
Washington, D.C.

December 1934




For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. - - - - Price 10 cents

Generally bids are bought	t when the buyer expects	Generally offers are boug	
a decline in the p	rice of the future.	an advance in the	
When exer	When exer	rcis	
Purchaser of the bid sells a future at the bid price which is the same or higher than the closing price of the future on the day the bid is exer- closed. <sup>1</sup>	Seller of the bid buys a futurests price which is the same or higher than the close on the day when the bid is made good. <sup>1</sup>	Purchaser of the offer buys a future at the offer price which is the same or lower than the close on the day when the offer is exercised. <sup>1</sup>	8
Purchaser of bids (1) goes	Seller of bids (1) goes	Purchaser of the offer (1)	8
abort, or (2) liquidates	long, or (2) covers ex-	goes long, or (2) covers	
existing long commit-	isting short commit-	existing short commit-	
ments in futures, or (3)	ments in futures, or	ments in futures, or	
makes an offsetting	(3) makes an offset-	(3) makes an offset-	
trade, thereby main-	ting trade, thereby	ting trade, thereby	
taining his position un-	maintaining his posi-	maintaining his posi-	
changed.	tion unchanged.	tion unshanged.	

# The following outline shows in condensed form we when privileges are exercised by those who purchase i

<sup>1</sup> When the bid or offer price is the same as the close, the privilege is usually no occasions, however, when the trader wishes to acquire or dispose of open commit exercise his privilege at "no profit."



# TRADING IN PRIVILEGES ON THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE

By PAUL MEHL, senior agricultural economist, Grain Futures Administration \*

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#### Uses made of privileges ... 39 a flord protection by limiting losses due to changes in the price of futures..... Privileges make possible the financing of speculation in futures on less capital. 30 41 Premiums on privileges are a source of income to sellers. 42 Privileges furnish reveaue to brokers in addition to commissions 纷 addition to commissions... Privilege price used by some traders as a point around which their transactions in futures may center the next day.... Privileges provide a means of accumulat-ing or closing out speculative lines.... Attempts to accumulate or dispose of linest bounds burying and algorithm. 43 41 lines through privileges not always successful 70 Privileges credited with a stabilizing influence on the price of futures .... 76 75 78 ments.... 76 Increases congestion at close of futures market. 77 Summary Literature died..... ----

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### INTRODUCTION

Aside from a few short paragraphs in textbooks and pamphlets rescribing privileges, comments made from a historical standpoint by C. H. Taylor, a former member of the Chicago Board of Trade, (7)<sup>2 4</sup> and references made in published hearings of congressional committees as to the desirability of retaining or abolishing privileges, ind the Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Grain Trade 11), nothing has been printed which throws light on trading in priveges. No comprehensive study had ever been made as to the extent rivileges were traded in, the uses made of them by merchandisers

The author is greatly indebted to members of the staff of the Grain Futures Administration and to Wright Hollman of the University of Pennsylvania, who were very helpful in criticising the manuscript. Itslic numbers in parentheses refer to interature cited, p. 79. In Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Grain Trade (11, s. 13) contains many excepts from

Taylor's history.

<sup>69792-54-</sup>

of grain and by speculators, the frequency with which they were excisable at a profit to buyers, and their economic value until the te was begun by the Grain Futures Administration. In preparing report (9) in answer to Senate Resolution 40, adopted by the Unit States Senate on February 21, 1928, which requested certain inform tion pertaining to reports made by members of grain exchanges, cc siderable data were collected concerning trading in grain futur during the period of January 3 to October 31, 1927. By obtaini supplementary material showing the privileges bought and sold on t Chicago Board of Trade by the principal traders in privileges duri that period, it was possible to arrive at definite conclusions as to t extent bids and offers were traded in and used by the larger spec lators in building up and disposing of speculative lines in Chica wheat and corn futures. Additional data, obtained and analyze revealed the frequency with which privileges are exercised on t board of trade and the extent to which they may have a stabilizi influence on prices of futures.

In addition to concrete statistical data, the uses made of tradii in privileges are presented herein together with the unfavoral aspects of such trading. Reference is also made to the change attitude from time to time on the part of the officials of the Chica Board of Trade with respect to privilege trading. Because of t scarcity of material on privilege trading it has been deemed advisab to make public the information collected by the Grain Futures Admi istration in order that it may throw further light on that phase exchange activity for the benefit of those who may wish informatic on the subject.

# PRIVILEGE DEFINED

A privilege in grain futures is a contract whereby one person a quires the right to sell to or purchase from another during a specific period (a day, week, or month) a definite quantity of a specific grain future <sup>5</sup> at a designated price. The option to sell, so acquire is known as a "bid", and the option to purchase is known as a "offer". The buyer of a bid or an offer has the right to exercise, i not exercise, his privilege as he deems best. The seller of the bid i offer is required to "make good" the privilege only when it is exercise by the buyer.<sup>6</sup> In this respect a privilege differs from the ordinar future contract wherein the seller is obligated to deliver, and the buyer to receive, on the contract during the delivery month, the designated amount of contract grain. In the case of the privilege the holder (buyer) has the right to decide whether or not a tranaction in futures shall take place.

Privileges are variously referred to as "puts" and "calls", "ups and "downs", "deferred acceptances" and "indemnities", as well a bids and offers. They are spoken of also as "dailies" or "weeklies" depending on the length of time they have to run. In continenta Europe, privileges are termed "premiums" and are considered b Europeans as ordinary contracts for future delivery with a specie

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> A grain-future contract is an agreement to buy (or sell) at some future time, designated as the deliver month, in accordance with the rules of the exchange, a definite quantity of a certain grain at a price agree upon.

upon. • The grain trade usually speaks of the buyer of the privilege as the one who "makes good" the bid offer when he exercises it. Herein, however, the term is used in the sense of fulfilling the agreement rath than in the more limited sense used by the trade.

stipulation that, in consideration of a cash payment, one of the parties has the right to withdraw from the contract within a specified time.

A resolution of the directors of the Chicago Board of Trade adopted on January 12, 1926, authorized trading in privileges under the name of "bids and offers for deferred acceptance", the contract forms being as follows:

Bid Subject to Deferred Acceptance

Chicago, Ill., \_\_\_\_\_ 19\_\_\_

In consideration of \$\_\_\_\_\_, receipt of which I acknowledge, I agree at your election to purchase from you \_\_\_\_\_\_ bushels of \_\_\_\_\_\_ for delivery during \_\_\_\_\_\_ 19\_\_ at the price of \$\_\_\_\_\_\_ per bushel. Your election to sell must be manifested by delivery to me of your written acceptance of this bid at or prior to the close of the market on \_\_\_\_\_\_ 19\_\_. If this bid is accepted, the resulting contract shall be deemed an exchange contract subject in all respects to the rules of the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago.

#### Offer Subject to Deferred Acceptance

Chicago, Ill., ..... 19.\_

In consideration of \$..... receipt of which I acknowledge, I agree at your election to sell to you ..... bushels of ..... for delivery during ...... 19... at the price of \$...... per bushel. Your election to purchase must be manifested by delivery to me of your written acceptance of this offer at or prior to the close of the market on ...... 19... If this offer is accepted, the resulting contract shall be deemed an exchange contract subject in all respects to the rules of the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago.

Acknowledgment of Bid Subject to Deferred Acceptance

Chicago, Ill., \_\_\_\_\_ 19\_\_\_

I hereby acknowledge receipt of your bid to purchase from me bushels of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ for delivery during \_\_\_\_\_\_ at the price of \$\_\_\_\_\_\_ per bushel, subject to my election to sell which must be exercised at or before the close of the market on \_\_\_\_\_\_ 19\_\_\_\_

\*\*\*\*\*\*

Acknowledgment of Offer Subject to Deferred Acceptance

Chicago, Ill., \_\_\_\_\_ 19\_\_\_

I hereby acknowledge receipt of your offer to sell to me \_\_\_\_\_ bushels of \_\_\_\_\_\_ for delivery during \_\_\_\_\_\_ at the price of \$\_\_\_\_\_\_ per bushel, subject to my election to buy which must be exercised at or before the close of the market on \_\_\_\_\_\_ 19\_\_\_.

Buyers of bids are assumed to have purchased them in anticipation of a decline in the price of futures, whereas sellers are presumed to expect an advance or at least no material decline. With respect to offers the reverse is true: The purchasers are presumed to expect, or at least to guard themselves against, an advance, whereas the sellers are presumed to expect that prices will decline or at least that they will not advance beyond the price specified in the offer.

The purchase from the same person of a bid and an offer at the same price is termed a "straddle." It is a combined put and call, and gives the holder thereof the privilege of putting (selling) or calling (buying) the future, or both at the prices agreed upon. Straddles are sometimes termed "doubles." A trader will sell both bids and offers only when a dull, inactive market is anticipated by him the following day. Straddles are seldom sold on grain exchanges in the United States.

## LIFE OF BIDS AND OFFERS, TIME WHEN TRADED IN, AND COST

Trading in bids and offers good for 1 day is maintained for a half hour (1:30 to 2 p.m.) after the regular trading session has closed at 1:15 p.m., except on Saturdays when the time runs from 12:15 to 12:45 p.m.

Trading in privileges good "this week" begins on Monday morning of each week and is conducted each day until Wednesday; trading in those good "next week" begins on Tuesday morning and is conducted each day until and including Saturday of the current week. Weeklies may be bought or sold any time during the day from 9:30 a.m., to 2 p.m., except on Saturdays. On Saturdays the time limit is 9:30 a.m. to 12:45 p.m.

Transactions may be made in units of 1,000 bushels and multiples thereof. Bids good for 1 day are usually purchased at prices from 1 to 2 cents below the closing price of the future. Offers good for 1 day are generally from 1 to 2 cents above the closing price of the future. For weeklies the spread is somewhat larger.

For a privilege the buyer is charged a certain fee, the amount depending on whether the privilege is a bid or offer, a daily or weekly. The charge made for bids good for 1 day only, covering 5,000 bushels of wheat, corn, oats, or rye, is \$5.25 to members and \$5.50 to nonmembers. In the case of weeklies the charge is \$7.50 per 5,000 bushels to both members and nonmembers. Five dollars of the fee for dailies and \$6.25 of the fee for weeklies, per 5,000 bushels, goes to the seller of the privilege. The remainder of the fee is retained by the brokerage house as commission.

The fee charged for offers is at present the same as for bids, but an amount equal to the Federal tax is added because the seller has to pay the tax on the offers sold, and this be collects from the buyer. No tax, however, is collected at present on the sale of bids. In the early days of trading in puts and calls on the Chicago Board of Trade, there was no commission charge for executing orders for puts and calls, the commission houses relying on making their profits from the trades in futures growing out of the exercising of the privileges. Subsequently a commission was charged which at present is as stated above.

Although the above are the rates received by commission houses, the exchange rule specifies only the minimum to be charged. The rule reads:

Indemnities.—The minimum rates of brokerage and commission for trading in indemnities shall be as follows:

(a) On daily indemnities, where the privilege to buy or sell does not extend beyond the close of the session on the following business day, the brokerage payable by members shall be three percent of the consideration, the commission payable by members shall be two percent of the consideration, and the clearing rate, as defined in Rule 224, shall be two percent of the consideration.

(b) On other indemnities, where the privilege to buy or sell extends beyond the close of the session on the following business day, the commission payable by the buyer, whether member or non-member, shall be fifty percent of the consideration. One-half of this commission shall be retained by the commission merchant representing the buyer, and the other half shall be paid to the commission mer-

chant representing the seller, provided that, if the buyer is not represented by a commission merchant, the buyer may retain that part of the commission payable to his commission merchant; and, if the seller is not represented by a commission merchant, the seller may retain that part of the commission payable to his commission merchant. On indemnities of this character, the brokerage payable by members shall be ten percent of the consideration, and the clearing rate shall be two percent of the consideration.

(c) In all cases, there shall be added to the purchase price, and paid by the buyer to the seller of an indemnity, the amount of the Federal taxes.

#### THE EARLY HISTORY OF PRIVILEGE TRADING

Trading in privileges in Chicago has been carried on since the early sixties. On the Chicago Board of Trade, however, they have been traded in only at intermittent periods. In 1865 the rules of the exchange did not recognize trading in privileges. Taylor (7) says:

What are known as "puts" and "calls" were discountenanced by the closing paragraph of rule XI, which ran as follows: "Privileges bought or sold to deliver or call for grain or other property by members of the Association shall not be recognized as a business transaction by the Directors or Committee of Arbitration." Dealing in these privileges, however, though not recognized, does not appear to have been forbidden.

This provision, however, was dropped from the rules published in 1869.

In 1874, a law was placed on the statute books of Illinois, which prohibited trading in privileges. Following the enactment of this legislation, the directors of the exchange adopted a resolution prohibiting the buying or selling of puts or calls on the exchange floor, but it was seldom enforced (7, v. 1, p. 530).

In February 1885, a case, based on the law of 1874, was decided by the Illinois Supreme Court, which definitely established the illegality of trading in privileges.<sup>7</sup> In making its decision, the court said:

It is plain that under the contract between plaintiff and the firm of Hooker & Co., it was not in the contemplation of the parties any actual purchases or sales of grain or other commodities should be made for plaintiff, or on his behalf. Indeed, it was expressly agreed none should be made. All the speculating that was to be done was to be in differences in options—or, as the parties termed it, "betting on the market." Of course, it was expected by the parties that such purchases and sales of grain or other commodities that should be made, were to be made on the board of trade. As was said by this court in *Pixley* v. *Boynton*, 79 III. 351, the true idea of an option is what are called, in the peculiar language of the dealers, "puts" and "calls." A "put" is defined to be the "privilege of delivering or not delivering" the thing sold, and a "call" is defined to be the "privilege of calling for or not calling for" the thing bought. "Optional contracts," in this sense, are usually settled by adjusting market values, as the party having the "option" may elect. It is simply a mode adopted for speculating in in this sense the term "option" is used in the statute.

In 1887 the board of directors adopted another resolution forbidding the practice of trading in privileges, but this did not accomplish the results desired as members of the exchange resorted to the Open Board of Trade, another market in Chicago, where trading in privileges was permitted. Disciplining the members of the Chicago Board of Trade who traded in privileges was not found feasible as too many of them were engaging in the practice, and the punishing of all the violators might have meant the disrupting of the board of trade. With

Peerce v. Fosts, 113 El. 234. See also Federal Trade Commission Report on the Grain Trade (11, s. 3, pp. 114-15).

the failure to enforce the rule, trading in privileges on the part of the members increased off the exchange.

Taylor (7, v. 2, pp. 741-742, 771), made the following comments pertaining to privilege trading during the years 1887 and 1888:

The Directors of the Board of Trade were determined to keep trading within the limits prescribed by law and passed a resolution prohibiting trading in puts and calls, following this action by suspending a member for fifteen days for violation of the rule. The Open Board continued to trade in privileges, the transactions being stated as amounting to about 3,000,000 bushels daily. Some members of the regular Board took advantage of this opportunity to make these prohibited trades and the question arose as to the jurisdiction of the Board of Trade over transactions taking place on another Exchange. John T. Lester led the fight against privilege trading and complaints were filed against a number of members. \* \* \* In the latter part of January [1887] twelve members were called up for discipline on evidence said to have been furnished by H. C. Avery that they had been trading in privileges on the Open Board. This action enraged Mr. Hutchinson [B. P.] who was indignant that he had not been included among the offenders and threatened "to make it hot" for the Board. Inasmuch as the Directors had denied jurisdiction in the case involving the enforcement of a trade made on the Open Board, it was argued that they could not discipline members on account of such trades, but nevertheless seven members were suspended for from twenty to ninety days, and among those suspended was M. B. Crafts, the President of the Open Board. The fight against privileges was now carried into the Open Board itself. Mr. Crafts favored privilege trading, while T. M. Baxter led the opposition. Mr. Baxter claimed to have found a rule of the Open Board against privileges, which was not printed with the other rules, and under this filed complaints against ten members. Mr. Crafts, on the other hand, came forward with a plan for a "contract of indemnity" which was to replace Puts and Calls and which was practically the same thing under another name. At a meeting of the Directors of the Open Board, their attorney, L. H. Bisbee, cited a decision favora

During the latter part of July [1888] the Directors considered the cases of three small traders accused of dealing in Puts and Calls and gave a sentence of suspension against them. There was much outery concerning this and demand was made that the larger traders be punished also. The Directors pushed the investigation and Directors Montague, Richardson, and Rawleigh were appointed to go into the matter more thoroughly. They called some of the offenders before them and four members confessed to deals in Puts and Calls but refused to inform on others. Following this, nearly fifty members were called before the Committee. Many made admissions of guilt, but it was found that it would be impossible to punish all, without disrupting the Exchange and there was much sentiment in favor of reinstating the three suspended members. As a result of the investigation twenty-nine members were reprimanded, the suspended members were restored and secret committees appointed to report further violations, which were to be punished by expusion. Following the example of the regular Board, the Open Board acted also, and President French of that institution announced that the rule against trading in privileges would be strictly enforced.

In 1895, however, the newly elected president of the board of trade (1) advocated the immediate enforcement of the rules against trading in privileges. In his inaugural address he said (1, p. xix):

Trading in privileges has become so common outside of Exchange hours as to impair the good name of the Association. These transactions are outside the law and are distinctly obnoxious to your own rules. They can not be enforced either in the courts or under the rules of this Board, and anybody can sue at any time and recover for even inconsequential losses. The Illinois statute prescribes penalties of fine and imprisonment for making such contracts, and specifically declares that all such contracts "shall be considered gambling contracts and shall be void." It is claimed that the dull state of trade makes these transactions necessary, but do they not contribute to an important extent to the very stagna-

tion you complain of? By coopering prices within a narrow limit day after day, do you not discourage business that you would count on in a free and unrestricted market? The risks assumed by you as commission merchants are beyond computation, and more than all else in making these transactions we violate the law. I sincerely urge that means may be taken to put an end to the practice at once.

By 1900 sentiment had changed to the extent that by a vote of 623 to 373 the directors were given the authority to prevent trading in privileges and to suspend or expel any member found dealing in them. This change in attitude by the board members was largely due to the court decision rendered at that time which affirmed the validity of the 1874 statute.<sup>8</sup> The court held that:

\* \* The prohibition of the right to enter into contracts which do not contemplate the creation of an obligation on the part of one of the contracting parties to accept and pay for the commodity which is the purported subject matter of the contract, but only to invest him with the option or privilege to demand the other contracting party shall deliver him the grain if he desires to purchase it, tends materially to the suppression of the very evil of gambling in grain options which it was the legislative intent to extirpate, for the reason such evil injuriously affected the welfare and safety of the public. The denial of the right to make such contracts tended directly to advance the end the legislature had in view, and was not an inappropriate measure of attack on the evil intended to be eradicated. So far as that point is concerned the act must be deemed a valid law of the land, and as such must be enforced, though it infringe in a degree upon the property rights of citisens. To that extent private right must be deemed secondary to the public good.

The apparent change of heart was primarily with respect to trading in privileges in Chicago. In fact, the desire to trade in privileges was not suppressed, and trading was carried on by telegraph between Chicago and Milwaukee, where privileges could be bought or sold. In 1906 an amendment to the rules of the Chicago Board of Trade was adopted which prohibited trading in outside markets based on Chicago receipts. The amendment (to sec. 8 of rule 4) was as follows:

When any member, or any firm of which a member of this Association is a member, or any corporation of which a member is an officer, whether acting as principal or as agent, shall either directly or indirectly make or execute, or cause or permit to be forwarded for execution, upon any exchange or board of trade located outside of the City of Chicago, an order for a so-called "put" or "call", or for any contract respecting the purchase or sale of grain or provisions for future delivery, when by the rules, regulations, customs, or usages of such exchange or board of trade it is provided or permitted, or where the parties to such "put", "call", or contract contemplate that such "put", "call", or contract may be fulfilled or satisfied by the delivery of a warehouse receipt or receipts issued by a warehouse located in Chicago, such member, or such member of such firm, or such officer of such corporation shall be deemed guilty of conduct which renders him unfit for membership in this Association, and upon conviction thereof he shall be expelled.

To meet the demands of those who wanted privilege trading, a new method was adopted which met the approval of legal counsel as not being in violation of the law of 1874. The new system consisted of contracts to be designated as "indemnity of sale or purchase" on the theory that there would be no wager on price movements but rather the making of a contract, the purpose of which was to protect open commitments against loss due to price changes. These contracts were to expire at the close of the regular session of the exchange on the following day. Should the holder of the indemnity desire to exercise the privilege with respect to the whole or part of the quantity

I Booth v. Peepie, 57 N.E. 798. Also ass Federal Trade Commission Report on the Grain Trade (11, s. 5, pp. 1(6-118).

covered in the contract he must, after notifying the seller of his intention, make a sale to (or purchase of) the seller of the contract at the regular closing price of the future, and the difference between the price of the indemnity and the future was to be paid immediately as indemnity (11, v. 2, pp. 118-120).

This method of operation was carried on until 1910. In that year the exchange was under investigation by the Federal Government and the directors voted to abolish trading in indemnities as being substantially the same as trading in puts and calls. In September of that year, however, an amendment to the rule was passed by members of the exchange by a vote of 550 to 105 providing for trading in indemnities under certain restrictions believed to make such transactions legally sound. The restriction was to insert in each indemnity contract and confirmation a stipulation that the indemnity was bought to protect an existing and legitimate insurable interest in the commodities forming the subject matter of the risk not otherwise protected by contract made under this rule. When no insurable interest existed it was considered as gambling (7, v. 2, p. 1155; 11,v. 2, p. 120). This amended rule was in existence until 1913.

In 1913 the Illinois Legislature amended the law of 1874 to prohibit such contracts only—

where it is at the time of making such contract intended by both parties thereto that the option whenever exercised or the contract resulting therefrom shall be settled, not by the receipt or delivery of such property, but by the payment only of differences in prices thereof.

James C. McMath (5) of the Chicago Bar, apparently takes the position that the 1913 amendment does not legalize trading in privileges. He contends that sections 130 and 132 of the Illinois Criminal Code are effective as enacted in 1874. His ground for believing so is that the 1913 amendment contained verbatim the language of section 130 as enacted in 1874 with some new language added, and he cites Svenson v. Hanson<sup>9</sup> as his authority, in which the court said:

It is elementary that when an amendatory act retains in a new law the same words and phraseology that were contained in a former law which has been construed by the courts, it must be presumed that such law was retained in the amendatory act in view of the judicial construction already placed upon it.

Following the change in the law the board of trade adopted a rule permitting trading in bids and offers and designated the commission to be charged members and nonmembers.

In 1921 when the Future Trading Act was introduced in Congress, and the grain exchanges were subjected to public criticism for not correcting certain evils which were alleged to exist, the directors of the Chicago Board of Trade again conceded that trading in privileges was contrary to public interest and advocated its prohibition. In a communication to the president of the board, dated April 12, 1921, they made the following statement (10, p. 476):

It is our firm purpose to prevail upon our membership to so amend our rules as to preclude all transactions in indemnity contracts and at the same time induce other exchanges to follow the same course. While these contracts at times serve a very useful economic function, nevertheless they are frequently used as a medium of entering the market on a large scale. We have concluded that this fact outweighs all of their advantages, and it has led to our conclusion that they should be abolished.

Spenson v. Hanson, 289 Ill. 342.

With the enactment of the Future Trading Act of 1921, trading in privileges again was legislated out of existence by the imposition of a tax of 20 cents a bushel. On October 23, 1923, a test case was brought before a Federal court calling into question the constitutionality of that part of the law pertaining to privileges. Later, on January 11, 1926, the United States Supreme Court, to which the case had been appealed, rendered a decision in which it was held that the provision in the Future Trading Act pertaining to privileges was unconstitutional as an invalid exercise of the taxing power.<sup>10</sup>

On January 12, 1926, the next day following the decision, the directors of the Chicago Board of Trade passed a resolution permitting trading in privileges on the exchange thereby reversing the position the exchange had taken on previous occasions when it approved the prohibition of trading in privileges. Other exchanges followed suit and trading in bids and offers was again permitted."

During the early put-and-call days the trading was done mainly in the pits. Following an Illinois Supreme Court decision declaring these transactions gambling and illegal, as under an act entitled, "An Act to revise the law in relation to criminal jurisprudence" approved May 27, 1874, in force July 1, 1874, the trading was done outside of the trading room, in the halls and smoking room of the board of trade building, outside of the building, and sometimes at any convenient time or place where buyer and seller happened to meet.

Prior to 1913 payments incident to the transactions in privileges were in currency, without any definite record made except such as was kept by buyer and seller. Subsequent to the enactment of Illinois Senate Bill No. 126 in 1913 (except for the period following the enactment of the Future Trading Act in 1921, terminating with the Supreme Court decision in 1926), trading in privileges was officially recognized by the Chicago Board of Trade under the designation of indemnities or "deferred acceptances." The trading in privileges then returned from the outside, was carried on in the pit, and confined to that period of the day designated for such trading, although privileges valid for more than a day were traded in at any time during the day. Money transactions were recorded and handled through the Clearing Association.

# VOLUME OF TRADING IN PRIVILEGES

No record has ever been compiled by the board of trade of the volume of trading in bids and offers. A record of the volume of sales of offers is kept, however, by the Bureau of Internal Revenue of the United States Treasury Department, which collects a stamp tax on sales of offers. The tax return filed by each clearing member of the exchange shows the daily sales for each month. For the total trading in offers the figures showing the sales will serve the purpose, for the total purchases must equal the total sales.

For the 8 months, February to September 1921, immediately prior to the prohibition of trading in privileges by the Future Trading Act, the quantity of offers sold on the Chicago Board of Trade was as shown in table 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Truster v. Crocks, 209 U.S. 478. <sup>11</sup> Following the prior collapse of July 19-20, 1933, trading in privileges on the Chicago Board of Trade was suspended by order of the board of directors on July 24, 1933, until further notice.

# 10 CIRCULAR 323, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Oraln	Volume of trading in futures (sales)	Volume of trading in offers (sales)	Proportion trading in offers is of trading in futures
Wheat Corn Oats Rye	Thousand busheis 8, 181, 206 4, 375, 445 1, 940, 668 130, 032	<b>Thousond</b> bushels 724, 712 543, 326 215, 426 1, 675	Percent 8.68 12.46 11.10 1.29
Total	14, 027, 349	1, 487, 138	10. 2

TABLE 1Volume of trading in	offers compared with	h futures on the	Chicago Board
of Trade duris	ng February to Sept	ember 1981	

The same rate of trading for 12 months would make a total of offers sold during 1 year of nearly 2 billion bushels.

Records of all firms for wheat were taken for the months of August and September 1926, as a sample of the volume of trading in this one grain in offers since privilege trading was resumed. The totals obtained together with a comparison with the total volume of trading in Chicago futures for these 2 months are shown in table 2.

TABLE 2.—Volume of trading in wheat offers compared with wheat futures on the Chicago Board of Trade during August and September 1926

Month	Volume of trading in futures (sales)	Volume of trading in offers (sales)	Proportion trading in offers is of trading in futures
August	Thousand bushels 1, 014, 634 942, 763	Thousand bushcis \$4, 140 98, 280	Percent 9.28 10.42
Total	1, 957, 396	192, 420	9. 53

As there is no internal revenue tax on bids, no figures are available showing the extent of trading therein. Over a period of time, however, the volume of bids traded in would be about the same as the volume of offers.

Judging from these samples, the volume of trading in bids and offers in wheat is equivalent to approximately 15 percent of the volume of trading done in wheat futures on the Chicago Board of Trade. This percentage of trading in privileges appears relatively large as it is equivalent to the combined volume of trading in wheat futures on all of the other contract markets.

The volume of trading in privileges is distributed among the various brokerage houses in about the same percentage as is the trading in grain futures. Those commission houses having a large volume of futures trades usually have a large volume of trading in privileges, with approximately three fourths of the total trading concentrated in 20 to 30 houses. Trading in privileges varies from month to month. When the daily price fluctuations of futures become wider the volume of trading in privileges is larger than when futures fluctuations are narrow.

#### EXTENT PRIVILEGES ARE TRADED IN BY THE LARGER SPECULATORS

Privileges are traded in principally by speculators. They are sometimes used by hedgers, comprising elevator operators, exporters, and millers, but only to a comparatively small degree.

The large speculators, with a few exceptions, are principally sellers of privileges whereas the small traders, known as the "general public", are mainly buyers. From the standpoint of the amount traded in, the purchases of a small minority of the large speculators sometimes exceed the sales of the majority of the large speculators who are sellers. With few exceptions, the larger speculators seldom use privileges for protective purposes, and it is an open question as to what extent the general public uses them as a form of insurance.

Reliable information as to the extent that privileges are traded in by the larger speculators was not secured until an examination was made of the 1927 records of the brokerage houses. Data were obtained covering the first 10 months of 1927 which showed the trading in privileges by 29 of the larger speculators in wheat and corn. Their aggregate purchases of wheat privileges amounted to approximately 414,000,000 bushels and of corn privileges 191,000,000 bushels. The sales were 332,000,000 and 215,000,000 bushels, respectively, as shown in table 3. When compared with their transactions in futures, it was found that the volume of their trading in privileges was equivalent to 45 percent of their combined trading in wheat and corn futures.

 TABLE S.—Volume of trading in wheat and corn privileges for the accounts of 29 large speculators compared with their trading in jutures, from Jan. 3 to Oct. 31, 1927

	<b>m</b>		1	Frading in ;	Total of bids and				
Orain	Trading i	b futures	Purchases		Sal	Sales		offers	
	Pur- chases	Sales	Bids	Offers	Bids	Offers	Pur- chases	Sales	
Wheat	774 452	881 451	248 117	171 74	206 118	126 97	414 191	392 216	
Total Percent irading in privileges is of that in futures	1, 226	1, 332	860	945	324	223	605 49	547 41	

[In millions of bushels, i.e., 000.000 omitted]

Although most of the 29 traders were principally sellers of privileges in Chicago wheat futures, the aggregate purchases of the group were larger than their sales. With respect to privileges in corn, their aggregate purchases were less than their sales. This shows that

although the large buyers of privileges in the group were in the minority, their purchases of privileges in wheat outweighed the sales of the sellers who were in the majority. In corn, the purchases of the minority were exceeded by the sales of the majority.

The trading in bids and offers of these traders during 1927 varied considerably from month to month as shown in tables 4 and 5. During some of the months the trading in wheat was light, as for instance in January and February, whereas in other months, May for example, the trading was heavy. The quantity traded in varies with the price movements taking place from day to day, i.e., if price movements are large privilege trading becomes heavier, and if price changes are small the volume of privilege trading is lighter.

