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1. The Franchise Bill. speech delivered by the RT. Hon. W.E. Gladstone in the House of Commons, on 28th Feb. 1884. 30p
 2. Is a Publican's Licence a Freehold? A speech by W. S. Carr. 12th Mar 1890. 30p.

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3. Patriotism. An address delivered to the students of the University of Glasgow. By the RT. Hon. J. Chamberlain; 3rd Nov. 1897. 61p.

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AUTHORISED EDITION.

THE FRANCHISE-BILL.

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SPEECH

DELIVERED BY THE

RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P.,

IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

ON

Moving for leave to introduce a Bill to amend the law relating to the
Representation of the People,

ON THURSDAY, 28TH FEBRUARY, 1884.

*Printed for the Liberal Central Association, 41 and
Parliament Street, Westminster, S.W.*

PUBLISHED BY

ESS AGENCY, LIMITED,

ars Street, E.C.

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PRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE BILL.

MR. GLADSTONE, on rising to ask leave to introduce the Repeal of the People Amendment Bill, said :—
Sir, I intend to dismiss altogether from my mind and memory the conversation, or nearly the whole of the conversation, of the last quarter of an hour, and shall proceed to address myself to a subject which a large proportion of this House at least believes to be of vital importance in that full reliance upon the indulgence of the House which my experience assures me I may very safely anticipate. It commonly happens with regard to these large and constitutional questions—and it is well that it should so happen—that before they are proposed upon the responsibility of the Queen's Government they have attained to an advanced stage of progress in the public mind through discussion out of doors ; and in consequence it is not necessary very long to detain the House with the general arguments which, if they were entirely new, would undoubtedly be requisite in order to make a case for the introduction of a Bill. On that part of the subject, therefore, I shall be very brief, but a few words I must necessarily

I conceive that this Bill, this proposition, may be presented to the House under any one, and indeed under all, of three distinct and several aspects. In the first place, it is on our part a redemption of a pledge, because, although I do not use the word "pledge" in its more narrow and objectionable sense, there is no doubt, I think, as regards, the persons prominently concerned in conducting the affairs of the country in conjunction with the Liberal party, that

at and before, as well as since, the last election they have constantly assured the country that they regarded the work of Parliamentary reform as a proper and vital part of the mission, so to speak, of the present Parliament. The proposition may be regarded secondly as intended to satisfy a desire, for our belief is that a desire for the extension of the household franchise to the counties is widely and generally entertained among the classes who are to be affected by that extension. But there is another aspect in which I for one should hope that it will still more pointedly and constantly be viewed. It is a proposal in satisfaction of a pledge. It is a proposal to meet a desire. But above all it is a proposal in my view, and I think I may say in our view, to add strength to the State. I am not prepared to discuss admission to the franchise as it was discussed fifty years ago when Lord John Russell had to state with almost bated breath that he expected to add in the three kingdoms half a million to the constituencies. It is not now a question of nicely calculated less or more. I take my stand on the broad principle that the enfranchisement of capable citizens, be they few or be they many, —and if they be many so much the better—gives an addition of strength to the State. The strength of the modern State lies in the representative system. I rejoice to think that in this happy country and under this happy Constitution we have other sources of strength in the respect paid to various orders of the State, and in the authority they enjoy, and in the unbroken course which has been allowed to most of our national traditions ; but still, in the main, it is the representative system which is the strength of the modern State in general, and of the State in this country in particular. Sir, I may say—it is an illustration which won't occupy more than a moment—that never has this great truth been so vividly illustrated as in the war of the American Republic. The convulsion of that country between 1861 and 1865 was perhaps the most frightful which ever assailed a national existence. The efforts which were made on both sides were marked. The exertions by which alone the movement was put down were not only extraordinary, they were what would antecedently have been called impossible, and they were only rendered possible by the fact that they proceeded from

a nation where every capable citizen was enfranchised and had a direct and an energetic interest in the well-being and the unity of the State. Sir, the only question that remains in the general argument is, who are capable citizens?—"Hear, hear" from the Opposition)—and, fortunately, that is a question which, on the present occasion, need not be argued at length, for it has been already settled—in the first place by a solemn legislative judgment acquiesced in by both parties in the State, and in the second place by the experience of the last more than fifteen years. Who, Sir, are the capable citizens of the State, whom it is proposed to enfranchise? It is proposed in the main to enfranchise the county population on the footing, and according to the measure, that has already been administered to the population of the towns. What are the main constituents of the county population? First of all, they are the minor tradesmen of the country, and the skilled labourers and artisans in all the common arts of life, and especially in connection with our great mining industry. Is there any doubt that these are capable citizens? You (the Opposition) have yourselves asserted it by enfranchising them in the towns, and we can only say that we heartily subscribe to the assertion. But besides the artisans and the minor tradesmen scattered throughout our rural towns we have also to deal with the peasantry of the country. Is there any doubt that the peasantry of the country are capable citizens, qualified for enfranchisement, qualified to make good use of their power as voters? This is a question which has been solved for us by the first and second Reform Bills, because many of the places which under the name of towns are now represented in this House are really rural communities, based upon a peasant constituency. For my part I should be quite ready to fight the battle of the peasant upon general and argumentative grounds. I believe the peasant generally to be, not in the highest sense, but in a very real sense, a skilled labourer. He is not a man tied down to one mechanical exercise of his physical powers. He is a man who must do many things, and many things which require in him the exercise of active intelligence. But as I say, it is not necessary to argue on that ground, first of all because we have got his friends here—

(Ministerial laughter, as Mr. Gladstone indicated the Opposition)—from whom we must anticipate great zeal for his enfranchisement ; and secondly, because the question has been settled by legislative authority in the towns, and by practical experience. If he has a defect it is that he is too ready, perhaps, to work with and to accept the influence of his superiors—superiors, I mean, in worldly station. But that is the last defect that you (the Opposition) will be disposed to plead against him, and it is a defect that we do not feel ourselves entitled to plead, and that we are not at all inclined to plead. We are ready to take him as he is and joyfully bring him within the reach of this last and highest privilege of the Constitution. There is only one other word, Sir, to add on this part of the subject. The present position of the franchise is one of greater and grosser anomaly than any in which it has been heretofore placed, because the exclusion of persons of the same class and the same description is more palpable and more pervading than before, being, in fact, spread over the whole country, persons being excluded in one place while the same persons are admitted in another. I wish just to call the attention of the House to an important fact connected with this part of the question which is of frequent occurrence. It is a thing which the House detests, and which we in this Bill shall endeavour to avoid—namely, the infliction of personal disfranchisement. Observe how the present state of the franchise law brings this about. It is known and well understood that a labourer must follow his labour. Where his labour goes, where the works go in which he is employed, he must follow. He cannot remain at a great distance from them ; and the instance I will give—and though I am not personally conversant with it, I believe there is no doubt about the fact—is an instance which I think singularly applicable. It is that of the ship-building works on the Clyde. Those works were within the precincts of the city of Glasgow, and the persons who laboured in them were able to remain within the city, being near their work, and at the same time to enjoy the franchise. But the marvellous enterprise of Glasgow, which has made that city the centre and crown of the ship-building business of the world, could not be confined within the limits of the city of Glasgow, and it moved down the river. As the trade moved down

the river the artisans required to move down the river with it. That was a matter of necessity, and the obedience to that necessity involves under the present law wholesale disfranchisement. That is an argument which is sufficient for disposing of the general question. The whole population, I rejoice to think, have liberty of speech, they have liberty of writing, they have liberty of meeting in public, they have liberty of private association, they have liberty of petitioning Parliament. All these privileges are not privileges taking away from us, diminishing our power and security, they are all of them privileges on the existence of which our security depends. Without them we could not be secure. I ask you to confer upon the very same classes the crowning privilege of voting for a representative in Parliament, and then I say we who are strong now as a nation and a State shall by virtue of that change be stronger still.

I shall be obliged from the circumstances in which I stand to deal with this subject on its affirmative and on its negative side. I shall endeavour to explain to the House, without undue detail and without affecting too much of legal and technical precision, what are the provisions contained in the Bill that I propose on the part of the Government to introduce. But it will be equally necessary for me to dwell upon proposals which some have expected, and some have desired to see in the Bill, but which the Bill does not contain; because what I have to say upon that subject is vital to all hope of carrying what is contained in the Bill. Now I have considered what would be the most convenient course of exposition to the House, and I have arrived at this conclusion—I wish to fix and fasten your attention in the first place upon the borough franchise as it exists in England, because the borough franchise as it exists in England, with the modifications which we propose to introduce into it, and which I will immediately proceed to explain, is the hinge of the whole Bill. Upon that borough franchise the entire structure holds as respects not only England, but likewise as respects Scotland and as respects Ireland. The borough franchise, as it is, is three-fold. I put entirely out of sight what are sometimes called the “ancient-right” franchises—the case of freemen, the case of liverymen, the case of burgess tenure, and whatever other miscellaneous franchises there

are surviving under the old system. I put them aside, for they are not touched by the Bill for reasons which I will afterwards explain. Setting these aside, then, the borough franchise is three-fold. It consists, in the first place, of enfranchised occupiers of buildings of £10 clear annual value, with or without land. That was the franchise established by the Act of 1832. It consists, in the second place, of inhabiting occupiers of rated dwelling-houses. That is the franchise established and extended by the Acts of 1867, 1868, and 1869, and is the principal borough franchise of the country. The third branch of the borough franchise is the lodger franchise. So much for the present borough franchise in England.

Now I come to the future borough franchise which we propose. We leave the "ancient-right" franchises, as I have already said, exactly as they now are. We touch them in no way. We leave the household franchise established by the Act of 1867 exactly as it is now. We leave the lodger franchise exactly as it is now. But we do two things notwithstanding. First of all, for reasons which are partly of principle and partly with a view to unity, we extend the £10 clear yearly value franchise to cases where the occupation is of land without houses or buildings. At present it may be for houses or buildings alone, or houses or buildings with land. We extend it to land alone without buildings. There is a more important change which we propose to introduce, and it is also in the direction of extension. We propose to establish a new franchise, which I should call—till a better phrase be discovered—the service franchise. It will be given to persons who are inhabitants, and in the sense of inhabitancy, who are occupiers. The present law restricts, I believe, the signification of the term "occupiers" to those who are either owners or tenants. Our object is to provide a franchise for those inhabitants who are neither owners nor tenants; but they must be householders in this sense—either, in the first place, that they are actual inhabitants; or, in the second place, that there is no other inhabitant with them, superseding them or standing in the same position with them; and in the third place, they must either be inhabitants of an integral house or else of that separate part of a house which, at any rate, so far as England is concerned, has

already been declared to be a house for electoral purposes. Hon. gentlemen are aware of the general reasons which may be pleaded in favour of this enlargement. It is an enlargement absolutely required by the principle of this Bill, because the principal and central idea of this Bill is to give every householder a vote. The householder is just as much a householder, and has just as much the responsibility of a householder, whether he is in the eye of the law an owner or a tenant, or whether he is not, provided he is an inhabitant in the sense I have described. And this service franchise is a far-reaching franchise. It goes to men of high class, who inhabit valuable houses, as the officers of great institutions. It descends to men of humble class, who are the servants of the gentry, or the servants of the farmer, or the servants of some other employer of labour who are neither owners nor tenants, and who, in many cases, cannot be held as tenants, in consequence of the essential conditions intended to be realised through their labours, but who fully fulfil the idea of responsible inhabitant householders. The House will, therefore, see that in the future borough franchise, if our proposals be adopted, there will be a fourfold occupation or householding franchise—the old clear yearly value franchise of the Act of 1832, the lodger franchise of the Act of 1867, the service franchise of the Act (as I trust) of 1864, and there will be what is the most important of them all—the household franchise proposed in 1867, and developed from its original narrow and stunted proportions partly by the votes of this House and partly by subsequent Acts of Parliament, into what it is now—namely, the principal franchise of the cities and towns of this country. If hon. gentlemen will be good enough to retain in their minds this fourfold occupation franchise—the principal and almost exclusive basis of the franchise in English boroughs hereafter—they will have laid down a fixed standing point, from which they will be easily able to follow me in everything which I have further to explain.

I pass from the boroughs of England to the counties of England. The present county franchise I shall describe without any attempt at technical precision, but in popular terms, and I throw it into three classes. There is, first of all, the £50 rental franchise of occupiers

introduced under what was called the Chandos clause in the Act of 1832, and next to this the £12 rating franchise of occupiers introduced by the Act of 1867. These are different in their minute conditions, although they are alike in certain of these conditions, and in this condition particularly—that neither the one nor the other requires residence, and yet that they both of them fall under the condition of occupation franchise. The third description of the voter in the county is the voter in respect of property. Here again I shall not descend into detail, but simply say that by the voter in respect of property I mean the man who votes in respect of a freehold, in respect of a copyhold, or in respect of a leasehold. That is the present county franchise.

And now you will ask, how do we propose to deal with it? We propose to proceed as follows—I name the minor changes first. The first of these changes is one which is really intended for no other purpose than that of practical convenience and simplicity. It is, that we propose to abolish the £50 franchise, which I shall call for convenience sake the £50 rental franchise. I propose to abolish it because two categories of franchise where only one is necessary are highly inconvenient in the rate-books and registration of the country, and because we believe it is hardly possible that there will be any man entitled to this £50 rental franchise who will not come within the county franchise as we propose it for the future. The second change we propose is to reduce the figure of the rating franchise of 1867 from £12 rateable value to £10 clear yearly value. Those who hear me are aware that that will be a reduction greater in amount than the mere difference between £12 and £10, and it will appear, I think, as I proceed farther, why it is that we propose to place this franchise on the basis of the clear yearly value rather than on the basis of the rateable value—namely, because we thereby get a definition which we think will run tolerably well through the three countries. Sir, to this franchise we do not propose to attach the condition of residence. These, as I have said, are the minor changes.

But I now come to the main change of the Bill. It is this. I have said there were four occupation franchises in boroughs, one of them the £10 clear yearly value, the other three, the household, the

lodger, and the service franchise. These three we propose to import into the counties precisely as they are to be in the boroughs. Now I hope that will be clearly understood, because I wish to fasten attention upon it, as it is the main, the most operative, and the most extensive, perhaps I should also say the most beneficial change that is proposed.

Well then, with regard to the property franchises, I will not dwell upon them at length, but I will simply for the present say this much: We maintain the property franchises in principle, but we propose provisions which we think are necessary in order to secure them against abuses which are known in many parts of the country, and which in some parts are grievous and menacing to the people. Now I wish to keep together all that relates to the question of occupation. Sir, a fundamental part of the structure of this Bill is the union of the three kingdoms in one measure and essentially, so far as we without undue complexity can achieve it, not only in one measure, but in one and the same franchise.

I pass from England to the case of Scotland, which is a comparatively simple case. My first observation with respect to Scotland, which I beg hon. members from Scotland to bear in mind, is that we leave Scotland everything she at present possesses. She has certain peculiarities, and especially in regard to the borough franchise; it is not necessary for me to enter upon them now, but everything that is peculiar to Scotland will be left as it is. In the second place, we import the service franchise into Scotch boroughs, the Scotch boroughs being already possessed of the lodger and the household franchise, and likewise the £10 clear yearly value franchise. In that way we establish an identity of franchise between Scotch and English boroughs with the exception of those small peculiarities which we find in either country. I have done now with the Scotch boroughs. As regards the Scotch counties the case is pretty simple. We follow the line already laid down for English counties, and we propose to absorb in Scotland, as in England, the £50 rental franchise, which we believe will be quite unnecessary, and will be absorbed in what is now the £14 rated franchise. We propose to reduce that £14 rated franchise to the £10 clear yearly

value franchise, as in England. We also import into Scotch counties the three franchises which they at present want, as the English counties want them—the household, the lodger, and the service franchises. The House will thus understand that we have got to a virtual identity of the franchise, with small and insignificant exceptions, as between Scotland and England.

