



SIR JOHN LOGIN AND DULEEP SINGH.



Genro. de Am.
J. L. Lopez

SIR JOHN LOGIN AND DULEEP SINGH

BY

LADY LOGIN

WITH AN INTRODUCTION

BY

COLONEL G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I.

LONDON

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TO THE MEMORY
OF THAT ILLUSTRIOUS ENGLISHMAN, THE
RIGHT HONORABLE JOHN BRIGHT, M.P.,

WHOSE LOVE OF JUSTICE
AND WHOSE CLOSE PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP
WITH
SIR JOHN LOGIN
CAUSED HIM TO TAKE A SINCERE INTEREST
IN THE OBJECT OF THIS WORK,
AND WHO WAS ONLY PREVENTED BY HIS OWN MORTAL ILLNESS
FROM ADDING TO IT (AS HE HAD INTENDED)

HIS TRIBUTE
TO THE MEMORY OF HIS FRIEND,—
I DEDICATE THIS BOOK.

PREFACE.

IT is probable I should never have been induced to take up the subject of this volume but for the fact that the interest taken by my late husband in his ward invested it with an interest which has assumed greater proportions in consequence of the recent action of the Maharajah. For many years the Maharajah lived in our house; he spontaneously adopted Christianity under our roof; and he developed many instincts alike generous and calculated to inspire regard. I have always taken the deepest interest in him, and no one has been more grieved than I have been at the line of conduct he has lately so heedlessly adopted. Still, condemning that conduct as thoroughly as anyone, feeling that the world regards it as a base return for great kindness, I am anxious that that world should know that there is not only something, but a great deal, to be said on the other side. What that is I have told in these pages. They contain the story of the first connection of the Maharajah with the British to the present day. It is only just that, however the public may condemn the recent foolish utterances of

the Maharajah, they should know that his outbursts are not the offspring of a mere freak, that he has real wrongs, and that his nature, always quick and sensitive, has been goaded into action, which, in his calmer moments, he would be glad to disavow. The carrying out of this task has been rendered the more genial to me, in that it has enabled me to show the world what manner of man he was to whom the Government of India entrusted the earlier training of the young Prince. There have been men in India whose services have come more before the public, but I am confident I shall be borne out by those who knew my husband when I state that a truer man, one more imbued with sense of duty, and more fearless in the performance of it, never served the East India Company than John Spencer Login.

LENA LOGIN.

GRACEDIEU, WATERINGBURY, KENT,
July 4th, 1889.

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INTRODUCTION.

BY COLONEL MALLESON, C.S.I.

A FEW lines which I wrote on the subject of Duleep Singh in the *Asiatic Quarterly* about a year ago procured for me the pleasure of an acquaintance with Lady Login, whom I found to be even more interested than myself in the conduct and treatment of one who had been her husband's ward in the tenderest and most impressionable years of his life. I soon found that whilst Lady Login regretted equally with myself the wayward conduct of the Maharajah since he quitted England, we both agreed that there were many circumstances in his history, a knowledge of which would induce a public which judged only from facts within its ken to take a more lenient, or, at all events, a less prejudiced view of conduct which, without such explanation, would appear wholly unjustifiable. No living being was so thoroughly acquainted with all the circumstances attending the Maharajah's youth, early training, development into manhood, and subsequent career as Lady Login; nor could any one tell as accurately the history of those monetary relations towards the Government which have influenced so unfortunately the later actions of the Maharajah. I respectfully urged, then, upon Lady Login the advisability, in the interests of the Maharajah, in the interests of truth and justice, of writing from the stores of documents in her possession a connected history of the Maharajah's life, from the date of the

connection with him of the late Sir John Login to the time of the cessation of that connection. The story might, I ventured to suggest, form one of the main features of the life of one of the noblest servants of the late East India Company—Sir John Login himself.

The idea commended itself to Lady Login, and she at once acted upon it. The result is contained in this volume. How admirably Lady Login has performed the self-allotted task the public, I am confident, will unhesitatingly admit. The great merit of the narrative is that it tells "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." Lady Login has kept back nothing that she was able to tell. The result is a valuable contribution to contemporary history, and, what is of not less importance, a complete revelation of the causes which have influenced Duleep Singh in his hostility towards the British Government.

I have myself always held that the treatment dealt out to Duleep Singh after the close of the second Sikh war was alike impolitic and unjust. When that war broke out Duleep Singh was the ward of the British Government. He was a child of nine years old, and took no part whatever in the administration of the country of which the British Government had recognized him to be the Sovereign, but of which the English Resident and a council of native nobles were the actual rulers. The revolt of Moolraj, and the outbreak of Sikh chieftains in the Hazarah which followed that revolt, were directed against the actual Government of Lahore, which, as I have said, was presided over by an English Resident, and which ruled in the

name of Duleep Singh. Yet, when those risings were suppressed on the field of Gujerat, the British Government, then absolute master of the situation, visited the sins of Moolraj and the Hazarah chiefs on their innocent ward, deprived him of his kingdom, and, he has always asserted—though this would seem to be denied—of the estates which his father had accumulated, and consigned him to the care of Doctor—afterwards Sir John—Login.

To a truer-hearted, more conscientious, or better man it would have been impossible to consign him. How thoroughly and how well Sir John, aided in every particular by Lady Login, performed his duty towards the young Prince is admirably told in these pages. The reader who may take up the book for information on this point will, I am confident, not lightly lay it down. Upon this part of the history I do not propose to dwell in this Introduction. There can be no doubt—indeed, I had it from the Maharajah's own lips in 1871—that throughout this period, and at the date also of his speaking to me on the subject, he was thoroughly happy. I propose, rather, to ask the attention of the reader to the circumstances related in the fifteenth chapter—circumstances which explain the sudden migration from happiness to discontent, from discontent to despair, from despair to acts bordering on insanity.

It would seem that the Maharajah was a man of a trustful, generous, and open disposition. Further, that he did not care to bother himself with details, and that he hated business matters. So long as Sir John Login lived he was happy. Though often urged to effect a settlement, or rather to insist that the India

Office should make a definite settlement with him, he always put it off. He was content to have Sir John between him and the India Office. After Sir John's death, Colonel Oliphant, whom he appointed equerry and controller of his household, soon gained an ascendancy which produced similar feelings of trust. He was then living at Elveden, where he had the best shooting in England; and when I stayed with him there in 1871, he told me he was the happiest man in the world. When I next saw him, about ten years ago, he told me he was the most miserable. His words were to the effect that subsequently to Colonel Oliphant's death he had discovered that he had been cheated out of his kingdom, and out of the private estates which his father had possessed, and that he could get no settlement from the India Office; that he had still hopes that he might ultimately succeed, but that the treatment he had received had well-nigh broken his heart. He complained bitterly that no provision had been made for his family. When at Elveden, he said, he was in constant hopes that he might receive an English title, and with that title such a sum attached to it inalienably as might make him forget that he had ever sat on the footsteps of a throne; which hope, he added, was growing dimmer and dimmer, till it was well-nigh extinguished. He told me this one evening, the only evening that I dined with him, at the Garrick Club, of which he was a member. The time, to the best of my recollection, was 1879-80.

