proposed system will reduce a portion of the irregular cavalry and nearly all the local infantry, and as it will doubtless be advisable to throw open more appointments to qualified officers of the line than have hitherto been allotted to them, the number above shown, 1,224, is more than is likely to be required. Should they be so, there is an ample reserve at all times in the native infantry, the officers of which will stand as follows:—

For regimental duty - - - -	15
For detached employ - - - -	12
Absent on furlough - - - -	5
Available - - - -	10

Total establishment of regiment - 42

In the original memorandum to which this is appended I allowed twelve absentees, on account of furlough, to a regiment; I have now ascertained that in 1851, the latest account I can procure previous to the mutiny, the total number of absentees on this account, including the engineers, but exclusive of colonels of regiments, was 688, or 12.2 per cent. on the total establishment of 5,638 officers. Applying this percentage to an establishment reduced by 769 officers, as above proposed, the total number of absentees on furlough may hereafter be reckoned at 595;

or from the native infantry establishment of 2,184 officers, 266 officers, or 5 per regiment.

Before detailing the mode in which it is proposed to pay the officers doing duty with native regiments on about the same scale as officers on the general staff, I think it necessary to explain the plan on which I would recommend the staff to be organized.

It seems to have been a part of the policy of Government hitherto to place the civil department of the Indian army on a higher footing in respect of allowances than the military staff,—a policy very mistaken, in my opinion, as regards Indian service,—by which the fighting portion of the army has been habitually unduly depressed. It is sometimes argued that civil staff, having the disbursement of public monies should receive compensation for the risk of loss owing to imperfect accounts; but even supposing this argument sound, it would only apply to a portion of the number; and it is, perhaps, not sufficiently considered that this risk is reduced to a minimum where the civil staff officer is fully competent for the performance of the duties for which he receives pay, and that as a rule none but the ignorant or careless suffer, so that additional pay is, in fact, a compensation to incompetent men for the effect of their own incompetency. It can never be meant that the office of paymaster or auditor, whose qualifications are those of a clerk and accountant, is of more importance than that of the staff officer of a division, on whose sagacity, watchfulness, and active energy the well-being, and often the safety, of a force depends; and that the one should, as he does at present, enjoy much higher pay than the other, is a matter which I conceive ought to be amended.

There is also a very considerable and very unnecessary complication of accounts, owing to the different scales of staff pay to different departments, and also of the items composing staff and regimental pay, under the heads of horse allowance, half and extra batta, presidency and ordinary house rent, net pay, tent allowances, and gratuities, &c., while staff allowances are in some cases given in addition to, and sometimes in substitution of, part or a whole of the regimental allowances; so that a glance at the pay table conveys no information as to the actual amount enjoyed by any individual, and the unnecessary consumption of time and foolscap paper, and of clerk's labour in preparing and examining pay abstracts, is excessive.

I conceive that the whole subject may be very beneficially simplified, by classifying staff-officers of whatever departments into a few well-defined divisions, with but one scale of pay to each class, admitting but two heads for ad' pay, staff or regimental, viz., garrison and field, the latter to be given only when in the field or marching, or when required

to be in readiness to march, and to be of sufficient amount to cover the reasonable expenses of movement, which a subaltern's or captain's batta certainly is not.

Under these views, I should recommend the arrangement of the staff of an Indian army, and the allowances to officers serving with native cavalry and infantry regiments, to be somewhat on the following scale:—

CLASSIFICATION of STAFF OFFICERS and SCALE of MONTHLY PAY, as also of Officers serving with Native Regiments.

Class.	Designation.	Pay.	Batta.	Remarks.
1	Brigadier	2,500	300	All appointments not enumerated herein to be placed in one of these four classes.
	Military Secretary to Government.			
	Adjutant-General			
	Quartermaster-General			
	Chief Engineer			
2	Commandant of Artillery	1,400	200	
	Commissary-General			
	Auditor-General			
	Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding Regiment.			
	Deputy Military Secretary to Government.			
3	Deputy Adjutant-General	700	100	
	Deputy Quartermaster-General.			
	Judge Advocate-General			
	Dep. Commissary-General			
	Deputy Auditor-General			
4	Paymaster-General	450	75	
	Captain with Native Regiment.			
	Assist. Adjutant, Quartermaster, Commissary, and Auditor-General.			
	Deputy Judge Advocate-General.			
	Paymaster			
	Regimental Staff			
	Deputy Assistants			
	Aides-de-camp			

Under the proposed plan of massing the troops at a small number of stations, many brigade commands would be reduced, the remainder might be all of one class, and paid on one scale.

The officers of the adjutant and quartermaster-general's departments, if not possessed of sufficient army rank, should have it conferred upon them with their appointments, to be withdrawn or confirmed on their vacating them after a certain term of years, if specially recommended. I consider *bona fide* military rank to be highly desirable in such appointments for the more effectual performance of duty, and have known many cases in my experience where the want of it has been a serious impediment.

Adjutant and quartermaster-general and brigadier to be brigadier-general.

Deputy adjutant and quartermaster-general to be lieutenant-colonel.

Assistant adjutant and quartermaster-general to be major.

Deputy-assistant adjutant and quartermaster-general to be captain.

London, October 1858.

J. HOLLAND,
Colonel.

APPENDIX No. 8.

An ESTIMATE of the COST of converting a SAILING 80-GUN SHIP into a SCREW SHIP, with Engines of 400 horse-power, for the CONVEYANCE of TROOPS, and also of the ANNUAL CHARGE for WEAR, TEAR, &c. (Referred to in Col. Tulloch's Memorandum, Evidence, Question, 4529.)

Adaptation and Outfit of Ship.

Hull	16,000	This estimate is based on the assumption that the work is done in a dockyard; but if done by contract, from 13 to 15 per cent. should be added to the amount for fitting the ship.
Masts and yards	1,000	
Rigging and stores	10,000	
Machinery, 400 horse-power	24,000	
Armament, twenty 32-pounders for the upper deck, about	2,000	
	<u>£53,000</u>	

Annual Charge for Wear, Tear, &c.

Wages and provisions for crew, about 150 men	9,351
Wear and tear—Hull	2,500
„ Masts, yards, rigging, and stores	2,000
„ Machinery, 400 horse-power	2,400
„ Armament	80
	<u>£16,331</u>

The charge for coals should be estimated for the number of days under full steam-power at the rate of about 40 tons a day.

It should be observed that although line-of-battle ships could be converted into screw troop-ships at a comparatively small expense, they would not be so efficient or suitable as iron ships built especially for the purpose, with lofty decks capable of receiving horses; neither would they be suited as regards speed for the carrying of mails.

October 23, 1858.

APPENDIX No. 9.

MEMORANDUM for Sir A. TULLOCH, K.C.B.

1. Is it likely that the railway will be completed by April next?

The railway is completed from Alexandria to Suez, with the exception of a break at the Nile, where the troops cross by a steam ferry. A bridge is being built, which will be finished by June 1859.

2. What reduction in the expense of transit from Alexandria to Suez is likely to be effected in consequence. May it be assumed that the fare will not exceed 1d. a mile for soldiers and third-class passengers, that being the usual rate of conveyance by rail in other countries?

The Government of Egypt is most anxious to facilitate the passage of troops through the country, but it is not to be expected that they can be carried at the same rate as in England, as the expenses of the line are very heavy, all carriages, engines, rails, &c. coming from England. Plate-layers and artificers are Europeans as well as the drivers; they all receive very high wages, and it is necessary for the safety of the troops that these situations should not be filled by Arabs, at least for the present.

I do not know what work is done for the 1d. a mile mentioned in the query, but in this country the whole of the embarkation and disembarkation of the troops, as well as their conveyance by rail, has to be done by the transit administration; and as the ships at Suez are four miles from the shore, it is necessary to employ a steamer to convey the soldiers on board.

The present allowance of baggage is 2 cwt. for each officer, and 1 cwt. for each man; this includes his arms, which are packed in cases, and his knapsack which is in a sack.

In any future arrangement I have no doubt that the arms and knapsacks would not be weighed, so that the whole of the allowance would go towards carrying the heavy baggage of the regiment, as well as any extra ammunition or arms that it might be thought necessary to send. Suppose a regiment to be 800 strong, with complement of officers, say 32; their allowance would be 44 tons 4 cwt., which is nearly 20 tons more than is allowed to a regiment by the Queen's regulations.

I think the Government might be induced to lower their terms to 4l. for an officer and 2l. for a man, including everything except food, so that the English Government would be at no further expense for the men during the transit.

With respect to the food, a great saving can be made, as at present there is a heavy additional charge of between 14s. and 15s. a man that may be entirely done away with, and the men might carry their own rations; I should, however, suggest that one meal or some refreshment should be given them on their transit, as in case of accidents on the desert, the provisions they carried with them would then be available.

3. Could the distance be got over in ten hours, so as to admit of the soldiers being conveyed at night during the hot season, or what is likely to be the shortest period of transit?

The distance between Alexandria and Suez is about 226 miles, and including a delay of half an hour crossing the Nile, it can be accomplished easily by a special train in from ten to twelve hours.

4. As the expense of coals adds greatly to the cost of steam conveyance after leaving Suez, are any arrangements in contemplation when the railway is completed for coals being conveyed by it across the isthmus, so as to supply all the stations on the eastern route from Alexandria?

With regard to the conveyance of coal, the transit administration is making every effort to have it as efficient as possible; but owing to the great expense of conveying water for the use of the engines from Cairo to Suez, a distance of 96 miles, the Suez water being too brackish to be used by the locomotives, it will be unable to carry coal at a cheap rate; I should think at not less than from 26s. to 28s. a ton; even at this rate in time of war, or any sudden emergency, a great saving might be made.

G. D. MALCOLM.

APPENDIX No. 10.

(6.)

RETURN showing the STRENGTH, NUMBER, and GENERAL COMPOSITION of all CIVIL, LOCAL, and POLICE CORPS of the Three Presidencies.

NOTE.—The documents annexed have been furnished from the Judicial department of the East India House, in answer to this requisition.

MEMORANDUM.

There is but one police battalion in Bengal of which there is a return. The return is here annexed, together with the only statement that has been received of the police in the North-west provinces with anything of a military organization. The president in council, however, writes in a minute, dated 13th May 1858, "The pressure of circumstances has forced the Government suddenly and very largely to have recourse to a measure long in contemplation, namely, the levy of a police corps having a military organization more or less similar to that of the Punjab police corps for service in the North-west provinces and Bengal. An application for a levy of ten thousand men for this purpose, for service in the lower provinces, is now before the Government of India from the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. There is already one admirable police battalion in Bengal; and more levies have been for some months in progress in several districts of the lower provinces. In the North-west provinces we know that large levies in the form of police corps are on foot, and in actual service. In the central provinces alone, four police corps of foot and one of cavalry were formed or forming before I left them." He further states, in a minute of the 21st of the same month, that twenty or thirty thousand soldiers will soon be on foot in Bengal and Hindostan in the numerous military police regiments now raised and raising.

In the presidency of Madras there is no police having anything of a military organization, except the Sebundee corps and irregular horse included in the annexed return. Orders were, however, sent to Madras in a despatch, dated 30th September 1857, entirely to re-organize the police in the presidency. No report has yet been received of the measures taken or the progress made, in pursuance of those orders.

The police of Bombay underwent a complete re-organization five years ago. It is under the charge of district superintendents of police, who are all military men; and as the whole of the police, with the exception of that for the presidency town, has something of a military character, it has been included in the annexed returns. The statement for the Punjab and Scinde contain such information as the records of the India House afford in regard to the military police of those places.

The statement for Scinde has the peculiarity of including what is there called the "rural police," which is believed to be under military discipline, and is in fact a quasi-military force.

ABSTRACT OF MILITARY POLICE.—MADRAS.

For 1855-56.		
	European and Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers.	Men.
Vizagapatam, Golcondah Sibbendy	56	127
Kurnool, Irregular Horse - - -	53	294
Gaujam, Sibbendy - - - - -	36	249
Malabar, Local Corps - - - -	31	159
	146	829

BOMBAY POLICE as per Return dated 1st May 1855.

District.	Number of Officers.		No. of Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.
	European.	Native.	
Tannah - - - - -	2	14	1,920
Rutnagherry - - - - -	1	7	519
Surat - - - - -	1	9	857
Branch - - - - -	1	7	485
Ahmedabad - - - - -	1	17	1,127
Kaira - - - - -	1	9	843
Belgaum - - - - -	1	-	186
Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse - - - - -	4	24	753
Dharwar - - - - -	1	-	386
Poona - - - - -	7	8	1,133
Sholapore - - - - -	1	3	488
Ahmednaggur - - - - -	1	14	1,213
Kandeish - - - - -	1	25	1,826
Sattara Regiment of Native Infantry - - - - -	1	14	649
Total - - - - -	24	151	11,685

ABSTRACT STATEMENT of the PUNJAB POLICE, HORSE and FOOT, showing the Number of Men employed and the total Expense.

	Police Battalions.						Mounted Police.				Grand Total.			
	Native Commanders.	Ajuntants.	Soobadars.	Jemadars.	Havildars.	Naicks, Bugies.	Sepoys.	Resuldars.	Jemadars.	Duffladars.		Naib Do. Sowars.		
Total	7	7	70	70	350	350	70	5,600	27	54	108	108	2,700	9,521

NOTE.—The above is taken from a return dated 5th August 1854, the last which has been received. Since that time, however, there has been a considerable increase in the police force of the Punjab. The report of 1855-56 states generally that "the organized police, with a military system and discipline, and performing duties partly civil and partly military, consists of two corps of irregular infantry, seven battalions of foot, one regiment Punjab cavalry, and twenty-seven troops of horse. Their aggregate strength stands at 12,854 men, and their annual cost amounts to rs. 18,61,572 or 186,157l. on a population of twelve and three-quarter millions." The number of foot and horse are not given separately, but their relative proportions probably approximate to those of the above figured statement.

APPENDIX No. 11.

PROPOSED ORGANIZATION of a POLICE for the MADRAS PRESIDENCY.—By Mr. ELLIOT.

The Madras presidency occupies a great portion of the peninsula of India from Cape Cormorin up to 20° of N. lat., formed by the annexed 20 districts, containing about 140,000 square miles, and a population of about 22,000,000. This vast territory, upwards of 1,200 miles in length, is inhabited by various nations or tribes, with distinct languages, habits, and customs.

It is proposed to raise and organize a police or constabulary, for duty in these districts, on one uniform system of discipline, under an officer styled

The Chief Commissioner of Police,

vested, in direct communication with Government, with the direction, discipline, and internal economy of the force, with an office establishment at the seat of Government for the efficient control of the department.

Superintendent of Police.

Each district to be under a military officer of experience, styled superintendent of police, who should be master of the language of the district.

Deputy Superintendent of Police.

Two or more deputy superintendents of police in each district, according to its size and population. These officers to be selected from the military service or elsewhere by the Governor in Council.

The chief commissioner, superintendent, and deputies to be invested with the power of a justice of the peace.

Native Officers.

The native officers to be classed as jemadar majors, jemadars, duffadar-majors, duffadars, and naics; in the proportion of 1 jemadar major, 4 jemadars, 10 duffadar-majors, 50 duffadars, and 50 naics for every 1,000 men.

Peons.

Able-bodied men between 20 and 30 years of age, to be entertained without respect to class or castes, preference to be given to men who can read and write, to be styled peons.

Pay.

The jemadar-major -	-	35 rupees per mensem.
The jemadars -	-	30 "
The duffadar-majors -	-	20 "
The duffadars -	-	15 "
The naics -	-	12 "

The peons to be in three classes:—

1st class or $\frac{1}{4}$ of the force	6 rupees per mensem.
2nd class or $\frac{1}{2}$ of the force	7 "
3rd class or $\frac{1}{4}$ of the force	8 "

Men for the superior class to be selected for intelligence and good conduct, and liable to be put back for misbehaviour. The superintendents to recommend men for promotion to the rank of officers, which is not to be restricted to the district.

Dress.

The dress to be strictly native in every respect, and uniform throughout the force, only the quality or material worn to be adapted to the climate of the district. The men to be clothed by Government, under regulations for that purpose.

Arms and Accoutrements.

The peons to carry a short light carbine, slung over the back or shoulder; a strong, handy, serviceable weapon, not liable to get out of order, long range not required. A short sword, something like a ship's cutlass, but not quite so heavy and unconfined in the handle.

A single waist-belt for both sword and pouch, the plate to bear the name of district and number of the wearer.

The duffadars and naics to carry a double-barrelled carbine.

Register.

On being entertained each man will take the usual oath of a police officer, and when registered the code of regulations for the management of the force will be read to him, and he will be made fully acquainted with the terms of the engagement, and with the penalties to which he will be liable for misconduct. The code to be published by Government and distributed to the force for information and guidance.

Discipline and Drill.

Previous to the men being drafted for duty in the tannahs, detachments varying from 200 to 300 men to be assembled at the principal towns in the district for the purpose of being instructed in their powers and duties as policemen, to learn the use of their weapons, and to undergo a certain amount of drill, to form line, to move in a compact body, to extend into skirmishing order, to take advantage of ground or cover, to defend buildings, to act in streets, and particularly every information for vigilant patrolling.

Distribution.

Much will depend on the efficient distribution of the force; by reference to the size and population of the districts, it is evident that to follow strictly the usual proportion of 1,000 police for every 1,000,000 of souls would scarcely give a sufficient number of men to occupy the larger districts in beats of controllable dimensions; for instance, Bellary, containing 13,000 square miles, with a population of 1,200,000, would have a police of 1,200 men, whereas Tanjore, of 4,000 square miles, with a population of 1,600,000, would have 1,600 men; and Malabar, of 6,000 square miles, with a population of 1,500,000, would have 1,500 policemen. The strength for each district should, therefore, be left to be fixed when the system has commenced to work. The shape of the district must be also held in consideration when it is divided into beats. Many of them are slips, much greater in length than breadth. Headquarters, or the office of the superintendent, should be as central as possible, and his deputies should be again placed in the same manner in their several jurisdictions. For the easier working of the whole, the distribution should adhere as much as practicable, to the talook division of the district, with which the inhabitants are familiar, and if possible each talook should have a superior native police officer. The number and

extent of the beats must depend on the formation and other circumstances connected with the district, but the tannahs should be within reach of easy communication, say, each station should have a radius of 5 or 6 miles where there is a population; in partially cultivated spots the distance could be extended considerably, though daily communication between bordering beats should be imperative.

At head-quarters there should be always a reserve for urgent calls, and at all principal towns and high roads there should be a sufficient number of men to furnish escort parties, &c. If the police are to furnish guards for the large convict gaols, the force must be increased proportionally in such districts, and the calculation ought to provide also for the collecting of a body of men to attend at the annual festivals of certain temples or shrines where people congregate in multitudes. At certain fixed points in each district the police should be located in buildings (express) which could be defended in case of need, especially at the principal court station where the treasury and record office are established.

The number of men in a tannah should never be less than 8, in charge of an officer, either a duffadar or naic; some of the stations would require 12, 16, or even 20, and in towns the force ought to be equal to the preservation of the peace. Some of the outlying tannahs in wild districts should be located in mere huts, to be moved at certain seasons, or called in for special purposes. A portion of the force in each district should be in flying or movable stations, whereas others should be firmly and permanently fixed. There should be daily reports to the chief station in each talook, to be forwarded to head-quarters of the district; hereafter this communication may be perfected by a police telegraph throughout the whole system to insure daily information to the chief commissioner at the presidency.

The men in the tannahs to be mixed, both in regard to religion and language. In some districts where the Mahomedan population is scant, the proportion may be three Hindoos to one Mahomedan. In other districts, Bellary and Cuddapah, for instance, the division ought to be more equal; and in some districts it will be advisable to have a considerable portion of Mahrattas; and in all tannahs there ought to be a man or two from distant parts, to obtain the language, for the convenience of travellers or strangers. The men should not be employed in their own immediate district, but moved beyond local or family influence.

In addition to the force thus disposed, it is proposed to have a mounted body, in proportion of 100 to each 1,000 peons; not an expensive cavalry appendage, but mounted on the small Mahratta horse or pony (the best hack in the world), with the native bridle and saddle, celerity and endurance being the desideratum; the men to be disposed and armed exactly the same as the rest of the corps. This species of force would be invaluable in following up gang robbers, and also in keeping up a regular communication by relays of orderlies, especially in the larger districts, where the tannahs would necessarily be spread at greater distances.

In suggesting the formation of a concertive police of the above description, it is not intended to abolish the native institution of village watchmen or talliars. The office of the village watchman is hereditary; he is a professional police man from birth; he has land in the village; he is generally shrewd, intelligent, and active, and his local knowledge is perfect. It is proposed to register these men, and place them under the immediate control of the police authorities. It is true that one who understood the question intimately has recorded his opinion, that—"No system of police (in the Madras presidency) will be efficient, unless the subordinate duties be conducted by the talliars or village watchers; secondly, that the talliars will act only with effect under the head inhabitants; and, thirdly, that the head inhabitants will act only willingly under the amildars and collectors," that is to say, under the revenue officer; but this is a fallacy. Do not deprive these men of existing privileges or perquisites, give them a fair small salary, and their services can be commanded. It will not be necessary to clothe or arm them like the police, for they would not be called on to serve beyond the boundary of their own villages. For local purposes, under judicious control, these men are a ready made detective body. There are upwards of 40,000 villages in the districts, and probably there are upwards of 30,000 men at present depending on the State, whose services could be rendered most important by a very simple organization. The talliar should have all the powers of a policeman, but remain what he is, viz., a watchman; he should not be entitled to pension, for he has land by right,—but reward good service handsomely.

In the Madras presidency the police in the Mofussil is

under the control of the collector of revenue, and all the evils of such an arrangement are well known. In proposing to place it under an officer specially appointed for that purpose, it is not intended to trench on the powers of the collector; he would still remain the political head of his whole province, and retain all his power and authority as a justice of the peace and magistrate; but he would be relieved from all interference with the management of the force. Police involves a duty entirely distinct from magisterial. It is, to all intents and purposes, in its nature executive, and although not absolutely incompatible with that of magistrate, it had better be kept separate, for it necessarily involves acts against which appeal should be open to a magistrate; but when the magistrate is also the collector of revenue, the offices are beyond doubt incompatible, for the administration of the criminal law should not be subservient to the collector of revenue; therefore it is proposed to place the police under the command of an intelligent officer, who should give his whole undivided time and energies exclusively to that object. Under vigilant European supervision, every allegation of ill-treatment would receive instant attention and investigation, and be followed, whenever detected, by prompt and adequate punishment.

The material for police purposes in India is excellent. The natives are very intelligent, shrewd, patient, and persevering, and by constant attention on the part of active European supervision, an admirable constabulary, preventive and detective, could be speedily organized; indeed such are the institutions of society in India that, with a police constituted and commanded as suggested above, scarcely any crime, however minute, could be perpetrated without discovery of the offender by perfectly legal and justifiable means.

This sketch of what is proposed does not touch on the working of the police in connection with legal procedure, in the arrest and disposing of prisoners—for this the established law provides.

In conclusion, it may be mentioned that a rural police is now organizing at Madras on the above plan, and that the following salaries have been sanctioned by the supreme government:—

Chief commissioner	- -	2,500 rupees per mensem
A superintendent for each district	- - -	700 " "
A subordinate officer for each district	- - -	300 " "
Or two, at	- - -	150 " "

The existing police force, officers and men, amounts to 13,111, costing 69,556 rupees, and there are other peons performing other duties (revenue) as well as police duty, amounting to 4,525 men, costing 14,926 rupees.

This force of 17,500 men is exclusive of a police corps in the district of Malabar, 2 or 3 corps of subedaries in the Northern Circars, and a body of horse in Kurnool, besides the peons employed as military police at the several cantonments.

The presidency town police must remain distinct from the proposed force for duty in the districts.

DISTRICTS FORMING THE MADRAS PRESIDENCY.

—	Square Miles.	Population.	Talooks.	Villages.
Ganjam	6,400	926,980	9	1,272
Vizagapatam	7,650	1,254,272	3	609
Rajahmundry	6,050	1,012,056	16	841
Masulipatam	5,000	520,886	10	635
Guntur	4,960	570,083	14	1,040
Bellary	13,056	1,229,599	17	2,758
Cuddapah	12,970	1,450,921	14	1,833
Nellore	7,930	935,690	17	2,066
Chingleput	2,993	683,462	10	1,890
North Arcot	5,790	1,485,873	15	4,771
South Arcot	7,600	1,006,005	13	3,376
Trichinopoly	3,243	709,196	8	1,467
Tanjore	3,900	1,676,086	16	5,670
Madura	10,700	1,756,791	8	1,035
Tinnevely	5,700	1,269,216	13	1,298
Coimbatore	8,280	1,153,362	15	1,593
Salem	8,200	1,195,377	14	4,015
Malabar	6,060	1,514,909	18	2,781
Canara	7,720	1,056,333	11	2,281
Total	141,202	21,607,987	—	41,231

E. F. ELLIOT.

APPENDIX No. 12.

PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT.

Native Infantry for Bengal.

	Rupees per mensem.
1 commandant	- - - 1,500
5 captains at 800 rupees	- - - 4,000
5 subalterns „ 500 „	- - - 2,500
1 adjutant	- - - 700
Quartermaster	- - - 500
Serjeant-major	- - - 51
Quartermaster-serjeant	- - - 45
	<hr/>
	9,296
1 subahdar-major, pay and batta	- - - 60
9 subahdars at 50 rupees	- - - 450
10 jemadars „ 30 „	- - - 300
10 pay havildars „ 20 „	- - - 200
60 havildars „ 14 „	- - - 840
60 naicks „ 12 „	- - - 720
1,200 privates „ 7 „	- - - 8,400
	<hr/>
	20,266

The pay of the European officers to be a consolidated allowance, and drawn on the same conditions as staff pay. Though the proposed rate of pay for the European officers is considerably higher than that which regimental officers now receive, yet as there will be only 13 officers instead of 25 employed, the aggregate expense will not be increased. There will also be a saving in the charge for Native officers.

Regiments organized on the above establishment would each cost about 24,000l. a-year. Regiments organized on the present regular establishment of 1,000, including the European officers, cost 28,000l. each regiment.

The Government have now the opportunity of selecting for the new corps to be raised for Bengal, the officers most fitted for the command of Natives. The proposed rate of pay being high, service with these corps would be much sought after. The promotion of the officers selected would go on as they stand in the regiments to which they now belong.

In all Native corps the officer commanding the company should have the appointment of the naicks; the selection of havildars to rest with the officer commanding the regiment, in whom also should be vested the power of reduction without court-martial.

The appointment of the commissioned grades should be made, on the recommendation of the officer commanding the regiment, through the commander-in-chief to the Government.

Promotion to be entirely by selection, which, it is thought, would tend much to increase the intercourse between the European and Native officer.

This organization, if approved of, might by degrees be extended to the Native infantry of Bombay and Madras; and regulations might easily be framed which would govern the promotion of those officers who are hereafter appointed to the service.

R. B. WOOD, Colonel.

September 29, 1858.

APPENDIX No. 13.

MEMORANDUM by Colonel W. E. BAKER, BENGAL ENGINEERS, on the RE-ORGANIZATION of a CORPS of NATIVE SAPPERS for the BENGAL ARMY.

The corps of "sappers and miners" was combined with that of "pioneers" about 10 years ago; previously, the duties of the two corps had been nearly similar; both were employed on the construction of military roads and fortifications, but the sappers were not required to work on cantonment roads and drains, and the pioneers had no practice or instruction in throwing up fieldworks.

One of the companies of sappers was raised by the late Major Broadfoot, in Afghanistan, and, since the mutiny, a body of Feruzbee Sikh sappers was raised in the Punjab, and did good service at Delhi. Of the united corps of sappers and pioneers, some have remained faithful, but the greater part, I believe, joined the mutineers.

The following are my recommendations:—

I. That native sappers should be retained, but in reduced numbers.

1. Because Europeans could not work under an Indian sun.

2. Because, though a portion of the field engineering operations of a campaign can be performed with untrained labour under scientific European direction, yet much must be done under fire, at a risk of life which a common labourer could not be expected to incur.
3. Because I attach little weight to the objection that, in case of another mutiny, the scientific instruction imparted to native sappers might be turned against ourselves. Native troops, without European teaching, have always shown themselves apt in mining and throwing up breastworks and batteries; but skill in constructing fieldworks avails little without courage to defend them.
4. I would, however, limit the strength of the native sappers to 700 or 800 men, because, as before observed, part of the work usually devolving on native sappers may be performed by common labourers; for instance, during General Havelock's operations, Captain Crommelin threw a bridge of boats over the Ganges at Cawnpore during the floods of the rainy season without the aid of sappers.

II. That the corps of sappers should be employed in constructing roads and fortifications, and should be trained and practised in all branches of field engineering, but that it should be exempted from the duties of camp conservancy.

I recommend this exemption because I believe that liability to be employed as camp scavengers would lower the credit of the corps, and would limit the field of selection to the lowest castes. I would not say that men of low caste could not be made into good soldiers and intelligent sappers, but I would not wish to exclude altogether the more respectable classes.

III. That a body of trained labourers (bildars) be attached to the sappers, and be held available for cantonment and camp conservancy, for road-making, and for field operations; that they should not be obliged to work under fire, but might volunteer to do so; that they should not be armed, and that they should have no more of military organization than may be necessary for purposes of discipline.

IV. That both sappers and bildars should be recruited without reference to caste.

V. That the sappers should receive higher pay than the line, but that the pay of the bildars should be considerably lower.

VI. That men of the bildars distinguishing themselves for good service and intelligence should be eligible for promotion into the sappers.

VII. That the number of European sappers should be increased; that they should be trained during the cool season in the actual operations of field engineering; and at all seasons in the *direction* of such operations, the labour being performed by untrained labourers of different classes.

The number of European sappers latterly sent out by the Honourable Court to Bengal was, I believe, about 40 or 50 per annum, but most of these, as they acquired the native languages, were drafted off as overseers in the public works department. As overseers they are still liable to be recalled for military duty with the sappers, and, in the public works department, have been habituated to the direction of native labour. I would not, therefore, discontinue this practice, but would recommend that the number of European sappers present with the corps should not in future be reduced below 150.

W. E. BAKER,

London, Sept. 13, 1858. Colonel, Bengal Engineers.

APPENDIX No. 14.

GENERAL ENLISTMENT ORDERS.

GENERAL ORDER by the RIGHT HONOURABLE the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA in COUNCIL.
(No. 1,012.) Fort William, 25th July 1856.

EVERY recruit on enlisting into a native regiment is required to take an oath that he "will never forsake or "abandon his colours," and that he "will march wherever

"he is ordered, whether within or beyond the Company's "territories."

It has been the practice of Government to consider this oath, when not otherwise explained at the time of enlistment, as not in itself binding the soldier to proceed on service beyond sea; and therefore, whenever regiments have been raised for service beyond sea, no man has been drafted or enlisted into them but with his own consent, and with a full and clear understanding of his engagement to serve beyond sea when required to do so. From this practice the Government will not depart.

It is with a full and clear understanding of this engagement to serve beyond sea, when required to do so, that the native artillery, horse and foot, and six regiments of native infantry, the 25th, 40th, 47th, 65th, 67th, 68th, which are the only corps of the Bengal army available for general service, have been recruited.

The cheerful alacrity with which these regiments have at all times done their duty, wherever it has called them, and the distinction which they have won for themselves, are well known to the army, and will never be forgotten by the Government of India.

Neither does the Government forget how often, when it has needed the service of its troops in foreign countries, the native officers and soldiers of other regiments have come forward to form volunteer battalions, or to proceed as entire corps, to serve beyond sea.

The readiness with which they have done so is honourable to themselves, and is thankfully acknowledged by the Government.

But it has become very inconvenient to the Government, and it is hurtful to the state, that a small portion only of the native army of Bengal should be surely available for the service of the state beyond sea; and this inconvenience is not much diminished by the fact that the entire armies of Madras and Bombay are enlisted without any limitation of their place of service.

For this reason the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council will not henceforward accept the services of any native recruit for a regiment of light cavalry, of irregular cavalry, of infantry of the line, or for the Kelat-i-Ghilzie, Ferozepore, and Loodianah regiments, in the army of Bengal, who does not, at the time of his enlistment, distinctly undertake to serve beyond sea, whether within the territories of the Company or beyond them.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will be requested to take the necessary measures to ensure the due fulfilment of this determination of the Governor-General in Council, by enjoining officers commanding the regiments above mentioned to be strictly careful that, from and after the 1st September next, no recruit shall be enlisted except for general service; and that each recruit, on taking the prescribed oath, shall be made clearly to understand the conditions on which he is enlisted.

By the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

2. The following rules are to be entered in the Military Regulations, in substitution of the present articles 31 and 32 of section 31, with effect from the 1st September 1856; and the Commander-in-Chief will hold commanding officers responsible for the strictest observance of the same:—

31. All recruits for cavalry, regular or irregular, or for the infantry of the line, or for the corps named in the margin, are to be enlisted for general service; and no man is to be entertained for any of the above named corps who does not distinctly undertake to serve beyond sea, whether within the territories of the Company or beyond them.

32. The liability to be sent on foreign service, and the peculiar obligations in this respect under which they voluntarily place themselves, is to be distinctly explained to all such recruits at the time of their being originally entertained, and also at the time of their being required to take the prescribed oath under the colours of their regiment upon parade. The benefits and indulgences which are accorded by the Government to men who proceed on foreign service, as detailed in the regulations,* are also invariably to be fully made known to these recruits before they are sworn in.

* G.G.O., No. 96, 25 March 1825. G.G.O., No. 1,180, 21 November, 1855. Pay and Audit Regulations. 1848.

APPENDIX No. 16.

A RETURN showing the Number of Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File of the Local European Troops in India in each Year from 1843 to 1856, inclusive.

Years.	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	Total India.
1843	4,790	3,667	3,127	11,584
1844	4,778	3,551	2,855	11,184
1845	4,905	3,510	2,559	10,974
1846	4,328	3,447	2,850	10,625
1847	4,331	3,487	2,576	10,394
1848	5,153	3,946	3,327	12,426
1849	5,121	4,211	3,294	12,626
1850	5,505	4,114	3,423	13,042
1851	5,418	4,114	3,422	12,954
1852	5,330	4,289	3,633	13,252
1853	5,537	4,206	3,608	13,351
1854	5,625	4,327	3,531	13,483
1855	5,751	4,759	3,900	14,410
1856	5,750	4,800	4,264	14,814

Military Department, East India House, January 25, 1859.

W. E. BAKER, Colonel,
Military Secretary.

APPENDIX No. 17.

RETURN showing the Numbers of the Troops, regular and Irregular, which were serving in the three Presidencies immediately before the Mutiny,

	Royal Troops.		East India Company's Troops.											Total		
	Cavalry, (4 Regts.)	Infantry, (22 Regts.)	Engineers and Sappers.	Artillery.				Native Cavalry.		Infantry.			Veterans.		Medical Establishment.	Warrant Officers.
				Horse, (5 Brigades.)	European Foot, (12 Battalions.)	Native Foot, (6 Battalions.)	Regular, (21 Regts.)	Irregular, (33 Regts.)	European, (6 Regts.)	Native Regular, (155 Regts.)	Native Irregular, (45 Regts.)					
Officers	116	693	251	119	281	138	284	106	335	2,760	152	163	815	6,170
European non-commd. officers, rank and file	2,571	20,884	110	3,029	4,390	37	00	..	8,103	250	59	38,502
European veterans	465	465
Native commd. non-commd., rank and file	3,043	650	..	3,517	9,332	20,041	..	140,332	35,215	3,613	220,353
Gun lascars	440	1,033	343	2,460
Ordnance drivers	1,469	843	2,337
Apothecaries and stewards	434	434
Native doctors	631	631
Warrant officers, (Ordnance, &c.)	385	385
Totals....	2,691	21,577	3,404	3,256	7,768	4,838	9,876	21,047	3,438	152,860	35,426	4,241	1,899	385	..	277,746

Indian Army Commission.

Total Europeans—Officers - 6,170
Men - 30,352
Natives - 232,224

R. H. WOOD,
Colonel and Secretary.

277,746

APPENDIX No. 18.

STRENGTH OF TROOPS OF HER MAJESTY'S REGULAR ARMY ON THE INDIAN ESTABLISHMENT.
Adjutant-General's Office,
October 15, 1858.

	EFFECTIVES—All Ranks.								Total.
	Cavalry.	Foot Guards.	Infantry.	Royal Artillery.		Royal Engineers.	Military Train.	Medical Staff Corps.	
				Horse.	Foot.				
EAST INDIES—									
Bengal	3,269	—	40,310	420	2,070	259	239	73	56,240
Bombay	3,384	—	16,616	247	1,211	226	—	—	20,684
Madras	1,345	—	10,384	238	713	—	—	—	12,780
Total in India and on passage out	7,998	—	75,410	914	4,594	485	239	73	80,713
Depôt of Recruitment on Indian Establishment	1,696	—	12,081	—	—	—	—	—	13,676
Total	9,593	—	87,491	914	4,594	485	239	73	103,389

G. A. WETHERALL,
Adjutant-General.

APPENDIX No. 19.

RETURN showing the Strength of the European Local Force in India, to the latest date at which it can be given.

BENGAL.	Infantry	-	-	-	2,743
(Sept. 1, 1858.)	Artillery and sappers, including recruit battalion	-	-	-	3,187
	Light cavalry	-	-	-	1,522
	Camel corps	-	-	-	152
	Invalid battalion	-	-	-	146
	Yeomanry cavalry and other irregular horse	-	-	-	599
	Eurasian battalion	-	-	-	75
					8,424
MADRAS.	Infantry	-	-	-	2,745
(July 1, 1858.)	Artillery and sappers	-	-	-	2,110
	Veterans	-	-	-	318
					5,173
BOMBAY.	Infantry	-	-	-	2,656
(Jan. 1, 1858.)	Artillery and sappers	-	-	-	1,832
					4,488
	Total	-	-	-	18,085

East India House,
December 1, 1858.

W. E. BAKER, Colonel,
Military Secretary.
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APPENDIX No. 20.

RETURN showing the EFFECTIVE STATE of the CAVALRY REGIMENTS in INDIA, and their TOTAL STRENGTH, including the MEN at the several DEPÔTS.—Adjutant-General's Office, 3rd September 1858.

Regiments.	Rank and File.				
	In India.		On passage out.	Total Strength including Depot.	Establishment.
	Fit for Duty.	Sick.			
BENGAL:—					
2nd Dragoon Guards	467	51	100	733	676
6th Dragoon Guards	464	96	74	712	676
7th Dragoon Guards	365	56	110	692	676
7th Hussars	326	80	78	721	676
9th Lancers	413	55	79	625	676
	2,035	338	441	3,483	3,380
MADRAS:—					
1st Dragoon Guards	446	39	42	645	676
12th Lancers	515	51	57	679	676
	961	90	99	1,324	1,352
BOMBAY:—					
3rd Dragoon Guards	537	72	70	739	676
8th Hussars	414	25	56	799	676
14th Light Dragoons	540	88	10	672	676
17th Lancers	410	40	58	703	676
	1,901	225	194	2,913	2,704
Total	4,897	653	794	7,720	7,436

G. A. WETHEBALL,
Adjutant-General.

RETURN showing the EFFECTIVE STATE of the INFANTRY REGIMENTS in INDIA, and their TOTAL STRENGTH, including the MEN at the several DEPÔTS.—Adjutant-General's Office, 28th August 1858.

Regiments.	Rank and File.					
	In India.		On passage out.	Total Strength of Regiment.	Establishment.	
	Fit for Duty.	Sick.				
BENGAL:—						
5th Foot, 1st Bat.	577	92	125	1,075	1,200	
6th " "	425	136	292	998		
7th " "	995	82	133	1,302		
8th " "	651	67	141	1,087		
10th " "	698	23	16	917		
13th " "	699	111	279	1,265		
19th " "	924	62	151	1,390		
20th " "	601	142	232	1,143		
23rd " "	687	181	324	1,293		
24th " "	815	49	208	1,276		
27th " "	709	182	121	1,146		
29th " "	744	87	166	1,121		
32nd " "	376	51	49	1,047		
34th " "	549	154	306	1,434		
35th " "	632	138	143	1,090		
37th " "	495	107	136	977		
38th " "	660	234	181	1,260		
42nd " "	638	137	138	1,145		
52nd " "	710	125	345	1,367		
53rd " "	672	161	203	1,204		
54th " "	503	235	258	1,300		
60th " { 1st Bat.	536	99	236	1,037		
60th " { 2nd "	687	9	142	909		
61st " "	532	121	297	1,064		
64th " "	689	58	318	1,327		
70th " "	799	83	110	1,116		
73rd " "	654	53	58	867		
75th " "	632	85	237	1,177		
77th " "	490	28	130	786		
78th " "	662	28	16	865		
79th " "	611	227	133	1,136		
80th " "	804	86	226	1,000		
81st " "	885	53	67	1,112		
82nd " "	781	132	194	1,259		
84th " "	623	77	83	1,058		
87th " "	863	72	73	1,118		
88th " "	695	108	128	1,104		
90th " "	593	155	126	1,018		
93rd " "	703	122	111	1,068		
94th " "	748	58	212	1,244		
97th " "	622	115	306	1,265		
98th " "	763	23	131	1,077		
Rifle Brigade } 2nd Bat.	717	149	182	1,167		
Rifle Brigade } 3rd "	784	125	174	1,150		
	29,448	4,627	7,577	49,557		52,800

Regiments.	Rank and File.					
	In India.		On passage out.	Total Strength of Regiment.	Establishment.	
	Fit for Duty.	Sick.				
BOMBAY:—						
4th Foot, 1st Bat. (part)	*241	44	165	872	1,000	
18th " "	1004	65	49	1,178		
33rd " "	842	23	238	1,308		
51st " "	840	43	270	1,296		
56th " "	743	62	119	1,038		
57th " "	695	74	63	1,006		
71st " "	808	32	80	1,046		
72nd " "	880	44	100	1,131		
83rd " "	946	65	99	1,215		
86th " "	723	224	123	1,156		
89th " "	588	67	290	1,163		
92nd " "	914	41	120	1,232		
95th " "	667	18	282	1,151		
	9,891	802	1,998	14,787		15,400
MADRAS:—						
1st Foot, 1st Bat.	1,096	60	124	1,369	1,200	
43rd " "	871	61	84	1,104		
44th " "	718	122	172	1,249		
60th " 3rd Bat.	987	76	125	1,247		
66th " "	862	35	215	1,355		
68th " "	681	76	259	1,439		
69th " "	689	55	143	1,024		
74th " "	839	49	124	1,120		
	6,748	534	1,246	9,907	9,600	
Total Infantry	46,082	5,963	10,821	74,251	77,800	

N.B.—The following regiments having but recently proceeded from the colonies to India, are not yet fully recruited to their augmented establishment; viz., 4th foot (1st battalion), 37th, 57th, 60th (2nd battalion), 73rd and 77th.

* Exclusive of six companies (327 rank and file), stationed at the Mauritius.
W. F. FORSTER,
Deputy Adjutant-General.

The above returns show that in eleven cavalry regiments on an establishment of 676 each, amounting to 7,436, and that establishment being not only complete, but 284 rank and file in excess, the strength of these regiments being 7,720, there are only effective fit for duty in India 4,897, the difference between effectives and total strength, amounting to 2,823, being absorbed by sick, on passage out, and training at the depot.

In 65 regiments of infantry on an establishment of 1,200 each, amounting to 77,800 rank and file, and that establishment almost complete, there are only 46,082 effectives in India, the difference between effectives and actual strength amounting to 28,169.

Though the number returned as on passage out, 10,821, is large, yet when a force is stationed at a distance from home there must always be a large number in transit to and fro.

If the European regiments serving in India were placed on a lower establishment, the effective force would be in proportion reduced without a corresponding saving in expense being effected, for the charge for officers and staff would remain as it is at present.

R. B. WOOD,
Colonel and Secretary.

Sept. 13, 1858.

APPENDIX No. 21.

RETURN showing the NUMBER of REGIMENTS serving in the THREE PRESIDENCIES in INDIA.

ABSTRACT.
NUMBER of REGIMENTS serving in INDIA.

	European Corps.		Native Corps.	
	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Queen's Company's	11	65	—	—
" Irregular Corps	4	*12	12	88
Total	15	77	64	180
	Civil Corps		5	47

* Three in course of being raised.
August 1858.

RETURN of the NUMBER of REGIMENTS serving in the THREE PRESIDENCIES in INDIA under the MILITARY AUTHORITIES.

	Regiments of Her Majesty's Dragoons.	Regiments of Company's European Dragoons.	Regiments of Her Majesty's Infantry.	Regiments of Company's European Infantry.	Regiments of Regular Native Cavalry.	Regiments of Irregular Cavalry.	Regiments of Regular Native Infantry.	Regiments of Local, Extra, and Irregular Native Infantry.
Bengal	5	(a) 4	44	(b) 3	2	(c) 46	(d) 7	78
Madras	2	—	8	3	7	(e) 1	52	10
Bombay	4	—	18	3	3	5	29	4
	11	4	65	9	12	52	88	92

(a) Recruits for four regiments have been sent; but it is not known how many corps have been organized.
 (b) Three more regiments have been authorized, and now are being raised.
 (c) Including the following four European corps; viz., Bengal yeomanry cavalry; volunteer cavalry, Rajshaya; Calcutta volunteer guards (cavalry part), and the Meerut light horse. Also including the four regiments cavalry Hyderabad Contingent.
 (d) Three of these regiments are now in China.
 (e) Four troops Madras Volunteer Guards, Europeans.

Lists of the Corps of Irregular Horse and Foot included in this return are annexed.

RETURN of CORPS serving in the THREE PRESIDENCIES in INDIA under the Civil Authorities.

	Regiments of Native Cavalry.	Regiments of Police Infantry, &c.
Bengal	3	26
Madras	—	—
Bombay	2	21
	5	47

Lists of Corps included in this return are annexed.

LIST of REGIMENTS of IRREGULAR CAVALRY.

BENGAL.		Military or Civil.
EUROPEAN.		
Bengal yeomanry cavalry		M
Volunteer cavalry at Rajshaya		M
Calcutta volunteer guards (cavalry portion)		M
Meerut light horse		M
NATIVE.		
1st Regt. irregular native cavalry		M
2nd "		M
3rd (part) "		M
7th "		M
4th "		M
6th "		M
1th "		M
86th "		M
17th "		M
18th "		M
Corps of guides (cavalry portion)		M
Sikh cavalry, 4 regts.		M
Punjab " 5 "		M
Ranghur batt. (cavalry portion)		M
Jodhpore Sikh horse		M
Benares horse		M
Beatson's " 2 regts.		M
Mead's "		M
Behar "		M
Rohilkund "		M
Peshawur light horse		M
Lahore "		M
Towanah horse		M
Hodson's " 2 corps		M
Pathan " (Jat.)		M
Mynpoorie irregular horse		M
Mooltanee regt. (cavalry portion)		M
Bunnoo horse levies		M
Dera Ismael Khan do.		M
Nimar police corps (cavalry part)		C
Lahore mounted police		C
Mooltan		C

Under the Governor General and the Resident at Hyderabad.
 Hyderabad contingent, 4 regts. M

MADRAS.

EUROPEAN.

1 corps (4 troops) Madras volunteer guards M

BOMBAY.

NATIVE.

Poons irregular horse M
 Sind " 3 regts. M
 South Mahratta irregular horse M
 Guzerat irregular horse C
 Kusch " " C

LIST of REGIMENTS of Irregular Infantry, Native Police Corps, &c.

BENGAL.

EUROPEAN.

Calcutta Volunteer Guards, Infantry portion M
 Military or Civil.

NATIVE.

Regt. of Khat-i-Ghilzie M
 " Lucknow M
 " Ferozepore M
 " Ludiana M
 Sikh volunteers M
 Kemaon M
 Nusseree M
 Nepal Ghoorkas M
 1st Extra Ghoorkas M
 Kemaon levies M
 Landour rangers M
 Hill rangers M
 Assam corps, 2 regiments M
 Mhairwarah M
 Mhair " M
 Sylhet light infantry M
 Aracan battalion M
 Shekawtee battalion M
 Pegu light infantry M
 Munneepore regiment M
 Kamroop " M
 Mynpoorie infantry levy M
 Futteyghur " M
 Cawnpore " M
 Allahabad " M
 Hansi " M
 Govgaira infantry levy M
 Sealkote levy M
 Goordaspore " M
 Jhelum " M
 Infantry levy Mithun Kote M
 Bunnoo levies M
 Debra Ishmael Khan levies M
 Mooltanee regiment (infantry portion) M
 Ranghur light infantry M
 Sebundy sappers and miners (Darjeeling) M
 Corps of guides (infantry portion) M
 Resident's escort—Nepal M
 Malwa Bheel M
 Meywar " M
 Rattray's Sikh police corps M
 Sikh infantry—4 regiments M
 Punjab irregular infantry—24 regiments M
 Sikh police corps C
 Punjab police battalions, 4 C
 Nimar police corp (infantry portion) C
 Kookey corps C
 Divisional battalions, 19 C
 Under the Governor-General and the Resident at Hyderabad.
 Hyderabad contingent—6 regiments M

MADRAS.

EUROPEAN.

Madras Volunteer Guards, 10 companies M
 European Veterans, 1 company infantry, 1 company artillery M

INFANTRY.

3 extra regiments Native Infantry M
 Madras Sapper Militia M
 Madras Rifles M
 Native Veterans, 2 battalions M
 Native police battalion for Pegu M

BOMBAY.

NATIVE.

Marine battalion M
 Native veteran battalion M
 1st Belooch battalion M
 2nd " " M
 Guzerat police corps C
 " Cooly ditto C
 1st Kandeish Bheel corps C
 2nd " " C
 Ghaut police corps (Tannah) C

Sawunt Warree local corps	C
Kolapore infantry	C
Rutnagherry rangers	C
Kutch legion	C
8 Sind police corps	C
Poona	C
Ahmednuggur police corps	C
Surat Sebundy	C
Sattarah irregular infantry	C
Brouch police corps	C
Belgautn	C
Dharwar	C
Sholapoor	C
Kaira	C

APPENDIX No. 22.

RETURN showing the NUMBER, CASTE, and COUNTRY of the Native Officers and Soldiers of each Regiment, Regular and Irregular, of each Presidency, confined to Regiments borne on the Returns of each Army respectively; so far as can be stated from the Records in this House.—East India House, Sept. 1858.

BENGAL.

HORSE AND FOOT ARTILLERY.

NATIVE OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED, RANK AND FILE.	
Caste.		Caste.	
Mahomedans	11	Mahomedans	427
Brahmins	2	Brahmins	124
Rajpoots	3	Rajpoots	159
Gwallah	1	Gwallah	0
Hindus of inferior description	1	Hindus of inferior description	289
	<u>18</u>		<u>999</u>

NATIVE INFANTRY, 7 Regiments, viz.:—21st, 31st, 47th, 65th, 66th, 70th, and 73rd.

NATIVE OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED, RANK AND FILE.	
Caste.		Caste.	
Mahomedans	25	Mahomedans	1,170
Brahmins	52	Brahmins	1,878
Rajpoots	39	Rajpoots	2,637
Hindus of inferior description	23	Hindus of inferior description	2,057
		Sikhs and Punjaubees	54
	<u>139</u>		<u>7,796</u>

IRREGULAR AND LOCAL INFANTRY, * 12 Regiments, viz.:— Regiment of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, Regiment of Ferozepore, Regiment of Loodianah, Simoor Battalion, Kemaon Battalion, Nusseree Battalion, Hill Rangers, Assam Light Infantry Battalion, Mhairwarrah Battalion, Sylhet Light Infantry Battalion, Arracan Battalion, and Shekhawattee Battalion.

NATIVE OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED, RANK AND FILE.	
Caste.		Caste.	
Mahomedans	38	Mahomedans	1,185
Brahmins	23	Brahmins	849
Rajpoots	59	Rajpoots	2,711
Hindus of inferior description	43	Hindus of inferior description	2,247
Sikhs	17	Sikhs	1,309
Hill men	16	Hill men	1,112
Mughls	6	Mughls	705
Burmese	1	Burmese	6
Munniporees	1	Munniporees	167
		Jhats	48
	<u>204</u>		<u>10,339</u>

MADRAS.

HORSE AND FOOT ARTILLERY.

NATIVE OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED, RANK AND FILE.	
Caste.		Caste.	
Christians	0	Christians	2
Mahomedans	21	Mahomedans	514
Mahrattas	0	Brahmins & Rajpoots	97
Brahmins & Rajpoots	5	Mahrattas	26
Telingas (Gentoo)	3	Telingas (Gentoo)	214
Tamil	1	Tamil	242
Other castes	0	Other castes	98
Indo Britons	0	Indo Britons	15
	<u>30</u>		<u>1,208</u>

* No Returns of the Castes of other Regiments have been received.

Country.		Country.	
Hindoostan	5	Hindoostan	69
Northern Circars	7	Northern Circars	65
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	15	Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	702
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	2	Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	181
Baramahal	0	Baramahal	11
Ceded districts	1	Ceded districts	46
Mysore	0	Mysore	82
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	0	Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	52
	<u>30</u>		<u>1,208</u>

NATIVE CAVALRY, 7 Regiments.

NATIVE OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED, RANK AND FILE.	
Caste.		Caste.	
Mahomedans	68	Christians	32
Mahrattas	6	Mahomedans	1,956
Rajpoots	3	Rajpoots	90
Indo Britons	0	Mahrattas	300
		Other castes	2
		Indo Britons	159
	<u>77</u>		<u>2,539</u>

Country.		Country.	
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	64	Hindoostan	22
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	7	Northern Circars	67
Mysore	3	Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	1,841
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	1	Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	205
Ceded districts	2	Baramahal	48
		Ceded districts	54
		Mysore	212
		Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	90
	<u>77</u>		<u>2,539</u>

SAPPERS AND MINERS.

NATIVE OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED, RANK AND FILE.	
Caste.		Caste.	
Christians	5	Christians	115
Mahomedans	0	Mahomedans	51
Brahmins & Rajpoots	1	Brahmins & Rajpoots	6
Mahrattas	0	Mahrattas	2
Telingas (Gentoo)	3	Telingas (Gentoo)	99
Tamil	4	Tamil	177
Other castes	2	Other castes	356
Indo Britons	0	Indo Britons	8
	<u>12</u>		<u>814</u>

Country.		Country.	
Hindoostan	0	Hindoostan	26
Northern Circars	1	Northern Circars	64
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	7	Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	352
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	2	Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	160
Baramahal	0	Baramahal	20
Ceded districts	0	Ceded districts	19
Mysore	1	Mysore	81
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	1	Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	92
	<u>12</u>		<u>814</u>

NATIVE INFANTRY, 52 Regiments.

NATIVE OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED, RANK AND FILE.	
Caste.		Caste.	
Christians	4	Christians	1,853
Mahomedans	534	Mahomedans	15,272
Brahmins and Rajpoots	83	Brahmins and Rajpoots	1,922
Mahrattas	12	Mahrattas	385
Telingas (Gentoo)	242	Telingas (Gentoo)	15,371
Tamil	97	Tamil	4,275
Other castes	8	Other castes	1,616
Indo Britons	0	Indo Britons	1,011
	<u>1,030</u>		<u>41,705</u>

Country.		Country.	
Hindoostan	51	Hindoostan	1,938
Northern Circars	317	Northern Circars	16,938
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	239	Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	8,841
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	177	Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	4,760
Baramahal	29	Baramahal	1,022
Ceded districts	32	Ceded districts	1,705
Mysore	59	Mysore	2,698

Country.		Country.	
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	119	Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	3,617
Deccan and Mahratta	7	Canara, Moulmein, Jaulnah, and Belgaum	28
		Deccan and Mahratta	99
		Portugal	1
		Other parts	58
	<u>1,080</u>		<u>41,705</u>

Country.		Country.	
Hindoostan	29	Hindoostan	1,073
Northern Circars	1	Northern Circars	21
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	2	Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	30
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	0	Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	0
Deccan	2	Deccan	125
Concan	1	Concan	114
Mysore	0	Mysore	0
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	0	Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	0
Bombay	1	Guzerat	14
		Persia	1
		Lisbon	4
		Africa	2
		Bombay	4
		Punjaub and Scinde	21
		Cabool and Afghanistan	15
		Europe	1
	<u>36</u>		<u>1,425</u>

BOMBAY.

HORSE AND FOOT ARTILLERY.

NATIVE OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED, RANK AND FILE.	
Caste.		Caste.	
Mahomedans	7	Christians	5
Brahmins and Rajpoots	10	Mahomedans	300
Mahrattas	5	Brahmins and Rajpoots	330
Telingas (Gentoo)	0	Mahrattas	405
Tamil	0	Telingas (Gentoo)	1
Other castes	25	Tamil	0
Indo Britons	0	Other castes	894
	<u>47</u>	Indo Britons	1
			<u>1,936</u>

Country.		Country.	
Hindoostan	36	Hindoostan	1,151
Northern Circars	1	Northern Circars	26
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	1	Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	21
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	0	Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	5
Deccan	3	Deccan	398
Concan	7	Concan	331
Mysore	0	Mysore	6
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	0	Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	0
		Guzerat	4
		Malabar	1
		Cabool and Afghanistan	3
	<u>47</u>		<u>1,936</u>

SAPPERS AND MINERS.

NATIVE OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED, RANK AND FILE.	
Caste.		Caste.	
Christians	0	Christians	0
Mahomedans	2	Mahomedans	44
Brahmins and Rajpoots	0	Brahmins and Rajpoots	63
Mahrattas	1	Mahrattas	102
Telingas (Gentoo)	1	Telingas (Gentoo)	48
Tamil	0	Tamil	0
Other castes	4	Other castes	196
Indo Britons	0	Indo Britons	1
	<u>8</u>		<u>454</u>

Country.		Country.	
Hindoostan	4	Hindoostan	198
Northern Circars	0	Northern Circars	1
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	0	Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	6
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	0	Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	1
Deccan	2	Deccan	192
Concan	1	Concan	56
Mysore	0	Mysore	0
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	0	Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	0
	<u>8</u>		<u>454</u>

NATIVE CAVALRY, 8 Regiments.

NATIVE OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED RANK AND FILE.	
Caste.		Caste.	
Christians	1	Christians	66
Mahomedans	12	Mahomedans	459
Brahmins and Rajpoots	9	Brahmins and Rajpoots	252
Mahrattas	1	Mahrattas	118
Telingas (Gentoo)	0	Telingas (Gentoo)	0
Tamil	0	Tamil	0
Other castes	12	Other castes	508
Indo Britons	1	Indo Britons	22
	<u>36</u>		<u>1,425</u>

NATIVE INFANTRY.—29 Regiments.

NATIVE OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED, RANK AND FILE.	
Caste.		Caste.	
Christians	5	Christians	270
Mahomedans	111	Mahomedans	2,048
Brahmins and Rajpoots	188	Brahmins and Rajpoots	6,421
Mahrattas	116	Mahrattas	7,980
Telingas (Gentoo)	6	Telingas (Gentoo)	107
Tamil	1	Tamil	55
Jews	3	Jews	12
Other castes	130	Other castes	7,788
Indo Britons	0	Indo Britons	22
Purwarrees	3	Purwarrees	170
	<u>568</u>	Mohcees	29
		Sikhs	28
			<u>24,870</u>

Country.		Country.	
Hindoostan	268	Hindoostan	11,089
Northern Circars	7	Northern Circars	135
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	37	Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	412
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	13	Southern Carnatic, (Trichinopoly)	203
Deccan	57	Deccan	1,800
Concan	178	Concan	10,878
Mysore	4	Mysore	36
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	0	Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	33
Guzerat	4	Mysore and Punjab	28
	<u>568</u>	Guzerat	80
		Scinde, Punjab, and Rajpootana	155
		Europe	1
			<u>24,870</u>

1st BELOOCH BATTALION.

NATIVE OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED, RANK AND FILE.	
Caste.		Caste.	
Christians	0	Christians	0
Mahomedans	0	Mahomedans	307
Brahmins and Rajpoots	14	Brahmins and Rajpoots	85
Mahrattas	1	Mahrattas	11
Telingas (Gentoo)	0	Telingas (Gentoo)	0
Tamil	0	Tamil	0
Other castes	0	Other castes	1
Indo Britons	0	Indo Britons	0
	<u>15</u>		<u>904</u>

Country.		Country.	
Hindoostan	2	Hindoostan	104
Khoorasan	10	Khoorasan	530
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	0	Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	5
Southern Carnatic	0	Southern Carnatic	0
Deccan	0	Deccan	8
Concan	1	Concan	6
Punjaub	2	Punjaub	138
Scinde	0	Scinde	113
	<u>15</u>		<u>904</u>

2nd BRIGADE BATTALION.

NATIVE OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED, RANK AND FILE.	
Caste.		Caste.	
Christians	0	Christians	2
Mahomedans	9	Mahomedans	808
Brahmins and Rajpoots	5	Brahmins and Rajpoots	23
Mahrattas	0	Mahrattas	2
Telingas (Gentoo)	0	Telingas (Gentoo)	0
Tamil	0	Tamil	0
Other castes	0	Other castes	23
Indo Britons	0	Indo Britons	0
	14		858
<hr/>		<hr/>	
Country.		Country.	
Hindoostan	5	Hindoostan	66
Guzerat	1	Guzerat	3
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	2	Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	12
Affghanistan	2	Affghanistan	255
Deccan	0	Deccan	6
Punjaub	0	Punjaub	155
Concan	0	Concan	3
Beloochistan	1	Beloochistan	76
Scinde	3	Cutchee, &c.	32
	14	Scinde	217
		Bhawulpoor	33
			858

MARINE BATTALION.

NATIVE OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED, RANK AND FILE.	
Caste.		Caste.	
Christians	1	Christians	9
Mahomedans	12	Mahomedans	180
Brahmins and Rajpoots	0	Brahmins	0
Mahrattas	2	Mahrattas	4
Telingas (Gentoo)	0	Telingas (Gentoo)	0
Tamil	0	Tamil	0
Other castes	5	Other castes	671
Indo Britons	0	Indo Britons	0
	20		864
<hr/>		<hr/>	
Country.		Country.	
Hindoostan	0	Hindoostan	31
Northern Circars	5	Northern Circars	17
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	0	Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	35
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	0	Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	0
Deccan	6	Deccan	72
Concan	8	Concan	697
Mysore	0	Mysore	0
Tanjore, Madras, and Tinnevely	1	Tanjore, Madras, and Tinnevely	12
	20		864

APPENDIX No. 23.

PRESENT EMPLOYMENT of the OFFICERS of the BENGAL NATIVE INFANTRY REGIMENTS, as shown by the Army List, dated July 10, 1858.

	Colonels.	Lt.-Cols.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieuts.	Ensigns.	Total.
Doing regimental duty	—	26	19	104	176	17	342
On leave, chiefly sick	87	22	20	92	120	—	316
On staff employ	1	17	24	200	150	4	396
Engaged temporarily on detached duties arising out of the mutinies, and with Her Majesty's regiments.	—	4	11	125	251	160	557
Unemployed	17	4	—	—	—	—	21
Wanting to complete the establishment of regiments.	—	6	—	3	109	178	296

East India House, Dec. 18, 1858. W. E. BAKER, Colonel, Military Secretary.

RETURN showing the Establishment of Officers now sanctioned for the Bengal Artillery, the Number of Officers of the Corps now unemployed, and the Number required to complete the Establishment, as per Army List for April 1858.

Establishment now sanctioned.	OFFICERS.					Wanting to complete the Establishment.
	Unemployed.	Temporarily employed on Services arising out of the Mutinies.	Employed Regimentally, including Ordnance Commissariat.	Permanently employed on Duties other than Regimental.	Absent in Europe.	
Colonels - 12	No officer is recorded in the Army List as "unemployed." See next column.	34	150	29	43	93
Lt.-cols. - 24						
Captains - 72						
2nd Capts. 72						
Lieuts. - 168						
348		255				

East India House, December 1, 1858. W. E. BAKER, Colonel, Military Secretary.

APPENDIX No. 24.

RETURN of the number of the Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry Cadets appointed and embarked for India since May 1857.

	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	Total.
Artillery	89	47	37	173
Cavalry	33	16	6	55
Infantry	172	125	60	357

East India House, Dec. 1, 1858. W. E. BAKER, Colonel, Military Secretary.

APPENDIX No. 25.

RETURN showing the total Number of regular Regiments and Battalions (European and Native) belonging to Her Majesty's and the East India Company's Armies respectively, borne on the Establishment of each Presidency immediately before the Mutiny; also showing the total Number of European Commissioned Officers of each Service and Presidency, and the relative Proportions in which established Divisional and Brigade Commands were then allotted in each Presidency to Her Majesty's and the East India Company's Officers respectively.

Presidency.	Her Majesty's.				East India Company's.										Total.							
	Dragoons.		Infantry.		Engineers.		Horse Artillery.		European Ft. Artillery.		Native Ft. Artillery.		Native Cavalry.		European Infantry.		Native Infantry.		Her Majesty's.		East India Comp's.	
	Regiments.	Officers.	Regiments.	Officers.	Battalions.	Officers.	Brigades.	Officers.	Battalions.	Officers.	Battalions.	Officers.	Regiments.	Officers.	Regiments.	Officers.	Regiments.	Officers.	Regiments.	Officers.	Regiments.	Officers.
Bengal	2	80	15	660	5	125	3	75	6	150	3	75	10	330	3	153	74	1,924	17	740	104	2,738
Madras	1	40	3	142	3	75	1	42	4	90	1	24	8	184	3	155	52	1,353	4	182	72	1,932
Bombay	1	40	4	176	3	75	1	24	2	48	2	48	3	89	3	153	29	754	5	216	43	1,171
Total	4	160	22	978	11	275	5	147	12	294	6	147	21	493	9	459	155	4,030	26	1,138	219	5,335

COMMANDS and their ALLOTMENT to QUEEN'S and COMPANY'S OFFICERS respectively.

		Divisional.	Brigade.
Bengal	- 7	{ 2 Queen's 5 Company's }	16 { 3 Queen's. 18 Company's.
Madras	- 6	{ 2 Queen's 4 Company's }	12 { 2 Queen's. 10 Company's.
Bombay	*4	{ 1 Queen's 2 Company's }	10 { 2 Queen's. 8 Company's.
Total	17	*the 4th (Sind) being held alternately by a Queen's and Company's officer.	38
Queen's	- 5		7 Queen's.
Company's	11		31 Company's.

East India House,
November 1858.

W. E. BAKER, Colonel,
Military Secretary.

APPENDIX No. 26.

1. RETURN of the Number of Officers tried by General Court-martial, from May 1, 1849, to December 31, 1854.

Period.	Abroad.		Home.	Total.
	India.	Elsewhere.		
From May 1, to December 31, 1849	10	4	2	16
From January 1, to December 31, 1850	13	9	2	24
1851	3	6	3	12
1852	5	7	1	13
1853	7	4	6	17
1854	3	3	3	9
Total	41	33	17	91

Sept. 22, 1858.

J. L. S. MOWBRAY.

2. RETURN of the Number of Soldiers who were tried in India and elsewhere by Courts-martial, compared with the Effective Strength of the Army during the Period from January 1, 1849, to December 31, 1854.

Years.	Effective Strength of the Army in India.	Number of Men tried in India.	Effective Strength of the Army elsewhere.	Number of Men tried elsewhere.	Proportion of Trials to the Effective Strength.	
					India.	Elsewhere.
1849	24,883	1,276	106,114	8,714	1 in 19	1 in 12
1850	28,197	1,307	97,956	7,449	1 in 21	1 in 13
1851	27,607	1,008	95,757	6,692	1 in 27	1 in 14
1852	27,251	926	97,694	7,013	1 in 29	1 in 13
1853	25,767	916	99,914	6,791	1 in 28	1 in 14
1854	26,099	841	104,523	5,158	1 in 31	1 in 20

Average per annum on the six years:—

Effective Strength in India	-	26,634	} 1 in 25
Number of Men tried in India	-	1,045	
Effective Strength elsewhere	-	100,326	} 1 in 14
Number of Men tried elsewhere	-	6,969	

G. A. WETHERALL,
Adjutant-General.

Horse Guards, S.W.,
October 12, 1858.

APPENDIX No. 27.

RETURN of the EAST INDIA COMPANY'S REGIMENTS of EUROPEAN INFANTRY in each Year from 1843 to 1852.

Year.	Number of Regiments.	Establishment, 1st January.	Wanting to complete.	Recruits embarked.	Number of Deaths.	Number invalided and discharged.	Number removed to Non-effective List or other Corps.
1843	6	5,436	296	197	262	227	23
1844	6	5,432	293	260	304	154	23
1845	6	5,434	477	256	342	176	41
1846	6	5,446	914	675	333	204	64
1847	6	5,450	1,115	1,360	192	111	36
1848	6	5,450	387	605	282	145	34
1849	6	5,448	13	850	397	182	23
1850	6	5,448	3	492	305	106	50
1851	6	5,448	—	232	249	126	45
1852	6	5,448	14	379	219	119	28

Average Establishment - - - 5,444

Average—wanting to complete - - - 350

APPENDIX No. 28.

RETURNS showing the total Number of European non-commissioned Officers and Soldiers borne on the Town Major's Non-effective List in each Presidency, and the number employed in each Department, Civil and Military.

BENGAL.		MADRAS.		BOMBAY.	
Serjeants-major and quarter-master serjeants of native corps.	245	Serjeant-major and quarter-master serjeants	138	Serjeant-major and quarter-master serjeants of native corps	20
Public works	208	Public works	12	Public works	59
Commissariat department	28	Store serjeants	46	Commissariat department	41
Electric telegraph department	15	Commissariat department	36	Electric telegraph department	14
Police	10	Laboratory serjeants and corporals	6	Police	24
Adjutant-general's department	5	Key serjeants	6	Adjutant and quarter-master general's departments	8
Quarter-master general's department	3	Hospital serjeants	1	Gun carriage department	5
Clerk in ordnance department	1	Serjeants	42	Ordnance department	157
Locally employed (as bazaar serjeants, barrack serjeants, &c. &c.)	163	Corporals (1) privates	23	Locally employed (line serjeants, barrack serjeants, &c. &c.)	40
Governor-general's band	16			Land transport corps	8
Insane	2			Medical stores	2
No position or rank stated	3			Garrison band	41
				Indian navy	3
				Insane	3
Total	678		309		427

East India House,
Dec. 1, 1858.

W. E. BAKER, Colonel,
Military Secretary

APPENDIX No. 29.

RETURN showing the Comparative Amount of CASUALTIES amongst the QUEEN'S REGIMENTS of INFANTRY on the INDIAN ESTABLISHMENT and the EUROPEAN INFANTRY in the Service of the EAST INDIA COMPANY, as deduced from the Number of Deaths, Discharges in India, and Men invalided and sent to this Country during the Ten Years from 1843 to 1852.

YEARS.	The Queen's Troops.						Honourable East India Company's European Troops.					
	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.	Dead.	Invalided and sent Home.	Discharged in India.	Total Casualties.	Per-centage.	Strength.	Dead.	Invalided or Discharged.	Non-effective List.	Total Casualties.	Per-centage.
1843 -	29,846	2,179	551	148	2,878	9.6	5,140	262	227	22	511	9.9
1844 -	27,884	1,745	922	122	2,789	10.0	5,149	304	154	23	481	9.3
Sikh War { 1845 -	29,447	2,931	982	161	4,074	13.8	4,957	342	176	41	559	11.2
{ 1846 -	27,645	2,594	896	162	3,652	13.2	4,532	333	204	64	601	13.2
1847 -	26,157	1,196	1,037	271	2,504	9.5	4,335	192	111	36	339	7.8
Punjab Campaign { 1848 -	23,617	975	548	178	1,701	7.2	5,063	282	145	34	461	9.1
{ 1849 -	25,398	1,906	508	117	2,531	9.9	5,435	397	182	23	602	11.7
1850 -	26,947	1,186	706	170	2,062	7.6	5,445	305	106	50	461	8.4
1851 -	26,614	1,052	719	152	1,923	7.2	5,448	249	126	45	420	7.7
1852 -	26,645	1,399	872	255	2,526	9.4	5,434	219	119	28	366	6.7
Total for 10 years -	270,200	17,163	7,741	1,736	26,640	—	50,938	2,885	1,550	366	4,801	—
Annual average -	27,020	—	—	—	2,664	—	5,093	—	—	—	480	—

Casualties per cent. : Queen's Troops, 9.8; East India Company's European Troops, 9.4; or the casualties amongst the Queen's Troops are .4 per cent. greater than amongst the East India Company's European Troops.

Average strength of the Queen's Troops for the above years was	-	-	-	27,020
Average establishment	-	-	-	25,677
Excess of strength over establishment	-	-	-	1,343
Average establishment of the six European regiments of the Company's service	-	-	-	5,444
Average strength	-	-	-	5,093
Excess of establishment over strength	-	-	-	351

It is to be observed that some of the men of the Queen's troops returned and sent home as invalids recover their health, and again return to the service in India. In the Indian army all men sent home are at once discharged.

The number of men who purchase their discharge from the Queen's army in India is considerably larger than the number in the Company's. The following is a Return of the number of such discharges for the years 1843 and 1848.

	1843.		1848.	
	Queen's Army.	Company's Army.	Queen's Army.	Company's Army.
Number of Men purchasing their discharge in India	46	3	65	12

Some of the men also of Her Majesty's regiments have, perhaps, served seven or eight years before they are sent to India. The men sent for the Indian regiments are all new recruits.

These will more than account for the small excess of wear and tear in Her Majesty's regiments.

Adjutant-General's Office, Horse Guards,
September 23, 1858.

G. A. WETHERALL,
Adjutant-General.

APPENDIX No. 30.

Adjutant-General's Office,
October 15, 1858.

RETURN of the Number of Men who have volunteered in India between the Years 1843 and 1852.

Number of men who have volunteered in India from 1843 to 1852, both years inclusive - 5,515

G. A. WETHERALL,
Adjutant-General.

APPENDIX No. 31.

RETURN showing the Strength and Number of Deaths of Non-commissioned Officers and Men of Her Majesty's Forces serving in India annually during the Fifteen Years from 1843 to 1857 inclusive.

Years.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.	
	Strength.	Deaths.
1843	33,224	2,530
1844	32,380	1,853
Sikh War { 1845	33,547	3,362
1846	32,291	2,856
1847	29,620	1,413
Punjab Campaign { 1848	27,423	1,091
1849	31,293	2,063
1850	30,692	1,377
1851	30,275	1,175
1852	30,455	1,479
1853	29,035	1,626
1854	29,464	1,048
1855	27,758	875
1856	23,995	1,198
1857	35,191	2,589
Total for 15 years	456,643	26,535
Annual average -	30,442	1,769
	Deaths, 5·8 per cent.	

Adjutant-General's Office, G. A. WETHERALL, November 18, 1858. Adjutant-General.

APPENDIX No. 32.

RETURN of the Number of Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File belonging to Regiments serving in India, who have purchased their Discharge in each year, from 1843 to 1856.

Year.	Number of purchased Discharges.	Year.	Number of purchased Discharges.
1843	249	1851	166
1844	217	1852	187
1845	264	1853	275
1846	369	1854	215
1847	211	1855	75
1848	144	1856	85
1849	124		
1850	165	Total -	2,746

Total strength for 14 years, - 421,452.
Total discharges by purchase, 2,746.
One in 153.

W. F. FORSTER, Deputy Adjutant-General.
Adjutant-General's Office, Horse Guards, November 27, 1858.

APPENDIX No. 33.

A RETURN showing the Number of Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File of the East India Company's Troops, Artillery, and Infantry, who have purchased their Discharge in each Year, from 1843 to 1856.

Year.	Number of purchased Discharges.	Year.	Number of purchased Discharges.
1843	24	1851	42
1844	35	1852	48
1845	37	1853	62
1846	38	1854	44
1847	64	1855	62
1848	41	1856	49
1849	31		
1850	45	Total -	612

Total strength in 14 years, 175,119.
Total discharges, - 612.
One in 286.

Military Department, East India House, December 17, 1858. W. E. BAKER, Colonel, Military Secretary.

APPENDIX No. 34.

RETURN showing the Strength and Number of Deaths during the first Year of Service in India, in such of Her Majesty's Regiments as have arrived there from Australia and the Cape of Good Hope, from 1843 to 1857.

Adjutant-General's Office, November 18, 1858.

Regiments.	Strength on embarkation.	Reinforcements from England.	Volunteers from Regiments in India.	Total Strength.	Station from which embarked.	Date of Arrival of Head-Quarters in India.	Number of Deaths during first year of Service in India.
80th Foot . . .	968	78	124	1,185	Australia	1844: Nov. 16.	183
51st " . . .	904	68	110	1,151		1846: Oct. 7.	72
96th " . . .	935	89	.	1,024		1849: April 26.	60
12th Lancers . . .	338	20	151	509		1854: Jan. 13.	8
74th Regt. . . .	556	289	128	951	Cape of Good Hope	Jan. 12.	62
43rd " . . .	574	353	201	1,128		Jan. 30.	44
89th " . . .	768	178	.	940		1857: Sept. 11.	34
136th " 1st Bat.	763	216	.	979		Oct. 3.	73

APPENDIX No. 35.

RETURN showing the Number of Deaths during the first year of residence in Eight Regiments which have proceeded direct to India from Great Britain.

Regiments.	Strength.	Number of Deaths in first year.
70th Foot . . .	1,003	128
83rd " . . .	1,168	62
87th " . . .	1,034	229
75th " . . .	1,064	137
52nd " . . .	1,006	70
81st " . . .	1,008	82
27th " . . .	770	109
35th " . . .	602	49
	7,803	866
Average . . .	982	108

G. A. WETHERALL, Adjutant-General.

RESULT of the preceding Return.

No. of Regiments.	Whence proceeded.	Strength.	Deaths during the first year of Service.	Average Deaths per Cent.
3	Australia . . .	3,360	284	7·8
5	Cape of Good Hope	4,513	221	4·8
8	England . . .	7,963	566	11·0

Indian Army Commission, Dec. 1858.

APPENDIX No. 36.

RETURN showing the Number of Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File of the under-mentioned *Ages*, that composed, at the Time of Embarkation,* the Six Regiments of Infantry of Her Majesty's Army which were last sent to India, previously to the War with Russia.

Adjutant-General's Office,
November 24, 1858.

Regiments.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.						Total Strength.
	Under 20 Years.	20 to 25.	25 to 30.	30 to 35.	35 to 40.	40 Years and upwards.	
87th Regiment	67	440	197	109	27	3	857
75th "	124	339	438	39	12	2	949
52nd "	270	383	256	149	68	5	1,106
81st "	222	407	230	129	55	4	1,047
74th "	151	266	199	192	81	13	902
43rd "	105	298	313	246	91	4	1,052
Total	939	2,117	1,628	864	320	36	5,913
Average per Reg. of all ages	166	362	271	144	54	6	985

G. A. WETHERALL, Adjutant-General.

* The above particulars cannot be stated at the time of embarkation, and the information is given from the first report received from each regiment after its arrival in India.

APPENDIX No. 37.

RETURN showing the Number of Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File of the under-mentioned *Ages*, on the 1st January 1856, that composed the 1st and 2nd Bengal, Madras, and Bombay European Infantry Regiments.

	Under 20 Years of Age.	20 to 24.	25 to 29.	30 to 34.	35 to 39.	40 and upwards.	Numbers in each Regiment.
	BENGAL.						
1st European Fusiliers	52	234	353	125	33	6	803
2nd " "	55	189	285	166	84	6	725
MADRAS.							
1st European Fusiliers	—	35	226	221	177	70	729
2nd European Light Infantry	24	102	315	262	108	33	902
BOMBAY.							
1st European Fusiliers	40	68	385	284	76	3	861
2nd European Light Infantry	71	120	338	260	71	5	915
Total	242	748	1,932	1,258	607	128	4,985
Average per Regiment of all ages	40	124	325	209	101	21	822

East India House,
December 1858.

W. E. HAKER, Colonel,
Military Secretary.

APPENDIX No. 38.

RETURN showing the Number of Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File of the under-mentioned *Ages*, that have composed any two of Her Majesty's Regiments of Infantry in each Presidency, after Ten to Fifteen Years' Service in India.

Adjutant-General's Office, November 24, 1858.

Presidency.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.						Total Strength.
	Under 20 Years.	20 to 25.	25 to 30.	30 to 35.	35 to 40.	40 years and upwards.	
BENGAL.							
10th Foot	66	280	340	200	144	9	989
22nd "	41	130	325	429	59	5	989
MADRAS.							
25th Foot	37	67	875	373	128	22	1,002
84th "	46	153	198	335	131	11	922
BOMBAY.							
78th Foot	21	135	474	232	50	3	909
86th "	57	154	320	295	115	4	923
Total	268	650	2,027	1,915	620	54	5,734
Average per Regt.	44	141	337	319	103	9	955

W. F. FORSTER, Deputy Adjutant-General.

APPENDIX No. 39.

RETURN showing the Number of Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File of the under-mentioned *Service* that composed, at the time of Embarkation,* the Six Regiments of Infantry of Her Majesty's Army which were last sent to India, previously to the War with Russia.

Regiments.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.												Total Strength.	
	18 yrs. Service and upwards.	14 to 17 yrs.	12 to 13 yrs.	10 to 11 yrs.	9 yrs.	8 yrs.	7 yrs.	6 yrs.	5 yrs.	4 yrs.	3 yrs.	2 yrs.		Under 2 yrs. Service.
87th Regiment	27	20	39	55	13	20	29	55	77	96	208	120	98	857
75th "	11	37	31	47	26	24	38	47	73	256	54	144	161	949
52nd "	14	103	60	89	44	25	101	43	58	60	47	83	379	1,106
81st "	18	65	46	69	36	36	107	38	42	41	67	195	287	1,047
74th "	39	87	48	65	74	42	79	58	51	45	61	97	156	902
43rd "	28	167	83	80	32	60	77	83	61	57	80	100	144	1,052
Total	137	479	307	405	225	207	431	324	362	555	517	739	1,225	5,913
Average per Regiment	23	79	51	67	37	34	72	54	60	92	86	123	204	985

* The above particulars cannot be stated at the time of embarkation, and the information is given from the first report received from each regiment after its arrival in India.

Adjutant-General's Office, November 30, 1858.

W. F. FORSTER,
Deputy Adjutant-General.

APPENDIX No. 40.

RETURN showing the Number of Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File of the under-mentioned Service that composed the First and Second Bengal, Madras, and Bombay European Infantry Regiments, at the date of the last Returns.

Presidency.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.													Total Strength.	
	18 Years Service and upwards.	14 to 17 Years.	12 to 13 Years.	10 to 11 Years.	9 Years.	8 Years.	7 Years.	6 Years.	5 Years.	4 Years.	3 Years.	2 Years.	Under 2 Years Service.		
BENGAL -	1st European Fusiliers -	8	67	16	87	47	45	182	62	18	103	11	162	123	877
	Ditto -	1	102	9	12	41	57	119	18	8	78	17	156	166	819
	Average per Regiment -	4½	84½	12½	44½	44	80½	125½	45	8	90½	14	164	144½	848
MADRAS -	1st European Fusiliers -	41	210	44	188	47	0	15	51	46	7	5	6	78	748
	2nd European Lt. Infantry	12	325	1	147	58	1	30	113	34	1	2	116	78	913
	Average per Regiment -	26½	267½	22½	167½	52½	½	22½	82	40	4	3½	61	78	833
BOMBAY -	1st European Fusiliers -	30	117	39	159	59	0	69	74	2	4	1	273	6	893
	2nd European Lt. Infantry	3	150	29	84	93	172	9	79	0	0	0	320	0	938
	Average per Regiment -	16½	163½	34	121½	76	86	39	76	1	2	½	289½	3	915½

East India House,
December 3, 1858.

W. E. BAKER, Colonel,
Military Secretary.

APPENDIX No. 41.

RETURN showing the Number of Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File of the under-mentioned Service that have composed any Two of Her Majesty's Regiments of Infantry in each Presidency after 10 to 15 Years' Service in India.

Presidency.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.													Total Strength.	
	18 Years Service and upwards.	14 to 17 Years.	12 to 13 Years.	10 to 11 Years.	9 Years.	8 Years.	7 Years.	6 Years.	5 Years.	4 Years.	3 Years.	2 Years.	Under 2 Years Service.		
BENGAL -	10th Regiment -	14	307	135	100	61	83	140	85	41	45	60	45	74	980
	22nd " -	12	88	199	145	28	136	108	27	52	60	13	49	88	989
	Average per Regiment -	13	247	167	122½	44½	104	124	56	46½	52½	36½	47	81	989
MADRAS -	35th Regiment -	60	98	144	345	92	38	58	65	32	16	12	5	44	1,002
	84th " -	51	181	227	92	25	30	56	9	25	37	47	53	69	922
	Average per Regiment -	60	139½	185½	218½	58½	34	57	37	28½	29½	29	56½	66½	962
BOMBAY -	78th Regiment -	17	105	108	71	357	85	5	8	11	3	46	62	39	909
	80th " -	20	153	123	175	41	24	175	24	10	3	23	26	111	923
	Average per Regiment -	18½	129	115½	123	199	54½	90	15	10½	5½	39½	44	75	916

Adjutant General's Office,
November 30, 1858.

W. F. FORSTER,
Deputy Adjutant-General.

APPENDIX No. 42.

A RETURN showing the STRENGTH and NUMBER of DEATHS of NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, and RANK and FILE, in the EAST INDIA COMPANY'S ARMY, at each of the STATIONS in BENGAL PRESIDENCY occupied by that Force, from 1843 to 1857 inclusive.

MILITARY STATIONS.	1843-44-45-46.			1847-48.			1848-49.			1849-50.			1850-51.			1851-52.			1852-53.			1853-54-55-56-57.								
	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.						
Dumdum	-	-	-	504	23	4.56	533	36	6.75	297	29	9.76	399	14	3.51	73	4	5.48	75	3	4.00	76	3	3.94						
Dinapore	-	-	-	71	2	2.81	100	3	3.00	85	4	3.53													92	2	2.17	106	-	-
Benares	-	-	-	120	6	5.00	153	3	1.96	308	17	5.51	85	1	1.17	103	3	2.90	1,090	28	2.56	1,079	97	8.98	1,090	28	2.56			
Chunar	-	-	-	336	19	5.65	331	16	4.83	298	12	4.02	116	3	2.58	193	3	1.55	279	4	1.43	913	89	9.74	279	4	1.43			
Cawnpore	-	-	-	884	33	3.73	789	117	14.82	497	45	9.05	116	3	2.58	103	3	2.90	1,079	97	8.98	1,090	28	2.56	1,090	28	2.56			
Meerut	-	-	-	216	6	2.77	861	13	3.60	116	3	2.58	103	3	2.90	193	3	1.55	279	4	1.43	913	89	9.74	279	4	1.43			
Agra	-	-	-	90	1	1.11	99	1	1.01	1,079	97	8.98	1,090	28	2.56	1,090	28	2.56	1,090	28	2.56	1,090	28	2.56	1,090	28	2.56	1,090	28	2.56
Umballa	-	-	-	427	13	2.04	913	89	9.74	279	4	1.43	193	3	1.55	103	3	2.90	1,079	97	8.98	1,090	28	2.56	1,090	28	2.56	1,090	28	2.56
Subathoo	-	-	-	1,091	43	3.94	709	68	9.59	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Loodianah	-	-	-	323	12	3.71	159	11	6.91	111	5	4.50	102	7	6.88	102	7	6.88	102	7	6.88	102	7	6.88	102	7	6.88	102	7	6.88
Ferozepore	-	-	-	182	7	3.84	62	2	3.22	147	12	8.16	140	4	2.85	140	4	2.85	140	4	2.85	140	4	2.85	140	4	2.85	140	4	2.85
Hosheapoor	-	-	-	100	2	1.98	104	1	0.96	76	5	6.56	94	-	-	94	-	-	94	-	-	94	-	-	94	-	-	94	-	-
Jullundur	-	-	-	189	4	2.11	191	5	2.61	219	2	0.91	207	3	1.44	207	3	1.44	207	3	1.44	207	3	1.44	207	3	1.44	207	3	1.44
Lahore	-	-	-	349	12	3.43	207	18	2.60	1,388	110	7.92	1,440	209	14.51	1,440	209	14.51	1,440	209	14.51	1,440	209	14.51	1,440	209	14.51	1,440	209	14.51
Nusseerabad	-	-	-	71	1	1.40	74	4	5.40	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Mhow	-	-	-	76	3	3.94	76	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Darjeeling	-	-	-	-	-	-	71	6	8.45	57	8	1.40	71	2	2.81	71	2	2.81	71	2	2.81	71	2	2.81	71	2	2.81	71	2	2.81
Laudour	-	-	-	-	-	-	103	11	10.67	137	20	1.46	122	16	13.11	122	16	13.11	122	16	13.11	122	16	13.11	122	16	13.11	122	16	13.11
Wuzeerabad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	192	8	4.16	86	8	9.30	86	8	9.30	86	8	9.30	86	8	9.30	86	8	9.30	86	8	9.30
Mooltan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	139	6	4.31	128	9	7.03	128	9	7.03	128	9	7.03	128	9	7.03	128	9	7.03	128	9	7.03
Peshawur	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	581	19	3.27	636	26	4.08	636	26	4.08	636	26	4.08	636	26	4.08	636	26	4.08	636	26	4.08
Sealkote	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	82	2	2.43	82	2	2.43	82	2	2.43	82	2	2.43	82	2	2.43	82	2	2.43	
Gobindghur	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
In Burmah	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Murree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
TOTAL	-	-	-	5,029	187	3.71	5,035	404	8.02	6,006	408	6.75	4,978	335	6.72	5,075	228	4.49	5,075	228	4.49	5,075	228	4.49	5,075	228	4.49	5,075	228	4.49

The Returns showing details at each Station for these years have not been received.

The Returns showing details at each Station for this year have not been received.

The Returns for these years showing details at each Station have not been received.

APPENDIX TO MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE COMMISSIONERS

NOTE.—The number of deaths in this and the following statements is exclusive of "killed in action," though probably deaths arising from wounds or from diseases contracted in actual warfare are included.
 Record and Statistical Department, East India House,
 December 14, 1858. (Signed) M. HORNIDGE.

A RETURN showing the STRENGTH and NUMBER of DEATHS of NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, RANK and FILE, in the EAST INDIA COMPANY'S ARMY, in each of the Stations occupied by that Force in the Presidency of BOMBAY, from 1843 to 1857.

MILITARY STATIONS.	1843, '44, '45, & '46.			1847.			1848.			1849.			1850.			1851.			1852.			1853.			1854.			1855.			1856 and '57.		
	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.			
Bombay -				114	21	18.42	157	17	10.82	193	38	19.68	157	22	14.00	75	6	8.00	221	6	2.71	543	27	4.97				146	4	2.74			
Poona -				251	7	2.78	732	8	1.09	1,057	33	3.12	1,431	37	2.58	1,320	23	1.74	1,020	12	1.17	560	8	1.42				1,051	11	1.04			
Ahmednugger -				541	8	1.47	354	6	1.69	353	14	3.96	881	6	1.57	505	5	.99	463	5	1.08	435	8	1.83				268	5	1.86			
Poorundhur -				-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	43	2	4.65	78	4	5.02				69	-	-			
Deesa -				109	2	1.83	105	5	4.76	103	2	1.94	-	-	-	109	3	2.75	109	5	4.60	102	2	1.96				99	-	-			
Abou -				-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				74	-	-			
Belgaune -				-	-	-	29	-	-	976	30	3.01	1,059	24	2.26	1,249	21	1.68	1,163	34	2.91	117	2	1.70				124	2	1.61			
Sholapoor -				77	3	3.89	99	2	2.02	99	-	-	105	-	-	105	1	.95	111	2	1.80	105	1	.95				95	-	-			
Kurrachee -				889	16	1.79	-	-	-	136	6	4.41	121	7	5.78	143	3	2.09	144	3	2.08	1,123	29	2.58				1,107	18	1.62			
Hyderabad -				-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				873	21	2.40			
Nusserabad -				-	-	-	-	-	-	106	1	.94	105	3	2.85	102	1	0.98	110	2	1.81	122	-	-				105	2	1.90			
Aden -				731	35	4.78	487	12	2.46	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	132	-	-	513	8	1.55				118	8	6.78			
Vingorla -				-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	2	5.00	66	6	9.09	29	5	17.3	-	-	-				-	-	-			
Bhoj -				96	2	2.08	-	-	-	-	-	-	102	10	9.80	104	3	2.80	105	1	.95	109	2	1.83				-	-	-			
Peshawur -				-	-	-	1,153	36	3.12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				-	-	-			
Mooltan -				-	-	-	176	3	1.70	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				-	-	-			
Kolapoor -				88	-	-	98	3	3.06	104	-	-	101	4	3.96	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				-	-	-			
TOTAL -				2,896	94	3.24	3,390	92	2.71	3,127	124	3.96	3,602	115	3.19	3,778	72	1.90	3,650	77	2.10	3,807	91	2.39				4,128	71	1.72			

The returns showing details have not been received for these years.

No return for this year has been received.

No returns for these years have been received.

APPENDIX No. 43.

A RETURN, showing the STRENGTH and NUMBER of DEATHS in the EAST INDIA COMPANY'S EUROPEAN FORCES, ARTILLERY and INFANTRY, in BRITISH INDIA, in each Year from 1843 to 1857.

Years.	BENGAL.			MADRAS.			BOMBAY			TOTAL for INDIA.		
	Average Annual Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio per Cent. of Deaths to Strength.	Average Annual Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio per Cent. of Deaths to Strength.	Average Annual Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio per Cent. of Deaths to Strength.	Average Annual Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio per Cent. of Deaths to Strength.
1843	17,986	1,504	8.97	5,055	181	3.59	5,022	272	5.41	28,043	2,057	7.33
1844	16,548	834	5.03	5,513	165	2.99	3,667	244	6.65	25,728	1,243	4.88
1845	15,315	1,678	10.96	5,029	172	3.42	8,608	687	7.97	28,952	2,537	8.76
1846	19,009	1,123	5.90	4,940	171	2.45	9,253	864	9.33	33,202	2,158	6.49
1847	5,029	187	3.71	4,993	137	2.74	2,896	94	3.24	12,918	418	3.23
1848	5,035	404	8.02	4,596	79	1.50	3,390	92	2.71	13,021	575	4.41
1849	6,006	406	6.75	4,239	111	2.59	3,127	124	3.96	13,372	641	4.79
1850	4,978	335	6.72	4,359	124	2.84	3,602	115	3.19	12,939	574	4.43
1851	Not received.			4,718	146	3.09	3,778	72	1.90	—	—	—
1852	5,075	228	4.49	3,273	120	3.66	3,650	77	2.10	11,998	425	3.54
1853	5,629	456	8.10	4,011	149	3.71	3,807	91	2.39	13,447	696	5.17
1854	5,752	274	4.76	4,623	154	3.33	Not received.			—	—	—
1855	—	—	—	4,579	126	2.75	4,128	71	1.72	—	—	—
1856	† —	—	—	—	—	—	* 8,966	186	2.07	—	—	—
1857	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

* The Queen's and Company's European Troops cannot be distinguished in these years.

† The Returns from India for these years have not been received.

Record and Statistical Department, East India House,
14th December 1858.

M. HORNIDGE.

APPENDIX No. 44.

COMPARISON of the STRENGTH and DEATHS in the EAST INDIA COMPANY'S EUROPEAN FORCES and in HER MAJESTY'S ARMY serving in the EAST INDIES during the same Period; the former taken from the Return of Mr. Hornidge, dated the 14th December 1858, and the latter as extracted from the War Office Sanitary Returns.

Year.	Presidency of Bengal.				Presidency of Madras.				Presidency of Bombay.			
	E. I. Company's European Forces.		Her Majesty's Army.		E. I. Company's European Forces.		Her Majesty's Army.		E. I. Company's European Forces.		Her Majesty's Army.	
	Strength.	Deaths.	Strength.	Deaths.	Strength.	Deaths.	Strength.	Deaths.	Strength.	Deaths.	Strength.	Deaths.
1843	—		Omitted because the information has not been given for the East India Company's European Forces.		5,035	181	7,699	427	5,022	272	6,066	468
1844	Cannot be obtained separately from that of Her Majesty's troops.		Omitted because the information has not been given for the East India Company's European Forces.		5,513	165	7,850	276	3,667	244	6,323	824
1845	—		—		5,029	172	7,535	351	Cannot be obtained separately from Her Majesty's troops.		Omitted because the information has not been given for the East India Company's European Forces.	
1846	—		—		4,940	171	5,772	264	—		—	
1847	5,029	187	12,349	781	4,993	137	6,040	227	2,896	94	5,556	139
1848	5,035	404	11,502	1,190	4,596	79	5,321	125	3,390	92	6,208	179
1849	6,006	406	14,703	1,306	4,239	111	5,014	159	3,127	124	6,619	310
1850	4,978	335	17,307	911	4,359	124	4,838	110	3,602	115	5,872	165
1851	As above.		As above.		4,718	146	4,162	88	3,778	72	5,774	194
1852	5,075	228	16,659	1,196	3,273	120	4,548	304	3,650	77	5,688	194
1853	5,629	456	16,191	950	4,011	149	4,598	215	3,807	91	5,306	102
1854	5,752	274	17,087	782	4,623	154	4,357	143	As above.		As above.	
1855	As above.		As above.		4,579	126	3,209	80	4,128	71	4,423	80
Totals	37,504	2,290	105,798	7,116	59,908	1,835	70,943	2,769	37,067	1,252	57,835	2,655
Ratio per 1,000 of strength -	61.1		—		67.2		—		33.7		—	
					30.6		39.0				45.9	

These results, however, are subject to the corrections stated in the following Observations.

OBSERVATIONS on the preceding COMPARISON of the Relative Mortality among the European Forces of the East India Company's and Her Majesty's Army, from 1843 to 1855.

To ascertain the relative loss in Line regiments in India and in the East India Company's European force there, the strength and deaths as given on the last page of Mr. Hornidge's return, dated 14th December last, have been placed opposite the same information obtained from the War Office sanitary returns for the same years, as given in my evidence. For any years in which that information could not be given in the former, it has also been omitted in the latter; but before drawing conclusions, corrections must also be made for the following circumstances.

The loss of Her Majesty's army in Bengal in 1848 and 1849 includes 360 killed in action, and 67 died of their wounds in the campaigns of the Punjaub, who must be deducted, as in no way affecting the comparison in view. The number of deaths remaining to be compared is thus reduced to 6,689.

Next comes a deduction on account of the loss in the second Burmese war, in which two corps from this presidency, the 18th and 80th, suffered severely, chiefly from disease and casualties consequent on that service, for which the following corrections have to be made:—

	Strength.	Deaths.
From the total of Bengal of	105,798	6,689
Deduct 1852-3 18th Regiment	850	260
" " 80th "	900	197
" " 18th "	707	111
" " 80th "	754	143
Total Deductions	3,211	711

Showing the results, exclusive of } 102,587 5,978
the Burmese and Punjaub wars, } or 58 $\frac{2}{3}$ per 1,000.
to be - - - - -

It is shown by the returns received from the Indian House that about 996 of the latter force were also employed in the Burmese war in 1852-3, and that the loss was 83, but this would only reduce the total mortality to 60 $\frac{2}{3}$ per thousand against 58 $\frac{2}{3}$ in Her Majesty's army.

It forms, however, a much more important consideration that all the deaths which have taken place among that portion of the East India Company's troops borne on the town major's list in Bengal appear to have been omitted, and till the necessary correction has been made on that account, no accurate conclusions can be drawn as to the relative loss in the two forces.

It may serve as an illustration how much such peculiarities require being attended to in these comparisons, that out of 304 deaths recorded as having occurred in the establishment of Her Majesty's troops in the Madras presidency in the year 1852-3, 225 took place in 51st regiment, then serving in Burmah,

	Strength.	Deaths.
So that from the total in the comparison of	70,943	2,769
There must be deducted for this corps alone, in 1852-3	812	225
And in 1853-4	444	69
Showing the results in the Madras presidency, exclusive of the Burmese war, to have been	69,687	2,475

or in the ratio of 35 $\frac{2}{3}$ per thousand against 30 $\frac{2}{3}$ per thousand in the East India Company's European force.

The East India Company had also about 1,051 of their European force employed in Burmah in 1853, of whom 73 died, but even if these are deducted, it will leave the mortality of that class 30 per thousand, as on margin.

Total as in Comparison.	
Strength.	Deaths.
50,000	1,835
Deduct - 1,051	73
Remains - 48,949	1,762
or 30 per thousand.	

There are other considerations also which affect comparisons of mortality quite as much as the casualties of warfare, though it is impossible here to take them into account,

such as the salubrity of the barracks occupied by Her Majesty's and the East India Company's armies respectively at the same station. As an illustration of this, it is shown in a report by the Deputy Inspector-General at Madras in 1843, that owing to the extremely unhealthy locality of the barracks occupied by the former at Secunderabad, their loss had during the preceding ten years averaged 7 $\frac{3}{8}$ per cent., while among the European artillery it only averaged 3 $\frac{1}{10}$, or less than half as much. This cause of extra loss has now, I understand, been removed, but the fact is important as showing how many contingencies have to be taken into account in comparisons of this kind.

Owing to the enormous mortality in the campaign of Scinde and the sickness which followed, and occasioned a loss of 525 men in one regiment (the 78th) in a single year, it has become necessary in the Bombay presidency to omit any notice of the results for the year 1843 and 1844, as we have no means of knowing to what extent the East India Company's European force suffered from the same causes on the same occasions.

Therefore from the total of:—

	East India European Force.	Her Majesty's Army.		
	Strength.	Deaths.	Strength.	Deaths.
	37,067	1,252	57,835	2,655
Deduct, 1843	5,022	272	6,066	468
And 1844	3,667	244	6,323	824
Remains	28,378	736	45,446	1,363

being in the ratio of 29 $\frac{2}{10}$ per thousand in Her Majesty's army against 25 $\frac{2}{10}$ per thousand in the East India Company's Europeans.

From the former a few deaths in action should have been excluded, but they are not sufficiently numerous to influence the results.

After all these sources of discrepancy have been removed, it appears that so far as regards the usual mortality to which European troops are exposed, exclusive of what results directly or indirectly from warfare, the loss in the East India Company's European force has been greater than that of Her Majesty's Army in Bengal by above 2 $\frac{2}{10}$ per thousand, and less in the Madras and Bombay presidencies by 5 $\frac{2}{10}$ and 4 per thousand respectively.

These results, however, would be subject to a further modification tending to increase the rates in the East India Company's European force, should it be found that the returns of that service refer only to the deaths recorded by the medical department, which usually omits all who did not come into hospital. In the War Office returns every death, from whatever cause, is included.

The invaliding and transfers to invalid establishments have been higher among the East India Company's Europeans in the proportion of 28 to 21 per thousand throughout India, and their mortality would probably have been more strongly indicated also in this comparison, but for the larger proportion of men of long service in Line regiments which have been above 10 years in India, as is shown by the following summary of the Horse Guards and India House returns on that head, viz.:—

	Of and above 10 years' Service.	Under that Service.	Total Strength.
On the average of six of Her Majesty's regiments in India there were	1,383	1,484	2,867
On the average of the six East India Company's European regiments	967	1,629	2,596

This peculiarity in the longer services of the men in Her Majesty's corps arises from the operation of volunteering, which tends to bring into them from other regiments returning home numbers who, having been for many years in India, are subject to high rates of mortality, but which is not likely to be the case when there is no longer a bounty on volunteering, and the service of Her Majesty's regiments there is reduced to 10 years. The men will then as a body necessarily be of less deteriorated constitution and younger than any local European force maintained permanently in the country, and consequently better fitted to contend against the influence of the climate.

ALEX. M. TULLOCH.

War Office, January 1859.

RETURN showing the Extent of Invaliding in the East India Company's European Armies in the Presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, for each year, from 1825 to 1844 inclusive; extracted from a Return to the House of Commons, dated June 16, 1845.

RETURN showing the Number of Men discharged at Chatham as Invalids from Troops of the Line serving in the several Presidencies in the East Indies; extracted from pages 481 and 483 of Appendix to Report.

Year.	BENGAL.		MADRAS.		BOMBAY.	
	Strength.	Inva- lided.	Strength.	Inva- lided.	Strength.	Inva- lided.
1825	4,312	167	4,350	108	1,928	50
1826	4,357	205	4,548	150	1,727	55
1827	3,793	248	4,082	97	1,805	91
1828	4,177	217	5,216	74	2,227	113
1829	4,406	205	5,007	114	2,210	118
1830	4,550	202	5,265	124	2,376	85
1831	4,757	154	5,325	120	2,243	120
1832	4,342	108	5,010	70	2,424	55
1833	4,220	85	4,739	81	2,285	103
1834	3,906	76	4,481	85	2,151	2
1835	4,084	70	4,749	84	1,990	82
1836	4,209	80	4,574	95	1,907	10
1837	4,324	129	4,645	122	1,861	91
1838	4,303	143	4,901	69	2,206	40
1839	4,098	118	4,696	120	2,043	60
1840	4,754	236	5,045	134	2,374	62
1841	4,761	220	5,783	132	3,479	77
1842	4,777	147	6,083	130	4,706	121
1843	5,016	106	5,917	121	5,023	201
1844	5,034	152	5,883	90	3,607	80
Totals	88,380	3,227	101,210	2,101	50,087	1,611

Ratio per Cent. 3'66 - - - 2'08 - - - 3'16

GRAND TOTAL	240,577	6,889
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Ratio per Cent. - - 2'88

Year.	BENGAL.		MADRAS.		BOMBAY.	
	Strength.	Inva- lided.	Strength.	Inva- lided.	Strength.	Inva- lided.
1840	-	372	-	376	-	91
1841	-	255	-	161	-	169
1842	-	173	-	74	-	182
1843	-	104	-	110	-	86
1844	-	125	-	96	-	125
1845	-	104	-	119	-	86
1846	-	260	-	342	-	244
1847	-	316	-	166	-	300
1848	-	663	-	112	-	121
1849	-	275	-	160	-	93
1850	-	126	-	71	-	167
1851	-	134	-	100	-	291
1852	-	126	-	75	-	190
1853	-	144	-	143	-	285
1854	-	110	-	75	-	245
Totals	188,407	3,106	87,486	1,771	84,670	2,673

Ratio per Cent. 1'69 - - - 2'02 - - - 3'15

GRAND TOTAL	300,563	7,680
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Ratio per Cent. - - 2'11

This information cannot readily be obtained for precisely the same period as is given above, but the results will be sufficient for an approximation.

APPENDIX No. 45.

ESTABLISHMENT of ROYAL ARTILLERY in INDIA per Estimates 1858-9.

Establishment.	Establishment of a Troop of Royal Horse Artillery.	Establishment of a Field Battery.	Establishment of a Company.	BENGAL.				BOMBAY.				MADRAS.				GENERAL TOTAL.
				2 Troops Royal Horse Artillery.	9 Field Batteries.	2 Garrison Companies.	Total.	1 Troop Royal Horse Artillery.	7 Field Batteries.	3 Garrison Companies.	Total.	1 Troop Royal Horse Artillery.	2 Field Batteries.	1 Garrison Company.	Total.	
Lieutenant Colonels	-	-	-	2	2	1	5	-	3	-	3	-	1	-	1	9
Lieutenant Colonels on Majors' Pay	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Senior Surgeons and Surgeons	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Assistant Surgeons	1	1	-	2	9	-	11	1	7	-	8	1	2	-	3	22
Veterinary Surgeons*	-	-	-	-	6	-	6	-	4	-	4	-	1	-	1	11
Captains	1	1	1	2	9	2	13	1	7	3	11	1	2	1	4	28
Second Captains	1	1	1	2	9	2	13	1	7	3	11	1	2	1	4	28
Lieutenants	3	3	3	6	27	6	39	3	21	9	33	3	6	3	12	84
Staff Serjeants	2	-	-	4	1	-	5	2	-	-	2	2	-	-	2	9
Company Serjeants	-	1	1	-	9	2	11	-	7	3	10	-	2	1	3	24
Serjeants	10	11	8	20	99	16	135	10	77	24	111	10	22	8	40	286
Corporals	4	9	6	9	81	12	101	4	63	18	85	4	18	6	28	214
Bombardiers	6	9	6	12	81	12	105	6	63	18	87	6	18	6	30	222
Gunners	90	115	115	180	1035	230	1445	90	805	345	1240	90	230	115	435	3120
Drivers	70	60	-	140	540	-	680	70	420	-	490	70	120	-	190	1360
Trumpeters	1	2	2	2	18	4	24	1	14	6	21	1	4	2	7	52
Furriers and Carriage Smiths	1	1	-	2	9	-	11	1	7	-	8	1	2	-	3	22
Shoing and Carriage Smiths	6	6	-	12	54	-	66	6	42	-	48	6	12	-	18	132
Collar Makers	3	3	-	6	27	-	33	3	21	-	24	3	6	-	9	66
Wheelers	3	2	-	6	18	-	24	3	14	-	17	3	4	-	7	48
Total	202	225	143	406	2035	289	2730	202	1582	429	2213	202	452	143	797	5740

* Of the Veterinary Surgeons shown as belonging to Field Batteries, One is attached to each Troop of Royal Horse Artillery.

APPENDIX No. 46.

DETAIL of a 6-POUNDER TROOP of ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY for SERVICE in INDIA.

	OFFICERS.			MEN.										Horses.	ORDNANCE AND CARRIAGES.										ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION PER GUN.		Carbines.	Ammunition Rounds per Carbine.				
	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Assistant Surgeon.	Staff Serjeants.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Bombardiers.	Gunners.	Drivers.	Farriers.	Shoeing Smiths.	Collar Makers.	Wheelers.		Trumpeters.	Guns.		Waggons.				Store Limber Waggon.	Forge.	Store Cart.	Medicine Cart.	Light Forage Waggon.			6-Pr. Gun.	12-Pr. Howitzer.		
																6-Pr. Guns.	12-Pr. Howitzer.	6-Pr. Gun.	12-Pr. Howitzer.	Spare.												
Establishment	2	3	1	2	9	6	9	90	70	1	6	3	3	1	182	4	2	4	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	231	236	12	470
Total	6			200										182	6		9				5					231	236	12	470			

ALLOTMENT OF MEN.													ALLOTMENT OF HORSES.										OFFICERS'	TROOP.									
	Serjeants.	Ran kand File N.C. Officers.	Gunners.	Drivers.	S. Serjts.	Serjeants.	Ran and File N.C. Officers.	Gunners.	Drivers.	Artificers	Trum-peters.	Total.																					
4 Guns, with their Waggons	1	2	10	6	-	4	2	40	24	-	-	76	6 Guns, at 6 each	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	-	
2 Howitzers, with their Waggons	1	1	10	6	-	2	2	20	12	-	-	36	6 Waggons, at 6 each	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36	
3 Spare Ammunition Waggons	-	-	2	3	-	-	-	6	3	-	-	9	3 Spare Ammunition Waggons, at 6 each	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	
1 Store Limber Waggon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	3	5 other Carriages	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	
1 Forge	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	2 Staff Serjeants	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	
1 Store Cart	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	6 Gun Detachments, at 8 each	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	48	
1 Medicine Cart	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	2 Trumpeters	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	
1 Light Forage Waggon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	1 Farrier	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
1 Staff Serjeant: Serjeant Major	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3 Shoeing Smiths	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	
1 Quartermaster Serjeant	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3 Wheelers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	
1 Serjeant Conductor of Stores	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 Trumpeter	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
1 Hospital Serjeant	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 Gunner, Acting Trumpeter	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
1 Farrier	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	In charge of Waggons and Carriages. Spare Men to attend to spare Horses, and to cover Casualties	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	
6 Shoeing Smiths	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	1	-	18	1	19	Spare Horses, estimated at 1-10th	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	
3 Collar Makers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-																					
3 Wheelers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-																					
1 Trumpeter	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-																					
Total	-	-	-	-	2	9	15	90	70	13	1	200																					

Note.—This Return shows that in a Troop of Royal Horse Artillery of 6-Pounders there is one more Officer, 88 more Men, and 13 more Troop Horses than in a Troop of Horse Artillery on the Bengal system. Native Drivers are not employed in the European Troops of Horse Artillery in Bengal, but every gun-horse is mounted: to each Gun and Waggon there are two sets of horses,—the spare horses being under the charge of the syca. A Troop of Royal Horse Artillery has nine Ammunition Waggons and five other carriages. The Bengal Troop has 12 Ammunition Waggons and 3 other carriages; but the Royal Artillery carry 231 rounds per Gun and 236 rounds for the Howitzers, against 224 rounds per Gun and 140 rounds for the Howitzer in the Bengal Artillery.

APPENDIX No. 47.

DETAIL of an EUROPEAN TROOP of BENGAL HORSE ARTILLERY equipped for FIELD SERVICE.

	COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.			Staff Serjeant.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Bombardiers.	Rough Riders.	Farriers.	TRUMPETERS.		Gunners.	GUN LASCARS.			Native Doctor.	Syces.	Grass Cutters.	Horses.	ORDNANCE.		WAGGONS.				AMMUNITION ROUNDS PER GUN.			Spare Carriage.	CARTS.			ARTIFICERS.											
	Captains.	Subalterns.	Assistant Surgeon.							Full Pay.	Half Pay.		Havildars.	Naicks.	Privates.					6-Pr. Guns.	12-Pr. Howitzer.	6-Pr. Guns.	12-Pr. Howitzer.	6-Pr. Gun.	12-Pr. Howitzer.	12-Pr. Howitzer.	Carbines.	Ammunition.—Rounds per Carbine.		Store.	Quartermaster's.	Bullocks.	Mistry Smith.	Firemen.	Filemen.	Hammermen.	Mistry Carpenter.	Workmen Carpenter.	Bildars.					
Establishment -	1	3	1	1	6	6	10	2	2	2	2	80	1	2	24	1	169	169	169	5	1	5	1	5	1	5	1	128	96	80	60	1	12	26	2	1	75	1	2	2	2	1	2	4
Total -	5			111								27			1	328		169	6		12				224			140		1	12	26	3		75	14								
ALLOTMENT OF MEN.													ALLOTMENT OF HORSES.										ALLOTMENT OF BULLOCKS.																					
Per Gun and its Waggon - $\left. \begin{array}{l} 1 \text{ Serjeant.} \\ 1 \text{ Corporal.} \\ 1 \text{ Bombardier.} \\ 10 \text{ Gunners.} \end{array} \right\} = 15 \times 6 = 90$ and with spare Horses - 2 ditto. Total - 15 x 6 = 90 Staff Serjeant - 1 Farriers - 2 Stable Orderly - 1 Trumpeters - 4 8 Allowing for Sick, &c. - 13 Total - 111 GUN LASCARS. Per Gun - 2 } = 3 x 6 = 18 Per Waggon - 1 } Allowing for Sick and for Stores - 9 Total - 27													Per Gun, 2 sets of 6 each and 1 spare = 13 x 6 = 78 Per Waggon, 2 sets of 6 each and 1 spare = 13 x 5 = 78 1 Staff Serjeant - 1 6 Serjeants - 6 2 Rough Riders - 2 2 Farriers - 2 2 Trumpeters - 2 Total - 13 Total - 169										1 Spare Howitzer Carriage, and 6 Ammunition Waggon. 7 at 8 each = 56 2 Store Carts at 7 each = 14 1 Quartermaster's Cart at 5 = 5 Total - 75																					

APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY.

APPENDIX No. 48.

DETAIL of a 9-POUNDER FIELD BATTERY of ROYAL ARTILLERY for SERVICE in INDIA.

	OFFICERS.			MEN.										ORDNANCE AND CARRIAGES.										ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION PER GUN.		Carbines.	Ammunition Rounds per Carbine.		
	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Assistant Surgeon.	Staff Serjeants.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Bombardiers.	Gunnery.	Drivers.	Farrier.	Shoeing Smiths.	Collar Makers.	Wheelers.	Trumpeters.	Horses.	Guns.		Waggons.		Spare Gun Carriage.	Store Lumber Waggon.	Forge.	Store Cart.	Medicine Cart.	Light Forage Waggon.			Guns.	Howitzers.
																9-Pr. Guns.	24-Pr. Howitzers.	9 Pr. Guns.	24-Pr. Howitzers.										
Establishment	2	3	1	2	8	6	9	100	70	1	6	3	2	2	140	4	2	6	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	176	174	60	460
Total	6			209										140	6		11		6					176	174	60	460		

ALLOTMENT OF MEN.												ALLOTMENT OF HORSES.										OFFICERS'.	TROOP.								
	Serjeants.	Rank and File N.C. Officers.	Gunnery.	Drivers.	S. Serjeants.	Serjeants.	Rank and File N.C. Officers.	Gunnery.	Drivers.	Artificers.	Trumpeters.	Total.																			
6 Guns, with their Waggons	1	2	12	7	-	6	12	72	42	-	-	132	Officers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	
1 Store Lumber Waggon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	6 Guns at 8 each	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	48	
1 Forge	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	6 Waggons at 6 each	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36	
1 Store Cart	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	5 other Carriages	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	
1 Medicine Cart	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	Spare Gun Carriage	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	
1 Light Forage Waggon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	Mounted Non-commissioned Officers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	
6 Spare Ammunition Waggons	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	10	Trumpeters	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2		
1 Serjeant Major	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Farrier	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1		
1 Quartermaster Serjeant	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Spare Horses, estimated at 1-10th	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13		
1 Serjeant Conductor of Stores	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-																			
1 Hospital Serjeant	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-																			
1 Farrier	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	12	2	18																			
6 Shoeing Smiths	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-																			
3 Collar Makers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-																			
2 Wheelers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-																			
2 Trumpeters	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-																			
In charge of Waggons and Carriages, and spare Men to attend to spare Horses	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	18	18	-	-	39																			
Total	-	-	-	-	2	8	15	100	70	12	2	209																			

N.B.—Second Line of Ammunition Waggons not horsed.

* The spare Gun Carriage (which requires 3 Drivers) has lately been sent out to each Field Battery.

Note.—This Return shows that a Field Battery of 9-Pounders of the Royal Artillery comprises 6 Officers, 209 Non-commissioned Officers, Gunnery, and Drivers, and 140 Troop Horses; and that a Field Battery on the Bengal Establishment contains 5 Officers, 85 Europeans, 60 Native Drivers (making a total of 145, exclusive of the Officers), and 130 Troop Horses. The Royal Artillery have 11 Ammunition Waggons and 6 other carriages. The Bengal Artillery have 12 Ammunition Waggons and 3 other carriages. The Royal Artillery carry 176 and 174 rounds per gun and howitzer, the Bengal 168 and 112 rounds.

APPENDIX No. 49.

DETAIL of a HORSE FIELD BATTERY on the BENGAL WAR ESTABLISHMENT;—viz. 130 HORSES.

	COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.			Staff Serjeant.	Rough Rider and Farrier Serjeant.	Assistant Farrier and Saddler.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Bombardiers.	BUGLERS.		Gunnery.	GUN LASCARS.			Native Doctor.	DRIVERS.			Syceas.	Grass Cutters.	Horses.	ORDNANCE.		WAGGONS.			AMMUNITION ROUNDS PER GUN.			Spare Carriage.	Ammunition Rounds per Carbine.	CARTS.		ARTICLES.										
	Captain.	Subalterns.	Assistant Surgeon.							Full Pay.	Half Pay.		Havildars.	Naics.	Privates.		Havildars.	Naics.	Drivers.				9-Pr. Guns.	24-Pr. Howitzer.	9-Pr. Guns.	24-Pr. Howitzer.	9-Pr. Guns.	24-Pr. Howitzer.	24-Pr. Howitzer.	Carbines.			Store.	Quartermaster's.	Bullocks.	Mistry Smith.	Firemen.	Filemen.	Hammermen.	Mistry Carpenter.	Workmen Carpenters.	Bildars.			
Establishment -	1	3	1	1	1	1	6	6	6	2	2	60	1	2	24	1	3	3	60	70	130	130	5	1	5	1	5	1	96	72	64	48	1	12	26	2	1	75	1	2	2	2	1	3	4
Total -	5			85								27			1	266			130	6		12			168			112		1	12	26	3	75	14										
ALLOTMENT OF MEN.													ALLOTMENT OF HORSES.										ALLOTMENT OF BULLOCKS.																						
Per Gun and its Waggon { 1 Serjeant. 1 Corporal. 1 Bombardier. 8 Gunners. Total - 11 x 6 = 66													6 Guns at 10 each - - - - - 60 6 Waggons at 10 each - - - - - 60 For Outriders - - - - - 5 Spare - - - - - 5 Total - 130										1 Spare Howitzer Carriage, and 6 Ammunition Waggons 7 at 8 each - - - - - 56 2 Store Carts at 7 each - - - - - 14 1 Quartermaster's Cart at 5 - - - - - 5 Total - 75																						
Staff Serjeant - 1 Farrier Serjeant - 1 Assistant Farrier - 1 Buglers - 4 Allowing for sick and spare Men - 12 Total - 19																																													
GUN LASCARS. Per Gun - 2 Per Waggon - 1 } 3 x 6 = 18 Allowing for Sick, and with Stores - 9 Total - 27																																													

APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY.

APPENDIX No. 50.

RETURN showing the Expense incurred on account of Troops and Invalids of Her Majesty's and Company's Services going out and returning from India, for the last 15 years, viz., from 1843-44 to 1857-58, inclusive.

	*Troops Outward, including Recruits.		Recruits Outward.		Invalids Homeward.		Invalids Homeward.	
	H.M.'s Service.		Company's Service.		H.M.'s Service.		Company's Service.	
	£	s. d.	£	s. d.	£	s. d.	£	s. d.
1843-44	56,349	6 6	12,010	2 3	20,306	0 9	6,469	19 6
1844-45	52,808	11 3	9,102	11 3	16,487	19 0	4,659	8 9
1845-46	49,538	12 3	11,085	18 9	25,640	3 3	6,471	19 0
1846-47	63,535	9 6	23,716	18 0	13,977	6 9	6,165	5 0
1847-48	39,413	9 8	29,070	5 9	15,376	14 6	5,461	9 0
1848-49	67,531	18 9	11,995	13 0	21,669	6 0	4,161	6 9
1849-50	63,010	19 9	21,815	16 0	6,650	2 6	3,077	3 3
1850-51	17,023	1 3	12,436	18 9	14,829	3 6	2,857	16 0
1851-52	17,975	3 9	8,846	3 6	14,635	17 0	4,064	12 3
1852-53	26,198	15 0	15,943	16 3	22,308	7 0	3,890	16 0
1853-54	92,229	2 9	46,067	19 3	37,427	16 0	3,925	0 0
1854-55	55,308	18 9	29,030	10 3	29,974	11 0	9,503	0 0
1855-56	23,744	16 0	15,190	18 0	33,600	9 9	8,940	10 0
1856-57	23,044	9 9	17,481	17 6	22,153	1 9	6,286	0 6
1857-58	1,261,943	15 11	110,913	6 4	24,757	12 0	8,133	2 0

* The recruits of the Queen's service proceed to India as soldiers on the strength of a regiment, and are not distinguishable as recruits, the cost of their transport, therefore, cannot be separately given.
East India House, December 16, 1858. G. FRIEND, Accountant-General.

APPENDIX No. 51.

DETAILS OF EXPENSE of a REGIMENT of the East India Company's European Infantry, on full Batta, in Bengal, as per last annual Military Statement, viz., for 1856-6, if complete to its full establishment as at present fixed.

	Per Month.		Per Ann.	
	Rs.	a. p.	£	
1 Colonel	-	-	1,124	
1 Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding	1,432	4 0		
1 Lieutenant-Colonel	1,032	4 0		
3 Majors, at 789 8 0	1,578	6 0		
14 Captains, at 415 6 0	5,815	4 0		
22 Lieutenants, at 256 10 0	5,648	19 0		
10 Ensigns, at 202 12 5	2,027	19 0		
1 Adjutant	257	0 0		
1 Interpreter and Quartermaster	177	0 0		
1 Surgeon in charge	715	6 0		
2 Assistant Surgeons, at 286 10 0	573	4 0		
Rupees per month	19,254	4 0		
per annum	2,31,051	0 0	23,105	
Effective Staff:—				
1 Serjeant-major	44	7 10		
1 Quartermaster-serjeant	38	7 10		
1 Schoolmaster-serjeant	43	7 5		
1 Armourer-serjeant	22	7 5		
1 Orderly-room Clerk	39	14 8		
1 Hospital-serjeant	22	7 5		
1 Drum-major	22	7 5		
10 Colour-serjeants, at 29 15 6	299	11 0		
40 Serjeants, at 22 7 5	898	8 8		
60 Corporals (under 14 years), at 15 15 0	706	14 0		
20 Drummers, at 14 2 9	283	7 0		
20 " (on halfpay), at 7 1 4	141	10 8		
800 Privates (under 14 years), at 11 12 6	9,700	0 0		
Rupees per month	12,342	15 4		
per annum	1,48,115	8 0	14,811	
20 Puckdies, at 9	180	0 0		
10 Bhoosties, at 5	50	0 0		
40 Sweepers, at 4	80	0 0		
Allowances to Officers commanding companies, at 36	300	0 0		
Ditto, for repairs of gun and stationery, at 20	200	0 0		

APPENDIX No. 52.

DETAILS OF EXPENSE of a REGIMENT of Her Majesty's Infantry of the Line, on full Batta, in Bengal, according to the last annual Military Statement, viz., for 1856-6, if complete to its full establishment as at present fixed.

	Monthly Expense.		Per annum.	
	Rs.	a. p.	£	
Colonel	-	-	1,433	4 0
1 Lieutenant-Colonel in command	1,433	4 0		1,000
1 Lieutenant-Colonel	1,033	4 0		
3 Majors, at 789 8	1,578	6 0		
10 Captains, at 415 6	4,153	12 0		
12 Lieutenants, at 256 10	3,079	8 0		
8 Ensigns, at 202 15 5	1,622	3 4		
1 Paymaster (under 5 years)	524	7 0		
1 Adjutant	257	0 0		
1 Quartermaster (under 10 years)	359	14 0		
1 Surgeon in charge	715	6 0		
3 Assistant Surgeons, at 286 10	859	14 0		
1 Interpreter	100	0 0		
6	41	Rs. per mo.	15,716	14 4
		Rs. per ann.	1,88,602	0 0
Effective Staff.				
1 Regimental Serjeant Major	45	2 10		
1 Quartermaster-serjeant	38	15 2		
1 Paymaster-serjeant	23	14 1		
1 Armourer-serjeant	22	14 1		
1 Schoolmaster-serjeant (under 10 years)	22	14 1		
1 Hospital-serjeant	27	15 1		
1 Orderly-room Clerk (under 7 years)	22	14 1		
10 Colour-serjeants, at 30 8	305	0 0		
40 Serjeants, at 22 14 1	915	3 4		
60 Corporals, at 16 3 10 (under 14 years)	974	6 0		
1 Drum-major	22	14 1		
20 Drummers, 10 at 14 6 10	144	4 4		
10 at 13 7 8	134	12 8		
200 840 Privates (under 14 years service) at 12 0 8	11,280	12 8		
214	1078	Rs. per mo.	13,980	14 6
		Rs. per ann.	1,67,873	0 0
Non-Effective.				
Non-Commissioned Staff, viz.—				
1 Drill-serjeant	14	0 0		
10 Pay ditto, at 7	70	0 0		
1 Drill-corporal	7	0 0		
2 Assistant Schoolmasters, at 10	20	0 0		
1 Schoolmistress	22	8 0		
1 Librarian	8	0 0		
1 Provost-serjeant	10	2 0		
1 Savings Bank Clerk	20	0 0		
130 Wives of soldiers (12 per cent.) at 5	650	0 0		
130 Children, at 24	323	0 0		
Bazar Establishment	25	0 0		
1 Thudal	11	8 0		

APPENDIX No. 51—continued.

	Per month. Rs. a. p.	Per Ann. £
Non-effective Staff:—		
1 Drill-serjeant	14 0 0	
1 Drill-corporal	7 0 0	
10 Pay-serjeant, at 7	70 0 0	
2 Assistant Schoolmasters, at 15	30 0 0	
1 Schoolmistress	15 0 0	
1 Librarian	8 0 0	
1 Provost-serjeant	10 2 0	
1 Clerk, Savings' Bank	8 0 0	
Wives of soldiers, at 12 per cent., of whom 80 at 5 0	400 0 0	
34 at 3 8	109 0 0	
Children, estimated at 144, at 2½	360 0 0	
Establishment under quartermaster	8 0 0	
Bazar servants	25 0 0	
Allowance for butts and targets	4 0 0	
" for petty stores	1 8 0	
" for a mess	180 0 0	
Good conduct pay (average)	850 0 0	
Head money for 947, at 25 per cent.	235 0 0	
Rupees per month	3,114 10 0	
per annum	87,575 8 0	3,787
Victualling 947 men, at 7½	7,102 0 0	
Rupees per annum	85,224 0 0	6,822
Clothing estimate		2,500
Charges for recruiting, including clothing and the whole expenses incurred up to time of embarkation		2,700
Pay or "ship money" for recruits, for voyage, average for years 1853 to 1856, per annum 24s. 2s. 1d., each at 12 per cent., or 112 men		1,792
Passages of drafts, including women and children, 128 at 14s. each		1,875
Passages home of invalided soldiers who are all discharged in India, at 7 per cent., 67 at 25s. each		360
Passages of officers coming home on sick certificate		12,037
Barracks estimated at		4,905
Total		£72,963
Estimated additional cost if the number of rank and file were raised to 1,000		8,800
Total		£81,803
The Government of India calculate on having 12 of the officers available for staff and other detached employment; their pay and allowances are, when so detached, not properly chargeable on the regiment; for one major, three captains, and eight lieutenants, at the rates charged in the account, the deduction will amount to		4,905
Total		£76,987

NOTE.—The estimated cost of pensions is omitted, as they are not included in the statement of a Queen's regiment. The cost of bedding, of hospital attendants, of medicine, of camp equipage, ammunition, and stores, wear and tear of arms, of punkahs and tatties, are not included in this account.

East India House, December 1858.

W. E. BAKER, Colonel,
Military Secretary.

APPENDIX No. 52—continued.

	Monthly Expense. Rs. a. p.	Per annum. £
10 Lascars	37 3 0	
20 Puckalliers	180 0 0	
20 Sweepers	80 0 0	
Contingent allowance to Officers commanding companies, at 50	500 0 0	
Allowance for petty stores	1 8 0	
Ditto for butts and targets	4 0 0	
Mess allowance	150 0 0	
Head money for 1,078 Europeans, at Rs. 25 per 100	270 0 0	
Good-conduct pay to European Non-commissioned Officers and Privates, average	1,000 0 0	
Rs. per mo.	3,436 3 0	
Rs. per ann.	41,233 0 0	4,123
Victualling 1,078 men, at Rs. per month 7½	8,085 0 0	
Rs. per ann.	97,020 0 0	9,702
Clothing, estimated at		3,000
Charge for the levy money, &c. of all men embarked with regiments for India, and a corresponding credit for men landed with regiments from India in the same year. The proportion who came home in ordinary times may be taken at ¼ of those who go out. The charge on the rate of 1854-5 was 13s. 14s. 10d. each man. This for 1,124 men would amount to 14,833s. 12s. 8d. Two fifths of this would be 5,952s. The difference between these two sums divided over 10 years, the probable future time of service in India would give per annum		893
The approximate Annual Charge for an Infantry Depot in England, as per statement from the War Office, enclosed in a letter dated the 13th instant, is as follows:—		Per annum.
	£ s. d.	£
Pay to officers and men (220)	4,945 15 0	
Average charge for beer money, lodging allowances, &c., levy money, and contingent expenses	907 12 10	
Staff charges, 17 per cent. on the above charges, exclusive of pay of officers	845 3 5	
Barrack accommodation, at 1s. 15s. 6d. per man	379 17 0	
Excess price of bread and meat, beyond the stoppages from men's pay	173 19 10	
Charge for clothing	509 8 0	
Ditto for accoutrements	18 7 1	
		7,780
Passages and Reliefs:—		
The expenses under this head will be taken on the scale of the Cape route. The passage money of the officers, out and home, averages	10,000 0 0	
The conveyance of the regiment in ordinary times, at 14s. a man, including women and children, would cost	16,912 0	
To bring back ¼ of the number would cost, at 25s. per man	12,050 0 0	
The pay of a regiment, including officers, whilst on their voyage out	5,500 0 0	
The pay of all officers ¼ of the men for the voyage home	3,400 0 0	
	47,862 0 0	
Divided over 10 years		4,786
The passage of officers to supply vacancies, and of officers coming home on sick certificate, and returning, estimated at		500
The passages out of drafts, at 12 per cent., and at 14s. per head, including women and children		2,030
Pay of the drafts on voyage out		528
Passages home of invalid soldiers estimated at		1,228
Barracks estimated at 5 per cent. for outlay, and 5 per cent. for keeping up		15,060
		87,114
The Government of India are allowed, with the concurrence of the Commander-in-Chief in India, and under rules laid down by the Horse Guards, to appoint a certain number of officers of H. M.'s regiments to detached appointments, if qualified in the native languages; estimate three to be withdrawn, viz., one major and two captains, at the rates above charged, the deduction will amount to		1,943
		£85,371

NOTE.—The pensions are omitted, as there are no data here upon which to calculate the actual amount chargeable upon the Indian and the Imperial revenues on this account. The cost of bedding, of hospital attendants, of medicine, of camp equipage, ammunition and stores, wear and tear of arms, of punkahs and tatties, are not included in the account.

East India House, December 1858.

W. E. BAKER, Colonel,
Military Secretary.

APPENDIX No. 53.

OBSERVATIONS ON Colonel BAKER'S Estimate of the relative Cost of a Regiment of the Line serving in India and a Local European Corps, by Colonel Sir A. TULLOCH ; with Colonel BAKER'S Note thereon.

COLONEL SIR A. TULLOCH'S OBSERVATIONS.

A.

Supposing it admissible that the pay and allowances of 12 officers should be deducted, on account of staff and other employment, from the establishment of a local, European corps in India, while three only are deducted, for the same reason, from the service companies of a line corps, still there are many other items in Colonel Baker's comparison which appear objectionable, and are likely to make an important difference in the results.

I find, for instance, the cost of barracks for a regiment of the line stated at 15,000*l.* a year, while that of a local European corps is estimated at - 12,637

Both sums appear enormous, but I can discover no reason for so great a difference in the relative amounts, seeing that the quarters of both are not unfrequently interchanged. The utmost that could be contended for is, that the charge should be proportioned to the relative strength of the two corps, in which case it would be annually for a line Regiment - - - - - £14,380

Instead of - - - - - 15,000

Difference to be deducted - - - 620

B.

In like manner the expense of clothing in each case, calculated on the same principle, would be

£2,846

Instead of - - - 3,000

Difference to be deducted - - - 154

C.

It is also necessary to point out that an equal proportion, viz., 12 per cent. annually, has been calculated upon, in both forces, as necessary to replace the annual waste by deaths, invaliding, and limited service expiring. But it requires no demonstration to show, that if regiments of the line are to be relieved every ten years, as charged for in the comparative estimate of Colonel Baker, the proportion, both of invalids and time-expired men returning annually, must be much less than from a corps in which *there is no periodical relief*. Even so far as regards invaliding, this tends to keep the annual ratio in the Line below that of an Indian local corps, in the proportion nearly of two to three,* and it must have a still more prominent effect, in regard to limited enlistment men, because in regiments of the line, which are largely recruited just before proceeding to India, comparatively few can have attained ten years' service before the period of relief for the corps arrives, and as the General Commanding has always the power of extending the service for two years longer, he no doubt would do so, to prevent the necessity for sending home soldiers before their regiment.

Keeping these considerations in view, there can be no question that, whatever may be the per centage of passages to be provided annually for draughts to a regiment of the line, it will be at least three per cent. below what is required for a local European corps, and that the relative charge for the former should therefore be

£1,521

Instead of - - - - - 2,030

Difference to be deducted - - - 509

D.

The passages home of invalided and time-expired soldiers have, for precisely the same reasons, been either much under-estimated for the local European corps, or over-estimated for the Regiment of the line. If 1,675*l.* annually be sufficient for the former, half the amount should be enough for the latter, or £837

Instead of, as charged by Colonel Baker 1,925

Difference to be deducted - - - 1,088

Carried forward - - - £2,371

COLONEL BAKER'S NOTE THEREON.

A.

The estimate of 15,000*l.* a year for a regiment of the line of the full establishment may appear very large, but it is nevertheless correct, the barrack accommodation of soldiers in India having been greatly improved within the last eight or ten years. The reduction proposed on account of the lesser sum fixed for a Company's regiment is inadmissible; for the difference has been already accounted for and charged in the estimate for a Company's regiment under the head—"if the number of rank and file were raised to "1,000," amounting to 8,899*l.* per annum.

B.

The original estimate for clothing is believed to be correct, but at all events the difference occasioned by bringing up a local regiment to the standard of 1,000 rank and file has been accounted for in the sum stated in the preceding note.

C.

It cannot be admitted that a less supply of recruits will be required for a regiment of the line than for a local regiment. Regiments proceeding to India take with them all their old soldiers, and in the first few years of their service in India unquestionably suffer more from sickness than regiments which have been acclimated. A proportion of 12 per cent. annually has been reckoned for a long course of years as requisite to keep up both establishments.

D.

The passage home of invalided soldiers has been estimated at 7 per cent. on both establishments. The difference to raise the proportion for a regiment of the local infantry to the same establishment of rank and file as a regiment of the line has been already brought to account under the head referred to in note A.

* See Return of Invaliding, Appendix No. 44, p. 89.

COLONEL SIR A. TULLOCH'S OBSERVATIONS.

COLONEL BAKER'S NOTE THEREON.

Brought forward - - - £2,371

E.

Another considerable item must be disallowed as originating in mis-calculation, viz., the pay of drafts on the passage out, which is nothing more than an advance of part of the annual pay already charged at the depôt for the same men, on which account, therefore, must be deducted - - - 558

F.

The pay of a regiment, including officers on the passage out, and the pay of two-fifths of the regiment on its return home is also objectionable as a charge, at least to the extent of about three-fourths, in so far as it is by no means necessary that the reliefs should be sent by the Cape, which tends to make this charge three times more than it would otherwise be, while the same object can be effected at even less expense by steam conveyance and troop ships by the Red Sea route. On this account, therefore, there would have to be deducted three-fourths of 890*l.*, or, - 666

G.

At a time when steerage passengers are conveyed by steam from Ireland to New York for 6*l.* 6*s.*, provisions included; and cabin passengers at 16*l.* 16*s.*, with a mercantile profit, there appears no reason why the Government might not, with vessels of its own, convey troops to and from India, by the Overland route at a corresponding rate, proportioned to the distance, being about 14*l.* in the one case, and from 50*l.* to 60*l.* in the other, which would make a reduction of at least one-third in the 10,000*l.* estimated for the passages of the officers belonging to a single regiment. The stoppages from both officers and men while on ship-board on account of provisions, appear also to have been left out of view. For all which an annual deduction is claimed of at least - - - 500

H.

I now come to the last and most important items respecting the pay of the depôts, in regard to which Colonel Baker appears to have fallen into some serious mistakes.

In 1855-56, the period to which his comparison relates, the depôts of regiments in the East Indies consisted, as they had done for a long series of years, of but one company each; and it was not till two years afterwards, that they were raised to the strength he has stated.

The events of the Sepoy insurrection having rendered it absolutely necessary for a time to add to the means of recruiting, the establishment at the depôt was doubled in July 1857; but under no circumstances can it be admitted that this extra establishment, caused for a specific object, should be brought into a comparison which relates to the year 1855-56.

If one company at the depôt was found sufficient for 30 or 40 years, no doubt it would be so again, when the present emergency is over; and therefore a deduction is claimed to the extent of half the cost of the two companies erroneously taken into this comparison, or - - - 3,890

General Total - - - £7,985

I.

It may be necessary also to point out as affecting this branch of the subject, that whatever the establishment of a depôt may be *nominally*, it is well known, that both the force there and at head-quarters, are never likely *all* to be in receipt of pay; that two or three months must elapse before vacancies occurring at head-quarters can be regularly reported; and at least an equally long period before recruits can be raised to fill these vacancies; but Colonel Baker's comparison charges the pay on both establishments, against the line force, as if *complete*, while on the other hand he has, apparently, charged only the cost of the recruits actually raised, which must make a difference, more than sufficient to turn the scale, which has now been brought within a few hundred pounds.

E.

The pay of drafts during the passage out has not been included in any of the other charges in the estimate now under review.

F.

Sir A. Tulloch has not taken into account the great difference which exists, and which must necessarily exist, between the cost of carrying passengers overland by steamers hence to Alexandria, and from Suez to India, and that by sailing vessels round the Cape. The difference of pay by the saving of time might possibly be 666*l.*, as here assumed; but the increase of passage expenses could not be less than 33,000*l.*

G.

The estimate here given of what the Government could do "in vessels of their own" may form a subject for separate consideration. According to the experience of the India Department the estimate is entirely gratuitous.

It is a mistake to suppose that the stoppages of both officers and men, whilst on shipboard, on account of provisions, appear to have been left out of view. The net amount of pay, less the stoppage for rations, has been charged. The cost of the rations is included in the passage money.

H.

No mistake whatever has been made in these items. The Royal Commissioners expressly called for a statement of the cost of a regiment, if complete, according to the present establishment. What the cost may be, including the depôt, in future years, when the establishment may be reduced, has not yet been computed.

I.

Recruiting is carried on in anticipation of vacancies, otherwise it is not possible to keep numbers complete at head quarters.

COLONEL SIR A. TULLOCH'S OBSERVATIONS.

COLONEL BAKER'S NOTE THEREON.

K.

In this comparison I have avoided all notice of the relative expense for pension in the two forces, but it may be useful to keep in view that in the European local corps, the widows of soldiers receive pensions of from 2½d. to 4½d. a-day, according to the rank of their husbands, and that all men discharged as unfit, from disability, after 14 years' service, receive permanent pensions of from 9d. to 1s. a-day, whereas, in the line, it is only in certain cases, dependent on good conduct and severe disability, that they receive any other than a temporary pension, and, if permanent, the rate seldom exceeds 7d. a-day, except in the case of non-commissioned officers. After 21 years' service in India, too, the private of the Indian army is entitled to a pension of 1s. a-day, whereas in the line he is only entitled to from 8d. to 1s. a-day, according to his good conduct.

L.

These additional boons are no doubt necessary, considering the prolonged service of the East Indian soldier in a tropical and unhealthy climate; but while, on the one hand, all the expenses attending the reliefs of regiments of the line are estimated with such scrupulous minuteness, it is necessary, on the other, to take into account the expense of those boons which have been found necessary in local European corps, to induce men to forego the chance of returning to their native land before they are completely disabled. If this consideration be kept in view, as should, it is submitted, be the case, the local force will be found to have nothing to recommend it on the score of economy, whether present or prospective.

ALEX. M. TULLOCH.

War Office, Dec. 31, 1858.

M.

It will be observed that I have taken no notice, in this comparison, of the more expensive retirement allowed to the East India Company's officers, than to those of the line; because, having already adverted to that subject in my evidence, it seems unnecessary to repeat it, or again to enforce the conclusion that no deductions can be drawn as to the relative cost of the two armies, unless this important feature be taken into consideration.

A. M. T.

K.

Some years since an inquiry was made to ascertain whether the pensionary advantages to the soldiers of the local service were greater or less than in Her Majesty's service, and it was found that on the average of all ranks there was no difference of any importance. For the Queen's service (1855) the average rate of pensions was 11½, for the Company's 11½. The pensions to the widows are of very small importance. Soldiers' widows marry again, in most cases, a few weeks after their widowhood.

L.

It is believed to be quite an error to suppose that the so-called "boons" here mentioned have anything to do with the inducements of men to enlist into the local force. That force is a favourite service, chiefly as holding out prospects to deserving men of obtaining promotion in various departments of the government of India.

M.

All considerations of the difference of cost of pensions has been postponed. It remains to be seen whether the dead weight of the Queen's service, or of the local service, is proportionably the greater of the two.

W. E. BAKER, Colonel,
India House, Jan. 22, 1859. Military Secretary.

COLONEL SIR A. TULLOCH'S REMARKS ON COLONEL BAKER'S NOTES.

A. and B.

These conclusions can only be admitted when it is shown that the proportion of the 8,899l. referred to will bring up the charge for the barracks of the line regiment to 15,000l. and for the clothing to 3,000l. The addition of about the eighth part of 8,899l. on one side of a comparison can obviously never compensate for an addition of about a fifth part of that sum on the other, which is the excess complained of.

The statement annexed of the cost of building 11 barracks, each for a regiment of the line in India as given by Mr. Melvill only a few years ago appears also to afford a strong presumption that the estimated charge of 15,000l. annually is high, as the erection of each of these barracks only cost on an average 22,000l., and most of them being permanent, they would last, of course, for many years.

C. and D.

Regiments of the line do not take with them all their old soldiers, except when hurried abroad at such a crisis as occurred last year; they leave behind many to be discharged as worn out. The statement of such regiments suffering from want of acclimatization, though alleged to be unquestionable, is contrary to all statistical evidence, as is proved by the great reduction in mortality which has taken place in the West Indies since corps have been relieved every third year, and by the fact that in the East Indies, ensigns, among whom the majority must be unacclimatized, die at the rate of only 23 per thousand annually, while the captains, well acclimatized, die at the rate of 34 on the average of a long series of years.

It will not admit of doubt that regiments composed of men enlisted for 10 or 12 years' service, and regularly re-

lieved at the end of 10 years must necessarily have fewer men to send home periodically on account of service expired than corps which remain for ever in India, and this fact must influence both these deductions, to the extent at least for which I have taken credit.

E. and I.

If Colonel Baker refers to the fourth charge for dépôts on page 3, he will find 528l. stated for the pay of drafts on the voyage out; while the very first dépôt charge on page 2 includes the pay of officers and men for a whole year, though it may be not half of them are raised in that period. If the recruits are not men from the dépôt establishment, where do they come from? The recruiting in advance, to which he refers in "I," is only allowed occasionally to the extent of a small per-centage, and recruits are rarely so plentiful as to admit of any excess being sent out from that source.

F. and G.

These calculations refer to prospective payments. I may be wrong in supposing that what seems likely to prove the cheapest arrangement will be carried through, but Colonel Baker is surely just as much so in assuming that there will be any necessity for losing four months' pay on a voyage which may be made in one, or in concluding that the enormous amount paid for the conveyance of troops by steam during a period of unexampled pressure should be considered an equitable basis for estimating the probabilities of future expenditure by the Red Sea route.

H.

Whatever number of men the Indian Government find sufficient at home to keep up their local regiments to the proper establishment, *precisely the same number will suffice for Her Majesty's Depôts*; but if it be required that recruits of line regiments should be more completely trained than those of the Indian establishment at Warley, the superior efficiency thus obtained should be considered an equivalent for the expense, in which case the charge of 7,780*l.* on the one side of the comparison, and 2,700*l.* on the other, for the respective depôt establishments ought to be left out of the calculation.

K.

In such calculations as this the probable duration of the pension requires to be taken into account, quite as much as its average amount. In the line the soldier frequently receives a pension of from one to three years for the same service, which would give to the soldier of the East India Company's army a pension for life, usually extending to between 22 and 23 years, an important distinction, which does not appear to have been adverted to in Col. Baker's note.

In conclusion, I beg to submit the annexed comparison by Mr. Melvill, in 1832, of the relative cost of a regiment of the line and local European corps, which shows that at that period the latter was considered rather the more expensive of the two, which character, I apprehend, it will be still found to retain.

ALEXANDER M. TULLOCH.

War Office,
February 3, 1859.

MEMORANDUM ON COST OF DIFFERENT BARRACKS IN INDIA, extracted from a STATEMENT by MR. MELVILL in the Supplemental Appendix to Reports from the Select Committee on Indian Territories.

Stations.	When built.	Cost.
		Rs.
Hazareebaugh (partly temporary)	1843	111,584
Moulmein (temporary)	1841	54,901
Meerut	1843	140,925
Subathoo	1843	230,427
Kussowlie	1843	215,669
Dugshai	1847	349,031
Bellary	1850	236,745
Poonah (two regiments)	1842	641,164
Sukkur	1845	167,990
Hyderabad (Scinde)	-	295,053
Total for 11 regiments	-	2,443,489
Average	-	Rs.222,195

The accommodation has been for one European infantry regiment in each case, except at Poonah. When the extent of the force could not be ascertained by regiments, the station has been omitted to avoid any risk of error.

According to this statement the average cost of building barracks for a whole regiment is only about 22,213*l.*; five per cent. on which for outlay and five per cent. for keeping up, being the basis adopted by Colonel Baker in his calculation, would only make the expense of these barracks 2,200*l.* a year instead of 15,000*l.*, though they appear to have afforded about 1,200 cubic feet of space per man, exclusive of the verandahs.

COMPARISON, by Mr. Melvill, of the relative Cost of a Regiment of the Line and a Local European Corps in 1832 according to the Numbers actually present with each Corps; extracted from p. 242 to 247 of Appendix to Report of Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 1832.

	Bengal Establishment.		Madras Establishment.		Bombay Establishment.	
	A regiment of His Majesty's infantry, consisting of ten companies. No. of officers and men, 844.	A regiment of Company's European infantry, consisting of eight companies. No. of officers and men, 783.	A regiment of His Majesty's infantry, consisting of ten companies. No. of officers and men, 844.	A regiment of Company's European infantry, consisting of eight companies. No. of officers and men, 782.	A regiment of His Majesty's infantry, consisting of ten companies. No. of officers and men, 844.	A regiment of Company's European infantry, consisting of eight companies. No. of officers and men, 781.
Actual cost of numbers present, per military statement of 1830	St. rupees per month. 22,066	St. rupees per month. 20,039	Madras rupees per month. 26,749	Madras rupees per month. 30,282	Rupces per month. 21,424	Rupces per month. 34,290
Deduct surplus the establishment	-	-	-	1,110	-	2,237
Add, for deficiency in complement	22,066	20,039	26,743	29,172	21,424	32,053
Calculation for rations	4,181	5,177	1,165	-	10,173	-
" for clothing	3,188	2,952	3,587	3,325	-	-
	-	1,616	-	1,760	-	1,754
	29,435	29,784	31,495	34,257	31,597	33,807
£ per month	3,261	3,300	3,599	3,915	3,554	3,803
or, per annum	£39,132	£39,600	£43,188	£46,980	£42,648	£45,636
Clothing allowance issued in England	2,300	-	2,300	2,300	2,300	-
Recruiting charges	2,200	2,200	2,200	2,200	2,200	2,200
Calculation of passage to India; whole regiments and recruits; also reliefs and return of invalids (as respects European troops).	5,000	2,400	5,000	2,400	5,000	2,400
Proportion of pensions, &c.	2,500	2,300	2,500	2,300	2,500	2,300
Colonels' pay	613	-	613	-	613	-
Cost per annum	£51,745	46,500	55,801	53,880	55,261	53,536

REMARKS BY SIR A. TULLOCH.

From this Return there can be no doubt that the line force was at that time considered the least costly of the two, for on raising the local European corps to the same strength, namely, from 782 to 844

	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.
The cost would have been	£50,122	£58,151	£56,773
But the cost as above for a regiment of the line was	51,745	55,801	55,261
Being more in regiment of line	1,623	-	-
Less in do.	-	2,350	1,512

Showing on the average of every three regiments throughout India a difference in favour of the line of £2,239 annually, or £746 per regiment.

MEMORANDUM.

Having carefully re-examined all the items in my estimate of the cost of a regiment of the line serving in India, and having inquired into the objections made by Colonel Sir A. Tulloch, for the purpose of diminishing the amount of that estimate, I now desire to state that I find the estimate to be essentially correct.

But on reviewing the estimate of the cost of a local European regiment, I find that I have stated it too high by 1,390*l.* per annum, under the head "Estimated additional cost, if the number of rank and file were raised to 1,000, 8,899*l.*"

The correct details of this head are as follows:—

	Per Month.			Per Month.		
	R.	A.	P.	R.	A.	P.
Corporals, 10, at 15	15	0	-	159	6	0
Privates, 140, at 11	12	6	-	1,645	4	6
Women, 18, at 5	0	0	-	90	0	0
Children, 12, at 2	8	0	-	30	0	0
Good conduct pay	-	-	-	150	0	0
Head money	-	-	-	35	0	0
Per Month	-	-	-	Rs. 2,109 10 6		
				<u>£</u>		
Or per annum	-	-	-	2,531		
Victualling	-	-	-	1,180		
Clothing	-	-	-	500		
Recruiting and ship money	-	-	-	433		
Passage out of 18 additional recruits	-	-	-	252		
Passage home of 10 additional men	-	-	-	250		
Barracks, to raise the amount to 15,000 <i>l.</i>	-	-	-	2,363		
Total	-	-	-	<u>£7,509</u>		
Instead of	-	-	-	<u>8,899</u>		
Difference	-	-	-	<u>£1,390</u>		

	<u>£</u>	
The estimated cost of a regiment of the line of the present strength is -	-	85,271
Do. of a local European regiment -	-	75,567
Difference per annum	-	<u>£9,704</u>

The estimate quoted by Sir Alexander Tulloch, as presented to the House of Commons in the year 1832, is inapplicable to the present time.

The statements quoted by Sir A. Tulloch of expenses of European barracks are also wholly inapplicable to present circumstances. I have had, in my late office of Secretary to the Government of India, in the Department of Public Works, peculiar opportunities of knowing the cost of permanent barracks for European regiments on the enlarged scale lately introduced; and I am satisfied that the annual cost will not be less than the amount specified in the estimate, viz., 15,000*l.* per annum per regiment. Indeed, the amount will be greater, as the estimate does not include any part of the cost of a church, which will be required at every new fixed station of a European regiment. The erection and maintenance of a church, exclusive of a chaplain, cannot be stated at less than 250*l.* per annum.

India Office, Feb. 18, 1859.

W. E. BAKER, Colonel,
Military Secretary.

III.—PAPERS RECEIVED FROM INDIA.

APPENDIX No. 54.

PROPOSED FORMATION of a COMMISSION in INDIA.

The COURT of DIRECTORS of the EAST INDIA COMPANY
to the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA in COUNCIL.

(No. 235.—Military.) November 25, 1857.

1. We trust that when success, by the blessing of Divine Providence, shall have attended your efforts to put down the mutiny of the native army of your Presidency, and to re-establish the authority of the Government in the disturbed districts, you will be enabled to take advantage of the services of select officers of ability and experience to assist you, by investigation and by practical counsel founded thereon, in forming wise conclusions on the most important subject, which must soon press for decision; namely, the proper organization of our army in India.

2. To this end we authorize you to appoint, as soon as circumstances will permit, a Commission, composed of military officers of the armies of the three Presidencies (with whom should be associated officers of the Queen's army who have had experience of Indian service), on whose knowledge, experience, and judgment you can rely; together with one or more civil servants, whom you may consider to be specially qualified for such a duty by their knowledge of the native character and general administrative experience.

3. In framing instructions for the guidance of this Commission we are desirous that the following heads of inquiry should be specified, in addition to any others which you may consider to deserve their attention:—

1st. Should corps be raised, each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?

2nd. Should corps be composed of troops or companies, each of which shall consist of separate tribes or castes; or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in the whole regiment?

3rd. Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of a native regiment?

4th. What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulations relating to tribes and castes, with a view to determine the future composition of the native army?

5th. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for service in India, with the natives of the country; and, if so, should they be formed in separate regiments, or in companies, or otherwise?

6th. Whether, in native infantry regiments, the discontinuance of the grades of native commissioned officers, and the substitution of an European serjeant and corporal to each company, is advisable; and, if so, whether, in lieu of the prospect of distinction and emolument arising out of these grades, it would be advisable to establish graduated scales of good-service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of service?

7th. Whether the system of promotion generally, by seniority, to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained), should not be altered and assimilated to the systems in force at Madras and Bombay.

8th. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, what will be the best organization for each branch respectively?

9th. Have the powers of commanding officers of native corps, and the powers of officers in charge of companies, been diminished? What consequences have been the result? Is it desirable that those powers should be increased, or what other measures should be adopted for the improvement of discipline?

10th. Should cadets be trained and drilled in European regiments before they are posted to native regiments; or what would be the best mode of drilling and training cadets before they are posted to native regiments?

11th. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army, or ought there to be any, and what, changes in those rules, or in the system of punishment?

12th. How can the demands for European officers for staff and detached employments be best provided for, without injuring the efficiency of regiments?

4. It is to be understood that the inquiries to be made by the Commission, and the opinions to be offered by them are to have reference to the several branches of the native army—Infantry, regular and irregular; Cavalry, regular and irregular; Artillery, and Sappers and Miners; and with respect to the Artillery and Sappers and Miners, whether

they should be composed, as heretofore, of Europeans and natives, or be entirely European.

5. To aid your Government in forming an opinion as to the proportion which the European should bear to the native portion of the army in India generally, and at each presidency separately, we would recommend that your Government should call upon the Commission to give their opinions on this very important question; and we can entertain no doubt that the enlarged knowledge and experience of the members of the Commission will enable them to furnish you with valuable information on this head.

6. Having obtained opinions on all these heads of inquiry, and on such other heads as you may deem to be essential to the thorough development of the important questions at issue, you will refer the views of the Commission for the consideration of the Commander-in-chief, and will then furnish us with the results of your careful deliberation upon the whole of the measures which should, in your judgment, be taken for the organization and maintenance, in the utmost practicable state of efficiency, of whatever military force you may think it desirable to form.

7. The Commission itself may be instructed to make to the Governor-General in Council any suggestions or recommendations which occur to them, although not on matters comprised in the specified heads of inquiry.

We are, &c.

R. D. MANGLES.

F. CURRIE.

&c. &c.

From the OFFICIATING SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT
of INDIA in the MILITARY DEPARTMENT to the
SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of INDIA in the
MILITARY DEPARTMENT with the GOVERNOR-GE-
NERAL.

(No. 1,085, Military.)

SIR, Head-Quarters, April 23, 1858.
Ordered in Council on } THE attention of the Honourable
April 23, 1858. } the President in Council having
been drawn to the military letter from the Honourable the
Court of Directors, No. 235, of the 25th November last,
relative to the reorganization of the Indian army, and
suggesting the appointment of a Commission to inquire
into the several heads noticed, I am directed to request that
you will ascertain from the Right Honourable the Governor-
General whether this is one of the subjects his Lordship
desires to dispose of himself, as his Honour in Council is
of opinion that the time has arrived for entering into the
inquiry, and that the Commission to be appointed should
commence its duties with the least possible delay.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. D. ATKINSON,
Major Officiating Secretary to the
Government of India in the
Military Department.

Council Chamber,
Fort William, April 23, 1858.

To the OFFICIATING SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of
INDIA in the MILITARY DEPARTMENT, CALCUTTA.
(No. 369, Military.)

SIR,
I AM directed to acquaint you, for the information of
the Honourable the President in Council, and with reference
to your letter No. 1,085, of the 23rd ultimo, that finding it
impracticable to constitute a Commission, as suggested by
the Honourable Court in their letter No. 235, of the 25th
November 1857, to consider and report upon the important
subject of organizing the Indian army in the three presi-
dencies, the Right Honourable the Governor-General has
determined to take into his own hands the direction of the
inquiries necessary to be made in order to arrive at a just
conception of the measures proper to be suggested for the
placing of the armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay on
such a footing as the interests of Her Majesty's territories
in India may seem to require.

2. His Lordship has selected Lieut.-Colonel H. M. Du-
rand, C.B., of the Bengal engineers, an officer of great
ability and experience, who has not only been much dis-
tinguished by his services in the field, but has also acquired
that knowledge of the native character which political em-
ployment at native courts is so well calculated to give, to
aid his Lordship, and to communicate under his Lordship's
immediate instructions with the several personages and
officers, civil and military, whom it will be necessary to
consult in furtherance of the great object in view.

3. The instructions given by his Lordship to Lieutenant-
Colonel Durand, who arrived at Allahabad on the 13th

instant, will be seen in the accompanying copy of my letter to his address, No. 238, dated the 16th instant.

4. It is the Governor-General's intention to solicit the assistance of the President in Council in ultimately determining on the report to be made and the measures to be proposed for the consideration of the home authorities.

5. Meanwhile his Lordship has directed that the questions which are to be submitted to the several witnesses whose evidence will be called for shall be sent to each member of council individually for such replies as each may desire to give.

6. The Governor-General is sure that his honourable colleagues will readily consent thus to contribute to the information and testimony upon which an ultimate decision will be founded.

I am, &c.

(Signed) R. J. H. BIRCH, Colonel,
Secretary to the Government of India,
Military Department, with Governor-General.
Allahabad, May 22, 1858.

To Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. DURAND, C.B., on
Special Duty with the GOVERNOR-GENERAL.
(No. 238, Military.)

SIR,

I AM directed to acquaint you that the Right Honourable the Governor-General has been pleased to require you to repair to his head-quarters, in order that he may avail himself of your services in the special duty of collecting information by means of which the Government of India may be enabled to devise measures for the proper organization of the army in India.

2. The Honourable Court of Directors, in their despatch No. 235, dated the 25th of November 1857, suggested to the Governor-General in Council the expediency of taking advantage of the success which under Divine Providence it was anticipated would attend the efforts of his Lordship in Council for the suppression of the mutiny of the Bengal native army, and for the re-establishment of the British authority in the disturbed districts under this presidency; to appoint a Commission composed of the military officers of the armies of the three presidencies (with whom were to be associated officers of the Queen's army who had had experience of Indian service), together with one or more civil servants specially qualified for such a duty by their knowledge of the native character and general experience.

3. A copy of the Honourable Court's despatch is herewith transmitted for your information.

4. Circumstances having rendered it impracticable, notwithstanding the successes which have attended our troops in the field, and the important advance which has been made towards the re-establishment of the power of Government in this presidency, to constitute such a Commission as the Honourable Court desired to see appointed, the Governor-General has determined to adopt the alternative of obtaining in writing, from eminent and experienced officers, civil and military, their opinions on certain heads of inquiry to be distinctly specified, and to which their attention shall be particularly called.

5. The Honourable Court's despatch specifies twelve heads of inquiry on which they are desirous of obtaining information with a view to ultimate measures, and to these heads others are to be added which may be considered to deserve attention.

6. It will be your duty, under the immediate instructions of the Governor-General, to frame such questions for the consideration of the persons whom his Lordship may determine to consult as may best conduce to elicit their opinions on the various important points involved in the great subject of the proper organization of the Indian army, and to develop the mass of information which the experience and observation of such officers may enable them to bring to bear on the general subject.

7. These opinions will be received by you, and will be submitted by you to the Governor-General, in such mode as his Lordship may be pleased to direct.

I am, &c.

(Signed) R. J. H. BIRCH, Colonel,
Secretary to the Government of India,
in the Military Department with
the Governor-General.

Allahabad, May 16, 1858.

MINUTA by the Honourable Major-General Sir JAMES
OUTRAM, G.C.B.

Re-organization } ON the 25th November 1857, the Hon-
of the Army. } ourable the Court suggested that
" when success, by the blessing of Divine Providence,
" should have attended our efforts to put down the mutiny
" of the native army, and to re-establish the authority of

" Government in the disturbed districts," or, " as soon as
" circumstances should permit," a commission should be
appointed to assist the Government of India " by investi-
gating and by practical counsel founded thereon in form-
ing wise conclusions on the most important subject which
" must soon press for decision, viz., the proper organization
" of the army in India."

The Court directed that the report of the Commission should be submitted for the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief. And his Excellency's opinion having been obtained, the Government was required to furnish to the Honourable Court " the results of its careful delibe-
ration upon the whole of the measures which should, in
" its opinion, be taken for the organization and mainte-
" nance in the utmost practicable state of efficiency of
" whatever force it might think desirable to form."

No action up to that date, having been taken in the matter, we, on the 23rd April, proceeded to ascertain from the Right Honourable the Governor-General, " whether this
" was one of the subjects which his Lordship desired to
" dispose of himself, as his Honour in Council was of
" opinion that the time had come for entering on the
" inquiry, and that the Commission to be appointed should
" commence its labours with the least possible delay."

After the lapse of a month we learned through a printed circular, dated 21st of May, giving cover to a series of queries, and received by us individually, that the Governor-General had seen fit to entrust to a single officer those momentous duties which the Honourable Court wished to have confided to a board of " select officers of experience," taken from the Company's armies of the three presidencies and from Her Majesty's service, aided by " one or more
" of the civil servants, whose knowledge of the native
" character and administrative experience specially qualified
" them for such a duty."

And on the 22nd of May, the Governor-General directed the military secretary to acknowledge the letter of the 23rd of April, and to intimate that his Lordship had resolved " to take into his own hand the direction of the inquiries
" requisite to be made," and to conduct them through the agency of the officer, copies of whose circular had been addressed to us on the previous day.

It is far from my wish to disparage the merits of the very able officer on whom his Lordship's choice has fallen, for whose gallantry, talents, and accomplishments I entertain a high respect. But I cannot recognize any single individual as competent to discharge those onerous and important duties of inquiry, comparison, analysis, deliberative and practical counsel, assigned by the Court to that mixed Commission of widely diversified experience, the appointment of which it had recommended.

I am ignorant of the reasons which have induced the Governor-General to regard as impracticable the appointment of such a Commission.

In my present state of information, I can myself perceive no insuperable difficulty to the adoption of the Court's recommendation, and its non-adoption, if at all practicable, is, I think, greatly to be regretted. For the sample given in the first series of interrogatories that has been issued of the mode in which the momentous inquiry, ordered by the Court, is likely to be conducted, has begotten in my mind very serious apprehensions for the results. What, for example, can be more unreasonable than to apply to each of the scores of " eminent and experienced public servants, " civil and military," to whom the circular questions are addressed, for information regarding the number and distribution of the European troops of each arm now serving in the Bengal presidency (question 1.); or the number and distribution of the native troops of each arm serving within the same area (question 3.); or the proportion which the regular, irregular, and police divisions of the native Bengal army bear to each other (question 5.); or their ethnological affinities (question 5.), or the adequacy of the existing barrack accommodation for the European troops now serving in the Bengal presidency (question 9.); or whether an alteration in the number of troops would require an augmentation of barrack accommodation (question 10).

A Commission would have at once ascertained these, and many other *matters of fact* from the adjutant and quartermaster general, and have communicated them to the " eminent and experienced public servants, civil and military," whose opinions were sought in reference to the future organization of the army.