TABLE 4.—Wheat: Monthly trading in privileges, by 29 large speculators, Chicago Board of Trade, with the percentage of bids and offers made good, from Jan. 8 to Oct. 81, 1927

•		Bids							
Monáh	Pur-	Bales	Net	Made	e good		sge made od		
	chases	Dales	trade i	Pur- chases	Sales	Pur- chases	Sales		
January February March April May June June August September October	33, 815 22, 020 50, 360 30, 015 16, 785 20, 850 20, 675	bushels 12, 350 8, 905 25, 940 13, 586 33, 160 24, 170 13, 170 9, 955 26, 395	buaheia -8, 255 -630 +7, 875 +8, 435 +17, 200 +5, 845 +3, 615 +10, 895 -4, 720	Thousand busheis 220 5, 110 2, 770 1, 555 4, 470 1, 865 1, 015 1, 255	bushcis 3, 260 1, 335 6, 030 3, 130 1, 450 3, 870 2, 115 1, 235 8, 450	Percent	Percent 20, 40 14, 99 22, 25 23, 04 4, 37 16, 01 16, 01 16, 01 12, 41 13, 59		
Total	36, 530 243, 420	39, 440 206, 070	-2,910 +37,350	5, 255 23, 505	7, 690 33, 565	14.39 9.78	19.60 16.29		
<del></del>	Offers								
Month	1			<b>URB</b>	8				
Month	Par-		Net		good	Percenta goo			
Month	Par- chases	Bales	Net trade <sup>r</sup>		-				
Month January February March April May June June June Juny September October	chases Thousand busheis 7,080 11,735 22,910 21,255 21,240 19,350 19,350 13,765 18,310	Baies Thousand bushels 6,040 5,535 13,335 7,060 25,780 25,780 26,115 11,185 10,486 11,845 14,090	trade t	Msde Pur-	good Sales	goo Pur-	й 		

<sup>1</sup> Plus sign indicates net purchase; minus sign, net sale.

#### TRADING IN PRIVILEGES ON CHICAGO BOABD OF TRADE

				Bids			_			
Month	Pur-	Sales	Net	Made	good	Percenta	ge made xd			
	chases	58165	trade 1	Pur- chases	89185	Pur- chases	Sales			
January Pebruary March April May June June June August September October Total	4, 150 9, 700 4, 105 16, 520 10, 685 11, 270 12, 940	Thousand busheis 2, 145 2, 595 5, 100 4, 885 19, 290 16, 395 10, 015 17, 006 30, 610	Thousand buckels +060 +1,555 +4,560 -2,770 -5,710 +1,035 +2,925 -2,070 -2,070 -1,295	Thousand bushels 1, 540 1, 760 1, 070 1, 070 1, 170 1, 110 935 1, 770 5, 050 5, 220 18, 645	Thousend bushels 725 1,225 362 1,610 1,755 800 3,275 6,340 18,067	Percent 87. 11 18. 04 26. 06 1. 03 10. 39 8. 30 13. 68 31. 70 18. 35 16. 94	Percent 33, 60 47, 21 18, 02 19, 34 J. 58 9, 82 17, 15 7, 99 19, 85 20, 85 20, 85			
		Offens								
Month	_									
Month	Pur-	Balas	Not	Msde	good	Parcenta				
Month	Pur- chases	Gaime	Net trade i	Made Pur- chases	good Sales					
Month January Yebruary March April May June June July September October	<b>Chases</b> <b>Thousand</b> <b>busheis</b> 2,860 5,615 6,445 8,520 7,275 8,520 7,275 8,740 9,090 18,995	<b>Sales</b> <b>Thousand</b> <b>Dushcis</b> 4, 130 8, 025 5, 370 8, 145 13, 125 12, 150 14, 385 14, 380 12, 150 14, 380 13, 210	trade i	Pur-	_	goo Pur-	Řa – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –			

#### TABLE 5.—Corn: Monthly trading in privileges, by 29 large speculators, Chicago Board of Trade, with the percentage of bids and offers made good, from Jan. 3 to Oct. 31, 1927

i Pluz sign indicates net purchase; minus sign, net sale.

# THE DISTANCE PRIVILEGES SELL FROM THE CLOSING PRICES OF FUTURES

The price of the daily privilege is determined with reference to the price of the future at the close of the market. The spread between the price of the privilege and the closing price of the future is spoken of as the distance the bid or offer sold from the close.

Comparing the prices of the daily bids and offers in the May and December wheat futures sold on the Chicago Board of Trade during the years 1926 to 1930 with the closing prices of the futures, it was found that during approximately 75 percent of the time bids and offers sold at a distance from the close of from 1 to 2 cents. On only about 25 percent of the days were the spreads 2 cents or more. Similar percentages would no doubt be obtained for the March, July, and September futures.

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For individual years and futures the percentages varied. The percentage of spreads of 2 cents or more is larger in some years than in others. For example, the bids and offers traded in during the year 1926, the latter part of 1929, and the year 1930 were frequently 2 cents or more from the close. During the life of the future the delivery month will usually show the widest range in the distance that privileges sell from the close. As can be seen in table 6, during 21 of the 40 instances, or 52 percent of the time, privileges sold as much as 4 cents or more away from the closing price of the future during the delivery month. A further examination of the data will also reveal that in 11 of the 20 delivery months quotations on offers were the farthest away, thus suggesting that sharp advances in the price of the Chicago wheat futures were anticipated during these months and particularly on the last few days of the month when most of the larger spreads occurred. How much trading is done in privileges at so great a spread is not known. One can assume, however, that the volume of such trading is small.

**TABLE 6.**—Maximum distances that prices of daily bids and offers in Chicago wheat futures were from the daily closing price of the future, during the respective delivery months, for the years 1926 to 1930

	19	25	1927		1928		1929		2990	
Future	Bids	Offers	Bids	Offers	Bida	Offers	Bids	Offers	Biðs	Officers
May July September December	10½-16½ 4¼- 7¾ 3¾- 4½ 4¾- 0½	10 -1134	3%- 5% 2%		875 24-3		646	836 234	5 <del>14 514</del> 2 <del>31 3</del> 14 134 134	1%-3%

(In cents per bushel)

Norz.-Above data are based on prices actually paid for daily bids and offers, as recorded by the Chicago Board of Trade, with "bid" and "asked" quotations excluded.

#### FACTORS DETERMINING THE DISTANCE THAT PRIVILEGES SELL AWAY FROM THE CLOSE

As stated in the preceding section, the distance that bids and offers sell away from the closing price of the future is, most of the time, less than 2 cents. Sometimes, as during the delivery months, the spread is greater. It was thought that possibly the size of the spread, i.e., the difference between the closing price of the future and the price of the privilege, was related either to the range in the price of the future on the day the privilege was traded in or to the anticipated range for the following day. An analysis of the figures compiled, however, shows that there is very little, if any, relationship between the distance that the privilege sells away from the close and the price range of the future on the day the privilege is traded in or on the following day. In the former case, the correlation coefficient for the 1926 Chicago September wheat future is +0.458 and for the 1926 December future +0.259. For the latter, in which the spread between the privilege and the future is compared with the price range of the future on the following day, the coefficients are, for the same futures, +0.224 and +0.337, respectively. As no relationship is shown between the daily range and the distance the privilege sold away from the close, it was thought that probably the change in the

price of the future, comparing the close of one day with that of the previous day, might have had an influence. It was found, however, that this price change was not a factor in determining the distance privileges sold from the closing price of the future.

The factors which determine the size of the spread are these: The supply and demand for privileges, i.e., the willingness of traders to sell or buy rights; the length of time the privilege has to run, i.e., daily or weekly; whether or not the privilege happens to be in a future which already is in its delivery month, as for example, a privilege bought in July wheat during the month of July; the past trend of price movements over a period of time; and the present state of the market, i.e., the outlook for advancing or declining prices. Indications are that traders are largely influenced by recent movements in prices of futures. If the price trend has been downward for a number of days the trade are apt to continue to be bearish and if, on the other hand, prices have been advancing, they are inclined to look for a further advance until something upsets the trend and starts it in the opposite direction. One will find that when the trend is downward bids will sell farther away from the close, whereas with an upward trend, offers will sell at a greater distance from the closing price of the future. Trading in privileges takes place during the last half hour of trading in the cotton and stock markets. Should any wide fluctuation occur in either of those markets during that 30 minutes of trading it is apt to influence the prices at which privileges in grain are sold on the Chicago Board of Trade. Another element which affects the demand for privileges is the amount for which privileges were good at the close of the futures market. For instance, if offers were good for 1½ cents at the close of the market, bids will most likely sell farther away from the day's closing price than would otherwise be the case because of the demand for them by traders who called the offers earlier in the day but did not wish to advance margin money to protect the commission house against any change in the price of futures the following day.

# THE PRIVILEGE MARKET AS A FORECASTER OF DAILY PRICE MOVEMENTS OF FUTURES

The distance that daily bids or offers sell away from the closing price of the future indicates whether trade sentiment is principally bullish or bearish as to the next day's price movement. If bids sell farther away from the closing price of the future than do the offers, it is presumed that the predominant trade sentiment is that prices of futures are more likely to decline than advance the following day. On the other hand, if the offers sell farther away from the close, an advance in price is anticipated.

Whether the predominating trade sentiment was right or wrong was determined in the following manner:

If the average of the prices of the bids was farther away from the close of the future than that of the offers, the trade was considered to be principally bearish. If the closing price, or average of the closing range, of the future the next day was lower than that of the previous day the privilege market was considered to have forecast correctly the change that took place. On the other hand, if the offers sold farther away, and the price of the future showed a decline at the close, the privilege market was wrong in its prediction. Conversely, if the bids sold farther away, and the price of the future closed higher the next day, the prevailing sentiment of the trade was held to be wrong. On days when the average of the bid prices was the same distance from the close as the average of the offers, it was assumed that trade sentiment was about equally divided as to whether prices would advance or decline the next day, and, therefore, that no advance or decline in the price of the future was predicted, and such instances were not included in the analysis.

From an analysis of the March, May, July, September, and December Chicago wheat futures traded in during the period of January 14, 1926, to December 31, 1930, it appears that the privilege market was right 63 percent of the time in forecasting whether or not the trend as indicated by the average closing price of the future would be higher or lower the following day, as shown in table 7. This 5-year average is based on 3,784 instances, comprising 5 major futures combined, when both bids and offers were traded in on the same day, and the privilege market forecast higher or lower prices. There were 299 other instances when no forecast was indicated.

TABLE 7.—Number of days and percentage of time that the privilege market was right or wrong in forecasting higher or lower prices of wheat futures the following day on the Chicago Board of Trade during the period of Jan. 14, 1926, to Dec. 31, 1930

Fature	Day		ich the p lorecast—	rivilege : -	market	Days on which the forecasts were—			
A GENA	An ed- vance	A de- cline	Total	No fore-	Grand total	Right	Wrong	Right	Wrong
March May July September December	Number 254 502 440 406 477	Number 176 431 381 364 353	Number 430 938 821 770 830	Number 39 62 75 65 58	Number 449 995 898 885 888	Number 272 567 511 492 543	Number 158 366 810 278 287	Percent 63.25 60.77 62.24 63.90 65.42	Percent 86.74 39.23 37.76 36.10 34.58
Total	2,079	1, 705	8, 784	2599	4, 083	2, 385	1, 399	63. 03	36. V7

For the individual futures, however, the percentage of instances when the forecasts were correct ranged from 49 to 71 percent. The poorest showing was made for the 1927 wheat futures for which the average of the 4 major futures was 57 percent. The best results were obtained for the 1930 futures for which the percentage of correctness was 68, as can be seen in table 8.

TABLE 8.—Percentage of time that the privilege market was correct in forecasting higher or lower prices of Chicago wheat futures the following day, by futures, during the period Jan. 14, 1988, to Dec. 31, 1980

March future	Percent	May future	Percent	July future	Percent	Sep- tamber future	Percent	De- cember future		Average of all futures
1926 1927 1928 1929 1930	63 62 64	1928 1027 1928 1929 1930	61 49 64 67 65	1928 1927 1928 1929 1930	63 52 62 66 70	1926 1927 1928 1929 1930	60 63 66 60 70	1925 1927 1928 1929 1930	82 82 85 71 87 86 71	61 87 64 64 88
5-year average.	i 68		61		62		84	•••••	<sup>65</sup>	68

1 3-year average.

The results secured show that approximately 63 percent of the time the daily privilege market correctly forecast an advance or decline in the closing prices the following day. The fact that the privilege market was right but 63 percent of the time suggests that there are factors which have an influence on prices of futures the following day which have not been taken into consideration or whose influence was underrated by the traders in privileges. It may also be that traders were influenced too much by price movements just experienced. The relatively poor showing with respect to forecasting price movements may also have been due in part to the inability of many of the traders. at the time the privileges were traded in, properly to evaluate the effect of anticipated changes in fundamental conditions. Some of the factors influencing prices of futures, however, may not be foreseen as, for example, unexpected changes in the weather, heavy concentrated trading on the part of one or more speculators which was not anticipated, or a sudden increase in export demand.

A study made of some of the instances when the privilege market failed to forecast correctly price movements the following day indicates that when prices have been declining speculators are apt to anticipate a further decline and conversely, when the trend has been upward, they believe prices will advance still further. In other words, they cannot foresee when changes in the trend will take place.

### THE FORECASTING ABILITY OF 13 LARGE SPECULATORS AS RE-VEALED BY THEIR TRADING IN PRIVILEGES

In order to ascertain how the forecasts of the privilege market, as a whole, compared with those of the larger speculators, figures were compiled showing the number of instances when the price of the privilege bought or sold by the large trader came within the closing price range of the future the following day. If the price of the privilege came within the closing price range the next day the trader was rated correct in his forecast if he were the buyer and wrong if he were the seller. The latter, when he sold the privilege, was assumed to have forecast that the price of the future would not reach the privilege price the following day. There are times, however, when the seller of a privilege may wish to increase or liquidate his existing open commitments by means of bids or offers, and in order to do so he may attempt to force the price of the future through the price of the privilege so that the privilege he has sold will be exercised by the buyer. In this manner he may operate under cover and at times accumulate or dispose of part of his line at more favorable prices than would be the case if h's heavy trading went through the pit. In the absence of knowledge as to his motive, such cases have been treated on the same basis as the others, namely, that when the privilege was sold the seller was of the opin on that it would not be exercised by the purchaser.

The figures for 13 of the larger speculators given in table 9 show that the 7 sellers of privileges were right most of the time in their implied forecasts, and the 6 buyers were wrong. The range of percentage of correct forecasts for the 7 sellers of privileges ran from 62 to 84, with an average of 73 percent for the group. For the 6

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TABLE 9.—The number and percentage of instances that each of 18 large epeculators was right and wrong, respectively, in forecasting higher lower closing prices of Chicago futures for the day following the buying or selling of privileges, during the period of Jan. 8 to Oct. 81, 1927	or 😡
lower closing prices of Chicago futures for the day following the buying or selling of privileges, during the period of Jan. 3 to Oct. 31, 1927	4.4

#peculator	Grain traded in Principal outure of privilege trading		Bids			Offers				Total for bids and offers combined Total		Total			
			Ri	ght	Wr	ng	Ri	ght	Wr	ong	Right	Wrong		Right	Wrong
1	Cora	80iling Buying	13.0 94.6 48.0	Percent 68 80 78 68 85 73 68 27 18 40 20 82	7.0 15.2 10.0 17.5 22.9 9.0 49.7 89.9 108.8 67.7 183.0	Percent 85 14 25 82 15 27 82 60 80 80 80 80 80	Number 12.0 14.0 21.5 176.6 11.0 91.8 8.2 45.6 88.8 45.6 88.8 41.1 87.3	Percent 60 74 72 67 80 61 78 80 61 78 18 20 37 32 60 20 20 20	Number 8.0 8.0 11.8 43.2 7.0 83.2 42.8 111.4 04.7 145.9 87.7	Percent 40 28 38 30 20 20 27 84 71 68 76 40	25. 0 108. 8 81. 0 58. 0 308. 0 106. 1 28. 8 83. 8 83. 8 53. 6 75. 1	Number 16.0 20.2 20.0 20.0 60.1 16.0 82.7 82.7 270.7 132.4 278.0 128.7	Number 40 130 110 87 375 51 270 100 363 216 8M 204	Percent 62 84 74 67 62 69 70 22 28 89 21	Percent 38 16 38 88 18 31 80 78 77 61 70 44
4	Corn	ļ	2.0	- 04	71.0		8.0		12.0	71	7.0	14.0	21	88	07
Average for sellers Average for buyers			*******	74 34	*******	28 50	•••••	50 82		81 68				78 82	27 68

buyers the percentage of their forecasts wrong ranged from 44 to 79 with an average of 68 percent.<sup>18</sup>

Because the sellers of privileges in the group were right, on the average, 73 percent of the time it does not necessarily follow that they had superior market judgment and, therefore, were better forecasters of price movements, as these large sellers frequently protect the bids and offers sold by trading against them in the futures market.<sup>13</sup> This trading against the privileges, therefore, results in giving the large sellers of privileges credit for having been correct in their forecasts a greater number of instances than would have been the case had they not prevented prices of futures from going through the prices of the privileges.

Because sellers of privileges were right much of the time in forecasting price changes does not necessarily mean that they made a profit on their privilege transactions over a period of time. Whether or not they made a speculative profit depends on the quantity of privileges they had sold and for which they received fees, and the extent of their losses taken when the buyers exercised their right to put or call. The losses sustained by the sellers when they were wrong in their forecasts might have offset the gains made when they were right. On the other hand, the speculative profits made or the losses sustained by the buyers are dependent on the quantity of privileges exercised and the profits made on those put or called. Commissions and taxes paid must also be allowed for, and in addition the buyer has the cost of the privilege to take into consideration.

#### FREQUENCY WITH WHICH PRIVILEGES ARE MADE GOOD

Privileges purchased, which are good for 1 day only, may be exercised any time the next day. The general practice, however, is for commission houses to exercise privileges in behalf of their customers at the close of the market. Of course, the trader can instruct the broker that his privileges be exercised during the day if the price is reached, but in the absence of such an order they ordinarily would not be put or called except at the close. At rare intervals privileges are exercised before the close, but in such instances it is because a large trader exercises his right to put or call.

There apparently are several reasons why privileges are exercised only at the close in the absence of instructions from the customer. (1) It facilitates the handling of privileges on the part of commission houses and their brokers in that they do not have to watch the cards, showing the privileges to be exercised, throughout the session to see if the price of the future has reached that of the privileges which are to be put or called, and thereby detract their attention from the filling of orders for the purchase or sale of futures. (2) The exercising of customers' privileges earlier in the day, would give rise to complaints on the part of customers as to whether or not the "taking of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> In determining the number of instances the trader was right or wrong in his forecasts, the bld and offer for each future was compared with the closing price of the future of the following day. If the hid in I future was not good if was designated as one instance when the purchaser thereof was wrong. If the trader bought bids in 2 futures and both were not exercisable at the close of the following day, they were counted as 2 instances. Offers not callable were counted in a like manner. If a part of the privileges bought were exercisable, and another part were not, the percent good and not good were taken into consideration. For example, if one half were good and the other half not good, the designation was 50-percent right and a like

Purcehtage wrong. <sup>13</sup> Levely the privilege can be exercised any time during the time limits, but from a profit-making standpoint it is not exercised by the holder thereof unless the price of the future reaches or goes through that of the privilege.

profits" could not have been done more advantageously at some other time during the trading session. (3) The customer has an opportunity during the day to purchase or sell futures if he thinks that he can do so to better advantage than is possible by the exercising of the privilege. (4) The practice of exercising privileges at the close does not in any way nullify the customer's right to order his broker to exercise his privilege any time during the session.

# FOR THE MARKET AS A WHOLE

The total amount of privileges, in terms of bushels, made good on the Chicago Board of Trade from day to day is not known as no record has so far been kept by any organization. It was found, however, that for the 5-year period of January 1926 to December 1930, daily bids in wheat on the Chicago Board of Trade, all futures included, were exercisable at a gross profit at the close of the market nearly 25 percent of the time, and offers almost 21 percent, or on the average approximately 1 day of every 4 or 5. For the individual years, the percentages varied from 20 to 28 percent in the case of bids, and 17 to 25 percent for offers as shown in tables 10 and 11. Over a longer period, however, the percentage of days that bids are exercisable at a profit probably will be the same as that for offers. That bids happened to be good more often than offers during the years 1926 to 1930 was due principally to the fact that the major price movements were more frequently downward than upward.

TABLE 10.— The maximum and the average number, and percentage, of instances that Chicago daily bids in wheat, all futures included, were good, by years, from Jan. 14, 1926, to Dec. 31, 1930

Item	1926	1927	1925	1929	1980	Total
Instances that daily bids, all futures included, were traded in	780	811	919	962	945	4428
day	156	204	253	214	263	1090
	19.8	26. 2	27. 5	23.3	27. 8	34. 6
closing price of the future the next daynumber	108	145	166	152	170	741
Totalpercent	13. 7	17.8	18. 1	15.8	18.0	15.8

 TABLE 11.—The maximum and the average number, and percentage, of instances that Chicago daily offers in wheat, all futures included, were good, by years, from Jan. 14, 1926, to Dec. 51, 1930

Itam	1926	1927	1928	1926	1930	Total
Instances that offers, all futures included, good for 1 day were traded in	787	806	907	950	943	4392
number	157	191	226	174	188	906
Total	19. 9	191 23. 7	226 24. 9	18.3	10.8	906 20.6
number Totalpercent	102 18. 0	129 16.0	134 14. 8	106 11, 2	107 11, 4	578 18. 2

# FOR THE AVERAGE INDIVIDUAL

In determining the number of instances that daily privileges were good on the Chicago Board of Trade, the high of the bids and the low of the offers were compared with the closing price of the future. As no individual trader will always have privileges bought or sold at such favorable prices, no trader can hope to have his individual privileges exercised as often as any privileges are good on the exchange. Over a period of time the prices at which an individual makes purchases or sales of privileges will tend to approximate the average of the prices for the market. Such being the case, the frequency with which he may expect his privileges to be good will be determined by the number of times the price of the future reaches the average of the range of the daily prices of bids or of offers.

Calculations based on data covering 1926 to 1930 indicate that on the average individuals trading every day would have had daily bids in wheat made good about 17 percent of the time and offers 13 percent or, in other words, privileges would have been good on the average 1 day in 6 or 7. As shown in tables 10 and 11, these figures are from 6 to 8 percent under those for the exchange as a whole, which are based on the maximum number of instances that bids were good when comparing the high of the bid prices with the low of the closing prices of the future the next day. In the case of offers the low of the offer prices was compared with the high of the closing prices of the future the following day.

#### PERCENTAGE OF PRIVILEGES THAT ARE EXERCISED

#### FOR THE MARKET AS A WHOLE

The data examined for September 1926 indicate that probably 12 to 15 percent of the daily privileges traded in on the Chicago Board of Trade are made good. During that month offers in wheat were traded in to an amount representing 98,280,000 bushels. Of that amount, offers representing 12,625,000 bushels were exercised. The latter figure is 12.8 percent of the total trading in offers. No record is available showing the quantity of bids that was traded in or exercised during that month. As the price trend of futures during September 1926 was upward, it is certain that relatively few bids would have been exercised. Over a long period, however, as many bids as offers will be exercised. As offers and bids are rarely good on the same day, it can be said, based on the data for September 1926, that for the market as a whole probably 12 to 16 percent of the privileges purchased were exercised. That the percentage indicated appears reasonable is suggested by the fact that during the 10-month period of January to October 1927, the combined percentage of bids and offers made good 14 by 29 large speculators as a group came within the range of 12 to 16 percent, and as these large traders were primarily sellers of privileges and the general public the buyers, it is logical to assume that this percentage is representative of the market as a whole.

#### FOR 29 LARGE SPECULATORS

The percentage of privileges in Chicago wheat futures made good for the accounts of the 29 speculators during the first 10 months of 1927 was somewhat less than that of the average for the market as a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> The term "made good" is here used in the sense of fulfilling the agreement.

whole for 1927. The percentage for the latter was almost 18 for bids and 16 for offers, whereas for the speculators referred to it was, averaging the privileges bought and sold, 13 percent for bids and 14 percent for offers as shown in table 12.

**TABLE 12.**—Transactions in wheat and corn privileges on the Chicago Board of Trade by 29 large speculators, with the percentages made good, from Jan. 3 to Oct. 31, 1927

	Volums 1	raded in		Quantity	made good	t	Com- bined
	Purchases	Seics	Purc	iases	Ba	lec	purchases and sales made good
Wheat: Bids Offers	Million bushele 243 171	Millon bushels 206 126	Million buskels 34 22	Percent 9.88 12.87	Million buskels 34 21	Percent 16.60 16.05	Percent 12.92 14.48
Total	414	332	46		55		
Corn: Bids Offers	117 74	118 97	19 11	16. 24 14. 86	18 17	15. 26 17. 53	15.74 16.37
Total	191	215	20		85		
Total	<b>60</b> 5	547	76	12.55	90	16.45	14.41

For corn, the percentage of privileges made good, purchases and sales combined, for these speculators taken as a group, was around 16 for both bids and offers.

For the individual speculators comprising the group of 29 the percentage of privileges made good varied from none to 100 percent. Most of the group, however, had less than 20 percent made good as can be seen in tables 13 to 16.

 TABLE 13.—Wheat: Number of speculators in the group of 29 having various percentages of privileges made good, Chicago Board of Trade, during Jan. 3 to Oct. 31, 1927

	Nuz	nber of spe	culators w	rbo	Total number of speculators who—		
Percent made good	Bought bids	Soid bids	Bought offers	Sold offers	Bought bids or offers	Sold bids or allers	
None	1 3 1 1 1		8 2 1 2 2 2 2 2		18 3 5 5 3 2 2 1 2	10 1 8 11 9 7 1	
50 to 55. 55 to 60. 70 to 75. 75 to 80. 90 to 96		1		1	1	1	
Total	19	25	22	24	• 41	* 30	

1 The total number of speculators is greater than 29 because most of them were both buyers and sellers of privileges and therefore are counted twice.

TABLE 14.—Corn: Nu	mber of speculators in th	s group of 29 having various percent	-
ages of privileges ma	de good, Chicago Board	e group of 29 having sarious percent of Trade, during Jan. 3, to Oct. 31	,
1987			

	Nur	nber of spe	eulatora w	po	Total number of speculators who—		
Percent made good	Bought bids	Sold bids	Bought offars	Sold offers	Bought bids or offers	Sold bids or offers	
10 to 35	2	7 1 4 8 6 1 2 2 1 1 					
Total	23	87	18	25	341	1 63	

<sup>1</sup> The total number of speculators is greater than 29 because most of them were both buyers and sellers of privileges and therefore are counted twice.

TABLE 15.—Wheat: Volume of privileges iraded in and solume made good, by 89 large speculators, Chicago Board of Trade, from Jan. 5 to Oct. 51, 1987

		Bic	ls i			Off			Rida	mada	Offers	Tuada		
Trader no.			Made	good (		Made goo			good good			good		
	Bought	Bold	Bought	Bold	Bought	Bold	Bought	Bold	Bought	Bold	Baught	ŝold		
	Those, bs. 15, 850	Thoma. Die. Die. 095	Thoma.	Thous. bu. 15, 155	Thous. bu. 2, 865	Thous. 80. 3, 540	Thous.	Thons: bit. 3, 235	Per-	Per- cent 23. 41	Per- cent	Per- cent 91.3		
	600 39, 775	10, 150 230 18, 300	3. 855	L 435 230 755	400 2,570 17,895	7, 660 400 17, 120	2, 355	1, 225	12.95	14, 14 100, 00 5, 68	13.08	15.9		
	1, 798 2, 960	17,070 9,745 6,120 110		3, 645 400 940	2, 845 1, 000	11, 540 2, 600 \$00	730	1, 495 195		21.35 14.57 15.36	25, 31	12.0 7.5		
5 5 8	8 3,055	1,730 17,875 405		300 1, 595	150 7, 185	3,605 23,626	150	250 2,990			100.00	6.9 12.6		
	300 1 410 900	10, 450 5 1, 955 2, 890	350	1,645 425 \$90	1, 655 1, 370	11, 690 2, 255 10, 355	1, 200 340	1,320 425 2,505	9.54	15.74 21.74 13.40	71.51	11.1 18.8 24.1		
	16, 110 84, 120 2, 390	1, 705 4, 510 5, 565	1, 198 9, 600 900	200 885 1,285	13, 405 34, 545 1, 870	1,005 1,390 2,550	645 6, 215	25	6,86 11,41 33,47	11, 73 19, 62 23, 09	4.81 15.10	22.1 10.1 9.8		
		13, 715 435 350 3, 900	4	1, 795 540	1, 695 100 1, 400	9,355 500 50	300 	1,800	264	13.00 21.54	17.70 34.71	19, 1		
	6,930 6,930 21,760	7, 070 625 16, 585	633 1, 945 1, 415	435 100 <b>990</b>	1,790 9,540 11,310 1,420	7,955 1,555 5,015 35	510 3, 375 1, 580	1, 280 150 965	9.18 15.08 6.50	6. 13 16. 00 5. 91	99.65 34.35 11.97	16.0 9.6 13.9		
	1,785 43,940	235 1, 925 206, 070	445	140	1,750 53,430	440 1, 945	65 4,636 21,550	130	94.98 10.72	59.57	1 % 8.66	97. 3. 5		
WOODS DIE	e good, a	li tradiers	combi	ad. 000	110,340	140, 199	al, 000	20,695	9.78	18.29	12.63	18.4		

		Bi	is .			01			Bids made		Offers made	
Trader no.			Made	good	]		Made	boog		od	<b>\$</b> 0	od
	Bought	Bold	Bought	Bold	Bought	Bold	Bought	Bold	Bought	Bold	Bought	Bold
	Thoma.	Thous.	Thoma.	Thons.	Thous. bil	Thoma.	Thoma.	Thoma.	Per- cent	Per-	₽त- व्य≣	Per- cent
7	3,740 390	21,100 1,960		3, 375		2,485 2,100		2,255 200		16.00		90.7 3.3
	5,905 2,000	2,910	2,840	50	1,645	6,000	400 2,405	865	48.09	173	24.22	12.9
	860	1, 350	L	260	100	2, 505		490		19.96		19.5
	2, 415	19,640	1,065	<b>5</b> , 595	1,985	1,655	\$25	1,200	44.10	18.30	26,45	32.8
8	1,645	1,570	500	250 200	690	4,160 2,770		100 500	30.40	22.28 6.47		2.4 18.0
1		5, <del>1</del> 05		400		1.090		905		7.40		19.2
ŧ		755		300		400				39.74		
5		2, 550		665		5,150		985		26.96		29.1
6 8	150	18, 170 770		3, 065	80	16, 840		\$, 585		16.51		15.6
9	1.50	10.935		1,512		12, 140		1,950		14.01		16.0
D	700	170				L						
1	6, 985	2, 630	1,300	820	5, 950	3, 010	065	235	18. 61	12.17	11.18	7.1
2	920 17.040	3, 650 260	100 2,360	1,010	1, 300 13, 105	8,955 1,390	250 1,405	2, 325	10.87 13.85	27.60 90.77	19.23 18.72	<b>X</b> , ;
4	51.030	3, 835	6,735	-	19, 210	\$30	2,905	505	13.20	ou ii	15.12	54.3
5	110	1,050		650	1 450	1,550		250		61,90		16.1
6	25	1,815		300	220	1, 345	20	60		16.52	9.09	- 14
7	500	250				150 200						
<u></u>	1.710	5,950	200	1.040	455	8.250	225	410	11.69	17. 书	49.45	4.5
	3, 290	1,030	425	120	2,155	1, 995	540	290	13.26	11.65	25.06	14.5
	9,155	7, 120	675	560	7,705	4, 710	895	1, 100	7.37	8.15	11. 62	74.1
	145 8.065	50 255	700		1,930 1,295	450 125			19, 10			
	8,000 8,420	455	200	85	4,890	125	850		5.55	7.69	17.86	
					·							
Total[ ercent mad		118, 235			74, 490	96, 740	11,685	17, 180	15.91	14.28	14.88	17.