The whole story is told, fairly and impartially told,

in the fifteenth chapter. The evil, as Lady Login tells us, dates from the time of the annexation of the Punjab. No settlement, properly so called, was then made. But, when Duleep Singh attained his majority, Sir John Login pressed upon Sir Charles Wood the necessity of coming to a settlement on the terms of the Treaty, and suggested Sir John Lawrence as the most suitable person to draw up the agreement. Sir Charles Wood, after some delay, assented; and Sir John Lawrence agreed to act in the matter on condition that Sir Frederick Currie should be associated with him. This was conceded. The two men met and drew up a report. This report, however, was objected to in Council, and was never acted upon. The outcome was that somewhat later Sir Charles Wood offered "improved" terms to Duleep Singh. The Maharajah accepted these terms, with the reservation of his rights, as the head of the family, of being allowed to have a voice in the apportioning of the fund known as the "Five Lakh Fund," and to inspect the accounts. He further claimed the repayment of his losses in the Mutiny. This was the last transaction. It occurred just before Sir John Login's death.

It is to be regretted that the Indian Council set aside the settlement proposed by Sir John Lawrence and Sir Frederick Currie. These men had been on the spot; they knew all the circumstances of his case; and if their recommendations had been attended to, Duleep Singh would still be a loyal subject of the Queen, and the "perfect happiness" of 1871 would never have been impaired. But not

only was the recommendation not acted upon, but no permanent settlement was ever arrived at. The relations between the Maharajah and the India Office can be best described as having been from first to last hand-to-mouth relations.

As a specimen of what these have occasionally been, I quote from the last page of this book:—"The Government," writes Lady Login, "has never accounted to the Maharajah for the money received for the sale of the house, nor has he received anything in respect of the value of the land, though the papers show that the whole was purchased out of his money; nor any compensation in respect of the contents of the house which were destroyed at the Mutiny." Lady Login proceeds to show that during thirty years differences arose which would have instantly disappeared if the recommendations to which I have referred had been adopted. Since then officials have arisen who had had no part in the original treaty—who knew nothing of Duleep Singh as the recognized ruler of a powerful state—who know him only as a deposed prince, asking, as they consider it, for alms.

The Maharajah, doubtless, has many faults, and his more recent conduct requires the exercise of a large amount of charity. But there are few who will rise from the perusal of Lady Login's book without admitting that he has suffered great wrongs, and without asking whether it is yet too late, by a generous concession, to bring back the lost sheep to the fold he quitted in despair.

G. B. MALLESON.

July 12th, 1889.

APPENDIX.

I.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER TO MR. JOHN BRIGHT, M.P., ON THE
POLICY OF OUR RULE IN INDIA.

(In reply to one of his dated September 1st, 1857.)

Sept. 1857.

MY DEAR MR. BRIGHT,

. . . . The intelligence from India continues to be indeed most painful, and full of atrocities and treachery, although certainly not causing more apprehension or anxiety, as to the final result, than it did at first. That we should have been able to maintain our ground so well against such odds, could never have been anticipated by the mutineers; and when they hear of the successive arrivals of ships from England with reinforcements, before they have succeeded in establishing civil power in a single district, we may have reason to hope their treacherous, cowardly hearts will quail within them through fear.

No one who has had opportunity of seeing Mahomedans (and Hindoos) in countries to which our influence had not extended, is much surprised at atrocities which are not very uncommon among them, and although the dread of consequences under our rule has prevented the exercise of such revolting cruelties, there is scarcely a man, woman, or child among them, to whose imagination they are not perfectly familiar, and, except by those

whom education has enlightened, who does not consider them to be perfectly justifiable, if not praiseworthy, against "Kafirs," such as we are! This revolt has torn the veil from Hindooism and Mahomedanism, and shown them in their true colours.

I am quite as anxious as you can be, that we should bring no discredit on the Christian name by the manner in which we make these miserable wretches atone for their appalling atrocities. Of all that can be proved to have been ringleaders in the revolt, we have no alternative than to make a most fearful example. But those who have taken a lead in these atrocities are, I believe, few in comparison with the multitudes who have been led astray by them, and for whose ignorance we are, to a certain extent, responsible.

Whenever we are again in a position to enforce order, and to bring the guilty to punishment, we need be under no difficulties, however numerous they may be. With so many railroads to make in India, on which convict labour can be made useful, so many settlements and colonies within the tropics, such as Pegu, Mauritius and the West India Islands, where a labouring population is required, so many ships available to convey them, and with a sincere desire to remove the ignorance and superstition which have caused such atrocities, we may confidently hope that, with God's help, we shall yet be able to "overcome evil with good."

The manner in which our countrymen have been led to carry out the sentence of death upon these mutineers, with a view to make their executions more impressive upon the natives that witness them, is certainly most distressing, and I deeply deplore it; but if it has the effect of deterring others from such crimes, and depriving the criminals of that bravado which leads them to rush to the halter prepared for them and die as martyrs, I cannot find fault with it; for, however revolting, it is not more cruel or less instantaneous than any other mode, nor am I apprehensive that it will have the effect you suppose of "rousing revengeful feelings which time can never heal." The people of India consider us to be perfectly justified in thus punishing men guilty of such atrocities against us, knowing from the general leniency of our punishments hitherto that we have only been driven to them by their treachery; and if we can only succeed in putting down the

mutiny, and re-establishing our power firmly, I should have no more apprehension of going unarmed among the very sons of these men in their villages than I ever had.

In truth, with this, as in other things, we are obliged often to act in opposition to our right feelings, and in a manner which would be most unjustifiable among a people less barbarous in heart, in order to give that impression of our power and energy which is necessary to enable us to do any good among them, and to raise them out of that debasing superstition and ignorance which is the fruitful source of all these atrocities.

In the same way, I am quite prepared to make more allowances for such men as Clive, Warren Hastings, and others of our countrymen in India than you do, for being carried away by their successes (among a people who held their possessions by the sword) to acts and results which, to our settled notions of rights of property for so many centuries, appear most extravagant and oppressive; and I am very certain that even at this present moment—after we have, by the strength of our Government for the last fifty years, given a security to individual rights unknown before—there is not a single native of India who has read or heard of Clive or Warren Hastings, who attaches that discredit to their proceedings which Englishmen do. It is very true that you may have been in the way of hearing natives of India profess very high-flown sentiments on these points, as it suited their individual interests to do so; but I am very much mistaken, after twenty-five years' experience of them, and among such men as Lord Metcalfe, Mr. Thomason, and many others (who knew them better than I can pretend to do), if there is a single one who, in circumstances like Clive, Warren Hastings, and other Englishmen, would have shown half their moderation.

We must never forget that public opinion among natives of India generally is in many respects not further advanced than it was in England during the Heptarchy (certainly *not* so far in its religious basis), and that our ideas of individual rights and abstract justice are comparatively new to them, and can with difficulty be adapted to their minds. They are making progress, no doubt, and that very rapidly; and another fifty years of our rule, and the security enjoyed under it, will bring them well up to us, if we do our duty.