No Commission constituted on the principles laid down by the Court would, I think, have issued (question No. 2.) in its present form, " What number of European troops of " each arm do you deem necessary for the Bengal presi-
" dency, and what should be their ordinary distribution ;" for they would have seen that no opinion of any value could be given which did not view the regiments of the Bengal army in relation to those of the entire Indian Em-

pire, and estimate its proper European strength, in reference to the strength of the European element deemed requisite for the armies of the other presidencies, the latter being a point which the typographical construction of the circular justifies us in assuming that the officers of the Bombay and Madras armies have severally been invited to discuss with a similar disregard of the provision to be made beyond the limits of their respective presidencies.

No commission such as that contemplated by the Court would have called for off-hand answers to question No. 4: "What number of native troops do you deem necessary for the Bengal presidency, and what should be their ordinary distribution?" Nor do I think that any officer whose opinion is worth having would choose to answer it except in a very round-about manner. He would first state the minimum native force, which, in his opinion, would suffice in co-operation with the maximum European force recommended by him for the maintenance of our military interests. He would then proceed to specify the particular organization of the native army, by the adoption of which the relative proportion of native troops might, in his opinion, be augmented with safety and advantage to the state. And he would then state the maximum native force which, were his views of organization adopted, might with propriety be maintained. Yet the circular letter which gives transmission to the queries specially states that there is "no necessity for touching on the many important particulars to which the letter of the Honourable Court adverts," particulars specially relating to the proper method of RE-ORGANIZING the native army.

I might considerably extend my illustrations of the imperfections of the circular list of queries now under notice, and of the inappreciation it seems to me to exhibit of the general bearing and mutual dependence of the points suggested for inquiry and settlement by the Honourable Court of Directors; but I abstain from doing so, for it is in the last degree painful to me to criticize unfavourably any document issued under the sanction of the Right Honourable the Governor-General. I feel, however, so acutely the tremendous nature of the interests which are at stake that I consider I should most signally fail in my duty did I abstain from recording my dissent from the manner in which the investigation urged on this Government by the Court of Directors, and so long delayed, is at length being carried out.

The Governor-General, through the military secretary, has expressed his confidence that each of us "will readily consent" thus to contribute to the information and testimony upon "which an ultimate decision will be founded." And I would right gladly furnish my humble quota of advice on the questions submitted to me, inappropriate and defective as I consider them to be. But as his Lordship intimates that it is his intention "to solicit the assistance of the President in Council in ultimately determining on the report" to be made and measures to be proposed for the consideration of the home authorities," it appears to me that my opinion would be more worthy of his Lordship's notice, and their expression more calculated to conduce to the public interests, if deferred until I had had the advantage of examining the recorded views of the various persons whom his Lordship proposes to consult; and I cannot but think it unadvisable that I should commit myself intermediately to opinions which I may see fit to modify or withdraw when I shall have studied and pondered over that body of evidence which it is his Lordship's intention to submit to us.

May 30, 1858. (Signed) J. OUTRAM.

MINUTE by the Honourable J. P. GRANT, President of the Council of India in Council.

June 4, 1858.

Re-organization of the Indian Army. } 1. We have been informed, in reply to the question conveyed in our Secretary's letter of the 23rd of April, respecting the inquiries ordered by the Home Government to be made upon this subject, that the Right Honourable the Governor-General has determined to take into his own hands the direction of these inquiries; that his Lordship has found it impracticable to constitute a Commission for this purpose, and will proceed by the method of written questions and answers, and that he intends to avail himself of the assistance of the Council in ultimately determining upon the report to be made, and the measures to be prepared, to the Home Government.

2. Our honourable colleague Sir James Outram has recorded a strong opinion in favour of proceeding by Commission, and we know that there is no man whose opinion on this subject ought to carry and will carry more weight with it. There can be no doubt that, if practicable within the time we have to spare, the inquiry would be best conducted in the first instance by a Commission taking evidence *in loco*, and testing by cross-examination the grounds of all opinions advanced. For this reason, and because this is

the method laid down in the instructions of the Home Government, there can be no doubt that this would have been the method to adopt, if practicable. The Right Honourable the Governor-General, however, who has given his mind to the subject, has come to the conclusion that it is impracticable to constitute such a Commission as was desired, and has opened the inquiry otherwise. I am not myself in possession of information which enables me to form a judgment worthy of my own or of any other person's attention on the question of present practicability, and I consider the method of inquiry a point which, for the moment at least, is settled. For these reasons I do not now propose to enter upon the discussion of this point.

3. Further, the view which I take of the urgent necessities of the case makes this point in my eyes one of secondary importance in the business which now presses itself upon Government. I believe that if we are to hold Hindostan, we must reorganize the Bengal army without a day's delay. I think there has been as much delay as is prudent in regard to the whole of this subject already. I have no fear that any organization *ad interim* which we may hurriedly adopt will impede the free action of a future Government when the time comes for putting into practice the mature system which it is hoped may be ultimately elaborated by the united wisdom of many minds, applied for a long time to this difficult subject. On the contrary, I am convinced that the possibilities of the position are so narrow, and the indications of the way of safety so clear, that in the main, if we do not allow our attention to be distracted with remote objects which in no way concern our present difficulties, we cannot go materially out of our course.

4. Before the mutiny our military expenditure was the main part of our whole expenditure. I am not one of those who think that our financial situation was then bad. On the contrary, I believe that, making proper allowances for new and extraordinary public works, which directly and indirectly would do more than pay the interest of the money spent upon them, it was a not unsatisfactory situation, though certainly improveable; but it gave us no actual surplus for a reserve, and for any reserve in prospect there were large demands for important civil objects, second in urgency only to military protection. At the same time, our military establishment was below the fixed scale, and consequently, our military charges were below the average. We were short of our establishment by two European regiments, and the European regiments we had were in strength much below their complements. Exclusive of the European artillery, the deficiency in three presidencies was nearly 6,000 men, or say one-sixth of our whole European establishment.* The native army, as then constituted, was not believed to be in excess of the wants of the country. The result of the financial question then is, that there is no money for an Indian army on a new establishment beyond what was expended upon it on the old establishment, and what is true of the whole Indian army is true of the Bengal army, which is the greater part of the whole. Now, this financial question must rule the entire subject; whatever theories are approved, whatever system of organization is adopted, must be such as can be compressed within the bounds prescribed by the financial considerations, the short result of which I have stated.

5. A great part, not far from half of the current monthly expense of every regiment, whether of Europeans, of the Queen's or the Company's army, or of native regulars, is on account of the European commissioned officers; this, I believe, is not the case with the great military nations of Europe; but that it is the case with the Company's regular army in India, and with Her Majesty's army in India, is a fact, and it is with the fact that we have to do;† whatever may be the theories of individuals, we cannot speculate upon such a reform as would alter this fact, and indeed even if the system of the great military nations were adopted, one of the effects of which would be to reduce by one half or more the comparative number of commissioned officers, the expense of the officers would still be a very large proportion of the whole expense of the army in India. Now we have, and we should be thankful to Providence that we have, the European commissioned officers of the Bengal army on hand. They must be made use of, and no system will be possible, as an ultimate system, which does not make use of them, and provide for them very much as they have been heretofore provided for; here then we have out of the three items of expenditure, so far as Bengal is concerned, the whole of that part of the expenses of the army which consisted in the cost of the Queen's troops, and the whole of that part which consisted in the cost of the Company's Europeans, and about half of that part which consisted in the cost of the native army.

* See Appendix A, which is formed from information furnished by the military offices.
† See Appendix B.

a fixed quantity. Thus it is but a small portion of the whole that gives any scope for the theories of an army commission. This argument appears to me to be applicable equally to the armies of all the presidencies. But it is only the Bengal army that demands immediate re-organization.

6. I have never heard of one Bengal officer, or of one Bengal official civilian, or of one English resident in Bengal, or of one English statesman, who doubts that the late disaster has proved the absolute necessity of largely increased European force in India, and especially in the Bengal presidency. I have never heard but of one Indian officer of any presidency who has a different opinion. There was never a chain of cause or effect more apparent than was the connexion in this revolt of the explosion as the effect, and of the insufficiency of the European element in the mass of the army as the immediate cause. In the Punjab was collected nearly the whole of the European force on this side of India; whether the proportion there of European to native troops were adequate or not may be made a question, probably it was less than will ever hereafter be thought sufficient in any part of India; still it was not inconsiderable, and therefore it kept down the revolt. The revolted class was more numerous in the Punjab than anywhere else, and it was quite as hostile there as elsewhere. But the greater part of what European force we had on this side was there also, and this was enough to repress the outbreak, and to enable the great administrator of the province to look for strength from another native source. In the Agra provinces and Oude there were very few Europeans, and the proportion of European to native troops was small,* and there the revolt ran through the country as a lighted train beyond all human control. It may be a difficult question for discussion what should be the strength of the Indian army hereafter. I myself believe that it must be an army numerically very weak according to all European standards, and that nevertheless such an army will be found sufficient. But I apprehend that all sober minds will now agree that a large proportion of that army, whatever may be its gross strength, must be composed of Europeans.

7. If my argument has been followed I believe it will be conceded that there are only two sources from which this indispensable increase of European force can be provided, namely, the European officers of the native army, and the money formerly spent upon the regular sepoys, which is about half the cost of the European officers. Now it seems to me, this being so, that fifty army Commissions might sit for fifty years, and at the end of that time they could only say what we may all as safely say now, viz., that in respect to the most important point of all, namely, the European element, the only possible course is to raise European regiments, as many as need be, with money saved from the pay of the regular sepoys, and to officer them with the necessary number of European officers of the native army, for more Europeans we must have, and there is no possibility of paying for more Queen's troops than the old establishment, unless Parliament chooses to pay for them, which I do not think it will do.

8. How many thousand men must be raised in this manner is a most fit subject for discussion, whether by a Commission or otherwise. But it is certain that a great many thousand, say twenty thousand, infantry at the least possible minimum must be thus raised in Bengal alone. The raising of these men will take some considerable time, and during that time discussion and inquiry as to the precise number to be raised will be useful. But I do most earnestly deprecate the loss of time, whether in discussion or in inquiry, or in anything else before accepting the principle which is proved beforehand to be one of the necessities of the case, and commencing at once vigorously to carry it into execution, so far as it certainly must be carried at last, by enlisting men as fast as possible, and organizing regiments in time to receive the men as fast as they are enlisted.

9. This measure, so far as it was justified by then existing circumstances, was recommended by us in our despatches of the 19th of May and the 6th June 1857, just after the first outbreak of the mutiny had occurred. We have now been honoured by the receipt of the Honourable Court's despatch of the 21st April last, informing us, that in accordance with our recommendation in the first of our despatches aforesaid, three new regiments of Bengal Europeans are to be provided, who will be officered from the officers from six regiments of the old Bengal native infantry. I earnestly hope that there will be no obstacle to the further and speedy progress of the Government in this inevitable course. I shall be forgiven, where the stake is so great, in remarking, that if our recommendation had been adopted when it was made, the three new regiments now actually determined

upon, would have been by this time in fact, and several other regiments not yet determined upon would have been by this time far advanced towards completion; those only who are as intimately acquainted as we are with the existing difficulties of the Government can know how valuable such an additional force would have been at this moment.

10. I may also be pardoned for mentioning, that this very same principle was proposed by me for adoption in the case of the regular native cavalry of three presidencies long before an universal mutiny of any native army had been thought a possible contingency; though my case then was consequently much weaker than it now is, my arguments were the same. Though I had then the misfortune to differ from Lord Dalhousie, for whom, as an Indian statesman, my respect is unbounded, I never doubted the soundness of my argument. The measure I then recommended has now been adopted in great part by converting eight out of the ten Bengal cavalry regiments into European dragoons. If that conversion had been made before, we should have had no cause to regret it.

11. So much for the part of the coming system which is manifestly certain, namely, the European element. It appears to me that it will be found, after a little reflection, that the main features of the native element of the future army are equally certain, as being equally the necessary consequences of the present state of things. A native army there must be, but it need not be an army of regulars, even if it were desirable to adhere to the old regular native infantry model; the new native regiments could not be fully officered by European officers as heretofore, because there would not be nearly officers enough for the purpose. The native army, exclusive of all civil and police corps, cannot at the least be much less numerous than the European army; let us say it cannot be less than two-thirds of the Queen's and Company's European troops in India. As the greater part of the only officers available will be required for additional European regiments, and as there is no money wherewith to procure more officers, it follows that there will be comparatively few officers for distribution amongst the whole of the native regiments. Necessity is our master; and on this point it is useless to call upon professional gentlemen to inquire and debate about the best possible system, when there is no choice of systems. The native army must be so far on the irregular model, as to have no more than two, three, or four European officers to a regiment.

12. I do not suppose that this is to be regretted, for I believe the best military authorities are unanimous, or almost unanimous, in thinking that for native troops, the irregular model is the best. In fighting, the most fully officered regular native regiment has never equalled the conduct of some Sikh regiments in these last battles, with only two or three Europeans to lead them. In loyalty, the most fully officered regulars have no comparative excellence to boast of since our mouths have been opened respecting sepoys; I have never heard it denied that it is a waste of money and strength to use up the services of a score of European gentlemen in officering a battalion of natives.

13. If this be so, there is another great limb of the coming system shaped out to our hands by circumstance, without putting us to the necessity of inquiry or debate. We must raise from amongst the untainted classes of loyal districts irregular native corps, with a very few selected officers to each, in order that by help of this cheap and safe succedaneum our Europeans, men and officers, may be made the most of.

14. It is true that the classes from which to draw these native troops, the combination or separation of the several classes, the localization or otherwise of the regiments, and all the details of management, are the legitimate subjects of such inquiry and discussion as are proposed. But whatever may be the ultimate determination on these very important points, it seems to me that with a little care a native army may be now raised, so that it may, without much inconvenience, be put hereafter into any shape that may be determined upon eventually; some leading principles, I believe, may be taken for granted. For example, whatever may be resolved upon in regard to the native army generally, some corps, I apprehend, will certainly consist exclusively of particular tribes, or groups of tribes, such as Goorkahs; whatever may be resolved upon as to the exclusion or admission of the Poorbeeah sepoy class, now infamous, it will be necessary to raise men for the most part of other classes at present, for obvious reasons, and this makes it necessary to go to distant places, and even to other presidencies, for the supply of present wants in Hindostan; whatever proportions may be allotted for different tribes eventually, it may safely be assumed that no one tribe, such as Sikhs, will be armed in such comparatively large numbers as to become in themselves a source of dan-

* See Appendix C.

ger, and this, too, makes it necessary to provide, as soon as possible, the means of gradually but largely reducing the Sikh element, which is now confessedly too strong for a permanency. Again, whether the principle be adopted of mixture in the elements of battalions, and consequent uniformity in the battalions themselves, or the contrary principle of having the greatest possible variety of battalions, each battalion being itself homogenous, it will be prudent to act in the meanwhile on the latter principle as much as possible, because it will always be easy to mix up, and always difficult to separate. But with a little thought and prudence upon such points as these, I can see nothing likely to interfere materially with the system to be ultimately elaborated, whatever it be, in commencing in earnest the re-establishment of a trusty native army to-morrow.

15. To recapitulate my argument, I hold that as our military expenditure was our main item of expenditure before, when we had no surplus, and no proper means of saving in other departments generally, we have no more money to spend on the Indian army now than we had before the mutiny; and I hold, that as the great element of our military expenditure is the pay and pensions of the European officers, and as we have a very large body of such officers, who must be used, paid, and pensioned in our lands, it follows that we are constrained by the state of our finances to use as many as necessary of these officers for the requisite number of additional European regiments, leaving the rest to afford a small number of officers to each of the new native regiments to be raised.

16. My earnest recommendation is that without advertence to the proceedings of any military Commission, or to any military inquiry conducted in any other manner, measures of the most energetic nature be immediately instituted in England in respect to Europeans, and in India in respect to natives, for the reconstitution of the Bengal army upon the principles above indicated.

17. We have for the moment, but only for the moment, an additional force of Queen's troops in India of considerable strength. But the cost is terrible; and still we have not strength enough. I tremble to think of what would be the certain consequence to India if whilst India remains in this dependent condition England should be called upon to arm. It seems to me to be tempting our good fortune, which by the Divine blessing has been hitherto almost miraculous, to be still discussing military theories instead of re-establishing an army.

(Signed) J. P. GRANT.

June 4, 1858.

APPENDIX A.

STRENGTH OF EUROPEAN REGIMENTS serving in BENGAL before the Mutiny.

January 1, 1857.

Regiments.	Established Strength of Non-commissioned Officers, Farriers, Trumpeters, Drummers, and Privates.	Actual Strength of Non-commissioned Officers, Farriers, Trumpeters, Drummers, and Privates.	Short of established Complement.
Her Majesty's 6th Dragoons	743	634	109
" 9th Lancers	703	676	27
" 8th Foot	1,067	935	132
" 10th "	1,067	948	119
" 24th "	1,067	999	68
" 27th "	1,067	1,016	51
" 29th "	1,067	808	159
" 32nd "	1,067	864	203
" 35th "	1,067	652	415
" 52nd "	1,067	954	113
" 53rd "	1,067	948	119
" 60th "	1,067	963	104
" 61st "	1,067	1,021	46
" 70th "	1,067	808	259
" 75th "	1,067	1,006	61
" 81st "	1,067	904	163
" 87th "	1,067	995	72
" 1st Europ. Fusils.	977	868	114
" 2nd "	977	583	394
" 3rd Europ. Regt.	977	808	169
	20,383	17,485	2,897

N.B. One whole Regiment short in Bengal—1,067.

STRENGTH OF EUROPEAN REGIMENTS serving in BOMBAY before the Mutiny.

March 1, 1857.

Regiments.	Established Strength of Non-commissioned Officers, Farriers, Trumpeters, Drummers, and Privates.	Actual Strength of Non-commissioned Officers, Farriers, Trumpeters, Drummers, and Privates.	Short of Established Complement.
Her Majesty's 14th Lt. Dgns.	743	656	87
" 16th Foot	1,067	1,089	22 excess.
" 78th Highlan.	1,067	957	110
" 83rd Foot	1,067	942	125
" 86th do.	1,067	945	122
" 1st Fusiliers.	977	885	92
" 2nd do.	977	1,158	181 excess.
" 3rd Eur. Reg.	977	777	200
	7,942	7,409	736
	Deduct excess		203
	Actual deficiency		533

MADRAS.

Her Majesty's 12th Lancers	743	609	134
" 43rd Foot	1,067	1,109	42 excess.
" 74th Highlan.	1,067	973	94
" 84th Foot	1,067	892	175
1st Madras Fusiliers	977	1,002	25 excess.
2nd European Lt. Infantry.	977	979	2 excess.
3rd European Regiment	977	964	13
	6,975	6,528	416
	Deduct excess		69
	Actual deficiency		347

N.B. There was one whole Regiment short in the Madras Presidency—1067.

APPENDIX B.

COST OF AN INFANTRY REGIMENT OF HER MAJESTY'S SERVICE.

	Rs.	As.	P.	Rs.	As.	P.
Officers.						
37 Officers	14,734	14	3			
Staff and Establishment	4,515	12	4			
Command and other allowances	2,528	8	0	21,779	2	7
Men.						
117 Non-commissioned officers	2,989	4	5			
950 Privates	11,203	8	4			
Rations, clothing, and other charges	12,506	11	3	25,999	8	0
N.B. The Queen's 69th Foot has 12 officers in excess, costing Rs. 2,917-15-3 monthly						
Per mensem, yearly				47,778	10	7
				5,73,343	15	0

COST OF A REGIMENT OF NATIVE INFANTRY.

	Rs.	As.	P.	Rs.	As.	P.
Officers.						
26 European officers	9,861	2	1			
20 Native officers	940	0	0			
Staff and establishments	1,209	1	4			
Command and other allowance	1,517	5	2	13,527	8	7
Men.						
140 Non-commissioned officers	1,780	0	0			
1,000 Sepoys	7,000	0	0			
Charges	826	14	0	9,606	14	0
Monthly						
				23,184	6	7
Yearly						
				2,77,612	15	0

APPENDIX C.

STATEMENT showing the Number of EUROPEAN and NATIVE TROOPS in the PUNJAB and in the AGRA and OUDE PROVINCES in March 1857.

Punjab.

European Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry 13,335
Native ditto - - - - - 50,214

In Agra and Oude Provinces.

European Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry 4,260
Native ditto - - - - - 27,263

STRENGTH of EUROPEAN ARTILLERY serving in BENGAL before the Mutiny.

January 1, 1857.

Regiment.	Horse and Foot Artillery.	Established strength, Horse and Foot.	Short of complement.
European Artillery .	2,886	3,000	114

STRENGTH of EUROPEAN ARTILLERY serving in the MADRAS Presidency.

May 1, 1857.

Regiment.	Horse and Foot Artillery.	Established strength, Horse and Foot.	Excess of complement.
European Artillery .	1,856	1,792	64

STRENGTH of EUROPEAN ARTILLERY serving in the BOMBAY Presidency.

May 1, 1857.

Regiment.	Horse and Foot Artillery.	Established strength, Horse and Foot.	Excess of complement.
European Artillery .	1,473	1,292	181

MINUTE by the Honourable H. RICKETTS.

Organization of } I AGREE generally in what has been said
the Army. } by the honourable President and Sir
James Outram. It appears to me improbable that a satisfactory result should be arrived at by the method of inquiry it is proposed to pursue. Each person consulted will forward a plan of his own; when all these plans come to be compared, they will be found so inconsistent one with the other, and founded on such different data, that further reference will be necessary to all the writers, and the questioning will be interminable. There must be very great delay.

I would strongly recommend the appointment of a committee, as originally intended. Provided there be no change in the secretary to the committee, it does not, I think, much signify how often the members of the committee may be changed. I do not see why a committee of three members should not commence at Murree, and when they have examined all those whom it might be considered desirable to question at that place, should it be inconvenient to bring all or either of them away from thence, other three might take it up at Umballa, and when they had completed the examinations at that place other three might take at Meerut, and so on at Agra, and Allahabad, and Calcutta, each member leaving on record his sentiments on quitting the committee. I am by no means certain that this would not be better than having the same three men throughout, provided, as I have said, the secretary remain unchanged.

An opinion extracted by the questioning of a committee is generally much more valuable than an opinion recorded in the closet. The wits of the witnesses are sharpened by the questioning, and the wits of the members are so sharpened by one good witness, that they are enabled to turn to good account the incomplete suggestions of many less competent witnesses; doubts and discrepancies are at once cleared up and reconciled, and opinions which, if collected in the manner proposed, would be impossible of reconciliation and useless, may be sharpened and modified till they contribute to the formation of a serviceable whole.

As the Right Honourable the Governor-General has expressed his wishes to consider the subject in council, I cannot think it good that the members of council should record their opinions on the questions propounded; a person must naturally be disinclined to place on record an

opinion as a witness with very incomplete information, when he will shortly have to give his opinion as a councillor with complete information before him. On the other hand, with his opinion as a witness recorded, he would be disinclined to acknowledge that he was wrong.

Had the Right Honourable the Governor-General declared it to be his intention to dispose of the subject while separated from the council, on that case there could be no objection to a declaration of his sentiments on the part of a councillor, for he would have no concern with the fixed award.

The information alluded to in questions 1, 3, 5, and 9, can only be procured from the departments concerned. I have placed in the hands of the secretary to Government in the military department a memorandum of the information necessary. He will procure it as quickly as may be from the several departments, and when complete, a copy might be sent to Colonel Durand to be forwarded to all those to whom the questions have been sent.

I quite agree with the honourable the President in thinking that practically the inquiry must be limited to a very narrow range. We must have an army of Europeans completely officered, and we must have an army of natives, with not more than two or three European officers in each corps (I would have several corps with only one European officer, but that question need not be discussed here). Indeed, we already have an army of natives complete within a few thousands. At this moment there must be considerably more than 100,000 men with our arms in their hands in the Bengal presidency, including the Punjab, of which 65,000 (with police corps) are Punjab men; a very few thousand in addition to those must complete the native force, for, as shown by the President, the finances will not admit of the employment of more men.

It certainly is necessary that, without any reference to the inquiry, whether carried on as commenced or by a committee, the recruiting of English soldiers for India should be urged on as fast as possible, and that without delay they should be sent out to be formed into regiments to be officered by the officers of the late sepoy army. I never was more surprised than when I read the papers received by the last mail that the standard for recruits had again been raised an inch; were there 20,000 men ready for embarkation now they would not be one more than we want. There is not a single province on this side of India in which more European troops are not required; in Bengal, in Behar, in the Doab, in Oude, in Central India double the force now available would not be too many. With 65,000 armed Sikhs the Punjab and the Sutledge states should not be held by less than 20,000 Englishmen.

I believe that when the disturbances shall have been put down 50,000 European infantry and 10,000 European cavalry will be considered necessary to hold the country from Peshawur to Arracan. The precise number and how many of them should be Queen's troops, and how many troops recruited for service in India, may be questions for discussion, but I subscribe to the President's most earnest recommendation "that measures of the most energetic nature be immediately instituted in respect to the European troops," so much and so immediately needed.

(Signed) H. RICKETTS.

June 5.

MINUTE by the Honourable B. PEACOCK.

Organization of } IF the question were an open one I should
the Army. } very much prefer a Commission, such as that suggested by the Honourable Court, to the method of inquiry which the Right Honourable the Governor-General has determined to adopt; but I understand that that question has been finally determined. If a Commission were to be issued, I think a constant change of Commissioners would very much detract from its usefulness.

I am disposed to think that it will be better that the members of Council should not be called upon to answer the questions propounded, if they are to consider and form their opinions upon the whole of the evidence which may be elicited from officers of experience for their consideration and guidance. If, however, it be still desired, I will willingly answer the questions to the best of my ability.

I earnestly join in recommendation of his Honour the President, that without advertence to the inquiries which may be found necessary, with reference to the proper organization of the army in India, the most energetic measures be adopted for providing an increase of European troops; but I think we should be careful not to increase too much the number of native troops.

His Honour the President remarks:—"The native army cannot at the least be much less numerous than the European army; let us say it cannot be less than two-thirds of the Queen's and Company's troops in India."

We might safely I think exceed that proportion of natives; but at present, according to the last return made up to the 15th April last, there are in the Bengal presidency, including the Punjaub :—

Native troops armed	- - - -	72,419
Do. disarmed	- - - -	17,463
	Total - - -	89,882
<hr/>		
Whereas there are only European troops		49,581
Of whom only were effective	- - - -	44,581
And sick	- - - -	5,000

(Signed) B. PEACOCK.

June 10, 1858.

MINUTE by the Honourable Major-General Sir JAMES OUTRAM, G.C.B.

Re-organization of the Army, 2nd minute. } I HAVE read with much attention and deep interest, the minutes of his Honour the President and my honourable colleagues, which reached me yesterday evening; and in returning them I am anxious to offer a few observations supplementary of those previously recorded by me.

Had I construed the Honourable Court's suggestions as implying that the Commission of inquiry should necessarily proceed by *videlicet* interrogation, I should have acquiesced in the opinion of the Right Honourable the Governor-General, that the appointment of such a Commission as the Court recommended, was impracticable at a time when active operations were being conducted at so many different and widely distant points.

But I did not, and I do not, so construe the Court's letter. The Honourable Court doubtless expected that the Commission should, whenever practicable, summon before it those officers whose opinions it desired to ascertain and test. But it appears, I think, to have contemplated, as regards the overwhelming majority of officers to be consulted, that the consultation should proceed through the medium of written queries, so contributed and elaborated as to secure most of the advantages to be derived from conversational cross-examination. And it is, I think, easy to understand the reasons which induced the Court to recommend that an inquiry thus conducted, should be intrusted, not to an individual, but to a Commission.

Very different principles of recruitment and promotion have obtained in the native armies of India. These differences have led to widely discrepant systems of discipline and management: and before we proceed to reorganize our military establishments, it is desirable that we should thoroughly understand the various systems that have hitherto been in force in our native armies; that we should have a just insight into their effects immediate and remote; that we should fairly appreciate their respective advantages and disadvantages; that we should accurately determine how far the more laudable features of our system should be engrafted on the others; and that we should ascertain how far the various reformatory changes that have from time to time been recommended, are practicable and judicious: to what extent and with what results may they have been experimentally tried; how far their success or failure when thus tried was referable to the personal qualities of the experimenter, to local advantages, or to the material experimented on; and how far they are compatible with each other and with existing systems.

Though I possess a tolerably wide military acquaintance I am unable to indicate any of our officers whose thorough acquaintance with the material constitutions, traditions, and practical working of the three armies, and of the various forces, regular and irregular, of which these armies are composed, and whose freedom from presidency service or personal prejudices qualify him for so framing his interrogatories as to test the reasonableness and grounds of the widely dissonant views that obtain amongst military men of reputation, or for furnishing a lucid and thoroughly impartial analysis of and judgment on these dissonant opinions and reasonings, such an analysis and judgment as the Commander-in-chief and the Government could advantageously report on with a view to action.

To secure such a full, intelligent, impartial, and *practical* inquiry as I have described, it is, I think, indispensable that a Commission should be formed, such as the Honourable Court suggested; such a Commission would, I believe, be able to present their report within three months. And as I have already stated I am not personally aware that any insuperable obstacle exists to the formation of such a Commission authorized to conduct its labours in the manner I assume to have been intended by the Court.

Acquiescing in very much of what our honourable President says, I beg to record my hearty concurrence in his

most "earnest recommendation that measures of the most energetic nature be immediately instituted in respect of "the (additional) European troops," whose presence is so desirable. For only the fear of exceeding my legitimate functions, and of appearing to interfere with those of the Governor-General and Commander-in-chief, has hitherto prevented my pressing this subject on the attention of Government. I am not wont to take gloomy views of public affairs, but I freely confess that I regard with uneasiness our present condition and prospects, even apart from the contingency of a European war. Every week's delay in the restoration of order adjourns consummation for months, weakens our moral influence, and proportionately augments the amount of physical force which will be necessary for the effectual maintenance of our authority in India, while the events of the last twelve months remain fresh in the memories of the discontented, the ambitious, and the warlike. The truest economy will be found in the maintenance, for some time to come, of such a strong European force as shall not only enable us to crush the bands now in arms against us, but confirm our numerous native levies in their allegiance. It will be so, should the peace of Europe remain unbroken. How much more so, should that peace be disturbed!

Whatsoever be the proportion finally resolved on between the local and Horse Guards European regiments, the number of the former for India generally will not, I presume, be less than thirty; and I should be happy to hear that enlistment for at least that number, and for a corresponding augmentation of the local European artillery, proceeded rapidly, while the Queen's regiments in India were being kept up to their full strength. The officering of the local European regiments recruited for Bengal would be a mere matter of official routine.

(Signed) J. OUTRAM.

June 12, 1858.

APPENDIX No. 55.

MEMORANDUM by VISCOUNT CANNING.

The appointment of a Royal Commission in England to consider the question of the reorganization of the Indian army, induces me to send to England immediately the officer who, for some time past, has been specially employed in obtaining and collating the opinions of the Governors and Commanders-in-chief of Madras and Bombay, of the Commanders-in-chief in India, and of officers of rank and recent experience in the civil and military services of the East India Company.

2. In doing so, I consider it advisable to enable Lieutenant-Colonel Durand to lay before Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, not only the opinions which have been given in India in answer to the questions circulated under my instructions, but also my own views on some of the principal heads of inquiry, which will be submitted to the Royal Commissioners. For this last purpose this memorandum is placed in Lieutenant-Colonel Durand's hands.

3. In expressing these views, however, I must, for the present, abstain from entering into details. Time will not admit of this. Moreover, I have not yet been placed in possession of the opinions of some of those to whom the questions were referred; and the views and suggestions of others of high authority have been received too recently to allow of my giving to them the consideration which they deserve.

4. I should have been glad that my own general opinions, as now expressed, should have been accompanied by those of my honourable colleagues in the council; but it has not yet been possible to submit to the consideration of the President in council at Calcutta the papers which have been laid before me, and which, though still incomplete, are very voluminous. This will, however, be done as quickly as circumstances will admit, and I trust that before long I shall be enabled both to place it in the power of the members of council to express their opinion on the several points involved in the reorganization of the army in India, and to transmit to Her Majesty's Secretary of State my own views in regard to them in fuller detail.

5. I understand that the Commission will be instructed to inquire into the following points :—

- (1.) The terms on which the army of the East India Company is to be transferred to the Crown.
- (2.) The permanent force necessary to be maintained in the Indian provinces respectively, after the restoration of tranquillity.
- (3.) The proportion which Europeans should bear to native troops, in infantry, cavalry, and artillery, respectively.
- (4.) How far the European portion of the army should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as parts of

- the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only.
- (5.) In connexion with this question, the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion, and of securing the efficiency of the latter.
 - (6.) Whether it be possible to consolidate the European forces, so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other; and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object, with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now in the service of the East India Company.
 - (7.) Whether there should be any admixture of European and native forces, either regimentally or by brigade?
 - (8.) Whether the local European force should be kept up by draughts and volunteers from the line, or should be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain?
 - (9.) Whether it would be possible to raise any regiments in the colonies, either for temporary or permanent service in India?
 - (10.) Whether the native troops should be regular or irregular, or both, and if so, in what proportions?
 - (11.) Whether any native artillery corps should be sanctioned?
 - (12.) Whether cadets sent out for service with native troops should, in the first instance, be attached to European regiments, to secure uniformity of drill and discipline?

6. It appears to me that these points of inquiry are divisible into two branches, those which should be decided by Her Majesty's Government directly and absolutely, and those which the Government of India should be empowered to decide on, in accordance, of course, with any general instructions which may be issued by Her Majesty's Government, and subject to its approval, but with liberty to the Government of India to act upon its own decision, where early action may be necessary.

7. On the first point of the inquiry to be instituted by the Commission,—“The terms on which the army of the East India Company is to be transferred to the Crown,” I consider it unnecessary that I should offer any opinion. It refers, as I understand it, to terms which must be adjusted between Her Majesty's Government and the East India Company, and is one on which Her Majesty's Government can alone decide.

8. For the same reason I do not propose to offer any opinion on the fifth and eighth points; the fifth, relating to “the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the portion of the European army which is to be composed of troops of the line, and of securing the efficiency of that portion which is to consist of troops raised for the service in India only;” the eighth, relating to the “keeping up the local European force, whether by draughts and volunteers from the line, or by separate recruiting in Great Britain, as at present.”

9. The remaining points appear either to require an expression of my views, or to embrace subjects which might be most conveniently committed to the discretion of the Government of India.

10. And first, in regard to the second point,—“The permanent force necessary to be maintained in the Indian provinces respectively after the restoration of tranquillity.”

11. At the time of the outbreak at Meerut, the Bengal army numbered about 119,000 native troops of all arms; that of Madras 50,000, and that of Bombay 31,000. The aggregate of the Madras and Bombay armies was therefore less than that of the Bengal army by 38,000 men.

12. We are now emerging from the state of anarchy consequent on the revolt of the Bengal army, mainly through the strength and exertions of our British forces, but partly by the aid of the Punjab troops.

13. Exclusive of the disarmed corps, the Bengal army now amounts to about 80,000 men, and if the militarily organized police be included, it amounts to about 130,000 men; that is, some 11,000 men more than at the time of the outbreak at Meerut; of these 130,000 men, about 75,000 are Punjabees; and of these Punjabees probably 23,000 are Sikhs. The difference, therefore, between our position in 1858 and our position in 1857 is, that there is now a larger native force, and that the bulk of it, instead of being drawn from Oude, is drawn from the Punjab.

14. When the police of Madras is complete, there will be in all India about 300,000 native troops, regular, irregular, and police militarily organized.

15. In this state of things, the demands for European troops put forward by the various Governments, as at present necessary, are not excessive. The whole number does not much exceed the number which will be in the country when the draughts and reinforcements of the season arrive, viz., about 100,000 men.

16. I consider that the force of European Infantry ultimately requisite for the permanent occupation of the Bengal presidency, may be estimated at forty-five regiments. I do

not think it possible that the ground which the Bengal army will have to hold, can be sufficiently covered by less than that number. I should wish to see this force composed of thirty local regiments, and fifteen regiments of the line; the local regiments would be strong enough, if of the strength of 800 rank and file.

17. There are now in the Bengal army three European regiments of the Company's service, and three are in course of formation, being officered by European officers of six native infantry battalions. Therefore, for the other 24 regiments of local European infantry to be raised for service in Bengal, there remain available 68 cadres of battalion officers. If two of these cadres are taken for each European regiment, 48 cadres will be absorbed, and a surplus of 20 cadres will be left, after the European infantry shall have been provided for.

I propose that upon these 20 cadres there should be formed 20 regiments of regular native infantry; and further that the 30 regiments of local European infantry should furnish the officers required to officer on the irregular system 30 regiments of irregular native infantry.

18. In time of peace, it will, I believe, be found sufficient if these regiments are limited to a strength of about 700 each. This would give 50 native battalions for purely military service, and it would leave the 30 local European regiments, and the 20 regular native regiments, well able to supply officers for the command of the military police battalions, which have already been largely raised, and which, when once fully organized, will relieve the native troops of many of the non-military duties hitherto imposed upon them.

The same regiments will also be able to supply officers for general staff purposes.

19. In regard to native cavalry for Bengal, none but irregular corps are to be desired, and this arm of the service must be kept up on its present scale. It will be necessary that with each of the European regiments of local cavalry a corps of irregulars shall at all times be quartered, to relieve the European regiments of some of those duties which press heavily upon a small European corps.

20. In regard to European cavalry for Bengal, I have already represented to the Home Government, in a despatch of the 8th July last, that it is very desirable that the cavalry regiments of the local army should be ten of 440 sabres each, rather than five of 818 sabres each, as originally ordered by the Honourable Court of Directors. Should this proposal be complied with, it will still be necessary that not less than three regiments of cavalry from the English army should be retained in Bengal for the present.

21. In regard to artillery, I have given my opinion fully in a minute of the 9th of August last. I wish to see 78 batteries allotted to the local army.

22. Passing to Madras, and including with that presidency the province of Pegu and the Straits, I believe that 12 regiments of European infantry will suffice for its service.

23. Of European cavalry, I am of opinion that Madras requires for the present three regiments from the English army; but I recommend that eventually the eight native regiments of light cavalry be converted into three regiments of European cavalry, raised for the local army of Madras, of about the same strength as has been already recommended for Bengal, and that from the officers of the light cavalry remaining undisposed of, five regiments of irregular cavalry be officered. I say eventually, because, before this or any other change which will raise discontent, and which is not immediately urgent, is attempted in the native armies of Madras or of Bombay, the new Bengal army ought to be well in hand. This caution applies to all changes which will entail the disbandment of any large number of native troops in those presidencies. It will be better to incur for a year or two the expense of maintaining an extra European force drawn from the English army than to run the risk of the results which dissatisfaction and excitement may produce if we disturb the soldiery of Madras or Bombay before the great army of Bengal is reconstructed on safe principles. It would be a great error to suppose that we have now throughout India a tabula rasa, upon which we can build up any new military establishment which may be deemed proper, and to forget that, in prudence as well as in justice, the native armies of Madras and Bombay, which are still standing at their full numbers, and have shown themselves on the whole loyal, must be treated cautiously and considerately in the introduction of changes.

24. I have given my opinion respecting the artillery of Madras and Bombay in separate minutes, and I would not recommend that the changes to be made in this arm should be deferred.

25. In the matter of the European force to be allotted to Bombay, I am not in possession of the views of Lord Elphinstone; I therefore abstain from giving any positive opinion upon it. His Excellency the Commander-in-chief

of Bombay, Sir H. Somerset, estimates the required number of regiments at fifteen of infantry, and three of cavalry; the former at the full complement of 1,077 rank and file each, and the latter at 748 sabres each. I believe this requirement to be unnecessarily large, even though Rajpootana should be held by the Bombay army.

26. In regard to the 3rd point of inquiry, viz., "the proportion which European should bear to native troops in infantry, cavalry, and artillery respectively," I am of opinion that, as a general rule, the proportion should not be less than that of two to five, reckoning the military police as troops. It does not seem necessary to lay down any particular rule as to the proportion to be observed between Europeans and natives in each particular arm of the service, especially as, in the case of the artillery, the arm of paramount importance, it has been determined that in Bengal no appreciable strength of native artillery should be maintained.

27. The 4th point has already been noticed, so far as regards the army of Bengal.

28. The 6th point is this, "whether it be possible to consolidate the European forces so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other, and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object, with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now in the service of the East India Company."

29. The difficulties of amalgamation, arising out of the two distinct systems of promotion, by purchase and by seniority, obtaining respectively in Her Majesty's army and in that of the East India Company, are very great. I can suggest no satisfactory solution of them. But it appears to me to be most important that, in the event of an amalgamation of the local army with the line being found to be too difficult for adjustment or too expensive, or, for other reasons, not advisable, some arrangement should still be provided, by which the local European army should be made to feel that it is composed of the same stuff, and is in all respects in an equally honourable position with the line. I think it very desirable that officers should be enabled to pass from the one into the other, though here also difficulties are not slight; that there should be a clear understanding that the senior officers whose service and ability may render them fit for such marks of Her Majesty's confidence shall be permitted to serve Her Majesty out of India as well as in this country, and that divisional and brigade commands should be distributed between the two armies in a fair proportion. On the other hand, the officers of the line should have a larger share of staff employment than they have hitherto had.

30. On the subject of staff and civil employment I would here say a few words.

31. I think that in order to remedy the chief evil resulting from the Indian system of staff and civil employment, it will be found necessary to adopt the plan of *seconding*, as followed in Her Majesty's service. It would probably suffice to adopt it in regard to officers taken from their regiments for civil employ alone, and not in the case of those taken for the staff departments connected with the army. I doubt whether a staff list would work so well as *seconding*. The latter is equally encouraging to the regimental officer. It preserves to Government the advantages of the present system, and is more in accordance with the organization of the Indian service.

32. I do not share all the objections which have been very generally made to the withdrawal of officers from regiments for staff employ. I think that the disadvantages of the system are counterbalanced by great advantages which it would be unwise to sacrifice; and that the former admit of much mitigation, without departure from the system.

33. Considering the frequency and suddenness of calls for active operations in India, it is convenient to be able to strengthen a regiment with officers at short notice. At the same time it is desirable that officers whose presence with their corps is not required in time of peace, should be saved from the many evils attending an idle garrison life. Both these objects will be most cheaply and better accomplished by retaining with proper checks the system of civil employment for military officers.

34. Civil employment, and the prospect of it, give to officers a much greater interest in and knowledge of the country than they would otherwise acquire.

It places an officer in situations of responsibility and trial, of which he would otherwise have no experience; it sharpens his intelligence and makes him readier, handier, and more self-reliant, and therefore eventually a better soldier, than he would otherwise be. Some of the ablest and most distinguished men of the Indian service are those who have had the benefits of this system. Of those of the present day, it suffices to name Outram, Nicholson, and Edwardes; other names of more or less note might be added. Looking to the Queen's army, the mention of Sir Hugh

Rose and Sir W. Mansfield is enough to show that military ability is in no way impaired by a course of civil service.

35. And it is further to be recollected, that if the system of placing military officers in civil situations be discontinued, the inevitable consequence will be that the civil service must be largely increased, and considerable additional expenditure be occasioned thereby.

36. The 7th question, "whether there should be any admixture of European forces, whether regimentally or by brigade," may with advantage be left for experiment and decision in India. Admixture in brigades seems scarcely avoidable—in regiments it does not appear to me desirable; and in proposing, as I have already done, that a body of irregular cavalry should invariably be associated with each European cavalry regiment, I do not contemplate that the connexion should be permanent, but that the body of irregulars should be changed from time to time as may be most convenient.

37. In the evidence will be found a suggestion from Colonel Keith Young, for attaching to each European regiment a company of native infantry, selected from the cook boy class. Such a body would no doubt be useful in relieving the European soldiers of some duties which are wearing to the men, not beneficial to their discipline or health, and equally well performed by a native. The experiment is worth trial; but I think it would be found that nearly the same convenience could be obtained by a less close association, and that it is not an advantage to either party that the European and the native soldier should be forced into habitual juxtaposition.

38. In regard to the 9th head of inquiry, viz., "whether it would be possible to raise any regiments in the colonies either for temporary or permanent service in India," the possibility of raising these troops can be satisfactorily considered by Her Majesty's Government alone; but I earnestly hope that, even if the facility should prove greater than it has yet been found to be, no systematic introduction into India of African, West Indian, or foreign Asiatic troops may take place.

39. Fifteen months ago a West Indian or an African brigade would have been of great service, morally as well as physically. Our native regiments were turning against us daily. The natives in general were incredulous of our ability to supply their places, and to hold our own, with Englishmen. Any manifest proof that we had resources hitherto unknown to them, from which we could draw soldiers as impenetrable by the climate as themselves, and equal to them in bodily strength and discipline, would have operated very usefully. But the case is altered now. It has now become at least as necessary to inspire confidence and goodwill, as fear. Few measures could be more destructive of the first-named feelings than the suspicion that that which they consider the most honourable employment which we can offer them is, under a new order of things, to be put in other hands.

I quite concur in the objections which are urged by most of the witnesses to the adoption of this measure.

40. The tenth point has already been answered, so far as I am able to do so at present.

41. The eleventh is to this effect, "whether any native artillery corps should be sanctioned." I understand this to have been ruled generally in the negative. As regards Bengal, it will be easy to make the change, and I am of opinion that it will not be wise to make any exceptions to it unless in one or two outlying districts, such as the Trans-Indus frontier, Assam, and Arracan.

42. In Madras and Bombay the transition from native to European artillery must be made gradually; but I would begin to make it with as little delay as possible. The Scinde frontier, like that of the Punjab, would furnish an exception; but of the soundness of the policy which shall make the native army feel that nearly every piece of ordnance in the British territory is in our keeping, I have no doubt whatever. No change that we can make will be a surer source of security.

43. The twelfth point of inquiry is, "whether cadets sent out for service with native troops, should, in the first instance, be attached to European regiments, to secure uniformity of drill and discipline."

44. It has been already ordered, that cadets for the native infantry are to be attached for the first six months to European corps. The rule is an excellent one, though I doubt whether the term is long enough. But I am strongly of opinion that some measure more effective than this is necessary to make our young officers what they ought to be.

45. Cadets have hitherto joined their corps as half-educated youths; and it is more surprising that many have turned out well than that many early acquire indolent habits, which unfit them for an active career, and for posts of responsibility. It would be a great improvement if a

higher scale of education were exacted from candidates or nominees, and if it were further required that, before a young officer came out to India, he should qualify himself by being attached for a time to a Queen's regiment in England, in all the professional knowledge expected from an efficient subaltern.

46. I have now touched briefly upon the points of enquiry which I understand to have been submitted to the royal commission; but many collateral questions spring out of these; the castes and races from which the native army shall be mainly recruited; the proportion to be observed between them; the extent to which the recruiting for each regiment should be confined to a particular district, so as to give a local character to the corps; the grouping of different castes and races in the same regiment, or in the same company; the retention of native commissioned officers; the enlargement of the powers of commanding officers; the changes desirable in the system of courts-martial; the continuance or modification of the pension system.

47. Upon all these heads much valuable information will be found in the evidence which Lieutenant-Colonel Durand carries to England, although it is in many respects incomplete; and I am of opinion that upon nearly all of them a large discretion and the power of final action should be placed in the hands of the Government of India, subject to any guiding principles which Her Majesty's Government may think fit to prescribe.

48. Meanwhile the raising of troops mainly Hindostanee must continue, if only to provide a counterpoise to the present preponderance of the Punjabee and Sikh soldiers, upon whom during the disquietude of Hindostan we have been compelled to draw so largely, and whose number cannot be reduced until others are ready to take their place.

This is being done in such a manner as to avoid as much as possible any prejudgment on important points in the general reorganization.

CANNING.

APPENDIX No. 56.

MINUTE by the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA.

Allahabad, August 9, 1858.

1. On the 12th of May it was requested of the Court of Directors that immediate measures might be taken to increase each European battalion of artillery in India by one company, and to add one battalion to the European artillery at each of the three presidencies.

2. On the 26th of May* the Commander-in-Chief expressed his opinion, in a letter from the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General of the army, that it would be advisable to raise as many additional European troops and companies as will suffice to replace all the native troops and companies, regular and irregular. His Excellency further recommended that the rank of officers in the Company's artillery should be assimilated to that of officers in the Queen's artillery; and that, to that end, the grades of major and second lieutenant should be abolished, and the grade of second captain created in the Company's artillery, with such an additional rank of lieutenant-colonels as would place the latter on the same footing with the Royal artillery.

3. At this time a series of questions regarding the constitution of the artillery had been addressed to many distinguished officers, military and civil, in connection with the general scheme of a reorganization of the army; and answers to those questions have now been received from several functionaries of high authority.

4. After a careful examination I am of opinion that, as regards the artillery required for Bengal, to the consideration of which this minute is confined, very little can with safety be deducted from the Commander-in-Chief's proposal, that the whole number of native companies and troops must be replaced by an equal number of European companies or troops.

5. Before the mutinies broke out, the regular Bengal artillery was composed of thirty-six batteries of all denominations.

6. These batteries were served, and other general duties of the artillery corps performed, by a force consisting of fifty-five troops and companies, European and native.

Horse Artillery.—Three brigades, comprising nine European and four native troops.

Foot Artillery.—Nine battalions, comprising twenty-four European and eighteen native companies.

7. There was, besides, the irregular artillery force, or artillery of the contingents, consisting of twenty-three companies:—

Gwalior	-	5	Punjab	-	5
Malwa	-	1	Nagpore	-	2
Bhopal	-	1	Hyderabad	-	4
Joudpore	-	0½			
Kotah	-	0½			23
Oude	-	4			

8. This gives, in all, seventy-eight companies or troops.

9. I do not believe that any reduction worth counting can safely be made in this number. With every allowance for the greater trustworthiness, and, in some respects, greater efficiency of European artillery, the ground which has to be covered is the same; and I know no spot under the charge of the Bengal army where guns have hitherto been placed from which they could in prudence be withdrawn. A new distribution of our artillery force, both in our own provinces and in Central India, will be necessary. Less than five batteries will suffice for Gwalior; but Oude must have more than four, and addition must be made to the artillery in Bengal. Upon the whole, I see no hope of a diminution of the aggregate force.

10. It will be seen, in a return ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on the 16th April 1858, that from the year 1852 to 1857 the strength of the Bengal artillery was as follows:—

Year.	No. of Brigades and Battalions	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.	Gun Lascars.	Ordnance Drivers.	Total Europeans.	Total Natives.	Grand Total.
1852	12	237	3,406	2,330	1,152	1,236	3,643	4,727	8,370
1853	12	242	2,530	2,262	1,146	1,221	3,772	4,629	8,401
1854	12	252	3,446	2,321	1,181	1,332	3,699	4,774	8,473
1855	12	244	3,285	2,311	1,128	1,277	3,513	4,716	8,229
1856	12	244	3,138	2,320	1,151	1,268	3,382	4,719	8,101
1857	12	241	2,925	2,283	1,125	1,228	3,166	4,631	7,797

There were, therefore, at the time of the mutiny in 1857, 605 European artillerymen less in the Bengal presidency than in 1853.

11. According to a distribution return of the adjutant-general of the army for the 1st May 1858, the strength of the Company's European artillery was as follows:—

	Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.
3 Brigades Horse Artillery	46	967
5 Battalions Foot Artillery	66	1,512
	112	2,479
Add approximation for 6 Battalions Foot Artillery	13	302
	125	2,781

Total - - - 2,906 European Artillery.

12. Therefore, notwithstanding the draft of 1,407 men sent out for the artillery subsequently to the 1st January, 1857, a large proportion of which must have come to this presidency, the Bengal European artillery was, on the 1st May, 1858, about 140 men weaker than in 1857.

13. There were, however, on the 1st May, 1858, in the Bengal presidency, two troops, and thirteen companies of royal artillery, mustering 95 officers; 2,362 non-commissioned officers, rank and file. Total, 2,457 royal artillery.

14. The grand total of European artillery on the 1st May, 1858, may therefore be taken as about 5,363.

15. Of native artillery, on that date, the adjutant-general's return shows: 25 European officers, and 13 European non-commissioned officers. Total, 38.

1,363 native artillerymen; 1,071 gun lascars attached to European horse and foot artillery. Total, 2,434.

16. This native artillery consists of three troops of horse artillery; one battalion of three companies of foot artillery; five batteries, including the Peshawar mountain-train of the Punjab irregular force, and No. 4 garrison company of artillery of the same force. The 7th and 9th battalions of foot artillery are, however, omitted by the adjutant-general, no returns having been received; but as both battalions mutinied, they need not embarrass calculations.

17. It will be seen from the appended extract from the general remarks transmitted by Sir John Lawrence, Brigadier General Chamberlain, and Lieutenant-Colonel Edwards, in reply to the questions which have been addressed to them, that they recommend the maintaining of five and a-half

* Letter from Deputy Adjutant-General, May 20, 1858.

batteries of native artillery for frontier purposes; that the retention of native drivers and gun lascars, with all the European artillery of the local army, is advocated mainly as a measure of economy; that it is not suggested that the royal artillery should have native drivers and gun lascars, but that they should have European drivers as usual; and that the opinion is expressed that it is desirable always to have some of the royal artillery serving in India, not merely as a field of exercise for that arm, but to excite emulation in the artillery of the local army.

18. The commander-in-chief of the Madras army states that, when certain arrangements have been carried out, "all native artillery may be, and ought to be, dispensed with." In a memorandum dated Calcutta, August 11, 1857, Sir P. Grant observes, "I have said, in my memorandum of the 29th of June, that guns ought never again to be manned by natives: I will now add, that neither ought natives to be employed as syce drivers; a corps of European artillery drivers should be formed." The remark had reference to what was occurring at the time in the Bengal army.

19. Brigadier J. Jacob, in a printed letter to Sir C. Trevelyan, delivers his opinions as follows:—"The whole of the artillery in India should be European, with the exception of a few troops and batteries, formed for special service in particular localities where European troops could not live, such as this frontier of Scinde."

The strength of the "artillery in India should be increased. All the native artillery in the armies of the three presidencies should be replaced by Europeans, the gun lascars attached to whom should be replaced on their old footing, as they were in 1828; a full and complete company of gun lascars being attached to each European company. These men are most useful, and save the European artillerymen from fatal exposure and fatigue, while they themselves are not of a class ever likely to become dangerous to us."

20. Major-General Sir S. Cotton touches upon the subject in the following words:—"It is scarcely necessary to make any allusion to the artillery branch of the service, which requires, perhaps, no reorganization, excepting that in no way in future should the natives of the country be entrusted with British artillery, nor should any native of India be instructed in the use of such dangerous weapons; the native drivers are good horsemen, and the gunners most excellent, but they cannot be trusted; they have a religious veneration for their guns; and, in proportion as they are most valuable to the government they serve, so are they more formidable when they choose to be rebellious."

21. The argument in favour of a few batteries for frontier purposes is a valid one, and applicable to the Indus frontier of the empire, both in Scinde and the Panjab; but that in favour of native drivers, based on the good conduct of those at Delhi, and on the presence of a European cavalry escort, does not convince me. It must be borne in mind that elsewhere than at Delhi the defection of native drivers paralyzed European batteries, or very greatly embarrassed them; and, also, it should be remembered that the presence of an escort of European cavalry, however desirable, cannot always be accounted a certainty. The drivers are the masters of the motive power of the artillery, and, although the non-commissioned officers of a gun, riding alongside with loaded pistols, or a cavalry escort of European dragoons, may control the native drivers, it is far from desirable that artillery should be wholly dependent for its efficiency on such extraneous aids: it cannot be too self-reliant. Although the weight of opinion militates against the continuance of native drivers, it is in favour of the continuance of gun lascars, who may, with advantage, be kept up.

22. The maintenance of a few frontier batteries, as recommended by Sir John Lawrence, does not modify materially the augmentation requisite for the Bengal artillery; the large number of contingent batteries which have been lost to the State, and which must in a measure be replaced by European artillery, leaves the question almost unaffected by the five and a half native batteries required for the Panjab frontier.

23. Except by Sir John Lawrence and his coadjutors, Brigadier-General Chamberlain and Lieutenant-Colonel Edwards, the employment of Royal artillery in India, for the sake of emulation, is not advanced. During the present crisis, its services have proved most valuable, and it must be some time before its co-operation can be dispensed with, either in this or the other presidencies. Royal artillery, in order to be useful in India, requires to be provided with the establishments of the Company's artillery; it has to be horsed and equipped; it requires a separate staff; it needs interpreters in every battery; and in a variety of ways increases unnecessarily the complications of the military department, both in the field and in the office. Considerations of this nature, and the known efficiency of the artillery of the Indian armies, to which Sir Colin Campbell has so strongly and so frequently borne testimony, render

it doubtful whether Government might not purchase the advantage of emulation at too great cost and inconvenience, by carrying on a double system of Ordnance corps in India. Amalgamation, though full of difficulties and sure to be costly, might in the end prove more economical than a double system of Ordnance corps perpetuated in India.

24. The strength of European artillery on the 1st of May 1858 actually serving in the Bengal presidency was 5,363 as shown in paragraph 6. In addition to this there were 1,363 native artillerymen, besides 1,071 lascars. Before the mutiny, there were 2,283 native artillerymen, besides 1,125 gun lascars and 1,223 drivers; this omits all note of the irregular or contingent artillery, which, as I have already shown, counted twenty-three batteries. I do not think that the Bengal presidency can be made safe with fewer batteries than the late existing number of seventy-eight, nor with fewer artillerymen than may suffice these seventy-eight batteries, with a reserve for siege ordnance, for garrison and other duties.

25. This object may be attained with thirteen battalions of eight companies; six companies at 120 men, 720; two companies at 70 men, 140; total per battalion, 860 men; the grand total would then be 11,180 European artillerymen.

These numbers include drivers. The six strong companies would be attached to batteries, and the two weaker companies would form reserves, from which the others would be kept up to their strength, and the requirements of magazines and depôts supplied.

26. The strength here proposed for the companies is, I am satisfied, the minimum. Indeed, I fear that it would be found that batteries would be often undermanned with companies on this scale, but I would commence with it experimentally.

27. The necessity for a large proportion of officers in the Bengal artillery, as compared with the strength of men, is even greater than in the royal artillery; the latter has fewer field batteries in proportion to its numbers; the colonies and stations at which it serves, when out of England, are healthier generally than India, and consequently the officers absent on sick certificate are fewer; further, there is not the same demand upon its officers to furnish men for civil and staff employment. Although, therefore, the home government may be averse to increase the number of battalions, it is absolutely essential to augment the number of officers; and this may be most conveniently done by assimilating the corps to the royal artillery.

28. The grade of colonel-commandant which exists in the royal artillery is, at present at least, entirely uncalled for in the Indian armies. The greater want of our artillery is in captains and lieutenants; and bearing this in mind, and assuming that the additional battalions already asked for is conceded, the assimilation which I would propose is as follows:—

	Existing State.	Proposed Assimilation.
Colonels	12	13
Lieutenant-Colonels	15	26
Majors	12	-
First Captains	72	91
Second Captains	-	91
First Lieutenants	132	285
Second Lieutenants	60	-
Total	303	507

It will be observed that the whole augmentation lies in the grades of captains and lieutenants, and that to the amount of 204 commissioned officers.

29. In regard to cost, a regiment of Her Majesty's infantry, of nine companies, and 1,068 bayonets, costs about 61,000*l.* per annum.

A battalion of artillery of 860 men, and with fewer field officers, may, therefore, be reckoned to cost about 53,000*l.*

This will give, for thirteen battalions, a total of 689,000*l.*

The present cost of the artillery force of Bengal is 457,000*l.* per annum for the regular artillery, and about 80,000*l.* for the artillery of the contingents; in all, 537,000*l.*

The increase of cost would, therefore, be about 125,000*l.*, to which would have to be added the cost of the Panjab native artillery, if this should be retained for frontier services. It may be reckoned at 18,000*l.*

The whole increase in such case would be 170,000*l.*, a large sum, doubtless; but an expenditure from which, or from something approximating to it, I see no escape; and which, by securing to Bengal a strong and thoroughly reliable artillery establishment, will go further to maintain the tranquillity of the country than a larger sum spent upon any other arm.

The saving which might be effected by retaining native drivers, and proportionately diminishing the strength of the six full companies of each battalion, would not be very considerable. It certainly would not exceed 10,000*l.* per annum.

30. Brigadier-General J. Jacob recommends, that there should be no difference of pay between horse and foot artillery; and many officers, I believe, support this view, as also the abolition of horse artillery as a separate branch.

This, however, is a question of technical detail into which it is unnecessary here to enter. I also pass by other points of detail, such as uniformity of material throughout the three presidencies, the greater use of elephant draught, and other matters.

My present object is to place before the Court my opinion as to the extent to which the European artillery of Bengal should be increased, and the footing on which it should be re-organized. It is the arm of greatest moment to our military power in India, and the thorough establishment of it on a footing of efficiency is of urgent importance.

CANNING.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL REMARKS by Sir J. LAWRENCE, Chief Commissioner of the Punjaub, Brigadier-General CHAMBERLAIN, and Lieutenant-Colonel EDWARDES.

26. Profiting by the experience of the past year, it is proposed to transfer the mass of the artillery from the hands of native to those of European gunners. The value of artillery, is, perhaps, greater in Asia than in any other part of the world. Guns are an object of intense fear to the natives of India, and, for that reason, become objects of attachment and worship to the Indian gunner. A small European force, with a powerful artillery, should be irresistible; and no mutiny of a native army without guns could hope to be successful. Many officers would, for this reason, object to any artillery at all being left in the hands of the natives; but, in practice, it is not expedient to go to this extreme; the frontier must be excepted. Here, in the first place, a mountain-train is necessary, and an European mountain-train in India is an anomaly. The men are not able to undergo the fatigue that is involved; and they require an amount of carriage and supplies which render prompt or rapid movement impossible. The Peshawur mountain-train was originally manned by Europeans, but natives were substituted after the very first expedition in which they were engaged. Again, for similar reasons, the defence of the frontier requires native irregular cavalry and infantry; and it would be as unwise to brigade European artillery with native troops only, as to tell a frontier force that it could not be trusted with guns. Throughout the crisis of 1857, there were eighteen field-guns manned by native irregulars upon the line of the Indus; and their conduct was so good that to disband them would be unjust. Moreover, if native artillery be not allowed, European artillerymen must be located in the Derajat, which is as unhealthy as Peshawur, and European infantry be employed to guard them. For these reasons, it will be observed that, in the present scheme, the native infantry of the frontier has been maintained; and so long as the mass of our artillery in India is manned by Europeans, we need not fear to have a few native guns upon the border.

27. It is recommended, however, to reduce the size of each Punjaub light field-battery from six to four guns; a number which it is believed will suffice at Kohat, Bunnoo, and Derah Ishmael Khan. This reduction in the three existing batteries would give six out of the eight guns required for Peshawur, leaving two to be provided; two more required at Derah Ghazee Khan; and there will be twenty-two native field-pieces on the frontier, instead of eighteen, as heretofore. The details of the former and proposed arrangement are shown in the subjoined comparison:—

FIELD GUNS ON THE FRONTIER.

Before			Proposed.				
Stations.	European.	Native.	Total.	Stations.	European.	Native.	Total.
Campbellpore	-	-	-	Campbellpore	12	-	12
Nowshera	-	-	-	Nowshera	12	-	12
Peshawur	24	-	24	Peshawur	-	8	8
Kohat	-	6	6	Kohat	-	4	4
Bunnoo	-	0	0	Bunnoo	-	4	4
Derah Ishmael Khan and Derah Ghazee Khan	-	6	6	Derah Ishmael Khan	-	4	4
				Derah Ghazee Khan	-	2	2
Total	24	16	42	Total	24	22	46

Total increase, 4 guns native.
The mountain trains of Peshawur and Hazara remain as before, and are not included in this statement of field artillery.

* Supposing Government to approve the withdrawal of the European troops from Peshawur to Nowshera.

28. The only inconvenience that arises from this proposal is, that there is no battery from which to take the two guns for Derah Ghazee Khan. They need never be moved, and might be a separate subaltern's command.

29. Before quitting the subject of artillery, attention should be drawn to the great saving in expense which would result from retaining native drivers and gun lascars, with all the European artillery of the local army. If the gunners and cavalry escort are Europeans, there can be no fear of the drivers. This was strongly shown at Delhi, where their conduct was admirable. Drivers are not of the sepooy class, but of the syce class, and it is an incidental advantage to give an opening to the artillery syces for promotion. The royal artillery of the line would have European drivers as usual.

30. And here we would add, that it is desirable always to have some artillery from the line, serving in India, not merely as a field of exercise for that arm, but to excite emulation in the artillery of the local army.

APPENDIX No. 57.

MINUTES by the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India.

Referring to my minute of the 9th August 1858, in which I stated in detail my view of the proper strength and composition of the artillery of the Bengal army, and to the reasons therein given for my opinion, I now proceed to specify the force of artillery that I deem necessary for the army of Madras.

The Madras artillery at present consists of seven battalions of officers, each having—

- 1 colonel.
- 1 lieutenant-colonel.
- 1 major.
- 6 captains.
- 10 lieutenants (first).
- 10 lieutenants (second).

The number of horse brigade and battalions is six, viz.:—

- 1 horse artillery brigade.
 - 4 European troops.
 - 2 native troops.
 - 4 battalions European foot artillery, 4 companies each.
 - 1 Golundaz battalion.
 - 6 companies.
 - 2 supplemental companies.
- 8

I do not consider that a less force would suffice for the Madras presidency than 26 batteries, with a sufficient number of European artillerymen to man and drive them; and also to furnish a reserve large enough for siege ordnance, the defence of fortresses, and other important duties.

To obtain this object the Madras artillery should consist of six battalions of men, each of eight companies.

Of these companies, six, each 120 strong, would be attached to the batteries as gunners and drivers; and two, each of 70 men, would form reserves.

Total for the six battalions - - - 5,160

The proportion of reserve artillerymen required is large, but this is unavoidable, because the artillery force in garrison in Pegu and in the Straits, which must be periodically relieved, is furnished by the Madras presidency.

The number of officers absolutely essential for the command of the proposed force should be seven battalions, giving a total of—

Colonels	-	-	-	7
Lieutenant-colonels	-	-	-	14
First captains	-	-	-	49
Second captains	-	-	-	49
Lieutenants	-	-	-	154
				273

Being an increase of 105 over the present establishment.

(Signed) CANNING.

September 13, 1858.

Having, in my minute of the 9th of August and of the 13th September 1858, specified the force of artillery required for the Bengal and Madras presidencies, I will now state

the number and composition of that arm, which I consider indispensable for that of Bombay.

The Bombay artillery is at present established at a strength of five battalions of officers, and of four battalions and a horse brigade of artillerymen.

The battalions of officers consist each of—

- 1 colonel.
- 1 lieut.-colonel.
- 1 major.
- 6 captains.
- 10 first lieutenants.
- 5 second do.

—
24

Making a total of one hundred and twenty.

I would propose for this presidency a force of twenty-four batteries of field artillery, which is the number, including the troops and batteries of the royal artillery, now belonging to it.

It will be necessary to substitute European gunners for Golundaz in two of the battalions, and European drivers for native throughout the force. For this purpose an increase of 1,954 serjeants, rank and file, will be required: an addition of 75 European officers is also necessary for the proper performance of the full duties of the corps.

The establishment of artillery for the Bombay presidency would then be as follows:—

- 4 or 5 battalions of officers.
- 5 colonels.
- 10 lieut.-colonels.
- 35 first captains.
- 35 second do.
- 110 lieutenants.

Total - 195

Five battalions of artillerymen, each consisting of eight companies, viz. :—

- 6 companies at - - 120
- 2 do. do. - - 70

- Total for battalion - 860
- Do. do. 5 do. - 4,300

The artillery required for the defence of Scinde and for the garrison of Aden is supplied by Bombay. In might also, in times of emergency, be necessary to send an artillery force from that presidency in steamers up the Indus to the Punjab, the maintenance of a reserve of gunners over and above the minimum number required for the field batteries, and ordinary garrison duties, is therefore indispensable.

(Signed) CANNING.

September 14, 1858.

APPENDIX No. 58.

LORD CLYDE'S REPLIES TO THE FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, and FOURTH SERIES OF QUESTIONS ON THE RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY.

INFANTRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. *What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the infantry of the native Bengal army is composed?*

I am informed, almost exclusively Hindostances from Behar and the Doab, except that of late years a proportion of Sikhs and Punjaubees have been introduced; that is, regiments serving in the Punjab were told to complete vacancies by enlisting Sikhs and Punjaubees, not exceeding two hundred in number per regiment. The principal castes of Hindoos in the army were Brahmins, Rajpoots, and Aheers. The Hindoos formed the great majority, only from 100 to 200 men in a regiment being Mahomedans.

2. *What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?*

This appears to have been answered in No. 1.

3. *Have any races, tribes, and castes been excluded from enlistment, either by the regulations or the practice of the Bengal army?*

Yes, several of the lower castes were not allowed to be enlisted.

4. *Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected, or excluded from the field of enlistment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the native infantry of the Bengal army?*

The field from which recruits were obtained was too limited. I think men should be taken of every caste, or of no caste (if there are such people), and from every district. There cannot be too great a diversity.

5. *What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts of the Bengal presidency or its dependencies?*

I am informed that generally there was no difficulty in obtaining recruits without special agency. The men who went on leave brought back recruits to a considerable extent, and when regiments were in certain localities men flocked for enlistment.

6. *On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?*

Those ordered by regulation.

7. *When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of sepoys, or the followers of regiments, what precautions, if any, are taken?*

No special precautions were considered necessary, nor does any good appear to have arisen from any of the precautions taken, as referred to in the preceding question.

8. *What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry of the native troops in the Bengal army?*

All allusion to caste in any general recruiting regulations should, in my opinion, be done away with, and physical fitness be ordered to be the main point to be looked to. I mean that all castes should be admitted to the service, but it would perhaps be a wise plan to have regiments of several castes, as well as regiments of mixed castes. For instance, Rajpoot regiments, Mahomedan regiments, Brahmin regiments, &c. &c. In the mixed regiments recruits should be taken from every religion and caste.

9. *What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the native infantry of the Bengal army?*

That prescribed in the Articles of War.

10. *How long has this form been in use in the Bengal army?*

I have no idea.

11. *Can you suggest any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruits for the native infantry of the Bengal army?*

Appears to be a matter of much indifference. We seem to be the only people in the country who think the oath of consequence. The sepoys evidently do not.

12. *Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the Bengal presidency of seafaring habits, and could marine corps be formed from such races, tribes, or castes?*

Doubtless, from all I have heard, a marine corps could be formed if such is wanted. Whether it would be of use, proportionate to its expense, is doubtful.

13. *Has the Bengal presidency any marine corps; and, if so, of what strength, and whence recruited?*

I am told not.

14. *Should each infantry corps be raised, each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?*

Some might be; more might not. There ought to be no fixed rule. Corps should differ as much as possible; one be of all castes, one be of some particular caste, one from a particular district, another from every district, and of every caste. Uniformity in such matters is dangerous. When corps consist of various castes, then might often with advantage be formed in separate companies.

15. *Or should each corps be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?*

Appears to have been answered in No. 14.

16. *Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribe or caste?*

Appears to have been answered in No. 14.

17. *If a corps is not homogeneous, will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, so far as it may be possible, homogeneous, each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste? Or should the tribes and castes be mixed up in each company?*

Appears to have been answered in No. 14.

18. *If corps are not homogeneous but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes be entertained?*

Appears to have been answered in No. 14.

19. *If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same districts, or should police corps be recruited from a wide area without reference to districts?*

The police should be recruited generally in their own district, without excluding men of other districts.

20. *Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the army corps?*

Certainly not. The discipline and system of the police must be different from that of the line.

21. *What agency should be employed for recruiting in the districts of the Bengal presidency or its dependencies?*

No special agency would be found requisite. Commanding officers would be perfectly able to keep up their corps, save in the case of regiments being taken from some particular district, and stationed elsewhere. In such a case a small regimental depôt, where recruits would be received, might be desirable in the proper district of the corps.

22. *Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps, or a distinct agency?*

The recruiting should be carried on separately.

23. *What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the army of the Bengal presidency?*

It seems to be a matter of little moment.

24. *Should similar or different precautions be taken in connexion with recruits for police corps in the Bengal presidency?*

It seems to be a matter of little moment.

25. *Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for service in India with the natives of the country; and, if so, should they be formed in separate regiments, or in companies, or otherwise?*

It is believed they would cost too much to be used to any extent, and that the recruiting would be very difficult, and the supply of men willing to enlist limited.

26. *If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries, which are the countries and races to be preferred?*

Answered in No. 25.

27. *What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting?*

Answered in No. 25.

28. *Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments?*

They had better be kept separate, I think.

29. *If so, should such company or companies be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from European corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European corps, and subject to periodical relief?*

Answered in No. 14.

30. *Where should the barracks of such companies be placed relatively to the lines of the native troops?*

Answered in No. 14.

31. *Would such detachments seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?*

They would be inconvenient.

32. *How should such companies be armed, with similar or different weapons from the native troops with whom they would be associated?*

If they were associated with native troops they should be armed with a superior weapon to that given to the natives.

33. *How should the native infantry of the Bengal presidency be armed?*

With ordinary percussion muskets.

34. *How should police corps in the Bengal presidency be armed?*

A light percussion musket, fusil, or carbine.

35. *Do the advantages of making the dress of the native soldier a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?*

It is doubtful whether there are any advantages whatever. Probably the reverse would be the more advantageous of the two, to a certain extent.

36. *How should the native infantry of the Bengal army be dressed, with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier?*

With a loose dress or tunic, loose trousers, and turbans. The tunic and trousers of light material in summer, and of some warm cloth in winter.

37. *It has been proposed that to every European local regiment a native irregular regiment, officered from that European regiment alone, should be attached; what is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry in close and permanent association?*

It might be tried as an experiment; but there does not seem to be any advantage promised from it. It might perhaps consider itself entitled not to be employed except with its European corps, which would be a great disadvantage.

38. *Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers present any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?*

There appears to be no analogy. The European and native regiments, it is presumed, would stand in line together, share danger alike, and perform much the same duties. The drivers and gun lascars are looked upon as inferiors by the gunners, and consider themselves so.

39. *How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps?*

If such a corps was established, the lines and barracks should be near each other, but separate.

40. *Would such a system be favourable or the reverse to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops which is an element of strength?*

I do not think the adoption of the system would have much effect one way or the other; but I can see no particular advantage from it.

41. *How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war?*

It might be made to dovetail, but sometimes inconvenience, would arise from it, if, as a matter of course, a European regiment was always attended by its own native regiment.

42. *Is it desirable that the native troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of auxiliary native battalions in permanent association with European corps?*

They must be trained to act occasionally with no Europeans, save their own officers. There is no fear of their looking down upon European troops, but we should never again rely upon their feelings of dependence on Europeans, or on any other of their supposed feelings, but place it altogether out of their power to do serious mischief, which I believe to be by no means incompatible with getting good service out of them.

II.—MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

1. *Can you suggest improvement in the Articles of War in use in the Bengal native army?*

The powers of commanding officers should be greatly increased. It is doubtful if there should be such a tribunal as a native regimental court-martial, and it might without inconvenience be abolished, if the powers of commanding officers were adequately increased.

2. *Should the special rules regulating punishments in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?*

No; decidedly not. It is impossible to assimilate them, and therefore unwise to attempt it.

3. *Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the Bengal army?*

No; I should say not. Commanding officers have been too much hampered by them, and offenders have often escaped through some trivial error in the proceedings of courts-martial. This is most undesirable, especially with natives.

4. *What means are adopted to acquaint the native troops of the Bengal army with the military code under which they live and are governed?*

The Articles of War are directed to be periodically read out to the men.

5. *What proportion of the native troops can read for themselves in the vernacular dialect the Articles of War?*

Quite impossible to say; but of those who could read, I am told, very few probably ever perused the Articles of War.

6. *Under what military or civil code are police corps in the Bengal presidency?*

I have not the least idea.

7. *How is discipline maintained, and the authority of officers, European and native, upheld in police corps in the Bengal presidency?*

I know nothing of these police corps.

8. *Do you consider that the provision made for maintaining the discipline of police corps, and the authority of their European and native officers, sufficient, and the working satisfactory?*

I know nothing of these police corps.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTIONS, AND REWARDS.

1. *In the native regiments of the Bengal native infantry, what is the system of promotion? Is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?*

I am informed, and can also state from my own knowledge, that promotions went much by seniority; but sometimes men were promoted out of their turn for smartness, gallantry, &c. In some corps commanding officers promoted out of turn more than in others. A good deal had been done at head quarters of late years to encourage promotion by seniority, save in cases where the men were disreputable or very incompetent. There was an old order that men should not be promoted who could not read and write. This, in most cases, used to be a dead letter, but was very generally enforced after the publication of the new military regulations in 1855, and occasioned much dissatisfaction amongst men who had expected promotion, and were thus suddenly superseded owing to the revival of this rule.

2. *Are the native officers of the native infantry of the Bengal army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?*

Not generally so. There are exceptions, however.

3. *Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the men from amongst whom they have risen?*

I am informed that their qualifications originally were identical; but having been non-commissioned officers for several years, before obtaining commissions, they usually have learned more of their duty than they knew when sepoy, and many of them can drill a company very well. This I can state from my own observation.

4. *Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or in promotion from one commissioned grade to another?*

None.

5. *Does the intervention of the native officers, between the European officers and their men, weaken the influence of the European officers?*

Does a full complement of the European militate against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officers?

Not necessarily so, to both questions.

6. *Has it been found in the native infantry of the Bengal army, that on the occurrence of mutinies the native officers have given timely information, or been of any use in aiding the European officers to check mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?*

No; from all the information I have obtained, the native officers have gone with the men.

7. *Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued in the native infantry of the Bengal army?*

Must be continued, unless the number of European officers present with the native corps is to be immensely increased, which seems neither possible nor desirable.

8. *Is the substitution of an European sergeant and corporal to each company of a native regiment in lieu of its native officers advisable?*

I should say this would be inexpedient.

9. *If the abolition of the grade of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument thus closed to the native soldier, would a graduated scale of good service pay, and retiring pensions claimable after specified periods of services, be a compensating encouragement, and as efficacious as the commissioned grades?*

The abolition of the grade of native officer does not seem advisable, but a graduated scale of good service pay, and retiring pension claimable after specified periods, as a compensating encouragement, would, in my opinion, be injudicious. Men would cling on, when past work, to obtain higher pensions; and experience shows that commanding officers will not always prevent this.

10. *Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native troops to the British service?*

Not at all. The idea always previously entertained that the pensions ensured the loyalty of the army has proved to be utterly fallacious. Men who had just obtained pensions at the time of the mutiny, and could in no way be affected by the "greased cartridge" question, at once joined the rebel ranks. The number of pensioners that have come forward to support us, is believed to be very small.

11. *Should not the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?*

It is very doubtful if this is advisable. From all I have gathered from officers of experience in the Company's service, we do not know the natives sufficiently, and are more likely to promote a smart rascal than a good reliable soldier. The promotion should be by seniority to a certain extent; that is, the senior fit for promotion should be taken; and only occasionally, for great merit, or for distinguished gallantry, should a sepoy far down the list be advanced.

12. *Should the system of pensions, as now in force by regulation, be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?*

The system of pensions should be altogether modified. I would recommend that men should be enlisted for a certain number of years, ten or twelve say, and only those who were considered good men in every way should be allowed to remain beyond that period, and then as a favour. These, of course, would be the only men who would eventually obtain pensions. Even the men who were allowed to remain (who should be limited), should only be re-enlisted for ten years more, and so on. After 22 years service, if a man was not allowed to re-enlist (owing to physical unfitness, or otherwise), and his conduct had been good throughout his service, a trifling pension might be given. After 30 years service a well conducted man might claim a pension. Some such system would make the men anxious to conduct themselves well, and would make promotion tolerably rapid. Thereby doing away with the great evil of aged non-commissioned officers.

13. *What is the charge to the state of military pensions to native officers and men of the Bengal native army?*

I have no idea.

14. *Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in courts-martial?*

Generally not.

15. *Are native commissioned officers on a par with European sergeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?*

Generally not; but the native commissioned officers are usually very old and worn out; European sergeants and corporals are usually in the very flower of life.

16. *If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, what will be the best organization for the military corps?*

The Punjab organization for military corps answers well, but more European officers than four are needed, and on service commanding officers of these regiments generally apply for others to be attached. There should not be less than eight European officers present with a corps of infantry. It is often absolutely necessary that detachments of a troop or company should have a European officer.

- i. *Should they be fully officered by native commissioned grades, as well as with European officers, or—*

i. A full proportion of native officers; European officers as above.

- ii. *Fully officered with European, but have no native commissioned grades, or—*

ii. If on the Punjab system, need not be fully officered with European officers, but should have full proportion of native officers. If on the old regular system, must have full proportion of European officers (at least one a company, besides staff), besides native officers.

- iii. *Be officered like irregular corps, viz., have the full complement of native commissioned officers, with but a few European officers?*

iii. Already answered.

17. *How should the police corps be officered, the question applying both to European and native commissioned grades?*

A commandant and adjutant should be sufficient European officers for a police corps, with the usual proportion of native officers allowed to irregular infantry and cavalry.

18. *If irregular corps and police corps have native commissioned officers, and regular corps have no native commissioned officers, but only good service pay and pensions as an incitement to good conduct and efficiency, will the higher pay to privates and non-commissioned officers suffice to render the regular as popular as the irregular and police corps, and to draw as good recruits?*

Naturally not; the corps that are required to fight alongside of European regiments, and to move about India, should be on a more advantageous footing as regards pay, and on an equal footing at least as respects proportion of officers and non-commissioned officers, with police corps. In those of the latter, now raising, it is believed the sepoys receive as much as in the regular army or the Punjab corps. Of course men will prefer the police, for many reasons.

19. *In police corps, is there on first admission any test or examination as to capabilities of reading and writing, or are qualifications tested on promotion to non-commissioned grades, or on promotion to commissioned grades?*

I have no means of knowing.

20. *Has the distinct organization and the difference of system, regulations, and component races, in the three native armies proved favourable to our power in India?*

The distinct organization I believe to have been a benefit. If we had possessed one army in 1857, instead of three, (or with the Punjab, we may say four,) armies, we should have lost India.

21. *Should a certain degree of distinctness of system, organization, and composition, according to the views of separate governments, to time, and to local circumstances, be allowed; or should endeavours be made to assimilate or even to amalgamate the three armies?*

To amalgamate or to assimilate the three armies would, I believe, be dangerous and impolitic. A craving for uniformity has already done much mischief in the native army. What seems to be wanted is, not uniformity, but dissimilarity. We should therefore have corps of all races, and under different systems; but all governed by a few broad general rules.

IV. EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. *Within your experience, have the powers of commanding officers of native corps been increased or diminished in the Bengal army; and state the orders, or measures, or changes in the practice of the service to which you attribute such effect?*

They have been diminished practically, though not avowedly. Commanding officers have been much hampered with regard to promotions; and courts-martial sentences, approved and carried out by them, have been constantly upset, either in consequence of petitions to headquarters, or owing to flaws discovered in proceedings. The Deputy Judge Advocates of divisions are principally employed in endeavouring to discover mistakes in regimental courts-martial, in which they are often successful. Then again, a commanding officer sees his best officers often withdrawn for staff employ when he can ill spare them. At other times, the bad officer, who has set him at defiance and neglected his duty, is taken away without the commanding officer being consulted. All these things tend to weaken a commanding officer's authority, and are believed to have increased of late years.

2. *During the above period have the powers of officers of European or native corps been increased or diminished?*

They have been restricted.

3. *What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps upon the discipline of corps in the native infantry of the Bengal army?*

The result has been, I will not say the "mutiny," for that is doubtless owing to many things, but certainly the result has been to render the commanding officers almost cyphers, and their position undesirable. The commanding officer being thus crippled, found his only means of getting influence with the men was by flattering and coaxing them, and thus discipline was still further shaken. In truth, it was only when it suited the pleasure and convenience of the sepoy that he went heartily with commanding officer.

4. *What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the influence of captains, or officers in charge of companies?*

The result necessarily must be bad.

5. *Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps? Upon the distant authority of head quarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers commanding companies, and of the commanding officer of the regiment?*

The discipline of the regiment must mainly depend upon the influence of the commanding officer, and of the officers commanding companies.

6. *Should the power of commanding officers, and of officers in charge of companies, be increased or diminished?*

Rather increased than diminished.

7. *What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?*

I have already suggested enlarged powers being conferred on commanding officers. They should have authority to discharge a sepoy, to reduce a non-commissioned officer, or to confine a sepoy for days, and with stoppages of pay for the days in confinement, as in the Queen's service, always recording the circumstance in their regimental orders, and stating the nature of the offence. They should have power to stop a man's furlough. But above all, they should be as little interfered with as possible by superior authorities in matters of regimental detail. The Asiatic soldier must look to his commanding officer as very powerful. If a regiment is in bad order, and the commanding officer obviously inefficient, the Commander-in-chief should be able to deprive him of command at once, and to place an efficient officer in his stead. This will answer much better than a constant vexatious interference.

8. *Is the influence of the European officers among native troops greatest in time of peace or in time of war?*

The good officer will always have influence; but with native troops most so in time of war, because he is then thrown more with them. They know him better, and he becomes more acquainted with his men individually.

9. *What conclusion do you draw as to the course to be pursued with native troops in times of peace, with regard to the strength at which regiments should be maintained, the occupation to be found for them, and the like?*

Regiments should not be too strong; 640 or 700 sepoys is ample for infantry, 420 or 480 troopers for cavalry. If the native army is maintained on such a reduced scale, as it is hoped will be the case, there will be ample employment for it in the various duties of guards, escorts, detachments, &c.

10. *Has the strength of the native infantry of the Bengal army ever been so great in times of peace that it might have been in part employed otherwise than on mere military duties?*

No, it is believed not; but this has arisen not from necessary employment, but from the innumerable and most unnecessary guards and escorts required to be given by regiments.

11. *Would it have been practicable to employ the troops upon public works?*

Not as the army was constituted, and it does not seem desirable to maintain so large a native army as to have any number available for public works. A regiment of 640 sepoys will have, say,—

Sick	-	-	-	-	30
Recruits	-	-	-	-	50
On regimental employ	-	-	-	-	32
On regimental guards	-	-	-	-	40
On garrison guards (a small estimate)	-	-	-	-	50
On escorts or detachments (a small estimate)	-	-	-	-	50

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leaving, if not a man was on leave, only 392 men in the lines, to relieve 90 on guard, and to be in reserve to furnish detachments, &c. The above would be a most favourable case, and it will be seen there are none to spare for public works.

12. *In apportioning European officers to native troops,—*

- i. *Should native corps have a full complement of European officers, according to the present scale, besides a full complement of native commissioned officers, or,—*
- ii. *A full complement of European officers, and no native commissioned officers, or,—*
- iii. *A smaller number of European officers than at present, and a full complement of native officers?*

Already answered in question 16, section 3, of "Infantry."

13. *If a full complement of European officers, would you attach cadets at once to native corps, or first to European corps?*

All cadets should do duty with a European corps for at least a year before joining native troops; a longer period, perhaps, would be better.

14. *If a smaller number of European officers is assigned to native corps, how would you train them to this special employment?*

They should learn their military duty as officers of companies with a European regiment; their subsequent complete training should be with natives.

15. *Is the efficiency of regiments affected by the number of officers taken from corps for staff employments?*

It has been grievously so.

16. *Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable, in the course of mutinies, between the conduct of regiments with few, and those with many European officers present.*

The officers generally seem to have had more *esprit de corps*, when many were left with the regiment; but as respects the mutinies, the men made up their minds to rise, and neither number of officers nor the efficiency of commanding officers appears to have affected the course they took one way or the other.

17. *How can the demand for European officers for staff and detachment employment be best provided for, without injuring the efficiency of regiments?*

By having an unattached list for the staff.

18. *Would it be advantageous to the efficiency of the officers of the army as regimental officers to cut off the inducement which the hope of staff employment affords to young men to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches useful to the State?*

No; and it is presumed the State must have officers for special employment. There is no other sufficient source of supply open; certainly not on the same terms.

19. *Would the standard of acquirements amongst the officers of the army at large be lowered by any measure having such a tendency?*

It possibly would, as there would then be no inducement for officers to obtain proficiency in many branches of knowledge in which they now qualify themselves.

C. CAMPBELL, General,
Commander-in-chief.

ARTILLERY.

I.—RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF THE ARTILLERY.

1. *What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the native gunners of the Bengal army are composed?*
2. *What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the gun lascars of the Bengal army are composed?*
3. *What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the drivers of the Bengal army are composed?*

There is a much larger infusion of the Mahometan element than in the infantry. Some men (particularly gun lascars) come from Lower Bengal, which furnishes hardly any soldiers to any other branch of the army. These are Mahometans. The artillery generally come from Oudh, the Doob, Rohilkund, and the districts of Agra, &c.

4. *Should native gunners or golundazes continue to be enlisted, and to form part of the artillery of the Bengal army?*

The artillery should be entirely European.

5. *Should native drivers continue to be employed with European artillery?*

Certainly not. The native drivers are often a source of anxiety, and have the means of doing much harm.

6. *From what districts are the several races, tribes, or castes which enter into the golundaze drawn?*
7. *From what districts are the races, tribes, or castes which compose the gun lascars drawn?*
8. *From what districts are the drivers taken?*

Already answered in Nos. 1, 2, 3, of this section.

9. *Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded by regulation or practice of the service from the golundaz of the Bengal army; and, if so, for what reason?*

10. *The same question is repeated, both with respect to gun lascars and drivers.*

I am not aware of any castes, races, or tribes having been excluded.

11. *Supposing that native artillerymen were continued in the Bengal army, are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded from whom recruits for the golundaz might with advantage be enlisted?*

I cannot contemplate their being retained, as I understand there can be no doubt that they will be done away with, and no more enlistments are taking place.

12. *What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the golundaz of the Bengal artillery, for the gun lascars, and for the drivers?*

They are believed to come forward and offer themselves for service.

13. *On enlistment of recruits for the golundaz, the gun lascars, or the drivers of the Bengal artillery, what precautions of registry and other forms are taken before the local authorities of districts?*

Those laid down in the regulations, it is presumed.

14. *Would you suggest any alterations in the recruiting regulations or practice, if golundaz continue to be enlisted?*

15. *The same question is put with regard to gun lascars and drivers.*

Reply seems unnecessary.

16. *What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his being admitted into the golundaz of the Bengal artillery?*

Those laid down in the native articles of war, I presume.

17. *The same question is repeated with regard to gun lascars and drivers.*

Those laid down in the native articles of war, I presume.

18. *How long has this form of oath been in use in the Bengal artillery?*

I have no idea.

19. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the golundaz, gun lascars, or driver when first enrolled? or would you substitute any form of engagement for the oath?

It seems a matter of indifference.

20. If native artillerymen continue to be used, should the different battalions be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there and there only, or be recruited over a wide area irrespective of districts?
21. The same question is repeated with regard to gun lascars and drivers.
22. Should the battalions or troops of golundaz be homogeneous, to race or caste, or composite, having all tribes or castes mixed together?
23. If composite, in what proportion should the various races, tribes, or castes be entertained?
24. The two foregoing questions are repeated with reference to gun lascars and drivers?
25. What agency should be employed for recruiting golundaz, gun lascars, and drivers?
26. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, when enlisting recruits for the golundaz, gun lascars, and drivers?

Answers seem unnecessary.

27. If native drivers be discontinued would you replace them by Europeans, raised for that duty as part of their exercise, or by Anglo-Indians enrolled for this special duty?

All the European artillerymen should be trained as gunners and drivers, and the lightest men should act as drivers.

II.—RULES AND DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Are the same articles of war applicable to the European gunners and to the golundaz of the Bengal artillery?

No, certainly not.

2. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use of the golundaz of the Bengal artillery?

The same as suggested for the infantry.

3. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war as respects the European artillery?

They must be kept assimilated to the Mutiny Act, and articles of war for Her Majesty's forces; any difference is undesirable.

4. Are the gun lascars and drivers under the same articles of war as the golundaz; and do any improvements suggested comprehend these classes?

Yes, and the same improvements are desirable.

5. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

To assimilate the rules for natives with those applicable for Europeans is out of the question.

6. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the native artillery of the Bengal army?

I should suppose as unsatisfactorily in the native artillery as in the other branches of the service.

7. What means are adopted to acquaint the golundaz, gun lascars and drivers with the military code, under which they serve?

The articles of war ordered to be read to them periodically.

8. What portion of the golundaz, gun lascars and drivers can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular?

I have no means of answering this.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the Bengal artillery, what is the system of promotion in force for the gun lascars, golundazes, and drivers? Is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

The system of promotion is believed to be much the same as in the infantry.

2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the golundaz generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

Some are understood to be efficient; and during the mutiny the native batteries have been efficiently worked against us.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the golundaz, from among whom they have risen?

I am not aware that they are. They have of course had more instruction.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

I am not aware of there being any.

5. Do the golundaz of all grades undergo systematic instruction in anything else than ordinary gun drill? Are they practised at laying guns and mortars; at cutting fuses; at judging distances; adapting charges to mortars, &c.; or do European officers themselves execute these details?

They appear to understand all these things.

6. Can the golundaz of the Bengal artillery frequently read English and write it?

I believe not often.

7. Is it advisable that native gunners should be conversant with laboratory work?

No; but it would be inconvenient to have a battery with no one in it but the officer who understood laboratory work; therefore do away with the native artillery altogether.

8. Does the intervention of the native commissioned officer between the European officer and his men weaken or strengthen the position and influence of the European officer?

Answered under the head of "Infantry."

9. Have the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of golundaz been found on occasions of mutiny to evince cordial fidelity, to give timely information, and effectively to aid their European officers in checking or quelling mutiny? Have the native officers passively or overtly sided with the mutineers, or with the Government they had sworn to serve, and with the European officers?

All arms of the native army have been proved (as a rule) faithless, whatever their rank or caste.

10. If native artillery be continued in the Bengal army, should the grade of native commissioned officers be maintained or abolished?

It would in my opinion make very little difference in the amount of danger to the State arising from native artillery, whether these were native officers or not.

11. Would the substitution of such a number of European non-commissioned officers as would give one to each gun of a battery, in lieu of the native commissioned officers of golundaz, be advisable?

Simply throwing away the services of good men.

12. If the abolition of the grades of golundaz commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument be thus closed to the golundaz, would a graduated scale of good service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of service, be a compensatory encouragement and as efficacious as commissioned grades?

Answered under the head of "Infantry."

13. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the golundazes to the British service and the British rule?

Answered under the head of "Infantry."

14. Do the drivers and gun lascars receive pensions?

Yes.

15. Have the drivers and gun lascars of the Bengal artillery been found faithful in times of mutiny?

With native batteries, the drivers have joined the mutineers. With European artillery, both gun lascars and drivers have done good service in many cases, but they have been a source of anxiety, and always were narrowly watched. They knew that the slightest symptom of treachery would immediately cause their death. It is not desirable that our European artillery should be hampered by having such men attached to them,

16. *Should the system of pensions, as now in force by regulation, be maintained or modified, or prospectively abolished?*

Answered under the head of "Infantry."

17. *Can you state the charge upon the finances of the Bengal presidency on account of military pensions to the native artillery of the Bengal army?*

I have no means of knowing.

18. *Should not the system of promotion, generally by seniority, to the grade of native commissioned officer (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?*

19. *Are commissioned officers of golundaz generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?*

20. *Are native commissioned officers on a par with European sergeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?*

Answered under the head of "Infantry."

21. *Under the supposition that artillery be wholly European, would it be advisable to assimilate it as far as practicable with the royal artillery?*

Most desirable, with one exception. The Bengal horse artillery should, as at present, have every man able to serve as gunner and driver, and not have, as the royal artillery, a separate body of drivers unarmed, and who are not required to work a gun.

22. *What would this assimilation involve in changing the system of the Bengal artillery?*

It would involve an increase of officers and men (Europeans), and therefore add greatly to our strength.

23. *What would it involve of change in the material of the Bengal army.*

It would involve but little change. The Indian pattern ordnance is preferred as being lighter. The Bengal carriage is nearly the same as the royal carriage.

24. *What modifications would it be expedient to maintain in the organization of the Bengal artillery when assimilating it to the royal artillery, in consequence of the nature of the country, climate, and service?*

The modifications expressed in No. 21. It would be desirable also that a few store lascars and native artificers (non-combatants) should be attached to each troop or battery.

25. *Need the matériel of the Bengal artillery, if assimilated to that of the royal artillery, be at all modified in consequence of climate and service in India?*

Answered in reply No. 23. But the carriages should be made in India of timber properly seasoned.

26. *Do you advocate the maintenance of horse artillery at its present strength?*

It does not appear very excessive. There were 9 European and 4 native troops. The old European troops stand, a native troop is still employed, and 2 European troops have been formed by volunteers from the infantry, in lieu of two of the three mentioned native troops. Twelve troops are hardly too much for so enormous a country.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. *Within your experience, have the powers of the commandants of native battalions of artillery, and of officers in command of golundaz batteries of the Bengal artillery, been increased or diminished?*

2. *What has been the result upon the discipline of the golundaz of the Bengal artillery?*

3. *If golundaz artillery is continued, what measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline, and the confirmation of the influence and authority of the European officers?*

The replies made to these questions under the head of "Infantry" are equally applicable here.

4. *Is the efficiency of the Bengal corps of artillery affected by the number of officers taken away from corps duties for staff employment?*

Most lamentably so.

5. *How can the demand for European officers of artillery for staff and detached employment be best provided for without injuring the efficiency of the corps of artillery?*

By having an unattached list, and by "seconding" officers, as in the royal artillery. Every troop and battery requires four officers at least always present; and any system which fails to insure this is defective.

6. *Would the general standard of acquirements be lowered by any measure which, by removing the hope of staff employment, cut off the inducement which young artillery officers now have, to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches of knowledge useful to the State?*

The staff should be open to the artillery as to other branches.

C. CAMPBELL, General,
Commander-in-chief.

ENGINEER SOLDIERS, OR SAPPERS AND MINERS.

I.—RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION.

1. *What is the present constitution of the corps of sappers and miners of the Bengal army, as respects the European and the native elements?*

The companies are composed of natives. The full complement is twelve companies; each company should consist of—

- 1 soubadar.
- 1 jemadar.
- 6 havildars.
- 8 naicks.
- 2 buglers.
- 100 sepoy.

There is a European sergeant-major and a European quartermaster-sergeant to the corps, and two sergeants and ten corporals (European) trained at Chatham, and attached to each company or in such proportion as they may be available. There is a commandant and an adjutant always engineer officers; an interpreter, and quartermaster, who may belong to the engineers or to the infantry, and usually several young engineer officers are attached to the corps. There is also a conductor—an old sapper.

2. *What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the native sappers and miners of the Bengal army are composed?*

Mostly Hindostanees until lately. The sappers and miners at present are several hundred below the proper complement; and those who have been enlisted during the last year are believed to be generally Sikhs and Punjaubees. The Hindostanees who used to enlist were of all kinds, but there were probably fewer higher caste Hindoos than in the infantry.

3. *What districts are the races, tribes, and castes drawn from?*

From the usual recruiting districts, it is believed, of the North-western provinces.

4. *Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment either by the regulations or practice of the Bengal army?*

No such rule is known of.

5. *Are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of enlistment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the sappers and miners?*

None; it is believed now that Sikhs and Punjaubees are employed.

6. *What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits?*

None necessary.

7. *On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are taken before the local authorities of districts?*

The forms prescribed by regulation.

8. *When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of sepoy or the followers of corps, what precautions, if any, are taken?*

It is not known that any particular precautions are taken.

9. *What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition and efficiency of the engineer soldiers?*

In the sappers, all races who will come forward should be admitted; each race formed into a separate company or companies.

10. *What are the words of the oath administered to the engineer recruit on his entering the ranks of the sappers and miners?*
Supposed to be that laid down in the native articles of war.
11. *How long has the form been in use in the sappers and miners?*
Not known.
12. *Can you recommend any improvement in the matter or wording of the oath administered? or do you think an oath useless? Would you substitute any form of covenant or engagement?*
No.
13. *Should the companies of engineer soldiers be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or cast; or be composite, and have them mixed up; and if composite, in what proportion should the different classes enter?*
The companies might be of separate races or castes.
14. *What agency should be employed for recruiting?*
None is believed to be necessary.
15. *What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality?*
The same as heretofore prescribed by regulation.
16. *Has the recruiting of native engineer soldiers been hitherto from unskilled men, and is it practicable in the Bengal presidency, with reference to the habits and qualities, moral and physical, of the people, to adopt to any extent the system of the royal sappers and miners, by enlisting artificers and recruits conversant with some trade or special kind of labour?*
There would seem to be some difficulty in enlisting trained artificers in the sappers. One reason must be that the trained artificer earns more than the sapper receives as pay, and remains at his home. The old system seems to have worked well, and to have produced a very useful body of men.
17. *Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for hard labour and services in India, with the natives of the country, and if so, should they be formed in separate companies, or mixed up throughout the companies?*
Seems unnecessary, and they would probably require high pay.
18. *If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries for engineer soldiers, which are the countries and races to be preferred?*
Answered by answer 17.
19. *What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting.*
Answered by answer 17.
20. *Are the native engineer soldiers in sufficient strength for the requirements of service in the field.*
The corps of Bengal sappers and miners, if complete, and the two corps of Punjaub pioneers, would give upwards of 3,000 men, and this, with two or three companies of royal engineers, would probably be sufficient for the Bengal presidency.
21. *Is there any reason why all native infantry should not be trained to the ordinary work, in the execution of trenches; and be taught much now confined in general to sappers and miners?*
There seems to be no reason, save the disinclination of natives to do anything of the kind.
22. *Is any portion of the native infantry of the Bengal army accustomed to work in the execution of trenches, batteries, &c., and is the work done willingly?*
None are accustomed to the work in time of peace; sometimes native troops are so employed in time of war, but seldom have worked willingly.
23. *Has the sufficiency or insufficiency of the engineer soldiers of the Bengal army noted by you reference to the peculiar aptitude or the reverse of the native infantry of the line, or is your opinion based purely on the fair engineer wants of the service, irrespective of considerations connected with the efficiency of the line in siege and field works.*
The engineer soldiers, as before stated, seem to be sufficient for ordinary operations. In sieges, the line (European and native) must be called upon to work, and have done so generally; but the native infantry soldier of the regular army has never worked willingly.
24. *Have the sappers and miners of the Bengal army as many European sappers and miners, non-commissioned officers and privates as is desirable?*
Six European non-commissioned officers to a company of native sappers seems sufficient.
25. *How many European sappers and miners, and of what grades, should be attached to a company of native sappers and miners?*
The present number (six) is sufficient.
26. *Are you aware of any advantage which occurs from making the dress of the native sappers and miners closely resemble that of the European infantry?*
There is no advantage, that I am aware of.
27. *How are the corps of Bengal sappers armed?*
With carbines and swords.
28. *How should the engineer soldiers of the Bengal army be dressed and armed?*
Their present arms do very well, but the carbines would be, of course, more efficient if rifled. If other native troops have a smart dress, the sappers should have one likewise; but their working dress should be plain, as it is at present, in fact.
29. *What proportion of the native Bengal sappers and miners can read and write their own vernacular?*
I cannot say.
30. *What proportion can understand or speak English, or read and write English?*
I cannot say.
31. *Besides practice in sapping, mining, and field operations, have the Bengal sappers and miners any schooling?*
I believe so. They are apparently sufficiently trained for all practical purposes.
32. *Do you consider that they are to be classed as skilled engineer soldiers?*
Sufficiently so, as far as I can judge.
33. *With reference to the numerous demands for skilled European overseers and subordinates in the department of public works, and to military requirements, is it advisable to have, in addition to natives, a corps of European sappers and miners? If so, of what strength, and how officered?*
If companies of the royal engineers remain in India, the establishment of any other corps of sappers seems unnecessary. A reserve of European sappers should, however, be kept at head quarters to supply deficiencies in the non-commissioned officers with native companies, whether caused by death or by appointment as overseers.
34. *Could the corps of Bengal engineers furnish the requisite number of officers?*
That must depend upon the number of officers required and taken for the department of public works; but for the wants of Bengal, the number of engineer officers is too small.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. *Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war in use in the Bengal army?*
Answered under the head of "Infantry."
2. *Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?*
Alterations are desirable, but the rules should not be assimilated to those of the British army.
3. *Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the Bengal sappers and miners?*
No more satisfactorily than in other branches.
4. *What means are adopted to acquaint the Bengal sappers and miners of the military code under which they serve?*
The same as in other branches. See "Infantry."

III.—ORGANIZATION AND REWARDS.

1. *What is the system of promotions in the corps of Bengal sappers and miners; is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?*
Much the same, it is believed, as in other branches.

2. *Are the native officers of the Bengal sappers and miners generally of that intelligence and efficiency which renders them useful in the field?*

It is believed they make themselves useful, but they are too old.

3. *Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade? or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?*

It is not known whether there is any examination. There appears to be no general regulation for it.

4. *Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the sappers and miners from among whom they have risen?*

They must have had more instruction.

5. *Does the intervention of the native officers between the European officers and the men weaken the influence of the European officers?*

The answer already given to similar questions under the head of "Infantry" appears to apply to the sappers.

6. *Has it been found on the occurrence of mutinies that the native officers of sappers and miners gave timely information, and were of use in aiding the European officers to maintain discipline? Have they sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?*

The answer already given to similar questions under the head of "Infantry" appears to apply to the sappers.

7. *Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued in the Bengal sappers and miners?*

The answer already given to similar questions under the head of "Infantry" appears to apply to the sappers.

8. *When the European non-commissioned officers of sappers come on duty with the native commissioned officers, do the native commissioned officers or the European non-commissioned officers command in the absence of any European commissioned officer?*

An European non-commissioned officer would command, it is believed.

9. *Is the substitution of a full complement of European sergeants and corporals of sappers and miners to each company in lieu of its native officers advisable?*

The proportion now allowed is ample, and if native officers are allowed in other branches, they must be continued in the sappers.

10. *If the abolition of the grades of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument be thus closed to the native sappers, would a graduated scale of good service pay and retiring pension claimable after specified periods of service, be a compensatory encouragement, and as efficacious as commissioned grades?*

The answer to this question, under the head of "Infantry," applies equally to the sappers and miners.

11. *Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native troops to the British service?*

Not at all.

12. *Should the system of pensions, as now in force by regulation, be maintained, or modified, or abolished?*

Modified, as suggested under the head of "Infantry."

13. *If native commissioned officers are retained, should the system of promotion generally by seniority be altered, and promotion by merit and efficiency be the rule?*

Answer as under head of "Infantry."

14. *Are native commissioned officers of sappers and miners generally fit to take part in courts-martial?*

Answer as under the head of "Infantry."

15. *Are the native commissioned officers of sappers and miners on a par, in professional intelligence and efficiency, with the European non-commissioned officers and privates of the sappers and miners?*

Answer as under the head of "Infantry."

16. *What is your opinion of the system of appointing officers of the native infantry to the command of companies of native sappers and miners? Does it work well with the engineer soldiers? And is it advantageous as training to the European officers nominated to the duty?*

There seems no objection to it, if the native infantry officers are competent; but there ought to be sufficient engineer officers to render it unnecessary.

17. *Has the distinct organization, and the differences of system, regulations, and component races in the three native armies proved favourable to our power in India?*

Answered already, under the head of "Infantry."

18. *Should a certain degree of distinctness of system, organization, and composition, according to the views of separate governments, to time, and to local circumstances, be allowed, or, should endeavours be made to assimilate, or even to amalgamate, the three armies?*

Answered already, under the head of "Infantry."

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. *Within your experience have the powers of commanding officers of sappers and miners increased or diminished in the Bengal army?*

The answer given under the head of "Infantry" equally applies to the sappers and miners.

2. *During the above period, have the powers of officers of companies been increased or diminished?*

The answer given under the head of "Infantry" equally applies to the sappers and miners.

3. *Has the discipline of the corps of Bengal sappers and miners been influenced by the above causes?*

It would seem that it must necessarily have deteriorated.

4. *Upon what does the discipline of a body of sappers and miners mainly depend during a campaign? Upon the distant authority of head quarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in command of companies, and of the commanding officer of the corps?*

The answer given under the head of "Infantry" equally applies to the sappers and miners.

5. *Should the powers of commanding officers and of officers in charge of companies be increased or diminished?*

The answer given under the head of "Infantry" equally applies to the sappers and miners.

6. *What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of the discipline and efficiency of the corps of Bengal sappers and miners?*

The measures that have been suggested for the infantry are desirable for the sappers; but is most essential that a selected commandant should be always present with the sappers, and a portion of experienced European officers.

C. CAMPBELL, General,
Commander-in-chief.

APPENDIX No. 59.

CAVALRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. *What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army is composed?*

The Mohamedans, as I am informed, compose the large majority. Rohilcund, Delhi, and neighbouring districts furnished a large portion of the cavalry.

2. *What districts are the several races, tribes, or castes drawn from?*

3. *Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, either by the regulations or the practice of the service?*

I am not aware of any rule to this effect. Practically, the number of Hindoos has been small.

4. *Are there any races, tribes or castes hitherto neglected or excluded from whom recruits might with advantage be enlisted for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?*

I am not aware of any, but in the old irregular cavalry, Sikhs, Punjaubees, and Affghans were few, while in the Punjaub cavalry, they predominated.

5. *What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?*

They came forward freely without any special agency.

6. *On enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?*

Those laid down by the regulations should have been observed.

7. *When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of troopers, or the followers of cavalry corps, what precautions, if any, are taken?*

There seems to be no general rule on this head.

8. *What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?*

No regulations seem necessary, and uniformity in the composition is not desirable. The sources of supply are considered ample.

9. *What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?*

That laid down in the Articles of War, I presume.

10. *How long has this form been in use in the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?*

I have no idea.

11. *Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruit of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army when first enrolled?*

No; and from all I can learn, it is a matter of little moment.

12. *Should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bengal army be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?*

No; but it would probably be a good plan to have troops in squadrons of particular races.

13. *Or should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bengal army be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?*

They should be recruited generally over India.

14. *Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be homogeneous as to race or caste?*

No; but they might be so as to troops or squadrons.

15. *Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be composed of ressalahs, each of which shall consist of separate tribes or castes; or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in whole corps?*

Answered above.

16. *If the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportions should the races, tribes, or castes enter?*

Uniformity is undesirable. Corps should differ in this respect.

17. *What agency should be employed for recruiting?*

None is believed to be necessary.

18. *What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?*

The usual precaution should be taken of ascertaining from the district officers that the recruits really belong to the villages that they state they came from.

19. *Should a troop or squadron of Europeans form a component part of the irregular corps of cavalry of the Bengal army?*

It does not appear necessary. When practicable on service there should generally be a proportion of European cavalry, but I think it does not seem necessary to form them in regiments with irregular cavalry.

20. *If so, should such troops or squadrons be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from the European cavalry corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European cavalry corps, and subject to periodical relief?*

Answered above.

21. *How should the barracks and stables of such isolated European troops or squadrons be placed?*

Answered above.

22. *Would such detachments of Europeans seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?*

It would be inconvenient decidedly, for native cavalry corps or wings of corps are required at places where we send Europeans; and to have a commissariat would hamper efficiency and be otherwise inconvenient.

23. *How should such troops or squadrons of Europeans be armed? with similar or with different weapons from those in the hands of native troopers, with whom they would be associated?*

If there were such troops or squadrons they should be armed like other dragoons.

24. *How should the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be armed?*

Carbines and swords generally, but there need not be uniformity. Some corps might have lances, swords, and pistols.

II. RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. *Can you suggest improvements in the Articles of War now in use in the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?*

2. *Should the special rules regulating punishments in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?*

3. *Does the system of native courts' martial work satisfactorily in the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?*

4. *What means are adopted to acquaint the troopers of the Bengal irregular cavalry with the military code under which they serve and are governed?*

5. *What proportion of the troopers of the Bengal irregular cavalry can read and comprehend the Articles of War in their own vernacular?*

Answered under the head of "Infantry."

III. ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. *In the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, or seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?*

Seniority, it is believed, was less regarded in the irregular cavalry than in other branches, but still carried weight in promotion.

2. *Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?*

Generally more so perhaps than in other branches.

3. *Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the troopers from among whom they have risen?*

Originally not; but they have had more training, and to some extent were selected men.

4. *Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade; or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?*

None laid down.

5. *Cancelled.*

Not required.

6. *Has it been proved on occasions of mutiny, that the native officers have evinced cordial fidelity, given timely information, or been useful in aiding their European officers to check a general mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?*

Perhaps rather more than in the regular branches.

- 7, 8, 9. *Cancelled.*

Not required.

10. *Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native trooper to the British service and the British rule?*

No.

11. *Should the system of pensions, as now in force by regulation, be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?*

Answered under the head of "Infantry."

12. *What is the charge upon the finances of the State on account of military pensions to the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?*

I have no means of knowing.

13. *Should the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?*

Commanding officers should be left very much to their own judgment in making promotions in the irregular cavalry.

14. *Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?*

I should say only very moderately so.

15, 16. *Cancelled.*

Not required.

17. *Should any alteration be made in the mode of officering the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?*

Each troop should have a rissaldar, a noib rissaldar, and a jemadar.

18. *Among the classes which enter the regular and irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, which is the most popular, the regular or the irregular? and what reasons are assigned by the natives for the preference?*

The irregular with some classes; the regular cavalry with others; that is, with those who do not possess and cannot purchase horses, or have not relations in the irregular. There was no difficulty in obtaining candidates for either.

19, 20. *Cancelled.*

Not required.

21. *Under the supposition that irregular cavalry should be the only native cavalry in the Bengal army, should part be mounted by Government, or the whole placed on the usual footing of irregular cavalry in this respect?*

The whole should be on the usual footing of irregular cavalry, and none of the horses should be provided by Government.

22. *What is the average cost to Government of the horses on which the troops of the regular native cavalry of the Bengal army were mounted?*

I have no idea.

23. *Where are the horses obtained? and of what breeds are they?*

Principally stud bred.

24. *Whence does the irregular cavalry of the Bengal presidency draw its horses?*

From every part of the country where corps may be stationed.

25. *What is the average cost of the horses of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal presidency?*

I do not know, but it varies much at different periods, and in different provinces: perhaps ranging from rs. 100 to rs. 250.

26. *Are the requirements of the mounted branch of the Bengal army adequately met by the system pursued for obtaining horses?*

The stud does not produce sufficient horses for the force of dragoons and artillery required for Bengal.

27. *Can you suggest any improvement in the system of obtaining horses for the European cavalry and artillery of the army of the Bengal presidency?*

Arrangements should be contrived to procure horses from the Cape and Australia; also to purchase Arabs at Kurachee, and Cabul horses at Peshawur. These four sources and the studs would give sufficient horses, if it believed.

28. *It is advisable that the Government studs should be maintained, or should they be abolished, and Government rely on the markets of India, of foreign countries, and of British colonies, for a supply of horses for the army of India?*

I think it would be prudent that the studs should be retained.

29. *What is the pay of the troopers of irregular cavalry in the royal army?*

Twenty rupees per month.

30. *Has that pay proved sufficient to enable a corps to be well mounted and equipped, and thoroughly efficient in the field, during a protracted campaign?*

It is insufficient, and the men are consequently much involved until they obtain promotion. It has been recommended that it should be raised to rs. 25 per month.

30. *b. Have corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army been embarrassed by debt or free from debt?*

Some very much embarrassed.

31. *Should any alteration be made in the pay of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?*

An increase of rs. 5 per month to sowars is desirable, and a small increase to the higher grades.

32. *What is the system of the Bengal irregular cavalry with respect to Assamees, and the market value of the Assamee? Are there any restrictions upon the numbers which any native officer or capitalist of the corps may hold? Do you advocate the existence in corps of irregular horse of such large vested interest, or not? are they favourable to the maintenance of the efficiency of a corps in horses and in equipments, and to the conduct of duty?*

It is believed that the system varies much. Native officers are restricted in the number of their bargeers, but possibly they may secretly evade the rule, and have more bargeers than they ought. It seems objectionable that the bargeer system should be at all extended.

33. *What is the pay of mounted police in the North-west Provinces?*

I do not know.

34. *What is the organization of the mounted police of the North-west Provinces?*

35. *Of what races, tribes, or castes is the mounted police of the North-west Provinces composed?*

36. *How is the mounted police recruited, that is, what is the agency employed; the precautions taken before, or by the local authorities in entertaining men?*

37. *Where districts are large and duty heavy, has the pay of the mounted police at rs. per month been found adequate, and the police proved well mounted and efficient?*

I have no means of knowing.

38. *Is the difference between the pay of horse police, and that of irregular horse, such as to ensure the latter the superior mounting essential for his peculiar service?*

There should be such a difference. If an irregular cavalry trooper received rs. 25 per month, a police sowar certainly should not have more than rs. 22.

IV. EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. *Within your experience have the powers of commandants of corps of irregular cavalry in the Bengal army been decreased or diminished?*

They have been practically diminished.

2. *Cancelled.*

Not required.

3. *What has been the result upon the discipline of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps?*

Those who ought to know best say that the result has been unfavourable.

4. *Cancelled.*

Not required.

5. *Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps? upon the distant authority of head-quarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in charge of troops, and in command of corps of regular or irregular cavalry?*

Answered already under the head of "Infantry."

6. *Should the powers of commanding officers and of troop officers be increased or diminished?*

The powers of commanding officers should be increased. The troop commanders are natives, but they should have powers entrusted to them nearly akin to those of European officers of companies.

7. *What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?*

Those suggested already for the infantry.

8, 9, 10, 11, 12. *Cancelled.*

Not required.

13. *If a few European officers are assigned to a native corps of cavalry, whether regular or irregular, how would you select and train them?*

The original selection of officers to do duty with irregular cavalry should depend upon a man being a good horseman and linguist, and showing a taste for the branch. He should be with the irregular cavalry for a year on probation before he was finally appointed. Not one officer in ten is really suited for irregular cavalry.

14. *Cancelled.*

Not required.

15. *Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies in the conduct of corps (whether regular or irregular cavalry), whose complement of European officers was short or full?*

Answered under the head of "Infantry."

16, 17, 18, 19, 20. *Cancelled.*

Not required.

21. *Would it be practicable and advisable to attach to each European corps of cavalry a body of native irregular horse?*

It is doubtful whether this should be done. Opinions vary, and probably efficiency would be as well obtained by having separate cavalry corps, but there is no reason why both systems should not prevail.

22. *If so, what proportion should the native body bear to the European dragoons of the corps? how should it be armed? how mounted? how officered.*

If native cavalry form part of the same regiment as dragoons, the natives should not exceed two-fifths of the whole. They should be on the irregular system, armed as in other cases, and have at least one selected European officer for each squadron.

C. CAMPBELL, General,
Commander-in-chief.

APPENDIX No. 60.

MINUTE by the Hon. Lieut.-General Sir J. OUTRAM,
G.C.B.

September 30, 1858.

Governor-General's Memorandum on the Re-organization of the Army.

Our Hon. Prèsident has sent me these papers, in the expectation that I should first record my views on the subjects embraced in his Lordship's minute. But only a very small portion of the evidence then before the Governor-General has yet come to us, and not nearly the whole had been obtained when his minute was perused. I do not think therefore that I should be warranted in yet expressing my views on the whole question, for the reasons which I stated in my minute dated 30th May last, viz., as his Lordship intimates that it is his intention to solicit the aid of the President in Council in ultimately determining on the report to be made and measures to be proposed for the consideration of the home authorities, it appears to me that my opinions would be more worthy of his Lordship's notice, and their expression more calculated to conduce to the public interests, if I deferred until I had had the advantage of examining the recorded views of the various persons whom his Lordship proposes to consult, and I cannot but think it undesirable that I should commit myself intermediately to opinions which I may see fit to modify or withdraw when I shall have studied and pondered over that body of evidence which it is his Lordship's intention to submit to us.

We had relied moreover on the commission appointed by the Governor-General furnishing us with an analysis of the dissonant opinions, reasonings, and recommendations of the numerous military and civil officers of reputation whose opinions have been called for, and communicating his judgment thereon. That officer, we are informed, has been employed for some time past in collecting and collating information on the subject, but as yet we possess but a modicum of his collection, none of his collation, which latter should be called for, so far as it may yet have been prepared by Colonel Durand, whose sole attention has been devoted to the subject, thereby saving us from loss of time in wading through and comparing such a mass of conflicting statements.

As the Governor-General's 4th paragraph shows that he does not expect us to express an opinion on the several points involved in the re-organization of the army until more complete evidence is before us, I would defer entering on the subject until we are furnished with the entire evidence.

October 16, 1858.

I now learn, that at the rate the copies of the evidence are being furnished to us, it may be weeks before the whole is completed. I think, therefore, I ought no longer to defer recording my views on some of the more important points

discussed in the Right Hon. the Governor-General's memorandum, on which my decision is already formed, and not likely to be altered by any addition to the opinions we have obtained, especially as regards the very important questions of the proposed amalgamation of the army of India with the royal army, of the constitution of the staff, and the reform of the Madras and Bombay armies, which measures I consider of such vital importance, that I am anxious my honourable colleagues and my own views on those particular subjects, should be laid before the Home Commission before its final decision regarding them, if they are to be finally decided by that body. I purpose, therefore, now briefly submitting my general views on the several measures mooted by the Governor-General, and will hereafter consider more in detail these and the various supplementary measures contemplated, when the whole of the evidence called for by Colonel Durand is before us.

The first portion of the Governor-General's memorandum down to paragraph 16, and paragraphs 22 and 23, calls for no remark from me beyond the expression of my general concurrence in his Lordship's opinions as to the advisability of leaving certain points of the inquiry involved in the re-organization of the army, to the consideration of the Government of India, subject to the approval of Her Majesty's Government, and as to the permanent European force necessary to be maintained in the Indian provinces after the restoration of tranquillity.

Paragraphs 17 and 18.—Formation of the Bengal Army, European and Native.

I quite concur with the Governor-General as to the organization of the European portion of the Bengal army proposed in this 17th paragraph to comprise 30 regiments, which will absorb all the officers of the Bengal native army, with the exception of 20 cadres of regiments. But I would advise a different organization of the native portion of the Bengal army to what his Lordship proposes. I would not re-establish regular native infantry for Bengal, and would retain on the regular footing only the regiments which remained faithful, and those composed of the loyal remnants of other regiments; these I think should have higher pay than the rest of the native army comprised of irregular and police corps, who will generally, I understand, have nearly, if not quite, the same rates of pay as the line formerly received, and every reasonable distinction should be conferred on these regiments as a reward for their fidelity, and which regiments alone remaining *regular* and constituted on the old footing as to native officers, pensions, increasing pay on length of service, and all former privileges, would be a lasting memento of what the Bengal native army was.

By substituting 20 irregular for the 20 regular native regiments proposed by his Lordship, a considerable body of surplus officers would be supplied for general staff purposes and civil employ, who otherwise would have to be drawn from regiments, and no confusion would arise from these surplus officers being retained on the strength of the army if the "seconding" system is introduced, proposed by the Governor-General in his 31st paragraph.

The abolition of regular regiments in the army of Bengal, would cause the retention of the regular regiments in the Madras and Bombay armies to be regarded by the latter as a distinction secured to them by their fidelity.

Madras and Bombay Armies.

This reference to those armies brings me to the consideration of the Governor-General's remarks in his 23rd paragraph, to which I earnestly entreat the attention of the Home Commission; most thoroughly do I concur in the opinion therein expressed by his Lordship, that it would be a great error to forget that in prudence, as well as in justice, the native armies of Madras and Bombay, which are still standing at their full numbers, and have shown themselves on the whole loyal, must be treated continuously and considerately in the introduction of changes; not merely do I say with the Governor-General "that before any change which will raise discontent in these armies, the new Bengal army ought to be well in hand," but I go further; I consider that no change should be attempted, nor should it be allowed to appear that any such is contemplated, so long as those armies evince no symptom of disloyalty. The system and discipline maintained in those armies is in a great measure free from the blemishes which produced the revolt of the Bengal army, and I doubt whether any great change for the better could be introduced for many years to come; certainly no material change could be attempted, especially such as would entail the disbandment of large bodies of troops, without causing discontent and excitement which might lead to disastrous consequences; nor would I introduce even trifling changes just now in any branch of the armies of those presidencies, for any such would excite mistrust

and suspicion that greater changes were about to follow. On the contrary, I would proclaim to those armies how highly Her Majesty appreciates the loyalty they have evinced throughout the late trying crisis, in consideration for which they are assured that no alteration whatever shall be made in their organization, and that their constitution and privileges will be maintained so long as they continue loyal, &c., pointing to the utter extinction of the Bengal army as the consequence of disloyalty. Some such assurance is, I think, necessary, and should not long be delayed, for our native troops throughout India cannot otherwise than feel anxiety lest the misconduct of the sepoy of Bengal may cause us to discard from our service all of their caste and creed in other parts of India, so soon as we can conveniently do so.

Doubtless it is desirable to turn the regular cavalry into irregular or Selladar cavalry, and to reduce the native artillery in those armies; but even that I would not venture to do, so long as they continue loyal. The fate of the Bengal army will, it is to be hoped, deter those branches of the sister armies from following its example, and in accordance with my proposed proclamation, so long as they display no disloyalty, I would allow them to remain as they are.

If, however, the reform of those arms in Madras and Bombay must be carried out, the utmost that should be ventured with that view should be to allow the native artillery gradually to die and pension off, the pensioners to draw their pensions at head quarters, recruiting being stopped, and no future artillery instruction to natives being allowed; and by opening the ranks of Selladar irregular cavalry to volunteers from the regular cavalry, with the advantage of obtaining selladarships (assamies) without purchase, numbers would thus be induced to leave the regulars, and by, at the same time, ceasing to recruit for the regular cavalry, it also would gradually become extinct without the risk being incurred, which a more summary change might involve.

Native Cavalry, paragraphs 19 and 20.

I concur in what the Governor-General states in his 19th and 20th paragraphs, as to the necessity of maintaining irregular native cavalry, and none but irregular cavalry in the Bengal army; and I think great advantage will result from the organization proposed by his Lordship for the European local cavalry, viz., 10 regiments of 440 sabres each, instead of five of 818 sabres; as to the proportions which European and native cavalry should bear to each other in cantonment and field service, and the mode in which they should be connected, &c.; all such points will be considered when hereafter I enter into details.

European Artillery, paragraph 21.

I entirely approve of the artillery augmentation and organization for Bengal, proposed by his Lordship in his minute, dated 9th August, referred to in the 21st paragraph. Minor points remain for decision, such as the abolition of the distinction between horse artillery and field batteries, &c., which will be considered with the other details.

European Cavalry and Infantry for Madras and Bombay, paragraphs 22, 23, and 25.

The Governor-General's estimate of the European cavalry and artillery required for Madras and Bombay calls for no remark from me, beyond the expression of my general concurrence.

Artillery of Madras and Bombay, paragraph 24.

The Governor-General's minute respecting the artillery of Madras and Bombay, here referred to, have not been received. I have already shown why I deprecate any immediate interference with any branch of the armies of those presidencies. But that, if the native artillery are to be abolished, they should be allowed to die or pension off; future instruction of natives will be prevented by ceasing to recruit for the artillery; were the existing native artillerymen to be discharged, they would be available to instruct rebels, and to serve rebel guns.

Staff and civil employ, paragraphs 30, 31, 32, and 34.

In the Governor-General's views regarding staff and civil employment I entirely concur; I think with his Lordship that the advantages secured to the State by the system of supplying officers from the army for civil duties, and to officer the regular and police corps, greatly counterbalances the disadvantages to the army of having a portion of its officers withdrawn from regimental employ. It would be well if the demand could be more limited, but I would not deprive the Government of the advantage of such a field of selection, and I would not close the door to such a wholesome incentive to mental exertion as the prospect of civil employment, and to the exercise of physical powers; and the hope of employment with irregular corps stimulates in

young officers, without which the idle life of mere garrison duty in time of peace, under the relaxing climate of India, would cause all not naturally of strong or superior minds to deteriorate both mentally and bodily, and of course the morale and discipline of the Indian army would suffer in proportion to the inefficiency of its officers.

The disadvantage resulting from too largely denuding regiments of officers may, however, be greatly remedied by introducing, as proposed by his Lordship, the system of *seconding* followed in the royal army, so far as in the case of officers removed for civil employment, not army staff. This would be as advantageous and encouraging to regimental officers, as a staff corps, and far less costly to the State.

The mode of "seconding," I am informed, is, when an officer obtains a staff appointment of a certain class, his name is retained on the list of officers, but promotion is made in his room, adding to the grade in which the staff officer is, that is the staff officer is borne on the strength of his corps as a supernumerary, though his place is filled up, and affords the same promotion to all below him as if he were struck off. The rule in the British army is, I believe, that for the first two years that they hold civil appointment they are not "seconded," and draw their regimental pay. After two years they are seconded, and cease to draw military pay. They continue in this position ten years, after which (or a total of 12 years) they must either retire from the military service or return to their regiment. If they return they rejoin with the position they may have attained on the list, their promotion having gone on as if they had remained with the regiment.

I see no difficulty in introducing this arrangement, somewhat modified, perhaps, into the Indian army.

Proportion of European to Native Troops, paragraph 26.

I agree with his Lordship in thinking that the proportion of European to native troops, should not be less than that of two to five for the present, if ever hereafter it may be reduced; under the designation native troops, I include armed police.

Amalgamation of the Indian Army with the Royal Army, paragraphs 28, 29.

The amalgamation of bodies so differently constituted as the British and Indian armies,* I deem to be impossible without injury to the interests of the latter, especially of its officers. But were it practicable to effect the amalgamation with perfect justice to it and to them, I consider that the measure would be most impolitic. In the first place, to assimilate the two armies the system of purchase must be introduced into the Indian army, which would be detrimental to its moral, but more particularly would it be injurious to the Indian army, as creating a spirit of restlessness among young men (the officers) naturally desirous of changes and a feeling of instability in their position in India, which would deprive officers of heart in the service, it would destroy that *esprit de corps* which now animates our Indian army. The officers composing that army should regard India as their home, the only sphere in which they can acquire or hope for promotion and distinction, and to reconcile themselves to that home, care should be taken not to lower the India army in respect of dignity, privileges, and advantages not merely below, but even to an equality (in those respects), with the British army. Both the Indian local army (I mean its officers) and the portion of the British army serving in India, should enjoy superior advantages to what the British army possess in Europe, to reconcile them to service in India, and as being permanently fixed in India; the Indian officers should have guaranteed to them a larger share of staff employment than what would be secured to them by their mere numerical proportion to the officers of the British troops serving in India. For all staff appointments beyond the general staff of the army, the local experience of Indian officers ought to render them more eligible than officers of the British army whose sojourn in India is uncertain and more limited.

With a view to training officers for India, and leading their thoughts and wishes from early youth to India, I would retain on an enlarged scale the Addiscombe institution as the military college for India; where it should be incumbent on all candidates for the Indian army to undergo a course of education adapted for the career before them, for at least two years.

Although I would deprecate any change which would admit of officers of the Indian exchanging into the royal army, at any rate under the rank of a field officer, I concur with his Lordship in thinking that "senior officers," whose

* By thus styling our army the Indian army, in order to distinguish it from the existing British army, I do not mean to fix that designation on it. It ought, I think, to be styled "British Indian Army."

services and ability may render them "fit for such marks of Her Majesty's confidence shall be permitted to serve Her Majesty out of India as well as in this country," and that "divisional and brigade commands should be distributed "between the two armies in fair proportion."

Above the rank of lieutenant-colonel, exchanges might perhaps be allowed without disadvantage.

One great advantage of thus employing a portion of the officers of the Indian army in civil and other State service is, that for those occupying civil offices in India a military training may often prove of great advantage, as on occasions of sudden demands, that in times of war it enables Government at once to strengthen regiments with officers.

Admixture of European and Native Forces, paragraph 36.

I agree with the Governor-General in considering that this point ought to be left for decision in India. I will now merely observe, reserving for future consideration the many practical objections there are to the intermixture of European and native troops, that I think a close and intimate association of natives with the European soldiery, except in the field, should be avoided as much as possible; the closer the association with the lower class of our countrymen, the less respect is inspired by the latter; the closer the association with officers and educated Englishmen, on the contrary, the greater is the respect secured.

Native Colonial Troops for Service in India, paragraphs 38, 39.

I quite concur with the governor-general in deprecating the employment of native colonial troops in India for the reasons stated in his 38th and 39th paragraphs; and I heartily endorse his Lordship's opinion thus expressed:—"it has now become, at least as necessary to inspire confidence and good-will as fear. Few measures could be more destructive of the first-named feelings than the suspicion that that which we consider the most honourable employment which we can offer them is, under a new order of things, to be put in other hands.

Native Artillery, paragraphs 41 and 42.

I am of opinion with the Governor-General, that all the native artillery of the Bengal army should be abolished, with the exception of the few guns required at certain frontier posts, and in positions where Europeans could not live. But, for reasons before stated, I would rather retain the native artillery of Madras and Bombay, or, if it must be got rid of, I agree with his Lordship, that "the transition from "native to European artillery must be made gradually." But, I would urge very gradually, I would turn no trained artillerymen loose upon the country.

Cadets to do duty in the first instance with European Corps, paragraphs 43 and 44.

I am disposed to doubt the policy of attaching young officers for the first six months to European corps, which has been ordered. After a cadet has been well grounded in his military education at Addiscombe, I think that the sooner he is sent to do duty with a native corps under a good commander, the better. He will the sooner acquire a knowledge of the native languages—can only there obtain an intimate acquaintance with the native soldier, which will enable him to distinguish and appreciate his better qualities, and to discourage and counteract his evil tendencies. I am surprised to see that General Jacob advocates (cavalry) officers on first joining to serve for a year or two with an European regiment, for he elsewhere dwells on the advantage of "the officers of the European and native troops "thoroughly understanding the Asiatic soldiers, and treating "them accordingly;" and he most truly says, "when the "native soldier feels that he is understood, and justly "appreciated by officers whom he also respects, there is "nothing which he will not readily do or submit to. But "under other conditions a little misunderstanding might "lead to fatal mischief."

Now I maintain that early association with European troops is of all things that most calculated to prevent the officer acquiring the understanding and appreciation of the Asiatic character which is so essential to his personal influence over the native soldier. By sending young officers on their entry into the service to European regiments, they naturally imbibe the feelings and prejudices of those with whom they are associated, and it is an undoubted fact, that even in former times, before the late lamentable events had impressed the European mind, and especially the European soldier, with a contempt and hatred for the native character, it was seldom an officer could be found, whose early training had been in European regiments, who had not imbibed a distaste to the native, which no length of after service with a native regiment would remove; what then could now be expected from a young man, whose first years or months in

India are restricted to European association alone? Would he not be more disposed to foster than to ameliorate the better feelings which now unhappily have arisen between the governing and the subject races, until which are obliterated we cannot hope that our rule in this country will be satisfactory or profitable, either to England or India.

The greater proportion of the officers of the Bengal army will now be required from its European regiments, but I would rather that at least a moiety of the cadets should do duty with native corps on their first arrival in India, than that all should be attached in the first instance to European regiments. The system of selection for command now introduced will ensure their being well looked after by able and good officers, and by the time those finally posted to European regiments join their corps, they will have acquired some knowledge of, and probably some taste for, the languages, which will induce many to continue their studies, while at the same time their prejudices against the natives will have become much modified, if not removed.

But the selection of officers for civil and police duties, &c., will be much reduced in the Bengal presidency by so great a proportion being occupied by the local European army. I would draw more largely on the Madras and Bombay armies, therefore, for the officers required for such duties in the upper provinces, Oude and the Punjab. Especially should Madras be called upon to supply more, which at present provides so small a portion. A larger share of those much coveted appointments would compensate the officers of those presidencies, in some measure, for the greater advantages in promotion, &c., which the Bengal army has lately acquired.

Questions remaining for after consideration, paragraphs 45, 46, 47, and 48.

The remaining portion of the Governor-General's minute refers briefly to the many minor and collateral questions remaining for consideration. This I shall notice when the whole of the evidence is before us.

There is one subject on which his Lordship has not touched in this memorandum, which I look upon as one of the most important questions that has to come under the consideration of the Home Committee, viz., the continuance or modification of the pension department, on which I wish to make a few observations.

I so entirely concur in General Jacob's opinion on this subject, that I will premise by quoting his views as my own:—"The pensions must have had and have considerable effect in attaching men to the service. But in this case, as in all others, throughout the Indian services, the attempt to prevent the possibility of abuse has crushed all life out of the system; and under a better arrangement the effect of the same amount of public expenditure in pensions would assuredly have been tenfold greater than it is under existing regulations. The pensioners of each regiment should remain attached to that regiment; every man after 20 years' service might be allowed a moderate pension, and after 30 years' service a more liberal allowance. The commanding officer, in consultation with his medical and other officers, should have power to transfer men to the regimental pension list after the prescribed period of service, and such pensioners should be borne on a separate roll as pensioners of such a regiment. It should at all times be discretionary with a commanding officer to discharge any man without pension. The pensioners should be considered as belonging to the regiment, and no other than the regimental authorities should have anything to do with them. They should reside and receive their pensions at regimental head quarters only."

This arrangement is somewhat dependent on regimental head quarters being fixed as recommended by General Jacob and of the advantage and advisability of which I am fully impressed, but that is a matter which may be left for discussion hereafter; suffice it here to observe, that with free permission to visit the place of their birth occasionally, such an arrangement would not be unpopular with the sepoy, and would secure a colony of rising generations of sepoys with every regiment. It would undoubtedly be a great saving to Government in the cost of pension, paymasters, with their costly establishments, marching batta, &c.

But my principal object in now adverting to the subject of pensions is to express my hope that a system which has just been introduced may be at once put a stop to. I observe that the officer commanding the Lucknow regiment has been instructed to inform all new enlistments that their obtaining pensions will depend on their conduct up to the time of their retiring from the service. With sepoys such an intimation is tantamount to telling them that pensions have ceased, for suspicious as they now are of any really generous intentions towards their class on our part, they will have no

confidence whatever in any promise coupled with a condition. In the sincerity of nothing but a distinct pledge without any reservation will they place any faith, and even if convinced of our sincerity in making the promise, what reliance can they have on ever acquiring a pension when subjected to the caprice of every commanding officer under whom they pass their service, who, they would say, might form a dislike to them from any trivial cause, and record something against them which after the completion of their service would be brought forward as an excuse for debarring them from pension.

It appears to me that any intimation of the sort is quite unnecessary, and is only calculated to weaken the hold we possess over those who enter our ranks. The mere fact of a sepoy passing through the length of service which entitles to pension is a guarantee that he deserves it, for with the power of summary dismissal now vested in commanding officers no undeserving man will be retained in the service, and it is but just, as it is politic, that the sepoys should be assured and feel as a certainty that on completing certain terms of service, and it is but just as it is politic that the sepoys should be assured and feel as a certainty that on completing certain terms of service they will secure certain amounts of pension.

(Signed) J. OUTRAM.

October 16, 1858.

(True copy.)

APPENDIX No. 61.

REPLIES by Major-General BIRCH, C.B., Military Secretary, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

RE-ORGANIZATION OF ARMIES OF INDIA.

The Heads of Inquiry in the Court's Despatch may be classed as follows:—

- I. The Recruiting and the Composition of Corps.
- II. The Military Code and Rules of Discipline.
- III. Organization, Promotion, and Rewards.
- IV. European Officers.

INFANTRY.

I. THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the native infantry of the Bengal army is composed?

1. They consist of mussulmans, brahmins, chuttees, rajpoots, gwallas, sheers, and a great variety of Hindoo castes besides.

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?

2. I am not able to answer this question. There are men of all tribes and castes which are admitted into the army to be found in every district in which we recruit.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment either by the regulations or the practice of the Bengal army?

3. Extract General Regulations of the Bengal army, published in 1855, sec. XXXI., clause 6:—"It is not considered desirable to have too large a proportion of brahmins in any regiment; but in other respects commanding officers, when enlisting Hindoos of the respectable classes, are not to be biassed in favour of any particular religion or caste; special care, however, must be taken to reject all men of the inferior castes, such as bunneeahs, kyeths, naees, teeles, thumolees, gurrereas, lodhs, bhojuahs, kahars, mooraees, kandors, malees, kachees, and any others habitually employed in menial occupations."

Clause 7. "The number of Punjabees in a regiment is never to exceed 200, nor are more than 100 of them to be sikhs."

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected, or excluded from the field of enlistment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the native infantry of the Bengal army?

4. Goojurs, jats, gwallas, boatmen, the men along the right bank of the Indus and from Bundelcund might with advantage be more numerously entertained; but they are not excluded.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts of the Bengal presidency or its dependencies?

5. Parties are sent from regiments to recruit in districts with the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief. Native officers and men proceeding on furlough are made use of to bring back with them recruits.

6. On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?

6. Native officers are required by the regulations to take each recruit, after enlistment, to the tehseeldar in whose jurisdiction the village he belongs to is situated, in order that the tehseeldar may inquire and verify that his name, caste, parentage, and residence have been duly stated. Lists, with the tehseeldar's signature, are to be shown to the district officer that he may satisfy himself and record that the returns are formal and correct. A nominal roll, in a prescribed form, will then be prepared by the district officer and handed to the recruiting officer for delivery to the commanding officer of his regiment. General Regulations, sec. 31.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments or taken from the families of sepoys or the followers of regiments, what precautions, if any, are taken?

7. They must be well known in the regiments to which their relatives are attached. They are subjected to surgical examination, but as to registry, I do not believe that any particular precautions are taken. Few recruits are entertained in this way, I believe.

8. What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice relatively to races, tribes, or castes (with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry) of the native troops in the Bengal army?

8. I see no occasion for much alteration. It is now the fashion to advocate the admission of low-caste men; I confess to entertaining an opinion adverse to their admission into the native army, and I beg to state some reasons for this opinion.

In the first place, I cannot conceive the possibility of maintaining discipline in a corps where a low-caste non-commissioned officer will, when he meets off duty a Brahmmin sepoy, crouch down to him with his forehead on the ground, I have seen this done. The sepoy thus treated is the master of the officer.

Secondly. To ally ourselves with the lowest castes is to separate ourselves even more thoroughly than we are already separated by our religion and customs from the native chiefs of the country, and from the very numerous respectable tribes. The prejudices of caste can never be diminished, but will be exasperated by our doing so.

Thirdly. I doubt whether those who most strongly advocate the enlistment of the lowest castes would themselves like to serve with a regiment of domes or hullalkhorees, exclusively so formed.

Fourthly. I would not proscribe from our ranks brahmins and other men of high caste. Their numbers should be kept within moderate limits; but if we enlist largely among the lowest castes, it will amount to a practical exclusion of the highest classes of Hindoos and the most respectable Mohamedans,—the best soldiers.

Fifthly. However we might for other branches of the public service make use of men of low castes, to trust the military defence of the country to them would be very unwise, because extremely hazardous. It is yet to be seen how such men would behave in the hour of danger; I fear they would quail before a native enemy showing a determined front. The depressing influence of caste cannot but render such men deficient in that self-reliance which is an indispensable quality in a soldier.

Sixthly. It will not be a willing service that men of respectable castes will render to us, if associated with men of low castes. They will enlist because they desire to gain a livelihood, and not from any predilection for military employment; and it will be a very difficult thing to maintain the due observance of caste prejudices between one set of men and another in the same regiment, whose mutual forbearance is one element of the internal well-being of every corps. I have heard this idea scouted as one unworthy of our attention; but nevertheless it appears to me to be one of which we cannot set aside the consideration. It is one thing to look with pity or surprise, or even with condemnation, on the system of caste, and no one is more alive to its disadvantages and its demoralizing tendencies than I am. No favouritism would I tolerate as respects any one of them. Even-handed justice should be unhesitatingly administered

among them all, and discipline enforced with entire impartiality. But it is quite another thing to throw aside all consideration for the prejudices of caste, and to attempt to amalgamate races which are antagonistic and abhorrent the one to the other. There is nothing like caste in any other country, and no analogy whatever to be drawn from the fusion of races and tribes of other countries as a guide for us here.

But one thing is certain, that our disregarding the prejudice of caste will never induce the natives themselves to disregard them; and that, after all, is the main point.

Seventhly. The argument from the case of the Madras and Bombay armies, where castes are fused together to a certain extent, does not appear to me to militate with any force against the views I venture to entertain. The differences of caste are much more marked in the Bengal presidency, and the state of the community at large is different from that of the communities of the other presidencies.

Eighthly. The mutinies have *not* been occasioned by the influence of caste. Fears for their religion, from a firm, though mistaken, persuasion that the British Government intended to compel them to become christians, have universally prevailed alike among Mahomedans and Hindoos; but the different races, and those whose religious persuasions would under ordinary circumstances keep them widely asunder, have united in rebellion against our authority; a fact that clearly proves the hold of religious persuasions on the native mind, but refutes the notion that any one caste more than another has stirred up the rebellion.

Ninthly. The turbulence of the brahmins may be controlled by not enlisting too many of them, and by the strict and judicious exercise of command over those who are admitted into the ranks. But beyond this I see no wisdom in adopting measures with the avowed object of annihilating caste,—an object utterly unattainable by any measure we could adopt. I fully coincide in the propriety of the general order issued by Lord William Bentinck, on the 31st of December 1834, in these words:—"The Governor-General of India in Council is pleased to direct that all objections to men belonging to the respectable classes of the native community, or preferences among such classes, on account of caste or religion, shall cease to operate in respect to their admission into the ranks of the Bengal army." Further than this I see no occasion for concession.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the native infantry of the Bengal army?

9. Oath:—"I, A.B. inhabitant of _____ village _____ pergunnah _____ subah _____ son of _____ do swear that I will never forsake or abandon my colours; that I will march wherever I am directed, whether within or beyond the Company's territories; that I will implicitly obey all the orders of my commanders, and in everything behave myself as becomes a good soldier and faithful servant of the Company; and failing in any part of my duty as such, I will submit to the penalties described in the Articles of War which have been read to me."

10. How long has the form been in use in the Bengal army?

10. It was established by Government regulation, dated 8th of August 1796.

11. Can you suggest any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruits for the native infantry of the Bengal army?

11. I would propose that the following oath should be adopted henceforward. It is taken from the oath for European recruits for Her Majesty's service, and is modified to suit the native recruit:—"I _____ do make oath that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty, Her heirs and successors; that I will, as in duty bound, observe and obey all orders of the generals and officers set over me; and that I will willingly proceed by land or sea wherever my services may be required."

12. Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the Bengal presidency of seafaring habits, and could marine corps be formed from such races, tribes, or castes?

12. I think not; that is, with any prospect of advantage to the service.

13. Has the Bengal presidency any marine corps, and if so, of what strength and whence recruited?

13. No; unless it be the old 20th regiment, of two battalions, now numbered 25th and 40th, of which the

latter still bears the old designation of "murriam-ka-pultun," i.e. marine regiment. But these regiments are not the only ones of their kind now. There are besides them the 47th, 65th, 67th, 68th, all liable to be sent beyond sea.

14. Should each infantry corps be raised, each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?

14. I do not see how this could well be done, unless we restricted ourselves to having very few regiments; nor do I see any advantage in it. Practically, recruiting parties do, to a great extent, go to the same districts continually to obtain recruits, and in this way regiments come to have a large proportion of men from such districts, but they are not exclusively so composed by any means. But to restrict particular regiments to particular districts has this objection, that it would prevent their being employed at any great distance from those districts, and it would deprive them of the power of recruiting where they might be serving, or in any contiguous district, however eligible might be the recruits there obtainable.

The Goorkha regiments are, however, an exception. These can only be recruited from the hill districts, and I would keep them distinct in every way; but they cannot serve in the plains.

15. Or should each corps be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?—

15. I think the area for recruiting for each and every regiment should be unlimited, in order to guard against combinations of men of particular localities, and to enlarge as much as possible the field of selection, with exception of the Goorkha regiments and corps, such as the Assam and Sylhet and Arracan battalions.

16. Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste?

16. I think not. If men of one tribe or cast are likely to combine for evil purposes, the tendency to such combination would be greatly increased, and facilities towards it would be furnished by homogeneous organization of regiments. I would not have any regiment recruited exclusively from any particular district, even though all the races or castes in such district were freely admitted into it. But the objection to homogeneity of castes in regiments is much stronger than that which applies to recruiting exclusively from particular districts; inasmuch as such an organization would hold up to observation the distinctions of caste and perpetuate those distinctions, whereas, on the contrary, the blending of castes should be a principal object in the organization of our native army. While I am strongly opposed to the admixture of such heterogeneous elements as men of high and men of low castes, I would equally strongly deprecate any measure which would directly encourage the separation between one caste and another, among those which we know by experience to admit of fusing together into the ranks of our native regiments.

17. If a corps is not homogeneous, will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, so far as may be possible, homogeneous, each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste? Or should the tribes and castes be mixed up in each company?

17. I think the tribes and castes should be indiscriminately intermingled in the several companies. The pitting of one company against another would not tend to the improvement of discipline, and that blending in one common interest would be lost, which it is so desirable to establish in a regiment. Were different castes or tribes to be placed in distinct companies, the antagonism of castes and tribes would be perpetuated. Besides which there are regimental appointments, such as the commissioned officers, the non-commissioned officers, the drill havildar, and drill instructors, and under certain circumstances pay havildars of companies, for which the whole regiment competes; but the selection would be exceedingly difficult if the tribes and castes were placed in distinct companies.

18. If corps are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes be entertained?

18. I would entertain few brahmins, and would restrict mussulmans, rajpoots, and sikhs to one third of any regiment in which they were entertained. I mean that there should not be in any corps more than one third of its complement consisting of mussulmans, nor rajpoots, nor sikhs; but these tribes together might unobjectionably form half of any regiment, or more than half.

9. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district, or kept to separate districts, or should police corps be recruited from a wide area without reference to districts?
19. I perceive no reason for restricting recruiting, whether of military or police corps, to particular districts.
20. Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the army corps?
20. No; I think not. There is this objection, that such men would come into the army corps with higher expectations as to position and rank than would be palatable to the corps into which they entered. The prizes in a regiment should be kept for its own best men, to the exclusion of outsiders.
21. What agency should be employed for recruiting in the districts of the Bengal presidency or its dependencies?
21. I would, as heretofore, employ the agency of recruiting parties sent from regiments.
22. Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps or a distinct agency?
22. I am so strongly of an opinion adverse to police corps as armed and trained military bodies, that I cannot contemplate the recruiting for them.
23. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connection with recruits for the army of the Bengal presidency?
23. The precautions already taken, as stated above, should most carefully be continued. But copies of all registers of recruits, made by the civil authorities, should be transmitted to the Adjutant-General's office, and copies of all regimental registers of recruits, and of all kindred rolls, should also be deposited in the Adjutant-General's office. In the late mutinies the non-existence of these rolls, and the destruction of those with regiments, has proved very inconvenient.
24. Should similar or different precautions be taken in connection with recruits for police corps in the Bengal presidency?
25. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries equally qualified for service in India with the natives of the country, and, if so, should they be formed in separate regiments, or in companies, or otherwise?
25. I am not disposed to recommend introducing recruits from other countries. They would be very expensive, very troublesome, probably, and would disappoint us in the end. I think India itself furnishes sufficient men, and men sufficiently good, if well selected, without going abroad for recruits.
26. If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries, which are the countries and races to be preferred?
27. What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting?
28. Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments?
28. No, I think not. I would keep European and native regiments entirely distinct, and they will work together in cantonments and on service all the better for it. The prestige of the dominant class, the Europeans, would be much lowered and seriously injured if they were formed into regiments with the natives. Moreover, they could not be armed alike; and I am strongly of opinion that the jails, the treasures, the guns, and arsenals should be guarded by Europeans to the exclusion of natives. Now it would never do to make this distinction of duties and trusts if the races were attached to one and the same regiment. Another reason for not mixing them up is, that their clothing should be different, of which the effect on parade would be extremely uncouth.
29. If so, should such company or companies be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from European corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European corps, and subject to periodical relief?
30. Where should the barracks of such companies be placed relatively to the lines of the native troops?
31. Would such detachments seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?
31. No.
32. How should such companies be armed? with similar or different weapons from the native troops with whom they would be associated?
32. It is not expedient to arm natives with the Enfield rifle. It is necessary to arm the Europeans with them. This is one capital reason for not mixing them together in regiments.
33. How should the native infantry of the Bengal presidency be armed?
33. With the percussion musket.
34. How should police corps in the Bengal presidency be armed?
35. Do the advantages of making the dress of the native soldier a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?
35. I have always thought it a great mistake to dress native soldiers like Europeans.
36. How should the native infantry of the Bengal army be dressed, with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier?
36. In unghas or tunics covering the hip, with trowsers tied, and turbans; and this is a strong reason for not mixing natives up with Europeans, who must be differently dressed, of course.
37. It has been proposed that to every European local regiment a native irregular regiment, officered from that European regiment alone, should be attached. What is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry in close and permanent association?
37. I think it highly desirable that each European regiment should have a native irregular regiment attached to it; but I would not officer the native regiment from the European. I would not exclude any particularly well qualified officer of the one from being attached to the other; but I would select officers for the attached irregular regiment from the whole line. It is essential, I think, that a native irregular regiment should have its own commandant to look up to; and this would be defeated if, as I take the question to imply, it were merely officered from the European corps, the commanding officer of the latter being also commanding officer of the irregular corps. I would place the latter under the commanding officer of the European corps as a sort of brigadier (without increasing his command allowance), but it should be really commanded by its own commandant.
38. Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers presents any analogy with such an arrangement and any encouragement to adopt it?
38. No; the gun lascars and native drivers are quite on another sort of footing.
39. How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps?—
39. I would adopt the arrangement that heretofore has been adopted. I do not think it at all desirable that the native irregular corps should be brought into any closer contact in cantonments with the European corps than has heretofore been the case; and when marching out into camp, the relative place of the two corps in the lines they are having can make no difference.
40. Would such a system be favourable or the reverse to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops which is an element of strength?
40. The nearer the association, such as is involved in the proposed system, the greater the detriment, in my opinion, to the prestige of the European soldiery.
41. How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war?
41. In peace there might not be much difference in the intercourse between the European and the native corps. In war it may certainly be looked for that the service would be benefited by the mutual attachment between the two corps, and the emulation by the native of the excellencies of the European corps, as exemplified at Candahar, where the 40th foot and the 2nd grenadiers served closely together, and at Jellalabad, where the 13th foot and the 35th native infantry learned to attach themselves the one to the other.

42. Is it desirable that the native troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of auxiliary native battalions in permanent association with European corps?

42. The native troops should be taught to rely on the European troops. I think their association to the extent I have described would foster that sentiment; but if more intimately brought into union, I fear the sentiment fostered would be prejudicial to the reliance of the native troops on the European.

II. MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

1. Can you suggest improvement in the Articles of War in use in the Bengal native army?

1. At the outset of the consideration of this question, and throughout the entire discussion of it, it should be borne in mind that there is but one code for the native armies of the three presidencies, those enacted by the Act No. XIX. of 1847; that these Articles of War apply indiscriminately to all officers and soldiers, whether regular or irregular, in the service of the East India Company; and that if alterations are made in them to suit the case of the native army in Bengal, either such alterations must be declared to be specially and exclusively applicable to the Bengal army, or they will be applicable to the native armies of Madras and Bombay also.

Further, it has to be remembered that the sixth section of the Articles of War, relating to the mode of dealing with offences not military, is not now in question. That section brings criminal offences within the jurisdiction of courts-martial in places where there may be no civil judicature appointed by Her Majesty or the East India Company. The object of the present inquiry I understand to be, to suggest improvement in the Articles of War which relate to the trial and punishment of military offences.

Great pains were taken in the arrangement of the Articles of War to classify offences and the punishments awardable for them. The index to the contents, with which the Articles are prefaced, shows at a glance the simplicity of the arrangement; and it was hoped that that index, in addition to the headings of the several groups of crimes, and the clear specification of punishments awardable, with which each group of crimes terminates, would have been sufficient to keep courts-martial in the right way. Assuredly, with the commonest attention, this result would have been obtained. The Articles of War for Her Majesty's troops have similar divisions of offences into groups or classes, and precisely similar terminating clauses to each group; and so long as this arrangement continues to be adopted and to work well in Her Majesty's forces, I do not see why these Articles of War for the native troops should be formed or arranged on any other plan.

Section I. relates to enlisting and discharges, and consists of four Articles, none of which appear to me to require alteration.

Section II. relates to crimes of all descriptions, thrown into distinct classes, and to the punishments awardable for them in each class by courts-martial. It embraces the Articles from 5 to 69 inclusive.

It was a great object with the late Lord Hardinge, under whose instructions, as Governor-General, I framed the Articles of War, to restrict the actual infliction of corporal punishment to offences of a strictly military nature, the delinquent remaining in the service; to punish disgraceful offences ordinarily, and those not involving breach of military duty, so to speak, with imprisonment with hard labour, the offender being necessarily dismissed the service; and to assign only minor punishments to offences of the lighter kind. At the same time it was of course arranged that for disgraceful offences corporal punishment should be awardable; and that for all offences for which corporal punishment or imprisonment with hard labour might be adjudged, the minor punishments should also be applicable where there might be extenuating circumstances. The restriction of corporal punishment was made in a resolution by Government, dated the 30th August 1845, in the following terms:—

“Fort William, August 30, 1845.

“Resolution:—

“The Governor-General in Council has resolved, on the occasion of publishing the Act for providing Articles of War for the native army, that, until further orders, corporal punishment may be applied to the following offences, viz.:—

“1. For mutiny, insubordination, violence, or using or offering violence to superior officers.

“2. Drunkenness on duty. Under ordinary circumstances, and in cantonments, corporal punishment will not be inflicted for disgraceful conduct under the six Articles from 38 to 43 inclusive (now 40 to 46 of 1847).

“If the discipline of the army should at any time require that the restriction imposed by this resolution should be taken off, it will be rescinded.

“On the line of march, on board any ship or other vessels, and on service in the field, the full power of the Act will be exercised according to the absolute necessity of the case. On these occasions the resolution is not applicable; but the officers in command of troops will clearly understand that the object of this resolution is to inflict corporal punishment as seldom as possible, commuting it for other punishment in all cases when it can be done with safety to the discipline of the army.”

I consider this system of punishments to be the best that could be devised; and it would be no improvement, I think, to make any change in the classification of offences or the sentences awardable for each class, or to remove the restrictions on corporal punishment. It has been proposed in some quarters to make disgraceful offences punishable ordinarily with flogging; but with Lord Hardinge it was a principal consideration not to connect corporal punishment with crimes involving moral turpitude, which rendered the dismissal of the offender desirable; but men flogged and retained in the service should be considered disgraced. To a certain extent such men will, as it is, be looked upon by their comrades as disgraced by being flogged; but it appears to me to be a wise arrangement not authoritatively to attach, when it can be avoided, the stigma of disgrace to corporal punishment. I would, therefore, not make any alteration here.

It has been lately proposed to ask the legislative council for an Act by which imprisonment with hard labour might become awardable for all offences for which simple imprisonment is awardable under the Articles of War. Considering the nature of the offences for which the articles provide simple imprisonment, to the exclusion of imprisonment with hard labour, I doubt the expediency of this change; and as, so long as we have no military prisons in which to confine soldiers, so as to keep them separate from civil criminals, the infliction of imprisonment with hard labour necessarily carries with it the dismissal of the offender, this seems to furnish an objection to the change proposed.

Section III. relates to the administration of justice.

In the 76th and 79th Articles in this section no provision is made for mitigating a sentence of dismissal in the case of a sepoy; simple imprisonment might be substituted for such sentence. This has been proposed, but the proposal has not been carried into effect by Government as yet.

Article 101 in this section relates to trials by European officers. It gives offenders about to be tried the option of claiming to be tried by European officers. The second clause of this Article declares that “it shall be competent to the Governor-General of India in Council, by a general order, to authorize the native troops of any of the presidencies to claim to be tried in like manner by European courts-martial.”

This clause does not contemplate an authoritative order of Government that offenders shall be tried by European officers, whether they choose to claim to be so tried or not; and at present there exists no power to issue such an order. The circumstances of the native army in Bengal appear to require that Government should have such power, and that it should be exercised; and as it may be desirable to include the other presidencies in any such authoritative declaration, I would propose to leave the first clause of this article as it is, and to alter the second clause in the following manner:—

“And it shall be competent to the Governor-General of India in Council, or to the Governor in Council, at any presidency, by a general order, to authorize the native troops of any of the presidencies, or in the military service of Her Majesty, to claim to be tried in like manner, or to direct that such troops shall be tried by European courts-martial.”

Section IV., relating to the effects of the dead, does not seem to require any alteration.

Section V.—Miscellaneous.

Article 110 may, I think, be conveniently and unobjectionably altered so as to give power to officers commanding regiments to reduce non-commissioned officers. I would alter it thus:—“Non-commissioned officers may be reduced to the ranks by the sentence of a court-martial, or by order of the Commander-in-Chief, or by order of the officer commanding the regiment to which such non-commissioned officers may belong.”

Article 112.—I would propose further to strengthen the hands of commanding officers by adding to this article as follows:—“In cases of light offences, or in the maintenance of discipline, a commanding officer may, without the in-

"intervention of a court-martial, *cause corporal punishment with a rattan, to the extent of three dozen strokes, to be inflicted summarily on any sepoy, or may award,*" &c. &c. The words in italics are new.

Such are the few alterations which appear to me to be necessary to the improvement of the Articles of War. The total abolition of the Articles, which has been suggested in some quarters, seems to me to be a measure from which no good could be derived. It would not tend to civilize or ameliorate our native troops, and it would place a degree of power in the hands of commanding officers not known in any other army, for which the necessity is not apparent, and which would not in any way really strengthen their hold on the obedience or the affection of their men. Commanding officers, like all other persons, require to be themselves subjected to certain wholesome restrictions. The Commander-in-Chief, and even the Government in its executive capacity, are not at liberty to exercise an arbitrary authority independent of law; and there appears to be no good reason for investing commanding officers with authority independent of Articles of War.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishments in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

2. They must needs be retained, in my opinion.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the Bengal army?

3. Not so satisfactorily as it might, if officers would inform themselves of the provisions of the Articles of War. But great improvement may be looked for in this respect by European officers being substituted for native officers in courts-martial in the native army.

The revision to which proceedings of regimental courts-martial are subjected at the hands of general officers commanding divisions is felt as a grievance; but it would not be so if regimental courts-martial were conducted with proper care, or if commanding officers would inform themselves of their own powers, and act in strict accordance therewith. But some remarks on this subject will find a place in the answer to a subsequent question.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the native troops of the Bengal army with the military code under which they live and are governed?

4. The Articles of War are read to the native troops, in companies, and at parades of regiments, once a quarter, as directed in the 188th Article of War.

5. What proportion of the native troops can read for themselves in the vernacular dialect the Articles of War?

5. I am not able to reply to this question; but sepoys are debarred from promotion who have not a competent knowledge of reading and writing in at least one character. In very special cases, however, for distinguished conduct in the field and the like, men who cannot read may be promoted, but such cases must be reported to the Commander-in-Chief for approval.

6. Under what military or civil code are police corps in the Bengal presidency?

6. None that I am aware of; further than that I believe they are under the magistrates.

7. How is discipline maintained, and the authority of officers, European and native, upheld in police corps in the Bengal presidency?

7. I believe commanding officers of police corps have magisterial powers as well as the ordinary military powers of commanding officers.

8. Do you consider that the provision made for maintaining the discipline of police corps and the authority of their European and native officers is sufficient and the working satisfactory?

8. I have no means of judging.

III. ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the native regiments of the Bengal native infantry, what is the system of promotion? is it based on merit alone, or seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

1. The Regulations (sect. LIV.) direct that "in all recommendations for promotion the fullest consideration and attention is invariably to be given to the claim of seniority in every grade, where no such disqualifications as want of respectability of character, or other equally proper and just cause of objection to the advancement

"of the seniors shall exist; and to enable general officers and brigadiers to enforce the strictest observance of the regulations on this subject, commanding officers of corps, in promulgating promotions made by them in regimental orders, are required at the same time to publish the names of those passed over and the causes of their super-session. Seniority or length of service do not, however, in any case constitute a claim to promotion; inspection of past conduct and general qualification, and although they are always to be taken into account when proceeding to selection, yet they are never to be allowed to operate against proved disqualification in other respects." Further, "notwithstanding that commissioned and non-commissioned officers may be passed over on proper grounds, they are to be made to understand that it is still open to them by an improved course of conduct to establish a claim to promotion, and that all such claims, supported by the commanding officer, will be duly attended to."

Such are the safeguards with which the claims of respectable seniority are hedged round.

The practice, however, much more decidedly recognizes the paramount claim of distinguished merit and superior qualification than these regulations appear to encourage. I speak more especially of the higher grades.

2. Are the native officers of the native infantry of the Bengal army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

2. As a class they are extremely inefficient and very useless; but I have met with very remarkable exceptions.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the men from amongst whom they have risen?

3. No; and in many instances they are not to be compared with the men.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or in promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

4. No.

5. Does the intervention of the native officers between the European officers and their men weaken the influence of the European officers?

5. This depends very much, I think, on the European officers themselves. Where these take great interest in their men and show it in their conduct towards them, the influence of the native officers will be all in the same current if they are good native officers, and will be overborne if they are bad. When the European officers take little interest in their corps, the clever native officers will greatly influence the men for good or evil. But there is a large proportion of native officers who are mere cyphers.

6. Does a full complement of the European militate against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officers?

6. I do not think a full complement of European officers necessarily or unavoidably militates against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officers. It will not affect the case of good native officers; and in the case of the bad, it will, and just for opposite reasons, not affect them, for there is nothing in such men.

7. Has it been found in the native infantry of the Bengal army that, on the occurrence of mutinies, the native officers have given timely information, or been of any use in aiding the European officers to check mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?

7. In very few cases have the native officers given information or been of use to the European officers in checking mutiny. There is a large proportion of them who have sided with the mutineers, but my belief is that the majority have done so on compulsion. There are numerous instances of their siding with the European officers.

8. Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued in the native infantry of the Bengal army?