 TABLE 16.—Corn: Volume of privileges traded in and volume made good, by 29 large speculators, Chicago Board of Trade, from Jan. 3 to Oct. \$1, 1927

#### VOLUME OF TRANSACTIONS IN FUTURES ARISING OUT OF PRIVILEGES EXERCISED

If an offsetting trade is not made when a privilege is exercised, the purchaser of a bid and the seller of an offer either go short the future or liquidate a long commitment. On the other hand, in the absence of an offsetting trade in futures, a seller of a bid and a buyer of an offer either increase a long position or cover outstanding open future contracts when the privilege is exercised. This must be kept clearly in mind or one is apt to become confused when considering how a trader's position is changed through the exercising of privileges. It should be remembered also that it is only the buyer of the privilege who can exercise it and, therefore, only he that can receive any protection privilege trading affords.

If the trader is long futures the purchase of bids protects him against a decline below the bid price. On the other hand, if he has a short position in the market, the buying of offers protects him against an advance beyond the price of the offer. Privileges never give full protection; they only limit the loss to the difference between the price of the future and the price of the bid or offer.

When privileges are exercised by the buyer the seller of a bid must buy the future from the holder of the bid, and he must sell the future at the offer price if the buyer of the offer calls on him to do so. The buyer of the bid can, however, exercise his right to "put" regardless of whether or not the price of the future declines to or below the bid price. The holder of an offer likewise can "call" the future irrespective of whether or not the price of the future has advanced to or above the price of the offer. In practice, however, this is not done as the buyer of the bid or offer has nothing to gain thereby except the opportunity to change his position in the market under cover. From a financial standpoint he can do better by making a purchase or sale of the future through the pit. Sometimes, even though the bid or offer is good, the purchaser of the privilege does not exercise his right to put or call. A circumstance under which such would be the case is when the trader can make just as favorable or a more advantageous transaction by means of a pit trade sometime during the trading session. Another case when the privilege may not be exercised is when the price of the privilege and the future are the same. A third instance is when the commissions that would be charged the nonmember by the broker on futures trades arising out of the taking of profits on the privilege held, exceed the difference or spread between the price of the privilege and the price of the future and would thus result in a net loss. In the latter case, with some few exceptions, the privilege is exercised for the account of the commission house.

### FOR THE MARKET AS A WHOLE

The percentage of future trades that arise out of privileges exercised is not known as no figures have been compiled giving the information for both bids and offers. Data, however, collected for September 1926, revealed that the volume of wheat futures on the Chicago Board of Trade, arising out of offers sold and which were called, aggregated (for the 142 clearing members) 12,625,000 bushels, or 1.34 percent of the total trading in wheat futures for the month, which amounted to 942,762,000 bushels. The price trend during September 1926 was upward, therefore offers were more frequently good than were the bids. Because of this one would expect the trades in futures arising out of bids to be considerably less than 1 percent. Therefore the combined transactions in futures arising out of both bids and offers exercised would be not over 2 percent. Taking into consideration the fact that over a long period the quantity of future trades arising out of bids made good would be equal to that due to offers exercised, one can say that of the total volume of trading in wheat futures on the Chicago Board of Trade probably 2 percent of the purchases and a like percentage of the sales arose out of privileges exercised. This percentage of course would vary with individual days, months, and years, depending on the extent to which prices fluctuated and the amount of trading that was done in privileges.

# FOR THE ACCOUNTS OF THE 29 LARGE SPECULATORS

Large speculators many times make transactions in futures which arise out of privileges exercised either by them or by others. Some

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idea of the magnitude of these transactions during 1927 was secured from a study of the privilege trading of the 29 large traders. During the first 10 months of that year the quantity of Chicago wheat futures purchased by them collectively, through bids and offers made good, aggregated 55,125,000 bushels, and sales aggregated 44,500,000 bushels as shown in table 17. These transactions represented 7 percent of their total combined purchases, and nearly 6 percent of their sales, of wheat futures. In corn, as shown in table 18, their aggregate purchases, originating out of bids and offers made good, totaled 29,152,000 bushels and the sales, 35,770,000 which constituted approximately 6 percent of their total purchases and 8 percent of their total sales.

**TABLE 17.**—Wheat: Volume of future trading of each of 29 large speculators and the volume that arose out of privileges, Chicago Board of Trade, from Jan. 5 to Oct. 31, 1927

Trader no.		olume of trading	Volun	e of fature t priv	rading arising ilegen	rout of
	Purchases	Sales	Purc	haaa	Ba	les
<u></u>	Thousand bushcis 43, 405 1, 235	Thousand bushels 43, 785 1, 450	Thousand bushcis 16, 520 60	Percent of total purchases 38.06 4.85	Thousand bushcis 4, 110 350	Percent of iolai sales 9,30 24,11
4 8 9	4, 430 14, 400 108, 559 51, 320 37, 580 4, 225	4, 430 17, 600 107, 240 55, 149 28, 050 4, 425	230 3,090 4,365 400 940	5. 19 2. 85 8. 51 1. 06 72, 25	8, 235 1, 495 195	5.81 2.71 .51
14 15 18 19	2, 735 2, 510 10, 800 45, 325 4, 340	3, 835 2, 760 11, 305 46, 225 4, 235	300 1, 745 1, 645	11.96 16.16 37.90	250 2, 990 1, 220	9.05 26.45 3), 17
20	8, 505 6, 980 22, 040 49, 475 76, 135	8, 505 7, 090 21, 990 48, 215 75, 296	1, 625 730 845 6, 100	28.28 3.31 1.71 8.01	655 2, 505 1, 330 9, 745	9.25 11.39 2.76 12.94
26 28 27	17, 465 74, 555 3, 625 780 6, 670	16, 975 74, 797 3, 700 790 6, 310	1, 285 2, 996 	7.38 2.81 20.09	1,050 1,840	6 19 2.46
30	14, 360 10, 665 68, 470 13, 950	15, 230 10, 785 68, 290 13, 970	945 8, 475 2, 560 205	6.58 82.58 3.74 1.47	1, 915 1, 196 2, 080 565	12 57 11 08 3 05 4 04
26 Total	66, 905 774, 365	68, 978 781, 396	4, 625 55, 125	6. 72 7. 12	4, 575 44, 500	6.72 5.69

<sup>1</sup> Trader no. 33 traded in privileges but none was made good, and he had no transactions in wheat futures.

Trader po.	Total volun trad		Volume of future trading arising out of privileges							
	Purchases	Purchases Sales Purchases		hases	Sa	les				
	Thousand busheis	Thousand bushels	Thousand bushcis	Percent of lotal pur-	Thousand	Percent of				
•		29, 140		chases	bushcia	total sales				
T	29,797 75	23, 140	8, 375	11, 33	2, 165	8.27				
lf	25,560	29.560	450	( <sup>1</sup> ) 1,76		<sup>(1)</sup> 12.53				
	20, 560	29, 300	900 1,405	1.75	8, 705	12.03				
	3,010	3,010	2200	10.17 8.54	1,500 490	16.29				
	80.305	26.875	4,120	13.60						
	50,705	49,770	3,140	. 10.00	2, 265 600	8.43 1.21				
0	6.715	7,115	200	2.95	500	7.05				
1	16. 555	18, 455	400	2.57	905	1.00				
L#	L 630	5,750	300	6.28	j 400	6.00				
16	6,545	6.645	685	10.47	965	15.05				
6	20,220	20.035	3,655	16.11	2.535	12.00				
8	535	375	6, 900	10.11	4,000	12.00				
9	6.280	\$,005	1.532	29, 13	L 950	36.00				
Ö	11, 215	11. 215	1,000	44. IN	1,200					
1	16, 540	16. 640	985	5.85	1. 535	9.22				
2	19.565	19, 465	1,260	6.44	2,425	12.4				
8	50,730	50, 535	1.615	3.16	2,360	4.67				
A	47.540	48, 495	2,905	6.11	7.240	11.93				
	6.110	6,110	650	10.64	250	4.00				
B	11.522	11. 654	320	2.78	60					
7	2,555	2,555	040	A 10	, w					
8	1.130	1. 150				***********				
0	6.358	4, 285	1, 365	23.62	510	14. 24				
0	8.085	5, 245	660	12,96	725	13.82				
	44,005	43, 730	1. 475	3.35	1,775	4.05				
8	2,280	2, 285	4, 140		34,110					
	<u> 3</u> 330	5, 930			700	11.80				
<b>K</b>	7,905	7, 905	885	11.20	200	2.53				
Total	452 354	450, 969	29, 152	8.44	35, 770	7.98				

 TABLE 18.—Corn: Volume of future trading of each of 29 large speculators and the volume that arose out of privileges, Chicago Board of Trade, from Jan. 3 to Oct. 31, 1927

<sup>1</sup> Transactions in futures arising out of privileges for trader no. 17 were transferred to the account of trader no. 7.

The percentages of trading in wheat and corn futures arising out of privileges for the individual speculators making up this group of 29 show considerable variation, running from less than 1 to as high as 39 percent. For most of these traders, however, the percentage was less than 20.

The quantity of purchases in Chicago wheat futures that arose out of privileges for the individual accounts of the 29 speculators during the period of January to October 1927, ranged from 60,000 to 16,520,000 bushels with 13 of the traders having purchases totaling over 1,000,000 bushels. The sales ranged from 195,000 to 9,745,000 bushels with 14 of the traders having amounts aggregating over 1,000,000 bushels. For corn the purchases ranged from 200,000 to 4,120,000 bushels, with 10 traders having bought over 1,000,000 bushels. The aggregate sales in corn futures varied from 60,000 to 7,240,000 bushels with 11 having sold through privileges 1,000,000 bushels. These figures taken from tables 17 and 18 disclose the extensive use made of privileges by the larger speculators in acquiring and disposing of open commitments in Chicago wheat and corn futures.

The percentage of an operator's transactions in futures, arising from privileges made good, of course varies from time to time. There are periods when a considerable part of a speculator's transactions in futures arise out of privileges, whereas at other times he may use them but very little for building up or disposing of lines.

#### SPREADS AT WHICH PRIVILEGES WERE GOOD

The amount in cents per bushel for which a privilege is good (termed the "spread") is determined by the difference between the price of the privilege and the price of the future at the time the privilege is exercisable. In other words, the spread represents the gross profit available through the exercising of the privilege and the making of an offsetting future trade through the pit.

When the average price of the daily bids and the average price of the daily offers were compared with the average closing price of the wheat future on the day the privilege was exercisable, it was found that in more than 50 percent of the instances, covering the 5-year period of 1926 to 1930, the spreads for both bids and offers were not more than three eighths of a cent. With the exception of 1929 in the case of bids, and of 1926 and 1929 in the case of offers, the spread in more than 50 percent of the instances during each of the 5 years was not more than three eighths of a cent, as shown in table 19. During the 5-year period, with respect to 79 percent of the bids that were good, and 75 percent of the offers that were good, the spread was less than 1 cent.

Measuring the spreads by the method indicated, it was found that the maximum was less than 5 cents per bushel. In table 19, these spreads have been grouped according to size, showing the number of instances for each class. It will be seen that there are very few instances of a spread of more than 1½ cents.

			B	ds					0	ince		
Spread in cents per bushel	1976	1927	1926	1979	1930	Total	1926	1927	1828	1829	19300	Tota
None			34 22 15 16 15 15 2 2 8 5 3 3 6 2 1 5 4 2 1 1 1 2		14 26 14 14 5 9 8 7 9 10 3 5 3 4 6 4 2 2 3 1 2 4	104 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51					15 12 19 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2	
ы <sub>т</sub> с		1 I 1	1	1 1 2 2	1	4 2 3 4 7 1 3	2	1	1	1 1 1 1	1	

TABLE 19.—Number of instances that bids and offers in wheat futures were good for specified amounts, Chicago Board of Trade, by years, from Jan. 14, 1926, to Dec. 31, 1930<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The interve included are March, May, July, September, and Dece = ber

Spreed in cents per bushel	Bids						Offers					
	1925	1927	1928	1929	1930	Total	1926	1927	1928	1929	1630	Tota
Ие	1			1		1	1			1	2	
Jé			2	2		4	1	2				1
×	1			1	2	4		1		1		
H	1		2	<u>-</u>		5		<b></b>		1	1 1	
218				2		2						
¥			2	<u>-</u> -		2		1		l i		
Xe	l;-	1	+	2		8		<i>-</i>		2		
¥				+	1	2	1		<u>-</u>			
914				<u> </u>			1 1		2		[;•	
94	1	I	i		·:-	3					1	<b>i</b> :
<sup>1</sup> He	<u>-</u> -	*****	L	í T	1							
*	I		1	- <i>-</i>		1				2		
****		1	1	a-	1	3						
34				2						2		
<sup>1</sup> 916				2		2	***-		f			
	1			<b>X</b>	1	4			1			
***********************************				3			1				1 1	
		*****				8						
				1		1		1		1 1		
			; <i>-</i>	1		1			1 1			
<u>%</u> e		******	1	[+	*****	1		1	·			
<u>}</u>				<del>-</del> -					1			
% <b>6</b>		******		[ I		1				~~~~		*****
H			1			1		*****				
34				<b> </b>			1		<u>-</u>	1		
*716				h			*****		1	j		
						:-			;-	1 1		
)]	1		• • • <b>•</b> • •	·		1						
****						******			1		******	ł
27			• • • • • • •	þ		};-	1					
96					1	1						
Total	108	145	168	152	170	741	102	129	134	106	107	57
Potal 14 cant or less	62		104	60	86	396	47	72	81	41	57	20
Percent: 54 cent or less is	1	1	1	1				1				
el total	. 57	<b>6</b>	63	89	61	64	45	56	60	j 🕊	<b>S</b>	6

 TABLE 19.—Number of instances that bids and offers in wheat futures were good for specified amounts, Chicago Board of Trade, by years, from Jan. 14, 1926, to Dec. 31, 1930—Continued

When the various sized spreads were weighted by the number of times they occured, it was found that the weighted average by years ranged from  $\frac{1}{2}$  to 1 cent, approximately, with an average for the 5 years of approximately  $\frac{1}{2}$  of a cent. This held true for both bids and offers. The smallest spread during the 5-year period was in 1927, and the largest in 1929. The weighted average spread for bids was as follows: 1926, 0.62 cent; 1927, 0.46 cent; 1928, 0.49 cent; 1929, 0.92 cent; 1930, 0.60 cent; 5-year average, 0.62 cent. The weighted average spread for offers in 1926 was 0.69 cent; in 1927, 0.55 cent; in 1928, 0.59 cent; in 1929, 1.02 cents; in 1930, 0.58 cent; and the 5-year average, 0.68 cent.

# FACTORS DETERMINING THE PROFITABLENESS OF TRADING IN PRIVILEGES

The factors determining the amount of profit made or loss sustained on privileges by those who buy or sell them are the following:

The forecasting ability of the trader.

The percentage of privileges bought or sold that are put or called.

The size of the profit made or loss sustained on those put or called.

The commissions and taxes paid.

Information as to the forecasting ability of individual traders has been limited to a study of the 13 large speculators discussed in a previous section. It will be recalled that the analysis revealed the sellers of privileges were right in their forecasts about three fourths of the time and the buyers wrong to a like extent. No study has been made of the degree to which the individual small trader's forecasts were right or wrong. Information presented later, however, indicates that the average small trader will find, over a period of time, that his privilege transactions are unprofitable unless used purely for protective purposes.

With some exceptions, it can be said that it is to the financial interest of the speculative buyer of privileges to be able to exercise as many of them as he can and for the seller to make good as few as possible. The term speculative buyer does not include a person who purchases privileges purely for protection. He, of course, is not interested in having privileges become good. The speculative buyer of privileges is interested in having a large spread between the price of the privilege and the price of the future on the day when exercised so as to enhance his profit, whereas it is to the interest of the seller that the spread be small in order that his loss may be narrowed on those privileges he is required to make good.

Sometimes, however, the seller of a privilege may wish to have the privilege exercised by the buyer, and the former may even make trades which will aid in driving the price of the future through the privilege. In other words, he is willing to take an apparent loss on his privilege transactions in order to change his position in futures through privileges, as for instance, when he desires to close out a short line "under cover" by selling on a declining market. He may even sell short an additional quantity of a particular future in an effort to force the price through the bids, hoping that the holder of the privileges will exercise them, thus permitting the seller to cover a substantial quantity at a lower price than he might have to pay if his covering were done through pit purchases. In addition, he has the premium paid by the buyer for the privilege which still further reduces the cost of the futures purchased through bids. Additional illustrations will be given later in a section dealing with the acquiring and disposing of speculative lines through privileges.

The frequency with which privileges are exercised varies, also, between individuals, depending on the price at which the bid or offer is bought or sold. This factor accounts in part for the differences between individuals in the percentage of privileges exercised.

Because a nonmember of an exchange has to pay full commission, he is at a substantial disadvantage as compared with a member who does his own trading. The great advantage a member who does his own trading has over a nonmember is shown in the following tabulations. It will be seen that a nonmember buyer of bids must be able to exercise more than 88 percent of them at an average spread of threeeighths of a cent per bushel in order to make a profit, not allowing for Federal taxes on the future trades arising out of the bids made good. On the other hand, a member doing his own trading need only exercise 27 percent, not taking into consideration the Federal taxes and the clearing charge which he has to pay. This latter charge is, however, relatively small.

The percentage of purchases of daily privileges that a member and a nonmember, respectively, of the Chicago Board of Trade must exercise at specified spreads in order to make a profit follows.

A member buyer of daily bids or offers in wheat, corn, oats, or rye, doing his own trading, makes a profit, disregarding the Federal tax on offers 16 purchased, and on futures trades arising out of bids exercised, and not including clearing charges, if-

More than 80 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. More than 40 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. More than 27 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. More than 20 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. More than 16 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. More than 14 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. More than 12 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. More than 12 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. More than 12 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. More than 10 percent are exercised at a spread of 1 cent per bushel.

A nonmember buyer of daily bids or offers in wheat, corn, oats, or rye, makes a profit, disregarding the Federal tax on offers <sup>16</sup> purchased, and on futures trades arising out of bids exercised, if-

More than 88 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. More than 44 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. More than 29 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. More than 22 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. More than 17 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. More than 14 percent are exercised at a spread of 1 cent per bushel. More than 14 percent are exercised at a spread of 1 cent per bushel. More than 12 percent are exercised at a spread of 1% cents per bushel. More than 11 percent are exercised at a spread of 1½ cents per bushel. More than 9 percent are exercised at a spread of 1½ cents per bushel. More than 8 percent are exercised at a spread of 1½ cents per bushel.

The maximum percentage of sales of daily privileges by a member and a nonmember, respectively, of the Chicago Board of Trade that may be exercised by the buyer at specified spreads with profit to the seller are shown below:

A member seller of bids or offers, doing his own trading, makes a profit, not including clearing charges, if-

100 percent are exercised at no profit to the buyer. Less than 80 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. Less than 40 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. Less than 27 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. Less than 20 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. Less than 16 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. Less than 16 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. Less than 16 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. Less than 14 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. Less than 12 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. Less than 12 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. Less than 10 percent are exercised at a spread of 1 cent per bushel. Less than 9 percent are exercised at a spread of 1% cents per bushel. Less than 8 percent are exercised at a spread of 1½ cents per bushel. Less than 8 percent are exercised at a spread of 1½ cents per bushel. Less than 7 percent are exercised at a spread of 1½ cents per bushel.

A nonmember seller of bids or offers makes a profit, if—

Less than 36 percent are exercised at no profit to the buyer. Less than 24 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. Less than 18 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. Less than 15 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. Less than 12 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. Less than 11 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. Less than 9 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. Less than 8 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. Less than 8 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. Less than 8 percent are exercised at a spread of ½ cent per bushel. Less than 7 percent are exercised at a spread of 1½ cents per bushel. Less than 6 percent are exercised at a spread of 11/4 cents per bushel. Less than 6 percent are exercised at a spread of 1½ cents per bushel. Less than 6 percent are exercised at a spread of 1½ cents per bushel. Less than 5 percent are exercised at a spread of 1½ cents per bushel.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Although the seller of the offer pays the Federal tax thereon, the buyer pays to the seller an amount sound thereto.

In order for a nonmember seller of privileges to make a profit, less than 15 percent of the privileges sold must be exercised (at an average spread of three-eighths of a cent per bushel), whereas a member seller will profit if less than 27 percent of the privileges sold are exercised at such a spread. In other words, a member can have almost twice as many futures put to, or called from, him (at a %-cent spread) as a nonmember before incurring a loss.

The minimum percentage of bids or offers that must be exercised by a nonmember buyer at various average spreads, in order to make a profit, exclusive of Federal taxes on offers which the seller collects <sup>16</sup> and on future trades arising out of bids made good, is indicated in figure 1 by the curved line AB. If the point representing percentage and average spread falls under or to the left of that line the nonmember buyer incurs a loss, and if above or to the right of that line he makes a profit, excluding the tax collected on offers. For example, if the percentage of instances that a nonmember speculative buyer of bids exercised his privileges was 20, and the weighted average spread at which they were made good was five-eighths of a cent per bushel, he would have lost money on his privilege trading, as the location of that point on the graph would fall to the left of the line AB.

Line XY indicates the percentage of instances at various spreads under which the percentage of privileges made good by a nonmember speculative seller of privileges must come in order to make a profit. If the percentage falls on or above that line he suffers a financial loss. To illustrate, if he has put to him, at an average spread of one-eighth of a cent per bushel, more than 24 percent of the bids or offers he has sold, he will lose money. The percentage made good must be less than 24 at that spread in order to avoid a loss.

The OM line is the profit and loss dividing line for member buyers and sellers of privileges. This curved line is also based on the figures contained in the tabulations on page 31. It shows, for instance, that if the member buyer of bids or offers doing his own trading is successful in exercising his privileges more than 40 percent of the time at an average spread of one-fourth of a cent, he makes a profit on them, If, on the other hand, the percentage falls below 40, the buyer sustains a loss. In the former case the seller takes the loss, and in the latter he secures the profit, the member buyer's loss being the member seller's profit.

In a previous section it has been shown that if a trader had bought bids in each of the Chicago wheat futures at an average of the high and low quotations, and had exercised them at the close every time they were good and had taken profits by making an offsetting trade when the future was "put", he would have found that over the 5-year period considered the bids would have been exercisable only 16.8 percent of the time. The amount for which they would have been good, i.e., the difference between the price of the privilege and the offsetting trade, would have averaged 0.63 cent per bushel. When plotted on figure 1, it will be found that the point representing 17 percent and 0.63 cent per bushel lies outside of the profit zone of both nonmember buyers and sellers, showing that neither of them would have made any profit. As the point falls just above the line OM it also reveals that the member buyer could have made a profit, disre-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Although the seller of the offer pays the tax he collects it from the purchaser at the time the privilege is bought.

garding the clearing charges, in the event that he did his own trading, and the Federal tax on futures trades arising out of bids exercised.

The percentage made good, with the average spread, is shown in figure 1 for the years 1926 to 1930, with the respective years designated.




FIGURE 1.—A comparison of the percentage of bids or offers in Chicago grain futures that must be exercised at certain specified spreads by a member of the exchange doing his own trading and by a nonmember buyer ar seller, in order to make a profit, disregarding clearing charges paid by an exchange member and Frederal taxes on offers and an sales of futures arising out of the exercising of bids. (The dots for individual years are for bids in whest only.)

It can be seen that with respect to the nonmember traders the points all fell within the loss areas during the 5 years, whereas for the members they came, except during 1929 and 1930, within the profit area of the seller of bids.

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As to the offers in Chicago wheat during 1926 to 1930, it was found as shown in figure 2 that all points, except for 1930, came within the loss area for nonmember sellers.<sup>17</sup> Not one of the points fell within the profit area for nonmember buyers. The 5-year average also was




FIGURE 2.—A comparison of the percentage of offers in Chicago whest futures necessary to have been exercised at certain specified spreads by a member of the exchange doing his own trading, and by a nonmember buyer or seller, during the period January 14, 1925, to June 21, 1932, in order to make a profit, disregarding clearing costs to the exchange member.

in the loss zone for both buyers and sellers. The apparent gain for 1930 was more than offset by the losses for the other 4 years. The data suggest that on the whole nonmembers who were persistently

 $<sup>\</sup>sigma$  When the increased Pederal tax became effective on June 21, 1932, the cost of the bids and offers was made the same, i.e., 45 plus \$0.50 commission per 6,000 bushels. In addition to the 55 fee paid by the buyer, the seller of the offer collects from the buyer an amount exactly equal to the Pederal tax, whereas previously a flat charge of \$0.75 was collected for that purpose. The change makes it possible to consolidate bids and offers on one graph (fig. 1).

either buyers or sellers of privileges for speculative purposes apparently were losers in privilege transactions during the 5-year period of 1926-30.

In view of the fact that privileges in wheat at Chicago are good on the average only around 15 percent of the time, or 1 day in 6 or 7, and that in more than 50 percent of the instances when they are good the spread is not more than three eighths of a cent per bushel, and on the average only five eighths of a cent, there apparently is, with one exception, no profit in trading in privileges on the part of nonmembers of the exchange whether they are buyers or sellers. In other words, nonmembers who, over a period of time, are consistently speculative buyers or sellers lose money by trading in privileges. The one exception is where the nonmember customer has unusual foresight and is able to forecast price changes with a greater degree of accuracy than is normally the case. To show superior ability as a buyer he either must exercise a greater percentage of his privileges than the average buyer or be able to make offsetting trades which allow a profit not obtainable at the close of the trading session, and the latter at the risk of the privilege not being good at the close of the session.

The member buyer who does his own trading, and whose trades are made for the sole purpose of making profits in privileges—and who makes offsetting trades only at the close of the session—will find that he makes only a very small profit over a long period, unless he is able to exercise more than 17 percent of his privileges at an average profit of five eighths of a cent per bushel.

As stated in a previous section, bids in wheat on the Chicago Board of Trade were exercisable 17 percent of the time during the period of January 1926 to December 1980. The 5-year weighted average amount for which the bids were good at the close, if all were exercised, was five eighths of a cent per pushel. On this basis it will be found that the member buyer would have made a gross profit of only \$62.50 for every million bushels traded on bids in wheat. This would not have been sufficient to pay his clearing charges and the Federal tax on the transactions in futures arising out of the bids made good.

As the profit made by the member buyer represents a loss to the seller, the member seller of the bids would have had to absorb the \$62.50 loss. In addition he would have had to pay the clearing charges on the trades made by himself. Should he, however, have had another member execute the trades for him he would have had to pay half the commission that a nonmember would have paid. Had the buyer and the seller of the bids been nonmembers of the exchange they would both have suffered a loss. For the former it would have been \$462.50 per million bushels and for the latter \$587.50, not including taxes. Figures 3 and 4 show the comparative profits made and losses sustained, per million bushels, by nonmembers not allowing for the Federal tax, when various percentages of the bids and offers traded in are made good at specified spreads. The same information is given for members, no allowance being made for clearing charges, commissions, if any, or taxes.

As previously emphasized, the profitableness or unprofitableness of privileges as measured in this study is based on the assumption that when profitable they are always exercised at the close. The fact that a trader may have futures to apply on the privilege when exercised does not necessarily mean that the profit made or loss sustained on

the privilege is the spread or difference between the price of the privilege and that of the previously acquired future applied. Calculating the financial outcome on that basis would result in joining together profits or losses arising from both privileges and futures. For this type of transaction it is obviously impossible to measure the portion of profit or loss due solely to privileges unless the price of the future applied on the privilege is arbitrarily assumed to be that prevailing at the close on the day the privilege was exercised.




FIGURE 3.-Bids and offers bought: Gross profit or loss par million bushels purchased when specified percentages are made good at the spreads designated, for members doing their own trading and for nonmembers, disregarding clearing costs to members and Federal taxes.

At times a trader will purchase bids at a price a certain distance from the close and then sell an equivalent amount of bids at a price still farther away, thus giving him what is called a phantom profit. This potential profit is designated as "phantom" by the trade for the reason that it cannot be realized until the bids bought and sold have been exercised. Phantom profits may also exist by buying

and selling offers. There is, however, relatively little buying and selling of the same privilege by an individual for the purpose of making a profit.

Thomas Gibson (4, pp. 94-99) states:

\* \* \* The writer kept account of the transactions in "puts and calls" handled through a large concern for almost two years and found that only about 35 percent of the money paid for these privileges returned to the purchasers. That is to say, the profit shown to purchasers of "puts", "calls", and "straddles",




FIGURE 4.—Bids and offers sold: Gross profit or loss per million bushels sold when specified percentages are made good at the spreads designated, for members doing their own trading and for nonmembers, disregarding clearing costs to members and Federal taxes.

was only about \$350 out of each \$1,000 received by the sellers. After deducting the item of commission charges, it was found that the sellers of privileges reaped over 50 percent profit each year. The experiment referred to was based on grain privileges, but would probably hold good in stocks. The sellers of these "puts and calls" are among the brightest men in the street, and when they make prices they do so on the absolute basis that they have the best of the bargain and the buyers are usually a public element. In the test referred to, there were never three consecutive days when either "puts" or "calls" were good. There was on one occasion in the period consulted, an advance of over 20 cents a bushel in

wheat in three days, but "calls" were good only on the first day of the advance. On this occasion the "calls" were good for about 2 cents per bushel on the first day's rise, but the sellers offered nothing for the second day, except at prices far above the market, and although the market advanced 6 cents per bushel, wheat was not "called". On the third day, prices for "calls" were prohibitive, ranging from ten to twenty cents above the closing price and again wheat was not called, although the market advanced 8½ cents.

In the accounts examined, one seller of privileges on wheat had an open order to sell 100 puts and 100 calls every day at the ruling price. He thus received \$200 daily and invariably "took his loss" whenever the privileges operated against him. That is to say, if wheat closed one cent per bushel above the call price, he would be called for 100,000 bushels on his privileges, making him short that amount of wheat. This he bought in at once and pocketed a loss of \$1,000 less the \$200 received. Although he accepted some severe losses now and then, this account showed over \$30,000 profit on a year's business.