But, dear Mr. Bright, instead of giving much thought to the misdeeds of our predecessors in India—the cruelties of which I am sure you exaggerate greatly, and which I am very confident are not considered so bad by Asiatics as by ourselves, and cause but little ill-will towards us—I am anxious that you should turn your attention to *existing* evils, with a view to remove them. If the present state of India is a just judgment upon us, it is not so much for the misdeeds of the past century, as for the present neglect of duty and want of confidence in the right policy we should pursue.

Through the blessing of God, we have been placed in India in a position of the highest influence and responsibility.

We had an army of nearly 300,000 men, composed of Hindoos and Mahomedans, the most ignorant, most bigoted, and most superstitious of any class in India. We have had opportunities, no one can deny, of removing much of that ignorance, bigotry, and superstition by introducing education among them, without causing the least alarm for their religion (caste); and there are many who think that they were open to religious instruction without endangering our influence over them in the smallest degree. Instead, however, of our doing anything to enlighten them, as it was our duty to do, we have pampered them in all their ignorant superstitions; flattered them into a belief that as soldiers they were quite equal to ourselves, and instructed them only through the drill-sergeant. Is it to be wondered at that they should think we held India only by their sufferance, and that they should attempt to wrest it from us?

Our successes in India have placed many of the princes and chief men in our power, with all their families and dependants; many of them receiving pensions greater than the revenues of some independent states in Europe. We have had influence sufficient to induce them to educate their children, at least, in secular knowledge, and to show them the world as it now exists; but we have not done so; we have been satisfied to let them live in that state of sensuality natural to them, to indulge in dreams of their former greatness, surrounded by sycophants and slaves, and to be instructed only by the most bigoted of their creed, until, like the old Mogul and his family, and the atrocious Nana Sahib, we have prepared them fitly for the position they have assumed.

As the Paramount State in India for the last fifty years, we had the "right of presentation" (according to established practice under the Delhi emperors, and which the present puppet of the mutineers will, no doubt, affect to assume) to almost all the minor principalities in India, and, as such, the right of placing whom we pleased to rule over them, if we thought fit to do so.

During the reigns of the great emperors of Delhi to the time of Arungzebe (Alumgheer) this right was almost uniformly acted upon, and these petty *musnuds* were given away by them as readily as a *kardarship*, or *jagheer*, in the Punjab, by old Runjeet Singh, a few years since. The right of a son to succeed his father was never dreamed of, although it most frequently happened that a son was considered by the Emperor and his courtiers to be the fittest man for it, and could afford to pay the handsomest *nuzzur* on accession; in which case, he was, of course, preferred, and the grant and dress of honour sent to him, when he was considered by his subjects to be duly installed.

Of course, when the Emperor thought he could more conveniently and profitably hold the province under his own officials, he did so, receiving the revenues into his own treasury, and paying the functionaries himself, instead of giving out the province and the people on lease!

When the power of the Delhi emperors declined, princes and chiefs who had these *soubahs* and minor states naturally endeavoured to transmit them to their sons, and, in most cases, succeeded; but they never felt themselves secure in their position until they received a *sumnud* from the Delhi Emperor, even when a captive in the Mahratta camp.

When the success of our arms in the upper provinces of India placed the representative of the Mogul emperors in our hands, he transferred all his regal rights to our Government, on certain conditions, which have by us been faithfully fulfilled; and, although the East India Company (in deference, I believe, to public opinion in England, which considered such rights to be nothing more valuable than the claim of our Sovereign to the Crown of France) have not exercised those rights to their full extent, they had, in case of failure of direct heirs to such states, as they have them-

selves re-established, very properly acted upon this principle, leaving, however, personal property to the families of deceased princes, with pensions suitable to their wants.

Having, however, adopted so much of these rights as was convenient, they ought not to have neglected other responsibilities attached to their position, as they undoubtedly have done, viz., the duty of ascertaining and ensuring the proper qualifications of rulers succeeding, under their auspices, to the government of the subordinate states, and thus affording proper protection to the interests of their subjects.

Had the Government of India done their duty in this respect, and taken measures for the proper education and instruction of every young prince in India, over whom they had such right of influence, I doubt not that, ere this, we should have seen many native states much more advanced than they are in order and good government.

There is yet another point over which, I think, the East India Company have been greatly led astray, and of which the present position of India shows the extreme danger.

The policy of the Indian Government has, I believe, not intentionally, but not the less certainly, given encouragement to military employment far beyond its proper bounds; and I am convinced that, under a better system, there need not have been more than one-third the present number of native soldiers in India withdrawn from peaceful occupations.

So long as we had large native states, with their numerous armies, to oppose us, it was necessary for us not only to employ as many Sepoys as we could afford for our own defence, but to prevent them enlisting, under native princes, against us; but when the success of our arms had reduced the power of the native chiefs, and forced them to accept our terms—instead of attempting to reduce the military population of each state, as might often have been done, by disarming them, and in cases where we undertook their external defence, permitting no greater number of troops to be entertained by the chief than was necessary as personal guard, and for civil duties—our Government has been led by influences of various kinds to insist rather upon the organization of large contingents, to be officered by our army and paid by the subject state, leaving the chief very often to use his

own discretion as to the number of troops he should retain in his service, or at least taking little account of them.

As these contingents are perfect thorns in the sides of native potentates, and a constant source of ill-will and apprehension, obliging them often to keep up more troops than they would otherwise have done, it cannot be doubted that had the necessity or expediency of reducing military employment been sufficiently impressed upon our Government, this end might have been easily attained by insisting on disarming when we had the power, taking notice of the smallest infraction of the Treaty as to the number of troops to be employed, and requiring the payment of a small amount as tribute, in money, or produce, or the assignment of a district, to defray the expense of any addition which might be required to our own army for the external defence of the country.

It may perhaps serve to illustrate the extent to which native princes are sometimes permitted to increase the number of troops in their pay for the civil duties of the country, if I remark that the ruler of Oude in 1801 was limited by Lord Wellesley to the employment of seven or eight thousand men, but had up to 1848 been allowed to increase that number gradually to 55,000! We need not therefore wonder that Oude has been considered so long our nursery for Sepoys!

I could also say something on our "temporizing policy," in endowing their temples and mosques instead of boldly telling them that, as Christians, we can have nothing to do with them, but I have said enough, and must go on to another subject.

Had I not been aware of your sentiments, so well expressed in your letter to the electors of Birmingham, that to "restore order to India is mercy to India," I should have felt alarmed at the thought being entertained that "the loss of India would not ruin England, although the cost of keeping and the effort may;" but when I know that your remark does not refer to the present, but to some future time, when our rule can only be maintained there against the wishes of the people, by military power, and at a cost of English blood and treasure exceeding its benefits to the country and to India, I can readily acknowledge its propriety.

If I could not look forward to the time when we shall rule

India by other influences than mere military force, I should be disposed at once, after the revolt has been sufficiently suppressed and order restored, to select native rulers apparently best able to hold the ground in each of our provinces, endeavour to strengthen their position, enter into commercial relations with them, and leave them to govern their people in the way best adapted to their circumstances.