8. I think they should be discontinued, with special exceptions, in the cases of some few who may be reported to have superior qualifications, who are now in our native regiments. The rest I would pension or discharge with a gratuity.

9. Is the substitution of an European sergeant and corporal to each company of a native regiment in lieu of its native officers advisable?

9. I think this highly desirable; but it is indispensable that these non-commissioned officers should speak

the Hindostanee fluently; and the occurrence of drunkenness amongst them should be invariably punished by removal. I would rather say two *sergeants* than one sergeant and one corporal, because the havildars have the grade of sergeants, and it would be anomalous that, in the absence of the sergeant, a corporal should command havildars. It is indispensable that all natives in a company should be commanded by any European attached to it.

10. If the abolition of the grade of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument thus closed to the native soldier, would a graduated scale of good-service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of services, be a compensating encouragement, and as efficacious as the commissioned grades?

10. Yes, I think it would; for the proportion of men who rise eventually to the grade of commissioned officer is but small, whereas the scale of good-service pay would be to a great extent accessible among them, I would not hold out retiring pensions except in rare cases of merit, and for men wounded on service in the field. I think the native non-commissioned officer or soldier might very advantageously be encouraged and rewarded by occasional transfer to civil employment on the staff of the police, such as thanadars, darogahs, &c.; and if the military police is kept up, they might be transferred in good places to that body as a reward.

11. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native troops to the British service?

11. I have no doubt that retiring pensions do strongly attach the native troops to the British service. It has been said that the late mutineers show low ineffectual they are as a hold on the attachment of the troops; but then it is to be remembered that the general belief in the country was that the British supremacy was coming to an end; and with the British rule of course the pensions would be swept away.

I do not think that the mutinies furnish any criterion of the effect of the retiring pensions on the minds of men one way or other. At the same time I am convinced that with those who remained loyal, the retiring pensions had their full effect, together with the other advantages of the British rule, in keeping them loyal.

12. Should not the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

12. If the commissioned grades are retained, I think promotion for merit and efficiency should be the great object, but not the only one. Seniority can never justly be disregarded in toto. *Dashing* service is very often fully counterbalanced by *well adapted energy*, coupled with *experience*. Seniority unsupported by other claims should be disregarded without hesitation.

13. Should the system of pensions, as now in force by regulation, be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?

13. The present pension system must needs be religiously kept up in favour of those who are now in the native army. It could not be at once swept away without a breach of faith. But in the cases of all men newly enlisting, I would abolish pensions, except for rewarding rare cases of merit, and for providing maintenance for men wounded in action and for their heirs. The emoluments of the Order of Merit should be carried out of the service; but the Order of Merit and the Order of British India should be brought within due bounds at as early a date as possible. During the mutinies both these orders have been made use of in a manner very different from what their respective rules warrant.

The "Order of Merit" was intended to reward conspicuous bravery in action exclusively, and the claims of individuals are required to be investigated by a court of inquiry conducted by a judge advocate. The order has been largely conferred on men for loyalty, and for persevering brave resistance to the enemy, as in the instance of the Lucknow garrison, but without reference to conspicuous acts of bravery.

The Order of British India was intended for long and meritorious service of commissioned officers. It has been largely bestowed on native officers without the qualification of length of service. The Order is also limited in number, but no regard has been paid to the limitation.

14. What is the charge to the State of military pensions to native officers and men of the Bengal native infantry?

14. I am not in a position to answer this question, being only in camp, as it were, with the Governor-General.

15. Are the native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in courts-martial?

15. No; the great majority are quite unfit to do so. But then this is certainly owing in part to their not comprehending our military jurisprudence. On the whole, however, and taking into consideration the weighing of cases on their merits, rather than any peculiarities of our system, I think the native officers, with few exceptions, quite unfit to sit at a court-martial. I say this after having had an experience of eleven years as a practising judge advocate, and having met on court-martial duty the native officers of certainly the larger half of the regiments in the service. But I have met with occasional splendid exceptions, men of very superior intelligence.

16. Are native commissioned officers on a par with European sergeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?

16. No, certainly not; speaking of the generality. There are some fully equal to them.

17. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, what will be the best organization for the military corps? 1. Should they be fully officered with native commissioned grades as well as with European officers; or, 2. Fully officered with European, but have no native commissioned grades; or, 3. Be officered like irregular corps, viz., have the full complement of native commissioned officers, with but a few European officers?

17. Military police corps appear to me to be just so many irregular regiments, and I can suggest no better organization than that of irregular corps for them. With regard to purely military corps, I think they should be of two kinds, regular and irregular; the former fully officered with the European commissioned grades, but on a reduced scale, such as I have elsewhere suggested, and entirely without native commissioned officers; the latter officered as irregular corps usually are.

18. How should the police corps be officered, the question applying both to European and native commissioned grades?

18. From the unattached commissioned officers as much as possible, but the obstacle is that these worthy men frequently know but little Hindostanee; and by uncovenanted persons of the respectable classes. Native commissioned officers should be appointed as in irregular corps.

19. If irregular corps and police corps have native commissioned officers, and regular corps have no native commissioned officers, but only good-service pay and pensions as an incitement to good conduct and efficiency, will the higher pay to privates and non-commissioned officers suffice to render the regular as popular as the irregular and police corps, and to draw as good recruits?

19. Yes, I think so; but if this be doubtful, then does it furnish another reason for not keeping up military police corps.

20. In police corps is there, on first admission, any test or examination as to capabilities of reading and writing? or are qualifications tested on promotion to non-commissioned grades, or on promotion to commissioned grades?

20. Not that I am aware of. I know of no tests.

21. Has the distinct organization and the difference of system, regulations, and component races in the three native armies proved favourable to our power in India?

21. I do not think there is any such difference of system, regulations, and component races respectively in the three native armies as to admit of any reply being given to this question. The prestige of the British soldiery has preserved our power in India, and not the native army in any considerable degree.

22. Should a certain degree of distinctness of system, organization, and composition, according to the views of separate Governments, to time and to local circumstances, be allowed, or should endeavours be made to assimilate or even to amalgamate the three armies?

22. The three armies could never be amalgamated in my opinion. The Madras sepoy is not to be compared, and would not work, I think, with the sepoy of Bengal. Nor

would the Bombay sepoy. Neither would it be practicable to send native regiments to serve for any length of time in other presidencies; distance, family consideration, and perhaps climate, all militate against such a measure.*

I would keep the three armies quite distinct, as they are already in great measure by difference of language, the Hindostanee being found in all, but comparatively little known or used out of Bengal.

Their system, organization, and composition should be left, in my opinion, to the discretion of the separate Governments, to time, and to local circumstances. The entire separation of the three native armies has been of the most important use to us during the late mutinies. We have had the native troops of Madras and Bombay in antagonism with the mutineers and rebels in Bengal, which but for the separation of three armies might not have been.

Amalgamation, as regards the European officers, would work very inconveniently, I think. The officers of the three armies now on the list could not be amalgamated without great confusion and injustice to many in each presidency. If amalgamation is to take place at all, it should be with reference to the future only,—to officers admitted after a certain date; but I can anticipate no advantage from the measure. It requires time to accustom officers to the native soldiery; but experience gained in one presidency, and the acquirement of its peculiar language, would be in great degree thrown away in another. Changes in the officers to whom the men have become accustomed would operate very unfavourably on the men; and if it be impracticable, as local considerations appear to me to prove, to employ regiments of one presidency in another, except for the temporary purposes of warfare, the employment of the European officers interchangeably in the several presidencies would just involve that change and separation of officers from their men which is so undesirable.

IV. EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience have the powers of commanding officers of native corps been increased or diminished in the Bengal army, and state the orders, or measures, or changes in the practice of the service to which you attribute such effect?

1. This subject is a very comprehensive one. It embraces the punitive powers of commanding officers independently of courts-martial, and their powers in confirming the sentences of courts-martial, and further their power to reward men.

And first, as to the punitive powers of commanding officers independent of courts-martial.

Before there were regulations compiled for the guidance of officers, commanding officers often exercised powers, such as that of dismissing native soldiers, and of reducing non-commissioned officers, of chastising with a rattan, of awarding extra drill and duty, of refusing furloughs, for offences committed by their men; but such powers were not authoritatively conferred upon commanding officers. I speak of the period from 1821 to 1828 inclusive, which formed the early part of my experience in the service.

Dismissal.—On the 1st of September 1828 the standing orders for the Bengal native infantry were compiled by order of Lord Combermere, then Commander-in-Chief. Those orders limited the power to discharge sepoy to the cases of men who, from bodily defects, sickness, or accident, might become incapable of performing the duties of a soldier, and who were not entitled to the benefit of the invalid establishment. Recruits who, from awkwardness at the drill, were obviously unlikely to become smart soldiers were also liable to dismissal by commanding officers. But in all other cases of unfitness for the service, or when commanding officers were desirous to have sepoy discharged, they were required to obtain the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief.

In other words, commanding officers were declared to have no power to dismiss men as a punishment for offences committed.

The first Articles of War made for the native armies of the three presidencies were enacted in 1845 (Act XX. of 1845 of the Government of India). Before that time there were Articles of War established in each presidency by its own Government; those for Bengal were established in 1796, and they continued in force till 1845. Of the Articles

* In the Madras army there are but few sepoy, comparatively, from the Bengal presidency. These periodically visit their homes, but they are doubtfully received there by their own people, who look upon them as expatriated by joining the Madras army; and as many of them form connexions in that presidency, the estrangement is thereby strengthened.

of 1845, Article 2. provides that "no non-commissioned officer or soldier shall be discharged as a punishment except by the sentence of a court-martial, or by order of the Commander-in-Chief at the presidency to which he may belong."

This Article merely enacted by law that which was before well established by the regulations for the army,—that commanding officers had no power to dismiss men for offences committed; and now for thirty years this has been the rule, and for ever a longer period.

A revised code of regulations for the army was published in 1855. They take away from commanding officers the power to discharge men physically unfit for the service, which the regulations of 1828 had granted. All such cases are now to be referred to the Commander-in-Chief for orders.

Reduction of non-commissioned officers.—There has never been any recognized authority on the part of commanding officers to inflict this punishment. The old Articles of War did not touch the point. The Articles now in force; Act XIX. of 1847, enact that "no non-commissioned officer shall be reduced to the ranks but by the sentence of a court-martial, or by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the presidency to which the offender shall belong." (Article 110).

Minor punishments.—Under the old Articles of 1796 it was provided (Article III. section XI.) thus:—"Every non-commissioned officer and soldier shall retire to his quarters or tent at the beating of the retreat, in default of which he shall be punished, according to the nature of his offence, by the commanding officer." This is the only Article which alluded to the power of a commanding officer without the intervention of a court-martial.

In the regulations of 1828 minor punishments are not mentioned. In those of 1855 "the punishment of soldiers with a rattan at the pleasure of individuals entrusted with the instruction of recruits, or on any other occasion whatever, is strictly prohibited." The Government general order, dated 25th February 1835, had already prohibited the use of the rattan. The words in italics are those now in point; the allusion is to an old practice, now perhaps obsolete, but which I have myself witnessed five and thirty years ago, of sepoy being caned, not at drill only, but for stupidity or obstinacy on parade at regimental exercise.

The Articles of War now in force thus provide for minor punishments, Art. 112. "In cases of light offences a commanding officer may, without the intervention of a court-martial, award extra drill, with or without pack, for a period not exceeding fifteen days; restriction to barrack limits, not exceeding fifteen days; confinement in the quarter guard or defaulter-room, not exceeding seven days; solitary confinement, not exceeding seven days; removal from staff situations or acting appointments; or may order soldiers to be employed in piling and unpling shot, and in cleaning accoutrements of men in hospital." The regulations of 1855 follow up this Article of War by prohibiting extra duty being awarded as a punishment to a native soldier, and by declaring that no punishment not specified in the Article is legal. But intermediately, on the 16th of October 1854, a general order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief which greatly interfered with the power of commanding officers. It directed that men to whom drill exceeding six days might be awarded by their commanding officer, or confinement to barrack limits for six days (afterwards fixed at drill for 15 days or imprisonment in the quarter guard or defaulter-room, or restriction to barrack limits for six days, G.O., C.C., 23d January 1855), should have an entry of such punishment recorded in the defaulter-book, and that two such entries existing together should render the man ineligible for good-conduct pay for two years. But it also provided that any man who might be ordered such punishment, but denied the commission of the offence, should have the right to demand trial by court-martial; and that an intimation of this privilege should be invariably made to the soldier who might assert his innocence of the offence charged against him.

Secondly, as to the powers of commanding officers in confirming the sentences of courts-martial.

The Articles of War of 1796 directed that no sentence of a regimental court-martial should be executed till the commanding officer, (not being a member of the court-martial) or the governor of the garrison should have confirmed the same. There was no restriction then on the power to confirm sentences.

Matters continued thus till the 6th of November 1818, when, for the first time, regulations were made for the supervision of the proceedings of inferior courts-martial by general officers commanding divisions, and for their registry in the offices of deputy judge advocates general.

By these regulations the forms of procedure were rendered more exact and uniform than they had previously been, and the laxity and irregularity by which trials by regimental court-martial had been distinguished were considerably remedied; but as general officers commanding divisions were authorized to set aside for illegality the sentences of courts-martial confirmed by commanding officers, the operation of the new rules could not but weaken the powers of those officers. Reversal of sentence was never directed without the most cogent reasons, but no doubt the practice was one which worked ill for the discipline of regiments.

In November 1832 the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Edward Barnes, conferred full power on commanding officers to carry into effect all sentences, or to mitigate or remit them, and abolished the practice of referring certain sentences to the general commanding the division previous to execution. The same order gave a commanding officer power to confirm or not a sentence of corporal punishment, and to discharge a sepoy sentenced to flogging instead of inflicting that punishment.

In February 1835 the Governor General in Council prohibited the punishment of flogging either with the cat or the rattan, and substituted dismissal as a sentence for any offence for which up till that time corporal punishment might have been awarded; but the carrying into effect such sentence of dismissal was not left to commanding officers, it required the sanction of the general officer commanding the division. This order took away the powers conferred by the order of 1832.

The Act XXIII. of 1839 empowered courts-martial to sentence native soldiers to imprisonment with hard labour, and provided that all men so sentenced for any period, or sentenced to ordinary imprisonment exceeding six months, should be dismissed the service. But all such sentences were to receive the sanction of the general officer commanding the division. Commanding officers of regiments were now not allowed to carry into effect any sentence of imprisonment exceeding six months, nor to discharge men so sentenced.

In 1845 the Articles of War, made for the first time for the native armies of the three presidencies, gave some enlarged powers to officers commanding regiments, both of confirmation and of commutation of sentences, this last power being quite new. I beg to be permitted to say that I framed them, as judge advocate general, expressly with that object, under the sanction of the late Lord Hardinge, Governor General. The second edition of the articles made in 1847, and now in force, gave me in the same capacity the opportunity of still further enlarging the powers of commanding officers, and it was readily embraced. The Articles of 1847 give power to commanding officers, whenever the good of the service requires its exercise, to try offenders by regimental courts-martial for offences ordinarily cognizable by district courts-martial. Only offences restricted to the cognizance of general courts-martial were not within the discretion of commanding officers, such as violence to superiors, desertion, &c. They are empowered also to carry all sentences into effect without exception; and to instruct courts-martial not to award in particular cases either solitary imprisonment or corporal punishment.

There was, however, a resolution of Government, dated the 30th of August 1845, framed in connection with the Articles as made in that year, which laid down rules for corporal punishment, then restored by Lord Hardinge after having been abolished for ten years under the orders of Lord William Bentinck. It has been given verbatim in the reply to a previous question.

It limited the infliction of corporal punishment to the following offences:—

1. Mutiny, insubordination, violence, or using or offering violence to superiors.

2. Drunkenness on duty. It directed that under ordinary circumstances and in cantonments corporal punishment should not be inflicted for disgraceful conduct.

The resolution further declared, that if at any time the discipline of the army should require that the restrictions imposed by it should be taken off, it would be rescinded.

And lastly, that on the line of march, on board ships or boats, and on service in the field, the full powers of the Articles might be exercised according to the absolute necessity of the case, and on these occasions the resolution was not applicable. The object, however, of the resolution was stated to be to inflict corporal punishment as seldom as possible, commuting it for other punishment in all cases where it could be done with safety to the discipline of the army.

This resolution is still in force. If it interferes with the powers of commanding officers of regiments, it interferes likewise with that of superior officers; but in my opinion

in a very reasonable and proper way. The supervision of proceedings of courts-martial by general officers still continues, and numerous are the cases in which, even with all the extent of power confided to commanding officers, they lose sight of the plainest directions of the Articles of War, by trying by regimental courts-martial offences of which the cognizance is restricted to general courts-martial, and by other similar neglects necessitating the setting aside of sentences illegally confirmed by them.

With regard to corporal punishment (I use this term, as it is usually understood as flogging with the cat), having said that I think the restrictions of the Government resolution of the 30th of August 1845 should not be relaxed, I beg to be permitted to quote the following passage of a circular from the Adjutant General's office, issued in 1847, in connection with the Articles of War then made and now in force. It appears to me to contain the most just views, and to meet successfully the clamorous call now made in many quarters for the free use of corporal punishment:—

“Officers and men of the native army require neither austerity of manner nor severity of treatment, but at the same time it is indispensable to the maintenance of discipline, that authority should be exercised with a firm though gentle hand, and every instance of breach of discipline visited with promptitude and decision. Though it may not always be possible to humour their prejudices, the men may at all times be convinced, by judicious treatment, that their European officers are incapable of disregarding their feelings, and their attachment will thus be secured, even when recourse is had to reproof or punishment in support of discipline.”

The discharge of men flogged is no longer the rule, except when they are flogged for disgraceful conduct; this very circumstance of the retention in the service of men who have been flogged for military offences, furnishes, in my opinion, a very powerful argument for inflicting corporal punishment as seldom as possible, for the sufferers are certainly looked upon among their native comrades as to a certain extent disgraced.

On the whole, the occasional curtailment of the powers of commanding officers, and the want of uniformity of system throughout, as exhibited in the preceding notes, cannot but have had a tendency to weaken their authority; but matters have been on a much better footing since the enactment of the Articles of War of 1847; and with a few additional powers, which I propose to suggest in my reply to a subsequent question, and which has already been noticed in the preceding sheets, it appears to me that the position of commanding officers will be very satisfactory, and the discipline of regiments will thereby be secured.

2. During the above period have the powers of officers of European or native corps been increased or diminished?
2. Neither increased nor diminished, I think, in any perceptible degree.
3. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps upon the discipline of corps in the native infantry of the Bengal army?
3. I conceive that the greatly extended powers granted to officers commanding regiments by the Articles of War as now in force must have had at least a beneficial tendency on the discipline of regiments, and that where such has not been the case, the fault lies with the officers themselves.
4. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the influence of captains or officers in charge of companies?
4. I do not think there has been any perceptible alteration in the influence of officers commanding companies. Some regiments are what are called adjutant's regiments, in which the influence of officers commanding companies is diminished, and with very bad effect, by the centralization of the power to reward by promotion, &c. But no good commanding officer could suffer this; and I look upon it as occasional only, and very far from the system of the service.
5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps? Upon the distant authority of head-quarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in command of companies and of the commanding officer of the regiment?
5. Mainly on the authority and influence of officers in command of companies and of the commanding officer of the regiment.

6. Should the power of commanding officers and of officers in charge of companies be increased or diminished?

6. I think officers commanding regiments should have power to reduce non-commissioned officers as well as to appoint them. In Her Majesty's service and in the Company's European regiments commanding officers do not possess this power, and therefore it was withheld from commanding officers of native regiments when the Articles of War for the native army were made. But this power would greatly strengthen the hands of officers commanding native corps, and might, I think, be unobjectionably given. I would also give commanding officers power to inflict summary chastisement with a rattan, not exceeding three dozen strokes, on sepoys offending. The power of summary discharge I would not confer upon them; cases requiring the dismissal of the delinquent should be brought before a court-martial, and commanding officers have power already to confirm the sentences of courts-martial. I would not relax the Government resolution of the 30th of August 1845 regarding corporal punishment.

I think no man dismissed from a regiment by sentence of a court-martial, confirmed by the commanding officer, should be restored. Errors in proceedings, deficiency of evidence, and the like, should be pointed out, and if necessary, in severe terms, to the commanding officer; but his dismissal of a man so sentenced by court-martial should never be set aside. Numerous have been the cases of injustice done to men in dismissing them; but the sufferers might be employed elsewhere, or recompensed in some way, and should never be reinstated in opposition to the commanding officer's authority. It is an opinion entertained by many officers that no appeals should be received, and that the entertainment of appeals paralyzes the authority of commanding officers. I do not subscribe to this opinion. If an appeal is made on frivolous grounds, or is otherwise untenable, its rejection is certain, and the authority of commanding officers is thus upheld. But where there are just grounds of appeal, and a clear wrong has been done, it is quite too much to say that there shall be no remedy. It is the perpetration of such wrong, and not the entertainment of the appeal, that really injures the authority of a commanding officer. But though I am not in favour of rejecting appeals from men who consider themselves injured, I would not adopt any measure in consequence of any proof of such injustice which could at all wound the authority of the commanding officer.

I would propose to cancel the G.O., C.C., dated 16th October 1854 (mentioned in my reply to question 1 of this section), and to allow commanding officers full power to decide on the punishment to be awarded to a native soldier, though it may affect the man's right to good-conduct pay; and I would not give the latter the option of demanding a court-martial, which is very unsuitable in the case of natives.

The power to promote men to the non-commissioned ranks for eminent gallantry or conspicuous loyalty to the state, conferred on commanding officers by Government general orders of the 19th May 1857, should not, I think, be continued beyond the period of disturbance for which it was specially granted.

As respects officers commanding companies, I think their recommendations of sepoys for promotion and of naicks for advancement to havildar should be strictly attended to, provided they have had charge of the company for a sufficient time to enable them to pronounce on their men. Officers commanding regiments should never grant leave of absence to non-commissioned officers or sepoys, without first ascertaining that officers commanding the companies to which they belong concur in the grant of leave.

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

7. The subject is too full of minutiae to be embodied in an answer to this question. But in general terms I would suggest that it be impressed upon European officers punctually and exactly to fulfil their own duties, with detachments especially, as an example to their men. And they should go more often into the lines and among the men than is generally done.

But the main point towards securing the improvement of discipline in regiments is that the commanding officers should be selected with reference to qualification for command, and that proved inefficiency for command should inevitably lead to removal.

Adjutants of regiments should be most carefully selected. I think majors should be made eligible to do duty with other than their own regiments, for the purpose of commanding such other regiments, when the lieutenant-colonel attached to any such corps, or the major belonging to it, or the senior officer present, is unfit to command.

And also that it should be in the power of the Commander-in-Chief to send officers of all ranks, from one regiment to another, to do duty when occasion requires.

8. Is the influence of the European officers among native troops greatest in time of peace or in time of war?

8. Influence acquired in time of peace will carry with it influence in time of war. But it is in time of war, I think, that the native troops look most to their European officers.

9. What conclusions do you draw as to the course to be pursued with native troops in times of peace with regard to the strength at which regiments should be maintained, the occupation to be found for them, and the like?

9. I do not see how our native regiments are to be employed in times of peace, otherwise than in the performance of their own duties, any more than our European regiments. The strength I would propose for regiments is noted elsewhere.

10. Has the strength of the native infantry of the Bengal army ever been so great in times of peace, that it might have been in part employed otherwise than on mere military duties?

10. The strength of the native infantry has for a long time past been scarcely adequate to the duties required of it.

11. Would it have been practicable to employ the troops upon public works?

11. I think not.

12. In apportioning European officers to native troops, — (1) Should native corps have a full complement of European officers according to the present scale, besides a full complement of native commissioned officers; or, (2) A full complement of European officers and no native commissioned officers; or, (3) A smaller number of European officers than at present and a full complement of native officers?

12. I would not adopt either of these scales.

I have advocated the appointment of two sergeants to every company of our native infantry regiments, and the abolition of the grades of native commissioned officers.

If these measures are adopted, especially the first, I think the complement of European officers might be diminished. It would suffice to have six captains, six lieutenants, and four ensigns with each regiment of native infantry, besides the field officers.

13. If a full complement of European officers, would you attach cadets at once to native corps, or first to European corps?

13. I would send cadets to native corps that are well commanded, in preference to sending them to European corps. If the cadet is to be eventually posted to an European regiment, he will not have lost time by doing duty at first with a good native regiment. If he is to be posted at last to a native regiment, the sooner he begins to serve with one the better, that he may commence as soon as possible to know the men and to acquire their language.

14. If a smaller number of European officers is assigned to native corps, how would you train them for this special employment?

14. I see no difference, whether the number of officers be greater or less, in the means of training cadets.

15. Is the efficiency of regiments affected by the number of officers taken from corps for staff employment?

15. I think it is not; for, after all, it is a well-known fact that a regiment well commanded will be quite as efficient with but a few officers as a regiment indifferently commanded with a larger number of officers, and even more so. We have some regiments, the Kelat-i-Ghilzie, the Ferozepore, the Sirmoor battalion, for instance, with only a few officers which in efficiency are probably not far, if at all, behind the regular native infantry corps.

16. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable, in the course of mutinies, between the conduct of regiments with few and those with many European officers present?

16. I have no personal experience of mutinies in regiments. My observation has led me to the conclusion that the number of European officers with a native corps makes no difference, if the men are determined to mutiny. If

the influence of European officers has kept any regiment from mutiny, it is that of the commanding officer or the adjutant, or some highly respected and efficient officer in the corps, that has had the effect, and quite independently of the number present.

17. How can the demand for European officers for staff and detached employment be best provided for without injuring the efficiency of regiments?

17. The terms of this question seem to imply an affirmative answer to the 15th question, to which, however, I have ventured to give an answer in the negative. In reply to the present question, I beg to say that I think it by no means necessarily follows that the detaching of officers to the extent demanded for staff employment injures the efficiency of regiments. There should be a limited number, below which a regiment should not be allowed to fall in point of officers present. If two sergeants per company are given, I think it will amply suffice that the number of officers required to be invariably present with a native regular corps should be, besides the commanding officer, the adjutant and the quartermaster, three captains, and three subalterns. Leave within easy recall might still be given to officers, though, for the time, the minimum number be thereby diminished. This, with eight companies in a regiment, gives one officer to each company, including the staff, and it leaves half the officers, eight per regiment, for staff employ and occasional absence on furlough.

But I am persuaded that much might be done to relieve the pressure on regiments for the demands of the staff by largely employing uncovenanted persons and officers who have retired from the service, but who would be only too glad, in many instances, to come back to India to take employment.

18. Would it be advantageous to the efficiency of the officers of the army as regimental officers, to cut off the inducement which the hope of staff employment affords to young men to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches useful to the state?

18. I think not. But it is understood that a higher test than that now undergone will be established, which young men must pass before they can obtain commissions, and before promotion can be obtained. This will be of great service to the army.

I cannot imagine any beneficial influence being exercised on the minds of officers by cutting off the hope of staff employment. They would look upon themselves as to a certain extent kept back in the course of life.

I do not think this measure would give us such good material for our army as is now available, nor that any peculiar or increased attachment to the profession would ensue therefrom, but rather the contrary.

19. Would the standard of acquirements amongst the officers of the army at large be lowered by any measure having such a tendency?

19. I think it assuredly would.

ARTILLERY.

I. RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF THE ARTILLERY.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the native gunners of the Bengal army are composed?

1. Much the same as in the native infantry; but if I am rightly informed, there are fewer brahmins.

2. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the gun lascars of the Bengal army are composed?

2. Much the same as in the infantry.

3. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the drivers of the Bengal army are composed?

3. Chiefly Mahomedans and the less dignified classes of Hindoos, I believe.

4. Should native gunners or golundazes continue to be enlisted and to form part of the artillery of the Bengal army?

4. I think not.

5. Should native drivers continue to be employed with European artillery?

5. These appear necessary. They will help to do various duties which Europeans in this climate cannot perform.

6. From what districts are the several races, tribes, or castes which enter into the golundaz drawn?

7. From what districts are the races, tribes, or castes which compose the gun lascars drawn?

8. From districts are the drivers taken?

6—8. I am not able to answer these questions.

9. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded by regulation or practice of the service from the golundaz of the Bengal army, and, if so, for what reason?

9. I believe the rule is the same as in the native infantry.

10. The same question is repeated both with respect to gun lascars and drivers.

10. As above.

11. Supposing that native artillery were continued in the Bengal army, are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom recruits for the golundaz might with advantage be enlisted?

11. No; I think not.

12. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the golundaz of the Bengal artillery, for the gun lascars, and for the drivers?

12. I believe no particular agency is employed, but that a number of men, called omédwars, i.e. candidates, are to be found generally in the lines of artillery companies, and from these the golundaz are mainly recruited. I am not aware of any particular agency for enlisting gun lascars or drivers. The former, under certain circumstances, are eligible for transfer to the golundaz.

13. On entertainment of recruits for the golundaz, the gun lascars, or the drivers of the Bengal artillery, what precautions of registry and other forms are taken before the local authorities of districts?

13. I am not aware.

14. Would you suggest any alterations in the recruiting regulations or practice if golundaz continue to be enlisted?

14. I am not sufficiently informed on the subject to suggest any change.

15. The same question is put with regard to gun lascars and drivers.

15. As above.

16. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his being admitted into the golundaz of the Bengal artillery?

16. I do not think any particular form of oath is prescribed for or used in the artillery. All native recruits, including gun lascars and drivers, are sworn in on a gun, in presence of the senior officer of the brigade or battalion, and all the native officers, and it is fully explained to all recruits and establishments that they are entertained for general service, and engage to go beyond sea when required.

17. The same question is repeated with regard to the gun lascars and drivers.

17. Answered above.

18. How long has this form of oath been in use in the Bengal artillery?

18. See reply to question 16.

9. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the golundaz, gun lascar, or driver when first enrolled? or would you substitute any form of engagement for the oath?

19. I would prescribe the same oath as for the native infantry.

20. If native artillerymen continue to be used, should the different battalions be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there and there only, or be recruited over a wide area irrespective of districts?

20. I would do as proposed for the native infantry.

21. The same question is repeated with regard to gun lascars and drivers.

21. As above.

22. Should the battalions or companies, or troops of golundaz, be homogeneous as to race or caste, or composite, having all tribes or castes mixed up together?
23. If composite, in what proportion should the various races, tribes, or castes be entertained?
24. The two foregoing questions are repeated with reference to gun lascars and to drivers.
- 22--24. I beg to refer to my replies regarding the native infantry.
25. What agency should be employed for recruiting golundaz, gun lascars, and drivers?
25. I see no occasion for change.
26. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, when enlisting recruits for the golundaz, gun lascars, and drivers?
26. The same that are taken and proposed to be taken with the native infantry.
27. If native drivers be discontinued, would you replace them by Europeans raised for that duty, or by European gunners trained to the duty as part of their exercise, or by Anglo-Indians enrolled for this special duty?
27. By European gunners trained to the duty as part of their exercise. But I think, as I have said above, that native drivers should be retained. They have charge of the harness and gear of the animals, and are responsible for their being duly preserved and cleaned. They proceed with their cattle for forage, and assist in loading and unloading it. They give guards and sentries over their stables and sheds, and for other purposes when required. Two syce drivers per battery are instructed in shoeing horses.

II. RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Are the same Articles of War applicable to the European gunners and to the golundaz of the Bengal artillery?
1. No; the Europeans are governed by the Mutiny Act; the golundaz by the Articles of War for the native troops.
2. Can you suggest improvements in the Articles of War now in use in the golundaz of the Bengal artillery?
2. I beg to refer to my reply to the similar question regarding the native infantry.
3. Can you suggest improvements in the Articles of War as respects the European artillery?
3. No; these follow, *mutatis mutandis*, the Articles of War for Her Majesty's service.
4. Are the gun lascars and drivers under the same Articles of War as the golundaz; and do any improvements suggested comprehend these classes.
4. Yes; to the whole question.
5. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?
5. They should be retained.
6. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the native artillery of the Bengal army?
6. There is no difference, that I have observed, from the working of courts-martial in the native infantry.
7. What means are adopted to acquaint the golundaz, gun lascars, and drivers with the military code under which they serve?
7. The Articles of War are periodically read to them.
8. What proportion of the golundaz, gun lascars, and drivers can read and comprehend the Articles of War in their own vernacular?
8. I do not know.

III. ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the Bengal artillery, what is the system of promotion in force for the gun lascars, golundazes, and drivers? Is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?
1. Promotions to the commissioned grades is made by government, on recommendations sent by the commandant

of artillery regiment through the adjutant general of the army. The same rules as to seniority and merit apply as in the native infantry. Promotions to the non-commissioned rank are made by officers commanding brigades and battalions, at the recommendation of officers commanding troops and companies. No native artillery soldier entertained since 1826 is promoted who cannot read and write one language at least.

2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the golundaz generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?
2. Much the same as in the infantry, I apprehend.
3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the golundaz, from among whom they have risen?
3. I do not know.
4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?
4. I do not know.
5. Do the golundaz of all grades undergo systematic instruction in anything else than ordinary gun drill? Are they practised at laying guns and mortars, at cutting fuzees, judging distances, adapting charges to mortars, &c., or do the European officers themselves execute those details?
4. The instruction of the golundaz nearly approaches that given to the European artillerymen, I believe. Gun lascars are instructed in the foot and sword drills, also gun drill; the use of the gun, drag-ropes, and general duties connected with ordnance. They are used in magazine, park, laboratory, and ordnance commissariat duties occasionally.
6. Can the golundaz of the Bengal artillery frequently read English and write it?
6. I am not able to answer this question.
7. Is it advisable that native gunners should be conversant with laboratory work?
7. I think not, after the experience of the late mutinies. On this account I would not retain the golundaz.
8. Does the intervention of the native commissioned officer between the European officer and his men, weaken or strengthen the position and influence of the European officer?
8. This must be the same as in the native infantry.
9. Have the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of golundaz been found on occasions of mutiny to evince cordial fidelity, to give timely information, and effectively to aid their European officer in checking or quelling mutiny? Have the native officers passively or overtly sided with the mutineers, or with the Government they had sworn to serve and with the European officers?
9. They have behaved as ill, I believe, as their comrades in the native cavalry and infantry; but as in these arms, so in the native artillery, some have remained eminently faithful.
10. If native artillery be continued in the Bengal army, should the grades of native commissioned officers be maintained or abolished?
10. I would abolish the commissioned grades, if it be possible, to avoid detaching parties of artillery to out-posts, such as Arracan, &c.
11. Would the substitution of such a number of European non-commissioned officers as would give one to each gun of a battery in lieu of the native commissioned officers of golundaz be advisable?
11. I think it would; but then detachments with one European non-commissioned officer should be avoided.
12. If the abolition of the grades of golundaz commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument be thus closed to the golundaz, would a graduated scale of good-service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specific periods of service, be a compensatory encouragement and as efficacious as commissioned grades?
12. They might, I think, be so arranged as to ensure this result.

3. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the golundaz to the British service and the British rule?
13. As in the case of the native infantry, so with the native artillery, I do not consider the late mutinies to furnish any criterion of the effect of retiring pensions on the loyalty of the men. No doubt these are a powerful attraction to all natives to enter the service.
14. Do the drivers and gun lascars receive pensions?
14. Yes.
15. Have the drivers and gun lascars of the Bengal artillery been found faithful in times of mutiny?
15. No; with some exceptions.
16. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained or modified or prospectively abolished?
16. I would abolish pensions prospectively, except for men wounded in action, and the heirs of men killed on service, and for cases of peculiar merit.
17. Can you state the charge upon the finances of the Bengal presidency on account of military pensions to the native artillery of the Bengal army?
18. Should not the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grade of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?
- 17, 18. I would do as proposed for the native infantry.
19. Are commissioned officers of golundaz generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?
19. They are on a par with native officers of the infantry.
20. Are native commissioned officers on a par with European sergeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?
20. I have not the means of judging.
21. Under the supposition that the artillery be wholly European, would it be advisable to assimilate it as far as practicable with the royal artillery?
21. Yes; *mutatis mutandis*.
22. What would this assimilation involve of change in the system of the Bengal artillery?
23. What would it involve of change in the material of the Bengal artillery?
- 22, 23. I am not in a position to reply to these questions, nor would my opinion, as not being an artillery officer, be of any weight.
24. What modifications would it be expedient to maintain in the organization of the Bengal artillery when assimilating it to the royal artillery, in consequence of the nature of the country, climate, and service?
25. Need the material of the Bengal artillery, if assimilated to that of the royal artillery, be at all modified in consequence of climate and service in India?
26. Do you advocate the maintenance of horse artillery at its present strength?
- 24—26. I think horsed light field batteries might be substituted for the horse artillery. My opinion is given with great deference; it is founded on the expressed sentiments of some distinguished officers, Sir Charles Napier and others.

IV. EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience have the powers of the commandants of native batteries of artillery and of officers in command of golundaz batteries of the Bengal artillery been increased or diminished?
2. What has been the result upon the discipline of the golundaz of the Bengal artillery?
3. If golundaz artillery is continued, what measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline and the confirmation of the influence and authority of the European officers?
4. Is the efficiency of the Bengal corps of artillery affected by the number of officers taken away from corps duties for staff employment?

5. How can the demand for European officers of artillery for staff and detached employments be best provided for without injuring the efficiency of the corps of Bengal artillery?

6. Would the general standard of acquirements be lowered by any measure which, by removing the hope of staff employment, cut off the inducement which young artillery officers now have to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches of knowledge useful to the state?

1—6. Regarding these six questions, I beg to refer to my answers to the same questions respecting the European officers of native infantry regiments.

(Signed) R. J. H. BIRCH, Major-General,
Secretary to the Government
of India in the Military
Department.

Allahabad, August 28, 1858.

REPLIES by Major-General R. BIRCH, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

Questions having reference to Paragraph 5 of Despatch No. 235, of 25 November 1857, Military Department, from the Court of Directors.

1. What is the number of European troops of each arm now serving in the Bengal presidency, and what is their distribution?

Grand total of European troops	-	-	-	61,556
Deduct naval force	-	-	-	983
„ Madras European troops	-	-	-	3,172
„ Bombay European troops	-	-	-	7,308
				11,463
Balance	-	-	-	50,093

Of the Bengal presidency only—

<i>Royal Troops.</i>	
Horse artillery	- - - - 2 troops.
Foot artillery	- - - - { 14 companies with 8 field batteries.
Engineers	- - - - 2 companies.
Dragoons	- - - - 6 regiments.
Infantry	- - - - 44 regiments.

<i>Local or Company's Troops.</i>	
Horse artillery	- - - - 9 troops.
Foot artillery	- - - - { 24 companies with 12 field batteries.
Cavalry	- - - - { 4 regiments, in- complete.
Ditto raised during the mutinies	- 4 corps.
Infantry	- - - - 3 regiments.
Ditto	- - - - { 3 regiments or- dered, but not formed.

Grand Total.	
Horse artillery	- - - - 11 troops.
Foot artillery	- - - - { 38 companies. 20 field batteries.
Engineers	- - - - 2 companies.
Dragoons	- - - - 14 regiments.
Infantry	- - - - 50 regiments.
Cavalry raised during the mutinies	- 4 small corps.

Distribution (Bengal troops)—

		<i>Royal Troops.</i>		
		Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Bengal	- - -	None.	—	2
Punjab	- - -	Foot - 2 Field batts. 2	} 1	6
Field	- { Engineers, 2 companies	Horse - 2 Foot - 12 Field batts. 6	} 5	34
Pegu	- - -	-	—	1

Local or Company's Troops.

	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Bengal - - -	Foot - $\frac{1}{2}$ Field batts. $\frac{1}{4}$	}	-
	Horse - 5*		
Punjaub - - -	Foot - 10 Field batts. 4	}	1
	Horse - 6		
Field - - -	Foot - 13 $\frac{1}{2}$ Field batts. 7	}	3

NOTE.—Four regiments of light cavalry are incomplete, and three regiments of infantry have been ordered but are not yet formed.

2. What is the number of European troops of each arm you deem necessary for the Bengal presidency, and what should be their ordinary distribution?

	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Bengal - - -	10 companies 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ field batts.	} None.	10
N.W.P., from Benares to the Sutlej and the Jullunder Doab and Rohilkund - - -	6 troops 27 companies 22 field batts.		
Central India, from the Junna to the Nerbudda - - -	troops 11 companies 10 field batts.	}	8
	3 troops		
Punjaub - - -	20 companies 14 $\frac{1}{2}$ field batts.	}	16
	2 troops		
Oude - - -	7 companies 6 field batts.	}	6
	1 troops		
Gwalior - - -	5 companies 4 field batts.	}	3

Grand Total.

Horse artillery	- -	12 troops.
Foot artillery	- -	80 companies with 65 field batteries.
Engineers	- -	3 companies.
Dragoons	- -	21 regiments.
Infantry	- -	68 regiments.

(See tabular statement for the proposed distribution of these troops.)

This estimate may, perhaps, appear large; but circumstances have forced upon us the necessity of having more regiments of infantry than would have been required, had the native artillery continued faithful. It is now indispensably requisite that Europeans be substituted for native artillery, and wherever there are guns there must needs be protection provided for them by European infantry or cavalry. Heretofore we have had post guns at various small stations, manned by detachments of native artillery. Some of these guns must now be withdrawn, and those which remain must be manned by European artillerymen.

In making the preceding calculations, I have estimated the cavalry regiments, other than such royal dragoon regiments as may be kept in or sent to India, at a greatly reduced rate.

In my opinion a cavalry regiment should not exceed 350 in non-commissioned and rank and file. Regiments of this description are much more easily handled on parade and in the field, more easily found with quarters, more readily moved on service; they require fewer followers, they never need be divided, and in every point of view they are more serviceable than regiments of such strength as the four regiments of European cavalry lately introduced into the Bengal army. The effect of small bodies of European cavalry, much less numerous than the reduced regiments which I advocate, has been conspicuous in all our Indian wars; and recently the conflicts occasioned by the mutiny of the native army have, in every instance, shown that European cavalry, even in handfuls of men, have carried dread into the ranks of the rebel infantry, and have dispersed and overthrown large bodies of rebel native cavalry.

* Two of these are old native horse artillery troops manned now by Europeans.

If the proposition lately made by Government, to form ten regiments of cavalry of 384 privates, in the place of the four regiments of more than double that strength already ordered, and in lieu also of the only two remaining regiments of native light cavalry, the 5th and 8th, which it is proposed to disband, we shall have, with the six royal dragoon regiments now serving in Bengal, sixteen corps of cavalry. My estimate of our requirements amounts to five additional regiments, in all twenty-one. I would propose to leave only three of the present royal dragoon regiments in Bengal, and to substitute for the other three, three regiments on the reduced scale, having on the Indian establishment eighteen regiments of cavalry.

As regards the infantry, I am persuaded that regiments of 1,140 privates, which is the present complement of Her Majesty's regiments serving in India, are much larger than are really required. The work to be done is, in fact, done by a far less number of men. I would propose to have regiments of 800 rank and file at most; and it is on that calculation that I have estimated the number of corps of infantry required for the defence of this presidency. The old establishments of regiments of royal infantry was fifteen for Bengal, and even then, circumstances occurred in Europe which made it necessary to withdraw one regiment from this presidency (and one also from Madras), without replacing them. But it is not for Europe only that we have been called on for troops in time of war. The war in Persia took away for a time both infantry and dragoon regiments of the Royal army. After all that we have recently gone through in Bengal, from the unexpected mutiny in the native army, it would be unwise to subject the defence of this extensive presidency to the hazard of being rendered too great a task for us, by keeping up a European force composed so largely, as is that we now have, of regiments of the Royal service, liable, in a greater or less degree, to be called away to other fields of action, at a time when their places could not be supplied at all. I am very decidedly of opinion that a permanent local force is, on this account, of paramount necessity, and I think that not less than fifty regiments, out of the sixty-eight which I would propose to maintain, should belong to the Indian establishment. This will still leave us three more infantry regiments of the British army than we have had before, viz., eighteen; but in a total of sixty-eight regiments, two or three corps might be temporarily spared from India on an emergency. I would reduce the six regiments now in the Company's service to 800 rank and file, at the utmost, and would constitute forty-four other regiments for the Indian service on that scale. Fewer officers will be required for them, instead of the present plan of transferring to them the officers of two native corps to one European regiment, as will be shown in my reply to another question. I believe it will be found practicable, and not very long hence, to reduce the number of corps assigned for the present defence of this presidency; and as the railroads come to be completed, we shall be able to dispense with more of them. The standard height of the men might well be lowered, both in the infantry and in the cavalry regiments, on the Indian establishment.

Respecting the artillery, the want of additional force of this arm has long been felt. It is the most important arm of all, and only by maintaining a very powerful artillery can we hope to overawe those who oppose themselves to us.

The artillery on the Bengal establishment, before the mutinies, consisted of (regular artillery)—

Horse artillery	{ European 9 } Total 13 troops in
	{ Native 4 } brigades.
Foot artillery	{ European 24 } Total 52 companies in
	{ Native 18 } 9 battalions.
Field Batteries	- - - 21

Of this number, we have lost by the mutinies, one native troop and eight companies, with five field batteries, and three companies have been disarmed. But it has been determined by authority that no part of the artillery shall henceforward consist of natives; and it is now to be considered whether the artillery in Bengal shall consist, in whole, or in part, of an Indian establishment. One precaution must and will naturally be observed, that European artillery shall never be used with only native cavalry or infantry. It is indispensable, when our gunners are Europeans, that they shall be escorted by Europeans of the other arms. But I conceive that it will be necessary to keep up native drivers on the old footing. They will be required to do work that the Europeans cannot stand in this climate, and I think they would be powerless for mischief in the presence of the European gunners.

It was understood when the royal artillery reinforcement was sent out, that it was only to be temporarily employed in India. It was not publicly so announced, but that that it was so understood I know on very good autho-

city. The relative rank of artillery officers, from the peculiar constitution of the royal artillery, is a source of considerable inconvenience, from the supercession it involves of the officers of the Indian service, our artillery not being similarly constituted.*

It involves, too, this inconvenience, that the commands in the Royal artillery are more numerous, and, therefore, more expensive, than in ours, and that the pay of the men in the Indian artillery has to be increased, to put them on a par with the men of the royal artillery.

It has been said, and with much truth, that the example of the Royal infantry and cavalry is needed in this country, to give a tone to the European regiments in the Indian service. Great good has undoubtedly been derived from the presence of the royal troops, and whatever is of superior quality in the Indian service, is based on emulation of the excellencies which distinguish our own British army. But this sort of leading is not required in the artillery. Without venturing to offer any opinion of my own, I would refer with confidence to the repeatedly expressed opinions of able officers of the highest rank, who have declared the artillery of the Company's service to be second to none in the world, not even to that of our Royal army. It is much more important that the artillery force in India should not be liable to diminution by sudden calls for service elsewhere, than either the cavalry or the infantry.

On these considerations, and on others which might be mentioned, it appears highly desirable that the whole of the artillery should be of the Indian establishment.

The artillery of the Punjaub irregular force, and the Peshawur and Hazara mountain train batteries, might still be natives. The whole of the Punjaub irregular force consists of natives, and unless European troops should be added to them, European artillery alone could not be of any use, and would be in great peril. * * * If the power of artillery, which I have proposed to distribute throughout this presidency, be established, I do not apprehend any inconvenience from reconstituting the batteries of the smaller contingents, such as the Bhopal, the Malwah, the Kotah contingents, and the Joudpore legion, with native artillerymen. For this purpose, the few companies of foot artillery, and the two troops of horse artillery which have not joined in the mutinies, might be made use of, the latter on reduced pay. The Peshawur and Hazara mountain train batteries might also be retained.

With regard to the artillery employed in Arracan there is a difficulty. There has been a detachment there hitherto, furnished from the native battalion at Dum Dum; and it will be necessary to keep up the guns two in number. To man these guns with Europeans is not practicable. I conceive the details might be taken from the remaining portion of the Bengal native artillery which has not mutined. The increased pay given in Arracan might reconcile to permanent service in that province.

Scarcely had I written the preceding remark regarding the Punjaub batteries, when intelligence was received of a mutinous plot among some men, Malwah Sikhs, from the Cis-Sutlej states, of the 10th Punjaub infantry regiment, at Derah Ismael Khan, in which some portion also of the native battery there is said to be implicated. With this warning given to us, it appears to me to be highly necessary to do away with the Punjaub batteries, and that as soon as possible; and this measure, if carried out, necessarily involves the substitution of European regiments for some part of the Punjaub irregular infantry also; for, as has been observed, European artillery cannot be left alone with native cavalry and infantry under any circumstances.

There is one important consideration which has induced me to propose so large an amount of force, European and native, for the defence of this presidency;—the necessity for organizing moveable columns from the larger stations, which should be held in readiness to proceed at very short notice, in whatever direction circumstances may require. For these moveable columns carriage must of course be kept constantly provided. It appears to me that ponies and bullocks might be largely substituted for camels, and that the whole of the carriage for all movements of troops should be kept up by Government. We might do away with the batta given to troops marching; and while troops in the field must of course be restricted to a very small amount of baggage, troops marching for ordinary reliefs, or on escort duties of any kind, should likewise be made to move much less encumbered than has heretofore been the case.

Another reason for my proposing so large a European

force is, that to the European troops only would I entrust the charge of magazines and of treasuries, and the interior defence of jails.

It appears to me an excellent suggestion that all European soldiers should be taught to ride on camels, and that a certain number of these animals should be always kept up at large stations and at important posts, so as to admit of a detachment being rapidly conveyed to any point where their services may be emergently required. I would propose that all moveable columns should invariably have the means of mounting on camels a detachment equal to the wing of a regiment of infantry.

3. What is the number of native troops of each arm now serving in the Bengal presidency, and what is their distribution?

Grand Total of Native Troops.

Regiments, regular and irregular (armed)	-	75,859
Deduct Madras troops	-	5,010
„ Bombay „	-	6,557
		<u>11,567</u>
Balance	-	64,292
Regiments disarmed	-	17,776
Temporary levies, organized police, &c., serving in the Bengal presidency	-	44,371
		<u>126,439</u>

NOTE.—In the deductions are included 179 men of the Hyderabad contingent, and in the balance are included the

Nagpore irregular force	-	3,425
Mewar Bheel corps	-	1,004
Joudpore legion	-	1,118
Mhair regiment	-	550
Mhairwarra battalion	-	712
Muna battalion	-	577
		<u>7,336</u>

Horse artillery, 3 troops.*

Foot artillery, 6 companies, with some remounts, with 2 field batteries.

Sappers and miners	-	1	{ at Roorkee - 528
			{ at Attock - 89
			{ at Peshawur (2 cos.) 82
Body guard	-	1	(half armed and half disarmed).
Light cavalry	-	2	(disarmed).
Infantry, regular*	-	7	(armed).
„ „	-	19	(disarmed).
„ irregular	-	16	(armed).
„ „	-	1	(disarmed).
Cavalry, irregular	-	16	(armed).
„ „	-	1	(disarmed).
Artillery, irregular	-	3	with 3 batteries (one mountain train battery).
Punjaub and Sikh infantry	29		
„ „ cavalry	10		
„ irregular artillery	8		with 4 batteries (one mountain train).

New levies, and organized police are not included in this, neither are "Towanna horse," "Mooltan horse," and such corps.

Distribution.

Native Troops, Bengal.

		Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Foot artillery	-	2		
Field batteries	-	2	3½	15
		1 company of sappers.†		

Native Troops, Punjaub.

Horse artillery	-	2		
Foot artillery	-	8	5	33
Field batteries	-	5†		
		3 companies of sappers and miners.		

Native Troops, Field.

Horse artillery	-	1		
Foot artillery	-	7	11½	21
Field batteries	-	2		
		1 company of sappers and miners.§		

NOTE.—The Nagpore irregular force, Mewar Bheel corps, Joudpore legion, Mhair regiment, Mhairwarra

* This inconvenience has, to a great extent, been rectified by the orders recently received, to assimilate the artillery of the three presidencies with that of the Royal army in regard to the officers.

* Three of these regiments are in China.

† Seebunder sappers at Darjeeling.

‡ 2 mountain train batteries.

§ Also some Punjaub sappers.

battalion, Muna battalion, are not included; if they should be, the following should be added to the "Field," 1 foot artillery, 1 battery, 2 cavalry, and 7 infantry.

Of these regiments 2 troops of horse artillery, 3 companies of foot artillery, 3½ cavalry regiments, and 20 infantry are disarmed.

4. What is the number of native troops you deem necessary for the Bengal presidency, and what should be their ordinary distribution?

The native troops will, I presume, consist, as heretofore, of regular and irregular regiments, but with this important difference, that we shall, henceforward, have no regular native artillery, and no regular native cavalry.

With regard to the native infantry, there remain of the old Bengal army, the following regiments:—

<i>Regular Regiments.</i>															
Entire, armed, unaffected by the mutinies - - -	<table border="0"> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">{</td> <td style="padding-left: 5px;">The 12th</td> <td rowspan="4" style="vertical-align: middle;">- - - 4</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">}</td> <td style="padding-left: 5px;">" 31st</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">}</td> <td style="padding-left: 5px;">" 66th</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">}</td> <td style="padding-left: 5px;">" 73rd</td> </tr> </table>	{	The 12th	- - - 4	}	" 31st	}	" 66th	}	" 73rd					
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}	" 66th														
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Portions remaining faithful when their comrades mutinied - - -	<table border="0"> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">{</td> <td style="padding-left: 5px;">The 42nd.</td> <td rowspan="2" style="vertical-align: middle;">- - - 4</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">}</td> <td style="padding-left: 5px;">Portions of other regiments, estimated in all at about 2,000 men.</td> </tr> </table>	{	The 42nd.	- - - 4	}	Portions of other regiments, estimated in all at about 2,000 men.									
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With their arms restored and now on service in China - - -	<table border="0"> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">{</td> <td style="padding-left: 5px;">The 47th</td> <td rowspan="3" style="vertical-align: middle;">- - - 3</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">}</td> <td style="padding-left: 5px;">" 65th</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">}</td> <td style="padding-left: 5px;">" 70th</td> </tr> </table>	{	The 47th	- - - 3	}	" 65th	}	" 70th							
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Regiments which are likely to have their arms restored	<table border="0"> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">{</td> <td style="padding-left: 5px;">In the Punjaub</td> <td style="vertical-align: middle;">- - - 4</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">}</td> <td style="padding-left: 5px;">In Bengal</td> <td style="vertical-align: middle;">- - - 2</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2"></td> <td style="text-align: right; border-top: 1px solid black;">Total 16</td> </tr> </table>	{	In the Punjaub	- - - 4	}	In Bengal	- - - 2			Total 16					
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		Total 16													
Irregular regiments on the same footing as the line; but officered as irregulars	<table border="0"> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">{</td> <td style="padding-left: 5px;">Kelat-i-Ghilzie.</td> <td rowspan="5" style="vertical-align: middle;">.</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">}</td> <td style="padding-left: 5px;">Sirmoor.</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">}</td> <td style="padding-left: 5px;">Nusseree.</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">}</td> <td style="padding-left: 5px;">Kemaon.</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">}</td> <td style="padding-left: 5px;">Ferozepore.</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td style="padding-left: 5px;">Laodiannah.</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	{	Kelat-i-Ghilzie.	.	}	Sirmoor.	}	Nusseree.	}	Kemaon.	}	Ferozepore.		Laodiannah.	
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Of these corps, it appears that fourteen of the regular regiments are likely to remain embodied in the Bengal army. (In calculating the whole at sixteen, I reckoned the 2,000 men composed of remnants of corps, at two regiments, as on the old complement). It is probable now that they will be made into small irregular regiments. But the fourteen corps are all probably considerably reduced, by the operation of men on leave not having returned, by invaliding, and by discharges. I think it would be unadvisable to complete them to the old standard; and, as many irregular regiments must remain embodied, for the regular regiments of native infantry, I would propose 640 privates as a proper and sufficient complement. This was the strength of our regular regiments in 1831. I would propose also that they should be maintained in the form of regular regiments; irregular infantry corps have certainly not heretofore formed the *élite* of the native army, however otherwise the case may have been with the irregular cavalry. And it is to be remembered that the whole of the contingents have mutined, viz.:—the Oude, the Gwalior, the Bhopal, the Kotah, all consisting of corps on the irregular system. We have not one irregular regiment (I do not allude to merely local corps at all) which has stood against the mutiny, excepting those which, though with only the complement of European officers which irregular corps have, are yet in point of organization and pay, on the footing of native corps of the line, viz.:—the Kelat-i-Ghilzie, the Ferozepore, and Goorkha regiments. I would now bring into the line, the six regiments above enumerated, of which the men are now on the same footing as line regiments. This would make a total of twenty regiments of regular native infantry, already embodied; and to these I would propose to add ten more, giving on the whole thirty regiments of regular native infantry on the establishment.

For the duties of the larger stations, I think regular infantry regiments should in preference be employed, the number of European officers attached to them giving them an advantage for such localities over the irregular regiments.

I think none of the regular regiments should be kept up unless they now consent to serve beyond sea, or wherever they may be ordered. Those which have been disarmed should have this undertaking imposed upon them as a condition of the restoration of their arms; and in the case of those which have remained armed all along, their refusal to undertake general service beyond sea should lead to their

not being recruited, so that they may die out, and even to their discharge with suitable gratuities. I do not anticipate much difficulty in gaining the consent of the whole to take general service, considering the power we have acquired over them by the experience of the late time of disturbance.

It is an additional argument in favour of regular regiments over irregulars, that they proceed on foreign service with their own officers; whereas the irregulars require additional officers to be posted to them for the occasion, as was done when the 4th Sikh local regiment went to Burmah in the late war; a system which can but rarely work well, as on service it is more essential than anywhere else that the men should know their officers.

With regard to re-arming regiments which have once been disarmed, I know that there is a strong opinion held by officers of ability and experience that such a measure would be highly impolitic and objectionable, for they feel convinced that men once subjected to such an indignity can never be trusted again. I have ventured to hold a different opinion, and I do so still. Some of the native regular regiments were disarmed as a precaution, and they knew this, and were thankful for the measure. This sentiment has been expressed to me by native officers, who are among the best we have in the service. The alacrity with which some of them gave up their arms, and the cheerfulness with which they have since done duty, are corroborations of the fact, as in the right wing of the 4th native infantry, for example, and in the 32nd native infantry, and others. The right wing of the 4th native infantry is a striking instance. These men have been occasionally trusted with arms, and employed in the interval since they were disarmed, and they have repeatedly returned their arms into store when such occasional employment was completed. They show no symptom whatever of consciousness of disgrace by having been required to give up their arms, but quite the contrary feeling, and in a very decided manner. I see no reason to doubt that this will prove the case also with other regiments to whom their arms may be restored. The best men in the corps (and these formed, I am convinced, the majority in every regiment), felt inexpressible relief on seeing the means of mischief taken away from the bad and violently disposed minority, the men of worst character in their corps; and I see no reason to doubt that if the regiments to be re-armed are well selected, and if they be first weeded by the discharge of any man in them of bad character, we shall have a body of men in the remainder to whom arms may be safely restored, and who will not only not feel a disposition to resent as an indignity their temporary privation of their arms, but will feel and respond to the compliment of being again entrusted with them. Besides this, these men have before them the fruits of this causeless mutiny; they see, plainly exhibited, ruin brought down upon their own heads by their comrades who have risen arms against the Government; the distress of families by the stoppage of remittances; the desolation of their homes by the march of war over the land; the loss of pensions; the fall of men in battle, who, had they died in the service of Government, instead of in rebellion, would have left some provision to their heirs. These examples will surely not be thrown away; and, for my own part, I do feel firmly convinced that there exists, spread in greater or less degree throughout every regiment that we may again entrust with their arms, the elements of such fidelity and heroism as have distinguished the already very large numbers of native commissioned, non-commissioned officers and sepoy who have earned by their loyalty extraordinary rewards at the hands of Government. I would not re-enlist an individual of those who have taken their discharge, not a man who has been borne on the rolls of any regiment; but I have no fear as to the result of restoring arms to such of the disarmed regiments as, after the process of discharging the bad characters among them, may be selected for that honour.

Of the irregular or local infantry regiments (not including contingents, of course, but the old single irregular corps), heretofore existing before the mutinies, I think not one can be dispensed with, except it be the Calcutta native militia. That corps is doing such duty as a corps disarmed can do. I would not restore arms to it, but convert it into police.

How far the several levies raised and about to be raised in the North-western Provinces may answer their object, is yet an experiment of which the result has to be ascertained in the course of time. For local duties at the larger stations where they are raised, they may possibly do very well; but I am not sanguine as to their usefulness elsewhere, should they be sent from their proper stations.

For the number and distribution of the native troops which I would propose to have, I beg to refer to the tabular statement.

5. What proportion of native troops serving in the Bengal presidency are regulars, irregulars, and police corps; of what races are they composed, and in what proportions do the races occur?

5. Regulars	{	Armed	-	6,947	
		Disarmed*	-	16,575	
					23,522
Irregular	{	Armed	-	72,260	
		Disarmed	-	1,199	
					73,459
		Grand total	-		96,981
Police	{	Horse	-	7,115	
		Foot	-	17,972	
					25,087
		Grand total of regulars, irregulars, and police	-		122,068

NOTE.—Besides the above, there are troops belonging to the Rajah of Puttealla and other native princes, numbering in all 4,412 men.

Corps are composed of Affghans, Punjaubees, Pathans of Peshawur and the Dera Jat, Goorkhas, Hindoostanees, Arracanese, Assamese, and Santhals, &c.

The castes are Mussulmans, Brahmins, Rajpoots, Sikhs, Gwallas, Kayats, Koormees, Goosains, Bhats, Gurrereas, Burraies, and numerous othes castes of Hindoos.

I am not able to state the proportions of the different races.

6. What proportion of your proposed establishment of native troops should be regulars, irregulars, and police?

6. So far as relates to regular and irregular native regiments, this question has been already answered in my reply to the 4th question. (See tabular statement.)

As to the police, I have not the means of forming any very accurate opinion. I think the placing of *fire-arms* in the hands of native police, and drilling them *as regiments*, to be matters of very questionable policy. Constituted as they must needs be, of very much the same descriptions of men of which the native army, regular and irregular, is composed, it is only multiplying trained opposition to our rule against some future day of difficulty, to establish police regiments on anything approaching the footing of the native army. To protect the territories under our power against such internal disturbances as do legitimately call for the aid of the military force, properly so designated, and for their defence against external aggression, I consider the army, European and native, which I have proposed to maintain, to be sufficient. But if it is to be an object to overawe, not the regular and irregular forces only, but an armed and drilled native police also, it will be necessary to increase *considerably* our European force. If proper measures are taken to disarm the population of our provinces, there will be little occasion, I conceive, to place fire-arms in the hands of our police, when those whom they have to keep in order are not so armed; and if to resist Dacoits and other such disturbers of the peace, and to apprehend offenders, individually or in gangs, be the true duties of the police, I see no reason why they should have fire-arms, and much less why they should be drilled to act together as soldiers. Any such opposition as would require a force to be drawn out in array to put it down, seems rather a case for calling out the military than for using the police force. There is a well-known race of policemen often entertained for their own protection, or for aggression on their neighbours' property, by native zemindars, the *Lattogals*, Burkundaz, who take their designation from the weapon (the bludgeon) which they use. Of their entire effectiveness there is no doubt.

In connexion with the subject of arming and employing the police, I would take occasion to mention that, for escorts for treasure or army stores (excepting tents), I would not employ the police, but the irregular troops; but as strings of carts laden with wines and stores, such as the commissariat has to supply to the troops, sent by merchants to their constituents, may be seen now on the road from Calcutta to the principal part of this Doab, and were constantly seen before the mutinies traversing the whole country, even to Peshawur, with no protection but a few chuprassees, so might most commissariat stores now be forwarded from station to station with an escort of Burkundaz, armed with bludgeons, or at the most with swords.

The defence of jails should be entrusted to the military chiefly; the internal guard should be European soldiers; the external might be either, native irregular soldiers or police.

Every magazine should be defended by small fortifications, which should give defence to the treasuries, the commissariat supplies, and a small garrison of European soldiers, in addition to providing a place of refuge to the families of the officers and men when the bulk of the troops at the station went out on service.

7. What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in the Bengal presidency; and state the ratio, both inclusive and exclusive, of the police?

7. The proportion I have assigned in the tabular statement appears to me to be sufficient, if the police is not to be armed with fire-arms, and not regimentally drilled; but if the police is to be so armed and drilled, I think we shall require at least one-half more of European troops.

8. What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in India generally; and state the ratio, as affected by the inclusion or exclusion of native police corps?

8. If the police is to be what police ordinarily is, I think the proportion of the European to the native troops should be as one to four; but if the police is to have fire-arms, and to be regimentally drilled, the proportion should, in my opinion, be as one to three.

9. Is there adequate barrack accommodation for the European troops now serving in the Bengal presidency, and state its amount?

9. Of a permanent nature there is not; but accommodation, either permanent or temporary, and of the last kind some exceedingly good, there is enough available. The comparatively few troops now in the field are of course not included in the statement. What the amount of accommodation may be will best be ascertained in the department of public works.

10. Would additional barrack accommodation have to be provided in the Bengal presidency for the strength of the European troops you deem necessary, and to what extent?

11. Additional accommodation will be necessary; but to what extent I cannot here accurately state. But wherever it may be determined to place European troops, under my scheme or any other, the provision of barrack accommodation is so purely a matter of absolute necessity that there seems to be little occasion to calculate its amount or extent beforehand. Just as at Barrackpore and at Allahabad, on its being determined to locate European troops at those stations, which had not been done before, barrack accommodation was necessarily provided for them, so, at any other place, the expediency of having European troops there located is the main consideration, and that question once determined in the affirmative, the provision of barrack accommodation follows of course.

11. What proportion of the European force should belong to Her Majesty's regular army, and what proportion should be composed of troops raised for service in India?

11. I have stated this above; but, to recapitulate, I would propose, that—

The artillery should be wholly composed of troops raised for service in India, and consist of ninety-two troops and companies; that

The cavalry should consist of three royal dragoon regiments, and of eighteen regiments on the reduced scale, composed of troops raised for service in India; and that

The infantry should consist of eighteen royal regiments of foot, and of fifty regiments on the reduced scale of troops entertained for the Indian service.

12. Under the supposition that additional corps of Europeans have to be raised for service in India, how would you officer them?

12. The ten regiments of European cavalry already proposed by Government, are to be officered from the lists of the Bengal light cavalry, with a proposed addition of three lieutenants and two cornets to each. These ten regiments, if so constituted, will more than absorb the officers of cavalry now on the establishment. And if the additional regiments be constituted they will have to be officered by new appointments of officers from England. But to supply officers of standing, down to the rank of captain, inclusive, it will be necessary to allow of transfers from Her Majesty's service; and these should be so arranged as to afford to the cavalry officers now on the Indian establishment a fair share of the higher grades in the new regiments. I am not advocating amalgamation, for it appears to me that that is surrounded with inseparable difficulties, and could not be brought into operation without great injustice, in one way or another; but what I would propose is actual *bona fide* transfers of officers

* In these are included 507 military prisoners.

from Her Majesty's service to the Indian establishment, with every reasonable advantage secured to them of previous service for pension, but with restriction in all necessary respects to the system prevailing in the Indian service; and once transferred, they should thenceforward take their place on the gradation list of the Indian establishment. Officers for the lower grades might be supplied by the nomination of cadets, as heretofore.

The usual system of forming new regiments of European infantry has the immediate effect of making supernumerary as many colonels as there are regiments formed.

Each body of officers of the old native infantry has its colonel; but the junction of two such corps of officers causes the loss of one officer of that rank. The promotion in the line is by this means most injuriously interfered with, and not only in Bengal, but in Madras and Bombay also, the officers of the three presidencies being included in one list, down to the captains inclusive.

Again, the tone of the Bengal army is lowered by losing its colonels. Its officers by every such step that they lose, are less and less able to compete for those commands and distinctions, which the service of India presents to the just ambition of officers. Further, the loss of the rank of colonel regimentally, cruelly deprives us of that privilege which after all falls to the lot of comparatively very few among us, of enjoying rest and a competent income in our own country in the down-hill of life, a privilege which ordinarily is not attained in less than forty years' service. Again, every diminution of the grade of regimental colonel, is a diminution of the funds of those invaluable institutions on which our widows and orphans depend for their subsistence; and for every step in that rank lost to us, the subscriptions of all the other ranks of officers must be enhanced, a process which would soon press beyond endurance on the means of officers of all grades, especially of the lowest.

Lastly, any great diminution of the number of regimental colonels would sink Bengal into a third-rate presidency; a very anomalous state of matters, considering the extent of territory embraced within it, the very large amount of force, European and native, required for its defence, and the fact of its being the seat of the supreme Government of India.

In any arrangement that may be made in reorganizing the Bengal army the maintenance of a fair proportion of regimental colonels should be an object of special care.

The system of doubling up the officers of two corps into one new regiment gives the latter more officers than are required for it; for instance, two lieutenant-colonels and two majors. One of each grade is amply sufficient. In Her Majesty's regiments serving in India, one of the two lieutenant-colonels is generally away from the regiment, either as a brigadier, or on staff employ or on leave; and it frequently happens that one of the two majors is away on staff employ or otherwise. There is actually no occasion for two officers of these grades with any regiment. I think also that the captains and subalterns might without inconvenience be less numerous. Her Majesty's infantry regiments serving in India have twelve captains, fourteen lieutenants, and ten ensigns. The local European regiments have fourteen captains, twenty-two lieutenants, and ten ensigns.

It certainly cannot be necessary to have an establishment of officers more numerous than suffices for Her Majesty's regiments, which are of greater strength than our Indian corps. On this ground, two captains and eight lieutenants might at once be struck off from the complement of each of the European corps on the Indian establishment. But I am persuaded that twelve captains, twelve lieutenants, and six ensigns would be a proper and sufficient complement for each regiment of European infantry.

I have estimated the requirements of the Bengal presidency at fifty regiments of European and thirty regiments of native infantry, to form the permanent Indian establishment here. To officer these, according to the scale I have proposed for European and for native regular regiments, we shall require:—

	50 colonels	}	Total.
	50 lieut.-colonels		
For the European regiments	50 majors	}	80 colonels.
	600 captains		80 lieut.-colonels.
	600 lieutenants		80 majors.
	300 ensigns		780 captains.
For the native regiments	30 colonels	}	780 lieutenants.
	30 lieut.-colonels		420 ensigns.
	30 majors		
	180 captains		
	180 lieutenants		
	120 ensigns		

The present establishment of officers of all ranks in the Bengal infantry is—

78 colonels,
80 lieut.-colonels,
80 majors,
560 captains,
880 lieutenants,
400 ensigns.

Therefore, to make up the required complement of officers on the new scales, we are deficient of—

2 colonels,
220 captains,
20 ensigns,

and we have a surplus of 100 lieutenants.

Considering, then, that the first 220 lieutenants of infantry in the list are officers from fourteen to eighteen years' standing, 1843 to 1850, with very few of so late a season as 1849 and 1850, it would not be unreasonable to promote them to the rank of captain. If this be done, the measure will absorb 220 ensigns, to be promoted to lieutenants in their room.

The effect of what I have proposed will be, on the whole, the promotion of—

2 lieut.-colonels to be colonels,
2 majors to be lieut.-colonels,
2 captains to be majors,
222 lieutenants to be captains,
122 ensigns to be lieutenants;

and the same number of cadets, 122, will have to be supplied from England to complete the establishment. This would be no great drain.

I believe several projects of a different nature have occurred to others, and among them one is to consider all the officers of infantry as forming one general list, irrespective of the regiments to which they belong, and then to select from the whole such of the officers as may be considered best adapted for serving with European regiments. This plan would be highly injurious to a great many officers, without any adequate good to the service.

In the first place, to select from among a host of officers, who have never served in a European regiment, such as may be best fitted for such service, can only be a speculative and uncertain procedure. It can only be conjectured that, owing to their known or supposed possession of certain qualities, certain officers are better adapted than others for commanding European soldiers; and in many cases the selection will assuredly prove erroneous.

Again, the position of the selected officers in the corps to which they are sent will not admit of adjustment in any conceivable form which would not militate against the first principles of a seniority service such as ours. And the force of this suggestion is increased when it is remembered that the armies of Madras and Bombay are so mixed up with that of Bengal, that a radical alteration in the old system of promotion cannot affect one of the three armies without affecting the other two likewise.

But selection in order to form many European regiments is a hopeless task. What occasion there can be for doubting the efficiency of officers of the Indian service, and their capacity to command European soldiers, is not apparent. We have had European regiments for many years in all the presidencies, and though the first and oldest regiment in each presidency is now, in regard to the mode in which it was formed, beyond the memory of any one, the other six regiments, two in each presidency, have been formed within a comparatively recent period, and they were formed by the chance assemblage together of officers from the line, not selected, but posted to them according to their standing in the regiments generally. With these corps there has been no lack of able officers, and the efficiency of these regiments is unquestionable; it has been amply proved, both in peace and war. And it may be prognosticated most reasonably, that the new regiments will become as efficient as the old ones. If there be any sort of failure, it will be at first only; and every day's experience, and the constant flow of casualty and change, will speedily correct any deficiency.

There is another and very strong objection to this sort of selection for the European regiments from the general list. The claims of the European regiments are not a whit more emergent than those of the general staff; and it is assuredly a mistake to suppose that the refuse of officers will do for native regiments. We require the best officers we can get for all the various employments presented by the Indian service; and the first object should be to raise the tone of the whole army as one body, and not to let it be supposed that indifferent qualifications will answer the purpose of any branch of the service.

Having mentioned the general staff, I beg to be allowed

to say that the formation of a staff corps appears to me simply a question of expense, but of expense so enormous as to place its realization out of question. After very anxious consideration, I do not see how a staff corps is to be formed except by seconding, that is supplying the place in their regiments of all officers removed to the staff; and by allowing the rank of such officers to go on, *pari passu*, with that of those who succeed to their places in the regiments. But this does not provide for eventual circumstances, such as the occasionally proved inefficiency of officers employed on the staff, nor their vacating appointments after five years tenure of office, which is now the rule.

In the British army the unattached or half-pay list takes up officers appointed to the staff, but only their army rank goes on while they are unattached, and it is an object with the authorities to oblige as many officers as possible to return from the unattached list to the effective service, in order to lighten the public burthen. But this is not a sort of arrangement applicable to the Indian service, nor does it meet the views of those who suggest an unattached list for India. Their object is to get rid of staff absentees in regiments, and to shelve finally the inefficient officers of field rank. But as I before observed, these measures might be effected, but only at an immense increase of expense.

The real selection which should be made is that of commanding officers, and of the regimental staff. This selection should be rigid and uncompromising, and all will then work well.

13. Under the supposition that a considerable increase take place in the number of corps raised for service in India, and that they are officered from the officers of the mutinied battalions of the Bengal army, will this accession of seniority promotion corps create any greater embarrassment in juxtaposition with the purchase promotion system than what now accrues from the existence of the Royal artillery, Royal engineers, Royal marines, and the three Indian armies, in all which corps and armies seniority promotion is the system?

13. I think not, if the plan of officering the European and native infantry regiments which I have suggested be adopted, there will be no embarrassment, any more than there hitherto has been.

14. The feasibility of raising corps of foreign mercenaries, such as Tartars, Chinese, Malays, Dyaks, Africans, Madagascarenes, &c., being assumed, would you consider that the proportion of European to native and foreign mercenary troops could, with safety to our power and supremacy in India, be modified from the ratio stated in reply to Questions 7 and 8; if so, to what extent?

14. No; I do not think the proportion of one European soldier to four natives should ever be diminished.

TABULAR STATEMENT of European and Native Troops to constitute the Indian Service in Bengal, showing the proportions relatively of each, and their Distribution. (Local Corps in Assam, Sylhet, Arracan, and elsewhere, not included.)

Stations.	Horse Artillery.	Foot Artillery.	Field Batteries.	European Cavalry.	Irregular Cavalry.	European Infantry.	Native Infantry.	Irregular Infantry.	Moveable Column.
	A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F.	G.	H.	
Fort William	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	
Barrackpore	—	1	1	—	—	1	3	—	
Dum Dum	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	—	
Chinsurah	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Berhampore	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	
Dacca	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Chittagong	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Raneegunge	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	
Shergotty	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Gya	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Arrah	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Patna	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Dinapore	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Hazareebaugh	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Ranchee (Chota Nagpore)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Buxar	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Benares	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Jaunpore	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	BCDEF ½ ½ 1 1 ½
Azimghurh	—	1	1	1	1	1	—	1	
Bustee (Goruckpore)	—	1	1	—	1	—	—	—	ABCDEFH 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Allahabad	2	3	2	2	1	2	—	2	
Futtehpore	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Cawnpore	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Futtehgurh	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Etawah	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Mynpoorie	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Banda	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Allyghurh	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	BCEFG 1 1 1 1 1
Agra	—	2	1	—	1	—	2	—	
Muttra	1	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	ABCDEFG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Meerut	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	—	
Delhi	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Roorkee	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	ADEFG 1 1 1 ½ 1
Umballa	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	—	
Kussowlie	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Sobathoo	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Dugshai	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	ADEF 1 1 1 ½
Jullundur	1	1	1	1	1	1	—	1	
Phillour	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Calpee	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Jalaon	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Jhansi	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Nowgong	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Saugor	—	2	1	—	—	—	—	—	

Tabular Statement of European and Native Troops to constitute the Indian Service in Bengal, &c.—*cont.*

Stations.	Horse Artillery.	Foot Artillery.	Field Batteries.	European Cavalry.	Irregular Cavalry.	European Infantry.	Native Infantry.	Irregular Infantry.	Moveable Column.
	A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F.	G.	H.	
Mhow -	—	2	2	1	1	1	1	—	BCDEF 1111½
Neemuch -	—	1	1	—	1	1	—	1	
Nusseerabad -	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	1	
Nagode -	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	
Jubbulpore -	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	
Lucknow -	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	—	ABDEFG 111111
Fyzabad -	—	1	1	—	—	1	1	—	
Sultanpore -	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	1	
Other places in Oude -	—	3	3	2	2	2	2	—	
Bareilly -	—	2	2	1	1	2	—	1	BCDEF 11111
Shahjehanpore -	—	1	1	—	1	1	—	1	
Moradabad -	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	1	
Almorah -	—	½	½	—	—	½	—	1	
Nynce Tal -	—	½	½	—	—	½	—	—	
Gwalior -	1	3	2	2	2	2	—	2	ABCDEFH 1111111
Augur -	—	1	1	—	1	½	—	—	
Seepree -	—	1	1	—	—	½	—	1	
Ferozepore -	—	1	1	1	1	1	1	—	
Lahore -	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	—	ABDEFG 111111
Umritsir -	—	1	1	—	—	½	—	1	
Govindghur -	—	1	—	—	—	½	—	—	
Sealkote -	—	1	1	1	1	½	—	—	
Noorpoor -	—	½	—	—	—	½	—	—	
Kangra -	—	½	—	—	—	½	—	—	
Mooltan -	—	2	1	—	1	1	1	—	
Dera Ismail Khan -	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	—	} With infantry of the Punjaub irregular force.
Burnoo -	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	—	
Kohat -	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	—	
Jelum -	—	1	1	—	1	½	—	—	
Rawul Pindie -	—	1	1	—	1	2	—	1	
Attock -	—	1	½	—	—	½	—	1	
Shumsabad -	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	
Nowshera -	—	1	1	—	1	1	—	1	
Peshawur -	2	4	3	2	2	2	—	2	
Grand Total -	12	80	65	21	45	68	30	27	

INDIAN ESTABLISHMENT.

Proposed Strength of Regiments (exclusive of Artillery).

European Cavalry.	Irregular Native Cavalry.	Regular Native Infantry.	Irregular Native Infantry.
1 Colonel, 1 Lieutenant-colonel, 1 Major, 6 Captains, 12 Lieutenants, 6 Cornets, 384 Privates.	1 Commandant, 1 Second in command, 1 Adjutant, 400 Privates.	1 Colonel, 1 Lieutenant-colonel, 1 Major, 6 Captains, 6 Lieutenants, 4 Ensigns, 640 Privates.	1 Commandant, 1 Second in command, 1 Adjutant, 400 Privates.
European Infantry.			
1 Colonel, 1 Lieutenant-colonel, 1 Major, 12 Captains, 12 Lieutenants, 6 Ensigns, 800 Privates.			

But it is not proposed to reduce below 800 privates the local regiments, such as the Assam regiments, &c., which are now above that strength.

APPENDIX No. 62.

(No. 121.)
From Major-General W. R. MANSFIELD, to Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. DURAND, C.B.

SIR,
I HAVE the honour to send you the answers to certain series of questions respecting the future organization of the

Bengal army in obedience to the commands of the Right Honourable the Governor-General.

In order more fully to explain my meaning than appeared to me to be possible, by adhering solely to my answers to the questions, I have ventured to add a minute containing my views at length in the solution of the matter proposed for consideration.

I have, &c.
W. R. MANSFIELD,
Major-General.

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ANSWERS by the Chief of the Staff to QUESTIONS on "The Recruiting and Composition of Corps."—No. 1, Infantry.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

3. Yes.
4. Yes.
11. An oath is of no avail.
14. Yes, if possible, excepting exceptional corps like the guides.
15. Certain corps, such as guides, &c.
16. Not as a general rule. But the constitution of corps in this respect should vary.
17. By companies.
18. Should be distributed as equally as circumstances will permit.
19. In the same districts. Perhaps there should be little or no difference in the engagement of the two sets of men. I believe that irregular infantry and police corps should be convertible terms, and both to do the same duty in war and during peace. Practically this is the case in times of war when the police have received.

20. No; but I would render all native troops liable to a police duty, if requisite, and vice versa.
21. The commanding officer should be responsible for the enlistment of recruits.
22. Do. Do.
23. Leaving it altogether to the commanding officer under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, I would have nothing to say to any local authorities beyond calling on them for assistance in obtaining the men.

24. I recognize no difference.
25. Inexpedient. The Africans are the only people whom it would be worth while to enlist. To do so is forbidden by reasons of imperial policy.
28. No.
33. With the ordinary percussion musket,
34. Do. Do.
35. Close imitation is unnecessary.
36. With a view to the comfort and *activity* of the soldier, the dress of the French zouave might perhaps be studied to advantage with this object. But indeed one dress is as good as another, if stiff head-dresses and tightness be avoided. Tight jackets and shakos should be forgotten for ever, and a loose tunic or round long-waisted jacket and a pugree substituted. The trousers or peejamas cannot be too loose.
37. I very much approve of this suggestion.
38. Yes. As far as I know, the drivers and lascars belonging to the batteries have not mutinied.
39. In line, as in a regiment of two battalions.
40. In my opinion favourable. I do not see how the moral question of awe can be effected by it after recent occurrences; there will not be much intimacy under any circumstances.
41. This can only be told after the experiment has been tried. I do not see that any difficulty could arise. The native battalion might be detached for any length of time, but always with the certainty before it of returning to head quarters, i.e. the European battalion.
42. The spirit of confidence and self-reliance will be much enhanced by being constantly in association with Europeans.
This is a matter of "morale," produced by more success in arms, and not of training.
They will not fight the worse when away from their European comrades because they have acquired a feeling of self-reliance by constant success in their company.
W. R. MANSFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of the Staff.

ANSWERS by the Chief of the Staff to QUESTIONS on "European Officers."—No. 4, Infantry.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

5. Officers in command of regiments and companies, and not on the head-quarters.
6. Increased. In the eye of the native there should be no apparent limit to the power of his immediate chief.
8. The influence of one man on another is always at the greatest pitch in times of excitement.
We must look on soldiers as men, and consider they are acted on like their fellows in civil life.
Consequently the influence of real leaders or commanders of men is greatest in war, while that of a mere regulation-colonel, who has not the "quality" of command in him, will be stronger in times of peace.
W. R. MANSFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of the Staff.

ANSWERS by the Chief of the Staff to QUESTIONS on "Military Code and Rules of Discipline."—Infantry, No. 2.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

1. Articles of war to be dispensed with, and in their place a set of simple regulations, under which a soldier may be tried.
2. No.
3. No.
7. As in irregular corps.
W. R. MANSFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of the Staff.

ANSWERS by the Chief of the Staff to QUESTIONS on "Organization, Promotion, and Rewards."—Infantry, No. 3.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

1. Seniority.
2. No.
3. No.
4. No.
6. No.
7. Must be continued if it be only out of regard for the Madras and Bombay armies.
8. No.

9. A scheme of this sort might probably be worked out, but it would never atone for the loss of promotion and power.

10. It appears not from the experience of the last year. Great faith used to be placed on the virtue of pensions.

11. By merit.

12. Abolished.

14. They are always led by the Judge Advocate-General or the superintending officer.

15. This depends on the man and not on the class.

16. The irregular system, but with one officer to each company. In war the presence of many officers is imperative.

16 (1). Yes.

16 (2). No.

17. As at present in the Punjab; but there should be more European officers, say three to each battalion.

In the Punjab there is but one, I believe.

18. I should think not. It is contrary to human nature.

20. The last year is the answer to this question.

21. Keep the three armies separate, and maintain every marked difference of system.

All local distinction and difference should be carefully fostered.

W. R. MANSFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of the Staff.

MINUTE on the Reconstruction of the Army of Bengal, by Major-General Sir W. R. Mansfield, K.C.B., Chief of the Staff in India.

Allahabad, 13th July 1858.

I venture, with considerable diffidence, to add a minute to my series of answers to the questions proposed for consideration under the orders of the Right Honourable the Governor-General.

It has appeared to me that by the adoption of this course I may be able more thoroughly to elucidate my thoughts on the great subject of these questions than by presenting them only in a form which to a certain degree interferes with their connection, and therefore with close argument.

Perhaps it may be well to say *in limine* that my views are not merely of yesterday, since the great outbreak and rebellion of last year, but that they were the results of thought many years ago, when, owing to my position of command of one of Her Majesty's regiments, I was thrown much into contact with the native army of Bengal.

These views have been greatly strengthened by late occurrences.

CHAPTER I.

The Principle on which Native Armies should be formed.

Without attempting to indicate the original causes of the mutiny of the Bengal army, we may admit that the loyalty of the corps which remained true to their colours has been an affair of circumstances.

This remark applies as much to the native corps in the armies of Madras and Bombay, as to the few and isolated faithful regiments of Bengal.

In the two former the disease of mutiny did at times make its appearance, but the favourable circumstances were too strong to permit of its spreading, and, taken as a whole, the two armies have passed through a very terrible ordeal in a manner almost incredible.

To attribute this wonderful result to one of the circumstances, viz., a better system, or discipline as compared with the system and discipline of the army of Bengal, would be indeed an error.

We are not surprised to find the officers of the Madras and Bombay armies assume that a great superiority distinguishes them in this respect.

Perhaps this may be the case owing to their smaller numbers, although it is denied by many not incompetent judges.

Admitting it to be true, we must regard the fact as only one of the circumstances which conduced towards that result, of which the officers of the two southern armies are so justly proud.

If we look a little further we shall find another circumstance, from which a most important lesson may be learnt, containing perhaps the vital principle to be followed in the reconstruction of the army of Bengal.

The armies of Bombay and Madras being quite separate and apart from that of Bengal, having different interests, different system, and different services to show, are animated by an *esprit de corps* of their own, and it may be presumed

entertain much jealousy of the larger body, to which a certain pre-eminence has been awarded on account of its vastly superior numbers, and of the constant wars in which it has of late been engaged.

In this term of *esprit de corps* is included the feeling of separate nationality and race, which is always apparent in troops raised in different parts of a large empire.

If we may judge of the feelings of the soldiery by those of the officers, of which the latter make no secret from the generals down to the ensigns, we shall be hardly liable to error in ascribing a strong antipathy in the southern armies towards the great one of the north.

It is unnecessary to recapitulate what is so much known to every one, the constitution of the late Bengal army.

Suffice it to say, that that army, owing to the manner in which it was recruited, formed an immense quasi masonic brotherhood from Peshawur to Calcutta, and from the Himalaya to the Nerbudda. With that river the agency of the brotherhood stopped, and other military bodies were beyond which refused to acknowledge its signs or to obey its behests.

The unwise tendency of the Bombay Government of late years to give a preference to the Poorheas of Oudh, on account of the comeliness of such recruits, had nearly caused its army to be affiliated to the brotherhood of Bengal. Fortunately the mischief had not gone far enough to complete the process, when the outbreak of last year took place.

To this only may the safety of the Bombay army under Providence be now attributed.

We have sufficient evidence to show on what a precipice it was for some time standing on the account stated; and the cavalry of Madras, in which the same error was committed, gives testimony of a like nature respecting the army of that presidency, though in a far less degree, as the men enlisted in the northern provinces were few in number, as compared with the Poorheas in the service of Bombay.

The manner in which the warlike population of the Punjab has been employed in crushing the mutiny of the army and the general insurrection in the presidency of Bengal, is another instance differing in kind, but not in idea, of the sentiment which has so largely conduced to the safety of Southern India.

It was not because they loved us, but because they hated Hindostan and hated the Bengal army, that the Sikhs have flocked to our standards instead of seizing the opportunity to strike again for their freedom.

They wanted to revenge themselves, and to gain riches by the plunder of the Hindostanee cities. They were not attracted by mere daily pay. It was rather the prospect of wholesale plunder and of stamping on the heads of their enemies.

In short, we have turned to profit the *esprit de corps* of the old Khalsa army of Runjeet Singh in the manner which for a time would most effectually bind the Sikhs to us as long as the active service against their old enemies may last.

What then is the lesson to be learnt from the great instances which have been cited?

That we should avoid creating any grand centralised army like the one lately dissolved, and substitute in its place several local armies, which should remain distinct and separate from one another, and in each of which an *esprit de corps* peculiar to itself should be fostered by all the means incidental to distinct services, and countries differing in climate, latitude, and race.

Independent of the safety of the empire in not being again exposed to the secret plots of a mighty brotherhood, all of which obey the same impulses, we should recognize the fact, that the native army of India is not wanted for foreign war.

We have attained the natural limits of the Indian empire.

What we require is such an organization as may provide for the military defence and the maintenance of the peace in every part of the country, in the manner most agreeable to the troops and to the people, without sacrificing efficiency.

Perhaps the first severe shock given to the fidelity of the sepoy, was in the passage of the Indus, and in the early expeditions to China.

If we admit that we have passed the acquisitive phase of our Indian policy, and that we are bent for the future on consolidation of the empire only, we may arrive at the conclusion that several local armies for certain large provinces, partaking somewhat of the character of our militia at home, but liable to police duty, are more adapted to our object, on the grounds of general policy, than one large homogeneous body, which is an army for purely military, and for the most part aggressive purposes.

Our north-west trans-Indus frontier would naturally fall to the share of the army of the Punjab.

Its employment thus is suited to the warlike genius of the Sikhs.

It is necessary, on grounds of policy, that he should be constantly opposed to the Afghan, and sufficiently practised in war to meet the eruptions either of savage or civilized enemies from the west.

In other parts of the empire the native armies would really be but a better sort of police in ordinary times, and to duties of such a form would they, in fact, come to be limited, upon which they should be employed without remorse, instead of remaining in ease, idleness, and uselessness in large cantonments, as has been the case in time of peace hitherto. But they would be liable, as our militia, to service anywhere in case of danger to the empire.

Each chief commissionership is a mighty kingdom. It may be said that Imperial safety requires the characteristics of each kingdom to be preserved, and that no advantage can follow, whereas great danger might ensue on abolishing the old landmarks, or on obliterating old differences between provinces, religions, and races.

By the maintenance of a local force for each kingdom or commissionership, which should generally be moved only within the precincts of the country to which it belongs, and in which it was raised, the idea of a large confederacy of states under an Imperial Government would be maintained, instead of the dead levelling process of centralization pursued during our later years, the latter having been carried through by an army, which we fondly hoped, and perhaps almost believed, was so thoroughly mercenary as to have abjured every affection excepting that for pay and pension.

Such speculation on Indian policy may appear foreign to the subject of this minute.

In truth, however, they are not, but form the very essence of it. We cannot separate the policy of British India from the constitution of its army. The great sepoy mutiny has been but one form of general insurrection. Whether it was a cause or a consequence is now of little importance. An army of 120,000 men could not mutiny without dragging a large part of the country with it, in which it was raised, and vice versa, if wide provinces strike for freedom, the soldiers who spring from them are sure not to forget the claims of race, religion, and brotherhood.

It appears to me, therefore, that on the largest political considerations, as well as on account of the great military question, the various provinces or chief commissionerships of this immense presidency should be treated as a confederacy of states, each having its own local force, the binding string of the fasces of states being the British army proper of the Queen and of the Honourable Company, reinforced slightly by bodies of light troops, which should be gathered from every district and corner of India, and should be closely incorporated with the British battalions.

In one of my answers I have said, that as regards the service of the state, the native troops and trained police may be taken as convertible terms.

There can be no essential difference between the two bodies, recruited as they are from the same classes, and trained as they are in the same manner.

If the idea of local forces were adopted, we should find it inexpedient to allow any difference whatever to exist between them, and there should be no distinct appellation.

It matters not that in theory the idea of a police force differs from that of a military one. In practice we find the training required for the latter is the best preparation for the former.

The trained police of Ireland is probably the most efficient body of troops in the whole world, and the so-called police battalions of Scinde and the Punjab are in no respect inferior to the native battalions of this army. In point of fact there is no difference between them. They do the same duty, carry the same arms, and have a like training.

Here then it seems we have the secret of keeping the troops constantly employed.

When not assembled for the purpose of military instruction or for military duty proper, they should be dispersed, not on furlough, as according to the old practice, but on duty, in the discharge of ordinary police functions, under their European officers, as the disciplined auxiliaries of the magistrate, a *corps d'élite* on which the latter might depend when greater firmness is required than can be expected from his ordinary attendants and *chuprassies*.

If this were admitted it would be for the commander of the local army to institute a certain system of relief, under which a given number of his regiments would be kept together, and proceed with their military training, while the remainder should be employed in the districts with the magistrates, each corps having its own tour at stated intervals of both duties under its European officers.

The European officer who, under the old system, had no chance of becoming acquainted with the people or the

country, would thus, each in his turn, be thrown into contact with all classes of the population.

The extraordinary segregation of the British officers from the people could not but cease, and perhaps it might not be seen again that a wide-spread conspiracy should take place without the cognizance of a single white man throughout the presidency. It would come to pass that every officer employed with the native troops would have worked at some time or other during his career, and probably for a great portion of it, immediately with the civil magistrate, and would thereby be qualified to be a magistrate himself, while at the same time his efficiency as a military officer would not be impaired.

The local forces would have no artillery of their own. It being decreed, that in future all artillery shall be European, it would of necessity belong to the regular army, which is apart from the local forces, although portions of the former, including artillery, cavalry, and infantry, would be of necessity distributed throughout each state, as the general binding medium of the empire.

During the season of camps and drill the local forces might meet the regular army for exercise, but only then. At all other seasons the former should be dispersed over the various districts, some in the active performance of police work, others in cantonments as military bodies.

The wives and families should live in the cantonments with the men.

Long furloughs, so much abused formerly (vide General Sleeman's "Journey through Oudh," see page 49), would no longer be necessary, as the men would be in their own country, and would have their wives with them.

The system of long furloughs then should be altogether abolished.

They should cease to be a matter of right, and it should be left to commanding officers to determine whether they should be granted or not, according to the conduct of the applicants.

It will have been remarked, that the object of the system proposed is to obtain real work from the sepoys at all times, and not to maintain large bodies of armed men in a state of ease, and even luxury, and of the most profound idleness during peace.

Many years ago I ventured the remark, from personal observation, and it is a remark which has been in the mouths of many of our best authorities, that the only condition of safety with respect to the Bengal army was its constant employment in war. It was impossible to observe the state of ease in which they lived in time of peace, and the surly conduct of the sepoys when called on to do what did not exactly suit their fancy, without appreciating the dangers which would arise at some time or other from such pampered soldiery. Their officers steadily resisted their employment under the magistrates, and in too many instances pandered to their prejudices and idleness. Reasoning on great military principles, but forgetting, perhaps, the natures and character of the men he had to deal with, their tendency to combine for unlawful purposes, and mistaking perhaps the present wants of the empire, Sir Charles Napier earnestly recommended the concentration of great divisions of troops, thus alienating them still more from what may be called civil duty, by way of distinction, although in most parts of India it has generally borne a military character, and will always have to do so.

The old mutinies of India, and the terrible one of last year, demonstrate the inexpediency of such concentrations of native troops at immense stations, except where they may be wanted for garrisons, as at Peshawur. The necessity of advocating a principle of dispersion to preserve the peace of the country after the fashion of military police, rather than that of assembly for the purpose of imposing military display, therefore becomes obvious.

I believe the true principle to be adopted may be stated in a very few words.

As centralization is necessary to meet a foreign enemy, so dispersion is requisite for the maintenance of peace in a country which has been occupied. It sounds almost like a truism, but the repetitions of it cannot be avoided, and it must be pressed home, owing to the great and venerated authority under which an opposite view has been advocated.

One more point occurs to me in the general question of the sepoy before I pass to another part of the subject.

It appears to me, that in our anxiety to propitiate him, we have allowed him to gain an exaggerated opinion of his own value, and that we have not been at sufficient pains to cause it to be understood that admission to and retention in our service are great privileges.

The importance of this omission on our part can hardly be over-estimated. I would propose to repair the fault by abolishing the system of unlimited service, and to substitute in its place an enlistment for (10) ten years.

When the time of enlistment had expired, re-enlistment should be matter of the greatest favour, to be granted exceptionally only.

A second enlistment should not exceed five years, after the expiry of which term the soldier might be re-enlisted a third time. At every subsequent period of five years the bond should be again renewed.

As in the army of the Queen, the soldier should not be allowed to take his discharge while he might be engaged in active service.

The advantages to be gained would be as follows:—

The men would cease to look on their regimental positions as vested rights, and when once accustomed to a soldier's life would have the strongest incentive to merit the favour of re-enlistment.

The worthless and inefficient men would be got rid of without trouble.

The question of seniority promotion would be settled, as inefficient non-commissioned officers and even commissioned officers would have to abide by the law of their enlistment.

Pensions would not be paid except to the favoured few who had earned them by good service, after a series of re-enlistments.

Then would pensions really be the reward of merit and good service.

On such terms, I am of opinion that a pension list should still be allowed to exist, but only on such terms.

Such, then, are the general principles which I would advocate in the reconstitution of the native army:—

1. Local army for each commissionership or government.
2. To employ the troops actively in the performance of police duties, without sacrificing their military efficiency.
3. Enlistment for limited service; re-enlistment being held to be a great boon, and not a right.
4. Pensions a reward for good conduct and long service only.
5. A limited native auxiliary force to be attached to the British cavalry regiments and infantry battalions.

Extract from "A Journey through the Kingdom of Oudh," by Major-General Sir W. H. Sleeman, K.C.B., Resident at the Court of Lucknow.

THIS privilege which the native officers and sipahees of our native army enjoy for petitioning for redress of grievances through the resident has now been extended to all the regular, irregular, and local corps of the three presidencies; that is, to all corps paid by the British Government, and to all native officers and sipahees of contingent corps employed in and paid by native states who were drafted into them from the regular corps of our army up to a certain time; and the number cannot be less than fifty or sixty thousand. But European civil and political functionaries, in our own provinces and other native states, have almost all some men from Oudh in their offices or establishments, whose claims and complaints they send for adjustment to the resident; and it is difficult for him to satisfy them that he is not bound to take them up in the same manner as he takes up those of the native officers and sipahees of our native army, and he is often induced to yield to their importunity, and thereby to furnish grounds for further applications of the same sort. This privilege is not recognized or named in any treaty or other engagement with the sovereign of Oudh; nor does anyone know its origin, for it cannot be found in any document recorded in the resident's office.

If the resident happens to be an impatient, overbearing man, he will often frighten the durbar and its courts or local officers into a hasty decision, by which the rights of others are sacrificed for the native officers and sipahees; and if he be, at the same time, an unscrupulous man, he will sometimes direct that the sipahee shall be put in possession of what he claims, in order to relieve himself from his importunity, or that of his commanding officer, without taking the trouble to inform himself of the ground on which the claim is founded. Of all such errors there are unhappily too many instances recorded in the resident's office. This privilege is in the hands of the resident an instrument of torture, which it is his duty to apply every day to the Oudh durbar. He may put on a screw more or a screw less, according to his temper or his views, or the opportunity of officers commanding corps or companies, and native officers and sipahees in person, which never cease to oppress him more or less.

The most numerous class of complaints, and the most troublesome, is that against the government of Oudh, or its officers and landholders, for enhanced demands of rents; and whenever these officers or landholders are made to reduce these demands in favour of the privileged sipahees,

they invariably distribute the burthen in an increased ratio upon their neighbours.

Officers who have to pass through Oudh in their travels or sporting excursions, have of late years generally complained that they receive less civility from villages in which our invalid or furlough sipahees are located than from any others, and that if they are anywhere treated with actual disrespect, such sipahees are generally found to be either the perpetrators or instigators. This complaint is not, I fear, altogether unfounded, and may arise from the diminished attachment felt by the sipahees for their European officers in our army, and partly from the privilege of urging their claims through the resident, enjoyed by native officers and sipahees, now ceasing on their being transferred to the invalid establishment.

But the privilege itself is calculated to create feelings of dissatisfaction with their European officers, among the honest and hardworking part of our native army. Such petition only when they have just cause, and not one in five of them can obtain what they demand, and believe to be their just right, under an administration like that of Oudh, whatever efforts the resident may make to obtain it for them; and, where one is satisfied, four become discontented; while the dishonest and idle portion of their brother soldiers, who have no real wrongs to complain of, and feign them only to get leave of absence, throw all the burden of their duties upon them. Others again, by fraud and collusion with those whose influence they require to urge their claims, often obtain more than they have any right to, and their unmerited success tends to increase the dissatisfaction felt by the honest and more scrupulous portion of the native officers and sipahees who have failed to obtain anything.

Government will not do away with the privilege without first ascertaining the views and wishes of the military authorities. They are not favourable to the abolition; for, though the honest and hardworking sipahees may say that it is of no use to them, the idle and unscrupulous, who consider it as a lottery in which they may sometimes draw a prize, or a means of getting leave of absence when they are not entitled to it, will tell them that the *fidelity* of the whole native army depends upon its being maintained and extended. I am of opinion, after much consideration and a good deal of experience in the political working of the system, that the abolition of the privilege would be of great advantage to the native army, and it would certainly relieve the European officers from much importunity and annoyance which they now suffer from its enforcement. It is not uncommon for a sipahee of a regiment in Bombay to obtain leave of absence for several times over for ten months at a time, on the pretence of having a case pending in Oudh. When his leave is about to expire, he presents a petition to the resident, who obtains for him, from the Court, an order for the local authorities to settle his claim. This order is sent to the officer commanding his regiment. The man then makes up a piteous story of his having spent the whole ten months in prosecuting his claim in vain, when, in reality, he has been enjoying himself at home, and had no claim whatever to settle. The next year, or the year after, he gets another ten months' leave for the same purpose, and when it is about to expire, he presents himself to the resident, and declares that the local authorities have been changed, and the new officers pay no regard to the King's orders. New orders are then got for the new officers, and sent to his regiment, and the same game is played over again.

CHAPTER II.

Caste,—as regards Constitution of Regiments.

With regard to the Hindoo castes it may be expedient to adopt into the army we can hardly be too liberal.

The old spirit of exclusiveness in favour of the high and cleanly castes, which operated on the officers to the full as much as it did on the sepoys themselves, created the *imperium in imperio* which is ever the certain forerunner of mutiny in all armies.

The sepoys, believing we could not do without them, an opinion they were at no pains to disguise, naturally thought that whenever it might suit them to declare our rule at an end our ruin would be in fact accomplished.

The subserviency of the officers generally to the feeling of high caste, which gave them handsome and intelligent men, was, I believe, appreciated in all its strength by the sepoys, who actually played with the fears of their Braminized colonels, and insisted, in many instances, on the observance of certain customs, even in the presence of an enemy, to which we know they are perfectly indifferent under really intelligent and energetic command.

Thus was the germ of resistance to authority and discipline fostered, and it but too often happened that commanding officers openly admitted the presence of a power superior to their own discipline, succumbed to it themselves, and induced superior authority to give countenance to it also. The jealousy on the part of the sepoys of interference with what they held to be a vested right to fill the Bengal ranks was manifested, almost with violence, when the direction was given to admit a certain proportion of Sikhs to the corps in the Punjab shortly after the annexation of that country.

Exclusiveness in the choice of recruits must, therefore, be cut away root and branch, and, while we admit low caste, we must not shut out high caste.

Let all castes and let the Mussulman share and share alike in the regiments of the local armies.

There may be low caste corps, high caste corps, and Mussulman corps.

Other regiments may be formed of companies of different castes, and in all there should probably be a company or two of Mussulmans.

Uniformity in these respects is neither desirable nor advisable.

The more diversity that can be introduced into the constitution of the different corps the better, so that in case of any future attempt at combination the heterogeneous character of the various regiments may present an effective bar to it, and be the means of information to the commanding officers.

One test, however, should be applied to all.*

It should be a *sine qua non* that all the individual sepoys forming a company should mess together. Any man objecting to conform to this regulation should be immediately discharged. In war it is necessary to efficiency, and in peace it is required as a test of discipline in the face of caste and Hindooism.

I am strongly of opinion that Mussulmans should not be in the same company or troop with Hindoos or Sikhs, and that the two latter should not be mingled together. I would maintain even in the same regiment all differences of faith with the greatest care. There might be rivalry or even hate between two companies or troops.

The discipline of a native regiment instead of being impaired would gain by it, as regards the great question of the obedience of the whole to the commanding officer. The motto of the regimental commander, and therefore of the Commander-in-Chief, must be for the future "Divide et impera."

CHAPTER III.

The Regular Army of Bengal.

While the idea of local native armies for a confederacy of states has been entertained, it will not have escaped recollection that the binding medium of the whole, to ensure general allegiance throughout the empire, and the fidelity of the native soldiery, must be a large European force, to which should be permanently attached special native corps.

The presence of native troops with the British corps is necessary both in the field and in quarters. The idea of the local or police armies being admitted, it becomes, therefore, indispensable to render the British corps quite independent of the former, which, except in extraordinary circumstances, are not intended to move beyond the precincts of their own provinces.

Many reasons combine to show how imperatively the authorities of India are bound to limit the demands on England for regiments and recruits. The former affects the war department and the foreign policy of England, the latter touches the questions of British industry, population, and rates of wages very nearly.

We cannot, therefore, do without a regular native army, which shall act like the European force as a counterpoise of the local forces, while, from circumstances, association, and

* To a certain extent this has been carried out in the Punjab regiments.

The experiment has been tried in certain Hindoo low caste corps which have been raised during 1858, but without success.

On the urgent representation of the officers commanding some of these corps the Commander-in-Chief has deemed it advisable not to persevere in it.

His Excellency, among other things, was told that just now there was so much fear in the native mind about tampering with their faith and religious observances, that danger of serious nature might arise, which in ordinary times would not be the case.

paucity of numbers, it will be thoroughly identified with the British regiments proper, and be considered both by itself and the British regiments as the mere auxiliary of the latter.

The British corps proper should be numerically stronger than the native ones; but if such a plan be too expensive, it is necessary that the latter should on no account exceed the former in number.

I would prefer the following proportions:—

A native battalion, 600 strong, to be attached to every battalion of British infantry, whether the latter belong to the Queen's or Company's service:

In the cavalry, the native squadrons might be equal in strength to the British:

The officers of the native battalions should be taken from among the British regiments to which they are attached, the battalions and squadrons being respectively under the supreme command of the commanding officer of the British corps, there being a commandant of the native battalion or cavalry squadrons, according to the practice of the irregular system:

If possible he should be one of the majors of the European regiments, but if circumstances did not admit of such an arrangement, he should be chosen for his fitness from among the captains, or from another corps.

This arrangement is not meant to interfere with the detached employment of the native, whether cavalry or infantry, or to diminish the power of the commandant of the native battalion or regiment.

The latter would be to the British battalions as a second regiment in a brigade, to be commanded for general purposes; its own internal economy and regimental command being unimpaired, and maintained in all its integrity according to the well-known practice of our service.

The relief of a Queen's corps serving in India need not form any bar to such an arrangement.

If the foregoing designs were entertained it would become necessary to add largely to the establishment of officers in each regiment. The officers so employed could, at their option, be transferred to a relieving corps coming from England, under the orders of the General Commanding-in-Chief, according to the practice which has always obtained at the Horse Guards in disposing of the supernumerary officers reduced to half pay from the relieved regiments.

A regiment of two battalions, one British and one native, would thus be formed, and they should never be separated from one another, except for temporary and detached purposes. In the regiments of the Company's service the bond would last for ever, and as regards those of Her Majesty, it would endure till their departure for England. There would be no difficulty, however, when one of Her Majesty's regiments should, in its turn, be ordered home. The native battalion attached to it would await in some convenient station the arrival of the relieving corps, with which it should be connected without delay.

It seems to be generally admitted that the presidency of Bengal will not be able to subsist in future with an European garrison of less than (50,000) fifty thousand men,* and this exclusive of the force necessary for Gwalior and Rajpootana. I am myself of opinion that in the course of time, when the rebellion of this last year shall have become matter of history, and cease to be a means of excitement with the popular mind, when the province of Oudh shall have been thoroughly reduced, and order again properly established in Central India and Bundelcund, that a less number may be found to suffice, and that we shall not be required to maintain an European force of above (35,000) thirty-five thousand men,† for this presidency. But for the present, and for some years to come, probably ten at least, the larger number, viz. (50,000) fifty thousand, must be maintained.

Assuming that number to be indispensable, an assumption few would be found to deny, I would at once take measures to associate with them (30,000) thirty thousand natives, to be distributed rateably between the cavalry and infantry.

The head-quarters of each European regiment should be made the scene of a new levy.

It should be distinctly understood, that in such new levies the future regular army was to be, and that to them it was to be restricted, with some exceptions to be stated hereafter.

All corps and levies made under the orders of the Government, the Commander-in-Chief, the various chief commissioners, &c. &c., should be the local armies or police forces of their respective provinces, to be augmented or decreased accordingly as may be demanded by the general

* This will require an establishment of about 64,000.

† Requiring an establishment of 44,000.

policy of the empire, of that of each province under existing circumstances, and with regard to present emergencies.

Thus for the present we are compelled by a bitter necessity to admit an immense Punjabee and Sikh force, and to employ of them probably 60,000 men of all arms, to the exclusion of the other races and sects of Hindustan.

While the excitement of war, plunder, and success over their natural enemies lasts, we may believe this Sikh army may not give us trouble. But we can hardly doubt that, when the excitement has passed away, we shall have to exhibit great prudence and judgment in dissolving the large Punjabee force we have scattered broad-cast over the empire, and that we must provide in time a native as well as an European counterpoise.

Therefore, I repeat, no time should be lost in initiating the scheme which alone contains, in my belief, the principle of safety with regard to the regular army of India, and that each battalion and formed regiment of cavalry in the presidency of Bengal not quartered in the Punjab, should be permitted to raise a native corps for general service.

This duty should not be extended for the present to the British corps stationed in the Punjab.

When a few of the second or native battalions have been roughly formed, they should march with the British regiment to which they belong to the Punjab, and relieve the corps there stationed.

For some time to come we must resolutely abstain from enlisting more Sikhs or Punjabees, excepting to fill vacancies in corps we may wish to continue; namely, until the equilibrium has been restored in our ranks between these races and the others of Hindustan.

When that shall have been compassed, there will be no greater objection to Sikh companies in the regular army than to any other men in India, on the contrary, we know them to be most admirable soldiers, and, were it admissible on political considerations, would desire no other recruits.

CHAPTER IV.

The European Forces for the Army of Bengal.

THE question has been put,—“What proportion of the European force should belong to Her Majesty’s regular army, and what proportion shall be composed of troops raised for service in India?”

In answering this question, we are obliged to consider that the days of the Company’s service, properly so called, are numbered, and that the distinction as at present existing between the army of Her Majesty and of that of the Honourable Company cannot but soon come to an end. But it would appear, that although that distinction is about to cease, another one will spring to life, i. e. that there will be a local Queen’s army for India, as distinguished from the regular moveable army of the Crown.

Although there are no official data on which to ground this assumption, it seems there can be little doubt about it, in consequence of the late permission given to the Company to raise many additional regiments of cavalry and infantry. I therefore take liberty to assume the above question to be settled.

I am the more strengthened in this course, owing to the absolute and palpably evident necessity of having a body of English gentlemen trained to the knowledge of India, which shall not be estranged from its service, excepting under certain conditions.

Much may be said on the moral question of relieving regiments from time to time, but if the Crown takes possession of all the armies of India, that must in great measure be laid aside, and the source must be maintained in all its integrity from which the numerous functionaries proceed for the administration of the Indian empire.

Assuming, then, that a local European army will be entertained for the presidency of Bengal under the Crown, I would submit, that this body should consist of an artillery regiment having about the same strength as the present one, English companies being substituted for the old native companies. Of ten regiments of cavalry consisting of (400) four hundred sabres each,* and of (30) thirty battalions of infantry consisting of (12) twelve companies each. Of the twelve companies forming a battalion, two should remain in England as a depôt, in accordance with the system now adopted for Her Majesty’s army under the late orders of Government. Each battalion should possess

in India the same strength as that now allowed to Her Majesty’s regiments, viz.:

- 12 { 10 Companies abroad.
 - 2 ditto at depôt.
 - 1 Colonel-Commandant.
 - 2 Lieutenant-Colonels.
 - 2 Majors.
 - 12 Captains.
 - 14 Lieutenants.
 - 10 Ensigns.
 - 1 Paymaster.
 - 1 Adjutant.
 - 1 Quartermaster.
 - 1 Surgeon.
 - 3 Assistant Surgeons.
 - 1 Sergeant Major.
 - 1 Quartermaster Sergeant.
 - 1 Paymaster Serjeant.
 - 1 Armourer Sergeant.
 - Schoolmaster appointed by the Secretary of State for War.
 - 1 Hospital Sergeant.
 - 1 Orderly Room Clerk.
 - 12 Colour Sergeants.
 - 48 Sergeants.
 - 1 Drum Major.
 - 24 Drummers and Fifers.
 - 60 Corporals.
 - 1140 Privates.
- 1339* Total numbers.

Whilst, however, this large local force should be called into being for service in India, or without relief, it is absolutely necessary for the great purposes of example, discipline, and salutary emulation, that a certain number of the moveable regiments of the Crown should periodically come to India, and be relieved in due course, according to the practice which has obtained heretofore.

I have the most entire and absolute conviction, that this practice is required for the discipline of the local regiments. It cannot have escaped the most careless observer, that although regiments which have been long in India fight as well as highly disciplined corps just arrived from England, and that although the men of the former are for a time more efficient than the latter, as understanding the climate better, and being more able to take care of themselves, nevertheless there is by no means the same healthy tone of discipline running through the body in the one as in the other. It is by no means uncommon to see extraordinary sloth and debauchery in such old regiments, and that the officers have become so enervated by climate or other causes, that they are unable to check the one and to do away with the other. But again it is observed, that the quartering of such a corps in the neighbourhood of the well disciplined one excites a new emulation, when the importation of another commanding officer will go far to reassert discipline, effect the necessary reform, and finally restore absolute efficiency. I wish to draw no invidious comparisons between the two services, but will simply record that what has been here asserted has come under my observation in both.

I would therefore propose that the establishment coming from the moveable army of the Crown should be on about the same footing as that preserved in the time antecedent to the great mutiny, but I would add some artillery to it, and some royal engineers. The establishment would therefore stand thus:—

- †12 Troops and Field Batteries of Artillery.
- 4 Companies Royal Engineers.
- 2 Regiments of Dragoons.
- 15 Battalions of Infantry.

Much has been said in England respecting the great difficulty of obtaining recruits to meet the new and permanent demands of the army occasioned by the late military revolution in India.

In order to meet this difficulty I would submit, that as the British soldier in India is never required to carry a greater weight than his arms, ammunition, and great coat, it is unnecessary to seek for large and bulky men in the ranks for India. Consequently there should be one invariable standard of infantry and cavalry recruiting for India, whatever might be the regulation of the authorities at home for regiments serving elsewhere. The Indian standard should be 5 ft. 3 in. for grown men, and 5 ft. 2½ in. for growing lads. For the artillery no man under 5 ft. 6 in in height

* See latest recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief in this respect, as shown in Memo. by the Chief of the Staff, No. 173, which is appended, page 107.

* This number includes the depôt companies which it is proposed to retain in England.

† Vide Tabular Statement attached for explanation.

should be admitted, excepting the drivers, who would be men of 5 ft. 3 in. As a rule no man should be enlisted who has not completed his twentieth year.

It would soon come to be understood, amidst the classes from which the recruits are drawn, that the rivalry between the recruiting sergeants as now existing between those belonging to Her Majesty's service and those of the Honourable Company had ceased. The short men would go at once to the service disposed to admit them without question.

Such, broadly stated, is the system I would adopt as regards the component parts of the future army of Bengal, and I do not see that there need be any difficulty in developing it in practice.

The cavalry and artillery already exist, as also, it may be said, six battalions of infantry. It remains then to form twenty-four battalions in addition. The system hitherto adopted, and which seems to be agreeable to the Bengal army, is to take two battalions of the old native infantry and to fuse them into one of the new European regiments.

This system is understood by the officers of the army, and although fraught with some inconvenience in respect of producing rapid efficiency in a new battalion, perhaps militates less than any other which could be devised against the rights which every officer possesses according to the commission he holds under the Honourable Company.

Let us now, therefore, examine how the plan proposed would work with regard to the officers.

Including the three European infantry regiments lately ordered, 54 regiments of the old Bengal establishment will be absorbed in completing the European local infantry to 30 battalions. There would then be left the officers of 20 regiments, who should be distributed according to their seniority in the 30 European corps. The establishment of each corps being thus permanently increased as the only means of meeting the constant draughts on regiments made by the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief to fill the numerous offices of the civil and military administration of India, including the commandants and other officers for the native forces, regular and local.

It will be found eventually that the establishments of the European regiments, even with the addition proposed, will not be sufficient for the proper discharge of the service unless another great alteration be introduced, and that is, the institution of an unattached list, on which the names of all officers should be placed holding situations of certain position either in the civil government or on the staff of the army.

I would instance, as such situations, assistant commissioners of first and second class, and all officers in civil employ of position superior to that rank.

2ndly. Officers connected with the secretariat of Government.

3rdly. Officers commanding police corps.

On the staff of the army officers having the rank of deputy-assistant adjutant-general and all superior grades.

Officers having the command of irregular corps, or corps of the local forces proposed in the first chapter.

In order to atone for the want of regimental promotion thus entailed upon an officer accepting staff employment, he should receive a step in effective rank for every five years passed in staff employ, according to the custom obtaining in Her Majesty's service with regard to majors so situated. Thus the appointment of an officer to permanent staff employ would give a step of regimental promotion.

If such a system of unattached commissions be not introduced into the army of Bengal, it will be quite impossible to officer the European regiments in a manner sufficient for discipline, and at the same time to meet the calls of Government and the Commander-in-Chief.

An English regiment requires many experienced officers, and it also requires tolerably permanent command. If an English regiment be left to chance, if it be divested of all its best officers, if elderly gentlemen should be sent to command it, who are ignorant of regimental duty, as was formerly so often the case with the native infantry regiments of Bengal, the new local army will be a disgrace in quarters, and in all probability will misbehave in the field.

The government of India, however constituted at home and in the country itself, must now take the greatest precautions in this respect. They cannot succeed without in some measure separating the civil and military staff from the regiments, and incurring a larger expense in the matter of officers than that to which they have hitherto been accustomed.

It must also be borne in mind that the officers for the native portion of the regular army, whether the latter be attached to the European corps, as proposed by me, or not, must be drawn from the bodies of officers of which the Europeans corps are composed. It will not do hereafter

to have one set of men belonging to the European local corps and another to the native corps. They must originally belong all to the European corps, be trained there, and nominated by appointment to serve with the native corps according to the present irregular system.

Every man for the future, nominated to do duty with a native corps, must be a selected man, and his position should be enhanced by the receipt of larger allowances than those falling to the lot of his comrades who remain in the ordinary performance of duty in the European regiment.

In short, every appointment to a native regiment should be held to be a staff appointment, as is now the case with the irregular corps.

We now approach the question of the local army of India and that of the moveable army of England. It has been assumed that the local army will be a royal army.

We must recollect the great prestige and honour belonging to the army of the Honourable Company, and we must take care that those great and first-rate qualities of an army are not lost sight of. The local army of India must be placed on a footing of absolute equality with that of the moveable army of England.

This can only be obtained in one manner; viz., by allowing exchanges between the officers of the two armies.

The precedent for such an arrangement is found in all the local corps raised for special service in the various colonies. An officer serving in a West India regiment may go to the guards, or an officer in the Ceylon rifles to the blues.

This principle, then, on every account of justice to the officers of the local army and of harmony between the two services of the Crown, should be admitted under certain limitations.

Such limitations are necessary. The welfare of the state will not admit of wholesale exchanges, or of the too frequent departure of officers who have already acquired knowledge and experience of the country of their original choice.

I would venture to advocate, therefore, that no exchange should be permitted till an officer had completed ten years' service in India; that tolerable parity of years, without too much strictness in that respect, should be exacted from two men demanding to exchange; and that no officer should be able to transfer his staff appointment to the individual with whom he proposed to make an arrangement. Such exchanges would depend upon the fiat of the Commander-in-Chief, subject to the confirmation of the Crown, after the consent of the local government of India should have been obtained. Previous misconduct in either party should be an absolute bar, and no man who had blemished his character in the one, from whatever cause, should be allowed to transfer himself to the other.

Officers in the unattached list of all ranks, from that of general downwards, should be available for service anywhere under the orders of the Crown.

We should never again listen to a distinction between two services of Englishmen being a bar to the employment of a large class of experienced and intelligent officers.

The local British army of India, including officers and men, should be subject to the same Mutiny Act and Articles of War as the other forces of the Crown.

For the officers of the local army the same rules of furlough should remain as those now existing, excepting that no furlough should exceed two years in duration.

The old furlough of three years was originally calculated with regard to the twelvemonth sacrificed in the home and outward passages round the Cape.

I am not aware that any essential points have been omitted, in which the interests of the state or of the relations of the officers towards it are concerned. But there is one immediately affecting the officers in their private capacity, which may cause much difficulty whenever the attempt is made to amalgamate the service of the Crown and the Company. I allude to the funds to which all the officers of the latter have subscribed and are subscribing.

Under the regulations, and, therefore, the action of these funds, the officers of the Company's army form a joint stock association.

It will be for the actuary to determine hereafter how an individual officer may be compensated who might determine or wish to exchange to the regular army of the Crown, if such exchange be admitted to be, as it undoubtedly is, a necessity of state on account of reasons which have been already alluded to.

In any case the solution of the question will be most delicate and difficult; to determine which, without the consent of the individual affected, any government would be most averse. The advantage to be gained in dissolving an association which establishes an interest in a body of officers apart from their military profession, and not possessing a military character, cannot escape us.

CHAPTER V.

The Command of Native Regiments.

The Honourable Court has directed that the power of commanding officers of native infantry regiments shall be increased, and it has also been ruled that the claims of seniority shall be so far set aside, that incompetent lieutenant-colonels may be shelved under the orders of the Government.

These concessions to the opinions of those who are conversant with the native character are well considered and right, though it may be doubted whether they go far enough.

In the so-called irregular system, every commandant of a native regiment is a selected man. This should be the rule throughout the service, and for the future no man should be allowed to command a native regiment who has not been specially chosen for it. It is difficult to guard against jobbery and personal predilection, but on the whole on so important a matter it is better to risk the inconveniences which may spring from such causes than again to trust to the blind chances of a seniority system as regards the command of native soldiery.

It is bad enough in the case of a British regiment, fenced, as the latter is, by all the compensating circumstances of a Mutiny Act, the free spirit of the men, the prevalent sense of duty and the individual knowledge of what is due to them as soldiers, in short the perception of legality and freedom common to all British born men, which annihilates much of the personal influence of a commander, and causes the commander to look far more to the laws they live under than to the man who executes them.

But with Asiatics the presence of an incompetent commander is absolutely fatal. With them the immediate commander should be a second Providence, and stand instead of Articles of War and everything else. From him there should be no apparent appeal. He should rule them, not only as one of our regulation commanders, but as a king. But then he must be a king according to the old meaning of the term. The officers who, in former years, and in our own time, have had the most success in dealing with the native soldiery, are exactly those who from circumstances, or owing to their own strength of character, have escaped interference from higher authority.

The commandants of native corps must, therefore, be chosen men, and, when appointed, much confidence must be reposed in them.

Certain simple rules should be laid down for the guidance of the commandant, which should stand in lieu of Articles of War. The power of dismissal from the service, of inflicting corporal punishment, should be vested in him, records of his proceedings being carefully preserved for submission to the Commander-in-Chief.

It has been shown very fully, in the last year of war, that for service in the field the present irregular system does not give sufficient officers either to the cavalry or the infantry.

While in the field every regiment should have at least one European officer per troop or company. Whether that be useful, possible, or not, in time of peace, it should always be looked to and enforced when a regiment is engaged in war.

If the plan proposed in a previous chapter be adopted, this may be ensured without loading a regiment uselessly with officers when it is not actively employed. I say uselessly, as the ordinary business of interior economy cannot but be performed by native officers, as in the irregular regiments of the present day.

In the local or police armies I would have a commandant assisted by a second in command and adjutant. I consider the Punjab police arrangement, which only allow some officer to a corps, faulty in this respect, and that there should never be less than three English officers to any corps, however constituted, or whatever may be its denomination.

CHAPTER VI.

On the Questions having reference to Paragraph 5 of Despatch No. 235, of 25th November 1857.—Military Department, Court of Directors.

Many of the questions proposed in the paper, having reference to paragraph 5 of Despatch No. 235, have been answered in the foregoing chapters of this Minute, and others will obtain their replies from the Departments of the Adjutant-General and the Secretariat.

* Return marked

A. in answer to No. 1,
B. " " No. 3,

are annexed.

Questions 2 and 4 have been treated in the foregoing chapters of this Minute.

With respect to those questions in which it is required to state certain ratios, I would submit the impossibility of making even a proximate calculation until the plans of government shall have been decided on, respecting organization and European establishments. I therefore refrain from committing myself to any arbitrary assertion on these matters beyond what has been generally stated in this paper.

It appears from these Returns that the present proportion, including military police and levies of every kind, is about three to one of natives to Europeans.

It is probable, as time wears on and the country subsides into a state of peace, that we shall be able to manage with a proportion of four to one.

In former times, in the presidency of Bengal, it was, I believe, as much as fifteen to one.

With respect to Question 13, I would say in reply.—I do not think, when we are legislating on the future organization of the Indian army, that the question of purchase or non purchase should be entertained.

As explained in the fourth chapter of this Minute, I would admit the privilege of exchange between the officers of the regular army and those of the local army, under certain conditions.

Purchase, though winked at by authorities in India, has never been legalized or regulated in the Indian armies, as it has unfortunately been in that of Her Majesty. Although it may be difficult, perhaps impossible, utterly to abolish purchase in the latter, no step should be taken to authorize it in the local army.

Let there be no interference with the officers of the local army, but as at present let those who like to pay discharge themselves of their superfluous money, and let there be no illegality nor shame in receiving it on the part of the officers leaving the service.

This will not materially affect exchanges, or the status of either service; and I do not see that any embarrassment can occur.

The men who pay largely for promotion in Her Majesty's army are content, with rare exceptions, to enjoy life in England, and do not seek to improve their position by service in India, except in exciting times. This is well known to all regimental officers.

CHAPTER VII.

The future Distribution of the regular Forces in the Presidency of Bengal in times of tranquillity.

The proposed British establishment for the ensuing ten years is estimated at,—

44 Troops and Batteries of Artillery,
30 Reserve Companies " "
12 Regiments of Cavalry,
4 Companies of Engineers,
45 Battalions of Infantry.

Until peace is thoroughly established, we cannot do well without at least (50) fifty battalions of infantry. The question before us, however, is, the distribution of the forces for the maintenance of peace after it shall have been restored.

* NOTE.—Return marked C. to complete answer of Question No. 5, part of which is found in Return marked B.

I would propose for that purpose the following Distribution, as per annexed Return :—

	Reserve Companies' Artillery.	Artillery Troops or Companies.	Cavalry Regiments.	Infantry Battalions.				
Presidency Division	8	2	—	2	Besides the battalions, there will be recruit depôts at Dum Dum and Chinsurah for Her Majesty's regiments, and at Barrackpore, and eventually at Berhampore, for those of the Honourable Company. At Dum Dum are the head quarters of the Royal Artillery.			
Dinapore	1	1	—	2		At Hazeerabagh will be stationed a depôt of Honourable Company's recruits.		
Benares and Gazeepore	1	2	1	3	It is asserted that Gorruckpore is very unhealthy in the autumn. Owing to necessity, a regiment is quartered there for this year. Hereafter it may turn out advisable to bring it to the right bank of the Gogra. The force stated here is the minimum, owing to the great importance of the fort as a magazine, and the establishments, civil and military, which are growing daily.			
Buxur Azingbur						—	1	—
Gorruckpore	—	—	—	—				
Allahabad	2	1	1	2				
Banda	—	1	—	1	The dependencies of Saugor include Shahghur, Damoh, Jubulpore, and the intervening tract of country, which is prone to rebellion.			
Saugor	1	1	1	2				
Jhansee	—	1	—	1	The force stated here will only suffice for quiet times, it being necessary at present to occupy from Jhanzee Chunderie on one side, Mote and Koonch on the other, while there is a garrison at Culpee. When the country is thoroughly tranquil it will be sufficient to have one battalion at Jhansie, which shall detach two companies to Culpee.			
Cawnpore	1	2	1	2	Supports Oudh on the one side, and Bundelcund on the other.			
Futtaghur and Mynpooree	—	1	—	1	When the country shall have been disarmed, it will be possible to deduct two regiments from Oude, but not before.			
Oudh	4	6	2	8				
Lucknow						—	—	—
Fyzabad	—	—	—	—	This is a minimum, and may require reinforcement at any time.			
Bureach	—	—	—	—				
Seetapore	—	—	—	—				
Gwalior and Dependencies	1	3	1	2				
Meerut	1	2	1	1	One reserve company of artillery and one infantry regiment may be deducted from the strength of this garrison when the arsenal is removed and the fortifications destroyed.			
Delhie	1	1	—	2				
Agra	2	2	—	1	The strength of artillery here stated as required, on account of the arsenal and its proximity to Gwalior.			
Muttra	—	—	1	—	With regard to the feeling in the Company's Sutledge states, it might be advisable to quarter two infantry regiments at this station.			
Bacilly	1	1	—	1				
Moradabad	—	1	—	1				
Shahjehanpore	1	1	—	1				
Kamaon	1	—	—	—				
Umballah	—	2	1	1				
Ferozepore	1	1	—	1				
Jullundur, Phillour	1	1	—	1	Phillour has a magazine.			
Umritzur	1	—	—	1	This is a minimum.			
Lahore	2	2	1	2				
Mooltan	1	1	—	1	The presence of an infantry battalion should never be dispensed with at Mooltan.			
Sealcote	—	1	—	1	It is possible that the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab might prefer to send the regiment quartered at Sealcote to Jhelum.			
Rawulpindee	3	6	1	4	The troops at Rawul Pindée and other stations mentioned here are the outposts of the empire.			
Attock						—	—	—
Nowshera						—	—	—
Peshawur	—	—	—	—				
TOTAL	30	44	12	45				

The head quarters Royal Engineers should be at Roorkee, and the companies distributed according to the wants of the country.

W. R. MANSFIELD,
Major General,
Chief of the Staff.

NOTE.—The stations of the artillery as stated in this Return would be considerably affected if my scheme for the organization of artillery were to be adopted.

It will be observed that the above distribution makes no allusion to Burmah or Rajhpootana.

This has been done advisedly, on the assumption that, according to the practice which has prevailed for some years, the former, Burmah, will continue to be held by the army of Madras, and the latter, Rajhpootana, by that of Bombay. In the same manner, I would propose that Goonah and Mhow may be provided for by a detachment from the Rajhpootana force, and so be comprehended within that command.

If every corps comprised in the above Distribution Return were at its full strength we should find a total of about 62,000 rank and file, without taking into account the officers and non-commissioned officers.

In practice, it is discovered that when the establishment of a battalion in India stands at 1,000 rank and file, we never in fact find in the ranks more than 750. This is accounted for by the averages of the sick and the convalescent lists, the death vacancies, to fill up which is the process of a twelvemonth, as well as the other numerous vacancies caused by invaliding, discharges, &c., &c.

This number of 62,000 must therefore by no means be accepted as being absolute. On the contrary, it must be taken as the paper or establishment number, as distinguished from the number ready for active purposes, and we should make a reduction of fully one fourth from it, or of (250) two hundred and fifty men per thousand, even if the regiments be kept complete on paper by the yearly drafts. Thus the 62,000 will be reduced to 46,500, the latter number forming the European garrison of the Bengal Presidency ready for effective duty, although the larger one would figure in the Government returns.

CHAPTER VIII.

The Army of Bengal.

The calculation on which the Distribution Return is based depends altogether on the association of a limited native army, whether in camp or quarters, with the European regiments of cavalry and infantry.

If the British line proper be not so extended by a body of native soldiery attached to and dependent on it, the said native organization being apart from all others in the country, the necessity of adding largely to the numbers of the European corps will quickly make itself visible.

In former times the European force was the auxiliary of the Sepoy army. Now the conditions must be exactly reversed, and the Sepoy must be admitted only as the auxiliary of the European. The latter cannot do altogether without the former on his own personal account, and, as said before, England has not men to furnish an English army of (100,000) one hundred thousand men for the Presidency of Bengal. Consequently, wherever an European corps is quartered, it must have for a neighbour a weak Sepoy battalion, the latter being either on a separate establishment as formerly, or attached to the European corps, as I have ventured to recommend.

I conceive it to be very important that there should be no mistake in this matter. In it is involved the great considerations of economizing our demands on England, and of providing the counterpoise for the local or police armies.

There are, besides, certain native corps which I would preserve in their integrity, without interference with their present organization, consisting of Goorkas; viz.:-

Nusseree,
Kumaun,
Sirmoor,
66th Native Infantry,
73d " "

These battalions being kept quite apart should, as heretofore, be cantoned generally in the hills, and come down for any service for which might be required. The cantonment of each regiment might be a Goorka colony.

A few regiments, and remnants of regiments, have remained faithful. It might be well to retain and recruit them as a separate brigade, their officers being named by special appointment, as has been the case with the Kelat-e-Ghilzee regiment.

These regiments are, the
31st Native Infantry,
Kelat-e-Ghilzee Regiment, and
Lucknow Regiment.

Three regiments to be formed out of faithful remnants of mutinous corps.

Total, six.

Thus, besides the native force to be attached to the European corps, we should have an addition of (11) eleven

battalions, which would swell what may be called the moving native army, as distinguished from the local or police armies, to rather more than (40,000) forty thousand men, to be constituted as follows:—

4,800 Cavalry, 12 regiments, at 400 men each.
27,000 Infantry, 45 battalions, at 600 " "
4,000 Goorkas, 5 regiments, at 800 " "
4,800 six other N. I. regiments, at 800 " "

40,600

To this add proposed European establishment of all arms,—

62,000 excluding officers and serjeants.

102,000 Total.

This total, therefore, represents the army by which the Presidency of Bengal might, in my opinion, be held, if at the same time each large Government be provided with a local or police army, including irregular cavalry and infantry, which may be available either for military or civil purposes.

Let us recollect that the latter bodies have either been called into existence, or are in the course of being so, in all parts of this Presidency, under the pressure of circumstances.

In point of fact, it is only required to develop and complete what has been roughly shaped out.

CHAPTER IX.

On the Financial Results to be anticipated as consequent on the Scheme submitted.

On the 1st of January, 1857, the number of native soldiers in the army of Bengal, including irregulars of all descriptions, drivers and gun lascars, amounted to 170,000 men.

At that time the European force consisted of - 15,750
It has been ruled that, in point of expense, one European soldier equals two sepoys.

Deduct from the proposed European establishment	-	62,000
The old ditto	-	15,750
		<hr/>
		46,250

Multiply by 2, to give the equivalent of sepoys	-	2
		<hr/>
		92,500

Add the proposed sepoy establishment for the moveable army	-	40,600
		<hr/>
Total	-	133,100

If this sum be deducted from the native establishment, on the 1st January, 1857, viz. - 170,000

We shall find the difference of cost between the proposed moveable army and the old regular Anglo-Indian army of Bengal, irrespective of the pension list	-	133,100
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Difference	-	<hr/>
		36,900

It has been proposed, in the foregoing scheme, to abolish the pension list, excepting in certain cases.

What the saving under that head may be I cannot say, there being no published data of the receipts of Government in this respect. It is presumed, however, that it would be very large.

In such case, it would seem that if we allow the local or police armies to swell to (80,000) eighty thousand men, the cost to the State on account of military expenditure would not exceed what it was in the commencement of 1857, while we might expect a not inconsiderable diminution in the outlay of the civil magistrate on account of burkendaz, or non-military police.

It is not assumed that the latter can be dispensed with altogether, but I think we may fairly look to a considerable economy in this respect, when the military police has been fairly organized over the whole country. On this point, however, I am not competent to give an opinion.

CHAPTER X.

The Organization of the Artillery for Bengal.

I have refrained from answering the series of questions respecting artillery in India. The officers connected with that corps in this country have doubtless been called on for their opinion on the matters submitted, and I could but reiterate the information which I might be able to obtain from them at second hand.

But there are two or three points of general organization to which I would very respectfully venture to call attention.

An important problem demands solution, viz., how best to ensure economy with a large development of European artillery, without interference with real practical efficiency which depends on the sufficient manning of the guns.

Establishment of a Troop of Bengal European Horse Artillery.	1 Captain.
	3 Lieutenants.
	1 Staff Serjeant.
	6 Serjeants.
	6 Corporals.
	10 Bombardiers.
	2 Trumpeters.
	2 Farriers.
	3 Rough Riders.
	80 Gunners.
Total -	113 Europeans, 27 Gun Lascars,
Total -	140

Establishment of a Bengal European Horse Battery.	1 Captain.
	3 Lieutenants.
	1 Staff-serjeant.
	1 Rough riding serjeant.
	1 Farrier serjt.
	6 Serjeants.
	6 Corporals.
	6 Bombardiers.
	2 Buglers.
	60 Gunners.
Total -	87 Europeans. 66 Native drivers. 27 Gun Lascars. 1 Native farrier.
Total -	181

Establishment of a Bengal Reserve Company of Artillery.	1 Captain.	
	3 Subalterns.	
	1 Staff-serjeant.	
	6 Serjeants.	
	6 Corporals.	
	6 Bombardiers.	
	2 Buglers.	
	60 Gunners.	
	Total -	84 Europeans. 36 Gun Lascars.
	Total -	120

The field batteries are little better when the native drivers are subtracted.

Under these circumstances, I believe it to be an imperative necessity to add largely to the strength of every troop and field battery.

Establishment of a Troop of Royal Horse Artillery.	2 Captains.
	3 Lieutenants.
	1 Asst. surgeon.
	1 Vet. surgeon.
	2 Staff-serjeants.
	10 Serjeants.
	10 Corporals and Bombardiers.
	160 Gunners and drivers.
	1 Trumpeter.
	1 Farrier.
12 Artificers.	
Total -	198 men and 200 horses.

Establishment of a Light Field Battery Royal Artillery.	2 Captains.
	3 Lieutenants.
	1 Asst. surgeon.
	12 Serjeants.
	10 Corporals and Bombardiers.
	150 Gunners and Drivers.
	2 Trumpeters.
	1 Farrier.
	11 Artificers.
	Total -

Establishment of a reserve Company of Royal Artillery.	2 Captains.
	3 Lieutenants.
	7 Serjeants.
	10 Corporals and Bombardiers.
	92 Gunners and Drivers.
	1 Trumpeter.
	Total -

pieces, viz., one field gun and one howitzer to each troop

Under the old rules a troop of Horse Artillery, including all ranks from the Captain to the Lascars, numbers 140 men, and a field battery 181. *Vide margin.*

It cannot be too strongly impressed, that, for the purpose of active service, a troop, manned as above stated, is inefficient. We invariably observe, that after the first severe action in which a troop is engaged, it actually has not men enough to work the guns. After the second, leave is requested by the Commander of the troop, and obtained, to send one, two, or even three guns into park.

During the latter part of the siege of Delhi, the troops of Horse Artillery were partly driven and worked by men belonging to Her Majesty's 9th Lancers.

When the two Bengal troops came down to Delhi to the relief of Lucknow, there were but five guns in each troop, and these guns were imperfectly manned. They were afterwards helped by men taken from the Royal Artillery.

In the campaign of Lucknow and Rohileund, Colonel Tombs' troop, which came down from Meerut with a complete establishment, became so crippled for want of men, that it could not work more than (4) four guns.

The proposal has been made, and submitted to Government, to assimilate all establishments to the scale of the Royal Artillery. These establishments, *vide margin*, are very large, and, as compared with those of Bengal, may appear indeed extravagant.

I believe the proposal to be wise, but I can hardly expect the Government to entertain such a large proportion of men to the number of guns worked as that which finds favour at home, on account of the great expense of the European soldier in India.

Perhaps, however, a mean may be taken, by which a larger number of guns would be insured, and an organization introduced, not so inefficient on account of paucity of gunners, as is now the case, but not so extravagant as that presented according to the royal scales.

I would suggest, then, for consideration, that it might be expedient to adopt the English strength of men for troops and batteries, but to economize on the number of these bodies by adding two

and field battery, making the number of guns for every such body (8) eight instead of (6) six.

I have in my Distribution Return proposed the number of (44) forty-four troops and field batteries, and (30) thirty reserve companies for the establishment of Bengal with a general strength of (12,787) twelve thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven of all ranks.

In the Royal Artillery this would give a result of 264 light field guns. By the plan proposed the number would be swelled to 352.

The troops and field batteries would admit of convenient division, as a half troop or field battery would then consist of three guns and a howitzer, a sufficient force of moveable artillery for the minor stations or a small column.

It may be observed, that in the continental armies of Europe a field battery does consist of (8) eight pieces instead of (6) six as with us.

The late change of rank among the officers of the Bengal Artillery, causing the introduction of a second captain to each company, would seem to facilitate this arrangement, and the more frequent division of field batteries than has hitherto obtained with the original establishment.

Were such a design entertained, we should not require a larger establishment of captains than (148) one hundred and forty-eight, whereas it would be expedient to add one subaltern to each company on account of the more frequent divisions of batteries and the increased number of guns.

The arm being thus organized and manned, I cannot but think we should have an ample sufficiency of artillery to meet every purpose, and never again to trust a gun to a native; whereas every gun, putting the matter of race aside would be more efficient than has been the case hitherto.

It may be remarked in addition, that according to this plan it would be unnecessary to add to the number of battalions already existing, the only augmentation of officers required being that of one subaltern to each company or troop.

Let us assume that there are (24) twenty-four stations requiring the presence of one or more batteries of (8) eight guns, this being a larger allowance than is required in reality. We should then, according to the plan proposed, have (20) twenty batteries liable to division for minor stations and detached duties; i.e.,

24 to be kept entire at large stations,

20=40 half batteries, each of four guns, for minor stations.

I find that, according to the old rules, the total establishment of field guns maintained in a state of activity stood as follows:—

Troops or Field Batteries.	Guns.
9 European troops	54
4 Native do. Regular	24
21 Light field batteries, regular	126
3 Punjab field batteries	18
2 Ditto, mountain train	12
4 Gwalior	24
3 Oudh	18
4 Hydrabad	24
1 Mehedpore	6
1 Assam	6
1 Ramghur Battalions	4
1 Kotah Contingent	4
1 Bhopal Contingent	6
1 Jondpore ditto	4
1 Nagpore ditto	6
1 Malwa ditto	6
1 Sylet Battalion	2
<hr/> 59	<hr/> Totals.
	<hr/> 344

Thus it will be seen that there is but a difference of (8) eight field guns in the establishment proposed from that which was in existence before the mutinies, but with the great distinction, that, in former times, the European troops and batteries were less numerous than those worked altogether by natives, whereas now they will be altogether worked and driven by British gunners and drivers.

It is submitted that a half battery of four guns manned by Englishmen is more than a match for a native battery of (6) six guns.

I would observe that a certain number of Lascars cannot be dispensed with. The opinion of the Bengal Artillery would seem to run counter to the employment of Gun Lascars in future, but all the officers of that arm with whom I have conversed on the subject are in favour of servants whom they call *Store* Lascars by way of distinction.

Of these, one Tindal and (10) ten Lascars might be attached to each troop or field battery.

In conclusion I would remark, that one portion of the Royal Artillery system should very certainly not be imported into India.

In the Royal Artillery the drivers, though enlisted as gunners and drivers, are not even taught how to work a gun.

It is imperatively necessary in India that every Englishman attached to a gun should know how to work it on occasion, and be able to do so if required.

Consequently as heretofore all the men enlisted for the Bengal Artillery should be drilled as *gunners* and *drivers*.

The establishment proposed stands, therefore, as follows, for a troop of horse artillery:—

6 6 lb. guns		
2 12 lb. howitzers.		
2 Captains.	Native Artificers	- 12
4 Lieutenants.	Store Lascars	- 11
2 Staff Serjeants.		
10 Serjeants.	Total	<u>23</u>
4 Corporals.		
6 Bombardiers.		
171 Gunners and Drivers.	202 European establish-	
2 Trumpeters.	ment.	
1 Farrier.	23 Native ditto.	
	240 Horses.	
<u>202 Total.</u>		

In a Royal troop there are (160) one hundred and sixty gunners and drivers and (12) twelve artificers. In my establishment I add (11) eleven gunners and drivers and one trumpeter, as all artificers shall be natives.

Proposed establishment for a field battery:—

6 9 lb. guns.		
2 24 lb. howitzers.		
2 Captains.	Native artificers	- 12
4 Lieutenants.	Lascars	- 11
12 Serjeants.		
10 Corporals and Bombardiers.	Total	<u>23</u>
161 Gunners and Drivers.	192 European establish-	
2 Trumpeters.	ment.	
1 Farrier.	23 Native ditto.	
	170 Horses.	
<u>192 Total.</u>		

As in the troop the European artificers admitted in the Royal Artillery are added to the strength of effective gunners and drivers, their places being taken by native workmen.

Establishment of a reserve company to consist of:—

2 Captains.
4 Lieutenants.
7 Serjeants.
5 Corporals.
5 Bombardiers.
92 Gunners and Drivers.
1 Trumpeter.
<u>116 Total.</u>

Grand Establishment:—

12 Troops Horse Artillery.
32 Horse Field Batteries.
30 Reserve Companies.

To be formed in three brigades horse artillery and nine battalions of foot artillery.

If it be intended to maintain a certain proportion of the Royal Artillery regiment in the army of Bengal, it might be well to have three troops and (9) nine field batteries belonging to that regiment, subtracting a like number from the brigades and battalions of the Bengal regiment.

I cannot but think, for the efficiency of both, that much advantage would result in such a permanent arrangement.

I believe that at present both gain alike, and that on imperial grounds the practical experience won in Indian campaigns is as advantageous to the Royal Artillery and Her Majesty's service as the importation of new practice and new ideas is to that of Bengal. Both are called on to defend their own services and professional habits before the salutary rivalry of each other. We have a right to expect the very best consequences as an absolute certainty.

W. R. MANSFIELD,
Major General.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

No. 173.

MEMORANDUM by the Chief of the Staff on the future Formation of the Bengal Light Cavalry, European.

Head Quarters, Allahabad,
2d July 1858.

1. The Governor-General has determined that the 5th and 8th regiments of Native Light Cavalry are not more worthy of lenient treatment than the other corps of the same arm, and, consequently, that they shall incur a like fate.

2. A question therefore is submitted, as to whether a fifth regiment of European cavalry should be formed on the basis of the four regiments recently ordered, and now in course of organization, or, if any modification should be proposed, so as to constitute regiments of European cavalry of less strength than those already authorized, and how many in that case it may be thought desirable to organize, and with what complement of officers and men.

3. Considering the manner in which it will be necessary hereafter to disseminate the European cavalry throughout India, it appears to the Commander-in-Chief that it will be expedient to have small regiments instead of five strong ones.

It is of great consequence, for the sake of discipline and efficiency, that corps should not be broken up, but should move and work as a whole whenever circumstances permit.

4. Excepting when a large army is formed, there are few cavalry columns organized in which it would be necessary to have more than 350 British dragoons, as with them would be associated native cavalry to make the column up to (1,000) one thousand sabres in ordinary times.

5. Under these circumstances, His Excellency would recommend that there should be ten cavalry corps consisting of (3) three squadrons or (6) six troops.

1. Lt.-Colonel. To be officered as per margin, 1.
1 Major. The strength of the regiment to be as per margin, 2.
6 Captains.
12 Lieutenants,
6 Cornets.

6. The appointment of paymaster is not recognized in the East India Company's service, but it is probable that ere long, considering the great increase in the number of regiments belonging to the Honourable Company, it will be found necessary to adopt the practice of Her Majesty's service in this respect.

If this should come to pass it will be necessary to add one Paymaster and one Paymaster-serjeant to the above establishment.

7. Before closing this paper, it may be well to advert to a point of organization which has not escaped the attention of the Rt. Hon. the Governor General,—the possible mingling of native squadrons hereafter with the European squadrons.

If such a projection should ever be entertained—and of its feasibility and practical utility there can be little doubt—it will be found that the strength of the European regiment, as above stated, will be more convenient than a large one, both as a moveable body in the field and for ordinary purposes to which Government would apply such corps.

8. If we suppose (3) three native squadrons of British dragoons, of the strength above stated, we shall have a body of (6) six squadrons, consisting, when the regiment is completely effective, of (700) seven hundred sabres, after allowing a considerable margin for sickness.

9. No cavalry regiment should exceed this in strength, both on account of discipline in general and real efficiency as a moveable body under one commanding officer.

Sir Sydney Cotton reports most favourably of the experiment he has made in the Peshawur Light Horse.

In that corps there is one squadron of natives to two of Europeans. General Cotton passes the highest encomium on all alike.

By order,
(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD, Major-General,
Chief of the Staff.

A.

RETURN of EUROPEAN TROOPS serving in the BENGAL PRESIDENCY on 31st July 1858.

CORPS.	European Officers.	European Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	TOTAL.	CORPS.	European Officers.	European Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	TOTAL.
QUEEN'S.				HONOURABLE COMPANY'S			
ROYAL ARTILLERY.				ARTILLERY.			
E Troop Horse Artillery	7	181	188	Staff 1st Brigade Horse Artillery	No returns.		
F 8th Company 2d Battalion Foot Artillery	6	184	190	1st Troop 1st			
5th " 3d	5	177	182	2d " 1st			
1st " 4th	7	186	193	3d " 1st			
6th " 7th	6	178	184	Staff 2d	7	8	15
3d " 8th	7	176	183	1st Troop 2d	5	96	101
3d " 9th	7	181	188	2d " 2d	6	90	106
6th " 11th	5	96	101	3d " 2d	6	98	104
5th " 12th	6	162	168	Staff 3d	7	9	16
5th " 13th	4	201	205	1st Troop 3d	5	104	109
6th " 13th	7	191	198	2d " 3d	5	105	110
3d " 14th	6	202	208	3d " 3d	4	118	122
4th " 14th	7	108	115	4th " 3d		62	67
7th " 14th	6	209	215	Staff 1st Battalion Foot Artillery	1	4	5
TOTAL	92	2,594	2,686	1st Comp. 1st	4	83	87
ROYAL ENGINEERS.				2d " 1st		70	70
4th Company	6	110	116	3d " 1st	4	87	91
23d "	4	80	84	4th " 1st	1	43	44
TOTAL	10	190	200	Staff 2d	5	6	11
CAVALRY.				1st Comp. 2d	6	84	90
Her Majesty's 2nd Dragoon Guards	19	518	537	2d " 2d	3	66	71
6th " " (Carabin.)	23	614	637	3d " 2d	4	38	37
7th " "	32	495	527	4th " 2d Battalion Foot Artillery with			
" 7th Light Dragoons	27	439	466	European drivers attached	6	140	146
" 9th Lancers	16	541	557	Staff 3d Battalion Foot Artillery	4	6	10
" 2d Battalion Military Train	10	238	238	1st Comp. 3d	1	64	65
TOTAL	127	2,335	2,962	2d " 3d	7	85	92
INFANTRY.				3d " 3d	4	79	83
Her Majesty's 5th Fusiliers	24	713	737	4th " 3d	4	60	64
6th Foot (1st Battalion)	16	639	655	Staff 4th	5	6	11
" 7th Fusiliers	41	1,225	1,266	1st Comp. 4th	5	59	64
" 8th Foot	19	799	818	2d " 4th	5	58	63
" 10th "	22	778	798	3d " 4th	3	71	74
" 13th Lt. Infantry	30	859	889	4th " 4th	4	72	76
" 18th Foot	33	1,042	1,075	Staff 5th	2	5	7
" 20th "	31	796	827	1st Comp. 5th		43	43
" 23d "	34	928	960	2d " 5th	9	33	35
" 24th "	26	942	968	3d " 5th	1	40	41
" 27th "	26	986	1,012	4th " 5th		21	21
" 28th "	25	907	932	Staff 6th	4	6	10
" 32d Light Infantry	15	443	478	1st Comp. 6th	3	8	11
" 34th Foot	28	728	756	2d " 6th	4	89	93
" 35th "	35	858	893	3d " 6th	3	95	98
" 37th "	37	639	706	4th " 6th	5	85	70
" 38th "	38	951	989	TOTAL	145	2,352	2,397
" 42d "	31	828	859	CAVALRY.			
" 52d Light Infantry	25	978	1,003	1st European Regiment Light Cavalry	16	245	261
" 53d Foot	21	902	923	2d " " " "	18	266	280
" 54th "	33	797	830	3d " " " "	18	235	253
" 60th Rifles (1st Battalion)	30	716	730	4th " " " "	No return.		
" " (3d " ")	16	302	408	TOTAL	47	736	783
" 61st Foot	15	770	785	INFANTRY.			
" 64th "	27	801	828	1st European Bengal Fusiliers	40	855	902
" 70th "	17	979	996	2d " " " "	47	780	827
" 73d "	24	792	816	3d European Regiment	47	876	923
" 75th "	20	780	800	TOTAL	143	2,500	2,552
" 77th "	32	574	606	Bengal Yeomanry Cavalry	26	222	248
" 78th Highlanders	23	748	771	Lahore Light Horse	7	134	141
" 79th "	32	898	928	Peshawur Light Horse	7	170	186
" 80th Foot "	31	780	741	TOTAL	40	536	575
" 81st "	39	1,041	1,070	European Invalid Battalion	74	176	250
" 82d "	30	929	958	European Veteran Company		28	28
" 84th "	22	755	777	TOTAL	74	204	278
" 87th Fusiliers	23	1,006	1,029	GRAND TOTAL	1,031	40,411	51,378
" 88th Foot	40	877	917				
" 90th Light Infantry	32	803	835				
" 93d Highlanders	32	891	923				
" 94th Foot	41	854	895				
" 97th "	36	848	884				
" 98th "	37	769	808				
" 2d Battalion Rifle Brigade	28	930	958				
" " " "	33	951	983				
TOTAL	1,228	30,000	37,828				

Adjutant-General's Office,
Head Quarters, Allahabad,
4th August 1858.

B.

RETURN OF NATIVE TROOPS, REGULAR and IRREGULAR, serving in the BENGAL PRESIDENCY.

CORPS.	European Officers.	European Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.	TOTAL.		CORPS.	European Officers.	European Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.	TOTAL.	
				European.	Native.					European.	Native.
ARTILLERY.						LOCAL CORPS—continued.					
4th Troop 3d Brigade H.A. and Gun	6	3	189	9	189	Barilly	—	—	322	—	322
Lascars 1st, 2d, and 3d Troops	—	—	92	—	92	Sebundy Sappers and Miners	1	2	211	3	211
Gun Lascars 3d Brigade H.A.	—	—	—	—	—	Resident's Escort	—	—	—	—	—
Gun Lascars and Gun Drivers 2d	—	—	168	—	168	Local Company of Artillery	No returns.				
Battalion Foot Artillery	—	—	—	—	—	Nimar Police Corps	—	—	—	—	—
Gun Lascars and Gun Drivers 3d	—	—	214	—	214	Malwah Bheel Corps	—	—	—	—	—
Battalion Foot Artillery	—	—	113	—	113	Mcyyvar	4	2	1,030	6	1,030
Gun Lascars 4th Batt. Foot Artillery	No return.		—	—	—	Mcena Battalion	4	—	579	4	579
7th Battalion Foot Artillery	4	2	3	6	3	Calcutta Native Militia	3	1	963	4	963
Staff 8th Battalion Foot Artillery	Mutinied.		—	—	—	Hill Rangers	3	2	616	5	616
1st Company 8th Batt. Foot Artillery	3	—	100	3	100	Jodhpore Legion	4	2	703	6	703
2d " " " "	3	—	—	—	—	1st Sikh Infantry	4	—	986	4	986
3d " " " "	Disbanded.		—	—	—	2d " " " "	4	1	948	5	948
4th " " " "	5	—	39	5	39	3d " " " "	3	—	960	3	960
5th " " " "	3	—	120	3	120	4th " " " "	6	—	259	6	259
6th " " " "	Mutinied.		—	—	—						
9th Battalion Foot Artillery	No return.		—	—	—						
TOTAL	21	5	1,068	26	1,058	TOTAL	116	34	22,622	150	22,622
CAVALRY.						IRREGULAR CAVALRY.					
4th Regiment Light Cavalry	No return.		—	—	—	1st Irregular Cavalry	2	—	536	2	536
5th " " " "	7	—	442	7	442	2d " " " "	4	—	405	4	405
6th " " " "	8	—	17	8	17	4th " " " "	2	—	238	2	238
8th " " " "	8	—	354	8	354	5th " " " "	1	—	64	1	64
9th " " " "	7	—	189	7	189	6th " " " "	4	—	581	4	581
10th " " " "	—	—	129	—	129	7th " " " "	4	—	575	4	575
TOTAL	30	—	1,111	30	1,111	8th " " " "	4	—	472	4	472
SAPPERS AND MINERS						PUNJAB IRREGULAR FORCE.					
No return.						1st Punjab Light Field Battery	1	2	143	3	143
INFANTRY.						2d " " " "	2	—	141	2	141
2d Regiment Native Infantry	5	1	600	6	600	3d " " " "	1	1	141	2	141
3d " " " "	8	2	103	10	103	No. 4 Garrison Company of Artillery	2	—	151	2	151
4th " " " "	14	2	528	16	524	Hazara Mountain Train Battery	1	—	80	1	80
13th " " " "	7	1	876	8	876	Corps of Guides	4	—	1,137	4	1,137
16th " " " "	7	—	779	7	779						
21st " " " "	11	2	902	13	902	TOTAL	87	1	10,618	89	10,618
24th " " " "	8	—	819	8	819	INFANTRY.					
25th " " " "	11	—	776	11	776	1st Punjab Irregular Infantry	4	—	924	4	924
26th " " " "	2	2	143	2	143	2d " " " "	5	—	900	5	900
27th " " " "	7	—	725	7	725	3d " " " "	3	1	954	4	954
31st " " " "	No return.		—	—	—	4th " " " "	10	—	845	10	845
32d " " " "	No return.		—	—	—	5th " " " "	6	—	1,022	6	1,022
33d " " " "	4	2	848	6	848	6th " " " "	3	—	917	3	917
35th " " " "	6	1	755	7	755	7th " " " "	7	—	820	7	820
36th " " " "	4	1	122	5	123	8th " " " "	4	—	918	4	918
37th " " " "	6	1	131	7	131	9th " " " "	4	—	919	4	919
39th " " " "	7	—	753	7	753	10th " " " "	4	—	925	4	925
40th " " " "	2	—	103	—	103	11th " " " "	4	—	958	4	958
42d " " " "	No return.		—	—	—	12th " " " "	4	—	941	4	941
43d " " " "	No return.		—	—	—	13th " " " "	6	—	948	6	948
47th " " " "	No return.		—	—	—	14th " " " "	5	—	955	5	955
48th " " " "	6	1	657	7	657	15th " " " "	4	—	959	4	959
49th " " " "	8	—	305	8	305	16th " " " "	6	—	922	7	922
50th " " " "	10	—	775	10	775	17th " " " "	3	2	1,007	5	1,007
51st " " " "	7	1	795	8	795	18th " " " "	3	—	839	3	839
52d " " " "	8	1	124	9	124	19th " " " "	4	—	913	4	913
53d " " " "	6	—	578	6	578	20th " " " "	4	—	961	4	961
54th " " " "	No return.		—	—	—	21st " " " "	7	—	930	7	930
55th " " " "	0	2	860	2	860	22d " " " "	4	—	1,002	4	1,002
56th " " " "	12	2	880	14	880	23d " " " "	4	—	896	4	896
57th " " " "	16	1	1,089	17	1,089	24th " " " "	6	2	896	6	896
58th " " " "	11	1	803	12	803	Hazara Goorkah Battalion	3	—	793	3	793
59th " " " "	No return.		—	—	—						
60th " " " "	7	—	1,211	7	1,211	TOTAL	116	28	23,134	144	23,134
61st " " " "	—	2	138	2	138	GRAND TOTAL					
62d " " " "	5	4	202	9	202						
TOTAL	211	30	17,620	240	17,620						
LOCAL CORPS.						IRREGULAR CAVALRY.					
Kelat-i-Ghizze Regiment	5	2	1,167	7	1,167	1st Irregular Cavalry	2	—	536	2	536
Regiment of Ferozpoor	3	2	771	5	771	2d " " " "	4	—	405	4	405
Regiment of Loodanah	3	—	415	3	415	4th " " " "	2	—	238	2	238
Sikh Volunteers	No return.		—	—	—	5th " " " "	1	—	64	1	64
Kannoon Battalion	5	1	692	6	692	6th " " " "	4	—	581	4	581
Siraoor	No return.		—	—	—	7th " " " "	4	—	575	4	575
Nussroo	7	1	820	8	820	8th " " " "	4	—	472	4	472
1st Extra Goorkah Regiment	5	1	475	6	475	11th " " " "	No return.		—	—	—
Landour Hill Rangers	8	1	518	7	518	12th " " " "	2	—	416	2	416
1st Assam Light Infantry Battalion	4	2	1,025	6	1,025	13th " " " "	6	—	482	6	482
2d " " " "	3	1	1,133	4	1,133	14th " " " "	4	—	589	4	589
Mhairwara Battalion	4	2	738	6	738	15th " " " "	1	—	190	1	190
Mhair Regiment	3	2	622	5	622	16th " " " "	2	—	164	2	164
Sylhet Light Infantry Battalion	6	2	962	8	962	Behar	No return.		—	—	—
Aracan Battalion	6	2	723	8	723	Rohilcund	No return.		—	—	—
Shekhawatee Battalion	—	—	743	3	743	Peshawar Light Horse	—	—	148	—	148
Pegu Light Infantry Battalion	No return.		—	—	—	1st Sikh Irregular Cavalry	No return.		—	—	—
Munseepore Regiment	3	2	503	4	503	2d " " " "	6	—	617	6	617
Kamroop Regiment	4	2	915	6	915	3d " " " "	4	—	766	4	766
Mynseepore Infantry and Cavalry	—	—	590	—	590	4th " " " "	4	—	524	4	524
Futchegurh	—	—	539	—	539	1st Punjab	5	—	568	5	568
Cawnpore	5	—	825	5	825	2d " " " "	8	—	713	8	713
Allahabad	4	—	613	4	613	3d " " " "	6	—	536	6	536
Allygurh	2	1	307	3	307	4th " " " "	6	—	546	6	546
						5th " " " "	5	—	582	5	582
						Jodhpore Sikh Horse	1	—	453	1	453
						Mooltanee Cavalry	No return.		—	—	—
						Towanna Horse	No return.		—	—	—
						TOTAL	87	1	10,618	89	10,618

C.

DISPOSITION RETURN OF TEMPORARY LEVIES, ORGANIZED POLICE, CONTINGENTS, &c. in the BENGAL PRESIDENCY,
on the 1st July 1858.