The case of Ireland is rather more complicated, but with the patient kindness of the House I am sure there will be no difficulty in explaining what we propose to do. The present borough franchise in Ireland is twofold. In the first place there is the £4 rating franchise, but that franchise is not subject to the limitation of the £10 clear yearly value franchise, as in England—viz., that it must consist either of buildings or of buildings and land. It is a franchise which may exist with respect to land alone. Besides that £4 rating franchise there is the lodger franchise. With regard to the borough franchise in Ireland for the future, we propose to leave the lodger franchise as it is now. With regard to the £4 rating franchise, I think it will convey the clearest idea if I say that we propose to abolish it; and there will be a franchise, according to our plan, dependent upon value, and it will be a franchise of £10 clear yearly value, retaining all the other conditions of the £4 rating franchise, and identical with the £10 clear yearly value franchise in England and Scotland, except that each of the three countries has its own separate method of ascertaining what the clear yearly value is, with which we don't propose to interfere. We leave the lodger franchise as it is, and we import into Irish boroughs the service franchise and the household franchise, which is the great thing we have in view, precisely as in England.

With respect to the Irish counties, the matter is simple. We there have to deal with a franchise analogous to the £12 rating franchise in England. We simply reduce the county franchise in Ireland to one of £10 clear yearly value, without altering its conditions in other respects. This is in itself a small change. Having done that, we introduce the great change in Ireland which we propose in England and in Scotland, and we establish in Irish counties, as in Scotland and England, in the first place the

lodger franchise, in the second place the service franchise, and in the third place, and far above all, the household franchise. The House, I think, will see, therefore, in the first place, how far we have gone towards the identification of borough and county franchise, and, in the second place, that we have gone the whole length that it was possible to go in the identification of the franchise in the three kingdoms, and it is a vital and essential part of our measure that they should be treated upon a footing of perfect political equality.

I have done now with the occupation franchises ; and the reason why I have separated them from the property franchises is this—that occupation will inevitably be under the new system the ground and main foundation of our electoral system. Now, the property franchises will and must be few in number. The legitimate property franchises may be, perhaps, somewhat fewer than now, but they must be fewer in number in comparison with the occupation franchises. It is not possible to estimate with precision what proportion of our franchises hereafter will be occupation franchises, but I certainly for myself could not place the proportion of occupying franchises to property franchises, under the operation of this measure, at a lower rate than five as compared to one.

Now I come to the question of property franchise in English counties. Scotland and Ireland are also equally affected, so I shall not make separate statements with regard to them. As I have said, the property franchises in our English counties are freehold, copyhold, and leasehold. We propose that they shall in principle remain ; and the first question that arises is, Shall they or shall they not be made subject to the condition of residence ? We are of opinion, Sir, that upon the whole it is not necessary that they should be subjected to the condition of residence. There is a sort of show about the old English electoral law as if its original principle made residence a condition of the property franchise, which was then the exclusive county franchise. But we do not find that that idea bears scrutiny. The two matters of fact to which alone I need refer are first of all the dictum of Lord Coke, delivered in 1620, which governed the action of the House of Commons, and

governed the practice thereafter. I won't enter into a detail of the case; but Lord Coke's declaration—and the House of Commons acted upon it—was that residence was not enforced as a condition of the property franchise, according to the usage established in this country. And so it continued, and matters continued to be regulated upon that footing for a great length of time until we arrive at the reign of George III. and the Ministry of Lord North. In the time of that Ministry, but not by the action of that Ministry, and not under the influence of that Ministry, but apparently by the spontaneous action of the House of Commons itself, a Bill was introduced which finally and formally dissociated residence from the exercise of the franchise in respect of property. That is the state of things we find established, and which, so far as residence is concerned, we propose to leave. We in no way alter the law of residence, but we do feel that it is quite necessary to make provision against abuses. Those abuses are undoubtedly connected in a great degree with non-residence. I think that if we compare the number of non-resident voters in counties generally with the total county constituencies, we shall find that they are about one-eleventh part. But I am familiar with the case of a county where the non-resident voters are one-fourth part of the constituency. I need not explain to the House what kind of voters they are, or by what process they have appeared upon the roll of county electors, nor will I go into further detail into facts to justify at this moment the propositions which we shall be amply able to justify, should they be questioned. At present my object is to lay clearly before the House our proposal rather than to support and defend it in detail.

We propose, then, Sir, two enactments. In the first place, we propose to disqualify, with due exceptions, those incorporeal hereditaments which are, or readily may be, employed for the creation of fictitious votes. Those incorporeal hereditaments may be classed under two principal categories; in the first of these categories are rent charges; and in the second, are feus, head rents, and the like, where there is no reversion to the person who takes the benefit of the feu or head rent. Well, Sir, we think that it is manifest that there is one just exception, and that is the exception of the

tithe-rent charge of a parish held in single ownership. If we do not retain the condition of single ownership, tithe-rent charge, made, as it is, on every field, would evidently become favourable to the creation of fictitious votes, not in Scotland, where they are not so happy as to possess it, but in England. But the tithe-rent charge is usually held for the parish ; and the tithe-rent charge, not only because it is a very ancient property—perhaps the most ancient interest in land which exists in the country—but also because it is a rateable one—indeed, it has the quality of rateability more than any other description of property—we distinctly except, and hold that it should continue to qualify as now. That is one provision against incorporeal hereditaments of the description I have named. There are other incorporeal hereditaments rather numerous, I believe, in kind, but less significant and important, to which I need not refer. Then the other provision we propose to make is a provision against the sub-division of hereditaments. That is the other grand instrument by which this great operation, I might almost call it one of the staple manufactures of the country—the manufacture of votes—is conducted by the most skilled of all the capitalists who apply themselves to that particular work. I have in my possession a photograph of a hereditament, a certain structure not very imposing in itself, occupied by a single person and conferring one occupation franchise, but held by forty-five owners—every one of whom stands on the register in virtue of his forty-fifth part of this building, which qualifies only a single occupation voter. But it is right and necessary that we should distinguish between subdivision for Parliamentary purposes and subdivision which arises in the natural course of family transactions or of business ; and I may therefore say at once that we except from our disqualifying provision as to subdivision, cases where the share of subdivided property is obtained by descent, by succession, by marriage, by marriage settlement, or by will. There is another case, an important case, which ought to be taken in view, and which will be provided for, but in another manner. There may be a case of a joint ownership for the purposes of trade or business, and it may be said that the persons having such joint ownership, and using it for trade or business, ought not to be disqualified ; nor will

they be disqualified, because as joint occupiers they will be registered in respect of their trade or business. But we strike, and I hope strike effectually, at the fictitious vote, and by the fictitious vote I mean two descriptions of franchise—one where there is no real proprietary interest at all, but a naked dominion divested of every incident of dominion, and dependent merely on a life, and not always dependent on the life of the person himself who holds it, but dependent on some other's life. That is the worst, and what I may call the lowest, description of fictitious vote. But we also strike at fictitious votes where they have been secured through the machinery I have just been referring to, either of incorporeal hereditaments or of subdivision, and where there is no natural association with place; because we hold that when Parliament gives the franchise to a certain county or a certain town, its meaning is that that franchise is to be exercised by the people who belong to it, and not by a set of strangers who come in by surreptitious means, overpowering the genuine constitutional majority by a foreign importation, or, to employ words that have lately been used, by an invasion from without.

Sir, I think the House will now see that the Bill I am proposing to introduce is substantially, though not technically, confined to one main view, one great provision—to give unity and completeness to the household and occupation franchises throughout the United Kingdom. The principle upon which it proceeds is, that the head of every household, under the conditions of the law, shall vote, and we seek to go as far as we can to get the heads of households and enfranchise them. The lodger and service franchises we look upon simply as branches, I may call them enlargements, of the household franchise. It is, in point of fact, if it is to be described by a single phrase, a Household Franchise Bill for the United Kingdom; and the popular idea has not been far wrong which has seized upon the conception of it as a measure which is to extend to the counties what is now enjoyed by the towns, although in making that extension we endeavour to accompany it with some further provisions for giving greater completeness in practical application to the idea of household franchise.

Now, let me say shortly, we leave the "ancient-right" franchises alone. Let me say that we disfranchise personally no one. Wherever there is a provision in the Bill which would operate against the creation of franchises hereafter, identical in principle with some that now exist, we do not interfere with the right already legally acquired, however illegitimate it may seem to be. We leave the property vote alone, and confine ourselves to the endeavour to stop the extension of fictitious votes.

Well, Sir, these are the matters which the Bill contains ; but all will feel that it is impossible for me on this occasion to pass by what the Bill does not contain. I am prepared for the complaint that this is not a complete Bill, and for the question, "Why don't you introduce a complete Bill?" On that I have some things to say which appear to me to be of very considerable force, but at any rate I will state them ; and the first thing I will state is, that there never has been a complete Bill presented to Parliament on this subject of Parliamentary Reform. Never one. I make that assertion in the broadest way. There never has been a complete Bill presented to Parliament. Parliament has never attempted a complete Bill ; and, moreover, I will go a little further, and say that Governments and Parliaments would have committed a grievous error in judgment—I might almost say they would have been out of their senses—if they had attempted a complete Bill. There are different points in which a Bill may be complete. Was the Bill of 1831, or the Bill of 1832, a complete Bill? Why, Sir, they touched England alone. And what was England alone at that time? Not greatly more than one-half the United Kingdom. At that time, in 1831, the population of England was under fourteen millions ; the population of Scotland and Ireland was over ten millions ; and Ireland and Scotland were left to the mercy of Parliament, and were not touched by the principle of what is justly called the Great Reform Bill. There was no such thing as a complete Bill on that occasion, and there never has been a complete Bill.

Sir, there are three essential divisions of this great subject, and if we intend to deal with the subject as practical men, if we are endeavouring to pass a measure, and not to overlay and smother it,

we must recognise the limitation which is imposed, not upon our will and choice, but upon our power, by the nature of the case and by the conditions under which Parliamentary government is now carried on. The first of these three great divisions is to define the right of the individual—that is, to fix the franchise. To fix the franchise is of itself an enormous task; it is a question which may be led out, if you should think fit, into a score or scores of ramifications. But it is clearly one of principle—it is, to fix the right of the individual who shall be entitled to vote. The second branch of the question is to provide machinery for the exercise of that right, and that is the subject of registration. It has never been found, as far as I am aware, practicable to unite this vital subject of good registration with the subject of the franchise. The third is, to gather the persons whom Parliament judges to be capable of exercising the franchise with benefit to themselves and to the country into local communities; and that is the business of distribution of seats.

Now, Sir, what do we attempt? I am going, perhaps, to make a confession as to what you may think the nakedness of the land—of the stinty character of the measure; but locking at these three divisions we deal only with one, and we deal with that one, not upon exhaustive principles, but with a view to great practical ends, leaving much upon which the critic and the speculator may, if they think fit, exercise their ingenuity in the way of remark or of complaint. And why is it we should not present a complete Bill? The faculty of authorship is getting very weak, I am afraid, in myself, although many of my colleagues are not only in the vigour of life, but sufficiently fertile of mind and brain, and I have no doubt that with our joint authorship we could have produced a perfectly complete Bill. Why did we not do so? Because if we had done so we knew as well as if the thing had happened that the Bill must remain a Bill, and would never become an Act. I say this is not a perfect Bill with regard to the franchise. What are the questions we leave out? We do not aim at ideal perfection, and I hope gentlemen will not force us upon that line; it would be the "Road to Ruin." I have heard that there have been artists and authors who never could

satisfy themselves as to the perfection of their picture, or of their diction, as the case may be, and in consequence the picture and the diction have been wasted. I remember a most venerable archbishop—Archbishop Howley—who, with respect be it spoken, was the worst speaker in the House of Lords. And why? Because he was a man of inferior intellect? He was a man of remarkable intellect, remarkable education, remarkable refinement, but unfortunately he had a taste so fastidious that he never could satisfy himself that his terms were perfect and his phrases entirely beyond criticism, and in consequence of his fastidiousness between the one and the other catastrophe befel him. No, Sir; ideal perfection is not the true basis of English legislation. We look at the attainable; we look at the practicable; and we have too much of English sense to be drawn away by those sanguine delineations of what might possibly be attained in Utopia, from a path which promises to enable us to effect great good for the people of England. This is not an exhaustive list, but to aim at an ideal franchise might draw in the question of proportional representation; the question of women's suffrage; the question with regard to which my right hon. friend (Mr. Bright) has invented a wicked phrase, as he has invented a good many. (Laughter.) I call a phrase a wicked phrase when it commits murder, and my right hon. friend has had the fortune repeatedly to kill a proposal by a phrase. There was once a group of proposals made in a Reform Bill which he at once dubbed "fancy franchises," and by that phrase he killed them all. There is also the question of voting papers; the question of the franchises of the Universities, of the freeman's franchises, of the livery franchise and the burgh franchise; and there is again the principle of whether one man should have more than one vote. There is, in fact, no end to the proposals that might be raised even on the stage of the first of these three great divisions, without touching the other two. Our principle has been to inquire what was practicable; what were the conditions under which we had to move and to act in the present state of Parliament, and of Parliamentary business. We have heard in former years, and possibly we may hear this year, something about

the consequences of deck-loading a ship. We are determined, as far as depends upon us, not to deck-load our Franchise Bill. We consider that we have filled the hold with a good and a sufficient cargo, but the deck-loading of it would be a preliminary to its foundering; and were we with that impression—nay, not merely impression, but with that conviction and knowledge—to encumber our Bill with unnecessary weight, we should be traitors to the cause which we profess to have taken in hand, and we therefore will have nothing to do with giving encouragement to such a policy. As to registration, all I will say is this, that our Bill is framed with the intention of preparing a state of things in which the whole occupation franchise, which, I believe, will be about five-sixths of the franchise, shall be a self-acting franchise, and the labour, anxiety, and expense connected with proof of title, which is, after all, according to our view, the affair of the public and the State rather than of the individual, will, I trust, be got rid of. But, at the same time, our Bill is not a complete Bill in that vital respect, and we look to the introduction of another Bill for the purpose, with which we shall be prepared immediately when the House has supplied us with the basis on which it wishes us to proceed.

I now come to the third of these great problems, and I think the House will not be surprised when I say that, if we find ourselves quite incompetent, consistently with the aims we have in view and with public interests, to deal with the franchise in an exhaustive manner, they will not be surprised when I say that, *a fortiori*, in our opinion it would be absurd for us to attempt to deal in the same measure with what is termed redistribution. This is a question of great importance, and I make no apology for detaining the House upon it. The argument for redistribution was on former occasions never treated by us as a contemptible argument, even when we thought it was far wiser to separate the two subjects—I mean in 1866. There was a strong argument then in favour of uniting redistribution with legislation on the franchise, and it was this: that we had even then sought to keep alive broad and vital distinctions between the county and the town constituencies; and as long as these broad and vital

distinctions subsisted, there would have been very great inconvenience in a serious separation between legislation on the franchise and legislation on redistribution. For of course by legislation on redistribution two things happen—rural districts that have hitherto been rural districts in law become towns in law, and districts that have hitherto been towns in law, if there be any disfranchisement of however small a constituency, become rural districts in law. Well, in either case under the law that prevailed before 1866, and under the law which has prevailed since then, there would have been a very large change in the franchise, and, in certain cases, there would have been great disfranchisement inflicted had redistribution been left to be dealt with separately from legislation on the franchise, and at that time our contention was that the best way was to legislate on the franchise, and to follow that legislation at the earliest possible moment with legislation on redistribution. However, that argument was not then successful. But I admit at that time there was a great deal to be said in favour of those who opposed separation. What is to be said in favour of it now? The franchise is not going to be absolutely identical, but it will be within a shade of it. Don't let us conceal that from ourselves. All over the country the occupiers, taken as a whole, will be, if I am right, five-sixths of the whole constituencies. What harm will happen to them supposing you legislate on the franchise now? Supposing through any accident, which I do not expect, this Parliament is prevented from legislating on redistribution, what would be the worst that could happen? Districts now rural might, in another Parliament, become towns. What would be the difference? They would exercise the same occupying franchise in a town instead of exercising it in a county, and their right to vote in the county in respect of a property franchise from within the town they would retain as they have it under the present law. So again, where Parliament found it necessary in any smaller towns to deprive them of the privilege of returning by their sole power representatives to Parliament, those persons would still carry the same occupying franchise which they have heretofore had into the county. So that in fact that argument has practically vanished.

