THE THEORY OF IDLE RESOURCES

By the same author

ECONOMISTS AND THE PUBLIC JONATHAN CAPB, 1936

THE THEORY OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
P. S. KING & SONS, 1930

THE THEORY

OF IDLE RESOURCES

by W. H. HUTT



JONATHAN CAPE
THIRTY BEDFORD SQUARE
LONDON

PIRST PUBLISHED 1939

JONATHAN CAPE LTD. 30 BEDFORD SQUARE, LONDON AND 91 WELLINGTON STREET WEST, TORONTO

X:23. N3 G3 264652

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN IN THE CITY OF OXFORD AT THE ALDEN PRESS PAPER BY SPALDING & HODGE LTD. BOUND BY A. W. BAIN & CO. LTD.

PREFACE

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CHAPTER I — DEFINITION OF IDLENESS

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(1) Similar causes exist for idleness in labour, equipment and all other resources. (2) Idleness has one appearance but exists in several senses, (3) which require definition. (4) Popular conceptions of unemployment of labour recognized by custom and law do not help us to define 'idleness'. (5) The categories isolated here are based on logical rather than empirical criteria, (6) and the framers of policies ought to recognize them. (7) There can be no measure of utilization or idleness, (8) and Mr. Keynes's attempt to measure 'employment' has absurd implications. (9) Orthodox theory does not, as has been alleged, assume 'full employment', (10) which notion has no meaning as an absolute condition. (11) 'Idling', meaning 'under-employment', is a parallel conception to 'idleness'.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I, ON DEFINITIONS

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CHAPTER II — VALUELESS RESOURCES

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(1) Valueless idle resources are those which it would not pay any individual to employ, even if no charge were made for their use. (2) The range of valuable resources may expand or contract. (3) This does not imply any expansion or contraction in the effectiveness of the response to consumers' (or some other) sovereignty. (4) The vague phrase 'increase in economic activity' can only have meaning if it refers to a fall in the proportion of valuable idle resources to all valuable resources. (5) Purely valueless equipment can have no net scrap value. (6) Resources are not valueless because the costs of depreciation cannot be earned. (7) Idle unscrapped resources possessing scrap value may be in pseudo-idleness; (8) and idle re-

sources with capital value but no scrap or hire value are 'temporarily valueless'. (9) The idleness of equipment is seldom due to its being purely valueless. (10) Full utilization of existing resources is more likely to cause the range of valuable resources to expand than to contract. (11) Resources which have negative capital value but provide valuable services are unimportant. (12) Except for imbeciles, the sick and children, there are no parallels to valueless resources in labour. (13) The 'unemployed' are idle for quite different reasons. (14) And natural resources which have once been valuable seldom lose all their value, so that any subsequent idleness must be due to other causes.

CHAPTER III — PSEUDO-IDLENESS

(1) Uncompleted equipment in process of construction must be regarded as employed; (2) and individuals adding to their powers through education, or (3) conserving their powers through rest, or (4) actively 'prospecting' for remunerative jobs, may similarly be regarded as employed. (5) Pseudoidleness is a similar but not identical condition. (6) It exists when the capital value of resources is greater than their scrap value, whilst their net hire value is nil. (7) The service rendered by such resources is that of 'availability'. (8) Pseudo-idleness can be illustrated in capital consumers' goods and capital producers' goods. (9) The 'availability' may be regarded as continuously purchased in the form of capital investment until utilization takes place, or as continuously enjoyed and consumed in the form of income; (10) and this process is taking place, even when 'availability' is preserved without actual idleness. (11) The indivisibility of an efficient unit of specialized equipment is a common cause of pseudoidleness under fluctuating or spasmodic demand, (12) and sometimes under constant demand. (13) Reserves of goods for sale, or stocks of goods in course of liquidation may be in pseudo-idleness.

CHAPTER IV -- PSEUDO-IDLENESS IN LABOUR

(1) As skill once acquired is seldom lost, pseudoidleness in labour due to feared loss of specialized skill is rare (2) although cases may exist. (3) But important cases arise when supplementary employments will destroy simple availability for more profitable employments. (4) Those who accordingly keep themselves attached to a trade, are paid (5) not by a retaining fee, but through favourable 'expectation of earnings'. (6) Similarly, if 'floating labour', unattached to a particular trade, is a necessary consequence of productive technique, it is in pseudo-idleness and remunerated through 'expectation of earnings'. (7) The reality of such remuneration may be simply demonstrated. (8) The typical poverty of casual workers does not affect the issue. (9) The 'reserves' are purchased through wage-rates, and cannot be 'forced' unless employers' monopoly can destroy labour mobility.