DIVISION.	STATION.	CORPS.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.	Guns.	REMARKS.
PRESIDENCY.	Raneegunge	Sonthal Police	231	-	
	Cachar	Kaskie Levy	214	-	
	Purneah	Purneah Military Police Battalion	634	-	
	Dorundah	Call and Sonthal Levy	488	-	150 of these at Chyebasa.
	Dacodnugger	Bengal Police Battalion	303	-	
	Patna and Dinapore	Ditto	36	-	
	Basleo	Ditto	55	-	
	Chupra	Ditto	41	-	
	Arrah	Ditto	161	-	
	Dehree	Ditto	30	-	
DINAPORE.	Itolias	Ditto	290	4	
	Sasseram	Sebundy Levy	242	-	35 of these are Cavalry.
	Behar District	Behar Irregular Cavalry	176	-	
		Behar Station Gunns	757	-	
		Behar Mounted Police	25	-	Europeans.
		Sewan Levy	231	-	
	Ghazepore	Police Levies	131	-	
	Benares	Ditto	710	-	62 mounted, includes 337 of Colonial Levy, of which station is not given.
	Jonnore	Ditto	258	-	80 mounted. Note.—Of these Police Levies the Horses are partially armed.
	Mirzapore	Ditto	207	-	
Asmghur	Ditto	200	-	50 mounted. Infantry entirely unarmed.	
SAUGOR.	Allahabad	Sikh Police Corps	1,114	-	
		Allahabad Levy	625	-	
	Bandah	Bundlecund Auxiliary Levies	978	2	
	Calpee Road	Towana Horse	308	-	Since moved to Bilhour, between Cawnpore and Meerunka Sarai.
	Bunnee	Kurpoortala Raja's Contingent Artillery	88	-	
		Ditto Cavalry	146	-	
		Ditto Infantry	1,310	-	
		Ditto Ditto	186	-	
	Oonao	Pathan Horse	710	-	
	LUCKNOW.	2 Regiments Oudh Police Cavalry	811	-	
Ditto Infantry		2,218	-		
Seikh Levies from Umballah		711	-		
Allahabad Mounted Police		322	-	Detachments at Chintuth, Mollahabad, and Futteghur.	
Mullahabad	1st Regiment Oudh Police Infantry	879	-		
	Remains of Oudh Irregular Cavalry Corps	125	-		
Cawnpore	Cawnpore Levy	708	-	3 Companies detached to Meerunka Sarai.	
ETAWAH.	Auxiliary Levy Artillery	60	6		
	Ditto Cavalry	218	-		
	Ditto Infantry	373	-		
MYNPOORIE.	Mynpoorie Irregular Cavalry	414	-		
	Ditto Police Levy	303	-	200 Men detached to Etawah.	
	Futteghur	Futteghur Levy	578	-	
	Farruckabad Police Infantry	249	-		
	Ditto Cavalry	138	-		
ROHILCUND.	Shahjehanpore	Mooltanee Horse	638	-	
	Powasen, near Shahjehanpore	Rohilcund Auxiliary Police Cavalry	321	-	
		Ditto Infantry	220	-	
	Bareilly	Kemson Hill Levy	737	-	200 Men detached to Pillibheet.
	Moradabad	Mooltanee Horse	856	-	
		Pathan Horse	101	-	
		Cavalry attached to 1st Punjab Infantry	70	-	
		Gowan's Infantry	539	-	
	Bijnour	District Police Cavalry	219	-	
	Allyghur	Police Cavalry	102	-	
Police Infantry		210	-		
Allyghur Levy		277	-		
Agra	Police Battalion	903	-		
Muttra	Police Infantry	186	-		
Camp Muttra	Artillery, General Van Cortland's Levy	31	4		
	Towana Horse	149	-		
	Goorgaon Mounted Police	102	-	Have returned to Goorgaon.	
Boolundshur	Pathan Horse (Stokes)	226	-	En route to Allahabad.	
	Police Cavalry	540	-		
	" Infantry	453	-		
MOOSUFFERNUGGER.	Police Cavalry	107	-		
	" Infantry	222	-		
MEERUT.	Police Cavalry	403	-		
	" Infantry	622	-		
Delhis	8th and 9th Punjab Police Battalions	1,200	-	And in the Division. Approximate; no return.	
	Mounted Police	300	-	Ditto ditto.	
Jhujjhar	Jhujjhar Mounted Police	210	-		
	Esakhel Cavalry	107	-		
	Putteeda Raja's Artillery	66	-		
	Ditto Cavalry	387	-		
	Ditto Infantry	1,187	-		
Rhotuck	Towana Horse	220	-	Now at Goorgaon.	
	Police Cavalry	228	-		
	" Infantry	91	-		
Beharunpore	Raja of Jhesud's Troops; Cavalry	39	-		
	Ditto ditto Infantry	184	-		
Dehra Dheem	Police Cavalry	103	-		
	" Infantry	420	-		
	Police	174	-	25 of these are mounted.	

Disposition Return of Temporary Levies, Organized Police, &c. in the Bengal Presidency, on 1st July 1858—continued.

DIVISION.	STATION.	CORPS.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.	Guns.	REMARKS.	
SINDH.	Umballa	Police, Mounted	145	-		
		4th Punjab Police Battalion	575	-		
	Hooahairpore	Horse Levy	74	-		
		Foot	249	-		
	Loodianah		Putteah Raja's Contingent	59	-	
			Nabha Ditto	247	-	
			Sooraj Mookhhee Police Battalion	76	-	
			Mooltanee Infantry	20	-	
			General Service Levy	172	-	
	Hisar		Raja Jawahir Sing's Contingent	696	-	
		Mounted Police Detachment, Lieutenant Walcott's Battery	89	4		
Sirsa		Artillery	16	4	3 4-Pounders, 1 3½ Pounder.	
		Police Cavalry	288	-		
		Infantry	801	-		
	Putteah Raja's Infantry	69	-			
Lahore		Lahore Mounted Police	103	-	And in the Division.	
		Punjab Ditto	313	-		
	1st " Police Battalion	888	-			
Mooltan		Mooltan Mounted Police	260	-	And in the Division. Approximate; no Return.	
		3d Punjab Police Battalion	476	-		
LAHORE.	Googaira	Googaira Horse Levy	108	-	Approximate; no Return received.	
		Ditto Foot	200	-		
		Detachment 3d Punjab Police Battalion	103	-		
	Sealkote	Sealkote Foot Levy	263	-		
	Umritsur	Mooltanee Horse	104	-	No Return.	
		Infantry	44	-		
		7th Punjab Police Battalion	-	-		
	Goordaspore	3rd Troop Punjab Mounted Police	30	-		
		Goordaspore Foot Levy	183	-		
	Noerpore	Detachment 2nd Punjab Police Battalion	168	-		
Kangra	Ditto ditto	263	-			
PUNJAB.	Bunnee	Irregular Mounted Levy	306	-		
		Irregular Foot Levy	364	-		
		6th Punjab Police Battalion, Detachment	39	-		
	Dera Ismail Khan	Irregular Mounted Levy	285	-		
		Irregular Foot Levy	571	-		
		6th Punjab Police Battalion	722	-		
	Googurat	Irregular Mounted Levy	31	-	From Return of 1st June.	
	Googramvalla	Irregular Foot Levy	341	-		
	Licca	Detachment 6th Punjab Police Battalion	93	-		
Mithunkote	Irregular Mounted Levy	103	-			
	Irregular Foot Levy	110	-			
Tak	Detachment 6th Punjab Police Battalion	43	-			
Jhelum	Jhelum Levy	271	-			
Rawul Pindoo	Mounted Police	370	-	And in the Division. Approximate; no Return.		
	5th Punjab Police Battalion	380	-			
Campbellpore	Khuttuck Levy	162	-			
Attock	Mooltanee Horse Levy	49	-			
	" Foot Levy	76	-			
Nowahera	Mooltanee Horse	105	-			
Peshawur	Mounted Police	500	-	Approximate; no Return.		
GRAND TOTAL			44,371	26		

This Statement is necessarily, in many instances, imperfect, in consequence of Returns not having been duly furnished.

Quartermaster General's Office, Head Quarters,
Allahabad, 29th July 1858.

(Signed) W. MACPHERSON, Lieutenant Colonel,
Officiating Quartermaster General of the Army.

(A true Copy.)

H. H. CREALOCK,
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General to Chief of the Staff.

Note.—This number is constantly swelling, as the Magistrates under the orders of Government succeed in adding to the ranks of the Military Police.

(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD, Major General,
Chief of the Staff.

Tabular Statement of the Total Proposed Establishment of the Regular Army of Bengal.

THE EUROPEAN MOVEABLE ARMY OF THE CROWN.																																						
Number of Regiments.		Numbers of Troops, Batteries, and Companies.					Detail of Officers.										Detail of Non-commissioned Staff.										Detail of Troop and Company Non-commissioned Officers and Men.										Strength of each Regiment.	Total Strength of each Arm.
Cavalry.	Infantry.	Troops, Artillery.	Batteries, Artillery.	Cavalry Troops.	Engineers.	Infantry.	Colonels.	Major.	Captain.	Subaltern.	Paymaster.	Quartermaster.	Adjutant.	Surgeon.	Assistant Surgeon.	Veterinary Surgeon.	Regimental Sergeant Major.	Quartermaster Sergeant.	Paymaster Sergeant.	Hospital Sergeant.	Armourer Sergeant.	Farrier Sergeant.	Trumpet Major.	Saddler Sergeant.	Orderly-room Clerk.	Schoolmaster Sergeant.	Troop Sergeants Major.	Sergeants.	Corporals and Bombardiers.	Trumpeters and Drummers.	Farriers.	Privates, &c.	Horses.					
2	15	3	9	9	4	10	4	4	35	47	3	3	3	2	7	2	0	9	2	2	2	2	3	2	1	2	2	19	94	190	34	33	1,938	1,033	2,883	21,106		
* Staff Sergeants.																																						
THE EUROPEAN LOCAL ARMY OF THE CROWN.																																						
Number of Regiments.		Number of Troops, Batteries, and Companies.					Detail of Officers.										Detail of Non-commissioned Staff.										Detail of Troop and Company Non-commissioned Officers and Men.										Strength of each Regiment.	Total Strength of each Arm.
Cavalry.	Infantry.	Troops, Artillery.	Batteries, Artillery.	Troops, Cavalry.	Engineers.	Infantry.	Colonels.	Major.	Captain.	Subaltern.	Paymaster.	Quartermaster.	Adjutant.	Surgeon.	Assistant Surgeon.	Veterinary Surgeon.	Regimental Sergeant Major.	Quartermaster Sergeant.	Paymaster Sergeant.	Hospital Sergeant.	Armourer Sergeant.	Farrier Sergeant.	Trumpet Major.	Saddler Sergeant.	Orderly Room Clerk.	Schoolmaster Sergeant.	Troop Sergeant Major.	Sergeants.	Corporals and Bombardiers.	Trumpeters and Drummers.	Farriers.	Natives.	Privates, &c.	Horses.				
10	80	9	58	6	-	10	3	3	22	54	1	2	2	2	4	1	0	2	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	10	85	68	61	8	40	1,768	860	2,166	48,910		
* Staff Sergeants. † Reserve Companies. ‡ The Bengal Engineers, a Corps of Officers whose number varies.																																						
THE NATIVE MOVEABLE ARMY, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM LOCAL FORCES IN PARTICULAR PROVINCES.																																						
Number of Regiments.		Number of Troops and Companies.		Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates.	Horses.	Strength of each Regiment.	Total Strength of each Arm.																															
Cavalry.	Infantry.	Troops, Cavalry.	Infantry.																																			
12	-	8	-	400	-	400	4,800																															
-	45	-	0	600	-	600	37,000																															
-	8	-	8	800	-	800	4,000																															
-	6	-	8	800	-	800	4,800																															
Establishment		18	56	6	22	2,600	40,800																															
GRAND TOTAL STRENGTH OF ALL ARMS							(EUROPEANS - 70,016)	110,616																														
							(NATIVES - 40,600)																															

REMARKS.

Abstract of the European Force.

Officers	2,818
Non-commissioned Officers, Trumpeters, and Artificers	5,890
Rank and File	61,898
TOTAL	70,616

Note.—No statement of officers on account of the Native regiments has been given, as they will be deducted from the establishments of other regiments on the so-called Irregular system: vide text of Minute. The establishment stated in the Return for the local European regiments has merely been copied from the present royal establishments, which will probably require large augmentations to compensate for the extraordinary demands of the Government and the Commander-in-Chief for civil and military administration, and to admit all the officers of the present army. It must ever be remembered that, one season of the year being taken with another, the effective strength of the European forces in India is reckoned on the whole as less by one fourth than the regulated establishments. The figures in this return represent the proposed regulated establishment.

Note 2.—The 70,016 as European establishment includes 736 artificers, natives on the strength of the artillery, troops, and battalions.

(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD, Major General.

APPENDIX No. 63.

MILITARY LETTER from the GOVERNOR-GENERAL, dated Allahabad, July 8, 1858.

1. In your Honourable Court's Despatch, No. 219, dated 4th November 1857, which announced your intention to form four regiments of European Cavalry in the service of the East India Company, and communicated your desire that these regiments should be substituted for eight regiments of Native Light Cavalry, your Honourable Court left it to the discretion of the Government of India to fix upon the eight regiments which were to be dispensed with, retaining the other two corps: to which two regiments such native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and troopers as might have been faithful to the Government, were to be attached.

2. In pursuance of these instructions, it was arranged that the 5th and 8th regiments of Native Light Cavalry which had been disarmed, but had not mutinied, should be retained in the service, and that for the other eight regiments the four new European corps should be substituted.

3. The retention of the two regiments in the service involved the restoration to them of their arms; but previous to adopting that measure, and to enable me to judge whether the two regiments deserved to be treated with so much honour and confidence, I caused inquiry to be made through the Chief Commissioner in the Punjab regarding the conduct of the 5th and 8th regiments since they were disarmed. The accompanying papers will apprise your Honourable Court of the result of this inquiry, and will show you that neither of these regiments are worthy of having their arms restored to them, or of being any longer retained in the service.

4. It having now, therefore, become necessary to acquaint your Honourable Court that the retention of any portion of the Bengal Light Cavalry is impracticable, excepting such remnants of the ten regiments as may have continued faithful or may prove worthy of consideration when the disarmed corps are finally disposed of; before offering to you my own views on the best mode of supplying the place of the 5th and 8th regiments of Light Cavalry, I determined to obtain an expression of the opinion of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief on the proper organization of European cavalry regiments for the Indian service. I informed his Excellency that it was my intention to solicit your Honourable Court to supply the place of the 5th and 8th regiments with European cavalry, and I now beg earnestly to invite your early attention to the subject.

5. The establishment of the four European cavalry regiments which your Honourable Court directed has been G.O.P.C. No. 738. adopted, as shown in the accompanying May 11, 1858. General Order. But I am satisfied that regiments on that scale are too large, on various considerations; and while I would most strongly advocate the substitution of European corps for the 5th and 8th regiments of Light Cavalry, I beg to propose that this may be done, not by adding a fifth bulky regiment to the four already ordered, but by revising the establishment of these, and organizing ten regiments on a reduced scale in lieu of the ten regiments of Native Light Cavalry.

6. The scale suggested by his Excellency the Commander-in-chief is noted in the margin. The only question which occurs to me in regard to it is, whether it would not be better to retain the number of captains at seven, as at present, instead of reducing it to six, as proposed by his Excellency. Provision would then be made for absentees, an object of some importance, seeing that there is no chance of its being possible by any immediate arrangement to relieve the new European cavalry any more than other branches of the army from contributing officers to staff and detached employ; and the additional expense of keeping the seventh captain would be more than met by making the adjutant and the quartermaster non-effective instead of effective.
- 1 Colonel.
 - 1 Lieut.-colonel.
 - 1 Major.
 - 6 Captains.
 - 12 Lieutenants.
 - 6 Cornets.
 - 1 Adjutant.
 - 1 Quartermaster and interpreter.
 - 1 Surgeon.
 - 1 Assistant-surgeon.
 - 1 Veterinary surgeon.
 - 1 Riding master.
 - 1 Regimental sergeant major.
 - 6 Troop sergeant majors.
 - 1 Quartermaster-sergeant.
 - 1 Armourer sergeant.
 - 1 Saddler sergeant.
 - 1 Farrier sergeant.
 - 1 Schoolmaster sergeant.
 - 1 Orderly-room clerk.
 - 18 Sergeants.
 - 1 Trumpet-major.
 - 6 Trumpeters.
 - 18 Corporals.
 - 384 Privates.
 - 450 Horses.
 - 6 Troops.

der-in-chief is noted in the margin. The only question which occurs to me in regard to it is, whether it would not be better to retain the number of captains at seven, as at present, instead of reducing it to six, as proposed by his Excellency. Provision would then be made for absentees, an object of some importance, seeing that there is no chance of its being possible by any immediate arrangement to relieve the new European cavalry any more than other branches of the army from contributing officers to staff and detached employ; and the additional expense of keeping the seventh captain would be more than met by making the adjutant and the quartermaster non-effective instead of effective.

7. Your Honourable Court will determine whether, upon this point, any modification of his Excellency's proposed scale is desirable.

8. A regiment constituted as is now proposed, in point of non-commissioned officers and rank and file, will amount to 446 in all, and will form a very serviceable corps for purposes of discipline and for movement in the field. It will secure the advantages described by the Commander-in-Chief, and the scheme of organizing ten regiments of the proposed scale presents this favourable result, that while five regiments, on the scale of the four already established by your Honourable Court, amounting in non-commissioned and rank and file to 818 men in each, give a total of 4,090 men required to complete them. Ten regiments with a total of 440 men require only 310 additional men to make up the complement of the whole.

9. It will be observed by your Honourable Court that the Commander-in-Chief has made allusion to "the possible mingling of native squadrons hereafter with the European squadrons."

10. A project has been under my consideration for attaching to each regiment of European cavalry in the Indian service a corps of Native irregular cavalry, formed after the model of ordinary irregular cavalry regiments, with a commandant, a second in command, and an adjutant.

11. I strongly incline to think that such an addition to the European cavalry regiments would be of essential advantage in many points of view. But the question is one upon which there is a difference of opinion amongst officers of much experience, and as a decision upon it is not at all necessary to the immediate organization of the European cavalry regiments, I beg permission to defer bringing it before your Honourable Court until it shall have been further considered.

No. 736 of 1858.

General Orders by the Honourable the President of the Council of Indian Council.

Fort William, May 11, 1858.

Under instructions from the Honourable the Court of Directors, the Honourable the President in Council is pleased to direct the formation of four regiments of European Light Cavalry, on the Bengal establishment, in substitution of eight regiments of Bengal Native Light Cavalry.

Each regiment will consist of,—

- 1 colonel.
- 2 lieutenant-colonels.
- 2 majors.
- 14 captains.
- 18 lieutenants.
- 8 cornets.
- 1 adjutant.
- 1 interpreter and quartermaster, non-effective.
- 1 surgeon.
- 2 assistant-surgeons.
- 1 veterinary surgeon.
- 1 riding-master.
- 1 regimental sergeant-major.
- 10 troop sergeant-majors.
- 1 quartermaster sergeant.
- 1 armourer sergeant.
- 1 saddler sergeant.
- 1 farrier sergeant.
- 1 hospital sergeant.
- 1 orderly-room clerk.
- 40 sergeants.
- 1 trumpet-major.
- 10 trumpeters.
- 40 corporals.
- 10 farriers.
- 700 privates.

To be formed into ten troops.

School establishment as authorized by the Regulations:—

- 1 drill-sergeant.
 - 1 drill-corporal.
 - 10 pay-sergeants.
 - 1 librarian.
 - 1 provost-sergeant.
 - 1 savings bank clerk.
- } non-effective.

Syces, grass-cutters, quartermasters, and other native establishments, in the proportion authorized for Her Majesty's Dragoon regiments.

The pay of the several grades will be the same as that of corresponding ranks in Her Majesty's Dragoon regiments. The troop contract allowances will be issued at the rates heretofore authorized in Native cavalry regiments.

The regiments will be officered each with the officers of G.O.O., No. 224 of 1839. two of the regiments of Native cavalry, whose junction in one regiment G.O.O.G. { 29 June 1838. } will be effected by the same gradual process as that which was adopted when the 1st and 2nd European regiments of infantry were formed into one regiment.

The officers of the Native cavalry are accordingly transferred with effect from the 1st May 1858.

Those of the 1st and 3rd to the 1st Bengal European Light Cavalry.

Those of the 2nd and 7th to the 2nd Bengal European Light Cavalry.

Those of the 4th and 6th to the 3rd Bengal European Light Cavalry.

Those of the 9th and 10th to the 4th Bengal European Light Cavalry.

The colonels, who will be extra to the establishment, consequent on the formation of four regiments instead of eight, will remain as supernumeraries until further orders.

Officers hereafter appointed will be posted to the new regiments, and not to either of the wings; and officers so posted can succeed to vacancies in the higher grades only, after the officers who belonged to the wings at the time of their junctions shall have been promoted.

The uniform and equipments of the Bengal European Light Cavalry will be prescribed hereafter, and such further orders as may be necessary respecting the formation of the new regiments will be issued by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

The 5th and 8th regiments of Native Cavalry will retain their numbers and present organization until further orders.

(Signed) F. D. ATKINSON, Major,
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India,
Military Department.

No. 469 A.

From the Adjutant General of the Army to the
Secretary to the Government of India.

Military Department,
With the Governor-General.

Sir,
In reply to your letter of the 19th ultimo, No. 384, communicating for the information of the Commander-in-Chief the decision of the Right Honourable the Governor-General to supply the place of the 5th and 8th regiments of Native Light Cavalry, and requesting his Excellency to state his views as to the expediency of forming corps of less strength than those already authorized, and as to the number it would be desirable to raise; I am directed to request you will submit to his lordship the following observations:—

2. Considering the manner in which it will be necessary hereafter to disseminate the European cavalry throughout India, it appears to the Commander-in-Chief that it would be better to have ten small regiments rather than five strong corps; for it is of great consequence that corps should not be broken up but should move and work as a whole whenever circumstances permit.

3. Excepting when a large army is formed there are few cavalry columns required in which it would be necessary to have more than 350 British dragoons; as with them would ordinarily be associated native cavalry sufficient to make up the column to a thousand sabres.

4. In this view his Excellency would recommend that there should be ten cavalry corps consisting of three squadrons, or six troops each, and officered and constituted as per margin.

5. The appointment of regimental paymaster is not recognized in the Bengal army; but the Commander-in-Chief thinks it probable that ere long, considering the great increase in the number of European regiments of the Honourable Company, it may be found necessary to adopt the practice of Her Majesty's service in this respect. If this should come to pass, it will be necessary to add a paymaster sergeant to the establishment now suggested.

6. Before concluding I am directed to advert to a point of re-organization which has not escaped his Lordship's notice, viz., the possible mingling of native squadrons hereafter with the European squadrons.

If such a project should ever be entertained, and of its feasibility and practical utility his Excellency has little doubt, it will be found that the strength of the European regiments as above stated will be more convenient than a large corps, as regards a moveable body in the field, and for the ordinary purposes to which Government would apply such regiments.

7. If three native squadrons of irregular cavalry were added to three squadrons of British dragoons of the strength suggested, there will be a body of six squadrons numbering, after allowing a margin for sickness, above seven hundred sabres, a strength which Sir Colin Campbell considers should never be exceeded, both on account of discipline and the real efficiency of a moveable body under one commanding officer.

8. Sir Sydney Cotton has reported most favourably of the experiment he has made in the Peshawur Light Horse, where a troop of Natives is associated with two of Europeans. The Major-General passes high encomiums on all alike.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. MAYHEW, Lieut.-Col.,
Adjutant-General of the Army.

Head-Quarters, Allahabad,
July 3, 1858.

P.S. The enclosures of your letter are herewith returned, as requested.

NOTE.

The following is a comparison of the establishment of the Four European local corps already sanctioned, with that for the Ten regiments now proposed:

	Establishment of Four European Corps per G. O., May 11, 1858. Ten Troops each.	Establishment now proposed for Ten European Corps. Six Troops each.	Increase of Establishment by the Proposed Arrangement.
Colonel - - -	1	1	5
Lieut.-Colonel - -	2	1	0
Major - - -	2	1	0
Captains - - -	14	*7	0
Lieutenants - - -	18	12	30
Cornets - - -	8	6	20
Adjutant - - -	1	1	5
Interpreter and Quartermaster, non-effective - - -	1	1	5
Surgeon - - -	1	1	5
Assistant Surgeon -	2	1	0
Veterinary Surgeon	1	1	5
Riding Master -	1	1	5
Non-commissioned and Troopers -	818	440	0
Increase of Officers by the proposed arrangement -			80

Five regiments of 818 men each give a total of 4,090 men; 10 regiments of 440 each will require 4,400 men, or an addition of only 310 men to make up the complement of the whole.

If a comparison be taken of the number of effectives likely to be present at head-quarters with an establishment of 4,400 non-commissioned officers and privates, with the result as shown with respect to the Queen's Dragoons in India, the result would be that with an established strength of 4,400, there would only be present at head-quarters 2,783 non-commissioned and troopers.

Establishment of Queen's Dragoons in India	-	7,720
Present effective	-	4,897
This result applied to an establishment of 4,400 would produce	-	2,783

Indian Army Commission, (Signed) R. B. Wood,
December 1858. Colonel and Secretary.

* The Commander-in-Chief proposed six captains only, but the Governor-General prefers seven, which would make provision for absences for staff employ.

APPENDIX No. 64.

Lord HARRIS'S ANSWERS, &c.

Government House, Madras,

July 2, 1858.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter, in which you enclose a list of queries having reference to paragraph 5 of the Honourable Court's Despatch, No. 235, dated November 25, 1857.

In accordance with your Lordship's request, I now furnish replies to those questions.

I have endeavoured to make my answers as concise as possible, without entering upon the grounds on which my conclusions have been formed, but I am quite prepared to give my reasons for them, if required.

I have, &c.

HARRIS.

ANSWER to QUESTION 1.

EUROPEAN TROOPS of all Arms, Madras Presidency, according to established Strength.

	Sergeants, Corporals, and Privates.
Dragoon and Lancers	1,416
Artillery:—Royal	933
Company's	1,845
Veterans	125
Infantry:—Her Majesty's	8,629
Company's	2,841
Veterans	115
European Sappers	75
Total established Strength	15,979

DISTRIBUTION of EUROPEAN TROOPS, Madras Presidency, according to Effective Strength.

	Regiments.	Troop or Companies.	Sergeants, Corporals, and Privates.
Nagpore Force	Kamptee Artillery	Head Quarters and 1 Comp.	227
Hyderabad Sub- sidiary Force	Seounderabad Lancers	Head Quarters, H. M. 12th Lancers	397
	Infantry	Her Majesty's 1st Royals	1,110
Northern Division	Artillery	Head Quarters and 1 Comp.	223
	Vizagapatam Infantry	Her Majesty's 69th Regiment	197
	Infant. Vet. Comp.	3 Companies	110
	Masulipatam Artillery	1 Company	17
Ceded Districts	Bellary Infantry	Detail	484
	Artillery	1 Company	79
	Shorapoor Infantry	Her Majesty's 74th Highlanders	95
	Dharwar Infantry	Do.	283
Fort St. George	Ramandroog Infantry	3 Company	101
	Fort St. George Artillery	1 Company	91
Centre Division	Infantry	Detail	921
	Mount Artillery	Her Majesty's 44th Foot	698
	Head Quarters, Madras and Royal Artillery	Head Quarters, Madras and Royal Artillery	21
	Vellore Artillery Veterans	Detail	71
Mysore Division	Palaveram Artillery Veterans	1 Company	520
	Bangalore Dragoons	Her Majesty's 1st Dragoons	998
	Infantry	Her Majesty's 60th Rifles	295
	Artillery	Head Quarters and 1 Troop Horse, and 1 Comp. Foot	98
Malabar and Canara.	Mysore Infantry	Her Majesty's 60th Rifles	100
	Hurryhur Infantry	Do.	463
	Cannanore Infantry	Head Quarters, H. M. 66th Regt.	106
	Mangalore Infantry	Her Majesty's 66th Regiment	134
	Malliapooram Infantry	Do.	105
	Calicut Infantry	Do.	106
Southern Division	Sirey Infantry	Do.	719
	Trichinopoly Infantry	Head Quarters, 2nd European Light Infantry	72
	Artillery	1 Company	58
	Tanjore Infantry	2nd European Light Infantry	59
	Moulmein Artillery	1 Company	813
	Rangoon Infantry	Head Quarters, H. M. 68th Foot	116
Pegu Division	Artillery	Head Quarters, and 1/3 Comp.	496
	Tonghoon Infantry	Head Quarters, H. M. 69th Foot	117
	Artillery	1 1/2 Company	25
	Bassein Artillery	1/2 Company	36
Straits	Shuay Gheen Artillery	1/2 Company	66
	Thayetmys Artillery	1 Company	61
	Penang and Malacca Artillery	1 Company	237
Gen. Whitlock's, or Saugor Field Division	Saugor Lancers	19th Lancers	415
	Bandah Artillery	1 Troop and 4 Companies	198
	Saugor Infantry	3rd Madras European Regiment	474
	Bandah Infantry	Head Quarters, 3rd Europ. Regt.	1,035
	Hinnotah Infantry	Head Quarters, H. M. 43rd Foot	185
	Dummah Infantry	3rd Madras European Regiment	49
Bengal Field Force	Jubbulpore Infantry	Do.	561
	Lucknow Infantry	1st Madras Fusileers	108
	Benares Artillery	1 Company	
Total Real Strength			13,950

(Signed) F. S. GABB, Major,
Deputy Adjutant-General of the Army.

ANSWERS TO QUESTION 2.

EUROPEAN TROOPS of each Arm deemed necessary for the Madras Presidency.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Companies of Artillery.		
			Horse.	Foot.	Reserve Companies.
Kamptee } These two stations to supply Saugor {	1	1	1	2	1
Jaulnah } and Mhow with detachments. {	1	1	1	1	-
Secundrabad - - - - -	2	1	1	2	1
Northern Division - - - - -	1	-	-	1	-
Bellary - - - - -	1	-	-	1	1
Bangalore - - - - -	1	1	1	2	1
Mercara (to provide Malabar) - - - - -	1	-	-	1	-
Jackatalla } to provide Trichinopoly - {	1	-	-	-	-
Trichinopoly - - - - -	-	-	1	1	-
Fort St. George - - - - -	1	-	-	-	1
St. Thomas' Mount - - - - -	-	-	1	2	2
Penang - - - - -	-	-	-	1	1
Singapore* - - - - -	1	-	-	1	1
Thayatmayoo - - - - -	1	-	-	1	1
Toughoo - - - - -	1	-	-	1	1
Rangoon - - - - -	1	-	-	1	-
Moulmein - - - - -	1	-	-	1	-

* The question of a station for European Infantry being formed at the Straits is left for the decision of the Government of India, but is here thrown out as a suggestion.

ANSWER TO QUESTION 3.

NATIVE TROOPS of all Arms, Madras Presidency, according to established Strength.

	Havildars, Naignes, and Privates.
Cavalry - - - - -	2,754
Artillery - - - - -	849
Sappers and Miners - - - - -	1,505
Infantry, including 3rd Extra Regt. and Madras Sapper Militia	62,722
	67,830
Veterans— - - - -	2,324
	{ Variable, will increase in proportion to increase of army.
<i>Hyderabad Contingent:—</i>	
Cavalry - - - - -	2,192
Artillery - - - - -	388
Infantry - - - - -	5,280
	7,860
<i>Irregulars:—</i>	
Kurnool Horse - - - - -	332
Mysore Horse - - - - -	2,809
Nair Brigade (Travancore) - - - - -	1,563
Ganjam Sibundies - - - - -	423
Malabar Police - - - - -	174
Nagpore Force, Cavalry - - - - -	400
Artillery - - - - -	138
Infantry - - - - -	2,688
	8,527
Total of all classes	85,117

DISTRIBUTION OF NATIVE TROOPS of all Arms, Madras Presidency, according to Effective Strength.

Divisions, &c.	Stations.	Regiments.	Troops or Companies.	Havildars, Naignes, and Privates.	Total.
Nagpore Force	Kamptee	1 Cavalry - - - - -	- - - - -	258	3,646
	Seonie	3 Infantry - - - - -	- - - - -	1,930	
	Hoosingabad	- - - - -	1 Detachment - - - - -	78	
	Seetabaldee	1 Infantry and - - - - -	3 Companies - - - - -	621	
	Narasingapore	- - - - -	4 Companies - - - - -	408	
Hyderabad Force	Secunderabad	1½ Cavalry - - - - -	- - - - -	512	4,497
	"	5 Infantry - - - - -	- - - - -	3,895	
	"	- - - - -	Detachment Sappers and Miners. - - - - -	46	
	"	- - - - -	Detachment Artillery - - - - -	44	
			Carried forward - - - - -		8,143

ANSWER TO QUESTION No. 3.—continued.

Divisions, &c.	Stations.	Regiments.	Troops or Companies.	Havildars, Naigues, and Privates.	Total.	
Northern Division	Cuttack	1 Infantry	Brought forward	550	8,143	
	"	"	Detachment Artillery	41		
	Sumbulpore	"	Detachment Artillery	28		
	"	"	Detachment Infantry	697		
	Veizianagram	"	Detachment Artillery	38		
	"	2 Infantry	"	1,322		
	"	"	Detail	31		
	Masulipatam	"	Detachment Artillery	14		
	"	1 Infantry	"	844		
	Vizagapatam	1 Infantry	"	1,053		
Berhampore	"	Detachment	248	7,329		
Rusulcoudah	1 Infantry	"	545			
Samulcottah	1 Infantry	"	912			
Dowlaisweram	Sappers and Miners	"	358			
"	"	8 Minor Outposts	608			
Ceded Districts	Bellary	1 Cavalry	"		390	3,917
	"	2 Infantry	"		1,720	
	Cuddapah	1 Infantry	"		981	
	Cumbum	"	1 Company Infantry		82	
Fort St. George	Kurnool	1 Infantry	"		794	3,464
	Madras	Body Guard	"	113		
	"	2 Infantry	"	1,523		
	"	1 Sapper Militia	"	877		
Centre Division	"	1 Native Veteran Battalion	"	951	2,551	
	Saint Thomas' Mount	Head-Quarters, 5th Battalion Artillery.	"	93		
	Vellore	1 Infantry	"	788		
	"	2 Native Veteran Battalion	"	209		
Mysore Division	"	"	8 Minor Outposts	1,461	2,935	
	Bangalore	1 Cavalry	"	383		
	"	1 Infantry	"	755		
	Huryhur	1 Infantry	"	477		
	North Canara	"	3 Companies Infantry	396		
Malabar and Canara	Mercara	1 Infantry	"	483	2,615	
	"	"	4 Minor Out Posts	441		
	Cannanore	"	Detachment Artillery	48		
	Mangalore	2 Infantry	"	1,346		
Southern Division	"	1 Infantry	"	25	4,760	
	"	"	7 Minor Outposts	568		
	Trichinopoly	1 Cavalry	"	698		
	"	3 Infantry	"	1,730		
	Quilon	1 Infantry	"	639		
Pegu Division	Palamcottah	1 Infantry	"	720	9,851	
	"	"	14 Minor Outposts	"		
	Bangoon	5 Infantry	"	2,883		
	Thayetmyo	4 Infantry	1 Company Sappers & Miners	99		
	Tonghoo	1½ Infantry	"	2,614		
	Shuaygheen	¼ Infantry	1 Company Sappers & Miners	88		
Straits	Moulmein	2 Infantry	"	1,212	1,855	
	"	"	1 Company Sappers & Miners	92		
	Singapore	"	9 Minor Outposts	461		
	"	"	"	1,054		
China	"	"	"	1,348	229	
	Penang	1 Infantry	Detachment Artillery	77		
	"	"	Detachment Artillery	651		
Service	"	1 Infantry	Detachment Artillery	32	2,086	
	"	"	5 Minor Outposts	720		
	"	"	"	375		
Service	Hong-Kong	"	Detachment Infantry	229	3,124	
	Saugor Field Force	3 Infantry	1 Company Infantry	1,996		
	"	"	1 Troop Horse Artillery	90		
Service	Bengal	2 Cavalry	"	663	52,859	
	"	"	Detachment Sappers and Miners.	112		
	"	3 Infantry	Detachment Artillery	2,225		
	"	"	1 Company Artillery	44		
	"	"	"	80		

ANSWER TO QUESTION 4.

When the police of the Madras presidency is reorganized this force will relieve the troops of some of the duties on which they are employed, and I consider that the army will be sufficiently numerous at its present full strength, provided

the six local corps for Pegu are raised. It might, however, be advisable to diminish the number of native cavalry regiments, and replace them by Europeans. This, however, is a subject requiring serious consideration, and upon which I should require further information before giving a deliberate

opinion. It has already been determined to do away with the native artillery.

I should be disposed to retain the present distribution of the forces, at all events until it is proved to be defective.

ANSWER to QUESTION 5.

NATIVE TROOPS, Madras Presidency, as consisting of Regulars, Irregulars, and Police, and of what Races composed.

	Havildars, Naigues, Privates.	Castes.						
		Christians.	Mussulmans.	Telingas. or Gentoos.	Tamul.	Other Castes.	Indo- Britons.	Hindoostanee (Oudh, &c.)
<i>Regulars.</i>								
Madras Army - - -	52,859*	2,137	19,783	17,238	5,426	2,769	282	2,972
Hyderabad Contingent	7,860	-	-	-	-	Chiefly of the same classes as the Bengal Army.		
<i>Irregular.</i>								
Kurnool Horse -	332	-	-	-	-	Mussulmans.		
Mysore Horse -	2,809	-	-	-	-	Mussulmans and Hindoos.		
Nair Brigade -	1,563	-	-	-	-	Hindoos.		
Ganjam Sebundies -	423	-	-	-	-	Hindoos.		
Nagpore Force -	3,226	-	-	-	-	Mussulmans and Hindoos, chiefly of the same classes as the Bengal Army.		
<i>Police.</i>								
Malabar Police -	174	-	-	-	-	Nairs, Moplas, and Mussulmans.		

* The castes in the 3rd Extra Regiment N. I., and of the recruits recently transferred from recruiting depôts to corps. are not given in the returns.

Adjutant-General's Office, Fort St. George,
June 22, 1858.

(Signed) F. S. GABB, Major,
Deputy Adjutant General of the Army.

ANSWER to QUESTION 6.

It is difficult to give a very definite answer to this question.

Return No. 3 gives the numbers and distribution of the regular army of Madras, and of the few local corps strictly under the orders of this Government, but it will be observed it also includes as part of the forces within the military area of the presidency the irregulars belonging to Nagpore, the Nizam, and Travancore; and as these two first-named large and important territories are in no way under the supervision of the Madras Government, I cannot pretend to give any opinion concerning them. I, however, suppose them to be efficient and loyal, and that the number of our regular troops usually stationed amongst them has been generally found sufficient. I have stated above that the police of this presidency is about to be reorganised. At present, with the exception of a few Sebundy corps and the Kurnool horse, it is not a disciplined force, and it is even difficult to ascertain its numbers. When reorganised the police will include the small irregular corps above-mentioned, and should amount to about 22,000 men. There would then be no irregulars strictly within the presidency.

The regular army would amount to about 60,000.

STATEMENT of BARRACK ACCOMMODATION now available for European Troops of all Arms, Madras Presidency, including Pegu and the Straits.

		Number of Men who can be accommodated.			
		Cavalry.	Artillery.	Infantry.	Hospital.
Nagpore Force - - -	{ Seetabuldee - - -	-	133	-	12
	{ Kamptee - - -	-	260	1,000	-
Hyderabad Subsidiary Force	{ Secunderabad - - -	-	147	621	187
	{ Trewalgherry - - -	-	-	1,000	-
Ceded Districts - - -	{ Bellary - - -	-	70	2,260	-
Northern Division - - -	{ Vizagapatam - - -	-	-	40	20
Fort St. George - - -		-	400	1,245	Genl. Hospital
	{ Vellore - - -	-	-	190	100
Centre Division - - -	{ Arcot - - -	-	-	640	160
	{ Saint Thomas' Mount - - -	-	1,208	-	-
	{ Poonamallee - - -	-	-	600	-
Mysore Division - - -	{ Bangalore - - -	700	173	1,000	-
	{ Mercara - - -	-	26	-	50
Malabar and Canara - - -	{ Cannanore - - -	-	-	1,000	112
	{ Malliapooram - - -	-	-	150	12
Southern Division - - -	{ Trichinopoly - - -	-	147	413	140
	{ Jackatalla - - -	-	-	1,000	-
Pegu Division - - -	{ Hangoon - - -	-	-	-	-
	{ Moulmein - - -	-	-	-	-
	{ Thyatnew - - -	-	-	-	-
	{ Tonghoo - - -	-	-	-	-
Straits - - -	{ Singapore - - -	-	-	-	-
	{ Penang - - -	-	-	-	-
	{ Labuan - - -	-	-	-	-
			No Returns received.		

N.B. New Cavalry Barracks at Bangalore, to accommodate 700 men, not yet completed, are not included.

Quartermaster-General's Office,
Fort St. George, June 19, 1858.

(Signed) ARTHUR DRURY,
Acting Assistant Quartermaster-General of the Army.

ANSWER TO QUESTION 10.

Additional barrack accommodation would be required for—

- 1 regiment of cavalry at Secunderabad.
- 1 " " Nagpore.*
- 1 " " Jaulnah.*
- 1 wing at Mercara.

* Or possibly for wings at these places, and also at Mhow and Saugor.

There would also probably be additional accommodation for artillery required at some stations.

ANSWER TO QUESTION 11.

I should be disposed to have three-fourths of the infantry and cavalry belonging to Her Majesty's regular army. I would recommend that the regiments should be relieved within a shorter period than at present.

The artillery might be chiefly raised for India.

ANSWER TO QUESTION 12.

They must I suppose through the regular course of the Honourable Company's service. This would be apparently the simplest course, though other plans might be suggested.

ANSWER TO QUESTION 13.

I must confess I do not fully comprehend this question.

ANSWER TO QUESTION 14.

I consider the proportion could not be altered.

LOLD HARRIS'S ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ON THE RE-ORGANISATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY.

INFANTRY.

MY LORD, Botacamund, August 14, 1858.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 16th June 1858, forwarding questions connected with the reorganization of the infantry branch of the service.

I beg to send herewith my replies to the same, and regret that recent indisposition has been the cause of delay in transmitting them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HARRIS.

The Right Hon. Viscount Canning.

No. 1. THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. The Madras army is composed of :—
Mahomedans,
Brahmins and Rajpoots,
Mahrattas,
Telingas or Goutoos,
Tamulians,
Pariahs, &c.
2. Mahomedans are drawn from all parts. Telingas chiefly from the Northern Circars; Tamulians, &c. from Central and Southern Carnatic, Mysore, Ceded districts, Madna, and Tinnevely.
3. No race, tribe, or caste has been excluded from enlistment by regulation. It has been an object to maintain a due proportion, so that no one caste should preponderate over another.
4. With the sanction of Government, an order was published in December last, fixing the caste proportion as follows :—
One-fourth Tamulians of various castes from the Carnatic and Ceded districts.
One-fourth Telingas and other Hindoo castes from the Northern Circars.
One-fourth Mahomedans from various parts.
One-fourth natives of lower castes, or without recognized caste.
5. Recruiting parties under European and native officers, chiefly the latter, when it is inconvenient to detach parties. Recruiting for particular corps is carried on by officers commanding stations, under orders from army head quarters. There are also recruiting depôts.
6. A descriptive register is taken by the recruiting and the examining medical officer, showing the recruit's name, age, height, country, village, caste, colour, &c., and is forwarded monthly to the regiment.

If the party is under a native officer, the candidate is taken for approval to the nearest commanding or staff officer. The party is generally composed of natives of the district in which the recruiting takes place, and they bring in relatives, acquaintances, &c.

7. No special precautions, beyond inquiry as to character and fitness.
8. I would not recommend any at present.
9. The words of the oath are, "I ———, private, do solemnly affirm in the presence of Almighty God, that I will serve the Government with truth and loyalty, and that I will faithfully obey the orders of all officers set over me. I do also further affirm that I will never abandon these colours, and that I will defend them with my life."
10. It has been substantially the same for the last 50 years.
11. It is not probable that any alteration would render the oath more binding.
12. There are a few on the western coast, and also on the eastern, of sea-faring habits; but it is very doubtful whether marine corps could be formed of them. Some enrol themselves as lascars on board steamers, &c., but many of these come from other countries.
13. No.
14. I think not.
15. Yes.
16. Certainly not.
17. No.
18. Answered in question 4.

19. In my opinion the distinction between police and military corps should as a general rule be so complete in regard to the description of men, of which each should be composed, that recruiting for both might be allowed in the same districts.

20. I consider that the police corps require a superior description of men to that suitable for the army corps; they could not, therefore, serve as nurseries for troops.

21. No other agency than that mentioned in reply to question 5 can be employed with advantage.

22. A distinct agency.

23. No change in this respect appears desirable; beyond, perhaps, when practicable, an inquiry of the village authorities, as to the candidates really being what he states himself to be.

24. The system for forming the police corps for the Madras Presidency is now under consideration. I have no doubt it will vary from that employed for the army in some respects.

25. I should doubt the expediency; but if determined on, I would prefer separate regiments.

26. I have no experience, except of Africans. They would probably answer.

27. Agencies could be established at the British settlements.

28. }
29. } I am entirely opposed to the arrangements suggested.
30. }
31. }
32. }

33. As at present with the percussion musket, which is superior to anything in use with other native troops. Notwithstanding the fidelity of the Madras army, a judicious policy seems to require that the European alone should be armed with the Enfield or rifle musket.

34. With a constable's staff for ordinary duty; with a carbine and short sword for special service.

35 & 36. I have no doubt that the native soldiers prefer being dressed like the Europeans. The great desideratum is to originate a suitable costume for the latter.

37. I would keep the European and native regiments entirely distinct.

38. No.
39. I would attempt nothing of the sort.
40. In my opinion, unfavourable.
41. In a very unsatisfactory manner.
42. We cannot preserve, even if we attempt, different systems for the military and for the general population. There can be no question that our policy tends to improve the nature of the natives morally, intellectually, and physically.

No. 2.—MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

1. }
2. } Having had the advantage of seeing the answers to
3. } these questions by H. E. Sir Patrick Grant, I beg
4. } leave to express my general concurrence with his
5. } views.

6. } There is only one police corps strictly so called in
7. } this Presidency, but there are in addition and under
8. } similar rules three Sebundy corps formed, and two
being raised. These corps, though entirely under the
direction of the civil authorities, are disciplined at
present under military regulations; they will, how-
ever, eventually be amalgamated with the general
police of the country.

No. 3.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

I may make the same statement of general concurrence respecting the questions in this list.

No. 4.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

I have received no copy of No. 4.

APPENDIX No. 65.

SIR PATRICK GRANT'S ANSWERS.

SIR, Ootacamund, June 16, 1858.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 15, of the 21st of May, received here on the 10th instant, and to make the following replies to the series of "Questions" therein enclosed.

ANSWER TO QUESTIONS 1 and 2.

My letter to Major-General Sir William Mansfield, chief of the staff, dated 1st January 1858, with Enclosures, contains full information on the points adverted to. Copy accompanies.—A.

ANSWER TO QUESTION 3.

The number of native troops of each arm now on the establishment of the Madras presidency is as follows:—

Two troops of horse artillery, 168 gunners.

One battalion of Golandauze, of eight companies, including two supplemental companies. The strength of the battalion is 552 privates, with the usual proportion of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers.

One corps of sappers and miners, consisting of 12 subadars, 12 jemadars, 50 havildars, 100 naicks, and 1,350 privates, formed into 12 companies.

Seven regiments of light cavalry (the eighth has been broken up); each regiment consists of 367 sabres of all grades, being a total of 2,569 light cavalry sabres.

Fifty-two regiments of native infantry of the line, and three "extra" regiments; total, 55 regiments of native infantry, amounting in all to 61,600 bayonets.

Two veteran battalions, numbering together 2,320 bayonets.

The distribution of these native troops is shown in Enclosure B.

ANSWER TO QUESTION 4:

I conceive the existing number of native troops to be quite necessary for the Madras presidency at present, and until our European force is increased to the extent proposed, till a local force for Pegu is organized, and an efficient police is formed. When these arrangements shall have been carried out, all native artillery may be, and ought to be dispensed with. The light cavalry may be reduced from eight to four regiments, of six hundred privates each, formed into light troops. I would hope that a considerable reduction may be likewise effected in the strength of the native infantry, but to what precise extent I cannot now say.

When a police is organized and in working order, the distribution I would propose to make of the native troops (infantry) is as follows:—

	Reg.		Reg.
Madras	3	Kurnool	1
Vellore	1	Secunderabad	5
Trichinopoly	3	Nagpore Territory	6
Palamcottah	1	Jaulnah	2
Quilon	1	Masulipatam	1
Cannanore	3	Vizianagram	3
Mercara	1	Russilecondah	1
Mysore	1	Cuttack	1
Mangalore	2	Mangoon	3
Bangalore	3	Thyatmyo	2
Huraghur	1	Tonghoo	2
Cuddapah	1	Moulmein	2
Bellary	3	Straits	2
			—
Total regiments of native infantry			55

ANSWER TO QUESTION 5.

The proportion of regulars is given in the replies to Question 3.

The irregulars and police corps, viz. the Hyderabad contingent, the Nagpore irregular force, the Nair brigade, the Kurnool irregular horse, the Mysore Silladar horse, the Orissa Paik companies, the Ganjam Sebundies, the Malabar police corps, are not under military authority, and I am unable to give any information with respect to their composition; but the enclosed Return (C.) shows the distribution and numbers of these forces.

The proportions of the different races now ordered to be observed in the composition of the regulars are specified in the enclosed General Order, dated the 3rd December 1857, No. 74. (C. 1.)

ANSWER TO QUESTION 6.

As regards regulars, this question is answered in the reply to Question 4.

With respect to the proportion of irregulars and police, I am not able at present to form an opinion except as regards Pegu, for which, in my report dated 2nd February 1857, forwarded to the Government of India by the Madras Government on the 9th idem, I recommended the following local force:

Two companies of artillery,
Two companies of sappers,
One regiment of cavalry,
Four regiments of infantry,
inclusive of the present Pegu light infantry.

ANSWER TO QUESTIONS 7 and 8.

In the Madras presidency, and in India generally, I consider that the European force never should be below the proportion of one-third of the native troops of the line. I would not allow police corps to affect the calculation either way.

ANSWER TO QUESTION 9.

The barrack accommodation for the European troops now borne on the establishment of the Madras presidency is shown in Enclosure D. It will be observed that it is inadequate.

ANSWER TO QUESTION 10.

The extent of additional barrack accommodation required for the European force, I deem to be necessary for the Madras presidency, is specified in Enclosure D.¹

ANSWER TO QUESTION 11.

On this point I recorded my opinion, and it is still the same, in my memorandum placed in the hands of the Governor-General on the 29th June 1857. Extract enclosed, E.

ANSWER TO QUESTION 12.

I would officer additional corps of Europeans raised for India in the mode specified in my memorandum submitted to the Governor-General on the 11th August 1857, and for the reasons therein given. Copy Enclosure F.

ANSWER TO QUESTION 13.

An increase to the number of corps raised for service in India, and officered from the officers of the mutinied battalions of the Bengal army ought not, I think, to cause any additional embarrassment on account of the two different systems of promotion by purchase and promotion by seniority.

ANSWER TO QUESTION 14.

I consider that foreign mercenaries, of the races specified in this question, are almost as little to be trusted in the long run as are the native troops of India.

I am of opinion that there is in the heart of every black man an inherent dislike of the white man, which will always lead him to sympathize with those of his own colour, however they may differ in race, creed, or country.

To provide effectually for the safety of our Indian empire, never let us have less than the proportion of our own countrymen indicated in my replies to Questions 7 and 8.

As instructed in paragraph six of your letter under acknowledgment, I have, on the present occasion, confined my replies to the points specified in the series of "Questions."

I, however, take leave to add, that I have already, in various minutes, memoranda, and letters, submitted to the higher authorities, recorded my sentiments on almost every point adverted to in the letter from the Honourable the Court of Directors, No. 235, of the 25th November 1857,

and in the Despatch from the Secret Committee, No, 1930, dated the 9th March 1858.

I have, &c.
(Signed) PAT GRANT,
Lieutenant-General, Commander-in-Chief.

NOTE.—In my reply to Questions 7 and 8, I have stated that the European force in India never should be below the proportion of one-third of the native troops of the line; and the strength respectively of Europeans and natives which I have specified as being required for the Madras presidency is, as nearly as possible, in that ratio—thus:—

EUROPEANS.		NATIVES.	
48 Companies of Artillery, each averaging 121 of all ranks	5,208	4 Regiments of cavalry, each 703 sabres	2,812
8 Regiments of Dragoons, each 703 sabres	2,109	55 Regiments of Infantry, and two Battalions of Veterans, amounting in all to bayonets	68,920
13 Regiments of Infantry, each 1,162 bayonets	14,976		
Total Europeans	22,298	Total natives	66,732

PAT. GRANT,

A.
SIR, Madras, January 1, 1858.
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 12th ultimo, communicating to me the desire of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief in India, to be furnished with a statement of all the European corps belonging to both services now stationed in or expected at the Presidency of Madras, together with the stations held by the respective corps.

On these points I hope that the enclosed * return will be found to afford full and explicit information to his Excellency.

The Commander-in-chief in India also requires to be made acquainted with my opinion on the strength of the European forces which I may consider necessary as the permanent British garrison of the various British provinces, including Burmah, over which my command extends.

On this most important question, I have already, some months since, communicated my views to the Right Honourable the Governor-general of India, as well as to the Right Honourable the Governor of Madras, and I now proceed to submit my opinions, in like manner, to his Excellency the Commander-in-chief in India.

I consider that for the thorough protection and military occupation of the Madras Presidency within its present defined limits, and including Burmah, we require a British force of—

Artillery.	
156 field guns, requiring to be manned by troops or companies	26
Reserve companies	17
Total troops or companies	43

Cavalry.	
Regiments	3

Infantry.	
Regiments	13

And of this force, I would propose the following "disposition."

Southern Division.—Head-quarters at Trichinopoly.
12 guns, one reserve company of artillery and two regiments of infantry.†

Centre Division.—Head-quarters at Madras.
12 field guns, (3) three reserve companies of artillery, one of which should always be quartered in Fort Saint George, and one regiment of infantry.

Mysore Division.—Head-quarters at Bangalore.
18 Field guns, one reserve company of artillery, one regiment of dragoons, and one regiment of infantry.

Malabar and Canara District.—District head-quarters at Cannanur.
Six field guns, one reserve company of artillery, and one regiment of infantry.

Ceded Districts.—Head-quarters at Bellary.
12 Field guns, one reserve company of artillery, and one regiment of infantry.

Northern Division.—Head-quarters at Vizianagram.
12 Field guns, two reserve companies of artillery, and one regiment of infantry.

* Dated 31st ultimo, prepared by the quartermaster-general of the army.

† One at Trichinopoly and one at Jackatalla (Neilgherry Hills).

Secunderabad Field Force.—Head-quarters at Hyderabad.

24 field guns, one reserve company of artillery, one regiment of dragoons and two regiments of infantry, one of which and six field guns to be placed at Jaulnah.

Nagpore Field Force.—Head-quarters at Ramptee.

18 field guns, two reserve companies of artillery (one always to be in the fort of Seetabuldee, in which is situated the arsenal of the entire force), one regiment of dragoons, and one regiment of infantry.

Burmah.—Head-quarters, Rangoon.

42 field guns,* three reserve companies of artillery,† and three regiments of infantry.‡

Straits.—Head-quarters, Singapore.

Two reserve companies of artillery, one for Singapore, the other for Penang,

RECAPITULATION.	ARTILLERY.				
	Number of Field Guns.	Troops and Companies for Field Guns.	Reserve Companies.	Regiments of Dragoons.	Regiments of Infantry.
Southern Division - - - -	12	3	1	-	3
Centre Division - - - -	12	3	3	-	1
Mysore Division - - - -	18	3	1	1	1
Malabar and Canara - - - -	6	1	1	-	1
Ceded Districts - - - -	12	2	1	-	1
Northern Division - - - -	12	2	2	-	1
Secunderabad and Jaulnah field force - - - -	24	4	1	1	2
Nagpore field force - - - -	18	3	2	1	1
Burmah - - - -	42	7	3	-	3
Straits - - - -	-	-	2	-	-
Total Field Guns and European Force of all arms - - - -	156	26	17	3	13

To meet these requirements we have available and in prospect,—

Field guns	150
Troops and companies to man these guns and for reserve companies, 1 troop, 2 companies royal artillery, 4 troops and 16 companies Madras artillery. Total troops and companies	29
Regiments of dragoons	32
Regiments of European infantry	11

Thus our means in hand and in prospect fall short of our necessities to the extent of six field guns, twenty companies of artillery, one regiment of dragoons, and two regiments of infantry; and if, as seems to be contemplated, the Saugor Territory north of the Nerbudda is again transferred to the Madras presidency, I consider that we shall require a further accession of European force of not less than eighteen field guns, manned by three companies of artillery; two reserve companies of artillery, one regiment of dragoons, and one regiment of infantry. The establishment of troops of horse artillery and companies of foot artillery in this presidency are, in my judgment, much below the strength which a due regard to efficiency in this all-important arm of the service demands.¶

* Rangoon	12
Theyatmyo	12
Tonghoo	12
Moulmein	6
	42
† Rangoon	1
Theyatmyo and Meaday	1
Tonghoo	1
	3
‡ Rangoon	1
Theyatmyo	1
Tonghoo	1
	3

§ 1st King's Dragoon Guards, 12th Royal Lancers.
¶ H.M. 1st, 43rd, 44th, 3rd Battalion 60th Rifle, 68th, 69th, and 74th. East India Company's 1st Fusiliers, 2nd Light Infantry, and 3rd Regiment.

¶ Present establishment of a Troop of Madras Horse Artillery:—
1 Serjeants.
1 Corporals.
1 Bombardiers.
30 Gunners.

Of a Company of Foot Artillery.
6 Serjeants.
6 Corporals.
6 Bombardiers.
60 Gunners.

Of a Regiment of European Infantry.
50 Serjeants.
50 Corporals.
800 Privates.

I consider that a troop of horse artillery should consist of at least 100 gunners, with a corresponding number of serjeants, corporals, and bombardiers; and I am of opinion that companies of foot artillery should be augmented to a strength of 80 gunners each, with additional non-commissioned officers in proportion.

I also think that the establishment of regiments of European infantry of the Company's service should be

fixed at one thousand privates each, with a proportionate number of non-commissioned officers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) PATRICK GRANT,
Lieut.-General, Commander-in-Chief, Madras.

To Major-General Mansfield, Chief of the Staff,
Head-quarters Camp, Cawnpore.

A. 1.

STATEMENT of all European Corps belonging to Her Majesty's and the Honourable Company's Services, and the Stations at which they are now serving or immediately about to be quartered at, in the Madras Presidency (including Burmah).

Troops.	Com- pany.	Regiments.	Strength in India accord- ing to last Return. Rank and File.	Where serving.	Remarks.
H. - - -	-	Royal Horse Artillery -	214	Saint Thomas' Mount.	
A. - - -	-	Horse Artillery -	510	General Whitlock's force. Secunderabad. Bangalore. Kamptee.	
B. - - -	-	Ditto - - -			
C. - - -	-	Ditto - - -			
D. - - -	-	Ditto - - -			
		1st Royal Dragoon Guards	505	Bangalore.	
		12th Royal Lancers -	648	Wing at Secunderabad. Wing with General Whit- lock's force.	
Horse Battery	1	Royal Artillery - -	159	Ordered to Bellary from Bangalore.	
	1	Ditto - - -	153	General Whitlock's force.	
	1	Ditto - - -	214	Ordered to Tonghoo.	
	1	Ditto - - -	126	Secunderabad.	
Horse Battery	A.	1st Battalion Artillery -	384	Straits - - - - Reserve Company. Burmah - - - - Reserve Company. Bellary. Burmah - - - - Horses withdrawn to Bengal.	
Ditto	B.	Ditto - - -			
Ditto	C.	Ditto - - -			
Ditto	D.	Ditto - - -			
Ditto	A.	2nd Battalion Artillery -	395	Trichinopoly. Burmah - - - - Reserve Company. Saint Thomas' Mount - Reserve Company. Kamptee - - - - Reserve Company.	
Ditto	B.	Ditto - - -			
Ditto	C.	Ditto - - -			
Ditto	D.	Ditto - - -			
Ditto	A.	3rd Battalion Artillery -	373	Bengal. Burmah. Burmah. General Whitlock's force.	
Ditto	B.	Ditto - - -			
Ditto	C.	Ditto - - -			
Ditto	D.	Ditto - - -			
Ditto	A.	4th Battalion Artillery -	395	Ditto. Ditto - - - - Reserve Comp. for Siege Train. Secunderabad. Burmah - - - - Reserve Company.	
Ditto	B.	Ditto - - -			
Ditto	C.	Ditto - - -			
Ditto	D.	Ditto - - -			
		H.M.'s 1st Royals (1st bat.)	1,041	Secunderabad.	
		" 43rd Light Infantry	958	General Whitlock's force.	
		" 44th regiment -	760	Fort Saint George.	
		" 60th Rifles -	1,040	Bangalore.	
		" 66th Regiment -	844	Cannanore - - -	2½ Companies on detachment at Calicut and Malliaporram.
		" 68th Regiment -	761	Burmah.	
		" 69th Regiment -	718	Burmah - - -	3 Companies on detachment (temporarily) at Vozagapa- tam.
		" 74th Highlanders -	890	Bellary.	
		1st Madras Fusileers -	850	Bengal - - -	Intended to be quartered on the Neigherry Hills on return to this Presidency.
		2nd European Lt. Infantry	850	Trichinopoly.	
		3rd Madras European Regiment.	850	General Whitlock's force.	To be eventually quartered at Kamptee.

ABSTRACT.

1 Troop Royal Horse Artillery - - -	214	Total Strength of each Arm, Rank and File.		
4 Troops H.C.'s Horse Artillery - - -	510			
2 Regiments H.M.'s Dragoons - - -	1,148		Artillery, Royal and H. Company's - - -	2,926
4 Companies Royal Artillery - - -	652		H.M.'s Dragoons - - -	1,148
10 Companies H.C.'s Artillery - - -	1,550		H.M.'s and H.C.'s Infantry - - -	9,562
8 Regiments H.M.'s Infantry - - -	7,012			
3 Regiments H.C.'s Infantry - - -	2,550			
		Total of all arms - - -	13,636	

Head Quarters, Ooty,
24th June 1858.

F. N. NUTT,
Quartermaster General.

(Original.)

B.

DISTRIBUTION RETURN of the NATIVE TROOPS of each Arm now on the Establishment of the Madras Presidency.

Description of Troops.	Regiment.	Head-quarters of Corps.
Horse Artillery -	E. Troop -	½ F. S. in Bengal.
Ditto -	F. " -	¼ Secunderabad.
Light Cavalry -	1st Regiment	F. S. General Whitlock.
Ditto -	2nd " -	Trichinopoly.
Ditto -	3rd " -	Sholapore.
Ditto -	4th " -	Bangalore.
Ditto -	5th " -	F. S. Bengal.
Ditto -	6th " -	Bellary.
Ditto -	7th " -	F. S. Bengal.
Golundauze -	5th Battalion	Kamptee.
Ditto -	2 Companies	Saint Thomas' Mount.
Ditto -	1 Company -	Straits.
Ditto -	1 " -	F. S. in Bengal.
Ditto -	1 " -	Cannanore.
Ditto -	1 " -	Sumbulpore.
Ditto -	1 " -	Burmah.
Ditto -	Supplemental Company.	Mount.
Ditto -	"	Vizianagram.
	8	
Sappers & Miners	Head-quarters	Dowlaishweram.
Ditto -	4 Companies -	Dowlaishweram.
Ditto -	1 Company -	F. S. Sir H. Rose's force.
Ditto -	1 " -	F. S. General Whitlock.
Ditto -	1 " -	F. S. Bengal.
Ditto -	1 " -	Secunderabad.
Ditto -	4 Companies -	Burmah.
	12	
Native Infantry -	1st Regiment	E. S. General Whitlock.
Ditto -	2nd " -	Quilon.
Ditto -	3rd " -	Cannanore.
Ditto -	4th " -	Burmah, Menday.
Ditto -	5th " -	Berhampore and Sumbulpore.
Ditto -	6th " -	Burmah, Rangoon.
Ditto -	7th " -	Secunderabad.
Ditto -	8th " -	Burmah, Tonghoo.
Ditto -	9th " -	Secunderabad.
Ditto -	10th " -	Secunderabad.
Ditto -	11th " -	Cannanore.
Ditto -	12th " -	Burmah, Rangoon.
Ditto -	13th " -	Burmah, Moulmein.
Ditto -	14th " -	Straits, Singapore.
Ditto -	15th " -	Burmah, Thaytemew.
Ditto -	16th " -	Mangalore.
Ditto -	17th " -	F. S. in Bengal.
Ditto -	18th " -	Vellore.
Ditto -	19th " -	F. S. General Whitlock.
Ditto -	20th " -	Bangalore.
Ditto -	21st " -	Trichinopoly.
Ditto -	22nd " -	Straits, Penang.
Ditto -	23rd " -	Burmah, Rangoon.
Ditto -	24th " -	Burmah, Henzadah.
Ditto -	25th " -	Madras.
Ditto -	26th " -	Kamptee.
Ditto -	27th " -	F. S. in Bengal.
Ditto -	28th " -	Hooshungabad.
Ditto -	29th " -	Maenlipatam.
Ditto -	30th " -	Bellary.
Ditto -	31st " -	Vizianagram.
Ditto -	32nd " -	Kamptee.
Ditto -	33rd " -	Kamptee.
Ditto -	34th " -	Trichinopoly.
Ditto -	35th " -	Hurryhur.
Ditto -	36th " -	Kurnool.
Ditto -	37th " -	Burmah, Shuay Gheen.
Ditto -	38th " -	Vizagapatam.
Ditto -	39th " -	Burmah, Thaytemew.
Ditto -	40th " -	Cuttack.
Ditto -	41st " -	Burmah, Rangoon.
Ditto -	42nd " -	Secunderabad.
Ditto -	43rd " -	Russellcondsh.
Ditto -	44th " -	Burmah, Thaytemew.
Ditto -	45th " -	Madras.
Ditto -	46th " -	Vizianagram.
Ditto -	47th " -	Bellary.
Ditto -	48th " -	Burmah, Moulmein.
Ditto -	49th " -	Secunderabad.
Ditto -	50th " -	F. S. General Whitlock.
Ditto -	51st " -	Palamcottah.
Ditto -	52nd " -	Mercara.

* Four companies in China.

Distribution Return of Native Troops—cont.

Description of Troops.	Regiment.	Head-quarters of Corps.
Madras Rifles -	8 Companies †	F. S. Bengal.
Native Infantry -	1st Extra -	Samulcottah.
Ditto -	2nd " -	Trichinopoly.
Ditto -	3rd " -	Cuddapah.

Quartermaster General's Office, N. F. NEILL,
Head Quarters, Ootacamund. Quartermaster General.

Besides the above there are—
2 Native Veteran Battalions, Head quarters at Madras and Arcot respectively.

1 Madras Sapper Militia, at Madras.

Strength of Madras Army:—

2 Troops Native Horse Artillery at 90	180 rank and file.
1 Regiment Gölundauze	600 "
1 " Sappers and Miners	1,450 "
7 " Light Cavalry, at 324	2,268 "
52 " Native Infantry, at 1,060	55,120 "
3 Extra Regiments, at 1,060	3,180 "
Total	62,798

Strength of Veterans and Sapper Militia:—

2 Veteran Corps, at 1,110	2,220 rank and file.
1 Madras Sapper Militia	1,024 "
Total	3,244

F. N. NEILL,
Quartermaster General.

C.

ABSTRACT of Local and Irregular Forces serving in the Madras Presidency.

Description of Territories.	Horse Battery.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Infantry.	TOTAL.
Mysore Territory -	-	2,784	-	-	2,784
Travancore Country -	-	-	29	1,608	1,637
Malabar Police -	-	-	-	177	177
Kurnool Country -	-	337	-	-	337
Nizam's Dominions -	-	2,231	742	5,233	8,256
Nagpore Territory -	1 4	495	-	2,657	3,366
Ganjam Country -	-	-	-	472	472
TOTAL	114	5,847	771	10,197	16,929

C 1.

EXTRACT from General Orders by his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, dated Head-quarters, Choultry Plain, 3rd December 1857. No. 74.

7. The following caste proportions are to be maintained in recruiting under this order:—

‡ Tamulians of various castes, inhabitants of the Carnatic and Ceded Districts.

‡ Telingas and other Hindoo castes from Northern Circars.

‡ Mussulmans from various parts.

‡ Natives of lower castes, or without recognized caste.

8. Until further orders, the foregoing paragraphs will also apply to the recruiting of the army generally.

(True extract.)

W. O. AMES,
Lieut.-Colonel, Adjutant-General of the Army.

† Rifle companies of 1st, 5th, 16th, 30th, and 40th N. I., and two companies of the 54th N. I.

D.

DETAIL of Barrack Accommodation for European Troops in the Madras Presidency.

Divisions.	Stations.	Nature of Barrack.	Capable of containing Rank and File.	Total accommodation for			Remarks.
				Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	
Presidency	Fort Saint George	Infantry Barracks	1,245	-	-	1 Regt.	Has been condemned as a barrack for Europeans, and will not contain more than 700.
	Ditto	Artillery	400	-	-	-	The Artillery Barrack will only contain 100.
	St. Thomas' Mount	Horse Artillery Barrack	104	1 Tp. Horse	-	-	} Good Barracks, but will not contain more than 300 each. Depot H.M.'s Troops, Occupied, but of the worst description.
	Ditto	Ditto	104	Ditto	-	-	
	Ditto	Foot Artillery	400	4 Cos. or 1 Battalion	-	-	
	Ditto	Ditto	400	Ditto	-	-	
	Poonamallee	Infantry	600	-	-	-	
Centre Division	Arcot	Ditto	640	-	-	-	{ Infantry Depot, Company's Europeans.
Nagpore Force	Sectabuldee	Artillery	133	1 Company	-	-	
	Kamptee	Ditto	100	Ditto	-	-	
	Ditto	Ditto	100	Ditto	-	-	
	Ditto	Horse Artillery	100	1 Tp. Horse	-	-	
	Ditto	Infantry	1,000	-	-	1 Regt.	
Ceded Districts	Bellary	Artillery	70	1 Company	-	-	Old Infantry Barrack at Bellary long since condemned and out of use.
	Ditto	Infantry	1,260	-	-	1 Regt.	New Barracks. Artillery Barrack condemned.
Mysore Division	Bangalore	Infantry	1,000	-	-	1 Regt.	Infantry Barracks long since condemned, holds not more than 800.
	Ditto	Horse Artillery	116	1 Tp. Horse	-	-	
	Ditto	Cavalry	700	-	1 Regt.	-	
	Ditto	Artillery	80	-	-	-	Not in use.
	Mercara	Ditto	26	-	-	-	
	Malliapooram	Infantry	150	-	-	2 Comps.	
Cannanore	Ditto	1,000	-	-	1 Regt.		
Hy Sub Force	Secunderabad	Infantry	700	-	-	1 Regt.	Condemned, but still in use.
	Ditto	Artillery	170	2 Companies	-	-	Not in use.
	Jainah	Horse Artillery	100	1 Troop	-	-	
	Trimulgherry	Infantry	1,000	-	-	1 Regt.	New Barrack.
Southern Division	Trichinopoly	Infantry	413	-	-	A Wing	Condemned, and temporary Barracks sufficient for the accommodation of the corps.
	Ditto	Artillery	103	1 Company	-	-	New Barrack.
	Jackatalla	Infantry	1,000	-	-	1 Regt.	

N.B. New Cavalry Barracks at Bangalore to accommodate 700 men not yet completed, and not included. Most of these barracks are quite incapable of holding now the number they were originally intended for, on the improved system of quartering, certainly not more than two-thirds of the number originally mentioned can be quartered in any of them.

Head-quarters, Ootey, June 24, 1858.

F. N. NEILL,
Quartermaster-General.

D. 1.

The exact extent of quartering for European troops in Burma is not known, the public buildings not being under this presidency. There are, however, quarters for a regiment of European infantry at each of the stations of Rangoon, Moulmein, Sheyatmeo, and Tonghoo; and for detachments at Mecaday, Bassein, and Shuaygheen; quarters for artillery at Rangoon, Moulmein, Sheyatmeo, Tonghoo, and for smaller parties at Shuaygheen and Bassein. These quarters were, however, of a very inferior description in January 1857, as fully reported in his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's minute of the 2nd February of that year.

Nothing is correctly known of the means of quartering in the straits, but the following is the extent of additional barrack accommodation deemed necessary for the European forces in the Madras Presidency:—

Fort St. George	-	-	One regiment of infantry.
Presidency	-	-	Two European infantry depôts.
Vellore	-	-	Half company of artillery and two companies of infantry.
Mysore division	-	-	Two companies of artillery.
Malabar and Canara	-	-	Two companies of artillery.
Ceded Districts	-	-	Three companies of artillery.
Northern Division	-	-	One regiment of infantry and four companies of artillery.
Secunderabad	-	-	One regiment of infantry and two companies of artillery.
Jainah	-	-	One regiment of infantry.
Kamptee	-	-	One company of artillery.

F. N. NEILL,
Quartermaster-General.

E.

EXTRACT from a Memorandum, dated Calcutta, June 29, 1857.

I think that the officers appointed to these European corps should be sent home to raise and organize their regiments, and until they are formed and fit for duty it is obviously necessary that India should be occupied by Her Majesty's troops, a portion of which should always be in this country. There are no better troops in the world than the European regiments of the Company's service, but associating them with troops of the Royal army creates a generous emulation and rivalry, is a powerful stimulus to exertion, and beneficial in very many respects. The system of interior economy of regiments of Her Majesty's service is, I believe, superior to that of any army in the world, and it should be strictly followed in all European regiments of the Company's service. The troops should be cantoned in considerable bodies, in the most eligible position, and in the proportion of one European to three native soldiers.

(Signed) PATRICK GRANT,
Lieut.-General, Commander-in-Chief, Bengal.

F.

MEMORANDUM.

Calcutta, August 11, 1857.

IN continuation of my memorandum of the 29th of June, I beg to recommend, if additional European regiments for the Company's service are sanctioned, that the following mode of officering them may be adopted. I propose that the existing establishment of officers of native regiments of each branch, artillery, cavalry, and infantry, should be maintained as now existing, and promotions go on as at present, regimentally; that the officers to serve with the European corps shall be selected by the Commander-in-Chief from the whole army, and in the proportions obtaining in Her Majesty's service.

That only those in excess of such numbers, and after providing for the staff duties of the army, shall be retained for the performance of duty with native corps.

When from any cause an officer proves unfit for the thoroughly efficient discharge of the duties of an European regiment, it shall be competent to the Commander-in-Chief to remand him to the native corps to which he belongs, and to supply his place by selection, as before.

I anticipate the most favourable results from this mode of officering additional European corps.

It will secure the presence with each corps of the number of officers necessary to maintain discipline and perfect efficiency.

The principal of selection will admit of none but efficient officers being attached to European regiments, a point of the highest importance, the value of which cannot be over-estimated, and belonging to different regiments, and having distinct and separate interests, the officers attached to European corps will have little or no inducement to purchase the retirement from the service of their brother officers with whom they are for the time serving; and thus jealousies and bad feeling and frequent changes will be in a great measure obviated.

I need scarcely draw attention to the evils of the present system under which officers are appointed to regiments, solely with reference to their standing on the gradation list, and the command of corps falls into incompetent hands, merely because rank and seniority are considered to have claims which cannot be set aside save in cases of notorious and proved unfitness and incapacity, such as hardly ever occur or can be established.

I think the home establishment of officers of Her Majesty's service would quite suffice for Company's European regiments in India, viz.—

Cavalry.

- 1 lieutenant-colonel.
- 1 major.
- 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 cornet, per troop.
- 1 lieutenant or cornet for adjutant, interpreter, and quartermaster.

Infantry.

- 1 lieutenant-colonel.
- 2 majors.
- 1 captain, 1 lieutenant or ensign per company; and 2 additional subalterns for adjutant and quartermaster, and interpreter.

Artillery.

- 1 captain and 3 subalterns per troop or company with battery attached.
- 1 captain and 1 subaltern will suffice for a reserve company.

The establishment of a regiment of light cavalry in Bengal is—

- 1 lieutenant-colonel,
- 1 major,
- 7 captains,
- 9 lieutenants,
- 4 cornets.

And thus two regiments of light cavalry could supply the complement of officers I have indicated for a regiment of European dragoons, and leave available for employment with native troops, staff, or other duty,

- 1 lieutenant-colonel,
- 1 major,
- 6 captains,
- 9 lieutenants,

making a total of 17 officers, from which deduct 3 for each native corps (which I consider quite a sufficient number as I should now wish to see native regiments constituted, whether of cavalry or infantry), and 11 officers for every two regiments of light cavalry are left surplus.

In like manner every two regiments of native infantry can supply the regulated establishment of officers for one regiment of European infantry, and there would still remain 11 officers of those two regiments available for detached employment, &c. &c.; and from the 24 regiments of native infantry composing the Bengal army, the officers would stand thus, supposing twenty European infantry regiments were to be found. The total number of European officers of all ranks below regimental colonels borne on the establishment of 74 regiments of native infantry amount to

Deduct establishment proposed for 20 regiments of European infantry.	} 700
34 regiments of natives	102
	802

Leaves 1048

European officers of infantry available for any purpose, after fully providing, as I think, for maintaining a full complement with regiments.

I have said in my memorandum of the 29th June, that guns ought never again to be manned by natives. I will now add, that neither ought natives to be employed as syca drivers. A corps of European artillery drivers should be formed.

Nearly the whole native army is now either in open revolt or disarmed on well-founded suspicion of unfaithfulness; there can therefore be no breach of faith in reorganizing regiments, and making any change the Government may consider expedient in the constitution and terms of enlistment of the native portion of the Bengal army. If when the present disturbances shall have ceased, there should be any regiments who have throughout conspicuously maintained their loyalty, an exception in their favour can be easily made.

(Signed) PAT. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General, Acting Commander-in-chief.

SIR PATRICK GRANT'S REPLIES.

INFANTRY.

I. THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the native infantry of the Bengal army is composed?
 1. Mahomedans, Brahmins, Chuttees, Rajpoots, Sikhs, Gwallahs, and Ahuns are the races, tribes, and castes of which the Bengal army was composed.
 2. What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?
 2. Chiefly from Oude, a few from the Punjab, and the rest from Bhajepoor and the Doab.
 3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment, either by the regulations or the practice of the Bengal army?
 3. Men of the inferior castes habitually employed in menial occupations were not eligible for enlistment in the Bengal army, either by regulation or practice.
 4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of enlistment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the native infantry of the Bengal army?
 4. Yes; I consider, and I speak from experience, having made the experiment, that recruits might with great advantage be drawn from amongst the following races and tribes hitherto neglected and excluded, viz., Mewatees, Runghura, Guajurs, and Jats. They make excellent soldiers under strict discipline and judicious management.

- What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts of the Bengal presidency or its dependencies?
5. Native officers and men proceeding on furlough, generally brought back with them recruits in sufficient numbers to supply deficiencies; if this source failed, the agency of recruiting parties under native commissioned or non-commissioned officers was resorted to.
6. On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?
6. The officer or non-commissioned officers commanding the recruiting party was required to ascertain from the local authorities of districts that the recruits were really what they represented themselves to be.
7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of Sepoys, or the followers of regiments, what precautions, if any, are taken?
7. The soldier who presented a man for enlistment was held answerable for the correctness of all particulars connected with the candidate for service.
- Note.—Having no records or official documents to refer to relative to the Bengal army, I have answered the foregoing seven questions entirely from memory.
8. What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice relatively to races, tribes, or castes, [with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry of the native troops in the Bengal army.]
8. Every man physically fit should be eligible for enlistment, without distinction of race, tribe, caste, or district; and I think it would be well sometimes to employ European instead of exclusively native agency in recruiting.
9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the native infantry of the Bengal army?
9. I do not recollect the words of the oath with sufficient precision to enable me to answer this question.
10. How long has this form been in use in the Bengal army?
10. I think the form of oath was modified when the new articles of war for the native troops were introduced in 1845-6, but I am not certain.
11. Can you suggest any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruits for the native infantry of the Bengal army?
11. From my recollection of the wording and matter of the oath, I think it was as full and binding as it was possible to make it.
12. Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the Bengal presidency of seafaring habits; and could marine corps be formed from such races, tribes, or castes?
12. Yes, in the south-east portion of the province of Bengal Proper, in the districts of Chittagong, Dacca, &c., races and tribes of seafaring habits were to be found in considerable numbers, and the old "marine regiment," the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 20th native infantry, was composed exclusively of these classes.
13. Has the Bengal presidency any marine corps; and if so, of what strength, and whence recruited?
13. There is no marine corps at present in the Bengal presidency.
14. Should each infantry corps be raised, each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there and there only?
14. I am opposed to district corps being formed for a regular army, and much prefer general enlistments.
15. Or should each corps be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?
15. Answered in the reply to the preceding question.
16. Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste?
16. Composite not homogeneous corps are the most desirable, in my opinion.
17. If a corps is not homogeneous will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, so far as may be possible, homogeneous, each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste? Or should the tribes and castes be mixed up in each company?
17. Neither would I have companies homogeneous, but mix up tribes and castes in each company, and as much as possible in equal proportions.
18. If corps are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes be entertained?
18. As much as possible in equal proportions.
19. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district or kept to separate districts, or should police corps be recruited from a wide area without reference to districts?
19. In my opinion recruiting for corps, either for military or police purposes, should be general throughout the country, and not restricted to separate or particular districts. The more the different classes and races are mixed so that no one tribe shall unduly predominate, the less chance there will be of combination against authority.
20. Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the army corps?
20. Most decidedly not.
21. What agency should be employed for recruiting in the districts of the Bengal presidency or its dependencies?
21. See reply to 8.
22. Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps or a distinct agency?
22. Police corps should be, I think, recruited exclusively by police agency.
23. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connection with recruits for the army of the Bengal presidency.
23. See reply to 6.
24. Should similar or different precautions be taken in connection with recruits for police corps in the Bengal presidency?
24. Similar precautions are desirable.
25. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries equally qualified for service in India with the natives of the country, and if so should they be formed in separate regiments, or in companies or otherwise?
25. I am strongly opposed to the expedient of enlisting the inhabitants of the tropical climates for service in India, for I am convinced that as a general rule the black man will always fraternize with the black man against the white man. And if the natives of other tropical climates are, as I believe them to be, composed of better stuff for soldiers than are the natives of this country, it is to my mind an additional argument against enlisting them for service in India.
26. If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries, which are the countries and races to be preferred?
26. Africans who are not Mahomedans are to be preferred if recourse is had to recruiting in other tropical climates.
27. What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting?
27. I have no information or experience that enables me to say what is likely to prove the best agency to employ for such recruiting.
28. Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments?
28. On no account should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments. Always and under all circumstances keep your Europeans in distinct and separate regiments.
29. If so, should such company or companies be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from European corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European corps, and subject to periodical relief?
29. Answered in 28.
30. Where should the barracks of such companies be placed relatively to the files of the native troops?
30. Answered in 28.
31. Would such detachments seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?
31. Answered in 28.

32. How should such companies be armed? with similar or different weapons from the native troops with whom they would be associated?

32. Answered in 28, and I will now add that I cannot express in sufficiently strong terms my condemnation of the admixture of Europeans with natives referred to in 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32.

33. How should the native infantry of the Bengal presidency be armed?

33. Native infantry never should be armed with a fire-lock superior to the ordinary percussion musket. Never put into the hands of a native soldier an Enfield rifle or weapon of a similar superior description.

34. How should police corps in the Bengal presidency be armed?

34. I would arm police corps also with percussion muskets. Natives cannot manufacture caps, and therefore it is only while the caps last (and it is easy to regulate the supply) that the percussion musket can be turned against us.

35. Do the advantages of making the dress of the native soldier a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?

35. Formerly before the Bengal army destroyed and disgraced itself, and having regard to what I know was the feeling of the men, I should have urged that the dress of the native soldiers ought always to be assimilated to a certain extent to that of the European soldier.

36. How should the native infantry of the Bengal army be dressed with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier?

36. Now that the Bengal native infantry have forfeited all claim to have their wishes or feelings on the point considered, and as it does not affect their efficiency, I would no longer seek to assimilate them with the European soldiers in either dress or equipments. I propose that henceforward the dress of the Bengal sepoy shall be a dark blue cotton merzai quilted with cotton for the cold season; blue jungheas and a pugau of any colour wound round the head in a uniform regimental pattern; a blanket great coat or cloak; shoes as formerly worn; and black or brown leather instead of buff accoutrements for the hot season, and white cotton merzai and jungheas, all else as in the cold season.

37. It has been proposed that to every European local regiment, a native irregular regiment, officered from that European regiment alone, should be attached. What is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry in close and permanent association?

37. My opinion is strongly adverse to the permanent association in quarters of natives with Europeans proposed in this question. Mixing Europeans and natives in just proportions on field service is very advisable and advantageous to both; but I think it most undesirable that the native soldier should have the opportunities which close and permanent association would give to him of seeing the European soldier in the degrading position and state in which, unhappily, the latter too often exhibits himself in quarters.

38. Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers presents any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?

38. I do not consider that the association of Europeans with gun lascars and native artillery drivers presents any analogy with the arrangement proposed in the immediately preceding question (37), nor any encouragement to adopt it.

39. How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps?

40. Would such a system be favourable or the reverse to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops which is an element of strength?

41. How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war?

41. Do not seem to me to call for any reply with reference to my answers to 37 and 38.

42. Is it desirable that the native troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of auxiliary native battalions in permanent association with European corps?

42. It is most desirable that native troops should not be trained to feel that they are entirely dependent upon European troops for support. But I do not hesitate to assert (in opposition to the oft-expressed opinions of Sir John Malcolm and other distinguished and experienced officers) that (most providentially, as I think,) it is alone through the instrumentality of their European officers that native troops are ever imbued with a spirit of confidence and self-reliance on service, and the native troops in our service so officered will always be immeasurably superior to any Asiatic enemy to whom they may be opposed.

Efficiently commanded and well led by British officers, native troops will always, my experience tells me, acquit themselves with credit, independently of European support. But they have no confidence whatever in the very best native officers, and deprived of their European officers (as I think it will be admitted late events have abundantly made manifest) except behind walls or other protection native troops are a mere armed rabble.

PAT. GRANT, Lieut.-General,
Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army.

Ootacamund,
16th July 1858.

SIR PATRICK GRANT'S REPLIES TO THE FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, and FOURTH SERIES OF QUESTIONS ON THE REORGANIZATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY.

INFANTRY.

I. THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. A General Order of the 3d December 1857 prescribed that the Madras native army shall be composed of the following races, tribes, and castes, in the proportions of each specified, viz. :—

- One fourth Tamulians of various castes, from the Carnatic and ceded districts.
- One fourth Telingus and other Hindoo castes, from northern circars.
- One fourth Mussulmans, from various parts.
- One fourth natives of lower castes, or without recognized caste.

2. This question is partly answered in reply No. 1. The following is a list of the countries, &c. of the different castes of which the Madras army is composed, as taken from the inspection return for infantry :—

COUNTY OR DISTRICT.

- Northern Circars.
- Central Carnatic (Madras, Vellore, &c.)
- Southern Carnatic (Trichinopoly).
- Baramahal.
- Ceded districts.
- Mysore.
- Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevely.

3. All men physically fit for soldiers, and of the prescribed age, without distinction of race, tribe, or caste, are eligible for enlistment in the Madras army. There is no exclusion either by regulations or practice.

4. Reply to 3. answers this.

5. The only agency employed in the Madras army for the enlistment of recruits consists of selected recruiting parties under European or native officers, chiefly the latter, detached from the headquarters of regiments, or from recruiting depôts, of which latter there are four formed within the last few months. The officer in charge of a recruiting party, on arrival in the district selected, generally breaks his detachment into smaller parties, or sends out intelligent men singly into the different villages.

Occasionally the officer commanding a particular station is, however, directed to recruit a certain number of men for particular regiments, which he does by enlisting men who present themselves on the spot.

6. Candidates presenting themselves for enlistment to a recruiting party when at a station where there is a medical officer or subordinate, are examined by him, and if passed he enters their names in a roll, showing the recruit's age, height, chest measurement, caste, colour, particular appearance, marks, scars, &c., native country and village. Men pronounced fit are considered enlisted from date of examination, and these rolls are forwarded monthly to the regiment by the recruiting officer. If candidates are taken

where there is no medical officer, they are examined at the first station where one is to be found. Should the party not be under a European officer, then the recruits are taken to the nearest commanding or staff officer for approval, and are considered as enlisted from the date they were provisionally entertained.

7. No particular precautions are taken in the case of men enlisted at regimental headquarters beyond ascertaining their physical fitness for the service. These men are generally brought forward by some one in the regiment, and after inquiry as to character, &c. are submitted for the commanding officer's approval.

All recruits enlisted into a regiment are carefully examined by the medical officer, and reported on by the inspecting general annually in his confidential report.

8. No alterations appear to be called for in the existing recruiting regulations. Until December last Mahommedans and Hindoos were enlisted in equal proportions. The proportions are now as indicated in the reply to Question 1; and the composition of the army is not, I think, susceptible of further improvement.

9. The words of the oath or solemn affirmation administered to each recruit under the colours of the regiment when he has completed his drill, and is fit to join the ranks, are:—

"I, _____, private, do solemnly affirm, in the presence of Almighty God, that I will serve the Government with truth and loyalty, and that I will faithfully obey the orders of all officers set over me. I do also further affirm, that I will never abandon these colours, and that I will defend them with my life."

10. The above form of oath has been in use in the Madras army for the last thirty years and upwards.

11. It does not occur to me to suggest any change in the wording or matter of the oath.

12. There may be a few on the western coast, as there are some at Madras; but they are not, I believe, in sufficient numbers to admit of marine corps being formed. A few enrol themselves as Lascars on board steamers and sailing vessels.

13. There is no marine corps in the Madras Presidency.

14. I am opposed to district corps being formed for a regular army, and much prefer general enlistments.

15. Answered in the reply to the preceding question.

16. Composite not homogenous corps are the most desirable, in my opinion.

17. Neither would I make the companies homogenous, but, as at present, mix up the tribes and castes in each company.

18. The proportions in which the races, tribes, and castes should be entertained are specified in reply to 1.

19. In my opinion, recruiting for corps for military purposes should be general throughout the country wherever suitable recruits can be had, and not restricted to separate or particular districts. For police corps, however, it is advisable to recruit in particular districts, because in some parts, Malabar and Canana, Rajahmundry, the Goomsoor country, and Sumbulpore for example, all, save the inhabitants of such localities, are sure to be prostrated by disease when employed in those quarters.

20. Most decidedly not.

21. It does not seem to me that any better agency than the present can be employed to recruit for the army.

22. Police corps should, I think, be recruited by police agency exclusively.

23. I do not think it necessary that any precautions should be taken before the local authorities in connection with recruits for the army. On the contrary, imposing forms and restrictions would add to the difficulties of procuring recruits, which already are much felt in this presidency.

24. In recruiting for police corps, reference to the local and civil authorities is advisable, with a view to ascertaining the previous character of candidates for enlistment, and that they really are what they represent themselves to be.

25. I am strongly opposed to the expedient of enlisting natives of other tropical countries for service in India, for I am convinced that, as a general rule, the black man will always fraternize with the black man against the white man. And if the natives of other tropical climates are, as I believe them to be, composed of better stuff for soldiers than the natives of this country, it is to my mind an additional reason against enlisting them for service in India.

26. Africans who are not Mahommedans are to be preferred, if recourse is had to recruiting in other tropical climates.

27. I have no information or experience to enable me to say what would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting.

28. On no account should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments. Always, and under all circumstances, keep your Europeans in distinct and separate regiments.

29. Answered in 28.

30. Answered in 28.

31. Answered in 28.

32. Answered in 28.

I cannot express in sufficiently strong terms my condemnation of the admixture of Europeans with natives referred to in 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32.

33. Native infantry never should be armed with a fire-lock superior to the ordinary percussion musket. Never place a long-sighted rifle or weapon of that superior description in the hands of a native soldier.

34. I would arm police corps also with percussion muskets. Natives cannot manufacture caps, and therefore it is only while the caps last (and it is easy to regulate the supply) that the percussion musket can be turned against us.

35. The dress of the native soldier ought always to be assimilated, to a certain extent, to that of the European soldier.

36. Scarlet tunics and Oxford mixture trowsers, as worn by Europeans, is the dress prescribed for the Madras army, and I do not think that these articles of equipment are susceptible of improvement. They conduce to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier, and he likes the dress and is proud of it.

The head dress and sandals of the Madras army are unsightly, and in many respects objectionable; but I have satisfied myself, by personally communicating with the native soldiers of all ranks, that they entertain a rooted dislike both to shoes and to any head dress less native in form and material than the present. I have, therefore, uniformly declined to countenance any such changes, for I cannot perceive the wisdom of making an army dissatisfied, to gain a point which, after all is of no real or substantial importance.

37. My opinion is strongly adverse to the permanent association in quarters of natives with Europeans proposed in this question. Mixing Europeans and natives together in just proportions *on field service* is very advisable and advantageous to both; but, I think, it most undesirable that the native soldier should by close and permanent association, have opportunities of seeing his European comrade in the degrading position in which, unhappily, the latter too frequently exhibits himself in quarters.

38. Native artillery drivers have, I hope, been for ever abolished, and I do not consider that the association of Europeans with gun lascars presents any analogy with the arrangement proposed in the immediately preceding question, 37, nor any encouragement to adopt it.

39, 40, and 41, are answered by my replies to 37 and 38.

42. It is most desirable that the native troops should not be entirely dependent upon European troops for support. But I do not hesitate to assert (in opposition to the oft-expressed opinions of Sir John Malcolm, and many other experienced and distinguished officers) that (most providentially, as I think,) it is alone through the instrumentality of their European officers that native troops are ever inclined with a spirit of confidence and self-reliance on service, and that native troops in our service so officered will always be immeasurably superior to any Asiatic enemy to whom they may be opposed.

Efficiently commanded, and well led by European officers, native troops will always acquit themselves with credit, independently of European support. But they have no confidence whatever in the very best native officer, and deprived of their European officers, as late events have abundantly shewn, except behind walls or other protection, they are a mere armed rabble.

PAT. GRANT, Lieut.-General,
Ootacamund,
6th July, 1858.

II. MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

1. It will be beneficial to remove the restrictions upon corporal punishment *in garrison* for disgraceful conduct.

The offence of habitual drunkenness ought to be constituted in this army, where it is by no means of rare occurrence.

And corporal punishment should be sanctioned for in-

subordinate and mischievous writing—such as placards, anonymous letters, and the like.

2. In my opinion the special rules regulating punishment in the native army should be retained; framed, as these rules have been, with reference to local circumstances and to native prejudices, feeling and religion, with which it is as impolitic to interfere as it is unjust, and a positive breach of faith.

3. I do not, myself, think that native courts-martial do work altogether satisfactorily; but, nevertheless, I am very averse to take from native commissioned officers the privilege of sitting upon courts-martial. It is optional with the native soldiers of the Madras army whether they will be tried by a European or a native court, and it seems to me that this is sufficient, without degrading native commissioned officers by ruling positively that they are not eligible for this duty.

4. The prescribed sections of the articles of war are explained to every recruit prior to being enrolled; and translations of the articles, in Hindoostanee, Feloogoo, and Tamil, are read to the men on parade once in three months. The monthly returns of regiments, dated 1st January, 1st April, 1st July, and 1st October of each year, are required to specify that this has been done.

5. This point cannot be ascertained without calling for returns from regiments.

6, 7, and 8. I am unable to answer these questions. Police corps in this presidency are not in any respect under military authority, nor have I any information with regard to them in any particular.

PAT. GRANT, Lieut.-General,
Commander-in-Chief.

Ootacamund,
16th July 1858.

III. ORGANIZATION, PROMOTIONS, AND REWARDS.

1. On merit and seniority combined, but by positive merit rather than by mere seniority or length of service.

2. The native officers of the native infantry of the Madras army are generally as intelligent, useful, and efficient as native officers are capable of being made.

3. Merit being the principle on which they are selected for promotion, it may be fairly assumed that the acquirements of the commissioned grades are to a certain extent superior to those of their comrades in the ranks.

4. There are preliminary examinations to promotions in the superior grades tending to qualify for the commissioned ranks, and every havildar on promotion to jemadar attends adjutant's drill till reported fully acquainted with the duties of his new grade.

There is no test for promotion from one commissioned grade to another.

5. The intervention of the native officers between the European officers and their men cannot weaken the influence of the European officers if the European officers do their duty; if they take that interest in their men, which a conscientious sense of duty and a determination to maintain his legitimate authority will always dictate to an officer in command of a company, and if they know the names and characters and capacity of their men;—if these points are attended to, and in May 1857 I directed that they should be specially reported upon by inspecting officers,—the influence of the European officers never will be weakened by the intervention of the native officers.

I do not think that a full complement of the European makes either against or in favour of the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officer. I hold that as a general rule it is wholly impossible to make the native commissioned officers professionally efficient, and well it is that such is the case. For my part I do not desire to see native officers capable of efficiently exercising even the command of a company, much less that of a regiment or brigade or division.

6. The native officers of the Madras army have, in some instances, but very rarely, given timely information and aided their European officers in checking mutiny and disaffection.* They invariably side, ostensibly, with the European officers; but they are known, in some instances, to have secretly encouraged disaffection.

7. I think it was a great mistake, when originally forming a native army, to institute the native commissioned grades;

but I should consider it a positive breach of good faith and in the highest degree impolitic and unjust, to discontinue the grade of native commissioned officer in the Madras native infantry, who have throughout the late crisis in Bengal maintained an unshaken loyalty to the Government.

8 and 9, require no answer, referring to my reply to 7.

10. Unquestionably retiring and family pensions have had a great effect in attaching the native troops to the British service. The natives of India do not love us it is true, but they are keenly alive to their own interests, next to their religion, the strongest feeling of their nature—and they well know that under no other rulers will they enjoy the liberal advantages they receive in the British service. But this, and every other consideration, will be cast aside without a moment's hesitation if (and their fears and suspicions are easily aroused) the idea once takes possession of their minds that there is any intention to subvert or interfere with their religion, their religious prejudices or feelings.

11. Merit, combined with seniority, but primarily merit governs promotions in the grades of native commissioned officers in the Madras army.

12. The system of pensions as now in force in the Madras army should be maintained inviolate.

13. I have ascertained from the Military Auditor General that the aggregate per annum of military pensions to native officers and men of the entire native army of the Madras Presidency amounts to 13 lacs and rupees 23,399 10.

14. I do not think native commissioned officers generally are fit to take part in courts-martial, but nevertheless I deprecate their being deprived of the privilege of sitting upon courts-martial. As I before observed, it is optional with a native soldier whether he will be tried by a European or a native court; and any change is, in my opinion, unadvisable.

15. In point of professional intelligence and efficiency the general run of European serjeants and corporals are, in my opinion, immeasurably superior to the general run of native commissioned officers.

16. The existing organization of military corps of native infantry works well, and should, I think, be maintained as regards the native grades of the Madras army. A just proportion of European officers who will look upon their regiment as their home, and be content to remain with them, is quite indispensable to the efficiency of a native regiment.

If selected solely for superior merit and qualifications, the proportion of European officers usually attached to irregular corps will be found sufficient; but if the command and officering of a native regiment is to be dependent on seniority and mere chance, as at present, a full complement of European officers is absolutely necessary.

17. Three European officers will suffice for a police corps. And in police corps I would have no native commissioned officers. Police corps are almost entirely new to the Madras presidency, and there is no breach of faith in organizing them on whatever may be thought the best system.

18. Were the different organizations indicated in this question adopted, I should expect that regular corps would not be by any means so popular a service, nor draw such good recruits as irregular and police corps.

19. I cannot answer this question; there is but one police corps in this Presidency (the Malabar,) and it is exclusively under civil authority.

20. The distinct organization, and difference of system, and component races in the three native armies has, I consider, saved India in the crisis through which we are now passing.

21. To assimilate or amalgamate the three native armies would be, in my opinion, a most suicidal measure.

So long as each native army is under a distinct and separate system and composition, a general combination is little likely to occur; but amalgamate the three armies, and in time they will feel that the cause of one is the cause of all, and they may, and most probably would, unite against us in event of revolt or mutiny taking place on a question in which all were interested—religion or pay for instance.

PAT. GRANT, Lieut.-General,
Commander-in-Chief.

Ootacamund,
17th July 1858.

MEMORANDUM for his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

1. By General Order G. 6th February 1821, Subidar Shekh Ismail, of the 1st Battalion, 20th regiment, was granted a palankeen, with an allowance of 70 rupees per mensem, for discovering a plot at Nagpore in 1819.

2. A subidar named Kisson Doss, pensioned from the 4th cavalry with a palankeen, &c., for previous faithful services, gave information to the Adjutant-General in 1832-35, of the conspiracy at Bangalore.

* See annexed Memorandum from the Adjutant General of the Army.

3. General Order G. 28th September 1832, Subidar Major Syed Guffoor and Subidar Syed Abdool Rymon, both of the 8th light cavalry, were rewarded for frustrating the designs of evil-disposed persons, who caused the pollution of a mosque at Arcot. But it was considered a necessary precaution to transfer Syed Guffoor from his regiment to the pension establishment, lest any implicated should revenge themselves upon him.

4. In 1837 the subidar of my troop gave me the only information that was received in the 6th regiment light cavalry of the intentions of the men to resist the order just issued discontinuing the full batta, and of their making the order, although the regiment had not come under its operation, a subject of formal complaint to the inspecting general.

5. By General Order G. 28th April 1842, Subidar Major Shaik Davood, 10th regiment, and Subidar Major Jinam Rhan, of the 48th regiment, with two previously distinguished subidars,* all of whom had honourably exerted themselves during the batta affair at Secunderabad, received special marks of the approbation of Government. The two named gave information as well as assistance to the authorities. On the same occasion five native officers,† of horse and foot artillery, received special rewards; and one of them, a jemidar, greatly distinguished himself by his fidelity and in giving early intimation of the designs of the disaffected. At the time these events occurred I was in the Adjutant-General's department, and personally acquainted with the latter individual.

6. In the recent 8th light cavalry case, Colonel Anderson of the 3d light cavalry was informed by a native officer of the latter corps, that the 8th regiment had resolved on not embarking for Calcutta except on the old rates of pay and pension, &c.

7. A trooper of the 8th light-cavalry, on the advice of his father-in-law, a pensioned subidar of that regiment, also gave intimation to the adjutant of the designs of the men; and for fear of the consequences, declined having his fidelity publicly rewarded.

The above are the only instances I can at present call to mind, but I doubt not, had I access to the records in my office at the Presidency, I could adduce further instances of fidelity to Government on the part of individual native officers of this army.

PAT. GRANT, Lieut.-Colonel,
Adjutant-General of the Army.

Adjutant-General's Office,
Headquarters, Ootacamund,
17th July, 1858.

INFANTRY.

IV. EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. During my experience of two years as Commander-in-chief of the Madras army it has been my constant aim to strengthen the hands of commanding officers of native corps.

i. By insisting that all applications for appointments to the staff shall be transmitted through commanding officers, who are required to give their opinion on the qualifications of the applicants, and especially to state whether they have received from them all due support and assistance.

ii. By confirming, in the case of native promotions, the recommendations of commanding officers as far as possible.

iii. By requiring that officers commanding companies shall have, in all cases, a potential voice in promotions in their respective companies.

iv. By directing inspecting officers personally to ascertain and report whether officers in command of companies are thoroughly acquainted with the names, characters, and history of their men; insufficient information on these points being, in my opinion, fatal to the influence over their men of European officers serving with native corps.

2. The powers of officers of corps have been increased as above specified.

3. I persuade myself that a favourable result has been obtained by the increase of the powers and influence of officers of corps, as above described.

4. The reply to 3, answers this question.

5. The discipline of all corps upon service mainly depends upon the influence and judicious exercise of authority of the commanding officer and the officers in command of companies, but more especially upon the commanding officer.

6. If we could always arrange to have none but sensible, judicious, and thoroughly competent officers in command of regiments, it would certainly be desirably to increase their powers and to give them every latitude.

But constituted as the service is, and that an officer not notoriously incompetent must obtain command of a regiment when he attains a certain rank and standing, the restrictions imposed on the powers of commanding officers have been salutary I conceive.

As respects the powers and influence of officers of companies, I refer to my reply to 1.

7. The other measures I would suggest for the improvement of discipline are these,—

i. I would (experimentally) concede to commanding officer of native regiments power to confirm and execute the sentences of all regimental courts-martial, including sentences of forfeiture of good-conduct pay, without referring to any superior authority.

ii. I would allow commanding officers of native regiments at their own discretion to punish native non-commissioned officers without the intervention of a court-martial or superior authority, by

Extra drill,

Pack drill, and

Placing their names lower on the list of naik and havildar.

iii. I would restore to commanding officers of native regiments a power exercised by them (and with great advantage to discipline) up to 1827, when the practice was peremptorily prohibited, as well as corporal punishment, by Lord William Bentinck, that of caning men in the ranks and recruits at drill, at the discretion of the commanding officer and the adjutant.

If an officer is so wanting in judgment, temper, and discretion as to be incapable of fitly exercising these increased powers, he is unfit for command, and it should be competent to the Commander-in-chief to remove him from the position of commanding officer of a regiment.

8. The influence of the European officers among native troops is greatest in time of war when officers and men are much more thrown together, and learn to know and to appreciate one another's good qualities.

9. The discharge of the duties imposed upon them as soldiers, has found the native troops in more than a just amount of occupation during the 38 years I have been in the service. When adjutant general in Bengal, I placed before the Commander-in-chief (Sir Charles Napier) a return shewing that one third of the entire native army was permanently on duty, day and night, from year's end to year's end. And since I have been in command of the Madras army, I have made repeated representations that that army also is similarly overworked, and the energies and exertions of the troops most unduly and injuriously over-taxed in like manner.

10 and 11. Reply to question 9 answers these. But I have to add, that the Madras native troops are habitually liable to be employed on public works of a military character when not fully occupied on ordinary military duties. And I desire to state here, that I have never known the Bengal sepoy refuse to engage in such works on field service.

12. My replies to questions 7, 10, and 17, head, "Infantry. III. Organization, Promotions and Rewards," answers this question, clauses 1, 2, 3, included.

13. I would attach all cadets to European corps until they should be thoroughly drilled and fitted to assume command of a company on parade. I think it most objectionable that this indispensable professional instruction should be imparted to European officers by any native, or in conjunction with native recruits by a European instructor. A European officer should join a native corps so well up in his drill as to be capable of teaching others, and not be dependent on those under his command for instruction in his military duties.

14. If a smaller number of European officers is assigned to native corps, I would select for such special employment those distinguished for superior energy and vigour of mind and body, temper, judgment, unbending resolution, and a good colloquial knowledge of the language of their men.

15. The efficiency of regiments, in my opinion, is most injuriously affected by the number of officers taken from corps for staff employment. Either regiments are drained of their best and most deserving officers, or patronage is not dispensed with justice to individuals, and solely with reference to superior merit. On this head, in a minute

* Pensioned Subidar Shaik Dowell; and pensioned Subidar Futteh Homed Sirdar Bahadour.

† One Subidar and four Jemidars.

dated the 21st May 1857 (duly forwarded to the Supreme Government and to the home authorities), I wrote as follows, and I adhere now to the opinions I then expressed, viz.:—"I repeat, that in the Madras army the principal causes of complaint are the unceasing demands upon the energies of the men, their poverty, and, more than all, the great paucity of European officers of standing and experience present with regiments. Officers and men must be brought more together, and the European officers must be taught to look upon their regiments as their home, and not to fix their whole thoughts, as they now do, on devising means of getting away to staff or other detached employment. Anything rather than regimental duty is the universal feeling. The consequences of this craving are, utter indifference, not to say positive dislike, towards their men, and the engendering of a restless, discontented disposition, which is, I doubt not communicated to the soldier." See also my memorandum of the 29th June 1857, placed in the hands of the Governor General on that date.

16. The conduct of native regiments in quarters, either in the course of mutinies or at other times, is not influenced so much by the number of European officers present as it is by securing the presence with corps of a really competent commanding officer and a proportion of experienced and contented officers of companies, who take an interest in their men, and know how to deal with them, and to secure attachment.

On field service, the presence with native troops of a full compliment of European officers is very important; the youngest and most inexperienced will inspire the native soldier with far more confidence than the very best native officer ever does.

17. In answer to this question I quote again from my Minute of the 21st May 1857:—"Either form a staff corps, or completely change the system by which local and irregular forces are at present officered from the line; the effect of which is to deprive the regular army of its most valuable officers, thus making the main army of minor importance to those local and irregular excrescences and make-shifts."

"Take the officers who are to serve with these local forces from the line; but let them understand that they will be struck off the strength of their own regiments, and have no further claim to promotion therein, or to any of the staff appointments of the regular army."

* * * * *

"Local and irregular forces should be available for employment on field service, so as to occasionally open to all ranks a field for distinction; but once an officer makes his election, and enters the local and irregular levies, all connexion between him and the line should be for ever severed, and his place in the regular army at once filled up."

* * * * * and let this principle be made applicable to the department of public works also."

Note.—As regards officering the Bengal army, see also my Memorandum of the 11th August 1857, submitted on that date to the Governor General. Copy (F.) accompanied my letter to Lieut.-Colonel Durand, dated 16th June.—See page 125.

18. The system I have suggested for providing for staff and detached employment, would not, I conceive, cut off from the officers of the army inducements to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches useful to the state, while it is calculated, I think, most essentially to promote the efficiency of regiments of the line and of regimental officers.

19. My reply to question 18 answers this question also.

Note.—This same series of questions in reference to the Bengal army has been sent to me; but I am not aware that I have here stated anything with respect to the Madras army that is not equally applicable to the Bengal native troops. To reply separately would, therefore, be a mere repetition of what I have already written on the several points adverted to under this particular head.

PAT. GRANT, Lieut.-General,
Commander-in-Chief.

Ootacamund,
July 17, 1858.

ENGINEER SOLDIERS, SAPPERS AND MINERS.

I.—RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION.

1. The corps of Sappers and Miners consists of 12 companies.

EUROPEAN.

1 Serjeant-major, 1 Quartermaster-serjeant, 24 Serjeants.
24 1st Corporals, 24 2d Corporals.

EAST INDIAN.

1 Assistant apothecary.
2 Buglers.

NATIVE.

12 Subadars.
12 Jemadars.
1 Havildar major.
50 Havildars.
100 Naignes.
1350 Privates.
24 Recruit } Boys.
24 Pension }
12 Puckallies.
53 Artificers.
1 2d Dresser.

2. CASTES.

Christians	-	-	-	35
Moosulmans	-	-	-	79
Brahmins and Rajpoots	-	-	-	8
Mahrattas	-	-	-	4
Telingas (Gentoo)	-	-	-	191
Tamil	-	-	-	246
Other inferior castes	-	-	-	496
Indo-Britons-	-	-	-	15

3. COUNTRY.

Hindoostan.
Northern Circars.
Central Carnatic (Madras, Vellore, &c.)
Southern Carnatic (Trichinopoly).
Baramahal.
Ceded Districts.
Mysore.
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly.

4. None.
5. I think not.
6. As in the native infantry.
7. As in the native infantry.
8. As in the native infantry.
9. None; the existing system answers perfectly.
10. As in the native infantry.
11. As in the native infantry.
12. As in the native infantry.
13. Composite; the present proportions are good, and should be left undisturbed.
14. The present system answers all purposes.
15. None which do not at present exist.
16. Efforts are systematically made to obtain recruits acquainted with useful trades.
17. It is not considered expedient that natives of other tropical climates should be enlisted as sappers. If, however, it is determined that such shall be enlisted, they should be formed into separate companies, and not mixed up with the natives of India.
- 18 and 19. See replies to these questions in reference to infantry.
20. The existing establishment of the corps is sufficiently strong for the absolute requirements of the service, but the sappers are found so useful a body of men, that the number of companies might with advantage be increased.
21. The native infantry soldier's time is sufficiently occupied in the performance of duties proper to him. He has always willingly laboured upon military works when his services have been required; but to make sapper training, even in a modified shape, part of his regular duty would be exceedingly unpalatable to him.
22. Yes; when occasion has required; and the work has been done willingly.

23. On the fair engineer wants of the service.

	Surjeants.	1st Corporals.	2d Corporals.
Present for duty	8	17	14
Not joined	—	—	4
In Civil Employ	22	6	11
TOTAL	25	23	29

24. Certainly not; for this reason, that the majority of the European sappers, vide margin, are at present employed away from their regiment, under civil engineers of divisions, &c.

25. The existing establishment of 2 serjeants, 2 corporals, and 2 2d corporals is ample; provided

these men are allowed to remain with their corps.

26. I am not aware of any advantage from making the dress of the native sappers resemble that of the European infantry. The Europeans attached to the sappers have an established working or fatigue dress.

Jacket, trowsers, and boots supplied by Government biennially G.G.O., 12th May 1864, No. 114.

27. Native officers }
Staff serjeants } with swords.
Havildars and }
Buglers }

The privates,—with sapper carbines with sword-bayonet.

28. Dress and arms. The present dress and arms appear to me to be quite suitable.

29. Unknown.

30. Unknown, but it is believed that a great many of them know a little English.

31. There is a school of instruction in carpentry, brick and tile making, stone cutting, and other artificers' work, for natives.

32. Their qualifications are scarcely sufficiently high to authorize their being classed as skilled engineer soldiers.

33. It appears to me highly desirable that the Public Work department should be altogether separate from that of the military corps of sappers. But I do not advocate establishing a corps of European sappers for actual work in this climate. A sufficient number of qualified European sappers, to act as overseers and superintendents, would quite suffice.

34. Certainly not, unless a large augmentation to the corps of engineers takes place, or the existing establishment is restored to military duty. Under the present system there are never more than two Engineer officers attached to the corps of sappers, viz., the commandant and the adjutant, and scarcely an engineer officer in purely military employ of any sort; the department of Public Works, and various civil duties, absorb nearly the entire body of engineer officers.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. As in the infantry.
2. As in the infantry.
3. As in the infantry.
4. As in the infantry.

III.—ORGANIZATION PROMOTION AND REWARDS.

1. As in the infantry.
2. The native officers are efficient and intelligent; but none of this grade can take the place of a European officer.
3. As in the infantry.
4. I think not; they are promoted for military efficiency, rather than on account of professional acquirements, as in the infantry.
5. As in the infantry.
6. I am not aware that there has been anything approaching mutiny in this corps; nor do I think that portions of it have been at stations at which other troops have been insubordinate. From their earliest formation the Madras sappers have been eminently conspicuous for their admirable conduct in every situation. On every occasion of service throughout India—in Afghanistan, in Scinde, and in Persia—they have been employed, and always acquitted themselves with marked distinction.
7. As in the infantry.
8. By the practice in this army, the native officer's commission holds good over the European warrant or non-commissioned officer.
- 9 and 10. As in the infantry.

11. As in the infantry.
12. As was recommended for the infantry.
13. As in the infantry.
14. As in the infantry.
15. I think not. The European sapper is educated expressly for engineer work, and is taught a variety of sapper duties that the native never learns.
16. Infantry officers are appointed to the sappers as a substitute for engineer officers, and the system answers sufficiently well. But the infantry sapper officer's standard of efficiency is very much lower than that for the officer of engineers.

The instruction the infantry officer receives at sapper headquarters, before he can be detached in command of a company, is no doubt advantageous to him; and when qualified for such detached duty he is competent to superintend all the work that can be required of native sappers; and, perhaps, the infantry sapper officer is better suited to the native sapper work than the more highly-educated engineer officer.

At the same time, I think the corps should be separately officered; as the demands for it take officers from their own regiments, and they are often strangers to their men.

17. Now doubt it has. See reply to this question in reference to infantry.

18. As in the infantry. Attempts at amalgamation, assimilation, or centralization of the three native armies must, in my opinion, prove most injurious to our power in India.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. The power of the commandant of sappers has been increased, as described in the answer to this question in reference to the infantry; but the constant changes of commandant and assistant, in view to their obtaining the superior allowances in the department of Public Works, to which their standing gives them a claim, is very injurious to the corps.
2. There has been also an increase in the power of the officers of companies.
3. There has been little or no change as regards the native portion of the sappers. The conduct of the few European sappers has decidedly improved.
4. On the authority and influence of officers commanding companies, and the officer commanding the force under whose immediate orders the sappers are serving.
- 5 and 6. As in the infantry.

PAT. GRANT, Lieut.-General,
Commander-in-Chief.

Ootacamund,
August 31, 1858.

CAVALRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. The Madras cavalry, with the exception of its trumpeters, farriers, and bandsmen, who are chiefly East Indians, is composed exclusively of Mahommedans, Rajpoots, and Mahrattahs, and, by the latest return, in the following proportions:—

Mahommedans	-	-	-	2,341
Rajpoots	-	-	-	98
Mahrattahs	-	-	-	324

2. Twenty-three from Hindoostan.
Forty-nine from Northern Circars.
About two hundred from Mysore.
About two thousand thirty-six, Arcot District, Vellore, Madras, &c.
About three hundred, Trichinopoly and Tanjore, and the rest from the Baramahl and ceded districts.

3. No races, tribes, or castes have been excluded by regulation from the Madras cavalry, which, in regard to composition, is much the same now as when the two senior regiments were transferred to the East India Company in 1784 by the Nawaub of Arcot. The regular cavalry has for many years been considered the birth right of the Mahommedans of the Arcot district; and, with the exception of a few Mahrattahs, commanding officers have made little effort to recruit elsewhere. The paucity of Hindoos in the ranks I find attracted attention: fifteen years ago, and endeavours were made, with but partial success, to obtain Rajpoots and

Mahrattahs. From all I have been able to gather it is clear to me that there was no doubt a strong feeling on the part of commanding officers in favour of the Mahomedan; and this, with other causes, has tended to exclude Hindoos from the Madras regular cavalry.

4. Possibly Hindoos from Mysore might be induced to enter the native regular cavalry, as they readily enlist into the Mysore horse; the Mysore horse, however, as a matter of policy, has been purposely retained in a state of comparative indiscipline, and for that reason is, in all probability, much more popular than the native regular cavalry. Moreover, there is, I learn from Lieutenant-General, Sir Mark Cubbon, the strongest disinclination on the part of the people of Mysore to quit the province for any lengthened period.

5. The same agency as for native infantry when requisite; but the present establishment of light cavalry regiments (300 privates) is on so reduced a scale, that of late years vacancies, as they have occurred, have been easily filled up by the transfer of recruit boys or by enlistments at regimental head-quarters.

6. The same as for native infantry.

7. The same precautions as for native infantry.

8. Not of necessity, but as a simple measure of precaution the existing preponderance of Mohammedans should be gradually reduced until Hindoos and Mahomedans are in equal proportions, if it can be managed.

9. The same oath as for native infantry.

10. See native infantry.

11. See native infantry.

12. I much prefer general enlistments to recruiting in any particular districts; but as stated in the reply to question 2, it is only in certain districts that men suitable for the mounted branch of the service have been obtained.

13. Without reference to districts, if practicable.

14. Composite, not homogeneous, corps are most to be desired in my opinion.

15. The tribes and castes should be as much as possible mixed up in the whole corps.

16. Mahomedans and Hindoos in equal proportions would be the best composition, but Hindoos of the inferior tribes and castes dislike the cavalry service, neither are they well fitted for it; and Rajpoots and Mahrattahs in sufficient numbers are difficult to be obtained; indeed, I am led to believe that they are not procurable in this presidency in any number.

17. The present agency is quite suitable if the existing system is to be followed; but if my recommendation to enlist half Mahomedans and half Hindoos is adopted, it may be necessary to employ extra means for providing a sufficient number of the latter class, such as a recruiting depot, and a distinct agency similar to that recently created for the infantry.

18. See reply to question 23, "infantry," on this point.

19. See reply to question 28, "infantry," on this point.

20. Answered as above.

21. Answered as above.

22. Answered as above.

23. Answered as above.

24. With the old dragoon sabre adapted to the strength of the man's arm. The present sword is much too heavy for a native trooper, and I may say for any but the most powerful men in even a regiment of European dragoons. Swords of several different weights, adapted to the varied strength and size of the men, should be given to regiments of cavalry, and the scabbards should either be of wood or lined with wood; the present steel scabbards have wood in them, but it is not in the proper place; it is placed at the sides of the blade, and not where it ought to be, before the edge. The perpetual drawing and returning swords should be prohibited. The swords should be drawn and inspected by the officers periodically; the edge carefully examined and reset if it has sustained injury, because they give confidence, not for any other reason. I would give each native cavalry soldier a brace of percussion pistols; and for sentry or vidette duty, I would arm one-fifth of the men with percussion carbines; but as I have often heard said by the late Colonel Charles Cureton, than whom there was no better cavalry officer, nor one of more varied experience, "the dragoon's true weapon is his horse."

25. There is advantage in assimilating to some extent the dress and equipments of the regular native cavalry to those of the European dragoon; but I think that generally assimilation is carried too far. As regards the dress and equipments, &c. of native cavalry, I would recommend that reference be made to a report on those points which was drawn up by me under the instructions of the late Sir James Lumley (then adjutant-general of the Bengal army) in 1841-42.

Information was sought for and obtained from the best and most experienced officers of both Her Majesty's and the

Company's service in India, and submitted to the government of India (Secretary, Military Department,) with a full expression of Sir James Lumley's own opinions, and there the matter ended.

26. The dress I would recommend for the light cavalry of the Madras army is a loose scarlet or dark blue tunic "nimcha" or "mirzai" pattern, double-breasted, and with a stand-up collar, without lace, embroidery, or frippery of any sort; pantaloons, blue cloth, "peg-top" pattern; jack boots reaching four inches above the knee cap to draw over the pantaloons; hunting spurs to buckle over the boots; a twisted turban of uniform pattern. A head dress more European and less native in form and material than the present "tumbrous, inconvenient, and unsightly "turban" would be strongly objected to by the Madras light cavalry. A cloth cloak as at present.

The stable dress, if one is required in a native corps, should consist of a pair of blue cotton or serge pantaloons made like the others; a blue or red cotton or serge "merzai" skull cap, and shoes or sandals as at present.

The officers' dress should as closely as possible resemble the men's. I would, however, defer for a time, making any change, in regard to dress, in the Madras light cavalry.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1 to 5 inclusive. See my replies to these same questions with respect to "Infantry." They are equally applicable to cavalry.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1 to 16 inclusive. See my replies to the foregoing questions with respect to "Infantry." They are equally applicable to native cavalry.

20. The substitution of irregular for regular native cavalry in the Madras army would not detract from efficiency, and would be far less costly. But a measure so sweeping is calculated to startle the minds of the existing regular cavalry, and to fill them with all kinds of fears and suspicions; and this is the invariable effect produced on natives by any changes in their condition, even such as are to us manifestly and unmistakably for their advantage.

With the sole exception of the 8th regiment, the whole regular cavalry of the Madras army have acquitted themselves both in the field and in quarters loyally and creditably during the disturbances in Bengal, and I strongly recommend that so entire a change as converting them into irregular horse may not be attempted.

21. To mount irregular cavalry either in part or in whole on government horses would entirely upset the present constitution of this branch, and, in my opinion, destroy their usefulness, their economy, and their instant readiness for immediate service without assistance from commissariat or any other department.

22. Rupees five hundred and fifty (rupees 550) each.

23. Arabia, Persia, the Cape, Australia, and some few are bred by the Silladars in the Mysore district, but they are of a very inferior description.

26. The requirements during the past twelve months have been unusually heavy, and they have been marvellously well met.

27. Australian and Cape horses equal to the requirements of the European cavalry and artillery of the Madras presidency should be obtained from those colonies. The other breeds of horses are deficient in the weight and substance indispensable to thorough efficiency for those arms of the service.

28. On this point I recommend that reference should be had to a correspondence which passed, I think, in 1846-47, on the subject of procuring horses for the public service from the colonies. The correspondence will be found in the office of the adjutant-general of the Bengal army. The measure was strongly advocated by the military authorities of the day. Considerable expense was incurred in sending selected officers of experience to Australia to institute inquiry into the matter. If my memory does not deceive me their report was highly favourable in every respect; but nothing came of it.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

16. See my replies to the sixteen foregoing questions, head "Infantry, 4 European Officers." They are quite as applicable to cavalry.

17. Presuming that the strength of regiments of dragoons of the royal army has been fixed with reference to considerations of thorough efficiency, experience, and mature deliberation, it appears to me that corps of European dragoons raised for service in India ought to be composed of the same number of sables. At the same time I will state, though with diffidence, that my individual opinion is that a regiment of 500 privates, with the regulated proportion of non-commissioned officers, and consisting of eight troops, is the best and most handy organization.

18. The existing establishment of officers for a regiment of native light cavalry will suffice for a regiment of European dragoons of the strength indicated in my reply to the preceding question, if none are withdrawn for staff or other detached employment. But if the present system is persevered in of denuding corps of the line of their best officers, and creating a craving to get away in those who remain, I hold that it will be impracticable to maintain regiments in a state of thorough efficiency.

19. A single rank admits of showing a more extended front; every sword comes into play also, and these are obvious advantages; but a single rank looks weak and loose, and I think is so in reality as well as in appearance.

The double rank, on the other hand, has weight, solidity, and compactness, and I think that order of formation adds materially to the confidence of the soldier likewise. On these grounds I base my opinion in favour of the double rank system of formation. At any time a single rank can be formed if occasion requires, but let the double rank be the rule.

20. Trusting that the single rank system never will be introduced, it is unnecessary for me to reply to this question.

21. Of course it would be practicable, but in my opinion most inadvisable, and in every way objectionable, to attach a body of native troops permanently to any European corps.

22. Requires no answer referring to my reply to the preceding question. I consider my replies on these points with respect to infantry equally applicable to cavalry.

PAT. GRANT, Lieut.-General,

Commander-in-Chief.

Outacamund,

August 19, 1858.

CAVALRY, BENGAL.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. Hindoostanee Mahomedans, Sheikhs, Synds, Moghuts, and Pathans, and Hindoos, Brahmins, Rajpoots, Jats, and some also of the inferior castes. There are also Ranghurs in considerable numbers (*i.e.* Hindoos converted to Mahomedanism), and some few Sikhs and Afghans.

2. Principally I think from the Delhi and Rohilcund districts. It must depend a good deal upon where the corps was raised.

3. I do not believe there are any regulations on this head for the irregular cavalry. The practice I think has been much the same as that of the regular army, *viz.* to exclude men of the inferior castes habitually employed in menial occupations.

4. I do not think so; the ranks are open to all classes, except the sort of men particularized above.

5. Recruiting is generally carried on amongst the native officers, non-commissioned officers, and sowars of the regiment. In most corps an "omedwar" list was kept. Any man of the regiment who wished a relation or friend to be enlisted brought him to the adjutant, and had his name put down in this list. Upon a vacancy occurring in the ranks, the commanding officer selected a recruit from amongst the body of omedwars present with the corps. Upon being entered on the list, of course they were at liberty either to remain with the regiment with their friends and wait their turn, or meanwhile to seek service elsewhere; if they obtained it, their names were simply erased.

6. I do not think recruiting parties were ever sent out into districts. With recruits brought up by men in the

regiment those who presented them for enlistment stood surety.

7. Answered above. Their friends are responsible.

8. No alterations seem to me to be called for.

9. I do not remember the exact words. They swear to serve the company faithfully, to obey their officers, and never to desert or forsake their standards. Mahomedans are sworn upon the Koran, and Hindoos upon the "Gunga Jul."

10. I believe the form of oath is just the same as that employed in the regular army. I suppose it has been in use since the irregular service was formed and regularly organized and placed under the authority of the commander-in-chief, *i.e.* in 1846-47.

11. It does not occur to me to suggest any change, and I do not believe that any form of oath to serve a christian is considered really binding by either Hindoo or Mahomedan.

12 and 13. I much prefer recruiting over the widest possible area without reference to districts.

14. Composite, not homogeneous, corps are the best in my opinion.

15. Neither would I have the Resselahs homogeneous, but mix up tribes and castes in each and as much as possible in equal proportions.

16. If composite, the chief object should be to keep an equal balance between the two religious classes of Mahomedan and Hindoo.

17. I think just as at present.

18. The man enlisting him being held responsible for a recruit, seems to be as much precaution as can be necessary.

19, 20, 21, 22, and 23. See my replies to questions 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32. "Bengal infantry," head "Recruiting and composition of corps." The answers apply equally to irregular cavalry.

24. Native Tulwar and Victoria percussion carbine.

25 and 26. See my replies to these same questions in reference to the native regular light cavalry of the Madras army.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. I think they might be much simplified, and the catalogue of offences which commanding officers are empowered to deal with without reference to superior authority much increased.

2. Retained; they were made especially for the native army, and with regard to the prejudices, &c. &c. of natives, at the same time the present would be a good opportunity to make any alterations which the times call for, as indicated in the reply to the immediately foregoing question.

3. I think that the principle of trial by courts-martial is good, but I much doubt that the present system does work satisfactorily, and I think it very desirable that it should be more simplified at all events in irregular corps, where, as much as possible, the commanding officer should be supreme.

4. The Articles of War can be read to them periodically upon parade as in regular regiments.

5. I cannot tell, but in most corps I fancy a very small number.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS

1. Merit and seniority combined; seniority though greatly preponderating in the scale.

2. No, I do not think they are conspicuously so, nor by any means so much more so than those of the regular army, as is generally supposed. There is a like mixture of dull and bright in both.

3. Not so in my opinion.

4. The only test *ordered*, I believe, but rarely attended to, is, that a man should be able to read and write, *i.e.* before he can be promoted from the ranks to be a non-commissioned officer. The examination on these points is easily slurred over if a man is naturally sharp and intelligent, and the commanding officer considers him likely to make a good non-commissioned officer. For further promotions there is no test.

6. Most rarely, I believe, has any information been obtained from, or any warning been given by, native officers on these occasions. On the occurrence of an outbreak the generality, I think, do ostensibly range themselves on

the side of their officers, but their influence either in preventing or quelling a revolt appears to be nil.

10. See my reply to this same question in reference to the native infantry of the Madras army.

11. I think there ought to be pensions for long and faithful service, and that it would not be wise to abolish them. The present system as to rates, &c., appears to satisfy the recipients; any alterations, however, might be made that recent occurrences suggest with respect to the Bengal native army.

12. I cannot say.

13. I think promotion by merit and efficiency should be the rule; commanding officers generally have a just regard to the claims of old soldiers.

14. They are always proved to be swayed by party and private interests. They do not see offences in the same light as we do, and from this it is often very hard to get them to award an adequate punishment for what we consider, and what our Articles of War lay down, as serious offences.

17. A native regiment should either be fully officered, i.e., to admit of the management of troops and companies being entirely in the hands of European officers, or if not, the present number of three officers is ample for an irregular corps,—the second in command, in time of peace, and present with the head-quarters of his regiment, has nothing to do, and the adjutant little more; the commanding officer is all in all. The permanent addition, therefore, of merely one or two more officers is unnecessary. But, on service, additional officers ought to be appointed to do duty.

18. I think when the service was first started the irregular cavalry was the most generally popular. It was something new; it opened a further large field for employment; there was a much greater laxity of drill and discipline, and the pay was so good,—at all events, in the non-commissioned and higher ranks. Even as regards the privates, I think, in a pecuniary point of view, a native would far prefer receiving 20 rupees to keep himself and his horse, than seven rupees a month and have a horse provided for him. There is sufficient proof of this in the anxiety of bargheers in irregular cavalry regiments to be made "khoduspahs," i.e., owners of horses of their own. Still, there is never any difficulty in obtaining recruits for the regulars amongst the families of the men belonging to them, in the same way as the irregulars get plenty of recruits from their families; and the regular sepoy generally considers himself superior to the irregular.

19 and 20. Erased.

21. See my reply to this same question in reference to the Madras cavalry.

22. Rupees 800 each, I think, but I speak entirely from memory.

23. The horses come from the various government studs. They are the produce of English and Arab sires out of country and stud-bred mares. Australian, Cape, and country horses have been purchased at odd times on emergencies. In 1843, and also in 1845, a number of Arabs came up from Madras and Bombay.

24. Wherever it can, horses generally are to be purchased, as required, in the district in which the corps is stationed. Some commandants also send men annually to purchase at the Hurdwar or other great fairs.

25. I should think from 160 to 180 rupees.

26. The irregular cavalry may be quite well left to themselves. I think that much greater care and attention than used to be observed might be given to the system of breeding horses in the government studs.

27. I think that government ought to be able to breed first-rate horses at their own studs, and at much reduced prices.

28. See my reply to this same question in reference to the Madras cavalry.

29. Twenty rupees a month in our own old provinces, beyond the Indus 30.

30. If not put to constant needless expense for showy and costly uniforms and various other things that commanding officers often oblige their men to get, which are not in reality required, ordinarily 20 rupees a month is sufficient. But on actual service during a campaign, when the cost of every article of food for man and horse is enhanced, and there is so much extra wear and tear of all kinds, the pay of a sowar should be increased to 25 rupees a month, I think.

30 b. Generally they are, I have always understood, more or less in debt. A Mahomedan, of which class they are mostly composed, is, I suspect, seldom free from it; he generally spends all he receives. But twenty rupees a month,

as I have before said, is sufficient on ordinary occasions to keep a sowar and his horse well; and an addition of five rupees a month when in the field would meet all extra expenses.

31. Answered in replies to 30 and 30b.

32. I think the present system of allowing a certain defined number of assamees to native commissioned and non-commissioned officers is good. It imparts some respectability and standing to these men, and forms an inducement to them both themselves to enter and to bring bargheers to the service. I think the number apportioned to the native officers should certainly be defined and limited to admit of a certain proportion of the sowars being "khoduspahs;" but if one native officer can afford to purchase an assameeship, while another cannot, I should allow him to do so. The average value of an assameeship I should suppose to be about 300 rupees. They must have increased in value, as the mounting, dress, and equipment of the men has become more expensive. I do not think they have any effect upon the efficiency of the corps in horses and equipments or conduct of duty one way or the other.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Since the irregular cavalry have been brought under direct military authority and subjected to the general regulation of the service, the powers of commanding officers have certainly been much diminished, and of late years the tendency has been to diminish them more and more.

2. If by "discipline" is meant the perfect subordination of the men to their commanding officer, I think that taking out of his hands the almost absolute authority he formerly exercised has been very injurious.

5. Certainly upon the authority, influence, and example of the officers who serve with and belong to them, more especially the commanding officer.

6. The powers of commanding officers should be increased; as I have before said, they should be almost absolute. The powers of officers of troops in corps of irregular cavalry where there are no European troop officers should be regulated entirely at the discretion of the commandant of the regiment.

7. Abstain from over drilling, and the efforts to convert corps of irregular cavalry into regiments of regular cavalry, and return to the old custom of encouraging them to practice their native exercises and feats of horsemanship and arms.

13. See my replies to questions 13 and 14, head "Infantry. IV. European Officers."

15. See my reply to question 16, head "Infantry. IV. European Officers."

21 and 22. These questions have already been answered in reference to regular cavalry and infantry, and the same replies are, I consider, equally applicable here.

PAT. GRANT, Lieut.-General,
Ootacamund, Commander-in-Chief.
August 14, 1858.

ARTILLERY.

I.—RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF THE ARTILLERY.

1. The same as the Madras native infantry.

2. As above.

3. As above.

4. I would never again have a native artilleryman in India. The conduct of the Madras native artillery has been admirable hitherto, and the portions employed in Bengal during the disturbances have acquitted themselves most creditably. I would therefore maintain the existing native artillery of this presidency, and let them gradually die off, enlisting no more native recruits however, and manning all field batteries by Europeans, the golundaz, while they are kept up, being formed into reserve companies. I may

add, that these measures, which I suggested more than a year ago, are now being given effect to as opportunity offers under instructions from the Court of Directors.

5. Certainly not; all artillery drivers should be Europeans, or (if the experiment now under trial answers) East Indians, should it be found that men of that class in sufficient numbers are procurable, which from present appearances is very doubtful.

6. Same as infantry.

7. As above.

8. As above.

9. See reply to this question as regards native infantry.

10. As above.

11. See reply to this question as regards native infantry.

12. As above.

13. See reply to this question as regards native infantry.

14. As above.

15. As above.

16. As above.

17. See reply to this question as regards native infantry.

18. As above.

19. As above.

20. As above.

21. As in question 20.

22. See reply to this question as regards native infantry; it is equally applicable to artillery.

23. As above.

24. As above.

25. See reply to this question as regards native infantry.

26. As above.

27. See reply to question 5.

The stature of a gunner should not be under five feet six or seven inches; a well-knit man of five feet three or four inches is quite tall enough for a driver, but they should, nevertheless, be bound by the terms of their enlistment to perform both duties if required.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. The Articles of War for native troops are alone applicable to native military classes of every description.

2. See reply to this question as regards native infantry; it is equally applicable to artillery.

3. In my opinion the Articles of War for all European troops in India should correspond in every particular with the Articles of War for Her Majesty's British army.

4. See replies to questions 1 and 2.

5. See reply to this question as regards native infantry; it is equally applicable to native artillery.

6. As above.

7. As above.

8. As above.

III—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. See reply to this question as regards native infantry; it is equally applicable to gun lascars, golundauzes, and native drivers:

2. As above.

3. As above.

4. See reply to this question as regards native infantry.

5. The golundauz have been systematically instructed and practised in all these points; but I am told that, with exception of the ordinary gun drill, they have evinced little aptitude either to receive or retain the instruction imparted to them.

6. I am informed that many of the golundauz can both read and write English, but that they are often indisposed to allow it to be known that they possess these acquirements.

7. Certainly not.

8. See reply to this question as regards native infantry; it is equally applicable to native artillery.

9. As above.

10. As above; but I earnestly hope that it has been authoritatively and finally decided to abolish native artillery not only in the armies of India, but as well in the forces of all native independent (so called) states and chiefs.

11. See reply as regards native infantry on this point; it is equally applicable to native artillery.

12. As above.

13. As above.

14. Yes, after 20 years' service, if unfit for further duty.

15. Neither more nor less so than any other native military retainers. The drivers and gun lascars are drawn from precisely the same classes and districts as the golundauz and native infantry, and I conclude are imbued with precisely the same feeling and disposition.

16. See reply to this question as regards native infantry.

17. As above.

18. See reply to this question as regards native infantry.

19. As above.

20. As above.

21. On this point of assimilation I beg to refer to a minute I recorded at Madras on the 21st November 1856, and of which I now forward a copy.* Assimilation to the extent therein contended for is much to be desired; any closer assimilation is, I think, not called for. The perfect efficiency of the artillery of the armies of India never has been doubted, and I imagine it is infinitely more economical than the royal artillery. I observe that the Chairman of the Court of Directors announced at the last Addiscombe examination, that the officers of the artilleries of India are to be placed on the same organization as the officers of the royal artillery, thus abolishing the ranks of regimental major and 1st lieutenant, and substituting for them the superior grades of lieutenant-colonel and 2nd captain, and doubtless this is a boon which cannot fail to be gratefully appreciated by the artillery of the Indian armies.

22. The "system" of the Madras artillery corresponds with that of the royal artillery, both horse artilleries being formed on the "detachment system;" and the system of drill and instruction throughout is also, I think, the same in both.

23. A royal artillery 24-pounder howitzer and 9-pounder gun are each 3 cwt. heavier than the pieces of the same description in use in India; and here and in Bengal the pole is in use instead of shafts, as used in the royal artillery and in the Bombay presidency. The royal artillery gun carriages are also much heavier than those of the Madras pattern. On these and other points see also the Minute of the 21st November 1856.

24. The present organization of the Madras artillery would be all that need be desired if an increase were made to the strength of troops and companies, if European were substituted for native drivers, and if the lamentable paucity of European officers were rectified; and in every case let us have horses instead of bullocks with field artillery. In my opinion a troop of horse artillery and a battery company of foot artillery should consist of, the former 100 and the latter 80 gunners, with the prescribed proportion of bombardiers, corporals, and sergeants; and let the establishment of officers be on a scale to ensure the presence at all times with each troop and battery of at least one captain and three subalterns. Artillery insufficiently officered never can be thoroughly efficient.

25. I think the present matériel of the Madras artillery most suitable to the climate and service in India; and I am of opinion that it would be a mistake, with our light horses, to assimilate it more exactly to that of the royal artillery.

26. There are at present two troops of native horse artillery in this presidency. They should be gradually reduced, and two light field batteries, manned by Europeans, substituted for them.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. See reply to this question as regards native infantry; it is equally applicable to artillery.

2. As above.

3. As above.

4. See reply on this head as regards native infantry. The paucity of officers, as I have repeatedly represented, is utterly destructive of thorough efficiency in the corps of artillery.

5. See reply on this head as regards infantry; it is equally applicable to artillery.

6. As above.

PAT. GRANT, Lieut.-General,
Commander-in-Chief.

Ooctacamund,
August 21, 1858.

* See page 138.

APPENDIX No. 66.

MINUTES of Lieut.-General Sir PATRICK GRANT,
Commander-in-Chief, Madras.

GENERAL STAFF OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

In the short minute on civil salaries recorded a few days ago, I remarked on the evil effects likely to arise from remunerating two officers, identical in labour, responsibility, and importance, at different rates. I observed that, as regards many of the appointments on the General Staff of the Madras army, this system prevailed; and I intimated my intention of offering the subject to the consideration of Government.

I think it will be admitted that the stimulus of progressive advancement is desirable to secure zeal, perseverance, and diligence; that the same rate of remuneration should be allowed for the discharge of duties in all respects of the same description, and involving precisely the same amount of labor and application; and that it is only just that the emoluments of an office should be in correspondence with its importance, responsibility, and labours. I now proceed to show that in these respects the present system in this Presidency is, in my judgment, defective; and how it may be best amended.

I commence with the Department of the Adjutant General of the Army—second to none in importance and responsibility—and far exceeding all others in downright labour and incessant application to duty.

The Adjutant General's Department comprises the following appointments; in the order in which, in my opinion, they ought to stand as respects position, responsibility, and labour, and in emolument, in reference to these considerations—*vis.*

- Adjutant General of the Army.
- Deputy Adjutant General of the Army.
- Assistant Adjutant General of the Army.
- Deputy Assistant Adjutant General of the Army.
- Assistant Adjutant General of Divisions.
- Deputy Assistant Adjutant General of Divisions.
- Major of Brigade.

The Deputy Adjutant General of the Madras Army draws a staff and horse allowance of Rs. 600 per mensem each; I think it too little, bearing in mind that he is the deputy of the Principal Staff Officer of the Army, and adverting to the onerous and important duties he has to perform. The Deputy Adjutant General in Bengal draws 800 rs. a month, and I am clearly of opinion that the Deputy Adjutant General of Madras should be raised to 700.

The Assistant and Deputy Assistant Adjutant General of the Army have precisely the same amount and description of duties, and I think that, as in Bengal, their designations and emoluments should be identical. They should be designated 1st and 2nd Assistant Adjutant General of the Army, and their Staff allowances ought to be raised, I submit, to a near approximation to the Bengal rate—I would say 450 rupees a month—the Bengal rate being 500; and the Assistant Adjutant General of Artillery should be placed on the same footing.

Assistant and Deputy Assistant Adjutant General of Division, as regards duty, labor, and responsibility, are exactly on a par, and in Bengal (except with an army in the field, when the Assistant draws superior office allowance to the Deputy Assistant) all are paid precisely alike. In Madras there is a wide difference; the Assistant Adjutant General of Division draws, in all, extra allowances amounting to Rupees 528 per mensem; while the Deputy Assistant Adjutant General of Division receives only Rupees 304. I think it will be admitted that the Bengal rule is the most just—and I propose that it should be adopted in this Presidency, giving to an Assistant or Deputy Assistant Adjutant General of Division the same rate of remuneration—rupees 400 per mensem each. All Brigade Majors have exactly the same duties and responsibilities, and in Bengal all receive precisely the same remuneration, while in Madras several different rates prevail, and, as far as I have been able to ascertain, without the

slightest reason. In Bengal all Brigade Majors receive rupees 354 per month, and I suggest that this rule should be adopted in the Madras Presidency.

In Bengal, a Brigade Major is allowed—and properly so—for every Brigade Command. In Madras we have ten Brigade Commands and only six Brigade Majors. Four more should be added to the present establishment, in assimilation with the Bengal practice. In Bengal there are three Fort Adjutants, but no such staff appointment as Cantonment Adjutant, and Station Staff Officer. In Madras there are six Fort Adjutants, three Cantonment Adjutants, and five Station Staff Officers.

With the one exception of Fort Saint George, I think all three Fort Adjutancies, the three Cantonment Adjutancies, and the five Station Staff Officers' appointments should be abolished. At the Head Quarters of a Brigade the duties now conducted by Cantonment Adjutants, Fort Adjutants, or Station Staff Officers, should be performed by the Brigade Major; at Stations not being the Head Quarters of a Brigade, and for which a Brigade Major is not given, the Staff duties should be conducted by one of the Regimental Staff Officers; the interpreter and Quartermaster has least to do, and can therefore most conveniently take the duty.

This is the practice in Bengal, and I recommend that it should be followed in this Presidency. At some few stations in Bengal the "Station Staff" is * allowed 25 or 30 rupees a month for an extra writer, and the same rate should obtain here.

The designation of Station Staff Officer at Poonamallee and Palaveram should be changed, I think, to "Commandant of the Depot"—the emoluments remaining the same as now existing; and for Saint Thomas' Mount I suggest that a Brigade Major should be given, in lieu of the present "Station Staff."

In course of my service I have held the whole of these appointments, from Regimental Adjutant to Adjutant General of the Army, and may therefore be allowed to speak authoritatively with respect to them.

DEPARTMENT OF THE QUARTERMASTER GENERAL OF THE ARMY.

Though not so laborious, in importance and responsibility this Department is considered to be on a par with the Department of the Adjutant General; and in respect of allowances it ought to be placed on the same footing.

In Bengal all the Officers of this Department are considered to belong to the Department of the Quartermaster General "of the Army"—which is the designation of each and every grade—and they are employed wherever the Commander-in-Chief thinks they can be of most use. Generally an Officer of the Department is attached to each Division of the Army, but not necessarily so, as appears the rule at Madras; and when not absolutely required with the troops, they should be detached to parts of the country not previously well known, required to report on their general features and resources, the lines of road which traverse them, the state of the roads, the names and description of the different villages, the extent of the population, where supplies for troops marching, and carriage, and water, can be most conveniently provided and found, &c. &c. Very important information may be gained this way, and on points on which it is the particular duty of the Quartermaster General's Department to afford accurate and reliable intelligence.

All general duties in the Quartermaster General's Department at Stations or with Division or Detachments of the Army, for which no provision is made by express appointment, should be performed by Regimental Quartermaster.

IN THE MADRAS PRESIDENCY WE HAVE

- 1 Quartermaster General of the Army.
- 1 Dy. Qr.-Mr. General of the Army.
- 1 Asst. Qr.-Mr. General of the Army.
- 1 Dy. Asst. Qr.-Mr. General of the Army.
- 3 Assts. Qr.-Mr. General of Division and Forces.
- 6 Dy. Assts. Qr.-Mr. General of Divisions.

IN BENGAL PRESIDENCY THERE ARE

- 1 Quartermaster General.
 - 1 Dy. Qr.-Mr. General.
 - 2 Assts. Qr.-Mr. General.
 - 2 First Class Dy. Assts. Qr.-Mr. General.
 - 2 Second Class Dy. Assts. Qr.-Mr. General.
 - 2 Offig. Dy. Assts. Qr.-Mr. General.
- } all "of the Army."

Thus, in Bengal, ten officers, two of them officiating and extra to the fixed establishment, discharge duties on which thirteen officers are permanently employed in the Madras Presidency, though the extent of the former and the numerical strength of its army, vastly exceeds the extent and numbers of the Madras Presidency and Army.

<p>Allowances as in Bengal, viz.</p> <p>1 Same as Adjutant General of the Army.</p> <p>2 " Dy. Adjutant General of the Army.</p> <p>3 " Asst. Adjutant Genl. of the Army.</p> <p>4 Rs. 400 per month } Includes allow- 5 Rs. 300 per month } ance for horse 30 Rs. entitled to the pay, batta, gratuity and tentage of their regi- mental rank.</p> <p>Note.—Officiating Deputy Assistants draw Rs. 250 per mensem, with the pay and allowances of their regi- mental rank.</p>	<p>I think the following re- duced establishment would be found quite sufficient for this Presidency, viz.</p> <p>1 Quartermaster Genl. 1 1 Dy. Quartermaster General - - 2</p> <p>2 Assistants Quarter- master General - - 3</p> <p>3 Dy. Assts. Qr.-Mr. General, 1st class - 4</p> <p>3 Dy. Assts. Qr.-Mr. General, 2nd class - 5</p>
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enjoyed by those who have preceded me when they recorded their sentiments.

I propose to consider the subject under each of the following heads :

Organization.	Equipments.
Armament.	Light Field Gun Carriages.

Organization.—The Madras and Bombay Horse Artillery is formed on the "Detachment system," as in the Royal Artillery, and only the near horses in draught are ridden.

In Bengal there is no Detachment, and every horse in draught carries a rider. The system has proved thoroughly efficient in Bengal, where the horses are of much superior weight and substance, and it is far less expensive than the "Detachment system," which requires more men and more horses. But the Bengal organization would not be suitable to the other Presidencies, where the horses are much smaller and lighter than the Bengal Government Stud horse. Moreover, the differences in organization do not materially affect the real question of the one Presidency being able to assist the other when necessary; and I would therefore make no change in this respect, but allow each Presidency to retain its present organization, and Bombay its shafts, instead of the pole, as used in Bengal and Madras.

The organization of the Light Field Batteries is the same in all the three Presidencies.

Armament.—The Bengal Armament of a Troop of Horse Artillery is five 6-pounders and one 12-pounder howitzer, and of a light field battery five 9-pounders and one 24-pounder howitzer. In Madras and Bombay the proportions per troop and battery are four guns to two howitzers—which I consider greatly preferable, and for this reason—every two pieces are supposed to be superintended by a Subaltern, and it is highly desirable that the pieces should be of the same description: but if only a single howitzer is present, this is impracticable, and hence, with a gun and a howitzer (provided with different ammunition and varying in so many particulars otherwise) superintended by the same officer, much confusion and serious mistakes may, and I am aware do, sometimes arise in the heat and hurry of action. Further, the 24-pounder howitzer is the perfection of a light field piece, and if two are attached to every battery with a force in the field, a howitzer battery can be readily formed at any moment.

In Madras and Bombay all light field batteries, manned by Native companies, are armed with 6-pounders and 12-pounders howitzer, because Natives are thought physically unfit to work Ordnance of any heavy calibre; but, judging from the appearance of the Native artillerymen here and in the Bombay Army, I am disposed to think that the prevailing opinion with respect to their physical powers is groundless. Doubtless they are not nearly such large powerful men as their Bengal comrades, but quite equal, nevertheless, to the service of a 9-pounder battery; and I strongly recommend that the present comparatively useless 6-pounder field batteries in Madras and Bombay should be at once armed with the immeasurably superior 9-pounder gun and 24-pounder howitzer. In Bengal one troop of horse artillery was armed with the heavier Ordnance as an experiment and it answered admirably. It was a superb troop (Fordeyce's), and in the rapid advance and long marches to Peshawur, under Sir Walter Gilbert, as well as in the foray to Kohat with Sir Charles Napier, this troop always maintained a forward position without the least distress to either the men (Europeans) or horses. I do not, however, advocate arming horse artillery generally with 9-pounders; but I think 6-pounders most objectionable for light field batteries, and I hope that they may be peremptorily forbidden in the Madras and Bombay armies.

Equipments.—In Bengal all harness and saddlery is issued, in the first instance, from the Government stores, and afterwards maintained complete in all respects from the contract allowance, issued monthly to officers in command of troops and batteries—who are responsible to superior authority that everything is in perfect order.

When an officer is appointed to a troop or battery to supply a vacancy, he is required to purchase, at a valuation, such of the stock ordered to be kept up as may remain in store, the property of his predecessor; and whenever an officer is removed from a troop or battery, the horse furniture and stores are surveyed by a committee, and he is called upon, previous to his departure, to make good all deficiencies, according to an adjustment to be determined by the regimental commanding officer; and precisely the same course might be followed, if the mode of supply and keeping up were assimilated—if the public convenience rendered it desirable (as is now the case in Burmah) that the troops of batteries of different presidencies should exchange equipments. In Madras, and Bombay also, I believe, the duties of providing, repairing, and maintaining in a state of efficiency, the saddles, bridles, harness, and horse appointments of horse artillery, horse field batteries, and

JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

The present establishment is, I consider, quite suitable, being in the proportion of a Deputy Judge Advocate General for each Division, and Field force, and the emoluments are in exact correspondence with those of the Deputy Judge Advocates General of the Army in the Bengal Presidency; the designations likewise correspond.

These three are the Departments of the Army under the immediate orders of the Commander-in-Chief, and to them I shall therefore confine myself.

If the views I have enunciated are concurred in by the Right Honourable the President and my colleagues, I would suggest that the financial portion of the subject be referred for report to the Military Auditor General, in order that the entire question in all its bearings, may be fully before the Government.

(Signed) PAT. GRANT.

November 18, 1856.

ARTILLERY.—21 November 1856.

The authorities at Home and in India have, for upwards of thirty years, entertained an anxious desire to assimilate the Artillery of the three Presidencies; so as to admit of their affording mutual assistance, and of changing materiel, stores, and equipments, on occasions of their being associated on duty or of exchanging stations.

For these thirty years this most important subject has been keenly discussed by Artillery Officers of the three Presidencies, successive Commanders-in-Chief in India have recorded their opinions on it, voluminous reports have been made, experiments tried, recommendations and suggestions innumerable have been offered, but as yet without any satisfactory result, and to shew that the real object is as far from being accomplished as ever, I need only point to the fact that the Bengal and Madras Artillery have been unable to exchange armaments and equipments, when directed within the last few weeks to relieve one another in Burmah and the Sangor Division: and consequently the Madras guns, and carriages, and horse equipments, have to be conveyed from Mhow to Burmah, and the Bengal materiel must be taken from Burmah to Mhow.

Why this most serious inconvenience has not long since been corrected, and the necessary assimilation effected, is I think clearly explained by the Honourable the Court of Directors as follows:—"Each Government recommends its own fancied superiority in Ordnance improvements, and advocates the suggestion of its own Artillery officers, little or no attention is paid to what may already be in useful operation at the sister Presidencies, and comparisons which might be beneficial and lead to uniformity, are seldom made."

It is quite hopeless to expect unanimity on this subject amongst the Artillery officers of the three Presidencies, and if assimilation so highly important and desirable is to be attained, paramount authority can alone decide in what manner and to what extent it is to be carried out. I think, therefore, that the Honourable Court alone can effectually deal with the question, and it will be in the highest degree gratifying to me if the observations I beg to make, prove of any assistance towards arriving at a final judgment on the several points in dispute.

It is in no spirit of presumption, but, on the contrary, with very great diffidence, that I approach a subject which has for so lengthened a period engaged the serious attention of so many able and experienced officers of the highest rank; nor should I venture upon the task were it not that the whole correspondence having repeatedly passed through my hands while I was Adjutant General of the Army in Bengal, and having seen and minutely examined in every particular the Artillery of the three Presidencies, I have had opportunities of comparing each with the others not

native cavalry, including the body guard, devolve on the military board; and it is intended, I believe, to transfer them to the Commissariat Departments on the Board being abolished. Under this system, the regulated allowance for each horse, granted by Government, is formed into a general fund (on the principle of the old off-reckoning fund for the provision of army clothing) for the benefit, not of the troop officers who have the direct and immediate charge of the equipment, but of commanding officers of *regiments*, and the profits are divided annually amongst the officers so entitled, giving two shares to the officer commanding the horse *brigade*, one share to each officer commanding a regiment of cavalry, and one-fourth of a share to each officer commanding a horse battery.

In my opinion the Bengal plan is the best, it creates a generous rivalry amongst the troop and battery officers as to who turns out in the most efficient state and best equipped; while the regimental commanding officer is responsible that no deviation from established patterns takes place. It insures the instant supply and correction of deficiencies or omissions, however arising, which must be impracticable when the arrangements are, as at Madras, under the control of a distant governing body, like the military board or the Commissariat, and thus delay and tardy references take the place of promptitude and immediate action.

Light Field Gun Carriages.—From the outset this point has been the great bone of contention between the artillery officers of the different presidencies, and it is, before all others, the one on which assimilation to a certain extent is most urgently called for.

In Madras and Bombay, and also in the Bengal artillery, the gun carriage is constructed on much the same principle, and it can be used in Bengal without the least difficulty: but the Bengal carriage cannot be adopted in the other presidencies without ruining the horses, from its great additional weight in draught, arising from the weight being placed in front of instead of behind the limber axle. In Bengal this is not felt as an inconvenience, because of the superior size and strength of the horses; but with the light smaller horse in use here, the increased weight the Bengal carriage throws on the neck of the animal is destructive of efficiency.

I have had the different carriages submitted for my inspection and compared one with the other with the greatest care and attention, and I have no hesitation whatever in pronouncing in favour of the Madras carriage; but for all practical purposes the assimilation will be sufficient if the Madras construction of the pintle and position of the pintle hook, the Madras wheel, the Madras diminished length of axle-tree body and diminished length of axle-tree arm, as compared with the excessive length of the Bengal axle, are adopted as the pattern for all India.

It is not a matter of importance, even if a Madras battery were brigaded with a Bengal battery, that one should have a swivel loop, the other a fixed one—but it is very important that one should be able to borrow a wheel from the other, which at present is impossible, for the nave of the Bengal wheel is too long for a Madras axle arm, and the arm of the Bengal axle too thick for the Madras nave; in these respects, therefore, assimilation is highly necessary. The Madras short pole in rear of the limber to fix the pintle to is, I think, a great improvement, and materially facilitates limbering up, without in any degree diminishing the strength of the carriage, but I would not force its introduction upon the other presidencies if they are opposed to it, for overstrained assimilation is neither desirable nor necessary.

I have served in the field with every troop and battery of the Bengal Artillery—I have the highest admiration for the regiment, and all the officers of any standing are my personal and valued friends, and as these facts are well known, it may perhaps be imputed to me that I have a strong leaning towards the system and practice of that corps—but I can honestly declare that the opinions I have now expressed are free from all such predilections or prejudices. I have deliberately and impartially weighed and considered, and compared one with the other, every point which I thought ought to be carefully investigated, and with the single view of endeavouring to ascertain and show what changes are advisable for the general good of the three presidencies, so intimately involved, as I think, in procuring the desired extent of assimilation. And I have assuredly not written under present local influences or promptings, for I have neither consulted any one here, nor has any officer of the Madras Artillery been even made aware of my intention to draw up this report.

Minute by the Right Honourable the President, Madras,
December 4, 1856.

The subject of the Minute of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief appears to me very important—and requiring early attention.

The diversities which exist between the armies of the three presidencies in various points must be very objectionable—more especially in case of their having to act together.

It would probably be impolitic to endeavour to assimilate them at once, but they might gradually be diminished.

At present, I imagine, many of them are scarcely known of, and are only discovered when the troops come together, or happen to replace each other.

The best method, it strikes me, for bringing them to light and for reducing them to comparison, would be for an Inspector for each Department to be appointed for the whole of India—whose duties would be to report periodically on all the points worthy of notice in their respective arms of the service.

The Minute of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief should be brought to the notice of the Government of India for their favourable consideration, and with a recommendation that it should be forwarded by them to the Honourable Court.

From the Secretary to Government, Military Department,
December 23, 1856, No. 3370; to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

I am directed to forward for submission to the Government of India the annexed copy of a Minute by the Commander-in-Chief having reference to the assimilation of the materiel of the Artillery of the three Presidencies.

2. The subject appears to the Governor in Council to be one of great importance, and requiring early attention; the diversities of pattern which at present exist frequently proving a serious hindrance to the public service.

3. It might not be prudent or perhaps practicable, immediately to effect a complete assimilation; but it appears highly desirable that measures should at once be adopted for its gradual accomplishment.

4. Many of the points of difference probably are at present scarcely known, and only come under notice as the Artillery of different Presidencies are required to serve together or to relieve each other.

5. It would seem necessary, therefore, in the first instance that a complete comparison should be instituted in every item of Ordnance equipment of the three Presidencies, preparatory to the establishment, as far as may be found practicable, of similar patterns for the whole.

6. In regard to the system under which saddlery and harness are supplied in this Presidency, the Governor in Council would observe that it was established with the sanction of the Court of Directors, as well as of the Government of India, and that the experience of more than twenty years has proved it to be in every point of view free from objection and perfectly efficient.

Memorandum by Lieut.-General Sir Patrick Grant,
June 1857.

European troops now in Bengal:—9 troops of horse Artillery, being 54 guns; 24 companies of foot artillery, 12 of which man twelve of the twenty light field batteries or 72 guns; thus, 126 field guns in all are manned by Europeans, and the remaining (72) seventy-two by natives; 2 regiments, Her Majesty's dragoons; 15 regiments, Her Majesty's, 3 companies, in all 18 regiments of infantry.

Under present circumstances, and they are likely to be of long duration, this force of Europeans is altogether inadequate. The present disposition of Europeans is very good as far as it goes, but some stations require to be strengthened, and some new ones must be formed, I conceive.

I consider that we should have at and in the immediate neighbourhood of the presidency, in addition to existing numbers,—

2 batteries (12 guns) and (1) one regiment of infantry.

At Berhampore, a battery (16 guns) and (1) one regiment of infantry.

At Dinapore, another battery (six guns).

At Benares, another battery and a regiment of infantry.

At Allahabad, a battery and a regiment of infantry, and two reserve companies of artillery.

At Cawnpore, 18 field guns, 1 regiment of dragoons, and two regiments of infantry.

At Lucknow, 12 field guns and a regiment of infantry.

At Agra, 12 field guns, another reserve company of artillery, and a regiment of infantry.

At Umballah, 6 field guns and a regiment of infantry.

At Jullundar, 6 field guns.

At Ferozepore, 6 field guns.

At Rawalpindee, 6 field guns.

faction being manifested. 2nd. Granting to the Goorkhas (Sirmoor Battalion) the pay of the line when moved from their stations, after they had mutinied because it was withheld; and the order directing that if officers overdraw pay for the sepoy they should liquidate the surplus themselves, not deduct it from the man, as happened in the case of the 43rd N. I. I write from memory, and may make mistakes as to dates and corps, but I cannot be in error as to the facts.

In support of the third cause:—"The want of officers in whom the sepoy could confide," it is sufficient to refer to the last army list. Taking the first twelve regiments, I find present with their regiments 10 field officers, 34 captains, 61 lieutenants, 28 ensigns, total, 133 officers, or $11\frac{1}{2}$ officers per regiment. Deduct commanding officer, adjutant and quartermaster, and all ensigns under two years' service; and there remains 57 officers per regiment for company duty. Further, these officers are discontented, only looking forward to leave their regiments for some more pleasant employment, so that they perform, and unwillingly, the bare outline of their duty; and never, as a general rule, mix or converse with their men; but, on the contrary, too often refuse to listen to their complaints, at the best telling them to go to the adjutant, and not unfrequently, "Go to hell—don't bother me."

With regard to my fourth head, "that officers have not sufficient control over their men, and consequently are not respected by them." 1st. I would refer to the circulars and orders directing seniority to be the rule for promotion, contrary to former standing orders, thus depriving officers commanding companies, as well as regiments, of all power of rewarding good or punishing bad men. The seniority system is also vicious, in that it leaves the acute, active-minded man to brood over his bad luck in the ranks, while confers promotion on the "good" imbecile at the top of the list, who, easily led by his smart intelligent junior, is wholly incapable of guiding or controlling him. I entertained totally different opinions on this head formerly, but I now recant, and these are my present deliberate convictions. 2nd. The order preventing officers from punishing non-commissioned officers except by sentence of a court-martial, which is tantamount to saying that an officer shall not interfere with a non-commissioned officer at all; for it is impossible to try a man for the thousand and one trifling faults which make up the sum of a bad non-commissioned officer, for which one or two days drill is a sufficient punishment. 3rd. The inability to reduce a bad and careless non-commissioned officer except by sentence of a court-martial for some very gross fault, and the consequent laxity of discipline of the army. 4th. Difficulty experienced in punishing even bad men by a court-martial, as any legal flaw, however trifling, is sufficient to invalidate the proceedings; so that commanding officers prefer shutting their eyes to faults to demonstrating their own powerlessness to their men. 5th. Encouraging petitions against officers who have either to prove their case or submit to reproof, while the presenter of a false petition escapes scot free; and thus officers have all to lose and naught to gain, while the petitioner has all to gain and naught to lose. Petitions must of course be received, and thoroughly inquired into; but when they are proved to be without foundation and vexatious, the petitioner should be punished, and in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, petitions are quite unfounded.

The following examples of the way in which the authority of commanding officers is lowered and contemned have been related to me by one of the most intelligent field officers in this army, as coming within his own knowledge. A non-commissioned officer plundered the property he was appointed to guard, perjured himself to conceal his misconduct, took his discharge to avoid a court-martial, and some months afterwards petitioned the then Commander-in-Chief to be restored. His Excellency ordered him to be reinstated, and to be tried by a court-martial, when he was found guilty of theft and perjury; but nevertheless the culprit was retained in the service, and thrust back upon his regiment. A native officer obtained a month's leave when he ought to have been some distance on the route to join, he sent in a petition to his commanding officer asking for an extension of a month, which he well knew his commanding officer had no power to give, pleading urgent business in the civil courts as his excuse. His commanding officer wrote, desiring him to rejoin immediately, but in spite of several orders to this effect, the native officer stayed away until the end of the second month. On rejoining he was placed in arrest, and pleaded illness as his reason for absenting himself. The commanding officer applied to the general commanding the division for a court-martial on the man for disobedience of orders and for falsehood, for he had not been ill. The answer received was, that the general commanding the division conceived that a man in the

position of a native officer had a right to expect that his application would be attended to, and the man was released with a reprimand. A few days afterwards a very excellent native officer requested two months leave, and the same commanding officer applied to the same general of division recommending that it should be granted. The reply was, the Government were so liberal in their leave to soldiers, that the general could not think of granting the application. The only comment I will make on these circumstances is, that the system which allows a commanding officer of a regiment to be so lowered in the eyes of his men, calls loudly for amendment.

Having thus traced the causes of dissatisfaction and distrust, I proceed to suggest measures to avert their recurrence. As remedies for the first and second causes of discontent, I would propose that one rate of pay should be received by the soldier under all circumstances, and compensation given when provisions or carriage rise above a certain fixed rate; or should this be considered inexpedient, a peace and war and beyond frontier scale of pay might be adopted, as is the case with the irregular cavalry: this would effectually stop all discontent on the score of pay, as no misapprehension could arise, and the Government would not be placed in the invidious position of either persevering in wrong, or granting, when disaffection had shown itself, what ought never to have been deducted from the soldier; above all, the soldier would not have the opportunity of believing that he had coerced the Government. Under the present system, no officer or soldier knows what the different rates of pay are under different circumstances, nay, even the Audit Office itself is sometimes at fault.

The want of efficient officers with regiments may, I conceive, be remedied by the adoption of the measures proposed in the following minute, which I recorded at Madras on the 21st May 1857,* and I think that no officer of this army should be appointed to the staff until he shall have qualified under the rules recently introduced into the Queen's service, and which should be made applicable to the Indian armies also.

In order to remedy the 4th evil, "officers not having control over their men, and consequently not being respected by them," officers commanding and in charge of troops and companies should have a potential voice in all promotions in their respective troops and companies, and the greatest attention should be paid to their recommendations by the regimental commanding officer, unless he sees good and sufficient reason for overruling them.