But however much in the opinion of many who judge of the Government of India only from an English point of view, a national insurrection was at any time to be expected against it, the present revolt has nothing of the dignity of that character. On the contrary, all our information tends to show that the people are by no means disaffected towards us, and would consider the loss of our government to be a great calamity.

The rebellion has not then the least spark of that patriotism in it which the natural feelings of free Englishmen are ready to admire, even when opposed to us, but as a mere impotent attempt of ignorant fanaticism, unfortunately fostered by ourselves, to stem the tide of advancing civilization.

Even amidst all the horrors of present anarchy, I can discern the dawns of a brighter intelligence, and of an influence likely to be more lasting than military rule, requiring only the fostering care of a powerful Government, and the security to individual rights (which recent events will teach our Indian subjects to appreciate) to be developed to its full extent, and to bind India to England in bonds of mutual interest and good-will.

With a better knowledge of the power and enterprise of England diffused among our fellow-subjects there, will arise the feeling that our national character and commercial energy are necessary to develop and promote their industrial wealth, and that the most productive country in the world, with a population so little able to find markets for themselves, must necessarily be dependent on the strongest and most enterprising of the maritime powers, and united to it in the bonds of self-interest.

But may we not entertain hopes of even a higher influence than these, and that with the extension of the Gospel message—which, as Christians, it is our duty to make known—stronger sympathies will be awakened between us, to bind us in a new relation, under the influence of which we may safely leave them

to govern themselves, without any misgivings as to the consequences?

With such a prospect before us, let us throw all doubts aside as to our policy towards India, and at once boldly undertake the responsibilities which Providence has entrusted to us, assured that if we do so in a right spirit, strength will be given to us to carry it out!

Although you have at least given as much consideration to the subject as I have, and applied the great abilities and judgment with which God has blessed you to devise a plan of government for India suited to its present wants, you may, nevertheless, accept a few suggestions I have to offer as to its organization, in the hope they may be useful.*

As the interests of the English nation in the government of India have now attained too great a magnitude to be entrusted to any other power than the Imperial Legislature, and as the East India Company's government has existed long enough to show that it has established an influence in India likely to be more lasting than military power, I think that it may retire from its responsibilities as soon as order has been restored, and with very much greater credit than you are perhaps prepared to concede to it.

Believe me, dear Mr. Bright,

Yours sincerely,

J. S. LOGIN.

II.

EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE ON THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA BETWEEN SIR CHARLES PHIPPS AND SIR JOHN LOGIN, *July, 1857.*

The first of these papers opens with a defence of the civil administration of the country under the

* This is in reference to a scheme for the government of India, to which allusion will be made later.

Company's government, pointing to the fact that the people are more contented under it, and have enjoyed more peace and security, than under any other Government which ever existed there.

"I believe it to be equally true," says Sir John Login, "that with so much corruption and want of integrity on the part of the native officials, whom they are obliged to employ, and so much apathy (as to public measures), selfish avarice, and ignorance, on the part of the people, it would have been impossible for any Government to have done more for the civil administration of the country than has been done by them. I admit that they may have been urged on to activity in their civil administration by the frequent attacks made upon it in Parliament; but these attacks have been so often made by men who only see everything from an English point of view, and who are so manifestly ill-qualified to judge of the true state of matters, and so full of prejudice against the Company's government, that all the sympathies of old Indian officers are enlisted in favour of their old masters; and they are *averse* to *expose* the real defects of their rule, or to add in any way to their embarrassment. To those who have given consideration to the subject, it has been for some time sufficiently evident that the weak point in the Company's government has not been so much the civil as the military administration; but, strange to say, this has seldom been made the subject of attack in Parliament, and I am not aware that the reduction of strength of the native army in India has ever been proposed even by my friend Mr. Bright."

After alluding to the necessity which formerly existed for maintaining a much larger native army than was now required,* he continues:—"It was politic to conciliate these men to our discipline as far as possible, and to avoid every offence to caste prejudices. I fear that these attempts to conciliate were, in the early days of our rule, carried much beyond conscientious limits,

* See *ante*, letter to Mr. Bright, p. 556.

and to an extent which would not now be sanctioned by the lowest code of Christian morality. . . . When the reduction of the Punjab . . . removed the last independent native army from which any danger was to be apprehended . . . the proper time would appear to have arrived for commencing to reduce the strength of our native army, and for increasing our European force." He then speaks of the fatal policy of making European troops dependent on native commissariat contractors, and of placing an arsenal like Delhi in sole charge of native troops. He gives his reasons for believing that "although several Bengal regiments have frequently shown an exacting spirit, and one or two have actually mutinied and been disbanded," yet no "real disaffection to the Government has existed among them until within a very recent period;" and then mentions the causes which, in his opinion, led to the Mutiny, and says, that providentially for us, the revolt broke out sooner than was intended by the ringleaders, and before the mutineers had concerted all their arrangements. As a medical officer he then remarks, that though the heat would be injurious to the European troops at that season, yet that during the excitement of active service they suffer less, or, at least, *quite as little*, as native troops (an opinion fully borne out by subsequent events). When order should be at length restored, and any hostile population disarmed, he suggests that a police corps, mounted and on foot, should be organized in every district, under English officers as magistrates; that European camps, fully equipped and able to take the field on the shortest notice, should be formed (say at Dehra, the Murree Hills, and Darjeeling for Northern India) with detachments to every magazine and depôt; that good roads, with caravanserais at marching distances, should be made wherever railroads cannot be constructed; that men of high caste should not be *excluded* from enlisting, but should not be allowed to *preponderate* in the ranks, which should consist of a due proportion of men of every caste, and that there should be an admixture of Sikhs, Goorkhas, and Mahomedans in *every company*. Though this might cause more trouble to their officers in cantonments, there would be less risk of conspiracy, and their loyalty would be better ensured. All troops should be enlisted on the understanding that they were to be employed

beyond seas if required, or on fatigue duties as sappers and miners. He concludes with the suggestion that it might be advisable to attach one, or perhaps two, companies of Punjabi Mahomedans and hill-men to each European corps, to be commanded by the regimental officers; they would be useful, he says, in relieving Europeans from unnecessary exposure, and in training young officers for service with the native army.

This memorandum, and its accompanying letter, called forth the following response:—

OSBORNE, Aug. 7th, 1857.

MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

Although overwhelmed with business, as you may suppose, during the visit of the Emperor and Empress, I must write one line to thank you again for your *most interesting* letters, and to beg you will continue to enlighten me upon Indian affairs, which, I know, that you understand better than most people. I am happy to hear that Burnand is supposed to have shown great energy and skill before Delhi, and I hope that he may have shown equal military skill in his attack upon the town itself, which seems, from the plan, to have a large, straggling, outside fortification, with a pretty strong citadel or palace.

What a blessing that the Maharajah was not in India at the time of this fearful outbreak. I cannot conceive a more distressing position than his would have been.