CHAPTER V — PREFERRED IDLENESS

(t) Preferred idleness is found in labour only. The simplest case is preference for leisure. (2) Things like pride, prestige, boredom or laziness may lead to idleness being preferred to the return from employment. (3) The preference for idleness may depend upon attachment to a district where an individual has relatives or friends and a customary mode of living. (4) Given the social will, preferred idleness implies no wrong use of resources but might be deplorable on moral grounds. (5) Preferred idleness among the 'work-shy' tends to vary! according to the income available without work. (6) There may be a preference for jobs giving inter-! mittent leisure, (7) and if the effect is held to be 'demoralizing', decasualization might be a remedy. (8) But the 'reckless' and 'lazy' casual labourer may simply be relying upon the fact that he will not be allowed to starve.

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CHAPTER VI -- IRRATIONAL PREFERRED IDLENESS

(I) Consumers are apt to be more vigilant in respect of the price than the quality of a commodity. (2) Similarly, workers in general tend to be more concerned about wage-rates than about the purchasing power of wages, and in depressions may collectively prefer unemployment to employment at lower wage-rates. (3) Mr. Keynes seems to argue that much idleness is due to this cause which. he implies, orthodox economists overlooked. (4) But although the conception of 'irrational preferences' lies outside the province of 'pure theory', except as data, this has not meant blindness to their existence; (5) for the orthodox have realistically recognized the significance of such preferences in relation to scarcity through the conception of 'net advantageousness'. (6) It is the statesman rather than the economist who is concerned with the avoidance of the results of irrationality in preferences. (7) But in any case, other sources of irrationality are probably much more serious.

CHAPTER VII — PARTICIPATING IDLENESS

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(1) Resources are in participating idleness when their idle existence confers the right to participate in monopoly revenues. (2) The condition may arise under a restrictive quota scheme. (3) But resources may actually attach themselves in idleness to a monopolized trade because of participation rights obtainable. (4) Unless complete mergers are possible, unused capacity is likely to be maintained for 'quota-hunting' (5) although, since participating idleness militates against harmonious output restriction, other distributive arrangements may be sought. (6) Interloping resources may be attracted in to share in the chance of employment in a monopolized field. The consequent participating idleness may be illustrated by the example of petrol retailing. (7) 'Participating idleness' may easily be confused with 'pseudo-idleness' or 'aggressive idleness'.

CHAPTER VIII - PARTICIPATING IDLENESS IN

LABOUR

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(1) Participating idleness in labour is most clear under 'short-time' work with 'work-sharing' motives, the monopoly-revenues being shared equally, (2) and cessation of recruitment being a means of sharing them among a declining number. (3) Participating rights are not conferred on a worker accepting another employment. (4) An excluded worker may remain unemployed and attached to a monopolized trade because his availability increases his chance of the privileged employment it may offer; (5) and even if temporary employment would not destroy his availability it might weaken his right to privileged employment, (6) Interlopers may be attracted in to share in the chance of employment in a monopolized field. The consequent participating idleness may be illustrated by the example of stockbrokers, (7) or the medical profession, (8) or certain poorly paid casual trades; (9) in the latter cases, the odium attaching to the employers of low-paid labour having the same consequence as wage-fixation (10) and acting as an important contributory cause of the casual nature of such employments. In these circumstances, decasualization is inequitable. (11) Work-sharing arrangements resemble the quota systems of cartels, and unemployment benefits paid out of union funds resemble cartel bonuses to compensate for the withdrawal of output. (12) But, unlike unemployment benefits, cartel bonuses are not contingent upon the continued idleness of the resources in alternative employments. (13) In practice, State-subsidized unemployment benefits support general restrictionism in the labour market and are contingent upon absolute idleness. (14) But cartel arrangements are voluntary in a sense in which labour restrictions are not. (15) For justice, the compensation conferred by a union's unemployment pay should be complete; (16) and this would be insisted upon if the

members of a trade-union regarded it as share-holders do a firm. (17) But organized labour has usually been hostile to the dilution of monopoly-revenues through work-sharing. (18) The failure of the poor to share their poverty is the most neglected aspect of the unemployment problem.