If courts-martial were simplified and less law governed their proceedings, I think we should have more real substantial justice and much improved discipline.

(Signed) PATRICK GRANT.

MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Calcutta, August 19, 1857.

Secretary to Government Letter No. 644, of February 26, 1857, with voluminous accompaniments.

The proportion of artillery attached to the Madras army is much too limited, and I think a perusal of this correspondence will amply satisfy whoever reads it that a large increase to that most important arm of the service is essentially necessary.

I think an addition of three battalions is required, and they should be exclusively Europeans. I would never again have a native artilleryman in India.

At present we have in the Madras army two troops of native horse artillery, and a battalion of Golundauze, consisting of eight companies, including two supplemental companies. Hitherto these native artillerymen have been faithful, and I am disposed to maintain them on their present footing, and to let them gradually die off; but I would not entertain any more native recruits for the artillery, and I am strongly of opinion that all the field batteries should be manned by Europeans alone. The Golundauze, while they are kept up, being formed into reserve companies exclusively.

Field artillery, with odious bullock draught, is shorn of half its efficiency. I cannot too strongly urge the absolute necessity of horsing all the batteries, and for ever abolishing bullock draught.

The strength of companies of European artillery should be raised from 60 to 75 or 80 gunners each, with a corresponding increase of non-commissioned officers.

All artillery drivers should be Europeans; or the experiment might be advantageously tried, of organising a corps

of drivers of East Indians; they make good trumpeters, drummers, and buglers, and we can at least feel confidence in their loyalty: they would also stand exposure to the climate better than our own countrymen.

Officers, in the proportion of one captain to command each troop and battery, and one subaltern for every two guns, should be at all times present with troops of horse artillery and light field batteries.

Each reserved company of European artillery should have two officers attached to it, one of whom should be either a captain or an old and experienced lieutenant.

One European officer of some standing will suffice for a native reserve company.

In addition to these numbers, at least one third spare of each rank should be available to provide for casualties and contingencies. My time is limited, and I am unable to enter more minutely into this most important question.

(Signed) PAT. GRANT.

STAFF CORPS.

May 21, 1857.

The sentiments which have been recorded by the Right Honourable the President in his Lordship's Minute of this date have my entire and hearty concurrence in every particular.

I believe it to be impossible to exaggerate the amount of the mischief which has been produced by the press, European and native, in India. It calls loudly for remedy, and I trust that measures may be adopted, and speedily, to check and restrain an evil of such magnitude.

I have already, in my minute dated the 16th of March, stated at some length my impressions with respect to the feeling of the Native Army of this Presidency, of the perfect accuracy of which I am now more than ever convinced.

The deplorable events which have taken place in Bengal must, to some extent, have the effect of unsettling the minds of the men of the native armies throughout India, and I hold it to be absolutely necessary, to secure the safety of our Indian Empire, that a very large increase to the European force should be made at once. At the very least calculation this Presidency will require the number of European regiments indicated by the President. His Lordship has shown how little prepared we are just now to deal with any serious outbreak, and I trust that no time may be lost in placing matters on a satisfactory footing.

The discipline and morale of the Bengal army have received a shock which will require years of the most judicious management and thorough knowledge of the native character to repair: if, indeed, the old, loyal, faithful feeling of attachment to the Government and their officers can now be ever revived.

Let it be our earnest endeavour to avert from the Madras army the distressing fate which has involved the disgrace and ruin of one of the noblest armies in the world.

I repeat that, in the Madras army, the principal causes of complaint are the increasing demands on the energies of the men, their poverty, and, more than all, the great paucity of European officers of experience and standing present with the regiments. Officers and men must be brought more together, and the European officers must be taught to look upon their regiments as their home, and not to fix their whole thoughts, as they now do, on devising means of getting away to staff, or other detached employ; anything rather than regimental duty is the universal feeling.

The consequences of this craving are, utter indifference, not to say positive dislike, towards their men, and the engendering of a restless, discontented disposition, which is, I doubt not, communicated to the soldier.

Either form a Staff corps, or completely change the system by which local and irregular forces are at present officered from the line, the effect of which is to deprive the regular army of its most valuable officers (otherwise patronage is not dispensed with purity and justice), leaving only those of inferior merit and capacity for duty with their regiments, and thus making the real and main army of minor importance to those local and irregular excrescences and make-shifts. Make all irregular and local corps into separate local bodies, each for the protection of, and the discharge of the duties of the district to which it may be attached, such as Hyderabad contingent, &c., in the Nizam's dominions, Oude corps in Oude, Gwalior corps in the Gwalior country, Punjab corps in the Punjab, and so on. Take officers who are to serve with these local forces from the line, but let them understand that they are struck off the strength of their regiments, and have no further claim to promotion therein, or to any of the staff appointments of the regular army. If officers take to the irregular forces, they should be made to stick to that line, rising from adjutant to the command of a corps, and holding the

command (once obtained) in perpetuity. Local and irregular forces should be available for employment on field service whenever necessary, so as to occasionally open to all ranks a field for distinction: but once an officer makes his election, and enters the local and irregular levies, all connexion between him and the line should be for ever severed, and his place in the regular army at once filled up. Each district brigade to be commanded by a brigadier from the regular army, with the usual staff drawn from the local force. These Brigade commands should, however, be open to officers of proved and acknowledged ability, and distinguished merit, belonging to the local forces, and this should be the highest post to which they could aspire; further promotion or advancement being compensated for by present advantages of pay, &c. &c.

The sole and entire patronage of the local and irregular forces to be in the hands of Government, applications being, however, made to the Commander-in-Chief for the services of officers of the line, required to fill vacancies. But in no other way should the Commander-in-Chief have any power to interfere with these forces. His real business is with the regular army, to that, to its well-being and its improvement and interests, let the Commander-in-Chief devote his every energy; and, let me ask, may not the Department of Public Works have this principle applied to it with advantage?

(Signed) PATRICK GRANT.

APPENDIX No. 67.

LORD ELPHINSTONE'S REPLY TO THE FIRST SERIES OF QUESTIONS.

SIR, Bombay, September 22, 1858.

I HAVE the honour to forward my reply to the first series of questions on the subject of the numbers and organization of the military and police force to be maintained in the Bombay presidency.

I have, &c.
Colonel Durand, C.B. ELPHINSTONE.

1. *What is the number of European troops of each arm now serving in the Bombay presidency, and what is their distribution?*

Return marked A. shows the number of European troops of each arm now serving in the Bombay presidency, and their distribution.

2. *What is the number of European troops of each arm you deem necessary for the Bombay presidency, and what should be their ordinary distribution?*

Return marked B. shows the number of European troops of each arm deemed necessary for the Bombay presidency, and what should be their ordinary distribution.

In replying to this question I have taken into consideration the present limits only of this presidency: Bombay troops, however, now occupy garrisons in Rajpootana and Central India, at the stations of Neemuch, Nusseerabad, Mhow, Seepree, Jhansi, Gwalior, and in the Nizam's territories at Jaulna.

The agents to the Governor-General in Rajpootana and Central India, and the resident at Hyderabad, will, I conclude, be called upon to consider what garrisons will be required for these stations.

3. *What is the number of native troops of each arm now serving in the Bombay presidency, and what is their distribution?*

Return marked A. shows the number of native troops now serving in the Bombay presidency and their distribution.

4. *What is the number of native troops you deem necessary for the Bombay presidency, and what should be their ordinary distribution?*

Return marked B. shows the number of native troops deemed necessary for the Bombay presidency, and what should be the ordinary distribution.

5. *What proportion of native troops now serving in the Bombay presidency are regulars, irregulars, and police corps? Of what races are they composed, and in what proportions do the races occur?*

The proportion of native troops now serving within the limits of the Bombay presidency are:—

Regulars	-	-	-	-	26,668
Irregulars	-	-	-	-	8,588
Police, disciplined and armed (exclusive of the police of Bombay and of Sind), viz.	-	-	-	-	9,871
Bombay town police	-	-	-	-	1,162
Sind police	-	-	-	-	5,075

In the accompanying Return marked C., the races of which the regular troops are composed are shown, with the proportions per cent. The total number of regulars in this return varies from that above given, as the return includes the whole of the regular Bombay army, the troops serving without as well as within the presidency.

The irregulars number 8,588, the proportion per cent. of races to the whole being:—

Deccanees -	37.9	Guzerattees -	8.8
Hindoostanees -	24.4	Kutchees -	3.9
Madrasees -	0.58	Bheels -	0.9
Concannees -	10.0		

The proportion per cent. of races in the Bombay police to the whole is as follows:—

Mahomedans -	18.6	Mahrattas -	25.7
Kolees -	8.2	Bheels -	13.0
Poorbheas -	3.1	Christians -	0.3
Rajpoots -	3.05	Hindoo castes -	27.4

The proportion per cent. of races in the Sind police to the whole, is as follows:—

Mahrattas -	4.3	Punjabees -	5.0
Purdasees -	13.8	Belochees -	6.5
Mussulmans -	44.5	Sindees -	24.0

6. *What proportion of your proposed establishment of native troops should be regulars, irregulars, and police?*

To meet the requirements of the Bombay presidency only, I should propose that the regular force should consist of 25 regiments of infantry.

The irregular force of 9 regiments of cavalry and 13 regiments of infantry, including the marine battalion.

I would have no regular cavalry, except the European regiments.

The police force should consist, as at present, of about 18,000 men; 700 of these mounted for the Bombay provinces (not including Sind), and 1,500 mounted for Sind.

7. *What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in the Bombay presidency? and state the ratios, both inclusive and exclusive of police corps?*

I have proposed that the European force for the Bombay presidency should consist of 2 regiments of cavalry, 4 troops of horse artillery, 20 companies of foot artillery, 1 company of sappers, and 9 regiments of infantry.

According to present established strength, these would give in numbers:—

Cavalry -	-	-	1,492
Horse Artillery -	-	-	764
Foot Artillery -	-	-	3,600
Sappers -	-	-	120
Infantry -	-	-	9,630
			<u>15,606</u>

The native troops deemed necessary are—

- 3 companies African artillery;
- 5 companies of sappers;
- 25 regiments of regular infantry;
- 9 regiments of irregular cavalry; and
- 13 regiments of irregular infantry, including marine battalion.

These would give in numbers according to present established strength:—

African artillery -	-	-	300
Sappers -	-	-	620
Regular infantry -	-	-	28,600
Irregular cavalry -	-	-	6,930
Irregular infantry -	-	-	11,000
			<u>47,450</u>

The proportion therefore of Europeans to the regular and irregular troops would be a third of the whole, and inclusive of police, would be about one-fourth.

8. *What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in India generally? and state the ratios as effected by the inclusion or exclusion of native police corps?*

I have no means of judging what proportion the regular and irregular native troops and police should bear to each other in Bengal and in the Punjab. My impression is that the proportion of Europeans to natives of every description should not be less than 20 per cent., and for the next few years 25 per cent.

9. *Is there adequate barrack accommodation for the European troops now serving in the Bombay presidency, and state its amount?*

Return marked D. shows the amount of present barrack accommodation for European troops in the Bombay presidency.

10. *Would additional barrack accommodation have to be provided in the Bombay presidency for the strength of European troops you deem necessary, and to what extent?*

Returns marked E. and F. show the additional barrack accommodation required in the Bombay presidency, for the strength of European troops deemed necessary for it.

11. *What proportion of the European force should belong to Her Majesty's regular army, and what proportion should be composed of troops raised for service in India?*

I think the whole of the European force should belong to Her Majesty's regular army.

When the East India Company had an army of its own, distinct from that of the Crown, I can conceive a difference of opinion existing upon this subject, but now that the whole army of India is to be a royal army, there seems to be no good reason for maintaining a distinction between one part of the European force and the remainder.

It is no valid argument to say, that the regiments of Her Majesty's regular army are liable to be withdrawn from India in the event of an European war; for unless the whole of the European troops in India were raised for local service only, that portion of them which belonged to the Queen's regular army would always be liable to be thus withdrawn, and even if the whole were raised as local troops, means would be found, in the event of any great emergency to make them available for general service, neither do I consider that it is a sound reason for raising European regiments for Indian service only, to say that such regiments will be more entirely at the disposal of the Government of India.

If there is one thing which must be laid down as a principle not to be departed from in our military arrangements in India, it is the entire subordination of the army both European and native to the Government of India. The troops of the Queen's regular army while serving in India, must be wholly subject to the authority of the Queen's Government in India. Regimental promotion, indeed, may be left entirely to the Horse Guards, but the patronage of every staff appointment in India should be vested, as with very few exceptions, it now is entirely in the hands of the supreme and local governments, and of the supreme and local commanders-in-chief.

Having gone into the arguments commonly used in favour of the measure of raising European regiments for Indian service only, I will briefly add those which seem to me to tell conclusively against it.

1st. It will perpetuate the distinction which has hitherto existed between the Queen's and the Company's service, a distinction which has occasioned much jealousy and heart-burning, and which ought now I think to be done away with for ever.

2nd. It is impossible that any local troops can be really equal to the British line; they must always be conscious of a species of inferiority. They do not fight the battles of England on the battle-fields of Europe. Even if the enemy whom they may have to encounter upon the plains of India were of a different stamp, the fact that he is not a European enemy would take away half the glory of defeating him. But the fact is, that henceforward our European force will have no regular armies in India to conquer, for I presume that the organization of the native army will in future be such that no general revolt will be possible. I need hardly say that this is no reason for being satisfied with any but the best description of European force in India. English troops cannot be supplied in great numbers, and even if England could furnish them, India could not afford to pay for them; we must pay the best price for those that we have, and we ought to have the best article.

But a European force raised for India, and constantly stationed there, will be physically as well as morally inferior to the Queen's regular army. Instead of keeping men in this climate until their health is ruined, I am convinced that true policy demands that we should have more frequent reliefs of our European regiments. No regiment ought under any circumstances to remain in India more than ten years, and, except under a great exigency, no man should be allowed to come out who is not willing to enlist for the whole of this period, and whose health and constitution do not at least permit the hope that he will live to return. One great cause of expense is the sending out men who are wholly unsuited for the climate. Not only the poor fellow who dies or is invalided, but the man who is sickly, and passes half his time in hospital, is a direct loss to the State.

I would add the Company's European artillery and the nine regiments of European infantry to the Queen's regular army; the best way of doing so would be to incorporate the artillery of the three presidencies with the royal artillery, retaining them as separate battalions, and allowing every

officer and man the option of remaining in India and of drawing his full Indian pay and allowances, or of serving in other parts of the world upon the same pay and allowances as are now drawn by the royal artillery. In any case, both officers and men should retain their right to retire from the service on the Indian rates of pension. Probably the Company's infantry regiments might be at once transferred to the royal army as second battalions to the nine oldest regiments in the line which have not second battalions already, by doing this both the officers and men who are accustomed to India and wish to remain here, might always have the opportunity of remaining. One battalion of each of the nine regiments might be kept in India as long as there are any officers or men belonging to the Company's regiments remaining. Officers and men not wishing to return to Europe might always be kept in this battalion; and all would be entitled to the Indian rates of pension on their retirement or discharge.

12. *Under the supposition that additional corps of Europeans have to be raised for service in India, how would you officer them?*

The answer which I give to this question may be inferred from my reply to the last.

I believe that it would be a great mistake to raise any additional corps of Europeans for service in India only. I think that the whole European force should form a part of the Queen's regular army, consequently the officers must belong to Her Majesty's regular army.

It may be objected to this that the members of the Council of India, like the Court of Directors, are to be partly remunerated by the patronage of the Indian armies; and that if all the officers of the European force in India are to belong to Her Majesty's regular army they will lose a portion of their patronage, and if the native corps are in future officered in the way which I am going to suggest, they will be deprived of the whole of it. But I do not see why this should be the case; the privilege of recommending officers for their first commissions is already exercised by the colonels of the household regiments, and virtually by the Commander-in-chief, the Board of Admiralty (for the Marines), and (formerly at least) by the Master-general of Ordnance (for the artillery and engineers); if, in lieu of their present patronage, the members of the Council of India were allowed to recommend to Her Majesty a certain number of qualified young gentlemen for commissions in the army, this objection might be got over, at any rate it ought not to stand in the way of a measure which would place all the Queen's officers upon an equal footing, and thereby remove a source of jealousy and heartburning, which will otherwise continue to exist as heretofore.

Another objection of a different kind is, that if all the Queen's officers in India are appointed by the Crown, the patronage of the Crown (or of the Horse Guards) will be too much increased, but this may be met either by allowing the members of the Council of India to exercise a portion of that patronage in the way I have suggested, or what would be much better, by allowing them to nominate a certain number of cadets to the Royal Military College, of which all who qualified themselves for the army should receive commissions from the Queen.

I may here remark that one of the most effectual means of promoting a good feeling and military spirit among all the officers of the army and of uprooting every remnant of jealousy and separation between the different services would be to educate all young gentlemen destined for the army at the same military college. I am convinced that nothing would have a better effect upon the morale of the army than the amalgamation of the so-called college at Sandhurst with the academies of Woolwich and Addiscombe.

It is hardly necessary to point out that the efficiency of the professorial staff would be trebled, while greater scope and opportunity of improvement would be afforded to the talents of every cadet.

13. *Under the supposition that a considerable increase takes place in the number of corps raised for service in India, and that they are officered from the officers of the mutinied battalions of the Bengal army, will this accession of seniority promotion corps create any greater embarrassment in juxta-position with the purchase promotion system than what now accrues from the existence of the royal artillery, royal engineers, royal marines, and the three Indian armies, in all which corps and armies seniority promotion is the system?*

From what I have already written it will be seen that I do not recommend that any European corps should be raised for service in India only.

With regard to the officers of the Bengal army whose regiments have mutinied, I think that they might be provided for in the following manner:—

1st. All officers at present employed on the staff or in command of irregular or police corps, or on other detached duty to be placed on a general staff or detached list, such arrangements being made for the promotion of officers upon this list, as may give them as nearly as possible the same average prospect of promotion which they would have enjoyed regimentally.

I would make the appointment of officers to all native regiments by selection from the general staff list upon the same principle, and in the same proportion that officers are now selected from the line for the irregular corps.

Of the regimental officers now unemployed, a limited number (say 10 or 15 per cent.) in excess of the number at present on the staff or on detached employment, or required for native regiments under the system proposed in the preceding paragraph, might be allowed the option of being included in the general staff list, with a view to filling vacancies.

The supernumeraries while unemployed might receive the net pay of their rank, and an unattached allowance which would make up their income to that which they would have drawn as regimental officers at a half batta station.

No officer to be eligible for the staff list who is not qualified for staff employment, according to the present standard.

When the officers now placed upon the staff list retire or die out, I would provide for the performance of their duties by officers taken from the Queen's regiments who have passed the required test, which will of course include an examination in the native languages.

When officers are placed on the general staff list, their places in their regiments to be filled up; thus the inconvenience of taking officers from their regiments, and of again remanding them when these are ordered on service, often to the neglect and injury of the important duties for which they were selected, would be obviated.

A further limited number of officers belonging to the mutinied regiments of the Bengal army might be allowed the option of entering Her Majesty's service. It has been found that the practice of attaching a Company's officer to each Queen's regiment as interpreter has been very useful. I believe that if one captain and two subalterns were to be attached to each as supernumeraries, to be absorbed as vacancies occur, that the same object would be gained, and many useful officers might find employment. Officers thus transferred to European regiments might further have the option of remaining in India until they had served their time, or of going home with the regiment in which they were serving; and in the event of their remaining in India, they should be entitled to pension according to length of service and upon the Indian scale, as at present.

My impression is, that after establishing the general staff or detached list which I have proposed, and after allowing for the absorption of three officers into each European regiment in India, there would remain but few officers unprovided for. But to all officers not included in the general staff and detached list, and not absorbed into European regiments in India, I would pay a fair equivalent for their loss of service, either in the shape of a pension, chargeable upon the Indian revenue, or of purchase money for their commissions. These officers, if pensioned, to be relieved from all liability to serve; if purchased out, they would of course be free from any liability of the kind.

The question refers to the officers of the mutinied battalions of the Bengal army only, but it will be perceived that my answer is of a wider application, and embraces the whole of the Company's officers. I would recommend the establishment of a separate general staff list in each presidency.

14. *The feasibility of raising corps of foreign mercenaries, such as Tartars, Chinese, Malays, Dyaks, Africans, Madagascarenes, &c., being assumed, would you consider that the proportion of European to native and foreign mercenary troops could, with safety to our power and supremacy in India, be modified in the ratio stated in reply to questions 7 and 8; if so, to what extent?*

In calculating in reply to questions 7 and 8 the proportion of European to native troops of all sorts, I have assumed that the native army will be so constituted as to render the danger of general mutiny as small as possible. It appears to me, that if proper precautions are used (I shall have another opportunity of explaining those which I advocate, and in the meantime I beg to refer to my minutes of the 14th and 22nd May last), I am persuaded there would be as little to apprehend from native troops as from foreign mercenaries, and I do not think that the employment of the latter would enable us to reduce the number of European troops.

There are, however, two exceptional cases in which foreign troops might be advantageously employed; one of

these is in the artillery. I agree with those who think that it is not judicious to train any natives of India to the use of guns. They make excellent artillerymen, and they attach great value and importance to guns; but these very circumstances make it dangerous to place them in their hands. There are some stations, however, such as Shikarpore and Aden, in this presidency, in which European troops suffer severely, and where it is, nevertheless, necessary to have artillery. I would suggest that a few companies of African artillerymen might be formed for those hot stations.

Another exceptional case is, when a whole province is disaffected or hostile to us, like Oude or the Delhi division. In such a case it would be dangerous to raise troops on the spot, and it is not desirable to keep a body of native troops from a different part of the country in such a province. They would be liable to be tampered with, perhaps they might carry the spirit of disaffection to their homes. In this case it would be safer to depend wholly upon European and foreign troops. I do not see why we might not at once secure the services of the Gold Coast artillery corps, of the three West Indian regiments, and of the Ceylon rifle corps (Malays), their places being taken by native (Indian) artillery and by sepoy regiments; the difference of pay ought not to prevent this measure from being carried out. The Indian Government would pay the difference between the colonial allowances and Indian allowances, and it would gain six companies of African artillery and four excellent regiments, while six companies of Golundaz and four or five of the sepoy regiments now disarmed and utterly useless, or worse than useless, would be not only got rid of, but turned to good account.

September 21, 1858.

ELPHINSTONE.

MINUTE.

The Secret Committee's despatch to the Government of India of the 9th of March (No. 1930) has been sent to us only that we may obtain and submit the opinion of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief as to the future probable demand for troops, and their distribution within this presidency. Upon these points a military opinion is of course indispensable; but it seems to me that the subject of the despatch includes the composition as well as the distribution and strength of the native army; and holding, as I do, that this was the radical error to which the greatest disasters which we have experienced were chiefly to be attributed, I hope that I shall not be considered officious if I take this opportunity of bringing my views upon this matter under the notice of the Government of India and the Secret Committee. They are not new to my colleagues, for I have already entered fully into them upon more than one occasion.

I cannot explain the system of recruitment which I advocate better than by transcribing a part of my minute of the 21st September last. "I have a very strong opinion upon this subject. I believe that for a long time past we have too much lost sight of our true policy with respect to the native army; and when I find that the views which I have long entertained, and which were formed from reading the minutes of Sir Thomas Munro, and from conversing with General Cubbon, the late Sir John Doveton, and other officers of great experience in the Madras army, are so nearly the same as those which are now expressed by Brigadier-General Jacob, I am strongly impressed with the conviction that they are sound.

"I beg to append to this minute copy of one by Sir Thomas Munro, dated December 29th, 1820. It will, I am sure, be read with interest at the present moment. "Our native troops," says Sir Thomas Munro, 'unite the character of a standing army with that of a militia.' It is to be observed that this is, or at least was, the case with all the best native armies that have ever existed. The Mahrattas, the Khalsa of Lahore, and, to this day, Goorkhas of Nepal, are exactly described by these words of Sir Thomas Munro. The effect of losing sight of this normal condition of the native army is, to use Sir Thomas Munro's words, 'to convert it into a body of mere mercenaries, finding homes and families wherever they may go, and ready to join in any disturbance dangerous to the State.'

But it may be said that there is equal or even greater danger in forming our regiments exclusively from men belonging to the same part of the country, and that our safety consists in forming our regiments of the most discordant materials. I know that this is the prevailing opinion at the present moment, an opinion, however, which is founded upon a state of things totally different from that which I advocate. I hope, therefore, that I may be allowed to show in what this difference consists.

"As I have before remarked, the system advocated by Sir Thomas Munro is the nearest approach to that of the

"best constituted armies under native governments. It may be regarded in fact as the natural system of an indigenous army. According to it the troops, though liable to serve in foreign countries and in distant parts of India, are essentially local troops. The regiments are raised in the same districts in which they are habitually quartered. The men, though belonging to the same part of the country, are not necessarily of the same caste. It is, however, probable that a large proportion of them are, and that there are, as Sir Thomas Munro expresses it, 'many families related to each other serving in the same corps.'

"That experienced officer and farsighted statesman did not, however, anticipate danger from this cause. He knew that the two things that possess the greatest influence for good over the mind of the native are his family and his village, and he sought to enlist this influence with the sepoy, into the service of Government. He considered that the more a regiment was localised, the more this influence would be felt, the more the thoughts and aspirations of the sepoy would be concentrated in his regiment, and the less community of feeling would exist between him and the sepoy of a different regiment, raised in a different district, and seldom brought into contact with him, except when on actual service.

"The Bengal army was the very opposite of this; though 100,000 men were raised from the same province, and exclusively from the highest castes, and though they refused to serve beyond sea, they certainly could not be considered a local force in the same sense of the term in which it was used by Sir Thomas Munro, but a very small proportion of that great army was ever quartered in the district from which it was almost exclusively raised.

"The regiment was never considered by the sepoy as his home; in the regiment the influence of the family and the village was wholly wanting, indeed this influence instead of leading him to concentrate all his thoughts in his own regiment, as it would have done under the system recommended by Sir Thomas Munro, had a directly opposite tendency, for the Bengal sepoy had his relations and his correspondents in half the regiments in the army, any attack real or fancied upon the susceptibilities of one regiment was thus felt by the whole, and when one mutinied, the rest followed, as if impelled by some unseen, but irresistible impulse, as if an electric shock had been felt by them all.

"General Jacob's plan differs in some important particulars from Sir Thomas Munro's. He localises the headquarters of the regiment even more completely than Sir Thomas Munro, who merely contemplated the periodical and frequent return of each corps to the station which it regarded as its home, the place whence it was chiefly raised, but General Jacob does not advocate the location of his regimental home in the district where the regiment is principally recruited, the tie which he seeks to create is a purely regimental one. In this respect his plan seems to me inferior to Sir Thomas Munro's. It has this further disadvantage, that it has no tendency to isolate the regiments from each other, an object which, I think, we should seek to promote by every means in our power."

If the plan which I advocate be adopted, each regiment will have its own special recruiting district, from which no other corps will be permitted to enlist recruits, the complete isolation of regiments will be effected, for it will be difficult, if not impossible, to keep up that close correspondence, and to create that community and identity of feeling in regiments thus composed, which existed in the late Bengal army; on the other hand the home associations, the only healthy moral influence which we can bring to bear upon the native mind will be encouraged, and it is not too much to say will be arrayed on the side of Government.

It is not necessary in order to carry out this plan, that regiments shall be raised in every district, or even in every province. I am quite aware that there are parts of the country in which it would be impossible to raise a regiment, there are other parts where at present, at all events, it would be highly inexpedient to do so. The area of recruiting districts must be in proportion to their capacity to furnish recruits; this does not depend so much upon the density of the population, as upon the character of the people; but as a general rule, I would endeavour to raise regiments in every part of the country, excepting only those provinces where the spirit of disaffection prevails. Even in the lower provinces of Bengal which are probably the most unwarlike in India some races will be found like the Santhals who may probably be turned into good soldiers.

This radical change in the system of recruiting should be the basis of our future policy with regard to the native army. It may be useful also to divide the army into different classes, such as troops of the line, irregular levies, and police corps, and to separate these classes as much as pos-

sible by artificial means, each class having its own terms of enlistment, rates of pay, arms, and uniform.

It seems to me that it is worthy of the consideration of the Government of India whether the army of the Punjab shall not be entirely separated from the army of Bengal; for many years we have been endeavouring to assimilate, to centralize, to do away as much as possible with the differences and peculiarities which used to distinguish the armies of the different presidencies. I think that it must now be admitted that it is just as well that we had not altogether succeeded in effecting this object. If we had thoroughly amalgamated the three armies, and had incorporated Sikhs and Ghoorkahs into the mass, where should we have been now?

But it may be urged that if we had done this the mutiny of last year would not have taken place, that it was in its origin a caste movement, and that the intermixture of other castes and races would have prevented it. I am not prepared to admit this; but even admitting it, for the sake of argument, I cannot allow that mutinies can only be caused by caste questions. I believe that more mutinies have arisen from questions of pay and allowances than from any other cause.

But suppose the whole native troops to be formed into one grand army, the component parts of each regiment being as heterogeneous as possible, and suppose some cause of discontent to arise which affects all castes alike, the danger would be undoubtedly far greater than that which overtook us last year. I have long considered this subject, and I am convinced that the exact converse of this policy of assimilation is our only safe military policy in India. *Divide et impera* was the old Roman motto, and it should be ours. The safety of the great iron steamers, which are adding so much to our military power, and which are probably destined to add still more to our commercial superiority, is greatly increased by building them in compartments. I would ensure the security of our Indian empire by constructing our native army upon the same principle; for this purpose I would avail myself of those diversities of race and language which we find ready to our hands. I might, perhaps, hesitate to express my conviction so decidedly, if I were not able to show that my views upon this subject are entirely in accordance with those of the Duke of Wellington. The following extract from a letter of his Grace to Mr. Wyne, the President of the India Board, dated Strathfieldsaye, August 7th, 1826, is so much to the point that I cannot forbear to copy it:—

" Since I wrote to you yesterday I have read that part of Malcolm's book which relates to the military establishments in the East Indies, and I see that he recommends the amalgamation of the armies, the equalization of their pay, and indeed the formation of the whole into one. He attacks the opinion which I entertain of the security which is derived from the division of the establishments.

" But Malcolm passes over unnoticed two or three little events not much to the credit of Indian armies as armies, but which ought to have a great influence in the decision of these questions. First, the mutiny of the European officers of the Bengal army in 1795-96.

" 2ndly. The mutiny of the sepoys of the army of Fort St. George; and thirdly, the mutiny of the officers of the army of Fort St. George. Some others might be quoted, such as the arrest of Lord Pigot, &c., but I refer only to those of modern times as bearing more immediately upon the question.

" It is true that this country can always rely upon the King's troops in India, that is to say, if the native army is kept in the hands of the Company; but I declare I believe that if, upon any one of those occasions the armies had been amalgamated, and had formed but one, the dependency upon this country would have been lost.

" With these events before us, and seeing what armies have done in different countries of Europe and are capable of attempting, I cannot but think it fortunate that they are three separate and distinct armies, and not an army consisting of 250,000 men.

" But there is one point peculiarly Indian which Malcolm has not brought forward in discussing this question, however much it deserves consideration, and notwithstanding that it has not escaped him in considering other parts of this subject, and that is the different classes and nations of people of whom these armies (proposed to be made one army) are composed. He says very truly, in another part of his book, that the natives of the countries about Cape Comorin are as unlike those of Hindostan or of the provinces of Bengal, as a native of Spain or of Italy is to a native of Sweden, or of the north of Germany or of Russia, and their languages differ as much as their appearance. The exclusive merit of these officers of the Company's army is their understanding the language, manners, and customs of the natives of India placed under their

" command. But how is a man belonging to a corps raised and stationed on the coast of Coromandel or Malabar, or in the ceded districts or the Deccan, to go and command a battalion raised and stationed in Hindostan? He knows no more of them than (not so much probably as) the commanding officer of one of the King's regiments who may have done duty in Hindostan. The fact is that all these armies differ in their discipline, appearance, mode of doing duty, &c., not only because they are separate armies and paid at different rates, but because they are composed of people of different nations; this can never be altered, let us leave the rest as it is.

" If you have not read it, pray read the account of the mutiny of the officers of the army of Fort St. George, which was in fact fomented by the commander-in-chief, General MacDowall. Pray likewise read the account of the late conspiracies in the Russian armies, which are not unworthy of attention in considering the question of forming the Indian armies into one."

These extracts show that the Duke of Wellington considered the separation of the native armies of the three presidencies as our greatest safeguard against the danger of mutiny. I need not point out the striking corroboration which the events of the last year have afforded to his opinion; my object is simply to suggest the adoption of the principle of separation and isolation which he advocated to the fullest extent which may be found compatible with perfect efficiency and convenience.

May 14.

(Signed) ELPHINSTONE.

MINUTE.

Having read my honorable colleague's minutes, I hope that I may be permitted to add a very few words on the subject of the enlistment and composition of the native army.

I am aware that this is a subject upon which a difference of opinion is almost sure to exist. In fact it is impossible to propose any plan which is not open to some objection. I admit at once that there may be danger in drawing the native troops exclusively from the population of the country in which they are to be generally and habitually quartered, but I believe this danger to be infinitively less than that which arises from the opposite system. I would point out that under a system either of promiscuous or of partially *foreign** enlistment, the complete isolation of regiments, and even of armies, becomes impossible; correspondence will be kept up between men in different regiments, and in different armies; the community of feeling and interest between the different regiments and the different armies, and the consciousness of strength which this inspires, will not be destroyed. But if the principle of isolation be adopted, if the native army be completely and thoroughly localized, this great and constant source of danger would cease to exist.

There might still be disaffection, and there might still be mutiny, but it would be local, not general.

In this presidency the police, which are purely local, have never shown any sympathy for local insurgents or rebels, and I need not say that I entirely concur with both my honourable colleagues that the existing system in this presidency should not be disturbed; at this moment we have two Bheel battalions in Candish acting against their own clansmen and chiefs. In Ireland, the constabulary and the military force, almost equally recruited from the Irish population, have never hesitated to act against their own countrymen, whether ribbonmen or orangemen. Even supposing that a regiment or the troops at one station were gained over, that they refused to act, or even joined the disaffected, their disaffection would not immediately spread into other regiments or stations, and the whole European force in the division, and probably a portion at least of the native troops where different races and languages exist in the same division (they would be found in every Indian army), would be available to suppress it.

There are two other points in my honourable colleague's minutes, on which I wish to explain myself more clearly than I appear to have done. Mr. Mallet observes that this presidency is divided into four great military districts, and that only two of them would furnish sufficient recruits for their military occupation. But though I would *localise* each regiment, and give it a home or permanent head quarters, I do not recommend that regiments should never be moved from this home. If Guzerat or the Southern Mahratta country will give us no recruits, they must be garrisoned by regiments raised in other parts of the presidency, those regiments being however frequently relieved,

* i.e. from other parts of India.

and never kept for more than three or four years away from their permanent head quarters. I believe, however, that recruits would be much more readily found in those parts of the country which do not now furnish any, if the local system of enlistment were adopted; I can easily understand a man whose language is Guzrattee or Canarese, disliking to enter a regiment of Mahrattas and Hindostanees, who are to him almost foreigners. A hundred years ago, not many highlanders would have enlisted in an English regiment.

The other point is one upon which Mr. Reeves lays much stress, and which I readily admit deserves the greatest consideration. My honourable colleague thinks that regiments should be composed of different castes and classes, and that great care should be taken that neither Brahmans nor Mussulmans, nor indeed any class of natives, should be allowed an undue numerical superiority; but attention to this precaution is not, it appears to me, incompatible with the principle of isolation; indeed, I have great doubts whether any Brahmans should be enlisted; they appear to exercise an influence over the men of other castes which is inconsistent with discipline. I have heard of a low caste officer falling at the feet of a Brahmin private and beseeching his blessing. This seems utterly subversive of all correct military feeling and discipline, and if there is any truth in such stories, the only remedy would appear to be the exclusion of men possessing such influence from the ranks. With reference to other castes and classes, I agree with my honourable colleague, that it is desirable that men of different castes should be encouraged to enlist, and that if possible no one caste should predominate. (I except, of course, regiments composed of a particular tribe or race, like Bheels or Kolies.) Knowing, however, that mutinies and disaffection proceed from other causes besides caste, I think that all precautions upon this point will be ineffectual to prevent them, if our native regiments are still linked together by a system of enlistment which fosters those feelings of common interest and mutual reliance upon each other, and that consciousness of power, without which no mutiny of an army en masse could ever be brought about.

May 22. (Signed) ELPHINSTONE.

A.

RETURN showing the Troops, European and Native, of all Arms serving within the limits of the Bombay Presidency and their Distribution.

	Commissioned Officers.		Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	
	Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.
Her Majesty's Troops.				
1 Troop Horse Artillery - - -	5	-	312	73
2 Light Field Batteries - - -	10	-	331	29
11 Regiments Cavalry - - -	63	-	1,076	-
6½ Regiments Infantry - - -	245	-	5,377	-
Total - - -	323	-	6,996	102
Hon. Company's European Troops.				
1 Troop Horse Artillery - - -	5	-	119	25
5 Companies Foot Artillery, with Light Field Batteries.	12	4	398	260
1 Company without Battery - - -	4	1	79	30
3 Companies Reserve Artillery, with Light Field Batteries.	7	2	293	138
1 Regiment Infantry - - -	32	-	983	-
Total - - -	60	7	1,870	453
Hon. Company's Native Troops.				
4 Companies Foot Artillery, with Light Field Batteries.	3	19	9	470
5 Companies, without Batteries	11	21	2	441
Head Quarters and 21 Companies Sappers and Miners.	4	5	17	319
1 Regiment Light Cavalry - - -	15	14	2	441
5 Regiments Irregular Cavalry - - -	20	123	-	3,686
21 Regiments of Infantry - - -	279	485	14	21,357
1 Marine Battalion - - -	4	24	-	1,130
1 Native Veteran Battalion - - -	14	18	-	822
Enrolled Pensioners - - -	5	65	2	1,661
Total - - -	355	774	42	30,281
Grand Total - - -	738	781	8,908	30,836

DISTRIBUTION of the above.

Her Majesty's Troops.	Stations.
Artillery.	
D Troop, Horse Artillery - - -	Poona.
1st Batt. 8th Comp. Light Field Battery -	Baroda.
14th Batt. 5th Comp. Light Field Battery	Kuladghee, Dharwar, and Nurgood.
Cavalry.	
3rd Dragoon Guards (Head Quarters Wing)	Kirkee.
Detachment - - -	Sattara.
Detachment - - -	Under orders to proceed to Nuggur.
Depôt, 14th Light Dragoons - - -	Kirkee.
17th Light Dragoons (Lancers) - - -	Kirkee.
1 Squadron - - -	Sholapore.
Infantry.	
4th King's Own (Wing) - - -	Ahmedabad, temporarily transferred from Mauritius.
18th Royal Irish (Head Quarters) - - -	Poona.
2 Companies - - -	Under orders to proceed to Nuggur.
1 Company - - -	Asserghur.
83rd Regiment (Head Quarters) - - -	Poona.
2 Companies - - -	Sattara.
1 Company - - -	Sholapore.
1 Company - - -	Ahmednuggur.
51st Light Infantry - - -	Kurrachee.
1 Company - - -	Ahmedabad.
2 Companies - - -	Hydrabad.
1 Company - - -	Shikarpore.
56th Regiment (Head Quarters) - - -	Belgaum.
1 Company - - -	Sawaut Warce.
57th Regiment (Head Quarters) - - -	Bombay.
Wing - - -	Aden.
Depôt, 84th Regiment	Belgaum.
74th Detach. from Bellary, temporarily	Dharwar Fort.
Depôt, 78th Regiment	Poona.
Depôt, 83rd Regiment	Deesa.
Depôt, 86th Regiment	Poona.
88th Regiment	Deesa.
92nd Highlanders, 1 Company	Bombay.
1 Company - - -	Nusick.
1 Company - - -	Mullegaum.
Depôt, 95th Regiment	Deesa.
Details of Recruits of Her Majesty's Regiments.	Baroda and Broach.

Honourable Company's Native Troops.	Stations.
Artillery.—Horse Brigade.	
Head Quarters - - -	Poona.
4th Troop - - -	Poona.
1st Battalion.	
Head Quarters - - -	Ahmednuggur.
1st Company, with Light Field Battery - - -	Ahmedabad.
2nd Company, without Battery - - -	Aden.
3rd Company, with Light Field Battery - - -	Belgaum.
4th Company - - -	Hydrabad.
2nd Battalion.	
Head Quarters - - -	Bombay.
2nd Company, with Light Field Battery - - -	Sattara.
3rd Company - - -	Sholapore.
Reserve.	
No. 1 Company - - -	Shikarpore.
No. 3 Company - - -	Kolapore.
No. 4 Company - - -	Kurrachee.
Infantry.	
Depôt, 1st Regiment Fusiliers - - -	Kurrachee.
2nd Regiment Light Infantry - - -	Belgaum.
Detachment - - -	Kolapore.
Detachment - - -	Kuladghee.
Detachment - - -	Batnasherry.
Depôt, 3rd Regiment - - -	Ahmednuggur.
Honourable Company's Native Troops—Artillery.	
1st Comp. 3rd Batt. Artillery - - -	Detachments, Rajcole and Surat.
2nd Comp. " with Lt. Field Battery - - -	Ahmedabad.
3rd Comp. " - - -	Deesa.
4th Comp. " - - -	Ahmednuggur.
5th Comp. " - - -	Aden.
1st Comp. 4th Batt. with Lt. Field Battery	Head Quarters, Ahmednuggur.
2nd Comp. " - - -	Ahmednuggur.
4th Comp. " - - -	"
6th Comp. " - - -	"
Sappers.	
1½ Company Sappers and Miners - - -	Poona, Detachment, S. Mahratta Country.
1 Company - - -	Aden.
Cavalry.	
1st Lancers (Detachment) - - -	Bombay.
2nd Light Cavalry (Detachment) - - -	Deesa and Bombay.
2nd Madras Light Cavalry - - -	Sholapore.
Poona Irregular Horse (Head Quarters)	Seroor.
Detachments - - -	Khandesh, Poona, Nuggur, and Shullghat.
1st Sind Horse Irregular Detachments - - -	Jacobabad.
- - -	Hoosenkagherry, Tungwance, Khundkote, and Koomree.
2nd Sind Irregular Horse Detachment - - -	Jacobabad.
3rd Sind Irregular Horse - - -	Bojun.
- - -	Jacobabad.

Honourable Company's Native Troops.	Stations.	Honourable Company's Native Troops.	Stations.
<i>Cavalry—cont.</i>		<i>Infantry—cont.</i>	
Southern Mahratta Horse	Head Quarters, Kulladghee.	22nd Regiment, N. I.	Settara.
Detachments	Belgaum, Dharwar, Sattara, and Kolapore.	Left Wing	Tasaun.
		Detachments	Asta, Beccapoor, and Punderpoor.
<i>Infantry.</i>		23rd Regiment, N. I.	Malligaum.
1st Grenadier Regiment, Native Infantry	Bombay.	Detachment	Asserghur.
2nd Grenadier	Rupoolpoor.	Depôt, 25th Regiment, N. I.	Poona.
Depôt	Ahmedabad.	26th Regiment, N. I.	Dhoolia.
3rd Regiment, N. I.	Sholapore.	Detachments	Nuzkur Districts.
Detachment	Beegapoor.	28th Regiment, N. I.	Dharwar.
5th Regiment, N. I.	Ahmednugkur.	Detachments	Field Service, Southern Districts.
Detachment	Field Service in the Districts.	29th Regiment, N. I.	Aden.
6th Regiment, N. I.	Poona.	30th Regiment, N. I.	Malligaum.
7th Regiment, N. I.	Bombay.	Detachment	Kurrachee.
8th Regiment, N. I.	Baroda.	31st Regiment, N. I.	Deesa
Detachments	Jumbosser and Dohud.	<i>Irregular Infantry.</i>	
11th Regiment, N. I.	Ahmedabad.	Marine Battalion	Bombay.
Detachment	Gogo.	Detachments	Sind, Bushire, &c. &c.
Depôt, 13th Regiment, N. I.	Hydrabad.	Native Veteran Battalion	Dapoolce.
14th Regiment, N. I.	Kurrachee.	Detachments	Bhowdy and other parts of the Koukan.
Detachment	Ahmedabad.	Enrolled Pensioners	Tauna, Poona, Ahmednugkur, Dapoolce, Malwan, and Ahmedabad.
15th Regiment, N. I.	Kolapore.		
Detachments	Kutnagherry Vingoria, and Kulladghee.		
16th Regiment, N. I.	Surat.		
Detachment	Broach.		
17th Regiment, N. I.	Deesa, under orders for Rajcote.		
Wing	Rajcote.		
18th Regiment, N. I.	Belgaum.		
Detachment	North Canara Frontier.		
20th Regiment, N. I.	Belgaum.		
Detachments	Ramghat and Betsee.		

N.B.—No Returns of the 3rd Belooch Battalion and the two Sind Rifle Regiments have been received; they are not, consequently, included in the above.

(Signed) R. PHAYRE, Lieut.-Col.,
Quartermaster-General.

Quartermaster-General's Office,
Poona, July 1, 1858.

B.

PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION of TROOPS in the Bombay Presidency.

	Cavalry.		Artillery.			Sappers and Miners.		European Infantry.		Native Irregular Cavalry.		Native Infantry.				Barrack Accommodation required.
	Regiments.	Troops.	European.		Afr.	Eur.	Nat.	Regiments.	Companies.	Regiments.	Troops.	Regular.		Irregular.		
			Troops.	Companies.	Companies.							Companies.	Regiments.	Companies.	Regiments.	
<i>Poona Division</i>																
Poona	1	-	2	2	1	1	2	1	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	-
Sattara	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	5	1	-	1	-	1	-	-
Ahmednugkur	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Malligaum	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Nassick	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-
Asserghur	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	1	-	-
Dhoolia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Dhurrumpoor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Total	1	-	2	6	1	1	2	2	-	2	-	6	-	-	-	-
<i>Guzerat Division.</i>																
Surat	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Broach	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-
Baroda	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	5	-	-	-
Ahmedabad	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	2	-	1	-	-
Deesa	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
Rajcote	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
Dohud	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Total	-	-	1	5	-	-	1	2	-	3	-	7	-	2	-	-
<i>Southern Division.</i>																
Belgaum	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-
Dharwar	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Kulladghee	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
Sawnut Warree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Kolapore	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	1	-	1	-	-
Sholapore	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Total	1	-	1	4	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	6	-	2	-	-
<i>Sind Division.</i>																
Kurrachee	-	-	-	2	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	-
Hydrabad	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-
Shikarpore	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Jacobabad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	2	-	-
Total	-	-	-	3	1	-	1	1½	-	3	-	3	-	5	-	-
Aden	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	½	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-
Bombay	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	-
Grand Total	2	-	4	20	3	1	5	9	-	9	1	25	-	13	-	-

C.

RETURN of RACES in the Bombay Army, January 1, 1858.

	Hindoostanees.	Concan.	Deccan.	Gooserrat.	Madras.	Malabar.	Punjab.	Sind.	
Artillery - - - -	909	195	152	9	8	2	—	—	1,276
Engineers - - - -	226	115	225	—	8	—	—	—	574
Cavalry - - - -	1,001	175	127	41	41	—	—	—	1,385
Infantry - - - -	11,011	15,684	2,723	256	534	279	153	74	30,174
Total - - - -	13,147	16,169	3,227	306	591	281	153	74	33,949

Proportion per Cent. of each Race to the whole Army :—

	Per Cent.		Per Cent.
Hindoostanees - - - -	38.75	Madras - - - -	1.71
Concanes - - - -	47.6	Malabar - - - -	.82
Deccanees - - - -	9.5	Punjab - - - -	.45
Guzerat - - - -	.90	Sind - - - -	.01

This Return does not include Beeloch Battalions or Irregular Cavalry.

D.

RETURN of Existing and Sanctioned BARRACK ACCOMMODATION for European Troops in the Bombay Presidency, including Aden. Calculated at 1,200 Cubic Feet per man.

STATIONS.	Permanent existing.	Temporary existing.		Temporary Sanctioned.				Permanent Sanctioned.		REMARKS.
	Number of Men.	Wing.	Companies.	Regiment.	Wing.	Troop.	Companies.	Wing.	Companies.	
Artillery.										
Bombay - - - -	For 264 Men	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	In Fort George Barracks.
Poona - - - -	For 164 Men	-	-	For Two Troops				-	-	For 1 Company Artillery recommended. Poona Division.
Sattara - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	For One Company	-	
Naggur - - - -	For 381 Men	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Malligaum - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	For One Company	-	
Asseerghur - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	For One Half Comp.	-	
Belgaum - - - -	For 60 Men	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Dharwar - - - -	-	-	-	For One Company				-	-	Southern Division.
Kulladghee - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	For One Company	-	
Kolapore - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	For One Company	-	
Sholapore - - - -	For 88 Men	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	These Barracks condemned.
Ahmedabad - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	For One Company	-	
Baroda - - - -	Old Pendants -	-	-	-	-	-	-	For One Company	-	
Surat - - - -	Space in the Castle for about 100 Men.	-	-	-	-	-	-	For One Company	-	Northern Division.
Deesa - - - -	For 116 Men	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Kurrachee - - - -	For 162 Men	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Shikarpore - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	For One Company.	-	Sind Division.
Aden - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Total Artillery	1,235	-	1	-	-	2	2	-	8½	
Cavalry.										
Sholapore - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	For One Wing.	-	
Kirkee - - - -	For 453 Men	For a Wing.		-	-	-	-	-	-	
Sattara - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	For One Wing.	-	
Total Cavalry	453	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	
Infantry.										
Bombay - - - -	For 778 Men	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	640 in Town Barracks, and 318 at Colaba.
Poona - - - -	For 831 Men	For One Wing		For One Regiment				-	-	In the Gorporee Barracks. New Wanancee Barracks in course of completion. Poona Division.
Sattara - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	For Two Companies.	-	
Asseerghur - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Belgaum - - - -	For 645 Men	-	-	-	-	-	-	For One Wing.	-	
Dharwar - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	For Two Companies	-	
Kulladghee - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	For One Company	-	
Kolapore - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	For Three Companies	-	
Sholapore - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	For One Company	-	
Ahmedabad - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	For One Wing	-	
Baroda - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	For Two Companies	-	
Ahoo - - - -	-	For 200 Men		-	-	-	-	For 100 Men additional.	-	Northern Division.
Deesa - - - -	For 883 Men	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Kurrachee - - - -	For 1,618 Men	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Hyderabad - - - -	For 1,392 Men	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Aden - - - -	-	For One Wing		For One Wing.				-	-	Sind Division.
Total Infantry	5,947	2	-	1	1	-	-	2	11	At Kurrachee there are, in addition Pendants of an old temporary construction for about 1,600 men.

E.

ADDITIONAL ACCOMMODATION required for European Troops deemed necessary for the Bombay Presidency, taking into account present permanent accommodation only.

	Cavalry.			Artillery.			Sappers and Miners.		Infantry.		
	Regiments.	Troops.	Number of Men.	Troops.	Companies.	Number of Men.	Companies.	Number of Men.	Regiments.	Companies.	Number of Men.
<i>Poona Division.</i>											
Poona	—	—	—	—	1	118	1	120	—	—	—
Sattara	—	—	—	—	1	118	—	—	—	5	500
Ahmednuggur	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2½	250
Malligannu	—	—	—	—	1	118	—	—	—	—	—
Asserghur	—	—	—	—	1	118	—	—	—	—	—
Total	—	—	—	—	4	472	1	120	—	7½	750
<i>Northern Division.</i>											
Surat	—	—	—	—	—	50	—	—	—	—	—
Baroda	—	—	—	—	1	118	—	—	—	—	—
Ahmedabad	—	—	—	—	1	118	—	—	1	—	1,070
Deesa	—	—	—	1	—	191	—	—	—	3½	350
Rajcote	—	—	—	—	1	118	—	—	—	—	—
Total	—	—	—	1	3	595	—	—	1	3½	1,420
<i>Southern Division.</i>											
Belgaum	—	—	—	—	½	89	—	—	—	3½	350
Dharwar	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	200
Kolapore	—	—	—	—	1	118	—	—	—	5	500
Sholapore	1	—	746	1	1	{ 191 118 }	—	—	—	3	300
Total	1	—	746	1	2½	516	—	—	—	13½	1,350
<i>Sind Division.</i>											
Kurrachee	—	—	—	—	½	74	—	—	—	—	—
Grand Total	1	—	746	2	10½	1,657	1	120	1	24½	3,520*

* That is for one Regiment of Cavalry, 2 Troops of Horse Artillery, 10½ Companies of Artillery, 1 Company of Sappers and Mines, 3½ Regiments of Infantry.

The number of Men for each Regiment, Troop, and Company is taken from the present established strength for the different branches of the Army.

F.

ADDITIONAL BARRACK ACCOMMODATION required for European Troops deemed necessary for the Bombay Presidency, taking into account present accommodation, both permanent and temporary.

	Cavalry.			Artillery.			Sappers and Miners.		Infantry.		
	Regiment.	Wing.	Number of Men.	Troops.	Companies.	Number of Men.	Companies.	Number of Men.	Regiment.	Companies.	Number of Men.
<i>Poona Division.</i>											
Poona	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	120	—	—	—
Ahmednuggur	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	300
Malligannu	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Asserghur	—	—	—	—	½	59	—	—	—	—	—
Total	—	—	—	—	½	59	1	129	—	8	300
<i>Guzerat Division.</i>											
Surat	—	—	—	—	½	59	—	—	—	—	—
Ahmedabad	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	500
Deesa	—	—	—	1	—	191	—	—	—	3	300
Rajcote	—	—	—	—	1	118	—	—	—	—	—
Total	—	—	—	1	1½	368	—	—	—	8	800
<i>Southern Division.</i>											
Belgaum	—	—	—	—	½	89	—	—	—	—	—
Kalapore	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	200
Shalapore	—	1	373	1	1	309	—	—	—	2	200
Total	—	1	373	1	1½	398	—	—	—	4	400
<i>Sind Division.</i>											
Kurrachee	—	—	—	—	1	118	—	—	—	—	—
Grand Total	—	1	373	2	4½	943	1	120	—	13	1,500*

* Equal to 1½ Regiments of Infantry, 1 Wing of Cavalry, 1 Company of Sappers and Miners, 2 Troops of Horse Artillery, 4½ Companies of Artillery.

APPENDIX No. 68.

Lord ELPHINSTONE'S replies to FIRST SECTION of INFANTRY SERIES of QUESTIONS.

INFANTRY.

I. RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the native infantry of the Bombay army is composed?

The races are chiefly Concanes, Deccanees, and Hindoostances in the regular army. We have three battalions of Beloochees, and are raising two more; two battalions of Bheels, and are raising a third; and one corps of Koles. All castes are professedly admitted, but most Commanding Officers have hitherto given the preference to the higher castes.

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?

The Concanes, chiefly from the Southern Concan; the Deccanees, from all parts of the Deccan; the Hindoostances, from Oude and the neighbourhood of Cawnpore and Delhi; the Beloochees, from Sind and Beloochistan; the Bheels, from Khandesh, and the new corps from the hills of Guzerat; the Koles, from the Nassick district.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment, either by the regulations or the practice of the Bombay army?

None are excluded by the regulations. In practice hardly any recruits have been hitherto obtained from Guzerat, and few from the Southern Mahratta country. The Bheels, Koles, Beeruds, and other aboriginal tribes, are virtually excluded from the ranks of the regular army.

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of enlistment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn from for the native infantry of the Bombay army?

I have no doubt that if the system of local enlistment were adopted and insisted upon recruits might be obtained from those parts of the presidency which at present furnish none. For example, I see no reason why the Hindoos and Mussulmans of Guzerat should not be much more largely enlisted in the Bombay army. The Koles too of Guzerat are a very fine race, and might, I believe, be induced to enlist for general service. This government has just ordered the Beloochees to be enlisted for general service; hitherto they have only been engaged for service in Sindh; but one battalion volunteered for the Persian war, and another went to Delhi. It is doubtful whether the Bheels will engage for general service. They are a very shy race, and under any conditions enlistment goes on very slowly with them.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts from which the Bombay army is recruited?

I believe that recruits are brought in by their comrades when they return from furlough, but recruiting parties are also sent from regiments.

6. On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?

See Jameson's Code, Third Appendix, Page 182., Section 46., Article 214.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of sepoys or the followers of regiments, what precautions, if any, are taken?

I am not aware of the details upon this subject.

8. What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes (with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry of the native troops) in the Bombay army?

I advocate the system of local and separate enlistment for each regiment, in preference to the general and indiscriminate enlistment of men for the whole army in the same districts. Upon this point I beg to refer to my minutes of 14th and 22d May, appended to my former paper of replies.

I doubt if any Brahmins should be enlisted; the religious influence they possess over the inferior castes seems to be inconsistent with military discipline and even with safety.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the native infantry of the Bombay army?

I, A.B., private in the regiment, do swear, that I will not abandon these colours, but always defend them to the utmost of my power, and that I will implicitly obey all the orders of my commanders, and in every thing behave myself as becomes a good soldier, and faithful servant of the Company; and failing in any part of my duty as such, I will submit to the penalties described in the articles of war which have been read to me.

10. How long has this form been in use in the Bombay army?

Since the 11th April 1807.

11. Can you suggest any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the sepoy of the Bombay army?

If any oath is to be retained, the sepoy should be required to swear allegiance to the Queen.

12. Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the Bombay presidency of seafaring habits; and could marine corps be formed from such races, tribes, or castes?

The present marine corps is chiefly composed of Mussulmans and low-caste Hindoos. The so called native Portuguese, chiefly Roman Catholic fishermen, of whom there are a large number in Salsette and the Concan, would, in my opinion, form as good a native marine corps as could be raised. But I doubt their willingness to enlist in a corps chiefly composed of Hindoos and Mussulmans.

13. Has the Bombay Presidency any marine corps; and if so, what strength, and whence recruited?

This has been answered in the reply to the previous question. The marine corps is of the same strength as that of a regiment of the line.

14. Should each infantry corps be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there and there only?

I have already given my opinion upon this point. I attach the utmost importance to it. I believe that upon this more than upon all the other conditions together depends our future security in India.

15. Or should each corps be recruited over a wide area, in fact without reference to districts?

Answered in the foregoing reply.

16. Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste?

Where races and tribes are so entirely distinct as the Bheels, Koles, Beloochees, &c., I think that they should be formed into distinct corps. In districts where the population is mixed, and people of different tribes and castes are found in the same village, it would be desirable to enlist all indiscriminately.

17. If a corps is not homogeneous, will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, so far as may be possible, homogeneous, each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste? Or should the tribes and castes be mixed up in each company?

My answer to this question may be inferred from the foregoing. There can be no inconvenience in mixing up people enlisted from the same district and speaking the same language.

18. If corps are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, and castes be entertained?

It may be as well to prevent any caste having the preponderance; but if each corps is enlisted in a separate district, and if there are no Brahmins, this is a matter of comparative indifference.

19. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district, or kept to separate districts, or should police corps be recruited from a wide area, without reference to district?

I would enlist them from the same districts. As the police

receive less pay than the army, and have constant hard work, the better sort of recruits would enter the army.

20. Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the army corps?

Most certainly not. It is of the utmost importance to keep them as distinct as possible. Besides, I would have a lower standard for the police, and would have men of a different stamp altogether.

21. What agency should be employed for recruiting in the districts of the Bombay presidency or of its dependencies, or in districts of other presidencies?

Under the system which I have explained in my minutes of 14th and 22d May, probably no special agency would be required. Each regiment would return periodically to the district in which it was recruited, or to its neighbourhood, and the regimental head quarters would be the recruiting depot.

22. Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps, or a distinct agency?

I am not aware that any particular agency is required; there appears to be always abundance of recruits for police corps.

23. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the army of the Bombay presidency?

I am not aware that any precautions are necessary in this presidency. I presume that the precautions here alluded to are intended to prevent the enlistment of mutineers and disaffected men.

24. Should similar or different precautions be taken in connection with recruits for police corps in the Bombay presidency?

Answer as above.

25. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for service in India with the natives of the country, and if so, should they be formed in separate regiments, or in companies, or otherwise?

With the exception of a few African artillerymen for stations where Europeans cannot exist without great risk of life and health, I would have no foreign mercenaries. I would prefer relying upon the natives of the country. But it may be advisable for a time to entertain some regiments of Africans and Malays for service in notoriously disaffected districts, where it would be neither expedient to raise troops or to quarter regiments raised in other parts of the country which might become infected with the disaffection of the inhabitants.

26. If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries, which are the countries and races to be preferred?

I have no knowledge of the natives of other tropical countries; but the Africans in the West India regiments and the Malays in the Ceylon rifle regiments are said to be excellent soldiers.

27. What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting?

I have no knowledge which would enable me to answer this question.

28. Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of a native regiment?

I cannot possibly conceive an arrangement more calculated than this to exhibit in the strongest light our distrust of the natives and our own weakness.

29. If so, should such company or companies be enlisted for the special purpose, or be composed of men selected from European corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European corps, and subject to periodical relief?

I leave this question to be answered by those who advocate the measure.

30. Where should the barracks of such companies be placed relatively to the lines of the native troops?

31. Would such detachments seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?

32. How should such companies be armed? With similar or different weapons from the native troops with whom they would be associated?

I leave these questions to be answered by those who advocate the measure.

33. How should the native infantry of the Bombay presidency be armed?

If there is any choice, I would of course give the best arms to the Europeans, but I would not, even on this point show any distrust of the natives.

34. How should police corps in the Bombay presidency be armed?

I would arm them with a light fusil or musket and a short sword or knife, which would be useful both as a bayonet and as a separate weapon.

35. Do the advantages of making the dress of the native sepoy a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?

I should say not. It appears to me that it would be preferable to dress them in a uniform better suited to native habits.

36. How should the native infantry of the Bombay presidency be dressed with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier?

I cannot answer this in detail, but I think a looser and more native style of dress than the present would be better.

37. It has been proposed that to every European local regiment a native irregular regiment officered from that European regiment alone should be attached. What is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry in close and permanent association?

Believing that local European regiments would be the greatest of all possible mistakes, I do not enter into this question.

38. Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers present any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?

It is sufficient to recall to Colonel Durand's recollection the conduct of the drivers of the Bengal battery at Mhow last year.

39. How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps?

Needs no reply.

40. Would such a system be favourable or the reverse to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops, which is an element of strength?

Nothing in my opinion would be more calculated to impair both.

41. How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war?

I leave this question to be answered by those who advocate the measure.

42. Is it desirable that the native troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of auxiliary native battalions in permanent association with European corps?

We must have native troops, and it is better that they should be competent and self-reliant than good for nothing, which would be the case if they are taught to depend upon European support. Our policy should be to create an army which we can rely upon, and then to make it as good as we can.

Oct. 4, 1858.

ELPHINSTONE.

APPENDIX No. 69.

Lieut.-General Sir H. SOMERSET'S ANSWERS.

SIR,

Head Quarters, Poona,
July 22, 1858.

I HAVE the honour to communicate to you, for the information of the Right Hon. the Governor-General, my views regarding paragraph 5 of the Honourable Court's despatch, No. 235, as well as replies to the questions which accompanied your circular letter, No. 14, of 21st May.

2. Should it be resolved to enlist natives of other tropical countries for service in India, I would certainly recommend their being formed into separate regiments; but, after due consideration, I am led to doubt the expediency of such enlistments at all.

3. I think that, in the long run, regiments so composed would cost the State nearly as much as Europeans do, without possessing their general efficiency.

4. But it is chiefly on political grounds that I deprecate such enlistments, and I will therefore submit for his Lordship's consideration, a few of the reasons that strike me as militating against them.

5. The history of India for the past century has shewn, I think, that our rule has rested more upon moral influence and the natural ascendancy of our race over the Asiatic, than on the numerical strength of the British troops maintained in the country; and it seems to me that though it is our plain duty to augment the latter, yet that we must still look to moral influence as the distinguishing characteristic of our rule; and here I will not stop to analyse on what this influence is based, its chief outward cause is, undoubtedly, the European element, civil and military, in the country; but besides that, there are other points of no small importance, such as the superior vigour, moral, physical, and intellectual, of the Anglo-Saxon. Not the least of the collaterals I refer to is the salutary impression on the native mind of our unbounded resources. Hyder Ali is not the only native who has felt what he undoubtedly expressed, that, "in regard to our power, he was not afraid so much of what he saw as of what he did not see."

6. I gather, from the results of a year's severe test, that the truth of this principle has been fully established, for though in the course of many years the undue reduction of our European forces, too indulgent a rule, and many other powerful causes, had so weakened its effect in a portion of our Empire, as to pave the way for mutiny and rebellion, still the main body of the people of India remained passive under its influence, and thus allowed time for the full restoration of its supremacy by means of an accession of European force, and the successive victories that followed.

7. If a section of our subjects, carried away by a mixture of ignorance, arrogance, and fanaticism, were recently led to overrate their own strength and underrate ours, to forget that the substantial privileges which they enjoy depend solely on their connection with us, and *not* on the soundness of their own constitution, moral or social, we may conclude that, having now had ocular demonstration that the European force in this country can be trebled, and having learnt such severe lessons through its instrumentality, they will, as a body, abandon such fallacies, and readily believe that our ascendancy, even under the most adverse circumstances, is a practical as well as a moral truth.

8. If I am right, then, in supposing that the ascendancy of our prestige and moral power constitute the main spring of our rule, I think that before introducing any foreign elements into our system, we should satisfy ourselves that they will strengthen, or at all events not weaken it.

9. I must confess that I am far from thinking that the enlistment of foreign native mercenaries into our ranks will have a beneficial effect; they would not, in the first place, command the respect that Europeans do, nor could they for reasons of policy, as well as duty, be introduced in sufficiently large numbers to render us independent of the sepoys, who, numerically speaking, must always preponderate; nor do I consider that, should a moral epidemic recur, like that from which we are now emerging, they would be one whit more trustworthy than the natives of this country themselves are.

10. Finally, they might occasion jealousy and distrust between us and the whole native army, and their presence be, very probably, attributed to inability on our part to maintain an adequate European force in the country; and, if such were the case, the consequences might be more serious and embarrassing than we can now trace.

11. After viewing the subject, therefore, in every possible light, I think that if we maintain a fixed European force *en evidence* in the country, and steadily persevere in our attempts to free its people from the moral thralldom in which they are held by their Brahminical heads, we should be independent of native foreign mercenaries, and always command the respect as well as the support of a large section of our subjects: indeed, even now it is not so much the people in this presidency as the Brahmins who are disaffected, and it is clear that our influence must either transcend theirs or in time yield to it.

12. I shall now have the honour to reply to the questions which accompanied your letter under reply.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS Nos. 1 and 3.

13. The number of European and native troops now serving in the Bombay Presidency, and their distribution, is given in the annexed Return, marked A.

14. The Rajpootana field force, though at present under the orders of the Government of India, properly belongs to the Bombay Presidency, and has been included as serving therein.

15. *Mhow*, at present held by Bombay troops, has also been included.

16. Returns showing these details also accompany the sketch.

ANSWER TO QUESTIONS Nos. 2 and 4.

17. I beg to submit a return, marked B, showing the number of European and Native troops I propose for this Presidency as at present defined, and their distribution.

ANSWER TO QUESTION No. 5.

18. In the accompanying return marked C, I give as near a computation as possible of the strength of the regulars, irregulars, and police, to which this Presidency will soon be completed. For the information regarding the races of the men, I must refer you to other sources.

19. There are two extra battalions of infantry, upwards of 1,100 strong each, that are now being formed by drafts from regular regiments; these battalions are really regulars, but at present officered as irregulars, and for reasons which I will explain in treating the next question, No. 6. I deprecate the proportion of irregulars being augmented beyond what it now is, namely, about 10,000 men.

20. There is one other point which I desire especially to urge upon his lordship's notice, which is, that whatever irregular troops we have, may be kept free from serving as police under civil officers, as at present practised. I shall hope, further on, to show how utterly impossible it is for any body of troops to be efficient as police and soldiers too; but, independently of this, it often happens that the sudden withdrawal of irregulars from police duties for field service hazards the tranquillity of the districts affected by it, there being generally no force available to replace them. I would suggest that if it is indispensably necessary that irregulars should be so employed, more than half the regiment may not be on detached duty at once, the other half being at head-quarters for instruction in drill, &c., &c.

ANSWER TO QUESTION No. 6.

21. The question as to what proportion of our native establishment should be regulars, irregulars, and police, involves, I think, some of the most important considerations of the present day, because there are ideas abroad whose practical adoption would lead, I fear, to great evils and fresh complications.

22. I allude, in the first place, to the hypothesis that the native army should from henceforth be required to perform the combined duties of police and soldiers; and secondly, that, for financial reasons, its present establishment of twenty-five* European officers per regiment should be reduced to four (inclusive of the surgeon), according to the model of irregular corps.

23. I cannot but regard the first of these projects as simply impracticable, chiefly because the population of this part of India is subdivided into a variety of races, many of them aboriginal and predatory; whose employment by Government is not only a matter of policy but of duty, and who, though ready and willing to enter police corps, are resolutely averse to leaving their own districts, and to the course of discipline necessary for a soldier.

24. But besides this there is the natural diverseness between the duties required of policemen and soldiers, which

* This excludes one colonel and two medical officers but includes regimental staff.

renders their unfettered performance on a large scale, by one and the same body, impossible.

25. For instance, in a policeman, a local knowledge of the country and people is the principal qualification, whereas in a soldier a perfect freedom from all local ties, sympathies, or encumbrances, a readiness to move anywhere on any duty, at a moment's warning, and a strict discipline are required.

26. If, therefore, the raw material as well as the mode of its preparation for the two branches are so radically different, I cannot see how the combination contemplated by such a theory could be even attempted with any hopes of success.

27. With regard to the reconstruction of the native army on the irregular model, I quite agree that the reduction of the native commissioned, non-commissioned rank and file of the former in each regiment so as to correspond with the latter more closely than at present, is a measure that would be productive of economy and good order, but I cannot agree that the number of European officers to non-commissioned rank and file should be reduced below its present proportion.

28. The present established strength of a native regiment is as follows:—

European Commissioned Officers.		Pay in Garrison.	
		Rupees.	As. P.
1 Colonel	-	1,295	5 0
1 Lieut.-Colonel	-	827	14 0
1 Major	-	640	14 6
7 Captains	-	2,618	7 0
11 Lieutenants	-	2,483	4 0
5 Ensigns	-	910	9 7
1 Surgeon	-	674	1 0
1 Assistant-surgeon	-	255	12 0
<hr/>		9,706	3 1

European Non-commissioned Officers.		Rupees. As. P.	
1 Sergeant-major	-	50	13 2
1 Quartermaster-sergeant	-	44	13 2
<hr/>		95	10 4

Native Commissioned, Non-commissioned Rank and File.

		Average Garrison Pay as per Classes.	
		Rupees.	As. P.
12 Subadars	-	624	0 0
12 Jemadars	-	294	0 0
12 Color Havildars	-	192	0 0
48 Havildars	-	672	0 0
60 Naiques	-	720	0 0
24 Drummers and Fifers	-	192	0 0
12 Bhistees	-	90	0 0
1000 Privates	-	8,000	0 0
<hr/>		1,180	10,784 0 0

29. Thus, the twenty-nine native infantry regiments of this presidency are established to contain 34,220 native commissioned, non-commissioned rank and file, and their garrison pay monthly, inclusive of European officers, amounts to about 600,000 rupees.

30. This strength having been found totally inadapted to the positive duties which had to be performed, Government sanctioned, as a temporary measure, the enrolment of about 2,000 pensioners, and two extra battalions 1,180 strong each, so that over and above the 34,220 men specified, we have about 4,360 to meet present emergencies,* but of this extra number the 2,000 enrolled pensioners being an expensive body, and too old and infirm to perform other than light camp duties, must be discharged as soon as their relief can be arranged for.

31. I have just shown that we already have upwards of 4,000 regular native infantry over and above our established strength, but it is unorganised and unofficered at present, and therefore of very little use. Though the army is so hard worked, that unless augmented or reorganised it cannot continue to perform its present rate of duty for long without great loss, yet I am led, after the most careful

consideration, to believe that instead of increasing its rank and file, the most efficient and politic mode of relieving it and strengthening our system will be by a reorganization calculated alike to increase our moral hold upon it and render it fitter for detailed and detached work than it is at present.

32. About 39,000 native commissioned, non-commissioned rank and file would, I think, meet all our requirements, if organised on either of the following plans.

33. The first, which is the one that I would most strongly recommend, involves the abolishment of the rank of native commissioned officers altogether, and the increase of the European officers so as to make up for that reduction.

34. I have found that we have at present too many companies and too many non-commissioned rank and file* for the purposes of general economy; and I would, therefore, propose that each regiment should consist of 10 companies and the following ranks.

Europeans.	Natives.
1 colonel.	30 colour havildars.
1 lieutenant-colonel.	40 havildars.
1 major or second lieutenant-colonel.	50 naiques.
10 captains.	20 drummers and fifers.
12 lieutenants (including 1 adjutant, 1 quartermaster).	10 bhistees.
10 ensigns.	850 privates.
1 surgeon.	
1 assistant surgeon.	
<hr/>	
37 officers.	980
<hr/>	
1 serjeant-major (European)	
1 quartermaster-serjeant (ditto).	

35. But if the plan of excluding the native officers be objected to on political grounds I trust that, at least, the present number of European officers per regiment may be continued, and that the following may be the strength of native commissioned,† non-commissioned rank and file per 10 companies, viz. :—

	Garrison Pay.
	Rupees.
10 subadars	520
10 jemadars	245
10 colour havildars	160
40 havildars	560
50 naiques	600
20 drummers and fifers	160
10 bhistees	75
850 privates	6,800
<hr/>	
1,000 total.	Rupees 9,120

36. I would propose that our army, which now consists of 29 regiments of native infantry, should be reconstructed into 39 of 1000 each, which, at the comparatively trifling cost of about a lac and a half per mensem in excess of our present expenditure on this head, would give us a force more in hand, better disciplined, and better adapted to both military and political purposes than the present army is.

37. In estimating the number of officers for a native infantry regiment the number, on an average, required from each for military and civil staff appointments must never be lost sight of. In the present day it has amounted to about three per regiment for military and five for civil.

38. While I quite agree that three European officers are sufficient for each police corps, I cannot believe that that degree of discipline, which is the life and soul of the regular army, can ever be either established or maintained by that number of European officers per regiment in a native Indian army.

39. Whatever soldierlike qualities the sepoy may hitherto have shown, he owes their development solely to his European officers, under whose directing influence his natural

Abstract Cost.	
28 officers	Rupees. 9,706
1 serjeant-major and quartermaster-serjeant	95
1000 native commissioned, non-commissioned rank and file	9,120
<hr/>	
	19,921
	39
	170,280
	50,763
<hr/>	
Total rupees	787,919

* 12 companies—1,180 native commissioned, non-commissioned and rank and file.
† 10 companies—1000 native commissioned and non-commissioned rank and file.

* These make in all 38,590 regular native infantry.

prejudices and apathy have been overcome to an extent that can be best estimated by comparing the present state of the native army of this presidency with what it was 30 years ago.

40. A well-officered native cavalry or native infantry regiment is not only as a rule a better disciplined and more efficient body in the field than an irregular one; but it has greater weight in the country in time of peace. Its European officers often exercise a beneficial influence beyond the limits of their regiment, and I have observed that political officers and magistrates, in certain circumstances, estimate the native regulars at a very different standard from other native troops.

41. That the reduction of European officers in the native army would involve a loss of its discipline and general efficiency there can be no doubt; but there is a still more serious evil inseparable from it, and that is the *undue power that it would throw into the hands of the native officers*, for officers there must be of one kind or the other.

42. Now, if there is one lesson which the history of the past year has taught us more prominently than another, it is, I think, the imperative necessity of so arranging the constituent elements of our system, civil and military, as to place the reins of all branches of importance in European hands.

43. We have learned that our supremacy in this country depends chiefly upon the European element; but more, I think, upon its judicious fusion amongst the mass to be governed by it than upon its bare physical strength; and I firmly believe, that no addition of European strength that we are able to make to this presidency would ever compensate for the moral and physical paralysis which an undue reduction of European officers would occasion to the native army, and through it to the State.

44. No native will progress towards the European standard of improvement except by constant and well-regulated association with Europeans, and I cannot but regard any measure that tends to lessen that association in the army as clearing the way for a host of villains who by dint of superstition and fanaticism would endeavour to mould that army to their purpose. An example of this occurred last year in the case of the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, half of which was composed of Hindoostanees, but whose lines, in the midst of mutiny and rebellion in Malwa, were comparatively inaccessible to seditious agents, not only on account of the vigilance of the European and native commissioned and non-commissioned officers but the good feeling and mutual regard that existed between them and their men.

45. It may be relied upon that the effect of isolating the native army, either externally from their comrades, the European soldiers, or depriving them internally of their European officers, would sooner or later be productive of an inflated spirit of pride that would ultimately lead to their entire alienation from us.

46. Some of our most distinguished and *practical* generals (Lord Hardinge and Sir Charles Napier amongst the number) have earnestly represented to Government the want of more European officers* with native regiments, but no officers of experience in the field has yet come forward to declare that we have got *too many*. When I reflect that out of the three officers proposed for each regiment, dashing and vigorous leaders for every difficult occasion have to be supplied, casualties filled, the errors of indiscipline rectified by holding together the wavering or rallying the broken mass, I feel utterly at a loss to account for so suicidal a project as that under notice, involving, as I before remarked, undue power being thrown into the hands of the native officers, and even placing them in command of regiments on field service.

47. The real calibre of the native of India must always be borne in mind when judging of matters so important as these are. Sepoys led by an European officer are different men from those not so, *more especially against a foreign enemy in a strange country*.

48. I would mention here, as bearing closely on the point under discussion, that out of the three native cavalry regiments serving with Sir James Outram in Persia, the 3rd light cavalry (a regular corps) was held in highest esteem in the army as always ready, always efficient; and certainly, if we recall to mind their dashing conduct at Khooshab, the prominent position they held was well earned and well deserved.

49. I will not dwell further on the subject than to observe that if an European regiment requires some sixty officers to maintain its discipline and lead it in the field, much more

a native one some five and twenty; in no point of view therefore can I see the reasonableness of the theory that would reduce that five and twenty to three.

50. My own impression is, after the most careful consideration, that the police must be a perfectly distinct force, and that (including local corps) it should not exceed about half the numerical amount* of the regulars and irregulars put together. Although its existing proportion is a little in excess of that, yet, as there are pensioners and veterans, and some city police included in the total, it may be taken as equivalent to half, and is, I conclude, that considered sufficient by the Government to meet the wants of this presidency, according to its present limits.

51. I think also that the irregulars should never exceed a proportion of one fourth the regulars. These proportions are also existing ones (or very nearly so), the result of practical trial, and I would strongly and respectfully urge on his lordship's notice that they have of late years, and especially during the one that is past, stood a test that affords the best guarantee we could desire for their general adaptation to foreign and home service.

ANSWER TO QUESTIONS Nos. 7 and 8.

52. The proportion of European troops to the whole native force of the Bombay presidency, police, regulars, and irregulars, should never, I think, be less than one fourth,† and excluding the police, they should bear a proportion of about half the regulars and irregulars put together.

53. It will be difficult to maintain a greater proportion of European to native troops than one fourth, but it is politic to maintain that, if possible.

ANSWER TO QUESTIONS Nos. 9 and 10.

54. The barrack accommodation for troops in the Bombay Presidency, as well as that required for the strength I consider necessary, are stated in the accompanying return marked D.

ANSWER TO QUESTION No. 11.

55. The proportion of European force to be drawn from Her Majesty's army must depend upon what could be permanently spared from that army in the time of war. I am strongly of opinion that it will never answer in the event of an European war to denude India to the extent already done. I submit this view as accordant with past experience, and I think that two thirds of the European force required for the permanent occupation of India should be composed of troops raised exclusively for that service.

ANSWER TO QUESTION No. 12.

56. I would officer those troops as at present, on the seniority promotion system, and if requisite absorb the unemployed officers of the Bengal army in their organization, and the reconstruction of the native army.

ANSWER TO QUESTION No. 13.

57. With regard to the embarrassment that will accrue from the juxtaposition of the seniority and purchase promotion systems, it would, I think, be very great, unless some remedy similar to what has been applied to the Royal and Company's engineers and artillery, be granted to the Company's cavalry and infantry also, the officers of which will now be superseded on all sides, as the abolition of the rank of major in the artillery and engineers gives the officers of those arms a decided advantage over those that are still under the seniority promotion system. I am not quite clear as to the actual course that would afford the desired relief, but would suggest for consideration that each native cavalry and infantry regiment should have a second lieutenant-colonel, who would only receive the pay of a major until he attained a certain position on the general list of lieutenant-colonels, after which he would be entitled to the pay of that rank. Whilst thus expressing myself, however, I must say that I do not speak at all confidently on this subjects.

ANSWER TO QUESTION No. 13.

58. I do not think it would be safe to reduce our established European strength below one-fourth of the whole of the troops in India, be the remaining three-fourths com-

* Present established strength--	
Regulars	42,814
Irregulars	10,135
Police	23,798
Total	81,487

* It must always be borne in mind how large a proportion of the European officers of native regiments are withdrawn for staff duties.

† This proportion would admit of ‡ being temporarily sent on service

Honourable Company's European Troops.		Commissioned Officers.		Non-commissioned, Rank and File.	
		Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.
Serving in the Presidency.	2 troops horse artillery -	10	—	253	49
	6 companies foot artillery, with light field batteries -	14	5	474	325
	1 company without battery -	4	1	79	30
	3 companies reserve artillery, with light field batteries -	7	2	293	138
	1 regiment infantry -	32	—	982	—
Total -		67	8	2,101	542
Serving beyond the Presidency.	2 troops horse artillery -	11	—	292	49
	1 company foot artillery, with light field battery -	2	1	97	73
	1 company reserve artillery, with light field battery -	1	—	32	46
	2 regiments infantry -	52	—	1,801	—
	Total -	66	1	2,222	168
Grand Total		133	9	4,343	710

DISTRIBUTION of the above.

Hon. Company's European Troops.	Stations.	Hon. Company's European Troops.	Stations.
Artillery.		2nd Battalion—cont.	
Horse Brigade.		3rd company, with light field battery	
Head quarters -	Poona.	4th company, with do. do. -	Shalipoor.
1st troop -	Central India, F.F.	Reserve.	
2nd troop -	Nussersabad.	1st company -	Shikarpoor.
3rd troop -	Central India, F.F.	2nd company -	Central India, F.F.
4th troop -	Poona.	Detachment -	Jaulna.
1st Battalion.		3rd company -	Kalipoor.
Head quarters -	Ahmednuggur.	4th company -	Kurrachee.
1st company with light foot battery -	Ahmedabad.	Infantry.	
2nd company, without battery -	Aden.	1st regiment fusiliers -	Bengal Presidency.
3rd company, with light foot battery -	Belgaum.	Depôt -	Kurrachee.
4th company, with do. do. -	Hydrabad (Sinde).	2nd regiment light infantry -	Belgaum.
2nd Battalion.		Detachment -	Kalipoor.
Head quarters -	Bombay.	Ditto -	Kulladghee.
1st company, with light field battery -	Neemuch.	itt -	Rutnagherry.
2nd company, with do. do. -	Sattara.	3rd regiment -	Central India, F.F.
		Depôt -	Admednuggur.

Honourable Company's Native Troops.		Commissioned Officers.		Non-commissioned, Rank and File.	
		Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.
Serving in the Presidency.	5 companies foot artillery, with light field batteries -	5	21	6	671
	5 companies without batteries -	11	22	2	487
	Head quarters and 34 companies sappers and miners -	6	7	20	427
	2 regiments light cavalry -	33	33	3	959
	5 regiments irregular cavalry -	20	125	—	3,686
	26 regiments native infantry -	339	614	17	26,469
	1 marine battalion -	4	24	—	1,130
	1 native veteran battalion -	14	16	—	822
	Enrolled pensioners -	5	55	2	1,661
	Total	437	917	50	36,312
Serving beyond the Presidency.	1½ companies sappers and miners -	3	3	13	130
	2 regiments light cavalry -	31	31	2	846
	Detachment of irregular cavalry -	—	1	—	26
	3 regiments native infantry -	39	69	1	2,630
	2 Helooch battalions -	15	4	—	2,041
Total	90	108	16	673	
Grand Total		527	1,025	66	41,985

DISTRIBUTION of the above.

Honourable Company's Native Troops.	Stations.	Honourable Company's Native Troops.	Stations.
Artillery.		Infantry—cont.	
1st company, 3rd battalion artillery -	Detachments Rajkote and Godra.	6th regt. native infantry -	Poona,
2nd company, 3rd batt. with light field battery -	Godra.	7th regt. native infantry -	Bombay.
3rd company, 3rd batt. with do. -	Deesa.	8th regt. native infantry -	Baroda.
4th company, 3rd batt. with do. -	Nusseerabad.	Detachments -	Jambooseer and Dohud.
5th company, 3rd battalion -	Ahmednuggur.	9th regt. native infantry -	Mhow.
6th company, 3rd battalion -	Aden.	10th regt. native infantry -	Central India F.F.
1st company, 4th batt. with light field battery -	Head quarters, Ahmednuggur.	11th regt. native infantry -	Ahmedabad.
Detachment -	Neemuch.	Detachment -	Gogo.
2nd company, 4th batt. with light field battery -	Ahmednuggur.	12th regt. native infantry -	Nusseerabad.
3rd company, 4th battalion,* -	—	Detachment -	Neemuch.
4th company, 4th battalion -	Ahmednuggur.	13th regt. native infantry -	Neemuch.
5th company, 4th battalion,* -	—	Detachment -	Nusseerabad.
6th company, 4th battalion -	Ahmednuggur.	Depôt -	Hydrabad.
Sappers and Miners.		14th regt. native infantry -	Kurrachee.
Sappers and Miners (head quarters and 1½ company) -	Poona detach. Southern Mahratta country.	Detachment -	Ahmedabad.
1 company -	Aden.	15th regt. native infantry -	Kolapoor.
1 company -	Neemuch.	Detachments -	Rutnagherry, Vingorla, and Kulladghee.
1½ companies -	Central India F.F.	16th regt. native infantry -	Surat.
Cavalry.		Detachment -	Broach.
1st lancers (head quarters) -	Central India F.F.	17th regt. native infantry -	Rajkote.
Detachments -	Nusseerabad and Bombay.	Wing -	Deesa.
2nd native light cavalry (head qrs.) -	Neemuch.	18th regt. native infantry -	Belgaum.
Detachment -	Deesa.	Detachment -	North Canara frontier.
3rd native light cavalry -	Central India F.F.	19th regt. native infantry -	Mhow.
2nd Madras light cavalry -	Sholapoor.	20th regt. native infantry -	Belgaum.
Detachment -	Secunderabad.	Detachments -	Ramghaut and Baltsee.
Poona irregular horse -	Seroor.	22nd regt. native infantry -	Sattara.
Detachments -	Khandeish, Poona, Ahmednuggur, and Thulghaut.	Left wing -	Tasgaum.
1st Scinde irregular horse -	Jacobabad.	Detachments -	Ashta, Beejapoor, and Punderpoor.
Detachments -	Hoosenkegheny, Tungwanee, Khundkote, and Koonree.	23rd regt. native light infantry -	Khandeish.
2nd Scinde irregular horse -	Jacobabad.	Detachment -	Asseerghur.
Detachment -	Rojun.	24th regt. native infantry -	Central India F.F.
3rd Scinde irregular horse -	Jacobabad.	Depôt -	Mhow.
Detachment -	Gundava.	25th regt. native infantry -	Central India F.F.
Southern Mahratta irregular horse -	Head quarters, Kulladghee.	Depôt -	Poona.
Detachments -	Belgaum, Dharwar, Sattara, and Kolapoor.	26th regt. native infantry -	Dhoolia.
Infantry.		Detachments -	Nuggur districts.
1st grenadier regt. native infantry -	Bombay.	28th regt. native infantry -	Dharwar.
2nd grenadier regt. native infantry -	Ahmednuggur (Guzerat.)	Detachments -	Field service southern districts.
Depôt -	Ahmedabad.	29th regt. native infantry -	Aden.
3rd regt. native infantry -	Sholapoor.	30th regt. native infantry -	Malligaum.
Detachment -	Beejapoor.	Detachment -	Kurrachee.
4th regt. native infantry, rifles -	Mhow.	31st regt. native infantry -	En route to Deesa.
5th regiment native light infantry -	Ahmednuggur.	Irregular Infantry.	
Detachments -	Field service in the district.	Marine battalion -	Bombay.
		Detachments -	Scinde, Bushire, &c.
		Native veteran battalion -	Dapoolie.
		Detachments -	Bhewudy and other parts of Koukan.
		Enrolled Pensioners -	Tanna, Poona, Ahmednuggur, Dapoolie, Malwan, and Ahmedabad.
		1st Belooch battalion -	Bengal Presidency.
		2nd Belooch battalion -	Deeragazee Khan.
		Detachments -	Mungrota Meetunkote.

* These companies do not at present exist, the men who composed them having been distributed among the other companies of the battalion.

N.B. No returns of the 3d Belooch Battalion and the two Scinde Rifle Regiments, (being civil,) have been received; they are not consequently included in the above.

H. SOMERSET,
Lieutenant-General, Commander-in-Chief.

B.

PROPOSED PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT of Regular Troops for the Bombay Presidency, and their Distribution.
Head Quarters, Poona, July 22, 1858.

Stations.	EUROPEANS.						NATIVES.		REMARKS.	
	Sappers and Miners.	Horse Artillery.	Reserve Companies of Artillery without Lt. Field Battery for Garrison Duty.	Companies of Artillery with Light Field Battery.	Cavalry.	Military Train.	Infantry.	Cavalry.		Infantry.
Bombay garrison.	—	—	1	—	—	—	1 reg.	—	2 regs.	Exclusive of the marine battalion. The detachment of European infantry to be furnished from the Presidency or Ahmedabad, as found convenient, and the whole of the European troops to be quartered in the Castle.
Surat	—	—	1	—	—	—	Detach. 1 co.	—	½ reg. hd. qr. wing.	
Northern division:										
Broach	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	½ reg.	If European troops not required at Baroda for political reasons, the whole of this force might be concentrated at divisional head qrs. Ahmedabad.
Baroda	—	—	—	1	—	—	Detach. 1 co.	—	1 reg.	
Ahmedabad	1 co.	—	—	1	—	Detach.	1 reg.	—	2 regs.	
Rajkote	—	—	—	1	—	—	Detach.	—	1 reg.	
Deesa	1 co.	1 troop	—	1	—	Detach.	1 reg.	Wing -	2 regs.	
Mhow	"	—	—	1	1 squad.	Detach.	"	1 reg.	4 "	
Rajpootana field force:										
Nuseerabad	—	—	1	1	"	"	"	Hd. qr. wing.	3 "	It has been proposed to dismantle Agimere, and establish our arsenal, &c. in a field fortification at Nuseerabad.
Neemuch	1 co.	1 troop	1	—	Hd qrs. and 2 squads.	Detach.	"	1 reg.	2 "	Should be the head quarters of Rajpootana field force. A field fortification is in contemplation.
Scinde division:										
Kurrachee - Hyderabad	2 cos.	—	—	2	—	Detach.	2 regs. Wing -	—	3 " 1 reg.	When the frontier brigade sanctioned for Jacobabad is properly organized, the European artillery and infantry now at Shirkarpoor would be brought to Hyderabad. In addition to the regular native infantry at Kurrachee, Hyderabad, and Shikarpoor, there is a Belooch battalion for each station.
Shikarpoor	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Aden	1 co.	—	1	—	—	—	Wing -	—	1 reg.	
Southern division:										
Belgaum	"	—	—	1	—	Hd. qrs. of a div.	1½ regs.	—	3 regs.	One company of siege artillery for fort.
Dharwar	—	—	—	1	—	—	Detach. 2 cos.	—	1 "	The Europeans inside the fort.
Kulladghee	—	—	—	1	—	Detach.	Detach. 3 cos.	—	1 "	At present the head quarters of the Southern Mahratta horse.
Kolapoor - Sholapoor	—	1 troop	—	1	Wing -	"	Wing -	—	1 " 2 regs.	The 2d regiment of Mahratta horse should be at Sholapoor.

Proposed Permanent Establishment, &c.—cont.

Stations.	EUROPEAN.						NATIVES.		REMARKS.	
	Sappers and Miners.	Horse Artillery.	Reserve Companies of Artillery without Lt. Field Battery for Garrison Duty.	Companies of Artillery with Light Field Battery.	Cavalry.	Military Train.	Infantry.	Cavalry.		Infantry.
Poona and Kirkee.	Hd. qrs. and 2 cos.	2 troops	—	1	1 reg.	Hd. qrs. of the corps.	2 regs.	—	3 regs.	
Sattara	—	—	—	1	Hd. qr. wing.	—	Detach.	—	1 reg.	
Ahmednugur.	—	—	3	1	—	Detach.	Wing -	—	1 "	
Malligaum - Dhoolia	—	—	—	1	—	"	"	—	2 regs.	
Asseerghur	—	—	Detachment from Nuggur.	—	—	—	Detach.	—	1 reg. Detach.	
Total	1 reg. A.	6 troops	9 companies B	18 light field bats.	3 regts.	A corps of 4 divs. C	15 regs.	3 regs.	39 regs.	

A. If a corps of sappers and miners composed entirely of Europeans be objected to on the score of expense, that arm of the service ought at least to be composed of half Europeans and half natives. Our present strength of native sappers is five companies, far below the requisite proportion for this army. Were an European battalion of five companies added to this, I consider we should have enough. It is certainly questionable whether we should be entirely dependent upon natives as sappers and miners any more than as artillery-men. Were a foreign enemy to appear in India and be joined by our native sappers, we should, without Europeans of that arm, be in an awkward predicament.

B. Siege artillery required as a reserve and for garrison purposes in forts, &c. At present we cripple our light field batteries to man siege trains, and too often detach the latter inefficiently equipped.

C. Every one has felt the imperative necessity of bringing the carriage of armies under military control and organization, of keeping up in time of peace a certain proportion of animals and equipments, drivers, &c., with each division of the army. Such proportion not to be less than one-third; the quantity of carriage required to move the force at the station. Thus we should have a nucleus on which to base an augmentation in time of war, with some hope of rendering the mass in some degree manageable through the medium of the trained officers, non-commissioned officers, and drivers accustomed to the work. If this corps cannot, for reasons of economy, be entirely European, it should at all events be partly so, for the same reasons that we would put our artillery in sure hands, for without its baggage and commissariat an army soon becomes a rabble. If an enemy, strong in cavalry, knew how to use it, he might in most instances destroy all the baggage of an Indian division, simply owing to its unmanageable character, being composed of a heterogeneous mass of men, cattle, and vehicles, chiefly pressed into the service for the occasion. The delay in starting troops for want of carriage, the check to agriculture and trade caused by its seizure from the people of the country, the enormous outlay with which the present system is attended, the infinite sources of fraud that it contains, and other evils too numerous to detail, are reasons that will be found to counterbalance any arguments, resting on financial grounds, that can be brought against it, but even on those grounds I am satisfied that it will be found a saving in the long run.

Detail.	Established strength.				
	Commissioned Officers.		Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.		
	Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.	
2 battalions of sappers and miners.	30	10	500	570	The Europeans should be all artificers.
6 troops of horse artillery	30	—	900	150	Two more troops of horse artillery are urgently required.
9 companies reserve artillery	45	—	945	288	
18 light field batteries	90	—	*2,682	576	* Including drivers.
3 regiments of European cavalry.	129	—	2,244	—	
Military train	26	—	800	—	
15 European regiments	750	—	16,155	—	
3 regiments native light cavalry.	78	48	6	1,950	
39 regiments native infantry	1,092	780	78	38,220	
Total	2,270	838	24,310	41,754	

The proposed establishment of regular native troops will be 42,592, including native officers.

H. SOMERSET,

Lieut.-General, Commander-in-Chief.

D.

STATEMENT showing the existing BARRACK ACCOMMODATION for European Troops in the Bombay Presidency, as well as that required for the Strength considered necessary.

Station.	Troops.	Existing Barrack Accomodation.		Permanent Barrack Accommodation required.	Remarks.
		Permanent.	Temporary.		
Bombay	1 company of reserve artillery.	For a battalion in Fort George. For 286 men in the Town Barracks, and for a wing at Colaba.	—	—	The present infantry barracks are condemned. New ones are required.
	1 regiment of infantry		—	1 regiment of infantry	
Surat	1 company of reserve artillery.	—	1 company of artillery	1 company of reserve artillery.	The detachments of artillery and infantry occupy buildings in the Castle.
	1 company of infantry	—	1 company of infantry	1 company of infantry	
Baroda	1 company of artillery, with battery.	—	1 company of artillery, with battery.	1 company of artillery, with battery.	
	1 company of infantry	—	2 companies of infantry	1 company of infantry	
Ahmedabad	1 company of sappers and miners.	—	—	1 company of sappers and miners.	
	1 company of artillery, with battery.	—	1 company of artillery, with battery.	1 company of artillery, with battery.	
Rajkote	Detachment mil. train	—	—	Detachment mil. train	
	1 regiment of infantry	—	Wing of infantry	1 regiment of infantry	
Deesa	1 company of artillery, with battery.	—	—	1 company of artillery, with battery.	
	Detachment mil. train	—	—	Detachment mil. train	
Mhow	1 regiment of infantry	1 regiment of infantry	The European troops at present are sheltered in the artillery barracks, hospitals, and other public buildings.	—	The company of sappers or detachment military train can be accommodated in one of the artillery barracks.
	1 company of sappers and miners.	—		1 company of sappers and miners.	
Nusseerabad	1 company of artillery, with battery.	2 companies of artillery, with battery.	Major-General Roberts, commanding Rajpootana field force, was invested with full authority to take whatever measures he deemed proper to insure shelter for the troops at Nusseerabad and Neemuch, for the hot season and rains.	—	
	1 squadron of cavalry	—		1 company of reserve artillery.	
Neemuch	Detachment mil. train	—		—	
	1 regiment of infantry	—		1 squadron of cavalry	
Kurrachee	2 companies of sappers and miners.	—		1 troop horse artillery	For one company already sanctioned.
	1 troop of horse artill.	1 troop of horse artill.		1 company of artillery	
Hyderabad	Detachment mil. train	—		2 companies of artillery, with batteries.	
	2 regiments of infantry	1 regiment of infantry		1 regiment of infantry	
Aden	2 companies of artillery, with batteries.	—		Detachment mil. train	
	Detachment mil. train	—		As only a wing of infantry is proposed to be stationed at Hyderabad, accommodation for the company of artillery and detachment military train can be provided for in the infantry barracks, with some addition and alteration.	
Aden	Wing of infantry	—		1 company of sappers and miners.	
	1 company of reserve artillery.	1 company of artillery		—	
	Wing of infantry	Wing of infantry		—	

STATEMENT—cont.

Station.	Troops.	Existing Barrack Accommodation.		Permanent Barrack Accommodation required.	Remarks.
		Permanent.	Temporary.		
Belgaum	1 company of sappers and miners.	—	—	1 company of sappers and miners.	The present artillery barracks in the fort for the reserve company.
	1 company of reserve artillery.	—	—	—	
	1 company of artillery, with battery.	1 company of artillery	—	1 company of artillery, with battery.	
Dharwar	Head quarters of a division of mil. train.	—	—	Head quarters of a division of mil. train.	
	1½ regts. of infantry	1 regiment of infantry	Wing of infantry	½ regiment of infantry	
	1 company of artillery, with battery.	—	1 company of artillery, with battery.	1 company of artillery, with battery.	
Kulladghee	2 companies of infantry	—	2 companies of infantry	2 companies of infantry	
	1 company of artillery, with battery.	—	1 company of artillery, with battery.	1 company of artillery, with battery.	
	Detachment mil. train	—	—	Detachment mil. train	
Kolapoor	3 companies of infantry	—	1 company of infantry	3 companies of infantry	
	1 company of artillery, with battery.	—	1 company of artillery, with battery.	1 company of artillery with battery.	
	Detachment mil. train	—	—	Detachment mil. train	
Sholapoor	Wing of infantry	—	3 companies of infantry	Wing of infantry.	
	1 troop of horse artil.	1 company of artillery, condemned.	—	1 troop horse artillery	
	Wing of cavalry	—	Wing of cavalry	Wing of cavalry	
Poona	Detachment mil. train	—	—	Detachment mil. train	Plans and estimates for 2 troops of horse artillery and 1 company of artillery, with battery, under preparation.
	Wing of infantry	—	1 company of infantry	Wing of infantry	
	Head quarters and 2 companies of sappers and miners.	—	—	Head quarters and 2 companies of sappers.	
Kerkee	2 troops of horse artil.	2 troops of horse artil, condemned.	—	—	Plans and estimates for new barracks before Government.
	1 company of artillery, with battery.	—	—	—	
	Head quarters of the military train	—	—	Head quarters of military train.	
Sattara	2 regiments of infantry	2 regiments of infantry	—	—	
	1 regiment of cavalry	1 regiment of cavalry, condemned.	—	—	
	1 company of artillery, with battery.	—	1 company of artillery, with battery.	1 company of artillery, with battery.	
Ahmednuggur	Head quarter wing of cavalry.	—	Wing of cavalry	Head quarter wing of cavalry.	
	2 companies of infantry	—	2 companies of infantry	2 companies of infantry	
	3 companies of reserve artillery.	For a battalion of artillery.	—	—	
Malligaum	1 company of artillery, with battery.	—	—	—	
	Detachment mil. train	—	—	Detachment mil. train	
	Wing of infantry	—	1 company of infantry	Wing of infantry	
Asseerghur	1 company of artillery, with battery.	—	1 company of artillery	1 company of artillery, with battery.	
	Detachment mil. train	—	—	Detachment mil. train	
Asseerghur	Wing of infantry	—	—	Wing of infantry.	
	Detachment of reserve artillery.	—	—	Detachment of reserve artillery.	
Asseerghur	1 company of infantry	—	1 company of infantry	1 company of infantry	

ABSTRACT.

	Existing Accommodation for		Required for	
1 regiment of sappers and miners	-	-	-	10 companies.
6 troops of horse artillery	-	4	-	2 troops.
9 companies of reserve artillery	-	6	-	3 companies reserve artillery.
18 companies of artillery, with batteries	-	5	-	13 companies, with batteries.
3 regiments of cavalry	-	1	-	2 regiments of cavalry.
1 corps of military train	-	—	-	1 corps of military train.
15 regiments of infantry	-	7	-	8 regiments of infantry.

Head Quarters, Poona, July 22, 1858.

(Signed) H. SOMERSET,
Lieut.-General, Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army.

Adjut.-General Sir HENRY SOMERSET'S REPLIES to the Series of INFANTRY QUESTIONS ON ARMY RE ORGANIZATION.

INFANTRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. Christians, Mussulmans, Hindoos, Jews, Seiks, men drawn from every part of India, without reference to race, tribe, or caste, and fit to bear arms.

2. The Dekkan, Konkan, Hindoostan (Northern Provinces) for the most part, the Punjaub, Malabar, furnishing a small quota, Guzerat, and Kutch, but few in number.

3. No.

4. Coolies and Bheels have perhaps been neglected. It remains, however, to be tested whether they will, as is the custom under the Bombay presidency, proceed wherever called upon to serve; but none have been excluded.

5. Of parties composed of a native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and men of the regiment requiring to be recruited. Lately, with great success, a European officer from each regiment has been detached, and succeeded well, or the reverse, according to the activity and intelligence of the officer.

6. The Government General Order by the Bombay Government, of the 5th May 1855, No. 539., contains the regulations on this head.

7. No precautions are taken if the enlistment take place in the cantonment where the regiment happens to be located, but if at another station the man is examined by a committee of officers, and if found fit, registers are forwarded, one to the officer commanding his regiment, the other to the adjutant-general of the army. The same precaution is taken with respect to the sepoys' families.

8. Alterations are not required. It is requisite only to make officers commanding regiments individually responsible that none but eligible recruits are entertained, without reference to race, tribe, or caste.

9. "I, A.B., private in the battalion, regiment, do swear, That I will not abandon these colours, but always defend them to the utmost of my power; and that I will implicitly obey all the orders of my commanders, and in everything behave myself as becomes a soldier and faithful servant of the company; and failing in any part of my duty as such, I will submit to the penalties described in the Articles of War which have been read to me."

10. Since April 1857.

11. The oath appears clear in its wording, and to contain all that is required.

13.

14. No, I think not; the measure would not be politic. The Bombay army, under existing regulations, can enlist only within its own limits, and but few recruits can be had from Candesh, Guzerat, Cutch, and other districts. Restricted to the Deccan, Northern and Southern Concan, including the Sawunt Warree, the Bombay army is in my opinion likely to become a Mahratta clique.

15. Recruits should be taken from all parts of the country, excepting, perhaps, Oude, until we ascertain the cause of the mutiny, without reference to race, tribe, or caste. Brahmins should be excluded the service, both civil and military.

16. No; it should be a promiscuous mass of all races, tribes, and castes.

17. No. The companies should not be homogeneous, but, like the regiment, composed of all castes.

18. This must wholly depend upon the facility given to enlistment. If commanding officers are permitted to enlist where they please, care should be taken that the companies are composite, not homogeneous.

19. Military corps from all districts, if possible. The police from the particular pergunna in which it is serving.

20. I think not. Commanding officers should be held wholly responsible for the recruitment of their respective corps.

21. The agency should be left entirely to commanding officers.

22. Distinct.

23. If thoroughly acted up to, nothing more is required than existing regulations, which are clear and distinct.

24. The recruiting for the police should be local.

25. I am quite averse to enlisting natives of any other tropical climate for service in India. I am convinced it would be impolitic.

26. I am not acquainted with any, except the natives of South Africa, none of whom would enlist or enrol themselves for permanent service in India.

27. I conceive it could only be done through the government of the colony.

28. I conceive this measure objectionable and unadvisable.

29. I am averse to mixing Europeans with natives in any way.

30. Answered above.

31. Do. do.

32. Do. do.

33. With the percussion arms at present in use.

34. Wholly dependent on political consideration; but when the mutiny shall have been put down, the country people disarmed, and complete police arrangements organized, this body should be armed with a sword and truncheon only.

35. The disadvantages have been removed by the abolition of the shako, stock, and knapsack. Tunic, loose trousers, and kilmarnock, form an excellent dress. Imitation has the advantage of uniformity only.

36. If you do not adopt the native dress entirely, dress them as they now are.

37. I am very doubtful about the expediency of this. The native regiments may be brigaded together at one station, but I do not suggest or approve of any amalgamation.

38. Gun lascars are advisable and necessary, but I would have no native drivers.

39. The European barracks should be entirely separate from the other lines.

40. I do not approve of association, beyond occupying the same cantonment.

41. Not at all.

42. The native troops have confidence in themselves, but I would brigade them together in all operations. I am of opinion that associating the native troops with Europeans would have a bad effect, and is not advisable further than brigading them together in the field.

II.—MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

1. There ought in my opinion to be but one Mutiny Act and one Code of Articles of War for the army in India, so modified as to be applicable to the Queen's and Company's troops, European and Native.

2. I conceive this is answered by the above.

3. I think not; courts-martial composed of European officers only would work better.

4. By translation into the vernacular, and by reading and explaining to the troops the Articles of War.

5. About one-third.

6. Under the civil code.

7. Entirely under the commissioner of police.

8. This is a question upon which, as no reports are made to the commander-in-chief, I am unable to give you an opinion.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. On merit and seniority combined.

2. I think them generally intelligent for their position, but I doubt their utility. I am opposed to having native officers in the regular army.

3. Native officers acquire intelligence and experience from having been previously havildars and naiques, but there are many privates equally intelligent.

4. There is an examination for the grade of havildar, but having attained that rank all non-commissioned officers are considered eligible for promotion.

5. In some measure I think it does. Certainly not; there cannot be too many European officers.

6. There has been only a very partial mutiny in the regiments of the Bombay army. I do not think that the native officers did give timely information, and in one regiment they were many of them deeply implicated.

Had there been no native officers, the mutiny could not have been concealed as it was.

7. If the practice of taking away the European officers for civil staff employ was discontinued (which it ought to be), and the full complement of officers retained with the regiment, there would be no necessity for native commissioned officers, and I think it would be desirable that it should be gradually discontinued.

8. If respectable European non-commissioned officers could be obtained, men thoroughly conversant with the colloquial language, one per company might be more advantageous to discipline than an unsteady European in the position of a non-commissioned officer. I am not inclined to recommend this system to be adopted. The sepoy makes an excellent soldier, is active and intelligent, many of them capable of performing any duties up to that of serjeant or havildar major; beyond that he should not be promoted.

9. A gradual scale of good service and retiring pensions would be highly appreciated, and would be efficacious, and a compensating encouragement to the deserving native non-commissioned officer.

10. Most undoubtedly it is what they all look forward to and appreciate.

11. This does not apply to the Bombay army. The promotions are all by selection and merit.

12. The system of pensions should be maintained.
- 13.
14. I think not; they are greatly influenced by the superintending officer in their opinions.
15. They have great professional intelligence, but they have not the efficiency of European non-commissioned officers.
16. As they now are, and full corps of European officers, and no native officers; 2, fully officered by Europeans. I would do away with native officers; 3. I would only have native officers in the irregular corps; but the line regiments should be fully officered by European officers; but until the practice of taking officers for the civil staff is discontinued (a system fraught with mischief, and destructive of discipline), this can never be the case.
17. By active educated gentlemen of the civil service, or by a separate corps of officers for the police service.
18. I think so. The men serving generally in the irregular corps are a different class of persons.
19. I am not aware that there is.
20. Most favourable. I consider it to have been the saving of India.
21. On no account to assimilate or amalgamate the three armies.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Yes; by authority to discharge at discretion any soldier who may apply for his discharge, or whose removal from the service might be desirable, under present circumstances, a report being made to army head quarters of the cause of the measure.
2. They have neither been increased nor diminished.
3. As the increased power referred to in No. 1 answer was given to commanding officers in August 1857, there has hardly been time to ascertain the result of the measure.
4. There has been no increase or diminution of the influence of captains or officers in charge of companies.
5. Upon the authority and influence of officers in command of companies, and of the officer in command of the regiment.
6. Increased.
7. Magisterial power to the commanding officer answers admirably in the irregular regiments, which might with advantage be introduced generally. Flogging should be ordered for theft, insubordination, and any disgraceful conduct, to which should be added imprisonment, and as a consequence expulsion.
8. It is at all times great, and would be greater if officers were not so frequently taken from the regiments for civil staff duties; a system most injurious to the service.
9. The duties of the native troops in garrison are at all times severe. They have their own amusements, in which they are encouraged and indulged by their European officers.
10. Never.
11. On military field works, for which they should receive a small addition of pay.
12. The want of a full complement has been greatly felt, caused by the circumstances before alluded to.
12. Para. 2. A full complement of European officers, and no native officers whatever.
12. Para. 3. No native officers.
13. If a full complement of European officers was maintained, I see no reason why cadets should be at first posted to European regiments. They should be posted to native regiments, and be made to study the native languages, time and opportunity being given for that, with only a very little drill, until the first object was attained.
14. I have already suggested that the complement must be complete.
15. Most materially and injuriously.
16. I cannot say. All the regiments have been equally inefficient in officers.
17. For certain staff appointments I would have a staff corps; but it is the demands of the civil staff that destroy the efficiency of regiments.
18. I would not cut off the inducement (except for the civil employ). Officers cannot be too highly educated, even for regimental service.
19. I do not conceive it would; but on this point I write a separate minute.

V.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. I feel it impossible to speak too strongly upon the injurious effects to the army, to regiments, and to discipline, by the system that exists of taking so many officers from their regiments for staff and civil employ.
2. This point has been brought, I believe, under the notice of government, by many commanders-in-chief and general officers, more particularly by the late Sir Charles Napier; but their remarks and observations have had little or no effect.
3. With the example that we have so recently had before us in Bengal, where the whole of the native officers have

maintained with their men, it cannot be necessary to dilate on the utter uselessness of native commissioned officers. I will therefore only remark on the necessity of having a full complement of European officers, and endeavour to show the injurious effects to discipline by the system of depriving regiments of their officers, and the encouragement held out to them to obtain staff employment, civil or military.

4. The discipline of a regiment can only be carried out by every member of it minutely attending to the duties assigned to him; the subaltern to his squad of men, the captain to his company, and the commanding officer to the whole.

5. Every officer on joining a regiment should go through the regular drill, and should be taught the mode of looking after his men, learning the system of accounts and the system of discipline as laid down by the Articles of War and the regulations of the service, and for his efficiency on these points he ought to look up to his commanding officer for encouragement, approbation, and protection.

6. By the practice of government a totally different system is encouraged and prevails. It is perfectly well known that a cadet from his first joining is told by his friends to look out for a good staff appointment. He comes out armed with letters from influential friends and members of the Court of Directors, to governors and secretaries, &c.; but is careless of any introduction to his commanding officer.

7. These recommendations, particularly if coming from persons of influence and power, are carefully recorded, to be acted upon as occasions may offer.

8. The young man joins his regiment, learns a little of his drill, but very shortly finds himself selected for military or political employ on the staff, and this without any reference to his qualifications, and invariably without any reference to his commanding officer.

9. The Court of Directors have laid down a rule that no more than a certain number of officers can be taken from a regiment, but this is frequently broken through, either as an emergent case or for special reasons; the consequence is, that regiments are left almost entirely without officers, which renders it impossible to carry out any system of responsibility throughout the various ranks, and thus discipline falls to the ground; and this system is carried through all ranks, from the lieutenant-colonel to the ensign, to the injury of every regiment in the service, and to the army generally.

10. Thus officers taken from their regiments for staff employ rejoin on promotion after some years absence, totally ignorant of their regimental duties, and of discipline, &c., and many of them positively not knowing how to put on their uniform.

11. During my experience in command in India I have known officers, after 14 and 18 years absence on civil employ, rejoin on promotion to take up the command of a regiment. How can such a man know anything of his duty? And how can any discipline be carried on in any army where such a system exists.

12. Many of the regiments of the Bombay army are commanded by captains; others have but one captain for duty; and one regiment now in the field (should the present commander, a captain, have to come away sick,) will be commanded by a junior lieutenant. Another point is the great injury to discipline and military esprit by such a system. An officer gets appointed to civil employ; the commissariat, revenue, survey, police, or deputy collector of a district, or other non-military employment; he immediately throws off his uniform, swaggers about in all kinds of costumes, grumbles at having to pay the slightest subscription towards the expenses of messing or entertainments given by his regiment (while more worthy men are doing double regimental duty), sets for a time his commanding officer at defiance, thinks it the greatest possible bore to have anything to do with his regiment, and when he does rejoin he returns to it more ignorant than the recruit of yesterday.

13. Experience has shown us that when the day of trial comes, native officers are useless nay worse than useless, and yet there are not, for the reasons I have stated, sufficient European officers left to look after the companies or to carry on the current duties of the regiment.

14. In several regiments subalterns are in command of three and four companies; how then is the interior economy of those companies or their organization and discipline to be attended to?

15. I believe the natives to be greatly attached to their officers, and they would be more so if the regiments were kept complete, and by doing away with the native officers bring the European officers more frequently and necessarily in contact with their non-commissioned officers and men. I can speak from more experience than most men, having been many years in the Cape Mounted Riflemen, and having commanded the regiment for upwards of 28 years, a regiment 1,000 strong, with a full complement of 45 officers, more than three officers never having been permitted to be absent at one time. The whole regiment looked up to their

officers as their fathers and protectors, and followed them to their death.

To have the native army efficient, it should have its full complement of officers, who should from their first joining be made to learn to conduct their duties on the system established by the regulations; and no officers should be taken for any other staff employ but these:—adjutant-general, brigade major, military secretary, or A.D.C., and those only under the distinct sanction of the commanding officer. The quartermaster general's department, being a scientific branch of the service, should be taken from a staff corps. The commissariat should also be a totally and entirely distinct branch of the service, as also the police.

16. More officers should be appointed to native regiments, and a better system of promotion established, and officers encouraged to learn their duty as officers, and to remain with their regiments, and above all to be taught to look up to their commanding officer for recommendation as to their qualifications. By the present system the commanding officer is totally and entirely set aside; he is never asked the question as to an officer's fitness or qualification, neither is the general officer or indeed the commander-in-chief, except to ask if there are more than the usual complement of officers away from their regiment.

17. I have known adjutants and quartermasters of regiments (the most important and responsible officers of a regiment) taken away, and appointed to staff and police appointments, without a question being asked; and thus the whole efficiency of a regiment becomes completely and entirely upset.

18. Until this system is discontinued, and a rule laid down that no officer shall be selected and taken from a regiment without the consent of the commanding officer of the regiment, obtained through the commander-in-chief, it is utterly hopeless to carry on discipline in a manner to ensure regiments being efficient, or the comfort and well-being of the soldiers of the native army attended to and secured.

19. I enclose a return of the number of officers on staff and civil employ in the Bombay army, exclusive of those from the artillery and Native cavalry.

H. SOMERSET,

Lieut.-General, Commander-in-Chief, Bombay.

Poona, July 24, 1858.

The established strength in European commissioned officers, exclusive of the colonels, of the 29 regiments of native infantry of the Bombay army, is as follows	725
From which must be deducted the vacancies of ensigns requiring to be filled up	78
	647
Out of which number the absentees on staff employ amount to	218
	429
From which deduct the number absent on furlough beyond presidency limits	67
TOTAL	362

APPENDIX No. 70.

PROPORTION OF EUROPEAN TO NATIVE TROOPS.

Circular

From Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. DURAND, C.B., to
Allahabad, May 21, 1858.

1. Under instructions from the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India, I have the honour to forward a printed copy of Letter No. 235,* dated 25th November 1857, from the Honourable the Court of Directors.

2. Circumstances having rendered it hitherto impracticable, notwithstanding the successes which have attended our troops in the field, and the important advance which has been made towards the re-establishment of the authority of Government in the disturbed districts, to constitute such a commission as the Honourable Court desired to see appointed, the Governor-General has determined to adopt the alternative of obtaining in writing from eminent and experienced public servants, civil and military, their opinions on the several heads of the inquiry, the conduct of which would otherwise have been entrusted to the commission.

3. In respect to the order in which these heads shall be taken up, his Lordship is of opinion that the main features of the revolt of the native army in Bengal, and the general and financial considerations which the issue of this unparalleled mutiny entail, are of themselves sufficient to prescribe the point to which, practically, the attention of the Home Government must first be directed; that point being

the strength and the composition of the European army, which must be permanently maintained in India, as the broad and fixed basis of our power and security.

4. This being so, the 5th paragraph of the Honourable Court's despatch becomes the one of primary importance. And indeed a decision on the point above noticed, as well as on the question raised in that paragraph, viz., the proportion which the European should bear to the native portion of the army in India generally, and at each presidency separately, will go far to simplify inquiry into other parts of the whole subject, the financial aspect of which will then be brought clearly into view.

5. Impressed with the necessity for a speedy, though a well-considered settlement of these fundamental data, the Governor-General has directed me to forward for your attentive consideration the appended series of questions, and to request that replies may be returned with as little delay as the weighty nature of the points referred for your opinion may render practicable.

6. This series of questions will be followed by other series upon the various heads to which the Court's despatch calls attention; therefore, in replying to those which I am now directed to place before you, there will be no necessity for touching upon the many important particulars to which the letter of the Honourable Court adverts, but which are foreign to the main question raised in the fifth paragraph.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. M. DURAND.

From Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. DURAND, C.B., on special duty with the Governor-General, to the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India.

MY LORD, Allahabad, August 16, 1858.
On the 21st May last, under your Lordship's instructions, a circular letter, enclosing the first series of questions upon the subject of army reorganization, was despatched to the various public servants, civil and military, whose opinions it was deemed advisable to obtain.

2. In the circular letter in question it was stated that in your Lordship's opinion, the main features of the revolt of the native army in Bengal, and the general and financial considerations which the issue of this unparalleled mutiny entailed, were of themselves sufficient to prescribe the point to which, practically, the attention of the Home Government must first be directed; that point being the strength and the composition of the European army which must be permanently maintained in India as the broad and fixed basis of our power and security. That consequently the 5th* para. of the Honourable Court's despatch, No. 235, dated 25th November 1857, became the one of primary importance, and that a decision upon the strength and composition of the European army, and the proportion it should bear to the native army at each presidency separately, and in India generally, would go far to simplify inquiry into other parts of the whole subject, the financial aspect of which would then be brought clearly into view.

3. I have now the honour to lay before your Lordship a précis of the replies which have been received upon the first series of questions.

4. I beg likewise to represent that a précis of the replies upon the subsequent series of questions is in course of preparation; but with reference to the views expressed in the 5th para. of the circular letter of the 21st May 1858, it seemed advisable to submit without delay the accompanying paper for your Lordship's consideration and orders.

5. Upon the political question raised by the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab respecting Peshawur, the précis avoids remark; the subject, however, being one which, though of political character, has an incidental bearing on the amount and disposition of force necessary for the Punjab, it will not fail to meet with the attention which the importance of the question demands.

6. I have endeavoured to conform to the instructions conveyed to me in the Military Secretary's letter, No. 238, of the 16th May 1858,† and have therefore abstained from offering any opinions upon the various subjects contained in the précis.

7. A correct return of the barrack accommodation of the Bengal presidency is in course of preparation by the Secretary of the Government of India in the department of Public Works. It did not seem advisable to delay the papers for this return, which can be separately submitted when received.

* To aid your Government in forming an opinion as to the proportion which the European should bear to the native portion of the army in India generally, and at each presidency separately, we would recommend that your Government should call upon the Commission to give their opinions on this very important question; and we can entertain no doubt that the enlarged knowledge and experience of the members of the Commission will enable them to furnish you with valuable information on this head.

† Appendix No. 64, p. 52.

* Appendix No. 54, p. 51.

PRÉCIS of REPLIES to the QUESTIONS having reference to paragraph 5 of Despatch No. 235, of 25th November 1857, Military Department, from the Court of Directors.

QUESTIONS 1, 2, 3, and 4.

1. What is the number of European troops of each arm now serving in , and what is their distribution ?
2. What is the number of European troops of each arm you deem necessary for , and what should be their ordinary distribution ?
3. What is the number of native troops of each arm now serving in , and what is their distribution ?
4. What is the number of native troops you deem necessary for , and what should be their ordinary distribution ?

1. The Adjutant-General of the Bengal Army, Colonel Mayhew, in his letter, No. 1473A, of the 6th July 1858, after stating that considerable delay had taken place in submitting his replies, in consequence of the difficulty he had experienced in collecting material for the returns called for by questions 1, 3, and 5, proceeds to answer questions 1 and 3 by enclosing the Distribution Return of the troops, European and native, serving in the Bengal establishment on the 1st May 1858. He notes, however, with regret, that the returns are somewhat imperfect, which is attributable partly to his having no information as to the various police corps lately raised, and partly to having received no returns from six of Her Majesty's corps of infantry, a battalion of Company's European artillery, and two battalions of Company's native artillery, besides having no returns from the Sirmoor battalion, and from the levies of horse raised since the mutiny.

2. From the Distribution Return of the 1st May 1858, it appears, omitting the corps of infantry and the artillery, from which no returns had been received, that the strength of European troops of all arms was—

Officers - - - - 1,665
Rank and file - - - - 42,947

In order to include the omitted corps, if an average be struck upon those whose strength is shown by the return, then the total of the European troops would be about—

Officers - - - - 1,864
Non-commissioned and rank and file - - - - 48,433

3. From the same source the strength of the native troops, omitting those corps of which Colonel Mayhew had no returns, was, on the 1st May 1858, as follows :—

European officers - - - - 713
" non-commissioned officers - - - - 115
Native commissioned, non-commissioned, and rank and file - - - - 77,550

Allowing for the Sirmoor battalion and for the cavalry levies, the strength of the native troops may be taken at—

European officers - - - - 750
" non-commissioned - - - - 150
Native commissioned, non-commissioned, and rank and file - - - - 80,000

4. Colonel Mayhew expresses the opinion that for many years to come a European force of not less than 60,000 men of all arms will be required; and, without taking into account the sappers and miners, the European force should be composed of 10,000 artillery, 8,000 cavalry, and 40,000 infantry. The distribution of this force Colonel Mayhew would leave very much as it is at present, making Calcutta, Dinapore, Allahabad, Lucknow, Agra, Delhi, Lahore, and Jhelum large entrepôts for European troops, on which all their outposts might be assembled, whether for offensive or defensive operations, and where large stores of every kind should be always in a state of preparation for service.

5. Colonel Mayhew is of opinion that the native troops might be retained numerically in equal proportions with Europeans for cavalry, infantry, and sappers, and be distributed in like manner, and always associated as much as possible. He considers, however, that the native troops of the line have one and all forfeited every claim to consideration, and should be disbanded at once; that every man should be given distinctly to understand that all claim had ceased under old regulations, but to such portion as had shown active loyalty to the State, enhanced benefits might be granted as a reward.

6. This recommendation would involve the disbanding, at once, of about 20,000 men, and would thus reduce the 80,000 native troops to about 60,000 men—the equal proportion which the Adjutant-General proposes.

7. Sir J. Lawrence, Brigadier-General N. Chamberlain, and Lieutenant-Colonel Edwards, have given full and valuable replies to the series of questions, both as restricted to the Punjab and as applied generally to the Bengal presidency. They have further added general remarks, replete with important observations.

8. It appears that there are now serving in the territories under the administration of Sir J. Lawrence the following European force :—

Artillery - - -	1,691
Cavalry - - -	707
Infantry - - -	11,157
Total - - -	13,555

The European force deemed necessary is as follows :—

Arm.	Regiments.	Troops or Companies.	Number of Men.
Sappers - - -	- - -	2	200
Artillery - - -	- - -	29	2,900
Cavalry - - -	5	-	2,500
Infantry - - -	17	-	17,000
Total - - -	- - -	- - -	22,600

9. The strength of native troops, exclusive of those unarmed, is,—

Native regulars - - -	1,000
" irregulars - - -	7,710
Punjab " - - -	20,860
Police - - -	13,050
Depôts - - -	2,750
Levies - - -	7,076
Total - - -	52,446

The strength recommended varies but little in amount from the foregoing, and is given as follows :—

Arm.	Regiments.	Troops or Companies.	Number of Men.
Pioneers - - -	- - -	2	200
Artillery - - -	- - -	8½	840
Irregular cavalry - - -	15	-	7,400
Police horse - - -	- - -	54	5,400
Infantry - - -	31	-	27,624
Police battalions - - -	12	-	10,900
Total - - -	- - -	- - -	52,364

10. With regard to the number of European troops necessary for the Bengal presidency, Sir J. Lawrence and the officers associated with him observe, that to speak confidently on this point would require a more detailed knowledge of many parts of the presidency than they possess; but that to the best of their judgments 54,600 men should be the strength of European troops for the Bengal presidency. This number they distribute as follows :—

Bengal, including Arracan and Pegu	10,000
North-west Provinces - - -	17,000
Central India - - -	5,000
Punjab, including Peshawur - - -	22,600
Total - - -	54,600

11. They do not enter into a detail of the different arms, as that seems a mere question of proportion, but in distributing European troops Sir J. Lawrence and his committee are decidedly of opinion that these should not be frittered away in detachments, but centralized; firstly, with reference to political requirements; and, secondly, to the healthiest places within those political circles.

12. Having no correct data available as to the present strength and distribution of the native troops, a statement is subjoined, showing the troops serving in the Bengal presidency in January 1857, before the mutiny :—

Europeans - - -	19,670
Natives - - -	176,834
Total - - -	196,504

Laying down the principle that native soldiers should be as five to two Europeans, that is three native infantry, and two police to two European soldiers, Sir J. Lawrence and his committee would distribute them as follows :—

	Europeans.	Natives.	Total.
Bengal - - -	10,000	25,000	35,000
North-west Provinces - - -	17,000	42,500	59,500
Central India - - -	5,000	12,500	17,500
Punjab - - -	22,600	56,500	79,100
Bengal Presidency	54,600	136,500	191,100

13. Mr. C. B. Thornhill gives a tabular statement, which in one view supplies an answer to questions 1 to 4, and exhibits the strength and disposition of the European and native army in the North-west provinces before the mutiny, and the arrangement he would suggest for the future. The value of the tabular statement is increased by Mr. Thornhill entering clearly, though concisely, in his letter upon the grounds on which his replies are based, and also by the information which the letter contains regarding the police battalions now forming for the North-west provinces.

14. In framing his estimate of the force required for the North-west provinces, Mr. Thornhill adheres to the civil division of the country into the seven circles of commissioners' jurisdictions, because this has formed the basis of the organization of the new police battalions, which force he anticipates will in a great measure supply the place of the old native army as mere local guards. It will be observed that the seventh circle comprehends the Central India agency.

15. According to the tabular statement, the strength of Europeans requisite for the North-west provinces may be taken at 16½ batteries or companies of artillery, 5 regiments of European cavalry, 18½ regiments of European infantry, besides a corps of veterans, and some invalids. In paragraph 21 of the letter which accompanies the tabular statement, the suggested strength of Europeans would be five regiments of cavalry, and about 17 of infantry, besides artillery.

16. The native troops required are,—six regiments of irregular cavalry, eight regiments of native infantry, and 32 district police battalions. In paragraph 20 of Mr. Thornhill's letter, it is laid down that each divisional battalion will consist of an average of about 3,000 foot and 500 horse, and that in round numbers the organized police for the six divisions of the North-west provinces may be taken at 20,000 foot and 3,500 horse. If a regiment of native infantry be assumed as 1,000 bayonets, and a regiment of irregular cavalry at 584 sabres, then the total of native troops for the North-west provinces would amount to 28,000 infantry, and 7,000 cavalry, or 35,000 men.

Mr. Muir proposes, for all India, sixteen brigade stations of the following force:—

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Total.
For moveable columns	25,000	5,200	2,500	32,700
To garrison 16 brigade stations	16,000	-	1,600	17,600
Total - - -	41,000	5,200	4,100	50,300

The brigade stations proposed are:—

North-west Provinces	{	Meerut.	Punjab	3 similar Stations.		
		Allahabad.				
		Lucknow.				
Rajpootana and Central India	{	Gwalior.	Bengal	{		
		Nusserabad.			Madras	2 Brigade Stations.
		Mhow.				

Besides these, however, Mr. Muir considers that the divisional stations, treasuries, &c. require the presence of European troops, and for the following places he estimates that a force of

- 8 Infantry regiments,
- 3 or 4 Cavalry,
- 6 or 7 Batteries of Artillery,
- 3 or 4 Reserve Companies of Artillery.

would suffice:—

- | | |
|----------------|----------------|
| 1. Bareilly. | 5. Saugor. |
| 2. Agra. | 6. Jubbulpoor. |
| 3. Benares. | 7. Jhansi. |
| 4. Goruckpore. | |

The 29 or 30 stations which are the head quarters of district civil administration, and chiefly within the divisional circles above specified, he would provide with forts where they have them not already, and considers that each should have a small garrison of Europeans trained to artillery practice. To meet this requisition, he would have a garrison corps formed of invalids and pensioners 1,500 strong, besides 300 to 400 artillerymen. To the 50,300 European troops of the 16 brigades must therefore be added, 12,100 men for the divisional and district stations of the North-west provinces.

The police force of the North-west provinces is to be composed of 18,800 infantry and 5,100 cavalry.

For the North-western provinces Mr. Muir estimates the force necessary as European troops:—

- 11 Regiments of infantry.
- 3 " cavalry.
- 10½ Troops or battalions of artillery.
- 9½ Companies of artillery.

In all 14,700 men, to which he adds native troops:—

17 Regiments native infantry.

5 " cavalry.

1 Company Christian artillery.

In all, 19,600 men, or in the proportion of 1½ native regular soldiers to one European soldier; police included,) or European to 2½ native soldiers.

The total of regular troops for the North-west provinces would therefore be 34,300 men, or, police included, 58,200 men.

As Mr. Muir makes no estimate of the strength of force required for the divisional and district stations in Bengal Proper, in the Punjab, and in the Madras and Bombay presidencies, it is difficult to approximate to the real amount of troops European and native he deems necessary for the Bengal presidency, or for the Madras and Bombay presidencies.

17. Major-General Sir Sydney Cotton proposes to combine the regular native horse and foot altogether with the European corps, in the proportion of two Europeans to one native. To the 40,000 European infantry, which he would fix as the least amount of force required for the Bengal presidency, Sir S. Cotton would attach 20,000 natives, trained, armed, and disciplined precisely in the same manner, and incorporated with the Europeans. Consistently with the Adjutant-General, Colonel Mayhew, Sir S. Cotton advocates, as a preliminary step to reorganization, that the whole of the regular cavalry and infantry of the Bengal army remaining embodied, whether armed or disarmed, whether apparently loyal or otherwise, be *in limine* discharged from the service of the British Government. The new levies Sir S. Cotton would graft and amalgamate with the European troops; and if it were deemed expedient to re-enlist any part of the old native army, it should be on similar terms, and with a like object, as in the case of the new levies. The artillery should, in the opinion of Sir S. Cotton, be entirely European; and as he objects to native drivers, it follows that to the 40,000 European infantry must be added an artillery of such strength as would be able to furnish drivers as well as gunners.

18. The police force of the country, not armed and trained as soldiers, as heretofore, Sir S. Cotton would increase, so as to do away with the necessity of employing the troops in detached duties; but in addition to the 20,000 natives, armed and trained like, and amalgamated with the 40,000 European infantry, Sir S. Cotton proposes about 40,000 irregular infantry, armed with firelocks and two-grooved rifles, but not trusted with the Enfield rifle. The proposed strength of irregular cavalry is not given.

19. If it be assumed that Sir S. Cotton's requirements as to artillery demand 10,000 Europeans, then the total of European troops for the Bengal presidency will be 50,000 men, exclusive of cavalry, which does not enter into Sir S. Cotton's estimate. The total of native infantry, regular and irregular, amounts to 60,000 men.

20. In the opinion of Brigadier-General J. Jacob, the strength of European troops, exclusive of artillery and sappers, sufficient for the Bengal presidency, would be 20,000 men. Of these 10,000 for Bengal, and 10,000 to be placed at Simlah; but he would have 10,000 men at Kurrachee as a reserve force, generally applicable to service, whether on the Indus frontier or elsewhere.

21. If the foregoing opinions are compared, the disparities will be found considerable; chiefly so, however, with respect to the native portion of the force to be maintained. Comparison in detail cannot be instituted, because where two appear to concur, as in the instance of Sir J. Lawrence's committee and Mr. Thornhill, in their calculation of the European troops required for the North-west provinces, it will be observed that the comparison would be fallacious to a certain extent, inasmuch as Sir J. Lawrence probably includes Oude, and excludes specifically Central India from the North-west provinces; whereas Mr. Thornhill excludes Oude, and includes Central India, or a good part of it. Sir J. Lawrence's committee and Brigadier-General J. Jacob concur as to the amount of European force advisable to maintain in Bengal, viz., 10,000 men; but they differ widely as to what is necessary for the Punjab, for which Sir J. Lawrence requires 22,600 men; whereas Brigadier-General J. Jacob considers 10,000 men at Simlah sufficient for the North-west provinces and the Punjab, but would have 10,000 men at Kurrachee, which he considers to be the best and most convenient position in all India for European troops, and especially useful as a reserve force for the Punjab and the North-west frontier. Sir S. Cotton, except in casually mentioning what he considers advisable for the Trans-Jhelum frontier, does not enter into details as to the position of the corps d'armées into which he would divide the troops of the Bengal presidency.

Sir W. Mansfield remarks that it seems to be generally admitted that the presidency of Bengal will not be able to subsist in future with a European garrison of less than

(50,000) fifty thousand men, and that exclusive of the force necessary for Gwalior and Rajpootana. He is of opinion "that in the course of time, when the rebellion of the last year shall have become matter of history and cease to be a means of excitement with the popular mind, when the province of Oudh shall have been thoroughly reduced, and order again properly established in Central India and Bundelcund, that a less number may be found to suffice, and that we shall not be required to maintain an European force of above* (35,000) thirty-five thousand men for this presidency. But for the present and for some years to come, probably ten at least, the larger number say (50,000) fifty thousand must be maintained."

Major-General Birch considers that the Bengal presidency will require—

Horse artillery	-	-	12 troops.
Fort artillery	-	-	} 80 companies, with 65 field batteries.
Engineers	-	-	
Dragoons	-	-	21 regiments.
Infantry	-	-	68 regiments.

He remarks that this estimate may appear large, but that the defection of the native artillery, and the necessity of substituting European artillery in its place, entails the necessity that guns be supported by European infantry or cavalry wherever they may be placed. Major-General Birch, however, proposes that the cavalry corps do not exceed a strength of 350 non-commissioned rank and file, and that they be 18 in number on the Indian establishment, and that the dragoon regiments of the line be 3 in number, so as to raise the total to 21 corps of cavalry.

As regards the infantry, he proposes that the regiments do not exceed 800 rank and file, and that the local force be composed of 50 such regiments, the remaining 18 being from the lines so as to raise the total to 68 regiments. This amount of force, when railroads are completed, it may hereafter, and not very long hence, he supposes, be found practicable to reduce.

For reasons assigned, Major-General Birch would have none but local artillery, amounting to 77 batteries of horse and foot artillery, besides a few native batteries for the smaller contingents, from the existence of which he would apprehend no inconvenience in the face of such a heavy preponderance of European artillery.

22. The general results as respects the strength of Europeans approximate more nearly, and are as follows:—

	Europeans.	Natives.
Major-Gen. Birch	71,000	19,200
Major-Gen. Sir W. Mansfield	50,000	30,000
To be reduced hereafter to	44,000	30,000
Colonel Mayhew	60,000	60,000
Sir J. Lawrence	} 54,600	} 136,500
Brigadier-Gen. Chamberlain		
Lieutenant-Col. Edwardes		
Major-Gen. Sir S. Cotton	40,000 Inf.	60,000 Inf.
Brigadier-Gen. J. Jacob	20,000 Inf. and Cavalry.	

As artillery and cavalry must be added to Sir S. Cotton's proposed strength of European infantry, his estimate would probably be raised to a total strength of European force about a mean between Colonel Mayhew's and Sir J. Lawrence's, or probably nearer that of the former than of the latter. Sir W. Mansfield, assuming 50,000 European troops to be indispensable, would at once take measures to associate with them (30,000) thirty thousand natives, to be distributed rateably between the cavalry and infantry. He would make the head quarters of each European regiment the scene of a new levy, and would restrict, with some exceptions, the future regular army to such new levies. All corps and levies raised to be the local armies or police forces of their respective provinces, and to be augmented or decreased according as the general policy of the empire or that of each province may render necessary. He observes upon the "bitter necessity" which at present compels the employment of such a preponderance of Punjabee and Sikh force, whom he estimates at 60,000 men; and remarks, that while the excitement of war, plunder, and success over their natural enemies lasts, we may believe this Sikh army may not give us trouble, but that it can hardly be doubted that when the excitement has passed away great prudence and judgment will have to be exhibited in dissolving the large Punjabee force scattered broadcast over the empire; and that we must provide in time a native as well as an European counterpoise. He would therefore lose no time in initiating the scheme, and in causing each battalion and formed regiment of cavalry in the presidency of Bengal not quartered in the Punjab

* Requiring an establishment of 44,000.

to raise a native auxiliary corps for general service. When a few such corps had been roughly formed, Sir W. Mansfield would move them with the British regiment to which they belonged to the Punjab, and relieve the corps there stationed. Except for particular corps, the recruiting of Punjabees and Sikhs should cease until the equilibrium between those races and the Hindustanees had been restored in our ranks.

With regard to the native troops necessary for the Bengal presidency, Major-General Birch gives an analysis of the existing state (at the time of writing) of the remains of the Bengal native army, and proposes bringing the six irregular corps, viz., the Kelat-i-Ghilzee, the Ferozepore, and the Goorkha regiments into the line, which would make a total of 20 regiments of regular native infantry already embodied, to which he proposes to add 10 more, so as to have altogether 30 regiments of regular native infantry on the establishment. Major-general Birch considers 640 privates as sufficient strength for these corps.

The reasons which lead Major-General Birch to advocate the re-arming of some of the disarmed native corps are stated at length, as also the bearing which an armed police, militarily trained and organized, has upon the strength of European troops necessary for the military occupation of the country.

The placing arms in the hands of native police, and the drilling them as regiments, he considers matter of very questionable policy, and as multiplying trained opposition to our rule against some future day of difficulty. He thinks that if proper measures are taken to disarm the population of our provinces, there will be little occasion to place fire-arms in the hands of the police; that if the police is to be what police ordinarily is, the proportion of the European to the native troops should be as one to four; but if the police is to have fire-arms, and to be regimentally drilled, the proportion should be as one to three.

General E. J. Jacob regards the Punjab as being well within the sphere of influence and action of his proposed reserve force of 10,000 men at Kurrachee, he would not of course bring into comparison, in disconnection from his reserve, the 20,000 men he assigns to the Bengal presidency; making allowance for this, the widest disparity is between the proposal of Brigadier-General J. Jacob and those of the other recorded opinions.

23. The closest apparent agreement is between Sir S. Cotton and Colonel Mayhew, for their proposals would seem to concur in the force of natives as well as of Europeans. It has been seen that both suggest that the remnants of the old Bengal army, whether armed or disarmed, be at once disbanded; but neither enter into particulars to show how this can be safely carried into effect, that is, without adding to the number of rebels still in arms, and to the general insecurity of the North-west provinces. The strength of native troops proposed by Sir J. Lawrence is more than double that recommended by Sir S. Cotton and Colonel Mayhew; but Sir S. Cotton calculates upon an increase of the police, which, though not armed or trained as soldiers, is to relieve the army of detached or escort duty in every possible case. Colonel Mayhew likewise excludes police, a point he leaves untouched; Sir J. Lawrence includes police; and Mr. Thornhill in his estimate of 35,000 native troops for the North-west provinces includes as many as 23,500 police, of horse and foot, armed, trained, and having a thoroughly military organization, under the command and supervision of about 120 European officers.

QUESTIONS 5, 6, 7, and 8.

5. What proportion of native troops now serving in are regulars, irregulars, and police corps? Of what races are they composed, and in what proportions do the races occur?
6. What proportion of your proposed establishment of native troops should be regulars, irregulars, and police?
7. What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in ; and state the ratios, both inclusive and exclusive, of police?
8. What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in India generally; and state the ratios as affected by the inclusion or exclusion of native police corps?

24. The proportion of races in the native troops serving under Sir J. Lawrence in the Punjab is—

Mussulmans	-	30,188
Sikhs	-	14,692
Hindoos of mixed castes	-	7,566
Total	-	52,446

The Sikh element, usually thought to predominate in the forces under Sir J. Lawrence's orders, is in the ratio of about one Sikh to two Mussulmans; and when the mixed Hindoo castes are added, the ratio is one Sikh to two and a half

Mussulmans and Hindoos. The pure Sikh element has therefore a counterpoise in the greater armed numerical strength of Mussulmans and Hindoos.

25. In the territories under the administration of Sir J. Lawrence the ratio of European troops, inclusive of police, is as three to seven; exclusive of police, as five to eight. The Committee lay down as a rule that the minimum of Europeans should be one to three natives, and the maximum one to two; and they point out that, assuming this principle to be expedient, to 22,600 Europeans they might have 67,800 natives. The actual proposition, 52,364 natives, is a mean between the two ratios. They justly remark that the country can neither be held nor worked by Europeans alone; and although, as a mere question of security, a large European force is essential, a still larger number of natives is indispensable for the administration of the country. They add that if at first sight the ratio of natives in their proposal be deemed too great for safety, it must be borne in mind that on the side of the Europeans are ranged 102 field pieces of artillery against 22 on the side of the natives. Or if it be thought that less natives would suffice for the administration, they answer that at every point the natives have been reduced to the lowest practicable numbers. The increase and decrease of the several arms are shown as follows:—

Arm.	Former Strength.	Proposed Strength.	Increase.	Decrease.
Europeans	12,050	22,600	9,550	—
Natives, regular and irregular	58,717	36,064	—	22,653
Police	9,000	16,300	7,300	—
Totals	79,767	74,964	16,850	22,653
Result, actual decrease	—	—	—	5,803

26. As a general rule, Sir J. Lawrence and his associated officers lay down the principle that native soldiers should be as five to two Europeans; and that they would keep as nearly as practicable to the following proportions:—

European soldiers	-	-	-	2
Native infantry	-	-	-	3
Police	-	-	-	2
Total	-	-	-	7

This is merely laid down as a general rule, for they correctly observe that some of the races of India are much more warlike and robust than others, and that the European check ought to vary with the native power. Thus, they state it as their opinion that in the Punjab and Upper India less than one European to two Sikhs, or Pathans, or Goorkhas would not be safe; whereas with the Hindoostances it might be one to three; and with the southern races one to four. They show that before the mutiny European soldiers were only one to nine. For India generally, they maintain that the proportion laid down for Bengal should pervade the whole of India, and that they know of no element of security which would render it safe to increase the proportion of natives, except that of Christianity.

27. Mr. Thornhill considers that the European arm should not be less than one-third of the total strength of armed and disciplined natives of all kinds, and that recourse should be had chiefly to a system of organized police, for the performance of all guard, escort, and interior detachment duties which formerly were discharged by the native army. This, as will be seen by his letter and tabular statement, is in course of being rapidly carried into effect, in so far as the raising, arming, and training of a militarily organized police is concerned. Taking the average strength of European corps of cavalry and infantry, the proportion of Europeans to natives, armed and trained, would be in the North-west provinces, according to Mr. Thornhill's proposed distribution, about two Europeans to three and a half natives.

28. Colonel Mayhew would have the European and the native troops in equal proportions in the Bengal presidency, and as one to three for India generally, exclusive of police. Sir S. Cotton would have them in the ratio of two Europeans to three natives, exclusive of police, in which ratio of two to three he is in accordance with Sir J. Lawrence and his colleagues. As Sir J. Lawrence writes from Peshawar, it may be said that the replies from the Punjab are unanimous upon the proportion which the European should bear to the regular native troops, viz., two to three, exclusive of police.

29. Upon this point it may be here observed that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief at Madras, Sir P. Grant, formerly the Adjutant-General of the Bengal army, and an officer of much experience in the field, states as his

opinion, that in the Madras presidency, and in India generally, he considers that the European force never should be below the proportion of one-third of the native troops of the line, and that he would not allow police corps to affect the calculation either way.

30. Upon this subject his Excellency, Lieutenant-General Sir H. Somerset, the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay, observes, that the proportion of European troops to the whole native force of the Bengal presidency, police, regulars and irregulars, should never be less than one-fourth, a proportion which admits of one-third being temporarily sent on service. Excluding the police, Sir H. Somerset would have the Europeans bear a proportion of about half the regulars and irregulars put together. He considers that it would be difficult to maintain a greater proportion of European to native troops than one-fourth, but that it is politic to maintain that, if possible.

31. The object of the first series of questions having been, as before remarked, to ascertain the strength and composition of the European army which must be permanently maintained in India generally, as well as in each presidency separately, it is now advisable to give a résumé of the requirements of the Madras and of the Bombay presidencies; and in doing so the Madras presidency will be first taken.

32. Sir P. Grant refers to a letter, copy of which he appends, dated the 1st January 1858, addressed to Major-General Sir William Mansfield, as containing full information as to the European troops of all arms, belonging to both services, stationed in or expected at the presidency of Madras; and also as to the European forces which Sir P. Grant considers necessary for the various British provinces, including Burmah, under his Excellency's command.

33. Sir P. Grant is of opinion that until the European force is increased to the extent proposed, and until a local force is organized for Pegu, and an efficient police is formed for that province, the existing number of native troops in the Madras army is quite necessary for that presidency. When those arrangements shall have been carried out, he considers that all native artillery may, and ought, to be dispensed with; that the light cavalry may be reduced from eight to four regiments; and he hopes that a considerable reduction may be effected in the strength of the native infantry, though he cannot say to what precise extent.

34. It has already been shown that in his replies to questions 7 and 8, Sir P. Grant was of opinion that the European force in India should never be below the proportion of one-third of the native troops of the line; that ratio is nearly kept in Sir P. Grant's estimate of the strength of European and native troops required for the Madras presidency, which is as follows:—

EUROPEANS.		NATIVES.	
43 companies of artillery, each averaging 121 of all ranks	5,203	4 regiments of cavalry, each 703 sabres	2,812
3 regiments of dragoons, each 703 sabres	2,109	55 regiments of infantry, and 12 battalions of veterans, amounting in all to bayonets	68,920
18 regiments of infantry, each 1,152 bayonets	14,970	Total Natives	68,732
Total Europeans	22,288		

The present strength of the Madras Army is as follows:—

EUROPEANS.		NATIVES.	
1 troop Royal horse artillery	214	2 troops Company's horse artillery	180
4 troops Company's horse artillery	510	1 regiment of Goolundaze	600
2 regiments of Her Majesty's dragoons	1,148	1 regiment of sappers and miners	1,450
4 companies of Royal artillery	652	7 regiments of light cavalry	2,268
16 companies of Company's artillery	1,650	52 regiments of native infantry	55,120
8 regiments of Her Majesty's infantry	7,012	3 regiments extra	3,180
3 regiments of Company's infantry	2,550	2 regiments of veterans	2,220
Total Europeans	13,636	1 regiment of Madras sapper militia	1,024
		Total Natives	68,042

The proposed future strength of force for the Madras presidency and its dependencies is therefore much the same as to native troops, but shows an increase of 8,652 European troops, of whom 2,277 are artillery-men. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief includes no European regiment for the Straits, in this estimate of required strength.

With respect to the proportion of irregulars and police, Sir P. Grant is unable at present to form an opinion, except as regards Pegu, for which province his Excellency has recommended a local force in his report to the Government of India, dated 2nd February 1857.

The Right Honourable the Governor of Madras, Lord Harris, considers that when the police of the Madras presi-

gency is reorganized, that force will relieve the troops of some of the duties on which they are employed. The police when reorganized is to amount to about 22,000 men, and when in operation his Lordship is of opinion that the native army will be sufficiently numerous at its present full strength, provided the six local corps for Pegu are raised; that it might, however, be advisable to diminish the number of native cavalry regiments, and replace them by Europeans; but that the subject requires serious consideration and further information before giving a deliberate opinion.

The established strength of the European and native troops of the Madras army are as follows:—

NATIVES.		EUROPEANS.	
Cavalry - - - -	2,754	Dragoons and lancers	1,416
Artillery - - - -	840	Royal artillery	933
Sappers and miners	1,503	Company's ditto	1,845
Infantry, including 3 extra regiments and Madras sapper militia	62,722	Veterans ditto	125
Veterans - - - -	2,324	Her Majesty's infantry	8,629
		Company's ditto	2,641
		Veterans	115
		European sappers	75
Total - - - -	70,154	Total - - - -	15,079
Real strength - - - -	52,850	Real strength - - - -	13,950

Lord Harris' proposal, as to the amount of European infantry required for the Madras presidency, agrees with that of Sir P. Grant, viz., 13 regiments; but the Governor of Madras suggests, for the decision of the Government of India, the question of making the Straits a station for a European corps, which would raise the estimated strength of Europeans to fourteen. As the Governor of Madras states that it has been already determined to do away with the native artillery, the 35 troops, batteries, and reserve companies, which Lord Harris deems sufficient, would be European; but there are eight less than in Sir P. Grant's proposed force, and one dragoon regiment more. The two distributions may be seen in the following table:—

LORD HARRIS.					
	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.		
			Horse.	Foot.	Reserve Company.
Kamptee to supply Saugor and Jaulnah } Mhow	1	1	1	2	1
Secunderabad	1	1	1	1	1
Northern division	1	1	1	1	1
Bellary	1	1	1	1	1
Bangalore	1	1	1	1	1
Marcara, to provide Malabar	1	1	1	1	1
Jacktalla } to provide Trichi- Trichinopoly } nopoly	1	1	1	1	1
Fort St. George	1	1	1	1	1
St. Thomas' Mount	1	1	1	1	1
Penang	1	1	1	1	1
Singapore	1	1	1	1	1
Thyatinyoo	1	1	1	1	1
Tonghoo	1	1	1	1	1
Banagoon	1	1	1	1	1
Moulmein	1	1	1	1	1
Total - - - -	14	4	6	19	10
				35	

SIR P. GRANT.					
	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.		
			Horse.	Foot.	Reserve Company.
Kamptee	1	1	3	2	2
Secunderabad and Jaulnah	2	1	4	1	1
Northern division	1	1	2	1	1
Bellary	1	1	2	1	1
Bangalore	1	1	2	1	1
Cannanore	1	1	2	1	1
Jacktalla	1	1	2	1	1
Trichinopoly	1	1	2	1	1
Fort St. George	1	1	2	1	1
St. Thomas' Mount	1	1	2	1	1
Penang	1	1	2	1	1
Singapore	1	1	2	1	1
Thyatinyoo	1	1	2	1	1
Tonghoo	1	1	2	1	1
Banagoon	1	1	2	1	1
Moulmein	1	1	2	1	1
Total - - - -	13	3	26	17	17
					43

The requirements of the Madras presidency, according to Sir P. Grant, are 156 field guns, 13 regiments of European infantry, 3 regiments of dragoons, 43 troops, batteries, and companies of reserve. To meet these requirements there are available and in prospect 150 field guns, 23 troops and companies of Royal and Company's artillery, two regiments of dragoons, and 11 regiments of European infantry. Thus the means in hand and in prospect fall short of what Sir P. Grant considers the necessities of the Madras presidency to

the extent of six field guns and 20 companies of artillery, one regiment of dragoons, and two of infantry. His Excellency adds that if, as seems to be contemplated, the Saugor territory north of the Nerbudda is again transferred to the Madras presidency, that a further accession of 18 field guns and five companies of artillery, one regiment of dragoons, and one regiment of infantry will be necessary. This would raise the total of cavalry and infantry to a par with Lord Harris', and the companies of European artillery to 48, or 13 more than the Governor of Madras proposes.

Lord Harris observes that the object he has in view in recommending this force and its distribution is to ensure the moral effect produced by the presence of Europeans, and to secure the speedy formation of small forces capable of acting within certain areas with rapidity and effect. He considers that if this course be adopted, and if at the same time the native corps be formed with discretion in the selection of materials, and disciplined with vigour, the proportions of mere numbers are of little importance, and cannot very well be taken as any significant test for ensuring safety and predominance.

When the Madras presidency police is organized, and is of the complement of 22,000 men, the whole body of armed natives would be about 88,000 men, exclusive of the Pegu local force and the Hyderabad and Nagpore contingents. If the two latter bodies be included, then in round numbers the Madras European force will be associated with 100,000 armed natives, exclusive of the Pegu local force. The ratio of European troops to native may be taken as being at present one to six, and the proposals raise the ratio of European to native troops to one to three and a half; or, if the police be included, and Pegu local force, to about one European to five native armed men.

Pegu and the Nizam's territory being occupied by Madras troops, and therefore included in the replies from the Governor and the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras presidency, the remarks of the Commissioners of the eastern side of the Bay of Bengal, and of the Resident at Hyderabad may here be noticed in subordination to the more general review of the requirements of the Madras presidency.

Lieutenant-Colonel Davidson, the Resident at Hyderabad, proposes to raise two African corps in place of two of the present infantry regiments of sepoy of the Hyderabad contingent. If troops of this description are not entertained, he advocates the location of an additional European regiment in the Nizam's territory, somewhere near Longsongoor or Mofdgul, whichever is found the more favourable in point of climate; and would have another European regiment at Ellichpoo, with a sanitary station near the latter cantonment at Chickuldah. He observes that this would be a more expensive arrangement than the enrolment of African corps, and, considered with reference to tropical service, probably not so efficient.

Lieutenant-Colonel Davidson remarks that if the strict letter of treaties be adhered to, we might not be able to place any European infantry in the subsidiary force, excepting a few artillerymen, vide Article 3 of Treaties of 1798 and 1800 respectively; but he considers that according to the treaty of 1853, the Hyderabad contingent might be all Europeans, only the numbers, not the description of troops, being therein specified. No objection has, however, ever been made by the Nizam to the introduction of European troops, and the practice seems to have been to regard the specification of sepoy battalions in the treaties as having reference to the expense, and in keeping up the subsidiary force one European soldier has been considered numerically as two natives. Lieutenant-Colonel Davidson would substitute European artillerymen for the Golundaze of the Hyderabad contingent, and he does not think that the augmentation of European infantry he proposes would cause the Nizam any uneasiness.

The troops which Lieutenant-Colonel Davidson proposes for the occupation of the Nizam's territories are as follows:—

EUROPEANS.		NATIVES.	
1 regiment cavalry	700	SUBSIDIARY FORCE.	
3 regiments infantry	3,000	1 regiment cavalry	350
3 troops horse artillery	200	5 regiments infantry	4,000
6 horse batteries	600	HYDERABAD CONTINGENT.	
		4 regiments irregular cavalry	2,350
		6 regiments native infantry	5,412
		POLICE.	
		District	1,744
		Hill rangers, &c.	441
		Total native troops	12,698
		Total police	2,185
Total - - - -	4,500	Total natives - - - -	14,283

The European force ordinarily consisted of one regiment of European infantry and two companies of artillery; it was lately increased by a regiment of cavalry and a battery of royal artillery, so that it amounts to 1,894 of all arms. The proposed increase amounts therefore to about 2,600 Europeans. As the Nizam has at present in service 18,000 Arabs, and about 5,000 Affghans, or altogether 23,000 men, the armed natives may be taken at 37,000 men of regular and irregular troops, British and Nizam's. Lieutenant-Colonel Davidson's proposal therefore gives the proportion of European to native troops—

Exclusive of police and Arabs, &c.,
1 European to 2·68 natives.
Inclusive of police, exclusive of Arabs, &c.,
1 European to 3·17 natives.
Inclusive of Arabs and Affghan soldiery,
1 European to 8·2 natives.

The Commissioner of Pegu, Major A. P. Phayre, has, in his replies, included the Tenasserim provinces; and states the present strength of the European and native troops serving in Burmah as follows:—

EUROPEANS.		NATIVES.	
3 regiments infantry -	2,188	4 companies Madras sappers -	861
5 companies of artillery -	351	13 regiments of Madras native infantry -	7,550
		1 regiment Pegu light infantry -	800
		8 regiments police -	1,000
		1 company native artillery -	53
MOULMEIN.		MOULMEIN.	
Artillery -	76	2 regiments of infantry -	1,408
Infantry -	110		
Total Europeans -	2,705	Total Natives -	11,772

Major Phayre remarks that another class of troops differing from those entered in his return is now being raised in the Madras presidency as "Pegu police corps." They are to be composed of the same races generally as the Madras regiments of the line. The Commissioner observes, that knowing neither the language, the manners, the people, or the country, they will scarcely be useful as police in the strict sense of the term; but that as jail and treasury guards, and in taking ordinary station duties at large stations, they may facilitate a permanent reduction of the number of regular troops in Pegu. They would also, if half the force were composed of these police corps, diminish the frequency with which the turn for service in Burmah will fall upon the regular native infantry of the Madras army.

Major Phayre recommends that a European regiment be added to the present strength, and be placed at Moulmein; where he considers it would be of great service with reference to the display of force towards the Burmese territory; would be readily available, if required, at Calcutta or Madras; and have the advantage of the healthiness of Moulmein. With this exception, the present number and distribution of European troops in Pegu appears to Major Phayre all that can be desired. He would, however, reduce the native regiments from thirteen to nine, and make minor changes in their distribution. Of the nine regiments, four might be the "Pegu police corps" now raising in Madras. The whole proposed force would then be as follows:—

European infantry and artillery	-	5,400
Native regular infantry	-	5,000
Native Indian police	-	4,000
Pegu light infantry	-	1,600
Native sappers	-	575
Total	-	16,575

The native regiments are here assumed at their full strength, and the augmentation is almost entirely in the European part of the force, and amounts to 2,700 men.

Major-General J. Bell, who commands the Pegu division, does not include the Tenasserim provinces in his replies. He proposes no increase to the European force now in Pegu, but would have the battery of European artillery which was withdrawn restored to Pegu, so as to allow of one being at Thyatnyoo. He suggests no alteration in the distribution at present existing.

With respect to the native troops, the Major-General remarks that there are now serving in Burmah eleven regiments, of an average strength of 600 privates each. When each corps is augmented to its full complement of 1,000 privates, he considers that two regiments might be safely withdrawn, one from Rangoon, and one from Thyatnyoo; and that if a Pegu police corps of 1,000 strong be given, then two more corps of regulars might be withdrawn, one from Henzada, and one from Thyatnyoo. He would post-

pone the consideration of police corps until the one promised is obtained and experience shows how it works.

The proportions involved in the Major-General's proposals are,—

European soldiers to regular native infantry,
Three to seven.

European soldiers to native infantry and police,
Three to eight.

Captain Hopkinson, the officiating Commissioner in the Tenasserim and Martaban provinces, proposes no increase to the force of European and native troops on that coast, except that the companies of artillery and infantry should be at their full strength. But both Colonel Stevenson, the officer commanding, and Captain Hopkinson, though not deeming such an increase absolutely necessary, consider that the presence of two or three hundred Europeans at Moulmein would make assurance doubly sure, and prove highly satisfactory to the mercantile community. Both officers, however, assume the invariable presence of a vessel of war on the coast. Upon this subject a letter from Captain F. B. Seymour, of Her Majesty's ship "Pylorus," is appended.

Major-General Sir M. Cubbon, Commissioner of Mysore, considers that the European force for the territories under his administration should not be fewer than one complete European regiment of infantry, at least 1,000 strong, or still better 1,200; one complete regiment of European dragoons, at least 700 strong, and 300 European artillery, horse and foot; the whole to be stationed at Bangalore.

With respect to native troops, Sir M. Cubbon considers one entire regiment necessary at Mercara in Coorg, together with one brigade of European artillery for special reasons; one regiment at Hurryhur, on the northern boundary of Mysore, and one native regiment at the French Rocks, or at a new station proposed by the Commander-in-Chief between Seringapatam and Mysore; at Bangalore, two regiments of native infantry, but no native light cavalry.

Of irregular troops, there are four battalions of Mysore irregular infantry, consisting of about 2,200 men, and seven regiments of Mysore irregular horse, numbering about 2,500 privates. Both are distributed throughout the country as revenue and judicial guards, as escort for treasure, and generally for police purposes. 1,000 of the jelladars are now serving under the orders of the Madras Government beyond the frontier of Mysore.

The number of European troops proposed is in the ratio of two to five of the regular native troops, and two to between nine and ten of the regular and irregular troops.

Sir M. Cubbon's proposal as to European troops agrees with that of the Commander-in-Chief for Mysore, but differs in distribution of native troops, as the Commissioner would dispense with the regiment of light cavalry, and has only two instead of three native infantry regiments at Bangalore. He also would place a brigade of European artillery at Mercara, but of what strength the brigade should be is not stated.

From the replies of his Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir H. Somerset, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army, it appears that, according to the information and returns received at head-quarters up the 22nd July 1858, the following was the strength of the European troops borne on the rolls of the Bombay army:—

Her Majesty's Troops.	Officers.	Non-commissioned and Rank and File.
Serving within the limits of the Presidency -	475	10,986
Serving beyond the limits of the Presidency -	203	5,299
Total of Her Majesty's troops	678	16,285

Honourable Company's Troops.	Officers.	Non-commissioned and Rank and File.
Serving within the limits of the Presidency -	67	2,101
Serving beyond the limits of the Presidency -	66	2,242
Total Company's European troops	133	4,343
Grand Total of European troops	811	20,628

The same returns and distribution list show the strength of native troops as follows:—

	European Officers.	Natives.
Serving in the limits of the Presidency Non-commissioned officers	437	37,229
Serving beyond the limits of the Presidency Non-commissioned officers	90	5,781
Total European Officers Non-commissioned Officers	527	41,985

The proposed strength of European and native troops is as follows:—

	Established Strength.			
	Commissioned Officers.		Non-commissioned Officers.	
	Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.
3 battalions of sappers and miners	80	10	500	570
6 troops of horse artillery	30	—	900	150
3 companies reserve artillery	45	—	945	288
16 light field batteries	90	—	2,082*	576
3 regiments of European cavalry	120	—	2,244	—
Military train	20	—	800	—
15 European regiments	750	—	16,155	—
3 regiments of native light cavalry	78	48	0	1,950
39 regiments of native infantry	1,092	780	78	38,220
Total	2,270	838	24,310	41,764

* Includes drivers.

Including officers, European troops - - - 26,580
Ditto ditto, Native troops - - - 42,592

An examination of the details of the proposed strength of European and native troops will show that the increase of Europeans, amounting to 4,548 of all ranks, is due to the substitution of Europeans for Golundaze and drivers; to the battalion of European sappers and miners; and to the military train. The same number of batteries now on the rolls of the presidency is recommended; viz., twenty-four; but instead of—

European officers - - - 100
" non-commissioned and rank and file - 2,573
Native officers - - - 52
" non-commissioned and rank and file - 2,013

Sir H. Somerset proposes for the artillery, 24 batteries, manned by,—

European officers - - - 165
European non-commissioned officers and rank and file - 4,527
Native non-commissioned and rank and file - 1,014

Hence, the increase of Europeans for the artillery is 65 officers and 1,954 non-commissioned officers and rank and file.

There are now on the rolls of the presidency four regiments of Her Majesty's cavalry, which have 130 officers and 2,339 non-commissioned and rank and file. Sir H. Somerset proposes three regiments of European cavalry of full strength, viz., 129 officers and 2,244 rank and file; in other words, nearly the same strength of men and officers.

Of Her Majesty's infantry, there are now borne on the rolls of the presidency 14½ regiments, giving 505 officers and 12,712 non-commissioned officers and privates. To these must be added three regiments of Company's European infantry, giving 84 officers and 2,783 non-commissioned officers and rank and file; or a total of 17½ regiments, having 589 officers and 15,495 non-commissioned officers and privates. Sir H. Somerset proposes 15 European regiments of full strength, giving 750 officers and 16,155 non-commissioned officers and privates. Here, again, the increase is due to the assumption that the 15 regiments are at their full complement, for there is a reduction of 2½ regiments of European infantry.