Another account was operated on a different principle by the seller of privileges and resulted in even larger profits. This individual would sell ten "puts" and ten "calls" on wheat each day. In the event of his being called, i.e., short of the wheat, he would, on the next day, sell no "calls," but 20 "puts". In the event of a decline below the "put" price, he had enough short wheat to protect ten of his "puts" and in reality automatically close out his ten thousand short, frequently at a profit. As has been stated, his profits were greater than in the first instance quoted. There was, of course, a more highly speculative element in his form of operating than in the other method, but the operator was never either long or short more than 10,000 bushels and received about \$6,000 a year or 60 cents per bushel from his privileges in addition to the accruing of profit or the curtailing of loss by his mechanical method.

In the accounts examined the persistent purchasers of privileges all finally lost money, except in a few cases where lines acquired on "puts or calls" were carried to a successful conclusion in the course of time. That is, a purchaser of "calls", finding a profit in his privilege, would call the wheat and keep it. This, however, resolved the matter into pure speculation, as the maximum benefits derived from this form of trading can only be correctly measured by the profit shown at the expiration of the "put" or "call". That is to say, the seller need suffer no greater loss than that shown when the contract he has given matures, and consequently the profit to the buyer cannot be greater except through speculation.

It would appear from these facts, that the purchasing of privileges is a poor business proposition, while the selling of privileges is a money making affair. This is true. We need only compare the kind of men who buy "puts and calls" and those who sell them to have this truth made apparent. The late Russell Sage was a persistent writer of these instruments and made a great deal of money by the process. The late Edward Partridge also made a good deal of money in this manner in the Chicago Wheat Market. He also used privileges to aid his manipulative campaigns. On several occasions, he sold "calls" heavily through the day, then suddenly bid wheat up just at the close of the market, effecting a closing just above the call price. The scattered purchasers would call the wheat and put Mr. Partridge short several millions at a high price, which was just what he wanted. He could not have sold as much wheat in the open market without breaking the price several cents. On the same principle, he used sometimes to sell a great many "puts" when he wished to cover a line of short wheat and rush the price downward at the close, thus enabling him to purchase a great line without disturbing the market by bidding for it. The process only worked a few times, however. As soon as it was discovered it failed, as the call price, when reached met with such a wave of selling that it was impossible to break through it, and the manipulator was "hoist with his own petard."

There is another drawback to the habit of buying privileges—a mental one. They are frequently made the basis of positive trading with disastrous results. The man who believes in an advance in certain shares or commodities, frequently purchases privileges instead of following out his own convictions by actual trading. Thus the man who had good reasons for expecting an advance in wheat at the time of the 20-cent advance mentioned above, and who used either "puts" or "calls" or both, as a means of operating on his opinions, would have reaped less than two cents a bushel during an advance of twenty cents. He might, of course, have called the wheat on the first day of the advance and remained long, but in that case he would merely have been speculating with equal chance of less or profit in ensuing transactions. Aside from the initial two cent gain, he would have been in no different position than if he had purchased and held the cereal on margin.

It is the writer's opinion, founded on the experience set forth above, that it is much better to effect transactions in the ordinary manner, than to depend on privileges. If "puts" and "calls" are dealt in at all, they should be sold, not purchased. The insurance companies make more money than is paid out in losses; so do the sellers of privileges. It may be well to add, however, that the man who runs an insurance company is in danger if he does not understand his business and his risks, or if he enters the field without sufficient capital to provide for possible initial losses. All this applies to the seller of privileges.

#### **USES MADE OF PRIVILEGES**

Broadly summarized, the uses made of privileges are the following: They afford protection by limiting losses due to changes in the prices of futures. They make possible the financing of speculation in futures on less capital. They are a source of income to those who sell them to earn the premiums. They also supply supplementary revenue to brokers in addition to regular commissions charged on privileges, in that customers' privileges are frequently exercised for the commission house's own account. The privilege price is used by some traders as the point around which their transactions in futures center the next day. Privileges provide a means of accumulating or closing out speculative lines. They are also said to have a stabilizing influence on the price of futures.

## AFFORD PROTECTION BY LIMITING LOSSES DUE TO CHANGES IN THE PRICE OF FUTURES

Bids and offers furnish protection only to those who buy them as they alone have the right to exercise them. A bid may be used to protect an individual who is long the future or actual grain, against a decline in price. An offer can provide protection to a person who has short contracts open in grain futures or has sold cash grain which he still has to purchase.

The following illustrations show how privileges may be used for protective purposes:

#### EXAMPLE I. A TRADER LONG WHEAT FUTURES BUYS BIDS

A nonmember customer of a grain commission house is long 5,000 bushels of May wheat at \$1.12. The price declines to \$1.11 at the day's close. Desiring to limit a possible further loss, he buys five bids in May wheat immediately following the close of the day's session, at, say, \$1.10, or 1 cent below the closing price, good until the close the following day. The bids on 5,000 cost him \$5.50 (\$5 plus 50 cents commission). Should the market the following day break through the bid price of \$1.10 and remain below that figure until the close, he may dispose of his long wheat by "putting" it, that is, by requiring the seller of the bids to buy 5,000 bushels of May wheat from him at \$1.10, thus limiting his loss to 2 cents per bushel (\$1.12 less \$1.10). To this loss must be added \$5.50, the cost of the bids and the Federal tax on the future trade arising out of the privilege exercised. A "long" can handle his transactions to better advantage in this way than by placing a stop-loss order at \$1.10, as by means of bids he has until the close of the market to put the grain, thus giving him an opportunity to profit by any advance in the mar-

ket. He also avoids the risk of having the stop-loss order executed at a price lower than \$1.10.

## EXAMPLE 2. A TRADER SHORT WHEAT FUTURES BUYS OFFERS

A nonmember customer of a commission house is short 5,000 bushels of May wheat at \$1.11 at the close of the market. He desires protection against an advance in the market. Thus he buys five offers at \$1.12, or 1 cent over the market, good until the close the next day. For this protection he pays \$5 plus a commission of 50 cents, total \$5.50, plus the Federal tax on offers. He pays this premium for protection for 1 day against loss in excess of 1 cent per bushel. Should the market advance above the offer price of \$1.12, he can call the wheat, thereby requiring the seller to sell 5,000 bushels of May wheat to him at the offer price of \$1.12. The buyer of the offer thus limits his loss to 1 cent per bushel plus the cost of the privilege, the commission, and Federal tax.

Cash-grain merchants may buy offers and at the same time sell bids. In this way the \$5.50 plus the tax per 5,000 bushels paid for the offers is partially offset by the \$5 per 5,000 bushels received from the sale of the bids.

## EXTENT PRIVILEGES ARE USED FOR PROTECTION BY TERMINAL ELEVATORS, EXPORTERS, AND SPECULATORS

Advocates of privilege trading always contend when the economic value of privilege trading is questioned that it should be permitted because it affords protection to cash-grain interests. The extent to which privileges are used for protection is overemphasized. Privileges apparently are not purchased on the Chicago Board of Trade to any appreciable extent by the larger cash-grain dealers such as elevator concerns and exporters, as a means of protection against price changes. The Federal Trade Commission also found privileges were not used to any appreciable extent by the cash-grain trade. In its report it says (11, vol. 7, p. 293): "This form of trading appears never to have been used appreciably by the cash-grain trade and such a facility does not appear to be needed by hedgers."

The reason elevator concerns seldom use them is because it is too costly, and from experience they are able to estimate pretty closely each day before the close of the futures market what purchases or sales they need to hedge in order approximately to take care of business done after 1:15 p.m. Any purchases or sales made in excess of those estimated are hedged at the opening of the market on the following day.

To illustrate, a terminal elevator company knows from experience approximately how much grain it is likely to obtain on the acceptance of "to arrive" bids sent out after the close of the futures market. A hedge to cover the estimated amount is placed just before the close of the futures market. Should the amount of grain bought after the close be larger than anticipated, the excess bought is hedged at the opening of the market the next day. By this method of operation the money that would be spent for privileges is saved and over a period of time the results obtained have, it is said, proved satisfactory.

The buying of offers can be of value to the dealer in cash grain who desires to offer wheat to European buyers subject to acceptance in the

afternoon or before the opening of the market on the next succeeding business day. In the event of the acceptance of his offer being followed by strong bullish news, resulting in a sudden advance in price at the opening the following morning, he has avoided taking a loss due to overnight price changes. Whenever export sales are to be made in Canadian wheat the exporter is more likely to purchase the privilege in the Winnepeg market where Canadian wheat futures are traded in than on the Chicago exchange. There is, however, another means of protection which he may utilize which is known as a "refusal." It often happens that an exporter will receive a request to make an offer covering a specified amount of grain. Whenever he makes an offer which is termed "firm offer"18 he can protect himself by buying a privilege or by making an arrangement with someone to supply him with the required amount of grain if his offer is accepted and to refuse, or cancel, the arrangement in case the offer is rejected. The latter is known as a "refusal." He would be quite sure to protect himself by means of a privilege or a refusal if his purchase of the grain, should the offer be accepted, be apt materially to influence market prices upward because of the large quantity involved in the transaction. Exporters, however, will frequently take the risk of an overnight price change when the quantity involved is not too large or the wheat on which the firm offer is made is not of a special type for which a sudden small demand will cause the price to advance sharply.

A study made of the trading in privileges by 29 of the larger speculators during 1927 previously referred to, revealed that they seldom used privileges as a means of protecting open commitments in futures. The majority of the 29 were primarily sellers of privileges, whereas only buyers secure protection of open commitments through privileges.

Other than as a means of financing his future trades with a minimum of capital, the extent to which the small trader uses privileges solely for protecting open commitments against price changes is not known. Privileges are, however, used by small traders in place of "stop loss" orders.

### PRIVILEGES MAKE POSSIBLE THE FINANCING OF SPECULATION IN FUTURES ON LESS CAPITAL

The small speculator at times uses privileges as a means of lessening additional margin calls and thereby avoids the necessity of advancing larger sums of money to finance his open speculative commitments in futures. By the payment of \$5.50 for bids covering open long commitments representing 5,000 bushels, the customer is protected for 1 day against a decline in price below the price of the bid, and the brokerage house also is protected without calling for additional margin. By the buying of an offer for \$5.50 plus the Federal tax, the trader is protected, should he have a short position in the market, against an advance in price beyond the price of the offer. Should the privilege not be exercised, the customer may buy another privilege for the next day's protection or be subject to margin call should the price advance. From the data analyzed, and previously presented, it appears that, over a period, the buying of privileges is a costly method of protecting open trades.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> A firm offer is one in which the saller gives the buyer the privilege of acceptance within a limited time.

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## PREMIUMS ON PRIVILEGES ARE A SOURCE OF INCOME TO SELLERS

Many sellers expect that over a period of time the losses they sustain in making good the privileges exercised will absorb only two thirds of the fees received by them, thus leaving one third as profit. This expectation is based on trade tradition rather than on conclusions derived from the keeping of records of transactions actually made.

## PRIVILEGES FURNISH REVENUE TO BROKERS IN ADDITION TO COMMISSIONS

The small trader in privileges is, as a rule, not much interested in using privileges as a means of acquiring or disposing of open commitments in grain futures as is frequently done by the larger speculators. His primary purpose is to secure profits on his privilege transactions or use them in lieu of margin money to protect the speculative commitments in futures which he has already made. Because of this the custom is, in the absence of instructions to the contrary, to take profits, if any, on his privilege transactions. In taking profits for the customer, the broker exercises the privilege for him. In doing so he either acquires or gives up, depending on whether it is a bid or offer, future contracts to the extent of the privilege exercised. Before putting or calling the future he makes an offsetting future trade which results in the customer's not having changed his position in the market. The difference between the price of the bid or offer and the offsetting trade is the gross profit accruing to the account of the customer. From this is deducted the commission due the broker on the future trade arising out of the privilege exercised. Whenever the gross profit is one-fourth of a cent or less per bushel, the commission charges, plus the Federal tax on the futures trade arising out of the privilege exercised, exceed the gross profit with the result that the nonmember customer has a loss in his privilege transaction. Whenever such is the case the general practice among the commission houses is to take the trade into their own account. This gives them a gross profit of one-eighth to one-fourth of a cent per bushel in addition to the regular commission received on the privilege from the customer. The brokerage house, however, must pay a small commission to the broker in the pit and pay the Government tax on the future trade arising out of the bid made good.

## PRIVILEGE PRICE USED BY SOME TRADERS AS A POINT AROUND WHICH THEIR TRANSACTIONS IN FUTURES MAY CENTER THE NEXT DAY

A number of the larger traders use the prices at which they bought or sold privileges as a guide to their trading operations in futures on the following day. Knowing the prices at which the privileges were bought or sold, their activity in futures centers around those prices, which serve as pivots. For example, to the holder of privileges, the bids or offers represent potential trades in futures, in other words, bids may result in sales of futures, and offers in purchases of futures. Offsetting trades are made accordingly. To illustrate: Trader A buys bids representing 50,000 bushels of July wheat at 75 cents, or 1 cent below the close. Let us assume that the next day the market opens at 75% cents. Then the price of the future declines to 74% cents, and later it advances to 75% cents with the close at 74% cents. Anticipating a decline in price he may sell 25,000 bushels of July wheat at  $75\frac{1}{2}$  cents and another 25,000 at  $75\frac{1}{2}$  cents. When the future reaches the bid price he may cover 25,000, and when it reaches  $74\frac{1}{2}$  cents, cover the other 25,000 bushels. Expecting a reaction he may purchase a third 25,000 bushels at  $74\frac{1}{2}$  cents. Believing that the price will advance further, he buys an additional 25,000 bushels when the price reaches  $74\frac{1}{2}$  cents, and at  $75\frac{1}{2}$  cents he sells 25,000 bushels, and on the decline at the close to  $74\frac{1}{2}$  cents he "puts" the remaining 25,000 to the seller of the bids thus leaving himself without open commitments at the end of the day.

A form of trading used by professional traders is to purchase or sell, depending upon whether they are buyers or sellers of bids or offers, half the amount of the future named in the privilege when it becomes good during the trading session. The holder of a bid may buy, for example, 5,000 bushels of May wheat at the bid price or lower, should the market decline to that point. Having made the purchase he is in a favorable position to profit by any advance or further decline in price. If the price advances he makes a profit on the 5,000 bushels of May wheat purchased. Should the market price, on the other hand, decline further he can "put" the futures to the seller of the bid, as the bid which covered 10,000 bushels of May wheat protected him against a loss on the 5,000 bushels bought during the session. In addition he may buy another 5,000 bushels to apply on the bid as he has the right to "put" the entire 10,000 bushels. This type of trading carried on by holders of privileges is spoken of by the trade as "trading against privileges purchased." When a seller of bids or offers makes trades in anticipation of having wheat put to him or being called for futures, his trading is referred to as "protecting his sales of privileges."

## PRIVILEGES PROVIDE A MEANS OF ACCUMULATING OR CLOSING OUT SPECULATIVE LINES

Speculators use privileges principally as a means of trading on less capital or for the purpose of accumulating or disposing of open commitments. Privileges may give them an opportunity at times to get into and out of the market at prices which may be more favorable than if they acquired their holdings through pit transactions. In addition it permits the larger speculators to acquire or dispose of their line more or less under cover, i.e., without revealing what they are doing in the market which, of course, is advantageous to them.

The selling of bids is sometimes taken advantage of by the speculator of large means when he is in a position temporarily to depress the market to a point where the privileges will be exercised by the buyers of the bids. This gives the large speculator a chance to cover his short line or increase his long line without bidding in the pit. He, of course, might fail if obliged to sell a larger volume than would be put to him at the close.

The extent to which the larger traders use privileges to get in or out of the market is indicated by the following data secured by the Grain Futures Administration: During the first 10 months of 1927 the 29 large speculators previously referred to collectively traded in Chicago wheat futures to an aggregate amount of 1,556,761,000 bushels (purchases and sales combined) of which not less than 99,625,000 bushels, or 6 percent, arose out of privileges made good. In corn futures their aggregate transactions amounted to 903,323,000 bushels of which not less than 64,922,000 bushels, or 7 percent, represented

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privileges made good. For the individual traders the percentage of trades in futures arising out of privileges exercised varied considerably as was shown in tables 17 and 18. In some instances none of the trades of the individual speculators was due to privileges exercised, whereas in other cases a considerable quantity arose out of privileges. In many instances the quantity was more than 1,000,000 bushels for the 10 months, and in the case of one individual the amount exceeded 20,000,000 bushels for wheat and amounted to nearly 6,000,000 bushels for corn. The extent to which the futures arising out of privileges were used to accumulate or close out large speculative holdings is disclosed in table 20.

TABLE 20.—Extent to which privileges were used in acquiring or disposing of long and short lines in Chicago wheat and corn futures by 22 large speculators in wheat and 22 in corn, from Jan. 5 to Oct. 51, 1927<sup>1</sup>

	Use mad	e of futures a offers m	Total amount used for—			
Grain and privilege	Accumu- lating long lines	Acquiring short lines	Liquidat- ing long lines	Covering short lines	Acquiring lines	Disposing of lines
Wheat:			<u>_</u>			
Bids Offers	9, 015 10, 175	16, 770 10, 655	6, 550 8, 990	24, 015 10, 625	25, 785 20, 830	30, 568 19, 615
Total	19, 190	27, 425	15, 540	34, 640	46, 615	50, 180
Corn: Bids Offers	13, 100 5, 165	12, 490 5, 150	5, 995 11, 750	4, 777 4, 905	25, 590 11, 315	10, 772 16, 665
Total	19, 265	17, 640	17, 745	9, 682	36, 905	27, 427
Grand total	88, 455	45, 065	33, 285	44, 322	83, 520	77, 607

[In thousands of bushels, i.e., 000 omitted]

<sup>1</sup> 19 of the speculators in wheat also traded in corn intures and are, therefore, included in both groups. There were also some large speculators who traded in privileges but did not have any transactions in intures arising out of privileges during the 10-menth period.

The extent to which the large speculators changed their position in a single future on individual days due to future trades arising out of privileges varied from less than 100,000 bushels to as much as 2,560,-000 bushels. An examination of the figures in tables 21 to 28 reveals that about 39 percent of the quantities are less than 100,000 bushels in size, and 32 percent are between 100,000 and 200,000 bushels. The remaining 29 percent are 200,000 bushels or more.

Whether privileges were used principally to accumulate or liquidate a long line or to acquire or cover a short line was determined by the net position of the trader at the beginning of the day on which the privileges were exercised and the amount of future trades that arose out of privileges. For example, if the trader were net long and his privileges, when exercised, resulted in sales of futures, he was deemed to have used the privileges to liquidate long holdings. Should his net long commitments, however, be relatively small, say 15,000 bushels, and the sales arising out of the privileges exercised be large, let us say 100,000 bushels, resulting in a short line in excess of the amount liquidated, he would be considered as using the privileges mainly for purposes of short selling. Any transactions in futures in addition to those which arose out of privileges were not taken into consideration in deciding the purpose for which privileges were used. The reasons for ignoring these pit trades are these: (1) The privileges were purchased or sold on the previous day when the trader had a definite long or short position in the market and which position may have influenced his trading in privileges. (2) The future trades made in the pit the second day for his account may not have been connected in any way with the transactions made in privileges. The future trades may have been made before or after the privileges were exercised. They may have been made with a view to forcing the price of the future through the price of the privilege or to preventing the privileges from being made good. They may have also, partly or wholly, represented offsetting trades made when the privileges were exercised. At any rate, the motive with respect to taking or changing a position in the market was formed before the future trade was made.

## ACCUMULATION OF LONG LINES OF FUTURES THROUGH PRIVILEGES

The accumulating of a long line of futures through privileges can be accomplished by either of two methods, (1) the selling of bids, or (2) the buying of offers. The accumulation of a long position through the sale of bids can be accomplished only if the bids are exercised by the buyer. Their exercise is at times brought about, in case the seller of the privilege wishes to have the future put to him, by his helping to depress the price of the future until it goes through the price of the bid as is illustrated later. The selling of the future is done when the price is near that of the bid. The advantage of forcing the price of the future through the bid price when accumulating a long line is twofold. (1) The sales of futures made through the pit may mislead pit observers, who presume to know for whose account large orders are being executed, by giving them the impression that the trader is bearish when in reality he is bullish, but operating under cover. (2) It may be possible by the use of bids for the speculator who operates on a large scale to obtain futures in large quantities. at somewhat more favorable prices than if they were all purchased through the pit.

The extent that bids are used by large-scale speculators in accumulating long lines is disclosed by the figures in tables 21 and 22, which show that during the 10 months of January to October 1927, 21 of the larger speculators, taken together, accumulated, through the sale of bids, long commitments in Chicago wheat futures aggregating over 9,015,000 bushels, as compared with 10,175,000 bushels through the purchase of offers. Twenty large speculators in corn futures acquired 13,100,000 bushels through the sale of bids and 6,165,000 bushels through the purchase of offers. The degree to which bids and offers were used by different individuals comprising the group of 21 in wheat and 20 in Chicago corn futures varied considerably. Each of 8 speculators accumulated, from time to time, various amounts of Chicago wheat futures which, for the 10-month period, totaled 1,000,000 bushels or more. In Chicago corn futures 7 of them accumulated, individually, as much as 1,000,000 bushels or more. Some of them obtained 1,000,000 bushels or more in each of these two grains. Of these 2 groups the most outstanding as revealed in tables 21 and 22 were traders nos. 4, 6, 7, 24, and 31. Each of them accumulated at various times quantities of Chicago wheat or corn futures which for the 10-month period aggregated 2,000,000 bushels or more.

# TABLE 21.—Accumulating of long commitments in Chicago wheat futures through bids sold or offers bought by \$1 large speculators during Jan. 3 to Oct. 31, 1987

In thousand	ls of bushels	; i.e., 000 omitted]
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Trader no.	Date	Net position at close of previous day	1927 fature	secun (bot	ontity oulated ught) ough	Other trading in the same future	
				Bids	Offers	Fur- chases	Sales
1	July 28 Aug. 19	Even. Long 2,000	Decemberdo	30 200		500	
Total				230			
8	Mar. 19 Oct. 22 Oct. 29	Long 1,180 Long 575 Even	July Decemberdo	50 35	<i>5</i> 95	325 665	120 205 1,305
Total			,	85	595		<u> </u>
6	Mar. 15	Even	July	245			
	Mar. 19 Mar. 22	Long 245. Long 495	do	250 250			
Total				745	ļ		
7	June 2	Long 3,700	September	925			
	June 3 June 17	Long 4,625 Long 6,525	do	135 500		65 200	
	June 23	Long 7,225	do	600			
Total				2, 160			
9	July 18	Long 105	September	100			105
11	Mar. 7	Even	May	440			
	Mar. 10 June 17	do	do Jal <del>y</del>	100 200			
	June 28	do	September	200			
Total	·····			940			
18	July 15	Eyen	September	100			
16	Mar. 28 Apr. 4	do	May July	15 25			25
	Apr. 7	Long 5	July	25	50		
	Apr. 9 May 10	Long 55 Long 25	do	100	100		200
	June 2 June 3	Long 500	September	50 100			
	July 11	Long 1,280	do	55			165
	Aug. 19 Aug. 24	Short 50	December	150 150		50	
	Aug. 29	. Short 40	do	150			190
	Sept. 8 Sept. 10	Long 90	do	100 100			
	Sept. 10 Sept. 17	Long 190	do	100		•••••	
Total				1, 120	150		
17	Jan. 31	Long 75	May	50			
19	Jan. 4	Long 50	do	50			50
	Jan. 4 Do Jan. 6	Long 45.	July May	50 50		*********	
	Jan. 6 May 10 Do May 18 June 28 June 19	Short 55	July	100		100	
	Do May 16	Short 50	September	100 50	-*	50	
	June 28	Even	September	100		50	
	July 15	do	December	50 50			
	D0	Long 50	December.	50			
1	101 A 19	Even	September December	50 50			
	July 18 Do July 28 Do	Long 50.	September	23 50			
	Do	Long 100 Long 150	December	50 60			*******
	Aug. 29 Bept. 3	Long 50	do	50			
Total				925			

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## TABLE 21.—Accumulating of long commitments in Chicago wheat futures through bids sold or offers bought by \$1 large speculators during Jan. 3 to Oct. 31, 1927— Continued

[In thousands of bushels; i.e., 000 omitted]

Trader no.	Date	Net position at close of previous day	1927 future	accun (bou	ntity pulated light) ugh-	Other to in the futo	sama
				Bids	Offers	Pur- chases	Sales
21	Jan. 7 Jan. 21	Long 10. Long 25.	May		500		210 25 50
	Jan. 25 May 27	LONG OU.	do		200		50
	June 2	Long 100	Septemberdo	100	100		200
	Sept. 10	Long 200	December	50	<b></b>		
	Sept. 17	Long 350		50		50	
	Sept. 26	Even Long 200 Long 350 Long 400	do	50	******		
Total				275	800		
72	Jan. 4	Long 100	May	50			100
	Jan. 19	Even		20		60	
	Jan. 31			100		100	200
	Feb. 7	Long 950	do	20	-••• <u>-</u> ==-	200	
	Apr. 3	Long 205	d0		50 90	100	50
	Anr. 20 May 2	Long 950 Long 950 Long 205 Long 405 Exen	do	*******	100	50	90 155
	July 15		September	50		50	50
	Aug. 8	Long 100			100		
	Sept. 28	Long 100	December	50		150	
Total				290	840		
23	36em 10	7	Tala		90	425	285
20	May 18	Long 195 Long 450	July		65	420	250 535
	July 22	Long 110	do		l õ	305	130
	May 27 July 22 July 28	Long 235	do		100	400	820
Total					260		
<b>N</b>	Mar. 1 Mar. 29	Short 65	Maydo July		310 420	125 930	855 930
	ADF 29	Long 45 Long 105		********	60	430	130
	Apr. 29 May 21 May 27	Long 640			825	735	485
	May 27	Long 040 Long 853 Long 350	đe		500	100	230
	Jinne 11	Long 350	do September	95	100	105	100
	June 30 Oct. 29	Long 603 Long 655	December		340	355 430	765 530
		MOLE VOULEELEELE	Down of the second				
Total				95	2,065		
26	Apr. 4 June 17	Short \$0	May. September	- 50		*********	190
	June 17	Short 5	September	50			135
	June 23 July 12	Long 45	do	25 60	*****	50 443	135 865
		494112 1410320400000	~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~				
Total				185			
29					<u> </u>		
	June 20	Long 100	Sentember		500		
	June 30 Oct. 15	Long 100	September	30	500		
	Oct. 15 Oct. 17	Long 30.	December	30 500	500		
	Oct. 15	Kyen	September December do	30	500		
Total	Oct. 15 Oct. 17 Oct. 28	Long 30.	December	30 500	500		
Total	Oct. 15 Oct. 17 Oct. 28	Long 30 Even	Decemberdo	30 500 310			
Total	Oct. 15 Oct. 17 Oct. 28 May 3	Kyen Long 30 Even Long 330	Décember (1928) May July	30 500 310	500 500		
Total	Oct. 15 Oct. 17 Oct. 28 May 2 Jan. 7 Jan. 12	Long 30	December do (1928) May July May	30 500 310	500 500 500 500 15		300
Total	Oct. 15 Oct. 17 Oct. 28 May 3 Jan. 7 Jan. 7 Jan. 12 Jan. 18	Long 30 Even Long 320 Long 320 Long 300	December do. (1928) May July May do.	30 500 310	500 500 500 500 500 15 200		165
Total	Oct. 15 Oct. 17 Oct. 28 May 2 Jan, 7 Jan, 12 Jan, 13 Jan, 25	Long 30 Even Long 320 Long 320 Long 300	December do (1928) May July May do	30 500 310	500 500 50 50 15 200 750		
Total	Oct. 15 Oct. 17 Oct. 28 May 2 Jan. 7 Jan. 12 Jan. 18 Jan. 25 May 1	Long 30	December do (1928) May July May do	30 500 310	500 500 500 500 15 200 750 750 100		165
Total	Oct. 15 Oct. 17 Oct. 28 May 2 Jan. 7 Jan. 12 Jan. 18 Jan. 25 May 1	Kyen           Long 30.           Even           Long 320.           Long 300.           Family 300.           Long 300.           Long 300.           Long 300.           Long 165.	December do (1928) May July May do do do Jay do	30 500 310 540	500 500 50 50 15 200 750		165 745
Total	Oct. 15 Oct. 17 Oct. 28 May 2 Jan. 7 Jan. 12 Jan. 18 Jan. 25 Mar. 1 Apr. 29 May 2 June 2	Long 30. Long 30. Long 30. Long 200. Long 300. Long 65. Long 165. Long 165. Long 100. Long 100. Long 100.	December	30 500 310	500 500 50 50 15 200 750 750 100 100 100		165 745
Total	Oct. 15 Oct. 17 Oct. 28 May 2 Jan. 7 Jan. 12 Jan. 18 Jan. 25 Mar. 1 Apr. 29 May 2 June 2	Long 30 Even	December	30 500 310 540	500 500 500 15 200 750 100 100 100 100 200	75	165 745
Total	Oct. 15 Oct. 17 Oct. 28 May 2 Jan. 7 Jan. 13 Jan. 25 Mar. 1 Jan. 25 Mar. 2 June 2 June 2 June 2	Long 30 Even	December do July May May do July do July do July Docember December	\$0 500 310 \$40	500 500 50 50 15 200 750 750 100 100 100		165 745 100 125 100
Total	Oct. 15 Oct. 17 Oct. 28 Jan. 7 Jan. 12 Jan. 13 Jan. 18 Jan. 28 Jan. 28 Jan. 28 Jan. 20 June 2 June 2 June 2 June 1 July 11 July 11 July 11	Kyen           Long 30.           Even           Long 200.           Long 300.           Long 300.           Long 100.           Long 103.           Long 103.           Long 355.           Long 76.           Long 76.           Long 77.	December do	\$0 500 310 840	500 500 500 15 200 750 100 100 100 100 200		165 745 100 125 100
Total	Oct. 15 Oct. 17 Oct. 28 Jan. 7 Jan. 12 Jan. 13 Jan. 18 Jan. 28 Jan. 28 Jan. 28 Jan. 20 June 2 June 2 June 2 June 1 July 11 July 11 July 11	Long 30 Long 30 Long 30 Long 200 Long 300 Long 65 Long 75 Long 75 Long 103 Long 103 Long 75 Long 76 Long 76 Long 30 Long 30 Long 30 Long 30 Long 30	December do (1928) May July do do do do September September September do do do do September September	\$0 500 310 840 	500 500 500 500 15 2000 7500 100 100 100 100 2000 1200 1200 1200	73	165 745  100 125 100 100
Total	Oct. 15 Oct. 17 Oct. 28 May 2 Jan. 7 Jan. 13 Jan. 25 Mar. 1 Jan. 25 Mar. 2 June 2 June 2 June 2	Long 30 Even	December do	\$0 500 310 840 	500 500 500 15 200 750 100 100 100 100 200 200 100 100	73	165 745 100 125 100
Total	Oct. 15 Oct. 17 Oct. 28 Jan. 7 Jan. 12 Jan. 13 Jan. 18 Jan. 28 Jan. 28 Jan. 28 Jan. 20 June 2 June 2 June 2 June 1 July 11 July 11 July 11	Long 30 Long 30 Long 30 Long 200 Long 300 Long 65 Long 75 Long 75 Long 103 Long 100 Long 75 Long 76 Long 76 Long 30 Long 30 Long 30 Long 30 Long 30	December do (1928) May July do do do do September September September do do do do September September	\$0 500 310 840 	500 500 500 500 15 2000 7500 100 100 100 100 2000 1200 1200 1200	73	165 745 100 125 100

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## TABLE 21.—Accumulating of long commitments in Chicago wheat futures through bids sold or offers bought by 21 large speculators during Jan. 3 to Oct. 31, 1917— Continued

Trader no.	Date	te Net position at close of previous day	1927 fature	accua (bot	ntity miated ught) ugh—	Other trading in the same future	
				Bids	Offers	Pur- chases	Sales
32 Total 84	Jan. 4 Jan. 19 Jan. 21 Feb. 9 Feb. 25 Mar. 29 Apr. 29 Apr. 9 Apr. 19 May 18 May 34 July 26	Long 160 Long 170 Short 20 Long 70 Long 130 Long 5 Long 50 Long 120 Long 85	September	285 115 	85 150 80 250 ± 115	420 144 510 450 450 90 90 90 450 450 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 9	595 2500 425 740 175 175 195 225 170 135 225 170 135 860 860 860 860 860 135 860
Total				85	65		
35 Total	Jan. 7 Jan. 18 Jan. 20 May 3 May 5 May 18	Long 215 Long 445 Long 370 Long 235	Maydo Julydo dodo		100	200 205 25 110 5	300 205 
Grand total				9,015	10, 175		

[In	thousands	of	bushels;	i.e.,	000	omitted]	
						-	-

1 Net.

) On offers.