Have you ever turned in your mind what will be the best plan for the future formation of an efficient army in India?

Sincerely yours,

C. B. PHIPPS.

In response to the concluding sentence in the above letter, Login prepared and presented to Sir Charles a

memorandum on the reorganization of the Indian army, of which we can only afford space to give the leading points,

This scheme provides for a large European force, an auxiliary native army, and a native military police; also for the formation of a staff corps, and the regulation of pay, promotion, and pensions, of both European and native officers in all branches of the service.

It commences with these words:—

“To place our military establishment in Bengal on a secure and efficient basis, after the suppression of the present revolt, it appears necessary—

(1) That we should possess a large European force, perfectly equipped, and ready for field service;

(2) An *auxiliary native army* of infantry and cavalry under English officers, sufficiently equipped to oppose successfully any Asiatic troops which can be brought against us, and—

(3) A native military police, mounted and on foot, under the command of English military officers, with magisterial powers, to be stationed in every district for support of civil authority.”

The European force in Bengal, North-West Provinces, and Punjab, were to be formed into three or more large camps in the neighbourhood of the hills, where the men could be employed in various ways throughout the day, even in the hot weather. The native troops were to be cantoned in detached regiments, and only brigaded in the cold weather for exercise. Each native regiment was to be complete in camp-equipage, but carriage was to be indented for, as was then the rule. The native military police were to form local stationary corps, distributed over the several *thannas*; large parties occupying the *serais* along the roads, and furnishing guards at the *chowkies*.

European officers who have not passed the examination in Urdu, or who are under twenty-one years of age, to be posted to European

portion of force; those who have passed such examinations, are above the age of twenty-one, and are acquainted with their military duties, may be posted to the native army.

A staff corps to be formed, from which the military staff, diplomatic, military police and civil departments were to be supplied.

Further, it appeared necessary:—

(1) To form an active and retired list of general and field officers as in the royal service. The retired list to include all general and field officers above the age of —, or those of younger age who may be unfit for active service in the field.

(2) To offer increase of pension to induce all officers above thirty-five years' service to retire at once with additional rank.

Promotion in the staff corps was to be somewhat less rapid than in the more military branch.

Young officers, on first joining, to be attached to European regiments for two years, then to be examined in native languages, regimental drills and exercises, &c., . . . and then posted to European or native corps or staff corps, according to qualifications. Those posted to native army to remain attached to European corps, till passed in Urdu, and otherwise fit to command in native regiments as lieutenants on the general list.

Officers of engineers, artillery, and staff corps to be classified in a *general list*.

Officers of European cavalry and infantry—*regimentally*, until field officers, then on a *general list*.

Officers of native cavalry and infantry—on a *general list* for army rank, but for duty in regiments, *regimentally*.

Officers of European cavalry and infantry to be allowed to take special appointments for a specified time, but afterwards to return to regimental duty, or else to enter staff corps, where promotion is less rapid.

Permission should be given soldiers of Madras and Bombay armies to enter Bengal service if desired.

The new native army to be organized on the following principles:—

(1) Men of all respectable castes admitted in fair proportion, but neither Brahmins nor Syuds in too large numbers.

(2) To proceed wherever ordered, by sea or otherwise.

(3) To be formed into messes of ten men each, one man of good caste selected as cook or caterer.

(4) Armed with muskets and fusils, not requiring greased cartridges.

(5) When not employed on military duty, to serve as sappers and pioneers, extra *batta* being given.

(6) Each native infantry regiment to consist of not more than 600 men, under one commandant, four officers of companies, one adjutant and quartermaster, one serjeant-major, and one quartermaster-sergeant; with one native commissioned officer for each company, and the usual proportion of non-commissioned rank.

(7) Promotion to rank of native officer not to be by seniority, as formerly, but deserving havildars to be occasionally promoted from other regiments.

(8) When necessary to supersede an old havildar, that he be permitted to retire on half-pay, with the rank of Jemadar, to recruit for the regiment in his native village.

(9) That no European officer be appointed to a company who has not passed the Urdu examination, nor any be eligible who has not passed as interpreter (after a specified date), for the position of commandant or adjutant.

(10) That no officer be appointed to a native corps who has not attained the age of twenty-one, or has not been thoroughly instructed in drill and discipline with an European regiment.

(11) Pay of European commandant to be not less than £1,000; adjutant and quartermaster £600; officers of companies (exclusive of allowance for repairs of arms) £400, increasing according to rank and service to £600 or more.

In regular cavalry, *if still kept up*, each regiment to consist of three squadrons, each troop to be commanded by an European officer (the senior holding squadrons), and one supernumerary officer attached to each squadron in the field. In the irregular

cavalry, one commandant, one second in command, and one adjutant, appear sufficient.

The pay of officers of regular cavalry to be one-fourth more than the infantry, and that of irregular cavalry one-third above infantry scale ; but no officer to be appointed to the latter who has not passed as interpreter, or is not noted as a good horseman, or skilled in military exercises.

The dress of the whole native army to be made more suitable to the climate and habits of the men.

The concluding portion treats of the medical staff to be attached to each regiment, and of the improvement of the schools already established in many regiments for the children of Christian bandmen ; these latter were to be extended and the Sepoys encouraged to attend them.

In reference to the above memorandum Sir Charles writes :—

OSBORNE, *Aug. 18th, 1887.*

MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

I have read your letters and the papers which accompanied them, with all the interest which they excite and deserve.

They are very valuable to me, as instructing me upon a subject of which I am very ignorant, but which is certainly the paramount subject of the day, and which must before long engross the chief attention of statesmen.

Your military plan has much that is good in it, and the chief points to which I should have objected would be the appearance of promotion, as it were, from the European regiments to the native—the reason for this is evidently the acquirement of a proficiency in the native languages, but unless you gave some material advantage in pay, or advantages to these corps, you would not, I think, induce young men to undergo this extra trouble for the purpose of commanding Indians instead of Englishmen—and if you do make the commissions in the native

service more valuable, I think you would create great jealousy. The selection for civil and political employment from the staff corps, would, I fear, not only open the door to much jobbery, but would take all your best men from the department in which it is most necessary to retain them. . . . But my opinion is, and I believe it is one that is very generally spreading, that, now that it is necessary that the army in India should be, in a very large proportion, composed of Europeans—that is, of Englishmen—it is impossible that the lives, the reputation, and the *prestige* of British armies should any longer be left under the control and government of the East India Company. The anomaly, even whilst the Indian army consisted of natives, and the white regiments were the exception, was a very startling one, and the system certainly has not, in point of experience, worked well—indeed, the constant jealousies between the Royal and Company's officers was in itself a sufficient practical difficulty; but it appears to me impossible, *speaking solely and entirely for myself*, to justify, in any way, the raising of a large British army, to serve anybody but the Queen.

There appears to me to be objections to such a system—constitutional, economical, political, and moral—that render it quite impossible to be continued. It does not require much argument, I think, to prove that it is not likely that the directors of the East India Company should be very able military administrators, and it is well known how little power is entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief in India. The system has been an enormous command of patronage, exercised at a distance, and the local administration of the army has never been entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief in India, whilst by staff and civil appointments, those who remain in the ranks of the army are divided into two classes—the expectants of employment, and consequent seekers of patrons; and the disappointed and discontented.