Now let me look at the arguments in favour of separating legislation on the franchise and legislation on redistribution. I have said our measure is incomplete, and that there has never been a complete measure. But our measure is complete in one vital respect, in which no measure heretofore presented to Parliament has been complete. It is absolutely complete as to its area. In our opinion there was an imperative necessity for making it complete as to its area. I for one should be no party to the responsibility of bringing in on this occasion three separate Bills. All the three countries have a case for enfranchisement arising out of the insufficiency of the present constituencies as compared with what they might be; but of the three the strongest is that of Ireland. I could bear no part in the responsibility of passing, perhaps, a Reform Bill for England and perhaps, a Reform Bill for Scotland, and then leaving a Reform Bill for Ireland to take its chance. I do not wish to rest on my own impression of what would happen. But I have noticed the tone of Conservative organs, and the language of those Conservative organs is in effect that there may be something to be said for extending the franchise in England and in Scotland, but to extend it in Ireland is madness. (Hear, hear, from an Opposition Member, and laughter.) That is a Conservative organ. (Renewed laughter.) That is an indication of what would probably happen, I do not say in this House, but elsewhere. Under these circumstances the necessity of a complete measure in point of area is, I would say, absolute, and nothing will induce us to part with the principle. Next, I would ask the House to consider what it is that we ought really to attempt. What has been the effect of uniting redistribution with franchise legislation since 1832? It has been that the redistribution has been of a trivial character, hardly purchasing a postponement of the question, and in reality and in regard to its broader principles has simply given the question the go-bye. Some people may be innocent enough to think that our opponents are to be conciliated by uniting redistribution with franchise legislation. We had some experience of that matter in 1866, and we found that, confident and sanguine and perhaps a little ferocious as our opponents were before we introduced our Redistribution Bill, when

we introduced it their appetites were whetted, became keener than ever, and still more lively was the rush made on every occasion at the unfortunate Bill, until it and still better the Government which proposed it, were brought to their extinction. In 1867 the number of seats liberated was thirty-eight, and they were liberated by a peculiar process and by leaving a large number of small towns with one member. We have to face the question whether places with 3,000, 4,000, or 5,000 inhabitants are to continue to possess the sole power of returning a representative to Parliament. The uniting of the two descriptions of legislation has resulted formerly in the inefficient handling of redistribution. If redistribution is to be touched at all, it must be touched more broadly.

What will be the effect of introducing a plan of redistribution? It is quite evident we ought to have some regard to what has happened before. There was one effective plan known to Parliament—the plan of 1831-1832. What was the effect of that plan? The effect was two-fold—in the first place it multiplied six-fold the labour of the Reform Bill. In Committee on the Reform Bill there were three nights occupied upon the franchise legislation; twenty-four nights were occupied on redistribution; and the effect of associating redistribution with legislation on the franchise would be to produce at present a result not very different. More than that, the franchise legislation has opponents who find it difficult to show their colours. Redistribution is their favourite study; but it is impossible not to observe this fact—that of the three political crises produced in connection with reform legislation, every one has been produced by redistribution, and not one by the franchise. A vote on the redistribution of power brought about the defeat of the first Reform Bill, and it brought about a dissolution of Parliament. A vote on the redistribution of power brought about the crisis of the year 1832, which was the most serious crisis known to the country since the Revolution of 1688. It was all brought about by the vote of the House of Lords—not upon the franchise, oh no—it was more convenient to deal with the question of redistribution. The crisis of 1866 involved no consequences more serious than the displacement of one Government and the introduction of another Government,

which in the following year introduced a Bill establishing the principle of household suffrage. I only refer to it because it comes under the definition of a crisis. To take the two Bills together would be to place on ourselves a multitude of provisions and a complexity of legislation such as we know would make it impracticable for us under the present condition of Parliamentary business to have the smallest hope of passing into law. There is one reason which is not unimportant—a practical reason, and that is that it is quite impossible until we have the new franchise legislation to form any just idea of the limits of the new redistribution. That, however, I need not dwell upon, but there is another reason which goes to the root of the matter, and it is this—the union of franchise legislation with redistribution makes a confusion of things that ought to be kept sedulously apart. (AN HON. MEMBER: Why?) I will tell you why. The question of the franchise is a large and national one, and ought to be determined upon Imperial considerations. I take it there is no doubt about that. Is redistribution a question that is only determined upon Imperial and national considerations? Of course the question of redistribution raises up local feeling, and what may be described without offence as a selfish feeling. The effect of that is this, that, where the two measures are mixed together, those who think their local interests are touched by the measures, oppose the extension of the franchise for fear of the redistribution which is to follow. The consequence is that they decide the great Imperial question of the franchise on grounds which are sectional and local, if not selfish. It appears to me that that is a political objection of a very grave description indeed. These reasons seem to me to be more than sufficient to justify and to compel us to decline the responsibility for any measure which should combine redistribution with extension of the franchise.

Now what do I admit? I admit that legislation on redistribution ought to follow legislation on the franchise at an early date, aye—at the earliest date—and the earliest date will be next Session; and it is for that reason we have brought forward the Franchise Bill of 1884 in order that within the natural life of the present Parliament there may be plenty of time to deal with the

question. (Laughter from the Opposition.) Of course I mean if we have the permission of hon. members opposite. Perhaps you may say, "Tell us your plan." (Opposition cheers.) Well, Sir, we do not intend to walk into any trap. And in my opinion there can be no greater mistake than for a Government, which is not going to legislate immediately on redistribution, and cannot legislate upon it during the Session to give its view on the subject.

The only substitute I can offer is a very humble one. I have not the least objection to make a little sketch of my own views upon redistribution, and although I cannot commit my colleagues absolutely to them, yet I certainly would say this, that I would not submit them if I believed them to be vitally in conflict with any of the opinions they entertain. I need not detain the House long with them, but I will just run through the main features. In the first place I think when a measure of redistribution comes, as it may come, I hope, next year, in order that it may have that sort of relative finality to which we ought always to look forward, especially when organic changes are in question, it must be a large measure of redistribution. I do not know whether it need be so large as the measure of 1831, which, of course, effected a wholesale slaughter of nominally existing boroughs and constituencies in this country; but at any rate it must be nearer the measure of 1831 than the one of 1867 in order to attain its object. At the same time I am not personally at all favourable to what is called the system of electoral districts, or to the adoption of any pure population scale. I cannot pretend to have the fear and horror which some people have with regard to the consequences of electoral districts. My objection is a very simple and practical one. In the first place electoral districts would involve a great deal of unnecessary displacement and disturbance of traditions, which, I think, you ought to respect. But my second objection is—and I regard it as a very important one—that I don't believe that public opinion at all requires it, and I doubt whether it would warrant it. Next I should say that in a sound measure of redistribution the distinction between town and country, known to electoral law as borough and shire, ought to be maintained. Although our franchise is nearly

identical, that is not the question. The question is whether there is not in pursuits and associations, and in social circumstances, a difference between town and country, between borough and shire, which it is expedient, becoming, and useful to maintain. Now, Sir, I do not think we ought to have any absolute population scale. I would respect within moderate limits the individuality of constituencies, and I would not attempt to place towns which have had representation for many generations precisely and mathematically upon the footing of towns that have not.

There is another principle to which I would call attention. I am certainly disposed to admit that very large and closely-concentrated populations need not have, and perhaps ought not to have, quite so high a proportional share in the representation of the country as rural and dispersed populations, because the actual political power in these concentrated masses is sharper, quicker, and more vehement. That consideration, of course, would apply most of all to the Metropolis. Another proposition I would lay down is this—I would not reduce the proportional share of representation accorded by the present law to Ireland. In the case of Ireland, as in the case of some other parts of the country, in my opinion some regard ought to be had to relative nearness and distance. Take Scotland, for example: the nearest part of it is 350 miles off and some parts of it are between 600 and 700 miles off. It is impossible to say that numerical representation meets the case, though I grant it is pretty well made up for by the shrewdness of the men whom Scotland sends; but it is her virtue and good fortune which cause her to make so excellent a choice. Undoubtedly, however, the representation is exercised under greater difficulties, and it is fair that those parts of the country which like Scotland and Ireland are separated by great distances, not omitting the element of sea, should be more liberally dealt with in proportion to the representatives they ought to send. Well, Sir, that is pretty nearly all I have to say, excepting one other proposition which I am disposed to lay down with considerable hesitation, and not as giving a final opinion. Speaking roughly, what will happen will be this. Smaller boroughs, so many of which are in the South of England, must yield seats for London and other great

towns, for the counties, and, thirdly, for Scotland and the North of England, which have perhaps the largest and most salient of all these claims. The prospect of that operation certainly suggests a proposition, if under the altered circumstances of Parliament and its increasing business Parliament were disposed to entertain it, but which it has not yet favourably entertained, and I think ought not to entertain unless for grave cause, for a limited addition to the number of its members. I ask no assent of the House to that proposition. All I say is, I do not exclude it from the view of the whole circumstances of the case ; and it may be found materially to ease the operation, which is one taken altogether of no slight magnitude and difficulty. Finally, when redistribution has come forward, then will be the proper time for considering all the propositions with regard to minority representation and with regard to modes of voting. These very important subjects will have to be fully considered, but I myself see no cause to change the opinion I have always entertained with regard to them. I admit they have claims which ought to receive the full and impartial consideration of Parliament.

Before sitting down I wish to make two appeals. One is an appeal to gentlemen whom I am afraid I cannot class as friends, and more particularly to the right hon. gentleman (Sir J. Hay) who has given notice of the first amendment. He knows my sentiments on that subject. It is impossible to entertain the question of redistribution at all without including in a measure a liberal enlargement of the number of members accorded to Scotland. If we are called upon to set aside this Bill to make that assertion, which is totally unnecessary, we may equally well be called upon to make any other assertion. We then come to the amendment of the hon. member for Knaresborough (Mr. T. Collins) ; it is one of those motions which might be multiplied by the score, and of which it is too obvious the object is to say we will not entertain your Bill, we will not consider it. Then comes the motion of the hon. member for Stafford (Mr. Salt.) That is a distinct refusal. He proposes to the House distinctly to refuse to entertain the subject recommended by the initiative of the Government and the Crown. The House has.

never taken such a course. The House has upon very rare occasions indeed entertained motions analogous to that of the right hon. gentleman, that is to say, touching the subject matter even of measures recommended in the Queen's Speech; but that has been extremely rare, and I submit to the House that it is rather hard that after more than a hundred persons have been allowed upon their own authority and recommendation to bring Bills into the House of Commons without resistance, that the Speech from the Throne on the responsibility of the Government, recommending in the most prominent manner the subject of Parliamentary reform to the consideration of Parliament, is to be met for the first time in our history by an absolute refusal to entertain the subject at all, and by setting up other reasons which, in the opinion of the hon. member, are reasons why the recommendations from the Throne should be contemptuously trodden down. That is my appeal to the opponents of the measure.

But I have the strongest appeal to make to its friends. I entreat them not to endanger the Bill by additions. This Bill is in no danger from direct opposition. It has some danger to encounter from indirect opposition; but of these dangers from indirect opposition, I for one am not afraid, unless they be aggravated by the addition of dangers which it may have to encounter from friendship. For I do not hesitate to say that it is just as possible for friends to destroy the measure by additions which it will not bear, as it is for enemies. If I may presume to tender advice, it is this: Ask yourselves whether the measure is worth having. What does it do, and what does it do in comparison with what has been done before? In 1832 there was passed what was considered a Magna Charta of British liberties; but that Magna Charta of British liberties added, according to the previous estimate of Lord John Russell, half a million, while according to the results considerably less than half a million were added, to the entire constituency of the three countries. After 1832 we come to 1866. At that time the total constituency of the United Kingdom reached 1,364,000. By the Bills which were passed between 1867 and 1869 that number was raised to 2,448,000. And now, Sir, under the action of the

present law the constituency has reached in round numbers what I would call 3,000,000. I will not enter into details; but what is the increase we are going to make? There is a basis of computation, but it is a basis which affords, I admit, ground for conjecture and opinion. That basis of computation is the present ratio in towns, between inhabited houses and the number of town electors. Of course we have availed ourselves of that basis for the purpose of computation. I have gone into the matter as carefully as I can, and the best results I can attain are these. The Bill, if it passes as presented, will add to the English constituency over 1,300,000 persons. It will add to the Scotch constituency, Scotland being at present rather better provided for in this respect than either of the other countries, over 200,000, and to the Irish constituency over 400,000, or in the main to the present aggregate constituency of the United Kingdom taken at 3,000,000, it will add 2,000,000 more, nearly as much as was added since 1867, and more than four times as much as was added in 1832. Surely, I say, that is worth doing, that is worth not endangering. Surely that is worth some sacrifice.

This is a measure with results such as I have ventured to sketch them that ought to bring home to the mind of every man favourable to the extension of popular liberty, the solemn question what course he is to pursue in regard to it. I hope the House will look at it as the Liberal party in 1831 looked at the Reform Bill of that date, and determined that they would waive criticism of minute details, that they would waive particular preferences and predilections, and would look at the broad scope and general effect of the measure. Do that upon this occasion. It is a Bill worth having, and if it is worth having, again I say it is a Bill worth your not endangering. Let us enter into no byeways which would lead us off the path marked out straight before us; let us not wander on the hill-tops of speculation; let us not wander into the morasses and fogs of doubt. We are firm in the faith that enfranchisement is a good, that the people may be trusted—that the voters under the Constitution are the strength of the Constitution. What we want in order to carry this Bill, considering as I fully believe that the very large majority of this country are favourable to its principle—what we want in

order to carry it is union and union only. What will endanger it is disunion and disunion only. Let us hold firmly together and success will crown our effort. You will, as much as any former Parliament that has conferred great legislative benefits on the nation, have your reward, and

“ Read your history in a nation's eyes,”

for you will have deserved it by the benefits you will have conferred. You will have made this strong nation stronger still, stronger by its closer union without; stronger against its foes, if and when it has any foes without; stronger within by union between class and class, and by arraying all classes and all portions of the community in one solid, compacted mass round the ancient throne which it has loved so well, and round a Constitution now to be more than ever powerful, and more than ever free.

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Is a Publican's Licence a Freehold?

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❖ A SPEECH ❖

BY

W. S. CAINE, M.P.,

ON THE

SECOND READING OF THE LOCAL TAXATION

(CUSTOMS AND EXCISE DUTIES) BILL,

MAY 12th, 1890.

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A SPEECH

BY

*W. S. CAINE, M.P., on the Second Reading of the
Local Taxation (Customs and Excise Duties) Bill,*

MAY 12th, 1890.

MR. SPEAKER,—

I am sorry to say that neither the appeal with which the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Ritchie) concluded, nor the able and clear speech he has delivered, nor the arguments he has adduced in the course of that speech, have any effect whatever in inducing me to withdraw the Amendment which I am about to propose—

"That this House declines to assent to a Bill which provides by payment out of public moneys for the extinction of annual licences in the manner provided in the said Bill."