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TABLE 22.—Accumulating	of	long c	commitments	in Ch	nicago	corn	futures	through
bids sold or offers bought l	by i	:0 larg	re speculators	durin	g Jan.	. 8 to	Oct. 31,	1927

[In thousands of bush	els; i.e., 000 omitted}
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Trader Do.	Date	Net position at close of pravious day	1927 fature	accun (bot	ntity nulated 1gbt) ugh—	Other trading in the same future	
		uzy		Bids	Offers	Pur- chases Sales	Sales
1	Jan. 8 Jan. 10 Jan. 25 June 27 July 1	Long 4.500	Maydo doSeptember		100 100 100 100	200	100
To <b>tsi</b>				50	400		
<b>\$</b>	Jan. 18 Aug. 4 Aug. 5 Aug. 8 Aug. 8 Oct. 6	Long 865	do do do		500 500 365 500 325 205	500	
Total					2, 405		

## TABLE 22.—Accumulating of long commitments in Chicago corn futures through bids sold or offers bought by 20 large speculators during Jan. 3 to Oct. 31, 1927— Continued

[In thousands of bushels; i.e., 000 emitted]

Trader no.	Date	Net position at close of previous day	1927 future		ulated ght)	Other tr in the s futu	ame
				Bids	Offers	Fur- chases	Sales
8	Turber 15	Short 60	Santamber	500			
¥	July 15 Sept. 21	Long 1.040	December	485		25	
	Oct. 13 Oct. 14	Even	September December do do	686		200	
	UCL. 14	rong 980		750			
Total		******		2, 420			
7	Jan. 26	Tang 9 050	May	200			
f	Jan. 28	Long 3.950	do	200			
	Oct. 10	Even	do. Decemberdo	100			
	Oct. 11 Oct. 15	Even	00	500 600			600
	Oct. 20	Long 345	do do do	500		*********	
	Oct. 26	Long 695	do	500			
	Oct. 31	Long 608		775			
Total		****		8, 876			
P	Sept. 16	Long 100	December	50			150
	Oct. 1 Oct. 20	Even	do	100	-++		
	Oct. 30	Long 500		100		*******	
Total				250			
10		×		800			
10	Mar. 10	Long 800	May	200		80	••••
11	Aug. 24 Oct. 26	Long 1,100 Long 100	September	200			
	Oct. 26	Long 100	December	200			
Total				400			
	[						
14	Oct. 1	Long 300	December	300			
18	July 14	Ryen	September	35			35
	July 15 Sapt. 6	Long M. Even	do	100 100			30 50
	Sept. 10	22 7 000	do	100			100
		do					
Totol	-	40		120	+		
Total	-			- 335			
Total	Jul <del>y</del> i						275
	July 1 July 14	Long 230	September	160		210	400
	July 1 July 14 July 15	Long 230 Long 790 Long 800	Reptember December	160 200 100			400
	July 1 July 14 July 14 July 15 Aug. 16 Aug. 31	Long 230 Long 790 Long 800	Reptember December	160 200 100		210	400 1, 075
	July 1 July 14 July 15 Aug. 16 Aug. 31 Sept. 8	Long 230 Long 790 Long 800	Reptember December	160 200 100		210 125	400 1, 075
	July 1 July 14 July 18 Aug. 16 Aug. 31 Sept. 3 Sept. 6 Sept. 10	Long 230 Long 790 Long 800	Reptember December	160 200 100		210	400 1, 075
	July 1 July 14 July 14 July 15 Aug. 16 Aug. 31 Sept. 8 Sept. 8 Sept. 10 Sept. 12	Long 230 Long 790 Long 800	Reptember December	160 200 100		210 125	400 1, 075
	July 1 July 14 July 14 July 16 Aug. 16 Aug. 31 Sept. 8 Sept. 0 Sept. 10 Bept. 12 Sept. 12	Long 230 Long 790 Long 800	Reptember December	160 200 100		210 125	400 1, 075
	July 1 July 14 July 14 July 16 Aug. 81 Sept. 8 Sept. 10 Sept. 10 Sept. 10 Sept. 37	Long 230 Long 790 Long 800 Long 100 Long 200 Long 250 Long 250 Long 250 Long 250	Reptember	160 200 100 70 100 100 100 100 100 100 100		210 125	400
	July 1 July 14 July 14 Aug. 16 Aug. 18 Sept. 6 Sept. 10 Sept. 12 Sept. 12 Sept. 21 Sept. 21 Sept. 21	Long 230 Long 790 Long 800 Long 100 Long 200 Long 250 Long 250 Long 250 Long 250	Reptember	160 200 100 70 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10		210 125	400
	July 1 July 14 July 18 Aug. 16 Aug. 16 Aug. 16 Sept. 8 Sept. 6 Sept. 10 Sept. 12 Sept. 12 Sept. 11 Sept. 21 Sept. 21 Sept. 21 Sept. 21 Sept. 37 Oct. 1	Long 230 Long 790 Long 800 Long 100 do Long 200 Long 250 Long 250 Long 250 Long 500 Long 500	September	160 200 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10		210 125	400 1, 075
	July 1 July 14 July 14 July 18 Aug. 16 Aug. 31 Sept. 8 Sept. 10 Sept. 12 Sept. 10 Sept. 12 Sept. 12 Sept. 10 Cot. 12 Oct. 14 Oct. 18 Oct. 20	Long 230 Long 790 Long 800 Long 100 do Long 200 Long 250 Long 250 Long 250 Long 500 Long 500	September	160 200 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10		210 125	400 1, 075
	July 1 July 14 July 14 July 16 Aug. 16 Aug. 16 Sept. 31 Sept. 10 Sept. 12 Sept. 16 Sept. 21 Sept. 21 Oct. 1 Oct. 14 Oct. 14	Long 230 Long 790 Long 800 Long 100 do Long 200 Long 250 Long 250 Long 250 Long 500 Long 500	Reptember	160 200 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10		210 125	400 1, 075
	July 1 July 14 July 16 Aug. 81 Sept. 8 Sept. 6 Sept. 10 Sept. 27 Oct. 11 Oct. 18 Oct. 18 Oct. 26	Long 230 Long 790 Long 800 Long 100 do Long 200 Long 250 Long 250 Long 250 Long 500 Long 500	September	160 200 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10		210 125	400 1, 075
16 Total	July 1 July 14 July 14 July 18 Aug. 16 Aug. 31 Sept. 3 Sept. 10 Sept. 12 Sept. 21 Sept. 21 Sept. 21 Sept. 22 Sept. 23 Sept. 24 Sept. 24 Se	Long 230 Long 790 Long 800 Even 100 Long 200 Long 250 Long 250 Long 250 Long 350 Long 350 Long 355 Long 355 Long 355 Long 355 Long 355 Long 355 Long 355 Long 355 Long 355	September           Decomber           do           do	160 200 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10		210 125	400 1, 075
16	July 1 July 14 July 14 July 18 Aug. 16 Aug. 31 Sept. 3 Sept. 10 Sept. 12 Sept. 12 Sept. 12 Sept. 12 Sept. 12 Sept. 12 Sept. 12 Sept. 14 Oct. 14 Oct. 14 Oct. 14 Oct. 20 Oct. 20 Oct. 26 Sept. 1	Long 230 Long 790 Long 800 Even 100 do Long 200 Long 250 Long 250 Long 250 Long 550 Long 550 Long 550 Long 551 Long 190 Long 350 Long 200 Long 200 Long 200	September           Decomber           do           do	160 200 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10		210 125 	400 1, 075
16 Total	July 1 July 14 July 14 July 18 Aug. 16 Aug. 31 Sept. 3 Sept. 10 Sept. 12 Sept. 12 Sept. 12 Sept. 12 Sept. 12 Sept. 12 Sept. 12 Sept. 14 Oct. 14 Oct. 14 Oct. 14 Oct. 20 Oct. 20 Oct. 26 Sept. 1	Long 230 Long 790 Long 800 Even 100 do Long 200 Long 250 Long 250 Long 250 Long 550 Long 550 Long 550 Long 551 Long 190 Long 350 Long 200 Long 200 Long 200	September           Decomber           do           do	160 200 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10		210 135 	400 1, 075
16 Total	July 1 July 14 July 14 July 16 Aug. 31 Sept. 6 Sept. 10 Sept. 10 Sept. 10 Sept. 10 Sept. 11 Sept. 27 Oct. 11 Oct. 18 Oct. 20 Oct. 20 Oct. 20 Oct. 20 Oct. 20 Sept. 1 Feb. 36 Feb. 28	Long 230 Long 790 Long 800 do Long 200 do Long 250 Long 250 Long 250 Long 350 Long 500 Long 500 Long 100 Long 500 Long 200 Long 200 Long 500 Long 200	September	160 200 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10		210 125 	400 1, 075
16 Total	July 1 July 14 July 14 July 16 Aug. 31 Sept. 6 Sept. 10 Sept. 12 Sept. 16 Sept. 12 Sept. 16 Sept. 16 Sept. 16 Sept. 16 Sept. 16 Sept. 16 Sept. 16 Sept. 20 Oct. 14 Oct. 18 Oct. 20 Oct. 20 Sept. 20 Sept. 20 Sept. 20 Sept. 37 Sept. 37 Sept. 37 Sept. 37 Sept. 38 Sept. 37 Sept. 37 Sept. 38 Sept. 37 Sept. 38 Sept.	Long 230 Long 790 E ven Long 800 Long 200 Long 200 Long 250 Long 250 Long 400 Long 500 Long 500 Long 190 Long 190 Long 190 Long 100 Long 100 Long 100 Long 100	September	160 200 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10		210 125 	400 1, 075
16 Total	July 1 July 14 July 14 July 18 Aug. 31 Sept. 3 Sept. 3 Sept. 10 Sept. 10 Sept. 10 Sept. 11 Sept. 21 Sept. 21 Se	Long 230 Long 790 Long 800 do Long 200 do Long 250 Long 250 Long 250 Long 50 Long 50 Long 50 Long 50 Long 50 Long 50 Long 50 Long 50 Long 50 Long 100 Long 50 Long 100 Long 100 Long 100 Long 100 Long 100 Long 100 Long 100	September           Decomber	160 200 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10		210 125 	400 1, 075
16 Total	July 1 July 14 July 14 July 16 Aug. 31 Sept. 6 Sept. 10 Sept. 12 Sept. 16 Sept. 12 Sept. 16 Sept. 16 Sept. 16 Sept. 16 Sept. 16 Sept. 16 Sept. 16 Sept. 20 Oct. 14 Oct. 18 Oct. 20 Oct. 20 Sept. 20 Sept. 20 Sept. 20 Sept. 37 Sept. 37 Sept. 37 Sept. 37 Sept. 38 Sept. 37 Sept. 37 Sept. 38 Sept. 37 Sept. 38 Sept.	Long 230. Long 790. Long 790. Long 800. E vest. Long 200. Long 200. Long 250. Long 250. Long 250. Long 350. Long 500. Long 50. Long 100. Long 50. Long 100. Long 200. Long 100. Long	September	160 200 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10		210 125 	400 1, 075

## TABLE 22.—Accumulating of long commitments in Chicago corn futures through bids sold or offers bought by 20 large speculators during Jan. 3 to Oct. 31, 1927— Continued

Trader 20.	Date	Net position at close of previous day	1927 future	bound (bou	ntity nuisted ught) ugh—	Other to in the futu	same
		usj		Bids	Offers	Pur- chases	Salas
19	June 25	Long 585	September	50	L		
	July 1 July 15	Even Long 550 Long 50	July September	50			
	<b>n</b> .	Long 550	December	50			
	July 28	Long 550	September	50			
	July 28 July 29 Aug. 29	Long 600 Long 325 Long 375 Long 425	de	50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50			
	Aug. 29	Long 325	December	50			
	Aug. 31 Sept. 3	1/00g 3/0	do	50		******	
	Sedt. 6	Long 475	do	50			
	Sept. 10	- <u>.</u>	do	50			
	Sept. 12	Long 575	do	50		******	
Total				1,060	l <u></u>		1
1	July 14	Even	September	40	Ì		1
	July 30	Long 150	do December		100		
	July 25	Shert 50 Long 510			315 250	310	L
	Sent. 6	Long 420	do	50	200		15
	Oct. 1 Oct. 18	Even	do	30			1 7
	Oct. 18	Long 5	(1928) May	100			
Total		***** <b>**</b> ***************************		220	665		
8	Jan. 31	Long 200	May	10			11
	Feb. 1 Feb. 7	Long 10	do	40			2
	Feb. 9	Long 25 Long 50	do	85			<b>X</b>
	Feb. 9 Feb. 16	Long 250	do	50 50		50	2
	Feb. 21	Even	do	50 50	ļ	50	
	Feb. 28 Mar. 3	LONG 350	do	50 50	]	50	14
	Mar. 5	Long 350 Long 300 Long 450 Long 300 Long 275	do	50 50		00	10
	Mar. 12	Long 300	do		50		. 5
	Apr. 6	Long 275 Even	do		100	50	10
	Apr. 27 May 2	aven	September	50	100	150 850	10
	June 10		July	100			10
	June 23 June 25	Long 350 Long 250	July September	50			10
	July 1	LODE 200	do	50 100		100	8 20
	Sept. 27	Long 100	December	100		100	
	Oct. 18 Oct. 20	Long 100	do	50 75			5
	Oct. 20	Even	(1928) March		[		7
Total		*****		1,010	250		
ø	Jan. 10	Long 350	May		200		
	Aug. 8	Long 360 Long 435	September December		136	95	5
<b></b>	Sept. 19	LOUX 100	1/80011064		125	500	1, 4ŭ
Total					460		
H	Jan. 6	Long 595	May		30		
	Apr. 29 May 4	Even	September		75		
	May 1 May 11	Short 185 Short 115	May		300 250	230 290	23 21
	May 13	Even	Julydo		100	710	58
Total		******************			765		
8	Jan. 28	Long 200	M87	200			
<b>N</b>	Feb. 7	Long 200	May	100			
	Føb. 16	Long 300	do	100			
Total				<b>400</b>			
na.	Mar. 14	Long 180	Мау	50			8
Wes	Mar. 17	Long 130	do	30			3
	Mar. 22	đa	do	20		55	10
	May 7 Sept. 12	Long 45. Even	July December	60 50		145 55	34 25
	Oct. 1		do	50			تء 5
Total				260			

[In thousands of bushels; i.e., 000 omitted]

TABLE 22.—Accumulating of long commitments in Chicago corn futures through bids sold or offers bought by 20 large speculators during Jan. S to Oct. S1, 1927— Continued

Trader no.	Date	Net position at days of previous 1927 future day		Quantity accumulated (bought) through—		Other trading in the same future	
				Bids	Offers	Pur- chases	Sales
\$0	May 2 Sept. 18 Oct. 14 Oct. 18	Even	July Decemberdo	300 100 150	100	400	
Total				550	100		
31	Jan. 4 Jan. 14 Jan. 25 Mar. 10 Mar. 24 July 14 Aug. 5 Aug. 8 Oot. 20	Long 310 Long 210 do Even do	May	20 20	100 70 100 220	20 250 80	225
32	Jan. 14 Feb. 9 Feb. 28 May 14 June 13 D0 June 23 Sept. 12 Sept. 20	Long 210 Long 40 Long 100 Long 5 Long 5 Long 50 Long 15	Maydo 	55 100 100 100 100 100	150 150 145 55 + 280	650 (~ 100 150 810	500 500 505 505 505 505 500 245 895 * 15 900
Total				420	630		
Grand total.				13, 100	6, 165		
<u> </u>	I Net.	± 01	a dida.	+ On	offers.		L

[In thousands of bushels; i.e., 000 emitted]

Illustrations.—The accumulation of a "long" line on a large scale by means of selling bids is illustrated by the trading operations of speculators nos. 6 and 7. On March 11, 1927, the former had no open commitments in the July wheat future. That day he sold bids in July wheat to the extent of 235,000 bushels, and on March 12, 14, 17, 18, 19, and 21, he sold, each day, 250,000 bushels in the same future. On the 15th, 19th, and 22d futures were put to him as shown in table 21 which resulted in giving him at the close of the trading on the 22d a net long position of 745,000 bushels in the July future without his having purchased a single bushel through pit trades. While building this long line of July wheat through the use of privileges, he also increased his short commitments by the 22d in the May wheat future from 1,405,000 to 3,105,000 bushels by sales of 1,700,000 bushels made through the pit. His selling of the May future most likely aided in forcing the price of July wheat through the bids as the trades in the former were made on the same days that the July wheat was put to him. On each of four other occasions this same speculator accumulated, through bids, long commitments in Chicago corn futures ranging from 485,000 to 750,000 bushels. On July 15, he obtained 500,000 bushels, on September 21, 485,000 bushels, October 13, 685,000

bushels, and on October 14, 750,000 bushels, or a total of 2,420,000 bushels as is shown in table 22.

During June 1927 speculator no. 7, who is also a heavy trader in privileges as well as in futures, was successful four times in using bids to accumulate a long line of Chicago wheat futures. On June 2 by the use of bids he added 925,000 bushels to his long line of September wheat, which already was 3,700,000 bushels. The next day he added another 135,000 bushels, on the 17th, 500,000 bushels more and on the 23rd, 600,000 bushels, making a total of 2,160,000 bushels, acquired by means of bids sold. In Chicago corn futures he accumulated, through bids, as little as 100,000 to as much as 775,000 bushels, at a time. The aggregate amount obtained by him through bids during the 10-month period of January to October 1927 was 3,375,000 bushels of which almost 3,000,000 were secured during October. Additional illustrations of the extent to which bids were used in accumulating long lines by 19 other speculators in wheat and 18 others in corn will be found in tables 21 and 22.

The accumulation of long lines through the purchase of offers is excellently illustrated by the operations of trader no. 4. On August 3, 1927, this trader had no open commitments in the December corn future. After the close of the futures market on that day, however, he purchased offers in December corn to the extent of 500,000 bushels. These were exercised by him on August 4. On the latter day he again bought offers to the amount of 500,000 bushels. Of this quantity offers representing 365,000 bushels were called by him on August 5. This gave him a net long position of 865,000 bushels. At the close of the futures market he purchased additional offers in the December future to the extent of 1,000,000 bushels of which 500,000 were called on August 6, thus giving him a net long position of 1,365,000 bushels in that future. This was further increased through offers called on August 8 to 1,700,000 bushels. This whole amount, acquired through offers, was liquidated by sales through the pit on August 11, when the price of the December future declined 11/8 cents, net, for the day. By building up this line of 1,700,000 bushels in a single future under cover, through privileges, he did not contribute anything directly to advancing prices. On the other hand, when he liquidated his holdings through the pit the market received the full force of his selling. It can, of course, be argued that the sellers of the offers contributed to advancing prices when they made purchases to protect themselves on the days that they were "called" for futures or later when they bought corn futures which they automatically went short when the offers were exercised by the buyers. This argument, although sound, does not alter the fact that trader no. 4 did not directly aid in advancing prices of futures.

## LIQUIDATION OF LONG LINES OF FUTURES THROUGH PRIVILEGES

Long lines of futures can be liquidated by sales made in the pit or through privileges which are exercised. In order to liquidate by the use of privileges a trader necessarily has to purchase bids or sell offers. Being the buyer, he may exercise the bids whenever he desires within the time limit specified. In order to reduce long lines through the sale of offers, however, the seller must wait until the offers are exercised by the buyers. The exercise of offers is sometimes assured by the seller's making purchases of futures in the pit when the price of the future is near that of the offer and thereby aiding in driving the price of the future through the price of the offer. From experience the seller knows that if the privilege is good at the close it is pretty certain to be exercised.

Liquidation by the large speculators was accomplished more frequently through the sale of offers than by the purchase of bids during the 10-month period, January to October 1927, as is indicated by the figures in tables 23 and 24. The aggregate amount of Chicago wheat futures liquidated during the 10-month period for the account of the large speculators previously referred to was 6,550,000 bushels through bids, and 8,990,000 bushels through offers. In corn futures 5,995,000 bushels were liquidated through bids, and 11,750,000 bushels by means of offers. Offers are more frequently used than bids because "longs" prefer to liquidate when prices are advancing, and offers, therefore, are more likely to be exercised than bids. In addition, liquidation through the purchase of bids necessitates the payment of fees by the trader, whereas by selling offers the fees are paid to the traders. "Longs" who have overstayed the market and wish to minimize their loss will at times buy bids in preference to liquidating in the pit.

**TABLE 23.—Liquidating of long commitments in Chicago wheat futures through bids bought or offers sold by 16 large speculators during Jan. 3 to Oct. 31, 1927** 

Trader no.	Net position at olose of previous day		1927 luture	Quantity liqui- dated (sold) through —		Other trading in the same future	
		ury		Bids	Offers	Purchases	Sales
5	Мыг. 29 Мау б	Long 275. Long 730	Maydo		350 165	310 20	2, 390 55
Total		·····			515		
ð	May 5 May 34 May 27	Long 1,710	Julydo		250 245 500	930	555 475
Total					995		
7	June 7 June 30 July 7 July 26	Long 7,825	Septemberdo do do		100 500 95 200		500
Total			· • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		895		
9	July 16	Long 200	September		95		
10	Apr. 2 Apr. 6 Apr. 6 Apr. 21 Apr. 21 Apr. 21 May 17 May 18 May 23 May 24 May 23 May 24 May 23 May 24 May 23 May 24 May 24	Long 23. Long 235. Long 215. Long 1,100. Long 1,675. Long 1,600. Long 1,600. Long 615. Long 800. Long 1,690. Long 1,400. Long 1,400.	May		50 100 200 150 190 75 100 50 300 100 230 100		15  100 50  625  100
Total	•••••				2, 125		

[In thousands of bushels; i.e., 000 cmitted]

## TABLE 23.—Liquidating of long commitments in Chicago wheat futures through bids bought or offers sold by 16 large speculators during Jan. 3 to Oct. 31, 1927— Continued

Trader no.	Date	Net position at close of previous	1927 (uture	Quent	ity liqul- l (sold) gh —	Other tr the same	
		day		Bids	Offers	Purchase	Sales
17	Jan, 7 Jan, 20 Feb, 2	Long 100 Long 125 Long 135	May		100 50 100		
Total					250		
19	Jan. 12 May 5 May 21	Long 150 Long 400 Long 100	Maydo		20		300
	Do May 23 May 24 June 27	Long 45 Long 50 Long 100 Long 150	September		. 50 . 50 . 70	100	50
	June 30 Do July 16 July 20	Long 100	July September December		150 100 100		100 100
Total	Do. July 26	Long 50	September September		. 50		
21	Jan. 20 Sept. 23 Sept. 24	Long 200 Long 450 Long 475	May Decemberdo		25 25 75	50	200
Total					125		
22	Jan. 7 Jan. 12 Jan. 18	Long 350	May		150	100 150	100
	Jan. 20 Jan. 25 Feb. 2	Long 70 Long 350 Long 500	do do do do		25 150 100	30 200 300	100
	Mar. 4 Apr. 6 May 3	Long 350 Long 200 Long 400	do do July		100 50 100	200 250 100	100
	May 5 May 7 May 18 May 21	Long 400 Long 100 Long 200	do		100 75 100 95	400 100 150 600	150 100
	May 24 May 27 June 7 July 7	Long 600 Long 250 Long 800	do		100 100 100	45 100 150 100	850 400 100
	July 20 July 22 Aug. 15 Sept. 23	Long 100 Long 800 Long 100	September do December do		100 85 50	150 150 100 50	390
	Oct. 6 Oct. 8	Long 500	(1928) May		150 20	50 200	206
Total					2, 460		
23	Mar. 22 June 3 July 7	Long 115 Long 570 Long 325	July. do September		125	300 200 185 ( * 20	55 230 130 1100
Total	Oct. 25	Long 850	December		1 80 205	{	340
24	Mar. 7 Mar. 28	Long 80	Мау	100 515		355 110	220 500
	Mar. 30 Apr. 4	Long 460	do	1 265 605		160 100 125	* 425 240 305
	Apr. 7 Apr. 9 May 10 June 2	Long 635 Long 260 Long 540 Long 625	do do July September	120 500 500 475		550 200 130	165 570
	June 7 June 17 June 23	Long 235 Long 290 Long 935	do July	i 170 500	ð 	510 3 5 250 425	150 175 165 670
Total	Oct. 11	Long 1,005	December	500 4, 250	5	35	800
i See footzotet at (	and of table	3	1		P		

[In thousands of bushels; i.e., 000 omitted]

TABLE 23—Liquidating of long commitments in Chicago wheat futures through bids bought or offers sold by 16 large speculators during Jan. 3 to Oct. 31, 1927— Continued

Trader no.	Date	Net position at a close of previous 1927 future day	Quantity liqui- dated (sold) through		Other trading in the same future		
				Bids	Offers	Purchases	Sales
30	June 2 June 11	Long 190	Julydo	200 3.5		5 120	485 215
Total			*	235	- <b>-</b>		
81	Jan. 15 Jan. 19	Long 100	Maydo	120	100	170	
	May 23 June 23 July 28	Long 150.	Julydo September	100 100	25	100 80	120
	Aug. 19	Long 250		250			200
Total				570	125	*******	
82	Jan. 7 Mar. 7 June 3	Long 105	do	5 185	85	220 80 250	455 135 100
	July 18	Long \$30				{ * 165 35	J 355 150
	Sept. 10		-	1 135	. <b></b>	270 25	220 160
	Sept. 23		do		100	15	50
	Oct. 20	Long 145	do	140		{ + 10 8	* 50 \$50
Tota]				555	185		
34	Jan. 18 July 11 July 20	Long 480.	May September do	445	70	70 300 250	355
Total				445	120		
25	Mar. 30	Long 170	Мау	200		375	390
Grand total.				6, 550	8, 990		

[In thousands of bushels; i.e., 000 omitted]

TABLE 24.—Liquidating of long commitments in Chicago corn futures through bids bought or offers sold by 18 large speculators during Jan. 3 to Oct. 31, 1927

In thousands o	bushels; i.e.,	000 omittad]
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Trader no. Date	Date	Net position at close of previous	1927 future	Quantity liqui- dated (sold) through-		Other trading in the same future	
	day		Bids	Offers	Purchases	Sales	
1	Jan. 25 June I Aug. 8 Aug. 9 Aug. 94 Sept. 16	Long 4,600 Long 3,855 Long 300 Long 215. Long 5,780 Long 5,470	May July December September December		100 500 80 185		
Total		*****************		2,840	865		
5	Jan. 10 May 4	Long 470	May		190 300	100	210
Total					490		
6	May 18 Sept. 20 Oct. 26	Long 313 Long 2.585	July December		200 500	940	1, 895
Total		``` <b>``````````````````````````````````</b>		80	700		

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TABLE 24.—Liquidating of long commitments in Chicago corn Jutures through bids bought or offers sold by 18 large speculators during Jan. 5 to Oct. 31, 1927— Continued

Trader Do.	Date	Net position at close of previous	1927 future	Quant: dated thro	ity ilqui- i (sold) ugh —	Other tre the same	
		day		Bids	Offers	Purchases	Sales
7	35	7	·		-		
f	May 11 May 14	Long 5,660	Julydo		200		
	May 18	Long 6.245	i		500		
	July 20	Long 7,850 Long 7,395 Long 845	do. September		455		
	July 22 Oct. 25	Long 7,395	December		. 200 . 55		19
	Oct. 28	Long 1,095	do		405		8
<b>m</b>							
Total 10	June 1	Long 1,500	July		2,115 500		
11	July 25	Long 695	September		. 200	100	
	Aug. 5 Aug. 6	Long 1,195			200		
	Aug. 6	LOUE 190	do		105	200	
	Aug. 8 Oct. 28	Long 1,195 Long 995 Long 795 Long 300	December		200		50
(The ist		-			4		
Total		*******************			905		
15	May 11 May 14	Long 250	July		100		200
	May 14	Long 80	do		100		
	May 19 May 26	Long 150 Even	do		. 100 . 100	200 100	
		13 * <del>C</del> U				100	
Total					<b>i 40</b> 0		
16	Jan 18	Long 2 380	Мау		200	275	28
	Jan. 18 Jan. 25 Mar. 16	Long 2,430 Long 2,195 Long 100	do		50		
	Mar. 16	Long 2,195	do July		200	235	30
	May 27 June 13					450 250	100
	June 27	Long 230	do		105	505	200
	July 25	Long 230 Long 100 Long 50	do December		150		- 60
	Aug. I Aug. 25	Long 50	do		135		
	Sent. 19	Long 450	An.		100		
	Sept. 20 Oct. 6	Long 350	do		50 100		50
	Oct. 6 Oct. 25	Long 280	do		100	200 200	85
	Oct. 28	Long 430	do do do do		35 70	2000	ou
<b></b>							
Total					1, 475		
19	Zan. 6	Long 150	Мау		50		
	Jan. 8	Long 100	do		50		
	Jan. 10 Feb. 2	Long 50 Long 150	do		50 50		
	Feb. 10	Long 195	đa		1 EA		50
	Feb. 25	Long 250	do do do July		100		100
	Mar. 9 May 5	LOBE 200	do		50 100		50 150
	May 11	Long 105.	July.		50 50		
	May 27	Long 50	do		00		50 200
1	June 13 June 16	Long 150	Sentember		65 40		
	June 27 July 20	Long 635	do do September do		50		100
	July 20	1 A 7 7 6 11 1	66		50 50	*******	
	1.0 Inly 98	TODE 100	December		50 100		50
	Do. July 25 Aug. 96	Long 100 Long 500	September		50		
1	Do Sept. 19	Long 375	December (1928) March		50 10	********	*******
1		Long 180	(1940) BABU GB			********	
Total					1,065		
21	Map 10	Long 50	Inly		50		
<b>42</b>	May 19 July 23	Long 350	July. December	200			200
	Aug. 6 Aug. 16	Long 350 Long 300	September		85	70	100
	Aug. 16 Sept. 21	Long 820 Long 225	December	880 180		70 185	155
	30UL. AL	LANG LOU		100			
Total	-	-		760	135		