As compared with the strength of European troops at the time of the mutiny at Meerut, the proposed augmentation amounts to 17,000 of all ranks, and is, therefore, considerable; but close on 8,000 Europeans of all ranks borne

on the rolls of the Bombay presidency are serving beyond its limits in Malwa, Rajpootana, and Gwalior.

Sir H. Somerset proposes that the native infantry of the Bombay army, which now consists of 29 regiments, of 12 companies, and 1,180 native commissioned and rank and file, should be re-constructed into 39 regiments of 10 companies, and 1,000 native commissioned, non-commissioned, and rank and file. He calculates that an extra expenditure of a lac and a half of rupees would be about the cost of this re-organization. The present strength of 34,220 men has been found so totally inadequate that 2,000 pensioners and two extra battalions of 1,180 strong, each had to be enrolled; of these, the pensioners, an expensive body, being too old and infirm, must be discharged as soon as their relief can be arranged. Thus, over and above the 34,220 men of regular native infantry, 4,360 were enrolled to meet present emergencies; thus making in all 38,850 regular native infantry, or about 420 men less than the strength proposed by Sir H. Somerset.

The three branches of the regulars, irregulars, and police and local corps will shortly be of the following strength:—

Native regular troops	-	-	42,036
" irregulars	-	-	10,185
" police and local	-	-	28,738
Grand Total	-	-	80,959

Sir H. Somerset is of opinion that the question, what proportion of our establishment should be regulars, irregulars, and police, involves some of the most important considerations of the present day, because there are ideas abroad, the practical adoption of which would lead, his Excellency fears, to great evils and fresh complications. He considers the duties of the soldier and the policeman so diverse as to render their unfettered performance by one and the same body impossible; that the qualifications of a policeman are a local knowledge of the country and people, whilst those of the soldier are perfect freedom from all local sympathies or encumbrances, a readiness to move anywhere on any duty at a moment's warning, and submission to a strict discipline. To maintain such a state of discipline his Excellency considers that the European element must be increased, not diminished; that though police corps may be sufficiently officered by having three European officers, such a number is quite inadequate for the corps of the line; and he would do away with the native commissioned officers in order to find means, with no additional charge to the state, to augment the number of European officers above the existing establishment. He argues that the contrary course cannot fail to lower the discipline of the troops, and throw undue power into the hands of the native officers. He thinks that the past year shows the imperative necessity of keeping the reins, both of our civil and of our military administration, in the hands of Europeans; that our supremacy in this country depends chiefly upon the European element, but more upon its judicious fusion among the mass to be governed, than upon its bare physical strength; and he believes that no addition of European strength in our power to make would compensate for the moral and physical paralysis which an undue reduction of European officers would occasion to the native army, and through it to the state. He regards any measure which tends to lessen that association in the army of the European with the native as clearing the way for the dominance of superstition and fanaticism, and he quotes the conduct of the 25th Bombay native infantry at Mhow, in the midst of mutiny and rebellion in Malwa, as an instance of the effect of the vigilance of the European and native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, and the good feeling which existed between them and their men. After adverting to the opinions of such distinguished and practical generals as Lord Hardinge and Sir Charles Napier, Sir H. Somerset says, "When I reflect that out of the three officers proposed for each regiment, dashing and vigorous leaders for every difficult occasion have to be supplied, casualties filled, the errors of indiscipline rectified by holding together the wavering or rallying the broken mass, I feel utterly at a loss to account for so suicidal a project as that under notice, involving, as I before remarked, undue power being thrown into the hands of the native officers, and even placing them in command of regiments on field service."

Sir H. Somerset is of opinion that the police must be a perfectly distinct force, and that, including local corps, it should not exceed about a half of the regulars and irregulars put together, and that the irregulars should never exceed a proportion of one-fourth the regulars. These proportions are the existing ones, or very nearly so; and his Excellency urges upon the notice of the Governor-General, "that they have of late years, and especially during the one that is past, stood a test that affords the best guarantee

" we could desire from their general adaptation to foreign and home service."

The proportion of European troops to the whole native force of the Bombay presidency, police, regulars, and irregulars, should never, in his Excellency's opinion, be less than one-fourth; a proportion which would admit of one-third being temporarily sent on service. Excluding the police, the European troops should bear a proportion of about half the regulars and irregulars put together.

The Right Honourable the Governor of Bombay, Lord Elphinstone, appends to his replies a return marked A, which shows the number of European troops of each arm serving in the Bombay presidency, and their distribution, according to the information received at head quarters up to the 1st July 1858. It differs therefore slightly from a similar return appended to Lieut.-General Sir H. Somerset's paper.

In the return marked B, which shows the number of European and native troops of each arm which his Lordship deems necessary for the Bombay presidency, he observes that he has taken into consideration the present limits only of the presidency, and omits Rajpootana and Central India.

Lord Elphinstone proposes that the European force for the Bombay presidency should consist of—

2 regiments of cavalry;
4 troops of horse artillery;
0 companies of foot artillery;
1 company of sappers; and
9 regiments of infantry.

It is calculated that according to present established strength these would give—

Cavalry	-	-	-	1,492
Horse artillery	-	-	-	764
Sappers	-	-	-	120
Infantry	-	-	-	9,630
Total	-	-	-	15,606

The native troops deemed necessary are,—

3 companies, African artillery.
5 do. sappers.
25 regiments of regular infantry.
9 do. of irregular cavalry.
13 do. of irregular infantry, including the marine battalion.

It is calculated that these would give—

African artillery	-	-	-	300
Sappers	-	-	-	620
Regular infantry	-	-	-	28,600
Irregular cavalry	-	-	-	6,930
Irregular infantry	-	-	-	11,000
Total	-	-	-	47,450

The proportion therefore of Europeans to the regular and irregular troops would be a third of the whole, and inclusive of police would be about one fourth. The police force should consist as at present of about 18,000 men; 700 of these mounted for Bombay, and 1,500 mounted for Sind.

Lord Elphinstone is of opinion that the proportion of Europeans to natives of every description should not be less than 20 per cent., and for the next four years 25 per cent.

His Lordship is of opinion that the whole of the European force should belong to Her Majesty's regular army. He denies the validity of the argument in favour of a proportion of the European troops being raised for local service in India, based on the withdrawal, in times of pressure from European war, of Her Majesty's line corps; and he meets the argument that European troops raised for local service in India would be more entirely at the disposal of the Government of India, by stating, that "If there is one thing which must be laid down as a principle not to be departed from in our military arrangements in India, it is the entire subordination of the army, both European and native, to the Government of India. The troops of the Queen's regular army while serving in India, must be wholly subject to the authority of the Queen's Government in India. Regimental promotion indeed, may be left entirely to the Horse Guards, but the patronage of every staff appointment in India should be vested, as with very few exceptions it now is, entirely in the hands of the supreme and local governments, and of the supreme and local Commanders-in-chief."

He objects to a local European army, as—1st, perpetuating the distinction between the Queen's and the company's service;

2ndly entailing upon India a European force physically as well as morally inferior to the Queen's regular army; morally inferior, because conscious that they do not fight the battles of England on the battle-field of Europe; physi-

cally inferior because instead of keeping men in India until their health is ruined, Lord Elphinstone considers that true policy demands the more frequent reliefs of European regiments.

His Lordship would add the Company's European artillery, and the nine regiments of European infantry, to the Queen's regular army. "The best way of doing so would be to incorporate the artillery of the three presidencies with the royal artillery, retaining them as separate battalions, and allowing every officer and man the option of remaining in India, and of drawing his full Indian pay and allowances, or of serving in other parts of the world upon the same pay and allowances as are now drawn by the royal artillery. In any case both officers and men should retain their right to retire from the service on the Indian rates of pension. Probably the Company's infantry regiments might be at once transferred to the Royal army, as second battalions to the nine oldest regiments in the line which have not second battalions already. By doing this, both the officers and men who are accustomed to India, and wish to remain here, might always have the opportunity of remaining. One battalion of each of the nine regiments might be kept in India as long as there are any officers or men belonging to the Company's regiments remaining. Officers and men not wishing to return to Europe, might always be kept in this battalion; and all would be entitled to the Indian rates of pension on their retirement or discharge."

In reply to question 13, Lord Elphinstone proposes that the officers of the Bengal army whose regiments have mutinied, be provided for as follows:—

"1. All officers at present employed on the staff, or in command of irregular or police corps, or on other detached duty, to be placed on a general staff or detached list; such arrangement being made for the promotion of officers upon this list, as may give them, as nearly as possible, the same average prospect of promotion which they would have enjoyed regimentally."

"I would make this appointment of officers to all native regiments by selection from the general staff list, upon the same principle, and in the same proportion, that officers are now selected from the line for irregular corps."

"Of the regimental officers now unemployed, a limited number (say 10 or 15 per cent. in excess of the number at present on the staff, or on detached employment, or required for native regiments, under the system proposed in the preceding paragraph, might be allowed the option of being included in the general staff list, with a view to filling vacancies."

"These supernumeraries while unemployed might receive the net pay of their rank and unattached allowance, which would make up their income to that which they would have drawn as regimental officers, at a half batta station."

"No officer to be eligible for the staff list who is not qualified for staff employment, according to the present standard."

"Officers now placed upon the staff list retire or die out."

"I would provide for the performance of their duties by officers taken from the Queen's regiments who have passed the required test, which will, of course, include an examination in the native languages. When officers are placed on the general staff list their places in their regiments to be filled up; thus the inconvenience of taking officers from the regiments, and of again remanding them when these are ordered on service, often to the neglect and injury of the important duties for which they were selected, would be obviated."

"8. A further limited number of officers belonging to the mutinied regiments of the Bengal army might be allowed the option of entering Her Majesty's service. It has been found that the practice of attaching a Company's officer to each Queen's regiment as interpreter has been very useful. I believe that if one captain and two subalterns were to be attached to each as supernumeraries, to be absorbed as vacancies occur, the same object would be gained, and many useful officers might find employment. Officers thus transferred to European regiments might, further, have the option of remaining in India until they served their time, or of going home with the regiment in which they were serving; and, in the event of their remaining in India, they should be entitled to pension according to length of service, and upon the Indian scale, as at present."

"My impression is, that after establishing the general staff or detached list which I have proposed, and after allowing for the absorption of three officers into each of Her Majesty's regiments in India, there would remain but few officers unprovided for; but to all officers not included in the general staff and detached list, and not absorbed into Her Majesty's European regiments in India,

"I would pay a fair equivalent for their loss of service, either in the shape of a pension, chargeable upon the Indian revenues, or of purchase money for their commissions.

"These officers, if pensioned, to be relieved from all liability to serve; if purchased out, they would, of course, be free from any liability of the kind.

"The question refers to the officers of the mutinied battalions of the Bengal army only; but it will be perceived that my answer is of a wider application, and embraces the whole of the Company's officers. I would recommend the establishment of a separate general list in each presidency."

From the foregoing abstracts of the various opinions of the requirements of the different presidencies, it would appear that when brought together the following is the strength of European force proposed:—

Bengal, from	-	-	54,000 to 60,000
Madras, from	-	-	22,288 to 23,140
Bombay, from	-	-	15,606 to 24,226

In other words, for all India, from 100,000 to 107,000 non-commissioned officers and rank and file are considered necessary. Of these, upwards of 18,000 men are required for the artillery force; upwards of 72,000 for the infantry; and the remainder for engineer soldiers, cavalry, and military train.

From the return, laid before the House of Commons, in compliance with the order of the 4th December 1857, entitled "A Return of the actual Military Force that was in India at the time of the outbreak of the Mutiny at Meerut, &c., &c.," it seems that at the time of that occurrence the strength of European officers, non-commissioned officers, and rank and file, was as follows:—

Bengal	-	-	22,688 Europeans.
Madras	-	-	10,194 "
Bombay	-	-	9,589 "
Total	-	-	42,471 "

Of native troops, there were,—

Bengal	-	-	118,663
Madras	-	-	49,737
Bombay	-	-	30,940
Total	-	-	199,340 Natives.

There were on the 1st May 1858, borne on the rolls of the several presidencies, as follows:—

EUROPEAN TROOPS.

Bengal	-	-	51,197
Madras	-	-	13,636
Bombay	-	-	22,032
Total	-	-	86,865 European troops.

NATIVE TROOPS.

Bengal	-	-	80,000
Madras	-	-	66,042
Bombay	-	-	41,985
Total	-	-	188,027 Native troops.

It is to be regretted that the absence of any replies from Bengal Proper prevents a correct approximation to the existing strength of the armed police, either actually organized or in course of organization. From the replies received it is, however, known that the following is the strength of the various bodies of armed police having a military organization:—

Bombay	-	-	28,738
Madras	-	-	22,000
North-west provinces	-	-	23,500
Punjab police, levies, and depôts	-	-	22,876
Total	-	-	97,114

But this omits the military police forming in and for Oude, and for Bengal Proper, as also for Pegu.

Added to the 188,000 native troops, there will result a total of 285,000 natives armed and under military organization. Considering that Bengal Proper, Oude, and Pegu are omitted, it may be safely said that there are or shortly will be upwards of 300,000 natives armed and militarily organized in the pay of the British Government.

Upon the very serious consideration of the available cover for European troops it appears from the abstract furnished by Captain H. Yule, the secretary to the Govern-

ment of India, in the department of public works, that the amount of cover may be approximately stated, as follows:—

	Lower Provinces.	North-west Provinces, Nagpore, Oude, Saugor Territory.	Total.
New barracks, entirely built, a few permanent, and others of various degrees of durability.	For Men. 8,400	For Men. 18,800	27,200
Barracks restored, and miscellaneous buildings restored and adapted for cover.	3,350	28,800	32,150
Existing permanent barracks	4,850	5,900	10,750
	16,000	46,500	70,000

"This estimate is exclusive of the hospital accommodation and cover for officers, which has also been provided.

"The new barracks entirely built vary exceedingly in character and substance, from shelter of the most hasty and temporary character to that of the kind usually understood as permanent. Out of the whole amount, cover for about 2,200 men may lay claim to the latter character, including the works at Fort William, which have been some years in progress. Cover for about 8,000 or 9,000 men is of a very temporary kind, and the greater part of this has been entirely undertaken since the latter part of May, the remainder is of a medium kind, of which the better examples may last for 12 or 15 years with ordinary repairs.

"A copy of an abstract of accommodation in the Punjab is also added. This was received in the early part of the year, but requires little modification. It shows accommodation in barracks, omitting resort to other buildings, or to extraordinary crowding, for 16,840 men.

"Hence we have a total of accommodation for 86,940 men, entirely excluding the Madras and Bombay presidencies, Sind, Pegu, &c."

From the replies of the Punjab Committee, it seems that in the Punjab the total accommodation is more than sufficient for the 13,655 soldiers actually present; and that there is accommodation, permanent or temporary, for 20,000 men; that no difficulty has been experienced this year in sheltering the European troops; but that additional accommodation for 12,131 men would be required to meet the wants of the force of European troops recommended by Sir J. Lawrence's Committee. This results from some of the present barracks being temporary, and others not in the places where they are wanted. In no place, however, would really good barracks be thrown away by the proposed arrangements, except at Peshawur, where it is necessary to save life.

For the Madras presidency there will, according to the return which accompanies Sir P. Grant's replies, be required additional barrack accommodation for four regiments, and two companies of European infantry, two European infantry depôts, and fourteen and a half companies of artillery, according to his Excellency's proposed arrangements.

For the Bombay presidency Sir H. Somerset calculates that, according to the proposed strength and distribution of troops, there will be required of additional barrack accommodation cover for,—

- 8 regiments of infantry.
- 2 regiments of cavalry.
- 18 troops and companies of artillery.
- 10 companies of sappers and miners.
- 1 corps of military train.

Lord Elphinstone's estimate is less, and amounts to cover for,—

- 1 regiment of cavalry.
- 3½ regiments of infantry.
- 2 troops of horse artillery.
- 10½ companies of artillery.
- 1 company of sappers and miners.

In round numbers it may be estimated that the augmentations proposed for Madras, Bombay, and the Punjab involve the construction of barracks to accommodate from about 25,000 men to 30,000, according as the higher or lower estimates are taken. If some of the temporary cover lately raised in Bengal has to be replaced by more permanent accommodation, the foregoing will be proportionally increased.

QUESTION II.

11. *What proportion of the European force should belong to Her Majesty's regular army, and what proportion should be composed of troops raised for service in India?*

Upon the question what proportion of the European force should belong to Her Majesty's regular army, and what

portion should be composed of troops raised for service in India, Colonel Mayhew is of opinion that the majority of the European army of India should be raised for exclusive service in the country, and should be in the proportion of three local to one of Her Majesty's regular troops.

Sir J. Lawrence and his colleagues recommended—

	Line.	Local.
Artillery - - -	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
Cavalry - - -	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
Infantry - - -	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
Sappers and miners -	none	all.

Both Sir J. Lawrence and the Adjutant-General concur in the desirableness of keeping up emulation and improvement by having fresh regiments from home periodically; both note the attendant evils of expense of transport, non-acclimation, and ignorance of the country and people. Sir J. Lawrence considers the artillery as the great strength of the army; that it should be chiefly local, and as little liable as possible to calls from England for general service. The cavalry for India Sir J. Lawrence would have of a totally different kind from that in vogue for the British line; what are called light dragoons being too heavy for Indian horses, climate, and warfare. He would have every ounce of steel and brass got rid of, and accoutrements brought down as nearly as possible to the standard of a cross-country sportsman; and as so plain and simple a cavalry would not probably be admitted into the line, he would have this branch of the Indian army chiefly local. The engineer branch of the Indian army he would have wholly local, as they would be of little use if not thoroughly acquainted with the country.

Sir S. Cotton is strongly in favour of the amalgamation of the Indian armies, and of their being blended and becoming part of the regular army of the Crown. The European troops would, therefore, according to this proposition, all belong to the line, and none but the native portion to local troops.

Lord Harris would be disposed to have three-fourths of the infantry and cavalry belonging to Her Majesty's regular army; but would recommend that the regiments should be relieved within a shorter period than at present. The artillery might be chiefly raised for India.

Sir P. Grant is of opinion that there are no better troops in the world than the European regiments in the Company's service; but that associating them with troops of the Royal army creates a generous emulation and rivalry, is a powerful stimulus to exertion, and beneficial in very many respects. He believes that the system of interior economy of regiments of Her Majesty's service is superior to that of any army in the world, and that it should be strictly followed in all European regiments of the Company's service. His Excellency does not state the proportion of European troops which should belong to the line, or be local; but he states that a part of the European force for India should always belong to Her Majesty's line.

Sir H. Somerset considers that the proportion of European force to be drawn from Her Majesty's army must depend upon what could be permanently spared from that army in the time of war. His Excellency is strongly of opinion that it will never answer, in the event of an European war, to denude India to the extent already done; a view he deems accordant with past experience, and he thinks that two-thirds of the European force required for the permanent occupation of India should be composed of troops raised exclusively for that service.

Colonel P. Melville conceives it to be immaterial what proportion of the European troops belongs to Her Majesty's line, or are local; and that it may be allowed to fluctuate according to circumstances.

Sir W. Mansfield assumes, in consequence of the late permission given to the Company to raise many additional regiments of cavalry and infantry, that there is to be a local Queen's army for service in India; and he considers himself strengthened in the assumption that this question is settled from the absolute and probably evident necessity of having a body of English gentlemen trained to the knowledge of India, and not liable to be estranged from its service except under certain conditions. He observes that much may be said on the moral question of relieving regiments from time to time, but that if the Crown take possession of all the armies of India, that must in great measure be laid aside, and the service from which the numerous functionaries proceed for the administration of the Indian empire must be maintained in all its integrity.

Under these views Sir W. Mansfield would have the local Queen's army for the Bengal presidency to consist of an artillery regiment having about the same strength as the present one, English companies being substituted for the old native companies of 10 regiments of cavalry, consisting of (400) four hundred sables each, and of 30 battalions of infantry, consisting of 12 companies each. Of the 12 com-

panies forming a battalion, two to remain in England as a *dépôt*, in accordance with the system now adopted for Her Majesty's army under the late orders of Government. Each regiment to be of the same strength as that now allowed to Her Majesty's battalion, viz., 1,339, total number of commissioned, non-commissioned, and rank and file.

Sir W. Mansfield proposes that the strength of the line troops should be about the same as antecedently to the great mutiny, but he would add some artillery and some royal engineers. He proposes, therefore,—

12 troops and field batteries of artillery,
4 companies of royal engineers,
2 regiments of dragoons,
15 battalions of infantry,
in addition to the local Queen's troops.

As Lord Elphinstone advocates the amalgamation of the Indian armies and that of the Crown, he would have the whole of the European force in India part of the regular British army.

QUESTION 12.

12. Under the supposition that additional corps of Europeans have to be raised for service in India, how would you officer them?

Upon the question of the best mode of officering the local European corps, the Adjutant-General, Colonel Mayhew, is of opinion that the permanent European corps cannot be more readily commanded than by the British officers of the mutinied battalions of the native army, forming the complement for one European regiment out of two native ones, as is being done at present with the new cavalry and infantry corps.

Sir P. Grant proposes that the existing establishment of officers of native regiments of each branch, artillery, cavalry, and infantry, should be maintained as now existing, and promotions go on, as at present, regimentally. That the officers to serve with the European corps shall be selected by the Commander-in-Chief from the whole army, and in the proportions obtaining in Her Majesty's service. That only those in excess of such numbers, and after providing for the staff duties of the army, shall be retained for the performance of duty with the native corps. Officers who proved unfit for duty with a European regiment Sir P. Grant would have remanded to the native corps, supplying their places by selection, as before; and he anticipates most favourable results from this mode of officering additional European corps, as it would secure with each corps the number of officers necessary to maintain discipline and perfect efficiency, and would operate as a check to the system of purchasing out juniors, as the officers attached to European corps would belong to distinct native corps, and thus would have no interest in purchasing out those with whom they were for the time serving. Sir P. Grant considers that frequent changes would thus in a great measure be obviated. An important feature in his Excellency's proposal is, that the officers appointed to these European corps should be sent home to raise and organize their regiments, for until these are formed and fit for duty it is obviously necessary that India should be occupied by Her Majesty's troops.

On the other hand, Sir J. Lawrence's Committee advocate a different system from either of the preceding, though they concur as to the source from whence the officers are to be drawn. Their proposal, and the grounds upon which it is made, are given as follows:—

"The new regiments of Europeans should, we think, be officered from the officers of the old native army. The temporary disadvantages inseparable from their inexperience of European soldiers would be compensated by their knowledge of the country and language. The State too must find employment for these officers, whose devoted services as a body, during the late crisis, have established claims which cannot be overlooked, and there seems no other opening for them. The circumstances of the late crisis have, however, been so exceptional, and caused in the Bengal presidency such great derangement of promotion, that justice to the officers as well as the service seems to demand that the whole of the officers of the cavalry and infantry of that presidency should be thrown into two general lists for the two branches, and be placed according to seniority from their status on the 10th May 1857. As it is, the surviving officers of the worst corps have benefited by the mutiny, and have superseded not only their contemporaries of the best native regiments, but also those of the European regiments who have been putting down the mutineers. A very general dissatisfaction prevails upon this head, and it is very easy to remedy it now before beginning a new system. Having thrown all the officers into a general cavalry and general infantry list, the Adjutant-General's department of the army, and the generals of divisions should be called on to report

“ those officers whose inefficiency for the public service is notorious, and such officers should be struck off the rolls of the army, and allowed to retire on the pension of their rank, or on a bonus commensurate with their services; or, in some cases, both. The really efficient officers should then be posted to the new army according to seniority.”

Sir S. Cotton's proposal is again wholly different, inasmuch as he would first amalgamate the Indian armies with that of the Crown, abolishing all distinctions between the officers and soldiers of these hitherto distinct armies. He regards India as the only field for the training of officers to command, and that it is of imperial importance to England as a great European power that all European officers serving in the same army should be placed on the same footing, and rendered available in common for all duties.

After having described how he would organize and officer the irregular infantry and cavalry of the native portion of the army, he proceeds to advocate that the European officers serving on the staff and other detached duties, and in irregular corps in India, be placed on one general list, as in the artillery; and Sir S. Cotton is of opinion that it would be far better to have them so than on regimental lists, because from those general lists, selection being made for the regimental and staff duties, the officers best suited for the various occupations would find their way into their proper places. In the first instance the officers would be appointed in the regular service, and rise accordingly, that is, regimentally; being only placed upon the general list, or staff list, when attached to the staff or to irregular native corps.

It will at once be observed that Sir S. Cotton's proposed scheme is radically different from that of Sir J. Lawrence, and from Sir P. Grant's, and all three are distinct from that advocated by the Adjutant-General, Colonel Mayhew; which last has been already partially instituted by the orders of Government and the Court of Directors.

Colonel P. Melvill, the Military Secretary to the Government of Bombay, would have the additional corps officered from the present establishment of the Indian army, on the same principle as when augmentations were made in former times.

Sir H. Somerset would officer the additional European corps as at present, on the seniority-promotion system, and if requisite would absorb the unemployed officers of the Bengal army in their organization, and the reconstruction of the native army. Lord Harris would also officer the additional corps through the regular course of the Honourable Company's service, as the simplest course; though other plans might be suggested.

Sir W. Mansfield considers that the system of officering local European corps by fusing the cadres of officers of two native infantry battalions into one is understood by the officers of the army, and militates less than any other which could be devised against the rights which every officer possesses according to the commission he holds under the Honourable Company. He calculates that including the three European infantry regiments lately ordered, 54 regiments of the old Bengal establishment will be absorbed in completing the European local infantry to 30 battalions. “ There would then be left the officers of 20 regiments, who should be distributed according to their seniority in the 30 European corps; the establishment of each corps being thus permanently increased, as the only means of meeting the constant draughts on regiments made by the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief to fill the numerous offices of the civil and military administration of India, including the commandants and other offices for the native forces, regular and local.” Sir W. Mansfield, however, is of opinion that in addition to the fusion of the 20 cadres of battalion officers, with the 54 cadres, an unattached list, on which the names of all officers holding civil or military staff appointments should be placed, will be necessary. In order to atone for the want of regimental promotion, which would be entailed upon officers accepting staff employment, Sir W. Mansfield proposes that for every five years passed in staff employ a step in effective rank should be given, according to the custom obtaining in Her Majesty's service, with regard to majors so situated. He also advocates the introduction of the principle of exchanges under certain limitations between officers of the line and of the local service, and that officers on the unattached list of all ranks, from that of general downwards, should be available for service anywhere under the orders of the Crown.

It will have been seen by the quotations from the replies of Lord Elphinstone, that he advocates the transfer of the local European regiments to the line as second battalions; the formation of a general staff and detached list; and the thorough amalgamation of the Indian armies with those of the Crown.

In reply to question 12, the Military Secretary to the Government of India, Major-General Birch observes, that

the 10 regiments of European cavalry already proposed by Government are to be officered from the lists of the Bengal light cavalry, with a proposed addition of three lieutenants and two cornets to each. In order to officer the additional regiments he proposes, Major-General Birch suggests that, “ To supply officers of standing, down to the rank of captain inclusive, it will be necessary to allow of transfers from Her Majesty's service; and these should be so arranged as to afford to the cavalry officers now on the Indian establishment a fair share of the higher grades in the new regiments.” He points out that he is not advocating amalgamation, which he considers surrounded with insuperable difficulties, and not to be brought into operation without great injustice one way or another; but that his proposal is for *bonâ fide* transfers from Her Majesty's service to the Indian establishment, with every reasonable advantage secured to them of previous service for pension; but with restriction in all necessary respects to the system prevailing in the Indian service. Once transferred, they should take their place on the gradation list of the Indian establishment; whilst officers for the lower grades might be supplied by the nomination of cadets, as heretofore.

Major-General Birch then passes to the subject of officering the regiments of European infantry, and remarks that the usual system of forming new regiments has the immediate effect of making supernumerary as many colonels as there are regiments formed, and that promotion in the line is thus most injuriously interfered with, not only in Bengal, but in Madras and Bombay also. He notes that the status of the Bengal army is lowered by losing its colonels, as the army becomes less able to compete for commands and distinctions, and is cruelly deprived of the privilege, which, after all falls to the lot of comparatively very few of its members, and then only after 40 years' service, of enjoying rest and a competent income in their own country in old age; also, that every diminution of the number of colonels is a diminution of the funds of those invaluable institutions on which the widows and orphans of the officers of the Indian armies depend for their subsistence, and that the loss of colonels involves, as a consequence, a forced subscription from other ranks of officers of all grades, a process which would soon press beyond endurance on the means of the lower grades; lastly, that a great diminution of the number of regimental colonels, would sink Bengal into a third-rate presidency. He holds, therefore, that in any arrangements for the reorganization of the Bengal army, the maintenance of a fair proportion of regimental colonels should be an object of special care.

Major-General Birch points out that the system of doubling up the officers of two corps into one new regiment, gives the latter more officers than are required; more than are attached to Her Majesty's European regiments, which are of greater strength than the Indian European corps; he considers that 12 captains, 12 lieutenants, and 6 ensigns would be a proper and sufficient complement for each regiment of European infantry. For the 50 European and 30 native regiments, Major-General Birch's proposal is therefore as follows, viz. :—

European regiments :		
50 Colonels.		
50 Lieut-Colonels.		
50 Majors.		
600 Captains.		
600 Lieutenants.		
300 Ensigns.		
Native regiments :		
30 Colonels.		
30 Lieut-Colonels.		
30 Majors.		
180 Captains.		
180 Lieutenants.		
120 Ensigns.		
		<i>Total.</i>
		80 Colonels.
		80 Lieut.-Colonels.
		80 Majors.
		780 Captains.
		780 Lieutenants.
		420 Ensigns.

The effect of the proposal would be the promotion of—

- 2 Lieut.-Colonels to be Colonels,
- 2 Majors to be Lieut.-Colonels,
- 2 Captains to be Majors,
- 222 Lieutenants to be Captains,
- 122 Ensigns to be Lieutenants,

and the same number of cadets, 122, would have to be supplied from England, to complete the establishment.

Major-Gen. Birch objects to a general list of the kind proposed by Brig. J. Jacob and the Punjab Committee, as being highly injurious to a great many officers without any adequate good to the service. He considers that selection would be speculative and uncertain, and in many cases erroneous; that the position of the selected officers in the corps to which they are sent would not admit of adjustment in any conceivable form which would not militate against the first principles of a seniority service; and that as the

armies of Madras and Bombay are mixed up with that of Bengal, a radical alteration in the old system of promotion cannot affect one of the three armies without affecting the other two likewise, that selection to form European regiments is a hopeless task, and that there is no occasion for doubting the efficiency of the officers of the Indian armies, the European regiments of which have proved of unquestionable efficiency, and have had no lack of able officers. Major-Gen. Birch also objects, to the scheme of selection from a general list, that the claims of the general staff and of native regiments are as emergent as those of European corps; and that the object should be to raise the tone of the whole army as one body, and not to let it be supposed that indifferent qualifications will answer the purpose of any branch of the service.

Major-Gen. Birch regards the formation of a staff corps as simply a question of expense, but of expense so enormous as to place its realization out of question; and he recommends "seconding," that is, supplying the place in their regiments of all officers removed to the staff; allowing the rank of such officers to go on *pari passu*, within that of those who succeed to their places in the regiments. He points out the character of the unattached or half-pay list of the British army, and its inapplicability to the Indian armies, or the objects sought to be attained for the improvement of those armies, and concludes by observing that the real selection which should be made is that of commanding officers, and of the regimental staff; a selection which should be rigid and uncompromising; and that all will then work well.

QUESTION 13.

13. *Under the supposition that a considerable increase takes place in the number of corps raised for service in India, and that they are officered from the officers of the mutinied battalions of the Bengal army, will this accession of seniority-promotion corps create any greater embarrassment in juxtaposition with the purchase-promotion system, than what now accrues from the existence of the Royal artillery, Royal engineers, Royal marines, and the three Indian armies, in all which corps and armies seniority-promotion is the system?*

In reply to this question, the Adjutant-General of the Bengal army apprehends that a considerable accession of seniority-promotion corps would not be productive of greater embarrassment than now exists. Sir J. Lawrence's committee are of a similar opinion; but they add, that should it create additional embarrassment, they have no hesitation in recommending that the present purchase-promotion system be no further extended, considering it based on vicious principles, and depriving the State of the military ability which would otherwise be available. They remark that the system which attains in the Indian armies, of purchasing out seniors, and benefiting by the promotion according to seniority, is a very legitimate and very useful way of giving money its influence in quickening promotion, and one on which public opinion keeps a wholesome check.

Sir P. Grant is also of opinion that an increase to the number of corps raised for service in India, and officered from the officers of the mutinied battalions of the Bengal army, ought not to cause any additional embarrassment on account of the two different systems of promotion by purchase and promotion by seniority.

Colonel P. Melvill is of opinion that the purchase-promotion system of Her Majesty's army produces no embarrassment in juxtaposition with the seniority-promotion system of the Indian army, and that no augmentation in the number of corps on the one side or the other can cause any embarrassment so long as the two systems stand divided from each other; but, that any attempt to amalgamate them would produce the utmost confusion.

Sir H. Somerset remarks upon this question, that the embarrassment that will accrue from the juxtaposition of the seniority and purchase-promotion systems would be very great unless some remedy, similar to what has been applied to the Royal and Company's engineers and artillery, be granted to the Company's cavalry and infantry also, the officers of which will now be superseded on all sides, as the abolition of the rank of major in the artillery and engineers gives the officers of those arms a decided advantage over those that are still under the seniority-promotion system. Upon this point his Excellency suggests for consideration the addition of a second lieutenant-colonel to each native cavalry and infantry regiment, to receive the pay of major until he attained a certain position on the general list of lieutenant-colonels; after which he would be entitled to the pay of that rank.

Sir S. Cotton does not touch upon this point; according to his proposal, all officers would enter the regular service, and that being one in which, with the exception of the ord-

nance and marine corps, purchase is the rule, all officers except those of the artillery and engineers would necessarily come under its operation.

QUESTION 14.

14. *The feasibility of raising corps of foreign mercenaries, such as Tartars, Chinese, Malays, Dyaks, Africans, Madagascarenes, &c., being assumed, would you consider that the proportion of European to native and foreign mercenary troops could, with safety to our power and supremacy in India, be modified from the ratio stated in reply to questions 7 and 8; if so, to what extent?*

Upon this question the reply of Sir J. Lawrence and his Committee merits special attention, and will be found to concur with the views of distinct and distant authorities belonging to other presidencies. In the event of foreign mercenaries (coloured races) being raised for service in India, Sir J. Lawrence's Committee does not think that the proportion of European troops could be modified to any sensible degree. The Committee strongly object to such a system, and upon grounds thus stated:—"Military service is one of the most powerful means of conciliation which the British Indian Government has at its disposal; but after we have given all the service that is available, it is still one of the popular complaints that we give so little. It is a necessity of our position that we must spend a large proportion of the revenues of the country on European soldiers; but no such necessity exists for bringing in Muhomedan, Hindoo, and Buddhist foreigners from other tropical countries. Such a policy would be felt to be oppressive, and would be departing from the benevolent desire we have ever had to rule India for the benefit of the Indians. Moreover, with the memories of 1857 still fresh, we doubt much whether the natives of India are not the most docile of coloured military races. Again, every foreign coloured soldier that you bring into India, displaces an Indian soldier,—a soldier by caste and profession, who will take to no other livelihood. What would the advocates of foreign mercenaries propose to do with these displaced military classes? No statesman can ignore them. The wise policy is to feed, use, and control them."

Upon this question the Adjutant-General of the Bengal army contents himself with the observation, that in the event of another rise against British dominion in India, no troops are safely to be trusted but European ones; he thus, by inference, discountenances the idea of the enlistment of foreign coloured mercenaries.

Sir S. Cotton is averse to the employment of foreign coloured mercenaries in the Indian service, and apprehends that they would become a very great burden to the State when worn out, and perhaps very troublesome; and in support of his opinion upon this point, he instances the Arabs in the Deccan in the service of the Nizam, and the Ceylon corps, composed of Malays, Caffres, and Sepoys, which were not found to answer.

The Resident at Hyderabad of the Deccan, Lieutenant-Colonel C. Davidson, takes a different view, and proposes to enlist in the Hyderabad contingent, in place of two of the present infantry regiments of sepoy, two African corps taken indiscriminately from the races inhabiting that great continent. He would apply this principle throughout the armies of India, and out of every eight regiments embodied, he proposes that two should be foreigners capable of serving in a tropical climate. After questioning the policy of entertaining low-caste men, and pointing out that low-caste men are equally disinclined to go on board a ship or to proceed on foreign service, and to the full as great adepts at secret combinations to resist authority as high-caste men, Lieut.-Colonel Davidson observes, that "The Native Governments have long since given us a practical lesson as to their opinion of the loyalty and fidelity of the sepoy soldiery of India. It will be found that their most trusted troops were always foreign mercenaries. The Nizam has at this present moment in his employ 18,000 Arabs, and about 5,000 Rohillas (Afghans), and many more of the latter tribe are in his territory seeking employment. Not a petty rajah in Guzerat but has, or endeavoured to have, his Arab or foreign guard, however small it may be numerically, for the protection of his person and treasury; alleging, they find the foreign mercenaries faithful, while their own immediate subjects cannot be trusted. So far as the difference of circumstances admits, we might do well to imitate the Roman policy, which jealously excluded the employment in their conquered provinces of troops native to the place, and substituted for them men having no local sympathies of country and kindred."

It will be observed that Sir H. Somerset enters upon the question under consideration at some length, and opens his

replies by treating this subject with a care and completeness which is the more valuable from the experience which his Excellency has had in the British possessions of Southern Africa; a quarter from whence many have proposed to draw a supply of foreign coloured mercenaries. Sir H. Somerset is of opinion that, in the long run, regiments so composed would cost the State nearly as much as Europeans, without possessing their general efficiency. He however deprecates the enlistment of foreign coloured mercenaries chiefly on political grounds, thus stated:—"If a section of our subjects, carried away by a mixture of ignorance, arrogance, and fanaticism, were recently led to overrate their own strength and underrate ours, to forget that the substantial privileges which they enjoy depend solely on their connexion with us, and not on the soundness of their own constitution, moral or social, we may conclude that, having now had ocular demonstration that the European force in this country can be trebled, and having learnt such severe lessons through its instrumentality, they will as a body abandon such fallacies and readily believe that our ascendancy, even under the most adverse circumstances, is a practical as well as a moral truth." Having thus arrived at the conclusion that the events of 1857 and of 1858 have resulted in the affirmation of our ascendancy, Sir H. Somerset is of opinion that foreign coloured mercenaries would fail to command the respect that European troops do; that they could not be introduced in sufficient numbers to render us independent of the sepoys, who, numerically speaking, must always preponderate; and that, should a moral epidemic recur like that from which we are now emerging, the foreign mercenaries would not be one whit more trustworthy than are the natives of India. Further, that foreign mercenaries might occasion jealousy and mistrust between ourselves and the whole native army, and lead to the dangerous conclusion of our inability to maintain in India an adequate European force. Sir H. Somerset objects, therefore, to the enlistment of foreign coloured mercenaries, and advocates the maintenance of a fixed European force, in evidence, in the country, and the steady perseverance in the attempt to free the people of India from the moral thralldom to Brahminical influence, which his Excellency asserts to be the disaffected element in the Bombay presidency, and the influence with which we are practically in conflict, and to which either our influence must become superior, or in time yield.

Colonel P. Melvill is of opinion that the presence of foreign coloured mercenaries would not enable the Government to dispense with any portion of the English troops in India.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Madras army is as much opposed to the entertainment of foreign coloured mercenaries as the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army. Sir P. Grant's words are, "I am strongly opposed to the expedient of enlisting natives of other tropical countries for service in India, for I am convinced that, as a general rule, the black man will always fraternize with the black man against the white man; and if the natives of other tropical countries are, as I believe them to be, composed of better stuff for soldiers than the natives of this country, it is to my mind, an additional reason against enlisting them for service in India."

The Commissioner of Mysore, Sir M. Cubbon, says positively that the introduction of foreign coloured mercenaries would be received with great distaste, not only by the existing Madras army, but by the population in general. Lord Harris considers that the presence of foreign mercenaries from other tropical countries would not admit of the proportion of the European troops necessary for the permanent occupation of India being altered.

Lord Eiphinstone expresses the opinion that there are two exceptional cases in which foreign coloured mercenaries might be advantageously employed. He suggests that a few companies of African artillerymen might be formed for service at such stations as Shikarpoor and Aden, in which European troops suffer severely.

The other exceptional case is, when a whole province is disaffected or hostile to us, like Oude or the Delhi division. "In such a case it would be dangerous to raise troops on the spot, and it is not desirable to keep a body of native troops from a different part of the country in such a province. They would be liable to be tampered with; perhaps they might carry the spirit of disaffection to their homes. In this case it would be safer to depend wholly upon European and foreign troops. I do not see why we might not at once secure the services of the Gold Coast artillery corps, of the three West India regiments, and of the Ceylon rifle corps (Malays), their places being taken by native (Indian) artillery and by sepoy regiments. The difference of pay ought not to prevent this measure from being carried out. The Indian Government would pay the difference between the colonial allowances and Indian allowances, and it would gain six companies of

"African artillery and four excellent regiments; while six companies of Golandauze, and four or five of the sepoy regiments, now disarmed and utterly useless, or worse than useless, would be not only got rid of, but turned to good account."

H. M. DURAND, Col. Engineers,
Special Commissioner from the
Governor-General.

APPENDIX No. 71.

(No. 173.)

From Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. DURAND, C.B., on special duty with the Governor-General, to the Right Hon. the Governor-General of India.

MY LORD, Allahabad, September 4, 1858.

I HAVE the honour to submit a précis of the replies to the series of questions having reference to the reorganization of the native infantry of the Bengal army.

2. From the importance of the subject, and its pressing nature, it did not seem desirable to delay the submission of the précis until those for the infantry branches of the other presidencies should be complete.

3. I beg to call your Lordship's attention to the postscript appended to the replies of the Punjab committee. Sir J. Lawrence, Brigadier-General Chamberlain, and Colonel Edwards therein state their conviction that unless the European soldier be placed on a footing more consonant with the advancing civilization of the English people, difficulty will be felt in maintaining a largely increased force of British troops in India. The measures they recommend are, the removal, as far as practicable, of the restrictions upon the number of married soldiers in a regiment; changes with respect to spirit rations, spirits sold at the canteens, and the substitution of beer and porter; the necessity of aiming to provide the army with well educated and thoughtful commanders of regiments; the present position of chaplains in India, and the crying necessity for its amelioration; an increase in the ecclesiastical establishment proportionate to the large number of British troops, and to the extension of the limits of the presidency; finally, the imperative necessity for a careful and conscientious selection of chaplains. As the précis upon the reorganization of the native infantry of the Bengal army afforded no opportunity of adverting to these suggestions of the Punjab committee, and as they are all of manifest importance, I venture in this form specially to call your Lordship's attention to the earnest representation of Sir J. Lawrence and his associated colleagues.

I have, &c.

H. M. DURAND, Lieut.-Col., Eng.,
On special duty with the Governor-General.

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMIES OF INDIA.

PRÉCIS OF REPLIES TO THE QUESTIONS having reference to the Native Infantry of the Bengal Army.

The Punjab having furnished a large part of the native army now existing, and which fills the gap of the revolted Bengal army, it was important to obtain particular information with respect to the Punjab troops. Sir J. Lawrence, Brigadier-General Chamberlain, and Lieutenant-Colonel Edwards, having sent full replies upon the subject specially referred to them, and that subject being one, under present circumstances, of great interest, it seems advisable to forward this digest of replies with the observations of the above-named officers, to whom, for the sake of brevity, the designation of the Punjab committee will henceforward be applied. As the committee has also furnished answers upon the general questions in their relation to the reorganization of the Bengal army, without restriction to the Punjab forces, though with frequent reference to the paper devoted to the latter, the digest will, when touching upon the opinions of the Punjab committee, bring their special and their general views together.

Similarly, the independent opinions of other authorities consulted will, where concurrence admits of such a course being pursued, be grouped together, and the names of the officers will be given in the margin, so as to facilitate reference to their original manuscripts.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND THE COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

QUESTIONS 1 and 2.

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the native infantry of the Punjab irregular force is composed?
2. What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?

The Punjab committee reply:—"Firstly, the Muhomedans of independent countries beyond our frontier,

" such as Cabul, Candahar, the Afreedee Hills, Swat, Bhoury, &c.
 " Secondly, Trans-Indus Muhomedan British subjects, from the Peshawur valley, Kohat, &c.
 " Thirdly, Cis-Indus Muhomedans. (These are the broad distinctions which should be carefully observed.)
 " Fourthly, Seikhs.
 " Fifthly, Hindoo hill races, which come under two classes, viz., those of the Jummoo independent hills, known as the Dogra Rajpoots, and the Rajpoots who are British subjects residing in the hills between the Ravee and Sutlej.
 " Sixthly, a sprinkling of Hindoostanees, 1,295 in the eleven regiments, of whom 288 were Muhomedans and 1,007 Hindoos.
 " Seventhly, 470 Goorkhas."

QUESTIONS 3 and 4.

3. *Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment either by the regulations or by the practice of the Punjab irregular force?*

4. *Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of enlistment, from which recruits might with advantage be drawn for the native infantry of the Punjab irregular force?*

" By the practice of the force, sweepers, muzzubbees (or sweeper Sikhs), mosullees (or Muhomedan sweepers), and the lowest Muhomedan and Hindoo classes generally, such as those laid down in the standing military regulations, sec. xxxi. part 2, para. 6, were excluded. There were also no Christians in the force. Originally there were some few Eurasian Christians (fifers and buglers) transferred from the native infantry regiments of the line; but being very few in number, and having no respectable associates, they fell into bad habits and disrepute, and were for this reason remanded to their original corps, since which there have been none.

" No class should be excluded from the native army. But though we ourselves may and ought to rise above caste, we cannot practically ignore it, so long as the natives themselves socially maintain it. If low caste men, sweepers, &c. be promiscuously enlisted in the ranks, our great political object which we have in view (viz. the counterpoise of races) will not be attained; for assuredly the low caste men, true to their traditions, will submit in everything to the higher caste in the regiment; and if their good conduct and smartness raise them to rank, it will only bring them superior pay, and not give them that influence over their military subordinates which discipline requires. At least we think that a great change must previously come over the native army on the question, before the lowest castes can be usefully associated with the highest castes in one corps. Moreover we believe that the native soldiers already in the ranks would be disgusted, if recruits whom they considered unfit associates were suddenly to be forced upon them in large numbers. We are aware that the armies of Bombay and Madras show all classes mixed together. We do not know how this works practically. It would be possible for the European officers, following the bent of their own wishes and feelings, to imagine that sweeper soobadars (for instance) were really the commanders of their men; and yet for that command to extend no further than the parade ground or the orderly room, and to cease altogether in the lines and interior economy of the regiment. But assuming that all caste prejudice has really been broken down in these armies, we would observe, firstly, that in them the majority of the community, or in other words public opinion, is indifferent to caste, while here the community is bigoted in its favour; and secondly, that the mixed system has in them happily grown up from the beginning, so that high caste men who now enlist in those armies, do it with their eyes open, and of their own accord, led either by the difficulty of getting service elsewhere, or by some peculiar circumstances; whereas the caste system has unhappily grown up and been indigenuous in the Bengal armies from the beginning, and has in them the same strength as the mixed system in the sister presidencies. However strongly, then, we may feel the tyranny of caste, and however resolved we may be to do all in our power to overthrow it, yet sound wisdom requires that we should not conceal the practical difficulties, but set them candidly forth, and then endeavour to meet them, and this especially because the low castes themselves are not prepared to help us, and seize the freedom we wish to give them. We have heard of a small guard of the Bombay army on detached duty making their own jemadar, a man of low caste, carry on his head the bundle of their clothes, &c., to which the jemadar, away from his European friends, submitted as a matter of

" course; and whether that anecdote be true or not, we have seen during the last year that when a regiment of native soldiers in the Bengal army mutinied, the whole of the low caste camp followers, tent pitchers, grooms, grass-cutters, sweepers, &c., went off with them like a flock of sheep, and thereby lost their service, unable to resist the habitual slavery of race. For these reasons our advice would be that we introduce the new system gradually, by having separate regiments for the low castes,* into which any native physically fit should be admitted; that a certain number of higher caste men be admitted into these low caste regiments, if, for want of service, they apply for it, as the best means of bringing about voluntary close association; and that similarly a certain number of the lowest caste men be admissible into high caste regiments, where the commanding officer sees that it can be done without offence; but we should at this stage deprecate the forcing of any fixed proportion or number of lowest caste men into the existing regiments of the force, lest in doing justice to one class we be felt (wrongly or rightly) to be doing injustice to another. Before leaving this question it seems necessary to explain, firstly, that though for the sake of contradistinction we have spoken of the Punjab regiments as 'high caste regiments,' yet in point of fact they would not be so considered by natives, as the Hindoo soldiers in them are generally Soodras; and, secondly, that in native estimation there is the widest difference between low caste and lowest caste men, which ought not to be overlooked. The Soodra is a low caste man in the eyes of the Brahmin and Rajpoot; but the two latter have no objection to serve with the former, whereas a sweeper is by all three considered to be an outcast."

The Punjab committee in its answers to the four first questions applied to the whole Bengal army state that of that army, "Three-fourths perhaps are Brahmins and Rajpoots of Oude and Buxar, and the rest Gwallas, and Aheers of different districts, Muhomedans of Oude and Behar, a few Hindoos from Rohilcund, a few Sikhs, and a few Goorkhas. That part 2, sec. 31. of the military regulations details those superior castes of natives which are eligible for the ranks. They exclude all inferior castes, and make no mention of Eurasians or Christians, neither of whom were in practice admitted to the ranks, though Eurasians were employed in the bands, and as drummers and fifers."

After referring to the observations already quoted upon the enlistment of excluded castes in the Punjab forces, the Punjab committee proceeds as follows:—"To which we would add our strong conviction of the duty and wisdom of bringing as many Christian natives into the service as possible. The Karens of Pegu are a Christian race, and should be freely enlisted, and next to them we would desire to see aboriginal races like the Sonthals, Bheels, &c., and segregated tribes, such as the Boondelas and Gouds, made available as counterpoises. Probably few of these secluded people would like to go far from their homes at first; but the provincial system which we have proposed entirely meets their present case, and in time, as the service became appreciated, they would probably go to any part of India. Again, the Eurasians, who have so long been a reproach to us, should now be elevated by enlistment and proper care. We would advocate the collection of all Christian natives and Eurasians together, in separate corps, and not dispersing them in the Hindoo and Muhomedan ranks, where in peace they would have no influence and be exposed to petty annoyances, and in rebellion would fall victims and be lost to the State. To each Christian native corps there should be an ordained Christian teacher and pastor, either European or native."

From the replies of the officers noted in the margin, it appears that the native infantry of the Bengal army was composed of Muhomedans, Brahmins, of all denominations, Chuttryas, Rajpoots, Gwallahs, Kaites, Aheers, Jats,

and that some few low caste men, such as Mallees, Kachees, Gurrereahs, i. e. shepherds, had crept into corps. After the conquest of the Punjab, the enlistment of Sikhs and Punjabees Muhomedans and Hindoos was allowed to the

* In the newly-raised Punjab regiments there are two entirely composed of muzzubbees, i. e. sweepers, of the Sikh religion. They are pioneers, and are doing well.

Lake were unknown in our army ranks; that the Papees of Oude, always employed by high caste, talookdars when anything desperate had to be done, were quite shut out from our ranks; that the Kunjars (Gipseys), Nutts, and Sweepers, all fine material, and highly recommended by Colonel Skinner, would not even have been touched formerly by our high caste European officers; that besides these are many other classes that might with great advantage be employed, among others, that the Mallah, or boatmen race, make excellent soldiers.

The officers who concur in this opinion, that none, not Col. K. Young, even the lowest classes, should be excluded, Major Williams, are entered in the margin.

The Commander-in-Chief remarks that the field from which recruits were obtained was too limited; and that he thinks men should be taken of every caste, or of no caste (if there are such people), and from every district, and that there cannot be too great a diversity.

QUESTIONS 5 and 6.

5. *What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts of the Bengal presidency or its dependencies?*

6. *On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?*

The chief agency seems to have been that of native officers and men, who, when they went on leave to their villages, were instructed to bring back with them young men fit for recruits. It appears that formerly recruits offered themselves in such numbers at the head quarters of regiments, even when stationed at a distance from the recruiting districts that no special agency was employed it being seldom necessary to send out parties for the purpose. It is remarked that regiments thus become family cliques; and that native officers took bribes to stand security, and that thus inferior

Col. Mayhew.
Sir J. Hearsey.

looking men got into the service.

With respect to the precautions taken when recruits were enlisted, it would seem that most officers were aware of none, except such security as the ipse dixit of a sepoy of the regiment or a native officer vouched in behalf of the recruit. Some officers quote the regulations containing the form originally introduced in the Punjab, but afterwards prescribed for the whole army; but this was only acted upon in the Punjab, and was impracticable in Oude, and other independent States; so that it was a dead letter, or nearly so, in

Sir S. Cotton.
Col. Shuldham.
Brig. Farquharson.
Sir P. Grant.
Major-Gen. Birch.
Commander-in-Chief.

the Bengal army. The Punjab committee observe that in future the form of attestation by the local civil authorities prescribed by the regulations for British subjects should be rigidly enforced, having become a more valuable check than ever.

The foregoing answers apply to Question 7, with respect to which it is therefore unnecessary to recapitulate what has already been stated; though at the same time the further remarks of Sir J. Hearsey, corroborated as they are by those of Brigadier Troup, deserve attention. The former notes that the custom of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers standing security that the men presented were good and proper recruits for the service, led to a corrupt system, which he thus describes:—"This opened a trade or profit to the native officers. They sold their interest, their recommendation, or good word, and made not the least hesitation in telling falsehoods so as to get the candidate enlisted! The native officers sold their interest, making the recruit (if he could not give sufficient money) bind himself down by oath to serve these native officers as *menials* for a certain term of years. All this was kept secret from their European officers. Every imaginary precaution was taken as laid down, under the head of 'enlistment' in the military regulations; but no European, no officer can overcome the tergiversation of a native." Brigadier Troup, after saying that he does not know what was the practice generally throughout the army, adds that though convinced that had the orders for registry of recruits been rigidly carried out, instead of being in most instances slurred over by the local authorities, the results would have been most beneficial, yet, that he had so little faith in this precaution that in the regiments he commanded he superadded another. This was a committee of native officers, aided by the regimental pandit and moulvie, to examine all recruits enlisted in the regiment. He adds with regret that notwithstanding all these precautions he found that he had been imposed upon in many instances as regarded the recruit's caste and place of residence.

QUESTION 8.

What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry of the native troops in the Bengal army?

The Punjab committee can suggest no improvement for the Punjab force, but for the Bengal army they suggest that "a relative proportion of the respective castes should be fixed and adhered to; and the prescribed attestation of magistrates should be invariably obtained. But these precautions will be of little use unless a proportionate share of promotions be given systematically in each race in the corps. Some races are more astute and obsequious than others, and if allowed become masters of the regiment."

Sir J. Hearsey and Colonel Mayhew advocate the total exclusion of Brahmins; the former officer recommends that no Muhomedans of Hindoostan Proper be entertained; Colonel Mayhew, that town-bred Muhomedans be excluded. Sir J. Hearsey is of opinion that in the regular infantry of the Bengal army all recruits should come from districts and countries new to the old provinces from whence recruits have hitherto usually been drawn. Colonel Shuldham, would greatly restrict the number of Brahmins and Muhomedans, and would have greater care taken in ascertaining the connections, castes, and villages of the recruits, and in all possible cases would require of recruits that respectable natives stood their securities.

Colonel Burn does not see that the material at our disposal affords much room for improvement. He considers that the future native army of Bengal, in order to work well, must be composed of an entirely new set of men; and that none of the old leaven should be left to impregnate the new mass; that every man who has been suspected, and had his arms taken from him should be dismissed, for that such men can never again serve with credit, as they will not be trusted by their officers, and will feel shamed and degraded. For the new army he would enlist all fighting classes, whether Muhomedans, Hindoos, or Seikhs, in due proportions, being careful only as regards their physical fitness for the service; and he apprehends no danger in this arrangement, if the paramount race, the Europeans, are maintained in proper proportion to the native auxiliaries. Brigadier Coke likewise would enlist from all tribes and castes that will fight; so also Colonel Farquharson, giving preference to the agricultural and pastoral races.

Sir P. Grant is of opinion, that every man physically fit should be eligible for enlistment without distinction of race, tribe, caste, or district; and that it would be well sometimes to employ European, instead of exclusively native agency in recruiting.

Sir S. Cotton thinks it very possible that recruiting depôts under well selected European officers might be established with great benefit for the purpose of recruiting from the various tribes and castes throughout the country; a view which is also taken by Brigadier Troup, who proposes three permanent depôts, with an experienced commandant, a surgeon, and two European sergeants to each; one at Buxar, to provide all corps at and below Benares; one at Lucknow, to supply all corps at and above Allahabad as far as Umballa; and another in the Punjab, to supply all corps stationed there and at Ferozepore. He points out how by this simple arrangement the army would at a trifling expense be kept complete with efficient men, and the state avoid the expense of paying for more men than are actually necessary to complete the army. He thinks that the service should be thrown open to all tribes and castes without distinction, with the exception of Christians, whom he would like to see a separate corps, feeling certain that a corps of native Christians would answer very well.

Major Williams would have carefully selected European officers sent into the districts to recruit and select from the population rather than from the more corrupt inhabitants of towns, and the officers charged with this duty should not trust too much to their subordinates.

Sir J. Hope Grant would not recognize caste, but take all races and castes; he however proceeds a step further than those who advocate the same absence of distinction as to castes, for he would make all recruits mess together.

The Commander-in-Chief would do away with all allusion to caste in any general recruiting regulations, and would have physical fitness the main point looked to. He would admit all castes to the service, but thinks it would perhaps be a wise plan to have regiments of separate castes, as well as regiments of mixed castes; and the latter to be composed of every religion and creed.

Major-General Birch sees no occasion for much alteration, and is adverse to the admission of low caste men into the native army; because, 1st, discipline cannot be maintained

where a low caste commissioned or non-commissioned officer crouches with his forehead to the ground before a Brahmin sepoy; 2ndly, to ally ourselves with the lowest castes is to separate ourselves more thoroughly than at present from the chiefs and respectable classes of the country, and to exasperate, not to diminish caste prejudices; 3rdly, he doubts whether the advocates of lowest castes would like to serve with a regiment of *Domes* or *Hullah Khores*; 4thly, that to enlist largely lowest castes is to proscribe Brahmins and other high castes, and respectable Mahomedans, the best soldiers; 5thly, the experiment of trusting the military defence of the country to men deficient in self-reliance from the depressing influence of caste, would be extremely hazardous; 6thly, that our disregard of the prejudice of caste will not induce the natives to do so; 7thly, the argument drawn from the Madras and Bombay armies is not applicable, the social state and feeling of caste being different in Bengal from the other presidencies; 8thly, the mutinies were not occasioned by caste influence, but from mistaken fears for their religion, all religions combining against us, which refutes the notion that any one caste stirred up the rebellion more than another; 9thly, the turbulence of Brahmins may be controlled by not enlisting too many of them, but sees no wisdom in adopting measures with the avowed object of annihilating caste, which is utterly unattainable by any measure we could adopt. Major-General Birch coincides with the General Orders of 31st December 1834, and sees no occasion for future concession. "The Governor-General of India in Council is pleased to direct that all objections to men belonging to the respectable classes of the native community, or preferences amongst such classes, on account of caste or religion, shall cease to operate in respect to their admission into the ranks of the Bengal army."

QUESTIONS 9, 10, and 11.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the native infantry of the Bengal army?
10. How long has this form been in use in the Bengal army?
11. Can you suggest any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruits of the native infantry?

The Judge Advocate-General of the Army, Colonel Keith Young, gives the oaths sanctioned by authority. The first oath, that administered to the sepoys of the late Bengal army, came into operation when the articles of war of 1796 were published. The second, that administered to the Sikh recruits, was first published to the army in General Orders of the 7th October 1853. Colonel Young observes, that in practice the words "I will go wherever I am ordered, whether by sea or land," have been introduced into the first form of oath, when administered to recruits in general service regiments.

The first form of oath runs as follows:—

"I, A. B., inhabitant of _____, village, _____, pergunnah _____, subah _____, son of _____, do swear that I will never forsake or abandon my colours; that I will march wherever I am directed, whether within or beyond the Company's territories; that I will implicitly obey all the orders of my commanders, and in everything behave myself as becomes a good soldier and faithful servant of the Company; and failing in any part of my duty as such, I will submit to the penalties described in the articles of war, which have been read to me."

The second oath, for Sikh recruits, runs as follows:—

"I, _____, inhabitant of _____, son of _____, swear by the Gooroo Grunth Sahibjee, and if I tell a falsehood may the Gooroo Grunth Sahib cause misfortune to descend upon me, that I will never forsake or abandon my colours; that I will march wherever I am directed, whether within or beyond the Company's territories; that I will implicitly obey all the orders of my commanders, and in everything behave myself as becomes a good soldier and faithful servant of the Company; and failing in any part of my duty as such, I will submit to the penalties described in the articles of war, which have been read to me."

With respect to the utility of these oaths, the Judge Advocate-General thus expresses his opinions:—"I am doubtful as to any advantage that is likely to accrue from swearing in recruits. The results of the last year have clearly shown how entirely powerless any form of oath has been to secure the fidelity of the sepoy. All have alike gone; those who it may be presumed, from education or from superior intelligence, know well the importance to be attached to an oath, as well as the more ignorant, who regards it probably as a mere form, to be forgotten as soon as it was made. I can scarcely believe

"that the oath has kept one sepoy true to his allegiance; no disgrace attaches, in their minds, to breaking it. The disgrace rests only in the punishment, and there is no advantage in the administration of an oath that might not, I believe, be equally gained by simply declaring to a sepoy at the time of his enlistment that he was expected to obey implicitly his superiors, and to go wherever he was ordered, whether by sea or land; and that no objection made by him hereafter would be received as an excuse for disobedience. If, however, it is considered desirable that the formality of swearing in recruits should be observed, I think it will be well to introduce the form in use in general service corps, and to lay down clear and defined rules for the manner in which the oath is to be administered, and the period after enlistment when it is to be taken."

The Punjab committee are of a similar opinion with the Judge Advocate-General, for they fear that in practice no oath will bind, that the unconscientious will boldly disregard it, and the conscientious find such loopholes, as that fidelity to their colours and their oath was kept by taking the colours with them when they mutinied; or, that the water they were sworn on came out of a well in the lines, and not from the Ganges; and so it was no oath at all! or, that no oath taken to an infidel is binding!

The Punjab committee would, however, still have recruits sworn in, because it is necessary to have some solemn engagement to which to appeal; but in the spirit of Act V. of 1840 they would substitute for all heathen or Muhomedan oaths an oath before Almighty God. They would simplify the oath to the fewest possible words, with the utmost possible scope, thus:—

"I, _____, inhabitant of _____, pergunnah _____, district _____, province, do swear before Almighty God that I will be a faithful soldier and servant of the British Government; that I will march wherever I am directed, and will obey all the orders of my European officers."

The Adjutant-General, Colonel Mayhew, and the officiating Quartermaster-General, Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson, would add to the existing form of oath the words "by sea or land;" but Colonel Mayhew would have the oath very distinctly explained to each recruit before he is sworn in, "which should never be till he has become accustomed for several months to the service, and at drill."

Brigadiers Steel and Farquharson likewise suggest the addition of the words "by sea or land;" but Brigadier Steel would further introduce a specific engagement, "to work at or from entrenchments in the presence of an enemy when required." Whilst Brigadier Farquharson would not restrict this part of the engagement so narrowly, but would have the recruits swear "to do anything, such as dig trenches, make roads, cut jungle, build lines, &c., during peace or war; menial work, as a right, to be excluded, which is against the religion of the Asiatic."

Colonel Shuldham suggests that every recruit be called on to swear that he is not a "bhugut," and that he never will become a bhugut while on the effective branch of the service. Colonel Shuldham states that the sepoys who are "bhuguts" remain in hospital for weeks after they are cured, because they will not take sufficiently nourishing food to recover their strength.

Sir J. Hearsey considers that as many tribes are likely for the future to be enlisted for the Bengal army, investigation should be made of the kind of oath which each tribe holds to be most binding, and would have such oath administered. In this opinion Sir J. Hope Grant concurs, for he remarks, that "the only hold, as far as conscience goes (and this of the very slightest), you can have on the recruit is to swear him according to his religion, and not by one form of oath, or one made up according to our ideas."

Major Williams observes upon this subject that neither solemn affirmation nor oath would in general prove binding on the men if disposed to mutiny. He suggests, however, a written agreement, signed, and sworn to in as solemn and binding a form as possible, and according to the respective creeds of the enlisting parties. He considers that mere solemn affirmation has little or no hold on a native; and that a statement required to be made on oath bears a very different aspect to them from one made on solemn affirmation alone, but that a written agreement has almost a greater hold on a native than a simple oath, as he is more careful to comprehend what he signs and swears to.

Brigadier Coke considers that it is high time that all oaths were done away with, as a bad soldier will never be bound by an oath, and a good one does not require one. He states that the 1st Punjab infantry has been raised nine years, and that no man in it was ever sworn in, or ever heard of the articles of war; that they obey their commanding officer, go where they are ordered, and have shown, like the rest of the Punjab corps, how they can fight wherever they have

been employed; that if they disobey orders they are flogged; and that till something of the Bengal line folly crept into the Punjab force, which, had it been carried out by commanding officers, would have ruined the force, non-commissioned officers and men were summarily dismissed when they were found from vice or temper to be unfit for the service. Brigadier Coke deems the commanding officer the only fit judge of these matters, and says, "Let native soldiers have only one master, their commanding officer, and they will be good and obedient soldiers; let them find that the brigadier is one master, the general a second, and the commander-in-chief a third, they will obey no master. To all officers who have thought on this subject, or who have experience of the native character, this truth is so self-apparent that I can only imagine one reason why it has not been acted on, and that is, that the Madras mutiny has not been forgotten, and that Government doubt the loyalty of their European officers."

Sir P. Grant and Sir S. Cotton consider the existing form of oath as good and binding as it is possible to make it. Colonel Burn proposes the adoption of the second or Seikh form of oath, with alterations to suit all classes.

Major-General Birch proposes a form of oath, taken from that for European recruits for Her Majesty's service, modified to suit the native recruit:—

"I do make oath, that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty, Her heirs and successors; that I will, as in duty bound, observe and obey all orders of the generals and officers set over me, and that I will willingly proceed by land or sea wherever my services may be required."

The Commander-in-Chief observes that we seem to be the only people in the country who think the oath of consequence, that the sepoys evidently do not; and that any improvement in the wording of the oath appears to be a matter of much indifference.

QUESTIONS 12 and 13.

12. *Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the Bengal presidency of sea-faring habits, and could marine corps be formed from such races, tribes, or castes?*

13. *Has the Bengal presidency any marine corps, and if so, of what strength, and whence recruited?*

With reference to the first of these questions, the answers chiefly point to the eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal as a possible recruiting ground for marine corps. Mughls, Chittagong Muhomedans, Karens, Burmans, natives of the Malay peninsula and of the Eastern Archipelago, are accordingly enumerated; the Dacca and other

boatmen, and the Sonthals are also adverted to, but Colonel Shuldham remarks that the men of Chittagong were thought deficient in courage.

Sir J. Hearsey, with reference to the second of these two questions, No. 13, states, that "Two regiments in the Bengal infantry were formerly called marine corps. The men were expressly enlisted for service beyond sea. This innovation was introduced at the earnest solicitation of my father, Colonel Andrew Wilson Hearsey, during the Governor-Generalship of Sir John Shore, afterwards Lord Teignmouth, or in the period of the first Governor-Generalship of Lord Cornwallis. Infantry regiments had been formed by volunteers to proceed by sea to Madras. Unfortunately, the transport, on which was half a regiment of sepoys, foundered in a typhoon, and was never heard of again. This caused a great dread of sea voyages, and innumerable objections were raised regarding caste prejudices, and these said caste prejudices have been ever since thrown in our teeth, when the sepoys of the Bengal army were inclined to disobey any order, or act in any country they disliked to go into."

Beyond noting the two battalions formerly considered as marine corps, though both the appellation and their specific duties have fallen into desuetude, the answers throw little light upon the subject, but the Punjab committee advocate the formation of marine corps raised from the races of sea-faring habits.

Both the Commander-in-Chief and Major-General Birch doubt whether marine corps would be of use to the service.

QUESTIONS 14 and 15.

14. *Should each infantry corps be raised in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?*

15. *Or should each corps be recruited over a wide area; in fact, without reference to districts?*

The opinions of the Punjab committee are as follows:—

"This is a very important question, but after mature consideration, and with reference to the events of the past year, we come decidedly to the conclusion that regiments

of native infantry should be provincial in their composition and ordinary sphere of service. As we cannot do without a large native army in India, our main object is to make that army safe; and next to the grand counterpoise of a sufficient European force, comes the counterpoise of natives against natives. At first sight it might be thought that the best way to secure this would be to mix up all the available military races of India in each and every regiment, and to make them all general service corps. But excellent as this theory seems, it does not bear the test of practice. It is found that different races mixed together do not long preserve their distinctiveness; their corners and angles, and feeling and prejudice get rubbed off, till at last they assimilate, and the object of their association to a considerable extent is lost. To preserve that distinctiveness which is so valuable, and which while it lasts makes the Muhomedan of one country despise, fear, or dislike the Muhomedan of another, corps should in future be provincial, and adhere to the geographical limits within which differences and rivalries are strongly marked. Let all races, Hindoo or Muhomedan, of one province be enlisted in one regiment, and no others, and having thus created distinctive regiments, let us keep them so against the hour of need, by confining the circle of their ordinary service to the limits of their own province, and only marching them on emergency into other parts of the empire, with which they will then be found to have little sympathy. By the system thus indicated, two great evils are avoided; firstly, that community of feeling throughout the native army, and that mischievous political activity and intrigue which results from association with other races, and travel in other Indian provinces, and, secondly, that thorough discontent and alienation from the service which has undoubtedly sprung up since extended conquest has carried our Hindoostanee soldiers so far from their homes in India Proper. There can be no question that a contented servant is better than a discontented one. Unfortunately, we have tried too much hitherto to purchase the contentment of our native armies by increased pay, batta, &c.; this has not answered its purpose, and has produced many evils. It has enriched the sepoys, but not satisfied them. Nothing can reconcile natives to long absence from their homes, where they leave their wives and lands. The sepoys felt they were being coaxed into foreign* service, and got both angry and insolent with a sense of power. We believe that what is called 'general service' has been prominent among the causes which undermined our once faithful native army. If, then, in future we keep our regiments moving ordinarily in a circle about their homes, we shall add greatly to their real happiness, and consequently their loyalty, and be able to get rid of all mischievous increases of pay. Fewer men will also suffice, for the furloughs will be shorter, and, in fact, we believe that the service will thus be rendered more safe, more economical, and more popular."

The Punjab committee, having thus laid down the general principle of provincial regiments, proceed to explain that, not to deprive the State of the advantage and precaution of having a few foreign regiments in every province, they would always have about a fourth of the regiments of each province stationed in the next adjoining province, and relieved every two or three years by another fourth. In the Punjab the committee would allow one third, because the Punjab frontier Trans-Indus requires regiments peculiarly equipped and organized; and it is desirable that they should not be moved. Again, it is desirable that the Goorkha regiments at Jutog and in Huzara, and the guides in Yusufzve should be locals. This leaves only the sixteen regiments in the interior of the province from which to detach corps for service in the North-west provinces or Oudh. As fifteen out of thirty-one Punjab regiments will on this plan never leave that province, it is thought that a third of the sixteen interior corps may well take a tour of more distant duty for three years at a time, which would give each of them six years uninterruptedly in their own province.

Brigadiers Coke and Farquharson are also for provincial recruiting for separate corps. The former officer (vide general remarks introductory to replies) is of opinion that corps should be raised of separate classes and tribes; thus, Seikh corps to be composed of Seikhs, and no admixture of any class with them; Brahmins and Rajpoots in other corps; Gwallas and other low caste Hindoos in other corps; but no Sweepers or Chumars to be enlisted; Hindoostanee Mussulmen in separate regiments, Goojurs separate, Mewattees separate, Pathans, Cis and Trans Indus with Punjabee Mussulmen separate, Dograhs in separate corps, as the Goorkhas are at present. His scheme, therefore, is

* i.e. anywhere very distant from their own homes.

that of provincial recruiting for corps of homogeneous composition as to races and tribes. Colonel Farquharson's appears to be exactly the same.

Brigadier Steel and Colonel Burn also consider that it would be advantageous to restrict the recruiting of each infantry corps to a prescribed district or province, and Colonel Burn instances the jealousy between the Oudh and Behar men taken advantage of at Lahore, where the Behar men were separate from those from Oudh.

Major Williams would have each corps raised in a prescribed district, but if so, should serve as little as possible in that district; and he quotes rule 7 of the police manual for the North-west provinces, in which it is laid down as a general rule, that "it is better not to have too many of any one district serving therein, as local ties would prevent them acting so efficiently against their own countrymen."

Sir S. Cotton, referring to his plan for the reorganization of the native army, in which corps of the irregular portion of the army are of the strength of 400, states, that if such were the case, "there would be no objection to their being raised and recruited in districts; not to remain there, but for general service." But if corps were stronger than 400 men, Sir S. Cotton thinks a counterpoise should be preserved by enlistment from separate parts of the country.

Sir J. Hearsey would have corps of distinct tribes, but provided the distinctiveness of tribes were kept, deems it immaterial from what districts the recruits come; the more distant from each other the better.

Sir P. Grant is opposed to restricted recruiting in prescribed districts, and much prefers general enlistment. Colonel Mayhew considers that a mixture of tribes of the same faith is very desirable, and that corps should be raised for general service by recruiting all over the country without restriction to districts. Brigadier Troup, Lieut.-Colonel Macpherson, Colonel Shuldham are in favour of recruiting over a wide area, and Sir J. Hope Grant advocates the same course as necessary to the exclusion of caste.

The Commander-in-Chief would have no fixed rule, and thinks that corps should differ as much as possible; one be of all castes, one be of some particular caste, one from a particular district, another from every district and of every caste. Uniformity in such matters his excellency deems dangerous, and it is added that when corps consist of various castes, these might often with advantage be formed in separate companies.

Major-General Birch objects to the restriction of corps to a particular district on the ground that it would prevent their being employed at any great distance from those districts, and would deprive them of the power of recruiting where they might be serving, or in any contiguous district. He advocates recruiting over a wide and unlimited area, to enlarge the field of selection, and guard against combination.

QUESTION 16.

Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste?

The Punjab committee are of opinion that some corps should be homogeneous, but that most corps should be mixed, of the races prevailing in the respective provinces; and they refer to the condition of the Punjab force, in which there are already three homogeneous corps, viz., one regiment of Goorkhas and two corps of Muzzubbee pioneers, this is exclusive of Nussuree Goorkhah battalion, which does not belong to the Punjab force. The committee state that if more regiments of Goorkhas could be obtained they would be glad, but that it appears impracticable, and that more Muzzubbee corps are not required. Hence they do not recommend any more homogeneous regiments for the Punjab, but that all the other provincial corps should be mixed, some being in the proportion observed in the new Punjab corps, viz. :—

Muhomedan companies	-	-	-	4
Seikh do.	-	-	-	4
Hill Rajpoot do.	-	-	-	2
				10

Others having a predominant element thus,—

Seikhs company	-	-	-	5
Muhomedans do.	-	-	-	3
Hill Rajpoots	-	-	-	1
Hindoostanees	-	-	-	1
				10

Or,—

Muhomedan company	-	-	-	5
Seikhs do.	-	-	-	3
Hill men do.	-	-	-	1
Hindoostanees do.	-	-	-	1
				10

Again, in one corps the whole of the Muhomedans might be Pathans of the Trans-Indus, though this should be quite exceptional. In another regiment they might be all Punjabee Muhomedans from the Cis-Indus, and so on. The views of Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson coincide with those of the Punjab committee.

The Adjutant-General, Colonel Mayhew, is of opinion that so far as Hindoos, Muhomedans, Seikhs, and Goorkhas are concerned, regiments should decidedly be homogeneous. He asserts, that the admission of the three latter only partially in the old infantry corps of the Bengal army quite neutralized their influence as counterpoises to Hindoo predominance of feeling throughout the infantry, whilst in the cavalry and artillery the Muhomedan ascendancy prevailed from the same cause.

Brigadier Coke would have each corps of one tribe or caste; and his reasons are:—"That in a rising of the Mussulmen, you would always have Seikhs, Dogras, Goorkhas, and Hindoo corps to depend on, and vice versa. By mixing the castes in one corps they become amalgamated, and make common cause, which they never do if kept in separate corps. Hindoos and Mussulmen are natural enemies, the same with Seikhs; yet the result of mixing them in one corps has been to make them all join against government, and not only the soldiers, but through them the Hindoo and Mussulman zemeendars were incited to make common cause, which they never would have done had the races been kept in distinct corps. Our endeavour should be to uphold in full force the (for us fortunate) separation which exists between the different religions and races, not to endeavour to amalgamate them. *Divide et impera* should be the principle of Indian government."

Brigadier Steel advocates the homogeneity of corps upon similar grounds, viz., that association creates a fellow feeling in corps, a fact which has been proved in the quarrels between corps; in such squabbles and fights the *esprit de corps* sets aside the considerations of tribe or caste. Colonel Steel, therefore, to prevent community of interest, would keep each corps and department as separate and unconnected as possible. Brigadier Troup likewise pronounces in favour of homogeneous corps.

Colonel Burn would not separate the Muhomedans and Hindoos of Hindoostan, but he would have distinct regiments of Seikhs; and with the latter, he would not amalgamate the Manjah and Cis-Sutlej Seikhs, but keep them separate. He observes, that when Seikhs were first admitted into our army he advocated their being kept in distinct regiments, and that the late mutiny has confirmed him in the correctness of that opinion. He notes, that the Seikhs belonging to the mutinous corps in Delhi went with them, and that nothing would induce them to break this unnatural alliance and join their countrymen, who were fighting in our ranks. They remained with the rebels throughout the siege. Colonel Burn advances the conduct of the Goorkhas, who have always been kept distinct, as a contrast to that of the Seikhs during the mutiny, and as proving with what advantage this distinction of races may be worked upon for the maintenance of our authority.

With the exception of Goorkhas and Pathans, Brigadier Farquharson would not have corps homogeneous; and Colonel Shuldham is of the same opinion, except that for service in the Straits he considers that a Mussulman corps would be most efficient.

Both Sir P. Grant and Sir J. Hope Grant are strongly opposed to homogeneous corps, and in favour of their being composite. So also Major-General Birch, who regards homogeneity as favourable to combination for evil purposes, and as calculated to perpetuate distinctions. Whereas, though strongly opposed to the admixture of high castes with very low castes, he equally deprecates the separation between one caste and another among those which we know by experience to admit of fusion together into the ranks of our native regiments.

QUESTION 17.

If a corps is not homogeneous, will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, so far as may be possible, homogeneous; each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste? Or should the tribes and castes be mixed up in each company?

The Punjab committee would have both homogeneous and composite companies, as both systems have their advantages. The men are happier in homogeneous companies; but the committee consider it a greater question whether mixed companies are not the better check. The committee deem that there is safety in a variety of systems, and that the army should be no more homogeneous in system than in race.

Sir J. Hearsey would have each company homogeneous. No caste prejudices to be allowed, and the name, the very word caste, to be abolished in the army; but he observes that, if tribes are mixed they will act together, and that many of the Seikhs joined the Poorbees in the late mutinies, because the Poorbees were more numerous; but that as soon as they were separated, and not overawed by the Brahmins and Mahomedans, they proved true and faithful to their salt and to the Government.

On similar grounds Sir S. Cotton advocates homogeneous companies; Brigadier Farquharson and Major Williams concur in this point. Brigadier Coke is of opinion that the next best thing to having the whole corps of one caste, is to have each company of one caste; and that tribes and castes should not be mixed in the companies. Brigadier Troup is also of opinion that tribes and castes should not be mixed up; but he remarks that, unless the whole regiment be homogeneous, it would be utterly impossible to preserve the companies of men of one tribe and caste, as removals from various causes would require frequently to be made from one company to another, on account of promotion and various other circumstances. Brigadier Steel, who dwells equally upon the impolicy of mixing races and castes, also adverts to the necessary intermingling of companies in the performance of duty.

On the other hand, Colonel Burn is of opinion that, if distinctions are made in regiments, by dividing the men into classes or tribes, quarrels will be incessant; and if corps are severally recruited from particular districts, he advocates that all the fighting classes of that district be admitted without distinction, and mixed up in the companies, as has been the practice hitherto.

Neither Sir P. Grant nor Colonel Mayhew are in favour of homogeneous companies, but prefer them composite. Sir J. Hope Grant and Colonel Berkeley, who concur in the non-recognition of caste, are also opposed to homogeneous companies, and in favour of composite ones, as not involving the necessity of purposely recruiting to keep up one class of men in a company. Major-General Birch is also opposed to homogeneous companies, as not tending to the improvement of discipline and a common interest, and as calculated to perpetuate the antagonism of castes and tribes, and as rendering more difficult the regimental appointments, such as commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers, drill instructors, pay havildars, &c.

QUESTION 18.

If corps are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes be entertained?

Colonel Keith Young makes one answer to Questions 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18, and would like to see all plans fairly tried. He thinks that it would be very desirable to have some corps recruited entirely from certain castes or certain districts. For instance, corps exclusively composed of Seikhs, Rajpoots, Gwallahs, Beloches, Goorkhas, Punjabees, Oude men, and Bhujpoorees; and again, he would have other regiments in which the companies were similarly composed, the regiments thus containing men of all castes and from all districts, but the companies being men entirely of one caste or one district. He considers that the latter organization would be found preferable for the mass of the native army, as corps exclusively composed of one caste, or recruited in one district, would have too much of nationality about them; and he conceives that it would be neither politic nor prudent to encourage national regiments, except to a very limited extent. Some regiments Colonel Keith Young would have composite throughout, as in the present Bombay, and in the late Bengal, army. Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson expresses opinions very similar to those of Colonel K. Young, but is careful to state that he would exclude the lowest castes from his composite corps.

Brigadier Coke objects to composite corps; and Brigadiers Steel and Troup, who also prefer homogeneous corps, answer Question 18, by the one (Colonel Steel) diverting to the proportions laid down by the regulations, whilst the other (Colonel Troup) recommends three equal proportions. Major Williams is also for equal proportions; and Sir S. Cotton likewise advocates one-third Seikhs, one-third Puthans, and one-third Hindoos. Sir P. Grant is also in favour of maintaining, as far as possible, equal proportions.

Major-General Birch says:—"I would entertain few Brahmins, and would restrict Mussulmen, Rajpoots, and Seikhs to one-third of any regiment in which they were entertained. I mean that there should not be in any corps more than one-third of its complement, consisting of Mussulmans, nor Rajpoots, nor Seikhs; but these tribes together might unobjectionably form half of any regiment, or more than half."

QUESTION 19.

If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district, or kept to separate districts, or should police corps be recruited from a wide area, without reference to districts?

Sir J. Hearsey, Brigadier Steel, and Colonel K. Young are of opinion that police corps should not be raised in the district in which they are to serve. Brigadier Steel and Major Williams would have the machinery for recruiting military and police corps kept perfectly distinct. Major Williams, Brigadier Farquharson, and Colonel Shuldham would allow the recruiting for both to be carried on in the same districts; so also would Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson.

The officers noted in the margin are strongly in favour of general enlistment over the widest area, both for military and police corps.

Colonel Burn, in connexion with a proposed organization for the infantry of the Bengal army, would have police corps that are not for local police duties recruited or filled up by drafts from the corps of the line. By which system the active service corps would be rarely efficient regiments, and the police corps would be composed of well-disciplined and steady old soldiers, in every way suited for the duties of a military police.

Sir S. Cotton, under the impression that police corps should never be armed, trained, or disciplined like corps of the army, considers that they might advantageously be raised in the districts in which their employment lies.

QUESTION 20.

Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the army corps?

In reply to this question, the general opinion is in favour

of their being kept perfectly distinct and that police corps should not be regarded as nurseries for the corps of the line. The exceptions are Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson, who, if necessary or expedient, would draw men from the police corps; and Colonel Shuldham, who would also occasionally, when there was an emergent call for men, have recourse to the police corps. Brigadier

Farquharson, who objects to the measure as a general rule, would, in time of war, sanction volunteering.

Colonel Burn, instead of making the police corps nurseries for the corps of the line, would make the line corps nurseries for the police.

QUESTION 21.

What agency should be employed in recruiting in the districts of the Bengal presidency, or its dependencies?

The officers noted in the margin regard the present system as meeting all requirements, and as open to little serious objection.

Sir P. Grant, instead of exclusively employing native agency, would sometimes employ European agency in recruiting.

The officers who advocate depôts under selected officers are given in the margin; and their reasons are, that the system will supersede the "Bhaeebunde" tendency heretofore so baneful to the service, and which still obstructs the introduction of new feelings into the native army; that the army would, at a very trifling expense, be be always kept complete with efficient men, and the State avoid the expense of paying for more men than are actually necessary; that a depôt in the heart of its own recruiting province would admit of the men leaving their friends there, and that when a regiment had suffered in the field, or on foreign service, it would be an indulgence to the men if it were sent to its own district and depôt to recruit. Brigadier Steel would form the depôts at

Buxar,	for Bhojpooreahs,
Allyghur,	" Jats,
Beelundshur,	" Goojurs,
Meerut,	" Mewattees,
Mynpooree	" Rajpoots, who could also be raised at preceding stations,
Umritsur,	" Seikhs,
Goozerat,	" Punjabees,
Rawul Pindee,	" Eusofzaes,
Joinpore,	" Rajcoomars,

and at any other places where there are distinct races of military character and taste. Brigadier Steel restricts his proposal to three depôts, viz., Buxar, Lucknow, and one in the Punjab.

Sir J. Hearsey would depute European officers, selected as good linguists, and for a knowledge of the native character, in charge of recruiting parties, otherwise there will be deceit and roguery. He would have very little, if any, recruiting in Hindoostan Proper, or in our old districts, or in Oude; for he apprehends that the men in these being the relatives and connexions of mutineers and pensioners who have been executed, transported, or had their villages burnt and estates escheated, will always be ready to turn traitors through revenge.

Major Williams also advocates the deputation of selected officers upon the duty of recruiting.

Brigadier Coke would entrust the recruiting to commanding officers of corps. Sir J. Hope Grant would likewise hold the commanding officer responsible.

QUESTION 22.

Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps, or a distinct agency?

The general opinion is in favour of a distinct agency, and of leaving the recruiting for police corps to the discretion and supervision of their own commanding officers. Brigadier Froup alone is of opinion that the same agency might be used; whilst Colonel Burn's proposal of line corps being the nurseries of the police corps puts aside this question.

The Commander-in-Chief would have the recruiting carried on separately.

Major-General Birch is so strongly of an opinion adverse to police corps, as armed and trained military bodies, that he cannot contemplate the recruiting for them.

QUESTION 23.

What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the army of the Bengal presidency?

The general opinion, though variously stated, concurs in the view expressed by the Punjab committee, that the existing rules only require to be enforced. Those who advocate the institution of recruit depôts would hold the officers commanding responsible for the correctness of the descriptive rolls sent with recruits to corps, and for ascertaining, by frequent visits to his districts, that the local civil authorities pay proper attention to the correct attestation of recruits, and to the accuracy of the returns as to their caste, employment, and residence; a duty represented to be slurred over.

The Commander-in-Chief deems it to be a matter of little moment.

Major-General Birch would have the precautions above stated carefully observed, and copies of all registers of recruits made by the civil authorities transmitted to the Adjutant-General's office, as also copies of regimental registers of recruits and of kindred rolls. He remarks, that in the late mutinies the non-existence of these rolls, and the destruction of those with regiments, proved very inconvenient.

QUESTION 24.

Should similar or different precautions be taken in connexion with recruits for police corps in the Bengal presidency?

Here, again, opinion is practically unanimous that the same precautions should be taken with recruits for police corps as are adopted with recruits for the line, or, rather, should be adopted for the latter.

Major Williams quotes the instructions issued to the officers of the military organized police of the North-west provinces.—(Vide rules 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.) From which it appears that strong, able-bodied, men, irrespective of castes, high or low, if recommended by the civil authorities, and approved by the civil surgeons, may be taken from the ages of 18 to 35 years for the police; that no one caste or tribe is to predominate; that native Christians are to be readily taken, if of good character; that the enlistment is for service in any part of India, and that, with the view of gaining good men, parties of influence and good character bringing 100 good men are to have the rank of jemadar, with liberty to recommend two havildars and two naicks.

The Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that it is a matter of little moment.

QUESTIONS 25 and 26.

25. *Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for service in India, with the natives of the country; and, if so, should they be formed in separate regiments or in companies, or otherwise?*

26. *If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries, which are the countries and races to be preferred?*

In the précis of the answers to the first series of questions this subject has been very fully treated, and the opinions of the Punjab committee, to which they refer, have been quoted in extenso. It is unnecessary here to recapitulate their objections to the introduction of foreign coloured mercenaries, a measure to which they are entirely opposed as in contravention of our policy of administering India, as far as practicable, for the profit and advantage of its inhabitants, and as increasing the difficulty of finding employment for the races, traditionally and habitually military in character and occupation, without aiding to solve the problem how these races are to be disposed of.

The officers noted in the margin are likewise very strongly opposed to a measure which they consider as probably equally costly with, and far less efficient than, the employment of European troops; that the recruiting would be very difficult, and supply of men limited; whereas India furnishes sufficient and fit men, if well selected, and as affording no security, such foreign coloured mercenaries being proverbially treacherous, and from the prejudice and sympathy of colour certain to make common cause against the European race.

The officers noted in the margin advocate the measure as expedient, and would have such foreign mercenaries formed into separate corps, and to consist of Malays, Chinese, Tartars, Africans, Burmese, and men of the Eastern Archipelago. Sir J. Hearsey limits his concurrence in the utility of the measure, to the enrolment of all tropical or very hot countries, including Malta, Sicily, Naples, the Ionian islands, Madeira, and the Brazils.

Colonel K. Young would enlist such foreign coloured mercenaries, and would have them in corps, organized in all three modes; viz., the regiment homogeneous, the companies of a composite regiment homogeneous, and the regiment composite throughout.

QUESTION 27.

What should be the best agency to employ for such recruiting?

Those who advocate the measure look to the assistance of governors, consuls, and European residents to aid the officers selected for the duty of raising corps of foreign mercenaries. Brigadier Steel observes that the Dutch raised corps in one colony for the service of another; that they had Malay corps in Java, and Amboynese corps for Java, a Javanese corps for Ceylon, and so on.

QUESTIONS 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32.

28. *Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments?*

29. *If so, should such company or companies be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from European corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European corps, and subject to periodical relief?*

30. *Where should the barracks of such companies be placed relatively to the lines of the native troops?*

31. *Would such detachments seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?*

32. *How should such companies be armed? With similar or different weapons from the native troops with whom they would be associated?*

The objectors to this proposal are numerous, and very decided in their opinions. The Punjab committee consider it would be a misapplication of European power. Colonel Burn is of opinion that any such compulsory amalgamation is bad. Voluntary friendships between the two classes he would encourage, but would not attempt any unnatural combination of men of such totally distinct habits, and deems that it would certainly be looked upon by the native soldier in its true light, as a coercive measure. Sir P. Grant says, "On no account should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments. Always, and under all circumstances, keep your Europeans in distinct and separate regiments." Colonel Mayhew considers that the close admixture of the

European with the native soldier will lower the former in the eyes of the latter, and that as the idiosyncracies of the two races are incompatible, they should be kept as distinct as possible. Sir J. Hope Grant, Colonel Berkeley, Colonel K. Young, Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson, Brigadiers Steel, Farquharson, Coke, Troup, and Major Williams are all clearly and strongly opposed to such an organization of native regiments; and Sir S. Cotton, himself an advocate for attaching native troops as auxiliaries to European corps, objects to so small a body of Europeans as one, or even two, companies forming part of a native regiment, and holds that the efficiency of the Europeans would in this manner be utterly sacrificed; and that they would speedily deteriorate, both in character and discipline.

The advocates for such an organization are Sir J. Hearsey and Colonel Shuldham. The former would have the flank companies Europeans, and two serjeants to each battalion company. Colonel Shuldham only approves of the adoption of this organization in the event of that in Question 27 not being carried into execution. In that case he would have the flank companies Europeans armed with rifles, and would further have a serjeant to each company of the battalion.

Sir J. Hearsey would have the barracks of such European companies on the flanks of the lines of the native companies, so also would Sir S. Cotton and Brigadier Troup if the organization they object to were adopted; but Colonel Shuldham would have the barracks of the two companies together, and in rear of the centre.

Sir J. Hearsey and Colonel Shuldham are of opinion that such detachments would not seriously complicate commissariat arrangements; Sir S. Cotton thinks they need not do so, but Brigadiers Farquharson and Troup and Colonel Berkeley are of the contrary opinion.

The advocates of this organization would arm the European companies with Enfield rifles.

Sir P. Grant remarks upon Question 32, that he cannot too strongly condemn such admixture. The Commander-in-Chief is also of opinion that they had better be kept separate; and Major-General Birch, who advocates their being kept entirely distinct, urges that the prestige of the Europeans would be much lowered and injured by close association; that they could not be armed alike; that, in his opinion, jails, treasuries, guns, and arsenals should be guarded by Europeans, to the exclusion of natives, and that if the two were associated in the same regiment it would not do to make such a distinction of duties and trusts. Moreover, that their clothing would be different, and the effect on parade extremely uncouth.

QUESTION 33.

How should the native infantry of the Bengal presidency be armed?

The Punjab committee would arm the native infantry with a light musket and bayonet. On frontiers, when hill tribes are to be kept in order, they might have two-grooved rifles; but never the Enfield, or any weapon equal to that in the hands of the European troops. Brigadier Coke concurs in opinion with the Punjab committee.

Sir S. Cotton would arm the native auxiliaries of his scheme of organization like the Europeans, with the Enfield rifle; but the irregular infantry which he proposes he would arm with the two-grooved rifle or common musket.

The officers noted in the margin would arm the native infantry with the common percussion musket and bayonet. Colonel Shuldham, with this weapon, or with fusils, as muskets are heavy. On the other hand, Brigadier Troup would arm them with the Enfield rifle.

Commander-in-Chief.
Major-General Birch.
Sir P. Grant.
Brig. Steel.
Brig. Farquharson.
Colonel K. Young.
Lt.-Col. Macpherson.
Colonel Burn.
Major Williams.
Sir J. H. Grant.
Colonel Berkeley.

QUESTION 34.

How should police corps in the Bengal presidency be armed?

The Punjab committee would arm the police with a percussion carbine and sword, and the officers whose names are in the margin propose the same.

Others advocate the police being armed with a common percussion musket, the supply of caps being regulated. Major Williams and Brigadier Troup, Colonel K. Young limit this to the military police, the former officer proposing to arm the cantonment and city police with clubs, and burkundaz with swords; whilst Colonel K. Young would give swords and spears to those not belonging to the military police.

Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson proposes the fusil; with which weapon Sir S. Cotton would also arm the police when the population was armed, though when these were disarmed he would only allow swords to be carried by the police.

Colonel Steel would give the police a musketoon, or cut-down musket; spear and bamboos to those who are for ordinary watch and ward, and a sword to detectives.

QUESTION 35.

Do the advantages of making the dress of the native soldier a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?

Upon this question the Punjab committee observe, that "there can be no advantage in a leather stock, tight coat, and trowsers which fetter the free use of the legs. In the late native army, in a really well-dressed regiment, a sepoy could neither stoop to the ground nor take rest in his accoutrements. Some improvements have recently

been effected in the European soldiers' dress; but much remains to be done before they get the full use of their limbs, and the greatest possible ease in a hot climate." The officers whose opinions tally with that of the Punjab committee, in considering that no advantage arises from the close imitation of the dress of the European soldier, are marginally given:

Sir J. Hope Grant.
Sir J. Hearsey.
Brig. Farquharson.
Brig. Steel.
Brig. Coke.
Colonel K. Young.
Colonel Shuldham.
Lt.-Col. Macpherson.
Col. Mayhew.
Major-Gen. Birch.
Commander-in-Chief.

Sir P. Grant however states his opinion as follows:—"Formerly, before the Bengal army destroyed and disgraced itself, and having regard to what I know was the feeling of the men, I should have urged that the dress of the native soldier ought always to be assimilated to a certain extent to that of the European soldier." Colonel Burn considers that the advantage of dressing the native like the European soldier is to prevent concentration of fire upon the European troops when in action, but that a looser and easier dress would be preferred by the natives, and also by the Europeans in this very hot climate. Brigadier Troup, too, is of opinion that the advantages of similarity of dress counterbalance the disadvantages.

QUESTION 36.

How should the native infantry of the Bengal army be dressed, with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier?

The reply of the Punjab committee is, "In a loose tunic, with open throat, no stock, a good thick turband that will ward off sun, or cold, or blows, and loose pantaloons without a single button, fastening round the waist by a string." This is the dress of the Punjab corps, and is referred to by the officers marginally noted.

Others are in favour of the Zouave dress.

Brigadier Troup is of opinion that the native soldier of the regular army should, both in dress and everything else, as far as the system can be made applicable to natives, closely imitate the European soldier in everything.

Sir P. Grant says:—"Now that the Bengal native infantry have forfeited all claim to have their wishes or feelings on the point considered, and as it does not affect its efficiency, I would no longer seek to assimilate them with the European soldier in either dress or equipments. I propose that henceforward the dress of the Bengal sepoy shall be a dark blue cotton mirzai, quilted with cotton for the cold season, blue jungheers, and a pugree of any colour wound round the head in a uniform regimental pattern; a blanket, great coat or cloak; shoes as formerly worn, and black or brown leather instead of buff accoutrements. For the hot season white cotton mirzai and jungheers; all else as in the cold season."

QUESTION 37.

It has been proposed that to every European local regiment a native irregular regiment, officered from that European regiment alone, should be attached. What is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry, in close and permanent association?

The reply of the Punjab committee shall be given in their own words:—"To this we are all opposed, though not on the same grounds. Sir John Lawrence and Brigadier-

“ General Chamberlain think that the wider the European and native regiments can be kept apart the better, and that any improvement in smartness and drill which the native regiments might acquire from association would be more than counterbalanced by familiarity with the vices and defects of too many of the European soldiery, which still leave so much to regret, even after the ameliorations and improvements of late years. Colonel Edwardes would not apprehend the above evil consequences, but he joins the other members in thinking the proposed combination impracticable on the following grounds:—In the first place, the management of a European regiment is totally different from that of a native regiment, and we can foresee nothing but inconvenience from the colonel of a European regiment (who must necessarily be the senior officer) controlling the system of the commandant of the native corps; secondly, it would be embarrassing to have two regiments thus inseparably tied together, and would greatly complicate the reliefs; thirdly, it would nullify all the proposals for provincial battalions. A certain number of native troops are, however, necessary with European troops, to relieve them from exposure to the sun, and leave as many Europeans available as possible. Brigadier-General Chamberlain and Colonel Edwardes think, therefore, that instead of as heretofore drawing the sepoys haphazard from the line, it would be better permanently to attach one or two companies of sepoys* to each regiment of European infantry, care being taken that high caste natives should not be enlisted for this duty, but those races who would most readily fraternise with the European. Sir John Lawrence, however, does not think that anything would be gained by such an arrangement, and would rather adhere to the ordinary practice.”

The proposal made by Brigadier-General Chamberlain and Colonel Edwardes is in accordance with the opinion and suggestion of Colonel Keith Young, who replies to this question by deprecating having any large body of natives intimately associated with European troops, and by proposing to have a native company raised from the class which supplies the cook-boys attached to each European regiment of cavalry and infantry in the service. To each company he would attach two European officers, selected for their knowledge of the language; and would have the companies to consist of 100 privates, and such complement of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers as may be decided upon for the native corps of the line. He considers that such companies would save Europeans from much exposure, and take numerous duties which otherwise necessarily employ European soldiers; and that the class, distinct from other natives, and accustomed to intimate contact with European troops, would continue, as they have done during the late disturbances, to regard themselves as part and parcel of the corps to which they belonged.

Sir P. Grant is strongly adverse to the permanent association proposed in Question 37, deeming it “ most unadvisable that the native soldier should have the opportunity, which close and permanent association would give him, of seeing the European soldier in the degrading position and state in which, unhappily, the latter too often exhibits himself in quarters.” Brigadier Troup carries his objection even further than this, for he expresses the opinion that such permanent association with the native would, in the course of a short time, so demoralize the European that he would only be so in name; and the maintenance of discipline, or anything like it, would be impossible.

The officers marginally noted are averse to the scheme; and Colonel Mayhew remarks that recent experience shows that admixture has not worked well generally; that the practice is to be discontinued in the artillery; and that it should not be introduced into other branches.

Colonel Burn considers the proposal better than that of flank companies of Europeans, but doubts if it would work well. Sir J. Hearsey, on the contrary, gives preference to the scheme of having European flank companies, and observes that Europeans kept separate cause natives to stand in greater awe of them.

The officers who approve of auxiliary native corps in close and permanent association with European regiments are marginally noted. Both Colonel Berkeley and Colonel Shuldham propose, however, to raise the auxiliaries to two corps, so as to form a complete brigade; but Colonel Shuldham adds a light field battery of European artillery. Sir S. Cotton, who considers that the arrangement pro-

* To be commanded by subalterns of the European regiment.

posed would prove eminently successful, instances the good feeling which sprung up between the European and native corps brigaded together for a long period in Afghanistan, and adverts to his scheme of army organization, in which he recommends the proportion of two Europeans to one native, incorporating the two races.

Major-General Birch deems it “ highly desirable that each European regiment should have a native irregular regiment attached to it. But I would not officer the native regiment from the European. I would not exclude any particularly well qualified officer of the one from being attached to the other; but I would select officers for the attached irregular regiment from the whole line. It is essential, I think, that a native irregular regiment should have its own commandant to look up to; and this would be defeated if, as I take the question to imply, it were merely officered from the European corps, the commanding officer of the latter being also commanding officer of the irregular corps. I would place the latter under the commanding officer of the European corps, as a sort of brigadier, (without increasing his command allowance,) but it should be really commanded by its own commandant.”

The Commander-in-Chief thinks it might be tried as an experiment; but that there does not seem to be any advantage promised from it. His excellency apprehends that the auxiliary native corps might perhaps consider itself entitled not to be employed except with its European corps, which would be a great disadvantage.

QUESTION 38.

Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers presents any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?

The reply of the Punjab committee is, that there is both a certain analogy and encouragement, and also certain difference in the two cases; that the gun lascars and native drivers economise European power, and have been found not only most convenient and useful in ordinary wars, but singularly faithful in the late exceptional crisis, when their loyalty was put to the severest imaginable test; but that the gun lascars and native drivers are not highly disciplined, drilled, and armed with offensive weapons, as the native auxiliary regiments or companies with a European regiment would be, and that so far the latter would be a new experiment.

Generally, the opinions are that there is no analogy, and no encouragement to be drawn in favour of auxiliary native corps from the association of gun lascars and native drivers with European artillerymen; that during the late mutiny, neither drivers nor lascars could be trusted, and that where they proved less rebellious than other native troops, it was probably owing to fear and being armed with swords quite useless; and that the artillery should have no native drivers, but be European exclusively.

Brigadier Troup considers that there is no analogy whatever, the two cases being in no way parallel, as the duties of the gun lascar and driver are perfectly distinct from those of the artillerymen, and they never come in collision with each other, which is quite different to being mixed up on an equality upon duty. Sir S. Cotton also deems the two cases not analogous, but instances the Peshawar light horse as being in point. The corps consists of three troops, two of which are European, and the third native, the latter being composed of men of the Punjab and of the Peshawur and Hazara districts, trained in every way as dragoons. Sir S. Cotton confidently says that this corps is as fully efficient as one wholly European, and that the most cordial feeling exists between the two races.

The Commander-in-Chief likewise considers that there is no analogy, an opinion also expressed by Major-General Birch.

QUESTION 39.

How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps?

There is not much variety of opinion on this point. Brigadier Farquharson, under the supposition of two European regiments being quartered together, would have their barracks in the centre, with the artillery between them. Sir S. Cotton would have the European barracks in the centre, and natives on the flanks.

Colonel Burn would have the barracks apart from the lines, the social habits of the two races being so contrary; and Colonel Shuldham would have them sufficiently near to check an emsute, but sufficiently separate to prevent all intimacy.

The Punjab committee consider the matter unimportant with so small a body, and would place a barrack for the two companies wherever most convenient.

QUESTION 40.

Would such a system be favourable, or the reverse, to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops which is an element of strength?

The Punjab committee have partly answered the question in reply to 39, but they add that they all think that if an auxiliary native corps were attached to a European one, it would end in the delegation of most important duties to the sepoy, such as magazine guards, &c., which ought always in future to be confined to Europeans.

Brigadier Steel considers that the European character is not sufficiently careful or suspicious, and that the system would be unfavourable to vigilance, and diminish the awe entertained for Europeans. Brigadier Troup and Major Williams and Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson also deem the system unfavourable, and calculated to lessen the awe which is an element of strength.

Sir J. Hearsy is of opinion that the awe maintained would be the same if his proposal were adopted.

Sir S. Cotton, Colonel Berkeley, and Brigadier Farquharson regard the system as favourable, as also does Colonel Shuldham, with the proviso that all intimacy must be prevented.

Colonel Burn takes a distinct view of this question which in his opinion hinges much upon the facility of inter-communication between the native and the European. His answer is, that "a closer association of the two races, if founded on friendship, would be favourable to that vigilance which has become essential. A friendly warning of what was going on at Meerut on the 10th of May 1857 would have prepared the European troops for immediate action. At present, the European and native troops are unable to communicate from a want of knowledge of each other's language. I would encourage in every way the acquisition of English in our native army. It would soothe the inhuman cruelty that is inherent in the native mind. So sensible were the Romans of the influence of language over manners, that it was their most serious care to extend, with the progress of their arms, the use of the Latin tongue. Britain should follow this example, and teach the English language throughout her Indian empire. The maintenance of that awe of European troops which is an element of strength, can only be upheld hereafter by having everywhere a sufficient European force ready and armed with authority, to put down at once any rising either of the native army or of the native population."

The Commander-in-Chief does not think that the adoption of the system would have much effect one way or the other, but his excellency sees no particular advantage from it.

Major-General Birch is of opinion that the nearer such association as is involved in the proposed system, the greater the detriment to the prestige of the European soldier.

QUESTION 41.

How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war?

The Punjab committee consider that auxiliary corps would be at all times embarrassing and inconvenient. Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson deems the objections to the arrangement so great as to outweigh partial advantages, and Brigadier Troup, though he thinks that it would work better in time of war than in peace, considers that it would never answer. Colonel Burn considers that the existing system of brigading native and European troops together is better than the forced alliance of the proposed arrangement under contemplation. Brigadier Steel holds that in camp it would work unfavourably.

On the other hand, Sir S. Cotton and Colonel Berkeley think the arrangement would answer equally well in peace and war. Colonel Shuldham apprehends no difficulties, and Brigadier Farquharson, who is of opinion that the two battalions need not be always kept together, deems the arrangement applicable to the requirements of the service.

The Commander-in-Chief observes that it might be made to dovetail, but that sometimes inconvenience would arise from the European regiment being always attended by its auxiliary native corps.

Major-General Birch considers that in peace there would not be much difference, but that in war the service would certainly be benefited by the mutual attachment of the two corps, and by the emulation of the native corps; and he exemplifies it by the feeling which existed between the 40th foot and 2nd grenadiers and the 13th foot and 35th native infantry.

QUESTION 42.

Is it desirable that the native troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of auxiliary native battalions in permanent association with European corps?

The Punjab committee observe in reply, that "Under the former system, in which the native army so greatly overbalanced the European one, it was not desirable to develop the native military talent, and self-reliance. It was politic under such circumstances, for instance, to promote sepoy by seniority, and not by merit, and to keep the command of companies in the hands of European officers. But if the re-adjustments and reforms in the Indian army which we have advocated, be carried out, we need not any longer be under the lamentable necessity of debilitating our native troops. We can then strive to make them vigorous and effective; contenting ourselves with the reservation of the artillery and latest improvements in the rifle for the European troops, and the certainty that whenever a native regiment, however efficient, mutinously separates itself from its European officers, it will find that it has lost its most vital principle."

Sir P. Grant considers that "it is most desirable that native troops should not be trained to feel that they are entirely dependent upon European troops for support. But I do not hesitate to assert (in opposition to the oft-expressed opinions of Sir John Malcom and other distinguished officers), that (most providentially, as I think,) it is alone through the instrumentality of their European officers that native troops are ever imbued with a spirit of confidence and self-reliance on service, and the native troops in our service so officered will always be immeasurably superior to any Asiatic enemy to whom they may be opposed. Efficiently commanded and well led, by British officers, native troops will always, my experience tells me, acquit themselves with credit independently of the European support. But they have no confidence whatever, in the very best native officers, and deprived of their European officers (as I think it will be admitted late events have abundantly made manifest), except behind walls or other protection, native troops are a mere armed rabble."

In favour of fostering a spirit of confidence and self-reliance among the native troops are Brig. Farquharson, the officers marginally noted. The Brig. Steel, Quartermaster-General, would have the Brig. Troup, native army small, but well-trained. Brig. Coke, Brigadier Troup is of opinion, that Colonel Burn, the system of auxiliary battalions Sir J. Hope Grant, must be unfavourable to the acquisition of confidence and self-reliance by the native troops. Brigadier Coke's answer contains matter of grave import. He says:—"I am of opinion, that native or any other troops who have no self-reliance would be worse than useless in the hour of trial. I would do everything in my power to give self-reliance to native troops. I do not mean by self-reliance a mutinous and insubordinate spirit. Nothing can be more mutinous and insubordinate than an English mob, but this does not make them self-reliant; witness the way in which a policeman walks into the midst of a violent chartist mob, and carries off his man. A mutinous and insubordinate army can only exist with a timid and weak government. No arrangement of troops, no amount of want of self-confidence will save an army under these circumstances, for they will soon find that their own want of self-confidence does not equal that of their rulers. I hope I shall always see native troops rely on Europeans for aid and support in the hour of danger, believing them to be their superiors in bodily strength, physical and moral courage; but I do not think we have in many cases since the late rebellion increased this feeling, and if it is not strenuously exerted, our northern soldiers will not long continue to believe in the name alone."

Colonel Berkeley and Major Williams would have native troops trained to have confidence in their European officers.

Sir S. Cotton thinks the development of confidence and self-reliance in native troops fraught with danger to the State, and would check their growth by his proposed system of organization. Those who are of the opinion that the encouragement of such qualities in native troops is implicit are marginally noted.

Colonel Shuldham supports this view by the remark, that when the tug of war comes, native troops always look up to the European troops, and that at other times it signifies little whether they have self-reliance or not.

Colonel Mayhew considers the question from a wholly different point of view, and expresses his conviction that the permanent association in the same corps of European and native soldiers would have the effect of making the expensive and needy Englishman dependent on the rich and usurious Hindoo, to whom he would find himself constantly bound by debt; and thus a spirit dangerous to discipline would be fostered in spite of the utmost care of the ruling powers.

This might, Colonel Mayhew adds, certainly be obviated, in a measure, by the frequent change of the native portion of a corps from its European base; but the amalgamation would thereby be weakened, and retain none but its worst features.

Major-General Birch says, that the native troops should be taught to rely on the European troops. He thinks their association to the extent he proposes would foster the sentiment. But that a more intimate union would be prejudicial to the reliance of the native troops on the European.

The Commander-in-Chief observes that they must be trained to act occasionally with no Europeans, save their own officers; that there is no fear of their looking down upon European troops, but that we should never again rely upon their feelings of dependence on Europeans, or on any other of their supposed feelings, but place it altogether out of their power to do serious mischief, which his excellency believes to be by no means incompatible with good service out of them.

II.—MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

QUESTION 1.

Can you suggest improvement in the Articles of War in use in the Bengal army?

The Judge Advocate-General of the army, Colonel Keith Young, is of opinion that until something is definitely settled regarding the organization of the native army, it will be premature to take the question of Articles of War into consideration. It appears that amended articles, approved by the Commander-in-Chief, General the Honourable G. Anson, were forwarded to Government, and are now before it; but Colonel K. Young thinks that whatever the constitution of the army may be, many more changes in the Articles of War than those recommended will be necessary. He is also of opinion that whatever the military code by which the army is to be governed, it should be left to the Commander-in-Chief to determine, with the sanction of Government, what the provisions of that code are to be; and he objects to this duty being devolved upon the Legislative Council; a body, mostly non-military, not possessed of a sufficient knowledge of the requirements of the army, and for whose laws, having reference to the army, the Commander-in-Chief is practically responsible. As a further reason for pronouncing it inexpedient to continue in the Legislative Council the power of framing Articles of War, Colonel K. Young advances the long delays in making necessary amendments, or in introducing any fresh article the Commander-in-Chief may deem essential to discipline.

Colonel K. Young suggests that the Legislative Council should pass an Act, abolishing the present native Articles of War, and vesting authority in the Commander-in-Chief, with the sanction of the Governor-General in Council, to frame such articles, rules, or regulations, as he may consider expedient from time to time for the preservation of discipline in the Bengal army. If the intervention of Parliament were required, the Home Government should be addressed on the subject. A similar provision might be made for the armies of the other presidencies; or if they thought proper the mode of dealing with the more serious offences might be left to be declared by the Supreme Government.

Colonel K. Young states:—"In elucidation of the evils resulting from framing Articles of War under a legislative enactment, I may mention that by the greater portion of the present native army, consisting of Seikhs and levies of all kinds, the Articles of War are understood to be ignored altogether, commanding officers proceeding for the trial and punishment of offenders under magisterial authority. I have no official knowledge that such is the case, but it is a matter of general notoriety, so that although it is declared by the articles that all native soldiers are to be subject to them, they are entirely set aside, and treated with a disregard but ill-calculated to ensure respect for legislative enactments; and there is besides, for after consideration, the illegality of all trials held otherwise than under the authority of the Articles of War. Were the power of making them vested in the Commander-in-Chief matters might have been properly provided for at once, all illegal proceedings avoided."

The Punjab committee observe that it is the general feeling of the army that the Articles of War for the native troops

are so technical, and so stringently construed, that justice is often sacrificed to form; and that it is difficult for a court-martial to observe their niceties and refinements; that prisoners admitted by all the authorities of the regiment, division and judge advocate's department to be guilty, frequently escape punishment, and return triumphantly to their regiments, to the great injury of discipline. That even judge advocates disagree about the requirements of the articles; whereas, to influence the native soldiery, which is their most valuable function, they should be so simple that any sepoy could understand them; though so comprehensive that no real offender could escape.

The Punjab committee quote instances of the defeat of justice by errors of procedure, or in sentences, being allowed to quash proceedings; and they point out other faults of system and practice which violate the plain laws of simple justice.

They are of opinion that native regimental courts-martial are a solemn farce, which might with great advantage to discipline be abolished, and their functions merged in the commanding officer. They add, that "it is not to be doubted that the gradual weakening of commanding officers has hastened the gradual dissolution of the discipline of the native army. We are a free people, rejoicing in constitutional liberty, and we have loved to treat our native subjects in the same way, forgetting that they are not yet fitted for it, and are certain to abuse it. What they respect is power in their immediate superior; not power a thousand miles off, in some jealous constitutional check. We must revert somewhat to first principles, and while guarding strictly against individual abuse of power, make every native soldier look up to his commandant." They then proceed to state the powers they wish to see vested in commanding officers; viz.,—

Proposed powers of Commanding Officers.

1. To dismiss any soldier whose term of service had not exceeded five years.
2. To recommend the dismissal of a soldier of more than five years' service to the brigadier, whose decision to be final, and not liable to appeal.
3. To reduce any non-commissioned officer one step, placing him at the head of the roll of lower rank.
4. To imprison a soldier or non-commissioned officer for a term of two months, half of which may be solitary confinement, and to recommend imprisonment up to six months, requiring the confirmation of the brigadier.
5. All imprisonment to involve loss of pay (except subsistence allowance), as it involves loss of the prisoner's services to Government.
6. Any man sentenced to more than four months imprisonment to be struck off the rolls of the regiment.
7. The commanding officer (and he alone) to sentence any sepoy to be flogged for insubordination or theft, to the extent of thirty lashes; no sepoy to be flogged twice in one month. Any sepoy flogged three times to be dismissed the service.
8. The commanding officer may fine any sepoy, non-commissioned officer, or native officer, within the limit of one month's pay in one year.
9. Every sentence of punishment to be entered in regimental orders.

Under the above rules petty civil crimes, in which both parties were soldiers or camp followers, would be tried by the commanding officer, serious crimes by the civil courts, and military crimes (as distinguished from military misdemeanors), requiring more than six months' imprisonment, by a district court-martial. The general of the division to have the power of confirming sentences up to fourteen years' imprisonment; beyond which sentences to require the confirmation of the Commander-in-Chief.

District court-martials to be the only court-martial for native officers and soldiers; and not to require more than five members, of whom two should be native commissioned officers, and three European officers. Only one European officer, and no native commissioned officer being of the prisoner's regiment. Commissioned native officers, as a rule, to be tried by district courts-martial; but when exceptional cases required, might be dismissed without trial by the chief military authority of the province.

The Oude committee would abolish the Articles of War. Sir J. Hope Grant. So, likewise, would the officers marginally noted, among whom Sir S. Cotton considers the Articles of War in their present form as wholly useless, and not understood by the native troops; with which view Major Williams coincides, styling the Articles of War incomprehensible to natives. Brigadier Coke would have no Articles of War, magisterial powers vested in the commanding officer, and capital cases made over to the sessions.

Brigadier Farquharson would also invest the commanding officer with magisterial powers, and substitute a simple code for his guidance. So also Sir J. Hearsay would have the articles few and plain, with much left to the discretion of the commanding officer. Brigadier Steel also, though he adverts to the fallibility of commanding officers, would have them given more authority.

The Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that the powers of commanding officers should be greatly increased, and his excellency remarks, that it is doubtful whether there should be such a tribunal as a native regimental court-martial, and whether it might not without inconvenience be abolished, if the powers of commanding officers are adequately increased.

Major-General Birch observes, that there is but one code for the native armies of the three presidencies, that enacted by Act No. XIX. of 1847; that the Articles of War apply to all officers or soldiers, regular or irregular, and that alterations to suit the case of the native army of Bengal will, unless declared exclusively applicable to this army, be applicable to those of Madras and Bombay also.

After noticing the great pains taken in the arrangement of the Articles of War, the classification of offences, and the indexing the contents, precisely in a similar manner to those for Her Majesty's forces, Major-General Birch observes, that he does not see why the arrangement which is found to work well in Her Majesty's army should require a different plan for the native troops. He then proceeds to make some observations upon the objects kept in view in framing the resolution of the 30th of August 1835, regarding corporal punishment, and the restrictions put upon its infliction; and considering the system of punishments the best that could be devised, he deems that it would be no improvement to change the classification of offences, the sentences awarded, or to remove the restrictions on corporal punishment.

Major-General Birch proposes an important addition to Article 101, so that it may be in the power of the government of the three presidencies to order, when desirable, that offenders shall be tried by European officers.

In Article 110, he would give power to officers commanding regiments to reduce non-commissioned officers; and in Article 112, he proposes still further to strengthen the hands of commanding officers by investing them with the power in cases of light offences, or in the maintenance of discipline, to inflict summarily, without the intervention of a court-martial, corporal punishment with a rattan to the extent of three dozen strokes.

Major-General Birch says:—"The total abolition of the articles, which has been suggested in some quarters, seems to me to be a measure from which no good could be derived. It would not tend to civilize or ameliorate our native troops, and it would place a degree of power in the hands of commanding officers not known in any other army, for which the necessity is not apparent, and which would not in any way really strengthen their hold on the obedience or the affection of their men. Commanding officers, like all other persons, require to be themselves subjected to certain wholesome restrictions. The Commander-in-Chief, and even the Government in its executive capacity, are not at liberty to exercise an arbitrary authority independent of law; and there appears to be no good reason for investing commanding officers with authority independent of Articles of War."

QUESTION 2.

Should the special rules regulating punishments in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

The Punjab and Oude committees would retain neither. Sir J. Hope Grant considers either objectionable. Brigadier Coke would have no special rules for regulating punishments of any kind in the native army. He would leave the matter to the commanding officer, who should keep a register of the men tried, the crimes for which they were tried, and the punishments awarded. The trials to be conducted in the presence of the native officers, in the vernacular. He considers the nature of Europeans and of Asiatics to be so utterly different, that it is manifestly impossible to frame rules to suit both races, as it is to render them of the same colour.

Sir S. Cotton considers that the present rules for the punishment of offences not requiring trial by court-martial are too lenient, and useless in upholding discipline. He is of opinion that corporal punishment, and solitary confinement in cells, should be inflicted at the discretion of commanding officers, whose powers should in every respect be much increased, and all, excepting capital crimes, be

punished under the orders of commanding officers. He recommends the following:—

CRIMES.	PUNISHMENTS.
Mutiny, desertion, and all capital crimes.	Death, transportation, by sentence of a European court-martial, sentence being carried out under orders of officer commanding division.
Disobedience, neglect of duty, and all other crimes not capital.	To be punishable with or without hard labour, solitary confinement to the extent of fourteen days, and corporal punishment not exceeding fifty lashes, these punishments being awardable by commanding officers of regiments.

Brigadier Farquharson would have a specific code laying down general rules; but leaving punishments, in a great degree, to the discretion of commanding officers.

Brigadier Steel considers the habits of the native so different from those of the European soldier that any assimilation for regulating punishment is not necessary.

The reply of the Commander-in-Chief to this question is, "No, decidedly not. It is impossible to assimilate them, and therefore unwise to attempt it."

In the opinion of Major-General Birch the special rules regarding punishments in the native army must needs be retained.

QUESTION 3.

Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the Bengal army?

The Punjab and the Oude committees are of opinion that the system of native courts-martial does not work satisfactorily, and in this opinion the officers noted in the margin concur. Sir S. Cotton considers, that the system has utterly failed in its object; that the native officers have no sense of justice, are totally ignorant of the Articles of War, and of their duties at a court-martial; and that the proceedings as at present conducted are farcical. Brigadier Coke gives the following picture of the working of this institution:—"Native officers sitting on a court will always endeavour to let off the offender for many reasons. There is always some clique who, either from being related to the offender or of the same tribe or village, will make it their business to get up a party amongst the native officers to screen the offender. If these native officers will not agree to this, it makes a feud, which shows itself in a thousand underhand tricks which tend to defeat justice and injure discipline. Native officers are also bad judges of punishment; certain crimes are great offences in our eyes, and considered of little moment by natives. This particularly applies to matters of discipline. Consult native officers fully in every matter regarding the proof of the crime,—let the trial be open, before all the native officers or men who are interested to attend: we lose much of the respect that we should otherwise obtain for our justice by closed courts,—but let the sentence rest with the commanding officer alone. All crimes committed at head quarters where he is present should be tried by him alone. Nothing gives a greater insight into the state of his corps. Evidence given before him, when the matter is first investigated, and what is afterwards given before a court-martial is as different as light from darkness. An investigation taken on the spot and at the time the offence is committed has a chance of eliciting the truth; the investigation before a court-martial never; as the evidence has been all tampered with and everything settled and agreed on beforehand in the lines. When any investigation is required affecting the state of the corps, let the court be comprised of European and native officers mixed. The acumen of the European officer, and the insight into native character and local knowledge of the native officer will be more likely to elicit the truth than any other kind of court; but it should only be used for the investigation of large matters."

Sir J. Hearsay would have all the courts-martial in native regiments composed entirely of European officers. Upon this question the Judge Advocate-General has the following remarks:—"I think that under the present system of trials by native courts-martial substantial justice is administered; and what is more, I believe the sepoys think so too; but I am at the same time of opinion that equally satisfactory results might be arrived at by less complex machinery; and the majority of cases now tried by native courts-martial might be disposed of with advantage by commanding officers of regiments, provided that these officers are selected officers not merely succeeding by seniority, and that their proceedings are open to proper supervision. This arrangement

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" would be one entirely consonant with native habits and feelings, who love despotic power whether as the governor or the governed; and for the future it seems unquestionable that the hands of commanding officers must be strengthened if a severe discipline is to be maintained."

Dissentient from the general opinions expressed is that of Brigadier Steel, who remarks that the conduct of the native army had been so satisfactory up to the period of the assembly of the rifle depôts, and that occasions for the assembly of courts-martial had been so rare, that he is not aware of any grounds of dissatisfaction with the institution of native courts-martial.

Major-General Birch attributes native courts-martial not working so satisfactorily as they might to the failure on the part of officers to inform themselves of the provisions of the Articles of War; he anticipates great improvement by the substitution of European for native officers in courts-martial in the native army; and observes that if courts-martial were conducted with care, if commanding officers would inform themselves of their own powers, and act accordingly, the revision of regimental courts-martial by generals of division would cease to be felt as a grievance.

The Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that the system of native courts-martial does not work satisfactorily, that commanding officers have been too much hampered by them; and that offenders have often escaped through some trivial error in the proceedings, a thing most undesirable with natives.

QUESTION 4.

What means are adopted to acquaint the Bengal army with the military code under which they live, and are governed?

The Punjab committee, like the officers marginally noted, mention periodical parades at which the Articles of War were read; but they add that the sepoys gained little knowledge in this way, and that their ideas were gathered from the precedents furnished by the management of their own and other corps, and the punishments awarded by courts-martial. The Oude committee state that European officers seldom understand the Articles of War, and less frequently are able to communicate. Major Williams remarks that at these periodical parades few heard, and scarce ten per cent. of the native troops who heard understood, what was read. Sir S. Cotton makes a similar observation, that the Articles of War were not understood when read out.

The Commander-in-Chief and Major-General Birch also reply that the Articles of War are directed to be periodically read out to the men (168 Art.)

QUESTION 5.

What proportion of the native troops can read for themselves in the vernacular dialect the Articles of War?

The Punjab committee reply that perhaps ten per cent. can read for themselves in the vernacular dialect the Articles of War. The Oude committee say one in a hundred, and that one in a thousand understand what they read. Brigadier Coke states that in Pathan and Sikh regiments not above one or two can read and write. Sir S. Cotton, not one in a hundred; Sir J. Hope Grant, very few indeed; Sir J. Hearsey, very few, not five per cent; Brigadier Steel and Major Williams, very few, a very small proportion. Brigadier Farquharson takes the most favourable view, and says about a half.

Major-General Birch remarks that sepoys, unable to read and write in one character, are debarred promotion except in special cases to be reported to the Commander-in-Chief.

The Commander-in-Chief finds it quite impossible to say what proportion of the sepoys can read; but that of those who could, very few, he is told, probably ever perused the Articles of War.

QUESTION 6.

Under what military or civil code are police corps in the Bengal presidency?

In the Punjab, in Oude, and in the North-west provinces, the European commanding officers have magisterial powers, and deal with petty offences; and the civil courts take cognizance of serious crimes.

The Commander-in-Chief has not the least idea under what military or civil code the police corps are placed.

Major-General Birch replies, "None, that I am aware of; further than that I believe they are under the magistrate."

QUESTION 7.

How is discipline maintained, and the authority of officers, European and native, upheld in police corps in the Bengal presidency?

In the Punjab police force the commanding officers in military cases punish according to their own discretion, subject to appeal to the chief commissioner. In the Oude police force the European commandant can summarily dismiss a private, and exercises the powers of a joint magistrate, punishing up to three years' imprisonment, without reference. He can reduce or fine non-commissioned officers, and can flog any private for a military offence; he can fine all native commissioned officers save commandants and adjutants of cavalry and infantry; he can promote to the various non-commissioned grades. The chief of the police has higher powers, and can summarily dismiss all ranks save that of native commandant, for which the sanction of the chief commissioner is required; he can sentence to imprisonment and to transportation for long periods; but transportation for life and capital punishment are subject to confirmation by the chief commissioner.

In the military police of the North-west provinces police officers can sentence to 100 lashes, and three years' imprisonment, with hard labour. Heinous crimes are committed to the sessions.

The Commander-in-Chief knows nothing of the police corps.

Major-General Birch believes commanding officers of police corps to have magisterial powers as well as the ordinary military powers of commanding officers.

QUESTION 8.

Do you consider that the provision made for maintaining the discipline of the police corps, and the authority of their European and native officers, sufficient, and the working satisfactory?

The reply of the Punjab committee is, that hitherto the body of military police in the Punjab has been small, and the selection of officers easy; and the system has been found to work well. The body will now be larger, and there would be no objection to a simple code.

Major Williams considers that ten months' experience the few and trivial complaints brought against the police of the North-western provinces, and the testimony of magistrates and commissioners, is highly in favour of the military police, and shows that the system is working satisfactorily.

Sir J. Hope Grant and Brigadier Farquharson also express favourable opinions.

Brigadier Steel, who was superintendent of the police corps disbanded in 1847, is of opinion that a higher rate of pay was accorded for the same material than was necessary, which may lead to the necessity for raising the pay of other establishments; and that experience only can show if the working is satisfactory.

The Commander-in-Chief knows nothing of police corps, and Major-General Birch has no means of judging of the working and discipline of the police corps.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTIONS, AND REWARDS.

QUESTION 1.

In the native regiments of the Bengal native infantry, what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, or seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

The Punjab committee reply that the system of promotion is based nominally on seniority and merit, but really on seniority, as the senior was never passed over unless he was imbecile. In the Punjab irregular force the rule is to give the promotion to the best man, preference being always shown to the senior if possible.

It appears, from the concurrent testimony of the officers marginally noted, that the general rule in the native infantry of the Bengal army was promotion by seniority; that the exceptions were rare, merit operating to a very limited extent, and provided the character were good seniority being seldom departed from; hence, says Major Williams, the noted inefficiency of superior grades of native officers. Colonel Burn remarks, that "it had become so much the practice to regulate promotion by seniority that it was looked upon as the right of the senior, and any deviation from this practice was regarded by the whole corps as an infringement of what they considered as established law of the service. Some

"commanding officers took advantage of the invaliding season, when a great many vacancies occurred, to promote smart and deserving men. They were generally selected from amongst the drill instructors. Others stoutly upheld the seniority system as the only safeguard against misconduct in the field and in cantonments." Brigadier Coke, after stating that seniority was the chief consideration, adds, "but many energetic officers laboured to get rid of their old and inefficient men, and to replace them with more efficient officers, both as regards age and qualifications; but what with the parsimony of the Government in keeping officers and men on the rolls of the regiments who were only fit for the invalids, to which they would neither send them nor discharge them; and what with the obstacles which were thrown in the way of commanding officers by head quarters to the promotion of junior and efficient men, the whole promotions for the last twenty years have been almost entirely by seniority."

Brigadier Steel is of opinion that promotion was regulated by merit and seniority combined, but observes that promotion by favour has sometimes caused discontent.

The Commander-in-Chief replies, "I am informed, and can also state from my own knowledge, that promotions went much by seniority; but sometimes men were promoted out of their turn for smartness, gallantry, &c. In some corps commanding officers promoted out of turn more than in others. A good deal had been done at head quarters of late years to encourage promotion by seniority, save in cases where the men were disreputable or very incompetent. There was an old order that men should not be promoted who could not read and write. This in most cases used to be a dead letter, but was very generally enforced after the publication of the new military regulations in 1855, and occasioned much dissatisfaction amongst men who had expected promotion and were thus suddenly superseded owing to the revival of the rule."

Major-General Birch quotes the regulations, section 54, *in extenso*; and adverting to its contents, says, that "such are the safeguards with which the claims of respectable seniority are hedged round," but that practice more decidedly recognized the paramount claim of distinguished merit and superior qualifications than these regulations encouraged.

QUESTIONS 2, 3, and 4.

2. *Are the native officers of the native infantry of the Bengal army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?*
3. *Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the men from amongst whom they have risen?*
4. *Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or in promotion from one commissioned grade to another?*

The Punjab committee reply that the native officers of the Bengal army were proverbially dull and inefficient, and they ask how it could be otherwise when the position of the native officers was considered a reward of long service, and not a link in the discipline of the corps, extreme age aggravating all their natural defects; whereas, the native officers of the Punjab irregular force are represented to be particularly intelligent, useful, and efficient, in all positions affording the greatest assistance to their officers.

The general sentiment is that the native officers of the Bengal army were not intelligent, useful, or efficient. Brigadier Coke states, that from two to three native officers might in a regiment be fit for their position. Colonel Burn depicts them as in general very old and perfectly useless; and he observes that one great blunder made by the mutineers was the selection of these old and worn-out men to command them; and that "it was the saving of our small army before Delhi,

that such men as Subadar Bukht Khan, and others equally infirm, were the leaders of the rebels." Sir S. Cotton represents them as dull, inefficient, and wholly useless in supporting discipline; and drawing a similar conclusion with the foregoing, quoted from Colonel Burn's, adds, "Were they otherwise, the mutiny has clearly shown us that they would be very dangerous and mischievous." Brigadier Troup regards them as the most stupid, useless, worn-out race that ever existed, and not to be trusted. Brigadier Steel considers that the native officers were useful in minor details, and that their position was an inducement to all ranks to behave well. The Oude committee remark, with respect to them, that of intelligent and efficient men there was the usual proportion under a seniority system.

There is a general concurrence of opinion with respect to the native officers of the Bengal army, that their acquirements were usually not of a higher grade than those of the men from amongst whom they rose. On the contrary, that age, indolence, and disease having usually impaired their energy and intelligence, they were, though originally on a par with the sepoys, actually of a lower grade, and frequently leant on a smart non-commissioned officer or private, especially if a Brahmin. Brigadier Troup remarks that "they (the native officers) are "from age and long service, so infirm and apathetic, that they are generally commanded by, instead of commanding those under them. Added to this, it is quite a mistake to suppose that the mere fact of giving a man a commission made him at once a native gentleman of influence; so far the contrary, it must be well known to all those who are at once conversant with the native character, that however much appearances may be kept up before the European officers, that when away from their control the youngest sepoy in the company, if of a higher caste, was considered a better man than the subadar; and this was productive of the most pernicious consequences, as regards discipline and duty, but more especially the manner in which it influenced the minds of native officers when sitting as president and members of courts-martial."

The Punjab committee, except the native officers of the Punjab irregular force, whom they state to be selected men, and consequently far above the average.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief remarks that from having been non-commissioned officers for several years before obtaining commissions, the native officers have usually learned more of their duties than they knew when sepoys, and that from his own observation his excellency can state that many of them can drill a company very well.

On the question of test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or from one commissioned grade to another, there is much unanimity. Sir J. Hearsey introduced tests in the cavalry regiments he commanded, but except (as remarked by Brigadier Farquharson) longevity, there would seem by concurrent testimony to have been none. In the Punjab irregular force there is no other than that of general qualification for command.

QUESTION 5.

Does the intervention of the native officers between the European officers and their men weaken the influence of the European officers? Does a full complement of the European militia against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officer?

The Punjab committee observe that the result of the intervention of the native officers must depend on the disposition and energy of both the European and the native officers; but that on the whole they believe that as far as their influence went, the native officers strengthened their European commanders. This is said with reference to the Bengal army; with regard to the Punjab force, they are of opinion that when the command is in the hands of a competent officer the intervention of the native officers does not weaken the influence of the European officers.

The Commander-in-Chief answers, "Not necessarily," to both questions; and Major-General Birch considers that the result of the intervention of the native officers depended very much upon the European officers themselves, vaying according to their conduct and the interest they took in their men. That when European officers took little interest, clever native officers would greatly influence the men for good or evil, but that many of them were mere cyphers.

Upon this point the authorities who deem that the intervention does not weaken the European officers are given in the margin: Brigadier Coke remarks, however, that sympathy between the native and the European officer decreased latterly, partly because the officer, finding himself powerless to reward or punish, ceased to take interest in his men, and partly because every officer who had interest or abilities only thought of getting on the staff, and of escaping the tedious routine of regimental duty; and Brigadier Steel observes that both classes of officers had too little power for either good or evil.

Major-Gen. Birch.
Punjab Committee.
Oude Committee.
Sir J. Hope Grant.
Sir J. Hearsey.
Sir S. Cotton.
Brig. Farquharson.
Brig. Coke.
Brig. Troup.
Brig. Steel.
Col. Burn.
Col. K. Young.
Major Williams.
Sir J. Hearsey.

Commander-in-Chief.
Major-Gen. Birch.
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Sir S. Cotton.
Oude Committee.
Brig. Farquharson.
Brig. Steel.
Brig. Coke.
Brig. Troup.
Col. K. Young.
Col. Burn.
Major Williams.

Others, however (vide margin), consider that the intervention of the native officers was unfavourable to the influence with the men of the European officers; that the latter should be all in all, and that the native officers were a hindrance; that if the latter were not in existence the European officers would act more directly upon their men; whereas, from the position which the native one holds, the European officer is compelled to repose a trust in him which he is very seldom worthy of.

Colonel Burn is of opinion that the intervention of the native officer between the European officer and his men might be made very beneficial; but that to effect this the native officers must be men of education and of a better class of society than the privates. He is of opinion that had we had men of this stamp in the army in 1857, to explain to the sepoys the utter groundlessness of their fears of being made Christians, there would have been no mutiny.

Upon the second section of this question, the Punjab committee is of opinion that a full complement of European officers certainly interferes with the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officers, but that in the Punjab irregular force the complement of European officers is only four. Sir S. Cotton considers that a full complement of European officers would make ciphers of the native officers, an opinion with which Brigadier Coke concurs, inasmuch as such an organization must cause the native officer to take little or no interest in his duties.

On the other hand, Sir J. Hope Grant, Brigadier Troup, and the Oude committee, hold the contrary opinion, namely, that a full complement of European officers does not militate against the professional efficiency of the native officer. Sir J. Hope Grant does not put it quite so absolutely, but says that it "ought not." Major-General Birch is also of opinion that a full complement of European officers does not necessarily militate against the efficiency of the native officers.

QUESTION 6.

Has it been found in the native infantry of the Bengal army that, on the occurrence of mutinies, the native officers have given timely information, or been of any use in aiding the European officers to check mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?

The Punjab committee are of opinion, that during the late mutiny the native officers of the Bengal army on few occasions gave any information of, or aid in checking, what was impending or taking place. But in former years, when there was dissatisfaction or mutinous feeling in particular corps, the committee state that the native officers, as a body, did tell their European officers what was going on; and that, even in the mutiny of 1857, the native officers went away with, rather than led the mutineers; and in any body that remained loyal there was generally a large proportion of native officers.

Colonel K. Young believes, "it may be stated without contradiction that the instances in which native commissioned officers have given timely information of intended risings are very exceptional, but when mutiny has once broken out they have very often sided with their European officers. During the late mutiny, however, their leaning has rather been towards the mutineers, on the ground, I believe, that they were deserting a hopeless cause; that they were abandoning, in fact, a sinking ship."

Sir J. Hope Grant's reply conveys the opinion that in some cases the native officers have given information, but that they were so old and useless that they were quite unable to check any mutiny or irregularity. The opinion of Major-General Birch is somewhat similar. He states, that "in few cases have the native officers given information or been of use to the European officers in checking mutiny. There is a large proportion of them who have sided with the mutineers, but my belief is that the majority have done so on compulsion. There are numerous instances of their siding with the European officers."

The foregoing are the more favourable opinions; those that follow are less so.

Brigadier Steel considers that the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, as a body, have always professed ignorance of any cause of discontent, and have pretended not to be parties to it.

Colonel Burn remarks, that "the native officers, being of the same class in society, and generally closely allied to a portion of the men under them, have in all mutinies aided and abetted the mutineers. They are all equally affected by the same cause, and being equally ignorant, any common ground of offence is as much a grievance to the commissioned officer as it is to the private soldier."

Sir J. Hearsey observes that native officers usually encourage mutiny if they think it may benefit them. That he has known them discourage trustworthy men from giving evidence or reporting mutinous acts or language; and that a native officer not siding (covertly) with the men would, indeed, be an exception to the general rule.

Brigadier Troup says, in reply to Question 6:—"I am not aware of their ever having done so; but on the contrary (they) have always practised the grossest deceptions, and played a double part throughout. I am not aware, excepting during the recent crisis, that they ever sided openly with the mutineers, although I am fully aware they always did so secretly; and although they have openly made the show of siding with the European officers, on occasions when the men did break out into open mutiny, selfish motives alone induced them to adopt the measure, for there was not one amongst them that did not know and tacitly aid in the coming storm without ever warning their European officers of what was about to take place; and had native officers of regiments under such circumstances been summarily dismissed the service, and their promotions filled up from other corps, I feel quite certain that mutiny would have been less frequent in the Bengal native infantry."

The remaining opinions concur in regarding the native officers as rarely of any use and very frequently themselves mutineers; and the Commander-in-Chief replies distinctly, "No; from all information I have obtained, the native officers have gone with the men."

QUESTION 7.

Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued in the native infantry of the Bengal army?

The Punjab committee advocate the continuance of native commissioned officers, but on a better system. They urge that, unless human nature can be altered, there must either be prizes for ambition or discontent; and that they regard the native officer as an indispensable link in the management of a native regiment. The Commander-in-Chief thinks that they must be continued, unless the number of European officers present with the native corps is to be immensely increased, which seems neither possible nor desirable.

Colonel K. Young would not only maintain but increase the number of grades, so that no soldier should be left during his whole service without seeing before him the chance of continued prospective advancement.

Brigadier Farquharson would likewise continue the grades of native commissioned officers, but demand higher intelligence and efficiency. Brigadier Coke would also continue them, but make them responsible for their companies. So too Colonel Burn, who regards native officers as necessary in the native army as a medium of communication between the sepoy and his European officer, and as more likely to listen with patience to the childlike complaints of the sepoy, and to send him away in good humour to his lines, than the European officer. Colonel Burn, however, would appoint native officers from the educated and wealthier classes in the district where the corps is enlisted; and he would make a knowledge of English an indispensable requisite for admission into the service.

The Oude committee and Sir J. Hope Grant are also advocates for maintaining the grades of native commissioned officers.

On the other hand, Sir J. Hearsey would discontinue the grades of native commissioned officers, being, in his opinion, worse than useless; and Sir S. Cotton, Major-General Birch, Brigadier Troup, and Major Williams are also in favour of abolishing them; the latter officer making it dependent, however, on the army not being broken up into small detachments, and stating, that provided men were selected for the grade, the rank of jemadar might be retained. Major-General Birch would make special exceptions in favour of men of superior qualifications now in our service; the rest he would pension or discharge with a gratuity.

QUESTION 8.

Is the substitution of a European serjeant and corporal to each company of a native regiment in lieu of its native officers advisable?

The reply of the Punjab committee to this question is, "Decidedly not. European serjeants and corporals could not in the climate of India perform the multitudinous duties of native officers. Nor would they have due influence with the men, or know anything wrong that was going

" on in the regiment. Instead of being an element of strength, we fear they would prove one of weakness and dissatisfaction. This was found to be the case in the Punjab regiments, and they were in consequence removed."

The Commander-in-Chief deems it inexpedient, and those who oppose such an organization on the ground that the class is not calculated to have supervision over sepoys; that it would be a waste of European soldiers, and of no use, are marginally noted.

On the contrary, Brigadier Troup thinks the substitution most advisable, but would not draw the European non-commissioned officers from the European troops in India, but from a superior class especially raised for this peculiar service. Sir S. Cotton and Sir J. Hearsey both advocate the substitution, as also Major Williams.

Major-General Birch deems the substitution highly desirable; but that it is indispensable that the non-commissioned officers should speak Hindoostanee fluently, and that drunkenness should be invariably punished by removal. He would prefer two serjeants to one serjeant and a corporal, because havildars have the rank of serjeants, and it would be anomalous that a corporal should command a havildar, yet that it is indispensable that all natives in a company should be commanded by any European attached to it.

QUESTION 9.

If the abolition of the grade of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument thus closed to the native soldier, would a graduated scale of good-service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of service, be a compensating encouragement, and as efficacious as the commissioned grades?

The Commander-in-Chief deems the abolition of the grade of native officer inadvisable; and a graduated scale of good-service pay and retiring pension, claimable after specified periods, injudicious; as men when past work would cling on to obtain higher pensions, and experience shows that commanding officers will not always prevent this.

The Punjab committee likewise object, and are of opinion that there must be a graduation of ranks, and a machinery for managing the men, which no pecuniary privileges without rank can give; and that such a system as the one stated in the question would neither be efficient nor popular.

The Oude committee would have the graduated scale, in addition to native officers.

The advocates for maintaining native officers consider that no substitute would supply their place; and that the rates of pay, and the increase given after specified periods of service, are high enough to insure excellent recruits, being better than they could earn in any of the ordinary walks of life.

On the other hand, Brigadier Troup takes quite a different view of this most important subject; he says, " This is a subject that I have closely studied for the last twenty years, and have during that period, at various times, got the opinions of men of almost every native regiment in the service; I can therefore speak with the utmost confidence upon it. No man on entering the service ever thinks of looking forward to the higher grades, so much so, that by far the greater majority of them would, had they the option, take their pension after serving fifteen years. I could, had I space here, give ample proof of this. The fact of the old native commissioned and non-commissioned officers clinging so pertinaciously to the service as they generally do, has, I know, decided many, who have not given the matter that study which it is worthy of, into the belief that they remain on in the service in the hope of gaining distinction, and a higher rate of pension. But in reality this is not the true cause, as I have it from the men themselves; the fact is, that many of them remain on in the service so long that they have outlived their families, and have no home to go to; others again say, ' I have remained in the service until I am so old that I would be useless at home, therefore the best thing I can do for my family is to continue in it as long as I can, and save all the money I can for their benefit; but had I been allowed I should have been very glad to have taken my pension after having served twenty-one years.' My opinion is, that the pay of the regular native soldier should be fixed at eight rupees per month in all situations, that the non-commissioned officers should be paid exactly as at present, and that there should be no such thing as marching

batta. Carriage at a certain rate per man when marching, and levies when in cantonments should be furnished by the state; this, with a graduated scale of good-service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of service, regulated on the same system as that in Her Majesty's army, would, in my opinion, make the native soldier more contented and efficient than he has ever been, and more than compensate for the loss of the commissioned grades."

Major-General Birch considers that the scheme sketched in the question would be efficacious, as the proportion of men who rise eventually to the grade of commissioned officer is but small; whereas the scale of good-service pay would be to a great extent accessible among them. He would reserve retiring pensions for exceptional cases of merit, and for men wounded on service in the field; and he thinks that the native non-commissioned officer and soldier might very advantageously be encouraged and rewarded by occasional transfers to civil employment on the staff of the police, such as thanadars, darogahs, &c., and also to the military police, if kept up. Sir S. Cotton takes a similar view as to the means open to Government for reconciling the native mind to what he regards a very necessary measure, and suggests the promotion of deserving men in police corps, or by civil employment, in addition to retiring pensions and to good-service pay, which latter boon he would have granted under the orders of the commanding officer.

Major Williams thinks there would be no difficulty in obtaining recruits for a limited native army on the encouragements held out by the plan suggested in Question 9; but pensions he would reserve for special cases of distinguished conduct in the field, or a long period of good conduct. Sir J. Hearsey would have no pensioners, no invalids, but a graduated and liberal scale of good-service pay, increasing after terms of five or six years unbroken good conduct. It appears that he contemplates a bonus in money to be occasionally given in lieu of pension.

QUESTION 10.

Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native troops to the British service?

The Punjab committee state, that the pensions have always been very highly valued, and that one source of discontent was the difficulty of getting invalided; still, that the institution, though a man could hardly get pensioned off while life was left in his body, was much valued; and that if it did not prevent the recent mutiny, it was because other questions of more vital moment were concerned. They consider the mutiny to have been very much among the younger sepoys. They advert to the practice of the invaliding committees in the Bombay army as much more liberal than in that of Bengal, and deem this one reason of the greater efficiency of the Bombay native commissioned and non-commissioned grades.

Brigadier Steel regards the invalid establishment to have been the mainstay and support of the regular native army, and always to have been looked upon with the greatest veneration.

Others, again, consider that although the late mutiny proved that retiring pensions were ineffectual in attaching native troops to the service, yet that the " monster deluge " of revolt which swept through the land, and the consequent destruction of confidence in the stability of government, an impression which caused many men to join in the revolutionary movement, ought not to lead to the abolishment of the pension establishment. The late revolt they regard as wholly exceptional, and that under ordinary circumstances pensions, either in receipt or expectancy, work a salutary effect. Brigadier Coke, however, makes similar observations with the Punjab committee, and considers our system of allowing men to serve on for the pension who are unfit for the service to be ludicrous, and that every man unfit for the service up to fifteen or twenty years should be paid up and discharged, provided his incapacity does not arise from wounds; and he adds, that if all soldiers who were unfit for the service up to fifteen years were weeded out of the corps, it would save much malingering, and reduce the pension establishment to a great extent.

The reply of the Commander-in-Chief to this question is, " No, not at all. The idea always previously entertained that the pensions ensured the loyalty of the army, has proved to be utterly fallacious. Men who had first obtained pensions at the time of the mutiny, and could in no way be affected by the ' greased cartridge ' question,

at once joined the rebel ranks. The number of pensioners that have come forward to support us is believed to be very small."

The Oude committee, Sir J. Hearsay, Sir J. Hope Grant, and Major Williams, also consider that retiring pensions have failed to attach native troops to the British service.

QUESTION 11.

Should not the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

In reply to this question the Punjab committee say, "Certainly; but we wish here earnestly to urge upon Government that to select native officers for merit, and keep them meritorious, the European officers themselves must be selected and efficient. A bad European officer cannot work a system of merit. He would soon spoil the best native officer in the world, and the more these questions of army reform are thought over, the more clearly will it be seen that the educating of the European officer lies at the root of the matter."

Those who advocate the discontinuance of the grades of native commissioned officers state that if retained, merit and efficiency should rule promotion.

Of those who are in favour of maintaining native commissioned officers Brigadier Coke and Colonel K. Young are, for merit, efficiency, and gallantry in the field ruling promotion; both officers would make the commanding officer the sole judge, considering him the most deeply interested in having efficient officers, and that if himself qualified for his position no one else is so fit to decide, and that if not fit for his position he should be removed summarily. Brigadier Coke remarks that he would not be too greedy to promote to the non-commissioned grade from juniors, if the seniors are able-bodied men and of good courage. It tends with the northern soldiers, who are jealous of their name and character, to disgust them with the service, and by this means many valuable soldiers are lost to the State.

Colonel Burn's opinion is analogous to Brigadier Coke's, for he states, that "if promotion to the native commissioned grade is to continue as hitherto, by advancement from the ranks, it ought to be by selection from the non-commissioned grades. Once a commissioned officer, the promotions ought to be made by seniority, except for some very sufficient cause it be found necessary to pass a man over in promotion, or to promote a junior for some good or gallant act."

Brigadier Steel would have a test adopted, and failure in any such test, as indicating a want of sufficient qualification, to exclude from promotion; but for any particular good conduct he would always grant promotion.

Brigadier Farquharson would make merit and efficiency the rule, but in the promotion of native commissioned officers to the commissioned grade he considers that seniority should not entirely be overlooked.

Major-General Birch also thinks that promotion for merit and efficiency should be the great object, but not the only one, as seniority can never be justly disregarded *in toto*, except when unsupported by other claims, when it should be so without hesitation.

The Oude committee are decidedly in favour of promotion for merit and efficiency.

The Commander-in-Chief gives the following answer to the question: "It is very doubtful if this is advisable. From all I have gathered from officers of experience in the Company's service we do not know the natives sufficiently, and are more likely to promote a smart rascal than a good reliable soldier. The promotion should be by seniority to a certain extent! That is, the senior fit for promotion should be taken, and only occasionally for great merit or for distinguished gallantry should a sepoy far down the list be advanced."

QUESTIONS 12 and 13.

12. *Should the system of pensions, as now in force by regulations, be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?*

13. *What is the charge to the State of military pensions to native officers and men of the Bengal native infantry?*

The Punjab committee advise, if, as they advocate, a system of pensions for native troops be maintained, that a committee of selected officers be assembled to go carefully into the details, having, as a preliminary, laid before them the actual charge to the State, the ratio in which it had annually

accumulated, and the disproportion or otherwise to the object in view and to the revenues of India, of the present system and scale of pensions. The Punjab committee then proceed to remark upon some inequalities in the rates of pensions to regulars and irregulars, and make suggestions with the view of rendering the rates more equitable, and also with the view of removing some restrictions which work prejudicially to the public service. On the subject of family pensions they recommend that the principle of bonuses should be as largely substituted for that of annuities as possible, pointing out that if fairly fixed on the principle of life insurance it should be no loss to Government in aggregate amount, would be a saving of machinery, and a bar against the frauds so largely practised. They then proceed to suggestions regarding graduated scales of pay in every rank of the native army, as calculated to excite emulation, ambition, and satisfaction, and as being consonant with the practice of Runjeet Singh in the Sikh army, and more or less, though not very systematically, in the armies of most Asiatic rulers. The committee base the proposition on the fact that a recruit cannot be worth as much as a veteran soldier, and that no good purpose is answered by putting them on a level as to pay. The committee also advert to the rates of pay and pension of native doctors, which, in proportion to the outlay of time and industry on their education and the importance of their duties, the committee deem unaccountably and unreasonably low; observing that it does not do to raise men's intellectual standard and to keep them down in the social scale, that the sense of justice and of power alike rebel against such a course, and that in the late crisis it has been remarkable how active the native doctors have been against us, having been the very brains of the mutiny in many regiments and stations, a fact which the committee attribute to the feelings above described.

Upon the subject of pensions the opinion of Colonel K. Young, a wholly independent authority, is in close accordance with that of the Punjab committee. He observes, that "the system of pensions in operation in the Bengal army should undergo a searching examination before anything is decided on the subject, and it should be compared with the system prevailing in the presidencies of Madras and Bombay. I know nothing of the former, but in the latter it is understood to be the practice to invalid in the army men comparatively young in age and constitution, and who would be certain of being rejected if sent up before an invaliding committee in Bengal. No doubt the pension list in the Bombay presidency is proportionally much larger than in Bengal, but the Bombay system is, in my opinion, the correct one, and I may add also, that it is actually the cheaper of the two, for in Bengal the worn-out men so frequently seen in our ranks are in fact pensioners and receiving a higher rate of pay than they would if invalided. It is true the amount paid them does not appear under the head of pension, but it ought to be so included whenever pay is given to men unable to do longer service. It would be better far to decrease the strength of your army than keep ineffectives in it."

Sir S. Cotton considers that as the native army will now be considerably reduced, the system of pensions might be maintained with advantage, as the boon is doubtless highly esteemed by the native soldier.

Those who would modify the system of pensions are numerous. Some, like the Punjab committee, admit that the present system has been greatly abused, and that it requires improvement, suggesting the substitution of a bonus where practicable.

Major-General Birch observes that the present pension system must needs be religiously kept up in favour of those who are now in the native army, and that it could not be at once swept away without a breach of faith. But in the cases of men newly enlisting he would abolish pensions, except as rewards for rare cases of merit, and for providing maintenance for men wounded in action, and for their heirs. He also remarks upon the necessity of bringing within due bounds the order of merit and the order of British India, both of which, during the late revolt, have been conferred in a manner very different from what their respective rules warrant. Brigadier Troup would also prospectively abolish the existing pension system.

The system proposed by the Commander-in-Chief is different from all the preceding ones. His excellency recommends that men should be enlisted for a certain number of years, ten or twelve, say; and that only good and fit men should be allowed to remain beyond that period, and then as a favour. That the men thus allowed to remain (who should be limited) should be then re-enlisted for ten years more, and so on. After twenty-two years' service, if not allowed to re-enlist owing to physical unfitness or otherwise, and the conduct had been uniformly good, a trading pension to be given. After thirty years' service, a

well-conducted man might claim pension. His excellency thinks that some such system would encourage the men to good conduct, expedite promotion, and remove the great evil of aged non-commissioned officers.

None of the authorities to whom questions have been forwarded are in a position to state what charge on the finances of the State is due to the pensions to native officers and men of the Bengal army.

QUESTION 14.

Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in courts-martial?

The Punjab committee consider the native officers of the late Bengal army not to have been fit, and that the whole system was a farce. "The native members, as a rule, were guided by the European superintending officer; and then went out and told the prisoners they were very sorry for the sentence, but could not help it. Native officers selected by merit and not by seniority would be quite qualified to sit; and, if only to keep up their dignity, we would advocate their sitting on district courts-martial—regimental courts being abolished."

The committee pronounce the native officers of the Punjab irregular force as being quite fit mentally to take part in courts-martial, and to pass judgment on most cases brought before them; but from want of moral resolution prone to give up their own judgments to that of the European superior.

On this important question there seems much general unanimity of opinions, and it seems advisable to give *in extenso* those of officers of so much practical experience as Major-General Birch and Colonel Keith Young. The reply of the former officer is as follows:—

"No, the great majority are quite unfit to do so; but then this is certainly owing in part to their not comprehending our military jurisprudence. On the whole, however, and taking into consideration the weighing of cases on their merits, rather than any peculiarities of our system, I think the native officers, with few exceptions, quite unfit to sit at courts-martial. I say this, after having had an experience of eleven years as a practising judge-advocate, and having met in courts-martial duty the native officers of certainly the larger half of the regiments in the service. But I have met with occasional splendid exceptions, men of very superior intelligence."

"Native commissioned officers are of use at a court-martial in sifting the particulars of the case under trial; but this, I think, is all. They have a voice in the verdict, but as regards the sentence, they are mostly guided altogether by the European officers superintending the proceedings; and it is perhaps as well that it should be so, their ideas and ours of the punishments required to maintain discipline being very different. I remember some years ago, when conducting the proceedings of a native general court-martial upon the trial of a sepoy charged with wounding a British officer at Loodianah, that after the man was declared guilty and the sentence came under the consideration of the court, the first native officer gave his opinion that a month or six weeks imprisonment in the quarter-guard would be a sufficient punishment. The matter was argued amongst them for some time, and a sentence of death was at last decided upon, and the man was executed. But it was a long time before the court arrived at this decision; and had they been left to themselves, it is possible enough that the punishment might have been, as originally proposed, a few weeks imprisonment in the quarter-guard. I should see no objection to native officers sitting on courts-martial, so long as they are under proper control."

The Commander-in-Chief pronounces the native commissioned officers as generally not fit to take part in courts-martial; and as will be seen by the marginal names, many concur in the same view. Sir J. Hearsey designates a native court-martial a farce,—the superintending officer and the interpreter trying the offenders whilst the native officers are often asleep or dosing. Brigadier Steel considers them inclined to severity in cases of disrespect to their own order, but reluctant to punish Brahmans. He thinks they may sometimes prove a screen for the European officer from the revenge of a culprit. Brigadier Farquharson says they either intrigue beforehand, or leave the trial to the superintending officer. Brigadier Coke would, as before stated in the Replies on Military Code and Rules of Discipline, have no courts-martial in the native army.

Colonel Burn takes a more favourable view; he says, the questions brought before a court-martial are generally very

simple, and have been dealt with by the native officers in a satisfactory manner, under the guidance of the European superintending officer. He remarks that one advantage of a native court is, that they thoroughly understand the native witnesses.

QUESTION 15.

Are native commissioned officers on a par with European sergeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?

The reply of the Commander-in-Chief is that native officers are not generally on a par with European sergeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency, but that the latter are usually in the very flower of life, whereas the native officers are usually very old and worn out.

Most of the authorities consulted are of a similar opinion, deeming the native officers not on a par, but inferior, speaking generally; Sir J. Hope Grant remarks that, except in few instances, they cannot be; and Major-General Birch, though he concurs in the generality of native officers being certainly not on a par, says that some of them are fully equal to the European sergeants and corporals.

Brigadier Coke is of the opinion that, taking efficient native officers and efficient sergeants, the former are infinitely superior in efficiency and intelligence in the command of native soldiers, and that inefficient men of both classes are equally useless.

The Punjab committee observe that native commissioned officers, promoted by seniority and worn out, cannot be compared with European sergeants and corporals selected for smartness, without reference to seniority, particularly if these remain with their own regiments, under strict discipline, and among their own countrymen. But European non-commissioned officers transferred to a native regiment are so circumstanced that their smartness and professional intelligence loses more than half its value from their inability to impart it; that knowing little or nothing of the language and feelings of the men, and failing to explain themselves, they become violent and rough, irritating the sepoys with native abuse of which they know not the meaning, and having no longer a rigid discipline to restrain them, being to a great extent their masters, they fall off. The committee, however, is of opinion that, taking the best instances of European non-commissioned officers, they have still no hesitation in saying that they can never be equally useful to the commanding officer in managing native soldiers as selected native commissioned officers.

QUESTION 16.

If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, what will be the best organization for the military corps?

1. Should they be fully officered with native commissioned grades as well as with European officers;—or,
2. Fully officered with European, but have no native commissioned grades;—or,
3. Be officered like irregular corps, viz., have the full complement of native commissioned officers with but a few European officers?

The Punjab committee advocate the Punjab irregular system, which is the third organization enumerated in the question. To secure efficiency in commanding officers they would establish the rule that, on attaining the rank of regimental major, an officer should vacate the command, unless invited by government to remain. The Oude committee, Sir J. Hope Grant, Brigadier Farquharson, Major Williams, and Colonel K. Young also advocate the irregular corps organization, but the last-mentioned officer would have a slight addition of European officers.

Major-General Birch proposes that the military corps should be of two kinds, regular and irregular; the former, officered according to the second, and the irregulars according to the third mode of organization.

Sir J. Hearsey, Sir S. Cotton, and Brigadier Troup are in favour of the second mode of organization. Both Sir J. Hearsey and Brigadier Troup propose having, besides the usual complement of European commissioned officers to each company, a couple of European non-commissioned officers in addition. Brigadier Troup remarks, that "unless organized in this way, if ever called upon to act against a disciplined enemy, instead of being of any use as soldiers they will become a dangerous, undisciplined, and disgraceful rabble. In my opinion, infantry soldiers, but more particularly native ones, cannot have too much European supervision to render them efficient: and if the military corps are to be kept separate from the police ones,

Sir J. Hearsey.
Oude Committee.
Sir J. Hope Grant.
Sir S. Cotton.
Brig. Troup.
Brig. Farquharson.
Brig. Steel.
Brig. Coke.
Major Williams.

“ and not broken up and detailed in small parties all over the country on public duties, far removed from the eye of the European officer, sometimes for several months together, as used to be the case, if pains are taken in the recruiting and training, I will venture to say, the British soldier excepted, they will be equal to any in the world.”

The Commander-in-Chief remarks that the Punjab organization for military corps answers well, but that more European officers than four are needed, and that on service the commanding officers of Punjab regiments generally apply for others to be attached. His excellency considers that there should not be less than eight European officers present with a corps of infantry, and points out that it is often absolutely necessary that detachments of a troop or company should have a European officer.

Brigadier Steel advocates the first mode of organization, viz. that regular corps of native infantry be fully officered, both with European and native commissioned officers; and he is of opinion that corps of regular native infantry should be treated as a superior class to those of irregular corps or police, in both rank and pay; as for local service, the same material can be obtained at a less cost.

Colonel Burn proposes to reorganize the infantry of the Bengal army in a manner which embraces a police force. “ The European infantry to consist of twenty regiments, organized in the same manner as the existing European corps.

“ The native army to consist of forty regiments of two battalions each. These forty corps to be officered as at present; the first battalion to be the active or service battalion, and the second to be employed on police duties.

“ Recruiting to be confined to the first battalion, and the second to be completed as vacancies occur by drafts of the oldest soldiers from the first battalion. The men of the first battalion would thus be young and active, and fit for any duty. The second battalion would be composed of old soldiers, well trained for the duties of a military police.

“ Of the forty regiments I would propose to form :—

- 15 of Sikhs.
- 5 of Punjab Mahomedans.
- 10 of Oude men, Hindoos, and Mahomedans.
- 5 of Behar men, Hindoos, and Mahomedans.
- 5 of other classes.

—
40 total.

“ Besides these the Goorkhas must be kept up as at present in distinct regiments and located in the hills. If this useful body of men could be increased, a few more regiments might be added to the army with great advantage to the State.

“ We should thus have for the new army, as compared with the old :—

	Old Army.	New Army.
Europeans	3	20
Native regiments, regulars	74	40
Ditto police	—	40
Irregular corps that mutinied or been disarmed	24	—
	101	100

“ The Punjab irregular force, and all local corps that have not been disarmed, to be maintained as at present.

“ The forty native regiments to be officered as at present, and the officers to be available for duty with either battalion. Those attached to the second battalion to be limited to—

- a commandant,
- a second in command,
- an adjutant,

“ with staff salaries as at present in irregular corps.

“ The first or service battalion to be always fully officered, and kept in the highest state of discipline.”

He then remarks, that it must not be inferred from the good service rendered during the late crisis by irregular corps with few officers that they are more efficient on service than regular corps with a full complement of European officers; that the irregular corps at Delhi and Lucknow were glad to have an addition; that out of fourteen officers with the fourth Punjab regiment before Lucknow twelve were wounded; and that the Sirmoor battalion, the guides, and the first Punjab infantry, suffered severely in officers before Delhi. That even with one or two European corps the want of officers was greatly felt at Delhi, and not to the men satisfactorily remedied by the appointment of what the

men called the “ sepoy officers ” to do duty with them, as they prefer their own officers.

Colonel Berkeley advocates auxiliary battalions attached to each European corps, officered on the irregular or No. 3 system.

QUESTION 17.

How should the police corps be officered, the question applying both to European and native commissioned grades?

The Punjab committee reply, “ One European and one native officer to each battalion, and one subadar and one jemadar to each company, as in the Punjab police.”

The Oude committee propose for the Oude police :—

- 1 chief of police.
- 1 assistant ditto.
- 4 divisional commandants.
- 4 ditto, second in command.
- 4 divisional adjutants.
- 8 district commandants.
- 8 ditto adjutants.

The Commander-in-Chief considers that a commandant and adjutant should be sufficient European officers for a police corps, with the usual proportion of native officers allowed to irregular infantry and cavalry.