The right hon. Gentleman said that the proposals which the Bill contains are reasonable and desirable, and that the opposition brought forward was owing to a misunderstanding of their nature. I can assure him that the Bill itself is exceedingly easy to understand. The difficulties which I and my friends experience have not been in understanding the clauses of the Bill, but in understanding the various explanations which Ministers have given with regard to them. The right hon. Gentleman also spoke of the Bill as being brought forward from a desire to help those who are battling with intemperance. Well, Sir, those of us who oppose the Bill have been for years past battling

with intemperance, and we can see nothing in this measure, taken as a whole, which is at all likely to promote the cause we have at heart. On the contrary, we believe that it will seriously injure it; and, therefore, we feel compelled from the initial steps of these proposals to oppose them to the utmost of our power in every legitimate way. I beg to assure my right hon. Friend that I do not in the least doubt his good intentions, especially towards the liquor trade; but it is the method by which he proposes to carry out those good intentions that we object to. It would appear as though right hon. Gentlemen on the Front Bench opposite cannot do anything for the Temperance Party without doing something at the same time for the liquor trade. Whilst offering 6d. to meet the demand of the Temperance Party they give a good round sovereign to those engaged in the trade. I will not follow the

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standings.

right hon. Gentleman into all the ridicule he has endeavoured to cast upon the expressions of public opinion which have been elicited by this Bill. It is perfectly natural, if hon. Members who are opposed to the principle of this measure, and have put down notices of opposition, are supposed by its authors to misunderstand the principles of the Bill—it is perfectly natural that humble individuals up and down the country who are not here to follow the intricacies of legislation should also be under some misunderstanding. But I will endeavour to show that some of the “misunderstandings” on which he has poured ridicule are very natural and legitimate conclusions to draw, and that the country is justified

1888
over again.

in supposing that the proposals of the Bill are only a re-introduction of the proposals of 1888. The right hon. Gentleman referred to, a very old friend of mine—Mr. Andrew Johnston—as being in favour of this Bill, but this gentleman is certainly strongly opposed to any money compensation being given out of the rates or taxes to publicans who may have lost their licences. Mr. Johnston took the chair for me in 1888 at a meeting in Essex, called for the purpose of denouncing the proposals brought forward by the Government at that time. The right hon. Gentleman claims that

he has secured the support of *the Church of England Temperance Society*. But I would point out to the right hon. Gentleman that he has only secured, if at all, the assent and support of one of the committees of that organisation. I have no hesitation in saying, from the intimate knowledge I have of that association, being myself a vice-president and on its Parliamentary Committee, that its main body would probably repudiate any such compromise as has

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been arrived at by the committee. Let us know the exact truth of the case. Canon Ellison, chairman of the Church of England Temperance Society, has issued to the Members of this House a document in which he expresses the hope that support will be given on the conditions contained in an enclosed communication which appeared in the *Times*. What are those proposals? This is one of them—that in any such Bill as the present the Church of England Temperance Society will maintain that the licence-holder is the only person whom the law recognizes; that he has no legal but only an equitable claim to compensation; if there are other interests behind, as are claimed, it must be a matter of agreement between themselves; that compensation shall be on the limited basis put forward by the Church of England Temperance Society, and shall be restricted to the period of ten years from the passing of the Act. We have heard from the right hon. Gentleman a detailed account of the concessions which the Government are prepared to make to the Church of England Temperance Society. Will any purchase made under the Bill be on the lines thus laid down?

Mr. RITCHIE: If the hon. Gentleman will read further on he will see the suggestions which have been made by the Government for the alteration of the Bill.

Mr. CAINE: I have nothing to do with "suggestions," I take my stand on the Bill itself. It is a suggestion contained in a letter to the *Times* which I am quoting, and I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he is going to insert in this Bill a clause directing that when the County Council and the publican agree with regard to the price, that price shall not be higher than the equivalent of ten years after the passing of the Act? If the right hon. Gentleman puts

that in he will largely modify his proposal, for ten years hence the whole objectionable features of the Bill will have passed away. The fact of the matter is—that if members opposite who are members of the Church of England Temperance Society are going to take any notice of this whip, I claim their votes for my Amendment without hesitation, unless, of course, they get a concession of the conditions contained in the communication I have already referred to. I cannot understand how the Church

Paltry of England Temperance Society could have concessions. accepted such paltry concessions as those made by the Ministers in charge of this Bill. I may point out, however, that this is the action of one of the committees only of a Society which has ramifications all over the country. The Liverpool Diocesan Church of England Temperance Society, for which I claim as much respect as any other Temperance Society, passed at its annual meeting, last Thursday, resolutions which, while approving the proposals further to tax spirits, to continue the increased duty on beer, to reduce the duty on tea, and to prohibit the issue of additional licences, strongly disapproves of the proposal to authorise County Councils to purchase liquor licences, on the ground that they are only held from year to year, and are not proper subjects for compensation. The resolutions go on to invite all Members of Parliament representing Divisions in the Diocese to use every effort to secure the rejection of this part of the Bill. I have still further evidence on this point. On the 9th May a meeting of the Liverpool Temperance Federation, conspicuous in which is the Church of England Temperance Society, which was fully represented, was held. A resolution was unanimously adopted by that federation in favour of the Government Bill so far as it restricts the issue of future licences, but strongly disapproving the proposal to pay compensation for liquor licences. *The total abstinence branch* of the Church of England Temperance Society which contains two-thirds of the members, and all the energy of the Church of England Temperance organisation, also at its annual meeting on the 13th passed a resolution which strongly opposed the Bill and urged their members to vote against it. At the meeting last referred to the Chairman made a speech in which

he called attention to the fact that on the preceding night I had asserted in the House of Commons that the Temperance Party would go solid against any proposal for giving compensation to publicans. At that statement there was long continued cheering, the audience rising like one man, and this completely discomfited the chairman, who had himself previously spoken in favour of some sort of compensation, and had suggested that the British nation would not desire to ruin the publicans. I can assure the committee of the Church of England Temperance Society that they have not heard the last of the whip which they have sent out.

Now I come to the Bill itself. The right hon. Gentleman said that if we were successful in carrying my Amendment the whole of the Bill must go. But why should the whole of the Bill go? It contains four distinct provisions, namely, (1) Police superannuation; (2) Conferring a vested interest on publicans; (3) Suspending the issue of new licences; (4) Free education for Scotland. The Educational, Superannuation, and Suspensory Clauses, to which I believe no opposition will be raised, are *the sugar that coats the compensation pill*. The principle of the Bill is, undoubtedly, contained in the attempt to create for the first time a legal vested interest in a public house licence. The acceptance by the House of my Amendment will only withdraw from the Bill three clauses out of 14; three sub-sections out of the balance. If these disappear the suspending of licences and the superannuation of the police and the education proposal for Scotland will, I think, meet with little serious opposition. And why should we not carry them without consenting to *this brabe to the publican's interest*? I am greatly surprised that the Government should again raise this thorny question during the present Parliament. When the President of the Local Government Board was introducing the Local Government Bill, in 1888, he said, on the Compensation Clauses—

“ We have determined, therefore, to make some proposal to the House which we believe fair and equitable, and it is for the House to say whether it is acceptable to it or not. We shall make a proposal which we hope the House will accept. If the House does not, our duty will have ceased.”

Well, sir, the House and the country repudiated the proposal. It cost the Government two seats—Southampton, where their majority of 668 was turned into a minority of 885; and Ayr Boroughs, where a Unionist majority of 1,175 was turned into a minority of 63. And be it remembered that in the latter constituency the seat was recovered when this compensation question was out of the way. History will repeat itself if the Government persevere. A warning has already come from Bristol, and the country will repudiate this latter proposal as vigorously as in 1888, and all the more because it is sought to bring it in by a back door. The President of the Local Government Board objects to the word "compensation" being used as regards this Bill. I am not surprised at it; it is a word of ill omen to him. I have not used it in the resolution which I have to move, but it lurks behind, and neither he nor I can keep it out of Debate, if we would. This Bill is intended, under cover of some small concessions to temperance reformers, to establish a money value in licences granted for 12 months only; so that, whenever the question of a large extinction of licences may come up in the future, *the principle of compensation* shall be found to be fully established. We have a statue in St. Stephen's Hall to John Hampden, and he earned it by his resistance to ship money. The sum was but small, less than half the sum proposed in this Bill for extinction of licences; but there was the principle, and it was to the principle that Hampden objected. In his speech last Wednesday to a deputation from the Church of England Temperance Society the President of the Local Government Board said:—

"The word 'compensation' never appears in the Bill, and I assert, that in doing what we have done, we do not lay the basis of compensation. . . . I assert that we do not desire by our proposals to lay down any lines upon which compensation is to proceed when Parliament comes to deal with the whole question of licensing."

I am sure my right hon. Friend is sincere in this declaration, and yet I differ with him *in toto*. The Bill has not been so understood by the Temperance Party in the country, or by the leaders of the Liquor Trade; nor has it been so understood by the

Conservative Press. What does the *Standard* say? The *Standard* speaks of the Bill as,

"A measure which assumes that County Councils might think it right to purchase instead of confiscating rights in licensed premises."

It proposes to enable

"Local bodies that are desirous of making a positive and immediate reduction to do so by offering fair terms to the publican."

Surely, "to purchase instead of confiscating (so-called) rights in licensed premises" will "lay down lines upon which compensation will proceed" in future legislation? But I commend to the President of the Local Government Board the following remarks of the *Birmingham Daily Mail*—an organ most devoted to the interests of the Government. They are as follows :—

"We scarcely think Mr. Ritchie is smoothing the passage of the Government licensing measure by quibbling over the meaning of the word 'compensation.' There is no reason why he should not at once admit that the Bill which comes before the House of Commons for Second Reading on Monday next does establish the principle of compensation. All the hair-splitting in the world, and the strictest insistence on verbal accuracy, will not get over that fact. We take Mr. Ritchie's contention to be this—that the payments of money authorised by the Bill are for the purpose of extinguishing licences, and not for enriching the outgoing publicans. Well, what is that but compensation? Why cannot Mr. Ritchie frankly say that with certain reservations the principle of compensation must be conceded. Why beat about the bush and give the Temperance party the impression that the Government shrink from the responsibility of urging that a licence-holder has in equity, if not in law, a claim to compensation."

Now, there is a refreshing frankness about the *Morning Advertiser* and the *St. James' Gazette* that the President of the Local Government Board would do well to imitate. It is clear the trade understands it as we do. What does the *Morning Advertiser* say? The *Morning Advertiser* says—

"The trade in both its departments are prepared to give an unanimous support to legislation which, however defective in regard of their interests

proposes to give them a certain measure of protection. They have the assurance that the Government have, at all events, put their foot down against plunder, and asserted the principle that the suppression of a licence, through no misconduct on the part of its holder, shall be effected by payment for its extinction. Once this principle is established by Parliament, it cannot be revoked off-hand when Sir Wilfrid Lawson and his friends chance to find themselves on the Treasury Bench, or behind it. They will have to respect the action of their predecessors; they will have to assume an honesty if they have it not; and it is because the Licensing Bill of the Government will—among other things—provide a safeguard in the future that it invites the approval and support of the trade."

What does the *St. James' Gazette* say—

"The Government has successfully asserted the principle that the extinction of a licence (not forfeited by misbehaviour) shall be accompanied by compensation. And once established in an Act of Parliament, and once set at work, the principle cannot well be thrown over when the Radicals come into power. They may kick and complain, but they would scarcely venture to treat the remaining licences with less honesty than those whom their predecessors had bought out."

Let me go to a Conservative paper of quite a different character. *The Rock*, a Church of England family newspaper, says, in a leading article (April 25th, 1890)—

"The blot in the plan, the fly in the ointment, is the renewal by a side-wind, of that old idea of compensating publicans for the non-renewal of licences. Their licences are for the first time to be treated as vested interests. Next Sunday is the Church of England Temperance Society's Sunday in London. We trust that powerful and prudent Society will weigh the insidious drift of this suggestion about County Councils buying up licences. It is the thin end of the wedge for much more extensive demands, and it will be the first time the English law has admitted that inn-keepers had vested rights in their licences."

But now I wish to call my right hon. Friend's attention to the words of one of his own colleagues. The President of the Board of Trade (Sir M. Hicks Beach), speaking at Bristol on Primrose Day, said—

"The brewer and the publican may surely not feel dissatisfied at the important recognition of the principle of compensation for licences taken away without any default of their holders."

**Principle
firmly
Established.**

I might go on *ad nauseam* with such quotations. It is idle for the Government to pretend that the Bill does not set up the principle of compensation. If it becomes law, the first County Council that buys up a licence with a view to extinction confirms and legalises the principle that there is a money value in a public house licence granted for twelve months, and no longer. *The principle contained in this Bill*, therefore, is, that no public house licence shall be extinguished without money compensation, except for offences against the law, and it is that principle the Temperance Party intend to resist to the bitter end. In his speech to the Church of England Temperance Society, the President of the Local Government Board, said—

“I am very glad of the opportunity of saying that if they are driven to argue it, the Government will argue this question of compensation, and will maintain that in order to deal with this question effectually, the question of compensation must be recognised.”

**The Views
of the
Government.**

Well, Sir, the Government have brought the argument on themselves, and it is now necessary that I should remind the House of what are the views of the Government on compensation. We are not left in doubt on that point. The President of the Local Government Board during the Debate on the Bill of the noble Lord the Member for Paddington (Lord R. Churchill) made it perfectly clear that the compensation to be laid down in any future measure the Government may introduce, with a view to a settlement of the licensing question, will be identical with that proposed in 1888 in the Licensing Clauses of the Local Government Bill for England. What were the proposals of the English Local Government Bill? In introducing that measure the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Ritchie) said—

“The question of the measure of compensation shall be referred to an arbitrator, who shall consider what is the difference in the value of the particular house with the licence and of the house without the licence at the time of the passing of the Bill.”

The Division on this Amendment will be a clear enough issue. Those who vote with me will declare that they cannot consent to a proposal which will confer a freehold interest in a licence granted for 12 months and no longer. That is all I ask the House to do. If we are defeated and these clauses become law, it will become impossible to extinguish a single licence without a money payment, "equal to the difference in the value of the particular house with the licence and of the house without the licence." This will become evident the moment *a possible transaction* is considered. A section of the public want to get rid of a public house. I will take a well-known case in Liverpool as an illustration. Five or six years ago a large gin palace was built opposite the gates of the principal dock for American liners. The application for a licence was opposed by all the steamship owners using the dock, and by all the stevedores loading the vessels. It was, however, granted. The house cost £8,000, and in 1888 the owner refused £20,000 for it. If this Bill becomes law immediate pressure will at once be put on the County Council to extinguish this licence on account of the mischief it is doing to the workpeople in the docks. The County Council will try to come to terms with the owner, who has just refused £20,000. The house is of no use for any trade but that of a public house, or that of a coffee palace. The first thing the owner would do would be to go to Peter Walker & Sons, or some other great monopolist. Any of the great monopolist brewers would jump at the chance of acquiring such a house. Having made his bargain with them, the owner would use it for screwing up the Council. This licensed house, which is exactly of the kind that the public want to see closed, could not be bought up by the County Council under, at least, £20,000. Liverpool's share of the grant of £350,000 will be £7,000, so that they could only extinguish this house by exercising the borrowing powers of the Bill and taking three years' instalments. This transaction, once through, the principle of compensation would be established for all time in Liverpool as well the rest of the country. The transaction would be thundered forth from the Conservative Benches as having

established a principle from which Parliament could not depart. In considering this Bill we must use our own common sense and the knowledge of our own districts as to what effect it will have if it became law. The right hon. Gentleman says—

“The money we desire to appropriate would enable Local Authorities to get rid of a considerable number of comparatively valueless public houses which are probably doing much more harm than more valuable public houses, especially in the rural parts of the country.”