CHAPTER IX — ENFORCED IDLENESS

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(1) Resources excluded from or withheld from monopolized employments must, if they remain idle, be idle in some other sense also. (2) Enforced idleness' is caused by the exclusion of resources during the monopolization of production; but the term has a limited meaning (3) and must be distinguished from two other forms of 'waste': (i) specialized 'diverted resources' which happen to find inferior employments, and (ii) the hypothetical resources which might have become specialized in the monopolized field but for powers of exclusion. (4) 'Diverted labour resources' may be described as in 'disguised unemployment', but the condition is unimportant in relation to other forms of waste which are not expressed in idleness. (5) 'Enforced idleness' may be caused by the monopolization of co-operant stages of production.

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(1) 'Withheld capacity' or 'diverted resources' arise from voluntary monopolization. (2) Mr. Keynes's conceptions, 'expectation of return' and 'disutility', cause the distinctions which we have to discuss to be overlooked. (3) If the monopolists' optimum outputs are everywhere attained before depression, the further withholding of capacity in depression cannot be simply explained. (4) A 'pure' price depression does not make withholding of capacity more profitable, (5) nor does it make interloping any the less easy. (6) The withholding experienced in practice is due firstly to the relations

of monopolistic co-operant producers (7) whose incentive to arrange for their collective optimum output is defeated in the scramble to preserve indi-(8) The withholding is due vidual revenues. secondly to outputs having previously exceeded the monopolists' optimum, probably owing to 'reasonable' and not maximum profits having been sought. (9) But a group may withhold capacity in its shortrun interest, and against its long-run interest, (10) which is particularly likely owing to the practical indeterminateness of the monopolists' optimum. (11) And withheld capacity may be 'individually \ rational' but 'collectively irrational'; (12) or 'indi-\ vidually rational' and irrational for the group. (13) When indivisibilities are large, the withholding of capacity may not, in rare circumstances, conflict with the consumers' sovereignty ideal. (14) Mr. Keynes's 'involuntary unemployment' may be intended to refer to the case of withheld labour capacity which is 'collectively irrational'; (15) but his conception seems to be based on the assumption that the power to withhold capacity cannot be restrained and that the resulting idleness can be avoided only through monetary policies, (16) a view which the economist should not accept.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER X, ON THE CONCEPTIONS OF 'COLLUSIVE' AND 'NATURAL' MONOPOLIES

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CHAPTER XI - STRIKE IDLENESS AND AGGRES-

SIVE IDLENESS

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(1) The distribution of monopoly-gains among cooperant monopolists is indeterminate, and may depend upon 'reasonableness' or (2) bargaining, in which case 'strike idleness' may arise. (3) When competing firms operate over more than one set of co-operant productive processes, distribution may be arranged through 'demarcations', which may be

enforced by strikes. (4) 'Strike idleness' does not arise from 'withheld capacity' unless a co-operant producer resists in order to force a sharing of the monopoly-gains. (5) 'Aggressive idleness' arises from the maintenance of unutilized capacity with a view to aggressive selling against potential interlopers.

CHAPTER XII - CONCLUSION

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(1) This essay has concentrated on 'idleness' issues, and ignored 'demand' issues. (2) But our analysis of idleness has introduced distinctions which are essential for any satisfactory study of the effects of demand variations. (3) The application of our conceptions to monetary theory has yet to be done (4) although they are directly serviceable in studies of the non-monetary aspects of idleness and (5) the trade cycle, and (6) may suggest the correct approach to the monetary aspects of idleness. (7) Wasteful idleness arises through the restriction of competition.

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It is curious that so important a subject as unemployment should have brought forth no treatise devoted to theoretical analysis of the condition. There have been many books purporting to deal with unemployment of labour, but these have either been descriptive works, like Sir William Beveridge's famous Unemployment, a Problem of Industry. or theoretical studies of demand, like Professor Pigou's Theory of Unemployment, or Mr. J. M. Keynes's General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. This essay tries to fill the gap. The necessity became clear to me in the course of an attempt to envisage the institutions required for an equalitarian or competitive society. Having found no satisfactory analysis of conceptions which it seemed essential to employ, I was forced to provide my own textbook treatment.