[In thousands of bushels; i.e., 600 omitted]

## TABLE 24.—Liquidating of long commitments in Chicago corn futures through bids bought or offers sold by 18 large speculators during Jan. 3 to Oct. 31, 1927— Continued

Trader no.	Date	Net j clos	osition at so of previous	1927 fature	Quanti dated throu	ty liqui- (sold) 1gh —	Other tra the same	ding in future
		,			Bida	Offers	Purchases	Sales
 99	Jan. İl	Eana	100	May		100	100	
<b>SE</b>	Jan. 13	Long	50	do		40	200	
	Jan, 18	Long	490	do		i 200	200	
	Feb.		50	do		40		
	Feb. (	Long	60	do	100	50	15	
	Feb. 18 Mar. 1	Long	150	do		100	150	50
	Mar. I	Long	250 500	do		100	100	
	Apr. 8	Long	325			25	50	
	Apr. 8 May 6	Long	100	September		100	250	50
	May 18 May 14		10	Julydo		100	50	
	May 14 May 11	LONG	50. 150.	do		100 100	250	200
	May 1	Long	200	do		100	250 200	300
	May 27	Long	650	September		100	200	544
	June 1	Long	350 300	do		100	300	
	July 20	Long	300	do		100		
	July 22 Do	Long	650 150	December		100	208 250	
	Aug. 4	Long	250	do	*****	100	100	
	Aug. 1		250	do		100	450	
	· Do	Long	860	September December		45		300
	Aug. 8	Long	700	December		1 100	150	
	Oat. €	LOES	100	do		25	50	
Total			*******		100	2,025		
23								
23	Feb. 2 Feb. 23	Long	300	May July dodo	300 30		185 130	140 115
	Арг. 2	Long	585	dinydo	20		50	100
	Apr. 12	Long	545		305		180	130
	Juna S	Long	565	September	100		240	310
	June 2	Long	360	September	150		130	225
	Aug. 21 Sopt, 16	Long	70 310	December	75 150		25 50	515 50
_	cobs it		01012220000					
Total			**********	**	1,130			
24	Mar. 1	Long	80	May.		20	56	140
	Mar. 18	Long	235	July	105			
	Apr. 12 May 10	Long	135		45		5	170
	MBY II	LODS	625	September	50		105	
Total					200	20		
28	Feb. 4	Long	100	Мау		100		
28	Jan. (			do		10	10	20
30							<u>ių</u>	
	Sept. 20	1.002	940	December		300		
31	Jan. 10		275	May.		100		
	July 2	Long	250	L'ecomper.	35			65
	Aug.	Long	278.	do		15	******	300
	Aug. 16 Oct. 22	Long	550 50	do (1938) May	300	50	100	
- ·			•••	(1040) 211(J				
Total	*******			· • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	335	165		
19	Feb. 10	Long	310	May		100	75	75
	Mar. 10	Long	103	ldo	200		30	
	Mar. 1	Long	173	do	35	[		40
	Мау (		240	\$W\$		50	645 ( 895	635 1, 160
	May 11	Long	585	do		80	8060 100	1, 100 2 200
	June 2		670	do	+ 100		455	238
	June 10	I Long	385	do	35		390	685
		Long	490			150	480	395
	Aug. 6				100	1	J 90	
	Aug. 6 Sept. 10		25	do	200		1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	100
	-	Long			1 80		10 875	
Total	Sept. 10	Long	25 195		1 80			1 90 615
Total	Sept. 10	Long				380		

Illustrations.-The most outstanding instance in which a large speculator used bids to reduce his long line on a big scale was that of trader no. 1. At the beginning of the day on September 16, 1927, he was long almost 8,500,000 bushels of December corn. By the end of the day his line was reduced by over 2,500,000 bushels through the exercising of bids bought the previous day. Apparently he felt that he could secure a better price for his long corn through privileges than by liquidating an equivalent amount through sales in the pit which would tend to depress prices. Other illustrations involving smaller amounts can be found by examining tables 23 and 24. For example, trader no. 24 frequently used bids as a means of liquidating holdings of wheat futures. During the 10-month period his aggregate liquidations amounted to 4,250,000 bushels. For trader no. 23, the aggregate liquidated in corn futures during the same period was more than 1,000,000 bushels. Two large speculators, nos. 16 and 22, used offers for purposes of liquidating holdings in wheat, on a large scale, during the 10-month period. For trader 16 the aggregate was over 2,000,000 bushels, and for trader 22, nearly 2,500,000 bushels. In corn there were four traders, nos. 7, 16, 19, and 22, who made considerable use of offers for purposes of liquidation. The total liquidations for trader no. 7 for the same period were over 2,000,000 bushels, for no. 16, nearly 1,500,000 bushels, for no. 19, a little more than 1,000,000 bushels, and for no. 22, slightly more than 2,000,000 bushels.

## BUILDING UP SHORT LINES OF FUTURES THROUGH PRIVILEGES

The acquisition of a short line in grain futures through privileges is accomplished in the same manner that long commitments are liquidated, namely, through the purchase of bids or the sale of offers. During the 10-month period of January to October 1927, 18 large speculators in Chicago wheat futures, and 17 in corn futures, used bids more extensively than offers in acquiring a short position. As shown in table 25, open short commitments in wheat futures aggregating 16,770,000 bushels were acquired by means of bids, and 10,655,-000 bushels through offers. In corn futures, open short commitments aggregating 12,490,000 bushels were acquired through the purchase of bids, and 5,150,000 bushels through the sale of offers, as shown in table 26.

There were 5 large speculators in wheat futures, and 4 in corn futures, and another trading in both grains who, at various times, during the 10-month period previously referred to, increased their short account very substantially through privileges. The most prominent was trader no. 24 whose open commitments in wheat were increased an aggregate of 5,185,000 bushels through bids, and in corn 6,535,000 bushels. Trader no. 35 acquired open commitments in wheat of 4,435,000 bushels, through bids. Trader no. 5 acquired open commitments in wheat of 3,735,000 bushels, by means of bids, and 1,285,000 bushels through offers. Trader no. 7 acquired open commitments in wheat of 3,305,000 bushels through offers. While open commitments, acquired through privileges by the remainder of the group were smaller, the aggregates were above the million-bushel mark, as can be seen in tables 25 and 26.

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# TABLE 25.—Increasing of short commitments in Chicago wheat futures through bids bought or offers sold by 18 large speculators, during Jan. 3 to Oct. 31, 1927

Trader no.	Date	Net position at close of previous day	1927 future		unt of s (sold) igh—	Other tre the same	ding in future
		- Cay		Bids	Offers	Purchases	Salet
5	Jan. 4 Jan. 7	Short 2,610	May	100	500	365 1, 255	49( 1,050
	Jan. 15	Short 2,075	do		1 70	50	·
	Mar. 4	Short 1,870	i do		350	920	70
	Mar. 9 Mar. 15	Short 2,075 Short 1,970 Short 2,085 Short 2,200	do	395 365		275 455	40
	Mar. 29	1 A YEQ	March		100		5
	Mar. 30	1 Short 2155	May	355		85	84
	Apr. 9 May 10	Short 3,190 Short 1,685	July	500 630		1, 785 1, 326	1, 37 65
	May 17	Short 1,775.			225	875	83
	May 18	Short 1.955	do		125	1 1 500	* 52
	May 21	Short 1.580			15	1,755 1,180	89 1, 33
	June 2	Short 710		210	10	\$10	1, 33
	June 3	Short 235	do	275		625	270
1	Juna 11 Juna 17	Short 520 Short 850	do	230 285		1, 130 945	1, 23 29
1	Juge 23	Short 680	do	390		225	7
Total	May 18	Short 698	7_]_	3, 735	1, 285		
		4	-		500	2, 360 945	
************	Jan. 25 Mar. 16	Short 4,845	May		100 580	V13	
	Mar. 20	12 hours 6 963	do		40		
	Mar. 29	Short 6,450	do		350		
	Apr. 11 Apr. 19	Short 4,705	Julydo		100		1, 20
	Apr. 21	I Short & Shi	do		250		
	Apr. 21 May 17 May 18	Short 4,845.	do		375	250	17
	May 18 Sept. 29	Short 5,395 Short 5,465	do December		500 330	250	39
	Oct. 6	Short 5,295	do		80		4
	0et, 29	Short 6,885	do		500		
Total					\$, 305		·
			*****************		<u> </u>		
_	July 36	Short 100			100		
5	Apr. 14 June 27	Short 100	July		100 50	150	
	Sept. 24	Even	September December		100	130	
		•					
Total	••••	·			250		
đ	Apr. 8	Short 5	July		20		
	May 2	Long 25	Julydo		100	100	
	May 3 July 20	Short 495	do September		95 50	250	15
	July 22	Short 575	i da		25		
	July 20	Short 600	do		25		
	Aug. 8	Short 700 Short 50	December	• • • • • • • • • •	50 100		
	Aug. 15 Oct. 8	Short 610	do		25		
	Oct. 16	Short 305	do		100		
	Oct. 29	Short 406	do	·····	100		
Total					690		
7	Jan. 12	Short 15	May		100		
9	May 9 May 9	Short 6	July September July do		50		
1	May 9 May 23	Sbort 5	July		50 30	50	
	May 24	Long 15	do		50	30	
	May 27	Short &	i an		50 50		10
	do	Short 20	September July		50 50		5 10
	31106 2						
	Juns 7	do	September		50		
Total	July 26	do	September December				

[In thousands of bushels; i.e., 600 omitted]

See footnotes at and of table.

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 TABLE 25.—Increasing of short commitments in Chicago wheat futures through bids

 bought or offers sold by 18 large speculators during Jan. 5 to Oct. 51, 1927—Con.

Trader no.	Date	Net position at close of previous day	1927 future	increas	uni of se (sold) ugh	Other tri the same	ading in a future
				Bids	Offers	Parchase	Bales
21	Mar. 23	Even	July		100		
	June 7		do	200	. 100		
	June 23	do	do September	200		. 100 30	100
Total				220	200		
		_		200	<u> </u>		
22	. Jan. 15	Even	Мау		45		·
23	Mar. 15	Sbort 445	Msy	115		300	
	May 16 June 2	Long 15 Short 70	July September	. 175 150		250	250 100
-	July 15	Short 105.	do	170		200	5
	Bept 27	8bort 310	December.	50		480	105
	Oct 17	Short 35	do	150		50	445
Total				810			<b>-</b>
24	Mar. 12	Short 180	May	185			175
	Mar. 17	Short 55	Maydo	500		445	70
	Mar. 19	Short 510	da	200		295	310
	Mar. 22 Apr. 7	Long 15 Short 445	do	500 200	<u></u>	195 130	185
	Ame. 9	Short 650	July	100	[	203	2:20
	Apr. 28 June 17	Long 10	i Sectebor	145		10	75
	June 17	Short 120	do Decenziber	600 255	• - <b>• • • • •</b> • • •	56 15	810 300
	Aug. 29 Oct. 17	Short 175 Long 65	do	600		75	500 620
	Oct. 18	Short 1.090	do	730		305	70
	Oct. 20 Oct. 21	Short 1,195 Short 1,795	do	600 500	ŀ	675	
-	<b>UG.</b> <i>M</i>	QUOL 6 19190				013	
Total			*******	5, 185	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		
25	Oct. 1	Short 1,630	December	800		1, 305	
	Oct. 25 Oct. 29	Short 2,050 Short 1,675	(1928) May		200 50	210	10
		02004 33010					
Total				908			
Total	• • • • • • • • • • • •				250		
26	Jan. 7	Short 215	May		200		565
	Jan. 7 Jan. 18	Short 85	May		200 150	195	110
	Jan. 7 Jan. 18 Mar. 1	Short 85 Short 425	do		200 150 50	195 740	110 395
	Jan. 7 Jan. 18 Mar. 1 Mar. 29 Apr. 2	Short 85 Short 425 Short 155	do		200 150 50 25 45	195	110
	Jan. 7 Jan. 18 Mar. 1 Mar. 29 Apr. 2	Short 85 Short 425 Short 155 Short 45 Short 195	do do		200 150 50 25 45 50	195 740 55 60	110 395 30
	Jan. 7 Jan. 18 Mar. 1 Mar. 29 Apr. 2 Apr. 6 May 17	Short 85 Short 425 Short 45 Short 45 Short 195 Short 205 Short 140	do		200 150 25 45 50 55	195 740 55 60 490	110 395 30
	Jan. 7 Jan. 18 Mar. 1 Mar. 29 Apr. 2 Apr. 6 May 17 June 27 June 20	Short 85 Short 425 Short 45 Short 45 Short 195 Short 205 Short 140	do		200 150 50 25 45 50	195 740 55 60 490 50 450	110 395 30
	Jan. 7 Jan. 18 Mar. 1 Mar. 29 Apr. 2 Apr. 2 Apr. 6 May 17 June 27 June 30 July 16	Short 85 Short 425 Short 45 Short 45 Short 195 Short 205 Short 140	do		200 150 50 25 45 50 55 50 55	195 740 55 60 498 50 450 700	110 355 20 190 10 445 315
	Jan. 7 Jan. 18 Mar. 1 Mar. 29 Apr. 2 Apr. 2 Apr. 6 May 17 June 30 June 30 July 16 July 18	Short 45	do		200 150 56 25 45 50 85 85 100 25	195 740 55 60 490 30 450 700 450	110 365 20 190 10 445 315 593
	Jan. 7 Jan. 18 Mar. 1 Mar. 29 Apr. 2 Apr. 6 May 17 June 27 June 27 June 20 July 16 July 26 July 26	Short 425	dodo dodo doJuly do September do do do do do	40	200 150 50 25 45 50 53 53 25 100 25 100 25 100 25 90	195 740 55 60 400 50 450 700 450 700 450 700 450 705 755	110 355 20 190 10 445 315
	Jan. 7 Jan. 18 Mar. 1 Apr. 29 Apr. 29 Apr. 6 May 17 June 30 July 18 July 20 July 20 July 26 Aug. 8	Short 85	do	40	200 150 50 45 50 85 25 100 25	195 740 55 60 498 50 700 459 695 755 25	110 355 30 190 445 315 595 455 380
	Jan. 7 Jan. 18 Mar. 1 Mar. 2 Apr. 2 Apr. 6 May 17 June 30 July 16 July 26 Aug. 8 Seot. 23	Short 425	dododo dodo dodo Beptember dodo dodo dodo dodo dodo Decomber	40	200 150 50 25 45 50 50 25 150	195 740 55 60 490 50 450 700 450 700 459 695 755 25 25 405	110 365 30 190 10 445 315 593 455 380 145
	Jan. 7 Jan. 18 Mar. 29 Apr. 2 Apr. 2 May 17 June 27 June 27 June 27 June 27 Juny 16 July 20 July 20 July 20 July 20 Sept. 23 Sept. 24 Oct. 6	Short 425	do	40	200 159 25 59 25 59 59 59 59 25 150 25 250 70	195 740 55 60 490 50 450 700 450 695 755 25 405 215 50	110 365 30 190 10 445 315 595 455 380 145 306
	Jan. 7 Jan. 18 Mar. 1 Apr. 29 Apr. 2 Apr. 6 May 17 June 30 July 18 July 20 July 20 July 20 July 20 July 20 Get. 25	Short 425	do	40	200 150 25 50 25 50 55 50 25 100 25 150 25 150 250 70 200	195 740 55 60 499 50 450 700 450 700 450 705 755 25 405 215 50 400	110 3355 300 190 10 445 315 595 455 380 145 306
24	Jan. 7 Jan. 18 Mar. 29 Apr. 2 Apr. 2 May 17 June 27 June 27 June 27 June 27 Juny 16 July 20 July 20 July 20 July 20 Sept. 23 Sept. 24 Oct. 6	Short 425	do	40	200 150 50 25 25 50 25 100 20 200 200 200	195 740 55 60 490 50 450 700 450 695 755 25 405 215 50	110 365 30 190 10 445 315 595 455 380 145 306
	Jan. 7 Jan. 18 Mar. 1 Mar. 29 Apr. 2 Apr. 2 May 17 June 30 July 18 July 20 July 20 July 20 Aug. 8 Sept. 23 Sept. 24 Oct. 25 Oct. 29	Short 425	do	40	200 150 25 50 25 50 55 50 25 100 25 150 25 150 250 70 200	195 740 55 60 499 50 450 700 450 700 450 705 755 25 405 215 50 400	110 3355 300 190 10 445 315 595 455 380 145 306
24	Jan. 7 Jan. 18 Mar. 1 Mar. 29 Apr. 2 Apr. 2 May 17 June 30 July 18 July 20 July 20 July 20 Aug. 8 Sept. 23 Sept. 24 Oct. 25 Oct. 29	Short 425	do	40	200 150 56 25 36 55 55 56 55 56 55 150 25 150 25 150 25 150 200 200 200 200	195 740 55 60 400 450 450 450 450 459 695 755 25 405 3115 50 400 200	110 3355 300 190 10 445 315 595 455 380 145 306
24	Jan. 7 Jan. 18 Mar. 1 Mar. 29 Apr. 2 Apr. 6 May 17 June 30 July 18 July 20 Aug. 8 Sept. 23 Sept. 24 Oct. 25 Oct. 29 July 12 Aug. 8	Short 45	do	40	200 150 50 25 25 50 25 100 20 200 200 200	195 740 55 60 499 50 450 700 450 700 450 705 755 25 405 215 50 400	110 3355 300 190 10 445 315 595 455 380 145 306
24	Jan. 7 Jan. 18 Mar. 1 Mar. 29 Apr. 2 Apr. 6 May 17 June 30 July 16 July 16 July 20 July 20 Jul	Short 45	do	40	200 150 26 25 30 30 100 25 100 25 250 70 200 200 1, 900 300 1, 900	198 740 55 60 400 50 450 700 450 695 755 25 405 215 50 400 200	110 3355 300 190 10 445 315 595 455 380 145 306
24	Jan. 7 Jan. 18 Mar. 1 Mar. 29 Apr. 2 Apr. 6 May 17 June 30 July 16 July 16 July 20 July 20 Jul	Short 425	do dodo do do September do December  do December  do December  do Docember  do Docember  DOCember  DOCEMBER  DOCEMBER  DOCEMBER  DOCEMBER  DOCEMBER  DOCEMBER  DOCEMBER  DOCEMBER  DOCEMBER  DOCEMBER  DOCEMBER  DOCEMBER  DOCEMBER  DOCEMBER  DOCEMBER  DOCEMBER  DOCEMBER 	40	2000 150 50 50 50 50 50 100 225 100 225 150 250 250 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 2	198 740 55 60 400 50 450 700 450 695 755 25 405 215 50 400 200	110 340 240 190 100 445 543 305 280 145 305 190
24	Jan. 7 Jan. 18 Mar. 1 Mar. 29 Apr. 2 Apr. 2 May 17 June 20 July 16 July 20 July 20 Jul	Short 45	do	40	200 150 26 50 50 50 50 50 100 25 150 25 150 250 700 200 200 200 1, 900	198 740 55 60 400 50 450 700 450 695 755 25 405 215 50 400 200	110 345 349 190 100 445 315 563 345 345 345 345 345 300 120

[In thousands of bushels; i.e., 000 omitted]

 TABLE 25.—Increasing of short commitments in Chicago wheat futures through bids

 bought\_or\_offers sold by 18 large speculators during Jan. 5 to Oct. 51, 1927—Con.

Trader no.	Date	Net position at close of previous day	1927 ^uture	A mount of increase (sold) through		Other trading in the same future	
		uay	_	Bids	Offers	Purobases	Sales
	Feb. 7	Short 10	July	100			
	June 23	Short 50	September.	100		50	N
	July 27	Even		75		30	
1	Aug. 29	Short 45	da	200		50	
	Oct. 29	Short 100	(1928) March		25	25	
Total		******		475	25		`
	_	_					
2	Jan. 12	Long 15			80	735	254
	Jan. 25	Long 30	do	*****	165	700	34
	May 16	Short 85	July	250		305	27(
	July 20	Long 30	Beptember December		150	510	23
	Sept. 28 Oct. 21	Short 110	do	110 300		85 555	23
	UCL. 21	OBUIL 210		000	******	000	43
Total				660	395		
6	Feb. 9	Short 430	Мау	190		70	110
****************	Mar. 10	Short 1.015	do	195		460	24
>	Mar. 17	Short 830	do.	840		830	25
1	Mar. 19			170		195	2
	Mar. 22	Short 1.025	do	200		580	6
	Apr. 4	Short 310	do	200			
	Apr. 7	Short 120	do	400		50	4
	June 2	Short 36	July	100		165	7
- 1	June S	Short 45	do	100		55	38
	July 15		September	295		880	30
	July 18 July 28	Short you	do	130 165	*=*****	420	28 44
	Aug. 19	Showt 708	December	800		140 265	11
	Seot. 2	Short 1 480	do	240		725	8
	Sept. 10	Short 1.730	do	180		495	
	Sept. 13	Short 1.480	do	50		90	81
	Sept. 17		do	485		425	3
	Oct. 1	Short 1.380		50		25	24
	Oct. 17	Short 1,900	do	50		148	29
	Oct. 18	Short 2,100	do	75	[	270	12
	Oct. 20	Short 2,155	do	550		1,075	13
Total				4, 435			
Grand total.		*		16, 770	10, 655		~~~~~

[In thousands of bushels; i.e., 000 omitted]

TABLE 26.—Increasing of short commitments in Chicago corn futures through bide bought or offers sold by 17 large speculators, during Jan. 3 to Oct. 81, 1987

[In thousands of bushels; i.e., 000 omitted]

Trader no.	Date	Not position at close of previous day	1937 future	Amount of increase (sold) through		Other trading in the same future	
				Bide	Offers	Purchases	Sales
<b>•</b>	Sept. 3 Sept. 27	Short 1,100 Even	December	500 1,000		800	300
Total		*****		1, 500			
6	May 27 Oct. 25	Long 115 Short 765	July December	965	500	535	300
Total				985			

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 TABLE 28.—Increasing of short commitments in Chicago corn futures through bids bought or offers sold by 17 large speculators during Jan. 5 to Oct. 51, 1927—Con.

Trader no.	Date	Net position at close of previous day	1927 future	increa	unt of se (sold) ugh-	Other tr the sam	
				Bids	Offers	Purchase	8ales
)	Sept. 19 Oct. 38	Even Short 500	Decemberdo	. 500	. 100	300	10
Total				500	100		
5	Jan. 17	Even	May		. 10		
	Feb. 5 Feb. 8	do	do		100		
	Mar. 12	Short 100	do		.[ 100-		
	Mar. 16 Apr. 18	Short 150	do		50 20		
	Apr. 23 May 18	Short 380	do		100		
•	May 18	Short 50	do July December		70	200	
	Sept. 19	Even	December		100		
Total					<u>585</u>		
6. <u></u>	Mar. 25 Mar. 29	Long 10 Short 190	May		50 10		5
	Apr. 8	Short 265	L do		150		
	Apr. 23	Short 845	do		100	**********	4
	May 4 May 19	Even do	Julydo		200	200	
	June 1	Long 100	September		100	100	
	July 20 Aug. 4	Short 50.	Decemberdo		100 100		
	Aug. 5	Short 150	do		50	50	
	Aug. 8	do	do		50	200	
	Aug. 8	Even	do		50	400	
Total					1,000		
3	Jan. 10	Long 5	<b>7</b>		40		
	Jan. 12	Even	July. May		50		
	Jan. 18	Short 50	QQ		50		
	Feb. 5	Even Short 50	do		50 50		
	Do. Feb. 10	Even	Julydo		50 25 20		
	May 13	Hover 50	do		20 50		
	Do May 14	Short 100 Short 70	September. July		50 50		
	Do	Short 150			50		
	May 17 May 18	Short 165	do July	-+	50		
	May 19 May 21	Short 155	do		50 50		
	May 24	Bven. Short 50	do		50		
	Do May 27	Sbort 95	Septemberdo		50 50		5
	June 1	Short 50	Joly		50		
	Do July 2	Short 195	July September December		50 50		
Total	, .		27 000000000000000000000000000000000000		885		
10141		_					
	Jan. 6 Feb. 28	Even	May	120	100	100 20	
	Apr. 12	Short 75		100			
	Apr. 22	Short 175	do	100		100	
	Арт. 27 Мау 25	Even Short 350	Jalv.	100 20		50	
	May 28 Sept. 24	Short 370 1	do	100		210	
	36pt. 24	Long 26			50	50	100
Total				540	150		
I <b>.</b>	Jan. 4	Even	Мау		100	<u></u> -/	<u></u>
	Jan. 6 May 11	do	doJuly	•••••	100	475	75
	IS	¥V	• •• J = • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •				
Total	L				300 i.		

[in thousands of bushels; i.e., 000 omitted]

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TABLE 28.—Increasing of short commitments in Chicago corn futures through bids bought or offers sold by 17 large speculators during Jan. 3 to Oct. 31, 1927—Con.

Trader no.	Date	Net position at close of previous day	1927 future	Amo increas throu	unt of e (sold) ugh	Other tra the same	ding in future
				Bids	Offers	Purchases	Sales
23	Feb. 1	Long 70	Maydo	285			95
	Feb. 23	Short 260	do	85		60	165
	Mar. 14 Mar. 24	Short 66	do	85 100		130	171 18
	June 10	Short 418. Short 205.	do. September December	200	**	190	10
	Aug. 16	SDOPL 530	December	145			12
	Aug. 16 Aug. 25	Short 250	l	50 300		425	-10
	Sept. 3	Short 190. Short 295	L	100		565	25
	Sept. 12	ODOLL 200	do	200		630	100
Total		******	-=	1, 230			
¥	Feb. 21	Short 320	May	235		60	3(
	Feb. 28	Short 895	do	405		200	
	Mar. 5 Mar. 10	Short 715	do	265 350		170 105	12 310
	Mar. 18	Short 526	do	125		240	160
	Mar. 22	CHEGTE ASKE	E. DĐ	385		65	840
	Apr. 7	Short 95.	do	160		50	160
	Apr. 12 Apr. 27	Short 390	do	140 100		25 15	180 60
	Apr. 27 May 4	Short 290	July	100	280	710	04. 54
	May 5	Long 85	de		205	340	
	June 28	Short 175	September	375			
	Aug. 29 Oct. 1	Long 115	December	440 430		5 500	3. 30(
	Oot. 13	Short 1.615	Julyde	800		225	300
	Oat. 14	Short 2,190	do	650		1, 165	12
	Oat, 16	Short 1,700	do	610		1,000	
	Oct. 20 Oct. 26		do	665 500		710	174 284
<b>5</b> -4-1	004.20	GUUEL 010			<u></u>		285
Total				<b>6,</b> 535	485		
25	May 13	Even	July		50		254
8	Mar. 28	Long 100.	E -		50		
		-	_				
80	Aug. 4	Short 175	December		100		
	Aug. 5 Aug. 24	Short 210 Short 385	September December	100	10	*********	
	Sept. 3	Short 250	do-,	100			
Total							
				200	110		
93	June 27	Even	September		25	50	2
	Oct. 28 Oct. 31	do	December	100	100	100	
		····· WV.····		200		100	-++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Total				100	125		
\$2	Jan. 4	Short 220	May		275	500	
	Jan. 18	LODY M	do		200	400	
	May 24 Sopt. 30	Short 255	July		130	885	12
	Oct. 26	Long 10 Short 95	Maydo July		45	390	5 1
		Onthe Contraction					·
Total					750		
М	July 14	Short 275	September	200		75	2
	July 15	Short 420	do	500	· · · · · · · · · · · ·	450	13
Total		******		700			
98	Ma- 10	Shart 147	Man	100		•100	
85,	Mar. 10 Sept. 3	Short 145.	May. December	100		200	
	Joope. J			<u> </u>			
Total	I			200			
10(41							·
Grand total.				12,490	3, 150	<u></u>	

[In thousands of bushels; i.e., 000 omitted]

Illustrations.—The building up of a short line through the use of bids is well illustrated by the trades of trader no. 4. On September 26, 1927, this speculator had no open contracts in corn futures. On that day, however, he bought bids in the December future to the amount of 1,000,000 bushels at 96% to 97% cents. The following day he sold 300,000 bushels of December corn through the placing of orders executed in the pit at 97 cents per bushel. This aided in making bids good. He also bought 600,000 bushels of December corn at 97 cents, and 200,000 bushels additional when the price declined to 95% cents. He also exercised his bids aggregating 1,000,000 bushels, which made him net short 500,000 bushels of December corn at the end of the day. This he covered the following day by purchases in the pit made at prices ranging from 94% to 95% cents, which permitted him to cover at a profit.

Another speculator who increased his short commitments through privileges was trader no. 9. He was short 500,000 bushels of December corn futures at the close of the market on October 25. He bought bids on that day representing 500,000 bushels of December corn at 82% to 82% cents. The following day he sold 100,000 bushels of December corn futures through the pit at 83 and 83% cents which, with the trades of others, aided in forcing the price of the future through the price of the bids. He then exercised his privileges for 500,000 bushels which made him net short 1,100,000 bushels.

Illustrations showing the use of offers in building up short commitments can be found in tables 25 and 26, but as offers are used less extensively for that purpose than bids, one will find fewer examples of the former involving large amounts.

## COVERING OF SHORT LINES OF FUTURES THROUGH PRIVILEGES

In order to cover open short commitments in grain futures through privileges, the trader must either sell bids or purchase offers. The larger speculators being principally sellers of privileges are more likely to sell bids than to purchase offers, and for two reasons: (1) In selling bids the trader receives the fees paid by the buyers while he must pay a fee for the purchase of offers. (2) As the short seller is anticipating a decline in prices on which to realize his profit, he naturally would be expected to sell bids rather than offers for purposes of covering open short commitments. If, however, he should desire to protect himself against any advance in price he, of course, would buy offers and thereby reduce the loss which he might suffer if he covered his open commitments through pit trades.