He said he hoped to be able to do that without raising the burning question of compensation. He has found out his mistake by now. He has raised that question. The principle which, I contend, would be legally established by the purchase of the great Liverpool gin palace, would be quite as successfully established by the buying up of *the little rural public house*. Let me take a case of which I have some personal experience. I am a partner in a mining company at Millom. There was a small house on a freehold which we do not own, but over which we have royalties. It came into the market, and we sent an agent to buy it at any price. He bid up to £390, and the house was bought over our heads for £400. When asked why he had not bid higher, he said the value of the house was only £200. A licence was removed to the house, and a man began to make money by demoralising our miners. There came a time when we had to take the minerals from under the house, and we had to pay £2,200 for it. If this Bill had been passed we should have tried to get the County Council to buy it. For if ever a licence was granted in defiance of the supposed wants of the neighbourhood, it was in this case. Millom's share of the £350,000 will be £80. I contend that this Bill, whether viewed from the standpoint of the Government, or the Opposition, or the Liquor Trade, or the Temperance Party, must inevitably set up the principle that a 12 months' licence is a freehold.

I turn now from the consideration of the principle itself to that of the methods by which the Bill proposes to carry out the principle.

The Methods of the Bill.

The measure contains no scheme for reducing the number of public houses throughout the country, no principle to guide Licensing Authorities in awarding compensation. It leaves the County Council to make its own bargain with the publican whose licence is to be extinguished. It is a compensation Bill for publicans without a scrap of machinery to carry it out. I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman has submitted his scheme to the Chairmen of the County Councils and got their opinions upon them. I shall be greatly mistaken if, before the Bill gets through Committee, the County Councils do not make it abundantly clear that they will have no such powers conferred on them with their good-will and consent. I have heard only to-day that the Cardiganshire County Council have passed a resolution condemning the proposal to pay compensation. I

should like to read a letter I received this morning, which I am sure will have great weight with hon. Members, especially Lancashire Members. It is from Mr. John Fell, Chairman of the Quarter Sessions of Lancashire, and who, I think, has been Chairman of the Licensing Committee for some years. Mr. Fell, who, I may add, is a supporter of the present Government, writes to me:—

“I think you are thoroughly in the right in opposing the recognition of any vested interest in public houses to be acquired in any sense by public funds. As you know, for many years I have, as a magistrate, held the view that renewals were absolutely discretionary, subject, of course, to the preliminary notices required by Statute and the right of appeal. In my 30 years' experience as a magistrate no new licence has been granted, except on the ground of apparently sufficient public requirement to justify it, proved on oath by witnesses, generally representing localities. If the reasons which induced the magistrates to grant to any individual the exercise of a privilege and limited monopoly in the sale of drink have passed away, the cause for the licence has also passed away. Why should anyone be compensated because in a pure trade venture, in which he has simply invested adequate funds to carry out his enterprise, the surrounding circumstances have changed? The applicant for the licence, if he misconstrued the bearing of the law, has been unfortunate—so is everyone else who commits the same mistake; but it has always seemed to me monstrous that we, the general public, should have anything strained to recognise a

vested interest in any licensing venture, as if the licensee had been a public benefactor and heroic. I could tell you of many a modified fraud which has been practised on Licensing Justices to secure a licence; but I am merely writing, as one of your constituents, to say I thoroughly approve resistance to the principle of compensation in any form. I hope Mr. Goschen will withdraw his plan. With the knowledge now well realised of the licence being only renewable from year to year on adequate grounds I fear there will be an ugly rush at the money provided for the extinguishment of licences in the hands of County Councils, possibly a good deal of jobbery to secure a share for the indifferent houses, whose fate is pretty well sealed at no distant date by surrounding causes."

I quote this because Mr. Fell's name is so well-known in the North of England, and because I am sure his opinions will have great weight with Members from the North of England. Now, I think the Government have no right to try to settle *the compensation question apart from the whole subject of licensing reform*. A Suspensory Act rather indicates an intention to deal comprehensively with the whole question; but if the Suspensory Clauses are only intended to buttress the principle of compensation, they will not be of any great value to the Temperance Party. But I want to call attention to the absurd situation which, in my judgment, this Bill will land us. The President of the Local Government Board has squared the Church of England Temperance Society, for the Second Reading, at any rate, by promising to insert words that shall make it clear—

"That nothing in this Act should be taken to interfere with the powers possessed by the present Licensing Authority to refuse the renewal of licences without payment."

I want the House to see the position that this promise sets up. If this Bill becomes law the County Council may give £1,000 for the extinction of a licence, and next week the Justices may refuse to renew a licence in the same street of the same town without any payment whatever. This shows the utter absurdity of attempting to settle the principle of compensation apart from a general and comprehensive settling of the whole licensing question.

Again, I ask the House to consider for a moment the ridiculously inadequate amount of money allocated for the purpose of extinguishing licences. £350,000 is to be divided among 52 English and Welsh counties, £50,000 among 33 Scotch counties, and £40,000 among 32 Irish counties. The Chancellor of the

A Nest
Egg.

Exchequer, in one of his speeches on this subject, spoke of this money as *a nest egg*. If the right hon. Gentleman ever kept poultry he knows what a nest egg is; but, if he does not know, I will tell him what it is. It is a sham egg put into a sham nest to induce hens to lay real eggs. That is precisely the operation this Bill will have on the tax-payers of the country if they are foolish enough to allow it to pass into law. I have already suggested the inadequacy of the sum, but let me give London alone as an illustration. London's share of the grant cannot be more than £60,000. I have circulated to Members a pamphlet giving particulars of the valuations of public houses in the Metropolis in 1888, on the basis of the clauses of the Local Government Bill. They show that the lowest average valuation at which the 10,000 "on" licences of London can be estimated is £5,000 each. This is not my valuation; but that of two eminent firms of valuers in the City of London. The money allocated to London, therefore, will be enough to extinguish 12 houses in the whole Metropolis. But it will be found, if this Bill passes, that every district of the Metropolis will have public houses to be extinguished. For County Council purposes London is divided into 58 districts. Each will want its share, £1,000. Does the President of the Local Government Board believe that there is a single fully-licensed house in London that can be bought up for £1,000?

Mr. RITCHIE: Certainly.

Mr. CAINE: I advise the right hon. Gentleman to test it. I say, without any hesitation, that to close one house in each district the County Council must accumulate their share of the grant for five years. The right hon. Gentleman is under the impression that lots of public houses can be extinguished for an old song. Let him build a public house, and go into the market

to buy a licence up, and he will soon find out how mistaken he is. The restrictive policy of recent years pursued by magistrates under increasing pressure of public opinion, and the keen competition of monopolist brewers have given a large speculative value to licences which never existed before. He now proposes to add *a fresh competition to the market* in the shape of all the County Councils in this country. What can be more ridiculous than a grant which gives £60,000 a year to extinguish licences among 4,000,000 of people? That gives to the mining counties of Cumberland and Cornwall £3,000 and £5,000 respectively. To Glasgow, £6,500; to Belfast, £1,500; to Huntingdonshire, £800; to Rutlandshire, £160, and to the vast County of Yorkshire, with its 2,500,000 of industrial population, £35,000 a year to extinguish annual licences which the Bill granting the money turns into perpetual Government leases.

We have been told over and over again *Who will really pay?* that *the publicans will have to pay this compensation.* We have an interest in the Revenue. We get the revenue from liquor, tea, Income Tax, property, and other sources. If this pernicious principle of taking taxes for the relief of rates continues, continual gaps will be made in our £85,000,000, which must be made up from other sources, and we draw upon our Reserve Fund, we draw upon the resources of the ratepayers just as much as if we raised taxes. I cannot admit for a moment that my interest in the tax raised from beer is any less than my interest in the tax raised from tea. We are taxed all round; the public house is a taxable article, and I am not going to be humbugged by the argument that the tax on drink is not a tax laid on the whole community.

But I want to turn from the proposals of the Bill itself, which I think I have conclusively proved to contain the principle of compensation laid down by the Government in 1888, to the effect the acceptance of that principle will have upon the whole future of the Temperance Movement. That is the main reason why I have raised the oppo-

sition to the Bill. The declaration of the principle of compensation in the Local Government Bill of 1888, to which I have referred already, meets with the uncompromising hostility of every section of the Temperance Party, who believe that if it were once established, their difficulties would be increased ten-fold, and a solid wall of 200 million of sovereigns would be built across their path, which is now clear and unobstructed. *We cannot entertain any proposal which gives anything but a twelve months' interest in the licence.* We contend that the liquor trade is a peculiar one, and differs *in toto* from other trades. If a man wants to start a public-house, he has to go before a magistrate, and furnish evidence of good character. Unless he is a man of unsullied reputation, and his house suitable, and unless a public house is required in the neighbourhood, the magistrates cannot give him a licence. When he has got a licence, he is placed under constant police supervision, and the trade is carried on under severe restrictions. A man who has been convicted of felony cannot keep a public house. When the Claimant, who called himself Roger Tichborne, came out of prison his friends raised a subscription, and thought the best thing they could do for him was to put him in a snug public house. They applied for a licence, and the magistrates were about to grant him one, when the clerk said: "You cannot do it." "Why not?" they asked. "Because he has been convicted." A man once convicted of felony cannot be entrusted with the trade. He may become a grocer, or a draper, or a minister of religion, or a Member of Parliament, but he cannot be a publican. Nothing can be clearer than that a licence is a permission given to a carefully selected individual to sell a dangerous article for 12 months, and that the State, by closely limiting the period, has always reserved to itself the right to withdraw the permission. A publican's licence is not held by him with the object of his making money out of it; it is held as subordinate to the public good, and in fulfilment of a supposed public requirement. *The holder of a licence for one year only has no legal claim to a licence for the next year.* In 1882 the right hon.

Mr. Ritchie
in the
Witness Box.

Gentleman (Mr. Ritchie) carried an Act through the House giving Justices the same discretion with "off" beer licences that they possessed in regard to public houses and "on" beer licences. Within two months of the passing of the Acts the Darwen Justices, then represented by the noble Lord the Member for Rossendale (the Marquess of Hartington), instructed the Chief Constable to prepare a map of the town to indicate positions of the holders of licences. The off-licences had reached great proportions, and the Justices resolved to make an effective reduction by refusing licences to 34 out of 72 "off" beer licences, which, by Act of Parliament, enjoyed the same privileges, and were held under the same discretionary power as on-licences. These 34 selected one of their number to appeal to the Quarter Sessions. Quarter Sessions at Preston confirmed the decision of the Local Magistrates, as those who knew best what was good for the community. The publicans appealed to the Queen's Bench; and they confirmed the decision of the Quarter Sessions. These 34 licences were extinguished without a single penny compensation. *Mr. Justice Field* rightly said, in the Court of Queen's Bench, in November, 1882, in giving final decision in the Darwen case, "In every case in every year there is a new licence granted. The Legislature recognises no vested right at all in any holder of a licence." It is, too, equally clear that these licences are not considered to be "property" in the sense of property which would pass to the holder's Trustee in Bankruptcy—for in a recent case in which such a Trustee took possession of a bankrupt publican's licence and opposed applications for its temporary transfer to the landlord of the house, the learned Chief Judge in Bankruptcy held that the Trustee had no right to the licence. The recent case of "*Sharp v. Wakefield*" shows that this view is held by Licensing Magistrates and sustained by County Quarter Sessions, Queen's Bench, and Court of Appeal—the latter finally deciding that the Justices had an unlimited judicial discretion in the matter, and might refuse to renew a publican's licence on other grounds than the

want of qualification, bad character, or misconduct of the applicant. I contend this is proved and upheld by the authors of the Bill under discussion. It is therein stated expressly that new licences shall only be granted, "at the free and unqualified discretion of the Licensing Authority," and the President of the Local Government Board stated, last Monday, that these words were inserted to make it clear that no right whatever should attach in the case of new licences. But every licence now in existence has been granted on precisely similar terms, and no right whatever should, on the same grounds, attach to them. Let me call attention to a statement made over and over again

by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and confirmed again and again by my right hon. Friend (Mr. Ritchie). The Chancellor of the Exchequer argues that because he and his predecessors have charged *Probate Duty on licences*, that, therefore, a vested interest has been created. There may be reason for refunding these unjustifiable imposts if they really amount to anything worth refunding; but we are entirely in the dark as to the details. I trust the Chancellor of the Exchequer may see his way to furnish the House with some specific details on this point. I have made inquiries from professional valuers.

Here is what a very large firm wrote—

"We should not in valuing for probate the effects of a deceased publican, include anything on account of the licence beyond the proportion of its cost to the next date of payment."

And other firms of great eminence take the same view. I will ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer two questions on this point. Firstly, What is the largest amount ever paid, to his knowledge, in Probate Duties for the value to the estate of the deceased of an annual licence? and, secondly, Can he give any case in which the amount paid has been larger than the proportion of its cost to the next date of payment? If this be all the Probate paid, I make him a present of his argument.

Monopoly
bars
Compen-
sation.

No compensation ought in any case to be given for *the extinction of a privileged monopoly* at the end of the time for which the privilege has been granted, and for which nothing has been paid. Excise fees are required for taking up the licence, but neither certificate nor licence are in any sense paid for. Monopolies bar all claim for compensation, since they already confer what is equivalent to compensation in the advantage given by the monopoly. The position of the holder of a publican's licence is clear enough—he has special profits from the licence which restricts competition, while he risks the monopoly being withdrawn. But the contention of Gentlemen opposite is that these licences have changed hands at high prices, and that, therefore, we have no right to refuse to renew them without substantial compensation equivalent to whatever loss the present holder may sustain. But to this I reply *caveat emptor!* ought the buyer to have injured the conditions. *How have these enormous values been built up?* I take the first case I come to, out of hundreds in my possession. A man built a house a short time ago, close to Burscough Junction, a country station near Ormskirk, in Lancashire. It cost him £400. He applied for, and got a beer licence, then he got a spirit licence, then he sold the house for £4,000. He walked into Court worth £400, he walked out with a certificate, for which he paid nothing, worth £4,000. What did the brewer, who bought his house for £4,000, get? Bricks and mortar worth £400, and the purely speculative chance—I admit a good chance—of getting a twelve months' licence renewed. The trade of the place improves; he makes money, and sells it to some other brewer, or to the public, for £6,000. The new purchaser steps into his place, and again buys the purely speculative chance of a renewal of licence. And this is why has taken place, and is taking place, all over the country. Fictitious values have been created, and have been forced higher and higher by the greed of brewers for retail as well as wholesale profits, and by the greed of a section of the public for high rates of interest. The electors of this country will never consent to endow mono-

Now let me look at the arguments in favour of separating legislation on the franchise and legislation on redistribution. I have said our measure is incomplete, and that there has never been a complete measure. But our measure is complete in one vital respect, in which no measure heretofore presented to Parliament has been complete. It is absolutely complete as to its area. In our opinion there was an imperative necessity for making it complete as to its area. I for one should be no party to the responsibility of bringing in on this occasion three separate Bills. All the three countries have a case for enfranchisement arising out of the insufficiency of the present constituencies as compared with what they might be; but of the three the strongest is that of Ireland. I could bear no part in the responsibility of passing, perhaps, a Reform Bill for England and perhaps, a Reform Bill for Scotland, and then leaving a Reform Bill for Ireland to take its chance. I do not wish to rest on my own impression of what would happen. But I have noticed the tone of Conservative organs, and the language of those Conservative organs is in effect that there may be something to be said for extending the franchise in England and in Scotland, but to extend it in Ireland is madness. (Hear, hear, from an Opposition Member, and laughter.) That is a Conservative organ. (Renewed laughter.) That is an indication of what would probably happen, I do not say in this House, but elsewhere. Under these circumstances the necessity of a complete measure in point of area is, I would say, absolute, and nothing will induce us to part with the principle. Next, I would ask the House to consider what it is that we ought really to attempt. What has been the effect of uniting redistribution with franchise legislation since 1832? It has been that the redistribution has been of a trivial character, hardly purchasing a postponement of the question, and in reality and in regard to its broader principles has simply given the question the go-bye. Some people may be innocent enough to think that our opponents are to be conciliated by uniting redistribution with franchise legislation. We had some experience of that matter in 1866, and we found that, confident and sanguine and perhaps a little ferocious as our opponents were before we introduced our Redistribution Bill, when

we introduced it their appetites were whetted, became keener than ever, and still more lively was the rush made on every occasion at the unfortunate Bill, until it and still better the Government which proposed it, were brought to their extinction. In 1867 the number of seats liberated was thirty-eight, and they were liberated by a peculiar process and by leaving a large number of small towns with one member. We have to face the question whether places with 3,000, 4,000, or 5,000 inhabitants are to continue to possess the sole power of returning a representative to Parliament. The uniting of the two descriptions of legislation has resulted formerly in the inefficient handling of redistribution. If redistribution is to be touched at all, it must be touched more broadly.