My reason for using the term 'idleness' instead of 'unemployment' is that the latter term has, by tradition, become associated with the idleness of labour, and any satisfactory study must obviously be concerned with 'idleness' in all resources. And having made 'idleness' my topic, I have adhered strictly to it, and do not claim to have made any direct contribution to monetary or trade-cycle theory. I was at first tempted to venture into this

province, but after many wanderings I could not feel satisfied that I had found my bearings with sufficient accuracy to try to guide others. Nevertheless, I have indicated a region which ought to be explored with the instruments that I have provided. My several critical references to the work of Mr. J. M. Keynes are due to the fact that his General Theory happens to be in the thoughts of all economists to-day. I have been wisely advised not to touch on any of the major controversies which his contribution has aroused. Certainly I have not avoided controversial topics. But it is my hope that all sides in the current debate on the monetary causes of idleness will find my analysis realistic and useful, and that it will be of some help to them in searching for the origin of their differences.

Although I am offering a 'theoretical' contribution, a mere contribution to conceptual clarity, my inspiration has throughout been the closest interest in practical affairs. The objective problem of inventing institutions which could foster security and equality has been the motive which has guided my study at each stage. I earnestly believe that policy-makers could find enlightenment in it. But I am sufficient of a realist to know that the chances of its exercising any influence on policy are small. The politicians in unemployment-cursed countries are too concerned with their immediate popularity to give much consideration to a dispassionate

inalysis such as I have attempted. For if they do clance at its pages they will soon see that its implications cannot be easily reconciled with ideologies to which they feel they must of necessity pander.

However, to encourage the policy-makers, I have indeavoured to treat the subject, as far as possible, in 1 non-technical way. Any patient and intelligent ayman should be able to understand my argument. [have reduced the current jargon and conventional echnical conceptions to a minimum, and where I 1ave employed them, their meaning should be sufficiently evident to the careful reader. In this way, my treatment differs from all the recent theoretical studies of demand which intend to deal with the causes of idleness. My suggestions need not be taken on authority. The reader who is unacquainted with the economic textbooks may follow my reasoning from point to point and himself decide on its validity. I welcome the layman not, as Mr. Keynes does in his General Theory, as an 'eavesdropper', but as one who can and should consider my thesis. I do not claim, however, to have produced a 'popular' work. Where I have thought it helpful, I have not shrunk from exploiting the most abstract conceptions. And I have incidentally introduced a new jargon of my own. Hence, the reader who is inexpert in economics must persevere and have constant recourse to the summaries which may guide him through a labyrinth of notions.

It has not been my task in this essay to recommend specific reforms. Certainly I have hinted at desir able changes, but my aim here has been to deter mine causes. If would-be reformers feel bewildered by the practical difficulties which my analysis o causes discloses, they may be helped by my own attempt to face the basic obstacles in my Economist and the Public, Chap. xxx, entitled 'Vested Interest and the Distributive Scheme'. The clue to the understanding of the chief economic and sociologica problems of to-day can be found, in my opinion in a recognition of the struggle which is in progres against the disrupting equalitarian effects of competitive capitalism. Competition and capitalism an hated to-day because of their tendency to destroy poverty and privilege more rapidly than custom and the expectations established by protections car allow. We accordingly find private interests com bining to curb this process and calling upon the State to step in to do the same; and unless the re sistance is expressed through monetary policy, the curbing takes the form of restrictions on production Hence there arises a clash between what I have called the 'productive scheme' and the 'distributive scheme'; and wasteful idleness, both in labour and in physical things, appears to be due to the conse quent restraint of productive power - a restrain imposed immediately in defence of private interests. but ultimately appearing to be reasonable and just

ecause it defends an existing and customary istribution.

The original typescript of this book was completed nore than two years before the present version was ent to the publishers. Several copies were put into irculation and I received advice and encouragement from so many friends that it is impossible to nake adequate acknowledgments. But I have a pecial debt of gratitude to the following who at lifferent times read the whole of the typescript as t then stood and whose comments led to substantial hanges of terminology, exposition or content: Professor Lionel Robbins, Mr. Frank Paish, Professor Arnold Plant, Professor F. A. Hayek and Mr. J. A. Shannon.

W. H. Hurr

University of Cape Town 1939

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