I feel confident, from what I hear and see around, that the rule of the Company is doomed; and though I am aware that the subject is a most delicate and most difficult one, with which I am wholly incompetent to grapple, I am equally convinced that the only problems now to be solved are the how and the when.

The other question upon which you touch—the missionary efforts to convert the native population—is one of *at least* equal

difficulty. . . . No one, I think, can object to the voluntary efforts of missionaries and their parent societies, . . . but, in the first place, great care must be taken that these attempts are not, in any degree, combined or mixed up with your acts of government, or any display of your power. You, *as a Government*, are not entitled to deal with them, as a people, upon this subject. . . . Private, devout and earnest individuals may at their own cost and hazard endeavour to win individuals . . . to Christianity; but they must do this with a proper regard for the feelings, however erroneous, of those whom they attack, or take the consequences. . . . The burthen of this lecture* is, throughout, the direct interference of the Almighty in the work of His mission. This is a most dangerous doctrine, but a very common one amongst very earnest religious men. It is evident that what God personally does, or marks His approval of, cannot be wrong; and if, therefore, they can only attain assent to their assertion, it necessarily follows that whatever they do is right. To carry on the greatest work of life, reason, as well as zeal, is requisite. . . . In short, when we attempt to eradicate the frightful superstitions of the Hindoos, we must take care that the pure religion which we give them in return is not blurred with the slightest shade of superstition.

. . . . If this mutiny has not originated in a religious feeling, excited by the Brahmins, have you any idea *upon what it is founded*? The Sepoys did not appear to have brought forward any complaint as to their treatment as soldiers; there does not appear to have been any political element in it, at least, no political object has been declared; but *if* a general idea has been given the natives that there was an extended intention to break down their differences of caste, and to press upon them a change of religion, I cannot but think that the work of conversion, holy and commendable in itself, necessary, and ultimately certain in its success, has not at present been carried on with the necessary delicacy and discretion.

Sincerely yours,

C. B. PHIPPS.

* An Address given by Mr. Clark, missionary at Peshawur, which Login had forwarded to Sir C. Phipps.

To the first objection to his military scheme contained in this letter—viz., The appearance of promotion from the European to the native army—Login replies :—

That it was necessary that officers in native regiments should be conversant with the language, and have had training in a European corps; because they were good linguists, it did not follow that they were better military men than their fellows.

To the second objection, viz.,—That without some material advantage, in pay or otherwise, young men would not be induced to undergo the extra trouble, &c., he says :—

“ According to the scheme, they receive one-fourth more pay, are able to live more economically, *but rise by seniority.*” In the European corps they would rise more rapidly by purchase. There would not be the rush for the staff corps that Sir Charles anticipated, owing to the early age at which the choice must be made, the slower promotion, and the extra examinations. After the period of probation, there would be a second examination for staff duties. Officers belonging to the military branch of the staff corps were to be eligible for adjutant-general, quartermaster-general, and surveyor's departments, guide corps, judge-advocate's department, commissariat, pay, audit, clothing departments, and military police; those of the civil branch for public works, political, revenue, and judicial departments; their pay to be one-fourth more than regimental officers of the native army.

With regard to the causes of the Mutiny, Login says :—

“ From the confidence reposed in the fidelity of the Sepoys, the Government had allowed them to outnumber the European troops in undue proportion, had entrusted them with the protection of its arsenals and magazines, and instructed them carefully in all military duties. To attach them to our service, pensions had been granted to them on retirement from age or incapacity, and

to their widows and orphans, in the event of their death in the field. They were encouraged, more than any other class, to attach high importance to caste observances, pampered in all their prejudices by concessions of every kind, and enabled to make these prejudices profitable to them in many ways. They were carefully excluded from any instruction except through the drill-sergeant, and the slightest interference with their habits, or attempt to remove their ignorance and superstition, were viewed by the military authorities with the greatest distrust." The "greased cartridges" was only a rallying cry, which served for Hindoos and Mahomedans alike; the real causes of the Mutiny were the sense that the introduction of education, railways, and telegraphs into India, and the suppression of immoral practices, would interfere with their caste prejudices *in time*, so that they ought to make a stand *now*; while, on the other hand, "they considered their loyalty to be of the last importance to us, attributed most of the attentions on the part of Government to a consciousness of their power, and believed that we held dominion in India on their sufferance alone!" They also resented the enlistment of new recruits for general service, and of Sikhs and Punjabis; while the finishing stroke was the annexation of Oude, since, as long as Oude was under a native ruler, their families and homes (by special agreement with the British Government) were exempt from taxation, but this privilege ceased on the annexation of the country. These grievances were felt by the older Hindostani Sepoys, who were chiefly recruited in Oude, and, as they could not be taken up generally, nothing was said of them, and the cry of the "greased cartridges" served the purpose of the ringleaders most admirably, and enabled them, through the bigoted ignorance and superstition which, with so much infatuation, the Government had *fostered* in the native army, to get up an alarm for their religion and caste.

Login was of opinion that the elevation of the Great Mogul to his ancestral throne was due to the impetuosity of the Mahomedan mutineers of the 3rd Cavalry at Meerut, and that it introduced an element into the future proceedings of the mutineers, which saved us from more extended defection, and gave us allies who might otherwise have been opposed to us. As to the ignorance of the English officers of the disaffection of their troops, it seems probable

that those who were best affected to their officers would be afraid to be seen by their more violent comrades communicating with them, and even the havildars, or native officers, whose *duty* it was to give in the usual reports, would be afraid to give more than a distant hint that "the men were greatly alarmed that the Government were going to make them Christians *by obliging them to bite greased cartridges.*" This report would probably be received by the officer with a good-humoured laugh, and perhaps a quizzical joke on the occasion, which the havildar would *appear* to enjoy as much as any one, and then go away, quite satisfied in his own conscience that he had given as much warning as he could do without risk to himself, in this life or the next, leaving the Englishman to tell his brother officer, "What *spoons* these Sepoys were!" "I earnestly trust," says Login, "that as our present contest in India is for a higher purpose than merely the protection of our commerce and our territorial rule—for truth against error, Christian civilization against barbarism—the manner in which we conduct it, and the use we make of our victories, may rise with the occasion."

Sir Charles Phipps, in a long letter from Balmoral, dated September 2nd, 1857, discusses fully the subject-matter of the last memorandum, but want of space prevents more than a few quotations.