What will be the effect of introducing a plan of redistribution? It is quite evident we ought to have some regard to what has happened before. There was one effective plan known to Parliament—the plan of 1831-1832. What was the effect of that plan? The effect was two-fold—in the first place it multiplied six-fold the labour of the Reform Bill. In Committee on the Reform Bill there were three nights occupied upon the franchise legislation; twenty-four nights were occupied on redistribution; and the effect of associating redistribution with legislation on the franchise would be to produce at present a result not very different. More than that, the franchise legislation has opponents who find it difficult to show their colours. Redistribution is their favourite study; but it is impossible not to observe this fact—that of the three political crises produced in connection with reform legislation, every one has been produced by redistribution, and not one by the franchise. A vote on the redistribution of power brought about the defeat of the first Reform Bill, and it brought about a dissolution of Parliament. A vote on the redistribution of power brought about the crisis of the year 1832, which was the most serious crisis known to the country since the Revolution of 1688. It was all brought about by the vote of the House of Lords—not upon the franchise, oh no—it was more convenient to deal with the question of redistribution. The crisis of 1866 involved no consequences more serious than the displacement of one Government and the introduction of another Government,

and I claim, therefore, without hesitation, that the average price of a licence in Liverpool is little short of £6,000.

Now, supposing the Corporation of Liverpool were the Licensing Authority, it is no stretch of imagination to assume that they would receive instructions from their constituents to reduce the number of licences in Liverpool, now about 2,000, by one eighth at least, probably more, and, under what the Government call equitable compensation, £1,500,000 would be required for the purpose. But this Bill only gives Liverpool £8,000 a year, and this cannot be capitalised beyond £24,000. Where must the rest of the money come from? Of course, it comes out of the pockets of the ratepayers, who would rightly refuse so large a sum for the dubious advantage of having only 1,750 public houses instead of the present number, 2,000.

In Bristol, where public houses are not, on the average, more than a third of the rating of those in Liverpool, a large Brewery Company has one tied house to each £4,870 of capital. In Newcastle, another has 215 tied houses to each £3,260. In Plymouth, another has 146 tied houses, representing one to £2,700 of capital. If the principle of compensation is right, by all means let the House accept it, but with their eyes open. If it is right, then *the publicans are entitled to the full compensation proposed in 1888, or they are entitled to nothing*. If the former, nothing short of £250,000,000 will pay for their entire extinction with, a proportionate sum for the partial extinction. The money can only be raised by an increase of national or local indebtedness, for the pretence that the trade itself can pay it is too flimsy to be worth a moment's argument, and is in itself destructive of the whole principle of equitable compensation.

There is a disposition on the part of advocates of compensation to rest their case upon *precedent*, and this is insisted upon in a clever pamphlet entitled *Compensation; the Publican's Case*, by Mr. Charles Cazney, Barrister, who rests this part of the case on precedents (and some of these have been mentioned in the House) afforded by the Acts for the Abolition of Slavery, for the Abolition of

Purchase in the Army, and for the Disestablishment of the Irish Church.

Now, I contend that none of these are analagous to this issue. The money paid to the West India Planters was paid by way of a bribe, and not as equitable compensation. The original proposal of the Government of the day was to advance to the West India body a loan to the amount of ten years' purchase of the annual profit, amounting to £15,000,000. This was met by the Acting Committee of West India planters, by a demand for £20,000,000 compensation, and a loan of £10,000,000. Eventually, the £15,000,000 was extended to £20,000,000 to get rid finally of a question that threatened the allegiance of our West India Colonies, that had become strained beyond endurance. It was far more to save the colonies from absolute ruin than to compensate the slave owners that the loan was granted. It is quite true that this loan was never repaid, but in all the Debates on the subject—and I speak in the hearing of one right hon. Gentleman who took part in those Debates—it was referred to as a loan, the repayment of which, however, was never insisted upon. But the slaves were by law the property of their owners for life, bought and paid for, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Midlothian said during the Debates, property honestly and legally acquired. But if the planters had held a licence from the Government to enslave the blacks from the first of September next ensuing and no longer, and had had to come up every year to have an annual licence renewed, what compensation would Parliament have given? When the Slave Trade was abolished in 1808, not one penny of compensation was asked for, not one penny of compensation was paid.

Then the Abolition of Purchase in the Army, which has been referred to, and as to whether this established a precedent for compensating publicans for loss of an annual licence, I think an answer was given by one or two interruptions from this side, and I do not suppose it will be pressed by any hon. Member speaking

to precedent. In the Army Purchase Act the compensation was given for money already paid by the officers, and not for a fictitious value created by competition. The commissions had been bought and paid for. I do not think this will be pressed as a precedent, but if it is, there are Members in the House who were responsible for the measure, and who will, no doubt, disclaim and disprove the views that it forms any precedent for the present discussion. At any rate, it did not pass the House without strenuous opposition from the Radical Party of the day, led by my old friend Mr. Peter Rylands.

The nearest precedent that can be quoted of the present claims of the publicans are the treatment of the collectors of taxes, and of the Curates of the Irish Church Disestablishment Act, who, undoubtedly, had no freehold or life interest in their curacies. But these were not compensated out of the taxes, but out of the Irish Church Fund ; a different thing altogether. They were not licensed for 12 months only, to conduct a trade that the State has always considered a danger to society, but they were servants of a department of State, whose avowed object was the religious instruction of the people.

There is no existing precedent which can reasonably be brought forward to justify the endowment of publicans with a freehold in the annual licences, to be paid for at full value if they are taken away in the interest of the community. It is because there is no precedent that *the Government seek to set up a precedent*. I am aware that the authors of this Bill deny any such intention. Speaking to the Church of England Temperance Society on May 7th, the right hon. Gentleman, the President of the Local Government, said the Bill would

" Form no precedent for a general scheme when Parliament tackles the great question, as it must do."

Now, with all respect to the right hon. Gentleman, I must deny his conclusion. The Government may not desire to establish a precedent, but they can no more escape the logical issue of their acts on licensing than on free education, for instance. They

declared last year that the grant of a sum of money for the payment of school fees in Scotland did not concede the principle of free education. But here in this very Bill is a further proposal to round the whole thing off. That they were mistaken then everybody admits to-day. They made the grant, and the principle is admitted all round. So it will be with compensation. Once lay down the law empowering Local Authorities to buy licences at the full market price, and put it in practice, and a similar result will follow.

If we are to compensate publicans for refusal to renew licences, then, on the other hand, we ought to *grant compensation to persons and property in every case when either is injured by the granting of a public house licence*. I have taken two districts of Liverpool, each

A Rival Claim for Compen- sation.	consisting of a block of six streets. One is at Toxteth Park on an estate owned by my hon. Friend the Member for Flint (Mr. John Roberts), and on this estate there is no public house whatever. In these six streets there are 443 houses.
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The poetical names of the streets are Elaine, Enid, Geraint, Gwendoline, Merlin, and Modred Streets. The houses have each a five yards frontage, and are built after a pattern which is popular in Liverpool, each having five rooms and a scullery. The income from these 443 houses last year was £8,744. Now, take the other block of streets at the other side of the city, at Everton, a pleasant district, a much healthier district than Toxteth Park, and a district very popular among the better working class. Here are 482 houses in six streets. I give the names, which are equally attractive, Bulwer, Coniston, Grasmere, Rydal, Ulswater, and Windermere Streets. They are the same kind of houses, with five yards frontage, five rooms and a scullery. There is this difference, however, that *there are eight public houses on the estate*, and hence it is that we find the income from these 482 houses was last year £6,820, or taking 443 houses, for the sake of comparison, the income was £6,268; that is to say, a public house reduces rentals on 443 houses by £2,500 a year, 30 per cent. on the whole rental. What compensation is there for this? Sir, I remember very well,

when Mr. Bruce's Bill was before the House, attending a meeting of owners and occupiers of public houses. The speakers thundered about compensation until at last one gentleman present rose and desired to put a question. "I have," he said, "four houses from which I derived £160 a year until a public house was opened close by, since which my rents have fallen to £90. Who is going to compensate me?" Well, Sir, the chairman ruled him out of order. Now, I want to warn the Government that if they persevere with these clauses of their measure we shall be bound to put down Amendments in this direction, that if publicans claim compensation from the rates, owners must claim compensation for injury to property from public houses. I do not wish to press this any further, at present.

We are taunted with obstructing temperance
 Who is obstructing? *legislation,* and of depriving the police of benefits, that may be conferred by our opposition to the Bill. I do not agree with this at all. There is no difficulty about police superannuation. If the Government think it is a good thing, I call upon them, whatever may be the fate of the rest of the Bill, to go on with that, but not to bracket it with proposals the Temperance Party cannot accept, and which would ruin their movement for long years to come. We may be charged with obstructing temperance legislation, but we take the responsibility of that without the slightest fear or hesitation, knowing what public opinion will be. Then we are asked to propose a compromise. There is a section of the Temperance Party, the Church of England Temperance Society, which has made a proposal for compensation, and agree to pay solid black mail to the trade in the shape of a ten years' lease of life. Now, will the Government accept that as a final settlement of the controversy? I do not offer it, but I tell the Government if they choose to bring in a Bill on the lines of compensation proposed by the Church of England Temperance Society, neither I nor anyone else could prevent it coming on the Statute Book. I only say this as a word of friendly advice.

I make one last appeal to the Government to find some way out of the mess they have got into. I have shown no enmity to

the Government, except in 1888 and again to-day; but I tell them frankly that if, by this Resolution, I could turn them out, turn them out I would with the greatest pleasure; for I consider their proposals are fraught with such danger to the whole community that I would run any risk on any other subject rather than allow them to pass into law. You may make jokes at expressions of public opinion, but I challenge Members on the Treasury Bench to take a test of public opinion. Let them go into the streets in any district where working men live, take 100 men, and, having separated from these every tetotalter, from the remainder take an opinion whether they would consent to a farthing of the people's money being paid as compensation to publicans.

I do hope the Government may accept the Amendment I bring forward. I do not see why they should not. Let them take this vexed question out of the Bill, and keep it back until they are prepared to deal with the whole question of licensing. *I am puzzled and bewildered by the action of the Government.* What do they

A spoiled
Session.

hope to get by thus dragging a furious controversy on to the back of an already overloaded Session? Do they think they can carry this Bill, the Tithes Bill and the Irish Land Purchase Bill? Are they going to give up remedial legislation for Ireland to compensate publicans in England? If they think they can gain popularity by such a proceeding, I give very little for their judgment. Are they going to please the Church of England Temperance Society by throwing over the Tithes Bill in favour of this measure! The best thing the Government can do is to frankly avow they have committed a blunder. Other Governments have committed blunders before. No doubt the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Derby will have something to say if they withdraw these clauses, but never mind him. His past career is not altogether free from such blunders, and he will be ready to admit that. Withdraw this Bill. Nobody wants it. I fail to find that the Government are under any trade pressure, and certainly they are under none from the Temperance Party. No doubt it is an honest, *bona fide* attempt on the part of the Govern-

ment to give effect to certain qualms of conscience awakened in them on account of the increased consumption of liquor, and I am glad their conscience is pricking them ; but let them "bring forth works meet for repentance," let them withdraw the Bill or accept my Amendment, taking these clauses out, and to the rest of their proposals they will find no opposition that they cannot overcome. Take these clauses out and it is a good Bill.

I did at one time put down an Amendment attacking the whole Bill. I have thought better of that, and now simply attack these clauses alone. Any Member of the House can vote for my Amendment without committing himself to more than the Compensation Clauses as here drawn. I do not condemn by my Amendment any form of compensation except that contained in this Bill. We are determined to get rid of it if we can ; and if we cannot, we shall open an agitation for the repeal of the measure—an agitation which will be supported not only by the Temperance Party, but by the Church of England, the Nonconformists, and every person in the community who cares for the welfare of humanity.

3219

Patriotism.

Patriotism.

Address delivered to the Students of the
University of Glasgow.

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By the Right Hon.
J. CHAMBERLAIN,
M.P., LL.D., D.C.L.,

on November 3rd, 1897,
on the occasion of his installation as Lord Rector.

Westminster:
ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE & CO.

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1897.

PATRIOTISM.

MY first duty is to thank you for the great honour which you have conferred upon me in electing me to fill a position which in past times has been dignified by so many illustrious men. Since Francis Jeffrey delivered the first address, pronounced under similar circumstances, the history of the Lord Rectorship of the University of Glasgow has been in some sort a record of the public life and intellectual activity of the United Kingdom:—politicians, poets and preachers—the representatives of letters and of science—

men of thought and men of action—have successively occupied this platform, and have anticipated me in the task which I have undertaken to perform.

The honour that you have done me has been enhanced by the fact that it was unsolicited, and unexpected; and that it has been conferred by the unanimous voice of the four Nations which form the constituent body. My appreciation of it has been quickened by the sense that I possess none of those claims of previous association, of birth or nationality, or of academic distinction, which in many cases have guided and justified your selection, and that your choice has therefore been determined solely by your generous appreciation of a public service which has now extended over a period of nearly thirty years.

In the course of this interval of time, to

which for a moment I look back, momentous changes have taken place in the constitution and situation of this Kingdom—public opinion has altered greatly on many of the questions which occupied it at the beginning of the period—false judgments have been corrected, and new ideals have been formed—the leaders and teachers of my youth have most of them passed away, and we can now estimate their characters uninfluenced by the heat of the controversies which they provoked, and can judge them impartially in the light of the results which they achieved.

When so much has altered—persons, opinions and circumstances—I should think it a poor boast to pretend that I alone had remained unchanged; but, in view of the confidence that you have now vouchsafed to me, I ask you to believe that, through all the

vicissitudes of things, I have consistently sought—it may be sometimes with faltering steps and by mistaken roads—the greatness of the Empire and the true welfare of the people at large. This is not the place nor the time to indicate how far these objects have been advanced during the past thirty years. I would rather look forward to the future—the future which belongs to the young, and which will be shaped by the next generation, who have it in their power to undo or to carry on our work. It is this sense that the younger generation may at their pleasure realise or defeat the hopes which we have formed for the future, that makes their approbation so grateful to a Statesman who looks beyond his own life and tries to prefigure the destinies of his race and country.

A thought of this kind has suggested to

me the subject on which I propose to speak this afternoon. It would be presumptuous in me to follow the example set by many of my predecessors, and to advise you in the prosecution of the studies which are to fit you for your several places in the world. I will only venture to remind you of one universal precept and rule of success, which, spoken long before universities were thought of, applies to academic studies as it does to every action and decision of human life—“Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might.” No work is worth doing badly ; and he who puts his best into every task that comes to him will surely outstrip the man who waits for a great opportunity before he condescends to exert himself.