During the 10-month period of January to October 1927, the 18 large speculators in wheat and 15 in corn previously mentioned covered, by means of bids, open short contracts in Chicago wheat futures aggregating 24,015,000 bushels, and by means of offers, 10,625,000 bushels, as shown in table 27. In corn futures they covered, through bids, 4,777,000 bushels, and through offers, 4,905,000 bushels as shown in table 31. Seven of the large speculators in wheat futures, and four in corn futures, individually, covered more than a million bushels of the respective futures. Some covered more than a million bushels both in wheat and corn. As can be seen in tables 27 and 28, the outstanding traders were nos. 5, 6, 7, 16, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 35. The most prominent of the group was trader no. 7 who covered through bids in wheat futures an aggregate of 14,860,000 bushels. Trader 24 covered through offers an aggregate in wheat futures of 3,120,000 bushels and 2,140,000 bushels in corn. A third, trader no. 35, by means of offers, covered short commitments in wheat aggregating 3,580,000 bushels.

 TABLE 27.—Covering of short commitments in Chicago wheat futures through bids sold and offers bought by 18 large speculators during Jan. 5 to Oct. 31, 1927

 [In thousands of bushels; Le., 000 omitted]

				wai			
Trader no.	Date	Net position at close of previous		ered (t	ty cov- ought) igh—	Other tra the same	
		day	•	Bids	Offers	Pur- chases	Sales
£	Jan. 25 Feb. 28		Mey		25 500	1, 670	235
	Mar. 19	Short 740	đo	1 390		{ <sup>1</sup> 500 845	1 120 1, 130
	Apr. 7 May 5	Short 2,560	do	170	150	405	875
	May 28	Short 1, 740	July		340	1, 160 895	1, 415 240
	May 24	Short 1, 245	do		1 75	150	175
1	June 7	Short 15	do		75	1,360 805	980 1, 235
Total	·			550	1, 165		
đ	Mar. 28	Short 8, 405	Мау	500		800	100
	June S July 12	Short 335	July	300 100	<b> </b>		450
	July 15	Short 2, 190	May July September do	200		*********	1, 515 200
	July 18	Short 2 390		500	600		600
	July 20 July 26	Short 2, 605	do		120	700	
	Aug. 24 Sept. 17	Short 350	December	800 500			1, 550
	Sept. 21	Short 2,715	do December do do	500		********	1,050
Total		******************		2, 900	720		
7	Jan. 21	Bhort 5, 445	May.	600			
	Jan. 27	Short 3, 950	do	1,000		200	
	Jan. 31 Fob. 7 Fab. 9	Short 2, 750	00 do	540 500	*******	200	800
		Short 3, 510	do	600			700
	Mar. 10 Mar. 15	80011 3, 030	do	100 100		********	600 400
	Mar. 17	Short 4, 830	do	550		50	720
	Mar. 19 Mar. 22	Short 5, 450		600 500	*******		900 500
	Mar. 28	Short 6, 290	do	100		140	400
	Mar. 30 Apr. 4	Short 6, 800	do	1, 145 800		*******	250 200
	Apr. 7	8bort 5, 405		265			
	Apr. 9 Apr. 20	Short 3, 120	do	1,000 500		300	
	May 10	Short 5, 345	July	500			500
	May 16 Sept. 21	Short 4, 950	May	500 285		300	500
	Oct. 1	Short 6, 175	do	850			
	Oct. 11 Oct. 17	Short 4, 415	do	1,000		*******	
	Oct. 18					235	300
	Oct. 20 Oct. 21 Oct. 28	Short 3, 980	dodo	1,000		دي دري	500 1,100
	Oct. 28	Short 6, 960	do	275			
Total		*****		14, 500			
9	Apr. 9	Short 1, 230	July	200			300
	Sept. 17	Bbort 50	July December	100			200
Total		*****		300			
18	Sept. 10 Sept. 35	Short 100	December	100			
Total			da	300	<u></u>		
Total							

Footnotes at and of table.

# TABLE 27.—Covering of short commitments in Chicago wheat futures through bids sold and offers bought by 18 large speculators during Jan. 5 to Oct. S1, 1927—Continued

[In thousands of bushels; i.e., 000 omitted]

						1	
Trader no.	Date	Net position at close of previous	1927 future	ered (	tity cov- bought) hugh—	Other tr the sam	ading in s futura
	``	day		Bids	Offers	Pur- chases	Sales
16	Apr. 4	Short 25	Mov	25			
	ADT. 7	do	do.	50			
	Oct. 1	do Short 210	December	. 100			. 300
	Oct. 6	Short 610 Short 485	do	. 100		. 25	
	Oct. 17 Oct. 18	500rt 485	do	100			100
	1				- <u> </u>		
Total				. 475			
19	June 2	Short 155	Tule	45			
#V«	Do	Short 170.	July September	45			
	Do June 3	Short 110	1 111157	50		55 75	
	Do	Short 125 Short 200	September July	50		75	]
	June 11 June 17	do	400 do	50		50	·[
	Da	do Short 50	do. September July.	50		100	
	June 23 July 11	Short S0	July	100		80	
	Do	Short S0 Short 100 Short 50	September	40 50			
	111110 12	Short 151	July	70		80	
	De	Short 60	September	50	[	10	
	Sept.10	Short 50	December	50			
Total				720			
			*********************				
21	Feb. 9	Short 100	Мву		200	200	
	Apr. 29 June 3	Short 150 Short 100	July	100	200	150	200 100
	10000 0	5264 V 100	* (113				
Total				100	400		<u></u>
22	Feb. 9	Short 50	Мау	100			50
00	7 64	51	<b>.</b>		<del> </del>		425
28	Jan. 21	Short 210	đo	200		190	120
	Roh 10	Short 105			3 120 1	1 215	
	Feb. 10 Mar. 29	Short 195 Short 165	do		130 50	245 305	340
	Mar. 29	Short 185 Short 150	July		50 85		340 110
	Feb. 10 Mar. 29 Apr. 11 June 11	Short 185	July September		50	305	
Total	Mar. 29	Short 185 Short 150	July	200	50 85	305	
Total	Mar. 29 Apr. 11 June 11	Short 185 Short 150 Long 185	July September	200	50 85 100 365	305 65 	
Total	Mar. 29 Apr. 11 June 11 Jan. 6	Short 185 Short 150 Long 185	July September May	200	50 85 100 365 310	305 65  20	110
Total	Mar. 28 Apr. 11 June 11 Jan. 6 Feb. 10	Short 165 Short 160 Long 185 Short 1, 010 Short 360 Short 340	July September May	200	50 85 100 365 310 75	305 65  20 490	200
Total 24	Mar. 29 Apr. 11 June 11 Jan. 6 Feb. 10 Feb. 25 Mar. 23	Short 165 Short 160 Long 185 Short 1, 010 Short 360 Short 340	July September May		50 85 100 365 310	205 65  20 490 725 350	110 
Total 24	Mar. 29 Apr. 11 June 11 Jan. 6 Feb. 10 Feb. 25 Mar. 23 Mar. 28	Short 165 Short 160 Long 185 Short 1, 010 Short 360 Short 340 Short 420 Short 265	do. July. September May do July do do	200	50 85 100 365 310 75 155 100	205 65  20 490 725 350 225	110  200 340 8 280
Total 24	Mar. 29 Apr. 11 June 11 Jan. 6 Feb. 10 Feb. 25 Mar. 23 Mar. 28 Mar. 5	Short 165 Short 160 Long 185 Short 1, 010 Short 360 Short 340 Short 420 Short 265	do. July. Septamber May do. July do. July do.	125	50 85 100 365 310 75 155 100 5	305 65  20 490 725 350 225 215	110 200 340 8 280 135 220
Total 24	Mar. 29 Apr. 11 June 11 Jan. 6 Feb. 10 Feb. 25 Mar. 23 Mar. 28 Mar. 5	Short 165 Short 160 Long 185 Short 1, 010 Short 360 Short 340 Short 420 Short 265	do. July	125	50 85 100 365 310 75 155 100 	305 65 20 490 723 350 225 215 235 5	110 200 340 8 280 135 220
Total 24	Mar. 29 Apr. 11 June 11 Jan. 6 Feb. 10 Feb. 25 Mar. 23 Mar. 28 Mar. 5	Short 165 Short 160 Long 185 Short 1, 010 Short 360 Short 340 Short 420 Short 265	do	125	50 85 100 365 310 75 155 100 	205 65 20 490 725 350 225 215 215 235 590	110 200 340 8 280 135 220 325 10
Total 24	Mar. 29 Apr. 11 June 11 Jan. 6 Feb. 10 Feb. 25 Mar. 23 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Apr. 5 Apr. 6 Do. Apr. 11	Short 165 Short 160 Long 185 Short 1, 010 Short 360 Short 340 Short 420 Short 265	do	125	50 85 100 365 310 75 155 100 	205 65 20 490 723 350 225 215 225 590 190	110 200 340 8 280 135 220 325 10 50
Total 94	Mar. 29 Apr. 11 June 11 Jan. 6 Feb. 10 Feb. 25 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 29 Apr. 6 Do Apr. 11 Apr. 77	Short 165	do. July. Septamber do. do. July. do. do. do. do. do. do. do. July. May. July. May.	125	50 85 100 365 310 75 155 100 	205 490 728 356 225 215 225 550 190 1,045 480	110 200 340 340 135 280 135 220 825 10 50 120 120
Total 24	Mar. 29 Apr. 11 June 11 Jan. 6 Feb. 10 Feb. 25 Mar. 28 Mar. 29 Apr. 6 Do Apr. 11 Apr. 27 May 2	Short 165	do. July	125	50 85 100 386 310 75 155 155 100 10 110 305 700 25 140	205 	110 200 340 135 280 135 220 325 325 10 50 120 30 120 10
Total 24	Mar. 29 Apr. 11 June 11 Jan. 6 Feb. 10 Feb. 25 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 29 Apr. 5 Apr. 6 Do. Apr. 11 Apr. 77 May 2 May 5	Short 165	do. July	125	50 85 100 365 155 155 100 5 40 110 205 700 205 140 205	205 505 200 490 723 350 225 550 190 1,045 580 370	110 200 340 280 135 220 325 10 50 120 10 10 10
Total 24	Mar. 28 Apr. 11 June 11 June 11 Feb. 10 Feb. 25 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 29 Apr. 6 Do. 11 Apr. 77 May 2 May 5 May 7	Short 165	do. July	125	50 855 850 3100 75 155 155 155 100 100 110 205 700 225 140 305 55	205 65 490 722 350 225 215 225 550 190 1,045 4 89 370 910	110 200 340 135 220 10 50 120 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Total 94	Mar. 29 Apr. 11 June 11 June 11 Feb. 10 Feb. 25 Mar. 23 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Apr. 5 Apr. 6 Apr. 11 Apr. 27 May 5 May 7 June 20	Short 185	do. July	125	50 50 100 3865 310 75 155 100 	205 505 200 490 723 350 225 550 190 1,045 580 370	110 200 340 280 135 220 325 10 50 120 10 10 10
Total 24	Mar. 29 Apr. 11 June 11 Jan. 6 Feb. 10 Feb. 25 Mar. 22 Mar. 22 Mar. 22 Apr. 5 Apr. 5 Apr. 5 Apr. 11 Apr. 27 May 2 May 2 May 2 June 27 June 20 July 28	Short 185	do. July	125	50 85 80 310 75 155 100 5 40 110 305 700 225 140 300 55 50 300 310 310	205 65 20 490 722 350 225 215 225 590 1,045 4 89 370 910 910 1,235 475	110 200 340 340 138 290 325 325 10 10 10 10 10 120 340 140 310 855
Total 24	Mar. 29 Apr. 11 June 11 Jan. 6 Feb. 10 Feb. 25 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 20 Apr. 6 Do. Apr. 11 Apr. 7 June 27 June 20 June 20 June 20 June 20 June 20	Short 185	do. July	125	50 85 80 810 75 155 100 40 110 205 140 55 50 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 2	205 505 200 490 725 350 2255 5590 1900 1,045 4 80 370 910 1,235 475 10	110 200 340 8 280 135 220 325 100 50 120 140 140 310 310 35 25 100 140 140 140 100 140 100 100
<b>%</b> .	Mar. 29 Apr. 11 June 11 Jan. 6 Feb. 10 Feb. 25 Mar. 22 Mar. 22 Mar. 22 Apr. 5 Apr. 5 Apr. 5 Apr. 11 Apr. 27 May 2 May 2 May 2 June 27 June 20 July 28	Short 165	do. July		50 50 100 365 310 75 135 100 305 700 245 140 300 55 300 310 310 300 310 310 310 310	205 65 20 490 722 350 225 215 225 590 1,045 4 89 370 910 910 1,235 475	110 200 340 280 135 220 322 10 50 120 10 120 340 10 140 310 45 255
Total 24 Total	Mar. 29 Apr. 11 June 11 June 11 Feb. 10 Feb. 25 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 20 Apr. 6 Do. Apr. 11 Apr. 7 June 20 June 20	Short 165	do. July	125	50 85 80 810 75 155 100 40 110 205 140 55 50 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 2	205 505 200 490 723 350 225 5500 190 1,045 589 370 910 1,235 475 10 270	110 200 340 8 280 135 220 320 135 220 340 135 135 135 10 10 140 310 45 255 120 140 10 140 310 310 310 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325
94 Total	Mar. 29 Apr. 11 June 11 June 11 Feb. 10 Feb. 25 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 20 Apr. 6 Do. Apr. 11 Apr. 7 June 20 June 20	Short 165	do. July	125 	50 50 100 365 310 75 135 100 305 700 245 140 300 55 300 310 310 300 310 310 310 310	205 505 200 490 725 350 2255 5590 1900 1,045 4 80 370 910 1,235 475 10	110 
≫ Total	Mar. 29           Apr. 11           June 11           Mar. 28           Mar. 27           May 2           May 3           June 27           June 30           July 28           Do           Oct. 14           May 16           Sept. 10	Short 165	do. July	125 	50 50 100 365 310 75 135 100 305 700 245 140 300 55 300 310 310 300 310 310 310 310	205 505 200 490 722 350 225 235 590 190 1,045 489 870 910 1,235 475 10 270 5 10 270 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	110 200 340 8 280 280 135 220 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1
≫ Total	Mar. 28 Apr. 11 June 11 Jan. 6 Feb. 10 Feb. 25 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 29 Apr. 5 Do. 10 Apr. 7 May 2 May 5 June 27 June 2	Short 165	da. July	125 	50 50 100 365 310 75 135 100 305 700 245 140 300 55 300 310 310 300 310 310 310 310	205 505 200 490 723 350 225 5500 190 1,045 589 370 910 1,235 475 10 270	110 
≫ Total	Mar. 28 Apr. 11 June 11 June 11 Jan. 6 Feb. 10 Feb. 25 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 29 Apr. 6 Do Apr. 7 May 2 May 3 May 7 June 27 June 27 June 27 June 27 June 27 June 27 June 27 June 28 Oct. 14 Oct. 18	Short 185	da. July	125 	50 50 100 365 310 75 135 100 305 700 245 140 300 55 300 310 310 300 310 310 310 310	205 65 722 20 490 722 350 225 215 225 5 5 5 0 100 190 1,045 475 475 475 475 475 475 270 270 270	110 200 340 8 280 200 340 8 280 10 50 10 50 10 50 10 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 5
<b>%</b> .	Mar. 28 Apr. 11 June 11 June 11 Jan. 6 Feb. 10 Feb. 25 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 29 Apr. 6 Do Apr. 7 May 2 May 3 May 7 June 27 June 27 June 27 June 27 June 27 June 27 June 27 June 28 Oct. 14 Oct. 18	Short 165	do. July	125 	50 50 100 365 310 75 135 100 305 700 245 140 300 55 300 310 310 300 310 310 310 310	205 65 20 490 725 350 225 215 225 590 190 190 190 910 910 1,235 475 10 270 5 270	110 200 340 8 280 125 220 325 10 50 120 340 8 225 500 503 500 503 500 503 500 503 500 503 500 503 500 503 500 500
≫ Total	Mar. 29 Apr. 11 June 11 Jan. 6 Feb. 10 Feb. 25 Mar. 22 Mar. 22 Mar. 22 May. 2 May 7 June 27 June 20 July 28 Do Oct. 18 DO Oct. 20	Short 165	do. July	125 	50 50 100 365 310 75 135 100 305 700 245 140 300 55 300 310 310 300 310 310 310 310	205 65 20 490 723 330 225 215 215 235 590 190 190 190 1,045 4 89 370 910 1,235 475 270	110 200 340 8 280 135 220 325 10 30 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1
≫ Total	Mar. 28 Apr. 11 June 11 June 11 Jan. 6 Feb. 10 Feb. 25 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 29 Apr. 6 Do Apr. 7 May 2 May 3 May 7 June 27 June 27 June 27 June 27 June 27 June 27 June 27 June 28 Oct. 14 Oct. 18	Short 165	da. July	125 	50 50 100 365 310 75 135 100 305 700 245 140 300 55 300 310 310 300 310 310 310 310	205 55 207 490 722 350 225 590 190 1,045 489 370 910 1,235 475 10 270 5 6 270 300	110 200 340 8 280 125 220 325 10 50 120 340 8 225 500 503 500 503 500 503 500 503 500 503 500 503 500 503 500 500
94 Total	Mar. 29 Apr. 11 June 11 Jan. 6 Feb. 10 Feb. 25 Mar. 22 Mar. 22 Mar. 22 May. 2 May 7 June 27 June 20 July 28 Do Oct. 18 DO Oct. 20	Short 165	do. July	125 	50 50 100 365 310 75 135 100 305 700 245 140 300 55 300 310 310 300 310 310 310 310	205 55 207 490 722 350 225 590 190 1,045 489 370 910 1,235 475 10 270 5 6 270 300	110 200 340 8 280 135 220 325 10 30 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1

Footnotes at end of table.

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 TABLE 27.—Covering of short commitments in Chicago wheat futures through bids sold and offers bought by 18 large speculators during Jan. 3 to Oci. 31, 1927— Continued

Trader Bo.	Date		Net position at close of previous	1927 future	Quanti ered (b throu	ought)	Other trac the same	
			day		Bids	Offers	Pur- chases	Sales
26	Mar. 10			May	5		320	1,030
	Mar. 17 Mar. 19		Short 280	do	50 105		190 485	595 665
	Mar. 22		Short 190		55		360	385
1	Mar. 29		Short 105	L0	45		220	315
	Mar. 3	9	Short 145	do	40 50		60 315	600
	Apr. 1 Apr. 1	51	Short 290	do	100		300	210
	Apr. 2		Short 780	do		170	647	540
	Apr. 2 May 10		Short 70	do		85	296 260	270 200
	June 3		Short 150	Julydo	50		521	496
	June 2	8	Short 40	do. September do	25		270	300
	July Z July 2		Short 305	September	15	45	620 435	435 595
	July 2		Short 325	do	85		305	330
	Aug. 2	9	Short 105	do	50			
	Sept. 1 Sept. 1	U	Short 220		- 80 100		20 465	285 560
	Sept. 2		Short 105	do	110		735	1, 095
	Sept. 2	ē ]	Short 205	do. do. do. do. do.	255	<b>]</b>	165	685
	Oct. Oct.	17	Short 505	do	140 25		300 555	380 455
	Oct. 1		Short 370.	do	15		560	905
	Oct. 1	7	Short 248	do	15			75
	Oct. 3	1	Short 351	do	145		855	700
Total			*******		1,610	300		
80	Мау 2	1	Short 490	July		120	10	40
	June	8	do	Julydo September	800		340	83
	June 3 July 2	2	Short 275	. September	15	340	*********	150
	Sept. 1	ŝ	Short 685	dede	40		870	450
						1		100
	Sept. 2	1	Short 1,000		75		10	100
	Oct. 1	1	Short 1, 000	do	5			100
Total	Oct. 1	7	Short 1, 300		76 5 435	400		
Tota]	Oci. 1 Feb.	2	Short 1, 300		5 435			
Tota]	Oci. 1 Feb.	2	Short 1, 300		5 435		 25 125	
81	Feb. July 1 Oct. 2	2	Short 1, 300	July September December	5 435	65 25 100		
Total 31 Total	Feb. July 1 Oct. 2	2	Short 1, 300		5 435		 25 125	
81 Total	Feb. July 1 Oct. 2	2225	Short 1, 300 Short 100 Short 25 Short 55	July September December	435	65 25 100 190	25 128 25	78
81	Feb. July 1 Oct. 2	2225	Short 1, 300 Short 100 Short 25 Short 56 Short 240	JulySeptember December	435	65 25 100 190	25 125 25 	77 132
81 Total	Feb. July 1 Oct. 2 Aug. 3 Aug. 3	7 225 201	Short 1, 300 Short 100 Short 25 Short 36 Short 340 Short 155	JulySeptember December December		65 25 100 190 190	25 125 25 4 200 35 690	77 133 
31 Total 32	Oct. 1 Feb. July 1 Oct. 2 Aug. 5 Aug. 5 Sept. 1	7 225 201	Short 1, 300 Short 100 Short 25 Short 36 Short 340 Short 155	JulySeptember December	8 435	65 26 100 190 190 190	25 126 25 4 200 33 690 233	72 133 
31 Total Total	Oct. 1 Feb. July 1 Oct. 2 Aug. 5 Sept. 1	7 2255 20 14 9	Short 1, 300 Short 100 Short 35 Short 36 Short 340 Short 165 Short 435	July September December december	200 190	65 25 100 190 190	25 125 25 	77 135 
31 Total 32	Oct. 1 Feb. July 1 Oct. 2 Aug. 5 Sept. 1	7 2255 20 14 9	Short 1, 300 Short 100 Short 35 Short 36 Short 340 Short 165 Short 435	JulySeptember December December	200 190	65 26 100 190 190 190	25 125 25 	78 135 
81 Total S2 Total	Oct. 1 Feb. July 1 Oct. 2 Aug. 5 Sept. 1	7 2 2 2 5 5 10 13	Short 1, 300 Short 100 Short 25 Short 36 Short 340 Short 163 Short 435 Short 20	July September December do September	8 435 200 100 55	65 26 200 190 190 190 135 325	25 125 25 	77 132 132 10 120 1, 022 250
81 Total \$2 Total \$4	Cet. 1 Feb. July 1 Oct. 2 Aug. 5 Aug. 5 Sept. 1 Sept. 1 July 1 Mar.		Short 1, 300 Short 100 Short 25 Short 36 Short 340 Short 153 Short 435 Short 915 Short 915	July September December de September de September	δ 435 	65 26 100 190 190 135 525 	25 128 25 25 33 690 255 255	72 133 3 10 120 1,022 230 
81 Total \$2 Total \$4	Cet. 1 Feb. July 1 Oct. 2 Aug. 5 Aug. 5 Sept. 1 Sept. 1 July 1 Mar.		Short 1, 300 Short 100 Short 25 Short 26 Short 240 Short 153 Short 435 Short 435 Short 915 Short 905	July	δ 435  100 	65 26 100 190 190 190 190 190 190 190 190 190	265 126 25 25 ( 4 200 ( 35 690 255 255 200 210 465	77 133 10 120 1, 022 250 135 312
81 Total \$2 Total \$4	Oct. 1 Feb. July 1 Oct. 2 Aug. 5 Aug. 5 Sept. 1 July 1 Mar. Mar. Apr. 2 Do.	7 2255 00 M9 13 49 519	Short 1, 300 Short 100 Short 25 Short 26 Short 240 Short 153 Short 435 Short 435 Short 915 Short 905	July	δ 435  100 	65 26 100 190 190 190 190 190 190 190 190 190	225 126 25 25 4 200 33 690 255 200 200 210 465 200	
81 Total \$2 Total \$4	Oct. 1 Feb. July 1 Oct. 2 Aug. 5 Aug. 5 Sept. 1 Sept. 1 Mar. Apr. 1 Do. Apr. 1	7 2255 00 H9 13 499 519 121	Short 1, 300 Short 100 Short 25 Short 26 Short 240 Short 153 Short 435 Short 435 Short 915 Short 905	July	δ 435  100 	65 26 100 190 190 190 190 190 190 190 190 190	25 125 25 25 35 690 255 255 200 210 455 200 330	
81 Total S2 Total 34	Oct. 1 Feb. July 1 Oct. 2 Aug. 5 Sept. 1 Sept. 1 Sept. 1 Mar. Apr. Apr. Apr. Apr. Apr.	7 2255 00 H9 13 499 519 121	Short 1, 300 Short 100 Short 26 Short 26 Short 26 Short 155 Short 435 Short 435 Short 20 Short 20 Short 20 Short 253 Short 255 Short 255 Short 355 Short 455	July	δ 435 	65 25 200 190 190 133 325 400 35 325 400 215 200 215 280	25 125 25 25 25 25 4 200 235 690 235 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 200 210 200	
81 Total \$2 Total \$4	Oct. 1 Feb. July 1 Oct. 2 Aug. 5 Aug. 5 Sept. 1 Sept. 1 Sept. 1 Mar. Mar. Apr. Apr. Apr. Apr. May May		Short 1, 300 Short 100 Short 26 Short 26 Short 26 Short 155 Short 435 Short 435 Short 20 Short 20 Short 20 Short 253 Short 255 Short 255 Short 355 Short 455	July	δ 435 	65 25 200 190 190 133 325 400 35 325 400 215 200 215 280	25 125 23 35 600 235 235 235 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 210 210 210 210 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215	77 133 101 120 1, 022 250 133 314 244 255 55 77 211
81 Total \$2 Total \$4	Oct. 1 Feb. July 1 Oct. 2 Aug. 5 Aug. 5 Sept. 1 Mar. Apr. Apr. Apr. Apr. Apr. May May July	7 2 2 2 5 1 0 M 9 1 2 4 9 6 1 9 2 2 9 3 2 1 0 M 9 1 2 2 9 3 2 1 0 1 2 2 9 3 2 1 0 1 2 2 9 3 2 1 0 1 1 2 2 9 3 2 1 0 1 1 2 2 9 3 2 1 0 1 1 1 2 2 9 3 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 9 3 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	Short 1, 300 Short 100 Short 26 Short 26 Short 26 Short 155 Short 435 Short 435 Short 20 Short 20 Short 20 Short 253 Short 255 Short 255 Short 355 Short 455	July	δ 435 	65 25 200 190 190 133 325 400 35 325 400 215 200 215 280	225 125 25 33 690 255 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 350 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 2	77 77 133 133 14 12 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 25
81 Total \$2 Total \$4	Oct. 1 Feb. July 1 Oct. 2 Aug. 5 Aug. 5 Sept. 1 Mar. July 1 Mar. Apr. Do. Apr. Apr. May May May July July	7 22 22 25 10 10 10 12 12 20 20 20	Short 1, 300 Short 100 Short 26 Short 26 Short 26 Short 155 Short 435 Short 435 Short 20 Short 20 Short 20 Short 253 Short 255 Short 255 Short 355 Short 455	July	δ 435 		225 125 25 25 4 200 335 690 2255 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 405 550	
81 Total S2 Total 34	Oct. 1 Feb. July 1 Oct. 2 Aug. 5 Aug. 5 Sept. 1 Mar. Apr. Apr. Apr. Apr. Apr. May May July	7 22 22 25 10 10 10 12 12 20 20 20	Short 1, 300 Short 100 Short 26 Short 26 Short 26 Short 155 Short 435 Short 435 Short 20 Short 20 Short 20 Short 253 Short 255 Short 255 Short 355 Short 455	July September December de de September de de de de de de de de de de de de de	δ 435 	65 25 200 190 190 133 325 400 35 325 400 215 35 200 215 280	255 25 25 25 25 25 200 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 210 210 200 210 210 200 210 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25	
81 Total \$2 Total \$4	Oct. 1 Feb. July 1 Oct. 2 Aug. 5 Aug. 5 Sept. 1 Mar. July 1 Mar. Apr. Do. Apr. Apr. May May May July July	7 22255 10 M9 13 496 59 21 229 3 120 50 20 19	Short 1, 300 Short 100 Short 25 Short 65 Short 163 Short 435 Short 435 Short 20 Short 20 Short 20 Short 23 Short 23 Short 335 Short 330 Short 343 Short 343 Short 343 Short 343 Short 343 Short 343 Short 300 Short 300 Short 300 Short 300 Short 300 Short 300 Short 300 Short 300 Short 300	July September December do September do September May do do do July May July do do co do do do do do do do do do do do do do	δ 435 		25 25 125 25 25 25 25 25 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 550 205 550 205 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 12	
81 Total \$2 Total \$4	Oct. 1 Feb. July 1 Oct. 2 Sept. 1 Mar. 2 Sept. 1 Mar. 4 Aug. 5 Aug. 5 Sept. 1 Do. Apr. 3 Apr. 1 Do. Apr. 3 Apr. 3 May May May May Sept. 3 Sept. 1 Oct. 2 Cot. 2 Sept. 1 Do. Apr. 3 Cot. 2 Sept. 1 Do. Apr. 3 Do. Apr. 4 Do. Apr. 4 Do.	7 22255 10 M9 13 496 59 21 229 3 120 50 20 19	Short 1, 300 Short 100 Short 26 Short 26 Short 26 Short 26 Short 435 Short 435 Short 20 Short 20 Short 20 Short 23 Short 23 Short 335 Short 345 Short 455 Short 465 Short 465 Short 465 Short 455 Short 465 Short 455 Short 455 Short 465 Short 455 Short 455	July September December de de September do do do do do July do do July do do do do July do do do July do do do July do do July do do do do July do	δ 435 	65 25 26 200 190 190 190 190 190 190 190 355 225 400 355 200 200 200 355 200 100 100 100 100 100 100 201 30 200 100 190	25 25 25 25 25 25 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 215 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25	
31 Total 32 Total 34	Oct. 1 Feb. July 1 Oct. 2 Aug. 5 Aug. 5 Sept. 1 Mar. Apr. July 1 Mar. Apr. Do. Apr. May Nay July July July July Sept. 1 Oct. Sept. 2 Oct. Oct.		Short 1, 300 Short 100 Short 25 Short 26 Short 36 Short 435 Short 435 Short 20 Short 20 Short 20 Short 25 Short 25 Short 303 Short 303 Short 303 Short 303 Short 303 Short 603 Short 605 Short 1, 405 Short 1, 470	July September December de de de de de de de de de de de de de	δ 435 		225 125 23 690 235 690 235 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 200 210 465 200 200 210 465 200 200 210 465 200 200 210 465 200 200 210 200 210 200 210 200 200 210 200 210 200 20	77 77 133 12 132 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 28
31 Total 32 Total 34	Oct. 1 Feb. July 1 Oct. 2 Sept. 1 Mar. 2 Sept. 1 Mar. 4 Aug. 5 Aug. 5 Sept. 1 Do. Apr. 3 Apr. 1 Do. Apr. 3 Apr. 3 May May May May Sept. 3 Sept. 1 Oct. 2 Cot. 2 Sept. 1 Do. Apr. 3 Cot. 2 Sept. 1 Do. Apr. 3 Do. Apr. 4 Do. Apr. 4 Do.		Short 1, 300 Short 100 Short 26 Short 26 Short 26 Short 26 Short 435 Short 435 Short 20 Short 20 Short 20 Short 23 Short 23 Short 335 Short 345 Short 455 Short 465 Short 465 Short 465 Short 455 Short 465 Short 455 Short 455 Short 465 Short 455 Short 455	July September December de de de de de de de de de de de de de	δ 435 		225 126 225 23 690 235 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 200 210 200 210 200 210 200 215 200 200 215 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 20	72 135 
81 Total \$2 Total \$4	Oct. 1 Feb. July 1 Oct. 2 Aug. 5 Aug. 5 Sept. 1 Mar. Apr. July 1 Mar. Apr. Do. Apr. May Nay July July July July Sept. 1 Oct. Sept. 2 Oct. Oct.		Short 1, 300 Short 100 Short 25 Short 26 Short 36 Short 435 Short 435 Short 20 Short 20 Short 20 Short 25 Short 25 Short 303 Short 303 Short 303 Short 303 Short 303 Short 603 Short 605 Short 1, 405 Short 1, 470	July September December de de de de de de de de de de de de de	δ 435 		225 126 225 225 225 225 200 2255 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 210 200 210 210 200 210 200 215 200 200 215 200 200 215 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 20	77 77 133 12 132 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 28
31 Total 32 Total 34	Oct. 1 Feb. July 1 Oct. 2 Aug. 5 Aug. 5 Sept. 1 Mar. Mar. Mar. Mar. Apr. Do. Apr. Apr. Do. Apr. Sept. Sept. Sept. Sept. Sept. Sept. Sept. Sept.		Short 1, 300 Short 100 Short 25 Short 26 Short 36 Short 435 Short 435 Short 20 Short 20 Short 20 Short 25 Short 25 Short 303 Short 303 Short 303 Short 303 Short 303 Short 603 Short 605 Short 1, 405 Short 1, 470	July September December de de de de de de de de de de de de de	δ 435 		225 125 23 690 233 690 2255 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 465 200 210 200 210 210 200 210 210 200 215 200 200 215 200 200 215 200 200 215 200 200 215 25 200 200 200 215 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 20	77 77 133 12 132 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 28