I have to thank you for your most interesting letter and enclosure of August 28th. It would be the height of foolish presumption, were I to attempt to argue upon Indian subjects with you; indeed my objections are more calculated to draw out from you rejoinders by which I may profit and obtain information than to be of themselves of any value. Writing from myself, and without consulting any better locally informed authority, I can found my opinions only upon general principles, and their local application must of course depend much upon Indian peculiarities. . . . I see many practical difficulties in the *details* of your plan. I will put a case. Two officers enter the European Indian army at the same time; one is detached upon active duty, which leaves him no time for study of languages for several months; the other, re-

maining at a stationary quarter, has little to do and applies himself diligently to study the native languages. If they both intend to compete for the superior service, which alone leads to better emoluments and greater distinction, it is evident that the one who has been in his early service the most employed, and consequently the most useful, will, *ceteris paribus*, be always toiling in vain after him who was left in ease and inactivity. . . . With regard to the staff corps, I quite think that the formation of such a corps is very desirable, and that you will find in it many materials, which, particularly in India, will be very useful. . . . I await with anxiety your opinion on the last intelligence from India. I do not see what reason we have to expect any more favourable, nor do I understand any disappointment at Delhi not having fallen into the hands of that little army, which had long been waiting for reinforcements, which had not yet arrived. . . . The real direction in which, as it appears to me, we must point our most anxious looks, is to the firmness and fidelity of the other two Presidencies, and one cannot but fear, as time passes on, that the temptations offered may be undermining their fidelity.

. . . . I fear that you will have cause to regret the wet day that has given me time to inflict such a letter upon you.

I have by the Queen's direction ordered a clock to be sent down, which Her Majesty would wish to be presented, from her, to the Maharajah, but I will write upon a different sheet.

Ever sincerely yours,

C. B. PHIPPS.

In reply to Colonel Phipps' argument, stated as a hypothetical case of two young officers, one on active service, the other in cantonments, Sir John Login says:—

“I would by no means make proficiency in a critical knowledge of the languages a criterion of qualifications either for the native army or for the staff. A knowledge of the language required in a good officer of the native army is colloquial rather than literal, and the chances are that a young officer actively employed in

India on duty, even with European troops, will pick up the colloquial of the country quite as readily as another left in quarters; no one who is unable to do so, and to converse freely with the natives after two years' service in India, should, I think, be eligible either for the native army or staff corps. Higher qualifications in the language than this are not required in the first instance; but before an officer can be eligible for an adjutancy, certainly if not for the command of a native corps, he ought to be able, at least, to read easily, if not to write, the ordinary characters used in native correspondence among his men.

“No literary examination proves a good criterion of a cavalry officer, the hunting field affords the best training for *him*; but for officers of the quartermaster and surveyor-general and judge-advocate departments, the guide corps, commissariat, police, and civil branches, examination in the native language is essential. The adjutant-general's department should not be exclusively recruited from the staff corps, as good regimental officers are essential.”

In explaining the position and powers of the Commander-in-Chief in India towards the civil government, with regard to the peculiar functions of the Adjutant-General, Login pointed out that it was incorrect to assume (as Colonel Phipps did) that the late troubles arose from insufficient powers being granted to the Commander-in-Chief, who was appointed by the Horse Guards; that that officer's remonstrances, and desire for reforms in the army, were entirely disregarded by the Governor-General and Council, so that they would not even allow him to inspect Sepoy regiments! This Login showed to be a misconception of the actual state of things, and to support his assertion, referred the question to Sir George Pollock, than whom no higher authority could be found on Indian military matters, and whose friendship and confidence he had enjoyed throughout his career. Sir George's reply is as follows:—

CLAPHAM COMMON, Oct. 10th, 1857.

MY DEAR LOGIN,

Sir William Gomm applied to the Supreme Government for postheens and additional winter trousers for the European troops

-serving at Peshawur; the Governor-General *in Council* did not see the necessity for this additional clothing for the Europeans, as they had already as much as is allowed in *England*, and declined to provide it. Under ordinary circumstances, such an application would not again have been urged, but Sir W. Gomm passed by the Governor-General, and wrote direct to the Horse Guards or the War Department, urging the necessity of the measure. The Horse Guards ought, at that time, to have known better; they might have consulted several persons who had been at Peshawur, who could have told them that snow *never* fell there; but no! red tape would not brook such a course. Whether the War Department was referred to, I cannot say, but I think it was; however, the Board of Control was written to, and from that quarter an authoritative letter was sent, requiring the consent of the Court of Directors, who—although they were aware of the absurdity of the request—complied.

Sir George also told the following anecdote to show that Commander-in-Chiefs were in the habit of inspecting native troops :—

The commanding officer of a Sikh regiment was exceedingly proud of the manner in which his men went through the bayonet exercise and other evolutions; and their perfect steadiness on parade attracted the admiration of every soldier who saw them. General Anson having visited the station on his tour of inspection, this regiment was paraded before him, but observing that, as is the custom among Sikhs and Punjabis, they wore long beards and moustaches, and tight, unshapely pantaloons, he turned away with the remark, "You call *these* soldiers—how very unmilitary! Look at their pantaloons and their buttons!" and went on to examine some other regiment.

Having been requested to state his views on the best form of Imperial Government for India, Sir John Login

drew up an elaborate scheme which contained, amongst others, the following suggestions :—

(1) That the Government of India at home be entrusted to a Cabinet Minister (preferably a Peer of the Realm with some personal knowledge of India), assisted by a Council, of which he should be President, and as such be responsible to Parliament for their proceedings. (2) That there should be a Vice-President of the Council (under-Secretary of State), a member of the House of Commons, to be removed from office on change of Ministry. (3) That the Indian Council consist of twelve persons, of whom two-thirds be carefully selected by the Ministry for the time being, for their knowledge of Indian affairs, and the remaining one-third represent the commerce and manufactures of the country. (4) That those appointed by the Minister should be permanent, and placed in a position as independent as the judges; not allowed to hold seats in Parliament, or be directors of any commercial company; that the commercial members be appointed for five years by the Ministry, from lists submitted to them by the Chambers of Commerce of the United Kingdom and by the Board of Trade; no restrictions as to seats in Parliament to apply to these latter members. (5) That fixed salaries be allotted to the members of Council; that they be retired at a certain age with pension and honorary rank as members of Council; that the commercial members receive no pension. (6) That the rank of Honorary Member of Council may be conferred on all present directors of Honourable East India Company, on Governors-General, Commander-in-Chiefs and high officials, also on natives of rank and character who may visit England. (7) That two or more members be appointed direct from England to the Legislative Council at Calcutta. (8) That on the restoration of tranquillity in India, a proclamation should be made of the intention of Her Majesty to assume the administrative directly through Her Ministers, after a given date. (9) That members of the Legislative Council be selected from Madras and Bombay as well as Bengal.

The remainder of this scheme dealt chiefly with details of the constitution and powers of the proposed Council for India at home,

and the Legislative Council in India, and of the authority of the first over the second, also with the extent to which the Minister had power to act if opposed to the majority of his Council. It also suggested that an annual statement of Indian affairs be made in both Houses of Parliaments by the responsible Ministers at an early period of the Session, and an annual report be issued in the Blue Book and laid before Parliament, of the "moral and material progress" of India; furthermore, that the utmost latitude be allowed to the Viceroy and his Council, and that the duties of the Minister and Council in England be limited to foreign policy, military arrangements, assimilation of laws and institutions to the spirit of English civilization, as far as local circumstances render expedient, control of the judicial, financial and revenue systems, encouragement of commerce and extension of free trade.