Sir J. Hearsey and Brigadier Steel would have European officers as commandants, second in command, and adjutants, but the grades of native officers to have different designations to the grades in the army.

Colonel K. Young would officer police corps similarly with irregular corps but with fewer European officers, and the commanding officer supreme. So also Brigadier Farquharson, who would have a commandant and deputy commandant, with native commissioned officers as in regiments, but on less pay, with the addition of a native commandant, and an adjutant with superior allowances. Appointments to be granted to men or native officers who distinguished themselves in the military as well as in the police force.

Major Williams observes, adverting evidently to the police of the North-west provinces, that “ whilst the police take all civil and military duties, a full complement of officers and men are needed. Divisional police battalions of horse and foot consisting of 2,000 to 2,500, according to the respective wants of districts, with twelve European officers have sufficed to restore order; peace and tranquillity once re-established, the number of officers and men can be somewhat reduced.”

Major-General Birch suggests the employment of unattached commissioned officers with the police as much as possible, as also of uncovenanted persons of the respectable classes, and that native commissioned officers be appointed as in the irregular corps.

Sir S. Cotton, on the proviso that the people of the country are disarmed, would officer police corps by natives, as fully efficient to carry on police duties, and not dangerous from their command being only over policemen armed with swords.

Brigadier Troup, on the other hand, would have no native commissioned officers with police corps, but a European commandant, second in command, adjutant, surgeon, two European sergeants, and two corporals, besides the usual number of native commissioned officers to each company. He observes, “ Surely after the fearful warning we have had, it would be needless for me to impress upon my superiors the necessity there is for an extended European supervision throughout the length and breadth of the land, for they may rest assured that no native of whatever rank is worthy of trust without it.”

QUESTION 18.

If irregular corps and police corps have native commissioned officers, and regular corps have no native commissioned officers, but only good-service pay and pensions as an incitement to good conduct and efficiency, will the higher pay to privates and non-commissioned officers suffice to render the regular as popular as the irregular and police corps, and to draw as good recruits?

The Punjab committee say in reply, “ Certainly not; ” and Brigadier Steel the same. The Commander-in-Chief also says, “ Naturally not. The corps that are required to fight alongside of European regiments and to move about India should be on a more advantageous footing as regards pay, and on an equal footing at least as respects proportion of officers, and non-commissioned officers with police corps. In those of the latter now raising, it is believed the sepoys receive as much as in the regular army, or the Punjab corps. Of course men will prefer the police for many reasons.” Sir J. Hope Grant also thinks that the regular would not under the supposed circumstances prove

as popular as the irregular and police service. Brigadier Troup, however, thinks it would be so, but he considers it most objectionable and very impolitic, the soldiers being paid by and serving the same government, should have such a difference in their organization. Major-General Birch also thinks that the regular would be as popular as the irregular and police service under the supposed conditions; but if it were doubtful, he deems it another reason for not keeping up military police corps.

Colonel Burn is of opinion that, whichever system is adopted, the recruits will follow their relatives wherever they may be serving; and he does not think that the distinction, if made, of having no native commissioned officers in the regular regiments would render them less popular than police corps organized on a different system.

QUESTION 19.

In police corps, is there on first admission any test or examination as to capabilities of reading and writing? Or are qualifications tested on promotion to non-commissioned grades, or on promotion to commissioned grades?

All those consulted concur in stating that there are no such tests. Brigadier Coke deems reading and writing no test of efficiency, and would not insist on it as a qualification for promotion or admission. The Punjab committee observe that when the natives are generally educated, this may be done in police corps; that, at present, it is found impracticable even in irregular infantry corps; and they note that the military police have no detective duties.

QUESTION 20.

Has the distinct organization and the difference of system, regulations, and component races in the then native armies proved favourable to our power in India?

The Commander-in-Chief's reply is, "The distinct organization I believe to have been a benefit: if we had possessed one in 1857 instead of three (or with the Punjab we may say four) armies, we should have lost India." The concurrence is very general that the result has proved very favourable to our power; and Sir J. Hope Grant would keep not only the three presidencies, but Punjab distinct.

Sir S. Cotton takes a modified view. He regards the distinct nature of the armies of the three presidencies as one of the means which checked the spread of the mutiny; but he ascribes this result solely to the difference of races, and not to distinct organization or system, advancing in support and proof of this opinion the many Bombay regiments which have shown disaffection, and in which men were enlisted from the same class which furnished the mutinous Bengal sepoy.

Major-General Birch does not "think there is any such difference of system, regulations, and component races respectively in the three native armies as to admit of any reply being given to this question. The prestige of the British soldiery has preserved our power in India, and not the native army in any considerable degree."

Brigadier Troup is of opinion that the difference in the three armies has not proved favourable to our power in India.

QUESTION 21.

Should a certain degree of distinctness of system, organization, and composition, according to the views of separate governments, to time, and to local circumstances, be allowed; or should endeavours be made to assimilate, or even to amalgamate, the three armies?

In reply to this question the Commander-in-Chief observes, "To amalgamate, or to assimilate the three armies would, I believe, be dangerous and impolitic. A craving for uniformity has already done much mischief in the native army. What seems to be wanted is not uniformity, but dissimilarity. We should, therefore, have corps of all races, and under different systems, but all governed by a few broad general rules."

Those who are opposed to assimilation or amalgamation of the armies of the three presidencies, and in favour of the maintenance of distinctness of system, organization, and composition, are noted in the margin.

The Oude committee regard assimilation as destructive; and Major-General Birch observes that, "The entire separation of the three native armies has been of the most important use to us during the late

mutinies. We have had the native troops of Madras and Bombay in antagonism with the mutineers and rebels in Bengal, which, but for the separation of the three armies, might not have been." He points out the impracticability of sending native regiments to serve for any length of time in other presidencies; that distance, family considerations, and perhaps climate, militate against such a measure. He would leave the administration of each army to the discretion of its own separate government, and keep both the European officers and their men distinct from the native troops of other presidencies.

Those who are in favour of assimilating the three armies as much as possible are Sir S. Cotton, Sir J. Hope Grant, Colonel Berkeley, and Brigadier Troup. The latter notes that the amalgamation of the three armies would be very difficult, if not impossible, but would have every endeavour made to assimilate the system, organization, and composition of all three armies. Colonel Berkeley would amalgamate the three armies under the title of the Royal Indian army under one commander-in-chief, and assimilate and simplify the working of corps and departments. He would divide the army into three or four corps, and remarks that local circumstances might cause a difference in the organization and composition of regiments. Sir J. Hope Grant would not acknowledge caste in any of the three armies, and would assimilate their systems as much as possible.

IV.—INFANTRY—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

QUESTION 1.

Within your experience have the powers of commanding officers of native corps been increased or diminished in the Bengal army, and state the orders or measures or changes in the practice of the service to which you attribute such effect?

The Commander-in-Chief's reply is,—“They have been diminished practically, though not avowedly. Commanding officers have been much hampered with regard to promotions; and courts-martial sentences, approved and carried out by them, have been constantly upset, either in consequence of petitions to head quarters, or owing to flaws discovered in proceedings. The deputy judge-advocates of divisions are principally employed in endeavouring to discover mistakes in regimental courts-martial, in which they are often successful. Then, again, a commanding officer sees his best officers often withdrawn for staff employ when he can ill spare them. At other times the bad officer, who has set him at defiance, and neglected his duty, is taken away without the commanding officer being consulted. All these things tend to weaken a commanding officer's authority, and are believed to have increased of late years.”

The Punjab committee are of opinion, that “the powers of commanding officers have certainly been diminished for many years, till it had become a standing complaint in the regular native army; but this seems to have been effected not so much by actual orders and measures, as by the changing practice of the service; by a gradual interference at army head quarters with the internal economy and discipline of regiments; and the consequent centralization of influence not in the commandant of the regiment, but in the adjutant-general and commander-in-chief. Rewards and punishments are the two great sources of a commanding officer's influence over his men, and both seem to have been almost taken out of his hands. The principle of seniority promotion has been so hedged in, watched, and enforced, (even by such a professed military reformer as Sir Charles Napier, whose general order on the subject is, perhaps, the strongest on record), that practically the commanding officer had no discretion whatever, and promoted the senior on the roll, rather than enter upon a vain struggle to prefer a better man. No doubt the sepoy as a body like this. It gave every man in the regiment, whether fit or unfit, a vested right in the upper ranks, to which a system of merit promotion would only have admitted the most efficient. The one system only asked them to live, the other would call on them to exert themselves. The regimental commandant was interested in superseding the inefficient; and the inefficient found a readiness at head quarters to believe injustice had been committed. One or two such unsuccessful struggles after better things disheartened the most zealous commanding officer, who gradually lapsed into indifference, leaving the regiment to the undisturbed enjoyment of its vested rights, its life without emulation, its poor opinion of the colonel, and its reverence for the central institutions. Nor was more discretion left to the commandant in the matter of punishments.

Punjab Committee.
Oude Committee.
Sir J. Hope Grant.
Sir J. Hearsey.
Brig. Steel.
Brig. Parquharson.
Brig. Coke.
Col. K. Young.
Col. Burn.
Major Williams.

Punjab Committee.
Oude Committee.
Sir J. Hearsey.
Major-Gen. Birch.
Brig. Parquharson.
Brig. Steel.
Brig. Coke.
Col. Burn.
Col. K. Young.
Major Williams.

"The authority given by him, by Article of War 112, is altogether inadequate to the control and discipline of a mercenary regiment. His powers of summary punishment were so small as to be ridiculous. He could neither flog for insubordination, nor dismiss for general bad character; he could not give extra duty to the negligent soldier, nor refuse furlough to an habitual offender: he could not send a non-commissioned officer to drill, nor reduce without formal trial; and he was even prohibited from confining one before trial, and required to put him simply under arrest. When to all these restrictions is added the facility of direct appeal through the post office by any sepoy to the commander-in-chief, and even the reception of anonymous petitions, we can understand how such a system in course of years undermined the legitimate influence of the commanding officers, and gradually reduced them to the cyphers which they were found to be in 1857."

There is great unanimity as to the fact of the gradual diminution of the powers of commanding officers, but the foregoing quotation of the opinion of the Punjab committee comprises so clearly the main points advanced by the other authorities consulted (marginally noted), that it will only be necessary to complement the above summary by adding a few observations on the part of regimental officers of long experience with native troops, and of others whose opportunities of watching the system have also been considerable.

Lt.-Colonel Macpherson, after sketching the oscillations of increase and decrease in the powers of commanding officers, remarks, that there can be no doubt that the attempts made to rule and govern the sepoy as if he were a British soldier have caused a great deal of hurtful and unnecessary interference with the commanding officer's authority, even in trivial matters. He quotes a case in which a sepoy of indifferent character had his furlough stopped because he was in debt, and his creditors objected. The man petitioned against this, and Lieut.-Colonel Macpherson states, that it was ruled in the judge-advocate's department that the commanding officer was not justified in stopping mere debtor's leave. Very good law, but a very bad way of ruling a sepoy, in Lieut.-Colonel Macpherson's opinion.

Brigadier Farquharson notes, among other proceedings derogatory to the authority and influence of commanding officers, the promotion of men not recommended by them. Brigadier Steel, noting like others the restrictions as to promotion and punishments considers, like Lieut.-Colonel Macpherson, that general assimilation to the rules in Her Majesty's service proved prejudicial. Brigadier Coke states, that the powers of commanding officers were diminished to such an extent as to have been, in his opinion, one of the principal causes of bringing about the mutiny. After touching on the abolition of corporal punishment, the abrogation of the power to discharge soldiers unfit to remain in the service, of the power to reduce non-commissioned officers to the ranks, and of the discretion to promote, save by seniority, he adds, the having men sent back to them who had been dismissed as unfit men, and even by sentence of regimental courts-martial, on their presenting petitions to head quarters, and the general feeling engendered by these and other similar acts, that the commanding officer was helpless to punish or reward. Sir J. Hearsey dates a constant diminution of the powers of commanding officers since the half-batta question, and considers that government and the commander-in-chief have usurped the powers of commanding officers, who can neither punish nor reward. Sir S. Cotton notes the facilities of appeal given to sepoys, and the notorious manner in which they congregated at Simlah to present petitions to the Commander-in-Chief, and the numerous instances in which sepoys dismissed by regimental courts-martial have subsequently been reinstated; the timidity which has prevented corporal punishment and solitary imprisonment from being really carried out in the native army, and the quickness of the sepoys to take advantage of such indecision; the rigid adherence to promotion by seniority, the incompetency of officers in consequence of old age to command their regiments, observing, that in eight regiments in the Peshawar division he had not three who were able to command their corps efficiently; the lenity with which various acts of misconduct, all more or less bordering on mutiny, were on several occasions dealt with, in consequence of which the sepoy ceased to hold the power of the government, and much less the authority of his military superiors, in dread; unable to appreciate such leniency, men, who under their own systems of government

would have been ruled with a rod of iron, lost the awe necessary to the preservation of discipline in a large army. Sir J. Hope Grant likewise admits the gradual reduction of the powers of commanding officers since 1806, and adverts to the sepoys being directly *en rapport* with army head quarters. Brigadier Troup's summary touches on some additional points, and may be given in his own words, where, after noting the almost total abolition of corporal punishment, the abrogation of powers of dismissal, and the almost compulsory seniority promotion, he adds to the catalogue, "the withdrawal of the privilege of granting letters to soldiers having civil suits, and of leave beyond that for a month to officers or soldiers, the withdrawal of the power of franking soldiers' letters, the order regarding good-conduct pay and badges, by which a bad man if he showed a clean sheet for one year was necessarily rewarded; the new rules of courts of request, by which a soldier could get irremediably in debt in defiance of both his captain and commanding officer; the increased number of detached guards; the constant references required on every point; the interference on the part of the different departments, especially the pay and audit, all and each rendering the commanding officer and his captains of companies perfect cyphers, without the means of rewarding good, or effectually and readily punishing bad characters." After which he proceeds to observe upon the system of withdrawing officers for staff and civil employment without reference to the commanding officer's opinion, in terms very much like those used by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

Major-General Birch gives an analysis of the past and present powers of commanding officers, under the three heads of punitive powers independently of courts-martial, powers in confirming sentences of courts-martial, and power to reward.

It appears that before 1828 commanding officers exercised discretionary powers not authoritatively conferred, such as dismissal of native soldiers, reduction of non-commissioned officers, chastisement with the rattan, extra drill and duty, refusal of furlough. On the 1st September 1829 the standing orders, compiled by order of Lord Combermere, limited the discretion to discharge sepoys, and commanding officers were declared to have no power to dismiss men as a punishment for offences committed. Art. 2 of the Articles of War of 1845 enacted by law that which was before established by regulations of the army, and for upwards of thirty years had been the rule. But the revised code of regulations for the army, published in 1855, take away from commanding officers the power to discharge men physically unfit for the service, which had been left them in 1828.

Major-General Birch states that the old Articles of War (those in force from 1796 to 1845) did not touch the point of the reduction of non-commissioned officers, and that there was no recognized authority for commanding officers inflicting this punishment; one that now (article 110) can only be awarded by sentence of court-martial, or by order of the commander-in-chief of the presidency.

Major-General Birch points out that in the old Articles of 1796, except in one clause empowering commanding officers to punish non-commissioned officers and soldiers not in quarters or camp by beat of retreat, no allusion also was made to minor punishments; the same in the Regulations of 1829. In those of 1855, chastisement with the rattan was strictly prohibited. He then quotes art. 112, which defines the powers of commanding officers in minor punishments, and remarks that the Regulations of 1855 follow up this article by prohibiting extra duty as a punishment, and declaring no punishment to be legal that is not specified in the article. He then adverts to a general order by the Commander-in-Chief, of 16th October 1854, as greatly interfering with the power of commanding officers.

Upon the second subject, the powers of commanding officers in confirming the sentences of courts-martial, it appears from Major-General Birch's analysis that from 1796 to 1818 there was no restriction. That from the 6th November 1818 the supervision of the proceedings of inferior courts-martial by general officers commanding divisions, and registry by the deputy judge advocates general began, that the laxity and irregularity of regimental courts-martial were considerably remedied, and forms of procedure were rendered more exact and uniform; but that, as general officers commanding divisions could set aside for illegality the punishments confirmed by commanding officers, the powers of these officers were weakened.

In 1832 full powers were conferred by the commander-in-chief on commanding officers to execute, to mitigate, or to remit sentences, and the practice was abolished of referring certain sentences previous to execution to the general commanding the division. In February 1835 corporal punishment was abolished, and dismissal substituted;

the latter requires the sanction of the general commanding the division. This took away the powers conferred in 1832. Act XXIII. of 1839 further restricted the powers of commanding officers, who were now not allowed to carry into effect any imprisonment exceeding six months, nor to discharge men so sentenced.

In 1845, the Articles of War, framed by Major-General Birch when Judge Advocate-General, enlarged the powers of confirmation and of commutation of sentences assigned to commanding officers; and the second edition of the articles made in 1847, and now in force, afforded Major-General Birch (in the same capacity) an opportunity, of which he availed himself, still further to enlarge the powers of commanding officers. In advertence to the restoration of corporal punishment by Lord Hardinge and the resolution of Government, dated 30th August 1845, framed in connection with the articles as made in that year, Major-General Birch observes, that if it interferes with the powers of commanding officers, it does the same with that of superior officers, but, in his opinion, in a very reasonable and proper way.

After observing that the present practice of the retention in the service of men flogged for military offences furnishes in his opinion a powerful argument for inflicting corporal punishment as seldom as possible. Major-General Birch concludes his analysis:—"On the whole, the occasional curtailment of the powers of commanding officers, and the want of uniformity of system throughout, as exhibited in the preceding notes, cannot but have had a tendency to weaken their authority; but matters have been on a much better footing since the enactment of the Articles of 1847; and with a few additional powers, which I propose to suggest in my reply to a subsequent question, and which have already been noticed in the preceding sheets, it appears to me that the position of commanding officers will be very satisfactory, and the discipline of regiments will thereby be secured."

QUESTION 2.

During the above period, have the powers of officers of European or native corps been increased or diminished?

The Punjab committee reply that in proportion as the commandants of native corps lost their own power, so they and their adjutants absorbed the power of the officers in charge of companies, who had really less influence than the havildar-major, and ceased to take much interest in the corps. The Commander-in-Chief also considers that the powers of regimental officers have been restricted.

There is much agreement on this point. All noted in the margin hold that the powers of regimental officers have been diminished; the dread of responsibility increased, as remarked by Brigadier Farquharson; and having, as Sir S. Cotton observes, little power to punish and less to reward, the European officers became cyphers and lost their influence.

Major-General Birch is of the opinion that the powers of regimental officers have been neither increased nor diminished in any perceptible degree during the period of his experience.

QUESTION 3.

What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers upon the discipline of corps in the native infantry of the Bengal army?

The reply of the Punjab committee is, "A laxity of discipline throughout the native army, which made it ripe for mutiny on any difficulty. For years the regimental officers have been driven to coax instead of command their men. The policy of Government indeed wore the same appearance, attributable probably to that sense of weakness which necessarily sprung from the inadequate European force in the country. So far, however, from this being a good reason for weakening the European officers, and strengthening the sepoy, it was in our opinion the very reverse."

The Commander-in-Chief says, "The result has been, I will not say the 'mutiny,' for that is doubtless owing to many things, but certainly the result has been to render the commanding officers almost cyphers, and their position undesirable. The commanding officer being thus crippled found his only means of getting influence with the men was by flattering and coaxing them, and thus discipline was still further shaken. In truth it was only when it suited the pleasure and convenience of

"the sepoy, that he went heartily with (his) commanding officer."

The Oude committee are of opinion that the 'mutiny' owes much of its extent and virulence to the want of power of commanding officers. Brigadier Farquharson also states that although political causes existed, the system precipitated the mutiny; and both Sir J. Hope Grant and Brigadier Coke regard the diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers as a principal cause of the mutiny.

The working of the system is thus given by Brigadier Troup:—"The result has been most detrimental; the good officer and man was disgusted at finding that his captain and commanding officer had not the means of rewarding him, and that there was nothing to be gained by showing his good character, and the smart intelligent officer and soldier was disgusted, because there was no opportunity given him of gaining distinction, while the slothful, careless, or bad knew that the commanding officer could do them but little harm, and that they might go to a very great extent without incurring permanent disgrace, and consequently defied him. Commanding officers of companies, and corps generally lapsed into a state of indifference, finding that those who followed the *laissez-faire* system were considered the best officers, as they gave the least trouble; and the men conducted themselves according to their natural dispositions, certain that so long as they were not outrageously slothful or ill-behaved each had good pay, must see his family in turn, and at the end of a specified period must get an increase of pay, or promotion, or transfer to the invalid establishment, and consequently cared little or nothing for his officer; the more so that their officers, for these reasons, seldom mixed with them, and indeed as a rule cared little about their corps, and were constant and urgent in their endeavours to get away from it."

Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson, Major Williams, Sir J. Hearsy, and Colonel Burn concur as to the result being to render the sepoy independent of and indifferent to the European officer, and that contempt of the latter loosened necessarily the bonds of discipline. Sir S. Cotton states the result as being no discipline whatever. Colonel Burn advocates the restoration of punitive powers to commanding officers without reference to station and divisional commanders, and that for some time to come we must establish the old and inflexible maxim of Roman discipline, that "a good soldier should dread his officers far more than the enemy."

Major-General Birch conceives "that the greatly extended powers granted to officers commanding regiments by the Articles of War as now in force, must have had at least a beneficial tendency on the discipline of regiments, and that when such has not been the case, the fault lies with the officers themselves."

QUESTION 4.

What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the influence of captains or officers in charge of companies?

There is a pretty general concurrence that the diminution of the influence of captains or officers in command of companies led to the result that the sepoy lost respect for them, and that the officers lost zeal, so that the effect was necessarily bad. Some observe that the result depended more upon the individual character of the officers than upon anything else, as they had little or no real power. Others that the effect was to convey to the adjutant and havildar-major the authority and influence which officers commanding companies ought to possess; or, that if less affected by the centralization system than commanding officers, it told through the latter on the officers in command of companies. Some say it produced want of sympathy with the men, dislike to the service, and an incessant desire to escape from the irksomeness of regimental duty by leave, staff employ, the invalids, or retirement from the service. Others again assign it as a main cause, among others, of the loss of our army.

Colonel Burn observes, that captains and officers commanding companies have complained much of late years of want of power to reward or punish; but that the commanding officer, to be of real use, must be supreme, and should command through the captains of companies, vested with such authority as he may think right to delegate to them.

Major-General Birch does not think that there has been any perceptible alteration in the influence of officers commanding companies.

QUESTION 5.

Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps? Upon the distinct authority of head quarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in command of companies, and of the commanding officer of the regiment?

There is a general assent, that "the discipline of the regiment must mainly depend upon the influence of the commanding officer, and of the officers commanding companies," as stated by the Commander-in-Chief; and Brigadier Coke, after expressing himself to the same effect, observes, that "the reasons that corps have so seldom if ever mutinied on service are, that the pernicious influence of head quarters is then partially in abeyance. Commanding officers then take some of the requisite power into their own hands, and men are punished in a manner commensurate with their offences. Although the powers assumed by the commanding officers when on service are not what they ought to be, still they are sufficient to act as a check, and keep men in order."

Colonel Burn considers that the discipline of a corps on service depends entirely on the capacity for command of a commanding officer.

QUESTION 6.

Should the power of commanding officers and of officers in charge of companies be increased or diminished?

The Commander-in-Chief's reply is, "Rather increased than diminished;" and that of the Punjab committee is, "Certainly increased. There seems to have been in this, as in many other particulars of our military policy, a growing forgetfulness of our real position in India, and of our relations to a large mercenary army, evincing itself in an exaggerated protection of the sepoy, and jealous depression of his European officer. Late events have shown that both cannot command; and we would strongly advocate making our own countrymen the depositories of power, as by far the lesser evil. Trust the European officers with power; train them to its exercise; supersede them unhesitatingly if they prove unequal to the trust; and heavily punish them if they abuse it. We may then hope to hear no more of mutiny."

There is not a dissentient opinion as to the necessity of increasing the powers of commanding officers; some would have them supreme, with a power as nearly absolute as possible. Others would have them much increased, as also those of officers commanding companies, and would allow courts-martial only for grave offences. Major-General Birch would give commanding officers the power to reduce and to appoint non-commissioned officers; to inflict summary chastisement with the rattan, not exceeding three dozen strokes; but would not confer the power of summary discharge, reserving such cases for courts-martial; nor would he relax the Government Resolution of the 30th of August 1845, regarding corporal punishment. Dismissals by courts-martial should not, in his opinion, be set aside by errors in proceedings, deficiency of evidence, and the like; no man thus dismissed should ever be restored to a regiment. Major-General Birch is not in favour of rejecting appeals. He would cancel the general order by the Commander-in-Chief of the 16th October 1854. The powers conferred on commanding officers by G. G. O. of the 19th of May 1857, should not, he thinks, be continued beyond the period of disturbance for which it was specially granted. The recommendations of officers, who had been long enough in charge of companies to know their men, should be strictly attended to; and no leave granted without the concurrence of captains of companies.

Sir J. H. Grant.
Sir J. Hearsey.
Oude Committee.
Brig. Coke.
Brig. Troup.
Col. Burn.
Major Williams.
Lt.-Col. Macpherson.
Brig. Steel.
Brig. Farquharson.
Sir S. Cotton.
Major-Gen. Birch.

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QUESTION 7.

What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

The Commander-in-Chief suggests enlarged powers being conferred on commanding officers; that they should have authority to discharge a sepoy, to reduce non-commissioned officers, to confine sepoys for days, with stoppages of pay for the days in confinement, as in the Queen's service, always recording offences and punishments in their regimental orders; that they should be able to refuse furlough; but, above all, that in matters of regimental detail they should be as little interfered with as possible by superior authorities. But that if a regiment were in bad order, and the commanding officer obviously inefficient, the commander-in-chief should be able to deprive him of command at once, and to place an efficient officer in his place. To

the suggestions they have already made, the Punjab committee add, that "the root of all discipline is efficiency of command; and this can only be secured by a persistent course of selection of European officers for the native army. No irregular regiment can be efficient without picked native officers; but these can only be selected and controlled by a good European commandant. It will behove Government therefore to exercise a close and firm supervision over the selection from the European regiments, or otherwise, of officers for the native army; and at first they should only be appointed on probation." They then express the hope that a really efficient staff may, by the establishment of a military college at each presidency, be secured; and the army kept in working order by an "unemployed list" for inefficient officers; and they further recommend the introduction into the army of a rule limiting the continuance of an officer's service to 35 years; on completion of which every officer, unless invited to serve longer, must retire. Present incumbents to have five years' notice, but a premium of increased pension to be offered them to go at once. Above all, however, the Punjab committee draw the earnest attention of Government to the necessity of selecting efficient brigadiers and generals of division; and of not allowing those commands which demand faculties both mature and unimpaired to be regarded as mere rewards for length of service. They observe, "The army is, in truth, nothing but an organization of mental and physical force; and it is the last institution in the State in which anything weak or worn can be safely left. From the highest to the lowest every link in the chain of discipline must be equal to the strain it is to bear."

They note the daily relief of guards within the distance of a mile; and the discontinuance of petty guards on detached duty.

Major-General Birch is, similarly with the Punjab committee, of opinion that the main point towards securing improvement of discipline in regiments is that the commanding officers should be selected with reference to qualification for command, and that inefficiency should inevitably lead to removal. Also that adjutants should be most carefully selected. Moreover, that majors should be available for the command of other regiments than their own, when the lieutenant-colonels attached to such corps, or their majors, or senior officer present, were unfit to command. Also that it should be in the power of the commander-in-chief to send officers of all ranks from one regiment to another, to do duty, when occasion required.

The Oude committee likewise make a judicious selection of commanding officers, and the investing them with full powers, flogging included, leading measures for the improvement of discipline.

Both Colonel Burn and Brigadier Farquharson advocate giving commanding officers magisterial powers, as also ample powers to promote, dismiss, inflict corporal punishment, reduce to the ranks; but, says Brigadier Farquharson, such commanding officers must be selected men, and all their acts subject to review by inspectors of native troops, who should be appointed at the rate of one to every fifteen regiments, and who should submit periodical reports to commander-in-chief and heads of local government of provinces, in order that the latter may be acquainted with the tone and feeling of native troops in the province. Brigadier Coke would also have the commanding officer invested with magisterial powers to try his men for all crimes, murder excepted; which crime should be committed to the sessions, the commanding officer to have full powers to reward, promote, punish, reduce to ranks, discharge unfit men. He would have no Articles of War, no oath; the standing orders of the army and the field exercise being all that is necessary for drill and discipline; but separate standing orders for Seikhs, Puthans, Hindoostanees. Plain rules for drawing the pay of officers and men, "so as, if possible to protect the army from the injustice of the audit office, which has been the cause of greater disgust to the army than any other establishment in India."

Brigadier Troup observes that a system of discipline should be adopted which would show the soldier that his commanding officer had the confidence of his superiors. He would have rules, few, clear, and simple, altered as seldom as possible, and the same for every regiment, "such as to ensure an uniform rate of pay in all situations, and pensions claimable after prescribed periods of service; certain and speedy punishment awardable by the commanding officer, modified only by his own known good character; leave and promotion given by the regimental roster, except where his bad character or his qualifications should deprive him of the indulgence and reward; instruction in reading, writing, arithmetic, well grounded and not superficial; a clear understanding of all that is required of him; a knowledge that while his conscientious

"scruples would not be interfered with, he must on taking and while he retains the service of his masters act as a soldier, and make his prejudices bend to the requisitions of the service. At present the pay and audit rules are so complicated that no one understands them; the pensions are claimable only on the medical opinions of perfect strangers; punishments and rewards are uncertain; and from their general ignorance they cannot understand what is required of them; and find that many of their European officers are quite ignorant of their manners and customs, and can therefore be easily imposed upon, or demand of them what they have been told shall never be required, duties which make them outcasts at their homes."

Sir J. Hearsey advocates full powers to commanding officers to punish and reward, and to captains of companies with consent of the commanding officer.

Sir J. Hope Grant repeats his recommendations that the commanding officer be absolute, seniority system abolished, and caste ignored. Sir S. Cotton is of opinion that real discipline can only be maintained in the native army by the presence of the European soldier, and advises therefore that native corps be always cantoned alongside European corps.

QUESTION 8.

Is the influence of the European officers among native troops greatest in time of peace or in time of war?

There is no difference of opinion upon this point, and all agree that war, which throws men and officers more together, and makes them know each other better, is the time most favourable to the influence of the European officer, and when the latter are most looked to and valued by the sepoy.

QUESTION 9.

What conclusions do you draw as to the course to be pursued with native troops in times of peace, with regard to the strength at which regiments should be maintained, the occupation to be found for them, and the like?

The Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that regiments should not be too strong, that 640 or 700 sepoy is ample for infantry, and 420 or 480 troopers for cavalry; and that if the native army is maintained on such a reduced scale, as is hoped will be the case, the various duties of guards, escorts, and detachments will find it full employment.

The Punjab committee think that 800 privates should be the maximum in time of war for a native infantry regiment; and that in peace it might be gradually reduced to 700 or 600 if the service admitted of it. They note the great political importance of avoiding masses of armed natives, and advocate small corps as best both in the infantry and cavalry. They consider that such corps can only be advantageously employed in instruction drill, regular exercise, guards, and escorts; but would have them constantly handled, and every day under arms, even if only for ten minutes.

Major-General Birch, Brigadier Steel, and Brigadier Coke would employ native corps in time of peace as heretofore, guards, escorts, their own drill and discipline; these occupations will find them enough to do, and save the necessity for enormous establishments. Brigadier Coke does not advocate working native troops at road making or on public works; he is averse to employing soldiers as labourers, except on service. He would have the regiments 800 strong in time of peace, 1000 strong in time of war. Colonel Burn proposes the same strength, and is also opposed to employing native troops on public works, though he considers that in the drilling season the ordinary drill should include the construction of field works, and that no recruit should be dismissed his drill without having gone through a regular course of instruction in the use of the pickaxe and shovel. He thinks that this would remove the prejudice against working in the trenches which existed in the old Bengal army.

Brigadier Troup would never have a native regiment above 800 strong in time of peace; and would employ them in learning or keeping up the knowledge of all the duties required of European soldiers; of reading, writing, and arithmetic in one or other of the vernacular languages; of scaling, and the duties of sappers and miners, and in furnishing military guards; the police taking all civil duties; and guards, and escorts.

The authorities noted in the margin advocate the enlistment with a stipulation to labour and that native troops should, in time of peace, be employed on public works, such as roads, lines, &c. Sir J. H. Grant, Sir J. Hearsey, would have the corps 800 strong in time of peace. Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson, 640 strong and the Oude committee would keep them at a minimum

of strength, and work them well. Major Williams would also keep the native corps at a minimum in time of peace, and employ them in duties which European troops cannot undertake. He remarks that the military police, with fewer men, have done double the amount of work the native army formerly accomplished.

QUESTION 10.

Has the strength of the native infantry of the Bengal army ever been so great in times of peace that it might have been in part employed otherwise than on mere military duties?

The Commander-in-Chief replies that it is not believed to have been equal to more than the performance of its military duties, but that this arose, not from necessary employment, but from the innumerable and most unnecessary guards and escorts required to be given by regiments.

Major-General Birch considers that the strength of the native infantry has for a long time past been scarcely adequate to the duties required of it. Sir J. H. Grant also holds the opinion that it was never too strong for what it had to perform, and Colonel Burn is of the same opinion. Sir S. Cotton, too, holds that, with due consideration to the efficiency of the army, it could not have been otherwise employed. Brigadier Coke, after giving it as his opinion that the native infantry was not by any means too strong, says:—"I think, as before stated, it might well have been employed in police duties; but since the extension of our empire, and the triennial change of station, which I consider unnecessary, I think our native army has been rather over than under worked, and that this, to a considerable extent, rendered the service less popular than it formerly was, when our empire was of smaller extent. To march a regiment from Peshawur to Barrackpore is a serious undertaking, and puts men to a very considerable expense."

Brigadier Farquharson thinks that the men had too little to do at some stations; and Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson is of opinion that at the larger military stations they might have been employed otherwise than on mere military duties. So, too, Brigadier Steel, who would have it a condition of enlistment that men were to work, and who traces reluctance to work to the reduction of the batta, which in our earlier campaigns was given for labour in the trenches. Sir J. Hearsey, like Brigadier Farquharson, adverts to the frequently great strength of the native infantry corps, and considers that men could have been spared for work, but he notes the numerous guards, escorts, &c., detrimental to discipline, and a consequent necessity of perpetual re-drilling of the men returned from detached duty, where they had been neglected.

Of those holding the like opinion, that the native infantry might have been put to other employment, the Punjab committee remarks, that it would have been against the prejudices of the sepoy to do anything but military duty; and Brigadier Troup considers their employment otherwise than on military duties as highly objectionable.

QUESTION 11.

Would it have been practicable to employ the troops upon public works?

The Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that, as the army was constituted, it would not have been practicable, and also that it is not desirable to have a native army of such strength as that it can spare men for public works; and shows, taking a most favourable case, that a regiment of 640 sepoy, without a man on leave, will only have 392 men in the lines to relieve, at least estimate, 90 on guard.

The Punjab committee answer "No; the men would have mutinied. In time of war they will throw up field works, but even then they do not like it." Major-General Birch also thinks that it would not have been practicable; and Brigadier Coke states that the late Bengal army would (in his opinion) have mutinied had they been ordered to labour at public works. So, too, Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson, who says, that undoubtedly it would have been practicable had not the Bengal army been in a state of chronic mutiny, and certain to resist any attempt to make them labour. He adverts to a scheme published by Colonel J. Hodgson, for the employment of the native army on public works, one which some few officers might have succeeded in carrying out, but which, according to general conclusion, would have caused an outbreak.

The authorities who are of opinion that, under a proper system, making it a stipulation of enlistment, abolishing existing rules and custom, and working the men under their own officers, the employment of native troops upon public works is a practicable measure, are given in the margin.

Sir J. H. Grant.
Sir J. Hearsey.
Oude Committee.
Brig. Farquharson.
Lt.-Col. Macpherson.

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Sir J. Hearsey.
Sir S. Cotton.
Sir J. H. Grant.
Oude Committee.
Brig. Troup.
Major Williams.

QUESTION 12.

In apportioning European officers to native troops,—

1. Should native corps have a full complement of European officers according to the present scale, besides a full complement of native commissioned officers;—or,
2. A full complement of European officers and no native commissioned officers;—or,
3. A smaller number of European officers than at present, and a full complement of native officers?

The Commander-in-Chief and the Punjab committee refer to the answers given to No. 16 of the infantry paper, No. 3, on "Organization, Promotions, and Rewards." Major-General Birch also refers to a previously recommended scale, in which the abolition of the grades of native officers and the appointment of two sergeants to each company were conditions, the strength of European officers, besides the field officers, being six captains, six lieutenants, and four ensigns.

Brigadier Steel, Colonel Burn, and Sir J. H. Grant, advocate the first system or scale. Colonel Burn, for his service corps only; his reserve or police battalion being upon No. 3 scale.

Those who advocate No. 2 scale are Sir S. Cotton and Sir J. Hearsey for the regulars; for irregulars they propose No. 3 scale.

The advocates for the third scale are, Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson, with an increase to the number of grades of native officers; Brigadier Farquharson, in connexion with his proposal for auxiliary corps officered from their European battalion; Brigadier Coke, who, in addition to the commandant, second in command, adjutant, and quartermaster, would have from three to five officers doing duty, but all mounted, and would hold the two native officers to each company responsible for the conduct of their men; Major Williams, Colonel Berkeley, and the Oude committee.

QUESTION 13.

If a full complement of European officers, would you attach cadets at once to a native corps, or first to European corps?

In the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, "all cadets should do duty with a European corps for at least a year before joining native troops. A longer period, perhaps, would be better."

The Punjab committee would also keep cadets with European corps till they have thoroughly learnt their duty. The authorities who advocate this course are noted in the margin. Among these Sir J. Hearsey says:—"Never, for the future, allow your cadets or young European officers to be placed under the instruction of natives of any grade. Young officers, on arriving in India, ought to be attached either to Queen's regiments or to the Honourable Company's regiments of European infantry, and they should not be allowed to join a native corps until they were taught, and were *au fait* in all the duties required to be attained by an accomplished subaltern of the army. A perfect knowledge of company drill, of the use of the English rifle, sword exercise, fencing, *single-stick*, and *horsemanship*."

Colonel Burn also proposes a cadet college at Hazareebaugh, or at the nearest hill station, for a European regiment.

Sir S. Cotton would attach cadets to regiments in England, in the Mediterranean, and after a year's training send them on to India. The Oude committee would have no cadets in India, but would train them in England. If, however, in India, would form them with European corps.

Brigadier Coke would send cadets, on first arrival in India, to a college, such as Roorkee, on 200 rupees per mensem, where they should be kept until they passed their examination, whether for the infantry or the cavalry. He notes the nature of the examination and the athletic training that cadets should pass through, and he expresses the opinion that half the young officers of the army, on their first arrival in the country, contract habits of indolence, if not worse, which unfit them for the service of the State in after-life.

In conclusion, with the cavalry training he dwells on the opportunity for drilling the four newly embodied corps of cavalry after the principles laid down in Captain Nolan's book, and the necessity for making these light troopers individually expert horsemen, skilful in the use of their arms, and efficient for long-sustained and destructive pursuits.

Brigadier Steel takes a different view from any of the foregoing, being of opinion that nothing can be more disadvantageous than the attaching cadets for any length of time to European regiments, where they acquire ideas and opi-

nions derogatory to the native army, a thing not desirable when they are to serve with that army. Brigadier Troup is also of opinion that cadets, on arrival, should at once be posted to the native corps to which they are to belong. Major-General Birch advises the same course, and considers that if eventually posted to a European regiment the cadet will not have lost time by doing duty at first with a good native regiment, whilst, if to be at last posted to a native regiment, the sooner he begins to serve with one the better, that he may, as soon as possible, know the men and their language.

QUESTION 14.

If a smaller number of European officers is assigned to native corps, how would you train them for this special employment?

The Commander-in-Chief would have them "learn their military duty as officers of companies with a European regiment. Their subsequent complete training should be with natives."

The Punjab committee would send every cadet for two years to a European regiment. After that time, if an officer wished to qualify himself for a native corps, or any other staff appointment, the would send him, provided he had passed an examination in Hindoostanee, to the military college, there to go through a course of study in vernacular languages and professional knowledge. Two years to be the time allowed for passing through the college, after which the students to return to their regiments, their respective qualifications and fitness being reported to Government; and the latter could then select as many as were wanted for staff employ. Those assigned to native corps to "do duty" on probation for one year, after which they could either be permanently posted, transferred to some other department, or remanded to the European regiment. Should there be no college, there would be no better way than to send an officer, after two years with a European regiment, to do duty with a native corps.

Brigadier Farquharson would, after training with European corps, attach European officers at their own request, if competent and selected, to do duty with native battalions. Major Williams the same.

Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson considers that with the professional knowledge they would acquire in European regiments and a knowledge of the languages, the officers would not necessarily require any further special training; and he observes, naming Colonel Edwardes, C.B., the late Major Hodson, Major Daly, and others, that some of our best irregular officers have been drawn from our European regiments.

The Oude committee would select the officers for native corps from full European regiments.

Brigadier Steel and Major-General Birch would train them by attaching them to native troops from the first, as before stated.

Brigadier Troup hopes that the assigning a smaller number of European officers to native corps may never occur.

QUESTION 15.

Is the efficiency of regiments affected by the number of officers taken from corps for staff employment?

In reply to this question, the Commander-in-Chief states that the efficiency of regiments has been grievously affected from this cause; and in this opinion many concur, stating, Lt.-Col. Macpherson, that the best men were taken and the

native officers were useless or worse; that although it is the quality of the European officers, not their numbers, that is of use in *aweing* and governing the native mind, yet that under the present system the efficiency is impaired by so many selected officers being withdrawn, and by every officer not withdrawn from his regiment being rendered a discontented and dissatisfied man. Others merely remark that efficiency has undoubtedly been very materially affected from the above cause.

Brigadier Steel is of a different opinion, and thinks that, except in the field, where leaders are required to give native troops confidence, the efficiency of regiments has not suffered.

Major-General Birch also thinks that efficiency is not affected by the withdrawal of officers for staff employ, for that it is a well-known fact that a regiment well commanded will be quite as efficient with a few officers, as a regiment indifferently commanded with a larger number of officers; and he instances the Kelat, Ferozepoor, and Sirmoor battalions.

The Punjab committee reply:—"No, it was not the paucity of officers, but the bad system which ruined the regiments. As a general remark, the officers taken for the staff were not superior (*when taken*) to those left, though they usually became so by more active employ-

"ment in a sphere which gave more scope for exertion and discretion. The few officers left with the line regiments ought, under any other system, to have found more to do, and more call upon their faculties, more room for usefulness. But the more companies they got charge of, the more they saw that they had no power and that all authority, and hope, and fear centred in the adjutant and adjutant-general. Thus they lost heart, and retrograded, rather than advanced in zeal and efficiency."

QUESTION 16.

Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies, between the conduct of regiments with few, and those with many European officers present?

The Commander-in-Chief replies that the officers generally seemed to have more "esprit du corps" when many were with the regiment; but that the sepoys had made up their minds to rise, and that neither the number of officers nor the efficiency of commanding officers appear to have affected the course they took one way or other. So likewise the Punjab committee answer:—"No; the mutiny seems to have been quite irrespective of the number of officers." The opinion of Major-General Birch is to the same effect, and that if the influence of European officers has kept any regiment from mutiny, it has been that of the commanding officer, or the adjutant, or some highly respected and efficient officer in the corps. The unanimous

Oude Committee.
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Sir S. Cotton.
Brig. Coke.
Brig. Troup.
Brig. Steel.
Brig. Farquharson.
Major Williams.

opinion is, in short, that there was no difference whatever; and Brigadier Troup remarks that on the present system the number of officers was quite immaterial, as they had no influence. Sir J. Hearsey points out that all the contingents revolted as well as the regular troops, and that it was a general movement among the soldier class of Hindoostan, intended to have been simultaneous, and to have crushed the British power in India. That the object was to throw off the dominion of a foreign race, and then to sell their services to the highest native bidder; but certainly to a Hindoo ruler. Brigadier Steel observes that until the recent crisis, promotion, allowances, or the infringement of any usage on such points have been the cause of dissatisfaction in the Bengal army. He adverts to a curious circumstance in these words:—"The orders of General Wemyss for the Bengal volunteers to attend church in Ceylon in 1805, did not cause any open discord. They attended twice before the officers got the order cancelled. The attendance of detachments of 39 corps, each with an officer, at Umballa, 20 at Sealkote, and 12 at Dum Dum, for rifle practice, and their dispersal to their several regiments, caused a union of action that could not have otherwise occurred, combined with the proceedings at head quarters on the subject."

Sir S. Cotton, after stating that as the officers had little or no control over their men, the numbers of European officers made no difference, adds, that the case is widely different in action, where there is no comparison, between the conduct of native regiments with few and those with many European officers; a fact that has not only come under his own observation, but has been remarked in all our campaigns; and that without them, in action, a native regiment becomes a disorderly rabble more dangerous than useful.

QUESTION 17.

How can the demand of European officers for staff and detached employment be best provided for, without injuring the efficiency of regiments?

The Punjab committee advocate the general gradation list for the army of each presidency proposed by Brigadier-General Jacob, C.B., (see p. 207,) with some modifications, chiefly in his scale of employed and unemployed pay. The Punjab committee propose considerable lower rates of pay for generals and lieutenant-generals, so as to remove the inducement to remain too long in the country. They also add a third rate, or "subsistence allowance" of exactly one-half the "unemployed" scale; this is proposed for officers who from any reason of incapacity or vice, are thoroughly inefficient, yet cannot be brought under the lash of a court martial.

After touching upon the status of the medical officers of the army, and proposing a new table of precedence, the Punjab committee signify their dissent from the proposal of Brigadier-General Jacob that "a distinct and separate civil service be abolished." They also would modify the proposal made by Brigadier-General Jacob, with regard to candidates for the Indian service being educated at a military college in England, by proposing that half the appointments be direct, and that all be obtained by competition,

those to the college on entrance, and the direct ones on appointment to the army. They would have a senior military college established in India for completing the military training of staff officers.

In the opinion of the Punjab committee, "the general gradation list secures that degree of conservatism and equal promotion which must ever be popular with the majority of any service. The principles of selection for employment secures for Government the abilities of its best servants in the most important posts, and throws open the highest offices to emulation, industry, and ambition; while the three gradations of pay enable Government to deal effectively with delinquents, without absolutely ruining them, and will thereby carry public opinion along with such decisions. The junior and senior military colleges ensure the means of obtaining a sound professional education to every officer who desires to acquire it. The modified system of brevet, while increasing the inducements to render gallant service, provides a check upon the abuse of the prerogative, and diminishes the risk of unjust supercession. On the whole a scientific and effective staff will be produced, without depriving the line of its officers, or the officers of hope."

The Commander-in-Chief proposes having an unattached list for the staff; an expedient in which, under various modifications, the officers noted marginally, also find a remedy for the objections raised to the existing systems.

Colonel Burn would have all officers not employed on purely military duty removed on appointment to the staff, and their places in corps filled up in the ordinary manner. He would divide the staff corps into grades like other regiments, and would give promotion in it after fixed periods of service. No officers under any circumstances to remain on the effective branch of the army after 40 years' service. Colonels removed to the non-effective branch to receive a non-effective allowance (in lieu of the colonel's allowance)

of 300*l.* a year, this sum to be given in addition to the pension, and to be subscribed for by the officers themselves, by the payment of a fee or donation on promotion to each higher grade, as in the military fund. In order to prevent any undue pressure on the finances of the State, the removals during the first few years to be limited in number. Colonel

Burn thinks that this would in time relieve the army "of the old Indian lieutenant-colonels," to whom Sir Charles Napier ascribes the inefficiency of the regular corps of the Bengal army.

Sir J. H. Grant would have deputy assistant adjutant-generals, deputy judge advocates-general, and majors of brigade filled up by selected regimental officers. All other staff appointments by officers from a staff corps.

Brigadier Steel, besides a staff corps, proposes the alternative of having ten captains with a suitable proportion of lieutenants and ensigns to each regiment. Brigadier Troup also suggests the remedy of adding to each corps. He combines with this that no officer be taken for staff employment until he has served not less than five years, exclusive of absence on leave, with his regiment; and then only with the concurrence of his commanding officer.

Major-General Birch remarks that the question implies an affirmative answer to the 15th question, to which on the contrary he has given an answer in the negative. He is of opinion that the detaching of officers to the extent demanded for staff employment by no means necessarily impairs the efficiency of regiments; that there should be a limited number, below which a regiment should not be allowed to fall; and that with two sergeants per company it would suffice that besides the commanding officer, the adjutant, and the quartermaster, three captains and three subalterns should be present. He is, however, of opinion that much might be done to relieve the pressure on regiments by the employment of uncovenanted persons and of officers who have retired from the service, but would often be too glad to return to India for employment.

QUESTION 18.

Would it be advantageous to the efficiency of the officers of the army, to cut off the inducement which the hope of staff employment affords to young men, to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches useful to the State?

The Commander-in-Chief replies:—"No, and it is presumed the State must have officers for special employment. There is no other sufficient source of supply open; certainly not on the same terms."

Sir J. Hope Grant.
Sir S. Cotton.
Sir J. Hearsey.
Brig. Farquharson.
Brig. Steel.
Col. Burn.
Major Williams.
Oude Committee.
Col. Berkeley.

Ensign,	3 years.
Lieut.,	8 "
Capt.,	9 "
Major,	5 "
Lt.-Col.,	7 "
Total	32 "

On promotion	Rs.
To Lieut.	100
To Capt.	500
To Major	2,500
To Lt.-Col.	4,400
To Colonel	10,000
Total	17,500

The Punjab committee are of opinion that nothing could be more depressing and injurious to the officers of the army than to cut off the inducements to study furnished by the hope of staff employ. In this view Major-General Birch's opinion concurs, but he anticipates great service to the army by the establishment of a higher test prior to obtaining commissions in the army. In short, all are unanimous in the disadvantage which must arise to the service from cutting off the hope which frequently forms the inducement to qualify; but at the same time consider that the various schemes and modifications of staff corps proposed do not strike at this source of exertion. Thus, Sir S. Cotton is of the opinion that if the army be reorganized in the way he proposes, and the commands and staff appointments filled by selected officers in the manner he suggests, there should be sufficient inducement in the army itself for officers to acquire a knowledge of languages and of professional studies. He condemns the present system as depriving the army of its best and most intelligent officers for civil and other duties, which he considers totally opposed to their own profession. Sir J. Hearsey, Colonel Burn, Brigadier Troup, Brigadier Coke, all refer to their several suggestions and systems as not open to the objection of removing a spur to study and qualification.

The Oude committee would strike off officers when they left for civil employ.

QUESTION 19.

Would the standard of acquirements amongst the officers of the army at large be lowered by any measure having such a tendency?

The Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that it probably would, as there would then be no inducement for officers to obtain proficiency in many branches of knowledge in which they now qualify themselves. The Punjab committee ask how it could be otherwise, as few men pursue knowledge for its own sake alone. Major-General Birch says it assuredly would; in which view Brigadiers Troup, Steel, and Farquharson and Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson concur; as also Colonel Burn in nearly the same words as the Punjab committee. So, too, Sir J. H. Grant, Colonel Berkeley, and the Oude committee think the tendency of any such measure unfavourable; and Sir J. Hearsey observes that too much encouragement cannot be held out to officers to qualify themselves for staff situations, and that the opening should be left wide. He adds, "Sir Charles Napier, in conversation with me, said 'the European officers of the Bengal army made the best, most excellent staff officers, but their regiments ought not to be left with such few regimental European officers, for it made the native officers of opinion they could do just as well without European officers altogether,' and I deem the late Sir Charles Napier to have been a most unprejudiced and competent judge on that head."

Brigadier Coke considers that according to his proposed system the general standard of acquirements would be very much raised. Major Williams says:—"Any officer who loves his profession would seek to qualify himself for the higher positions attainable in it. Those who only strive to excel, in hope of gaining staff employ, would not much benefit the State either in that position or with their regiments." Sir S. Cotton is of opinion, "that the cutting off the hope of employment in the civil departments would improve the standard of military acquirements and general efficiency of officers, whereas he considers that the present encouragement afforded by civil employ to take up appointments for which they are not qualified, unsettles the minds of officers, and unfits them for their ordinary military duties."

SCHEME for the RE-ORGANIZATION of the INDIAN ARMY, by BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN JACOBS, C.B., &c., &c. (referred to in Answer to Q. 17, p. 206.)

THE Queen of England formally to assume the style and title of Empress of India, and to be proclaimed accordingly.

The armies of the several Indian Presidencies to be henceforth styled the Royal Armies of India.

In each of these armies, the whole of the European officers of the cavalry and infantry, and the European officers of the artillery and engineers above the rank of colonel, to be formed into one general gradation list, in which, under ordinary circumstances, all will rise by seniority.

Rank in this list to be the only permanent rank, all regimental and other rank being temporary only, and to continue only so long as officers may be serving with regiments, or be otherwise employed in a military capacity.

In case of officers being promoted for good service, &c., by the Queen, they are to take their places in the general gradation list, according to the dates of their promotions, and are to enjoy every advantage exactly as if they had risen to such places by seniority only. This general gradation list to be styled the "unemployed list." All the officers borne on it who may hold no special ap-

pointments will reside in India at such places as Government may direct, but will have no public functions to perform.

A fourth presidency, to be styled the North-West Presidency, and a fourth army to be formed; our present Bombay and Bengal armies together being divided into three equal parts for this purpose.

Ultimately, the whole establishment of European officers may probably be somewhat less than at present; but under the proposed arrangements, the number of officers in the whole general list of each army can readily be adjusted in practice to meet the demands of the public service; when these shall have been correctly ascertained, no further changes will probably be requisite.

For an army of the strength of the present army of Bombay, the following establishment might be proper:—

Battalions or Regiments.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Captains.	Lieutenants.
5 Artillery -	5	10	50	50
4 Engineers -	4	8	40	40
3 Cavalry -	3	6	30	30
33 Infantry -	33	66	330	330
45	45	90	450	450

Generals - - - 5
Lieut.-Generals - - 10
Major-Generals - - 15
The ranks of Major and Ensign to be abolished.

The several ranks of officers while unemployed in India, to receive pay as follows:—

	Rs.
General - - -	1,500 per mensem.
Lieutenant-General - - -	1,200 "
Major-General - - -	1,000 "
Colonel - - -	600 "
Lieutenant-Colonel - - -	400 "
Captain - - -	300 "
Lieutenant - - -	200 "

These rates of pay to be allowed to officers wherever residing, by permission, in India, and the like number of pounds per annum to be allowed to each when absent from India on leave to Europe or elsewhere.

The option of retiring on full pay of the rank attained to in the general list to be allowed after 30 years, and on half pay after 20 years.

Leave of absence to be granted at the discretion of the local governments.

Subscriptions to military and all other funds to cease to be compulsory.

A distinct and separate civil service to be prospectively abolished. Officers while unemployed or employed in civil capacities are not to be in any way subject to the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the army, or to military rule or etiquette.

All candidates appointed to the Indian service to be educated at a military college in England, and to reside at such college for at least two years, and not more than four years.

The minimum age for admission to be fourteen, and the maximum eighteen years.

The course at the college to include full instruction in mechanical and in physical science generally, and in political economy, also riding, rifle practice, and hardy exercises.

The residence at the college to be free of all pecuniary charge to the cadet, unless he decline proceeding to join the service in India in due course, in which case—to cover all cost to the State—he should pay at the rate of 100l. per annum for the period during which he has resided at college.

From the general list formed as above mentioned, officers are to be selected for every species of public employment, civil and military.

For each native infantry regiment, the establishment of English officers may be as follows:—

	Pay.
1 Colonel - - -	600 Rs. per mensem.
1 Lieutenant-Colonel - - -	400 "
2 Captains (to be each Adjutant and Quartermaster)	300 "

The pay assigned to each being in every case staff pay, to be drawn in addition to the pay due to each according to his rank in the general list. But though an officer may hold a lower rank in the general list than that which is assigned to his position in a regiment or other military employment, the temporary rank is always to hold good for precedence and command during the period of employment.

For the cavalry, the like establishment of officers may be allowed, with one hundred rupees extra pay to each rank, to cover the cost of horses and other expenses:

	Staff Pay.
For a brigade of any strength:—	
1 Major-General - - -	1,000 Rs. per mensem.
1 Captain, Major of Brigade - - -	400 "
For a Division:—	
1 Lieutenant-General - - -	3,000 "
1 Lieut.-Colonel, Adjutant-General - - -	400 "
1 Lieut.-Colonel, Quartermaster-General - - -	400 "
1 Captain, A.D.C. - - -	300 "
1 Major-General, Adjutant-General of the army - - -	1,500 "
1 Major-General, Quartermaster-General - - -	1,500 "
1 Colonel, Deputy Adjutant-General - - -	500 "
1 Colonel, Deputy Quartermaster-General - - -	500 "

Proper office establishment, &c., to be allowed to commanding and staff officers; company and troop allowances and contracts as usual.

All officers, when absent on leave beyond the division in which they may be serving, are to receive unemployed pay only, and if other officers act for them when absent, even within the division, otherwise than on duty, the officer acting for the absentee is to receive his staff pay in addition to his own.

Officers of the rank of captain in the general list are to be considered eligible for selection to fill any of the regimental ranks or other appointments. Lieutenants on the general list are not to be considered eligible for higher regimental or other military appointments than that of lieutenant-colonel.

At their own request, and with the approval of the regimental commanding officers, any unemployed officers may be attached to do duty with regiments or departments without extra pay.

The recommendations of officers commanding regiments, with respect to the appointment of officers to fill vacancies in their corps, or to their removal therefrom to the unemployed list in consequence of proved incapacity, &c., are to be attended to. All enlistments, discharges, promotions to and reductions from all ranks of native officers and soldiers, are to rest with the colonels of regiments, and are to be signified by them, with reasons, &c., if necessary, in regimental orders.

Articles of War for native Indian troops to be entirely abolished. Colonels commanding native Indian regiments are to have full magisterial authority over all ranks of natives of India in their regiments, followers as well as soldiers. Such powers to extend to the award and infliction of imprisonment, with hard labour, for a period of seven years, without the confirmation of higher authority being required; to imprisonment for fourteen years, subject to the confirmation of the general officer commanding the brigade; to transportation and capital punishment, subject to the confirmation of the general officer commanding the division.

Regimental lieutenant-colonels and captains are likewise to exercise magisterial powers under the control of the colonels commanding their regiments, and to such extent as he may think proper to authorize.

In all cases involving the award of a graver punishment than three months' imprisonment with hard labour, the infliction of corporal punishment above twenty-five lashes, or of a fine above fifty rupees, regular proceedings of the trials are to be recorded in full, to be laid before the general officer commanding, when required.

Cases of less serious nature may be dealt with summarily, on due investigation by the commanding officer at public regimental orderly room. A record of all such proceedings is to be entered in a proper book kept for that purpose, and preserved among the regimental records, for the inspection of general officers.

Colonels of regiments are to be held strictly and solely responsible to their superior officers and to the State, but not to the native Indian soldiers, for the propriety of all such proceedings.

Permanent head quarters to be established for each native Indian regiment, and complete carriage for every corps to be always kept up ready for a march, at a day's warning.

For the European infantry, the establishment of officers per regiment may be:—

	Rs.
1 Colonel	600 per mensem
2 Lieut.-Colonels, each	400 "
10 Captains	300 "
1 Adjutant	300 To rank above the
1 Quartermaster	300 Lieutenants.
10 Lieutenants	200 per mensem.

The officers of artillery and of engineers each to be borne in a separate list up to the rank of colonel, inclusive, and thereafter to be incorporated in the general list of the whole army, the senior colonel of artillery or engineers, when senior in the army, being promoted to major-general as vacancies may occur.

Unemployed pay to be the same for all arms.

Employed pay, whether regimental or ordnance, &c., to be allowed as for the cavalry.

Each battalion of artillery to have field officers and staff as for an European regiment, the numbers of captains and lieutenants being adjusted according to circumstances, to the number absent on leave, and the number required for the ordnance department, and other artillery staff duties. All artillery officers in India to be considered as "employed" when not on leave.

In the ordnance department, the rank and pay of the various grades to be adjusted as follows:—

Senior Commissary	as Colonel.
Senior Deputy Commissary	as Lieutenant-Colonel.
Commissaries of Division	as Captains.
Assistant Commissaries	as Lieutenants.
Commandant of Artillery—Major-	Rs.
General	1,100 per mensem.
Major of Brigade—Captain	500 "
Inclusive of horse allowance.	

No difference of pay between horse and foot artillery.

Engineer officers attached to the engineer corps, or holding other military appointments, to be on the same footing as artillery officers; but the duties of engineer officers in India are generally purely civil, and their salaries, &c. should be adjusted specially for each appointment.

In all appointments other than military, officers will receive their unemployed military pay, in addition to such emolument as may be assigned to them in their civil capacities; and when absent on leave, or on any account other than public duty, beyond the range of their immediate superior, they will receive only the unemployed rates of pay.

JOHN JACOB.

APPENDIX No 72.

PRÉCIS OF REPLIES ON SUBJECT OF IRREGULAR CAVALRY.

IRREGULAR CAVALRY, BENGAL ARMY.

I.—RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army is composed?

Sir J. H. Grant. "The irregular cavalry is composed chiefly of Mahomedans of various tribes and races.

Major Daly. "In the early days of its formation, the nobles and chiefs of tribes brought their retainers into the field, and thus troops and regiments were raised. Gradually this has changed, and though the service still has attractions for men of mark, as all have to pass through the ranks to position, these have decreased. The Rajpoots were formerly in greater numbers than now, though there are still some to be found, and a few Brahmins."

Brig. Christie. "Thaiks, Synds, Moguls, Pathans, Rangurs (Rajpoot Mussulman), Rohillas, Jats, Affghans, Rajpoots, Brahmins, and Sikhs a few."

Punjab Committee on Punjab Irregular Cavalry. "Hindoostannes from round about Delhi (like the rest of the irregular cavalry), Pathans of the Trans-Indus and Affghanistan, Punjabee Mahomedans, numerous Seikhs, and a few hill men."

Sir J. Cotton. "On the 1st May 1857 the 7th Irregular Cavalry stood as follows:—

Mahomedans, Synds, and Pathans	392
Mahomedan Rajpoots	82
Brahmins	62
Rajpoots	28
Seikhs	20
Hindoos of inferior description	2

Brigadier-General J. Jacob states that the regiments of the Scinde Irregular Horse are chiefly composed of Hindoostanes, mostly Mussulmans of the agricultural and land-holding classes of the districts around Delhi, Furruckabad.

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, or castes drawn from?

Sir J. H. Grant. "Rohilcund has given the best men, perhaps, Mahomedans (Pathans), the descendants and relatives of the men of Eusofyze. Delhi

supplies many sowars, and the least desirable in stamp. Jhuggur, Rhotuck, and Kullinore send forth hundreds, Rajpoots and Ranjhurs, Mahomedan converts, good soldiers, though they need to be commanded. Hurrianah gives its share; some of the best horsemen in the country are found in this district. A great many of Jhujier and Rhotuck men go to the Scinde Horse, tempted by the higher pay."

Brig. Christie. "Hansi, Hissar, Delhi, Boosbundshur, Meerut, Moradabad, Kurnaul, Bareilly, Sir J. Cotton. "Agra, Bhurtapore, Furruckabad, Mynpoore, Shahjehanpore, Putteeala, Loodianah, and a few from about Jullundur and Hoshearapore and Cawnpore and Lucknow, but only in a few regiments."

To the foregoing, the Punjab Committee add the Cis and Trans Indus, Affghanistan, the Punjab generally, and the Cis Sutlej, as sending horsemen to the Punjab Irregular Cavalry.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, either by the regulations or the practice of the service?

"Of late years the demand for irregulars has been such that no man who could manage a horse, and find good security amongst his comrades, has been refused service."

Sir J. H. Grant. Brigadier Christie replies, "No, excepting very low-caste men, who never ask to be entertained."

Sir J. Cotton. Brigadier Bradford says, "Doubtless low castes are excluded, such as Bhungees, Chumars, Bunrahs, and many others."

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom recruits might with advantage be enlisted for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

Sir J. H. Grant. The Jats were, perhaps, neglected on account "of indifferent horsemanship. I am not aware of the exclusion of any warlike class at all familiar with horses."

Brig. Christie. "It would be an advantage to a regiment to have men from Rajpootana Proper, Beckaneer,

"and Shekawatee, and also Mahrattas; but these men would not take service heretofore, as the pay was so very small, and consequently preferred the native service, as there they have plenty of pickings besides their pay."

Brigadier Bradford is not aware that any tribes or castes have been excluded or neglected that could have been enlisted with advantage, and says, it is understood that neither Mahrattas nor Rajpoots of Rajpootana would enlist in our service, as they would not submit to discipline.

Sir S. Cotton thinks that where native Christians can be obtained in sufficient numbers to form a troop, their entertainment would be highly desirable. He states, that sweepers have been tried under the name of Beydur (without fear). The prejudice of the men was too strong, and the "Beydurs" had to be got rid of. Though he does not recommend their being placed with other castes in a regiment, he thinks it might be desirable to have a few regiments of these men, the place of native officers being filled by European serjeants or Europeans of distinction from cavalry corps posted to these native corps as sub-officers.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

Sir J. H. Grant. "Recruiting has been usually carried on through the native officers and men of each corps; they train up their children for the service. No medium could be more efficient. Any native officer or man of family could raise a troop, if need be, in his own district. This was the agency adopted chiefly by officers to whom the raising of corps has been entrusted."

Sir S. Cotton. Brigadier Christie states, that Oomadwars came in numbers to their relations in the regiment, and are enrolled as vacancies occur.

6. On enlistment of recruits for irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts.

Sir J. Grant. Men's names are registered in their own districts, but desertion—ordinary desertion—is rare.

Brigadier Christie states that no precautions of registry are taken.

Sir S. Cotton replies, that the roll of the recruits, with a reference to some man of respectability in his village, is sent to the civil authority for verification and registry.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of troopers, or the followers of cavalry corps, what precautions, if any, are taken?

Sir J. H. Grant. "In irregular corps a list of candidates, the sons and relatives of men who have died or have been killed, or who are still present, is kept, and then pass in as vacancies arise. In some corps this is carried to such an extent that the admission of an outsider is unknown. These candidates or Oomadwars move about with the regiment. Doubtless there are many and great advantages in thus making a corps the home of a family from generation to generation; but there are also disadvantages. The circle from which the supply is drawn is narrow. Class interests obtain to an injurious extent."

Brigadier Christie states, that in his late regiment, the 9th Irregular Cavalry, he made a recruit always furnish two men in the regiment as securities for his respectability and good conduct before entertaining the recruit.

8. What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

Sir J. H. Grant. "I can suggest no alterations in the mode of recruiting. The ranks of the irregulars must be filled up in a great measure for a long time from the Punjab and the Pathans of Eurofzie and the border. There is no sympathy between the Pathan and the Seikh, and the former considers the Punjabee utterly degenerate. There is a fine race of Pathan about Pindee Gabe, in the Rawul Pindee district, who has lately taken service with us."

Brig. Christie. "An increase of pay and pension will bring a superior class of men into the ranks. As it is, a man of good family must be very poor before he takes service on seven rupees a month, which is all a

bhargur gets. On the other hand, if he has two or three hundred rupees, he finds it more profitable to trade with it than purchasing an assamee in a regiment of irregular cavalry, which are in most regiments sold for three or even four hundred rupees each."

Brigadier General J. Jacob would leave everything to the discretion of the regimental commander.

Sir J. S. Cotton would have recruits enlisted for general service. If irregular corps are kept at their present strength, he recommends preserving the counterpoise of castes by enlisting a distinct race for each squadron. He would prefer reducing the irregular corps to a strength of 300 or 350 men, and having such corps wholly of one caste, taking care that a due proportion of such caste be introduced into the service.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

Sir J. H. Grant. "Major Daly, C.B., has raised two corps of irregular cavalry, the 1st Punjab and the 1st Oude Cavalry, and has augmented the corps of Guides, yet he never administered an oath."

Brigadier Christie states, that the form of oath was introduced after he had left the irregular cavalry.

Brigadier Bradford remarks, that it is the same as in the regiments of the line.

Sir S. Cotton states that no oath is at present administered to irregular cavalry.

11. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruit of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army when first enrolled?

Sir J. H. Grant. "I would have no oaths. Oaths have not served to restrain the native army from the utmost brutality. No oath could have strengthened the fidelity of the Guides and Punjab corps; and in these they are not used."

Brigadier-General J. Jacob deems oaths to have the most pernicious effect.

Brigadier Bradford replies: "No; nor can I, after what has occurred, consider that any form of oath would be binding."

Colonel Gall would abolish the custom of administering oaths to recruits.

Sir S. Cotton thinks an oath somewhat similar to that of the infantry might well be introduced for the irregular cavalry.

12. Should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bengal army be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?

13. Or should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bengal army be recruited over a wide area; in fact, without reference to districts?

14. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be homogeneous as to race or caste?

15. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be composed of rissalahs, each of which shall consist of separate tribes or castes; or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in the whole corps?

Sir J. H. Grant and Major Daly think that some corps might be raised with advantage in prescribed districts, but that it is of little importance whether corps or troops be of distinct races; that the efficiency of the regiment in either case would depend on the character and disposition of the commandant; that along the Punjab border we have had much experience of this sort. Some officers have endeavoured to make their corps Pathan; others, again, are imbued with a Seikh fancy; companies and troops of races; and in each case the result was good, because the officers were in earnest.

The Punjab Committee refer to their replies to the Infantry Series, as the same principles are equally applicable to the irregular cavalry; and they add, that they do not put forward their views of counterpoising one race of natives with another as any panacea for all the evils of the old army. "No one remedy, no one principle, of reform or organization will meet the case, and to put any one forward as a charm for ruling native troops would only be empirical. We want a thorough revision of all details, and earnest attention to all defects that have been revealed in the mutiny. Among these defects, unquestionably the worst, and the one which operated most fatally against us, was the brotherhood or homogeneity of the Bengal army, and for that particular defect the remedy is counterpoise: 1st. The great counterpoise of Europeans; 2nd. That of various native races. Had the old Bengal army had all

"the other remedies applied to it ten years ago which we have recommended in these papers for the improvement of its discipline, staff, &c., it would doubtless have been a better army; but if its brotherhood had been left unbroken, unchecked by any adequate European force, and in the unsuspected possession of our magazines, posts, and artillery, it would still have broken bounds like water, at this one weak point, whenever its common prejudices were violently assailed."

Brigadier Bradford observes, that in raising corps from one particular part of the country, and there only, that there is the advantage that it would give the civil authorities greater power to check the enlisting of such corps than they possess at present. He would not have the corps homogeneous, but thinks that the tribes or castes might be kept separate, in rissallahs, for the better arrangement of messing.

Colonel Gall is of opinion that if the men enlisted for a corps be of different religions and different castes, it would be advisable to recruit each corps from a prescribed district, for then there would always exist a certain want of sympathy between regiments composed of men drawn from different districts; and this, added to estrangement produced between man and man by differences of religion and caste, would lessen the probability of combinations for an unlawful object. He would not have the regiments homogeneous, nor let caste prove an obstacle to enlistment in any corps. He would have the tribes and castes mixed up together in the rissallahs.

Brigadier Christie also advocates mixture of races and castes, and objects to recruiting for regiments in prescribed districts; he prefers recruiting over a wide area without reference to districts; but considers that rissallahs of different tribes would be desirable, as one can be pitted against the other in case of disturbances.

Sir J. S. Cotton thinks, that if the present strength of irregular corps be reduced each might be so raised in a prescribed district. If the present strength be retained, then each squadron might be so raised and recruited. He considers that the mutiny has proved the evil of amalgamating castes; and he is in favour, therefore, of having numerous corps or squadrons.

Brigadier-General J. Jacob would leave all such matters wholly to the discretion of the regimental commanders.

16. If the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportions should the races, tribes, or castes enter?

Being opposed to homogeneous corps, Brigadier Christie would have the tribes composing the regiments as nearly equal as they can be procured, though he remarks that the Mussulmans will always preponderate.

In like manner, Brigadier Bradford observes that it would be as well to have in each regiment a couple of rissallahs of Hindoos, or, in the case of Punjab corps, a like number of Mahomedan rissallahs. He adds, however, that he has not much faith that this arrangement would prevent their combining against the state, when inclined to do so.

Sir J. H. Grant and Major Daly strongly advise that distinction of race should be preserved,—that the Sikh troop be Sikh, and the Pathan, Pathan; and they prefer troops of different races for general service to corps of one race.

The Punjab Committee reply to Question 16:—"With reference to the peculiar nature of the Punjab frontier service, we would advocate in the Punjab irregular cavalry the following proportions of races:—

- " 2, Mahomedans,
- " 2, Seikhs,
- " 2, Hindustanees."

Sir S. Cotton thinks the irregular cavalry might be composed of half Hindoos and half Mussulman. The latter, including Trans-Indus, Pathans, Punjabees, and Hindoostanee Mahomedans, the former class consisting of Seikhs and Hindustanee Rajpoots. If native Christians are attainable, he considers it very desirable to have a proportion of them in the irregular cavalry, as well as all other branches.

17. What agency should be employed for recruiting?

18. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality in connexion with recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

Sir J. H. Grant refers to the replies given to Questions 5, 6, 7. The Punjab Committee consider that no change in the present system seems required, all that is necessary being to enforce the existing orders.

Colonel Gall advocates a careful system of registry, not unlike that instituted in the Punjab, and subsequently extended to the Bengal army generally.

Brigadier Christie would make the commanding officer the responsible agent for the recruiting, and advocate registry by the local authorities, and security taken from the head man of the village, if possible.

Sir S. Cotton is of opinion that the irregular cavalry will always be popular as a service, and apprehends no difficulty in recruiting. He considers the present precautions of a verification roll sufficient.

19. Should a troop or squadron of Europeans form a component part of the irregular corps of cavalry of the Bengal army?

20. If so, should such troops or squadrons be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from the European cavalry corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European cavalry corps, and subject to periodical relief?

21. How should the barracks and stables of such isolated European troops or squadrons be placed?

22. Would such detachments of Europeans seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?

23. How should such troops or squadrons of Europeans be armed? with similar or with different weapons from those in the hands of native troopers with whom they would be associated?

The Punjab Committee reply to (Question 19) the question whether a troop or squadron of Europeans should form a component part of the irregular cavalry corps of the Punjab, "No, certainly not, nor of any other regiments in India. The tendency would be to make the natives dragoons, so as to correspond with the Europeans, who would naturally become the model for the whole corps. It is one of the blessings of this crisis that it affords an opportunity of getting rid of the regular native cavalry, which we consider to have been a total misapplication of the European system, a branch of the old army which was at once costly and inefficient; and it would be throwing away all past lessons now deliberately to adopt a plan which would not only give us native dragoons again, but rob us of our irregulars. The experiment, as tried by Sir S. Cotton at Peshawur, was a very valuable one, for it made a few Europeans go a long way at a dangerous time; but the natives associated with them are thorough dragoons, than which nothing can be more foreign to the Asiatic."

Brigadier Bradford does not recommend a troop or squadron forming a component part of a corps of irregular cavalry, and cannot see any advantage to be gained by such a mixture.

Colonel E. Gall thinks it would be inexpedient to bring such a small body of Europeans into too close proximity with native troopers, familiarized with the weak points of the European soldier's character, and confiding in their numerical superiority, the natives might be disposed to take advantage of the Europeans.

Sir J. H. Grant and Major Daly consider that the introduction of a troop or squadron of Europeans would seriously embarrass the moveability and therefore diminish the value of irregular cavalry. In which opinion Brigadier Christie concurs, and deems it unnecessary that a troop or squadron of Europeans form part of a regiment of irregular horse. If the scheme were adopted all three consider that the troop or squadron must be enlisted specially for the purpose.

Sir S. Cotton is also opposed to such a measure, considering it calculated to lead to the deterioration of the European soldier in every respect. He advocates, however, that a squadron of natives be enlisted for service with European corps of cavalry, to save the European soldiers from duties of exposure, such as rear guard on the march, and covering foraging parties.

Brigadier-General J. Jacob replies:—"No. These questions appear to me to be equivalent to asking whether each troop of horse artillery should not have a Lancaster gun of ten tons weight or so attached to it."

24. How should the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be armed?

Sir J. H. Grant. "Every irregular should have a sword, lance, and carbine. He has much detached duty to perform, which necessitates the possession of fire-arms. Picquets, escorts, videttes, moving through hilly and jungle countries without fire-arms, are at the mercy of their enemy. This is well understood on both sides. With their carbine the sowar is treated with respect: without it he feels helpless. This is the general feeling amongst the men. I would have it optional to the man to carry a lance."

Brigadier Bradford and Brigadier Christie would arm the irregular with tulwar and carbine.

Colonel Gall would give native troopers a light carbine loading at the hore; but he would arm one squadron in every corps of irregular cavalry with spears, the shaft of bamboo, the common long hunting-spear called the boar spear. He considers there is no weapon like it in pursuit. He would have Europeans with better fire-arms than those given to the native troopers, and notices the carbine brought out by Her Majesty's 8th Hussars. He advocates wooden scabbards, cased in leather, for the present dragoon sabre.

The Punjab Committee would arm the privates with sword and carbine; native officers and non-commissioned officers with sword and pistol. Picked duffadars and troopers, at the discretion of the commanding officer, might carry spears. Sir S. Cotton thinks nothing can be better than a tulwar and a carbine, the present arms of the irregular cavalry.

26. Do the dress and equipments of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army admit of improvements; if so, state them?

As the Punjab Committee, in reply to this question, touch on the same point to which Colonel Gall adverts, viz., steel scabbards, it is best to give their service-like remarks *in extenso*:—"The Punjab irregular cavalry are very suitably dressed and equipped in a native chupkun, with kummerbund and turband, pijamahs, boots; swords and carbines for privates; and pistols and swords for officers. This requires no alteration. The saddles, however, in some cases require changing. At present some of the men have got charjamuhs, which are excessively hot, and give the horses sore backs. A light kathee, admitting of a native seat, should in these instances be substituted. In the irregular cavalry generally, especially in Hindostan, where rough and ready work is seldom seen, the tendency is to polish, and polish the irregulars into regulars. Few European officers have the free spirit of the irregular; and they tighten everything in the regiment, discipline and clothes, year by year. There is one relic of olden times which it is to be hoped will now be positively forbidden by Government, the steel scabbard of the regulars, which blunts the sword, loads the horse, and by clatter and glitter betrays every movement."

Brigadier Christie, Major Daly, Sir J. H. Grant consider the dress of the irregular cavalry good, though they object to the tendency in some corps to tinsel and trumpery. They recommend that the belts and appointments should be of English manufacture, as those of Indian manufacture fail in the test.

Sir S. Cotton says, that the present dress of the irregular cavalry is not good, taking a long time to put on; and he would substitute the tunic for the akhalik. He remarks, that Nolan's saddle has been tried in the 7th Irregular Cavalry by Colonel Mulester, and found to answer well.

Brigadier-General J. Jacob would leave the arms, dress, and equipments to the discretion of the commanding officers.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the Articles of War now in use in the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

Sir J. H. Grant. I think such alterations necessary in the Major Daly. Articles of War to render them serviceable in the irregular cavalry that I would abolish them altogether, and substitute a few simple rules within the comprehension of all. They have never been used in the Guides and in the Punjab Irregular Force. The general principles only are acted on. In the irregular cavalry a few general rules should suffice, such as the penalties of desertion, disaffection, insubordination, &c. The service is highly popular, and now that the cavalry is likely to be put on a better footing it will become more so. Men riding their own horses give pledges for conduct, and the fear of discharge has a beneficial effect even on the lowest. When a sowar begins to require punishment the best course is to get rid of him."

Brigadier Christie observes, that since the irregular cavalry has been subjected to the Articles of War they have deteriorated very much; and he most earnestly recommends that the old punchayet system be reintroduced, which was invariably found to answer so well.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

He would have nothing to say to the special rules regulating punishment in the regular native army or in the British army either.

Brigadier Bradford considers the Articles of War too complex, and very little understood by native troops, and that offenders not unfrequently escape punishment on mere technicalities. He would therefore substitute a simpler code, and abolish native courts-martial altogether.

The Punjab Committee refer to their corresponding answer in the infantry paper, in which their views and recommendations tally with those of Brigadier Bradford and those preceding.

Colonel Gall would subject native soldiers to all punishments which European soldiers are liable to suffer for grave offences.

Sir S. Cotton recommends the removal of all restrictions, leaving to courts in all cases their full powers, adding 25 lashes to minor punishments (Art. 112), and reduction of non-commissioned officers; also granting to commanding officers power to punish native commissioned officers.

He would have special rules retained, but made much more stringent.

Brigadier General J. Jacob states, that no Articles of War have ever been in use in the Scinde Horse. He would have no special rules, but would leave everything to the discretion of a selected commanding officer.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

The opinion of Sir J. H. Grant and Major Daly is, that the system of courts-martial in irregular corps works well in no respect; in which view Brigadier Christie coincides.

Sir S. Cotton is of the same opinion, as native officers will not uphold discipline; and he expects none to exist in the native army as long as native officers sit in court-martial, and commanding officers have not the power to punish native commissioned officers summarily, and reduce non-commissioned officers to the ranks. He would have trials held only by European officers; two being enough to form a court when there is a scarcity, and in case of a less number than two the commanding officer to possess the full power of a court-martial.

Brigadier General J. Jacob replies that courts-martial are not resorted to in Scinde Horse.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the troopers of the irregular cavalry with the military code under which they serve and are governed?

5. What proportion of the troopers of the irregular cavalry can read and comprehend the Articles of War in their own vernacular?

Sir J. H. Grant and Major Daly reply that portions of the Articles of War are read to the men from time to time. Those who are best acquainted with the articles are generally the scamps, "the lawyers," who boast of their use for evading punishment.

Brigadier Christie states, that in his regiment the old Articles of War which concerned the men were read once a quarter. Very few indeed could read, but all understood them when read and explained to them.

The Punjab Committee state that perhaps 15 per cent. of the Punjab Irregular Cavalry can read.

Sir S. Cotton states, that the Articles of War are read on parade, and that about one man in three can read and comprehend the Articles of War in their vernacular.

Brigadier-General J. Jacob remarks, that the practice in the different irregular cavalry corps of the Bombay army differs very greatly. No code was ever in use in the Scind Irregular Horse since he has commanded the corps, except the regimental orders, and no law thought of except the will of the commander.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

The Punjab Committee state, that in the Punjab irregular cavalry, as in the infantry, the promotion is given to the best men, preference being shown to seniority where possible. They add, "Here we must explain, what should indeed have been added to the corresponding answer in the Infantry Paper that an endeavour has been made though not so steadily persevered in as it might have been to keep up a proportion of *races* among the native officers and non-commissioned officers, as well as among the men of a corps; so that this consideration often decided a promotion."

Sir J. H. Grant believes promotion in the Bengal irregular cavalry was based chiefly on seniority, and remarks, Major Daly, that in the original corps all the commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers are or were very apt men.

Brigadier Christie, on the contrary, considers that the promotion was based on merit.

Sir S. Cotton remarks, that there is no rule that promotion shall be based on seniority; and that the system varies according to the ideas of the commandant for the time, and of the government in the cases of commanding officers.

"In the Scind Horse promotion by merit alone is the rule, and the commandant is the sole judge of such merit."

2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army generally intelligent, useful and efficient?

Sir J. H. Grant and Major Daly reply, that in the Punjab cavalry, where promotion is based on merit, the officers and non-commissioned officers are remarkable for their intelligence and efficiency. The Punjab Committee also answer, that they are certainly so. Brigadier Christie, referring to the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, replies, "Yes, if they are promoted as above (i. e. by merit), and it is the commanding officer's own fault if any but efficient commissioned and non-commissioned officers are promoted. He is of opinion that no man should be promoted to the grade of kote duffadar who is not fit to be promoted to a commissioned officer eventually."

3. Are the acquirements usually of a higher grade than those from the troopers from among whom they have arisen?

The Punjab Committee reply, that in the Punjab irregular cavalry the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers are selected on account of their intelligence and efficiency. Sir J. H. Grant and Major Daly remark, that the native officers of the Punjab cavalry are chiefly men of family and influence; and that the non-commissioned officers selected from the ranks were certainly, as a rule, the best to be found.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

With reference to Question 4, they state they are not aware of any test or examination being in force prior to promotion, nor do they think it would be advisable that there should be any. Brigadier Christie answers, that he never had any test or examination, having been intimately acquainted with the qualifications of all his officers and non-commissioned officers.

Sir S. Cotton states, that a few native commissioned officers who have had rapid promotion, and are in their prime, are intelligent and efficient, but that generally they are illiterate and bigoted men risen by seniority. In the Scind Horse, Brigadier-General J. Jacob thinks the native commissioned officers of the Scind Horse generally very good, within their own sphere of action, equal in efficiency to the average of captains and subalterns of the regular regiments. He notes the examination in drill, in accounts, &c. of men prior to promotion from the ranks.

6. Has it been found on occasions of a mutiny that the native officers have evinced cordial fidelity, given timely information, or been useful in aiding their European officers to check or quell a mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?

The Punjab Commissioners reply, "The only instance we can recollect of mutiny among the Punjab irregular cavalry was a partial one in the 2nd Punjab Cavalry at Delhi. It was confined to the Hindostanee section of the corps, and the three Hindostanee native officers were the ringleaders. The Sikh native officers of the same squadron on this occasion warned the European officers that something was wrong among the Hindostanees, though they had not been admitted to their counsel, and could not say what was meditated. The mutineers made overtures to a Puthan native officer of a Punjab infantry regiment, who immediately gave information, and the ringleaders were hanged on the spot."

Brigadier Christie answers, as a rule, certainly, in the late mutiny, the native officers have not evinced that fidelity which might have been expected from them, nor have they given any information, or aided in quelling the mutiny, and as many, if not more, have gone with the mutineers as have remained faithful.

Brigadier Bradford replies to the same effect.

Sir S. Cotton considers that native officers generally lead and prompt mutineers, pushing the men forward, and keeping in the background themselves.

Brigadier-General Jacob replies, that nothing can have been more noble than the conduct of the men and officers of every grade in the Scinde Irregular Horse, under circumstances of great trial and temptation during the late mutiny and attempted rebellion.

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native trooper to the British service and the British rule?

Sir J. H. Grant and Major Daly reply, that retiring pensions have undoubtedly much attached the people to our service and rule; and they are of opinion that the convulsion from which we are now emerging can hardly be said to prove the contrary. "The swoop was so universal, the presence of Europeans so rare, that they may well be pardoned for thinking the rule at an end." They consider that the pension system should undoubtedly be maintained, though the opportunity should not be lost to modify and amend it; in which latter opinion Brigadier Bradford coincides.

Brigadier Christie says, in answer to Questions 10 and 11, "In former days I thought they had, but from the day of the outbreak they cast all retiring pensions to the winds, as well as the honours conferred for distinguished conduct in the field. For the time they were perfectly demented; but I believe they bitterly repent it now. After the re-organization of the irregular cavalry, I would recommend the system of pensions should be retained; moreover, that the pensions of irregular cavalry should be increased to the same scale as the regular regiments, because they are no longer locals, but liable to move from station to station, the same as the regular troops, and employed in all warlike operations to a great extent; moreover, it is a notorious fact that they are far harder worked than the regular troops, and yet a naick in the latter gets the same pension as a jemadar in the irregular cavalry, viz., 7 rs. per mensem."

The Punjab Committee refer to their remarks in the Infantry Paper, in which analogous observations with Brigadier Christie's are made. Sir S. Cotton believes that retiring pensions, though they do not appear to have influenced the native army in the recent mutiny, were effectual in attaching native troopers to our service and rule. He would therefore maintain pensions, modifying the system, placing the irregular cavalry on the same footing as the line, exercising greater care in the selection of recruits, and having repeated inspections by a medical committee until men had been for years in the service.

13. Should the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

Sir J. W. Grant. Merit and efficiency should rule all promotion; without them there can be no reliance on the conduct of corps.

Punjab Committee. "Wherever existing, promotion by seniority, it should be abolished, and merit be the rule."

Brig. Christie. "I would make efficiency, proved by a test, the rule of promotion, giving the prior claim to seniority of course; but I would make merit displayed on the field of battle, or on active service in the field, an exceptional ground for advancement, and in these cases dispense with all further proofs of fitness."

Col. Gall. "Promotion, in my opinion, should be based on seniority and merit combined."

Brig. Bradford. "Sir S. Cotton would have merit and efficiency the rule."

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?

The native commissioned officers on courts-martial invariably are guided by the nod and inclination of the superintending officer. They know no higher justice than his wish.

Brigadier Christie deems the native commissioned officers perfectly efficient on punchayets, which he strongly advocates, but not so on courts-martial. Brigadier Bradford would have no native courts-martial.

Sir S. Cotton answers, "No; not the best of them."

17. Should any alteration be made in the mode of officering the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

I think the present system of officers is good. Two subalterns should be attached to each corps, as in the Punjab.

Sir J. H. Grant. Major Daly.

Speaking of the Punjab irregular cavalry, the Punjab Committee answer, "There are now three European officers, and a fourth doing duty (not including the medical officer), and this is the complement we would advocate."

Brigadier Christie says, "I consider, as only three officers are allowed to regiments of irregular cavalry, they ought to be the best procurable in the army, and selected with great care, for every thing depends on them. They ought to be superior horsemen, with great dash, and well up to their work in every respect."

Brigadier Bradford recommends no alteration, the best plan being to select officers as at present.

Colonel Gall says, "No officer should be allowed to join an irregular corps until he had proved the possession of certain acquirements, without which the duties of this branch of the service cannot be so efficiently performed as they ought to be. More than activity and zeal should be required of an officer destined to the command of an irregular corps. On service he is generally the first to come in contact with an enemy; he is the first upon whom the duty of reconnoitering a position devolves. As the general or other officer commanding a field force may be guided by the report of a reconnoissance, the information furnished by it should not only be most accurate, but accompanied by a plan of the ground, position, or external defences of the enemy, without which the clearest reports are imperfect; yet how very few cavalry officers comparatively have acquired the art of plan-drawing or sketching ground."

Sir S. Cotton would make it allowable to fill up every third vacancy in the commissioned grades by a direct nomination thereto of a young intelligent man who had not served previously, his first three years' service being on probation.

18. Among the classes which enter the regular and irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, which is the most popular, the regular or irregular; and what reasons are assigned by the natives for the preference?

Sir J. H. Grant. The classes which have hitherto entered Major Daly. the regular and irregular branches are distinct. The latter attracted a class for whom the regular service has no attractions,—men of some money,—fond, too, of the position and importance which belonged to the irregular branch. Oude supplied two thirds of the recruits for the regular cavalry, yet I have never seen an Oude man an irregular.

Brigadier Christie replies, "Decidedly the irregulars, as it is considered more honourable to ride one's own horse, and are altogether a more respectable class of men than those which enter the regular regiments, small zemindars, &c. Although the regulars are better paid, still the men that generally compose the irregular cavalry will not take service in the regular cavalry, disliking the constant parades, stable duty morning and evening, &c. I made it a point of never interfering with the men with regard to their horses, provided they were in good condition, and up to any amount of work."

Brigadier Bradford says, "The irregulars are most popular. I have never heard any reason assigned, that I remember; but I have no doubt that preference is given them from their being less trammelled with discipline, and less under the eye of the European officer than the regular cavalry, and the degree of respectability conferred by the ownership of a horse."

21. Would it be practicable and advisable to attach to each European corps of cavalry a body of native irregular horse?

Punjab Com- None should be mounted by government. mittee. Not only does a man take less interest in the government horse, but in critical times the trooper who rides a government horse has a direct inducement to desert. The trooper who rides his own has something to lose.

Sir J. H. Grant. The efficiency and tone of the cavalry Major Daly. would be changed if horses were supplied by government; better that all should remain on the footing which has worked so well.

Brig. Christie. All the native cavalry should be irregular, and ride their own horses. Government mounting men would be much more expensive. Moreover, particularly on detached duties, the horses would not have that care taken of them as if they were the men's own property. They would be nothing more than a corps of bhargeers, and consequently lose that self-respect which they at present possess.

Brig. Bradford. They should, as at present, be mounted on their own horses, which is probably the best part of the system.

Colonel Gall would have none of the irregular cavalry mounted by government.

Sir S. Cotton suggests that irregular corps be allowed to purchase at their chunda rate all stud horses not required for the artillery and dragoons.

Brigadier-General J. Jacob would have the whole on the Silladar principle and arrangements, and details left to the regimental commander. He observes that a regular native Indian cavalry could be formed on the Silladar principle, and that the Scinde Horse is more regular than any of the regulars themselves.

22. What is the average cost to government of the horses on which the troopers of the regular native cavalry of the Bengal army are mounted?
 23. Whence are the horses obtained; and of what breeds are they?
 24. Whence does the irregular cavalry of the Bengal presidency draw its horses?
 25. What is the average cost of the horses of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal presidency.
 26. Are the requirements of the mounted branch of the Bengal army adequately met by the system pursued for obtaining horses?

The Punjab Committee believes the average cost to government of the horses of the regular cavalry to be about 700 rupees, chiefly drawn from the government studs in India. They state that the average cost of the horses of the irregular cavalry has not been more hitherto than 125 rupees (though the chunda or horse fund allowed 150 rupees), for which reasons are shown in reply to Question 28. The troopers both of the Punjab irregular cavalry and for that of the Bengal army prefer the mares of Hindostan, failing which they look for horses in the Punjab; and only take northern horses as the last resort, because they cannot stand the heat or quick work, though they are admirable for artillery. The Committee note that there is great and yearly increasing scarcity of horses.

Sir J. H. Grant and Major Daly also observe that the requirements of the irregular cavalry were met of late with difficulty. Prior to the mutiny, the average cost of horses reached 175 rupees or even 200 rupees, a gradual rise having taken place since the increase of the irregular branch. The irregular cavalry formerly derived their horses from the zemindars, whose mares were visited by the stud stallions. During the last few years Afghanistan and the countries beyond have contributed greatly to our wants. The fathers and brothers of many of the sowars are large zemindars, who breed especially for the service, and this is represented as having been particularly the case about Bareilly and in Hurriannah.

Brigadier Christie says that a good irregular cavalry horse is not to be had under 200 rupees, but that many are admitted at a lower figure, say 150 rupees; that they are obtained from all parts of Hindostan and Afghanistan, and from the rejected colts and fillies at the government studs. He recommends that all the latter description of cattle be offered in the first instance to regiments of irregular cavalry, previously to being disposed of to other parties by the government stud officers, or sent to Calcutta for sale. Brigadier Christie purchased many horses of this description from the Hanper stud, which he says turned out particularly well. Up to the time of the mutiny he believes that the requirements of the mounted branch of the Bengal army were adequately met from the government studs, but since then foreign horses have been largely imported from the Cape and New South Wales.

Brigadier Bradford states, that the average cost to government of the horses supplied to the cavalry by the government studs was 466 rupees each, for the years 1854-55 and 1855-56, and he is informed that the accounts for the two last years will give a lower average, but the stud officers were unable to furnish it, and referred Brigadier Bradford to Major Newbolt, the auditor of commissariat accounts in Calcutta. Formerly the price of remounts was much higher. He gives the average cost of the horse of the regular trooper at about 175 rupees, and says they were obtained from the country generally.

27. Can you suggest any improvement in the system of obtaining horses for the European cavalry and artillery of the army of the Bengal presidency?
 28. Is it advisable that the government studs should be maintained, or should they be abolished, and government rely on the markets of India, of foreign countries, and of British colonies for a supply of horses for the army of India?

The present requirements of the mounted branch of the army Brigadier Bradford considers not adequately met by the government studs, and that in consequence of the late

increased demand for all sorts of horses it could not have been supplied without indenting on Australia and the Cape. He considers the colonial cattle well adapted to artillery purposes, and that that branch should in general be supplied from this source; but still he deems it inadvisable to trust altogether to distant colonies and foreign countries for a supply of horses; he therefore is in favour of maintaining the government studs, which have proved of great use in furnishing remounts to all the mounted branches, including the police force; and he remarks that the country breed, whatever it may have been, has greatly deteriorated, and now supplies but few horses for the artillery and dragoons.

Upon these points the Punjab Committee remark, that for Europeans of light weight and short height there is no horse like the Arab, for he stands heat and exposure, and poor food, in a wonderful manner. But Arabs are too small for such European dragoons as have hitherto been in India; and to mount such men the only horses are, firstly, New South Wales; secondly, Cape; thirdly, stud. For draught the northern horses are excellent, but when taken to Hindostan they fall off in condition, and are rejected. If the artillery in the Punjab, from Peshawar to Umballah, were limited to the northern horses, it would greatly ease the demand upon the government studs and other sources of supply for the cavalry, and when in course of relief the artillery went to Hindostan, the horses should be mutually exchanged between the relieving and relieved troops or batteries, so as to keep the northern horses in a congenial climate. We would also suggest that all stud bred colts should be gelded, and thus admit of mares being used with them in the ranks. The Committee are in favour of maintaining the government studs, as no source of supply can be spared, but would place them on a better and cheaper footing; and note it as a general opinion that the stud colts are pampered, their constitutions made delicate by high feeding, and that the hard work and poor food of a campaign consequently has an undue effect upon them; and this seems proved by the very different result among the fillies, which being rejected from the government service remain with the zemindars, get hard hoofs, tough constitutions, muscular legs, and good wind, and are at last bought cheap by sowars in the irregular cavalry, who prefer them to any other stamp of horse, for their real serviceable qualities.

Sir J. H. Grant and Major Daly also advocate the castration of the stallions passed into the service, and the introduction of mares into the ranks. They are likewise in favour of maintaining the Government studs, but would introduce a better system of breeding. They are of opinion that by entering mares into the cavalry service the expense of mounting it would be much diminished, and the state might then be able to afford keeping up a certain number of good brood mares, without which, however good the stallions, the improvement of the stock of horses is impossible. They are in favour of Arab stallions.

Brigadier Christie urges attention to the selection of mares for breeding purposes, as the principal thing to be looked to to insure good stock, and states that it has been little attended to in the breeding districts. He also urges strongly that the greatest care be taken in the selection of stud officers, which in some instances he considers has not been the case. He also recommends that the natives be encouraged again to breed horses such as they furnished in former years for the cavalry for 400 and 450 rs. each.

Colonel Gall also observes, that the want of breeding and size in the country mares is the cause of many defects in the stud produce; but he limits the remark to the Hanper stud. He advocates the abolition of the government studs, and the encouragement in Persia, Arabia, Scinde, Turkistan, the British colonies, and India generally, of the breed of horses for the Indian market.

Sir S. Cotton states the average cost of the irregular trooper's horse to be about 180 rs., and that they are obtained from the government stud districts, large fairs, and the Afghan dealers, and that the mares from the stud districts are the best. He considers that the requirements of the mounted branches of the Bengal army are scarcely adequately met. He suggests no improvement, but thinks that the government studs should undoubtedly be maintained and increased, and quotes the advantage derived from the fact that stud stallions were sent into the Sind Sanguor district about five years ago.

Brigadier-General J. Jacob states, that the horses of the Sind Irregular Horse average about 225 rs. each. The horses are chiefly from Beloochistan and Herat. He cannot give the average cost of the horses of other irregular corps of the Bombay army, that of the horses of the regulars averages 500 rs. each. He is strongly in favour of the Arab horse; opposed to the "standard height" for cavalry horses; in favour of government studs, properly

managed; and points out what he deems the errors of the English and Indian breeding studs.

29. What is the pay of the troopers of irregular cavalry in the Bengal army?
30. Has that pay proved sufficient to enable the corps to be well mounted and equipped, and thoroughly efficient in the field, during a protracted campaign?
- 30^b. Have corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal Army been embarrassed by debt, or free from debt?
31. Should any alteration be made in the pay of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army.

Sir J. H. Grant. The pay of the troopers, prior to the Major Daly. mutiny, was twenty rupees. The pay was insufficient. This has been felt by every one connected with irregulars, and was generally acknowledged. Corps were overwhelmed in debt, and would have been unable, in many instances, to take the field, but for the banker. In many corps the sowar never saw his pay; the whole abstract passed into the hands of the banker, who deducted his per-centage, varying from 24 to 48 per cent., and doled out subsistence money to his patient. Since March last it has been announced in the Punjab that the sowar's pay had been increased to 25 rs. The police generally throughout the kingdom have received the same notification. It has not been made known to the irregulars generally, but we act on the supposition that it is the case.

Brigadier Christie considers the pay of the irregular trooper, twenty rupees a month, most inadequate; and states that corps of irregular horse were generally deeply indebted to the regimental bankers. He thinks the rissaldars and rissaidars are sufficiently paid; that the naib rissaldars should have their pay raised to 55 rs. per mensem, jemadars to 50 rs., kote duffadars to 40s., duffadars to 35 rs., trumpeters and nugarcheis to 30 rs., and sowars to 27 rs.

Brigadier Bradford concurs in the opinion that 20 rs. a month was not sufficient, and that 25 rs., to which the pay has lately been raised, should ensure men being properly mounted. He also confirms the statement that men of the irregular cavalry are generally embarrassed by debt.

The Punjab Committee observe, that the former rate of 20 rs. had a long and fair trial, and was unquestionably insufficient, and more so the farther the corps were sent up the country. The extra five rupees supply all that was wanted, and ought not to be increased. But they advocate the improvement of the pay of native officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, with other modifications. The increase proposed amounts to 10,760 rs. per annum for an irregular corps.

They state that the irregular cavalry of the Punjab force was free from debt; that bankers were not allowed; and that great attention was paid to this subject. Advances were taken from government for the purchase of horses when any unusual mortality occurred, which saved the men greatly. In the Bengal irregular cavalry, where the system of bankers prevailed, every regiment was in debt from 30,000 to 60,000 rupees. Corps had been known to owe a lac of rupees.

Sir S. Cotton considers that the pay of the irregular trooper, 20 rs. a month, was certainly not sufficient, and that all were necessarily more or less in debt. He states that 25 rs. a month is the lowest sum that will admit of irregular troopers being really efficient, and would have fixed rates for the chunda. The chunda in the 7th Irregular Cavalry is 200 rs., which covers the horse only, arms, clothing, &c. being sold separately.

Brigadier General J. Jacob deems the pay of the Scinde Horse, 30 rs. a month, too low, and would increase it to 45 rs. a month, and that of corps serving in the interior of India to 36 rs. a month.

32. What is the system of the irregular cavalry with respect to assamees, and the market value of the assamee? are there restrictions upon the number which any native officer or capitalist of the corps may hold? Do you advocate the existence in corps of irregular horse of such large vested interests, or not? Are they favourable to the maintenance of the efficiency of a corps in horses and in equipments, and to the conduct of duty?

Sir J. H. Grant. "The assamee system in the light cavalry Major Daly. differs in corps. Some maintain a fixed price; others, again, submit them to auction; but the whole question is in the banker's hands. He sells up one man, a bad or ruined debtor, and buys for another whose race is yet to be run; but the system is false. Anything in excess of the value of the seller's horse

"and appointments is clearly a sale of the position; a kind of traffic which government could never have intended to authorize. The regulations lay down the number of assamees to be held by officers and non-commissioned officers, and prohibit the possession of them by outsiders; but what with the smallness of the pay and the grasp of the banker virtually the majority are held out of the corps. I would not tie down a commandant too tightly about bhargeers; something should be left to discretion and circumstances. Heretofore complaints have been made of the low characters of the bhargeers. It should be remembered the pay (7 rs.), with every thing to find, was not sufficient to tempt a good man, unless attached to or connected with an officer, or one who had hopes of becoming eventually a khodaspah. I think no man should be entitled to claim bhargeers; the fact of a man being a duffadar should not give him a bhargeer; nor would I exclude a man of character and influence, although but a sowar, from the possession of an assamee. Bhargeers certainly attach men of position to the service, by giving them the importance they love; they are not unfavourable to discipline, and if fairly paid would be desirable to some extent."

Brigadier Christie, after detailing the number of bhargeers allowed by regulation, adds, "None beyond this is allowed; a man not in the regiment cannot hold any assamee on any terms. Should such, however, be discovered, the assamee is at once forfeited, and given to a deserving bhargeer. I still advocate bhargeers to the above extent being allowed, as they much add to the respectability of the non-commissioned and commissioned grades, and I have never found any bad effects from it, under a commanding officer who is well up to his work."

Brigadier Bradford is of opinion that the bhargeer system is not favourable to the efficiency of a corps in horses or in any other way.

Colonel Gull would limit the number of assamees held by any one man. He considers that a native officer who held a very large number would possess an influence that might be used with effect against the government.

The Punjab Committee state, that in the Punjab irregular cavalry the value of an assamee is simply that of the horse, equipments, arms, and accoutrements. The number of assamees held by the native officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, is the same in the Punjab and Bengal irregular cavalry, amounting to 114 bhargeers per regiment, but that during the crisis of 1858 double the number was sanctioned in the Punjab, for the sake of raising men. No capitalists out of the corps are allowed to hold assamees. Upon the subject of bhargeers they deliver the following opinion—"The objection to bhargeers (or assamees held by native officers, &c., &c.) are numerous and substantial. They are more the private servants of their silladar than the government, and their silladar constantly favours them in matters of duty, for the sake of saving his horse, while as constantly quarrelling and bickering on other points. The settlement of these disputes is very difficult and troublesome. The bhargeer on a silladar's horse is not of the same use to government as a khoduspah,* and the aggregate of all the Bhargeers is no less than one-fifth of the whole corps. The best commandants in the Punjab cavalry advocate the abolition of bhargeers; and on the whole we decidedly concur with them. The only advantage of the bhargeer system is that the native officers like it; to meet which we would propose that the pay of each native officer be increased by way of compensation. We are quite certain that if bhargeers were abolished desertions would be diminished, for the opportunity of acquiring a horse, arms, and equipments tempts numbers of this class to desert on service, and join the enemy as a khoduspah."

Sir S. Cotton considers the bhargeer system the worst possible, the owners of the assamees looking on them as mere investment of capital, out of which they are to make the utmost profit. He would limit resaldars and resaldars to two bargeers, the object of the bargeers retained in the Bengal irregular cavalry being only to enable the native officers to be always mounted in case of casualties to their own chargers.

Brigadier-General J. Jacob replies, that the system differs much in different irregular cavalry corps of the Bombay army. The sale of assamees, by open and free auction, is allowed, under permission first obtained from the commanding officer.

33. What is the pay of the mounted police in the Bengal presidency?
34. What is the organization of the mounted police of the Bengal presidency?
35. Of what races, tribes, or castes is the mounted police of the Bengal presidency composed?
36. How is the mounted police recruited; that is, what is the agency employed; the precautions taken before, or by the local authorities in entertaining men?
37. Where districts are large and duty heavy, has the pay of the mounted police been found adequate, and the police proved well mounted and efficient?
38. Is the difference between the pay of horse police and that of irregular horse such as to insure the latter the superior mounting essential for his peculiar service?

The Punjab Committee state, that in the North Western Provinces the pay of the mounted police varied from 18 to 20 rs. a month, but has now been raised to 25 rs. In the Punjab it was 20 rs., but government has been asked to allow 24 rs. In the Punjab the majority of the mounted police are Sikhs and Punjabee Mahomedans, with a sprinkling of Hindostanees from the south and Pathans from the north some, Beloochees, &c.; always more candidates for the mounted than for the foot police, and little trouble in filling up vacancies, especially before the present war. The pay, 20 rs. a month, was just enough for man and horse to exist on, but left no margin for any emergency or accident to either. "There was no difference before the late war between the pay of the horse policeman and that of the irregular trooper; both had 20 rs. a month. This rate was found quite inadequate to the requirements of the irregular horse in the Punjab, and it has lately been raised by Government to 25 rs. The greatest difficulty was experienced previous to this increase in coaxing Punjabee recruits to the frontier."

Sir J. H. Grant thinks it was a mistake making the pay of the horse police and the irregular cavalry the same, viz., 25 rs. a month; but he is of opinion that 25 rs. a month are sufficient for an irregular horseman.

Brigadier Christie remarks, that the only police corps (mounted) that he is acquainted with is the "Behar Horse," who draw 5 rs. more per mensem than the irregular cavalry did, and yet are not half so well mounted as the 9th Irregular Cavalry were when he left it. The Behar Horse is a new corps; and to say nothing of the great difficulty of procuring suitable horses at the present time, Brigadier Christie says allowances must be made for a new corps.

In Scinde there are two classes of mounted police, one on 20 rs. the other on 15 rs. a month; the first chiefly composed of Hindoostan men, the second of Belooch.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of commandants of corps of the light cavalry in the Bengal army or of irregular cavalry been increased or diminished?

The reply of the Punjab Commissioners is, "Diminished even more than in the infantry. Formerly offences against discipline in the corps were tried by a punchayet or jury of native officers, under the guidance of the commandant; but this popular and effective institution has been abolished. Commandants have been prohibited from punishing or reducing non-commissioned officers, except by the forms of court-martial. Discharge of men has been put a stop to. The commandant has not even the power to order any man in his regiment to give an extra allowance of grain to a horse out of condition. All minor punishments must be dealt out according to regulation. In fact, the thing has been laid down by Procrustean rule, and the 'irregular cavalry' has long been a misnomer."

Brigadier Christie replies, that within his experience the powers of commandants of irregular cavalry have been most injuriously diminished.

Sir J. Hope Grant, Brigadier Bradford, and Major Daly also state that the powers of commandants have been diminished. Sir S. Cotton also avers that they have been greatly diminished.

Brigadier-General J. Jacob notes the prejudicial effects of the system of centralization.

* One who owns the horse he rides.

3. What has been the result upon the discipline of the light cavalry and irregular cavalry of the Bengal army of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps?

The result is represented by the Punjab Committee as having been "to reduce the efficiency of the regiments, and to render them dangerous to the state."

Brigadier Christie answers, "In former days the men looked up to the commanding officer, and did everything in their power to please him. Now matters are greatly changed, knowing that all power has been taken out of the hands of commanding officers."

Sir J. H. Grant remarks, "Discipline should tend to strengthen the powers and influence of commandants; it has been the tight binding of rules and regulations at variance with the constitution of the service which has weakened them."

Brigadier Bradford, who belonged to the regular, and had not served in the irregular cavalry, replies to this question, that he has not observed any difference as to discipline, that of the irregular cavalry having never been very strict.

Sir S. Cotton observes, that the result of the diminution of power in commandants has been to impair discipline.

5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps? Upon the distant authority of head quarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in charge of troops and in command of corps of regular or irregular cavalry?

Punjab Committee. "The discipline mainly depends on the character and ability of the European and native officers present, but especially on that of the commanding officer. At the same time, we consider that the careful and judicious supervision of a superior authority is essentially necessary, and that such authority, so expressed, must do good, and cannot do harm. We allude here to the supervision of officers commanding brigades and divisions, beyond which there should be no interference, except in extreme cases."

Sir J. H. Grant. "The discipline of an irregular corps Major Daly. "mainly depends on the character of the commandant. To be effective, it should be so. Possessed of the authority necessary for his position, a good commandant will have sufficient influence with the officers commanding troops and squadrons to ensure a proper tour and the discharge of duty."

Brigadiers Bradford and Christie also regard the discipline of a corps of irregular cavalry as depending upon the influence and authority of the commanding officer, and the way in which he exercises his power.

So also Colonel Gall, who believes "The discipline of a corps on service to depend mainly on the authority of its immediate commanding officer; of a native corps especially, on the understanding that the decisions of a commanding officer are final, and that he is the source of professional honour and advancement. The distant authority of head quarters involves references and appeals, and there is no right so liable to be abused by a native of India as that of appeal. In the native army it becomes dangerous when it is exercised by ill-disposed men, as the means of augmenting their own importance, and weakening their commanding officer's position in the eyes of their more ignorant comrades. By natives there is no power more respected than that of exercising liberality and executing justice, whether in the form of reward or punishment with promptitude and on the spot."

"The discipline of a corps on service, as every where else, depends entirely when the knowledge the men have of their immediate commander's will, and ability to punish breaches of discipline. That authority which is distant a native always thinks he can evade, and he holds it in no dread or awe."

Brigadier-Gen. J. Jacob. "The real effective discipline and useful military power of a corps of Asiatic soldiers in our service depends wholly on the personal character and influence of its English officers. The useful power of the Asiatic soldier depends entirely on what the English gentleman has instilled into him. If no virtue has gone out from the English officer, none will be found in the sepoy."

6. Should the powers of commanding officers and of troop officers be increased or diminished?

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

"To improve the discipline and establish a certain uniformity of system in the irregular cavalry, I would put

"the body under one head. There should be an inspector-general, under whom there should be inspectors or brigadiers of districts or divisions. The powers of commandants should be increased, but subject to the check

Sir J. H. Grant. "and supervision of the inspector-general. Major Daly. "Banks should be prohibited in regiments."

"On the first embodiment of corps, debts for arms and various appointments must be incurred. Government should here help the sower. After a certain period any man found in debt should be discharged. The great object of every commandant should be to preserve his men from debt. On 20 rs. per month this was impossible; on 25 rs. it should be made a sine qua non of service."

Brigadier Christie would increase the powers of commandants of corps and of troop officers, so also Brigadier Bradford, subject to the supervision of the general officers under whom they serve.

Colonel Gall points out the working of the restrictions on the powers of troop officers.

Sir S. Cotton would both increase the powers and the number of the European officers. He thinks there should be at least three more to each regiment, carefully selected for intelligence and general aptitude, and if not of the cavalry, would send them to a light cavalry corps to pass their drill.

12. If native regular cavalry be kept up with a full complement of European officers, would you attach cavalry cadets at once to native corps, or for a time to dragoon corps?

13. If a few European officers are assigned to native corps of cavalry, whether regular or irregular, how would you select and train them?

Sir J. H. Grant. "I would send no officer on entering the service direct to an irregular corps. He should do duty for two years at least with

"a corps of the line, infantry or cavalry; after that he should be appointed 'to do duty,' and thus become initiated. If an indifferent horseman, or otherwise incapable, the commandant should have the power of getting rid of him."

"I would select indifferently from both cavalry and infantry, taking only those who were good horsemen and otherwise qualified for the mounted branch of the service. For regular cavalry, I would attach them for a certain time to European dragoon regiments, or until they become thoroughly acquainted with their duties. The system in the irregular cavalry being so different, I would post them at once to irregular cavalry corps, where, under a good commanding officer, they would soon be up to their work."

Brigadier Bradford would select them as hitherto for the irregulars, but for regulars he deprecates the system of only a few officers being attached to a regiment, it being useless to try to carry on the regular system without a full body of officers.

The Punjab Committee would, after going through the course prescribed, select and appoint on probation the European officers for the irregular cavalry.

Colonel Gall would select them. After an examination before competent judges, he would make them go through a short course of instruction at the European cavalry depot, or at the head quarters of any European cavalry regiment. He notes the common error, that scientific requirements are only useful to officers of artillery and engineers, and advocates the possession of moderate professional attainments by officers of irregular cavalry.

Brigadier General J. Jacob refers to his scheme for the re-organization of the army as fully providing for all these matters.

15. Speaking from your experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies in the conduct of corps (whether regular or irregular cavalry), whose complement of European officers was short or full?

The Punjab Committee reply, that no difference was observable during the mutiny in the conduct of corps, whether of short or of full complements of European officers, though they allow that the general qualities of European officers had an effect on the character of a mutiny in its incipient steps.

Brigadiers Bradford and Christie are also of opinion that there was no difference.

"The only corps who can be said to have been staunch, and to have perilled life and limb for us, with a valour and heroism unknown in previous wars, have been the

Sir J. H. Grant. "irregular corps with few officers. In Major Daly. "almost all the instances these officers have been changed by death and casualties; yet the discipline and loyalty of the regiment have remained. In the few corps of the line which have refrained from mutiny, their conduct has been chiefly attributed to the great influence exercised by one or two native officers. In no case have I heard it attributable to the presence of more or less European officers."

Sir S. Cotton considers the power of the European officer to have been so reduced, and the native soldier had so ceased to look upon his officer with awe or respect, that it is immaterial whether the question be answered in the affirmative or negative, as the conduct of corps had no reference to the paucity or the reverse of the European officers.

21. Would it be practicable and advisable to attach to each European corps of cavalry a body of native irregular horse?
22. If so, what preparation should the native body bear to the European dragoons of the corps? How should it be armed? How mounted? How officered?

The Punjab Committee are opposed to attaching to

each European corps of cavalry a body of irregular horse. They consider it would be reviving in a new phase the old system of regular native cavalry, so costly and useless.

Brigadier Bradford is also opposed to the association of irregular cavalry with European dragoons, except in the customary manner in brigade. If regular native cavalry were to be maintained, he is in favour of their association in alternate squadrons with the European dragoons.

Brigadier Christie, Colonel Gall, and Sir J. H. Grant and Major Daly, deem it advisable to attach to each European corps of cavalry a squadron (Colonel Gall would have 250 irregular sowars to every 500 dragoons) of irregular horse, armed, equipped, and mounted in all respects like other irregular cavalry.

Sir S. Cotton is of a similar opinion.

Brigadier-General J. Jacob expresses himself as very doubtful of the advantage or propriety of such an association, and indicates that, except under the condition of well-selected European officers to command the native irregulars, a little misunderstanding might lead to fatal mischief.

E. M. DURAND, Col. Eng.,
Special Commissioner from the Governor-General.

IV.—ANSWERS BY THE COMMISSIONERS.

APPENDIX No. 73.

The DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE'S ANSWERS to the NINE QUESTIONS proposed by the COMMISSIONERS, 3rd August 1858.

1. *The proportion of European to native troops to be maintained in the Bengal presidency?*

1. I think that in the Bengal presidency, irrespective of the police force to be established, one third should be Europeans to two thirds natives. For Bombay and Madras, I am disposed to think that one fourth of the whole force should be Europeans.

2. *What amount of force will be required in the Bengal presidency after the country is settled?*

2. This is a question which it is next to impossible to decide upon in this country, and which must depend upon many local circumstances and considerations, which can only be determined upon in India itself. After, however, hearing the opinion of a vast number of most intelligent evidences, I am disposed to name as an approximate force, 50,000 Europeans of all arms for Bengal, with a proportion of native troops to be decided by the Government of India. For Madras and Bombay 15,000 Europeans each, with a due proportion of natives.

3. *Whether the native force in the Bengal presidency shall have the regular or irregular system, or both combined?*

3. The force should be combined of both regulars and irregulars as regards the infantry, and of irregulars as regards the cavalry.

4. *Whether any native artillery shall be allowed in the Bengal army?*

4. I would have no native artillery in the Bengal army, but I would attach a certain number of gun lascars to every European troop or battery. The Bombay officers give it in evidence that there are certain stations in that presidency which must be garrisoned by natives, no Europeans being able to live in them. An exception might be made in that presidency to these unhealthy stations, but I should make this an exception to the general rule, and I have even a doubt whether this exception should be made.

5. *The same question with regard to sappers and miners?*

5. For all scientific duties Europeans should be employed, and a certain portion of the force should therefore be European; but for all ordinary purposes of work, natives are indispensable, and I would have them formed on the Madras principle of low caste men, who would not object to the performance of the work required of them.

6. *Whether the Bengal native army should be composed of different nationalities or castes; and if so, in what proportion?*

6. The army should be composed of every description of nationalities and castes, and all should be as much as possible mixed up together, care being taken not to allow any special caste or nationality to have the predominance. It appears that some regiments are trying the experiment of having certain nationalities by companies, and it is said that it has been found in practice to answer well. Though I prefer the admixture of all throughout the regiment, I would not object to continue the experiment by companies, but I would not extend that system throughout the army.

7. *Whether the native army of Bengal is to be enlisted under a new code?*

7. I think the code requires considerable alteration. Every soldier should be enlisted for general service, and I would give greater power to commanding officers of regiments, as I feel certain that undue centralization does not suit the native character. The question of caste should never be tolerated as an excuse for the non-performance of military duties. The conditions upon which a man enlists should be carefully and fully explained to him from the outset, and if he does not object to enlist upon the terms proposed, he should be held to his contract afterwards. Strict discipline is essential in all armies, and a laxity of discipline should never be tolerated. The system of petitioning direct to superior authority without doing so in a respectful manner through the authorized channel of the commanding officer should be peremptorily forbidden.

8. *Whether the Bengal army ought not to be divided into two or more armies?*

8. I think the Bengal army should remain as at present, and not be further divided; but I think that the commander-in-chief should have his head-quarters, if practicable, at a more central station than Calcutta; and I would introduce the system of corps d'armées into the Bengal presidency, to be commanded by lieutenant-generals, all being part of the same army, and under the undivided authority of the commander-in-chief.

9. *Whether any change is required in the system of promotion as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers?*

9. I think a change is required for Bengal, where hitherto the seniority system has prevailed. I would introduce the system of selection, as prevailing in Bombay, and which appears to have answered well. I would not introduce native gentlemen without passing through the ranks. This system would, in my opinion, be very objectionable, and would endanger our position. In the civil service an introduction of more native element may be desirable, but certainly not in the military service, and all the native officers should, as is now done, be promoted from the ranks. The promotion in the non-commissioned grades should be made in companies, on the recommendation of the officer commanding each company; to the commissioned grades, on the recommendation of the commanding officer, by the commander-in-chief.

GEORGE.

Note.—With reference to my answers to questions 1 and 2, I would wish to observe that I have merely given the relative proportions I deem essential for the three presidencies. I have given the number of European troops which I should consider necessary in each presidency, and though I have given the proportion of native troops to European that might be maintained in each presidency, I would wish it to be clearly understood that I do not bind myself to any specified numbers, but would at all times maintain as few native troops as possible.

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM, INDIAN ARMY.

Horse Guards, December 27, 1858.

THE question as to the re-organization of the Indian army, appears to me to be one of such grave importance that in addition to the replies I am prepared to give to the various heads of inquiry, I would desire to record my opinion generally in a separate paper embodying my views on a subject of so much delicacy and difficulty.

There are many points under consideration, which can alone be settled in India, and all details must, more or less, be left to the local authorities.

The object of the Commission should be to lay down general rules and principles of action, with a view to assist Her Majesty's Government in forming their opinion, and which can hereafter be worked out in detail by the various departments to which they may apply.

Commencing with the first heads of inquiry, I am come to the conclusion, backed by very high authority, and in spite of much evidence to the contrary, that the object of our legislation should be to have but one European army for the whole empire including India. On imperial and military grounds I cannot conceive the possibility of two armies co-existing without the gravest injury to the best interests of the country.

I cannot but admire the esprit de corps which animates the officers of the Indian army in general, all leading them to the conclusion, that the army with which they have been associated from boyhood should be retained separate and distinct. But I cannot share their views, regarding the question as I do from a military point of view, and as one vitally affecting the best interests of the State, and I feel the firmest conviction, that nothing but mischief can result from the jealousies, divisions, and heartburnings, which must be inherent in any double army organization.

At the same time I am prepared to admit, that it would be a matter of great difficulty at once to adopt a plan of general service, however desirable such might be, and the feelings and interests of a large body of most efficient and valuable officers must doubtless be considered as well as the financial difficulties which might result from any sudden change of system.

Keeping these objects in view, I think that for the present a middle course must be adopted, which would give

time for effecting the necessary change, would least disturb the present state of things, but would yet ultimately tend to that complete fusion and amalgamation the absolute necessity of which I so strongly advocate.

Artillery.—I would therefore begin by at once forming a second regiment of artillery composed of the artillery of the three presidencies; the battalions and brigades to be kept distinct as at present in their three presidencies, but the whole of the officers being placed in one seniority list and the whole to be considered as one corps, without reference to the different presidencies in which they may be serving. I would let it be understood, that for the present this 2nd regiment would be employed in India only, but all the men to be enlisted henceforth for the corps and all the officers to be appointed to it from the present time, should be so enlisted and appointed for general service, not confined exclusively to India. The officers for the 2nd regiment of royal artillery, to be appointed from the cadets who have passed through the military college of Addiscombe. The various ranks of the officers to be assimilated to those of the royal artillery, and the establishments of men in troops, field batteries, and reserve companies to be identical in both regiments.

Engineers.—I would in like manner deal with the corps of engineers of the three presidencies, forming out of this body a second regiment of royal engineers.

It may be a matter for after consideration, whether this regiment should not have a more permanent local Indian character, as a large portion of this force, as regards the non-commissioned officers and men, must be composed of natives. It might therefore be desirable to look upon the second regiment of engineers as a local corps, but giving the officers of this corps full power to exchange with those of the first regiment of engineers, by which term I designate our present royal corps of this branch of the service.

Should this view be carried out, I would suggest, that only natives should be attached to the second regiment of engineers, with the exception of a large body of European non-commissioned officers who are indispensable as overseers, and I would always maintain in India a few companies of the present regiment of royal engineers, composed exclusively of Europeans, with their own officers attached to them. The non-commissioned officers for the second regiment could easily be obtained by volunteers from the men and non-commissioned officers of the first regiment, and thus the same system would be established in both corps.

Cavalry.—The European cavalry for Bengal should consist, as it appears by the estimates of Lord Canning and Major General Sir William Mansfield, of between 6,000 and 7,000 sabres. At present we have five regiments of cavalry of the line in Bengal, and ten regiments are in the course of formation for local service only.

I observe that a general opinion is expressed in favour of small regiments for local service in preference to the larger ones of the royal establishment. I confess myself opposed to such a plan, as small regiments can never be maintained efficient for service, and are more expensive in consequence of their staff than larger corps.

In deference, however, to the opinion so strongly expressed, I would propose a middle course by forming the ten local regiments of three squadrons each into eight regiments of four squadrons and 500 sabres, leaving the line regiments at their present establishment, though it may be a question for consideration, whether hereafter cavalry regiments should not be sent to India at the same establishment as that now proposed for the local corps, should it be found on trial that the lower establishment answers better for the service required of them. Four regiments of the line, with the eight local corps, would give 6,800 sabres. The local regiments to have three field officers each, one lieutenant-colonel, and two majors.

The local regiments should at once be numbered as regiments of the line, and the men to be enlisted for general service, though it may be clearly understood, that for the present these eight regiments are to be retained for duty in India only, till it is otherwise ordained, or as long as the present generation of officers, all of whom have belonged to the late Company's service, remain in the service. The whole of the officers who have belonged to the native regular regiments of cavalry will, by such an arrangement, be absorbed. Seniority will regulate promotion in these corps; the cadets from Addiscombe may be appointed to them, but exchanges will be allowed between them and the other cavalry regiments of the line.

Infantry.—The local regiments of European infantry at present, 12 in number,—six in Bengal, and three in Madras and Bombay respectively,—should, in like manner, be at once numbered as regiments of the line, but to be employed for the present exclusively in India, though the men to be enlisted from henceforth, should be for general service; the

officers to be appointed from the cadets at Addiscombe, and seniority to regulate the promotion in these corps. It is stated in the memorandum by Lord Canning and Sir William Mansfield, that 45 regiments of European infantry will be required for Bengal. There being six local European corps already in existence, the remaining 39 should be all regiments of the line, and if the present number of battalions of the army of the line should not be sufficiently numerous to furnish the corps serving in India and the colonies with adequate reliefs, any additional European corps to be formed, to be officered by the officers of the late Company's service, by which means a considerable number might and would be absorbed. A scheme, giving full details of the measures proposed to carry out these views, shall be annexed to this paper; but I would wish here to remark that the establishment for an infantry regiment might in time of peace consist of 10 service companies of 900 rank and file, with two companies of 100 rank and file as a depot.* The infantry force would thus amount in Bengal to about 40,000 men. I think it right to point out, that of late great complaints have been made as to the want of officers in regiments in India, consequent on the change established some years ago, when one subaltern per company in all regiments in India was reduced. Possibly a certain number of supernumerary subalterns, say four or six per regiment, might be added to each infantry corps; these to be all taken from the unemployed subalterns of the late Bengal army. By allowing these supernumerary officers to remain on the general army list, to which I shall allude hereafter, their promotion by seniority would go on irrespective of the regiment to which they might be temporarily attached, and thus their rights and privileges would be maintained. It will be observed, that in all the proposals I have made, I have endeavoured to assimilate the establishments of European corps in India, as far as practicable, to those at home. My object in so doing has been to make as little change as possible necessary on the transfer of a corps from the home or colonial establishment to that of India, or vice versa, on its return to the mother country after service in the East.

I have thus endeavoured, however imperfectly, to sketch out my views of the future organization of our European forces for service in India. I have not touched upon the presidencies of Madras and Bombay, as, in conformity with my views already expressed, I contemplate that the whole of the European cavalry and infantry of those presidencies, and a portion of the artillery and engineers, should be from the army of the line, with the exception of the six regiments of local infantry, three in each presidency, which already exist, and which I propose to deal with in like manner as the local European corps of the Bengal presidency.

Native Army.—I now proceed to a consideration of the native armies. The experience of the last few years convinces me that the native armies of the three Presidencies should be kept as separate and distinct as possible; and there cannot be a doubt that the suppression of the fearful mutiny from which we are now recovering, may, in a great measure, be attributed to the totally distinct character and feeling of the native armies of each Presidency. These native troops must from henceforth be looked upon in the light of auxiliaries to the European troops. Their number should be kept as low as possible. But, however much we may endeavour to reduce them, a considerable body will still have to be kept up, looking at the vast extent of country to be covered and defended, and the impossibility of the European troops performing many of the necessary duties of stations and cantonments.

A further very important feature presents itself for our consideration. In dealing with the native army of Bengal we have an open field before us, the late Bengal army having ceased to exist, and a new one having to be provided with a view of replacing it. Not so as regards the armies of Madras and Bombay, which still exist, exactly on the same footing, and to the same extent in point of numbers as before the late outbreak. I concur fully in the views expressed by all the Indian authorities, that it would be most dangerous to introduce at once any great changes into these two large bodies. For the present we must confine ourselves to the Bengal presidency only, and leave the armies of Madras and Bombay for future legislation should a change be deemed absolutely necessary in those two perfectly distinct bodies. Doubtless the time may arrive when, should the principle upon which the Bengal army is to be reorganized be found to answer, these may be extended to the two other presidential armies, but certainly that time has not yet come, and the greatest caution is imperatively called for.

* This establishment might be still further reduced to 800 rank and file, if that number be deemed sufficient, as stated in the memoranda of the Governor-General and Sir Wm. Mansfield.

Bengal Native Army.—For the Bengal army, therefore, I would at once place the officers composing it upon one general list of seniority, fixing the numbers of each grade, and allowing them to go up from the ensign to the colonel in regular and unbroken seniority. Cases for selection to higher rank may at times arise and might be sanctioned, but these should be considered the exception to the general rule, which, as heretofore, should be seniority only. From this list the selections should be made for officers to the regular infantry regiments, the irregular cavalry and infantry regiments, the staff, both civil and military, the police corps, in short for all the various employments which have hitherto been open to the officers of the Indian army. I do not mean to confine my selections for irregular or special duties to this general service list; officers will equally have to be selected from the European corps for these various staff duties, but a considerable proportion of them would, as a matter of course, devolve to the officers of the purely local and native service, and these would all be selected from the list above referred to. It is in this list that I would equally place the supernumerary officers of the late Company's army, for whom at present no employment can be found, and whom I propose to attach to the European regiments of the line. Their promotion would be thus ensured, and they would rise in regular gradation with the rest of their brethren.

A staff list or corps has been advocated by many. Such a corps might be formed, but I am myself on the whole rather opposed to it, and I think the general list above advocated will do away with the necessity for it, as a proportional number of officers may be always borne on that list with a view to their being employed on the staff.*

It may be argued that all esprit de corps would be lost by having a general list for the native army. I cannot concur in this view, for in the plan suggested I do not advocate a constant removal of officers from their regiments. I contemplate, that as far as practicable, officers will be retained for duty with the regiment to which they were originally appointed, unless specially selected, from superior qualifications, for service on the staff with irregular corps or with the police. In the royal artillery, where we have 14 battalions, all the officers are posted in the general list for promotion, and are yet appointed to different battalions, and no ill effect is found to arise from such an arrangement. A similar system has been recently introduced into the military train, and it has existed for years in the royal marines and in all regiments of the line having more than one battalion with the best possible results.

Though the mode of distributing the local native forces is a question which must mainly depend on the authorities in India, I cannot but think that it would be very valuable that some native corps should be ordinarily associated with every European regiment, both cavalry and infantry.

The two bodies would form a brigade under a well selected officer. Thus the brigade system which is found so necessary on service, would be permanently established. Two European corps with two or more native corps combined, and having a detail of European artillery attached, would thus form a brigade, and a certain number of brigades thus constituted, and of various arms, would form a division, two or more divisions a corps d'armée, an arrangement which, for purposes of discipline and military organisation, I hold to be quite indispensable in a large army such as that of Bengal ever must be. As regards the composition of this native army, it must be as mixed as possible, the cavalry wholly on the irregular principle, the infantry regular and irregular combined; and no native artillery, excepting possibly for a few localities where Europeans could not exist. I should not be disposed to give the Enfield rifles to native corps, but let them have the percussion arms hitherto in use. The police force should be differently armed for their special duties.

As regards the command of the troops, I would leave that much as it is at present. I would not add a fourth army to those of the three existing presidencies, but I would as now make the Commander-in-chief in Bengal Commander-in-chief in India, with the same powers he now exercises over the two other presidential armies, and I would denominate the superior officers at Madras and Bombay, commanders of the forces in those presidencies, in contradistinction to the Commander-in-chief. I would, however, as already stated, divide Bengal into corps d'armée, probably three in number, the officers commanding these corps to have considerable powers, but still all directly under the authority of the Commander-in-chief in Bengal. Such an arrangement would greatly reduce the detail labours of the latter, would give him more time to devote to the many important subjects which are daily brought

before him, and would in a great measure get over the difficulties consequent upon the vast distances that separate the various stations from one another, and render constant supervision a matter of so much trouble and inconvenience. I would further suggest, though this again is a purely local subject, that the whole of the stations, whether cantonments or garrisons of Bengal and indeed India, should be carefully revised, that a principle should be laid down not to allow any grand dépôt or arsenal for the army to be situated in any locality which will not admit of the constant presence of European troops, and to establish no cantonment without a small work attached as a sort of citadel to contain arms and stores of all description, and to which the European portion of the garrison could at all times resort in the event of mutiny or disaffection amongst the native troops or the inhabitants of the province.

In conclusion I would strongly urge the necessity for appointing a small committee of experienced departmental officers for carrying out the details of the measures now recommended for consideration.

GEORGE.

1. The terms on which the army of the East India Company is to be transferred to the Crown?
 1. This has been already settled by Act of Parliament, and the transfer has been made.
 2. The permanent force necessary to be maintained in the Indian provinces respectively after the restoration of tranquillity?
 2. This is a local question, and must be settled in India itself. It would appear to me, however, that about 90,000 Europeans—58,000 for Bengal, 19,000 for Madras, and 13,000 for Bombay—would be more than sufficient, with a proportionate number of native troops and police corps, to be decided upon by the local authorities.
 3. The proportion which Europeans should bear to native troops of infantry, cavalry, and artillery respectively?
 3. The number of Europeans to natives to be at the rate of two Europeans to five natives, inclusive of police, for Bengal; and about one European to three natives in the two other presidencies. These proportions never to be exceeded. No native artillery to be permitted, except in most exceptional cases.
 4. How far the European portion of the army should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as part of the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only?
 4. The whole of the Europeans to be prospectively, and as soon as practicable, troops of the line, and the local European corps to be gradually converted into line regiments.
 5. In connexion with this question, the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion, and of securing the efficiency of the latter?
 5. As all corps are to be of the line, all would in the course of time be periodically relieved, and the recruiting for all regiments would be provided for, in the usual direct manner. On regiments leaving India, they should be called upon to volunteer for regiments remaining in the country.
 6. Whether it be possible to consolidate the European force, so as to allow of exchanges from one branch of the service to the other, and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object, with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now in the service of the East India Company?
 6. The European force of both armies to be consolidated with the least practicable delay, and exchanges to be freely allowed in every branch of the service. The Government to guarantee the military funds, and an actuary to decide the terms upon which the transfer of officers is to be permitted.
 7. Whether there should be any admixture of European and native forces, either regimentally or by brigade?
 7. The only admixture of the forces can be by brigade, and such an admixture would be most desirable and highly important.
 8. Whether the local European force should be kept up by drafts and volunteers from the line, or should be, as at present, separately recruited for as in Great Britain?
 8. Having expressed my opinion in favour of one army, this question hardly requires an answer on my part, further than to say I would recruit directly for all regiments.

* In the European regiments the officers employed away from their regiments should be seconded after they have been absent from their corps for six months.

9. Whether it would be possible to raise any regiments in the colonies, either for temporary or permanent service in India?

9. I think decidedly not. All the authorities in India seem to be opposed to it, and I think their arguments are sound, and lead me to the same conclusion.

10. Whether the native forces should be regular or irregular, or both, and if so, in what proportion?

10. This again is a local question, but I would suggest that all native cavalry regiments should be on the irregular system, and the infantry should be partly regular and partly irregular.

11. Whether any native artillery corps should be sanctioned?

11. I think certainly not, excepting in such localities in which Europeans cannot exist for any length of time, from the deadly effect of climate.

12. Whether cadets sent out for service with native troops, should in the first instance be attached to European regiments, to secure uniformity of drill and discipline?

12. Much may be said on both sides, but on the whole I incline to the belief that it would not be desirable so to attach them, though it is open to consideration, whether the young officers or cadets before going out to India should not be thoroughly drilled at the home depôts of Indian regiments.

GEORGE.

MEMORANDUM on the re-formation of the INDIAN ARTILLERY and its amalgamation with the ROYAL ARTILLERY.

Horse Guards, S.W., 9th. Feb., 1859.

The establishment of the Indian Artillery as well as the Royal Artillery are each so vast that it is essential in the first place to determine what organization can be most readily adapted to both services in order that one uniform system may prevail, and that the many questions of detail and practice may be assimilated, so that the entire corps can with facility be worked under one head, instead of having, as at present, a diversity of custom in carrying on the various duties of the Artillery service, which, if continued, would naturally tend to retard the good effects, which must otherwise inevitably follow the formation of the two Artilleries into one corps, so as to admit of one branch taking up the duties of another, without the many transfers and alterations, both in men and matériel, which are inseparable from a difference in the establishment and equipment of troops and companies.

To effect this it is submitted, that the new brigade system proposed for the Royal Artillery will be the most simple, whilst the assimilation of the present Indian equipments and establishments to those of the Royal Artillery, will render the corps efficient in all its details, without involving any serious change or delaying, even for a day, the duties of the Artillery service.

It is therefore proposed, that the royal and local Artilleries should be formed into one corps consisting of two regiments, the first of which will comprise the present Royal Artillery, with the addition of two brigades, or 17 in all; and the second, the Indian Artillery of the three presidencies, to consist of 16 brigades which will be distributed as follows.—

In Bengal.

	Batteries.
2 brigades of Horse Artillery of 6 batteries each	12
5 brigades of Field Artillery of 8 batteries each	40
2 brigades of Garrison Artillery of 8 batteries each	16

68

In Madras.

1 brigade of Horse Artillery of 6 batteries	6
2 brigades of Field Artillery of 8 batteries each	16
1 brigade of Garrison Artillery of 8 batteries	8

30

In Bombay.

1 brigade of Horse Artillery of 6 batteries	6
1 brigade of Field Artillery of 8 batteries	8
1 brigade of Garrison Artillery of 8 batteries	8

22

Total number of batteries of 2nd regiment in India 120

The present number of troops and companies of the Artillery of the three Presidencies is 104 which leaves 16 to be raised to complete the 2nd regiment, whilst the same

number will be required to form the two additional brigades to be raised for the 1st regiment, and the total number of Guns that would be available in India would be as follows:—

		Guns.
<i>Bengal.</i>		
1st regiment,—	2 batteries of Horse Artillery	12
	3 brigades Field Artillery of 8 batteries each	144
2nd regiment,—	2 brigades of Horse Artillery, of 6 batteries each	72
	5 brigades of Field Artillery, of 8 batteries each	240
	2 brigades of Garrison Artillery, of 8 batteries each	—
		468
<i>Madras.</i>		
1st regiment,—	1 battery of Horse Artillery	6
	1 brigade of Field Artillery of 8 batteries	48
2nd regiment,—	1 brigade of Horse Artillery of 6 batteries	36
	2 brigades of Field Artillery, of 8 batteries each	96
	1 brigade of Garrison Artillery of 8 batteries	—
		186
<i>Bombay.</i>		
1st regiment,—	1 battery of Horse Artillery	6
	1 brigade of Field Artillery of 8 batteries	48
2nd regiment,—	1 brigade of Horse Artillery of 6 batteries	36
	1 brigade of Field Artillery of 8 batteries	48
	1 brigade of Garrison Artillery of 8 batteries	—
		138
Total guns		792

As the present establishment of the Indian Artillery, in officers and men, is below that of the Royal Artillery, the greater proportion of the promotion consequent on the augmentation would fall to the former, although the number of batteries to be raised in each is the same.

The establishment of each battery of both regiments serving in India is proposed to be as under:—

Horse or Field Battery.	Ranks.	Garrison or Siege Battery.
2	Staff-serjeants	—
10	Serjeants	6
8	Corporals	4
5	Bombardiers	4
90	Gunners	90
60	Drivers	—
2	Trumpeters	2
1	Farrier	—
6	Shoeing Smiths	—
3	Collar Makers	—
3	Wheeler	—
190	Total	106

It is submitted that all Artillery Cadets should pass through the practical course at Woolwich before joining the corps, whether they are previously educated at the Academies at Woolwich or Addiscombe.

By this arrangement, uniformity of system and instruction will be secured, and a feeling of good fellowship and unanimity will be engendered amongst the officers, by bringing them together at the commencement of their service, and teaching them that they are portions of one vast corps, and that, in whatever part of the globe, or in whichever regiment, they may be called upon to serve, it will be their interest, as well as their duty, to maintain that *esprit de corps*, which now so happily prevails in the Artillery service, and which is so conducive and essential to its well-being and efficiency.

Officers of the two regiments, when serving together, would take precedence for command of the whole according to the dates of their regimental commissions.

It is admitted by all parties that the Artillery, serving in India, should be composed almost entirely of Europeans, and be maintained in a thorough state of efficiency, ready

at all times to undertake the important part they are called upon to sustain in the event of war; and, keeping this fact in view, it will be found that the proposed establishment has been fixed on as low a scale as is consistent with the great end to be attained. Nor should it be forgotten that 30 men per gun has always been admitted as being absolutely requisite for ordinary European service, whilst the Royal Artillery in the Peninsular, and, more recently, in the Crimea, averaged nearly 40 per gun, which was never found to be too great a number.

It may here be observed, that most continental nations adopt the latter average, and the first Napoleon laid it down that no gun should ever take the field with less than that number, whilst the late Sir Alexander Dickson, considered 35 necessary.

General Mansfield strongly exemplifies the danger of undermanning guns and recommends 30, which has been taken as the basis in preparing the new establishment, which will be found less in actual numbers than when the Indian batteries were composed of part Europeans and part Natives.

European artificers are recommended, as, although during the very hot season they are unable to do much work, yet having a few to each battery will ensure to the captains, and that whatever requires doing will be properly performed, and they will feel in consequence greater confidence in the efficient state of the whole of their matériel, constituting, as it does, the main strength and thorough usefulness of all Field Artillery.

There is no doubt that every Artillery soldier whether gunner or driver, should be able to assist in working the guns, but, for the present, this would manifestly be impracticable, until the corps is in a more complete state, when officers would be held responsible, that, not only the drivers are instructed in gunners' duties, but that the gunners should be taught to ride and drive, so that every man on an emergency would be available for any duty required of him; and it must be distinctly understood that every battery is to be available at all times for field, siege, or garrison purposes as the Commander-in-chief may think it necessary to order.

MEMORANDUM showing the Present and Proposed ESTABLISHMENT of the ARMY.

	Cavalry Regiments.	Infantry Regiments.		Cavalry Regiments.	Infantry Regiments.
Present establishment of the army, exclusive of household troops	25	131	Present Distribution:—		
			India { Bengal - - - - -	5	50
			{ Madras - - - - -	2	7
			{ Bombay - - - - -	5	16
				12	73
			Required as detailed below	10	65
			To be withdrawn	8	48
			At home - - - - -	13	30
			Colonies - - - - -	—	23
				13	53
			General total	25	131
8 regiments of local cavalry raised for Bengal, to be numbered 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26	8	—	The requirements of the Service are—		
12 regiments of local infantry raised for India, to be numbered as follows:—	—	12	As detailed below { Bengal - - - - -	12	45
6 at Bengal, to be numbered 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, and 106.	—	—	{ Madras - - - - -	3	13
3 at Madras, 107, 108, and 109.	—	—	{ Bombay - - - - -	3	9
3 at Bombay, 110, 111, and 112.	—	—		18	67
			At home - - - - -	15	62
			Colonies - - - - -	—	38
				15	90
The royal army, European, (exclusive of household troops) will then consist of - To complete the requirements of the service	33	143	Total	33	157
	—	14	Present Establishment	26	131
	33	157	Difference	8	26
			At present raised for India	8	12
			Remaining to be raised	—	14

The calculation of the number of battalions requiring to be raised is made on the assumption that the requirements of the Indian service will demand the permanent employment of 67 battalions of European infantry. On this point, however, it is clearly impossible at present to form any certain opinion. It may be hoped, as the country becomes thoroughly pacified, and the native population disarmed, admitting of the disbandment of a large portion of the native army, also as the system of railroads becomes developed, that a considerably less European force may be required than is above estimated. In that case it may well be possible to withdraw so many battalions from India that the addition of 14 foot battalions may not become necessary. And with a view to such a contingency, it would therefore be expedient, at all events to suspend for the present the raising of such battalions. The army would thus remain for the time at its present strength, and the Indian finances would be relieved from the necessity of any immediate outlay for the levy of fresh troops,—a consideration of great importance in a financial point of view.

PROPOSED STRENGTH OF EUROPEAN TROOPS for INDIA.

Presidency.	Artillery.			Cavalry.		Infantry.			Total at each Presidency.		Pre-sidency.	
	Troops and Batteries.	Companies.	Strength.	Regiments.	Strength.	Regiments.	Strength.		Infantry reckoned at 500 per Regiment.	Infantry reckoned at 300 per Regiment.		
							At 900 each.	At 300 each.				
BENGAL - {	14 Troops Horse Art. 24 Batteries	16	10,310	12 Line at 700 8 Local at 600	6,800	45 39 of the Line, 6 Local.	40,500	35,000	Artillery Cavalry Infantry	63,310	59,310	BENGAL.
MADRAS - {	7 Troops Horse Art. 24 Batteries	8	6,738	3 Line at 700	2,100	13 10 Line, 3 Local.	11,700	10,400	Artillery Cavalry Infantry	20,538	19,238	MADRAS.
BOMBAY - {	7 Troops Horse Art. 10 Batteries	8	5,218	3 Line at 700	2,100	9 6 Line, 3 Local.	8,100	7,200	Artillery Cavalry Infantry	15,418	14,518	BOMBAY.
Total in India	132	32	28,472	18	11,000	67	60,300	52,600		99,772	93,072	

N.B. This force of artillery includes the 1st Regiment Royal Artillery, of which there will be five brigades and four troops of horse artillery, completing the number of guns in India as proposed by Lord Canning.

Horse Guards, December 28, 1858.

GEORGE.

APPENDIX No. 74.

NOTES on the EVIDENCE taken before the COMMISSIONERS appointed to Inquire into the Organization of the Army, at present Serving in the Pay and under the Control and Management of the Honourable the East India Company.—By the MARQUIS OF TWEEDDALE.

THE experience we have gained of the slight dependence we can place on the faithful services of the Bengal army, composed of high caste men, is a sufficient warning to us for the future, whilst on the other hand, the conduct of the Bombay and Madras armies, composed for the most part of a different class, has shown how necessary it is for the British Government to consider from what class the native army of Bengal should in future be raised.

With such experience, it appears to be our interest to enlist men into our service whose position will be raised in their own estimation, as well as in that of their fellow-countrymen, by serving in the native army on terms of equality as soldiers with those who formerly thought themselves by birth, from their high caste, or any other cause, their superiors. Caste must in future be disavowed in the native army, in all the duties of a soldier, but this disavowal of caste should in no way interfere with the private life of the native soldiers. It will also be necessary to consider what proportion the different nationalities or castes should bear to each other. At present we have too great a proportion of Mahomedans in the Madras army, we have it in evidence, that there is 35 per cent. of Mahomedans in the infantry, and the cavalry are high-class Mahomedans; with few exceptions they are excellent soldiers, but not to be trusted by a Christian government, when the standard of the Prophet or of the descendant of a Mahomedan emperor has been unfurled, as it would be contrary to their own religious faith to act in support of Christians.

The native army cannot be commanded or ruled by conciliatory measures involving concessions, which they will attribute to weakness or timidity, or by favouring one class more than another, but by strict discipline, based on principles of full and ample justice to all. It is not the native, but the European force, which must form the basis of our power in India, and its security ought to be our first consideration, so that it may be a pillar of strength in maintaining the peace of the country, in giving protection to our revenue and judicial officers in the execution of their duties, and in enabling Government to carry out such beneficial measures as will ameliorate the condition, and secure protection to the peaceful and industrious classes of the native population.

To make everything secure for the future, and to impress on the native mind our determination to leave nothing to chance, permanent fortifications must be erected in those parts of the country which contain an excitable, a military, or a lawless population. In selecting positions for these fortifications, consideration must be given to the health of the European force, their site should depend on the nature of the country, the railroad communication, water carriage, and a sufficient space for magazines, arsenal, wells, tanks, casemated barracks, and accommodation for the families of the soldiers. They must be so constructed, that in the event of any portion of the garrison being required for service in the field, the equipments and families, as well as the incumbrances of other troops belonging to the district, may be safely left under a small, but sufficient force for their protection.

The navigation of the principal rivers should also be made safe for the transit of goods, military stores, and all munitions of war. A marine force should be raised and disciplined for the working and management of a river flotilla of gunboats; this marine corps should be enlisted for general service in the East, as recommended by the late Duke of Wellington.

To make railroads generally available for military purposes, short lines to connect the commercial lines of railroad will be found necessary.

A corps of camels and elephants should be attached to each corps of the army, for the rapid transport of light troops within its district. The elephants should be trained to render assistance to the artillery in difficult ground.

With such means and conveniences for the transit of stores, ammunition, and all requisites for military purposes, the armies would at all times be ready to take the field fully equipped.

In order to enable the three armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay to afford each other mutual support, it will

be necessary to have a railroad running through the centre of the Peninsula, having one terminus at Ghooty in the Madras presidency, and passing by Hyderabad, Nagpore, and Jubbulpore, having its other terminus at Allahabad. The southern terminus would be on the Madras and Bombay railroad, the line would cross the Bombay and Calcutta railroad at Jubbulpore, and have its terminus on the Calcutta trunk railroad, leading to Agra and the north-west. With such a communication by rail, a large force could be readily thrown into the Nizam's, Nagpore, and Bundelcund territories. In Hyderabad there is a numerous, turbulent, and lawless population of Pathans and other Moslems, and in the interior of the Nizam's country the zemindars live in feudal grandeur, in forts, retaining Arabs as their defenders.

A permanent fortification, to be held by Europeans, near Hyderabad and another near Nagpore, would enable the garrisons to keep the two principal towns in check, and render disposable the greater part of their garrison for occasional service in the field.

In the event of the Madras army occupying the Saugur and Bundelcund territories, it would be well to consider the distance that Madras troops will be from their own presidency and place of enlistment, and whether therefore, Madras corps can be sent for garrison duty to the stations in these districts, without serious inconvenience, as the greatest difficulty will be experienced in carrying out the recruiting, in withdrawing the non-effective men, and in arranging the reliefs. The Madras sepoy, it must be remembered, are generally married men, and when proceeding on field service leave their families in depôt at any convenient station, but when moving from station to station for garrison duty they take their families with them, an arrangement not simply of their own choice, but unavoidable, for when serving in garrison, and consequently without batta, the men have not the means of supporting their families at a distance apart from themselves. This is noticed as a point which must be kept prominently in view in any measure connected with the location and relief of the troops.

The distance from Ghooty, in the north of the Madras presidency, (through which the contemplated railroad from Madras to Bombay will run) to Kamptee is 520 miles, from Kamptee to Jubbulpore 200 miles, from Jubbulpore to the centre of Bundelcund 100 miles, or an average of 800 miles from Ghooty to the cantonments in Bundelcund.

It would appear that if the railroad from Bombay to Calcutta is to pass through Jubbulpore, it would be a more convenient arrangement for the Bombay army to take the Saugur district, and the Madras army the Southern Mahratta country and Doab, unless a railroad is to be made, as I have indicated, from Ghooty to Jubbulpore, which would then place the Madras army on an immediate transit communication with its own presidency.

In peaceable districts, the natives should be made to register their arms, and they should be subject to a heavy penalty in the event of arms being found in their possession unregistered. In districts where the inhabitants have shown a turbulent or unruly disposition, they should be disarmed, as in Malabar, where the moplabs, a fanatical Moslem population, have been disarmed, and regulations and laws enacted empowering the magistrate to punish or restrain this turbulent class.

The uniform of all arms should be more attended to, and made more suitable to men undergoing fatigue in a tropical climate. The European barracks should be made airy, and accommodation should be afforded to married men and their families in barracks suitable for their position.

1. *The proposition of European to native troops to be employed in Bengal.*

If I am to assume that the population of Bengal, and of those districts where the Bengal army is to be employed, have a deadly feeling of hostility to our rule, it will be a difficult matter to say what amount of force will be required to maintain our superiority in these territories. There may, indeed, be predatory tribes, such as the Gogras and Bheels, or excitable Mahomedans, such as the Walabees, who will at any time take advantage of any disorganization of our military force; but the experience of others, as well as my own, justifies me in taking a more favourable view of the feeling of the great majority of the inhabitants as well as of the native soldiers; the desire of the former, I believe, is to live under a just and humane government, secure from the scenes of rapine and murder to which the mutiny of the Bengal army has led; and the Bengal army itself, in

former days, when kept under strict discipline, has displayed all the good qualities of soldiers, that have justly given it the reputation of a noble and faithful army.

It does not appear to me that the recent mutiny or revolt had any connexion with the industrious body of the inhabitants, but it had its origin in the widespread influence and organization of the fanatical leaders of a section of Mahomedans, who were always ready to take advantage of every occasion to assert the supremacy of the Mussulman dynasty and their faith. To accomplish this, they were regardless of the means they took to effect their object. They could not have selected a more opportune occasion than when the discipline of the Bengal native army was so defective and impaired. We have it in evidence (Qu. 3701) that a sepoy who fancied himself aggrieved by any act of his commanding officer, upon a trifling occasion, could appeal against him and make a representation to the commander-in-chief direct (Qu. 3705), without passing through the intermediate authorities. Such an act is contrary to the rules of military service and the maintenance of discipline; the consequence has been, that the regimental officers felt that the sepoy did not care for their authority (Qu. 3706, 3713). As might have been anticipated, this has become more and more apparent during the last twenty years.

It also appears that the commander-in-chief, with the approval of the Governor-General, altered the regulations, so as to limit or circumscribe the powers of commanding officers (Qu. 3716, 3719).

Enough, therefore has been given in evidence during the investigation to establish the necessity of a change in the system of carrying on the discipline of the Bengal army.

In the history of our rule in India it is known that insubordination has not been confined to the native ranks alone, it has been witnessed in the ranks above them, amongst those who ought to have set a better example.

This insubordination is still fresh in the memory of many old native officers. If on no other account, this alone ought to make us lenient in dealing with the sepoy. Even-handed justice requires that we should not treat the sepoy with more severity than we have treated those of our own race.

The superiority of European discipline, the bravery of our officers and soldiers, their endurance under privation and fatigue, and all those high qualities which distinguish the character of the British officer and soldier, have been so manifested of late to the natives as to leave no doubt on my mind that they will be inspired with more and more terror of what they consider our magical power. On this ground, I think we may safely trust the native soldiers to a large extent. At the same time recent experience teaches us that we should be prepared with all those measures of foresight and protection necessary to meet any emergency which may arise in future.

Impressed with these views, and considering that in the reconstruction of the Bengal army natives of mixed caste and creeds will fill the native ranks, it appears to me that one European, of the effective European force, to three natives, is a sufficient balance; at the same time, while I consider a large European force to be necessary, I do not see the necessity for the strength of the native army being kept up to the proportion indicated—three natives to one European,—as I look on it as a mere auxiliary force.

2. Amount of force which will be required in Bengal hereafter.

In forming any opinion on the amount of force required for the duties of the Bengal army, there are some considerations of importance which must be well considered. These are as follows:—

Are permanent fortifications, such as I have described, to be erected?

Will railroads and water carriage be made available for moving troops to a general point of rendezvous in the event of an outbreak?

Is the artillery in future to be European, with only a few native batteries for frontier service, or for localities not suited for the European constitution?

Is the regular cavalry to be European in future?

Is there to be a camel or elephant corps for moving small bodies of troops rapidly in case of minor outbreaks?

Are the natives to be disarmed in lawless, turbulent, or fanatical districts?

Are native soldiers to be armed with an inferior class of arms to that of Europeans?

Is there to be a regular effective police establishment?

If these questions are answered in the affirmative, fewer European troops will be required.

Until the fortifications, railroads, &c. are completed, the following is the amount of the effective force which I consider necessary for Bengal:—

<i>Europeans.</i>	
Artillery - - - - -	12,040
Infantry - - - - -	28,000
Cavalry - - - - -	9,000
Sappers - - - - -	400
<hr/>	
Total effective European force - - -	49,440
Add for sick and casualties 20 per cent.	9,888
<hr/>	
Total Europeans - - -	59,328

<i>Natives.</i>	
Regular infantry - - - - -	37,400
Irregular infantry - - - - -	37,400
Marine corps - - - - -	8,000
Sappers - - - - -	2,000
Gun lascars - - - - -	2,100
Besides such number of irregular cavalry as may be found necessary by the authorities in India. There have hitherto been twenty-four corps of irregular cavalry, I therefore put down 14,000	
Military police force, about which I require further information; in the meantime say - - - - -	10,000
<hr/>	
Total of natives - - -	110,900
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Total of army - - -	170,228

On the completion of the railroads and other works above mentioned, I consider that the following reduction in the strength of the army may be made:—

<i>Europeans (Effectives).</i>	
Artillery - - - - -	2,580
Infantry - - - - -	5,600
Cavalry - - - - -	1,800
<hr/>	
Casualties, &c., 20 per cent. - - -	9,980
	1,996
<hr/>	
	11,976
<i>Natives.</i>	
Infantry - - - - -	14,800
Gun lascars - - - - -	480
<hr/>	
	15,280
The sappers, marine corps, irregular cavalry, and military police remaining the same.	
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Total reduction - - -	27,256

The army would then stand thus:—

Europeans, effective and non-effective -	47,352
Natives - - - - -	96,620
<hr/>	
Total - - - - -	142,972

The above calculations are made on the supposition that a considerable civil police force is to be established. It will be necessary to hear officers experienced in Indian police before an opinion can be formed of the number required.

3. Whether the native force should be continued on the regular system, as heretofore, or should the irregular be introduced.

In the Madras presidency there has been little experience of irregular corps of infantry or cavalry. There is a corps of mounted police in Mysore, and another in Kurrul. They have received a military training, and are efficient for their purpose. The absence of regular troops has been supplied by sebandees or hired peons.

In the Nizam's territory and in Nagpore there are irregular regiments both of cavalry and infantry, as well as artillery. I would dispense with the native artillery and cavalry in both the Nizam's and Nagpore territories.

There should be no irregular cavalry in Madras. The Government have never employed any, as has been done in Bengal and Bombay; at the same time, an extension of the system of the Mysore horse to that presidency in special cases might be advantageous.

The uniform of the native troops should be light and suitable to the country and climate where they are to serve.

Their arms should be a smooth barrel musket, but light, and of the same bore as the European musket. More consideration is required as to the shape of the gunstock for sepoys than is given at present. Their accoutrements should be made conformable to their uniform.

The cantonments of the native troops ought to be more substantial. The allowance for hutting is insufficient, and the inconveniences to which the sepoys of the Madras army, on a change of station, are put by the exorbitant demands for carriage to move their families, ought to be remedied. The sepoys often deprive themselves of sufficient sustenance in order to save money to pay for their carriage on those occasions, and much disease is caused by the fatigue they undergo; for after they have performed their day's march, they are obliged to go back part of the road to render assistance to their families, and to bring them into the encampment.

It appears to be a bad system to allow sepoys to hold farms as ryots; they should have one occupation and one object, that of faithfully performing the duty of a soldier. If they are married, their wives should live with them in the lines, except in cases of foreign service, when their presence would be inconvenient. Arrangements in such a case should be made under the direction of the Government for their comfort and support, as it is done in the Madras army.

When the sepoy is on actual service, he should have daily rations issued by the commissary-general, as regularly as the European.

The difference between officers and men as to batta should be abolished, and all should receive alike half batta, except when marching or on field service.

Such native cavalry as are required for particular local service should be irregulars, and their numbers left to the decision of Indian authorities. This appears to be the prevailing opinion of the witnesses.

The success of the Scinde horse, a corps of irregular cavalry, may be attributed to the selection of the European officers, and to a commanding officer of rare attainments for such service.

This regiment has remained true to the Government when most other regiments of irregular horse have mutinied. If selection is necessary in the choice of officers, from what body are they to be selected? It may be said, a competitive examination on first appointment will secure the efficiency of officers for irregular corps. No doubt a military education may give an officer a military turn of mind, and qualify him by good training ultimately to excel in the higher branches of his profession. To excel as an officer of irregular troops, it requires that the officer should have a very practical mind, be energetic, have a thorough knowledge of human nature, be of very even temper, have abundant ingenuity to make shifts in difficulties, and great confidence in natives.

I am not aware in what branch of competitive examination such qualities as those mentioned will become apparent, and without them an officer would not be likely to arrive at the high standard General Jacob has done in command of irregular horse.

If the selection of officers for the irregular service is to be made, as at present, from the officers of the regular army, it would be to disregard all our late experience, to allow the selection of regimental officers being made for the staff, and irregular regiments of cavalry and infantry, and to leave those of inferior qualifications with the regular regiments. May this not be one of the principal causes to which the falling off in the discipline of the Bengal army might be attributed?

4. *Whether the native artillery should be continued.*

The artillery of the three armies should be Europeans, with the exception of a few companies to serve field guns in localities not suited to the European constitution, and

on frontier stations, and the regulation number of gun lascars to each European battery.

The cavalry should also be European light horse, and they should be clothed in a uniform more suitable to the climate.

5. *Whether the native sappers should be continued.*

The sappers of the Madras army, composed of low caste men, have long been a corps of brave and faithful men, in whom the Madras army have the greatest confidence. I had a letter from Lord Saltoun, under whom they served in China, purposely to bring to my notice their conduct as being most exemplary. I had also a letter from Sir Charles Napier, under whom a company fought at the battle of Meeanee, in which he stated that he placed unlimited confidence in their bravery and steadiness. He could only compare them to British troops, and said they were only second to the 22nd regiment of Her Majesty's European infantry. Sir Willoughby Cotton, also, has always spoken to me in the same terms of them during their long service under him in Burmah, in 1824 and 1825.

I do not see how we can avoid employing natives in the scientific branches, such as the making of gunpowder and other parts of arsenal work. These are well known to the natives; they are greater adepts at such works than the European artillerymen, and they can stand the heat of the workshops better.

Any one who has seen a display of fireworks in India must have been impressed with the ability with which they are made, and the talent of the natives for such work.

It appears to me advisable that officers who have been employed in the scientific department, or a conductor who has had experience in an arsenal, should be examined on this point.

It would be well also to call for evidence as to the system of training sappers in the Madras presidency.

6. *Whether the Bengal army should be composed of different nationalities or castes; and if so, in what proportion.*

We commenced the conquest of India with low-caste men; and our experience of the Madras and Bombay armies has proved them to be faithful soldiers to the British Government. We should remember this in the enlistment of our sepoys, and bear in mind, that in the history of native powers, low-caste men, it appears, were formed into elite battalions, which were brought forward to recover the day when the regular army failed and fled.

The native army should be composed of various castes and religions; and when the recruits are enlisted, it should be thoroughly explained to them that no distinction of race or caste will be acknowledged in the army, that all sepoys will be considered on an equal footing in their regiment until they attain the rank of non-commissioned or of native officers, and further, that all sepoys equally must work willingly when the service requires it, under the direction of their officers.

Although the fidelity of the Moslems and high-caste men in the Bengal army has of late been shaken by designing persons, yet, when the army has again been recruited by a general mixture of caste, as in the other armies, we may expect to see the same good effects produced as in Bombay and Madras; still, in all mercenary armies, where no national feeling exists between the soldiers and the Government which pays them, strict discipline, an unvaried observance of the rules and regulations of the service, and the regular payment of the troops, are the best modes of ensuring their faithful services. It will prove so with the sepoys.

If discipline be strictly enforced, and a kind feeling shown to the sepoys by their European officers, I do not doubt that those qualities which they so brilliantly displayed as soldiers in former days will become again as conspicuous under the Queen's Government; and the less personal distrust now shown for what has passed, the sooner will the Government regain the confidence of its native soldiers.

I am decidedly of opinion that no material change should take place in the organization of the sepoys of the Madras native infantry, except that they should be enlisted for general service. The sepoys, having had restored to them the advantages of which they had been deprived, are now willing to go on foreign service.

The sepoys of the Madras army have never, I believe, completely regained the confidence they had in the Government previous to Lord William Bentinck altering the pay,

pensions and allowances of the native army, without consulting the Madras Government, or considering the effect it would have on the sepoy, with whom "Mamoul," or usage, is the watchword.

No doubt the large proportion of Mahomedans in the Madras army has, more or less, created an excitement in that army during the late occurrences in Bengal; and the cavalry of the Madras army have been dissatisfied in consequence of the reduction of their pay which took place some years since; they felt this to be a grievance; they are principally composed of a high class of Mussulmans, who are brave soldiers in the field, but entertain strong prejudices against Christians, with which their own faith, founded on the Koran, inspires them.