## TABLE 28.—Covering of short commitments in Chicago corn\_futures through bids sold and offers bought by 15 large speculators during Jan. 5 to Oct. 31, 1927

Trader no.	Date	Net position at close of previous day	1927 fature -	ered (	diy cov- bought) ugh—	Other tr the sam	
		uxy		Bids	Offers	Pur- choses	Sales
	Mar. 5	Short 100	MAR	100			
	Mar. 10	Short 150	May: de	100		50	
	Mar. 14	do	do	60		] 10	
Total				. 260			- <u> </u>
	May 11	Short 2.890	July September		525	1,930	1
	May 21	Short 595	September	150	1	1 -1	. P
	June 3		l	1 300		<b></b>	
	June 10	Short 250	December	. 300			
	Sept. 16	SHOT 080	Lecender	425		1, 260	34
Totel				1, 175	525		]
			ł	<u> </u>		;	<u> </u>
**	Oct. 14	Short 260	December	. 100			10
8	Feb. 7	Short 100	May	100			
	Feb. 28	Short 150	May	100			
	Mar. 5	BOATLOU.	1QQ	. 50			
	Mar. 17	Short 200	do	. 100	******		
Total				850			
		Short 415	May	150			
	Apr. 9		00	. 150	[	20	
	Apr. 12 Apr. 22	Short 840	do	. 100 195			
	Arr 27	Short 985	do	300		6 60	4
	July 28	Short 100	December	150			
	Aug. 24	Short 50	Decemberdo	150			
4	Aug. 29	do	do	150			
Total				1, 345			
4000000000				1,010			
9	Feb. 7	Short 50	Мау				
	Dø	Short 100	July	50		18	
	May 16	Short 120 Short 200	do	2 35		13	
	Do May 21	Short 155	September	50			
	Do	Short 215	September.	50			
1	Do June \$	Short 100	Inde	100		100	
1	O	Short 245	September	55		145	5
1	Do June 25 July 28	Short 150	July December	10 50	••••	140	
1		VIIII VVIIIIIIIII	1/000001/04-22-22-22				
Totai				452			
	Oct. 1	Dhard SE	(1000) \$7.00				
L	Do	Short 25	(1928) May December	20 50		16	31 51
1			D 00000000 - 00000000				
Total				70		*******	******
	1 10	Shart (E	3/4-				
**************************************	Apr. 18 May 14	Short 285	MayJuly		95 150	5 155	28
1	May 14 May 18 May 28	Q	đa		500	835	841
1		Short 325 Short 630 Short 115	do		60	285	8
	June 3	Short 630	September.	310		710	55
ł	Aug. 5	SBOIL 110	00		140	150	71
Total				210	945		
1							· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	Feb. 25	Short 405	May		140	45	.2
	Mar. 1 Do	Short 600	July	******	205 120		10
l	Mar. 11	Short 635	May		60	540	
ļ	Mar. 11 Apr. 29	Short 345	do		50 100	75	7
l	Do	8 hort 505	July		295		:
	May 2 May 19		do		80 280	550	161 252
I	May 27	Short 350	July		500	365	#0K
1	18 2 2 4	SYSSUE & VAVAA AR AR AR AR					
	Aug. 26	Short 185	Septemper.		285	40	
	May 27 Aug. 26 Do Oct. 25	Short 60	September Decemberdo.		285 125 30	30 250	50 684

[In thousands of bushels: i.e., 000 omitted]

TABLE 28.—Covering of short commitments in Chicago corn futures through bids sold and offers bought by 15 large speculators during Jan. 3 to Oct. 31, 1927— Continued

Bids         Offers         Purchases         Sal           25	Trader no.	Date	Net position at close of previous	1927 (uture	ared (I	ity cov- bought) ugh—	Other trading in the same inture		
28			day		Bids	Offers		Sales	
May 20 Aug. 29       Short 95	25	Sept. 10	Short 400	December	250		150		
May 20 Aug. 29       Short 95	28	May 19	Short 205	July		20	710	620	
30		May 20	Short 95	do	10		205	575	
30	Total				40	20			
May 14       Short 5.       September       5         Sept. 6       Short 360.       December       90         Sept. 10       Short 360.	30	May 7	Short 140	July		120			
Sopt. 10       Short 360			Short 6	September		5			
Sopt. 12       Short 160			Short 350	December				100	
Total									
31	Total	LUDK II	V12411 100			195			
32			**********************						
32	\$1	Aug. 6	Short 40	December		50	76		
May 19       Short 275       July       169       10         Total       Feb. 2       Short 290       May	32	Mar. 11	Short 65			100	80		
Total         256           25			Short 275	July		150		25	
25	(Tratal			-					
26	1044								
Feb. 25       Short 505	85	Feb. 2	Short 290	May					
Mar. 1       Short 300		Feb. 25	Short 505	do		200			
May 24         Short 125         September         100           June 25         Short 85			Short 300	do		150			
May 24         Short 125         Beptember		Mar. 9	Short 190	do	-+	100		55	
Aug 26 Short 505 December 100 50			Short 125	September		100			
			8bort 85	do	85		*******		
Total		Aug 25	Short 505	December		100	50	26	
Total	Total				35	850			
Grand total	Grand tota).				A 777	4 005			

[In thousands of bushels; i.e., 000 omitted]

Illustrations.-Trader no. 7 who had the largest short position in Chicago wheat futures during the period of January to October 1927, of any individual speculator was a liberal user of bids in covering his open contracts. On 26 days he was successful in covering short commitments through the sale of bids. For individual days the quantities varied from as little as 100,000 bushels to as much as 1,145,000 bushels. On each of 5 days the volume of short contracts covared was 1,000,000 bushels or more. On each of 20 days the amount covered was at least 500,000 bushels. The aggregate for the 26 days was, as shown in table 27, 14,860,000 bushels. On 15 of the 26 days he made sales of futures ranging from 200,000 to 1,100,000 bushels. Part of the sales no doubt aided in forcing the price of the futures through the price of the bids sold by him. Some of the sales of futures were made at prices below the bid price. Most of the sales of futures were made at prices not more than one fourth of a cent above the price of the bids sold and in quantities more than sufficient to offset the privileges put to him. For example, on February 7 he sold 800,000 bushels of May wheat, most of which was at \$1.41%-%, which aided in making good bids in that future totaling 500,000 bushels which he had sold the previous day at \$1.41%. Purchases of 200,000 bushels at \$1.41% were also made, which offset the sales to that extent.

Another illustration of the use of bids is the trading of trader no. 25 who was, at the close on September 9 net short 500,000 bushels of December wheat futures which he had sold at \$1.36 to \$1.36%. He also sold bids on that day in the December future aggregating 250,000 bushels, and offers in a like amount. The following day he sold 500,000 bushels of December wheat at \$1.36%-%, which aided in making the bids good and resulted in the 250,000 bushels being put to him. This enabled him to cover at a lower price half of the short sales he made during the day.

The use of offers by speculators in covering open short commitments is illustrated by the operations of traders nos. 24 and 35, as shown in tables 27 and 28. Both of these traders were primarily buyers of privileges, which indicates why they were principally users of offers in covering short commitments. They also did considerable scalping which is indicated by the large quantity of purchases and sales that took place on the same day.

## ATTEMPTS TO ACCUMULATE OR DISPOSE OF LINES THROUGH PRIVILEGES NOT ALWAYS SUCCESSFUL

Attempts to accumulate or close out long or short lines by means of privileges were not always successful because the price of the future frequently did not go through that of the bid or the offer. There were two main reasons why such was the case. (1) The price of the privilege purchased was too far away from the price of the future, so that it would have required considerable additional buying to put the price of the future through that of the offer or considerable additional selling to get it to decline to the price of the bid. In either case, however, the holder of the privilege who wanted to liquidate his long holdings or cover his open short contracts through the pit had a more favorable opportunity to do so. (2) The seller of the bid who wished to accumulate a long line, or the seller of the offer who wanted to liquidate his long holdings may have been unsuccessful because of the opposition encountered. This opposition may have been due to the trading, to a limited extent, by other sellers of privileges who did not want the privileges to be exercised. Also, the execution of resting orders and the coming in of new business induced by the price changes probably contributed to making the venture a failure.

## PRIVILEGES CREDITED WITH A STABILIZING INFLUENCE ON THE PRICE OF FUTURES

One of the principal arguments advanced in favor of privilege trading is that it has a stabilizing influence on prices of grain futures by limiting the daily futures price range. This is brought about through the practice of "protecting" privileges sold and trading against those purchased. A trader who has sold bids may do one of several things in order to "protect" them. (1) He may sell futures at prices higher than the price of the bids sold, so that should the future be put to him by the holder of the privilege, the offsetting trade made earlier in the day will enable him to fulfill his obligation without taking a loss. Should the bids not be good at the close of the market, he has the choice of either remaining long, assuming he was "even" at the beginning of the day, or of closing out his futures trades at prices above the bids sold. (2) The seller of the bid, if bullish, may feel that even though the price of the future may decline through the bid price during the early part of the session, a reaction will probably take place which may cause the price of the future to

advance above that of the bid before the close: he anticipates that sufficient buying will come into the market to bring about the recovery of prices. Part of this buying he expects to come from holders of bids who have made purchases of futures below the bid price with a view to putting the futures bought to the seller of the privilege, or of selling the futures at a higher price should the future price advance above the bid price. In the latter case, of course, the privilege would not be exercised. Should the recovery from the low point of the day be slow, and the seller of the privilege feel that futures may be put to him at the close unless the price movement upward is accelerated, he may make purchases of futures with a view to aiding in driving the futures price above the bid price. If successful, he can dispose of his purchases of futures at a higher price than that paid and also not be called upon to make good the privilege sold.

In addition to the alternatives already mentioned, there still remains another method of protecting oneself against the bids sold, i.e., when the price of the future approaches that of the bid, to make purchases of futures with the hope of preventing the price, with the aid of buying on the part of others, from declining through the price of the bid. This latter method, however, is not as frequently used as the other two for the reason that it necessitates trading against the trend of the market, which traders do not care to do. They prefer to operate along the lines of least resistance.

The buyer of bids, as already mentioned, trades against them by purchasing futures after the price of the future has declined through the price of the bid. He does this with the intention of putting the future purchased to the seller of the bid, should the market price of the future close at the price of the bid or lower. Should the closing price of the future, however, be higher than the price of the bid purchased, the buyer will not exercise his right to put, but will sell the future through the pit which will net him a larger profit.

When protecting oneself against the offers sold or trading against those purchased, the method of procedure is just the opposite of that in the case of bids. The seller of the offer tries to buy futures at prices below the offer price, so that he will not suffer a loss in case he is "called" by the holder of the offer. Should the offers not be good, he can sell the futures purchased at the best price obtainable, take a long position in the market, or cover open short commitments. Should he be bearish, even though the price of the future has advanced through that of the offer, he may wait for a reaction to carry futures prices below the offer price. He anticipates that buyers of offers will enter the market to trade against the privileges held by making sales of futures at a price above the offer price, in anticipation of calling the seller of the privilege should offers be good, or of covering their sales of futures at prices below that of the offers should the future price decline below that of the offer purchased.

As has already been mentioned, the buyer of offers trades against them by selling futures when the price of the future has advanced through that of the offers with a view to calling the seller of the offer in case offers are good at the close of the market, or buying in the future should the price decline below that of the offer sold.

The percentage of the daily volume of trading in futures that arises out of sellers protecting themselves against privileges sold and trading against those purchased is not definitely known. It is 72 CIECULAR 323, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

estimated that it averages less than 11 percent of the trading in wheat futures. The percentage, however, is greater on days when the price range is large as compared with days when the range is small.<sup>10</sup>

Whatever stabilizing effect protecting and trading against privileges has on prices should be reflected in the relationship that exists between the daily volume of trading in futures and the daily futures price range. The daily range for a given volume of trading should, if there is any stabilizing influence evident, be smaller during a period in which privilege trading was permitted than when trading was not allowed.

In order to determine to what extent privilege trading may have had a stabilizing influence on prices of grain futures, the daily range in the price of the dominant or most active wheat future at Chicago in its relation to the total volume of trading in wheat futures was compared for two 4-year periods. The first was from January 3, 1922, to January 13, 1926, when trading in privileges was not permitted; and the second ran from January 14, 1926, to December 31, 1929, during which trading in privileges was allowed. The former period included 1,214 days, or a little more than 4 years, whereas the latter included 1,194 days, or slightly less than 4 years.

Approximately 87 percent of the time the daily ranges in the price of the dominant wheat future are less than 4 cents; therefore, if privileges have any stabilizing influence on the price of futures, such influence in order to be worthwhile must be effective on those days when the range is less than 4 cents. Some idea as to the stabilizing influence of privileges can be obtained from the data presented in. tables 29 and 30.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Table 30 shows the increase in the volume of trading associated with specified dally price ranges in the dominant future when trading in privileges was permitted as compared with a similar period when trading was prohibited. The increase includes trades in futures arising out of privileges exercised and such additional trading as was carried on by buyers of privileges who traded against them, and by sellers who traded to protect themselves against the possibility of having futures put to them or being called for futures. A glance at the table will show that this increased volume of trading is 13 percent or less of the weighted average daily volume of trading during the period of Jan. 14, 1926, to Dec. 31, 1929, when trading in privileges was allowed.

TABLE 29.— The number and percentage of days that daily range in the price of the dominant Chicago wheat future were associated with various
volumes of trading in all wheat futures for two 4-year periods, Jan. 5, 1922, to Jan. 15, 1926, when trading in privileges was prohibited, and
Jan. 14, 1926, to Dec. 81, 1920, when such trading was permitted

										Rs	nge									
Volume of trading (millions of bushels)		Under	I cent			1 to 2	cents		1	2 to 8	cents			3 to 4	oenta			4 to 5	oonts	
	1922 (	0 1925	1925 1	a 19 <b>39</b>	1922 (	o 1925	1926 t	o 19 <b>2</b> 9	1922 (	0 1925	1926 t	o 19 <b>29</b>	1922 t	n 1020	1926 t	o 1929	1022 t	o 1928	1928 t	o 1 <b>0</b> 2
as then 8	Daye	Per- cent 0.86	Days	Per- cent 0.75	Days	Per- cent	Doys	Per- cent	Days	Per- cent	Days	Per- cont	Days	Per- cent	Days	Per- canl	Days	Per- cent	Days	Per
4) 10		20, 73 29, 45 25, 56 9, 48 5, 18	23 42 32 18 8	0.70 17.29 82.33 24.06 13.53 6.77	9 28 81 98 80	1, 95 6, 07 17, 57 21, 26 18, 65	18 74 19 106	2,74 13,53 18,10 19,38	1 12 23	0.33 4.03 7.72	0 22	1.85		2. 50		****	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	1. 05	· · · · · · · · · · · ·	
to 38 to 40 to 46 to 50	1	1,72 .96 .86	822	2. 27 1. 50 1. 40	71 41 27 9	15.10 8.80 5.85 1.95 1.52	94 68 40 27 11	17. 18 12. 43 7. 31 4. 04 2. 01	45 62 42 44 25	16. 10 20. 81 14. 09 14. 77 8. 79	49 50 53 44 87	15.08 17.23 16.00 13.54 8.31	5 14 17 29 26	8, 13 8, 78 10, 62 18, 12 18, 25	8 12 10	2, 58 6, 90 6, 90 10, 34 8, 62	2 5 7 10	2, 11 5, 26 7, 37 10, 53	1	2. 8
0 M0 0 M6 0 70 0 78	• • - • • • • •	••••••	******				4 4 2 2 2	. 73 . 73 . 73 . 37 . 87	15 10 0 0	5.03 8.85 3.02 2,01	31 15 10	9, 54 4, 62 2, 45 3, 08	18 24 10 9	9, 38 15, 00 0, 25 6, 63 2, 50	14 17 10 14 14	12.07 14.00 8.62 12.07	18 15 14 7	13.68 15.79 14.74 7.37 8.42	20 0 2	10
lo 80 o 88 to 90 to 90 to 90 to 100	******	· • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •				******			2	. 117 . 67	39	80 01 .61	2	1, 25 . 62	4	7.75 8.45 2.50 8.45	0 4 1	6. 32 4. 21 1. 05	6 1	10 13 2
to 105 to 110 to 118	******		******										*****	******		******	1 1	1.05	2	
Total	116	100. 00	133	100, 00	461	100.00	547	100.00	298	100.00	325	100.00	100	100.00	116	100, 00	95	100, 00	1 40	100

TABLE 30.—Weighted average daily volume of trading in Chicago wheat futures associated with specified price ranges in the dominant wheat future during the 4-year period, Jan. 3, 1922, to Jan. 13, 1926, when trading in privileges was prohibited, compared with a like period, Jan. 14, 1926, to Dec. 31, 1929, when trading was permitted

Daily price range (cents)	volume of when trad	verage daily of trading ling in bids ers was—		Approximate average daily stabilizing influence of privileges on
	Prohibited	Permitted	lege trading was permitted	
Less than 1	Million bushels 15 27 43 53 53 84	Million buzhciz 16 30 45 61 72	Million bushcis 1 2 8 8 8	Cents (1) 34 to 34 35 to 34 34 to 36 34 to 34

I None.

Table 29 shows the number and percentage of days during each of the two 4-year periods that specified volumes of trading were associated with different price ranges. Two outstanding things can be seen in the table. (1) The tendency for the number and percentage of days for each range to concentrate around certain volumes of trading. For example, with a range of less than 1 cent the greatest number of days falls within those classes of trading coming within 5,000,000 and 20,000,000 bushels. With a range of 1 to 2 cents, it comes within the limits of 15,000,000 and 35,000,000 bushels, the limits becoming, larger as the size of the range increases. (2) Until the volume of trading reaches a certain amount, the percentage of days falling within the various classes tends to be larger for the 4-year period during which trading in privileges was prohibited than during the period in which such trading took place. After this maximum has been reached, the reverse is the case. For instance, it will be seen by referring to table 29 that when the daily range was from 1 to 2 cents the percentage of days associated with the various-sized volumes of trading was larger during the period when privilege trading was prohibited than for the period when it was permitted, until the volume reached the 20,000,000 to 25,000,000 bushel mark. For the former period the percentage figures increased from 1.95 to 21.26, whereas for the latter they increased from 2.74 to 18.10 percent. Beginning with 25,000,000 to 30,000,000 bushels, the percentage figures for the period in which there was no trading in privileges not only decreased, but were smaller than those for the period during which trading in privileges occurred. A similar tendency exists for the other ranges. The point at which the change takes place, however, is different for each of the ranges. For a range of 2 to 3 cents, it is 35,000,000 to 40,000,000 bushels; for 3 to 4 cents, 50,000,000 to 55,000,000 bushels; for 4 to 5 cents, 75,000,000 to 80,000,000 bushels; and for 5 to 6 cents, 80,000,000 to 85,000,000 bushels.

This tendency for the percentage to be greater for the one period than the other shows that with privilege trading a larger daily volume of trading in futures can be expected to be associated with a given price range than when there is no trading in privileges.

If for each of the ranges the number of days is weighted by the volume of trading, and if the figures so obtained are added together and then divided by the total number of days that the particular price range occurred, a weighted average daily volume of trading figure for each of the respective price ranges will be secured. The weighted average for each of the ranges for both of the 4-year periods, as shown in table 30, makes it possible to approximately estimate the influence of privileges on prices of futures.

During the 4-year period that trading in privileges was prohibited, the averages for the various daily ranges, as seen in the table, were somewhat smaller than for the 4 years that trading was allowed. The difference in favor of the latter was as follows: For a daily range of less than 1 cent, 1,000,000 bushels; for 1 to 2 cents, 3,000,000 bushels; for 2 to 3 cents, 2,000,000 bushels; for 3 to 4 cents, 8,000,000 bushels; and for 4 to 5 cents, 8,000,000 bushels. These differences do not necessarily represent an equivalent amount of additional trading that has gone through the pit, as was previously pointed out. A small portion of it represents the transfer of open commitments acquired at some previous date. The remainder of these various amounts, no doubt, constituted trading against privileges on the part of buyers and the protecting of privileges sold on the part of sellers. The approximate average stabilizing effect of this type of trading was, based on a study of the relationship existing between volume of trading and daily ranges in price of futures, as follows: When the daily range was less than 1 cent, none; when the range was 1 to 2 cents, the stabilizing influence probably was ½ to ½ cent; for 2 to 3 cents, ½ to ½ cent; for 3 to 4 cents, % to % cent; and for 4 to 5 cents, % to % cent.

## UNFAVORABLE ASPECTS OF PRIVILEGE TRADING

## SMALL TRADERS OF VERY LIMITED MEANS INDUCED TO SPECULATE

It has already been pointed out that although the buying of privileges may provide some overnight protection against price changes in futures, the greater part of the trading is probably done for some other purpose. The small traders, comprising the general public, as has been previously mentioned, are principally buyers apparently not so much for protective purposes but rather as a means of speculating on price changes in grain futures on less capital than would be required were the trades in futures fully margined. From a social viewpoint this is not desirable as the very limited funds of the small trader could probably be used to better advantage elsewhere.

It was also shown that privileges on the average are good only 1 day in 6 or 7, and when good the gross profits are frequently so small that much of the time they would, if exercised for the nonmember customer's account, result in a loss to the customer after commissions and taxes are deducted, and consequently the general practice among commission houses is to take such trades into their own account. This suggests that the small nonmember traders are in the main merely a source of profit for commission houses and large speculators and in addition provide a means whereby such large speculators are aided in building up and disposing of large lines under cover.

Small traders, on the whole, apparently being losers in their privilege trading, leads one to the conclusion that it is folly for them to engage in trading in privileges unless purchased purely for protecting open commitments. It should, however, be said that those who purchase privileges as a speculation limit their risk to the cost of the bid or offer, whereas those who speculate in futures assume greater risks.

## GAMBLING ELEMENT ASSOCIATED WITH IT

The old system of privilege trading by the payment of "differences", although undesirable, was nevertheless more generous to the small trader in that the commission charges were less than at present. The old practice of settlement by payment of differences caused, in part, privilege trading to be considered as gambling on price changes. The difference represented the spread between the price of the privilege and the future at the close of the market on the day the privilege was exercised.

Then, as now, the greater part of privilege trading was not associated with the shifting of an existing unavoidable risk on the part of the producers or merchandisers of grain or grain products and this contributed to its being considered as a type of gambling. The present system of settlement, requiring that futures must be put or called whenever a privilege is exercised, still has some of the gambling element connected with it. Even with present requirements, which make trading in privileges more expensive than formerly, there still is much trading on the part of those who are willing to "take a chance" on very limited capital in the hope of making a profit on price changes.

Alfred Marshall, professor of economics at Oxford College, Cambridge, England, in referring to privileges states (6, footnote p. 257):

A contract in relation to a future often takes the form of an "Option" by which the payment of a certain sum secures the right to demand certain things (or to sell them) within a given period at a specified price: these two options may be combined, an option to buy at a stated price being coupled with one to sell at a stated higher price. There are a few cases in which dealings in options are part of legitimate trade. But there appears to be more force in the arguments for prohibiting them by law than for prohibiting a simple buying or selling of futures; for they are relatively more serviceable to the gambler and the manipulator than to the straightforward dealer.

## PRIVILEGES CAUSE ARTIFICIAL PRICE MOVEMENTS

Trading in privileges results in additional trading in futures arising out of the practice of protecting privileges sold or trading against those purchased. This type of trading, which has been described in a previous section, affects prices of futures. Such trading, not induced primarily by changes in fundamental conditions such as changes in present or prospective supplies of, or demand for, cash grain, but principally with a view to making one's privilege transactions profitable, brings about price movements which are somewhat artificial in character. It adds an element with which other speculators have to reckon when deciding on whether to buy or to sell futures.

Trading in futures brought about by trading against privileges purchased or protecting those sold has, as was previously stated, a stabilizing influence on prices and also contributes to making the market more liquid, which, however, compensate but partially for the artificial influence of such trading on futures prices.

## INCREASES CONGESTION AT CLOSE OF FUTURES MARKET

When a buyer of privileges wishes to take a profit in the privilege exercised and not change his position in the market, he makes a purchase to offset the future put and a sale to offset the future called. The seller of privileges in making offset trades does the reverse. The making of the offsetting transactions at times accentuates the congestion at the close of the market caused by scalpers' "evening up" for the day and the execution of customers' orders to buy or sell "at the close."

The making of offsetting trades by buyers of privileges tends to widen the closing price range of the individual futures. This tendency to widen the range, however, is in part counteracted by new trades made for the accounts of other customers, by scalpers, or by such offsetting trades as are made by the sellers of privileges. However, the sellers of privileges, being principally the professional traders who are interested in building up or disposing of large lines of futures, are apt not to make offsetting trades but to change their position in the market should the futures be put or called by the holders of the privileges.

## SUMMARY

Trading in privileges on the Chicago Board of Trade has been carried on at intermittent periods since the early sixties. From time to time the exchange tried to prohibit its members from trading in privileges, but such efforts did not meet with success as the members resorted to the Open Board of Trade, another market in Chicago, and to the exchange at Milwaukee, where trading in privileges was permitted. The disciplining of members who persisted in the practice was not feasible, as there were so many engaged in privilege trading that to have disciplined all who violated the rules would have meant the disruption of the board. The Illinois law of 1874 which prohibited trading in privileges was not strictly enforced, and in 1913 it was amended, apparently to exempt privilege transactions not settled by the payment of "differences." It was the payment of differences that was considered a gambling feature of privilege trading. With the change in the Illinois law trading in privileges was again permitted on the exchange. In 1921 the directors of the Chicago Board of Trade recommended to the president of the board that trading in privileges be prohibited by amendment of the rules, as the directors believed that the advantages of such trading were outweighed by its disadvantages. With the passage of the Future Trading Act in 1921 privilege trading was, in effect, prohibited by Federal statute until the United States Supreme Court in a decision rendered on January 11, 1926, declared that the provision imposing a prohibitive tax on privileges was an unconstitutional exercise of the taxing power. This decision was immediately followed by the resumption of privilege trading on the exchange.<sup>30</sup>

Although no record is kept of the volume of trading in privileges on the Chicago Board of Trade, indications are, based on data acquired by the Grain Futures Administration for 2 months in 1926, that such trading is equivalent to about 15 percent of the trading in grain futures. The trading in privileges is principally for the account

<sup>&</sup>quot; On July 24, 1933, trading in privileges was suspended by order of the board of directors until further botico.

of speculators. The general public are for the most part buyers, and the large speculators are principally sellers. Privileges are not used to any great extent by merchandisers of grain or grain products.

About 75 percent of the time privileges sell at a distance of 1 to 2 cents from the closing price of the future. The months during which deliveries are made usually show the widest range. The supply and demand for privileges, the length of time the privilege has to run and the past trend and present state of the market are the factors determining the distance that privileges sell from the close.

Although the privilege market indicates whether trade sentiment is primarily bullish or bearish by the distance that privileges sell from the close, as a forecaster of the next day's price trend, it was correct only 63 percent of the time. Twenty-nine of the large speculators, however, who were sellers of privileges were as a group right, on the average, 73 percent of the time in forecasting the next day's price trend. Their heavy trading, which at various times has moved prices in the direction of their trading, as revealed in published reports of the Grain Futures Administration ( $\mathcal{L}$ ,  $\mathcal{J}$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$ ,  $\mathcal{G}$ ), accounts, in part, for their large percentage of correct forecasts.

Privileges good for 1 day are exercisable on the Chicago Board of Trade about once in every 4 or 5 days. For the average individual, however, who cannot always secure his privileges at the most advantageous price, they are good not more frequently than 1 day in 6 or 7.

More than 50 percent of the time that privileges are good the gross profit is three-eighths of a cent or less per bushel. The 5-year weighted average spread was around five-eighths cent per bushel for both bids and offers. The large number of instances that the spread is threeeighths cent or less and the small percentage of time that privileges are exercisable account in part for the fact that privilege trading on the part of the general public, for purposes other than protection, is unprofitable. In the case of the larger speculator in privileges, privilege trading has on the average been profitable only to the seller. Whenever the spread is one-fourth of a cent or less, the general practice is for the commission house to take the trade of the nonmember customer into its own account as the gross profit would be converted into a loss to the customer after paying commissions and taxes.

Privilege trading is considered useful by many members of the grain trade in that it affords protection against price changes, makes possible the financing of speculative transactions on a small capital, is a source of profit to some individuals, provides for the large speculator a means of getting in and out of the market under cover, and has a stabilizing influence on prices of futures.

Its unfavorable aspects are the following: The small amount of capital required to trade in privileges encourages speculation by traders of limited financial resources. The practice of trading against privileges bought and protecting those sold causes artificial price movements. The making of offsetting trades at the close of the futures market by the buyers of privileges who are taking profits, and by sellers who are taking losses, adds to the congestion at the close occasioned by scalpers' "evening up" for the day and the execution of orders to buy or sell "at the close."

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