But I propose to speak to you on a subject, which, although of more importance to your country than any classical or mathe-

matical learning, yet forms no portion of any curriculum, and remains without a Chair and without a text-book. "Learning," says Lord Bacon, "should be made subservient to action;" and your action will largely depend on the conception which you form in youth of the duties and privileges involved in that greatest of civic virtues, and most important element of national character, which we now call Patriotism.

What is this Patriotism, this almost universal instinct for which more men have given their lives than for any other cause, and which counts more martyrs than even Religion itself—this potent sentiment which has produced so many splendid deeds of heroic bravery and of unselfish devotion—which has inspired Art, and stimulated Literature, and furthered Science—which has fostered liberty, and won independence, and

advanced civilization—and which, on the other hand, has sometimes been misunderstood and perverted, and made the excuse for brutal excesses and arbitrary tyranny?

Dr. Johnson in his Dictionary tells us that a patriot is “one whose ruling passion is the love of his country,” and that Patriotism is “love and zeal for one’s country,” and we may accept these definitions as his serious interpretation of the words, although, as we shall see directly, the Doctor indulged on another occasion in a more cynical explanation.

But have the words always borne this interpretation? Some time ago, when pursuing a different subject, I noticed incidentally the fact that they do not occur once in the whole of Shakespeare’s writings. The omission seemed to me suggestive, and I communicated through a friend with

Dr. Murray, the editor of that wonderful monument of patient and discriminating scholarship and erudition, the new English Dictionary. By his kindness, I am informed that the word "patriot" was taken immediately from the French, where it was in use as early as the fifteenth century in the sense of "citizen," "fellow-citizen," or "compatriot." It occurs occasionally in the literature of the sixteenth century, at the end of which it was accompanied by such adjectives as "good," "true," or "worthy," which ultimately were imported into the meaning of the noun, till finally a "patriot" necessarily implied a good citizen and a true lover of his country. The transitional stages are illustrated by the words of the Preface to King James' Bible in 1611—"Was Catiline a good patriot that sought to bring the city to a combustion;" and again by

Milton, who spoke in his letter on Education of "living to be brave men and worthy patriots." But by the end of the century the modern use of the word was fully established, and when Dryden writes of men who usurped "a patriot's all attoning name," patriot is used alone and without an adjective as equivalent to a good son of his country.

This gradual evolution of meaning suggests the probability that the sentiment itself has undergone transformations, and we shall find accordingly that, although love of country is as old as the history of the nations, the particular form of this universal feeling which we now associate with the name of Patriotism is really one of the manifestations of that spirit of the age, a comprehension of which was impressed upon your predecessors by Lord Beaconsfield,

when he was Lord Rector of your University, as an essential part of education.

But before attempting these finer distinctions, let me extend somewhat our original definition. Patriotism presupposes a *patria* or *patrie*, and Lord Shaftesbury in his "Characteristics" quaintly complains of our language that we have no word to express our native community but that of *country*, which already is used in two other senses as the equivalent of the Latin *rus* and *regio* and the French *campagne* and *pays*. He ridicules the idea of a Patriotism founded on the accident of birthplace alone, pointing out that, in this case, a Briton born at sea would have no country but the ocean, and no countrymen but the fishes and monsters of the deep. The justification of the sentiment must be found in something more than attachment to the soil, which might be attri-

buted to a fungus; and depends on the pursuit of common interests, the defence of a common independence, and the love of common liberties. It is strengthened by a common history and common traditions, and it is part of a national character formed under these conditions. It implies undoubtedly an exclusive preference, and this is sometimes made an accusation against it; but, in this respect, it is only the natural development of that sentiment of filial and domestic affection which has characterised the relations of kindred since men first dwelt together in families.

The tribe is a larger family and has called forth many of the feelings which we connect with Patriotism, such as reverence for tradition, respect for ancestors, and preferential regard for common interests; but, having no country, the nomads of the desert and the

prairie could not be patriots in the modern sense.

The Patriotism of the Jews was a religious exclusiveness fanatically cherished and centred in Jerusalem, as the site of the Temple, and the City peculiarly favoured by Jehovah.

The Greeks were animated by an intense Patriotism which was, however, almost universally narrowed to the City. Once or twice in their history the cities of Greece united in a true sentiment of national devotion against a foreign enemy, but the union was only for the moment of danger, and the Patriotism of Athens, or Sparta, or Corinth, nourished on the rivalries of small communities, was a municipal rather than a national sentiment.

The Romans, with their subject provinces tributary to the Mother City, never secured,

or even attempted to create, that community of interest and equality of privilege throughout their Empire which might have gained for it the patriotic support of all its population. The feeling may have been more intense among the actual citizens of Rome in proportion as it was more restricted; but it was certainly confined to a very small proportion of those who lived under the Roman Eagles; and it differed in degree and in character from the sentiment which has since exercised so great an influence on civilized states.

But even in later times the ideas connected with the word have undergone change and development. During the whole of the Middle Ages the multiplicity of States and petty provinces and free cities led to endless disputes and aggressions, and provoked a spirit of intestine conflict which was

alien to any real devotion to country or nation.

Men fought and paid taxes to support the claims of their rulers, with little personal interest in the result; and sometimes on one side, sometimes on another, as the immediate ambitions of their leaders dictated, there was no fixed standard to which all paid allegiance. The conflicts of the Guelphs and the Ghibellines—the Thirty Years' War in Germany, or the Wars of the Roses in England, not to speak of a thousand petty struggles—battles, as Milton calls them, of the kites and the crows—the memories of which are only preserved in local histories, were altogether unfavourable to the growth and maintenance of any but the most restricted Patriotism, exhibited in connection with a particular city at some special period of its history.

It is to be noted, however, that there was one moment when a really national sentiment was evoked in France; where, for a short time, Joan of Arc aroused an enthusiasm which, uniting all Frenchmen in a common object, freed the soil of the country from its foreign rulers. But when she died, betrayed by those she had served so well, and martyred at the hands of enemies too frightened of her influence to be either just or generous, the enmities and the jealousies, for a moment allayed, soon revived, and all national feeling was lost in domestic broils and personal quarrels.

It is only slowly that nations are definitely formed. Artificial and arbitrary arrangements of territory, and populations distributed against their will, make no solid basis for the structure of national unity. But, gradually, we find the same causes

working to the same ends in every country, although operating upon them at different times. France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany, by some process of unconscious affinity, or natural selection, or political necessity, have become nations in the true sense of the word; and this change has been assisted by the growth of that National Patriotism, of which it is now one of the first and most urgent duties, in all these cases, to maintain the unity which it has created.

If Patriotism has aided the work of consolidation, it has itself been stimulated and strengthened in proportion as its sphere of interest has been enlarged. The individual patriotism of cities and provinces and weaker nationalities has not been extinguished, but there has arisen a wider and nobler patriotism, in which has been merged much

that was mean and narrow in the provincial, or parochial sentiment. There exists to-day in the provinces of France and Italy, in the kingdoms and principalities of Germany, and in the cantons of Switzerland, a local and separate, but perfectly legitimate and laudable, pride in their distinctive traditions, race, and character; but this sentiment is now only ancillary to the wider patriotism of a Frenchman, an Italian, a German, or a Swiss.

But, besides the multiplicity of petty and conflicting interests which for a long time delayed the growth of the patriotic sentiment, two causes influenced the character of the feeling. The first was the intensity of religious differences, which produced a line of division more marked than that of race or nationality. The Catholic Frenchman, for instance, in the time of Charles IX.,

was further removed in sympathy from his Huguenot fellow-countryman than from any foreigner of Catholic opinions. At that time, and during the Thirty Years' War in Germany, the feelings of loyalty and devotion, which we associate with Patriotism, were engendered by attachment to a faith, and not by love of country.

The other cause, which gives a different complexion to the national sentiment, was its personification in the Prince or Ruler. Louis XIV. said truly, "L'État c'est moi," and the boast of Frenchmen in his day was that "Nous sommes les sujets du plus grand Roi du monde." The ideas of duty and self-sacrifice took the shape of personal loyalty to the Sovereign. The dynasty represented the greatness and unity of the Nation; and the crime of treason was the most execrable of all human offences.

The fact is that in its present sense the idea of Patriotism was not generally accepted till the French Revolution, when loyalty to the Monarch was rudely divorced from loyalty to the country, and the dangers which threatened the existence and independence of their native land roused the masses of the French people, who for the first time felt their responsibility, to a fervour of enthusiasm and devotion such as the world had never witnessed before.

It was in truth a new sentiment—no longer sanctioned and encouraged, as in the past by the prestige of the Monarch, the claims of the Church, or the exigent demands of a privileged aristocracy—but a popular outburst of exclusive pride in a country which the masses of the people had just discovered to be their own, and an overwhelming confidence in the infallibility of

principles and institutions to which they owed their newly acquired rights of possession.

It was characterised by all the virtues, and disfigured by all the abuses of which the sentiment is capable. It was more intense, more devoted, and, at the same time, more arbitrary, and more aggressive, than it has ever been before or since; the name of patriot became the exclusive property of the partisans of the Revolution in its worst excesses as well as in its nobler principles; but both in its best and its worst evolutions, it was an agency of incalculable energy and force. Beginning as a legitimate and praiseworthy movement for the defence of the liberties of the country against the attacks of foreign despots, and protesting its respect for the Rights of Man and the fraternity of peoples, it hurled back the combination of

its foes, and then, forgetting its principles, and intoxicated by a sense of power, embarked on a crusade of fanatical proselytism, and asserted its claims to impose its own dogmas on reluctant nationalities, with as much indifference to their feelings as any Mahommedan conqueror.

Throughout all this period of Titanic struggle Patriotism was the most potent factor in the contest, and ultimately decided the issue. Animated by Patriotism, which gave to her armies a superhuman strength, France was able to confound all the efforts of her enemies. Then, ignoring in other nations a love of independence and freedom as strenuous as her own, she at last created and evoked in them this all-powerful sentiment, and was in the end driven back to her frontiers by an exhibition of the same spirit as that which had enabled her to defend

them. Stein and Hardenberg, in Prussia, taught their countrymen to emulate the Patriotism which the Revolution had induced in their neighbours, and turned to account, in their indomitable defence of the independence of their own country, the popular feeling which had proved itself so irresistible in France.

The degradation of Patriotism in France, and its growth in the rest of the continent, was greatly due to the policy of the first Napoleon, who, as Comte reminds us, was almost a foreigner in France, and whose enormous personal ambition was accompanied by a superstitious reverence for the ancient hierarchy. He was enabled by his genius to pervert the sentiment of Patriotism into immorality, and once more to identify it with personal rule. But when he fell, destroyed by the Patriotism which he had

created in other nations, at the same time that he undermined it in his own, French Patriotism flowed in quieter channels during the Monarchy and the Second Empire; until, in our own days, we have seen its splendid resurrection in the dignity, the devotion, and the courage, with which France has repaired the disasters of "the terrible year." I know of no eloquence more touching, more imbued with the true fervour of genuine Patriotism, than that in which Gambetta, the greatest of the statesmen of modern France, apostrophises his country as the mother of sorrows, and claims for her in her defeat and her humiliation a love deeper than the pride with which she should be hailed in the hour of victory and triumph.

It is not too much to say that if France to-day is still a great nation, a centre of intellectual activity and a pioneer of civilisa-

tion, she owes this position entirely to the fact that her greatest statesmen, writers, and preachers, have never ceased to foster the spirit of Patriotism among her people.

There is one fact in connection with all the recent manifestations of national Patriotism which is especially to be emphasised. It is that, now and henceforth, we are dealing with an entirely popular sentiment—not confined to individuals or to classes, but identified inseparably with the national character. It has become a democratic passion, and has ceased to be a privileged distinction.

The cause of the change is not far to seek. In his great work on Democracy in America, De Tocqueville points out, with his usual keenness of analysis, that there are two kinds of Patriotism—that of instinct and that of reason. The former disinterested,

undefinable, but associating the affections with the place of birth, and united with a love for old customs, and a respect for old traditions. The Patriotism of reason, on the other hand, is due to a perception of the personal interest of the citizen, and depends on his having a share in the government of his country and on his identifying himself with its prosperity and security.

It may be doubted, perhaps, if the distinction can be thus strictly drawn, and if the Patriotism of instinct is always disinterested, or if the Patriotism of reason is altogether indifferent to sentimental considerations; but it is at least certain that the enjoyment of independence, and a consciousness of a share in the responsibility of government, are necessary to the full development of a feeling which largely depends on a sense of ownership; and that

the growth of liberties has conduced to that widely diffused and popular Patriotism which is the strong defence of nations and the security for their freedom. The Patriotism of a king, of an aristocracy, or of a privileged class, has indeed influenced at all times the history of the world, but the Patriotism which has entered into the life blood of a whole nation is likely to prove a still more powerful agency in maintaining its stability and stimulating its progress.

I have dwelt on the experiences of France at some length, because the patriotic spirit has played so prominent a part in its history. But every nation which has shared the feeling has given to it a distinctive national character, and has derived from it distinctive advantages and disadvantages. French patriotism has, in accordance with national characteristics, been more passionate, more

assertive, more excitable, than any other. It has led the nation into great excesses, it has stimulated its vanity, it has rendered it unjust to the merits of others, and has sometimes tempted it to abuse its own strength and power. But it has also kept alive its intellectual activity, sustained its self-respect in times of adversity, carried its arms to the successful vindication of its liberties, placed it in the front rank of the nations of the world, and induced among its citizens the most splendid examples of heroism, self-sacrifice, and personal devotion.

Time would fail me to follow the influence of this feeling on the other nationalities of Europe. Patriotism has secured the unity of Germany and of Italy. It has created and consolidated the enormous empire of Russia, and it has preserved the independence of Switzerland and Holland.

But I pass on to consider it more especially in connection with the history of our own country. In England the long drawn-out vicissitudes of the Hundred Years' War with France offered little opportunity for the display of this sentiment. The struggle between Norman nobles settled in England, and French princes with conflicting claims of heirship and possession, constituted a sanguinary lawsuit in which English yeomen testified their loyalty to their feudal superiors, with slight personal interest in the conflict and with no national issues of supreme importance at stake. As in France so in England, love of country showed itself devotion to the king or ruler in whom the country was personified.

In such circumstances we cannot look for the Patriotism of reason; although the Patriotism of instinct, with all its passionate

fection and generous sacrifice, may not be wanting; and in this connection it is worth noting that although Shakespeare has made no use of the words, the true spirit of patriotism breathes in every line of that splendid passage in which the dying John Gaunt apostrophises his country:—

This other Eden—demi Paradise,

This fortress built by Nature for herself,

Against infection and the hand of war,

This happy breed of men, this little world,

This precious stone set in the silver sea,

Which serves it in the office of a wall

Or as a moat defensive to a house,

Against the envy of less happier lands,

“This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England.”

Yet it is instructive and interesting to observe that in the same sentences, he indicates as the chief source of his love and pride that his country is:—

“ This royal throne of *Kings*, this sceptred isle,

“ This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars,

* * * * *

“ This nurse, this teeming womb of royal kings,

“ Feared by their breed, and famous by their birth.”

In the civil wars which followed the death of Henry V., loyalty must frequently have been in doubt which King to follow, and when even families were separated in hostile camps a common Patriotism was impossible. But after the earlier Tudors had consolidated their power, and in the time of Elizabeth, the genius of the nation began to find its bent and to carry with it the popular interest from which Patriotism is evolved. The attempted aggression of Philip II. so roused the pride and the indignation of the English people, that, in spite of the bitterness of the religious controversy which was still raging, Catholic

and Protestant, noble and peasant, vied with each other in their eagerness to defend their "water walled bulwark—hedged in with the main."

The reign of Elizabeth marks also the future direction of the energies of the British race, and gives the first clear indication of that restless and audacious spirit of enterprise which was to make the ocean our highway, and to conduct us to an unexampled dominion in every part of the globe. The feeling ebbed and flowed according as the seat of authority was filled by Cromwell or Charles II., by James or William III.; but the conviction remained deep seated in the minds of the British people that they had found their mission and that the sceptre of empire had been definitely placed in their hands.