"You will not be surprised," remarks Colonel Phipps, in his voluminous reply dated Balmoral, Sept. 14th, 1857, "that I hesitated and took time to consider before I attempted to enter upon a subject which you have evidently considered so deeply and understand so well as that of the transfer of the supreme power in India from the Directors of the East India Company to the Crown. It is a subject upon which I still feel myself utterly unequal to give an opinion of any value." Further on he says:—"It appears to me that your opinion as to the time most fitted for any change to take place is well grounded. For some time to come, until the fermentation caused by this revolt has subsided, the Government of India must be in an exceptional state, and the new system of rule will grow better out of such a system of transition than from any other more normal state."

On September 28th he writes:—

In answering your letter and accompanying paper of the 24th inst., I must begin by thanking you for the free and unrestrained manner in which you have entered upon the different subjects. Without such sincerity, a correspondence such as ours would be a

mere waste of time, for wherever there was a different opinion between us, we should not know whether we were combating with the substance, or only a veiled shadow: Havelock has done very well; his promotion to the rank of major-general has gone out to him. . . . I have confined this letter to the *military* portion of your papers, and you will think that I have given you a pretty sufficient budget for one post! I have never kept copies of *my* letters, and I should be very much obliged to you if you would either let me have the originals to take copies or have copies taken for me—not for their own value, but because *your letters lose some of their value* without those to which they are an answer.

Sept. 29th. Since writing the enclosed I have read the telegram from India. How unsatisfactory!—the same story—creeping progress of the revolt—not a step in advance! Havelock's retreat is most unfortunate, and creates the worst fears for Lucknow, when one considers the daily consumption of men that must be going on, and that no reinforcements of importance can be expected for a month from this time,—it makes one tremble!

III.

BHYROWAL TREATY, 1846.

Articles of Agreement concluded between the BRITISH GOVERNMENT and the LAHORE DURBAR, on Dec. 16th, 1846.

Whereas the Lahore Durbar and the principal Chiefs and Sirdars of the State have in express terms communicated to the British Government their anxious desire that the Governor-General should give his aid and assistance to maintain the administration of the Lahore State, during the minority of Maharajah Duleep Singh, and have declared this measure to be indispensable for the maintenance of the Government: And, whereas the Governor-General has, under certain conditions, consented to give the aid and assistance solicited; the following Articles of Agree-

ment, in modification of the Articles of Agreement executed at Lahore on the 11th of March last, have been concluded on the part of the British Government by Frederick Currie, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, and Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Montgomery Lawrence, C.B., Agent to the Governor-General, North-West Frontier, by virtue of full powers to that effect vested in them by the Right Honourable Viscount Hardinge, G.C.B., Governor-General; and, on the part of His Highness Maharajah Duleep Singh, by Sirdar Taj Singh, Sirdar Shere Singh, Dewan Deena Nath, Fakeer Nooroodeen, Ræ Kishen Chund, Sirdar Runjore Singh Mujeetheea, Sirdar Shumshere Singh, Sirdar Lal Singh Morareea, Sirdar Kher Singh Sindhanwala, Sirdar Urjun Singh Rungnungealeea, acting with the unanimous consent and concurrence of the Chiefs and Sirdars of the State assembled at Lahore.

Article I.—All and every part of the Treaty of Peace between the British Government and the State of Lahore, bearing date the 9th day of March, 1846, except in so far as it may be temporarily modified in respect to Clause 15 of the said Treaty by this engagement, shall remain binding upon the two Governments.

Article II.—A British officer, with an efficient establishment of assistants, shall be appointed by the Governor-General to remain at Lahore, which officer shall have full authority to direct and control all matters in every department of the State.

Article III.—Every attention shall be paid, in conducting the administration, to the feelings of the people, to preserving the national institutions and customs, and to maintain the just rights of all classes.

Article IV.—Changes in the mode and details of administration shall not be made, except when found necessary for effecting the objects set forth in the foregoing clause, and for securing the just dues of the Lahore Government. These details shall be conducted by native officers, as at present, who shall be appointed and superintended by a Council of Regency, composed of leading Chiefs and Sirdars, acting under the control and guidance of the British Resident.

Article V.—The following persons shall, in the first instance,

constitute the Council of Regency—viz., Sirdar Tej Singh, Sirdar Shere Singh Attarewala, Dewan Deena Nath, Fakeer Nooroodeen, Sirdar Runjore Singh Majeetheea, Bhaee Nidham Singh, Sirdar Utter Singh Kaleewala, Sirdar Shumshere Singh Sindhanwala; and no change shall be made in the persons thus nominated without the consent of the British Resident, acting under the orders of the Governor-General.

Article VI.—The administration of the country shall be conducted by this Council of Regency in such manner as may be determined on by themselves, in consultation with the British Resident, who shall have full authority to direct and control the duties of every department.

Article VII.—A British force of such strength and numbers, and in such positions as the Governor-General may think fit, shall remain at Lahore for the protection of the Maharajah and the preservation of the peace of the country.

Article VIII.—The Governor-General shall be at liberty to occupy with British soldiers any fort or military post in the Lahore territories, the occupation of which may be deemed necessary by the British Government for the security of the capital, or for maintaining the peace of the country.

Article IX.—The Lahore State shall pay to the British Government twenty-two lakhs of new Nanuk Shabee rupees, of full tale and weight per annum, for the maintenance of this force, and to meet the expenses incurred by the British Government; such sum to be paid by two instalments, or thirteen lakhs and 20,000 in May or June, and eight lakhs and 80,000 in November or December of each year.

Article X.—Inasmuch as it is fitting that Her Highness, the Maharanee, the mother of Maharajah Duleep Singh, should have a proper provision made for the maintenance of herself and dependents, the sum of one lakh and 50,000 rupees shall be set apart annually for that purpose, and shall be at Her Highness's disposal.

Article XI.—The provisions of this engagement shall have effect

during the minority of His Highness Maharajah Duleep Singh, and shall cease and terminate on His Highness attaining the full age of sixteen years, or on the 4th of September of the year 1854, but it shall be competent to the Governor-General to cause the arrangement to cease at any period prior to the coming of age of His Highness, at which the Governor-General and the Lahore Durbar may be satisfied that the interposition of the British Government is no longer necessary for maintaining the Government of His Highness the Maharajah.

This Agreement, consisting of eleven Articles, was settled and executed at Lahore by the Officers and Chiefs and Sirdars above-named, on the 16th day of December, 1846.

TEJ SINGH.
 SHERE SINGH.
 DEWAN DEENA NATH.
 FAKEEB NOOROODEEN.
 RAE KISHEN CHUND.
 RUNJORE SINGH.
 UTTER SINGH.

F. CURRIE.
 H. M. LAWRENCE.
 BHAE NIDHAM SINGH.
 SIRDAR KHAN SINGH.
 SHUMSHERE SINGH.
 LAL SINGH MORABEEA.
 KHEE SINGH.
 UBJUN SINGH.