If we have a sufficient force of Europeans, I see no occasion to have corps of Africans, Malays, or Arabs, as the introduction of these would be apt to create feelings of jealousy and distrust in the native mind. I am also of opinion that the sepoys of one army should not be taken from the population living under the protection of the army of another presidency. At present no sympathy or national feeling exists between the three armies, and nothing should be done to encourage it.

7. *Whether the Bengal army is to be enlisted under a new code.*

The code of the Madras army has proved sufficient to maintain the discipline of that army when it has been strictly enforced. The Bombay code has had a similar effect. The military codes of these armies have been framed so as to resemble that of the Queen's army, as far as consistent with a native service. I can see no reason against a general uniform code for the native armies, if it is made short, and is thoroughly intelligible to the natives.

Many of the sepoy pensioners are able-bodied men, and are allowed to have their pensions too early in life. After fifteen years' service they receive four rupees a month, and are then often only from thirty-one to thirty-four years of age; something should be done to induce the sepoy to remain longer in the service, and not to leave it in the prime of life, when his soldier-like qualities are at the best.

The native regimental courts-martial should be less complicated; the punchayet system should be much more generally introduced for the punishment of crimes; the sufficiency of the amount of punishment ordered by a punchayet will depend upon the general state of discipline of the army.

The officer commanding a regiment should have power to discharge men of bad character, without a court-martial.

A great inconvenience is felt by the commander-in-chief from not having it in his power to remove majors from one regiment to another, instead of lieutenant-colonels. The practice is as follows:—Majors, on rising to that rank, take their home furlough of three years; on returning, they find their regiment commanded by a lieutenant-colonel, and that junior majors are in command of regiments, and receiving command money. They apply to have the command of their regiment, and if their petition is attended to, the consequence is, that the lieutenant-colonel is removed to a regiment which is commanded by a junior major, and to which he is most probably a perfect stranger. This operates injuriously to the lieutenant-colonel, who may be removed to a regiment hundreds of miles off. This system requires amendment.

The three armies should be enlisted for general service.

8. *Whether commanding officers should have more power than they now have to reward or punish.*

I answer, most certainly.

If the rules and regulations of the service were carried out *strictly*, it would be found that they give sufficient power to commanding officers of regiments, and this would remedy the defects which have been made apparent in the discipline of the Bengal army. But there is too much English law, not thoroughly understood by the responsible officer, to secure a just administration of it in the native courts-martial. The sepoys do not comprehend it, and a more summary investigation and sentence, would be more satisfactory to the natives.

One of the punishments for high military offences is a sentence of hard labour to work on the roads. This is not a native punishment, it interferes with caste and self-respect, and is very unpopular with high caste men, as it subjects them to a punishment which, on its being carried out, may be the cause of their being worked with a low caste man, while the crime in the eyes of the native may not be a disgraceful one.

The discipline of a native regiment does not depend so much on the number of European officers present with the regiment, as it does on the commanding officer and adjutant, and one officer to each company, being thoroughly masters of their business and able to instruct others. Example and regularity in carrying on duty commands the respect of a native soldier more than any other cause. In the Madras army, many regiments have had their full complement of officers on the staff, besides sick and those on furlough, but when commanded by an intelligent officer, who took an interest in the personal comfort of the sepoys and their families, such regiments are always in a good state of discipline. The services of the company officers are always of the greatest consequence, more particularly so in the field. On such service all officers are ordered to join, from their staff and other appointments.

9. *Whether the Bengal army is to be divided into two armies.*

I see no sufficient reason for dividing the Bengal army into two armies.

In the event of its not being so divided, it is obvious, from the military positions which it will occupy, that Calcutta is not a convenient place for the head quarters of the commander-in-chief. Agra appears more central.

When the railroads contemplated have been executed, the cantonments occupied by the Bengal army, European and native, will be supplied from the seaports with all the munitions of war. Stores also of every description will be supplied for the wants of the British soldier, and every facility through them afforded for the transport of troops.

10. *Whether any change is required in the system of promotion as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers.*

The advantages expected from the appointment of native officers, as a medium of communication with the European officers, and as affording the means of ascertaining the state of feeling of the sepoys, where any cause for excitement may have arisen in their minds, have not been realized.

The native officers now attain their rank at an advanced age, which unfits them for active service; and it deserves consideration whether they should not be pensioned according to seniority, when vacancies occur in the native officers' list, from the havildars' seniority list, as a reward for long and faithful services. A certain number of native gentlemen might be allowed to enter as volunteers, until they are reported sufficiently instructed in the duties of the lower branches of the service, and have acquired the attainments in English language and literature required of a cadet on first entering the army. After passing an examination, they would then be qualified for the rank of officer, when they should receive an officer's commission and be entered in the regimental list of officers. They should rise in the regiment by seniority until they attain the rank of major, which should be the highest rank they can attain, unless by selection of the Governor-General for superior rank; this, however, is a question of great difficulty and delicacy.

The Order of India should be the reward for energy, gallantry, and good and faithful service in the field.

The selection of naiks in the native army should be left to the commanding officer of the regiment. The naiks, on promotion, should be placed on a seniority list of havildars, and they should be selected by the same authority.

11. *As to whether there should be any admixture of European and native forces, either regimentally or by brigade.*

The system which obtains at present is suitable for maintaining a sufficient connexion between the European and native troops, viz. one regiment of European infantry brigaded with two of natives.

Police.

The information obtained from the witnesses who been examined about the formation of a police establishment for India does not enable me to give any well considered opinion in regard to the organization of such a force.

A great deal of information about rural and town police is in the possession of Mr. E. Elliot, late head of the police establishment at Madras, who, after thirty years' service in the police, was sent from Madras home, to

inform himself in regard to the organization of the Metropolitan, Manchester, and Rural police of the United Kingdom, as well as of the Irish constabulary force. He is the only person I know who is master of the whole subject, and he is well qualified to give information to the Commission on every branch of a police establishment, practical, theoretical, and financial.

The following is a summary of my views on the reconstruction of the army for Bengal:—

1. I think that the European force must form the basis of our power in India, and that a large force of Europeans is at present necessary.
2. That the native army should not be so large as heretofore, but considered only as an auxiliary force.
3. That the artillery, with limited exceptions, should be Europeans.
4. That the regular cavalry should be European light horse.
5. That native sappers (composed of low caste men) can be safely and usefully employed under the direction of Europeans.
6. That lower caste men should be enlisted.
7. That there should be an uniform code for the three armies, and that the powers of commanding officers should be enlarged.
8. That there is no sufficient reason for dividing the Bengal army into two armies.
9. That native gentlemen should receive commissions in the army, and that non-commissioned officers should be selected by commanding officers. The question, however, is one of great delicacy.
10. That European and native troops should be brigaded as at present.
11. That further information is required on the question of police.
12. That railroads should be completed and made available for military purposes.
13. That fortified commanding positions should be held in important districts.
14. That a marine force, composed of natives, should be raised for the navigation of the rivers.
15. That the natives should be disarmed, or put under strict regulations.

TWEEDDALE, General.

Yester, Oct. 18, 1858

ADDITIONAL NOTES ON THE EVIDENCE taken before the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Organization of the Army in India.

European Troops to belong to the Line, and Local Regiments to be added to the Line.

I agree with those who think that the European portion of the army should be composed of troops of the line,* and that the nine regiments which are now local regiments should be added to the regiments of the line and receive the numbers 101, 102, &c., with the name of the presidency to which they at present belong attached to their number.

*The following civil and military officers support that opinion:—

Sir G. Clerk, Under-Secretary of State for India.

Sir C. Trevelyan, appointed Governor of Madras.

J. G. Thomas, Esq., late Member of Council of Madras.

Major-General Sir A. Wilson, of the Indian army.

With the undermentioned officers of the line army, combining long Indian with general experience.

Major-General Sir Edward Lugard, 26 years experience in Bengal and Bombay.

Major-General O. Felix, 18 years service in Bengal, Bombay, and Madras.

General Sir W. Cotton, 16 years service in Bengal, Bombay, and commanded the Madras troops in Ava, in 1824, 1825, 1826. Commander-in-chief also at Bombay.

Major-General S. Pratt, 25 years service in Bengal and Madras.

Major-General Sir S. Cotton, 30 years service in Madras and Bengal.

Major-General Sir T. H. Franks, 15 years service in Bombay and Bengal.

Colonel R. Wood, 4 years service in Bengal, and military secretary to Field Marshal Lord Hardinge, Governor-General.

General Lord Cornwallis, Governor-General, recorded his opinion in 1794, by desire of the President of the Board of Control.

Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington recorded his opinion in 1812, by desire of the President of the Board of Control.

Whilst these officers all advocate the employment of troops of the line in preference to a local European force, there are other eminent men, as Sir J. Lawrence, the Governor of Madras, &c. &c., who, although approving a local European force, are in favour nevertheless of always maintaining a proportionably large number of regiments of the line in India, manifesting clearly their view of the necessity of maintaining a large number of regiments of the line in India.

Discipline of European Troops to be under the Supervision of Commander-in-chief at Horse Guards.

In common with many influential parties, both civil and military, I attach the greatest importance to the discipline of the European portion of the Indian army being placed under the supervision of Her Majesty's Commander-in-chief at the Horse Guards, in order to insure uniformity of discipline and the improvement of the *matériel* in all branches of the service, as well as that undivided responsibility should rest on the Commander-in-chief of the British army.

Governor-General to have paramount Authority in every other respect. No Troops to be removed from India without Consent of Governor-General in Council.

Although I think that the Royal European army in India should be moveable, and that its discipline should be under the undivided responsibility of Her Majesty's Commander-in-chief at the Horse Guards, the Governor-General must have paramount authority over the European troops in every other respect, after their landing in India; and I would not allow any portion of them to be removed from under his authority without the consent of the Governor-General in Council.

A great many witnesses have been examined on this point. Colonel Durand quotes Lord Elibinstone's words, as the clearest way of expressing his views on the subject. His opinion is expressed in words most explicit, and any one who has held a high situation in India must agree with his lordship. In no way does he express an opinion adverse to the Commander-in-chief at the Horse Guards giving instructions to the Commander-in-chief in India in regard to promotions in and the discipline of the line regiments.

When I was Commander-in-chief at Madras, the Commander-in-chief at the Horse Guards exercised that power over me in regard to the regiments of the line, without interfering with my authority as Governor in Council, and in my opinion with the very best effect. For various reasons I often wished that he had the same power over the local troops I commanded.

Confirmation of Sentences of Courts-martial to rest with Commander-in-chief in India. All Communications as to Discipline to pass direct between local Commanders-in-chief and Horse Guards.

I am of opinion that there are sufficient grounds for placing the confirmation of sentences of courts-martial passed on officers or soldiers belonging to line regiments, where the sentence is one of dismissal, penal servitude, or death, in the hands of the Commander-in-chief in India. It appears to me, however, that all communications about discipline should pass direct between the commander of each of the three armies and the Horse Guards, in order to save time, and all the more so as the Commander-in-chief in India has no means of personally inspecting the regiments in the other presidencies.

The result of experience has shown that Government has diminished the number of troops in India, contrary to the expressed opinion of the Governor-General. It is possible the same thing might in a greater degree be repeated by other governments with dangerous effect. We have seen the country engaged in war, and before its conclusion, instead of the ranks of the army being filled by able and disciplined men, they have been recruited by lads of tender age, in consequence of war being undertaken, and the means of carrying it on not being accurately calculated. We must be more cautious in future. India will prove a great drain on our population in this country.

Discipline of Local Regiments not so good as Line.

I do not look with the same confidence in the feeling and discipline of local European infantry as I do to regiments of the line. The officers do not exercise, nor do they possess the same influence over their men as in corps serving in England. The soldiers are of the same dominant class as the officers, and as they will feel their services essential to

the government, and that they cannot be dispensed with under any circumstances, there will not be the same obedience, nor securities for it, as with the moveable army. Excepting in rare cases, under special commanders, the Company's Europeans are not equal to regiments of the line in discipline and *morale*. If you have local regiments for India they must be enlisted for India. I therefore doubt the possibility of getting the same class of men as for the home army, except in time of war; in general, as a whole, they will be of a lower grade. When they belong to a local army they lose all the ties of home influences; they are for ever separated from parents, relatives, and friends at home, and they lose the independent spirit of the population in which they were brought up. Will there be the same *esprit de corps* in a local regiment? Will a soldier uphold the character of the British army, if he is not one of that army, but only one of a local force? He would never be engaged in general service against men of his own colour and stamina who were commanded by officers of the greatest renown and experience, and consequently he would think less of himself as a British soldier.

It must also be borne in mind, that the Company's European force has been hitherto a small minority, at all times largely out-numbered by the Queen's regiments of the line.

That it is not safe or wise therefore to assume from the very limited experience yet had of such local troops, that when they shall form a large preponderating force, having distinct interests of their own, that they will be found equally loyal and obedient to the Crown with troops of the line.

A local corps, if imbued with a bad or mutinous spirit, cannot be removed or withdrawn from India as a regiment of the line, should that be necessary.

Even in a financial point of view Major-General Tulloch's evidence represents the regiments of the line as not more costly than local corps.

No doubt a local force raised to serve in the East Indies only, would be a wholesome check against the precipitate withdrawal of European troops.

Is there no other check?

And how does this reason agree with the assertion that the administration, responsible to Parliament, will never denude India improperly of Queen's European troops.

It has been asserted that greater security will be obtained, as radical and organic changes are few.

Is it a greater organic change to increase the number of Queen's regiments in India, by adding additional corps to the regiments of the line serving in India?

Or, to change the local corps or army from a small force of a few thousand to a large force of 20,000 or 60,000 men. It has been alleged that the officers of the regiments of the line would neither have time nor inclination to qualify themselves for administrative duty. But it may be fairly urged, that if you throw open valuable offices to qualified men, there will be no want of such men, and past experience does not warrant the supposition that Queen's officers of the line will not be found to qualify themselves where an inducement is held out.

It has been stated in evidence that long residence in India deteriorates the soldier. We should, in time to come, have as little separation as possible from England and English influences, and the more of fresh and purely English feeling and blood that is thrown into our Indian system amongst the officers and soldiers, the more efficiently will the government be served. To a certain extent the higher class of officers of a local army have their English feeling renewed when at home on furlough or on sick certificate. The soldiers belonging to a local army cannot be expected to have the same advantage.

Major-General Sir William Mansfield, chief of the staff to the army commanded by Lord Clyde in India, is of opinion that regiments which have been long in India fight as well as highly disciplined corps just arrived from England. "And although the men of the former are for a time more efficient than the latter, as understanding the climate better, and being more able to take care of themselves; nevertheless, there is by no means the same healthy tone of discipline running through the body in the one as in the other. It is by no means uncommon to see extraordinary sloth and debauchery in such old regiments, and the officers have become so enervated by climate or other causes, that they are unable to check the one and to do away with the other."

Indian Press interferes with Discipline.

Nothing interferes so much with the discipline of the army in India as the encouragement given by the Indian press, to officers to bring before the public their imaginary grievances, by the publication of anonymous letters, which are re-printed in the native newspapers, with the worst effect as regards those in authority.

Ten Years to be the Limit of a Regiment's Service in India, and an annual System of Reliefs to be established.

The most experienced officers think that ten years should be the limit of a regiment's service in India. As it will always be of consequence that the greatest amount of force should be in India at the commencement of the cold season, a regular system of annual relief by a transport communication well matured, would place within the power of the Governor-General in Council an additional force, equal in amount to one-tenth of the European army in India at the commencement of the campaigning season, and of which he might avail himself if it was found necessary to do so.

Exchanges between Officers of European and Native Army, Few Officers brought up in Native Regiments are equal to the command of Europeans.

Great caution should be observed in allowing exchanges between officers who have been brought up in European and in native regiments. The natural bravery of a British officer will always command confidence and make him conspicuous on the field of battle in India, and while experience of the climate will teach him to take care of himself, he will always prove superior to a native enemy. Many able and experienced officers think that few officers brought up in native regiments are equal to the command of a British European regiment, and in their opinion I concur; no doubt there are exceptions, and very brilliant exceptions, to the contrary, and Her Majesty has always the power of availing herself of their services.

It is very important that those who are to command British soldiers in the midst of temptation and difficulties, either in India or elsewhere, should acquire a knowledge of their character and habits in early life.

The system of the Company's army was established on the supposition that officers and soldiers were to spend their lives in India, and to look on that country as their permanent domicile or home. I have stated my reasons for thinking why that system should be modified, and that the European branch of the army should be incorporated with regiments of the line.

Native Regiments and Police to be under Governor-General as formerly. Native Troops and Police to be armed with a Percussion Musket, and not to be trained the same as Europeans.

The European officers of the native regiments of infantry, regular and irregular, and of police corps, will in every respect be under the Governor-General as formerly; they will form a corps having special duties to perform, and be trained accordingly. From the evidence adduced regarding native troops it would appear that the general opinion is that the native army, regular and irregular, and the police corps, should be armed with a good musket having a percussion lock, but not with a Minié rifle, and that they should not be trained to the same nicety of movement as the European regiments. With such a difference in the arms and training there cannot now be the same spirit of emulation which was formerly so desirable amongst the officers of the native and European regiments.

Officers should have some inducement to enter Native Regiments.

Officers ought to have some stimulus or inducement to serve in native regiments; their regimental pay is the same as that of officers of the line serving in the colonies or elsewhere, the only difference being that in native corps allowances are made to officers to compensate or indemnify them for the increased expenses incurred in India. I am inclined to think that many officers would prefer serving with native regiments stationary in India, and receiving Indian allowances, than with regiments of the line, which take their tour of duties in the varied service of the British army.

Officers now unemployed to be appointed to new Regiments.

The mutiny of the Bengal army has thrown many officers out of employment. The services of the infantry officers will be required in the new levies of regular and irregular infantry; the officers of the late cavalry regiments will be again employed, either as officers in the new regiments of European light horse or in the irregular cavalry regiments, and the police will require the services of both cavalry and infantry officers. It is not improbable that some officers may wish to retire on their pensions according to the regulations of the East India Company, while others who prefer belonging to a moveable army may desire to serve in regiments of the line, it being understood of course that all officers must conform to the rules and regulations of the service to which their new corps belongs.

Local European Regiments to be continued for a time and gradually reduced.

As it would be inconvenient to make any great change in the organization and constitution of the army until India is more settled, the local European corps might be continued for a time, and as officers and men decrease in numbers, or are otherwise provided for, those who survive or remain should be drafted into one corps until the whole are exhausted, and all future officers appointed to serve in these local corps, so long as they exist, should receive their commissions as officers of the line, on the understanding that they will be transferred to the new European corps to be raised as regiments of the line.

Military Funds.

If it is an object to maintain the same system of funds in the native army as that which now exists, I cannot help thinking that an arrangement could be entered into with a mutual assurance office (on an understanding that the 8 per cent. given by the East India Company was guaranteed by government), which would afford the same advantages to subscribers as those they enjoy from the various funds which now exist.

Officers to command Divisions or Brigades, or for the Staff, to be selected for their Efficiency.

With every disposition to do justice to the claims of senior officers for the command of divisions, or brigades, or to hold other staff appointments, I think there ought to be a thorough understanding that efficiency for the public service will be the paramount consideration with those who exercise the power of making appointments, either civil or military, and it should ever be borne in mind that it is as necessary to maintain the discipline of the army by officers who possess the highest and most varied qualifications for the discharge of their regimental duties, as it is to select and employ those who are capable of undertaking the duties of staff officers or of holding civil positions, from possessing those qualifications which peculiarly fit them for such appointments.

Long experience has taught me that the officer entrusted with the command of an army should be a man of vigorous mind, which has been cultivated and improved by large experience in war and other ways:—possessed alike of coolness and decision of character, fit for every emergency and knowing all the requirements of an army in the field and elsewhere. He ought also to be able to appreciate the qualifications of others, and to employ their scientific acquirements in the service of the army he commands.

Claims of Merit and Seniority to be left to Commanders-in-chief of Army in India.

To estimate the several claims of merit and seniority must be left to the judgment of the Commanders-in-chief of the different armies of India. It is to him that the army looks for a just distribution of patronage, and no one is more interested in keeping up a high tone of feeling in an army than the Commander-in-chief.

In the Madras army it was unimportant whether the Commander-in-chief was called upon on the day he arrived in the country, to name a qualified officer to fill a particular situation. He had only to desire the adjutant-general to supply him with the half-yearly confidential reports on the conduct of the officers and their various attainments. In this way he had no difficulty in selecting an officer possessing the qualifications required.

Education and Examination of Cadets.

It appears to me that the examination which a young gentleman must at present pass before he receives his commission gives no satisfactory proof that he is at heart a soldier, or that he has been grounded in those qualifications which will make him useful in the various appointments open to him in India. The duties which a regimental officer may be called on to perform in Europe, in the colonies, or in India must not be lost sight of, the most intelligent officers are selected for staff and other appointments, leaving with the regiments those of less ability and education, and frequently having no natural taste for the life of a soldier.

The three Military Colleges to be placed under control of Minister of War; and Commander-in-chief and Council of India to nominate young Gentlemen to be educated.

In future, instead of commissions being given for the military service subject to competitive examination, I would place the three military colleges under the control of the Minister for War, with power to Her Majesty's Commander-in-chief and the Council of India to make

nominations in favor of young gentlemen who desire to make the army their profession.

They would receive a course of military instruction and of other branches of education, which would develop their military qualities, and lay the foundation of those accomplishments that mark the English gentleman and soldier. Periodical reports of their proficiency in study, in languages, of their moral character, energy, and other military qualifications, would indicate the branch of the service for which their attainments best qualified them, and the services of those proving deficient would be dispensed with. If all young gentlemen had to pass such an ordeal before they received their commissions, a selection from a body of regimental officers, possessing high and varied attainments for civil or military appointments, would never interfere with the efficiency of those who remained with their regiments.

The nominees of the Commander-in-chief and of the Council in India thus receiving their education at the same military college, a sympathy of kindly feeling and emulation would be produced among all ranks which would remove the jealousy and heartburnings which are said to exist under the present system.

Artillery for India to form part of Royal Artillery.

I see no force or weight in the arguments of those who wish to continue the system of local European artillery, on the ground of its being more suited to India than the royal artillery, except that the royal artillery is said to be more expensive from having a greater number of gunners attached to a gun, and that a number of grass-cutters and scises must be added to their establishment in India, in addition to the disadvantage of men unaccustomed to the country, and who cannot speak the languages. The first part of this reasoning is a mere question of detail, and in regard to the languages, they will gradually be learned by the royal artillery after their arrival in India, as they have been by the Company's artillery.

Sir Archdale Wilson, an artillery officer of the highest authority, has answered such objections as he thinks to the point, and his opinion confirms me in thinking, that in a military point of view, the local European artillery of India should be merged in and form part of the royal artillery; the two services when embodied will possess the experience and knowledge peculiar to India, as well as all the modern improvements in artillery which originate in Europe.

The royal artillery which served under Sir A. Wilson, landed at Calcutta, where they were equipped, and having, after a long march, joined him at Delhi, they served to his entire satisfaction during the siege.

It is well known that the natives of India have been awed by the Minié rifles, from the distance they carry with so much precision. The sooner Armstrong's 12 and 32-pounder guns are sent out to be used by the contingent and other forces as a part of their *matériel*, the sooner the natives will be brought under subjection; for nothing could produce more effect on their minds, than seeing a 32 lb. shell setting fire to a town at the distance of four miles.

Barracks.

There are, I have no doubt, healthier localities to be found for European troops at no great distance from the sites of the barracks now occupied. In the Madras presidency, with which I am acquainted, the hill station of Ramadroog, near Bellary, is an example, about which there is no difference of opinion.

Mortality in new and old Barracks at Cannanore.

It is well known that there are healthy localities where disease prevails, in consequence of an inferior or bad construction of barracks being occupied by European troops. The station at Cannanore is an example of this. Her Majesty's 25th regiment was stationed at Cannanore; a portion of the regiment occupied the old European barracks, and the remainder occupied the new barrack. The site of the latter is contiguous to that of the former; the old barracks had low ceilings, while the new barrack had no ceiling at all, but ample space for air, as the roof was high and well ventilated. A return of the mortality in the new and old barracks was prepared for me, signed by the surgeon of the regiment, and countersigned by the deputy inspector-general of Her Majesty's hospitals. From this return it appeared that the ratio of mortality in the old barracks was 34 per 1,000, while in the new barrack it was only 16 per 1,000. The average strength occupying the old barracks was 1,774, and the new 431. The return embraced the period from 1st June 1845 to 30th September 1847.

If proper Barracks are constructed on a healthy Site, Troops will be more healthy on Plains of India than in the West Indies. Sanitariums on Hills would be of great benefit.

There seems to be a wide difference of opinion about the most suitable localities where European troops ought to be stationed. The medical authorities, in expectation that railroads will be made available for the movement of troops, give a preference to the hills from sanitary considerations. It is their opinion that localities situated on high ground above the fever range, and below the level where Europeans are subject to diarrhoea, are more suitable to the European constitution. The positions are not indicated and an opinion is merely expressed of the desirableness of such situations being occupied instead of those previously occupied on the plains.

Other authorities, from considerations of defence, say that the bad effects of long marches to and from the hills, from the troops not being at all times within reach of places where their services may be required, and other inconveniences, would counterbalance the advantages that would be gained by a residence on the hills. Looking at it in the view of meeting a rebellious attack, it is necessary to keep the European troops on the plains (4755). And if a proper consideration be given to the quality of the soil on which barracks are built, as well as to their construction in a district which is free from miasmas, epidemics, or other inconveniences, no bad results would follow. I agree with Sir George Clerk, that the troops will be more healthy on the plains of India than they are in the West Indies, or even in many of our European stations; at the same time, I think that sanitariums on the hills for European regiments that are suffering from disease would be of great benefit to the army.

It is generally admitted, that the sites of barracks have been ill selected, and their construction imperfect.

Additional Statistics of Mortality desirable.

From all that is given in evidence, it appears to me, that while the statistics of the mortality of European troops in India are based on the experience of the past, it might be well to ascertain whether the example I have given of the new barrack at Cannanore would be supported by the statistics of the mortality in other well-selected localities, and in barracks built on an improved construction. I confess my distrust of all speculative opinions not based on experience, as regards the preservation of health in warm climates. It is too important a matter to be dealt with as a mere speculative question.

Number of Troops required for Madras.

The number of native troops necessary to do the duties of the Madras presidency will depend very much upon the efficiency and numbers of the police under organization. This presidency is far removed from foreign aggression, the inhabitants are naturally peaceable. If the bad feeling caused by the severe and questionable exactions of the revenue and judicial peons from the simple-minded natives, who come to pay their kist at the collector's catchery, or who are summoned to attend at a judicial court, was overcome by more vigilance on the part of their superior officers than has hitherto been exhibited, much good would result from such a course of action; and if a well organized police be appointed to do the duty of peons, of money escorts, collectors, honorary guards, and such like, fewer native regiments would be required. I agree with the Governor and Commander-in-chief in the number of European regiments required for doing the duty of the presidency proper.

Troops required in Nizam's Territory.

In the Nizam's territory there should at least be two regiments of European infantry, and one of cavalry, six regiments of native infantry, two troops of horse artillery, four horse batteries (9-pounders), and a reserve company of artillery, and three companies of sappers.

A permanent Fortification should be erected near Hyderabad, and new European Barracks.

A permanent fortification should be erected in the vicinity of Hyderabad, where new European barracks, on a healthy site and on the most approved construction, should be built.

Madras Troops should not garrison Posts beyond the Nerbudda.

I have a decided opinion, that the Madras troops should not garrison posts beyond the Nerbudda, for the reasons stated in my notes on the re-organization of the Bengal army. At the same time I see no objection to their serving

beyond that river in times of emergency, if their families accompany them, or if they receive batta for foreign service when their families are left behind, in order that the regiments may be able to move in light marching order.

Troops required in Nagpore Territories, and Tennasserim and Pegu Provinces.

The Nagpore territories, if Jubulpore is to be occupied by Madras troops, will require two regiments of British infantry, and two of British cavalry, two troops of horse artillery, three horse batteries, and four regiments of native infantry. If Seetabuldee is fortified one regiment of European infantry will suffice, but a reserve company of artillery should be added.

The organization of the Tennasserim and Pegu provinces is under the consideration of the local authorities, who are most competent to fix the military establishment required for that country.

Yester, January 1, 1859. TWEEDDALE, General.

APPENDIX No. 75.

Viscount MELVILLE'S ANSWERS to the NINE QUESTIONS proposed by the COMMISSIONERS, 3d August 1858.

1. *The proportion of European to native force to be maintained in the Bengal presidency.*

At present, not less than one third of the whole force.

2. *What amount of force will be required in the Bengal presidency after the country is settled.*

For the Punjab, Bengal, and North-west Provinces, 100,000 men.

3. *Whether the native force in the Bengal presidency shall be on the regular or irregular system, or both combined.*

Both combined; the irregular system being adopted principally for the cavalry; but the chief portion of the infantry to be regular.

4. *Whether any native artillery shall be allowed in the Bengal army.*

I am of opinion that native artillery cannot be altogether dispensed with, but the number must be limited to the necessity.

5. *The same question with regard to sappers and miners.*

Native sappers and miners, or a corps of pioneers, for the laborious duties, from which it is advisable that Europeans should be relieved as much as possible, will be required.

6. *Whether the Bengal native army should be composed of different nationalities or castes, and if so, in what proportion.*

Of all castes, without distinction, where the man is physically fit for service.

7. *Whether the native army of Bengal is to be enlisted under a new code.*

For general service.

8. *Whether the Bengal army ought not to be divided into two or more armies.*

Not unless a fourth presidency is established, when a division of the army would be rendered necessary.

9. *Whether any change is required in the system of promotion as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers.*

Unquestionably, and should be assimilated to the practice prevailing in the Bombay army, the promotion of non-commissioned officers being left entirely to commanding officers, and who should also select and recommend those they consider the most fit to be promoted to the commissioned rank.

MELVILLE, Major-General.

1st. How far the European portion of the army in India should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as part of the regular tour of service; and how far of troops raised for service in India only?

The answer to this question appears to me to involve the whole principle on which the European force to be employed in India should be constituted. Considering that the Government of India is now to be carried on under the direct authority of the crown, there does not seem to be any reason, when the army becomes a royal army, that it should not be made so in reality, and not merely in name, and that two descriptions of European troops should be maintained, the one being the Queen's army, as now constituted, and the other equally the Queen's army, but organised on a different system, under different regulations, and nominally not actually under the crown. This distinction should now be done away with, and the entire European force to be employed in India should be a royal army, all serving under the same rules and regulations, the same Mutiny Act, and articles of war, and under the same system that has hitherto prevailed for her Majesty's troops serving in India. Difficulties have been stated to exist in effecting this incorporation, but they do not appear to be so insuperable as not to make it desirable to overcome them, for the sake of having one army organized and disciplined on one system, and under the same rules and regulations. Little difficulty can be found in incorporating the artillery and engineers of the late Company's service, as the promotion in these corps is the same as in the royal artillery and engineers, the officers retaining all the rights they now enjoy as to pension on retirement; and all other advantages to which they are entitled, which were in force at their entry into the service of the East India Company. The artillery in point of equipment and organization should be the same in all three presidencies, so that, wherever serving, the stores, arsenals, and magazines may be available for batteries moved for service from Madras or Bombay to Bengal, which is not the case now, and much inconvenience results from the system.

In transferring the nine infantry regiments to the line, these regiments might for the present remain in India until the officers now belonging to them are absorbed; all new appointments being made as in other regiments of Her Majesty's service. No appointments to the army in India should now be made by the Council for India, but the name of every candidate for a Commission should be submitted for the approbation of Her Majesty, in the same way as is now done for commissions in the line. It has been recommended, and it is deserving of consideration, whether all cadets should not, in the first instance, be attached to European regiments for the purpose of learning their drill, and being instructed in their duty previous to being posted to a native regiment. Possibly this might be effected by sending all cadets to a garrison town in the same manner as the Company's engineer officers have been sent to Chatham to go through a course of instruction previously to proceeding to India. The more these officers are instructed in the discipline and interior economy of a European regiment the more efficient they will become, notwithstanding the necessarily different system, in the command of native troops, and should exchanges be permitted, under certain regulations, between officers of the European army and officers of the native army, the latter would be more fit to serve with a European regiment, from having once been instructed in all the detail of duty, than is the case now, from service in a native regiment being so different from what it is in a European regiment. No exchanges to be allowed from a European regiment to a native one without passing an examination in the native language, and officers serving entirely with native regiments till they attain the rank of regimental field officers, and who have never served in a European regiment, should not be allowed to exchange, but should be eligible to all other commands to which their standing would entitle them, whether of a brigade or a division. The subscriptions to all military funds to be voluntary, and no longer compulsory, Government guaranteeing to the present subscribers, who will of course continue on the same footing as at present, all the advantages to which they are entitled from these funds on the retirement from the service. All general officers employed on the staff in India to be nominated by the Home authorities, and such other staff officers as it has hitherto been the practice to appoint, but all other appointments to the staff, and brigade commands to be made by the local governments on the recommendation of the Commanders-in-chief in the different Presidencies, subject to the confirmation of the supreme Government.

No officer to be nominated to the staff by the local government, who has not passed in the native language, except to the command of brigades and divisions, as is at

present the practice. Much stress has been laid on the necessity of maintaining a European force formed for service only in India, on the ground that on a European war arising, troops might be injudiciously withdrawn from India. As the finances of India can only support a certain number of European troops, it is to be presumed that no greater number will be maintained than are absolutely necessary for the security of that empire, and whatever the strength at which that force may hereafter be fixed, it could never be calculated on by any government as forming any portion of the strength of the force necessary to be maintained for service at home, or in the other dependencies of the British Crown. The force for India must be, in addition to the force to be maintained in Europe and the colonies; and as Her Majesty's Government will be as responsible for the safety of India as for the other parts of Her Majesty's dominions, it is impossible to suppose that any Government, especially without the consent of the Governor-General, would endanger the safety of India by the withdrawal of any portion of a force calculated at the minimum ratio of that which will be required. The supposition is so improbable as in no way to counterbalance the immense advantage that will be gained from the whole of the European force in India being organized, disciplined, and equipped on the same system, and under the same rules and regulations. The new raised European cavalry regiments may likewise be transferred in the same way as the nine infantry regiments; or, if thought more advisable, the men might be allowed to transfer their services to the cavalry regiments now serving in India, the officers remaining on the strength of the regiments they formerly belonged to, and new cavalry regiments added to the army at home; formed regiments being sent out to bring up the strength of the cavalry to the number proposed to be maintained in India. All the European officers belonging to native regiments should be required to make themselves acquainted with the Mutiny Act, and Articles of War, and the Queen's Regulations, unless the practice of employing them to sit on courts-martial on European soldiers is discontinued. At present they know nothing about them, and are quite dependent on the Queen's officers who may be on the court for a knowledge of what they ought to do. It is not their fault that they are not acquainted with them, as no copies are ever sent out for their use, and they have very little means of becoming acquainted with them.

In answering the second question, there is but one reply, namely, that the force to be maintained at home shall be of sufficient strength to admit, not only in India, but in all other foreign stations, of a periodical relief every ten years. In the colonies the relief is nominally stated to be every ten years, but it never is; regiments being more frequently 12 or 15 years absent than 10. To give an instance of the period to which the foreign service is extended, the first regiment which I had the honor to command, was 24 years abroad at one time, and in the last 54 years has been exactly ten years in the United Kingdom, and is now in its eleventh year of service in India. The second regiment I commanded has, in the last 34 years, been nine years in the United Kingdom, and is now in its fourteenth year of service in India. No periodical relief can be established unless the force at home is of sufficient strength to enable a certain number of regiments to be constantly in transitu independent of the force which may be required for other duties and emergencies.

The answer to the third and fourth questions are comprised in the foregoing remarks.

MELVILLE,
Major-General.

APPENDIX No. 76.

Lieutenant-General Sir HARRY SMITH'S ANSWERS to the NINE QUESTIONS proposed by the COMMISSIONERS, 3d August 1858.

1. *The proportion of European to native force to be maintained in the Bengal presidency.*
 1. One European to two natives.
2. *What amount of force will be required in the Bengal presidency after the country is settled.*
 2. Eight regiments European cavalry, at 800 each - 6,400
 - Twelve regiments native regular cavalry, at 800 each - 9,600
 - Eighteen regiments irregular cavalry, at 800 each - 14,400

Thirty-five regiments British infantry, at 1,000 each	35,000.
Sixty regiments native infantry, at 1,000 each	60,000
Four hundred and two field guns, of which—	
120 guns, horse artillery	- 20 troops.
282 guns, horse batteries	- 47 batteries.
Divided into battalions.	
402 guns, all nine-pounders.	

This calculation is totally regardless of "battering trains," which must be organized at every great fortification, not as a part of the guns mounted on the "works."

3. *Whether the native force in the Bengal presidency shall be on the regular or irregular system, or both combined.*

3. There are localities where irregular infantry may be required at native courts; this must rest with the Governor General.

I am on principle opposed to irregular troops, but in a country like India, so numerous is the population, that irregular troops frequently absorb roving spirits, and turn to good account those who would be against us.

This is exclusive of the police force now embodied, and contemplated to be embodied.

The force I have named appears to me to be adequate, not only for the preservation of tranquillity in Bengal, including the Punjab, but equal to meet any emergency which may arise on the confines of our territories, its disposition to rest with "the Governor-General" and "the Commander-in-chief." But I venture to recommend that, in lieu of the system which has hitherto prevailed in India, of having so many different posts and stations, the troops should be kept together in large and efficient bodies, ready to move in force, when actually required, and the marching establishment to be maintained for the present.

Nothing so weakens an army, and impedes its rapidity of movement, as to have it scattered as it were over an extensive province, such as Bengal, to which the Punjab is now added; and wherever troops are stationed, there should be a "place d'armes" capable to contain stores, treasure, women, children, and the "impediments" of war, such "place d'armes" to be so constructed that its defence may be ensured by a very small garrison, *defensive alone*.

Engineers are invariably disposed to construct great fortifications, the expense of which is enormous, while they absorb the troops, and cramp the movements of an army.

All duties of a civil and financial character to be performed by the police.

4. *Whether any native artillery shall be allowed in the Bengal army.*

4. No native artillery, most assuredly, but to each troop and battery of British artillery I would attach forty natives of low caste, for duties of fatigue, &c.

5. *The same question with regard to sappers and miners.*

5. The nucleus of this corps must be British. I see no objection to the labourers being natives.

6. *Whether the Bengal native army should be composed of different nationalities or castes, and if so, in what proportion.*

6. There is nothing more important than that the Bengal native army should be composed of different castes and nationalities, from one end of India to the other; and the principle of collecting nationalities in companies is judicious; on the one hand it tends to prevent combination for evil, on the other it creates emulation.

7. *Whether the native army of Bengal is to be enlisted under a "new code."*

7. A very stringent code of military law, or Mutiny Act, and articles of war, to be framed and promulgated, that recruits may be well aware under what law and conditions they take service. "Corporal punishment" to be re-established, and the power of "capital punishment" to be fully provided to punish every act of "mutiny" or "gross insubordination;" and every power consistent with judgment and discretion should be restored or established for the officers commanding corps and regiments.

Increase of pay to be granted for "good conduct" after years service, and pension on discharge after years service.

The issue in India called "batta" is not to be regarded as a right, but as a donation from the Government, under peculiar circumstances.

Enlist for a period of years for "general service," without reference to "caste," and upon the express understanding that every native soldier must perform every duty required of him, as the British soldier does.

The proportion of Mahomedans should be one in four.

8. *Whether the Bengal army ought not to be divided into two or more armies.*

8. I see no advantage whatever in dividing the Bengal army into two; on the contrary, it would add to correspondence, and create obstacles in all combined movements.

9. *Whether any change is required in the system of promotion as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers.*

9. I am of opinion that the promotion to corporals and to sergeants should be vested entirely in the hands of commanding officers, and on the principle of eligibility.

To a commission, eligibility most decidedly, upon the recommendation of the officer commanding, whose power requires to be strengthened in every way, and his authority rendered definite and absolute in all regimental interior economy.

Whenever a sergeant is promoted to a commission over the heads of others on the ground of their ineligibility, these generally worn-out individuals should be invalidated, and obliged to retire on pension.

*A staff corps, if practicable, to avoid denuding regiments of their officers, who ought to regard regimental duty as the first and most important. Regimental officers to be eligible for transfer to this corps after years zealous regimental duty. Every effort should tend to attach officers to their regiments, and those accepting service in the staff corps are not to return to their regiments, but must invalid when nearly worn-out, a fair retiring pension being provided.

As to the occupation of Bengal and the Punjab, this must ever be vested in "the Governor-General" and "the Commander-in-chief;" but the ordinary rules and science of war, as well as the recent revolts, demand that, in a country of the enormous extent in question, exclusively of the small "places d'armes," I recommend; such posts as—

- Peshawur (a strong place d'armes),
- Lahore (a strong place d'armes),
- Umritsir and Gorindghur (already fortified),
- Delhi (works to be improved, and large stores erected),
- Agra (already a work which may be made formidable),
- Gwalior (a citadel to be constructed in the centre of the great fort),
- Lucknow (to be fortified),
- Calcutta (already Fort William),

should be regular fortifications, as depôts for all military stores, manufactories of arms, tents, saddlery, &c. &c. &c.

Care, however, must be taken in the construction of barracks in these fortifications, for the health of the troops is "paramount."

I name the above on general principles, but there are other places, such as "Cawnpore," "Benares," "Allahabad," "Saugor," &c. &c. &c. where places d'armes are indispensable.

The natives in India hold in high estimation "fortresses" and "works," regarding a country that does not possess them as exposed to irruptions; hence, when they see the territory thus held by "works" garrisoned by British troops, their passiveness is ensured.

H. G. SMITH, Lt.-General.

ADDENDUM.

A question now arises: what is to be done with that portion of the native troops who have stuck to their colours, on terms of service, in Bengal?

There are also to be discussed and acted on,—

- Arms for native cavalry.
- Clothing for native cavalry.
- Horse appointments.
- Camp equipage, &c. &c.
- The clothing for the British troops.
- Appointments and camp equipage.
- Clothing for native infantry, arms, accoutrements, baggage, &c. &c. &c.

Then come the all-important subjects,—

- Medical staff.
- Regimental surgeons.
- Inspectors.
- Hospital and field establishments, &c. &c.; than which, when I served in India, from 1839 to 1847, nothing could be less efficient.
- "Commissariat."

H. G. SMITH, Lt.-General.

Manchester, October 3, 1858.

* Evidence subsequently received induced me to alter this opinion in my Report of the 23d December 1858.

REPORT of Lieut.-General Sir HARRY SMITH.

THE Commission appointed by Her Majesty's warrant, under date 15th July 1858, for the purpose of inquiring into the organization of the army late in the service of the Hon. the East India Company, and of reporting what changes it may be expedient to make in the system now obtaining in the armies of India and the troops of the line; having assembled from time to time, and having taken the evidence of various officers in the civil and military employ of the late Company, many old hands who served previously to the revolt of the Bengal native army, and very many officers, civil and military, recently returned fresh from the field of operations, and having received minutes upon the subject from the Governor-General (who also sent over his military secretary, Colonel Durand), from the Governors of the respective provinces, from the Committee of Punjaub, from the secretary to Government, and from various other public functionaries high in office, civil and military, came to the decision, on the 9th of December instant, that, on or before the 1st of January 1859 each member of the Commission should transmit, separately, his written opinion previous to a General Report being framed. Sufficient evidence, both oral and documentary, having been taken to enable the Commission to arrive at a conclusive opinion.

I annex my view of this great question, derived from so extensive a field of information, and in some degree sanctioned by military services in India, proceeding to reply seriatim to the "Twelve Questions" embodied in the Order for the Assembly of the Royal Commission on the armies of India of the 15th June 1858.

1. The terms on which the army of the East India Company is to be transferred to the Crown?

1. This is comprehensively provided for in sections 30, 56, and 57 of "The Act of Parliament for the better Government of India," under date 2nd of August 1858.

2. The permanent force necessary to be maintained in the Indian Provinces, after the restoration of tranquillity?

BENGAL.

Eight regiments of European cavalry, at 800 each	6,400
Twelve regiments native regular cavalry, at 800 each	9,600
Eighteen regiments irregular cavalry, at 800 each	14,400
Thirty-five regiments British infantry, at 1,000 each	35,000
Sixty regiments native infantry, at 1,000 each	60,000
Four hundred and two field guns, whereof—	
120 guns, horse artillery, twenty troops	2,420
282 guns, horse batteries, forty-seven batteries divided into battalions.	5,687
402 guns, all nine-pounders.	
Total for Bengal	133,507

This calculation is totally regardless of "battering trains," which must be organized at every great fortification, not as a part of the guns mounted on the "works," and irrespective also of "police."

MADRAS.

Sir Patrick Grant's Estimate.

Europeans.

Forty-three companies of artillery, averaging 121 of all ranks, (guns, 258),	5,203
Three regiments of dragoons, each 703 sabres	2,109
Thirteen regiments of infantry, each 1,152 bayonets	14,976
Total Europeans,	22,298

Natives.

Four regiments cavalry, each 703 sabres	2,812
Fifty-five regiments infantry, and two battalions of veterans, amounting in all to, bayonets,	63,920
Total Natives	66,732
General total for Madras	89,020

BOMBAY.

Lord Elphinstone's Estimate.

Europeans.

Cavalry	1,492
Horse artillery (guns, 36)	761
Foot artillery (guns, 180)	3,600
Sappers	120
Infantry	9,630
Total Europeans	15,606

Natives.

Three companies African artillery	300
Five companies sappers	620
Twenty-five regiments regular infantry	28,600
Nine regiments irregular cavalry	6,930
Fifteen regiments irregular infantry, including marine battalion	11,000
Total natives	47,450

General total for Bombay - 63,056

Bengal	133,507
Madras	89,020
Bombay	63,056

General total for the three Presidencies - 285,583

3. The proportion which European should bear to native troops, in infantry, cavalry, and artillery, respectively?

3. Invariably one third European in the armies of the three presidencies.

4. How far the European portion of the army should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as part of the regular tours of service; and how far of troops raised for service in India only?

4. Upon all the evidence adduced I found my opinion that no European local force should be maintained; the whole to be troops of the line.

"The local European regiments now existing in the three presidencies to be at once embodied with or absorbed in Her Majesty's regiments of the line, numbering them from the 100th regiment onwards; every care being taken that strict faith be observed with the officers about to be thus amalgamated; the regiments, as previously stated, being at once absorbed, and numbered with the line.

5. In connexion with this question, the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion, and of securing the efficiency of the latter.

5. Regiments to be relieved every 10 years, generally via "The Cape of Good Hope;" the voyage being most beneficial to the troops, reserving the route, via "Suez," for cases of peculiar emergency.

6. Whether it be possible to consolidate the European forces, so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other, and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object, with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now in the service of the East India Company?

6. There is great difficulty in meeting this question. Some of the best suggestions are those laid before the Commission, in a memorandum by Colonel Wood, its secretary, and formerly military secretary to the late Lord Hardinge, when Governor-General. I allude to the plan he proposes for the transfer of the "European Troops" to the "Land," and that for the general amalgamation of the European and native forces.

7. Whether there should be any admixture of European and native troops, either regimentally or by brigade?

7. This is a matter of command; there ought, however, to be no regimental admixture whatever beyond 40 men per troop and company to be attached to the artillery, the operatives attached to the engineers, and the various and absolutely requisite number of camp-followers, in a climate like that of India.

Brigades should always consist of one regiment of the line, and two native regiments.

8. Whether the local European force should be kept up by drafts and volunteers from the "Jane," or should be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain?

8. This question is fully answered in the reply to query 4. viz. :—"No European local force whatever to be maintained."

9. *Whether it would be possible to raise any regiments in the colonies, either for temporary or permanent service in India?*

9. It is not considered possible to do so, nor does the evidence adduced regard it as expedient, when peace is established.

10. *Whether the native forces should be regular or irregular, or both: and if so, in what proportions?*

10. Both combined; for proportions, vide answer to query No. 2.

11. *Whether any native artillery corps should be sanctioned?*

11. No native artillery whatever, in any locality.

It is advanced in evidence that there are some few localities, so pernicious to the health of Europeans, as to render it absolutely necessary: I say, withdraw artillery from such stations, rather than infringe upon the general principle.

To each troop and battery I would attach 40 natives, of low caste, to relieve the Europeans from duties of fatigue.

12. *Whether cadets, sent out for service with native troops, should, in the first instance, be attached to European regiments, to secure uniformity of drill, and discipline?*

12. Assuredly; teach the cadets the duties of soldiers, by attaching them to regiments of the line in the first instance; especially now, as all the troops in India are royal, and to be amalgamated.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

1. The European troops, of every description, to be as now as to discipline, organization, interior economy, the regulated reliefs of regiments (which imperatively ought to arrive in India in the month of November), confirmation of promotion, first commissions, &c. &c., under the paramount authority of the Queen, and the orders of the Commander-in-chief at home.

2. The native royal armies to be as now, *three armies, distinct and separate from each other.* Under the orders of the Governors and Generals commanding of the three presidencies.

3. The native troops, for *the present*, to be armed with the old percussion musket.

4. The Governor-General, and the Commander-in-chief in India to possess the paramount authority over all the troops in the three presidencies, exercising this unlimited power through the Governors and Commanders of the forces of Madras and Bombay.

5. All interior military arrangements during peace in these respective presidencies to rest with the Governors and Commanders of the forces, nor would military discretion and judgment order any body of troops to be withdrawn from the minor presidencies, without previous intimation and reference.

6. The Commander-in-chief in India ought most assuredly to occupy a central position in the "Upper Province of Bengal."

7. The presidencies to remain as now established, viz. :—

Bengal	-	} This, I admit is rather political than military.
Madras	-	
Bombay	-	

8. In Bengal, the Governor-General and the Commander-in-chief of all India.

9. In Madras, the governor of the presidency and a commander of *the forces*, in whom should be vested, under all ordinary and peaceful circumstances, the disposition of regiments, the construction of fortifications, the appointment of staff-officers (confirmed by the Governor), and regimental promotions of the native royal troops.

10. Bombay to be precisely the same.

11. The Generals in supreme command in the three presidencies, to hold warrants vesting them with the power to convene and to confirm the sentences of general courts-martial awarding the punishment of death, or its mitigation.

GENERAL STAFF.

12. The army in India being greatly increased in troops of the line, cavalry, and artillery, the staff of these must be considered accordingly.

13. The appointments of Commander-in-chief, and Commanders of the forces in the minor presidencies, to be

made by the Queen, at the recommendation of the Commander-in-chief at home, as also

The adjutant-general	-	-	-	} Bengal.
The deputy-adjutant-general	-	-	-	
The assistant-adjutant-general (for artillery)	-	-	-	
The quartermaster-general	-	-	-	
The deputy-quartermaster-general	-	-	-	} Madras.
The deputy-adjutant-general	-	-	-	
The deputy-quartermaster-general	-	-	-	} Bombay.
The deputy-adjutant-general	-	-	-	
The deputy-quartermaster-general	-	-	-	

14. The alteration in the composition of the armies of India, reverses the order which previously obtained. *The Queen's army* is now the paramount force of the Indian empire. *The native royal troops* the auxiliaries.

15. Hence it must be clearly understood, that the Queen's staff-officers in the three presidencies are to be at the head of their respective departments, and to move, organize, and maintain the discipline of the troops, *aided* by the staff of the royal native forces.

16. In the former composition of the armies of India this was not the case; the company's adjutant-general and quartermaster-general moved the armies.

17. A considerable staff must be attached to the native royal forces; of these the local authorities are the only competent judges as to number, &c.

18. My present object is to recommend that the heads of departments in India should be appointed by the Queen through the Horse Guards, which authority Her Majesty would exercise so as to ensure the most efficient officers at the head of each department, selected from the army generally, as hereafter to be amalgamated.

19. The Governor-General and the Governors of the presidencies, to appoint such subordinate staff-officers, commandants of fortifications, &c. as they consider requisite, upon the recommendation of the respective generals in superior command.

20. There ought to be two officers of the quartermaster-general's department, viz., an assistant and a deputy-assistant-quartermaster-general at Calcutta.

21. Troops require great assistance upon disembarkation, and equally so upon the embarkation of invalids, which is frequently occurring; and this department should pay all detachments, as a major of brigade now does, who should be discontinued.

22. These staff-officers should be selected from the troops of the line who have served some time in India.

23. A judge-advocate-general at the head-quarters of each presidency, appointed at the recommendation of the respective Commanders of the forces, subject to the confirmation of the respective Governors.

24. The judge-advocates of the different presidencies should be selected for those offices, with reference rather to their common sense than to any legal knowledge they may possess. The subtleties of the law are not required in military matters, the object is to secure a just sentence, conscientiously, and directly attained.

25. The minor staff appointments, viz., assistants, &c. to be equally divided between the troops of the line, and the native royal troops, in the proportion of the numerical strength of each branch of the army.

26. The control of the general resources for the armies, all military establishments, the implements of war, ammunition, gun-carriages, tents, &c. &c. must ever exclusively rest with the authorities in India. The gun-carriages constructed in India are capital.

27. That proportion of divisional commands now nominated by the Queen, at the recommendation of the Commander-in-chief, Horse Guards, to remain as at present established. The remainder of the local commands to be vested in the respective Governors, and Commanders of the forces.

28. *I do not approve of a "staff corps;" I cannot conceive how it could work beneficially, either to the "staff," the "troops," or the "regiments." Our knowledge of duty, our aptitude for certain classes of it, are never developed until tried; a man may be a right good regimental officer, and yet a regular stick as a staff-officer, and your "staff corps" becomes saddled with inefficient men, while the troops suffer, and the regiments lose able officers.

29. I emphatically recommend the staff of the armies of India to be furnished on the system of "seconding;" which preserves regiments effective in officers, (a matter of vital importance,) and does not banish true, and most valuable regimental feelings and associations.

* In my Report of 3rd October, 1858, I stated an opposite opinion: subsequent evidence on this point has induced me to alter that opinion.

Hospitals.

30. Hospitals, both in camp and quarters, require considerable improvement everywhere,

31. There should be continued, as now, an inspector-general of hospitals at each presidency, the senior being with the Commander-in-chief, the others reporting to him.

32. There is an error which necessity, I fear, compels us to commit, viz., the sending our soldiers to India at too early an age; were it practicable, no man should go to India under twenty-two years of age.

33. A system prevailed when I was adjutant-general in India of holding medical boards up the country on soldiers to be invalidated. The men thus invalidated *should go home*: whereas a second board was held in Calcutta, upon their arrival there, from distances of 100 to 1,400 miles. Many men were rejected as invalids, having improved in health on the march or passage down, and sent back to their corps; their hopes of returning once more to their native land were blighted, and if they reached their regiments 99 out of 100 fell victims to disease; this I assert from experience.

Clothing.

34. The attention of the Government and of the Commander-in-chief is already directed to the clothing in wear by the army in India, and measures to improve it are in progress; formerly, a soldier in India and in Canada was clothed in the same material.

35. It is a difficult question to meet; the seasons of the year vary, the twenty-four hours vary, and a soldier must march all day, and probably sleep in the same clothes at night. Hence, the clothing ought to be of woollen texture, but light, loose, and flexible.

36. The head-dress of the troops in India is ill-adapted to the climate; it should be light, and calculated to protect from the rays of the sun, as well as from the rain.

37. The soldier, upon his arrival in India, ought to be provided, by the respective local governments, with a linen jacket and two pairs of trousers gratis; and also with a head-dress of some material hereafter to be determined on.

38. Our horse appointments cannot be too light, combined with serviceable utility; and our swords ought to be of the best quality.

Railroads, &c.

39. The construction of railroads in India will undoubtedly facilitate the movement of troops, but no general must place implicit dependence on them; they can be alone regarded as auxiliaries, so simple are the means of their partial destruction.

40. Troops by rail move rapidly it is true, but it must be borne in mind that in India you require elephants, camels, &c., for the transport of camp equipage, provisions, &c. &c. and the rail will bring these with the troops undoubtedly; but must unload them at the station, there to remain till the quartermaster-general's and commissariat departments can collect transport. Hence, rail conveyance becomes, as I state, a dubious auxiliary.

41. It has frequently occurred to me that the navigation of the rivers might be most advantageously improved, and made available.

42. I am in principle opposed to irregular troops; but in a country like India, so numerous is the population, that irregular troops frequently absorb roving spirits, and turn to good account those who would otherwise be opposed to us.

43. The time has not yet arrived when native gentlemen might at once be admitted into the army as officers; many of them have served ably and well with the irregular troops, and as tranquility is re-established, I see no reason whatever why native gentlemen should not be received into the service, reserving to the Governor-General and the Governors of presidencies the power of immediate dismissal.

44. The force I have named appears to me to be adequate not only for the preservation of tranquility in "Bengal," including the "Panjab," and the other presidencies; but equal to meet any emergency which may arise on the confines of our territories, its disposition to rest with the "Governor-General," and "the Commander-in-chief;" but I recommend that in lieu of the system which has hitherto prevailed in India, of having so many small and detached posts and stations, the troops should be concentrated in large and efficient bodies, ready to move in force, and the "marching establishment" to be maintained for the present.

45. This is irrespective of the police now embodied, and contemplated to be embodied all over India, of which I make no mention, and which must be *totally separate* and *distinct* from the "Army" and armed with inferior weapons; and all duties of a civil and financial character should be performed by the "police."

46. An army is weakened and its rapidity of movement impeded by being scattered, as it were, over an extensive province, such as "Bengal," to which "the Panjab" is now added; and wherever troops are stationed, there should be a "Place d'Armes" capable to contain stores, "treasure," "Women," "Children," and the "Impedimenta of War;" and so constructed that its defence may be ensured by a very small garrison, *defensive alone*.

47. Exclusively of the small "Place d'armes," I recommend that such posts as—

Peshawur	-	(a strong place d'armes),
Lahore	-	(a strong place d'armes),
Umritsir	}	(already fortified),
Govindghur		
Delhi	-	(works to be improved and large stores erected),
Agra	-	(already a work which may be made formidable),
Gwalior	-	(a citadel to be constructed in the centre of the great fort),
Lucknow	-	(to be fortified),
Calcutta	-	(Already "Fort William,")

should be regular fortifications, as depôts for all military stores, manufactories of arms, tents, saddlery, &c., &c.

48. Care, however, must be taken in the construction of barracks in these fortifications, for the health of the troops is *paramount*.

49. I name the above on general principles; but there are other places, such as "Cawnpore," "Benares," "Allahabad," "Saugor," &c., &c., where places d'armes are indispensable.

50. The natives in India hold in high estimation "fortresses" and "works," regarding a country that does not possess them, as exposed to irruption. Hence, when they see the territory thus held by "works," garrisoned by British troops, their passiveness is ensured.

51. Engineers are invariably disposed to construct great fortifications, the expense of which is enormous, while they absorb the troops and cramp the movements of an army.

52. It is established generally by evidence, that the royal native armies should be composed of different "castes," and "nationalities," from one end of India to the other; and the principle of collecting nationalities in companies is judicious; on the one hand it tends to prevent combination, on the other it creates emulation.

53. A very stringent "code of military law" or "Mutiny Act and Articles of War," should be framed, that recruits may be well aware under what law and conditions they take service.

54. "Corporal punishment" should be re-established; and the power of "capital punishment" fully provided to punish every act of "mutiny" or "gross insubordination;" and every power, consistent with judgment and discretion, should be restored or established for officers commanding corps and regiments.

55. Courts-martial on natives should hereafter be composed of regimental (instead of native) officers, and detachment courts-martial should be authorized wherever occasion demands.

56. Increase of pay should be granted for "good conduct," after years' service; and "pension on discharge," after years' service.

57. The issue in India called "Batta" should not be regarded as "a right," which has often originated a spirit of mutiny, but as a donation from the Government under peculiar circumstances.

58. Enlist for a period of twenty years for "general service," and upon the express understanding that every native soldier must perform *every duty* required of him, as the British soldier does.

59. The proportion of Mahomedans should be one in four.

60. I am irrevocably opposed to any division of the army in "Bengal;" the strength of all commands consists in the absolute and undivided authority of the General-in-chief, of course under the supreme local authority, "the Governor-General."

61. With reference to regimental promotion, I am of opinion that the promotion to "corporals" and to "serjeants" should be vested entirely in the hands of commanding officers, and on the principle of "eligibility."

62. To "commissions," eligibility most decidedly upon the recommendation of the officer commanding, whose power requires to be strengthened in every way, and his decisions rendered definitive, and without appeal in all regimental interior economy, promotions, &c. Great injury to discipline has arisen from soldiers preferring complainants after the decision of the commanding officer of the regiment has been given.

63. Whenever a serjeant is promoted to a commission over the heads of others, on the ground of their ineligibility, these generally worn out individuals should be invalidated and obliged to retire on pension, if the *native officers be continued*, the expediency of which is *very doubtful*.

Treatment of the Royal Native Troops.

64. In a memorandum by Lieutenant-General Sir Patriok Grant, (dated 29th June, 1857,) detailing various causes of the revolt of the Bengal Sepoys, he says:—"Further, these officers are discontented, only looking forward to leave their regiments for some more pleasant employment, so that they perform unwillingly the bare outline of their duty, and never, as a general rule, mix or converse with their men; but, on the contrary, too often refuse to listen to their complaints; at the best telling them to 'go to the adjutant,' and not unfrequently to 'go to ———, and 'don't bother me.'"

65. This is so pernicious, so monstrous, so opposed to all discipline and soldier-like feeling, that I cannot avoid to comment upon it.

66. The ruling feelings among colored men throughout the world are "fear" and "self-interest." The influence of these will be brought to bear, by the exercise of judicious, yet *absolute command*, founded on just and equitable principles. The native soldiery should be taught to regard the articles of war as imperative and definitive, ensuring discipline, protecting the good, and coercing the bad.

67. Officers of all ranks should mix with their men, as much as is compatible with discipline; attend to their wants, comforts, &c.; and, in short, make them clearly see and understand that the interest of officers and soldiers is one and the same; and that the great object of the former is the welfare and happiness of the latter, which is to be attained alone by implicit obedience on the one side, and by that fraternal kindness and attention on the other, which elevates military authority.

68. The officers have this part of their duty zealously to perform; but they must ever bear in mind that the native is suspicious and capable of the most profound cunning and dissimulation.

69. No portion of mankind is more susceptible of kindness than the "colored races;" but it must be a manly, judicious, and discriminating kindness, based upon a distinct understanding on the part of the Sepoy, that although the British soldier is a comrade and a brother, he is also his superior as a man of indomitable courage and endurance, and that the Sepoy only approaches his military position by being officered by British officers and associated with troops of the line.

70. Another point I desire to record for the observance of officers, viz., that whatever may be the virtue or otherwise of the religion professed by the natives, it should be scrupulously respected by officers; and nothing but imperative military duty (the service for which they are enlisted) must interfere with either their religion, caste, or prejudices.

71. There is no doubt that the late revolt originated, or was accelerated by a firm belief that the government contemplated their forcible conversion; a feeling for which, *however erroneous*, some ground was afforded by the fanatical zeal of a few individuals in positions of military authority, though far from sanctioned by the government of India.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

72. In the foregoing observations I have avoided detail; the outline of the composition of this vast army is that on which alone I have dwelt (its minutiae are local matters), desiring to regard India as part and parcel of the British empire, whose interests should be one and undivided, and its defence based upon a general levy of its military resources.

73. Those who apprehend danger to India from the withdrawal of any portion of the troops of the line, should remember this mutual and *inseparable interest*, as well as the energetic manner in which troops were poured into that country during the late crisis, and they must then feel assured that the government of England will ever equally provide for the maintenance of British supremacy in India.

74. Military opinions must be based upon military principles, and no wise government will ever wage two distinct and distant wars at the same period, if avoidable; nor will any *able government attempt to divide its resources for two separate and incongruous objects*, such as England, with all her numerous colonies, and the vast empire of distant India, but will rather rally and concentrate those resources of men, &c. upon which so great a strain is laid, as England has, by recent events, been compelled to sustain.

75. India was won by the sword, and by the sword of its *conquerors* it must be retained. History produces no example where for any *lengthened period* a conquered

territory has been maintained in subjection and tranquillity by the agency of troops raised from among its *native inhabitants*; sooner or later they have revolted, as recently in India.

76. Hence, I again advocate the policy which regards India as an integral portion of the British empire with *mutual interests*, mutual sources of improvement, &c. &c., and thus at some future period India, progressing as it now will, more rapidly in civilization, will, however *gradually*, abandon the religion and customs of barbarism.

77. One point, which I have hitherto avoided, I must allude to, viz., the enormous number of Sikhs in our service. Levied at a moment of vast emergency, they have been faithful so far, and their services have been of vital importance to our interests. That they have been so, is well accounted for in the evidence produced before the Commission, in which there is a reply containing this significant observation:—"They hate the Hindoos and the Mussulmen more than they do us, and the love of plunder has actuated them."

78. On the restoration of tranquillity this motive will *no longer exist*. It is therefore evident that the sooner we diminish their numbers in our service the better; they carry two-edged swords. The measure was a bold one: *it succeeded!*

79. I conclude this report with an anxious hope that as these great armies are amalgamated, and the service of the Queen pre-eminent, one interest may actuate all classes, the service of our country being paramount to all other considerations, and that the amalgamation may ensure that harmony and unanimity which so essentially contributes to maintain the efficiency of an army, and is ever the prelude to victory.

H. G. SMITH,
Lieut.-General.

Manchester,
December 23, 1858.

APPENDIX No. 77.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir GEORGE WETHERALL'S ANSWERS to the NINE QUESTIONS proposed by the COMMISSIONERS, 3rd August 1858.

Horse Guards, S.W., September 27, 1858.

1. *The proportion of European to native force to be maintained in the Bengal Presidency.*

1. For several years past the army of the East India Company has received many augmentations, but no proportionate increase of Europeans, the proportion of whom has always been below what it ought to be. No cordial union can be expected between the native and European troops serving in Bengal for a long time to come. I am therefore of opinion that the proportion should be one-fourth European.

2. *What amount of force will be required in the Bengal presidency after the country is settled.*

2. This will depend upon local circumstances, and can be better decided by the local Government; but, considering the present extent of the Bengal presidency, I consider that 152,700 is the minimum, viz. :—

Artillery	-	-	7,000	} European.
Sappers	-	-	700	
Cavalry	-	-	5,000	
Infantry	-	-	30,000	
			<u>42,700</u>	
Cavalry*	-	-	10,000	Irregular.
Infantry	-	-	100,000	Natives.
			<u>110,000</u>	Natives.
			<u>42,700</u>	European.
			<u>152,700</u>	

* In twenty regiments of 500.

Half-castes (topee-wallahs) who did good service under Clive, and native Christians should be encouraged to enlist.

3. *Whether the native force in the Bengal presidency shall be on the regular or the irregular system, or combined.*

3. The only native force to be of cavalry and infantry. The cavalry to be irregular, and the infantry regular. Although proposing that the infantry should be on the

regular system, it is worthy of consideration whether a multiplication of European officers tends to promote the efficiency of a native corps.

For all purposes, excepting actual field-service, a native regiment is not improved by a multiplicity of officers. Many of them are unavoidably young and inexperienced, and ignorant of the native languages. Like all other youths, they are for some time idle and thoughtless; the climate is adverse to mental or bodily exertion; they congregate in mess houses, and are absorbed in pursuits exclusively of European character. The greater the number of officers in a regiment, the more are they estranged from intercourse with the soldiery; personal influence or attachment necessarily declines; obedience is not cordial. The more subalterns, the slower the promotion; and slow promotion is one of the evils of the service.

It was the opinion of Sir Thomas Munro:—

“So far from thinking the efficiency of native troops increased in proportion to the increased number of European officers, I think the number of officers may be too great, and that when this is the case, it injures the discipline of the corps, and lessens the respect of the natives for their European officers.”

“One to a company is quite enough for every useful purpose.”*

The great expense of a regiment is the pay of European officers.

According to Mr. Grant's minute, the present amount of military expenditure cannot be exceeded; and as the increase of European troops is indispensable, so must the expense of native regiments be diminished.

Mr. Grant states:—“I have never heard it denied that it is a waste of money and strength to use up the services of a score of European gentlemen to officer a battalion of natives.”

I quite agree to this.

4. *Whether any native artillery shall be allowed in the Bengal army?*

4. None, as trained gunners.

5. *The same question as regards sappers and miners?*

5. A corps of 700 trained Europeans, as before stated, as superintendents; but all working men to be Coolies, hired as required, or low caste men embodied as pioneers.

6. *Whether the Bengal army should be composed of different nationalities, or castes, and, if so, in what proportion?*

6. Not to consist of separate nationalities or castes. The more nationalities and castes are blended in the same battalion, the greater the security. No class or caste should be excluded, but not more than 30 per cent. of Mussulmen should be admitted into the same corps.

This observation applies to the Bengal army.

7. *Whether the native army is to be enlisted under a new code?*

7. Sepoys should be enlisted for general service, and be given distinctly to understand that they are liable to perform every duty, whether of arms or fatigue, to which a soldier is subject. It is in evidence, that, in the better regulated armies of Madras and Bombay, no duty is objected to by the native soldiery.

8. *Whether the Bengal army ought to be divided into two or more armies?*

8. Not into distinct armies, but into distinct corps d'armes—each commanded by a Lieutenant-General—the whole comprising one army under a commander-in-chief.

This would essentially destroy the present system of centralization, by which all subjects are referred to headquarters, to the injustice of individuals, and the destruction of discipline, by depriving commanding officers of that respect which is indispensable to the maintenance of their authority.

“The authority they once possessed has, with the view of checking abuses, been so much divided, that there is too little left anywhere to command respect.”†

9. *Whether any change is required in the system of promotion as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers.*

9. A radical change is required.

The establishment of native officers, under the existing seniority system of promotion, is shown by the evidence to be useless; and so long as commanding officers are forbid-

den to select the active, intelligent, and trustworthy for the rank of jemadar and subadar, the sooner those ranks are abolished the better.

The sudden subversion of old customs is, however, dangerous,—not as regards the mode of promotion, but whether there should be such ranks as native officers. There must be a connecting link between the native soldier and the European officer; the familiar intercourse, so indispensable to mutual confidence and support, can never be maintained without it. There is no other channel through which a commanding officer, whether of a battalion or a company, can become familiar with the character and conduct of the sepoy under his command, and through which those little services can be rendered which bind the soldier to his officer. Such intercourse is, moreover, necessary, as the best means of acquiring the colloquial dialects of the natives,—more valuable than all the knowledge imparted by hooks or moonshies.

The fact that, during the whole course of the late mutiny in Bengal, not a single native officer gave any information, invests this subject with a peculiar and painful interest.

I do not agree with those who consider that native officers are useless, but they must be selected for merit, &c., as before stated,—not promoted for length of service, or as matter of right. A different system would produce trustworthiness and confidence, a new impulse would be given to the native soldier, emulation excited, and the service benefited.

We cannot expect to establish a bond of fidelity between the native army of India and ourselves, but we can improve their discipline and better their condition. They consider us as a foreign people, whom their necessities oblige them to serve. They have no bond to each other; the army consists of all classes and creeds. They are mercenaries; but they should be attached to our service by the hope of reward, by present promotion, and future pension.

The rank of native officer should therefore be maintained, their promotion depending on their commanding officer, but necessarily confirmed by Government in the name of the Queen.

Non-commissioned officers to be entirely promoted at the discretion of commanding officers, without reference to higher authority.

G. A. WETHERALL, Adjutant-General.

OPINION on the General Subject of transferring the ARMY of the EAST INDIA COMPANY to THE CROWN.

Horse Guards, S.W., Dec. 31, 1858.

THE whole army, European and native, to be incorporated with, and become part of, the army of the Crown.

ARTILLERY.

The artillery to form a second regiment of royal artillery, and to consist as follows:—

Bengal	- - -	Batteries or Battns.
Madras	- - -	Do. do.
Bombay	- - -	Do. do.

ENGINEERS.

The engineers to form a second regiment of royal engineers in like manner.

The whole to be recruited and trained in Great Britain under one system, as now in force with those corps.

The recruiting and depôt staff to be provided by the second regiments respectively.

The depôts of artillery to be at Woolwich, that of the engineers to be at Chatham, where all will perform the same course of instruction as now. Cadets of the East India Company are now instructed at Chatham.

No reserve companies of either artillery or engineers in India: they are receptacles for the idle and unprofitable officers and men.

EUROPEAN CAVALRY.

The European cavalry to have its depôts at Maidstone and Warley, or Canterbury; all to be recruited and trained alike. No recruit to be sent to India until dismissed from drill: the same rule to apply to newly appointed officers.

EUROPEAN INFANTRY.

The European infantry to follow the same rules, and be recruited and trained in depôt battalions, according to the present system in the Queen's army.

The cavalry and infantry to be in all respects regiments of the line, and numbered accordingly.

* Minute, 21st January 1843.

† Sir Thomas Munro.

NATIVE REGIMENTS.

The native regiments to be numbered as are colonial corps, viz. :—

- 1st, 2nd, 3rd, &c., Bengal regiments.
- 1st, 2nd, 3rd, &c., Madras regiments.
- 1st, 2nd, 3rd, &c., Bombay regiments.

Irregular regiments, although placed in the army list, to have their several local denominations, and to be officered from the regular regiments.

Irregular regiments may be composed of various tribes and nationalities. No officer to be appointed to such who has not a competent knowledge of the language and habits of those over whom he is placed. Such appointments to be considered as staff appointments, and to be paid accordingly. If found fit after one year's probation, the officers to be seconded in their own corps, and be eligible for promotion in them.

Officers in civil employment to be in like manner seconded; but, if continued in employment more than two years, to be placed on the non-effective list.

PERMANENT EUROPEAN FORCE.

The permanent European force to be maintained in India has been defined by the Governor-General and the Governors of Presidencies as follows :—

For Bengal alone.

Artillery,—78 batteries for siege, ordnance, garrison, and other duties	- - - - -	11,180
Cavalry,—3 regiments of line	- - - - -	} 6,398
10 local	- - - - -	
Infantry,—15 regiments of line	- - - - -	15,000
30 local	- - - - -	24,000
		56,578

This force of artillery is very inadequate for the required purpose. 78 batteries, at 180 men per battery, require 14,040.

Madras (Lord Harris).

Artillery,—6 batteries	- - - - -	1,080
19 companies	- - - - -	1,900
11 reserve companies	- - - - -	550
Cavalry,—4 regiments	- - - - -	2,664
Infantry,—14 regiments	- - - - -	14,000
		20,194

Lord Canning considers that 26 batteries are necessary, and that the Madras artillery should consist of 5,160.

Bombay (Sir H. Somerset).

Artillery,—24 batteries and troops	- - - - -	4,320
9 companies reserve	- - - - -	450
Cavalry,—3 regiments	- - - - -	1,998
Infantry,—15 regiments	- - - - -	15,000
		21,768

The Governor-General considers this force of artillery unnecessarily large.

Lord Elphinstone proposes :—

Cavalry (2)	- - - - -	1,492
Horse artillery	- - - - -	764
Field artillery	- - - - -	3,600
Infantry	- - - - -	9,630
		15,486

N.B. Military trains, and sappers, are not included in the above estimates.

TOTAL EUROPEANS.

Artillery	- - - - -	19,480
Cavalry	- - - - -	11,960
Infantry	- - - - -	68,000
		98,540
Add sappers	- - - - -	2,000
		100,540

The estimate of the Commander-in-chief at Bombay has not been adopted in the artillery for that presidency, as he proposes 1,000 native artillery; and as the opinion is unanimous that all artillery should be European, the batteries have all been calculated at 6 guns and 180 men.

No horse artillery has been calculated for, it has only been proposed in the Bombay command.

NATIVE FORCE, REGULAR OR OF THE LINE.

(The 30 irregular corps are here included as they are for purely military purposes.)

Lord Canning is of opinion that when peace is restored, 50 native battalions will be sufficient for purely military purposes,

- 20 to be regular.
- 30 to be irregular.

<i>Bengal.</i>	
50 battalions at 700	- - - 35,000 infantry.
<i>Madras.</i>	
No specification	- - - 60,000 "
<i>Bombay.</i>	
	39,000 "
Total	- - - 134,000 "

PROPORTION OF EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS.

If to these 134,000 regular native infantry be added the irregular cavalry, infantry, and armed police of the three Presidencies, the number of which is not known, but which may be reckoned at 150,000, the proportion of Europeans to natives will be nearly 1 to 3.

RELIEF OF EUROPEANS, AND MAINTENANCE OF EFFICIENCY.

Assuming that 100,000 will be the amount of European troops in India, 10,000 will be required annually to maintain the number efficient; it being proved by statistics of years, that the wear and tear by death, invaliding, and discharge is 10 per cent., or that a regiment of 1,000 is renewed every ten years. This may possibly be increased in consequence of the 'Ten Years' Enlistment Act, which will soon be in active operation, having been passed in 1847. This number will be necessary, whether the European regiments are local, or of the line, all being enlisted for the same period, and subject to the same casualties. As the services of a soldier enlisted for ten years may be prolonged, on foreign service, for two years more, and assuming that he will not be sent to India until he is trained and habituated to a soldier's life, the amount of his services in India may be reckoned at eleven years.

By sending out ten per cent. of the establishment annually, regiments may be kept up to an indefinite period; and as the men are thus perpetually renewed, there would be no great hardship, as regards them individually, to keep regiments in India for long periods. The officers would be the chief sufferers. Many regiments have been kept more than 20 years in India, but no murmur or complaint was ever heard on that account.

It is, however, considered desirable that every regiment should be relieved every 14 or 15 years.

There are now in India—

1 regiment, 14th Dragoons	18 years in May next.
" 9th Lancers	- 17 " "
5 regiments infantry	- 17 " "
1 " "	- 15 years in August next.
2 " "	- 14 " "

When peace is restored, these regiments will probably return home without relief; three of them are now under orders.

After these, there remain—

3 regiments of infantry,	13 years in May next, of which one is under orders for home.
5 " "	10 years in May next.
4 " "	6 " "
2 " "	4 " "
46 " "	2 " "
12 " "	1 " "

So that, when the regiments named have returned home, there will be no reliefs for several years, and then after long intervals, viz. :—

1861	1864	1870
3	5	2

After which the relief of those that went to India in 1857 will require consideration.

ABSORPTION OF OFFICERS OF THE LATE BENGAL ARMY.

An important question in the re-construction of the Bengal army remains to be considered; how are the officers to be provided for?

By the latest East Indian Army List there were, exclusive of artillery and European line regiments, the following officers to be posted :—

	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Colonels - - -	10 - -	73
Lieut.-Colonels - -	10 - -	71*
Majors - - -	10 - -	74†
Captains - - -	69‡	508§
Lieutenants - - -	74 } - -	750 Subs.
Cornets - - -	3 }	

If, as proposed by Lord Canning, ten regiments of European cavalry are raised, all the unattached officers of that arm will be provided for.

But following up his lordship's scheme, of forming only twenty regiments of regular and thirty regiments of irregular native infantry, there will be a considerable remainder of the higher ranks unprovided for.

The colonels, who are all non-effective as regimental officers, may be permitted to draw their off-reckonings, or colonel's pay, although not posted to regiments.

Deducting those on civil and staff employ, there will remain, of infantry,

Lieut.-Colonels - - -	63	} Regimental Rank.
Majors - - -	55	
Captains - - -	305	
Subalterns - - -	589	

	Colonels.	Lieut.-Cols.	Majors.	Captains.	Subalterns.
Three Regiments, in course of formation, will absorb - - -	3	6	6	42	96
20 Native Regiments - - -	20	20	20	140	320
Leaving for Irregular Regiments and Police Corps - - -	23	26	26	182	416
	-	37	29	123	173
	23	63	55	305	589

A number inadequate to the demand, if, as Lord Canning proposes, thirty battalions of irregular infantry be raised, and the irregular cavalry be kept up on its present scale.

It will be observed, that all officers employed on civil or staff duty are seconded, as proposed in a former part of this minute.

The twenty-four European regiments proposed by Lord Canning to be raised for local service in Bengal are not included in the above calculation.

Having proposed the amalgamation of the East India Company's army with the line, it remains to remark on the supposed difficulty, if not impracticability, of that measure.

The objections are :—

That one is a seniority service, and the other not.

The adjustment of the funds, supported by the compulsory subscriptions of officers in the one service, in which they have a vested interest, and which do not exist in the Queen's army.

The superior retiring allowance of the East India Company's service.

The danger to India of withdrawing troops in the event of war in Europe, or pressure at home.

The Queen's service is one of regimental seniority, as much as that of the East India Company, indeed more so, since the latter are promoted regimentally until they attain the rank of major only, when they are placed on a general list, and promoted according to seniority, a system fraught with disadvantages, by estranging commanding officers from regiments in which they have been brought up, and subjecting them to great inconvenience and expense, by removing them to distant stations, and which has driven many from the service. Lieutenant-colonels are never sure of remaining with a regiment. Transfers from one regiment to another are by no means unfrequent in the East India Company's service, and exchanges, it is believed, are also sanctioned.

It is difficult to imagine that any personal disadvantage could accrue from the exchange or transfer of officers from one service to the other, if both parties consider it for their mutual convenience. It would, on the contrary, be beneficial for many reasons; would weaken local habits, local prejudices, and interests, take away the provincial character

of a local force, expand the minds of officers, and improve them by enlarged intercourse with the world, and afford relief to many whose constitutions and efficiency are impaired by climate.

The same arguments apply to purchase. It is well known that purchase accelerates the promotion of those who do not purchase, and there are many examples of officers, unable to do so, who would never have obtained high rank in the army but for the promotion of their juniors as well as their seniors.

A vicious system of purchase now exists in the service of the East India Company, a system well known to the controlling authorities, and tacitly, though not officially, encouraged.

In every corps a fund is formed from the monthly subscription of all the officers for the purpose of purchasing out the seniors, by which the juniors gain no more immediate advantage than an advance of one step in the general list. This tax, in addition to the compulsory subscription to military funds, loads the junior ranks with debt which is often ruinous; the advantage they hope to derive is distant and prospective, and often never attained; the immediate advantage is derived by others.

To admit the direct purchase of commissions would be a boon to the service, generally and individually.

Exchange would be made by the mutual agreement of parties, and an actuary would calculate the value of the advantages which the one derives from retiring allowance and assistance from the military fund, as compared with those of the other service.

The minute calculation of the respective advantages cannot be entered into in this minute, the scope of which is confined to opinions on general principles; but, as regards the effect on the military fund, one example taken at random may suffice.

Two captains wish to exchange. He of the East India Company's service has been fifteen years in it, and has paid as follows to the military fund, the benefits of which he forfeits on exchange, and the other does not acquire :—

	R. s. a. p.	
As ensign, on appointment - - -	135 0	} Unattached.
" three years' subscription - - -	162 0	
As lieutenant, on promotion - - -	67 8	
" on joining - - -	202 8	
" eight years' subscrip- tion - - -	540 0	810
		1,107
As captain, on promotion - - -	135 0	} Unattached.
" on joining - - -	337 0	
" four years' subscription - - -	432 0	
		904
		Rs. 2,011

So that an ensign wishing to exchange would be reimbursed for his subscription to the military fund by Rs. 297, or 297; a lieutenant, by Rs. 1,107, or 1107; a captain, by Rs. 2,011, or 2014.

These sums might either be paid by the contracting party, or be repaid by the fund itself, which would be relieved from all claims upon it from that party.

It is understood that the Bengal government has taken upon itself the responsibility of all claims on the military fund of that presidency, and that the fund is not solvent. If so, the government will gladly relieve itself from future claims by such small payments.

In order to carry out more effectually the amalgamation of the two services, all subscriptions from new appointments should cease, and the Indian government take upon itself the management of the funds, which, in the presidencies of Madras and Bombay, are supposed to be solvent, and capable of securing to all subscribers their vested interests.

The future retiring allowances of officers must be a matter for the consideration of the highest authorities. Those who have really served a given number of years in India, whether of the local or line force, may be chargeable to the Indian revenue.

The danger of withdrawing troops from India is so purely a ministerial question, that it cannot be entertained by individuals.

The withdrawal of two cavalry regiments during the Crimean war is instanced as a reason for not more promptly suppressing the late revolt. This cannot be supported, one having been withdrawn from Madras and the other from Bombay; and one had returned and the other been replaced before the revolt took place. There were at no time fewer European troops in India than by law permitted.

* 3 of these on civil or staff employ.
† 19 " " "
‡ 22 " " "
§ 213 " " "
|| 101 " " "

SUMMARY.

The summary of these opinions is,—
That the army of India should be one and indivisible, as regards its relation to the Crown.

That the armies of the three presidencies should remain, as at present, distinct commands, with well defined limits.

That the officers in chief command of the troops at Madras and Bombay should be styled commanders of the forces.

That the proportion of European to native forces, according to the scales of the authorities quoted, is not too great—being nearly one European to three natives.

That all native infantry should be regular, and all the native cavalry irregular.

No native artillery at either presidency.

A corps of European sappers at each presidency, as superintendents of public works, and corps of native pioneers as workmen.

That the native army be composed of all castes and nationalities—the more the better.

The native army to be enlisted on the same terms at all presidencies, and governed by one and the same code; having for its text the Queen's regulations, as is now the case at Madras and Bombay.

That the Bengal army, although of one body, under one commander-in-chief, should be composed of three or four corps d'armée.

That commanding officers should have the power to promote non-commissioned officers without reference to higher authority, and to recommend for promotion to officers (native), and to exercise the same authority, in their regiments, as is accorded to commanding officers in regiments of the line.

That the European portion of the army should be numbered regiments of the line, taking India as a part of their tour of duty.

That their efficiency can be maintained by periodical reinforcements of ten per cent. on their established strength, and for an indefinite period.

The periodical relief of regiments to take place after service in India of fifteen years.

That there is no insuperable obstacle to the gradual amalgamation of the whole army, so as to allow the exchange from one branch to the other.

G. A. WETHERALL,
Lieut.-General.

APPENDIX No. 78.

General MONTGOMERIE'S ANSWERS to the NINE QUESTIONS proposed by the COMMISSIONERS, 3rd August 1858.

1. The proportion of European to native force to be maintained in the Bengal presidency.

1. I consider one European to three natives should be about the proportion.

2. What amount of force will be required in the Bengal presidency after the country is settled.

2. On the supposition that Saugor, and the greater part of Bundelcund, shall hereafter be occupied by Madras troops, as recommended by Sir George Clerk, in his evidence before this Commission, Q. 1180, and by Lieut.-General Sir Patrick Grant, in his memorandum dated 29th June 1857, that Rajpootanah, Malwa and Scinde, which geographically belong to Bombay, shall also be provided with troops from that presidency, there will then remain the countries bordering on the Ganges and Jumnah, and the Punjab to be furnished with troops from Bengal. I estimate the troops required for this purpose at about 36,000 Europeans of all arms, and about 96,000 natives, regular and irregular, exclusive of police.

By the Return from the India House, dated April 1858, laid before this Commission, the Bengal army stood as follows, on an average of the six years prior to the mutiny.

AVERAGE STRENGTH of the Bengal Army from 1852 to 1857.

—	Europeans, non-commissioned, Rank and File.	Natives, commissioned, non-commissioned, Rank and File.
Cavalry	1,500	{ 5,000 Regulars, 14,000 Irregulars,
Infantry	16,800	{ 34,000 Regulars, 58,000 Irregulars.
Artillery	3,330	3,200
Sappers	80	1,200
Total	21,710	135,400

ESTABLISHMENT of the Bengal Army as now proposed.

—	Europeans, non-commissioned, Rank and File.	Natives, non-commissioned, Rank and File.
Cavalry	3,000	12,000 Regular and Irregular.
Infantry	27,000	80,000 Regular and Irregular.
Artillery	6,000	2,600
Sappers	300	1,000
Total	36,300	95,600

The European infantry I suppose to be located as follows:—

In the lower provinces, including Allahabad and Gorruckpore - - - 8,000
In Central India, including Gwalior - - - 8,000
In the Punjab - - - - - 11,000

Total European infantry - - 27,000

The regular troops to be massed in strong brigades and divisions, with a fortified post at each station.

When the country is perfectly settled, and the Punjab considered in a satisfactory condition, I think it will be found that a portion of the European troops may be reduced, and the native troops increased, till the ratio of one to three is established.

3. Whether the native force in the Bengal presidency shall be on the regular or irregular system, or both combined.

3. A combination of both, but the majority of the infantry to be regulars.

4. Whether any native artillery shall be allowed in the Bengal army.

4. The general tenor of the evidence before the Commission is to the effect, that the fewer natives employed in the artillery the better. My own judgment does not lead me to the same conclusion, at least, not to the same extent as that expressed by most of the evidence before us; yet in deference to the opinion so generally maintained, I would, in the re-organization of the Bengal army, confine the native portion of the artillery, to the manning some of the batteries in the Punjab, to the duty of gun lascars, and to that of drivers to some of the batteries, as recommended by Sir John Lawrence, vide Lord Canning's Minute of the 9th of August 1858.

In computing the strength of the artillery, as I have proposed in paragraph 2, I have been guided by Lord Canning's Minute of the 9th August 1858, on the organization of the Bengal artillery, in which it is reckoned, that the same number of field guns will be required as before the mutiny, viz., 36 field batteries, which, at the rate of six guns a battery, gives 216 field guns. His Lordship further states that in addition to the foregoing, field guns will require to be provided to replace the guns hitherto supplied by contingents, viz. :—

Gwalior - - - 5	Carried over - 8
Malwa - - - 1	Oude - - - 4
Bhopal - - - 1	Punjab - - 5
Goudpore - - ½	Hydrabad - 4
Kotah - - - ½	Nagpoor - 2
8	Total batteries 23

One half, however, of the above or 12 batteries only, fall to be provided for from the Bengal artillery, viz. :—

Gwalior - 2 } Lord Canning in his Minute, proposes an increase to the guns for Oude, and a decrease for Gwalior, which I have followed here.

Punjab - 5

Total batteries 12

The other contingents named above, fall within the geographical limits I have supposed in paragraph 2, to be provided with troops from Bombay and Madras. Indeed, Hyderabad never has, and Nagpoor has not, for the last 35 years, been dependent on Bengal for military occupation or defence.

There will, therefore, be, by my calculation, the following field batteries to be provided for from Bengal.

36 field batteries as before the mutiny, at six guns each, makes 216 field guns.
12 field batteries as above - - - 72

Total - - - - - 288

Thirty men a gun for each field piece, will I reckon allow a proper proportion of men of all classes, European and native, for all artillery duties, including arsenals, reserves, &c., and that will amount to a total of 8,640 men, of whom I propose Europeans, 6,000; natives, 2,600, as in paragraph 2.

The following Table will show the strength of the artillery in Bengal before the mutiny, taken from the return dated India House, April 1858.

AVERAGE STRENGTH of the Bengal Artillery from 1852 to 1857.

—	Europeans, non-commissioned, Rank and File.	Natives.			Total of all Classes.
		Non-commissioned, Rank and File.	Drivers.	Gun Lascars.	
Horse Artillery	1,030	459	—	351	
Foot Artillery	3,300	1,860	550	—	
Total . .	3,330	2,919	550	351	6,555

The total of all ranks, European and native, as shown above, gives 6,550, which divided by 216, the number of field guns is nearly 27 men a gun before the mutiny; I have allowed 30 men in my calculation.

5. *The same question with regard to sappers and miners.*

5. With respect to the sappers, I think about one-fourth should be European, or about 300 Europeans to 1,000 natives.

6. *Whether the Bengal native army should be composed of different nationalities or castes, and if so, in what proportion.*

6. The greater the diversity of castes in a regiment, and the nearer equality in point of numbers, one caste bears to another the better. But on the question of different nationalities in the formation of a battalion, I wish to record my opinion, that I am strongly in favour of forming some regiments, with European companies as their basis, say two flank companies of Europeans, and the remainder natives of any part of India, who might choose to enlist, knowing that European companies formed the basis of the corps, a regiment so formed would, in my opinion, possess many advantages:—

1st. The real security against anything resembling the disasters which have lately occurred.

2nd. The spirit of emulation, likely to exist in a regiment so formed, as has been shown by the distinguished services performed of late by certain Punjaub corps composed of different classes.

3rd. The stricter discipline and more constant supervision that would be required from individual officers in such a regiment than has hitherto prevailed in our native regiments in general. In many regiments, the commanding officer and adjutant did the greater part of the work, and the consequence was, that the regimental officers did not take that interest in the internal economy of the corps, that it was desirable they should have done.

This is not an idea I have taken up in consequence of the late mutiny, though that disastrous event has greatly strengthened my former opinion. I some years ago visited the island of Java, and had an opportunity of seeing a portion of the Dutch colonial army in that island, and was much struck with finding that they had battalions composed of two companies of Europeans, two of African negroes, and the remainder of Javanese.

The plan was found to have answered well, and I may add was first adopted after the great insurrection in that island in 1825-26-27.

I would appeal to those most doubtful of the trustworthiness of the sepoys, if an organization such as I propose, would not have afforded a safeguard, if not a perfect security, against the terrible disasters of 1857.

The barracks and hospital of the Europeans of a mixed regiment should be judiciously built for defence.

We have something analogous in our own service in the horse artillery, both of Bengal and Madras. In the Madras horse artillery, of which I can speak from personal knowledge, there are four European troops, and two of natives in the brigade. There are almost always an European troop and a native one quartered together at Bangalore, without our experiencing any of the inconveniences or jealousies, apprehended by some of the evidences examined before the Commission, by such mingling of Europeans and natives.

7. *Whether the native army of Bengal is to be enlisted under a new code.*

7. The code, in my opinion, requires revision, especially as regards pensions to sepoys. I think a man should have a right to retire on a pension, after a certain period of service, say 25 or 30 years, without reference to his bodily strength, but before that period his pension should depend on wounds or illness contracted on service, or injury sustained in the actual discharge of duty.

8. *Whether the Bengal army ought not to be divided into two or more armies.*

8. I think if the Bengal army were divided into two, that it would be advantageous in many respects, but I confess there are many practical difficulties to the carrying out such a change.

9. *Whether any change is required in the system of promotion as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers.*

9. I am of opinion that nairques should be chosen from the most intelligent men, without reference to length of service; and that the havildar major, also a selected man, should be considered first for promotion to be a native officer. If to this were added employment in the police, with higher pay for deserving native officers, and the power of removing the less efficient ones to the pension or a half-pay list, such a system would, I consider, secure an efficient class of non-commissioned and commissioned native officers.

P. MONTGOMERIE,

Major-General.

October 11, 1858.

MEMORANDUM by Major-General MONTGOMERIE on the TWELVE HEADS of INQUIRY laid before the Commission.

1. The terms on which the army of the East India Company are to be transferred to the Crown?

All that it appears necessary to do on this head, in my opinion, is to declare to the troops, that the well-being and interests of officers and men will be looked after and guarded by Her Majesty's Government, as hitherto under the rule of the Company.

2. The permanent force necessary to be maintained in the Indian provinces respectively, after the restoration of tranquillity?

The opinions of the highest authority laid before the Commission concur in recommending a great addition to the European force hitherto maintained in India, especially in Bengal. My own opinion is, that the number now called for is considerably higher than will be thought necessary when tranquillity prevails, when railways and river steam navigation are more advanced, and fortified posts established. I would therefore say for some years, rather than for a permanency, the force to be maintained in the Indian provinces respectively should be as follows:—

In Bengal—About 40,000 European troops of all arms.
 " About 100,000 Native troops of all arms.
 In Madras—About 20,000 European troops of all arms.
 " About 60,000 Native troops of all arms.
 In Bombay—About 18,000 European troops of all arms.
 " About 40,000 Native troops of all arms.

3. The proportion which European should bear to Native troops, in infantry, cavalry, and artillery respectively?

In Bengal—
 One European to two Natives in the Infantry.
 One " three " " Cavalry.
 Three " one " " Artillery.
 In Madras—
 One " three " " Infantry.
 One " three " " Cavalry.
 Three " one " " Artillery.
 In Bombay—
 One " three " " Infantry.
 One " three " " Cavalry.
 Three " one " " Artillery.

4. How far the European portion of the army should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as parts of the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only.

My opinion is that the troops of the line should bear the proportion of one to two of the European local army.

5. In connection with this question, the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion, and of securing the efficiency of the latter?

The periodical relief of regiments of the line should, I think, as a general rule, be by the Cape of Good Hope.

If the local European army is much increased, the recruiting depôts must of necessity have much enlarged barrack accommodation and increased establishments.

Officers from India, whose leave of absence has expired, should, in my opinion, as a rule, do duty at the recruiting depôts, and take charge of drafts proceeding to India.

6. Whether it be possible to consolidate the European forces, so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other; and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object, with perfect justice to all officers now in the service of the East India Company?

I do not consider it practicable to effect the object proposed on this head with perfect justice to the officers of the Company's service.

7. Whether there should be any admixture of Europeans and native forces, either regimentally or by brigade?

My opinion is strongly in favour of an admixture of Europeans with natives regimentally in a portion of the regiments to be raised in Bengal, both in the cavalry and infantry. I have given my reasons for this opinion in my memorandum dated October 11th, under the 6th head; and I still feel convinced that no measure we could adopt would tend more to the efficiency of the Indian army, and to our security against any recurrence of a Sepoy revolt, than a judicious admixture of Europeans with Natives in the same regiment.

8. Whether the local European force should be kept up by drafts and volunteers from the line, or should be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain?

I think by both means. When regiments of the line are ordered home, the men might, under proper restrictions, be allowed to volunteer for local regiments.

9. Whether it would be possible to raise any regiments in the colonies, either for temporary or permanent service in India?

I do not think it would be advisable to raise regiments of coloured men for service in India in any of the colonies.

10. Whether the native forces should be regular or irregular, or both, and if so, in what proportion?

In Bengal, in my opinion, there should be a considerable number of irregular regiments, and the proportion of them to regular regiments may be much greater than in either of the other presidencies. Neither in Madras nor in Bombay have there been hitherto many irregular regiments, and I can see no necessity for increasing them now. Both in policy and in justice we should leave these presidencies as much as possible as they are. We should not lose sight of the fact that the armies of Madras and Bombay, as a whole, have stood staunch, and have taken a faithful part in putting down the revolt, and that India has been saved to us by their loyalty.

Sir James Outram, in his minute of the 7th of September, so forcibly expresses my ideas on this head that I will quote his own words:—

"Most thoroughly do I concur in the opinion expressed by his lordship, that it would be a great error to forget that, in prudence as well as justice, the native armies of Madras and Bombay, which are still standing at their full numbers, and have shown themselves, on the whole, loyal, must be treated continuously and considerably in the introduction of changes. Not merely do I say, with the Governor-General, 'that before any change which will introduce discontent in these armies, the new Bengal army ought to be well in hand;' but I go further. I consider that no change should be attempted, nor should it be allowed to appear that any such is contemplated, so long as those armies evince no symptoms of disloyalty.

"The system and discipline maintained in those armies is in a great measure free from the blemishes which produced the revolt of the Bengal army, and I doubt whether any great change could be introduced for many years to come. Certainly no change could be attempted, especially such as would entail the disbandment of large bodies of troops, without causing discontent and excitement, which might lead to disastrous consequences. Nor would I introduce even trifling changes just now in any

"branch of the armies of those presidencies, for any such would excite mistrust and suspicion that greater changes were about to follow. On the contrary, I would proclaim to those armies how deeply Her Majesty appreciated the loyalty they have evinced throughout the late trying crisis, in consideration for which they are assured that no alteration whatever shall be made in their organization, and that their constitution and privileges will be maintained, so long as they continue loyal, pointing to the utter extinction of the Bengal army as the consequence of disloyalty. Some such assurance is, I think, necessary, and should not be delayed, for our native troops throughout India cannot otherwise than feel anxiety lest the misconduct of the sepoys of Bengal may cause us to discard from our service all of their caste and creed in other parts of India, as soon as we conveniently can do so."

11. Whether any native artillery corps should be sanctioned?

In this respect, in my opinion, a marked difference should be shown between the Bengal Artillery and that of the other presidencies. In Bengal there need be very few natives taught to work the guns, though I see no good reason why a portion of native drivers and gun Lascaars should not be employed. With respect to the other presidencies, for the reasons given in the last paragraph, every favour should be shown to the native artillerymen, their pay should be raised to what it was before 1837, when a private goundange received nearly two rupees a month (or, say three half-pence a day) more than an infantry sepoy; this among a small body of men, was no burden on the public purse, but it was sufficient to make the artillery a favourite service, and gave the State a body of men, which within my own knowledge stood loyal, when the cavalry and infantry in the same cantonment showed a mutinous disposition. And only last year, when a body of Mahomedan fanatics from the city attacked the residency at Hyderabad, a detachment of Madras Native Horse Artillery stood staunch, and instead of wavering in their duty, opened their guns on the insurgents, although men of their own creed; had this detachment not stood firm at this critical moment, it is perhaps not too much to say, that the whole of the Nizari's territories might have been in revolt, and the south of India from Cape Comorin to the Nerbuddah in a blaze. The services of these men should not be ignored.

12. Whether cadets sent out for service with native troops, should in the first instance be attached to European regiments, to secure uniformity of drill and discipline?

Whatever training cadets undergo before joining their native regiment, would in my opinion, be better acquired in a military seminary or doing duty at a depôt in England, than with a European regiment in India, to which they are not to be permanently posted. I have observed, that in many cases, neither the commanding officer nor the regimental officers take the same interest in a cadet doing duty with a regiment, that they do in a youth posted permanently to it. I therefore think that a cadet should join the regiment he is ultimately to belong to as soon as possible after his arrival in India.

P. MONTGOMERIE,
Major-General.
January 3, 1859.

APPENDIX No. 79.

Col. BURLTON'S ANSWERS to the NINE QUESTIONS proposed by the COMMISSIONERS, 3rd August 1858.

1. *The proportion of Europeans to natives to be maintained in the Bengal presidency.*

1. First: Artillery.—To be all European.
Second: Cavalry.—One European to three native regiments.

Third: Infantry.—Equal numbers of regiments, European and native; but the former might be of smaller numerical strength than the latter. The moral effect of the presence of an European regiment at any post is very considerable on the native mind, without reference to, or knowledge of its strength; and financial considerations should also be allowed to have some weight. It would seem, therefore, the best policy to have a large number of small regiments rather than a small number of large ones.

2. *The amount of force for the Bengal presidency when the country is settled.*

2. First: Artillery.—Admitting the very great importance of this arm, I am disposed to think, assuming that it is to

be entirely European (except as regards a few gun lascars for every battery), that the former strength of the Bengal artillery will be nearly sufficient for the fixed establishment hereafter. It consisted previous to the mutiny of 13 batteries of horse, and 23 (including a small mountain battery) of foot artillery; and I should think if these were increased to 16 or 18 troops of the former, and 25 or 26 of the latter, there would be enough for all purposes. For siege trains and garrison duties 24 companies should be maintained, being an increase of, I think, five companies to the former establishment.

Second: Cavalry.—Twelve regiments of European cavalry and 36 of irregular horse, would, I think, be sufficient. The former should consist of four squadrons, of not less than 160 rank and file each, to allow of their division into good and efficient wings, if it should be desirable at any time to detach a portion of the corps on any emergency.

The irregular horse should be corps of 1,000 strong, as at present.

Third: Infantry.—Forty regiments of European infantry, and the same number of native regiments should be sufficient for all purposes of defence against aggression from without, (save in the most improbable contingency of an European invasion,) or broad rebellion within our territories; provided, as is understood to be the intention, the preservation of ordinary tranquillity, the suppression of dacoitee, and the quasi police duties of various kinds, which have heretofore been assigned to the regular native army, are henceforward to be entrusted entirely to an armed and organized police, supported by local corps, such as have hitherto been maintained in particular districts, and of which I believe few or none have joined in the recent mutiny. I may add here, as regards the composition of the European force, that I would have one half of it, of all arms, supplied from the regular army of England (as heretofore with a certain portion of it), and the other half to be a strictly local force, raised especially for the army of India, as has hitherto been the case with the European regiments of the East India Company. This, and many other points connected with the organization, discipline, dress, &c., both European and native, as well as the disposal of the vast numbers of irregular troops we have at present on our hands do not come within the legitimate scope of the question to which I am now replying, and may therefore be left for future consideration and discussion.

3. *Whether the native troops should be regular or irregular, or both combined?*

3. The whole of the cavalry, I think, should be irregular.

As regards the infantry, there is much to be said on both sides of the question, and on the whole I am inclined to think it would be desirable in the first instance, if only experimentally, to have one half of the native infantry on the regular, and the other half on the irregular system; but any how, whatever number of regulars may be kept up, it would be highly desirable that there should be much less adherence to European costume, and the minutiae of drill and equipment than has prevailed of late years, to the great disgust, as well as discomfort, of the native soldier. A larger proportion of European officers should also be allowed to the irregular regiments, not less, I should say, than five (exclusive of the medical officer), as well as two carefully selected European non-commissioned officers for each company, both in the regular and irregular regiments, in lieu of the native commissioned officers by whom our regiments have hitherto been uselessly encumbered. These last might be allowed gradually to die off or retire to the pension establishment. I do not expect that native gentlemen of family and influence could be found, in any considerable numbers, willing to accept commissions in our regular regiments of infantry, but many might very probably be induced and happy to join the irregular branch, as commissioned officers, and I would give them every possible encouragement to do so. This, however, is not the place to enter on that question.

4. *Whether any native artillery shall be allowed?*

4. Not a man beyond the necessary number of gun lascars for cleaning the guns and such like duties, except at a few outposts where Europeans cannot live with safety.

5. *The same question as regards sappers and miners.*

5. We must have some natives for rough day-work, but I would not admit or employ them in laboratories, magazines, &c., and all those we enlist should be low caste men.

6. *Whether the native army should be composed of different nationalities, or castes, &c.*

6. By all means. The more the better. Mix them up promiscuously in general, but I should be inclined to have

a few national regiments also, say, some all Seikhs, some all Goorkhas, and so on. Some of the finest classes of men in India, for soldiers, have never yet taken to our service, from their utter dislike to our clothing, discipline, &c. If they could be enlisted for our irregular regiments they would make splendid soldiers. I allude to the real native Rajpoots, Rathores, &c. of Rajpootana, as well as to Jhats, Rajcoomars, and various others, few, if any, of whom have ever yet been induced to enter our service, for the reason stated.

7. *Whether the native army should be enlisted under a new code?*

7. The evidence on this subject has been almost unanimous in favour of enlistment for general service, but I confess I am not satisfied that such a condition would, on the whole, be a desirable one to exact. I have no doubt whatever that if such a rule existed, it would have either one or the other of these results,—either it would deprive us of very many of our best recruits, or it would lead to numerous and most inconvenient desertions whenever a regiment was called on to embark on board ship. Lord Ellenborough's opinion on this point seems to me to be exceedingly well founded, and deserving of the most careful consideration. It is so seldom that native troops are required to serve beyond sea (and then they can only be withdrawn to a comparatively limited extent), that I think the old plan of having only a certain number of regiments enlisted specially for general service, and keeping them more than heretofore on the sea-board frontier, would be greatly preferable to the exaction of one universal engagement to serve beyond sea, on the part of our recruits, most of whom would enter into it with great repugnance, if not with the full intention of violating it on the first occasion of being called to its performance. I do not perceive any other points in the present code or terms of enlistment that require alteration, but if we abolish the rank of native commissioned officers we must also abolish native courts-martial, a measure of which the expediency is open to some doubt, at all events.

8. *Whether the Bengal army ought not to be divided into two or more armies?*

8. I should answer this question most decidedly in the negative. I see no one advantage that could be derived from such a measure, but I do see very great objections to it. Our Commission has not to deal with financial considerations, perhaps, but still I may point to the great additional expense which the division of the army must necessarily entail in a duplication of all departments nearly, of the general staff, as well as in the salaries and allowances of a second commander-in-chief and his personal staff. I look on this, however, as a secondary consideration compared with others; and more especially I would advert to the great discontent which such a measure would assuredly create amongst the officers of the army, to some of whom it would, of necessity, be fraught with hardship, if not injustice. This remark, I would observe, applies not only to the question of their comparative standing and promotion, as adverted to in Lord Ellenborough's reply, but to other circumstances also, which must not be lost sight of. We must bear in mind that the officers of the Bengal army have entered the service, and have lived, in the expectation of serving alternately, or occasionally, in the fine climate of the north-west provinces, or the Punjab, as well as in the generally less congenial climate of Bengal. That portion of the army which might, in the proposed division, be allotted to the latter, would surely have fair ground of complaint, if they found themselves doomed to spend so much larger a proportion of their lives than they had calculated on, in the swamps of Bengal, a province, where they could scarcely ever hope to see any service more exciting than the suppression of some disturbance, perhaps, amongst the Coles or other wild races of the jungles, or of some petty outbreak of a refractory zumeendar. On the other hand, it is by no means improbable, that many who might find themselves permanently located beyond the Sutlege or the Indus, might, for reasons of their own, be equally dissatisfied at being shut out, as it were, for the whole period of their service from the upper provinces of Hindostan; and, as they might possibly deem them, the pleasant and ever verdant plains of Bengal Proper. It has been supposed that the division of the army would have a beneficial tendency in preventing extensive combinations amongst the native troops in future, and the fact of the Madras and Bombay armies not having coalesced with the Bengal sepoys, to any extent, during the recent revolt, has been adduced as a case in support of the argument: but there is no analogy whatever between the two cases. With exception of the comparatively few Hindostanee sepoys in the Madras and Bombay armies, the ranks of both are filled by men differing *toto calo* from those of Bengal; their customs, habits, and ideas are greatly different, and their feelings towards the Bengal sepoys are

those of marked enmity rather than of sympathy. It is no wonder, therefore, that they did not join in the frantic outbreak of the latter. But how would the case stand if the present Bengal army were to be divided? The men in the one division, or army, would almost of necessity be of the same classes, castes, and countries, as the other; the two armies must continue to draw their recruits from the same localities (Bengal proper does not supply a single man to our ranks, and never will); and if, as doubtless will be the case in future, all nationalities and castes are to be mixed up freely in the ranks of both, there can scarcely be a shade of difference in their general composition; nor could the mere interposition of a river, as the boundary line between the two, cut off their communications, or frustrate their combinations. Another argument that has been adduced in favour of the division of the Bengal army, is founded on the great extent of territory which it holds, and which has been assumed to be too vast to be thoroughly and efficiently supervised by one Commander-in-Chief. The weakness of this proposition requires no proof. We have only to look to the British army, to its dispersion in nearly all parts of the world, under one Commander-in-Chief, and the argument at once falls to the ground. I conclude, moreover, that a considerable portion of the territory held at various times by the Bengal army, in Central India and Rajpootana, will hereafter be occupied by troops from the Madras and Bombay presidencies, a measure which would at once annihilate the last vestige of argument that has been brought forward, in support of the proposed dismemberment of the army of Bengal.

9. *Whether any change is required in the system of promotion as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers?*

9. There can be no doubt, I presume, in any quarter, that the system of promotion by selection of the best men, must be the most effectual in securing a body of smart and efficient officers in all ranks. All that is of any great importance in giving effect to such a system is, that commanding officers should be men above all suspicion of undue partialities, and of fair discriminating judgment; and it should be carefully explained to every recruit that he will have to look to merit only for his future advancement.

WILLIAM BURLTON, Colonel.

October 11, 1858.

MINUTE by Colonel BURLTON.

1. In compliance with the request of our Chairman, I beg to submit the following observations in elucidation of my opinions, on the nature and tenor of the Report which the Commission has now to prepare for submission to Her Majesty the Queen.

2. I conclude it may be assumed that our Report will be fashioned in the shape of seriatim replies, more or less amplified, to the thirteen principal questions on which evidence has been taken before us; with such general remarks, in addition, as may appear desirable, or called for.

3. On nine of these questions the Commissioners have already recorded their individual opinions; and Resolutions, founded thereon, were framed, and adopted by a majority of the members, at the meeting on the 21st of October last.

4. It would seem unnecessary, therefore, for any member to revert to the subject-matter of these questions, in the present instance, unless he may since have seen reasons for modifying the opinions he formerly recorded, or should be strongly opposed to any of the resolutions which have been agreed to by the majority.

5. Taking this view of the case, and, with one exception, acquiescing generally in the spirit of those resolutions, I do not now propose to enter into a renewed discussion of any of them, save the one of which I have made exception, and to which I entertain strong and serious objections.

6. That resolution is the first, on "the proportion of European to Native force to be maintained in India." It affirms that the proportion should be, "exclusive of Police Corps,"

In Bengal, 1 European to 2 Natives.
 In Madras 1 " " 3 "
 In Bombay 1 " " 3 "

7. To this proportion, as regards the Bengal presidency, I would wish to record my strong objections; and if my colleagues would reconsider the question, and, more especially advert to the amount of police force proposed to be kept up, and the nature of its armament and organization, as developed in the evidence before us, and in information mainly brought to our knowledge since the adoption of the Resolutions of the 21st of October, I cannot but think that they would concur with me in the opinion, that such a body of armed, disciplined, and semi-disciplined Natives,

as the proposed proportion would give, would be not only unnecessary, but fraught with extreme peril.

8. Let us first consider what will be the aggregate amount of armed Natives (regulars, irregulars and police) which this proposed proportion would give us, for the Bengal presidency alone. By our second resolution, we recommend that the minimum amount of permanent European force to be maintained in that presidency, after tranquillity is restored, shall be 50,000 men. That would give us 100,000 Native troops, exclusive of the armed police. The latter force cannot be so accurately estimated, but, I believe, we shall be under, rather than over the mark, if we calculate it at 80,000 men. It may surely be considered, that this latter force would be amply sufficient for the preservation of the public peace and tranquillity, within our territories; and with 50,000 Europeans in hand, we could unquestionably and securely bid defiance to all aggression from without, without encumbering ourselves with so large a body as 100,000 Native troops, on whose fidelity we could place no reliance, and who would be greatly more dangerous to us than any foreign enemy whom we are at all likely to encounter.

9. Again, supposing the police force to be sufficient, as it ought to be, for the preservation of order and tranquillity within our territories, and also for the performance of the various quasi-civil duties (such as treasure escorts, jail guards, &c.) on which the Sepoy army has heretofore been so largely employed, what occupation could be found for the latter in times of peace? How could they be kept free from the dreary stagnation of idleness, and the unsettled state of feeling,—the morbid brooding over imaginary, if not real, grievances, which idleness so commonly engenders in the Native mind?

10. It is true, an European force will always hold double its number of Native troops in check, and effectively and instantly, if properly handled, put down any attempt at outbreak or revolt, but it is obvious that the larger is the number of the latter, the larger must be the European force to overawe them; and in the proportions proposed, it seems to me, that we should, in fact, be keeping up a large and untrustworthy army, whose services we do not require, and then have to maintain, of necessity, an European force to prevent their turning their arms once more against us.

11. If, then, we find that a large Native army (beyond what is positively indispensable) is not only an useless expense, but a machine entailing a farther heavy outlay in the maintenance of additional European troops for its surveillance even in times of peace, let us consider also, the dangers that might, not unreasonably, be apprehended from it in case of war.

12. Can any one, with the events of 1857 before his eyes, again feel confidence in the fidelity of a Native army, if circumstances should at any time arise, giving them, what might appear, in their short sightedness, a fair chance of successful revolt? What security should we have, in the event of an insurrection within our territories, or of an invasion from without, (say from Afghanistan, or Nepal for instance) that our Native troops would not march off and swell the ranks of our enemies at the first opportunity? "Quis custodiet custodes ipsos?" Who could stay or stop them, if they selected a moment for their departure, when our Europeans were engaged with an enemy? Or who can calculate what might be the consequences, if, at such a moment, instead of taking to flight, in the hope of another Meerut paralysis or Dinapore lethargy to favor their escape, they were to turn upon us, in the field of battle? Great numerical strength will give confidence even to cowards, at times, to do what smaller numbers would not dare to contemplate.

13. Another consideration arises here—In estimating our proportion of European to Native troops, it must be remembered we have altogether ignored the police force, or left it out of our calculations, as though it could work no mischief, or would necessarily remain loyal in the event of another outbreak of the Native army; but I can see no good foundation on which to rest this very dangerous assumption. The men composing the police force, which will, in fact, be nothing more or less than a very large, but not highly disciplined, body of troops, will, of necessity, comprise all castes, tribes and nationalities, precisely as will the ranks of the army itself—their feelings, both religious and political, will be the same as those of the latter—their power of combination will even be greater, for they will be diffused over the whole country, in one continuous unbroken chain, through which, whilst the right hand, as it were, of any one or every district, grasps the left hand of its adjoining neighbour on the North, and vice versa, on its South, the electric shock of preconcerted or acceptable rebellion would travel with the rapidity of the fiery cross, (far quicker than circulated cocoa-nut, or Chapatties) from Chittagong to Peshawar. It is scarcely necessary to add,

that a rising of the police, if, as is most probable, they could also raise the population against us, would be infinitely more dangerous, and more difficult to deal with, than a revolt of the largest Sepoy army. What are the practical lessons these considerations should teach us?

1st. To maintain not one Native soldier more than is positively and indispensably necessary.

2nd. To disarm the population, as far as can be possibly done.

3rd. To arm the police with weapons sufficient merely to deal with unarmed or badly armed mobs (a few ordinary carbines, swords, spears, and bludgeons, for instance) but altogether inferior, as should be those of our Sepoys, to the arms of the European force; so that the superiority of the latter, in this, as in all other respects may be ever patent, palpable, to the comprehension of the natives of all classes, and lead them to feel in their hearts, that opposition or conflict must ever be hopeless.

14. In my former minute I advocated the maintenance of equal numbers of European and Native regiments of Infantry, and of three regiments of Native to one of European Cavalry, for the Bengal army, and I would still earnestly uphold an equality in the former branch. I would, however, modify my former opinion, so far as to recommend, that the Native force of Cavalry should not exceed the European in a greater ratio than two, instead of three, to one, and consequently that twelve of the thirty-six regiments of Irregular Cavalry, which I formerly recommended, might be dispensed with. I feel a thorough conviction that with 50,000 European troops (including the Artillery) 40,000 Native Infantry, and 24,000 Native Cavalry, the Bengal Presidency would be securely and safely provided for, as far as human foresight can provide for any thing. Any increase to that number of Natives, would be but an increase of danger instead of safety—the larger the Native force, the larger as I have before said, would be their confidence in their own strength, and the greater would be the chance of their again trying that strength against us. I need not dwell on the financial importance of my proposition, but the saving that would result from the maintenance of sixty-four, instead of one hundred thousand men is a matter of no trifling consideration.

40 regiments Infantry, say at 800	32,000
12 regiments Cavalry, say at 700	8,400
Artillery	10,000
	<hr/>
	50,400

15. There is another of the resolutions adopted on the 21st of October on which I should wish to make a brief remark. I allude to the 7th, and the question of Enlistment for General Service. The evidence in favor of this is so nearly unanimous, that it would indicate a larger share of self-complacency and *opiniâtreté*, than I wish to have credit for; were I to persist in upholding my own views on the subject; but at the same time I cannot but confess, that I am still very much in the position of

"The man convinced against his will,"—who,
"Is of the same opinion still,"

and I cannot, even now, help thinking that it would be the better plan (for the Bengal army, at all events) to have, as I before recommended, only a certain number of regiments raised expressly for general service, including service on ship-board, instead of exacting from every recruit, an engagement so generally repugnant, not merely to his prejudices, but, in the case of most of them, to his legitimate and honest feelings. I have a very strong opinion indeed, that the Government General Order of the 25th of July 1856, directing that all recruits thereafter enlisted, should be attested for general service, including embarkation on board ship whenever required to do so, was one, and by no means one of the least, of the exciting causes of distrust and dissatisfaction, which finally resulted in the great revolt of the army.

16. I will now proceed to the consideration of the four remaining questions, on which the Commissioners have as yet recorded no written opinions. On the first of these, viz:—how far the European portion of the army in India should be composed of troops of the line, and how far of troops raised for service in India only, the Commission came to a verbal resolution at our last meeting, that it was necessary to maintain a local European army; but, with a reservation on the part of some of the members, that this was to be considered a temporary decision only, and that their opinions were to be considered open to modification hereafter.

17. My own opinion on this subject, is so strong, and is supported by so powerful a phalanx of evidence, of the highest ability and most extended experience, that I am desirous of at once placing it on record, in case the question should be again agitated in the Commission.

18. It would be both unprofitable and tedious, were I to enter, in any detail, into the reasons which lead me to advocate as a permanent measure, the establishment of a strictly local European force, in every presidency in India.

The question has been so fully discussed, its advantages and supposed disadvantages have been so fully dwelt upon, and the arguments on both sides are so clearly exhibited in our minutes of evidence, that when I express my entire concurrence in the opinion of the great majority of eminent men, Statesmen, Commanders, and Civilians of extensive Indian experience (some of whom are enumerated in the

*Governor-General of India.
Governor of Madras.
Earl of Ellenborough.
Commander-in-Chief, Madras
Do. do. Bombay.
Sir W. Mansfield,
Military Secretary to Govern-
ment of India.
Adjnt. General, Bengal Army.
Sir J. Outram.
Sir J. Lawrence and fellow Com-
missioners.
Sir B. Vivian,
Sir Frederick Abbott,
J. P. Willoughby, Esq.
J. R. Martin, Esq.
Colonel Holland.
Colonel Durand.
&c. &c.

margin*), who have pronounced so strongly in favor of a local European army, I feel it would be superfluous to say more; and will content myself with adopting the words of the Earl of Ellenborough, that, "it is necessary to preserve this state of things; it affords the only security for the continued maintenance of the dependence of India upon England," words full of importance, and abounding in foresight and truth.

19. The second and fourth of the questions to which I am now replying, are very closely allied, and scarcely demand any detailed observations. As regards the Line regiments, I should strongly recommend their being relieved, if practicable, every ten or twelve years; and I am disposed to think the long sea-route by the Cape, as a general rule, would be preferable to the overland route through Egypt, when no urgent demand exists for the early presence of the troops in India. I anticipate no particular difficulty in obtaining recruits in sufficient numbers for the local force in India, if drafts or volunteers from the Line regiments returning home, are allowed to enter it.

20. I come now to the third question, as to the practicability of consolidating the European forces, so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other, and the regulations that would be necessary and practicable to effect this object with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now, (or rather, who recently were) in the service of the East India Company.

21. I confess I do not see that any particular benefit would accrue to the public service from the proposed consolidation of the European forces in India, in view to the introduction of the system of exchanges between the officers of the Line and the local army, whilst, on the other hand, it seems almost, if not entirely, impossible to effect such an arrangement consistently with a due regard to the rights and claims of the officers at present in the latter service.

22. If only the interests of the two individual officers who proposed to exchange were involved in the question, it would be simply a matter to be settled by themselves; but it is obvious that in a seniority service, the interest of every individual, junior to the exchanging officer, must be affected, for better or for worse, by every exchange that took place; unless, which is next to impossible, the ages, or rather the exact value of the lives of the two parties could be ascertained, and proved to be precisely the same. If, for instance, my senior officer, who may be aged and shattered in constitution from long residence in India, should exchange with another from the Line,—in all probability a younger and a stronger man,—it is clear that my chances of promotion, as well as those of every other man in the regiment junior to the exchanging officer, would be damaged, and our advancement unfairly retarded. I can see no means of averting this sort of injustice, except by rendering it a condition imperative on all exchanges, that they should first be acquiesced in by every officer of the local regiment, junior to him who wished to quit; and this would be so objectionable in principle, as well as difficult to carry out in practice, that I would not for a moment think of recommending its adoption, even though there were advantages to be gained by the introduction of the exchange system, which I do not at present perceive. In the lowest Commissioned ranks, (those of second lieutenants, cornets, and ensigns) perhaps there need be no objection to exchanges being made, as any one of these who might do so, would of course, come in as junior of his rank and regiment, and thus no injustice would be done to the prospects of any one, whilst every junior of the officer who went out, would rejoice in the step so gained.

23. Another obstacle that presents itself, if not to the introduction, certainly to the working of the proposed system of exchange, is the difference in the nature of the pensions or full pay retirements, in the Indian army (as now established for all actual incumbents) as compared with those of the Line. In the former, every officer, after serving a certain

number of years, becomes entitled, of right, to the full pay of a specified rank. Twenty years' service in India gives the full pay pension of captain, or 10s. 6d. a day; 24 years' service that of major, 292*l.* per annum; 28 years' service that of lieutenant-colonel, 365*l.* per annum; 32 years' service that of colonel, 456*l.* 5s. So also all lieutenant-colonels, majors, and captains, who from ill-health are unable to serve longer in India, can retire, whatever be the length of their service, on half-pay pensions as follows:—

Captains at	£127	15	0	per annum.
Majors at	173	7	6	..
Lieut.-Colonels at	200	15	0	..

Similar proportionate advantages are also granted to subaltern officers, who, (lieutenants after ten, ensigns after six years) are unable from ill-health to serve longer in India, their pensions in such cases being—

Lieutenants,	£73	0s.	per annum.
Ensigns	54	3	..

Lieutenants, after even six years' service, can also retire on ensigns' half-pay, if unable, from ill health, to remain in India; whilst all officers who may be compelled to retire, by wounds or ill health contracted on duty, after only three years' service, are allowed the half-pay of whatever rank they may have attained. Lastly comes the great prize of the Indian service, the rank of regimental colonel, with a share of off reckonings, or a commuted allowance in lieu, which enables the recipient to live at home at ease as long as he pleases, on an income of about 1,000*l.* or 1,200*l.* per annum.

24. The advantages above enumerated are those which the officer of the Indian army receives from the Government he has hitherto served. They are vested rights, as far as the officers now in the service are concerned, and could not be violated, or interfered with, without flagrant injustice and breach of faith. In addition to these, the Indian officer has also private rights and interests in the funds, to which he has been obliged, by the terms of his service, to contribute by donations and subscriptions from the date of his first commission. From these he derives the heartfelt gratification of knowing, that, whenever he may die, his widow and children will not only be provided for, to a certain extent, but that they will be indebted for their comfort to his own pecuniary sacrifices during life.

25. Taking these circumstances into consideration, and there are other advantages from the funds to which I have not adverted (such as passage money, income allowance, and outfit, in certain cases), it is difficult to suppose that many officers would be found willing to exchange into the Line, even if the system were permitted; in all probability, few or none, save the very young, or the thoughtless and improvident, tempted perhaps by a pecuniary consideration, would be likely to forego the advantages I have enumerated, and of which they know they cannot well be deprived.

26. There is yet another difficulty to be taken into account ere the system of exchanges can be fairly introduced. Supposing that such exchanges were sanctioned, and that officers could be found in both services ready and wishing to make them, and that the difficulties attendant on doing so without injustice to others could by any means be overcome, it will still be necessary to consider the question again, and to ascertain what would be its effects on the funds themselves, and how far those noble institutions could be protected from the damage or peril to which the system, unless carefully guarded against, would assuredly subject them.

27. The first question that arises, in considering the subject, is whether an officer exchanging from the Indian army into the Line, should or could, carry with him the advantages derivable from the funds which he had already fairly purchased by his donations and subscriptions: or whether, divesting himself of all claims thereupon, he could transfer them to the Line officer with whom he exchanges, supposing the latter were able and willing to purchase them. There could, of course, be no objection to any officer forfeiting at once all he had ever paid, as well as all his claims, present or prospective, on the funds, if he thought proper to do so; but if it be proposed, or expected, that officers who might come into the Indian army, by means of exchange, should step into the place of those with whom they exchange, as regards their position in the funds, the case would assume a very different aspect, and the committee of management, of the funds, having due regard to the interests entrusted to them, might find it necessary to require the payment of so large a sum in the shape of donations and arrears of subscription, perhaps (consequent on differences in the value of lives,—in the respective ages of the husband and wife,—in the comparative health of the

parties,—and other causes), as would in most cases, in all probability, operate as a bar to the exchange contemplated. The adjustment of the amount to be so paid by incoming members, would be a matter of great complexity and much nicety, and could scarcely be effected without the assistance of a professional actuary. As regards the case of officers transferred to the Line, by exchange, they might perhaps be permitted (and I see no objection to such an arrangement) to continue subscribing members of the funds, and to retain all their rights and claims as such, if they wished to do so. The payment of their subscriptions, &c., as they became due, could easily be effected through the paymasters of their new regiments, wherever they might be stationed; the difficulty, however, is not, as I before said, with those who leave, but with those coming into the Indian army by exchange.

28. On the whole question I have arrived at this conclusion, that in the lowest commissioned ranks only (second lieutenants, cornets, and ensigns) could the exchange system be introduced, without the chance, I might almost say the certainty, of its bringing hardship and injustice in its train. At the same time I see no objection to the officers of the Indian local force being transferred, if they wished, and could effect it, by purchase or otherwise, to fill vacancies in Line regiments at the pleasure of the Commander-in-chief; leaving their places to be filled up in their former corps, in regular seniority succession as at present. I believe a similar system is now permitted in the Royal army, in which an artillery officer may be transferred to a Line regiment, though no officer from the latter can take his place by exchange in the former.

29. It is scarcely necessary to add, that the difficulties which seem to interpose in the way of the regular exchange system being introduced between the two armies, are only applicable to the case of the present officers of the Indian service, who have the pledge of their Government that their rise shall be strictly by regimental seniority; of course, if it be deemed advisable, new rules may be introduced in the case of all future appointments to the service.

30. I would wish to add a few words on the subject of those admirable institutions, the Funds (Military and Orphan) of the Indian army; by which, at no cost to the Government, beyond the liberal assistance which it affords to their support, the widows and orphans of all officers are provided for in a state of comparative comfort; and assistance is rendered in the form of passage money, outfit, and income allowance to officers returning to or from Europe, on sick leave, &c.

31. It is only by making it obligatory on all young officers entering the service to become members of these funds that they can be upheld; and I most sincerely hope, that the present regulations to that effect may not, on any consideration be relaxed. If subscription were left optional, it is but too probable, that the proverbial thoughtlessness and improvidence of the young would operate to prevent many from joining institutions, of which they can scarcely appreciate the eventual inestimable value; and it is, I fear, almost if not quite certain, that if the present rule of compulsory subscription were departed from, the insolvency of the funds would, after a certain term of years, be the inevitable result, bringing penury and misery to the hundreds of widows and orphans, who might at the time be subsisting, and entirely dependent on its pensions. It would indeed be not only a short-sighted policy, but a gross injustice to the officers of the service, if the Government were to sanction any modification of the present rule, by which alone the stability of these institutions is maintained.

32. In support of this view, it is only necessary to bear in mind, that all officers who have entered the Indian army, for many years past, have been compelled to contribute to the funds, on the full understanding that they were thereby securing certain benefits to themselves, personally, whilst living, as well as to their widows and orphans, after death; so that these benefits were, in fact, guaranteed to them by the Government: Government was, no doubt, fully alive to the great advantages which it derived from being thus released from all obligation to support or pension the widows and orphans of its officers; and having compelled the latter to join in supporting the funds, and pledged itself that all who subsequently entered the service should do the same, it would clearly be a palpable and flagrant injustice were it to depart from that pledge, and thereby imperil the solvency of the institutions.

33. The importance of these funds, and the magnitude of their operations, is not, I believe, much understood in this country; but it may give some of my colleagues useful information, perhaps, in helping them to a correct judgment on the question, if I mention some particulars connected

with the one of them with which I happen to be best acquainted, the Military Fund of Bengal.

At the date of the last annual report (October, 1858), the capital of this institution amounted to £567,988

Of which was invested in the treasury notes of the Government - - - - - £558,527

The contributions of the officers of the army amount annually to upwards of - - - - - £75,000

There are now widows, annuitants on its books - - - - - 666

Whose pensions amount to, per annum - - - - - £106,905

The actuary's value of its liabilities, as estimated by Mr. Neison, is - - - - - £871,185

From which if the amount of capital shown above be deducted - - - - - 567,988

There will remain a deficiency of capital - - - - - £203,197

This deficiency of capital to meet liabilities, would be amply covered, if the fund could realize a claim it has against the Indian Government, for losses sustained through erroneous computations, during many years past, in adjusting its accounts at the India House. About four years since, the eminent actuary, Mr. Neison, estimated these losses at 437,913; but the managers and officers of the fund, I apprehend, would be quite satisfied if they could compromise the claim for one-half the amount.

34. I fear I have been led rather too far into a subject, not, perhaps, exactly within the legitimate scope of our inquiries, but as the question of compulsory subscription may come under the consideration of the Commission, I am anxious to put my colleagues in possession of the fact, that this fund (and I believe all the others are the same) was originally framed on correct principles, and would be in a perfectly prosperous and solvent state, as well as quite self-supporting (with the aid it receives from the Government) at the present moment, if its resources had not been curtailed, by the erroneous rules of computation of interest, exchanges, &c., above adverted to, as adopted at the India House. I believe the Bengal Military Orphan Fund and the Military Funds of Madras and Bombay are in a highly flourishing condition, dispensing their blessings on many hundreds of widows and orphans; and it is, I repeat, of the greatest importance, that nothing should be done, which can tend in the slightest degree to shake their stability, or check their beneficial action.

35. In conclusion, I will only add, that throughout this minute, I have abstained, purposely, from touching on matters connected with the Madras and Bombay armies, (with reference to either their present or their future) deeming it best to leave the question to be dealt with, by my colleagues from those presidencies, whose acquaintance with the subject must necessarily be much greater than my own. There are numerous other matters of detail, connected with the organization, armament, clothing, &c., of the army in India which will have to be entered into in our Report, but I am disposed to think they may be more conveniently discussed and settled in verbal conference at our Board, than in written minutes; and I have therefore contented myself with dealing with generalities, and confined myself principally to the important and distinct questions on which we have been particularly required to report, rather than weary the patience of my colleagues with a more extended exposition of my views and opinions on points of minor importance.

Bath, December 30, 1858.

WILLIAM BURTON,
Colonel.

APPENDIX No. 8.

Colonel TAIT'S ANSWERS TO THE NINE QUESTIONS proposed by the COMMISSIONERS, August 3, 1858.

As the only officer on the present strength of the Bengal army who has the honour of being a member of this Royal Commission, I cannot but deeply regret having been detained abroad by a severe illness, which has hitherto prevented my attendance, and I beg to express to the President and members my regret at my unavoidable absence.

After an attentive consideration of the proceedings and evidence already elicited, and as the only officer of that army, and one who has recently returned from India, being

in England on medical certificate, I trust to be permitted to offer a few observations on certain statements which have been made before the Commission, which, if uncontradicted by me, will go forth to the world in the proceedings as facts, although several of these assertions appear to have been founded entirely on hearsay evidence, and, in some instances, are to my own personal knowledge quite erroneous.

Colonel Skeffington Poole, Bombay Light Cavalry, Friday, 27th August 1858, page 23, states that,—“At Mooltan one evening a naik's (native corporal's) party of the Bengal army was going past; when they passed on I asked what was the matter, and one of my native officers said, ‘The naik is a lower class man of that party than one of the privates, and the private has just said, ‘We have left our lines, I intend to take command, and you go into the ranks, and you will obey me.’ I was informed by native officers in my own regiment that it was not a solitary instance.”

“This arises,” says Colonel Skeffington Poole, “from the difference of system and the difference of discipline throughout the army.” “Everything appears to be by caste there.”

I should account for the above entirely in a different manner, by supposing that the colonel's own people were imposing upon him; as, from my thirty-three years' experience in the Bengal army, I know that what they told him was simply impossible.

Colonel Poole goes on to detail some circumstances of a Bengal sentry at Mooltan taking “dustoorie, i. e., a few sticks out of every bundle of fire-wood at one of the gateways, &c.” This, of course, was simple robbery, and the man ought to have been handed over to the provost marshal. The discipline at Mooltan must have been lax indeed when such conduct was passed over without being reported.

Again, Saturday, 28th August, Major-General Capon, Bombay army, pages 10 and 11, states some “irregularities regarding the sentry of a guard at Mooltan,” who had his clothes only partly on, &c., while “he lounged about unlike a soldier,” and, on this, founds the assertion of the laxity of discipline in the Bengal army generally.

Major-General Capon, when questioned afterwards, in answer to Colonel Burton, admits, “I have no experience in the Bengal army, I only speak from what I have heard. I have certainly seen the native officers unfit from old age, &c. &c.”

Major-General Robert Alexander, Adjutant-General, Madras presidency, in proceedings dated 25th August, at page 28, reflects on the discipline of the Bengal army, stating, “We never allow caste to be put forward for not performing any military duty in the Madras army. The same men as those who have mutinied in Bengal do precisely the same duty in our army from the difference of discipline,” &c. &c.

I have known no cases of “caste” being permitted to interfere with the duties of a soldier. There always must be some little difficulty on board ship regarding the food of the men. However, this can be got over with management.

They only cook once during the twenty-four hours, and two hours are usually required for that purpose, should there be no pressure of service; otherwise they can live for days together on parched grain and sweetmeats, which require no cooking. This seemingly, too, without losing their strength; for they are a most frugal and abstemious race. Each man cooks his own simple food, giving less trouble to the commissariat than the cooking of any description of soldier I have yet served with; but the inhabitants of the Bengal presidencies, whom we can alone look to for soldiers in any number, will not cook in messes, and so far their “caste” must be respected, whatever may be the case with the 1,500 or 2,000 Hindostanes in the Madras army. These men, being so small a proportion in a vast army, may have adopted the customs of the majority; but, however desirable, it will be years before the inhabitants of Bengal adopt this habit.

Again, at page 29 Major-General Alexander states under the same head, “want of discipline in the Bengal army,” “It is a very common custom for the Bengal sepoy to get deeply into debt, and to be constantly brought up before Courts of Requests; the officers themselves (Madras?) felt that it was lowering the tone of discipline, and injuring the men in several ways;” and a representation would appear to have been “made by the officers commanding the regiments, that they would not be responsible for the duties done if they remained under the discipline in which they were placed.” On this representation, “a brigadier was sent up to command their own troops at Saugor.”

This is the first time I have heard it was “a common custom in Bengal for the sepoys to get deeply into debt, and to be continually brought up before the Courts of

"Requests." I have usually found the very reverse during my experience of the Bengal sepoy; whatever his other faults may have been, getting into debt is the exception. They are much more given to hoard up money, and to stint themselves of their proper food, should food be dear, than to spend too much. Courts of Requests are ordered to be held monthly throughout the whole of India at every station of the army. During the thirteen or fourteen years I commanded the 3rd Bengal Irregular Cavalry, I never had one single man brought before this Court, although my men were nearly all Mahomedans, a race much more given to extravagance than Hindoo sepoys, who are notorious for being penurious in their habits, and who remit more than half their pay every month to their families, a fact well known to every civilian throughout Bengal.

Again, page 34, Major-General Alexander states "the Bengal army was ill-composed, ill-disciplined, and demoralized, and to this I simply attribute the general mutiny of the Bengal army. The whole army was badly disciplined, including the European officers and all. I think that the whole system was bad." The example given is:—"The moment our troops got into the Saugor division, the officers thought nothing of leaving their detachments. There were others again (a thing very unusual with us) who were brought up before Courts of Requests. Another thing is, that there was not a large station in the Bengal army in which there was not a committee of officers; and if another wanted to run in debt, they would sit in judgment on his character, and inform the Bank whether he was in good credit or not." "All these things are injurious and ruinous to military discipline."

In answer to a question, "Have you any personal knowledge on which you found these statements?" General Alexander replies only, "that they are notorious." And again:—"If any one will contradict them, I will say that I have been misinformed." And again, in answer to a question, "Do you not know from your experience of the Bengal army, that the European officers in that army actually considered it no disgrace to be brought before a Court of Requests in order to oblige them to pay the wages of their servants, when, in the Madras presidency, an officer would have been turned out of his regiment for such conduct?" "I believe that it was a very general circumstance (I am speaking of what is notorious) that such officers were brought up before the Courts of Requests. It is a rare thing in Madras. We have had some instances of debt and demoralizing consequences in the Madras army, but they were exceptional, &c. &c."

I beg to contradict the above most distinctly as applying to the officers of the Bengal army as a body. Individuals of bad character no doubt there may be in any army, but I can confidently state that it was ever, in the Bengal presidency, considered disgraceful to any officer, whether of Her Majesty's or of the Company's service, "to be forced to pay his just debts by the award of a Court of Requests." Such a man becomes a marked man, and all chance of advancement in India is utterly destroyed. But, as any one may be summoned before a Court of Requests by any native servant or shop-keeper on the most false and fraudulent grounds, and the case must be given against an officer (be his rank what it may) if he does not attend to defend it, the most scrupulously honourable man might be forced to appear before a Court of Requests, even as a duty to himself and others; I know not how any officer of any presidency could ever be brought to a court-martial for simply appearing before a Court of Requests, as his doing so might only be to resist what he believed to be a grossly exorbitant or altogether fraudulent claim, and it is within my own knowledge that such false claims are occasionally preferred by natives of India.

In regard to committees of officers sitting in every station on the part of the Banks, I can only state that neither have I myself, nor any of my numerous military friends, ever heard of such proceedings in the Bengal presidency. I beg most distinctly to deny the imputations cast upon the officers of the Bengal army, than whom, I am proud to feel, a more honourable body does not exist.

On perusing the evidence of Lieutenant-Colonel John Hill, Bombay Engineers, page 26 of proceedings, dated 26th August, I find it thus stated:—"I have seen a Bengal cavalry regiment on the line of march within two miles of the enemy's guns, and every horse was led by a horse-keeper, the arms and accoutrements of the men were on the horses, camels, and horsekeepers, and the men were plundering in the fields, and paddling in water at the wells."

This statement it is out of my power to account for, as the Bengal cavalry have only one horsekeeper to every two

horses; and in general, these men are barely sufficient to lead the horses of the sick and absent troopers. I have marched, during my time of service, through most parts of Hindostan, both during war and peace, with cavalry regiments, regular and irregular, and I never saw or heard of such undisciplined conduct as described by the Lieutenant-Colonel, more especially within two miles of the presence of an enemy.

During a long and fatiguing pursuit, such as that by Sir Walter Gilbert to Peshawur, I have known commandants cause their troopers to dismount and lead their horses, in order to cool their backs, and save them as much as possible; but, beyond this, I never witnessed any relaxation of proper discipline in the line of march. In Sir Walter Gilbert's celebrated pursuit, when the Bengal column distinguished itself, of course a commander would deem it his imperative duty to save his horses in every possible manner; and Lieutenant-Colonel Hill, if present on that occasion, may have witnessed the laxity of which he has made mention; but in such a case the reason ought to have been obvious, viz., that of saving and relieving both horses and men.

1. *The proportion of European to native force to be maintained in the Bengal presidency.*

1. The present police force, under the denomination of "burkundauze," must be abolished throughout the Bengal presidency as utterly useless, and the police duties of every part of India taken in future by well paid and properly organized irregular native soldiers, under selected European commissioned and non-commissioned officers, on a system somewhat similar to that recommended by Mr. Charles Raikes, late civil commissioner with Sir Colin Campbell, and of the Sudder Court at Agra. The present strength of native police under this denomination of burkundauze chuprassies, &c. &c. is perfectly incredible, and, from their numbers, the cost to the state must be very great indeed, although they are so badly paid. Such a force has proved utterly inefficient, except to extort money from the community, and add to the general confusion during the late outbreak.

Excluding from the estimate a properly organized police irregular force for all the internal arrangements and peace of the country, I am of opinion that one European to two native soldiers of regular and irregular infantry ought to be ample, and, of the native portion, probably one half or two thirds might be irregular. This is a point, however, which can best be determined by the local government of India on the spot; and calculating the regular police force at 100,000 more, actually required, which are in reality native infantry soldiers, will make one European to four native soldiers.

When tranquillity is once effectually restored throughout the country, and this revolt has been sufficiently punished by the removal of every mutineer from the soil of India, no doubt it may be possible to reduce the proportion of Europeans. This must, however, entirely depend upon the manner in which our insulted authority is vindicated in the punishment of every soldier who has joined in the late rebellion. In my belief, the European prestige can alone be sufficiently restored by the transportation of every single mutineer. This is a punishment more dreaded than even death itself, and our future security, in a great measure, will depend on the manner in which this punishment is carried out. Should every mutineer be hunted down throughout the length and breadth of the land, the word mutiny will be held in such terror for hundreds of years to come by the natives of India, that there will be little danger of any future outbreak. There must be no half measures; it ought to be done thoroughly and completely, as "the thugs" have been put down; and there will now be little difficulty, in my opinion, as the Government holds a minute descriptive roll of each individual; and all who have done good service ought in like manner to be rewarded.

As to the proportion of cavalry, I am inclined to think that the same ought to hold good in that branch, but this will depend upon circumstances; and possibly, with reference to the number of mounted men required for the police duties, it may be necessary to have even a larger proportion of native horsemen than four to one European.

2. *What amount of force will be required in the Bengal presidency after the country is settled.*

This must be determined by circumstances, and it is impossible to hazard an opinion, but no doubt, when once peace and quietness is thoroughly established throughout India, and all the mutineers have been made a sufficient example of, the number of our European army may be very greatly diminished; and as the native troops increase in

efficiency for the police and other internal duties of the country, so ought their numbers to be kept under control.

With a country the size of the Bengal presidency, extending some 1,800 miles from Calcutta to Peshawar, and from the borders of Nepal across to Oudeypore and Mount Abu—probably some 1,200 miles more,—of course the number of troops that can be spared for foreign service must always be small, and the army will rarely be able to furnish men for other parts of the world, and at the same time hold India secure. This must be kept in mind in organizing the Indian army. We shall require that army for the duties of India, call them local if you will, and any great proportion cannot be spared to send beyond seas without risking the loss of India.

I coincide with Sir George Clerk and with General Tucker, that from 40,000 to 50,000 European troops will be required for years to come in the Bengal presidency.

3. *Whether the native force in the Bengal presidency shall be on the regular or irregular system, or both combined.*

The native force in Bengal must be partly regular and partly irregular. Of the infantry, the proportion of regular troops would probably be one third to two thirds irregulars; and of the native cavalry, I would have them all on the irregular system, but the irregular cavalry soldier must be properly and adequately paid; not, as the system has hitherto been in the Bengal presidency, paying the men so miserably that it was almost impossible to keep them efficient upon the pittance allowed by Government (viz. 20 rupees, or 2*l.* sterling a month) to cover every expense of arms, clothes, horses, tents, foragers, carriage, &c. &c.

Having served in the irregular cavalry ever since 1831, and, for very many years, commanded one of the oldest regiments in the service, I have the more confidence in speaking on this subject, and I entirely concur with Sir Patrick Grant in what he states regarding the Bengal irregular cavalry.

The constant intermeddling with all their regimental institutions and customs;—the insane desire seemingly to turn them into regulars;—curtailing the power of commanding officers, and depriving both native officers and men of the inducements they formerly had to enter the service; and the constant desire of assimilating them in every way to the regular native army, whom they had always most cordially looked down upon, and detested with a most thorough hatred;—the above alterations in their customs and institutions; the abolishing trial by punchait, and substitution of courts-martial on all occasions; and the feeling they had generally imbued that they were being turned into regulars in spite of all they could do;—these things have mainly contributed to the disgust of that branch, and the old description of irregulars have mostly left the army, being unable to live, and subsist their families, and keep their horses and followers in an efficient state under the new regime introduced of late years. For years past this has been the cause of the deterioration of this most important branch of the service, and was frequently urged upon Government by Sir Charles Napier, Lord Gough, and all the officers commanding regiments of irregular cavalry; and I took the liberty myself of pointing it also out to the late Governor-General, as well as to the late General Anson, in a written statement showing the altered circumstances under which the Bengal irregular army were now placed, and the impossibility of their existing on 20 rupees a month with the increased expenses they were subjected to in order to maintain themselves, families, and horses.

These facts have, to my knowledge, been frequently urged on the Government, and the only reply apparently was, "We get men at the present rates." We got them, it is true, but not "the men," only an inferior class would take service at such rates;—not the good sturdy yeomen of old days, who used to supply our ranks from Rohildand, men of body and substance, holding lands and villages, and mounted on their own family horses;—their own breeding;—whose position was in a great measure a security for their good conduct and fidelity to the state. The old men still in the service (I speak of my own old corps, the 3rd Bengal Irregular Cavalry, the old "Rohillah or Roberts' Horse," which was raised in 1811) nearly all appear to have been faithful to their sag, and throughout the late insurrection have done good and faithful service, and were the means at Saugor, in a great measure, of saving the lives of all the Europeans, men, women, and children, as well as the guns and treasure, by escorting them to the old fort of Saugor, some miles distance from the cantonments, where no infantry spy could be depended upon; and throughout the whole of the late rebellion these men have invariably done good service, although there was only a

small body at head quarters. The 3rd Irregular Cavalry, joined by the 31st Bengal Native Infantry, without a single European officer, attacked the mutineers and drove them out of the station, following them up for miles, and capturing the only gun which the enemy had attempted to carry off, together with the colours of the 42nd Native Infantry and standards, as detailed to me in a Persian letter received from one of the native officers of the regiment, and forwarded by the commanding officer.

As an instance of the changes which have taken place since I entered the service, and which have gradually led to increased expenses to the men, I may mention that originally the irregular cavalry were local to particular districts, and were employed in the collection of the revenue, for which they received extra allowances in the shape of one rupee (two shillings) a day per man while so employed, and enjoyed other advantages in their horses being fed. Now they have lost all such advantages, the rupee being duly collected, but carried to the credit of Government; and the men being strictly prohibited from taking forage for their horses without payment, under all sorts of pains and penalties, when sent out on such duties. They have entirely lost all such perquisites and advantages, and are put to the expense of "general service;" and, in fact, the whole condition of the irregular horsemen of Bengal has been materially altered for the worse, while his pay of 20 rupees per mensem, to cover every expense, has been allowed to remain the same. This is utterly inadequate to meet their monthly expenditure and keep them in a creditable way. On such terms, and with no permanent nominal head-quarters from which to draw their supplies, which might be laid in cheaply for them by their friends and relations at the proper seasons, as in the case of the Scinde Horse, who have a fixed head-quarters, it may well be understood what difficulties commanding officers of Bengal irregular cavalry have laboured under. The Scinde Horse, comparatively in a cheap country, with fixed and permanent head-quarters, get 30 rupees a month; while our men, liable to move to the other end of the world at a moment's warning, get only 20 rupees. I have perused the standing orders of Brigadier-General Jacobi's Scinde Horse, which have been published and sent to the members of the Commission, and which I cannot but approve of, being almost word for word, in every particular, the old and original standing regulations of my own corps "the 3rd Bengal Irregular Cavalry," raised in 1814 on the system of Skinner's Horse, and which regulations and customs have been invariably the regulations ever since the 3rd Irregular Cavalry was first raised, while the Scinde Horse was only raised in 1839, or even later; so that these regulations were most probably derived from my regiment, as I had a detachment for fourteen months in Scinde in 1839-40, or they may have been taken from the Poonah Horse, which went originally from Skinner's, I have understood.

I would have no regular native cavalry whatever. They have been most expensive, costing, on an average of ten years, 85 rupees, or 8*l.* 10*s.* per mounted trooper per mensem, and without any adequate result.

4. *Whether any native artillery should be allowed in the Bengal army.*

4. I would have the whole of the artillery Europeans, or as nearly so as possible. For particular purposes it may be necessary to have a few native artillerymen, on account of the nature of the climate where the guns may be required to be located, but the number need be very small, and even for such purposes, there could be little difficulty in mixing all classes so as to prevent any danger.

I would gradually introduce the European element into every troop and battery throughout the three presidencies.

5. *The same question with regard to sappers and miners.*

5. You must have natives for the manual labour, but there need be no difficulty or danger from employing natives thus, and the different classes and races can be so mixed as to render combination, among so small a body as the sappers, utterly impossible.

6. *Whether the Bengal native army should be composed of different nationalities or castes, and if so, in what proportions.*

6. Certainly; it must be composed of all nationalities, castes, and classes,—Sikhs, Rajpoots, Gwallahs, Mahomedans, and a small proportion, if any, of the Brahmyn class; but there can be no difficulty in finding men of inferior castes, fitted for the duties of a soldier.

We can get no real Goorkahs, but "hill men from the "lower ranges" may be had in diminished numbers. I

would here beg to remark, however, that throughout the entire length and breadth of the Bengal presidency, it is a mistake to suppose that men fit for military duties can be got who are altogether devoid of caste feelings, and prejudices; such men are not to be had in the Bengal presidency. With all due deference to those who, from their knowledge of the inhabitants of other parts of India, expect to find similar races in the Bengal presidency, I beg to point out, as my experience, that we have no races of men in Bengal who are without caste, and at the same time fitted for the duties of a soldier. Certain attention must always be paid to caste, if you expect to get men to enlist for the Bengal army. There is, however, no caste, high or low, which should be permitted in any way to interfere with military duty.

It will be most desirable that in the reconstruction of the Bengal army, all variety of castes should be intermingled as much as possible, and that no large proportion of priestly and intriguing Brahmins should be admitted. After what has occurred, there is little danger on this head, and every soldier in the regular army ought to be enlisted for general service, with the distinct understanding that proper arrangements would be made on board ship in regard to food and water, and their caste duly respected in such matters.

7. *Whether the native army of Bengal is to be enlisted under a new code.*

7. Under a new state of things in the Bengal army, of course; the old code of regulations for the natives must be entirely revised, and, in my opinion, the less the discretion of commanding officers is limited the better, they being held duly responsible to head-quarters. I believe that the limitations placed on their power of late years have been greatly instrumental in causing an entire separation between the native soldiery and their European officers, from whom they had nothing to hope or fear.

8. *Whether the Bengal army ought to be divided into two or more armies.*

8. I quite agree with those who have, in evidence, set forth the inexpediency of dividing the Bengal army.

9. *Whether any change is required in the system of promotion as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers.*

9. There is no doubt in my mind that the present system of promotion in the native commissioned and non-commissioned grades must be entirely changed in the Bengal army, and proper men selected to fill those ranks. The system of promotion by seniority has worked extremely ill.

I believe we must have native officers, and the object ought to be to select those best qualified.

THO. F. TAIT,
Colonel.

Fulham Palace,
October 20, 1858.

Colonel TAIT'S ANSWER to the FOUR QUESTIONS, suggested Heads of Inquiry proposed by the Commissioners.

Fulham Palace, January 1, 1859.

1. How far the European portion of the army of India should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as part of the regular tour of service; and how far of troops raised for service in India only.

1. The Indian Government must have at its command a body of officers experienced in all the usages, habits, and customs of the country, and qualified to fill all those situations which can only be taken by persons who have acquired a thorough and complete knowledge of India; it therefore appears a necessity that the army, as well as the civil service, should be composed chiefly of troops raised for duty in that portion of the empire, and the requirements of the Indian Government, for such a number of officers can only be met by a force local to India. The officers of Her Majesty's regiments of the line, looking upon India merely as a tour of duty, cannot be expected to take the same interest in the country, which those belonging to an exclusively local service must naturally feel. With very rare exceptions, nearly all officers and men of the line will always consider themselves as mere birds of passage in India, and it is not to be expected that it should be otherwise. Officers of the local service who, from early youth, have devoted their whole lives and prospects to making "India their profession," as has hitherto proved the case with the East India Company's officers, both civil and military, are no doubt the sort of men

whom any Government would prefer. It takes a long servitude in that country before men acquire that experience and knowledge of the language, habits, and customs of the East, which are so essential towards making a really efficient Indian employé. It is no mere smattering that will prove sufficient in filling such important situations as the Indian Government have constantly to fill up in all parts of the empire, and officers belonging to regiments of the line will rarely be found who have qualified themselves sufficiently for such duties. When such men are to be found, their services are not likely to be overlooked, for really efficient men are in demand in India, to whatever branch they may belong. Such duties, however, require real efficiency, combined with thorough local knowledge and capability for hard work. To obtain such officers and men, who will be content to make India their homes for the greater portion of their lives, as has hitherto been the case with the East India Company's civil and military servants, and to ensure a constant command of such men of character, respectability and integrity, must be the object of Government, for otherwise it will be impossible to carry on the duties of the country with proper efficiency, and no English officers, however clever, who go to India only for a few years, will ever effectively supply the places of the officers of the late East India Company's service, who have hitherto devoted their lives to that country.

I am the more urgent on this head, as there appears to be great danger lest a mere smattering of native languages and the passing some petty examinations, should be considered sufficient qualification to enable an officer to hold an Indian appointment, however responsible it may be, without reference to any peculiar knowledge of the people and of the requirements of the country.

It will, however, be impossible to insure such a body of officers as the India government has a right to look for, unless the local service of India be maintained on a footing of perfect equality with the rest of the British army, and, perhaps, in order to further this object, a limited power of exchange from one branch of the service to the other might be admitted with advantage to both services.

Lord Canning recommends that the number of local European regiments of infantry for the Bengal presidency should be raised to thirty. Taking everything into consideration, I hold to the same opinion:—The officers being drafted, as his Lordship proposes, from the different native battalions which have mutinied.

The remaining European troops required for that presidency will be furnished by the line, and as circumstances admit, such regiments in excess as may happen to be in India, can gradually be withdrawn to Europe.

It is to be hoped that no very long period will elapse before the state of the country may admit of a very considerable reduction in the present number of regiments now employed in that presidency, so that twenty (20) of Her Majesty's regiments of the line may be found ample, with the thirty (30) local corps, making up fifty (50) European infantry regiments for the Bengal presidency alone.

The question as to the artillery appears to be simple. The Company's European artillery has always proved itself most efficient in every respect:—There can be no necessity for keeping any of the Royal Artillery in India after peace is restored to the country. The local artillery has been proved to be much less expensive and quite equal to the requirements of the service, and there can be no difficulty in increasing that branch to any extent that may be necessary. I, therefore, am of opinion that, as a matter of finance, which must be considered, all the Royal Artillery may safely, in a very short time, be withdrawn, and, as a simple matter of cost, it appears to be absolutely necessary that this measure should be carried out as soon as the requisite increase has been made to the local artillery of India. This increase, it appears to me, can best be carried out in the most economical manner, as recommended by Lord Clyde and General Mansfield, by increasing all the horse artillery and horse field batteries to eight guns each, so as to admit of half troops and half batteries of four guns each being detached when requisite,—second captains, sub-alterns, and additional gunners and European drivers being added to each, so as to give the complement required for eight instead of six guns, and, at the same time, replacing with Europeans all the native drivers now in the Indian artillery.

Hitherto there have been of late years three of Her Majesty's European cavalry regiments in the Bengal Presidency, and no other European cavalry whatever. Now that five strong local European light cavalry regiments have been raised for Bengal, there can be no necessity for continuing always these three dragoon cavalry regiments belonging to Her Majesty's general army. The men who have been raised for the new local European cavalry corps,

are understood to be much smaller than any light dragoons ever raised before for Her Majesty's service, and such men are required in European war. There cannot be a doubt that on account of the perpetual difficulty of mounting heavy large men in India, it will be a great matter that all the European cavalry to be employed for the future in India should be small and active, and raised especially for that peculiar service; such fine, heavy cavalry as the royal dragoons, although called light and dressed as such, are not requisite for Indian warfare; and in time these three cavalry regiments, as well as the two in Madras and Bombay, might be withdrawn altogether, and the saving, in point of horses alone, ought to be very considerable. It is almost impossible to mount our present English royal dragoons; and, in fact, that description of European cavalry is not requisite in such a country, unless you retain one or two regiments for mere show, and to keep up the spirit of emulation between the two services.

2. In connection with this question, "The best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion; viz., the troops of the line; and of securing the efficiency of the latter, viz., the local Indian army?"

2. It has been pointed out to the Commission that troops from the Cape and Australia stand the climate of India better than regiments direct from England. If thought advisable, a depôt (as suggested by Sir George Clerk) might be established at the Cape, where all European regiments and all recruits for India, might be usefully employed in the duties of that colony for a year or two before being forwarded on to India; but, by taking advantage of the different sanatory hill-stations throughout India, I consider such precaution would hardly be requisite. When hill stations at an elevation of from 1,500 to 4,000 feet have once been fixed upon in different parts of India, all Europeans of the army might have their tour of such climate, and all invalids might at once be sent to the nearest hill depôts of the regiment. Each corps having a depôt of its own would enable commanding officers, on the recommendation of the surgeon, to send off at once all sickly or weakly men, and thus be the means of saving many lives; but such minor details can best be worked out in India. I feel convinced that thus you would, in a great measure, obviate the necessity of sending your European soldiers to Europe until their service in India was at an end, and this would be a great saving of cost in transporting men backwards and forwards.

3. Whether it be possible to consolidate the European forces so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other, and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object, with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now in the service of the East India Company?

3. In my opinion it will be impossible to consolidate the European forces so as to admit of free exchange from one branch of the service to the other, with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now in the service of the East India Company, nor does such appear advisable for the public service. I have no hesitation in giving my opinion that a separate local service for India is absolutely necessary, but there would be a decided advantage in a limited power of exchange from one branch of Her Majesty's service to the other, as in the Ceylon rifles, the Cape mounted rifles, and other branches of the army; although, excepting in the junior grades, it is rarely that much advantage would be taken of this permission. It would, however, be a decided advantage to both services that such an arrangement should be permitted, and it is just possible that hereafter it might be found a very great boon, and found to work well; and there is no doubt, in the meantime, it would be so esteemed by the local army of India as the arrangement best calculated to uphold the honour of the service, and to prevent any feeling of jealousy.

4. Whether the local European force should be kept up by drafts and volunteers from the line, or should be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain?

4. The local European force may be kept up by drafts and volunteers from the line, as well as by separate recruits in Great Britain, as at present. The buildings at Haylebury (late the Civil College of the East India Company) are now available for the home depôts, and a trifling increase to the present home Indian recruiting establishments would easily enable the officers to complete the requirements for the Indian service.

Smaller and lighter men are required for the Indian European cavalry. It would greatly facilitate the recruiting generally for the Indian service were the standard of the infantry recruits also fixed a trifle lower than for the line. For Indian service the European soldier is required, but height is of little consequence. Goorkahs and other hill tribes, who are very much smaller than the Bengal sepahis, are sufficient proof that it is pluck, not height or weight, which carries the day in India, as indeed, in most parts of the world, but there more especially.

T. F. TAYLOR, Colonel.

APPENDIX No. 81.

CORRESPONDENCE between MAJOR-GENERAL HANCOCK and THE SECRETARY.

1.—The SECRETARY to Major-General HANCOCK.

Indian Army Commission,
January 24, 1859.
SIR, I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Royal Commission on the Indian Army will hold its next meeting on Friday, the 28th January, at 11 o'clock.
I have, &c.
(Signed) R. B. WOOD,
Major-General Hancock. Secretary.

2.—Major-General HANCOCK to the SECRETARY.

Tunbridge Wells, January 25, 1859.
SIR, WITH reference to your letter of yesterday's date, I have the honour to request you will submit to the Chairman of the Royal Commission on the Re-organization of the Indian Army, that as the meeting to be held on Friday next is merely for the purpose of completing the Report of the majority of the Commissioners, to which, in consequence of my considering it my duty to make a separate report, I should be unable to attach my signature, I presume my attendance will not be required.
I have, &c.
Colonel R. B. Wood, C.B., (Signed) HENRY HANCOCK,
Secretary to the Royal Commission, &c.

3.—The SECRETARY to Major-General HANCOCK.

Indian Army Commission,
January 26, 1859.
SIR, IN reply to your letter of yesterday's date, I am directed by the Chairman of the Royal Commission on the Re-organization of the Indian Army to state that you must exercise your own discretion as to attending the meeting of the Commissioners on Friday next.
I have, &c.
(Signed) R. B. WOOD,
Major-General Hancock. Colonel and Secretary.

4.—The SECRETARY to Major-General HANCOCK.

Indian Army Commission,
March 1, 1859.
SIR, BY direction of the Chairman, Major-General Peel, I have the honour to inform you that it was unanimously decided at the meeting of the Commissioners this day, that before the Commissioners close their proceedings, you should be requested to favour them, by Saturday next, with your separate report. The Commissioners not being aware of the points on which you dissent from their opinions, as expressed in the draft report which has been sent to you, and to which the Commissioners have this day agreed, they are anxious to have the opportunity of considering and discussing them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. B. WOOD,
Major-General Hancock. Secretary.

5.—Major-General HANCOCK to the SECRETARY.

SIR,
 London, March 2, 1859.
 IN reply to your letter of yesterday's date, I have the honour to request you will inform the Chairman, Major-General Peel, that being satisfied, from the opinions expressed by himself and Lord Stanley on more than one occasion on which the subject thereof was discussed at previous meetings of the Commissioners, that in following the precedent of the Army Purchase Commission, and transmitting my Report direct to the Secretary-at-War, I should adopt a correct course, I must adhere to my determination then communicated to the Commissioners so to forward it, and regret being unable, therefore, to comply with the request conveyed in your letter under acknowledgment.

With respect to your remark that the Commissioners are not aware of the points on which I dissent from their opinions as expressed in the draft report which has been sent to me, I beg to observe that those points were made known to them by me at the time the votes were taken upon the resolutions on which the draft report has been framed; they are also shown in my written replies to the questions under each head of the inquiry, which are on the Commissioners' table, and which I have already informed them verbally, and through you in writing, would form the basis of my separate report. I have, &c.

(Signed) H. HANCOCK,
 Colonel Wood, C.B., Major-General, Bombay Army.
 Secretary to the Royal
 Commission, &c. &c.

6.—Major-General HANCOCK to the SECRETARY.

Tunbridge Wells,
 March 3, 1859.
 SIR,
 WITH reference to the second paragraph of your note of yesterday's date, extracted in the margin, I request the favour of your submitting to the Chairman, Major-General Peel, my opinion that the fact of the decision of the Commissioners, that I should be requested to favour them with my separate Report, having been passed on the 1st instant, after the Major-General and myself had left the meeting, and in the absence of Lord Stanley and Sir Henry Smith, who did not attend it; and of a proposal to the same effect having been disposed of before Major-General Peel left the chair, (which is not shown in the correspondence,) should be published.
 I therefore request the sanction of the Chairman to the insertion of this letter also in the Appendix to the Report.

I have, &c.
 (Signed) H. HANCOCK,
 Major-General.

Colonel Wood, C.B.,
 Secretary to the Royal
 Commission, &c. &c.