Throughout the greater part of the

eighteenth century, however, patriotism tended to become a byword and almost a reproach. The word was abused as a weapon in political controversy, seldom indeed in connection with our foreign relations, but constantly as a method of stigmatising the iniquities of a party at home. When Bolingbroke undertook to write an essay on the Spirit of Patriotism, he produced only a pamphlet directed against his political opponents; and when he subsequently attempted to describe a Patriot King, it is evident that he thought the first test of such a monarch would be his preference of Henry Bolingbroke to Robert Walpole. Lesser men than Bolingbroke were not slow to imitate his example. No borough-monger was so corrupt, no office-seeker so base, no scribbler so scurrilous—that he did not dub himself a patriot, and everyone

who differed from him a traitor to his country. And so was justified the exclamation of Johnson, uttered, be it noted in the presence of Mr. Fox, that patriotism was "the last refuge of a scoundrel," and the assurance of Junius that "nothing will satisfy a Patriot but a place."

But while the main purpose of Bolingbroke's essays must be held to be the discrediting of his political opponents, there is in the "Patriot King" one incidental sentence which does in some measure recognise the existence of that national ambition which, kindled by Drake and Raleigh and Grenville, and never since extinguished, has constantly burned in the hearts of the British nation. "To give ease," he says, "and encouragement to manufactory at home, to assist and protect trade abroad, to improve and keep in heart the national colonies like so many

farms of the mother country, will be principal and constant parts of the attention of a Patriot Prince."

If these aspirations have been at times silent, discouraged by official indifference, they have never wholly died in the popular imagination; and we have been privileged to see, in connection with the celebrations of a Reign, admirable in all its personal features and glorious in its Imperial attributes, a spontaneous outburst of enthusiasm for the unity and kinship of the Empire which may well quicken the blood and raise the hopes of

" All the loyal hearts who long
To keep our English Empire whole."

In this necessarily brief and imperfect review of the history of Patriotism I have not spoken separately of Scottish and of Irish Patriotism before the Union between the three countries. By the necessity of the

case, and as we have seen in the history of the separate provinces or nationalities of other European countries, it was bound to find its expression in hostility to its more powerful neighbour. Now that England, most happily for itself, has been for so long absorbed by Scotland, and united to Ireland, the streams of local Patriotism should form one river, and the emulation which may still properly continue should be no more than the friendly rivalry between members of the same family.

But while we are bound to-day to recognise no Patriotism which does not embrace the United Kingdom—and I would like to add the British Empire—there is no Englishman worthy of the name who will fail to sympathise with Scotsmen who celebrate the memory of Wallace and of Bruce, or with Irishmen who recall the

exploits of leaders who have fought and suffered for Irish rights. We are proud of all that is great and noble in the history of the sister kingdoms:—it has become part of the history of the greater nation of which we are each a member; and we appreciate the striking and eloquent words in which Lord Rosebery summed up the results of this local Patriotism and said that, but for it, “the centuries of which we are so proud—so full of energy and passion and dramatic history—might have passed silently and heedlessly over a dark and unknown province.”

How much the United Kingdom as a whole has gained by the influence of this feeling on its policy it is hardly necessary to say. Although our Patriotism has been of a sober kind, little aided by such commemorations as have been the rule in other

countries, and often slighted and discouraged by those in authority, it has nevertheless burned with a steady flame in all times of stress and danger; and has enabled the Nation to maintain its place, to carry out its work in the face of the most formidable combinations, and to create an Empire which has extorted the admiration and sometimes the envy of foreign observers. "England," wrote a German editor the other day, in a spirit which we may well wish were more frequently imitated by Continental critics, "has interests to defend over the whole earth; her ships cruise in all oceans, and the red coats of her soldiers are to be seen in every continent. She fights in all quarters of the globe, often under the greatest difficulties, and constantly with comparatively insignificant military forces, yet almost invariably holds her ground; and, indeed, not

only defends what she has, but is incessantly adding to her possessions. Threatened and fully occupied on the Indian frontier, Great Britain simultaneously conducts a victorious campaign in Egypt against powerful, dangerous and ruthless foes. This manifestation of universal power, this defence and extension of a world-wide empire, such as has not been paralleled for nearly twenty centuries, gives fresh proof of the invincible and unbroken vigour and vitality of the Anglo-Saxon race. England is still a distinguished pioneer of civilization, and the best wishes of her people always accompany these enterprises, which are undertaken, not only to extend her power and dominion, but also to promote indirectly the interests of humanity and civilization. The British sword is always followed by the British plough and ship, and it is this which esta-

blishes the success of her forward policy, since it constantly affords to it fresh justification."

On a review of the whole subject, it will be evident to you that the sentiment of which we have been speaking has grown and widened with the advance of civilization and the progress of liberty. To-day it is more powerful than ever before, and it is strongest in the most democratic communities—in France, in Switzerland, in the United States, and in the United Kingdom. Its influence has everywhere tended to secure toleration in religious controversies, and to moderate the bitterness of party contest. It has lessened the frequency of war by encouraging the union of smaller states and nationalities, and thereby decreasing the occasions of strife. So long as it was restricted to limited interests it was restless,

jealous and aggressive, but with enlarging scope and responsibility it has shown itself more inclined to respect the rights of others, while still claiming the exclusive devotion of its own citizens. It has encouraged originality, and stimulated every nation to find and pursue its own vocation and to develop to the fullest degree its national genius and character. And, meanwhile, it has promoted among the citizens of every land in which it has taken root a sense of public duty, and the growth of a spirit of self-sacrifice and devotion to the commonwealth.

To the ordinary mind such results are matter for congratulation; and yet in all times there have been a few individuals superior to the considerations by which ordinary minds are influenced, who have harped on the abuses to which, like every other virtue, Patriotism is liable, and have

chanted the claims of some abstract
• Humanity, in preference to those of their
native country.

Among the ancients a school of philosophy taught that the world at large was the country for which alone all should work and make sacrifices.

I am not aware that the world at large benefited by these theories, but it is curious to note that the same Horace who taught us that it was "sweet and seemly to die for one's country," also declared in the true cosmopolitan spirit that "the brave man was at home in every land, as fishes in the ocean." Philosophers in all ages have been fond of paradox, and somewhat indifferent to the practical application of their principles. The Encyclopædists and some of the German philosophers professed a similar doctrine; and in the early days of the French Revolu-

tion the Human Race was welcomed to the Constituent Assembly with Anacharsis Clootz as their Speaker. But common-sense and Patriotism were too strong for the theories of sentimentalists, and Clootz and his followers disappeared—"spectre chimeras," as Carlyle calls them, "who flit squeaking and gibbering till oblivion swallows them."

The fact is that a vague attachment to the whole human race is a poor substitute for the performance of the duties of a citizen; and professions of universal philanthropy afford no excuse for neglecting the interests of one's own country. Molière makes one of his characters say—"L'ami du genre humain n'est pas du tout mon fait;" and experience shows that "l'ami du genre humain" is very likely to degenerate into "the friend of every country but his own."

But it is said, Patriotism is not to be

distinguished from Jingoism and Chauvinism. It leads to unlawful aggrandisement, to duplicity, and selfish violence, which are sought to be justified by reasons of State. It places the interests of the country above all moral standards.

It may be admitted that there is a false Patriotism which would carry to extremes the doctrine of the American Statesman, "My country, right or wrong,"—a Patriotism which panders to national vanity, and is blind to see what is good elsewhere, and which cannot conceive of benefit to one country unless it involves injury to another. But these are the abuses and not the necessary consequences of the sentiment, and they may be found in full activity in countries, such, for instance, as China and Turkey, where no national Patriotism exists.

There is, however, something worse than

this false Patriotism,—which, after all, carries no authority, and is not sanctioned by any popular approval—and that is the factious spirit which would sacrifice national interests to secure the defeat of an opponent or a personal triumph. Such a spirit animated the great Whig leader, Fox, when he rejoiced in the defeats of British arms, and gloated over the failure of our negotiations; and though I am persuaded that no party leader would now-a-days follow his example, yet we have still to guard ourselves against excess of party zeal, and a self-righteousness which “always finds his country in the wrong.”

Meanwhile let us freely recognise the truth of Bolingbroke’s axiom, however ill he may have applied it, that “Patriotism must be founded on great principles and supported by great virtues.” It involves duties as well

as privileges, and these duties arise in connection with the domestic relations of the citizen to his country as well as in all that concerns the attitude of the country towards foreign nations. In both cases the idea of Patriotism involves that of personal sacrifice. Our obligations do not end with obedience to the laws, and the payment of taxes. These things are compulsory, and involuntary evidence of our love of country, since the Police insist on the one, and the Treasury takes good care of the other. But we give free and additional proof of Patriotism in making our full share of public work and responsibility, including the performance of those municipal obligations on the due fulfilment of which the comfort, the health, and the lives of the community, so largely depend. One of the most satisfactory features of modern times is the

greater interest taken by the educated and leisured class in the unambitious but most useful work of local institutions, while in national politics the pecuniary disinterestedness and integrity of our public men has now been for a long time a marked feature of our political life. It is not necessary to refer to the gross corruption of Sir Robert Walpole's day to show how greatly we have advanced. In much later times the idea of serving the Nation for the Nation's sake found few supporters, and no less a personage than the great historian of the "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire" was not ashamed to write with naif and characteristic detachment from all but his own personal inclinations, "I went into Parliament without Patriotism and without ambition, and all my views tended to the convenient and respectable place of a Lord of Trade."

To leave politics to the politicians, whether in national or in municipal work, is as fatal to the best interests of the State as to leave to mercenaries the defence of its territories. In this generation happily a higher ideal obtains; but even now there are many who fail to see that if the country is to be what they think it is, and what they know it should be, the result can only be reached by a general display of public spirit, by the contribution of all to the common good, and by efforts to develop the nobler side of the national character, and to cure its defects.

It is, however, in our external relations that national Patriotism has its greatest opportunities and its greatest dangers. It is self evident that the primary object of every country must be to defend its freedom and independence, and to make such preparations

as are necessary for its security. But, unless it is prepared to go somewhat further than this, and to maintain its self-respect and safeguard its honour, it will inevitably incur the contempt of its enemies and lose the affection of its children. I have said that one of the fundamental ideas of Patriotism is preference. It does not follow that this preference should involve the injury of others, but each nation may legitimately strive to become richer, stronger and greater. Competition among nations, as among individuals, is the stimulus to progress. Each nation has its distinctive qualities and special capacities. To discover them, and to encourage their exercise, is to fulfil the national mission and calls for the display of all the virtues of Patriotism.

The special mission of the United Kingdom has been clearly marked out by

her insular position and by the qualities of her people—by their love of adventure, their power of organisation, and by their commercial instincts. It is to be seen persistently colouring all her later history through which the steady expansion of the Empire has proceeded, and during which she has, sometimes unconsciously, sometimes even unwillingly, been building up and consolidating that great edifice of Imperial dominion which is now as much a necessity of our national existence as it is a legitimate source of national pride.

There is a small minority, no doubt, who view with little satisfaction the astounding spectacle of their country's greatness, who carp at our titles of possession, condemn the methods of acquisition, and attribute to the lowest motives of greed and to a vulgar desire for aggrandisement the extension of

British rule in so many quarters of the globe.

This is a very one-sided and jaundiced conception of the Colonial Empire of Great Britain, and leaves altogether out of sight the fact that, unlike those vast aggregations of territory in the past which form the only precedent to such a dominion, it has been the aim and practice of the founders of our Empire to extend its citizenship as widely as possible and to induce in every part that sense of equal possession in all its privileges and glories on which a common Patriotism may be founded.

The Makers of Venice, with whose peculiar circumstances as a commercial community, dependent for its existence on its command of the sea, we have much in common, declared it to be their principal object "to have the heart and the affec-

tion of our citizens and subjects;" and in adopting this true principle of empire they found their reward in the loyalty of their colonies and dependencies when the Mother City was threatened by enemies whom her success and prosperity had raised against her.

We have gone far in imitating her example; and wherever our rule has been established peace and progress, and security to life and property, have followed in its train, and have materially improved the condition of the native population. If the annals of our conquests have been occasionally stained by crimes of oppression and rapacity, they have also been illustrated by noble deeds of courage, endurance and self-sacrifice; and it is ungrateful to refuse to the adventurers and the pioneers, whose enterprise has

built up the Empire, a generous recognition of their difficulties and a just appreciation of their motives.

Let us by all means impress on all who exercise authority the maxim of the Venetian statesmen, and let us inculcate justice and honesty in all our dealings with native races; but let us discourage the calumnies by which some of the bravest and best of our countrymen have been defamed, and cheer them by a full recognition of the services which they have rendered. There is something unworthy in the eagerness with which the representatives of universal philanthropy clutch at every accusation of perfidy and cruelty which is brought against those who are risking life or reputation in our service, and use these unproved charges in order to enforce arguments for shirking our responsibility and limiting our obliga-

tions—for a little England and a policy of surrender.

Nowhere can such reasoning be more distasteful than in Scotland, which has given to the United Kingdom so many of its ablest administrators, its bravest soldiers, and its most devoted missionaries.

It is the clear duty of Patriotism, not dwelling over much on details, to consider in its broadest aspects this question of the expansion of the Empire in which we seem to be fulfilling the manifest destiny of our race. In such a review can any impartial mind retain a doubt that the pressure of the European and civilised races on the more backward inhabitants of other continents, has, on the whole, made for peace and civilisation and the happiness of the world?

But for this, the vast territories of the United States and of Canada might have

been left to a few hundred thousand of Indian braves, inhuman in their customs, stagnant in their civilisation, and constantly engaged in inter-tribal warfare. India would have remained the sport of contending factions, the prey to anarchy, and the constant scene of cruelty and tyranny: while Africa, depopulated by unspeakable barbarities and surrendered to the worst forms of slavery and fetichism would have pined in vain for a deliverer.

It is no exaggeration to say that, in one single year of such conditions, more lives would be taken, and more cruelties enacted, than in all the wars that have ever been undertaken by civilised nations in furthering their work of development and colonisation.

I believe that this work has specially devolved upon our country—that it is our interest, our duty, and our national mission

to carry it to a successful issue. Is it contended that the weary Titan staggers under "the too vast orb of his fate," and that we have not the strength to sustain the burden of Empire? We are richer, more numerous, and in every way more powerful than our ancestors when they laid the foundations of our dominion and encountered in the task a world in arms. We have the firm assurance of the loyalty and affection of the sons of Britain across the sea, and of their readiness to play their part in the common defence. We do not lack efficient instruments for our great purpose, and we can still count on the energy and devotion of our countrymen and on their ability to win the confidence and respect of the people whom they are sent to govern for their good. On the bleak mountains of the Indian frontier, amidst the sands of the Sudan, in

the swamps and forests of Western Africa— wherever the British flag floats—Englishmen, Scotsmen and Irishmen are to-day fronting every danger and enduring every hardship— living as brave men and dying as heroes—in the faithful performance of duty and the passionate love of their country. They ask from us that their sacrifices shall not be in vain.

If such is still the spirit of our people, why should we shrink from our task, or allow the sceptre of empire to fall from our hands,

“Thro’ craven fears of being great?”

I have faith in our race and our nation. I believe that, with all the force and enthusiasm of which Democracy alone is capable, they will complete and maintain that splendid edifice of our greatness, which, commenced under aristocratic auspices, has received in

these later times its greatest extension ; and
●that the fixity of purpose and strength of
will which are necessary to this end will
be supplied by that National Patriotism
which sustains the most strenuous efforts
and makes possible the greatest sacrifices.

Metchin & Son, London.
